

## **SPAIN**

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Perry W. Linder	1988-1992	Administrative Counselor, Madrid
Larry Colbert	1991-1994	Consul General, Madrid
Richard Ogden	1992-1995	Political Counselor, Madrid
David N. Greenlee	1992-1995	Deputy Chief of Mission, Madrid

**WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE**  
**Consular Practice**  
**Seville (1931-1932)**

*Ambassador William C. Trimble was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Princeton University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1931, where his career included positions in Estonia, France, Argentina, England, Brazil, and Germany, and an ambassadorship to Cambodia. Ambassador Trimble was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

TRIMBLE: I was assigned to Seville. My mother paid my trip over, which was the last time I took any money from my family. Those who had been accepted were given a large salary of \$2,500 a year, no allowances. Fortunately in Seville we had a government-owned building which was made for the 1929 Exposition, but with living quarters. The idea was everyone that came in at that time had to go through consular practice work, and it made a great deal of sense. There was no talk about cones or anything like that, which is--

*Q: I might add for the record, "cones" is the bureaucratic jargon for the major specialties within the Foreign Service: political, economic, administrative and consular.*

TRIMBLE: That was put in many years later by a man who was Mr. Dulles' private assistant and who became assistant secretary of administration. The idea was in my opinion completely wrong, and the Service still suffers from it. We had to learn consular practice. That is shipping, invoices, notaries, accounts, trade letters, commercial reporting, welfare, helping Americans abroad, passports, visas, and so forth. And you learned a lot about human nature and dealing with people, particularly if you had had a rather limited knowledge of human nature as a college student.

We all had to learn consular work. Then I went to what was called the Foreign Service School, which you had to go to for three months of further training, three months of study, in Washington. That was after over a year in Seville. Then the Depression was really on. Government employees worked one month without pay. So cutting down \$2,500 by one-twelfth didn't leave much. Fortunately, I was home, so I could live with my family and my mother at that time. Then I was assigned to Buenos Aires.

**MURAT WILLIAMS**  
**Private Secretary to Ambassador to Spain**  
**Madrid (1939)**

*Ambassador Williams was born and raised in Virginia and was educated at the University of Virginia and Oxford University. After serving in the US Navy in*

*World War II, he joined the State Department, serving in Washington, D.C., where he worked with the Refugee Relief Program, and abroad. His foreign posts include San Salvador, Bucharest, Salonika, Bern and Tel Aviv. Mr. Williams served as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1961 to 1964. Ambassador Williams was interviewed by Melvin Spector in 1990. He died in 1994.*

WILLIAMS: Yes. I expected to spend my life there. But I got a Rhodes scholarship and went to Oxford for three years. At the end of that time I had been invited by an old friend of the family's who was going to Spain as Ambassador to accompany him there as his private secretary. This was Alexander W. Weddell, who was our first ambassador to Spain after the Spanish Civil War.

I spent about seven months with him and realized that I had to go back to Dr. Freedman who was holding a job for me as assistant to the editor of the News Leader in Richmond. But the war came and the pull of the service was such that I had to leave the newspaper in September 1940 to go into the Navy. I spent the next five years in the Navy, but two of those years I had duty as assistant naval attaché in Madrid. When the war finally ended I had had three years of duty at sea, the Atlantic and Pacific, and after that I was told that I was in a good position to go into the Foreign Service under the Manpower Act. For some reason I was persuaded to do that and did not return to Dr. Freedman.

*Q: May I go back a moment before we leave this part of your history, when you were in England what was your general field of study at Oxford?*

WILLIAMS: At Oxford my principal field of study was politics and economics. I had a great opportunity there to study with some very good tutors, but Mr. Weddell was setting up an embassy in Spain in the spring of 1939, when I was finishing at Oxford, and he urged me to come as soon as I could. I spent a very interesting time as his private secretary.

*Q: You got a bird's eye view of being an ambassador from him at an early...*

WILLIAMS: Yes. I traveled with Ambassador Weddell and his wife to various places in Spain and I lived in their embassy. I was rather spoiled I should say. All the privileges of diplomacy with none of the duties that a Foreign Service officer might have at that time.

*Q: That period in Spain must have been very interesting. What were our objectives then in Spain?*

WILLIAMS: Our objectives were to establish relations with Franco without compromising the position of the American people and our government, which had been rather opposed to Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Mr. Weddell was a very correct and formal ambassador who could be counted on not to disturb Franco but at the same time to maintain our position. He was chosen, I think, because of those qualities that he had.

*Q: Was he a career Foreign Service officer?*

WILLIAMS: He had been ambassador previously to Argentina and had had many duties in the Foreign Service starting as vice consul in Zanzibar, I think it was, and Catania in Italy. He, himself, had been private secretary to an ambassador many years ago. He was a great teacher of the formalities and protocol and elegance of diplomatic life. At the same time he was quite serious. He made me study different aspects of Spanish politics and history. He believed very much in the importance of history for diplomacy.

*Q: Excellent.*

WILLIAMS: It was a great thing to be able to do, but I really had promised Dr. Freedman that I would come back.

*Q: So you were with two men who believed in history as a discipline.*

WILLIAMS: Yes, indeed. And I think it is a most important thing whenever you go to a post to learn the history of the place first.

**NILES W. BOND**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1942-1946)**

*Niles W. Bond was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a BA from the University of North Carolina and graduated from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1938. His postings abroad include Havana, Yokohama, Madrid, Bern, Tokyo, Seoul, Rome, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In 1998 Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Bond.*

*Q: Where did you get assigned next?*

BOND: To Madrid.

*Q: You were there for how long?*

BOND: I was there from the Fall of '42 until the Fall of '46. Four years.

*Q: That was a very momentous time in Europe.*

BOND: It was.

*Q: How did you get there?*

BOND: We took a Portuguese - well, almost a tramp steamer - a Portuguese ship called the Nyassa out of Baltimore to Lisbon, and then flew. We were taking a car with us, a convertible, which we intended to drive to Madrid. But they'd stowed it on deck on this coal-burning ship,

right behind the stacks, so the top was literally burned off by the ashes. We had to leave the car in Lisbon to have a new top put on, so we flew to Madrid. We were en route at the time of the North African landings.

*Q: That was in October of '42.*

BOND: Yes, and when we left Baltimore, and we reached the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, we were held up by the Navy, or the Coast Guard I guess it was. We weren't allowed to proceed until further notice. It turned out that at that moment the North African landings were beginning and they weren't letting anybody out. So, we arrived in Madrid at a very crucial time, and I think Madrid was really the best of all the European listening posts.

*Q: What was your job there?*

BOND: I was just sent as a third secretary. I had expressed an interest in political work and that was my understanding of what I would do. The DCM there, or the counselor, as he was then called, was the same one who had been DCM in Havana when I was there, Willard Beaulac.

*Q: Oh, yes. One of the great names of the Foreign Service, particularly of Hispanic affairs.*

BOND: Willard and I had known each other very well in Havana. I had dated his sister-in-law a number of times there. So when we turned up together, it was very fortuitous for me. He knew I was interested in political work and he gave me a lot of very interesting work to do. He was the one who recruited me into an intelligence organization, which... I don't know how to describe it. It had no name. It never had a name, so that people couldn't talk about it. You have to have a name to talk about something, have to know what to call it. Willard Beaulac was in that group and he was the one who recruited me. It was a small outfit, nameless, as I said, set up by the founder of OSS...

*Q: Bill Donovan, Wild Bill Donovan.*

BOND: Wild Bill. Wild Bill had apparently reached the point where he felt that the OSS was getting so much publicity that the enemy must think that they were just a scarecrow, and that the work was being done somewhere else. He said, "The tragedy is that the work is not being done anywhere else." So he wanted to set up this organization which would have no name to do the things he thought OSS should do, but was not doing. And could not really be doing under their set-up at that time.

The man who was put in charge of it was a retired Army general named Jean Grombach. He was the son of the former French consul general in New Orleans. Grombach had been brought up in New Orleans, and had then joined the Army, and had become a general. His office in New York, the office of this organization, was on West 57th Street in the Steinway Building, the old Steinway Hall.

The whole staff consisted of General Grombach, a retired admiral whose name escapes me, and a secretary. That was it. We had our own codes and we communicated with the fourth member of



the basic group, who was in the State Department. We would send telegrams to him in our code, which he could read. Then he would decode and send them on to West 57th Street. The State Department knew all about this but they couldn't read our messages. I stayed involved with that until about '54 or so. I was in Korea after the end of the Korean War, when I got orders to burn all of our codes, records, and all that sort of thing.

*Q: What were your responsibilities?*

BOND: Well, I was in touch with a number of European contacts (unknown to each other) who had access to German sources in The Netherlands, France, and Germany, whom I would meet at irregular intervals in Lisbon. They would give me information about what the Germans were up to in those areas. But we also got involved in the plot against Hitler.

*Q: This was July 20, 1944*

BOND: That's when it blew up, yes. We were in it, I guess, for about a year before that happened. The way I got into it was... the head of Lufthansa Airlines in Spain, in Madrid, was a member of the group plotting against Hitler. As head of Lufthansa, he could come and go between Madrid and Berlin as he wanted, without expense and without calling attention to himself. His contact in Madrid was head of the German Department of the Spanish Foreign Office. The latter, in turn, was a very close friend of mine. You may have heard the name of the man who was the Madrid head of Lufthansa: Otto John.

*Q: Oh, yes. He later became quite famous in the East/West conflict. He turned out to be a Soviet or East German agent in the West German government.*

BOND: Something like that. In any case, Otto John told my friend in the Spanish Foreign Office that he wanted to establish contact with the U.S. to let them know what the plotters were doing. So the head of the German Department in the Spanish Foreign Office told Otto about me and said "You can do it through him." So we worked it out and I arranged an appointment with Willard Beaulac. We brought Willard up to date on it and I don't think I ever saw anything of Otto John after that. I don't remember how many weeks it was before the balloon went up.

So that was one of the things this crazy little no-name organization got into. The only reference to this intelligence operation that bore no name was in correspondence back to West 57th Street. We were instructed to refer to OSS always as "the lake," and to our own organization as "the pond." Those were the only two rules that I remember. But it was exciting and interesting. We never knew who else was a part of this. There was never a list that anyone knew about. I still don't know. Later on, I was the only one in Tokyo and Korea who was part of it, I'm sure.

*Q: I would have thought that, when you arrived just during the invasion of North Africa, (Operation Torture, it was known as) this would have caused a real "earth change" in Spain. Before, Spain was trying to play both sides when all of a sudden a very powerful army was just to the south of them and obviously moving ahead. I would have thought that the Spanish government, led by Franco, would begin to open up towards the Americans more.*

BOND: Well, the Germans reacted much more than the Spaniards. The Germans moved down to the Spanish frontier. The unoccupied zone of France suddenly became occupied, and our embassy had told Franco as much as they could about what was going to happen. They didn't go into details or dates or anything but they didn't want him to be taken by surprise. So he did have some idea of what was going to happen, and was not unprepared. The Allies could not be sure there would be no negative consequences at all; from him, certainly. The fly in the ointment there was Serrano Suñer, the pro-German Foreign Minister; but he was apparently kept "out of the loop." But this all happened before I got there.

*Q: Yes. Did you find, when you weren't working for "the pond," that you were reporting on political developments in Spain?*

BOND: Of course, that was my principal job, until I was put in charge of the Embassy's Refugee Program.

*Q: Well, I was just wondering what one was seeing in Spain, because this was the time when the balance had begun to shift away from the Axis towards the Allies.*

BOND: Well, yes, the shift had been gradual and became definitive when the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. I wanted to continue doing political work, but Spain was developing a very serious refugee problem. This included an increasing number of American military refugees, people in uniform. Army Air Corps people, mainly.

*Q: Shot down or crash landed in France.*

BOND: Yes, and they were immediately taken in, as though through sheer coincidence, by friendly French peasants who would shelter them and then, by night, see to it that they reached the Spanish border. Anyway, the ambassador put me in charge of the embassy's efforts to help cope with the hundreds of refugees who arrived in Spain each week from all over Europe.

*Q: The ambassador was who?*

BOND: The Emeritus head of the History Department at Columbia University, Professor Carlton J.H. Hayes, a splendid ambassador with more knowledge of Spanish history than most Spanish historians. So from then on, for several months, I did refugee work. The first thing I was asked to do was in December of '42. I was instructed to move up to the French border area, the foothills of the Pyrenees, and look for American military fugitives. We were learning that a lot of them were crossing over and then being arrested by Spaniards and put in jail. So I chose to set up camp in Pamplona. It was everyone's favorite place, the running of the bulls and all that.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

BOND: So I took a room in the same hotel at which my old friend Hemingway had once lived and written. My job was to drive up every day to the little villages in the foothills of the Pyrenees and seek out the local jails. Then, I would ask whether they had any foreigners and, if so, I would interview them. Oddly enough, at that stage American military personnel had no instructions as

to what to do if they were captured. None whatsoever. So a lot of these people were calling themselves Canadian or some other English-speaking nationality. They thought it would be dangerous to say they were American.

The Spanish were very cooperative in the handling of American military prisoners. I would get from each jail where they were, the name, rank, and serial number of each one and their real names. Then, I would phone that list into the embassy. The embassy would pass the names to the Spanish air ministry, which sent emissaries to all these places to release the American military personnel concerned, and remove them to comfortable quarters in Southern Spain, for onward travel (to join U.S. forces in North Africa) some months later.

*Q: The Spanish just pushed them over to the Portuguese border, is that what they did?*

BOND: I don't remember what the mechanics were... But they put no serious bars in the way of these people going over, despite constant protests from the Germans. Getting back to Pamplona. I don't know whether you've ever been there, but Pamplona was a lovely little town.

*Q: No, I've never been there. Of course, it's known for the Running of the Bulls.*

BOND: It was the historic capital of the Kingdom of Navarre as early as the 10th century, but had long since lost all the trappings of royalty. It did, however, have a consular corps, consisting of one, in the person of the honorary consul of Uruguay. He was in fact Uruguayan by birth, but had lived most of his life in Spain. He had apparently persuaded the Uruguayan Government to bestow on him the title of honorary consul, and the city of Pamplona to accept him, because he liked Pamplona. He was the entire Pamplona consular corps. I had not had the pleasure of meeting him until one morning, about three o'clock, as I was sleeping in the hotel. There was a banging on my door and, only half awake, I opened the door to a tall gaunt figure, all in black. He introduced himself, apologized for the hour, and asked if he could come in. Once inside, the Uruguayan consul proceeded to tell me the reason for his nocturnal visit and the urgency which prevented him from waiting until daylight to call on me.

He had just gotten word, through a contact of his up in the hills, that there was a group of five French officers who had crossed the border and were expecting to be received by an agent of British intelligence because they had papers for him. The British had never shown up. They had to get back before daylight and so they had called him and said, "See if you can get somebody up here; preferably, if he's not British, an American." So he called me.

Without further ado, I drove him up to this funny little town. When we got there, it was still dark. They were in a tiny bar. It was a cold night, a fire in the fireplace, and there was a general, a colonel, a major, and two lesser ranks, all French air force officers. They were carrying a bundle of papers, a big thing with black seals all over it. The Colonel repeated to me that they were supposed to deliver those papers to a British agent for forwarding to the Free French Command in Algiers. And he said, "But the British never showed up. We have to get back. You're our last hope." So they gave me the package without telling me anything about what was in it and said, "Take it back and somebody will come by your office in Madrid in a few days to pick it up." And I said, "Well, how am I to identify this person?" In response, the colonel took out a one-

peseta note and tore it in two. "The one-peseta note has the serial number on both sides at different ends. So if you tear it in half, each side has the same number," he said, "This half is yours and the person that comes for the envelope, if he's the right one, will be carrying the other half."

So I took the bundle of papers back to Madrid and put it in the safe in the embassy. The following week, when I got to the office, my secretary said, "There's a weird looking Frenchman waiting to see you. He won't tell me what it's about." I asked her to bring him in. He was wearing a black trench-coat and a black beret, and was truly someone you wouldn't want to buy a used car from. (*Laughter*) He said, "I've come to pick up the package." I said "What package?" "You, know, the one that you were to deliver to me." I asked if he had brought his identification. He said, "Yes, I have it here." He poked around and pulled out half a peseta note. I checked it with mine and the number was wrong so I refused to give it to him.

He was absolutely infuriated. He said, "The people who gave you this will never forgive you for not giving me that package." I said, "Well, if you have the ..." Then he explained "I lost the real one and I thought you wouldn't notice, so I tore another one. I hoped you wouldn't check." Then he stamped out. We never heard from him again.

We sent the package by courier to Ambassador Murphy's office in Algiers and he passed it on to the head of the Free French. I was told later by a French diplomat in the Free French mission, which had since then been set up in Madrid, that those five officers were caught on the way back to France and that two of them were shot (I never found out which ones) and the other three arrested.

*Q: How did we see the political situation in Spain at that time? Franco was in full control?*

BOND: Yes, full control. Our instructions, simply stated, were to keep Franco from entering the war on the Axis side. That was the thing. And almost anything we had to do to accomplish that objective, the Department would accept. So all of this stuff that *PM Magazine* was publishing about the American ambassador being pro-Franco was and all such things, were off the mark.

Franco started doing things for us in '43. He may have begun before that, but not that I know of. He wanted no publicity for what he was doing because he had the Falange on his back. That was his party, you know, and they were violently pro-German and anti- American. So he had to keep it from them. But he did things. One of the first things he did was to allow American military aircraft to over-fly Spain on their way to North Africa. Then finally, he allowed American military aircraft to land in Spanish airports if they were in danger of crashing, you know. Little by little, he increased what he was doing for us.

(By the way, early in 1944, our first child, a daughter -- Ellen -- was born in Madrid, delivered by the same surgeon who, a few years before, had delivered Don Juan, the son of the King and heir to the Throne. Our second daughter -- Nancy -- was born in Florida in 1947.)

At the end of the war, I wrote a 50-page memo to the State Department trying to set the record straight. At that time, there was a lot of pressure from the press, particularly in the States, and in

England and France, but mainly in the States, pressure to throw Franco out. The State Department seemed to be falling for it. They did go so far as to join the British and French in withdrawing ambassadors from Spain, done against the advice of the U.S., British and French embassies in Madrid. This was a stupid reaction which guaranteed that Franco would not be thrown out any time soon. Almost everybody in Spain came to his defense, even those elements which hated him.

*Q: The Spanish had a division in Germany, the Blue Division, which didn't fare very well.*

BOND: It was terrible. It wasn't a trained group. It was a bunch of political prisoners and such. That was a disaster, both for the Spaniards and the Germans.

Anyway, I wrote this long memorandum to the Department setting forth what Franco had done against us, particularly in the early months of the War and what, later in the war, he had done for us. I was trying to get the State Department to realize that it wasn't a simple, one-sided thing: that he'd been our enemy all along - because he had not. One of my basic conclusions was that he was never either pro-Axis when he was doing things for them, nor pro-Ally when he was doing things for us. In both cases he was being pro-Spanish, which meant pro-Franco, and I still think that was exactly the situation, the way it was. And he managed to remain the dictator for another 30 or so years, until he died in 1975, at the age of 83.

*Q: Hitler had one meeting with him and said he would never meet that man again because Franco just wouldn't give him a commitment; Hitler essentially wanted to move troops through Spain.*

BOND: Yes. To Gibraltar. They wanted to take Gibraltar. Yes, Franco played fast and loose with Hitler. And we wanted to keep it that way.

**WILLIAM B. DUNHAM**  
**Country Specialist**  
**Washington, DC (1945-1954)**

*Upon entering the Department of State in 1942, William B. Dunham assumed postings in Spain, Portugal, Brussels, and Switzerland. Mr. Dunham prepared memoirs entitled "How Did You Get Here from There?" in 1996.*

DUNHAM: The Spanish Civil War, 1937 - 1939, had pitted the Fascist forces of General Francisco Franco against the Government's forces, the Republicans. The war also brought some involvement of those ancient enemies, the Germans and the Soviets, for whom it served as a kind of "practice run" prior to World War II when they were able to try out their new military toys and tactics during that Civil War. The war engaged, as well, the participation of many foreign volunteers, especially for the Republicans, including the Lincoln Brigade from the US, a left-wing group who associated themselves with the Soviets in the Spanish conflict. (This got them into a peck of trouble later during Senator McCarthy's witchhunt after

Communists/Communist sympathizers in the early '50s.) After Franco won the Civil War, he set up a Fascist dictatorship which lasted until his death in 1975. Both Spain and Portugal were neutral during World War II, but, unlike Portugal, Spain's neutrality had been well tilted toward Germany and Italy. We had therefore kept up a particularly active program of economic warfare in Spain to try to stop militarily significant supplies from going to the Axis powers, the very program that had introduced me to Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

After the war, Spain, seen as a remnant of the Axis and a pariah among nations, was easy prey for the Soviets who had their own post-war agenda for that part of Europe, including designs on the political infiltration of France as well as Spain whose highly strategic location they knew to be of major interest to the US as it was to them. They had some success in France during the '50s, but used the new United Nations to start an immediate preemptive campaign with respect to Spain to prevent us from developing any kind of entry there. After all, the Soviets could aspire to control the eastern end of the Mediterranean and had hopes of eventually controlling the western end as well, thus giving them control of the entire Mediterranean.

By way of first steps in their campaign, the Soviets forced the issue in the UN of an immediate boycott of "Franco Spain" by calling for the withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid. With fresh memories of Spain's wartime favoritism toward the Axis, there were few governments in a position to resist such a move, And so the ambassadors soon disappeared. During the next several years the Soviets kept up a steady drum-beat of attacks against "Franco Spain" thus keeping the highly charged, politically sensitive "Spanish Question" alive as a roadblock against any plans we might have with respect to Spain.

Very slowly, the US and European powers began to realize that our Soviet "allies" had a post-war agenda that called for Communist expansion world-wide. George Kennan, a brilliant Foreign Service Officer and expert on the Soviet Union who was well aware of these Soviet ambitions very early, led the way in warning about them and was the one who proposed the policy of containment that became US policy, indeed NATO policy, for the next 40 years. During 1947, he also worked up a series of papers that recommended a variety of changes and adjustments in other US policies. One of these, calling for a normalization of relations with Spain, caused an enormous ruckus especially in EUR as well as elsewhere in the Department where many felt the same strong aversion to Spain as publics here and abroad.

In addition to serving as desk officer for Portugal, I had been working as the assistant desk officer for Spain and in the fullness of time, after Kennan's blockbuster hit, if I didn't get dumped into the midst of this hottest and most controversial international issue of those times. Outer was transferred and I inherited the Spanish desk, too.

Before Outer left, I was sent once again on an orientation trip in preparation for these new duties. This time, thanks to her ever generous mother, Charlotte was able to make the trip, too. We departed in January 1947, in a threatening snow storm, leaving my mother-in-law with a two year old granddaughter and a baby grandson - and with oil for the furnace running dangerously low. As we went out the front door what should we see but an oil truck

delivering on our road. I had sent for emergency help and thought that truck was it. Not so. But I was able to tell our tale of woe to the driver and he said he would add our emergency delivery to his run, making it his next stop.

When we got to New York, the storm had worsened, the snow was falling thick and fast, the flight had been canceled, and we were to remain as guests of the airline until it was rescheduled. By the next morning the snow had ended all traffic, the city was eerily silent, not a sound on the streets, but the subways were running and we could get about. A plane carrying a group of senior military officials from the UK had gone down in the storm in the vicinity of Bermuda and a great search was under way which further delayed matters, giving us even more time in NYC. After three days, we were taken out to the airport, but once aboard the plane we heard that the pilot had fallen when he was coming aboard and had broken his arm. We would therefore have to wait for someone else. Next day we went out again and this time were able to leave with the new pilot.

When we got to Lisbon, our first stop. it was evening, the field was too overcast to land, though we could see street lights dimly through the clouds. But there was nothing for it, we would have to head to an alternate airport. So off we went to Gibraltar. At that point it turned out that the pilot was a veteran of the air line's South American routes but had never been on their runs to Europe, much less to Gibraltar. The runway there is laid out across the width of that narrow peninsula. But a high double fence runs the length of the peninsula marking off the double roadway that carries traffic between the border with Spain and the famous Rock - and, of course, it also crosses the runway. To complicate matters even further, fishing boats and others, all with tall masts, were tied up close to shore on both sides of the peninsula thus creating landing angles with very small tolerances. And the only map of this area the pilots had was a map of Western Europe. No thanks to that map, but with heartfelt thanks to the pilots and the controllers on the ground, we finally touched down safely after making several circles round and round, "getting the feel of the place" as one British officer put it. The beds were hard and lumpy, the bacon in the morning was very British - typically translucent - but the sky was clear, the sun was bright, and we went off en route to Lisbon breakfasting on the dried crusts of last evening's *hors d'oeuvres*.

After several days in Lisbon, we continued on to Madrid where we stayed with my old boss, friend, and now the *charge d'affaires*, Paul Culbertson and his wife, Maria. We arrived in the evening when it's usually time for dinner most places, But not in Spain. There business hours end somewhere between eight and nine, receptions run from nine to eleven, and dinner follows bye and bye. We did adjust eventually - but not right away, not by a long shot! In addition to getting to know the people at the embassy and some Spanish officials, we were able to travel extensively by car through Spain: Madrid and environs, Aranjuez, Avila, El Escorial, Toledo; then Bilbao, Barcelona; and finally south to Cordoba, Granada, Malaga, and Sevilla. At that time, 1947, we seemed to be almost the only travelers. The roads were largely empty save for the ever-present pairs of the *Guardia Civil* whom we saw patrolling the roads everywhere we went, wearing their black leather *tricorne* hats, ill-fitting, plain brown uniforms, and rifles slung from their shoulders.

In Madrid officials and the rich had cars - and everything else they wanted; buses were slow and dirty; taxis were powered by big charcoal-burners mounted at the back; and everyone else walked. The gap between the rich and all others was enormous, unmistakable: fancy country clubs, restaurants, boutiques, expensive shops of all kinds, mansions, expensive cars. All others were struggling at the bottom of the pile, with no sign of a middle class.

On one occasion, Madrid provided a bizarre and remarkable adventure when I was summoned to a visit with one Juan March, originally a fisherman, also a smuggler, onetime pirate allegedly, and an extremely wealthy man who had made his fortune one way and another through "businesses" in Majorca and Barcelona. His latest endeavor: the acquisition of the Barcelona Traction Company to add to his vast holdings.

In this venture he was battling against an American, Danny Heineman, also noted for his wealth and, reportedly, for his sharp business practices. I had met him and once, when Charlotte and I were in New York; we visited him and his wife at their apartment in the swanky Carlyle Hotel on the East Side. It was then we saw that he was a collector of antiquities and learned he would shortly be giving his collection of Mozart manuscripts to the Library of Congress. At the same time, he was also busy using all means possible, fighting Juan March for possession of the Barcelona Traction Company.

Hence, obviously, the summons to call on Juan March. That was to be a scene right out of an Alfred Hitchcock movie. "On a dark and stormy night" (literally), a long, sleek, black limousine came around to carry me off to Jaun March's house - nothing less than a palace complete with enormous gates in a high wrought iron fence that surrounded the property. A big, swarthy butler-looking, but bodyguard-type for sure, let me in and then led me on a long hike down hallways and through anterooms until we entered an ornate, dimly lit, ballroom-size library with a ceiling so high you could hardly see it. At the far end was a massive chimney and fireplace covered with intricate carvings and in front, with its high back to us, was placed a big, black, leather wing-chair. When I got around in front of the chair, there wrapped in a heavy rug-like blanket sat a wizened, tiny man all alone in this immense space. Jaun March, to be sure.

He talked, in his high-pitched voice, about this and that, a bit about his business interests in Spain and his hopes for the future of the country. But nothing about the Barcelona Traction Co. nor, for that matter, anything that involved me in any way, except one or two questions about our travels in Spain. That's all folks! The flick is over. A bizarre affair indeed. We speculated about what reasons could possibly lie behind this strange episode, but the most anyone could come up with was the guess that (a) he must have been curious and wanted to check me out for whatever that was worth; (b) he wanted me to see him in his exalted state; (c) both. In any case, he was never heard from again.

As we traveled out in the country we saw scores of farmers who live in towns and then walk long distances out to fields where they worked and plowed, much of it still being done in almost the same ways as those that have been used for centuries. Then at dusk they make that long walk back again. I remember on a trip a few years later asking the driver to pick up an elderly man who was walking so slowly he had fallen far behind the large group up ahead.



We talked about his work and village and when we arrived at his town he insisted that we join him at the bistro, where he always stopped after work, so he could offer us a glass of wine in appreciation for the ride we had given him. Very proud he was, and would hear no word of our reluctance to impose on his hospitality.

The grand palace at Aranjuez is especially memorable for the room with walls covered with white porcelain and green porcelain vines, imbedded in them, that stretch from floor to ceiling. Avila, with its towers and the great wall that surrounds the city, conjures up memories of ancient times as does El Escorial, Felipe II's huge, renowned palace so grimly white and forbidding. Toledo, the subject of El Greco's famous painting, is a beautiful, historic jewel, commanding as it does a small mountain-side from its crest to the Tagus river far below. A stunning sight and a fascinating and ancient city, famed among many things for its splendid gold and black metal work. One is ever drawn to return again and again.

Bilbao, center of the militant Basques with their separatist ambitions, is an industrial city on the Bay of Biscay. Here we had an opportunity to tour a factory, Retiro, famous for its porcelain such as the room at Aranjuez. Charlotte was much interested in their work and her many questions soon stumped our guides, caused quite a stir, and gradually drew a considerable group of men who could discuss the things she asked about, much to their delight, as we moved through the factory. After that, I was known there as her husband!

Later on we made a side trip to a nearby farm where a then little known prehistoric cave, Altamira, was located. When we arrived, the farmer came to meet us, making his way across a muddy field in his wooden shoes. The entrance to the cave was through a small opening buried in amongst boulders on a rocky hillside. He guided us down into the cave carrying a lantern that soon illuminated ancient and stunning drawings of animals on the walls of this place that had once been home to prehistoric people. A magical experience.

Barcelona, in Catalonia, home to another fiercely independent people with their own language, qualified even in those barren post-war years as a major port city on the Mediterranean with excellent commercial prospects for the future. The city with its location, lively people, long history, notable architecture and arts, is an exhausting fascination. While there, we also had an opportunity to visit Montserrat - home of the Black Virgin - a monastery built in the rocks of a mountainside that is no small challenge to reach. Well nigh unapproachable, distant, bleak, cold, damp, it obviously must be an even greater challenge to the monks who live there. A rare and notable place and a stronghold of the Church.

As we attempted to fly back to Madrid, we experienced one of the elementary problems then confronting a bereft Spain - transportation. With no phone service to the rudimentary airport and no ground to air communication, it was a guessing game whether the plane from Paris to Madrid would stop at Barcelona. The only way to find out was to be out there when the plane came along. For several days we watched it float by, until one day when it happened to land and we were permitted to board.

Southern Spain is glorious and was exactly that even in those indigent, early post-war days. Our introduction was the Parador atop the mountain at Santa Maria de la Cabeza, scene of a

famous Civil War battle. It was dark when we set out on the drive up the mountain thus leaving us with no idea of our surroundings. We were expected and soon discovered that we were the only guests. Even so, our hosts had dinner prepared and had provided us with excellent accommodations. In the morning I opened the shutters on the large windows. It was a clear, bright, sunny day, but the view was a big shock ... the drop from our window sill seemed easily a thousand feet straight down!

The great mosque at Cordoba and the glories of Granada are dramatic and breathtaking reminders of the Moorish past and its lasting influence on this region. Malaga on the Mediterranean was sunny, white and relaxing, a welcome respite with a delightful couple at the consulate there, Jack (John Y.) and Lynn Millar, who taught us much about Spain and Spanish ways and became our good friends.

Sevilla exemplifies the romantic image most of us have of Spain, the epitome of things Spanish, and it lives up in every way to its storied reputation. Our visit there was long enough so that it also included *Semana Santa*, Holy Week. Its elaborate celebration is an intense and extraordinary event. At its height, statues of the Virgin Mary, bedecked with the jewels and riches of each of the churches, are carried through the streets of the city, through the Cathedral, and thence back to their individual churches. They are moved through the streets on great platforms borne on the shoulders of countless men concealed underneath. Ultimately, the celebration becomes a revelation of the enormous wealth of the Church, even in the poorest parishes, and the deep and abiding dedication of the Spanish people to Catholicism..

Two residents of Sevilla made the greatest impression on us of all the Spaniards we met during our visit to Spain: The Infanta Beatrice, the granddaughter of Queen Victoria of England, and the Infante Alphonso, the brother of the previous King of Spain. We met them first when we were invited with the Culbertsons to dine with them at their home in Madrid. They were intelligent, bright, lively people, gracious, unpretentious with no "airs or side" whatsoever and we had a very congenial time together. Typical of the evening was a little episode at dinner. Charlotte was sitting on the left of the Infante and, at a certain moment, he leaned over and said, "You are sitting on the side of my bad ear. But, if you want to get my attention, just stick me with your fork." Certainly informal enough, but not something you would want to do to a member of that family of hemophiliacs!

At some point, the Infanta heard that Charlotte was a pianist and she later invited us to visit again and asked if Charlotte would be good enough to play for her. The result was a delightful visit filled with music and many stories from this extraordinary couple.

When it had become obvious that Franco had won the Civil War, these two volunteered to walk out ahead of troops as they marched toward towns where people were fearful of the treatment they would receive from the army. The Infanta and the Infante, who were much admired and highly respected, served in this way with great success as the guarantors of safety and good treatment for the residents of those towns.

The Infante had been an Air Force General at one time and was allowed to keep up his flying at the military airport just outside Sevilla where their palace was located. He was not provided with a car, however, so he rode his bike when he went out to the airport. The Infante was a very tall man and must have made an ungainly sight as he peddled along the dusty road. He told us that a young Air Force major grew so embarrassed, when he passed the general in his chauffeured car, that he was eventually able to persuade the military authorities to arrange appropriate transportation for the Infante.

Another tale concerned the Grand Duke Vladimir, pretender to the Russian throne. He lived with the Infantes at their palace in Sevilla. The Infanta didn't seem to think much of this shirt-tail relative. "He can't do anything much. But he does turn the handle on the grinder when I make *foie gras*." We were reminded of this tale a couple of years ago or so when we saw pictures of the Grand Duke when he was at last permitted to make a visit to Russia not long before he died.

As the time approached for us to return home, we made a final visit to the Infante and Infanta. Before we left, we asked what we could send them from home. With no hesitation at all, the Infanta said, "Jar rubbers for my *foie gras*, just jar rubbers!" And that we did indeed, in great numbers.

These two may have been royalty, but we liked and admired them as just genuinely good, plain, honest, respectable human beings, dedicated to their country and to their countrymen and that is how we remember them to this very day.

So, after our extended visit to Spain and the extraordinary experiences we had there, it was finally back to the realities of the job. If we were to undertake a normalization of our relations with Spain, the first step was obvious - we would have to arrange for the reversal of the UN resolution requiring the withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid. And what a political hot potato that was! The campaign was led by a number of Latin American governments, who never had liked the UN's treatment of Spain, and we quietly aided and abetted them.

Our course of action, though, was marked by more than a little internecine warfare in the State Department where many, especially in the Bureau of UN Affairs, remained adamantly opposed to the policy of normalizing relations with Spain. Over a period of two years or so, they took every opportunity, tried every dodge, to oppose or at least obstruct as best they could this first step: reversing the UN resolution. Outer often had to clear memos and cables with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for UN Affairs, Alger Hiss, who led the obstructionists there. However, Dean Rusk (later Secretary under Kennedy), whom I knew and admired, headed the UN Bureau, restrained his colleagues with a firm hand, and was the one I always went to for clearances.

This effort was also highly controversial among many members of the UN as well as among publics world-wide. The press was agog over this fiery controversy, of course, and the General Assembly's sessions were long, heated, and often grand theater. The Soviets were in particularly full cry on this issue, denouncing it as a Fascist plot and repeatedly proclaiming

that it was "doomed to failure," their favorite hex they put on all the most important undertakings they opposed. They were really wound up on the issue of "Franco Spain" so that phrase rang out seemingly forever in the General Assembly's meetings.

That was not the only place that saw some tussling and a bit of theater, however. The morning meetings of our UN Delegation were another such venue, though the drama there was far more civilized. Senator Austin of Vermont, a courtly, white haired gentleman of the old school, presided over the delegation. We gathered at nine each morning at our hotel, with the members of the Delegation seated around a table and staff sitting around the room behind them. We were each called on to present the issue we were responsible for whenever it was due to come up at that day's session.

Eleanor Roosevelt was a member of the delegation and sat next to the Senator where she tended to doze off during these briefings. She had an intense interest in The Spanish Question, however, and a lively dislike for the new US policy. So, when Senator Austin called "Mr. Dunham," she popped up wide awake and raring to go! It was always touch and go how long it would take to get through this item. The US position of quiet support for the reversal of the ban on ambassadors to Spain was firmly established and not open to any change. Nevertheless, Mrs. Roosevelt, true as always to herself, never failed to make her case against that policy whenever it arose. She and I often rode out together to the General Assembly meetings (in a converted warehouse out at Lake Success) to continue this ever-ongoing discussion. I never changed her mind one whit, of course, but over time we did become friends. She was a wonderful person and a very great lady and I had and have the greatest admiration and respect for her. Who could avoid treasuring such a person and such times with her.

In the fall of 1950, lifting the ban on ambassadors to Spain was due to come to a vote in the General Assembly. The in-fighting still raged within the State Department and was finally settled by Secretary Acheson with the backing of President Truman: the US would vote for ending the ban. There was intense interest in how the US would vote and I was deluged with visitors: representatives of other UN members came calling as did people from business and industry and members of the press, all trying to find out in one way or another what we were going to do. But we weren't telling. One day, I remember, a highly prominent columnist, a nasty bit of business named Joe Alsop, charged into my office and demanded that I tell him how the US would vote. When I declined, he raged on: did I know who he was, did I know I was obliged to tell him, etc., etc. A splendid performance, but to no avail. (If you are curious for more about him, see *Joe Alsop's Cold War*, A study of Journalistic Influence and Intrigue, by Edwin M. Yoder, Jr. Very revealing.) At last, amidst much controversy, the vote was taken, the reversal was passed, and we were launched on a new chapter in our relations with Spain.

In due course, Stanton Griffis was picked as the new American Ambassador to Spain. Rich, well connected at the top in Washington political circles as well as with Hollywood insiders, owner of the Brentano book store chain, he was set for his fourth ambassadorial post, having served previously in Poland, Egypt, and Argentina. He spent a year in Spain, February, 1951 to February, 1952. In his book, *Lying In State*, he writes as an apologist, yea an admirer of

Franco, and touts his own efforts to encourage the very US policies toward Spain he knew we were already busy developing.

Meanwhile, he did not like the small Embassy Residence on Ramon de la Cruz and instead, as he reported in his book, "rented the ancestral palace of a Spanish prince, filled with masterpieces of Velazquez and other Spanish artists." From all reports, it was well suited to his purposes. His book bears an apt title for those acquainted with his proclivities. He gave enormous dinner parties, including the showing after dinner of the latest Hollywood films. He sat at the back of the room and, when the lights dimmed and the film began, he slipped out the door. Like Herman Baruch, his ladies from Paris, and in his case Hollywood, joined him on schedule and, while his guests were enjoying the movie, he was free to enjoy a dalliance with them. When the signal came that the film was drawing to a close, he simply slipped into his seat at the back of the room where he could meet his guests again.

He told Charlotte and me once that he took one of these young starlets to an embassy reception. Greeting his hostess, he remarked that he had "accepted with pleasure" and then, in introducing his companion, said "and this is Pleasure." Whatever the case, there was no mistaking the fact that the infection had spread from Lisbon and we had another one, this time in Madrid. As archy, of *Archy and Mehitabel*, was wont to say, "*toujours gai, toujours gai*." Happily, an end would be put to these hijinks within a year with the arrival of a distinguished gentleman as the next ambassador.

While we all shared a deep aversion to Franco, the reasons for seeking to normalize US relations with Spain rested on compelling geopolitical and military factors. The Navy was seeking a base outside the Mediterranean and Spain's southern Atlantic coast offered an ideal location at Rota. The Air Force needed bases in Spain to permit long range reconnaissance aircraft to fly from the US, refuel in Spain, proceed on to Turkey and Iran in order to keep an eye on what the Soviets were doing just to the north (an area Winston Churchill described as the "soft under belly of Europe"), return to refuel in Spain, and then continue on back to the US. At the same time, we also had an interest in building up the Spanish economy, which was in shambles, in order to preempt any Soviet efforts to take advantage of that situation by infiltrating Spain for its own political purposes.

How best to proceed in developing our relations with Spain posed a perplexing dilemma for us. Even though the ambassadorial question had been resolved, that was a technicality compared to the widespread repugnance toward Spain. At this same time, the end of the '40s, great new programs were being launched to rebuild Western Europe, after the devastation World War II had wreaked, and to meet the growing threat posed by the Soviets: The Marshall Plan, which was designed to rebuild European economies, was going forward full tilt and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a building. Thus, constructing a special US military, economic, and something of a political relationship with Spain at the same time could cause serious questions among our Western European allies. Why were we interested in building this well-protected redoubt south of the Pyrenees, "outside" Western Europe?

We wallowed in this dilemma for quite a while and every time I ran into the Secretary he would say, "Well, Bill, when are we going to do something about Spain?" Whenever we

brought a sticky issue to him, he would often ask, "Is this a manageable problem?" And woe unto anyone who had to admit it wasn't. So, on one such occasion, when Acheson seemed in a receptive mood, I used his own test on him: "Soon," I replied, "but it's not a manageable problem just yet." He laughed at this bit of impertinence and said, "Okay, okay, *touche!*"

Then, one evening sitting on the back porch, it suddenly hit me: make a bases-for-aid horse trade with Spain. So I got a pad and pencil and wrote out a proposal then and there. It turned into a pretty top secret affair before I was done so I had to sleep with it that night. Next day I took it in, got it typed, showed it to my boss, and we took it up to our boss, George Perkins, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. His reaction was, "We better take this up to the Secretary right away." His reaction, in turn, was, "So we've finally figured out what to do about Spain. Good! I'll take it to the President as soon as I can get in to see him." That happened soon enough - that same day much to my surprise. When Acheson returned he told us they had had a long discussion and Truman finally said, "Well, okay Dean, if you say so." Then he added in his exceedingly plain spoken way, "But I don't have to like the son of a bitch, do I?" Unfortunately, this remark found its way into *The New York Times* later, but didn't seem to cause any reaction amongst the Spaniards.

Things then happened very quickly: a high level meeting between the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the next thing we knew the JCS Chairman was off to Madrid for a highly secret confab with his opposite number over there. We were, at last, launched on another step in trying to normalize our relations with Spain.

The bases/aid negotiations involved, on the US side, a wide variety of US departments and agencies in addition to the State and Defense Departments and many sections within each of them. In a situation such as this, the desk officer in the State Department is responsible, like a quarterback, to keep all those who have a part (however small) in the negotiations fully informed and involved, as necessary; to make sure that each and everyone of them understands at all times what is going on and why; to make sure they also understand how their particular interest fits into the whole; and to keep everyone moving in the same direction. The desk officer is responsible for all communications with the negotiators - all instructions regarding the negotiations go through the desk officer who is responsible for drafting them and then clearing them with all concerned.

We were extraordinarily fortunate in having Ambassador Lincoln Mac Veagh chosen as the one to be responsible for the negotiations with Spain. He and I, working together on the Azores negotiations, and visiting back and forth between Lisbon and Washington, had become good friends. When he was in Washington, he often came home with me for dinner and the evening visiting with Charlotte and our daughter and son. Before long he became known as Uncle Lincoln and when our second son arrived he served as his godfather. We were thus very much in sync when the time came for him to move over from Lisbon to Madrid to take on the bases-for-aid negotiations.

One of the hazards in diplomacy is that one can eventually become too involved, too sympathetic toward the country where you are posted until you are perceived as having gone "native." This becomes a particular hazard for those who are not accustomed to serving in a

diplomatic/negotiating capacity abroad and can cause difficulties in the negotiations when they become too sympathetic toward the interests of the other side, too willing to give in on one thing or another in order to gain agreement. As was to be expected, such difficulties eventually arose with some of the military officers involved in the negotiations, causing occasional stress and strain and even ill-feelings between those in Madrid and those in Washington. Therefore, having a veteran diplomat as the ambassador in charge of the negotiations was a vital safeguard.

On the home front, the load had become increasingly heavy and I was eventually fortunate enough to be allowed some assistance. One day Bob Murphy, then a top official who was following our work on Spain, said he thought I should be given some help. He knew one candidate and suggested I talk with him - Robert Goheen. A classics professor at Princeton, he was just back from the war and was much interested in getting a job in the Department. We did talk, he was obviously a splendid find, and we agreed the job becoming available would be just right for him. I talked to Bob Murphy and he set out to pull the necessary strings. Then a freeze on hiring hit, the deal was off, and Goheen said he guessed he'd just go back to teaching classics at Princeton. After some years, I saw a news item one day reporting the election of one Robert Goheen as the new president of Princeton University. Some years later yet came another news note announcing the appointment of Robert Goheen as ambassador to India. It took awhile, but lo, he had eventually made his way on board.

The hiring freeze didn't prevent an inside search. I had met Jack Millar in Malaga when he was consul there and knew him as a very intelligent, experienced and knowledgeable FSO with a solid tour in Spain under his belt. I heard that his time for transfer was coming up and persuaded the powers that be that Jack was just the man for the job. And, indeed, so he proved to be. Around this same time, both the French and Spanish desks were in dire need of expert help with economic affairs. I knew a brilliant young economist, E.J. Beigel, in a division on the economic side of the house. He had already been very helpful with some of the economic issues that we confronted and so, in concert with the folks on the French desk, we mounted a campaign and were successful in stealing E.J. away.

During these years, working on Portugal and Spain, we were lucky with the people in WE (Western European Affairs). First off we had somehow "lost" the secretary who had tried to rule Outer and me long ago and were blessed with an ideal replacement, Cleona Asher. Later on I was blessed with yet another helper, Ed Rowan, but in due course he ran off with Cleona. She was succeeded by yet another excellent person, but the FSO who replaced Jack Millar, Peter Rabenold, eventually ran off with her!

We were also fortunate with most of those who headed WE. In addition to Francis Williamson who was with us for many years, the Directors were Homer Byington (briefly), John Wesley Jones, and Theodore C. Achilles. Homer never was much involved in the Iberian Peninsula doings, but he left an indelible memory with me. He made every effort to avoid stepping on the cracks between the floor tiles and could make the long walk from our offices at the back of the building to the EUR offices at the front of the building and never step on a crack!

Johnny Jones and Ted Achilles, on the other hand took direct interest in the Spanish negotiations, as did Francis Williamson. They were all highly experienced, intelligent, and very able men. Johnny I especially remember for his friendly, sunny personality, and Ted, as a fellow pipe smoker, who despite his personal riches always smoked an old broken pipe he had found somewhere. They, along with Jamie (James C.H.) Bonbright with his delightfully dour ways, were a joy to work for and learn from and the four of them were very much part of that group who were my great mentors and friends.

The aid-for-bases negotiations were extremely complex and lasted for over three years. Arrangements for the naval base at Rota went smoothly with no serious problems. Not so negotiations for air bases. These included a considerable number of detailed and complicated subsidiary technical agreements and great care had to be exercised to make sure that any commitments made in them were fully approved in Washington and didn't contain even the slightest implications regarding the defense of the bases and thus of Spain. In addition, the overall agreement covering all base arrangements had to provide precise terms and conditions governing the use of the several air bases.

From time to time, as questions arose about these matters, we had to consult higher authority, including the Secretary at times. On other occasions he sent for us. After one such session ended particularly well at noon, I remarked that the Institute of Iberian Studies would have to do a little celebrating. Acheson was curious, what was that all about. I said it was just a bit of foolishness. The Institute was nothing more than a chowder and cocktail society: Oriental Cocktails (a martini with an onion rather than an olive) and seafood at one of the little dives down at the fish docks. In short, just a lunch break for us working level types. "Working level, what do you mean working level?" Acheson barked in mock outrage. "What do you think I do!" He then asked if he qualified to join us sometime. We invited him on the spot, anytime, just let us know, but of course he was never able to find time to frolic with us, though he did ask about the Institute once in awhile.

As for aid, the Spanish Government was, of course, very interested in military assistance, something we had to keep to a minimum for obvious political reasons. We weren't about to help build up Franco's military forces; some small amount of military aid was possible, but that was all. For our part, we were most interested in aid that would contribute to rebuilding the Spanish economy. Jack, E.J. and I sat down and began by reviewing the terms and conditions of the agreements that were being negotiated under the Marshall Plan at that time. Eventually, we cobbled together what we thought was an economic program that could help to build a stable economy, using not just dollars but also technical assistance. At one point, as we were drafting our proposed economic aid plan, Jack came up with an excellent Spanish word - *contraproducente* - that was a perfect fit in a very awkward spot in the draft. We used it to very good effect in this instance and some months later what should I see but "counterproductive" in a paper that had been prepared somewhere else in the Department. Gradually, over the next several years, it came into more frequent use in the Department, eventually spreading to the Hill through letters and other items that were sent up there from the Department. Nowadays, of course, it stands as just another ordinary, unremarkable word.



Very occasionally, Acheson inquired about our economic aid plans when he saw E.J. That happened fairly frequently when E.J. was called for briefings on another part of his job: the military aid we were giving to help the French with their military activities in French Indo-China, as it was then known. This produced another amusing incident when Acheson summoned E.J. to a high level meeting that was in progress. When E.J. walked in, Acheson told him what they had been discussing and told him they were confused about what military equipment, and how much, we had given the French to date. He asked E.J. what the figures showed. The records in this respect were less than clear and E.J. replied, "Well, sir, what would you like them to show?" which brought the house down - with Acheson leading the guffaws.

From these somewhat muddled bare beginnings, we all know all too well their tragic consequences as we slowly slipped, over the next decade, into that disastrous war in Vietnam. That was yet another proof, if any more were needed, of Agnes Allen's Law which all of us are well advised to heed at all times: "Almost anything is easier to get into than to get out of."

Participating in negotiations as politically controversial as the ones with Spain were in those days, was not without its own hazards. There were those in Congress, in organizations like the Lincoln Brigade, and other groups adamantly opposed to any dealings with Spain who mounted continuing campaigns against any agreements with "Franco Spain." Anyone so engaged was regarded as a Fascist. On the other hand, there were those in the Congress and other groups outside government who saw business benefits they could reap once these agreements were completed and they regarded as a Communist or a Communist "sympathizer" anyone they thought was driving too hard a bargain. I remember Senator McCarran hailing several of us up to a committee he was on to explain a cable he had got somehow. I had drafted it, Livie Merchant had signed it, and the Senator was suspicious that we were up to something that would be harmful to one of his constituents - the Wells Fargo Co. It was some very incidental matter that had nothing to do with that company, but the senator's immediate conclusion that we were "up to something" was symptomatic of the suspicions many business people had that their interests in future business in Spain were being overlooked.

The Spaniards had their own "lobby" set up. They had sent a high ranking official to their Embassy in Washington to encourage such suspicions about anything and anyone they thought was trying to drive too hard a bargain. Jose Felix de Lequerica, whom we all regarded as Ambassador-in-waiting, was a typical ward-heeler politico, ebullient, tricky, overtly friendly but untrustworthy, and capable of any underhanded maneuvers that would advance his cause. In short, a man well suited to his task.

As a consequence of this pervasive atmosphere in Washington, I was regarded, as the highly visible quarterback behind the scenes, as the *bete noir*, the evil spirit of the negotiations, by both sides! Where all the charges, hints, rumors came from I never knew (though I had my suspicions), but I was under almost non-stop investigation by the security people in the State Department as well as by the FBI. My friends in the State Department who were forever being questioned about me grew highly entertained by all this fuss and made a practice of letting me know whenever they had another interview.

I still remember one inquiry that vividly illustrates the hyper-sensitivity that infected our security people in those days as McCarthy began his witch hunt. My wife had been invited by a close friend of ours, with whom she regularly played chamber music, to join her in playing with a group one evening; she knew those in the group but not the person at whose home they would be playing. So off they went for a fine evening of music-making. But that was not the end of it. One day who should come tap tapping at our front door but an FBI agent. I had taken a couple of days off to paint the dining room so invited him in, gave him a chair, explaining that I couldn't stop in the midst of the job, but we could go on talking all the same.

It seems the FBI had somehow heard about the chamber music evening and it turned out, so the FBI man assured me, that the husband of the hostess that evening was known to be a subscriber to *The Daily Worker*. In the FBI's world, anyone visiting his house therefore took on guilt-by-association with a communist, or at the least a fellow-traveler as the phrase had it in those paranoid days. And, of course, since it was my wife who was there, I was automatically infected with that guilt-by-association as well! I told him how my wife happened to be there that evening even though she and her friend didn't know their hostess much less her husband. They had gone as they often did to join a group simply to play chamber music. As bizarre and absurd as this incident seems, and ludicrous in retrospect, it was nevertheless worrisome at the time. We couldn't help but recognize the detail these people were going into whenever my name came up. Nothing came of this particular affair, but the inquiries of my friends in the Department continued unabated.

The *ad hominem* attack is an ancient political device, of course, and it was in constant use all during the negotiations. At one point when they were coming down to their most difficult and delicate point, I finally asked my friends to relay a challenge from me to the next agent who came along: "Why don't you have guts enough to come in and talk to me directly instead of sneaking around behind my back all the time?" Well, did that ever hit a nerve. Before I knew it there was an FBI agent at my door. We did a little venting of ill-feelings on my part and explaining of required procedures on his part and then talked about why these constant charges were being made. I told him what was going on, the many opposing forces and special interests that were represented behind them, and finally asked him, "Did it ever occur to all of you that all of us are trying to do the best we can for Uncle Sam and that charges like these coming from all sides, from the far right to the far left, must demonstrate that we're doing a pretty good job for the US?"

Whether this encounter did any good I don't know, but the steady flow of investigations soon began to wane, aided, I suspect, by Senator McCarthy's witch hunts that were just beginning and soon occupied all the security types full-time chasing after the far more prominent people Mc Carty was attacking.

Our seemingly endless labors that the negotiations required were not without some relief occasionally. Ambassador Mac Veagh told me about one event that took him off to the celebration of the 400th anniversary of a Spanish university. He had been asked to represent his *alma mater*, Harvard, at the white tie ceremonies in a great cathedral (I have forgotten

where). He was well down the chronological list of institutions represented and the formal greetings that were given in Latin made his wait a long one. When his turn finally came, he had a long walk from near the back to the front of the cathedral. He had his speech in hand, but as he reached for his glasses they broke loose from the ribbon that held them around his neck, fell to the marble floor and shattered. As a former publisher of Greek and Latin poetry he had translated, he could recall enough of the greetings he had written so that he was able to present them, seemingly extemporaneously!

In the fall of 1952, when I was in Madrid for consultations, we also managed a fine but short outing. Back home the presidential campaigns were in full cry and it was certain that Ambassador Mac Veagh would be out if Gen. Eisenhower became president. I never knew what had happened between those two, but it was obvious from little remarks Mac Veagh had dropped at one time or another that there was bad blood between them. He had a very low opinion of Eisenhower and made no secret of it.

When it came time for me to leave, Mac Veagh suggested that we take a few days off and drive over to our old stomping grounds in Lisbon for a brief visit. I could then go on home from there. He was apparently anticipating the end of his diplomatic career and I had a feeling he was looking on this little trip as part of a final hurrah. If so, it certainly didn't disappoint. We always had a good time together and this outing - our last as it turned out - was no exception.

En route we stopped at Merida, a town that was once a leading Roman center. It had been extensively excavated and we were able to walk around that considerable area and along the ancient, rutted, cobblestone road that ran through the town, passing in front of the completely preserved foundations of houses and other buildings. The Forum bespeaks the grandeur of Rome and its great empire. Merida, however, reveals the daily life of ordinary people in an ordinary Roman town. It was, therefore, something one could relate to which made it an experience that roused feelings of awe, wonder, and fascination.

Cavendish Cannon, a veteran career officer and old friend of Mac Veagh's, had succeeded him in Lisbon and we were able to stay at the Residence since Cavendish and wife were away. She had piled up and locked all silver and other valuables in one reception room. But there were other rooms and tableware available that we could use for the big dinner party we had planned. It was a fine affair that completely filled the dining room with colleagues and many old friends. We all had a grand time and, thanks to Manuel, the major domo for many years, all went off without a hitch - save one small incident at dinner.

I sat at one end of the table and Mac Veagh at the other down near the entrance from the kitchen. At a certain moment I noticed that he was becoming agitated and wondered what could have gone amiss. He had a violent temper that occasionally erupted without warning and I - and he, too - certainly wouldn't want that to happen. Presently, Manuel came up to my end of the table, leaned over and whispered in my ear, "The senor's foot is on the signal bell." I finally got the message after he explained that the button that rang a bell in the kitchen was

hidden under the rug and thanks to my Number Elevens was making a racket at the other end of the table. With peace restored, our last hurrah was indeed a splendid success.

In the early months of 1953, the change of presidents, with the election of Eisenhower, brought the usual sweeping changes of senior officials in the Department and among ambassadors abroad. In the process, James Clement Dunn succeeded Ambassador Mac Veagh in Madrid. Jimmy, as he was known by one and all, was a distinguished, widely experienced, senior Foreign Service Officer and ideal for the Madrid post at this point in our negotiations. We were in the final stages and there was much to be finished up carefully and thoroughly and we needed someone who could step in, take charge, and see to it that the job was properly completed. And that Jimmy Dunn did in fine style.

I had not worked with him before, but enjoyed every minute of the relatively short time we had together both in Washington and in Madrid. He was a genial, very considerate and thoughtful man of generous spirit who can best be described as "a gentleman of the old school." All the same he was a skillful, resolute diplomat who could be tough as needed, but always in the most polite fashion. We worked together in Washington before he left and thereafter I made trips to Madrid as required to help out there. When I left Madrid after the last of these trips, he wrote a note to Charlotte, a kind and considerate gesture that was completely unnecessary but as characteristic of Jimmy Dunn as anything I could possibly think of;

Dear Mrs. Dunham

I feel very badly for taking Bill's time so much away from the family. I shall never forget what wonderful support he has given me.

There is no way you could conceivably be more "thoughty" than that.

One final adventure emerged as the negotiations were nearing completion. The negotiations for the naval base at Rota had gone smoothly, thanks to the orderly and highly professional assistance of the Navy's representatives on the negotiating team in Madrid. So also did the negotiations for the small military aid program and the economic assistance agreement.

The negotiations for the air bases were a very different story, both because of their complexity and highly technical details and also because we had run into some tricky, behind the scenes tactics by a couple of key Air Force officers, a one star general in Madrid and his "agent," a Lt. Colonel in the legal office of USAF headquarters in the Pentagon. They had gradually become increasingly obstructive during the course of the negotiations, frequently pressing to modify US positions, tactics, or instructions in such a way as to give in to, or otherwise favor, positions taken by the Spanish negotiators. So both in Washington and in Madrid we had to keep a constant watch on their activities.

The positions taken by these two officers on issues in the negotiations were so similar that it was obvious they had a very busy back-channel running full time. Still, we thought we had kept them well within our negotiating limits. Then the day came when I discovered, while

reviewing the drafts of the technical agreements subsidiary to the agreement on air bases, a paragraph none of us had ever seen or heard of before. It concerned defense of the air bases, should that ever be necessary, was vague and badly worded, but seemed to carry an implication committing the US to defense of Spanish territory. I checked with our folks in Madrid and they, too, were totally unaware of this paragraph as were Air Force members of our team in Washington.

At that point, I reported this new development to the USAF general who headed their Washington team and the next thing I knew the Lt. Colonel had vanished without a trace. I heard that the general also chewed out that one star type in Madrid and put an end to his operation behind the scenes. That still left us, however, with our doubts about that questionable paragraph. Our Assistant Secretary decided we should take it up with the new Secretary of State, a disagreeable man with a brilliant mind, John Foster Dulles. We were all wary of him because the day he assumed office he called all employees out to the parking lot where he gave us a speech about "positive loyalty." We were uniformly offended. Dulles had ripped his knickers right off the bat so far as we were concerned.

The Secretary's office was a massive affair with a ceiling two stories up and a length of half a city block. I explained the course of the negotiations to date, what the technical agreements were all about, and what our concern was about this particular paragraph. Dulles asked some questions, then sat there pondering, and finally got up and started pacing back and forth the length of his office. He was thinking out loud, analyzing the paragraph word by word, step by step, and I trotted along beside him taking notes. Eventually, you felt you could see light at the end of the tunnel, the probable conclusion he would come to. And sure enough, there it was when he finished.

It was a fascinating and extraordinary experience and, although it happened over 40 years ago, I still remember it as clearly now as I did then. He agreed that the paragraph was very poorly written, so much so, he thought, that no one could conceivably interpret it as an implied US commitment to defend any Spanish territory. We were thus spared the embarrassment of going back to the Spaniards to disown what the general and his Washington honcho had dreamed up, thus also revealing our momentary disarray.

Eventually, the time came when all that was left was working out the last details of all the agreements, proof reading them, and then obtaining final approvals all around on both sides, a long and arduous process. Then, at long last, we were able to hold signing ceremonies, three years and more after we had started negotiations. The job that had actually begun back in 1947, with George Kennan's paper, was finally finished.

The naval base at Rota evidently proved to be everything the Navy had expected because it is still in operation today after more than 40 years. The agreements regarding the air bases functioned well without untoward event, allowing the USAF to carry out for many years the missions for which these bases were intended. Years later after those missions were no longer required the bases were phased out leaving only occasional use of the air facilities near Madrid, particularly essential transit during the Gulf War. The military aid arrangements

were modest, but did provide a very military Spanish regime with a fig leaf of respectability in return for the air and naval facilities they provided the US.

For Spain, the agreements provided two results of fundamental significance. First, concluding agreements of such importance with the United States was of invaluable political import for Spain and started the very long process of removing them eventually from the situation of an international pariah. Second, the economic aid given under that agreement assisted Spain's efforts to revitalize and strengthen its economy and helped to stimulate the development of a middle class.

Spanish governments of whatever stripe have had to depend on a trio of elements to survive: the military, the Church, and the wealthy landowners and industrialists. Franco manipulated these groups with great skill to maintain his hold on Spain for 35 years. As a consequence of Spain's economic growth, however, that new element, a robust middle class, emerged in such proportions that it took its place along with the other three as one of the major elements in Spanish politics. Therefore, these latter day developments ultimately provided their own strong support for the peaceful revolution in Spain's political system that occurred following Franco's death in 1975.

After World War II, Franco had begun to plan the succession after his death. In 1947 he obtained life tenure as chief of state and a regency council was set up to enthrone a king of his choosing as his successor. Then, in 1954, he made an agreement with the Bourbon pretender to the throne for the 16 year old Prince, Juan Carlos, to be educated in Spain, thus indicating that the Prince, the grandson of the last king, Alfonso XIII, was to be groomed as Franco's choice to be his successor as the next king of Spain.

The conclusion of the agreements between the US and Spain encouraged businesses from the US and other countries to expand into Spain. Economic development had also been aided by the influx of American military personnel and their families whose presence benefitted the economies of the communities where the American bases were located. Gradually, then, with the strengthening and expansion of Spain's economy, with travel facilities improving and expanding, tourism began to grow rapidly. This surge soon required the construction of suitable facilities to meet tourists' needs and that encouraged even greater tourism. With such fine facilities blossoming on the Mediterranean coast, it was not long before Spain was enjoying a tourist bonanza which continues to this day.

Over the last four decades we have seen what the Spaniards have been able to accomplish. The association between the US and Spain may have been of some help in the early years in inducing the beginnings of a trend, but what was accomplished over those decades was unquestionably a Spanish achievement. During the first two decades, Spain's financial and economic conditions prospered and strengthened and eventually a time came (I forget the exact period, the '70s?) when Spain's highly favorable balance of trade with the US placed them second only to France in causing a drain on US gold reserves.

It is reasonable to say, I believe, that it was in large part a consequence of this solid growth and the wide-ranging prosperity that, after Franco's death, Spain, never noted for the

peacefulness of its political transitions, was able to move without disruption to a monarchy and parliamentary form of government and eventually even a socialist government - the most unheard of thing anyone had ever heard of. Franco had prepared the way for the return of the monarchy and soon the new king, Juan Carlos, provided a rallying point, a point of determination, will, and solid support, for the development of democratic institutions, policies, and practices as well as the preservation of conditions for their orderly growth.

As a consequence of these developments, Spain gradually began to take its place again in the world community as a member of the UN and the various European institutions and of NATO in 1981. Much later, in December of 1995, this process was completed, in effect, by two notable events. On December 2nd, President Clinton visited Madrid to attend a meeting of European nations to sign wide-ranging economic and trade accords which would strengthen US relations with Europe. And on the 5th, Spain's Foreign Minister, Javier Solana, was elected Secretary General of NATO.

**THOMAS J. CORCORAN**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Barcelona (1948-1950)**

*Ambassador Thomas J. Corcoran was born in New York in 1920. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950 and served in Spain, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Burundi. Ambassador Corcoran was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988.*

CORCORAN: My first post, more or less just picked out of a hat, I guess, was Barcelona, Spain. I was told that I could go to Lisbon, Barcelona, or Canada. Canada didn't seem like the Foreign Service. Barcelona seemed more interesting, so I went there. I spent a little more than two years in a small traditional consular post. At that time, we had files going back to the Spanish Civil War in the consulate. They had the background of the Catalan independence movement and of the Carlist monarchist movement which had a long history there, plus the largest American chamber of commerce outside the United States, although it was inactive and had been inactive since the civil war. Its membership was still open because of the textile production in that area.

We also had a lot of dual nationals with very complicated citizenship, because they or their fathers or grandfathers had been born in Puerto Rico. The Treaty of Paris, which meant to the United States and Spain the end of the Spanish-American war, had a special provision for people whose fathers or, I think, grandfathers had been natives of the Iberian peninsula. They could take an oath of allegiance and retain their allegiance to the crown of Spain, and some of them did. So eventually, they and their children were both American nationals and Spanish subjects. This made for some great complications if they traveled back and forth, and would maybe spend too much time in one place or the other. So that was an interesting part of the work there.

We had the usual run of consular work. I recall that a train fell off an embankment, about 90 meters, landed on the walk below and killed 22 people, one of whom we heard was an American.

I had to go down there and retrieve his body, which I found by looking at shoes, which seemed to be the best way to tell an American in those days -- rubber heels on a pair of shoes. That became a very complicated matter, because the man was a commercial traveler and his company and his next of kin both had an interest in what had happened to him and the disposal of his estate. That took some time.

We had not much trade with Spain in those days. We had things like capers in brine, for example, and plaster images of saints and things of that sort, which were exported in great quantities, largely to Puerto Rico.

We also had the French and the British consulate generals involved with us in the preservation of German assets in Spain, which were the spoils of World War II. So we had to administer, collect rents, and that sort of thing.

We had a small amount of visa work. I think the Spanish immigration quota was something like 200 a year. That was a pretty long waiting list.

**JAMES N. CORTADA**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Barcelona (1949-1951)**

*James N. Cortada was born in New York in 1914. He grew up in New York, but spent his high school years in Havana, Cuba. He attended college in New York five years, until 1932. Mr. Cortada joined the Foreign Service in 1942. His career included posts in Cuba, Spain, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

*Q: You served in Barcelona from 1941 to 1955.*

CORTADA: No, no. I served in Havana from 1942 to 1948, then a year in Washington, then in Barcelona from 49 to 51. But you see, my assignment to Barcelona was also a fluke. The Department of Commerce was pressing to get better business relations with Spain. In those days, Franco was in the diplomatic dog house. We only had a Chargé d'Affaires. It was Culbertson, Paul Culbertson. And the British had the same thing, and the French. But, (they were already thinking) in the State Department, about a change in policy. There was an interest in the government on finding out just what was the condition of Spanish industry. And most of that was in Barcelona. Well, they looked around and there was no economist who could speak Spanish and was available for the job, because there had been no recruiting during the war years. The Department of Commerce interested in promoting trade with Spain sent a note to the State Department to the effect that "Look, wait a minute, we got this young man here. We've trained him, and he's really talented. He's also been through the Brookings course. We think he could handle the task very well." So, despite the fact that I was about 2 or 3 ranks too junior for the job, I was sent as a second in command of the Consulate General in Barcelona, to take care of the very interesting study, and that's how I wound up there. But here's where history takes peculiar



turns. The analysis of the industry of Barcelona was duck soup. I had seen textile mills in Cuba and elsewhere and there was no problem with the job. Analysis of Spain's dry fruit's trade was also no problem. So it wasn't long before, frankly, I was beginning to be bored, and began to cast around for something useful to do. And my Consul General who was about 15 years my senior

Q: *Senior...*

CORTADA: Senior, 15 years my senior, a gentleman, a China hand and a diplomat of the old school, also extremely capable, with a wonderful wife, he gave me a free hand. I found out that Spain's pre-Spanish civil war economists were all Catalans. Furthermore, they were all Republicans. And those who were not in exile, but remained in Barcelona, had their wings severely clipped, were under surveillance by Franco's agents and had no contact with their colleagues in other countries. Since about 1936 until I turned up in the place, these folk really knew very little of what was going on in the world and nothing about the Marshall plan. Now, I am a pack rat by nature, and had saved all of my study papers from the Brookings Institute courses including details about the Marshall plans which included an analysis for each one of the countries benefiting from it. And these papers had an explanation of the philosophy behind them. What I did was establish a connection with these key economists, all of whom were much older than I, invite them to my home, about six or seven of them, key figures, have a scotch, and discuss the economy of Europe. Of course, they were fascinated. In a about a year, they learned all that was to be learned about the Marshall Plan. When in 1951, and I was already gone, the United States concluded an economic agreement with Spain, who were the people to implement it in the Spanish government. Well, folks of mine, all of whom had learned about the Marshall Plan in my living room! Each one of them went to a key position and they are the ones who developed that magnificent program for Spain which has turned that country into what it is today.

Q: *How did you find dealing with the Spanish officials at that time. Were they mostly phalange types? Were the competent, I mean the officials you dealt with...?*

CORTADA: Oh, yes. They were all Phalangistas, otherwise they couldn't hold the job, whether they were in the military, or whether they were in the civilian government. Very, very capable, that's why they won that civil war. The military were professionals. Just don't forget that Franco at the age of thirty-three was the youngest Major General in Europe and a veteran of the RIF wars in North Africa. So these were very capable people and it was not so long after the war. These people were still all gung-ho. And those officials in the civil government, like the civil governor of Barcelona, were former army officers.

Q: *Well. How did they react towards American representatives?*

CORTADA: Well, they were extremely friendly, but annoyed with our doghouse policy, instead of recognizing Spain's anti-communist posture, how they stayed out of WWII. But in my particular case and in my wife's, it was a completely different situation when they found out that I was as fluent in Spanish as they were, and not only that, but also in Spanish poetry. I still can recite, at my age, some of the key poems from the Middle Ages. In social gatherings that we would have, where still these things were done, the guests would come in with a particular poem and bingo I would contribute a stanza. Well, the Catalans, (and my wife is also bilingual so the

Spanish ladies felt very comfortable with her) came to regard me with my Catalan surname, a Spaniard, who somehow or another for several generations had been somewhere else, but understood Spain's culture clearly.

This led to some very frank and fruitful discussions. For example, there was a Baptist missionary, John David Hughey, in Barcelona proselytizing. He had been proselytizing in Yugoslavia and got kicked out. You will recall that Truman, a Baptist, had said that he'd see Franco in hell first before he recognized him because of his persecution of the Baptists.

Well actually, it wasn't so much persecution as the closed circle that Spain had put around itself. Now, John David Hughey and I became good friends, and I attended a number of church sessions. I went to see the Civil Governor about the matter. "Why the hell do you have those Civil Guards around the Baptist Meeting House, when these people are harmless as can be." "That isn't the problem", he responded, "If he (Hughey) has his meetings in Barcelona proper, I don't care, he can have them all day long, but he insists upon going to some of the villages outside, where Roman Catholicism is so intense and the priests so fanatic that they feel that the devil has come in their midst. They could do harm to them and create embarrassing situations for us. So I got my Civil Guards there, not to harass John David Hughey but to protect him from being harmed by the villagers." He said: "If you will tell John David to stay out of those villages, there won't be any problems, as a matter of fact I won't even have any of plain clothesmen around his church." Well, be that as it may, the fact was that John Davis was not pestered any more when he was in Barcelona. With regard to the Baptist issue there came a group of Congressmen with blood in their eyes. They were mostly very pro-Franco. They were escorted by a Spanish paid lobbyist by the name of Patrick.

*Q: They were pro-Franco, or anti-Franco?*

CORTADA: No, they were pro-Franco, and they wanted to force Truman to normalize relationships. You see, we're talking about 1950.

*Q: This was very much, I mean, you had particularly the catholic church of the United States pushing for it, which meant that you had the Irish and the Italian population pushing for it.*

CORTADA: Absolutely, and there was an Irish congressman from Brooklyn who was a key figure in the matter. They attempted to sneak into Spain, without anybody knowing about their visit, particularly the Consulate General. They planned to surprise Truman with stories fed to them strictly from government sources.

The manager of Pan American Airways was a very good friend of mine and he gave me a call. "Listen, there's a congressional delegation en route to Barcelona. I just want to tip you off. This is who they are." Well, I hopped to the airport immediately. To the horror of the lobbyist, when the plane arrived I was at the airport, welcoming them to Spain and offering the services of the Consulate.

It happened that this episode occurred while my Consul General was in England on vacation. I was the next in command. So there I was acting chief of the whole operation, because we also

supervised consulates in the rest of Spain, when these types turned up. In the group was Congressman Richards from North Carolina or South Carolina, a prominent Baptist who had a dim view of what some of his colleagues were after. He really wanted to get to the truth of the situation.

The next day, they were all taken by the Spaniards for a regular canned tour to Montserrat and all the works. I got a hold of John David Hughey and told him "Here is your chance. There's my secretary. Start dictating every damned complaint that you've got and give me a list of every pastor there is in Spain, because I'm going to hand over your report to these people and turn them loose on interviewing those pastors and give you a chance to state your case." Well, John spent about three hours dictating, and had copies made for each member of the delegation except the lobbyist. I marked "Limited official use only" on the envelopes because of the lobbyist. I knew damn well that they'd show it to him, but I wanted to have them over a barrel, because if they admitted that they had shown it to him they or one of them would be guilty of a security violation.

Mind you, having come out of the business world after ten years, I was a very brash young man. And frankly, if I got thrown out, I could make my living in the business world. I had that inner confidence and I didn't give a hoot about the rank of these people. They didn't awe me.

I had these envelopes with me when they came back to the Hotel Ritz, after their long excursion, and handed one to each as they came in.

That night, there was a banquet put on by the Civil Governor at the Palace in Barcelona where Christopher Columbus was greeted by Ferdinand and Isabella. And it was quite a thing. Liveried waiters, etc. To my surprise Congressman Richards very solemnly came to me and remarked: "You know, you have rendered a great service to us, because we're going to go and see all of these people (pastors) to get to the bottom of this problem." Then I called up Paul Culbertson, because they were going to go to Madrid and explained what had transpired. This is how these things happen.

**JOHN WESLEY JONES**  
**First Secretary, Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1949-1953)**

*Ambassador John Wesley Jones was born in Sioux City, Iowa in 1911. After graduating from George Washington University in 1930, he entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Mexico, India, Italy, and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Libya and Peru. Ambassador Jones was interviewed by Horace Torbert in 1988.*

JONES: Arrived in Madrid in November of 1949. By the grace of God, within a few minutes I learned, after I got there, that my wife and children were arriving, shortly, by plane from Rome.

So I just waited at the airport for their arrival and we had a wonderful family reunion at the airport in Madrid, and from there proceeded to the. ...

Q: *Palace, the Ritz?*

JONES: No. Tully, it was that nice little hotel not very far from the Embassy. Oh. In any event, the hotel had the same name as the street and it was within walking distance of the Embassy. [Hotel Velazquez on Calle Velasquez]

Q: *I can't remember what the name of it is. It's terrible.*

JONES: Yes. But in any event, that's where we stayed at the beginning. Just let me think a little bit about Madrid.

In those days we had no Ambassador because we had broken relations, no, we had withdrawn our Ambassador from Spain over protests with Franco's alliance with the Axis powers. So Paul Culbertson was the Chargé d'Affaires and I was the First Secretary in the Embassy in charge of the Political Section. Paul and Maria Culbertson were living in that beautiful residence on Ramon de la Cruz, which is now the residence of the Minister Counselor of the Embassy.

It was an interesting time and I began taking Spanish lessons immediately. It was a difficult transition from Italian to Spanish. Of course in those days we had to take our lessons outside of office hours so that I had to have my lesson from 8 to 9 before the Embassy opened. Considering Madrid social hours, it was difficult to be available and to be. ...

Q: *Be compos mentis by 8:00 in the morning.*

JONES: Be compos mentis by 8:00 in the morning.

Q: *When you didn't sit down to dinner until 11:00 at least.*

JONES: That's right. I think it's very possible that we did change my tutor's hours, but I had a wonderful man from a northern university who was very precise.

Q: *Vallelados. I had him, too.*

JONES: Vallelados, was that he?

Q: *Yes.*

JONES: He was wonderful and taught me wonderful Castilian Spanish.

It was very interesting, delightful time. Paul and Maria were still there, I think, when it was decided to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the Spanish government. By that time we had moved out of the hotel and into what was then quite a far out residential area.

*Q: Colonia del Viso?*

JONES: Colonia del Viso, thank you very much. We rented a house there, fully furnished, from Spaniards and lived there until the first Ambassador arrived. The first Ambassador was -- I've just thought of his name.

After the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, the first Ambassador to be appointed by the U.S. government to Madrid was Stanton Griffis, a retired Director of MGM and a most interesting man. He had served as Ambassador in Poland and also in Buenos Aires. So this was not his first ambassadorial post. But he left a great deal of the running of the Embassy to me since I was by that time, with Paul Culbertson's departure, I was the Counselor and number two in the Embassy. Because Stanton Griffis was unmarried he was very thoughtful and kind to my wife and always, in official functions, treated her as his hostess.

He was accompanied by Angie and Margaret Duke. Angie Duke is Angier Biddle Duke, who later had a very interesting career in the Foreign Service himself. But the Dukes were brought along by Stanton Griffis to be his immediate assistants, one on the social side and Angie on the diplomatic side. They both lived with the Ambassador in the Embassy residence.

The Ambassador did not like the house on Ramon de la Cruz. He thought it was too small for him, so he persuaded the Department to give him a rental allowance. He rented another palacio, the name of which I have forgotten, not very far from the Chancery and that's where he lived in great style with the Dukes. The Ramon de la Cruz house was standing empty. And since the U.S. owned it, I asked the Ambassador if he minded if I lived in it, move my family into it? He said no problem at all. Since it was furnished, Kitty and I with our children left the house in del Viso and moved into that beautiful residence on Ramon de la Cruz and spent the rest of our Spanish tour there.

Stanton Griffis was in Spain less than a year. I think he became rather bored with it. He was succeeded by Lincoln MacVeagh who had been our Ambassador in Portugal. When President Eisenhower was elected, Lincoln MacVeagh, who had been a firm supporter and favorite of Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, submitted his resignation as Ambassador. It was accepted by the new President, which I think was a great blow and shock to MacVeagh. He went into retirement back in Portugal in a villa near Estoril. So then Jimmy Dunn was appointed Ambassador to Spain. Since I had the great pleasure and fortune of serving under Jimmy Dunn twice, I just wanted to be sure that I had it in proper context chronologically. Thus succeeding Lincoln MacVeagh, Jimmy Dunn, who had been in Rome for quite a long while, was transferred as Ambassador to Madrid. I continued to serve him until 1953. In 1953 Homer Byington, who was the Director of Western European Affairs in the State Department, arranged with me and persuaded the Department to transfer him to Madrid to be Jimmy Dunn's Minister Counselor, and to transfer me from Madrid to Washington to be the new Director of Western European Affairs.

*Q: Smart man. Before we go into that, could you give me just a few words on what was engaging your time during the latter part of -- I know what was engaging your time earlier on, it was breaking in new Ambassadors and that sort of thing and doing the reporting that we did. But you*

*must have gotten by that time into the period when we were negotiating treaties for bases and what not in Madrid. Were you engaged in that?*

JONES: You're absolutely right. That was what I was principally engaged in, and the Political Section was particularly engaged in negotiating with the Spaniards a base agreement. They are tough negotiators. We were constantly receiving instructions from the State Department. But the fact that the Spaniards were interested in negotiating a base agreement with us was of course very encouraging and rather a change in their normal diplomatic relations with the rest of Europe and with the United States. So we did indeed negotiate a base agreement, and Jimmy Dunn was then the Ambassador. When I was transferred back to the State Department in March of 1953, I believe it was, the day that we sailed from Gibraltar was the day that the base agreement was signed in Madrid between the Ambassador and the Spanish Foreign Minister. So I left with a sense of real accomplishment. While I wasn't there for the signing ceremony, I did know, the day that I sailed home that the agreement had finally been signed and that we had a base agreement.

*Q: Was the agreement, the actual negotiation done by the Embassy or did they send out a special negotiating team or something for it?*

JONES: No. As I remember, the negotiations were done by the Embassy. But of course the Attachés.

*Q: Military attachés?*

JONES: Exactly. The military attachés were very much involved in it. But the negotiations were done by Jimmy Dunn and by the political and the military staffs in his Embassy. That I think was probably the most important thing that we did during that period. Our relations with the Spanish government were friendly and we were received by Franco with considerable respect. Having had three Ambassadors there during the time that I was the Chargé d'Affaires, I was privileged to ride with each new Ambassador in the open coach with horses to the Palace. ...

*Q: El Pardo?*

JONES: El Pardo, to accompany the Ambassador in presenting his credentials. Each time we were received by Franco. So ceremonially and politically it was a very interesting time for a Chargé d'Affaires to be stationed in Madrid in the late '40s and early '50s. I was there four years, from the end of 1949 to September of 1953.

**HERBERT THOMPSON**  
**Rotation Officer**  
**Madrid (1949-1954)**

*Herbert Thompson was born in California in 1923. After serving in the US Army from 1943-1946, Mr. Thompson finished his bachelor's degree at the University of California. His career included positions in Spain, Bolivia, Argentina, Panama,*

*Chile, and Mexico. Mr. Thompson was interviewed by Thomas J. Dunnigan in 1996.*

*Q: Now your first assignment was to Madrid.*

THOMPSON: That's right. [I arrived in September 1949.]

*Q: You spent five years there.*

THOMPSON: Almost.

*Q: What did you do during that assignment?*

THOMPSON: I was first assigned to the consulate as a visa officer. I suppose I did that for two years or more. Then I had the good fortune of having a DCM [deputy chief of mission], Johnny Jones, who was insistent on rotation of young officers to try to give them work experience. I was moved from the consulate to the economic section, where I worked for a year or year and a half. Then I was rotated to the political section where I remained until our departure in 1954.

*Q: I think Mr. Jones should be commended because that sort of rotation did not become routine in the Foreign Service for a number of years.*

THOMPSON: Yes, I think that's right.

*Q: Now you arrived there at a time when our relations with Spain were to say the least cool. As I recall we had only a chargé there we didn't have an Ambassador, and we were still unhappy with Franco's flirtation with the Axis powers in World War II.*

THOMPSON: Yes, that's right. Franco got very little credit for playing a very cagey game with the Axis during the war which had kept the Germans out of Spain and had left Spain relatively free to conduct its own affairs. Nevertheless at the end of the war there came the United Nations resolution condemning Spain as having been, I suppose, an Axis collaborator, and all member nations were required to withdraw their ambassadorial appointments and leave their missions only under chargés or withdraw the missions altogether. In our case, we had a chargé in Madrid at the time I arrived. I suppose Paul Culbertson, who was the chargé, was not replaced for at least a year after I arrived.

*Q: He was replaced by Stanton Griffiths, I believe, who had made his name in the movie industry but had been Ambassador in Poland at one time. How was he as an Ambassador in that situation?*

THOMPSON: Well from my lowly position at the foot of the stair, I suppose I was not in a position to judge very well, although I must say Ambassador What 's his name's performance was apparent even to me. He was a remarkably blustery type who called all the officers in the mission "son," and all the wives and other ladies "girlie," and never had any idea who anyone was except possibly for the DCM.

*Q: Were you able to travel about Spain or were you limited pretty much to Madrid at the time?*

THOMPSON: We did a lot of traveling, both for personal and official reasons, always within Spain. I recall at one point, I think I was in the economic section at the time, we had a dreadful protection case in Salamanca. For reasons best known to themselves, it was decided I would go up and try to free this American citizen who was in prison there after having killed a bicyclist with his auto. So I went up to Salamanca and stayed two or three days and finally got the man released on the understanding that he would post a modest bond and then would abscond from the country without interference from the authorities. He was most grateful, I must say.

On another occasion still on my assignment, I was sent again, for reasons best known to others, to assume responsibility for our consulate in Vigo after the incumbent had left the post. I was there about six weeks or so at a very inconvenient time. Our son, our first child had been born just days before I was asked to assume charge at Vigo. On the other hand, it was a very interesting assignment. I took it upon myself to take advantage of being the new counsel to make courtesy calls on a wide variety of local officials, the Archbishop as well as the military, and did a series of memcons on their views which I think were found interesting. In addition, of course, we traveled a great deal on our own time to religious festivals and the ferias [Spanish: festivals] of Sevilla and the ferias at Valencia. So we had an opportunity to see a good deal of Spain.

*Q: Did you find hostility toward the U.S. because of our stand towards Franco?*

THOMPSON: Outside official circles, no. We never encountered any at any time.

*Q: How would you assess Franco's hold and popularity on the people?*

THOMPSON: Well, as much as he endured for another 19 years or so after I left Spain, one has to assume his control was pretty good, and his popularity wasn't all that bad. After all, it was only his death that ended his rule.

*Q: Why did Stanton Griffiths resign as Ambassador? He resigned after a rather short time in Spain.*

THOMPSON: I don't recall.

*Q: It may have been business interests that brought him back.*

THOMPSON: Possibly, but I just don't know.

*Q: Did the shift to Lincoln McVeigh indicate any policy changes as far as the embassy was concerned?*

THOMPSON: Not as I recall. McVeigh, of course, had an academic background and had served in a post before, but I don't think his arrival was a signal for any significant change in our relations.



*Q: Now it was while you were there that we started to think about placing military bases in Spain. Had the embassy recommended for or against such an endeavor.*

THOMPSON: I have no recollection and had no direct role in recommendations of any kind, so I don't really know. But I think the initiative came from Washington and was more at the behest of our security interests than anything else.

*Q: It was cold war driven, in other words.*

THOMPSON: Yes, I'm sure it was because the whole objective, which was later accomplished, was to make a fixed aircraft carrier out of Spain with the bases that were then developed and utilized.

*Q: Did the U.S. presence, the official presence, grow while you were there that of AID people or military people or not, or was that observable?*

THOMPSON: Yes, our AID mission grew and we had a happy organizational arrangement in that Washington either arranged or permitted a structure wherein the economic consular became the head of the AID mission, a very useful arrangement. The influx of the military really took place largely after our departure. There were not significant numbers of personnel there while we were still there except in the immediate negotiating headquarters.

*Q: Did the flap over atomic weapons at the bases take place while you were there or did that come later?*

THOMPSON: No, that was much later.

*Q: That's when our ambassador had to go bathing in the sea to show the water wasn't contaminated after the bomb had dropped there?*

THOMPSON: That's right. That was just before he went rollerblading on his last trip.

*Q: How would you sum up your first tour in Madrid? It was an interesting one and a long one. Most officers don't have five years at their first post.*

THOMPSON: Yes, that's right. It was fascinating and I thoroughly enjoyed it and learned a great deal. It was also a very good launching pad for a subsequent assignment as the number two on the Iberian desk in Western European affairs.

*Q: You came back to that desk assignment in 1954 as I recall.*

THOMPSON: Yes, late in 1954, [November, I think].

*Q: What were the problems you faced in that assignment?*

THOMPSON: Well dealing with Spain was always a difficult business given the widespread attitudes in the United States and among our allies abroad about the Franco regime. On the whole the base agreements had been concluded and went forward without significant difficulty, and there really were no major problems that I can recall. After I became the senior desk officer [around June 1957], we had the negotiations for the Azores base complex with the Portuguese government which required enormous effort and endless consultation, but that went well and was finally completed successfully.

*Q: What was our attitude toward the Salazar regime?*

THOMPSON: It was one of substantial coolness and correctness. There really wasn't any great warmth between our countries at that time.

*Q: Did you accompany Secretary Dulles when he went to Madrid in 1955?*

THOMPSON: No I did not.

*Q: But you were undoubtedly present when Juan Carlos came to the U.S. in the summer of '58.*

THOMPSON: I think so. Yes we were still in Washington when the king came. I remember there were great doings at the Spanish embassy at the time of course. This was at the time of the rapprochement between Franco and the monarchy. Franco of course having had his way in terms of how the young king of Spain was to be educated and prepared for his possible future rule.

*Q: And were the Spanish basically happy over the aid they were getting or were there complaints about that?*

THOMPSON: I don't remember any. Well, I don't think the Spanish government was ever fully satisfied by any means, but as far as popular responses go my recollection is that there were no complaints about our aid program. In fact Spaniards in general were quite gratified to at last have that kind of a relationship with the United States.

*Q: In those years did we make any comments about human rights behavior in either Spain or Portugal as we are wont to do now in many cases?*

THOMPSON: No, we were not inclined to do that then. I think because the Foreign Service establishment as a whole had not fully grasped the relevance of human rights protection for the United States abroad and because it was not politic at the time to do anything to rock these regimes upon whom we were making significant security demands at the time.

*Q: Well at the end of your tour at the department in 1958, you were transferred to Bolivia.*

THOMPSON: That's right. I went to Bolivia as head of the political section in La Paz [in August].

**TERRENCE GEORGE LEONHARDY**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Madrid (1949-1955)**

*Terrence George Leonhardy was born in North Dakota in 1914. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of North Dakota he received his master's degree from Louisiana State University. His career includes positions in Colombia, Denmark, Spain, Mexico, and El Salvador. Mr. Leonhardy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 1996.*

Q: *You were in Madrid from when to when?*

LEONHARDY: I was in Madrid from spring of '49 to early '55. That, without a doubt, was my best post. Everything was just... First of all, the climate was a lot better. I had enough command of Spanish so that helped. And I went over on an Italian ship - I think it was the *Vulcadia* - to Gibraltar. That was where we had to get off and then I bought a new car before I got to Madrid; a Pontiac. I drove it out of the factory out in Detroit and had it on board. It was unloaded in Gibraltar and then, I remember, I had to wait three or four days in Gibraltar before I could get out of there to get into Spain. We went through all kinds of... Anyway, I remember when I was in Gibraltar, I had to go over to the border with Spain and I had to drive across the main airport, the runway, to get over there and I didn't realize they'd flushed all the gas out of my car practically and I almost got stalled on the way back. But anyway, I went through our customs agent that the embassy used for stuff, he asked me if I wanted to take out insurance on my car. And I hadn't thought of that, of course. I said, "Yes, I don't have any pesetas." He says, "Well, that's okay. We'll send the bill to the Embassy." I took out insurance and I drove up to Seville and stayed overnight there in the famous old... hotel and then the next day I drove to another stop on the way, one of these paradores but I was up in the Montes de Mancha, south of Madrid and there was practically no traffic on the roads. Gasoline was rationed, and so forth, except for trucks and stuff and I'd been passing people with ox carts and donkeys; some would be on the left side some would be on the right. I'd slow down and go around them.

I got up on La Mancha, about sixty miles south of Madrid and there were two bicyclists on the left side of the road and I came upon, got close to them, and I slowed down and they were on the left side so I decided to go around them on the right side. I wasn't going very fast, maybe thirty miles and hour and one of these guys cut in front of me. So I couldn't go the left because the other guy was there so I had to go to the ditch. Fortunately, it was in La Mancha where there were no trees on the side of the road because usually the European roads are lined with trees. I hit this sort of ditch and rolled the car over on the left side. I rolled down the window and climbed out and I had grazed this cyclist and he was hopping around on one leg and holding the other leg and screaming to high heaven. His bicycle had been damaged and the other guy just kept going and nobody came along on the road. Fortunately, I'd traveled in Spain with a car before and had a... Some guy came along, finally, from the North going South with his wife and a child and he asked me what happened. And I told him, he says, "Well..." I said, "Can you bring this cyclist to the village and get some medical attention?" And he didn't want to do it and he say, "That guy caused that accident, he can just suffer," you know. I persuaded him to take the

guy in and I said, "Report this to the Guardia Civil, the Civil Guard, because they patrol the road." Anyway, in about, oh, ten minutes another guy came down from the North. He was in a chauffeur-driven car; he was a Black; he was a nice-looking, well-dressed guy, American, and I'm sure to this day, he was the famous arms dealer, (I forget what his name was) he was supplying arms to all over Europe. Anyway, along came a truck from the other way, it had two Guardia Civil on it; had the truck driver and a couple of aides and they stopped right at my car. All the oil had leaked out of it. Anyway, the car wasn't too badly damaged; it was stove in a little bit on the side and the roof but it had the split window, you know, and the windows were shattered. Anyway, this truck driver roped my car to the back of his truck and pulled me into Madrid and the Guardia Civil were there and they made a little note of the accident, I guess. I got into Madrid and he got some - oil and everything was rationed pretty severely - but this truck driver went in to this old filling station and put oil in this car. I think I had enough gas but anyway, I got into Madrid with a shattered windshield. Fortunately, I knew the city a little bit so... Eventually I got the car fixed.

But the Embassy in those days was in a... We still didn't have full relations with Franco - and the Chargé, a guy named Paul Culbertson. We were in an old Catholic school house complex that we'd rented. So I was assigned to the economics section and I was assigned to do reporting on Spanish minerals and a number of other aspects of the Spanish economy. We were there for about three or four months - at least six months, I guess, in that building - and then we went into houses that the Germans had had on the main drag there. The Chancery was in one building and the commercial section was in some other and the administrative section was in another house right next door. And that's where we were a good part of my assignment there. We had a property we'd bought where the Embassy is now which was an old home in the middle of big grounds around it which they eventually built the Embassy but it wasn't finished when I left there. And then comes the Marshall Plan and the military base agreements and all that stuff.

*Q: Was that happening while you were there?*

LEONHARDY: Yes.

*Q: You say we only had a Chargé, this was, of course, during the high Franco regime and before we had...*

LEONHARDY: That was a result of a 1946, I think, UN resolution that none of the signatories to this thing would send an ambassador to Spain. We had this Chargé and then we gave them full recognition and our first ambassador had come from... He'd been in the Argentine and Poland; he was a political appointee; he owned Brentano Bookstores and he was Chairman of the Board of Metro Goldwyn Mayer. He was a guy named Stanten Griffins. Griffins had gone through a number of wives; he wasn't married at the time and he brought with him Angier Biddle Duke whom you probably read about this Spring; was killed in a... He wasn't the DCM he was a second secretary, I think, but he was sort of one of his main aides and we had, I'm trying to think who was the DCM at the time. Homer Byington, I believe, while he was there as DCM, but I think it was Johnny Jones who was DCM and then in 1953 we had Homer Byington. Once we got the Marshall Plan going, we brought in a whole new bunch of people to work on that and they had me - my first boss was Daniel Braddock and Nelly Turbick was second - he lives

around here. And then they sent over a man with the rank of Minister - a lawyer from South Carolina but via New York. He was in a New York law office - Ned Williams - we called him Mr. Ned anyway and he... At that time, I was reporting on minerals amongst other things and then we got into this whole business of stuff going behind the Curtain, minerals from mercury and pyrites and stuff that were getting into Eastern Europe.

*Q: The Spanish minerals played quite a role during World War II - wolfram. I'm not quite sure what wolfram is but I know it was a very important commodity that you wanted to keep out of German hands.*

LEONHARDY: It's used in the steel industry. I got into a lot of things because I'd been reporting on minerals amongst other things. Then we had, during the Korean crisis, they put on a big demand on us and sent two recently hired officers who were not full-time, I mean not Foreign Service officers - sent two people over to do all the reporting required on these... We had to go to every country in Western Europe where we had to put them on rationing, in effect. We asked, "What is your use of this product which we import?" And then we had to figure out - we had a history and then we had to figure out how much we could give them or sell them. I think there were almost a hundred different products that we had to report on, which was quite a task. I started it out, but with the idea that I was going to get these guys in and they were going to run it. Well, after the boss, Ivan Hoyt got the first two reports out of these guys, he says, "Hell, they can't even write English. You're going to have to take over and monitor everything they do." He says, "I'd thought you'd be through with it but you're not." So we had to do that.

Then we had, as I say, we had the base agreement and we had to buy minerals from Spain and we had all these contracts for wolfram, for mercury. And it got me into the secret mercury mines and installations down in the middle of the country. Spain and Italy produced about ninety percent of the mercury produced in the world and they had a monopoly before the war. Then they split up and it's the only mining operation in Spain that was exclusively the domain of the Spanish Treasury. It had been were operated by the Romans. They were very interesting, historically. The radius of twenty-five kilometers around this place, only people born in that area could work in the mines or the distillery. You may have heard about mercury poisoning but it's just horrible stuff and before they had ventilation and all that stuff. And these people were only required to work one day a week in this mine and they were given land outside so they could be out there farming and they'd work their one day. This was all written into a big law and women used to come from outside and have their babies in it so they could grow up working in the... Anyway, they put in a new distillery while I was there but it was a very inefficient operation. But I went down there twice with mining engineers from the States. They were just bug-eyed when we got down in those mines and saw how rich that ore was. Even during World War II, they produced as many as seventy-five thousand flasks a year. Here if a mine operation produces ten flasks a day, you know, it's a big deal.

Anyway, then I got into - we bought land also. We had to do a lot of negotiating with the Spanish Government on these contracts and with the individual mining company. Then we had one American who came over there with a lot of political whammy from Nevada and he had authority to go out and contract on his own and he was paying more than we were paying - were negotiating at. I remember I got a telegram back. This guy liked to entertain people. He had me

over to his house and buttered me up but anyway we got his contract canceled. He was a protégé of this Senator McCarran.

*Q: McCarran of Nevada who was a major figure in..*

LEONHARDY: He had all kinds of influence in Congress. Anyway, we got this canceled. And then he tried to get me thrown out of the Foreign Service. As a result he tried to find something, he went around... I mentioned earlier that my dad was involved in politics in North Dakota. He was a Democratic county chairman during the Roosevelt Administration. Truman was coming through there, while I was home, and he says, "I want you to come down and meet the President." I says, "No, I can't do that, I can't get involved in politics." Then he said, "Oh, but I'm having some Republican friends down, and so forth, and the President is just coming through." He was really upset that I wasn't going to go; he pleaded with me. Finally, I said, "Okay, I'll go." And I went down and somebody took my picture shaking hands with Truman on the back of this train. I don't know how this guy got wind of it but he tried to get me thrown out on the grounds that I had participated in a political rally. Fortunately, I had good friends back here in Washington that were rooting for me and I didn't have any problem but I was worried because it was during the McCarthy era and a lot of things were happening.

*Q: Back to the mineral business, did you see a problem of Spanish concerns diverting minerals toward the communist bloc?*

LEONHARDY: Well, that was an interesting thing because I worked very close with the British intelligence officer and they had little consulates all over Spain including Cartagena down in southern Spain; several of the ports where a lot of the minerals went out and he would give me lists of stuff, shipping documents showing where this stuff was destined and it was always purchased by a firm in England, so you assumed it was going to England but actually the destination of the ship was Antwerp and then they'd show Vaduz Liechtenstein was another place where stuff was... The Spaniards had no knowledge of this, you know, they assumed that this stuff was going to go wherever it was supposed to be going and so we would... I had pretty good relations with the Department of Commerce people and they didn't want it to go there. They didn't know and I would just feed them stuff, you know, and there was some effort, I think, to do something about it. But a lot of it was, as soon as you plug up one hole, while then they'd find another one, you know, some other port they'd go to. And they say, "Well, this is going to Antwerp, in Belgium." But we knew it would end up somewhere else so we had a bit of a problem convincing them that the stuff was going back there because they didn't have any information to that effect. Their information indicated everything was a-okay.

*Q: How about dealing with the Franco authorities? How did you find working with them?*

LEONHARDY: One interesting thing in dealing with the Franco regime was that, my last year or so there, we were trying to get our hands on a source of uranium and we were going all over the world looking for it. Our people here (I'm trying to remember what agency sent them over)... Anyway, we got two mining engineers came over from the States - young guys - and we worked out an arrangement with the Franco regime to let our people with their Geiger counters, and so forth, explore with two Spanish engineers in the area north of Madrid - anywhere in Spain north

of Madrid. And that wasn't really the primary area we were interested in. We knew from geology reports that the best geology was south. Anyway, I had to work and do most of the negotiating with the Spanish Government agency to work this thing out where our people could come over there. They'd go out, I remember it was in the summertime, and Spanish engineers, they took off during the summer on vacation. They didn't like this idea but our engineers were very able guys and they'd fan out. There actually were three of them. They'd fan out in different directions and they'd come in every weekend and report and then they'd go out again. They had jeeps assigned to them and the Spanish government was very cooperative in assigning people to help them, and so forth. Then we tried to negotiate and see if we could further south and the head of this particular agency in the Spanish government was a hard nut but I managed to crack him pretty well and we were able to go further south. We kind of moved out about half way to the Mediterranean. So our people were able to go down there and all they were doing was looking, really, for... They didn't come up with anything very big but anyway, it was part of an effort worldwide to try to find sources of uranium. So we had good cooperation from them and I might say, in the mercury mines, they hadn't let anybody in there (I signed the guest book and they hadn't had anybody in there for twenty years - just us.) That was a different department of the government, that was under the Treasury and I had to go and negotiate going down there. We had a Defense Mineral Procurement Agency in London and they had an American general in charge of it and a mining engineer and I worked with them but we negotiated these arrangements to go down and look at their lead mines and look at their mercury operations, and so forth.

**CARL F. NORDEN**  
**Commercial Counselor**  
**Madrid (1952)**

*Carl F. Norden entered the Foreign Service in 1938. In addition to serving in Chile, Mr. Norden served in Germany, Poland, Suriname, Cuba, Santiago, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Spain, Iran, France, and Venezuela. He was interviewed by Horace G. Torbert in 1991.*

NORDEN: I got myself assigned to Spain briefly, but unfortunately I dropped by there on the way from Switzerland, where my father was living, to see about a house, and at that unfortunate time, who should be there but the inspector. Inspectors are goddamned nuisances. He said, "This young man has got himself assigned not as commercial officer but as commercial counselor. This office does not rate a commercial counselor." And he was stupid, because at that point Spain was just coming around.

*Q: Just beginning. We were beginning.*

NORDEN: Just coming out, and it did rate a commercial counselor, because what was happening was very important. But unfortunately this inspector didn't have that kind of a mind. He was a typical...what one friend of mine always called them -- chicken inspectors.

**STUART W. ROCKWELL**  
**Political Section Chief**  
**Madrid (1952-1955)**

*Ambassador Stuart W. Rockwell was born in 1917. His Foreign Service career included positions in Panama, Turkey, Israel, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Morocco. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 5, 1988.*

*Q: I'd like to move briefly through your career so we can concentrate on your more senior ranks. You were in Madrid from 1952 to '55. What type of work were you doing at that time?*

ROCKWELL: I was chief of the Political Section in Madrid.

*Q: What was our attitude at that point towards Franco?*

ROCKWELL: Our attitude was favorably neutral, I would say. In other words, we did not approve of him, but we had no quarrel with him.

*Q: As the chief of the political section, how would you organize your office, as far as how would you assign officers, for example.*

ROCKWELL: We had them divided on Spanish foreign affairs and Spanish domestic affairs and intelligence, dealing with Spain. At that time, Spain had a protectorate in Morocco. Of course, the relations between Spain and the European nations were strained. On the domestic side, there was more or less a stagnant situation, because no meaningful political parties other than the official ones were tolerated. So it was a rather static situation. The major thrust, I think, of the Political Section was to give to Washington an idea of how the ordinary Spaniards were living under the regime, how they felt toward it, and what the regime's relationships with the European countries were. Obviously, Spain's relations with us at that time were somewhat controversial since there were many people in this country, particularly in the Congress, who felt strongly unfavorable to the Franco regime.

*Q: Did that have much of an effect on the operations at the embassy?*

ROCKWELL: No.

*Q: The heat was pretty well absorbed in Washington at that time.*

ROCKWELL: Yes.

**EDWARD S. LITTLE**  
**Foreign Service Reserve Officer**



### **Madrid (1952-1956)**

*Ambassador Edward S. Little was born in Ohio in 1918. He received an undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College and then attended the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served in the U.S. Navy during WW II. Ambassador Little joined the Foreign service in 1957. He served in Ecuador, Spain, the Dominican Republic, Switzerland, and Chad. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.*

Q: *When you went to Madrid from 1952 to '54, did you go there and become an FSO at that time?*

LITTLE: No. There was a very small program of exchange of civil servants for Foreign Service officers to get the Foreign Service officers more experience in the department and vice versa. That was the basis upon which I went to Madrid as a Foreign Service reserve officer.

Q: *This is before a great majority of positions in the Department were made Foreign Service positions.*

LITTLE: That's right. Wristonizing.

Q: *When the civil service and the Foreign Service were basically amalgamated?*

LITTLE: That was in 1955-56, and it was then that I came into the Foreign Service, transferring laterally.

### **JOHN F. CORRELL Labor Attaché Madrid (1952-1956)**

*John F. Correll graduated from Kenyon College and became a teacher in Mansfield, Ohio. He began his career in the labor unions in the early 1930's when he became the educational director for the local union. He was brought into the State Department by his friend, Cleon Swayzee. In addition, he has served at labor attaché in South Africa, Spain, Cuba and England. He was interviewed on March 9, 1990, by Morris Weisz.*

CORRELL: I went to Spain, and that gave me a very unusual opportunity to study the structure of an industrial relations kind of cooperation that they had between management and labor under a dictator, Franco. Franco was not so harsh as many people thought at that time, because labor and industry worked very, very well together. By that time I had picked up enough Spanish, and I also had an assistant who later became an assistant to the Spanish Labor Attaché in the United States. I learned a great deal about northern Spain where industry was predominantly in steel and ship-building.

*Q: Now you succeeded whom? Do you remember who it was who was there before you?*

CORRELL: Yes, there had been someone, but I can't recall who it was. But he had gotten along very well, and by that time, we had developed the outlines of what a Labor Attaché does. He observes the developments in the industrial relations field, particularly from the labor point of view, and he reports to the State Department, and he also reports to the Embassy staff and the Ambassador. And I was there at a time when we had some wonderful Ambassadors. Jimmy Dunn was one of the Ambassadors, and he was a fine gentleman, who understood the need for labor development, the need of a relationship between industry and labor, so that production could proceed.

**ROY R. RUBOTTOM, JR.**  
**Economic Counselor**  
**Madrid (1953-1956)**

*Roy R. Rubottom was born in Texas and studied at the Southern Methodist University and earned a Master's degree there in 1932. He was studying for his Ph.D. in Latin American Studies when World War II broke out. In 1941, he received a naval commission in the Office of Naval Intelligence. He entered the foreign service in 1947. He served in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Spain. In 1956, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. In 1960, he was appointed Ambassador to Argentina. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February of 1990.*

RUBOTTOM: I went to Spain. And got there in July of 53. I never will forget I wrote the whole third quarter economic report myself sitting at the typewriter, with the help of two or three Spanish locals. It was a really tough job. I don't know what kind of grade it got but in the meantime they were opening up the Bases agreement that had just been signed. We set up a U.S. Operations mission there.

*Q: This is the beginning of the bases in Spain.*

RUBOTTOM: I got there in July and the base agreements were signed in September 1953. The Operations Mission was set up and a man named Ed Williams was brought over as a political appointee to be Director of the U.S. Operations Mission. It was a combined mission right from the beginning. They decided they didn't want to have a separate mission of AID people--nowadays it's called AID, but in those days it was called something else--and a separate Embassy economic section. They merged the two. So I found myself working under Williams and I got to know him quite well. In the summer of 1954 I was called in by Ambassador Dunn whom I had gotten to know quite well, and he said, I've been talking to Williams and we're going to move you up to Economic Counselor. The Economic Counselor is going to be transferred and you're going to become the Deputy Director of the Mission. And I said well that's wonderful news. Thank you very much. So in the fall of 1954 Harold Stassen, who was then Director of FOA, what we call AID today, came over and stayed for three or four days. Williams was taking a firm

position that the second increment of economic assistance that went to the Spanish Government because of the base agreements should all be in the form of a grant. Stassen had already instructed Williams to try to negotiate about 80% of it as a loan. Williams was determined not to do this. He had been a successful insurance attorney. He had all kinds of arguments as to why it wasn't fair to Spain to do it this way. "They were entitled to an all-grant second year assistance program just as they had gotten in the first year." Well, I went with Williams and Stassen to all the negotiations that were going on. I did half of the interpreting. I guess I did the interpreting from Spanish to English, and the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs did the interpreting from English to Spanish. It was a very busy three days. Stassen left. He had with him the Director of the European Assistance Program, a fellow named Charles Urschel, who happened to be from Texas. I'd never known him before, never heard of him before. Two days after they left Spain I had a phone call from Paris telling me they were going to get rid of Williams and they were going to promote me to be Director of the Operations Mission. I said this is going to be a terrible blow to Williams. He's a very close friend of mine and I said I appreciate the confidence that you're showing in me, but I said I feel very badly about Williams. Well, he said, He's just refused to follow our instructions and we feel that you could do the job. So, sure enough the telegram came in and Williams was out, and I was promoted to be Director of USOM, one of three members of the country team, which meant that in the space of three or four months I had moved from Commercial Attaché to Economic Counselor to Deputy Director to Director of the Economic Mission. I stayed in that job for about a year and a half until May of 1956 when I came back to be Assistant Secretary. It was an incredible set of developments.

*Q: Could you describe how we saw Spain and Franco at this period of time? This was not that long-ten years after the war--Here was the one fascist dictatorship still at least I'm not sure that is the right term.*

RUBOTTOM: I wish I had brought my book with me. I am co-author of a book entitled United States and Spain since World War II that was published in 1984.

*Q: Who published it? This will go in the record.*

RUBOTTOM: It was published by Praeger, later bought by Houghton Mifflin. In that, I go into a great deal of detail, of course. I wrote all the political part of it and my colleague at SMU, Carter Murphy, wrote the economic part of it, and there are alternating chapters. It was an extremely pragmatic arrangement that led Acheson and Truman to finally overcome their revulsion against Franco. The pragmatic consideration was frankly, security. I think that in the light of what was happening in the rest of Europe, the problem of dealing with France was borne out later by their pulling out of NATO, that we needed a security anchor in southwestern Europe. We were also having problems with Morocco where we also had bases. And we had problems with Libya. This became a paramount consideration overcoming the political stigma. And there's no question that a political stigma was attached to that agreement in 1952. It was made at the time that Admiral Sherman was sent over and he died a week after he left. But the negotiations had started then during the Acheson-Truman period and then they were completed in the Dulles-Eisenhower period in 1953. I always felt it was a fair deal on both sides because security was a top consideration. Spain at that time was absolutely destitute, the result of its own three years of terrible civil war, deprivation and isolation in World War II. You wouldn't believe some of the

scenes in Spain then. For example, shortly after I arrived, my wife and I were invited by Ambassador Dunn to go to the annual celebration in southwestern Spain at a place called Los Palos, where Columbus took off on his discovery voyage. It was an extraordinary experience, all these Christopher Columbus scholars were there, some political people as well. As we were driving down the highway--I had only been in Spain a couple of months at that time--I saw a dark spot on the highway ahead and I wondered what in the world it was. Finally when we got close we had to slow down. It turned out to be a group of fifteen to twenty women dressed in black dresses with black bonnets covering their heads. Their arms were all covered too, and they were using old fashioned picks, trying to break big rocks into small rocks to repair the highway. They literally did not have any kind of highway equipment. So the U.S. assistance program was an enormous injection of modernization in to a destitute economy and society. The Program included the highways, the railroads, down to and including the ties and the steel for the tracks, electric power equipment, the steel mills, agriculture, technical assistance for some of their cottage industries, and so on right up to the atomic nuclear field. The last two years I was there I traveled all over Spain and saw what was being done. There's not the slightest question in my mind, and the point is made in this book we ultimately wrote, that Spain probably could not have made the economic transition, and it might not have been able to make the political transition from the harsh dictatorship of Franco to a Socialist Democracy, which occurred within less than two years after his death, had it not been for the injection of U.S. economic assistance. We poured one billion one hundred million dollars into Spain in about eight years. Most of it was in loans, but the first little bit was in grants. The Spanish people are hard-working, resourceful, technically competent people. But they had no resources at that time. As I said, the country was destitute.

*Q: How did we deal at the Embassy with the Spanish Officials? After all we were dealing with a dictatorship very much like the type we had been fighting in the Wars so it must have seemed like having very strange bedfellows. How did we deal with these people on the personal and professional level?*

RUBOTTOM: I dealt with them just like the Mexicans or anybody else. I was in Franco's Office one time in the three years I was in Spain. That was the time John Davis Lodge presented his credentials after he replaced Ambassador James Dunn. The people in the Foreign Office and the Economic Ministry, because they had established a special section, (later the man who headed that section became the Spanish Ambassador to the United States) to deal with the U.S. Operation Mission on the economic part of our relationship. They were competent people. They were sensitive people. They at times could be difficult but we always managed to come to agreement in the time that I was there.

*Q: Did we have any, I'm not sure the term is right, hidden agenda? In other words, we were giving aid for bases, but did we look upon aid, trying to direct it or doing something that we felt would eventually turn Spain around and make it something more palatable?*

RUBOTTOM: You've touched on an extremely important and a sensitive subject and something which takes us off into the realm of conjecture to some extent. I think you'd get a different answer from almost any person you talked to. No American can be reared in school, family, church, etc. without having a commitment to the democratic process, without being offended by

a cruel dictatorship when he or she sees it. I've always felt that you, in addition to the words you use in diplomatic negotiations, also have certain facial language, you have certain personality, you have certain things you say and do. There is the way you treat subordinates including chauffeurs and janitors that shows what your attitude is. It's not just what we say, it's what we do. It's the example you set in your personal life. And if you're in a country three years and if you occupy a position of any importance they're going to know about you. You stand out. I think these are the things that really count. You rarely ever get into a position where you can lecture an official about the advantage of democracy over dictatorship. Although you may at times have to carry out some fairly tough worded instructions. You then ought to send back what you say. I never will forget dealing with one Ambassador in Central America when later I was Assistant Secretary. Every telegram that would come back in response to instruction, he'd tell us what the Foreign Minister or President said. I finally had to send him a telegram and say, What did you say that led the Foreign Minister and the President to say that? Because it's a dialogue--it's not a one sided conversation. So it's a combination of all these things. An American, when he goes abroad in a diplomatic status, if he doesn't reflect the democratic traditions of his country and the values of his country, then he ought not to be there. And frankly, I'm afraid that there have been a few who have not done that very well. I think you make a whole lot more progress that way, than you do by trying to lecture. I never will forget that Fletcher Warren, a colleague and contemporary of Beaulac's, still living at 92 in Greenville, Texas, came home one time from Nicaragua. It was his first Ambassadorial post and he came home under instructions. We were intending to send a message to President Somoza that the U.S. disapproved of his removing from office the man who'd been elected President of Nicaragua. We sent him back after six months. This was when I was involved in Middle American Affairs. We found out that Tacho Somoza, not Tachito, (this was in the early 1950's), was far more repressive, far less respectful of the rights of his opponents, when we had withdrawn our Ambassador, than he was when the Ambassador was present. Now this is hard to sell to the press sometimes. I'm not saying that there aren't times when we shouldn't bring people home. Obviously we should.

*Q: It has always struck me that there is something a little bit crazy about diplomatic practice. When relations get poor you will remove the top man and sometimes keep moving on down to supposedly the least powerful person. It is considered an indication of diplomatic displeasure. But to take your senior person and remove him from the scene just when the going gets tough strikes me as being a bit idiotic. Is there anything else we should cover in Spain before we move on?*

RUBOTTOM: We've been at this for almost two hours and we haven't even gotten to what might be the most crucial points, and I don't know if I'm going to have time.

*Q: All right, you call it quits. Let's move on whenever you're ready.*

RUBOTTOM: I think we ought to quit as far as Spain is concerned. I came home from Spain to be Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. I got a phone call in March or April of 1956 and I came home in May. I became Deputy Assistant Secretary under Henry Holland. At the time I didn't realize that Holland had plans to resign. He resigned in September, and I found myself Acting Assistant Secretary until the following June of 1957. If I had known I would be left Acting that long I think I would have asked for an assignment to the field. Finally, in April,

Dulles, one day when we were going to visit the President of Costa Rica who was staying at the Blair House, said, "Dick I'm going to recommend that you become Assistant Secretary." I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary, I'm very honored that you would think that. I've been Acting Assistant Secretary now for about six months. There are at least two or three other people who are very well known politically who would like to have the job." He interrupted me and said "Dick, are you telling me that you don't want the job?" I said, "No, Sir." He said, "I've just told you that I'm going to recommend today to the President that you be appointed Assistant Secretary." I said, "I'd be very honored. Thank you very much." So then I had to wait another 90 days for confirmation because Wayne Morse, who was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Latin America, thought that because I was from Texas that I probably was involved in the oil business, or that I might be involved in something that was not to his liking. He was the great conscience of the Senate. Finally my hearing came up in June and there are 92 pages of fine print testimony of questions and answers between Wayne Morse and myself before he finally reached over the stand and shook hands, and said, "Mr. Rubottom, I'm delighted to see that you do not have any connections with the oil business that might adversely affect your dealings with Mexico. As far as I'm concerned, I'm going to recommend and vote for your confirmation." So it took me that long to become Assistant Secretary, but it was a fascinating period and there were lots of things that happened during that time. You could spend all the time of course, talking about Castro, but I don't want to.

**JOSEPH McEVROY**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1954-1959)**

*Mr. Joseph McEvoy was born on December 8, 1910 in Trenton, New Jersey. Upon graduating from Rutgers University in 1932 with a degree in journalism, Mr. McEvoy worked for the Associated Press until joining the Foreign Services in 1951. Mr. McEvoy's posts included Spain and Venezuela. Mr. McEvoy was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.*

McEVOY: In the middle of '54, I was posted to Madrid.

*Q: What was your program like in Madrid at that time?*

McEVOY: The program in Madrid had been running along well. The importance of the program in Madrid was that we had to consider as a USIA program priority the construction and development of American military bases, air and naval. That had been handled very well. Of course we were able to take advantage of the situation at that time in Spain--this was during the Franco dictatorship--in that the press was not as free as it might have been. But their enthusiasm for their fairly new relationship with the United States was very important. I went to Spain as Press Officer. I had been Public Affairs Officer in Venezuela. I went over as Press Officer. The PAO was Bill Cody. I didn't have a diplomatic passport because the Passport Division was rather stingy about handing them out at that time. However, Cody explained to Ambassador James Dunn that I had to be calling on the Foreign Office and also the Ministry of Information and

would require a diplomatic passport to do my job. Cody said, "I'd like your permission, Mr. Ambassador, to send a cable back to Washington." The Ambassador said, "No, Bill, I'll do it myself." So that hurdle speedily was cleared.

It was a curious situation as to how we dealt with the media there. It was all done, or the majority of it done, through the Spanish government. Oh, we made our courtesy calls and visits and other things to the newspapers and radio stations, but whenever we had a release of importance--and I'm talking about the ones that dealt with general relations, Spanish foreign policy and our own, and the Spanish-American military bases--it was all handled through the Foreign Ministry. There had been a very important step taken at the outset, I think largely through the efforts of Bill Cody, Ambassador Dunn and Major General August Kissner who was in charge of the U.S. military group. Kissner was a very self-effacing person. The American troops who were there--not troops per se, they were mostly officers and Spanish speaking officers or people who were learning to speak Spanish. They never wore their uniforms in public except when there was an event that required it.

Under the arrangement worked out, USIA was the organism that dealt directly with the Foreign Ministry and included material coming out of the Embassy, the Air Force public information set-up and the public information staff of the consortium which was building the bases, Brown, Raymond and Walsh. Once coordinated, I would bring the release already translated and turn it into the Foreign Ministry, or in some cases the Ministry of Information. It would automatically appear in the newspapers, magazines or radio stations. There wasn't much TV then. But the authorities never changed our copy. We could arrange cultural programs, in which we didn't have deal through the Foreign Ministry.

*Q: You never had the normal kind of relationship then with the press in which you would go directly to the reporters or to the editors? You had always to go through the Foreign or Information Ministry?*

McEVOY: In most cases. We would, for example, if an outstanding American figure, literary figure, political figure, was in Spain, arrange a news conference. But nobody ever asked the wrong question. That wasn't our doing. That was the fact that they were living under an authoritarian form of government. We had our dinners and our luncheons and everything else and we tried to keep close to opinion leaders. But you had to walk a very close line. We did avoid giving the idea in public that the U.S. was completely sold out to the Spanish government. That was the situation.

*Q: I suppose the dictatorship at that time was sufficiently strict so that you really couldn't measure the attitude of the Spanish people toward the government, or could you? Did you have any opportunity to get into that area?*

McEVOY: There were a lot of people not with USIA who had a complete opportunity to scout out the situation over there. And of course there was another thing: in the USIA organization we had a lot of Spanish nationals, local staff. And I would say (this had grown up before I got there) it became a sort of haven for ex-Republicans. So you had people who were always willing to come and tell you this or that bit of information. We used to hear anti-Government jokes, but I

never heard anyone say Franco was a crook. Of course, some repression existed. For example I know one of our translators was a medical doctor who had been on the Republican side during the Spanish civil war and could not practice except in charity hospitals. He took his month's vacation every year to work for the World Health Organization in Geneva. Now we were talking '54 and I was there till '59. It was a situation that was rather favorable for us in some aspects because we always could get anything in the press that we wanted to. On the other hand, it certainly wasn't democracy in action.

*Q: But, with respect to people with whom you could get some feeling about the Franco government, did you sense that there was any widespread anti-government feeling among the people. After all the Republicans had very wide support before and during the civil war, and I'm wondering how people felt about Franco by the time you were there.*

McEVOY: They weren't broadcasting their opposition in strong terms, I can tell you that. Not that they could have. It was surprising, in a way. You'd get the impression sometimes, I mean, that there weren't many Republicans left, that a few of them of the extreme left were still in Moscow.

But we did a lot of things. I was a member of the Royal Madrid Club, which is a big athletic organization. I still retained my interest in sports because I had been a sportswriter. And they were very cooperative. For example, USIA promoted a basketball game between the champions of the National Basketball League of the United States, the Syracuse Nats (no longer in the NBA) and the Royal Madrid club, just a bunch of kids at that time. The Nats had come to Europe under a State Department program. They had appeared in England and Italy on their tour. Spain was the only place where they didn't lose money. The game was a big success.

Subsequently, very interestingly, we promoted a game of American football. This was between American Air Force teams from Bitburg, Germany and Chateauroux, France. The game was played after a soccer game, at Royal Madrid's stadium. The stadium had about 50,000 people in it at the start of the league game and we put the American football on afterward. Royal Madrid wanted to put it on first but I figured if the field got torn up and Royal Madrid should happen to lose, it wouldn't have gone so well for us and them. We had a very good assistant press attaché named Herbert Morales who was educated in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Spain. Very, very capable guy. And he did the play-by-play over the loudspeaker system. It worked very well. We lost a lot of people after the first 20 minutes. They liked the uniforms and the bands, but the game was new to them.

*Q: But they didn't--*

McEVOY: They had programs with explanations in Spanish if they cared to use them. We must have had 20,000 there at the finish. The fans were interested in forward passing, that's what they liked best. It was a very successful promotion. And I think it did the Air Force image quite a bit of good.

*Q: Did you have any other special programs that you think of that were conducted while you were there?*



McEVOY: John Reid had been over there, strangely enough. He had preceded me from Caracas to Madrid and had done a good job with the cultural people. And then when his tour of duty ended we got Jake Cantor, who was very good. I had asked for Al Harkness but Al Harkness didn't want to come at that time. Subsequently he did.

*Q: I think by that time Al had been a PAO himself and he probably didn't want to come as a cultural officer after he'd been a PAO.*

McEVOY: Well, I think if he had gotten assurance that when I left he would become PAO I think he would have been more amenable to the idea. It wouldn't have hurt him at all because he would have done well there. But Jake Cantor is a topnotch man.

*Q: He's still going strong. He's now retired from the government but he's with the so-called DACOR House, the Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired. He is the top cultural man there-- in charge of their educational foundation, selection of scholarship recipients--*

McEVOY: If you run into him, please give him my best.

*Q: I surely will.*

McEVOY: He did an outstanding job in Spain.

As I say, my job, I mean, was a rather special job I would say. Ambassador John Davis Lodge became very interested in me when I was a press officer and I was at that time writing his speeches and accompanying him. He liked to travel, and he, having been an actor before, and having a good knowledge of French and Italian, he became very fluent in Spanish. Of course at first he sort of memorized the lines, but then he became fluent at it and he made tours all over the place. And I accompanied him most of the time. Lodge was very amenable to participating in USIA programs

When I was suggested for PAO in Madrid, believe me I wasn't, I don't think, the first choice. Bill Cody went to Paris; Sax Bradford replaced him; then Sax Bradford was shunted off to Brazil at the time because John McKnight had been assigned there but couldn't go. And after Sax left, Washington didn't want to displease the Ambassador. So that's how they made me Public Affairs Officer.

*Q: How long did Sax stay in Spain?*

McEVOY: I don't know, but it was possibly less than a year maybe.

*Q: He had--when I first went into USIA he was my PAO in Japan, and then he became the Assistant Director for Far East and from there he went to Spain. But I thought he had had a full tour. I didn't realize it was cut short.*

McEVOY: Yeah. He was I think very solidly behind my appointment. He liked to run programs, but he wasn't really crazy about some of the outside appearances--the public side of the job. He was an outstanding guy and I do miss him. He passed away quite some time ago, I guess.

*Q: Yes, he developed a brain tumor in 1966 and died quite suddenly.*

McEVOY: A man of great ability. I had known him in Buenos Aires slightly. He wasn't there very long.

*Q: I don't remember whether he was ever in B.A. or not as an assignment. He had, he was one of the very early appointees to the National War College and that was about 1947 or '48, and from there he went to Japan. I'm sorry. No, it wasn't that early. He went to Japan in '50--yes, it could have been. Because USIA took over the program from the Army in early 1952, and he had already been there nearly two years, so he had to have gone to Japan sometime late in '49 or early in 1950. I don't remember which. He may have been in B.A. before that. He had been the editor of the Seattle, Washington Star when it was a Scripps-Howard paper, and I think he came into the government from there. He may have had a short stint in the wire service, but I'm not--.*

McEVOY: I don't think so, come to think of it. He certainly was a nice guy and very able, and very low-key. I remember one of the things he did when he was PAO, he invited my wife and myself to join him and his wife at a luncheon for two Japanese diplomats. That was one of the longest and most difficult luncheons I ever attended. My wife would say, do you have any children? Yes. Boy? Yes. Girl? Yes. How many? Two. It was going on like that. Anyway, toward the end of the luncheon, the two wives of the Japanese talked--they had been quiet the whole time--and they spoke perfect English. It developed they were educated in the United States. But I suppose it did give me an in with the Japanese Embassy.

Madrid was an interesting assignment. I spent one three-week period as the Ambassador's only aide in San Sebastian. That's where the Spanish Foreign Ministry is in the Summer. I was also writing the Psychological Week.

*Q: For the Embassy.*

McEVOY: Right. The Agency sent me to Geneva in 1956 to head the USIA news coverage for the Big Four meeting--Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Eden and Edgar Faure of France--and then about a week or so later I went back for another two week stint in charge of the news coverage of the first Atoms for Peace conference.

When I moved up to PAO job in Spain, although the Ambassador wanted me to carry on the press job as I had before, we decided that it would be too much so we got an Assistant Press Attaché and a Press Attaché eventually. And they worked very well. I still wrote a lot of speeches. And did considerable traveling.

Our Air Force public information officers were very cooperative. Jack Higgins was our Information Officer and the Air Force set up frequent trips to France and Germany to places in

which he took along with him Spanish newspapermen or radio people. That was all strictly goodwill.

*Q: What was Higgins' position?*

McEVOY: Information Officer. He succeeded Bob Smith. Is Higgins still around?

*Q: He's retired. His first wife drowned over in Thailand and he's now married to a Mexican girl. He's retired in Mexico, and is living in Guadalajara.*

McEVOY: Oh. I've lost track, but I know he had great interest in Guadalajara.

Another job that was given to me was to run a press conference in Mallorca for Richard Nixon, Vice President at the time. He was on his way back from Moscow where he had had the "Kitchen Cabinet" session with Khrushchev. Nixon was on his way to London. The powers that be back in Washington didn't want the story spoiled by any announcements en route to London. Nixon had a refueling stop in Spain. So the Ambassador asked me to go over. He said, do you think there will be many American reporters there? I said, I don't think so. And I don't think the Spanish reporters are probably aware of his visit to the USSR. Lodge said I think you ought to go anyway, so he sent me to Palma de Mallorca. Nixon gave a news conference over there. All went well and he went on and made his big announcement back in London.

*Q: So he wasn't very big news in Spain then?*

McEVOY: He was the Vice President of the United States but that was about it. He would have attracted more attention in Madrid, but that was not in his plans.

*Q: He was still pretty big news in Japan when he came through there.*

McEVOY: We didn't do much to publicize his visit. The Ambassador was interested in that nothing go wrong. In fact, he went over there to greet him. They had been friends in the Congress.

We had a lot of important visitors in Spain. We had a lot of programs where we could use them.

*Q: Public opposition to the American bases had not yet surfaced at that time, had it?*

McEVOY: Had not surfaced, no. There was some opposition at first but you wouldn't, if you had been just passing through there, have realized it.

*Q: I suppose the Franco government wouldn't let it surface.*

McEVOY: No, it wouldn't.

*Q: But there was an underground feeling of dissatisfaction, was there, then?*

McEVOY: It must have been pretty quiet. You never did hear it. In fact, I think maybe there had been--you see, it had already been underway by the time I got there.

*Q: It had been underway a few years by then.*

McEVOY: Yes. I think now it's out in the open. Of course, this is the way they want to do it.

*Q: Yes, they're gradually getting rid of the bases over there.*

McEVOY: That's right.

*Q: Then who was it--do you have anything further you would like to say about the Spanish program while you were there, your part of it?*

McEVOY: I don't have anything further to say about it. I think it was a good program. We had excellent ties with Radio Nacional de Espana, of course. And the usual program tie-in. I don't think there were any great coups that we pulled off at all. But there didn't seem to be any need to. In fact, in some places we were trying to avoid overplaying our hand while things were running so smoothly.

**WILLIAM W. LEHFELDT**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Bilbao (1955-1957)**

*William W. Lehfeltdt was born in California on July 13, 1925. He served in the U.S. Army in a specialists role. Upon completion of his tour, Mr. Lehfeltdt received a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 1950. He entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Kabul, Bilbao, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Tehran. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 29, 1994.*

LEHFELDT: I was assigned to Bilbao, Spain.

*Q: Where you served from 55 to 57.*

LEHFELDT: Bilbao, of course, is the capital, a major city in the Basque country. I was first sent there as vice consul to do consular work. I then took over the economic reporting position that was there and eventually became principal officer for the last year that I was there.

I was still a bachelor so I had a different sort of life. As an official, I went to all the official things but I also had a bachelor's life. I have still a lot of friends in Bilbao.

One of my major interests, and what the embassy really wanted me to look to, was what was going on in the Basque community.

*Q: Could you talk a bit about your corner of Spain during this 55 to 57 period because it's still a problem.*

LEHFELDT: It was less of a problem in those days. This was well before the advent of the ETA organization.

*Q: That Basque terrorist organization.*

LEHFELDT: But Basque nationalism was rampant all over in the, what they considered the four provinces that made up the Spanish Basque country. Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava and Navarra. The Navarrese are a special kind of Basque. They were Carlistas, believing in the royal line that descended through the Bourbon-Parma line rather than the line that Don Juan and his son Juan Carlos I reflect, although they were about equal in legitimacy of claim to throne.

The Navarrese Basques were not necessarily Basque nationalists in one sense because the Carlistas (major movers in the succession wars of the 19th century in Spain) were a partner in the Falange with Franco from the beginning. The Basque nationalist movement, was really started in its fullest form at the end of the 19th century by Jose Antonio Aguirre, was what a number of the Spanish Basques were pushing for. People like Marquis de McMahon, whose family name is De la Sota, a very wealthy industrialist in the area exiled from the Franco days. He had bought from Vanderbilt the Vanderbilt yacht and it was used and evacuated in Dunkirk. I didn't realize until later that the house they were living in Biarritz on the promontory was where the Commanding General of Biarritz American University was living. It was a gorgeous place, I later visited it many times.

The Villalonga family, the Aguirres, the whole set of Basque families had lost a great deal to the Franquistas at the end of the civil war. They were, during World War II, very helpful to the allies in spiriting out, through France and through Spain to Portugal, shot-down fliers or other escapees. Many Basques were given medals by the allies during World War II.

When the US and Spain signed our bases agreement, I think it was in 1952 or 1953, many of the Basques became disenchanted with Americans. They turned their medals back in. As time went on and we developed closer relations with Franco, they became more and more anti-American, in a way because they felt that they had been led down some kind of garden path. It all in a sense began with Wilson and self-determination and all that sort of thing. It's true of a lot of minorities around the world.

So it was difficult for me to get to know a lot of Basques, partly because it was difficult to learn Basque to begin with. I don't know it, I didn't know it. I know some words, some of it at any rate, but not enough. But getting out into the real Basque areas, the countryside, was a function of being friends with somebody who could take you along with them and that's what I did.

For instance, you may recall that during the civil war, a thousand or so Basque children were taken to the Soviet Union by the Spanish Republican government. The Basques for safety sake

stayed there all during World War II. They were treated very generously. They were university graduates and doctorates and all sorts of things.

In the time I was in Bilbao an arrangement was made between the Spanish government and the Soviet government that would allow then mature people, twenty years later, to return to the Basque country. I got to know some of them.

There was a former Soviet General who was with the Voice of America, I can't remember his name. He came to Bilbao and I took him around to talk to a number of these people. It was a very interesting experience because he was interested in knowing what was going on. But some of these, for instance one fellow, they weren't allowed to bring in any money from the Soviet Union, or very little, but they could bring in things. The Spanish government didn't want to admit that the Soviet government had any kind of thing that was worth bringing, but one of them brought a Zil limousine, he wanted to become a taxi driver. That really upset the Spanish apple cart.

There were 2 lady Ph.D. botanists. Of course they couldn't get a job, they were sour apples. I know some of them ended up going back to the Soviet Union. For some months after they arrived you could buy in the market big tins of caviar and other things they had brought. But that was a sidebar.

The Basque nationalists were always a little bit of a chore. One had to sympathize with them for their aspirations but one really couldn't encourage them in their aspirations. So it was always a little bit of a problem.

*Q: Did you get involved in sheep herders and Senator Pat McCarran?*

LEHFELDT: I sent many alleged sheep herders to the United States. The PanAm and the TWA representatives would stream into my consular district. They would organize the lists and coach the guys as to what they were supposed to say. There were damned few sheep herders left in Bilbao. Franco had planted all the grazing areas with pine trees and eucalyptus for paper mills. So finding a real sheep herder was not easy but we sent an awful lot of them over every year.

*Q: They're in Nevada and California.*

LEHFELDT: Nevada, California, Utah and Idaho.

The head of the California range association, from Fresno, his name is John Bidagaray, would come over with someone who was known on the Hill, a lobbyist, as the Sheep Herder. I would go with them around every once in a while to Pamplona and to Vittoria and so on. We really didn't have too much control over it. It was controlled by the airlines and by the McCarran supporters.

*Q: Pat McCarran was the senator from Nevada, that was his main...*

LEHFELDT: Claim to fame for a while.

We also had the Basque-Spanish orphans program. We sent a couple of orphans to the United States, alleged orphans. They were no orphans, no question about that. It wasn't that they didn't have family to take care of them. That was an interesting time.

I was also there during the Suez.

*Q: This is October '56.*

LEHFELDT: At that time I was on assignment detailed as vice consul, consul, in Vigo. This was in the summertime, it wasn't as late as October, it was earlier than that, July I think it was.

The Spanish government customarily moved to La Coruña, moved to Galicia, because Franco would go on his summer cruise. He was a Galician after all. He would go around to his hometown on his yacht. The Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister would trail along on land.

So when I was in Vigo was when Franco was traveling along and the Foreign Minister was there. John Davis Lodge and Homer Byington were also trailing the Foreign Minister because they had to present demarches of one sort or another.

*Q: Lodge was the ambassador and Byington the DCM.*

LEHFELDT: They had to present demarches to the Foreign Minister on the US position on Suez and try to get Spanish support. So I spent a lot of time on the road between the consulate and wherever it was they happened to be. One time padding messages back and forth.

*Q: One time pad being a handwritten cryptography system which was very time consuming.*

LEHFELDT: Very time consuming and tedious. I was day and night for a week on this. It was interesting and I remember once they were meeting in a little place called La Ina. It was a resort on the coast, an island built by a soap manufacturer, very nice.

I had a message that I was instructed had to be delivered immediately to the ambassador. So I walked into a meeting he was having with the Foreign Minister, Fernando de Castiello, and handed it to him just at the time he needed it. It was fortuitous, that was one of the interesting incidents.

*Q: What was the impression you were getting of working with the embassy out of a consulate of Franco at the time?*

LEHFELDT: When I first went there, to Spain in '55, you had the feeling of depression when you got into Spain, repression. It was true. Everybody was careful what they said, what they did, how they disported themselves. Dress was very conservative, ladies were mostly in black because if they weren't in mourning for somebody immediate, they were in mourning for somebody close by. Things were not freely available in the stores. The economy was not really

burgeoning at the time. The left over bitterness from the civil war and World War II was still felt by many people.

The repressions on the Basqueness, the Catalaness and the Andalucianess of people were real. The Basque language was not permitted, you could not teach in it, you couldn't have newspapers in it and so forth and so on. For instance, the bombing of Guernica was still very real.

*Q: This is during the civil war, a famous painting of Picasso.*

LEHFELDT: Guernica is a lovely town, I used to go there.

*Q: Guernica is in the Basque.*

LEHFELDT: It's somewhere between Bilbao and San Sebastian (the summer capital, eventually, when Franco stopped his yachting).

I used to go to Guernica. One of the longest names of a man I've ever heard anywhere in the world is a fellow by the name of Pedro Garaguerica Echevarietay Sauregebeitia.

*Q: You'll get a draft of this and you can spell it.*

LEHFELDT: There were people who had been there and were bombed, it was feria day, a market day. Certainly it was true that Guernica had a special place in the hearts of the Basques because that's where the kings of Spain would come to swear to uphold what was known as the Fueros de Los Basques--the rights of the Basques. And indeed King Juan Carlos has done that, he did it early in his reign.

So that Franco was viewed as a dictator, a repressor, an evil man. There were always rumors that he was deathly ill, that he was going to die. Of course I went back to Spain 20 years later and they were still rampant. They did not view Franco as a savior.

*Q: How about the embassy? What was their viewpoint?*

LEHFELDT: By that time US-Spanish relations were reasonably close. We had several bases--Torrejon, Rota, the one in Zaragoza. So the official line was very much, Franco was maybe not someone you'd want to have home for dinner, but at least we were having relations with him.

*Q: One last question on this. You mentioned Pamplona, did you have problems with Americans getting caught running with the bulls?*

LEHFELDT: I ran the bulls. No, never had any problems. I did it 2 years as a matter of fact, it was great fun. Of course I wasn't one of those "bravos" who would follow those bulls all the way from the beginning down to the end. I would run in front of them and then jump on the doorstep or the windowsill of a friend of mine on the correo. It was interesting.

*Q: Did you have consular problems? People trying to be Ernest Hemingway?*



LEHFELDT: No, I never really had any. In those days nobody got hurt. Somehow, I don't know why, we didn't have the kind of problems in the early '50s that we had later on in the '70s. People got used to the embassy and the consulates being their savior.

I remember though, one couple came to see me in Bilbao. It was shortly after I got there. They wanted me to put a car and a driver at their disposal and take them around the Basque country. Well, I declined the pleasure. They said, "But I thought that was what you were here for, to help us make friends and see the places." A lot of people just didn't understand. As time went on they understood better what we were there for.

**STANLEY J. DONOVAN**  
**Strategic Air Command**  
**Madrid (1955-1960)**

*Stanley J. Donovan was born in Maine in 1910. He graduated from West Point in 1934 and served in the U.S. Air Force. His assignments abroad have included Buenos Aires, Madrid, and Turkey. In 1996 he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: You were in Spain this first time from when to when?*

DONOVAN: The first time was 1955 to 1960.

*Q: 1955 to 60. What did we have in Spain when you arrived and what were our interests?*

DONOVAN: We had a staff qualified to supervise the construction of air fields, lines of communication, air control, and working sites, everything to make our bases secure.

To do the work, we put contracts out for Spanish firms and then supervised the Spanish to see that they did the work. For example, with the site of Torrejon, we had set up a school to train some of this workers in some of the modern equipment, they had no idea in hell how to handle some of this modern equipment and use all of the big trucks and other things. BIW trained if somebody got a contract. Then he would send somebody to be supervised and some to be trained, and whatever they needed to work on. They did a good job, the Spaniards, on the work. They were taught a few lessons, of course, but they did very well, I considered some of the bases in Spain some of the best that we have.

*Q: How were you received by the Spanish military?*

DONOVAN: Just welcomed with open arms. They were very, very good, they were very cooperative. Anything that we needed from them that they had in their power to do and make it available to us. At one of their air bases there, we set up a school in electronic warfare for them. We sent some of their top people back to the U.S. to our schools. Then they came back to head up the section in the schools.

*Q: What was the purpose of all the bases we were building?*

DONOVAN: Originally it was that Strategic Air Command had bases down in North Africa, and LaMay thought that we needed something over there so that his bombers would be effective in any operations that might come up.

*Q: What was your impression of Franco during this initial period?*

DONOVAN: That's a question you'll get as many replies to as you ask the question. I personally think that Franco did a damn good job for Spain, and a lot of people don't realize what he did for Spain during World War II. Hitler and Air Marshall [Hermann] Goering met Franco and Sunja, his foreign minister, who I happen to know, up at the northern border of Spain. Hitler wanted passage of his troops down to Gibraltar. Franco said, "No." We couldn't have gone in the Mediterranean if he had allowed them to take Gibraltar. And another thing that very few know, if a British or American airman was shot down and managed to make his way to the Spanish border, they were more or less escorted to Gibraltar where they made their way back to England to fly again. That was something that he did that was very helpful to our forces.

*Q: Did you find that the Spanish military was interested in what was going on?*

DONOVAN: Oh, very much so. All of their top people were very interested in keeping up with what was going on in Spain, what was going on in the world, how things are moving in Spain, oh, yes, they were.

*Q: Did you have a feeling that the Spanish ruling class was out of touch with everything? They had not been involved in World War II, and having a fascist dictatorship made them a little ostracized it must have been a little bit uncomfortable.*

DONOVAN: Well, I don't think that they really suffered any of those thoughts, you might say. I think their military was all in accord with Franco. They didn't seem to want to form any great deal to throw him out or anything like that, as a matter of fact, you recall that later on there was this attempt to overthrow the government there. An army general took over a radio station there and called for all the other generals to join him and overthrow the government. Young Juan Carlos, the king, brand new in his job, decided not to. He didn't encourage anyone else and they defeated any other attempt to take over the government.

*Q: This was in the 1970s.*

DONOVAN: Yes.

*Q: Did you have any contact with our embassy in Madrid?*

DONOVAN: Yes. Generally speaking, when you have somebody there, the ambassador has a lot to say about it. However, the job of the chief guthsmard, for example, reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I didn't go through any theater commander. I didn't go through any

embassy or the State Department. I went right to the JCS. You might say I had a little theater of my own.

*Q: You left there the first time when?*

DONOVAN: I left in 1960.

**JOHN EDGAR WILLIAMS**  
**Visa/Economic Officer**  
**Madrid (1956-1960)**

*John Edgar Williams was born in South Carolina. He graduated from the University of North Carolina, Yale University and Victoria University. He has served in a variety of posts in England, Spain, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, New Zealand and Canada. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Dr. Anne R. Phillips in 1995.*

*Q: I'm thinking about political situation, I'm thinking about when you were heading down from the North, did you see evidence of Basque activity? Could you see a vast difference from Barcelona to Madrid?*

WILLIAMS: No. I didn't go through Barcelona. I went right down King Alfonso XIII's old highway where he used to drive his Hispano-Suiza every couple of weeks, and make it from Madrid to San Sebastian in six hours. He was a wild man they said, Alfonso XIII. This was before he left the country in 1930. Anyway, I drove down. The road was still very much like it had been at that time and it took me eight hours from Irun to Madrid.

*Q: Tell me about the road. Describe it.*

WILLIAMS: Well, it was a two-lane blacktop. It wound over the Guaderrama Mountains, north of Madrid and south of Segovia. There were all kinds of small mountain ranges up there, but the Guaderrama was the biggest, and it was all hair-pins curves.

*Q: No guard rails?*

WILLIAMS: No, not that I can recall.

*Q: Did you have a center line painted?*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes, there was a center line, I believe, in some places, not all. Around the worst hair-pins. It was quite a road. I drove it many times. There was another road that I drove often which was the road to the Northwest, the Carretera de La Coruna. When driving back to Madrid late at night, I would sometimes find myself behind convoys of trucks that were bringing fresh seafood down to Madrid from La Coruna. The fishing boats would be out all day and then they

would come in to the harbor at La Coruna in the evening. They would ice up all the seafood, fish and shell- fish, oysters, clams and all kinds of things. Then they would load them on these trucks. That fresh seafood would be on sale at five o'clock the next morning in the Madrid market. All the families would send their maids out to buy at that time in the morning to make sure they had fresh seafood. You could get stuck behind several of those trucks coming over the Guaderrama Mountains. It was not my idea of a lot of fun. Anyway, the roads were not very good. I could not discern many lingering after-effects, except political, of the Civil War. I don't recall seeing any ruined buildings in or near Madrid, and I lived in the northwest corner of Madrid where there was a lot of fighting.

*Q: You just didn't see any evidence of it?*

WILLIAMS: I didn't see any evidence of it and there was no discernable Basque activity. The Basque terrorism had not started up at that time. There was, I gather, some long-standing feeling for Basque separatism, but there was no active movement, because Franco had really suppressed all active movements in opposition to his government. You could talk against the government as long as you didn't do it in public, you know. As long as it wasn't in the newspapers or on the radio or anything. You could tell jokes about Franco all you wanted, but you could not organize a movement.

*Q: What about labor and politics? The labor situation, political situation?*

WILLIAMS: Well, you see, there is a long story about the economic development of Spain and the responsibility of the United States for it. We did play a very important role. I was almost four years in Spain. I spent my first couple of years in the Consular section. I was the head of the visa operation there. Then, I moved over into the Economic and Commercial Section. At that time, our AID Mission was joined with the Embassy Economic Section. That is a very unusual arrangement. We had a joint AID Mission-Economic/Commercial Section. Usually they are separate. I was in that for a while and I got a good chance to observe how we were actively helping the Spanish government to move itself into the modern economic era. We started off with the Agreement of 1952, the military base agreement where we agreed to give them economic and military aid in return for allowing us to set up several bases there. Rota the Naval Base in the South, and Torrejon near Madrid and, the big bomber base at Zaragoza. Torrejon was a fighter base. Anyway, that had been going on for several years. They were still under construction there. In fact, while I was there they were still constructing a pipeline from Rota on up through Madrid to Zaragoza for petroleum products for the bases.

*Q: Remind me, how far was the Rota base from Madrid?*

WILLIAMS: Oh, about three hundred miles.

*Q: And then on to --*

WILLIAMS: On to Zaragoza, another one hundred fifty, two hundred miles, something like that. The way pipelines go in this country it's not a long one, but there were right-of-way problems and all that stuff. So, there was some economic activity which had been directly generated by us,

base-building, pipeline building and so on. The thing is, Spain was still an outcast. They were poison as far as the Europeans were concerned, because Franco was considered to be a leftover legacy of Hitler and Mussolini which in some respects was true. Although, I must say, he was not as much of a puppet of Hitler and Mussolini as he has been made out to be. I recall an interesting incident that bears on that.

*Q: I'd like to hear that.*

WILLIAMS: There was a Spanish Marques named Merry del Val who told me, he had been a young man in the Foreign Ministry when he accompanied Franco to meet Hitler at the border at Irun in 1940. Apparently, one of the things that Hitler wanted in return for the aid he had given to Franco during the Civil War was Franco's permission to allow German troops to pass through Spain to attack Gibraltar. The Marques told me that he had been with Franco during the interview with Hitler. Hitler made his request and Franco said no. He didn't want to allow German troops to use Spain as an attack-base. That would bring Spain into the war, and Franco really didn't want to do that. Apparently, Hitler got angrier and angrier until he finally picked up a chair and hit it and broke it on the floor.

*Q: At this meeting?*

WILLIAMS: At this meeting, which apparently brought an end to the meeting. If Franco had allowed the Germans to go through and take Gibraltar, the war might have come out rather differently, because the entrance to the Mediterranean would have been blocked.

*Q: Did this man personally tell you that?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. The Marques de Merry del Val told me that he'd been there personally, he'd seen it and heard it.

*Q: Whoa! That's pretty powerful.*

WILLIAMS: Yes.

*Q: That's amazing. So, Franco was not necessarily the puppet?*

WILLIAMS: No, he wasn't. But, he was very much his own man. He had gotten to where he was by fairly ruthless means. Two senior officers, generals senior to him in the Spanish army, died under rather suspicious circumstances: General Sanjurjo and General Mola. One of them was in a plane crash and they could never quite figure out why the plane had crashed. I forget what happened to the other one. Anyway, I will say the Spanish owe Franco another debt, that is, the economic recovery plan with which we helped very much. We, the U.S. government, specifically the American Embassy there and to be more specific, the combined AID Mission/Economic-Commercial Section. At the time, I said the Spanish were poison as far as the Europeans were concerned. The Europeans hardly wanted to trade with Spain, much less make any agreements with them. They were beginning to set up what became the European Communities. They had already set up the Coal and Steel Community and they had signed the treaty of Rome in 1956.

They were well on their way to creating a United Europe, and Spain was left out. Spain, obviously was not going to get very far economically with a closed economy which they had at the time. In fact, most countries had fairly closed economies, but Spain was worse than most. They had high tariff levels; they had a lot of government subsidies for different activities; they had no currency relationships, clearing arrangements or anything like that with other European countries. It was a closed economy. It was obvious to us that they had to break out of this if they were going to get anywhere as a modern country. Furthermore, if they were going to be our ally, we wanted them to be a strong country with a powerful economy. It was not just for their benefit it was for our benefit, too. But, the benefits overlapped to a great degree. So, we worked on a couple of Franco's most trusted Ministers. Interestingly, these were a couple of guys who were members of the Opus Dei. Do you know what the Opus Dei is?

*Q: No. You'll have to remind me. And do you remember the names also by any chance?*

WILLIAMS: I don't remember the names of these ministers. But one, I think, was the Minister of Commerce and Industry and the other was the Minister of Economy. The Opus Dei is a Catholic lay religious organization in which the members take vows very similar to priestly vows. It's a very closely held organization and I'm not sure really what the basic idea of it is, but I know the people involved are Catholic to the core, but international Catholic. They're not provincial. They want to create a large Catholic community. In other words, these guys were interested not only in developing Spain economically, but seeing that Spain had good relations with their fellow Catholic countries, like Italy and France. I think this was part of the motivation behind their willingness to go that extra mile to bring Spain into the modern world economically. Anyway, we eventually had some help on this. There was a particular Frenchman, Jacques Rueff -- I forget what his position was, but he had a very prominent position in the French government and later in the European Communities, and he helped a lot on this. We persuaded these ministers in turn to persuade Franco to adopt an economic stabilization plan to open the economy, to devalue the currency, to free the currency. In other words, get away from a pegged currency. If you're going to have free international trade you can't have a pegged currency at some particular value in relation to the dollar or gold. You must do these things and lower the tariffs and cut government subsidies to favored activities. In other words, they had to allow free market principles to work.

*Q: What would have been some examples of government subsidies?*

WILLIAMS: Public transportation was one of the big ones. Ship- building was another one. Automobile manufacture. These things had been considered to be important back during the Civil War and they just hung on. If you're going to have a free market economy you can't have a lot of government subsidies around. Anyway, they adopted a plan which would, over a period of time, put into effect economic laws and rules and regulations of a free market type. They did have a couple of very difficult years after this. This was done in 1959. I was no longer there after mid '60, but I understand they had a couple of fairly tough years in 1960 and 1961, but ever since then, the Spanish economy has just been zooming.

*Q: That's very helpful and good. Going back to your involvement in that. Tell a little bit more specifically about how that worked.*

WILLIAMS: Well, actually my involvement personally was largely looking out for trade opportunities for American companies and doing analyses of different industries in Spain so that American businesses, on reading my analysis of the Spanish automotive industry, the ship building industry, the telecommunications industry, the electric power generation industry and so on could get an idea of where they might be able to fit in and sell some products to Spain. That was my main involvement.

*Q: Other goods and services. I'm thinking of '75. I know Proctor and Gamble for instance had executive people in Madrid. But, other U.S. companies?*

WILLIAMS: Very few American companies at that time had representatives in Madrid. Their representative in Italy or in France or somewhere where they would occasionally come and visit, you know. I do remember one particular incident when a Spanish businessman came to see me one day and said he was a shoe manufacturer. He said he had heard about a big shoe exhibition or trade fair in Chicago, and he was interested in going.

He asked if I could give him any information about it. So I did. I give him all the information he needed in order to apply to attend, and he went. I asked him to please call me again when he returned and let me know whether he had been able to sell any shoes over there. They made lovely shoes in Spain.

*Q: Talking about the shoe manufacturer in Madrid who came to you and wanted information on the Trade Show in Chicago and you gave him the information.*

WILLIAMS: I gave him the information and then, when he came back, he came to see me and he said, "Ah, Señor Williams, it's a disaster. I've accepted orders for many thousands of pairs of shoes. I can't manufacture all of these in the time that I would have to do it to fulfill these orders." I said, "What you need to do, I suggest, is get together with other small manufacturers and see if you can't distribute your orders around and maybe form a consortium to fulfill these orders." I said, "I'll tell you, if you don't fulfill these orders now, you'll never get another order. So, you really need to do something, because otherwise, the Italians are going to wipe you out." Well, apparently he did get together a group of manufacturers, they did fulfill their orders. Of course, the Italian shoes are always more popular in the United States than the Spanish, but the Spanish got a good little chunk of the market. You see, trade has to be two-way. If the Spanish earn dollars, they can buy more from us.

*Q: Where were they getting the raw materials mostly?*

WILLIAMS: Native raw materials mostly. The leather from inside Spain. They had a lot of cows.

*Q: I'm trying to think, would that have been mostly south Madrid or all over?*

WILLIAMS: All over. Of course, the dairy industries are more in the northwest, in Galicia. But, I'm not sure if the dairy cow is the one that the leather comes from to make shoes. It's a fine leather. Of course, there were pigs too. In Spanish they've got about eight different words for "pig." So, there's a lot of them.

Q: *So, you encouraged him just to get moving?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. Again, trade is a two-way street. If you want to export you got to be able to import too. That's been my philosophy all along. Trade is a two way street.

Q: *I was thinking back to 1956 that the Barcelona government had closed plants by Franco's orders. My question is, how much give and take was there, if any, between Madrid and Barcelona? Was Franco more concerned about things just in Madrid?*

WILLIAMS: No. He was worried about things all over Spain, particularly Barcelona, because that was the major industrial and business city, as it had been since Carthaginian times. As you know, I'm sure the Barcelona was named for Hamilcar Barca, who was Hannibal's father. It's an old city. It's been there a long time and it's going to be there a long time. But the thing is, the Catalans had never been very happy being ruled by Spaniards. During the Civil War, of course, they were on the side of the Republic, because they thought they would get more rights and autonomies from the Republican government than they would from the Franco government. They were right, too. But, the thing is, Barcelona and Cataluna, in general was a real hot-bed of republican sentiment, including long after the war. It was never in Franco's good graces and there was always a struggle there between the Catalans and the Castilians.

Q: *Yeah. I can remember when we were there, that was in '75. People in Barcelona said, "Where are you going?" We said, "Well, we're going back to Madrid." They said, "Well, why would you do that?" Something else, and this may not be about the American Embassy, but somewhere I read that women got property rights about 1957. I'm not sure what this note had to do with, what were women like, just an ordinary woman in Spain, 1956-57? I know that's a generalization.*

WILLIAMS: Yes, it is a generalization and I really don't remember about the property rights. But, women were very much under the thumbs of their husbands. I do remember that married women were very faithful to their husbands. Also, there was National Service for women, as well as men, on reaching eighteen or nineteen. It was social service for women, military for men. That did a lot of good.

Q: *And the extended family with strong generations stayed in one household?*

WILLIAMS: Yes, indeed. Particularly in the small towns in the villages and countryside, a woman who was widowed never married again. She always wore black from then on. She was always introduced as "La Viuda de Lopez" (for example), meaning "the widow of Lopez."

Q: *That was her identity?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. I would be surprised to learn that women had acquired modern property rights in 1957.



*Q: I'm not sure what this note was. I will have to do some more homework, because even in the United States, married women, even as late as the 1970's had to have permission of their husbands to sign a contract.*

WILLIAMS: Yes. Well, women in Spain certainly had to have permission from their husbands to do anything, for example, to immigrate. During my two years as Chief of the Visa Section, a woman might come in and want to immigrate to the United States. She would not be able to get a Spanish passport unless her husband had agreed to it and signed some document saying that he gave his wife permission to get a passport. Of course, if she had a passport, we, the Embassy, did not require that a woman have permission from her husband to get a Visa. But, of course, we had to require that she have a passport.

*Q: So, she had to fulfill the rules from both countries?*

WILLIAMS: Yes.

*Q: Alright. Thinking more about the unusual arrangement, the economic. You said that wasn't usually the case, economic section tied in with the --*

WILLIAMS: With the AID Mission.

*Q: Tell me again, it was just not the case in other European countries?*

WILLIAMS: No. Of course, earlier, we had the Marshall Plan, what they called Point Four under Truman. These were various other ancestors of the present AID program. Usually, as I said, they were a separate office within or attached to the Embassy. Not necessarily in the Embassy building, but attached to the Embassy. It was rather rare for this to be a joint Embassy AID Mission setup.

*Q: Also, what about strike, miners, mining? Tell me about that.*

WILLIAMS: Oh. Let me put it like this. The miners were a thorn in the flesh of most Spanish governments for the previous hundred years, especially back in the early 30's. The miners strike up around Oviedo, got to be very serious.

*Q: And what were they mining?*

WILLIAMS: Mostly coal mining in the North. There were some iron ore up there too. It was centered around Oviedo. The miners were apparently were the most militant of the unions, in the time preceding the establishment of the Republic in 1930 and during the Republic. Although, they were nominally allies of the Republic, if the Republican Government in Madrid didn't give them everything they wanted they would go on strike at the drop of a miner's hat. But, of course there was no striking during Franco's regime. Any strikes would be ruthlessly suppressed.

*Q: How ruthlessly?*

WILLIAMS: He would send in the Guardia Civil, the civil guard, and possibly shoot a few people. I don't recall any specific incidents. I may be maligning them, I'm not sure that they actually did shoot anybody. I'm not sure that any of the strikes or any attempts to strike got that far under Franco.

Q: *But, just great fear?*

WILLIAMS: Yes.

Q: *I was aware of the presence of soldiers even in '75 and at banks and other places. I mean, I felt very safe walking the streets late at night.*

WILLIAMS: Oh, you could feel safe.

Q: *I felt very safe. Much safer than the United States.*

WILLIAMS: I'm not sure if I mentioned to you before about the one incident that happened while I was there involving crime and punishment. A couple of guys killed an Army Paymaster and robbed the payroll. This Army officer was taking the payroll to his regiment, and these two guys held him up and killed him. Within 72 hours, they had been caught, charged, tried, convicted, appealed, appeal denied, and executed.

Q: *Within 72 hours. Ah!*

WILLIAMS: That was the way things went at the time. There was no doubt that they were the ones that did it. There was just no doubt at all. This was the reason why people felt safe walking the streets at that time.

Q: *Where was that?*

WILLIAMS: I forget where in Spain it was. I'm not sure if it was in the Madrid area or whether it was around Segovia or Avila. I'm just not sure.

Q: *Would that have been reported in the newspaper? How would you people have gotten word of that?*

WILLIAMS: I really don't know. I may have well gotten the word of it through some Army officers. I had a lot of groups of friends there. I had one group of friends who were Army officers. I had another group of friends who were artists, painters and another group of friends who were theater people. I guess mixed in with those were people from the university. So, I may well have gotten it from some of my Army officer friends. I used to love to give parties and get these groups together.

Q: *I'd like to hear more about that. I'm intrigued about that. Tell me about the groups.*

WILLIAMS: Oh well. I had several girlfriends at the time in Spain. One of the girlfriends was in to theater work. She wasn't herself an actress, but she was from a sort of formerly well-to-do Spanish family. Her father had been a governor of several provinces, a civil governor under the Republic. So, she and her father had gone into exile after the fall of the Republic. She spent several years in Mexico, and then came back, because she had an uncle on the other side who was a senior judge under the Franco regime. Anyway, she was well connected all over, but especially in the theater, so that's where my theater group of friends came from. I had another girlfriend who was a painter. I met a lot of painters. We were at a party one night at the studio of a friend who was a painter. Everybody had a little too much to drink, I guess, and I said, "I really do like that pretty painting over there. How much do you want for it?" He gave me some ridiculously low price and I said, "Sure, I'm going to take it with me." And, he said, "Fine. I can paint another one that would accompany it if you want me to." Well, I don't think I ever actually got him to do that. But, I love the painting, which is hanging upstairs. It's a painting of a ship in a harbor up there, the harbor of Gijon. Anyway, that was Pepe Cousino, my friend the painter. There were a bunch of real art-crafty types. Then, my Army officer friends. They were all Francophiles to the death. I had one particularly good friend, a Colonel, who used to take me to the bull-fights. He had been a widower for several years. He had two permanent seats at the Madrid bull-ring.

*Q: Sun or shade? Not that it matters.*

WILLIAMS: It was actually shade, sombra. So he would invite friends, including me, quite often. I learned so much about bull-fighting from that guy. Then, some of my other Army officer friends were members of a club which I joined called Cacerias Militares a Calallo. The Military Horseback Hunt Club. I didn't hunt on horseback. Actually, they didn't hunt very much either. They would take some hares out and let them go and then chase them with greyhounds on horseback. The "galgos de campo," like greyhounds. They were beautiful dogs. We would spend many Sundays out there. I would sit up there at the club house with one of my girlfriends and some of my Army officer friends and their wives and/or girlfriends and watch the hunt progressing across the land, the territory in front of us. It was really nice.

*Q: Where was that location?*

WILLIAMS: It was about fifteen miles southwest of Madrid. I was a member also of the Military Officers Club downtown. There, I did a lot of fencing. I had some good friends who were fencers. I used to be on the University of North Carolina Fencing Team. I can prove it, I can show you in my college annual.

*Q: I believe you.*

WILLIAMS: So, I would go to this club. The Fencing Master was an old Olympic champion. We did a lot of fencing there. Anyway, I had really good friends there and I enjoyed it.

*Q: I'm amazed about the different groups of friends. How were you thought of as an American diplomat? What did people think of you and how did that happen?*

WILLIAMS: Well, let me put it like this. If you were a diplomat at that time in Spain and this still applies most places, you were automatically a member of the upper class. I mean the upper class! And you were thought of as such, even though your background, back in your home country, might not have been upper class at all. Well, heck, I'm a North Carolina small-town boy, but nobody there really held that against me. A diplomat was accepted. We were offered memberships in clubs. I joined several, including the Club Tiro de Pichon, the Pigeon Shooting Club. Nowadays, people get shocked when I tell them about that. "You mean you actually shot live pigeons?" "Yeah, sure did." Then, we would take them home with us and cook them. Actually, they were more like doves.

*Q: Broil them or braise them, whatever?*

WILLIAMS: Broil them. Anyway, they accepted me as an equal. In Spanish, as I'm sure you know, there's a formal form of address and a familiar form of address. Well, between people of the upper class, you very soon, I mean very quickly, get into the familiar form of address, "tutear." They say "tu" instead of "usted," which is very difficult for people who have only studied Spanish and never lived in a Spanish speaking country. One of my oldest and dearest friends is a teacher of Spanish down at Georgia State. I still cannot get her to consistently say "tu" when she's talking to me. She always says "usted." That's just the way she was taught and some teacher told her that that's the way you do it. It's not. You have to be very careful in listening to the way people are talking to you so that as soon as somebody starts using the familiar form of address to you, you can immediately reciprocate, because if you don't, you have lost your opportunity. You are considered to be -- well, you're with-drawn, you're distant.

*Q: Her country of origin, her native country? The friend in Georgia?*

WILLIAMS: Her country of origin is Georgia. I don't mean Soviet Georgia either. Where Shalikashvili's ancestors came from. You know, General Shalikashvili.

*Q: So you did move in those circles. Tell me a little bit more about university people and what was the university's situation in the 50's or 60's?*

WILLIAMS: One of the university's situations was that they were held on a very tight rein. There was very little of what we would think of as academic freedom, that is, freedom of inquiry or freedom to teach alternate views of history. Some of my friends who were at the university were telling me there was a Francoist view of almost everything from the beginning of the 19th century through the middle of the 20th century. You could teach different views of what happened back in the 19th century or earlier, but when you got up in to the 20th century you started having to be very careful. There weren't many good academics. Salvador de Madariaga left. Unamuno went nuts. But let me add something to that. Arts and sciences just didn't enter in to that. There was nothing of the kind of the thing that they had in the Soviet Union, where science had to be politically correct. Well, I say the Soviet Union, maybe even here now in many universities. There was nothing of that. Arts and sciences were taught like one would expect them to be taught.

*Q: I'm thinking also of music and drama and plays.*

WILLIAMS: Now drama was something else. Playwrights were always trying to sneak things in to their writings.

*Q: You mentioned someone specific?*

WILLIAMS: Luca de Tena, I believe was the main one. By the way, Le came from a very influential family, and therefore had some protection. I think some of his relatives were prominent newspaper publishers. He would come out with plays which had little allusions in them. This was just beginning the late 50's. There were allusions to -- things that people could interpret as applying to the present even though, in the play, they applied to the past. They were in costumes from the 18th century. So, you could say this is the 18th century it has nothing to do with what's happening today. But, they did sneak in a few political criticisms. I learned about this from my friends in the theater.

*Q: I'm thinking about the places where these productions were actually held? Who came to the plays? Who would come to the theater? The more privileged or everybody? How would that compare to the United States?*

WILLIAMS: The middle and upper classes went to the theater. The lower classes didn't. There was one incident that I think is worth telling about, because it gives you an idea of what life was like for artistically-inclined people under the Franco regime. My girlfriend who was a painter asked me one time if I would like to go to Segovia with her to attend a meeting to honor some anniversary of the writer, Antonio Machado. There were two poets, Manuel Machado and Antonio Machado. This was Antonio, who had apparently lived and worked in Segovia. I'm not all that familiar with Machado's work, frankly. My favorite poet in Spanish is Federico Garcia Lorca. Anyway, we went to Segovia, to the place where Machado had lived and worked. It was an old 19th century apartment house. Not all that old considering that you got a lot of 16th and 17th century houses in Segovia. It was an apartment house several stories high built around a little internal court-yard a fairly narrow carriage entrance from the street going back into the court-yard. Many people were gathered in the court-yard to hear a reading of Machado's work. There was an official government celebration going on at the same time in honor of this poet in Segovia, which was where he was born. This meeting was sort of in competition with the official government sponsored commemorative. Anyway, there were a whole lot of people in the court-yard there, including my girlfriend and I. They were reading some of Machado's works and talking about the freedom to write and so on. Some plain-clothes policemen were seen filtering through the crowd. This was noticed by some of the people, including the young man who was on the platform reciting, talking or whatever. So, somebody shouted in the crowd, or maybe it was the young man on the stage, I'm not sure. But, somebody shouted, "Los Fascistas a Soria!" ("Let the Fascists go to Soria.") With that, all these plain-clothes men then tried to converge on the fellow on the platform, obviously intending to arrest him, but he got down and got away. I said to my girlfriend, "Look, let's get the hell out of here, because I'm afraid that this is going to turn into something that I would not want to have the American Embassy involved in." I might get declared "persona non grata," might get kicked out of Spain. Anyway, we sneaked out and got away.

*Q: Did you learn whether he might have been arrested or not?*

WILLIAMS: They did arrest some people, but they let them go.

*Q: Would those plain-clothes men have been local people?*

WILLIAMS: I don't know. They might well have been -- they would have been people operating under the Ministry of Interior from Madrid, but they might have been stationed locally. They have delegations of the Ministry of the Interior in all cities all over Spain.

*Q: Would people have known who might have been spying or concerned? How much suspicion was there?*

WILLIAMS: A lot of suspicion. Like I say, these people were spotted by the crowd when they came in and started walking towards the platform. They weren't shoving and pushing, they were just sort of working their way up toward the front.

*Q: Would this have been day, afternoon, evening?*

WILLIAMS: This was afternoon.

*Q: So they shouted out?*

WILLIAMS: Yeah, the shout really triggered it. That was fun.

*Q: Were you going by car? How did you get back?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. We had driven up in my Mercedes.

*Q: Oh my goodness. What size of engine of car?*

WILLIAMS: It was a 220-S; in other words, a 2.2 liter engine.

*Q: I remember seeing the government cars there in '75. It seems to me that those black cars were Dodges.*

WILLIAMS: It was a 4-door sedan, black, a lovely car. I ordered it from Germany. And, when I left Spain, I ordered a Mercedes-Benz sports car which I went and picked up at the factory. After I left Spain, I went to do my two weeks Army training in Germany and picked up my sports car during that time. I drove it down to Naples and put it on a ship to New York. The same ship I sailed on. I forget whether it was the "Independence" or the "Constitution."

*Q: What color was it?*

WILLIAMS: Carolina blue.

Q: *Oh my goodness. They make Carolina blue Mercedes?*

WILLIAMS: Well, I told them I wanted one. At the time you could order it in just about any color you wanted. There was a wide variety of colors.

Q: *Did they have special people to mix the paint?*

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't know, but it came out Carolina blue.

Q: *That's neat. Tell me about other people in the Diplomatic Corps, your friends. It seems that it was a great help that you knew a lot of people from Madrid. What about other people in the Corps, people you worked with up there in the hierarchy?*

WILLIAMS: Well, we had the hierarchy and the lower-archy.

Q: *Whatever.*

WILLIAMS: Well, we had Spanish employees besides the Americans in the Embassy. I supervised a number of Spanish employees and several Americans in both my capacities. When I was Chief of the Visa Section and then later when I went in to the Economic-Commercial Section. One of my employees in the Economic-Commercial Section was a Spanish Count. The Count of Casa Flores. He was a young man. Let me put it like this: he was not the brightest young man around, but when I needed to establish a contact with some Spanish company, corporation or organization, I would send out the Count of Casa Flores first, and he would go and present his card. He would always be received immediately by the Chief Executive Officer and would give them an explanation as to why Mr. Williams from the Embassy wanted to come and see them. They would immediately agree. He was a great door-opener, let me tell you.

Q: *And he didn't say anything terribly embarrassing; the title got him in and got you in?*

WILLIAMS: The title got him in and got me in, yes indeed.

Q: *Say more about the class structure. I've got two questions more about the Diplomatic Corps and jobs, chores, goals or every-day life?*

WILLIAMS: Well, I was not so much caught up in to the active social life of the Embassy people as a lot of people were, because more of my life was out in the Spanish community. I was not married.

Q: *That's what I was thinking. That gave you more of an advantage in many ways.*

WILLIAMS: That doesn't mean that I didn't get invited to parties or didn't invite other Americans to my parties, I did, because I wanted to get a good mix, particularly the Ambassador's parties. The Ambassador would invite a lot of people, particularly the single members of his staff to mix at the big receptions and to talk to people. I told you earlier that when I first arrived there that my Spanish was totally inadequate, but after about three months

my fluency begin to improve. After a year or so I was pretty fluent. So, I would go to the Ambassador's parties as a mixer. I met a lot of interesting people that way too. A lot of people including Christopher Columbus. Does that name ring a bell? Cristobal Colon, actually, the descendant of the original. Anyway, as far as relations with the other Embassy people, we had good relations. I remember there was one member of our Embassy staff who was the CIA Station Chief at the time was Archibald Roosevelt. He was the grandson of Teddy Roosevelt. His wife's name was, well, I can't remember her real first name but she was known as Lucky. She later became Chief of Protocol in the Department of State. Lucky Roosevelt. She was from Tennessee. She was from Lebanese parents and she looked as Lebanese as you can get, but she had a very thick Tennessee accent. You think of accents like that as being more from Georgia, but she had a real good Southern accent.

*Q: That would be different.*

WILLIAMS: They were a nice couple.

*Q: How was her Spanish?*

WILLIAMS: Reasonable as I recall. Not terribly good, but reasonable.

*Q: Southern accent Spanish?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. Anyway, we had an heir of the Dodge family there too, as I recall. The General Motors Dodge. We had somebody from one of the big cereal families, not Kellogg, but equally well known.

*Q: General Mills?*

WILLIAMS: I can't think of his name. The name was well known, but I can't think of it right now. Darn it, there goes my memory. Anyway, we had a good group of people at the Embassy at the time. Ambassador Lodge was a very socially minded person.

*Q: How?*

WILLIAMS: He was an old politician, aside from being an old movie actor. He went in the Navy in World War II and abandoned his movie career. He came out as a Commander, and then went into politics in Connecticut. He was elected to the House of Representatives, along with other fairly well known people, like Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy. Anyway, he was an intensely political, social type of person. He loved to meet people. He would shake hands and talk to people. He spoke excellent Spanish, excellent French, and pretty good Italian. His wife was an American -- I think she was an American-born Italian. Some of her brothers and sisters were born in Italy, but I think she was one of the American-born ones, and had been raised going back and forth from Italy to the United States. A high class Italian family you know. Francesca Braggiotti, one of her brothers, Chad, was a career Foreign Service Officer. Anyway, he would give lots of parties and all kinds of people would come, of course. Ministers of the government, admirals, generals, rectors of universities, artists, movie actors, the whole works. You might



meet anybody at one of their parties. And their dinners something else! We had protocol problems with some of the dinners because of the nobility.

*Q: Tell me about that.*

WILLIAMS: Well, there were different grades of nobility. You have to make sure that you are seating them properly and you have to remember that, when you get below the Duke level you go down to Marques and Count (conde) and Vizconde and Baron. Some of these are Grandees of Spain and some are not. Being a Grandee of Spain is special. All Dukes are Grandees of Spain, but not all of the rest of nobility are grandees of Spain. Now a Marques would normally out-rank a Count. But a Count who is a Grandee of Spain would out-rank a Marques who is not a Grandee. So, you had these complications at the dinner-table.

*Q: Who made those final decisions on the protocol?*

WILLIAMS: Well, sometimes I would, because the Ambassador recruited me as a part-time aide and assistant. We just got along well and he would take me with him on trips. For example, he would tell my boss to liberate me for about six weeks each summer to accompany him to Sebastian, because the government would move; Franco and his ministers would move to Sebastian for the better climate in the summer. Too damn hot in Madrid. So the Diplomatic Corps would have to go there to be near the government. This was always after July 18th, which was the anniversary of the Franco uprising or rebellion in 1936. For six weeks after that, everybody would be in San-Sebastian, and I would go up there with the Ambassador. Then, the Ambassador came to rely on me for protocol matters and I would frequently have to draw up seating arrangements for dinners. I would often call up the protocol people at the Foreign Ministry to get help. I didn't want to goof and have the Ambassador lose confidence in me.

*Q: Were there more winter parties or summer parties or just all year round?*

WILLIAMS: Well, all year round really, except in the summer. Well, he would usually have one big party in San-Sebastian during the summer. They rented a house near the beach up there and sometimes invited people to beach picnics. But they would entertain all year round in Madrid.

*Q: So, you called in reinforcements sometimes on this protocol business?*

WILLIAMS: Oh, sure. Protocol and general decorum were very important. I mentioned my British girlfriend (ex-fiancee) who showed up after sending me the ring back. Anyway, the first Sunday she was there she wanted to go to church so I took her to church. She was wearing what she would have worn to church in England. It was a summery day and she had a nice dress on with no sleeves, practically. As a good Catholic, which she was, she had a little thing on her head, but they would not let her in without covering her arms. In Spain, they had no Second Amendment. There was no right to bare arms. (Excuse my propensity for punning). I thought that was interesting, because the government was closely interlocked in many ways with the Catholic church.

*Q: Yes. I felt that was so even in the 70's. I was aware of the British, the Church of England was maybe allowed to have a church building there. Were they there in your time?*

WILLIAMS: There was a Church of England there.

*Q: But, as I understood there was not that relaxation for other Protestant groups.*

WILLIAMS: No. I'm not sure that they were forbidden or whether it was just there weren't enough people there of other Protestant denominations to establish a church. I'm a Presbyterian and I doubt if there were enough Presbyterians there to have a church. At the time, this was before the big Mormon campaign had started, or the Seventh Day Adventist and all those. I was just trying to recall whether there were any active Jewish synagogues. I don't recall really. That question suddenly popped into my mind and I can't answer it.

*Q: I felt so aware of the Catholic presence and that it was very much tied in to government.*

WILLIAMS: There is the old synagogue down in Toledo of course, but I'm not sure whether that's active or not.

*Q: I have a feeling it's more of a tourist attraction. I wasn't there, but I have a feeling it was more tourist than anything else, but I wouldn't know. Somewhere in my notes I put that a Baptist leader was arrested, but I don't know what that was about.*

WILLIAMS: I don't recall anything about that from my time.

*Q: In a way, I guess the roles of women were much more set.*

WILLIAMS: You recall that I mentioned National Service for women. At that time, there was a universal National Service. The young men went into the military service for a couple of years.

*Q: In the 1950's? The time you were there?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. In the 1950's. This went back at least to the 1940's, perhaps earlier, but I think it had been installed by the Franco regime. Also, for young women and girls out of high school there was a National Service obligation. They all went into it. They couldn't get out of it. Just being from a good family didn't mean you got out of it. The eighteen, nineteen, twenty old girls from Madrid would often go out to some small town in the provinces. It was kind of like the Domestic Peace Corps. These girls would go out there and they would teach these village and country and provincial girls some of the things that they knew about as young city women. These were things that were traditional women skills like sewing and mending and cooking and nutrition and things of that kind. They would, in turn, learn some rural skills. I thought it was interesting that they had this universal service, and girls and women were included. It got these girls from Madrid and Barcelona and Bilbao out into smaller places where they probably would have never gone to spend any time. It got some of the girls from the small places into the cities. I think it helped promote a more unified Spanish society, because Spain has always been chopped up into different ethnic and linguistic groups, by region. The people from Cataluna, of course,

were the main separatists; the Basques are separatists, the Andalusians at times have been separatists, the Galicians have been separatists. Many people feel they are, for example, more Galician or Andalusian than Spaniards. I think this universal service did an awful lot to break down this old provincialism in Spain and I think this was one of the good legacies of the Franco Regime. I'm not sure, but I don't think they have National Service for women any more.

Q: *That was for how long?*

WILLIAMS: I think for women it was a year. I think for men it was two years.

Q: *But even young women from privileged families had to do this?*

WILLIAMS: Oh, yes indeed!

Q: *Would they just take a whole year out of schooling?*

WILLIAMS: I think this was considered a part of their schooling. I believe it was a solid year and not broken up into summers.

Q: *I can remember you were talking about life in the provinces. I was aware that women there, even from very poor families would have extremely well dressed children. I can remember their white socks on very dusty roads.*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes. The children. The care and attention that was lavished on their children was just really something to see. They really did take care of their kids.

Q: *What I would like to do is maybe pick it up another time. Talk some more. We haven't even begun to scratch the surface on Spain, but when you were leaving there, what did you think would happen in the country? What was the feeling that you had?*

WILLIAMS: I was very optimistic and I believe my optimism was justified by later events. I thought that our economic plan which we had persuaded the Spanish government to adopt was going to have the effects that we predicted for it. Indeed it did later have those effects. As I mentioned, this came after an initial period of difficulty. But I was very optimistic, because down the road we could see the end of the Franco period had to come at some point. I don't think anybody at that time quite knew how this was going to play out. The way it actually did play out is another of Franco's great legacies to the Spanish people: the King, Juan Carlos. He educated this young man. He made sure that this young man got an education that would fit him to be the King, because Franco was determined not to permit the so-called legitimate heir to the throne, Don Juan to return as King, and indeed he was right. Don Juan would have been a disaster as King. Don Juan was a dinosaur. You know, you talk about right wing troglodytes, he is an original. But he was the legitimate heir as the eldest living and competent son of King Alfonso XIII. It took a lot of doing for Franco to get him to give up his right to the succession in order to put Don Juan Carlos in as King. I think we have seen that Don Juan Carlos has done a really excellent job. As you will recall, there was sort of a -- well, you can't hardly call it a revolt, but several Civil Guard officers went into the Parliament Chambers and started shooting into the

ceiling and all of the Parliamentarians dodged under their desks except Calvosotelo. They were trying to start an armed uprising against a government they considered far too liberal. They had thought apparently that the King would go along with them and endorse it. But, he said, "No, stop. We will not have any of this." This of course was after Franco's death that we are talking about. But, the few officers who were in on this were arrested and charged. I don't think that anything bad happened to them, but the King immediately let it be known where he stood on this kind of thing. I think the Spanish people owe Franco a lot for the King and the economic plan.

*Q: How important was the Foreign Service? How critical was American Embassy life in that effort? So what?*

WILLIAMS: Well, again I think that John Davis Lodge had established wide-spread, and excellent contacts among the Spanish people. While most of the contacts and friendships were with people in the middle and upper classes, he would go out to little places too. I accompanied him on a number of these trips out into the lesser little towns and cities. I remember our visit to Cuenca and down to Granada and all kinds of places. He would shake hands with little guys. The man on the street, the shop-keepers and everyone, and they all would go away thinking, "Ah, we've shaken the hand of the American Ambassador." So, I think the fact that he established such popularity for himself and for the United States helped a lot in this effort to convince the Spaniards to come out of their shell and to enter the modern world, specifically to be our allies and be Europeans. We were not trying to bring them over to just be U.S. allies to the exclusion of the Europeans, we wanted them to be Europeans and allies.

*Q: But to think about their own culture and respect that?*

WILLIAMS: Yes, and also think about their relationship with the United States in the background. As Americans, we were always considering what is in the best interest of the United States! What is in our shared interest? I think we generally came to the conclusion that our interests were so much overlapping that we could really almost say that what was in the best interests of the United States was usually in the best interests of Spain.

*Q: It seems that would take some doing, because some of those village do seem quite remote and quite far from Madrid.*

WILLIAMS: Yes.

*Q: Maybe not that far geographically, but worlds apart, it seemed to me. Tell me about the trip to Cuenca.*

WILLIAMS: It's a lovely little town. While we were there, they were having part of their Easter celebration. One of the parts of it was a parade of penitents. Cuenca, as you know, is on a steep bluff overlooking the river Jucar. They were filing up this steep path up into the central city from down below and they were all wearing what we think of as Ku Klux robes. Those white robes with red crosses on them and these pointy tops over their heads. You would have thought it was a Ku Klux Klan gathering, but that's what the Catholic penitents wear, or they did at that time. Of course, nowadays we are so inclusive we don't want to recognize there's any such thing as a sin,

it's just an alternative life-style or whatever and there's nothing to be penitent for. But, at that time there were real penitents. Some of them were carrying big crosses on their backs. That reminds me that one time in Barcelona I saw a similar kind of parade. There was a woman who was walking on her tip toes, barefoot, carrying a heavy cross on her back. Gosh!

*Q: That's heavy duty seeking for forgiveness, big time.*

WILLIAMS: Yeah.

*Q: So, the procession was just winding up to Cuenca.*

WILLIAMS: Yes. I remember that night, there was a sort of a little electrical fire alarm in the hotel. Apparently, there was a short circuit or something and there was a lot of smoke, but not very much fire. The Ambassador and his wife and I, we all had to evacuate our rooms and stand out in the street for awhile.

*Q: What was that like? Did you have much warning?*

WILLIAMS: Well, we were all in bed and there was no warning, just that we smelled smoke and somebody came around and knocked on our door and said, "There seems to be some problem here," so we got out. But it didn't last for very long, because nothing was really on fire, it was just some wires. It was an ancient hotel. I mean it was really an old monastery converted into a hotel about the sixteenth century or something like that.

*Q: So you were there when, 19 --?*

WILLIAMS: This would have been '57 or '58 I think.

*Q: About mid way into your term, right?*

WILLIAMS: Yeah, right.

*Q: What was Lodge's personality like?*

WILLIAMS: Oh, he was very outgoing and ebullient and sometimes a bit haughty, but this didn't interfere with being real friendly to people. Not friendly in a back-slapping kind of way. He wasn't a back-slapping politician, he was a hand-shaking politician and there is a difference there. He was just a very open kind of guy. Most of my fellow Foreign Service Officers didn't like him, but he and I got along just great.

*Q: Why didn't they like him?*

WILLIAMS: I really don't know. Maybe they felt he was too much a politician. At that time and even today, there still is some lingering feeling against politically appointed Ambassadors among career officers. Every career officer will accept the fact that there are politically appointed

Ambassadors and admit that they include some very good people. But, you can tell sort of in the background that they really think that a career man would probably do a better job.

*Q: I understand what you are saying. Yes, there could have been that feeling.*

WILLIAMS: This was particularly true back in the Department of State.

*Q: Let's talk about rank in the Foreign Service.*

WILLIAMS: Well, the Foreign Service has different sets of ranks, depending whether you are stationed at an Embassy or in the Department of State. Now of course, every Foreign Service Officer has a personal rank. It is, in a way, like military ranks, but not quite. What I think you're more interested in is probably in an Embassy abroad. Nowadays, all of our Foreign Service principal posts in independent countries are Embassies. We used to have some Legations, but we no longer have these, because some countries got offended when we would only have a Legation rather than an Embassy in that country. It used to be that an Ambassador was in charge of an Embassy and a Minister was in charge of a Legation. But the Ambassador Extraordinary is the top man at an Embassy in a national capital. Under him, if it's a fairly big place, there would be a Minister who is the Deputy Chief of Mission. The Deputy Chief of Mission might have a different title. He might have the title of Minister, he might have the title of Counselor, or, in some small places he might even have the title of First Secretary, but he is the Deputy Chief of Mission and that's the job title, not a diplomatic title. These diplomatic titles came from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and they were all laid out very carefully. So, under the Ambassador in that big Embassy there is a Minister. In those big Embassies there are several Counselors. In a small Embassy, you might have only one Counselor and he would be the Deputy Chief of Mission. At the big Embassies, there would be a Counselor in charge of each major section of the Embassy. For example in Ottawa, I was the Counselor for Commercial Affairs, in charge of all commercial activities. Then, below the Counselor rank, there are First Secretaries, Second Secretaries and Third Secretaries. Then, there are also Attaches. They might come at any place in the hierarchy. Technically, according to the Congress of Vienna they are not part of the diplomatic hierarchy, but they are, as the name implies, "attached." But, in our system you might have an agricultural attache, a commercial attache, a civil air attache, a drug attache, and others. There has been a great process of rank inflation in recent years. A friend of mine, for example, was until recently the Agricultural Minister in London. That Embassy has not just one Minister, but several Ministers. But this is unusual. It's only at the very biggest Embassies. Then, also at an Embassy you will have a Consular Section. The Consular ranks are different. Most career Foreign Service officers are given both a diplomatic commission and a Consular commission. When I first entered the Service I was given a commission as a Secretary in the Diplomatic Service of the United States and another commission as a Vice Consul of the United States. So, in the Consular part you have Consul General, which is the top Consular rank, then Consul, then Vice Consul. In some places we have honorary Consuls and Consular Agents, but that's another thing. They're not career people. The Consul General at a major Embassy would be equivalent to a Counselor, because he's in charge of this major section of the Embassy. But also, in many major cities which are not national capitals we will probably have a Consulate General there. If it's a significant, but somewhat less important city, we would have a Consulate there with a Consul in charge. For example, in Barcelona, we would have a Consulate General. And again,

there's been rank inflation with those, because a lot of cities that used to have only Consulates now have Consulates General. Then some of them are deserved and some are not deserved, because of the variety and extent of activities, the political importance, and so on.

*Q: I see. So, when you were in Spain what about the Foreign Service throughout the whole country?*

WILLIAMS: At that time, we had Consulates General in Sevilla, and Barcelona. We had Consulates in Valencia, Bilbao, and I believe we had one in Vigo, Galicia..

*Q: But, then Madrid had the heaviest concentration?*

WILLIAMS: Oh yes. There was a heavier concentration of official Americans in Madrid, right.

*Q: Total number in Madrid, roughly?*

WILLIAMS: Gosh, I really don't have much of an idea. Oh, we had a hundred or so in the Embassy. Well, not all of these were diplomatic officers. Some of them were secretaries and communications personnel who were not Foreign Service Officers, but Foreign Service Staff, we call them, some were "other agencies."

*Q: But, North Americans?*

WILLIAMS: Americans, yes.

*Q: And then of the Spanish-speaking?*

WILLIAMS: We had probably another fifty or hundred Spanish local employees -- Foreign Service Nationals, we call them. This would be particularly true in the cultural and information area, and in the Consular area. When I was Chief of the Visa Section there, I had two American officers working under me and about twelve Spaniards. So, that gives you kind of an idea. Of course, in other areas in the political section of the Embassy, you would find mostly Americans and just maybe a Spanish secretary.

*Q: Yeah. I understand. That's helpful.*

WILLIAMS: Now, I was going to tell you about back in the Department of State. Foreign Service officers are transferred back and forth from foreign posts to the State Department. Now under the Secretary of State you've got a Deputy Secretary and you've got Under Secretaries and you've got Assistant Secretaries. Usually, about the highest that a career officer would get, and this would be fairly rare, would be Assistant Secretary. A good many are Deputy Assistant Secretaries, but there aren't many Larry Eagleburgers who come up as Foreign Service Officers and get to be Secretary of State. In fact, I think Larry is the only career Foreign Service Officer, if I'm not mistaken, that has ever gotten to be Secretary of State. I guess you could say that Larry is an exceptional person. Of course, there was a Foreign Service Officer who became Secretary

of Defense, Frank Carlucci. That was tit-for-tat. because a career Army Officer, Alex Haig, had already served as Secretary of State. Anyway, that's a whole other story.

*Q: Yes. Do you want to say anything else today? I would like for us to pick it up another time. But, anything else that you want to say today about Madrid or about any of that?*

WILLIAMS: Well, I would be happy to pick it up any other time you want. I'm sure there are some things that I haven't thought of. I left Madrid in May of 1960 and went back to the Department of State for an assignment. The Ambassador fought to keep me there, and I think this was one of the things that people in the Department held against him. He was always wanting his own people in particular jobs, and to heck with the normal Department way of assigning or reassigning people. Anyway, he lost that battle.

*Q: Was there an expected tenure per post for most people, depending on rank?*

WILLIAMS: Yes. Well, not depending on rank, but the expected tenure depended more on the nature of the post, whether it was a hardship post or not. I can't seem to convince people that Madrid was a hardship post. There, the normal tour of duty was four years divided by home leave in the middle or three years without home leave.

*Q: Did you get home?*

WILLIAMS: Yes, I did have home leave while I was there. Because, I had not had home leave after finishing my tour of duty in London. I went on direct transfer to Madrid.

*Q: You just drove in that car.*

WILLIAMS: I just drove down in my little car. So, I had home leave while I was in Spain.

*Q: Did it seem strange to get back to the States from Spain? Was it a shock?*

WILLIAMS: No. No, not really. I have really not had too many cultural shocks. The major shock on getting back to the United States from any country, except in London, was always how different the traffic is here, driving.

*Q: And the size of the cars?*

WILLIAMS: How polite American drivers are as opposed to the people in Spain or Italy or Argentina or wherever. Oh God. They are like absolute madmen!

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*Q: In Spain.*

WILLIAMS: About the groups that I was a member of. There was another group that I neglected to mention before which we called a La Tertulia, just an informal men's group. About half of the



members were Americans from the Embassy, and the other half were Spaniards from all different walks of life. We had a judge, a couple of lawyers, a doctor, a professor from the University, all kinds of people. We would meet for lunch every Wednesday. Now lunch in Spain is something else. We would meet at this little restaurant -- well, when I say little, it was a non-tourist type of restaurant, one that no tourist would ever think of going to, because it wasn't in a tourist part of town.

*Q: The best kind for lunch?*

WILLIAMS: Yeah, right! We would meet there and first we'd have our tapas, hors d'oeuvres. Then we'd have our soup. Oh, and by the way, they're bringing bottles of red and white wine to the table and not counting how many bottles they bring. After the soup we'd have the fish. After the fish we'd have the meat. After the meat we'd have the dessert and with the dessert they'd bring the brandy and liqueurs. All this time we were talking, talking non-stop. This was really where I learned conversational Spanish. It was marvelous. We always spoke in Spanish, never English. In order to get a word in edge-wise, you had to be fluent. If you hesitated, if you were looking for a word, you would lose your chance, because somebody else would just jump right in. We talked about all kinds of different things. We had some people who were Franquistas and some people who were of a Republican background. I got a lot of the stuff from both sides. I really enjoyed that. It was a marvelous education and I made a lot of good friends too. So, I think maybe this was one of the best examples. You joined by invitation only.

*Q: And this was all men?*

WILLIAMS: All men. You had to be invited. You just couldn't apply and say you wanted to join. I hadn't even heard about it until a friend at the Embassy one day said, "Would you like to join me for lunch today at the Tertulia?" I didn't know what it was all about, but I went; and from then on I was sort of addicted. It was really just great. This went on from one o'clock until about four o'clock, because that's how long lunch takes in Madrid, you know. We talked about everything. I remember vividly one of these guys, the judge I believe, Judge Martin Cruz, arguing with me about Castro. By this time we're up in '59 and Castro was just coming in. He'd been on a guerrilla campaign and was just coming to power. The judge was saying over and over, "You people are silly to allow Castro to come to power. You could stop him. He's a Communist." I said, "Oh no, he's not a Communist. No, Castro's an agrarian reformer. He's just a liberal. He wants to get rid of Batista and his oppressive government." And he replied, "No, you'll see, he's a Communist." A couple of years later I remember writing Judge Martin Cruz and telling him, "I'm sorry, you were right, I was wrong."

*Q: How do you think he knew that so strongly?*

WILLIAMS: I don't know. I don't know whether he had sources or whether he was just going by what Castro said and his background. At that time, we paid little attention to the fact that Castro had played a part in the Bagotazo in 1948.

*Q: Yeah. Say a little bit more about that?*

WILLIAMS: The Bagotazo. The leftist revolt against the Colombian government in 1948 after the assassination of, oh what's his name. That well known leftist political leader who was assassinated, and the immediate response was an uprising on the part of the left in Bogota. There was a very comfortable arrangement at the time. Colombia alternated the major parties in power and in the presidency. But, things have never been the same since the Bagotazo. That was sort of the beginning of what has become both the leftist armed uprising there and the criminal element there, because they fed on the violence, and the drug culture just sort of grew out of that. Now of course, they are close allies. They are just like evil twins.

Q: *Just like two peas in a pod?*

WILLIAMS: Very close, yes.

Q: *At some point, I want to ask more about class structure and it seems to me that especially Madrid, there's such a sense of prosperity. I don't fully understand all of that, the class structure.*

WILLIAMS: Well, I don't understand it fully either, but all I can say is that the class structure began with the nobility and the upper class, even though they might not be nobles, the big business people, the bankers, and so on. That was a class. Then, you had a middle class. I guess you could say you had an intellectual class. There was some overlap there with the upper class and some with the middle class. The intellectuals, the artists, and the University people were in both classes. And, in the middle economic class were the shop keepers, you know, the old Bourgeoisie. Then you had the workers and peasants. There were a lot of peasants in Spain at that time and they were the lower class. There was very little communication or say, there was little upward mobility out of the lower class. Some, there was, but not an awful lot. There was very little movement from the countryside into the cities. There was nothing really to attract a lot of people into the cities at that time. Since then, of course, that has changed to a considerable degree.

Q: *So, there was not really a way for mixing to occur? Maybe no reason, no motive?*

WILLIAMS: No, not a lot. As far as class structure, that's about all I can tell you about. Certainly the classes were pretty rigidly defined. For example, you would hardly find a young man of a higher class marrying a girl from a village. Marriages were most often within classes.

Q: *And yet, the Catholic church would have been pretty much unifying force, I mean strong.*

WILLIAMS: Unifying in the sense that you could go to any church in the country and they would all know the ritual and everything. You know, "First you get down on your knees, fiddle with your rosaries, bow your heads with great respect and genuflect, genuflect, genuflect." Remember that one? Tom Lehrer.

Q: *Right.*

WILLIAMS: Anyway I don't think the Catholic Church was a unifying factor in so far as unification or bringing people together across class lines or across country-city lines. The church

was there in each village, and people were in that church in that village. If they came to Madrid and were there on a Sunday, then they would go to one of the big cathedrals or one of the churches and hear mass there, but they would then go back to their village, probably without even talking to anyone else in the church.

*Q: I'm wondering while they were there that they might have been aware that they were very much from the country? Did they look different or maybe get treated differently, or act different?*

WILLIAMS: I'm not sure that they would be treated differently. My impression at that time was that if some country person came in to one of the big churches in Madrid, he would simply be ignored. He would simply be another worshiper coming in to worship and then when he left he would be ignored. He would not be like our Protestant Ministers and I don't know if they do this in the Catholic church or not, where they get outside after the service and shake hands with everybody and have a little chat and so on. Nothing of that kind.

**WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK**  
**Special Assistant to Ambassador**  
**Madrid (1956-1960)**

*Upon graduating from programs at the University of Colorado and American University, Mr. William K. Hitchcock joined the Department of State in 1947. Mr. Hitchcock's career posts included England, France, Spain, India, and Vietnam. Mr. Hitchcock was interviewed by Stephen Low in 1998.*

*Q: Who was the ambassador when you were in Madrid?*

HITCHCOCK: John Davis Lodge.

*Q: I take it that you had an independent job?*

HITCHCOCK: I don't know what you mean by independent. It was a busy job, and it involved working quite closely with him. My title was his special assistant. The substance of my job clearly was his number one responsibility, and he had to give it a lot of time.

*Q: He was involved in your issues.*

HITCHCOCK: They were our issues, and there were quite a lot of them month in and month out. Of course, he could have taken over whatever he wanted to handle among the issues that arose. But, frankly, I don't remember that we had jurisdictional problems between us. Possibly we might have, had we been less busy.

*Q: And, didn't you want to go to Africa when you left Spain?*

HITCHCOCK: I tried during that period of time and even earlier to go to Africa. Things obviously were heating up there. I had been in Europe virtually all the '50s, and that fact alone made it difficult to work out an African assignment as my Spain tour was coming to an end. Washington kept saying, "We will not assign you to Africa now; you are first going to have to have a tour in Washington." I never took issue with that viewpoint, and I was sent to Washington as Director of the Office of Projects and Studies of the Disarmament Administration.

*Q: Before we go to Washington, let's go back to Madrid? Let's talk a little bit about the process of getting Spain integrated into NATO.*

HITCHCOCK: That was later.

*Q: That was later, but that process started with the negotiation of the U.S. bases.*

HITCHCOCK: The base agreement had been negotiated in 1952 and I was helping implement it. Spain's objectives, unexpressed so far as I know, included some assistance from the U.S. in its political rehabilitation. Spain was run by Franco and was a bit of a pariah state. The U.S. in partial exchange for the base rights was willing, in effect, to help burnish Franco's image. This was a tough sell, because many in the U.S. simply were so anti-Franco that they block any opening to Spain.

*Q: What were the obstacles? Who was opposing this thing? Whom did you have to convince to move in this direction?*

HITCHCOCK: This aspect was resolved well before I had anything to do with the Spanish Base question.

*Q: Eisenhower was President at this point?*

HITCHCOCK: He came in '53. So he would have been President when the agreement was signed.

*Q: This was the Eisenhower period?*

HITCHCOCK: I suppose so in a loose sort of way. The base situation both preceded and followed his presidency.

*Q: Who was your DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] when you arrived in Madrid?*

HITCHCOCK: An experienced FSO named Homer Byington.

*Q: Who was later our Ambassador to Malaysia? Who replaced him?*

HITCHCOCK: He was replaced by W. Parke Armstrong, previously the Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department for several years. He had had no prior experience as a DCM or even working in an embassy, and his relationship with Lodge was very tense.

*Q: Coming on top of your experience with NATO at the War College, how did you find this? Did this make sense to you, what we were doing?*

HITCHCOCK: Yes, but I frankly can't remember the kind of detail you seem to be seeking, if I ever knew. The U.S.-Spain base agreements were concluded in 1952 almost 4 years before my arrival in Spain. I suppose, with hindsight, it could be debated whether we needed all the bases we thought we did. You will recall there were three air bases, one naval base and several radar stations (mostly for navigation), all of which were part of the agreement. Whether or not having decided to do fewer bases we would have avoided some of the difficulties we had, I doubt it. We had some jurisdictional irritations, but the only major problem between us and the Spaniards occurred in 1957 (?) after I left, which involved the ditching of an Air Force plane off the coast of Spain with a hydrogen bomb aboard. We actually had good relations with the Spaniards up until that time. I can't comment on our relations after that, although, so far as I know, they continued to be satisfactory.

*Q: And, a good organization within the Embassy and with Washington. This was working well?*

HITCHCOCK: I think the Embassy relationship with the Government of Spain on military matters was good, as were the military to military contacts.

*Q: But the structure within the Embassy between you, the Military Attachés, the political section, and intelligence was working pretty well?*

HITCHCOCK: Actually, the Attachés performed normal attaché duties, and I had very little to do with them. We had a Commander of the U.S. Forces in Spain who also commanded the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) operation. It was with him and his staff that I had most of my contact on the U.S. side. Of course, the U.S. had an extensive network of relations with both the military and the civilian sides of the Government of Spain. These, as well as my relations with other parts of the Embassy, were excellent throughout my four years in Spain.

*Q: Can you give us some feel for the relationship between your duties and that of the Commander, US Forces Spain, who was, I think, a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, Europe (CINCEUR)?*

HITCHCOCK: MAAG and our base structure were part of the Spanish-American relationship, which also included our economic assistance program. It was the interconnection of those three that we tried to minimize as much as we could. But the Spanish were very conscious of trying to generate some kind of quid pro quo for the rights they gave us for the bases. Consequently, we had substantial military and economic assistance programs.

I personally had a very close relationship with the guy who was the head of MAAG and held the rank of an Air Force Major General. Among the embassy's economic team was Richard ("Dick") Aldrich, the famous producer married to Gertrude Lawrence, was the director of US AID (Agency for International Development) the whole time I was there. He was also economic counselor for some of the time. He was an old friend of John Davis Lodge. Aldrich had a deputy,

who incidentally is someone you know, named Milt Barall. Milt arrived in July 1957 and subsequently became Economic Minister at the embassy.

**MILTON BARALL**  
**Economic Counselor**  
**Madrid (1957-1960)**

*Milton Barall was born in New York in 1911. He entered the Foreign Service in 1948 and served in Chile, Haiti, Spain, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

*Q: You went to Madrid as economic counselor, where you served from 1957 to 1960. It seems like a logical assignment. Did it please you?*

BARALL: Well, I got interested in politics in the 1930s because of the Spanish Civil War, which was a big, big issue in New York City, with the Herald Tribune on one side and The New York Times on the other side.

*Q: Which side did you take at that time?*

BARALL: Well, I think I read the Herald Tribune, but I was on the Republican side. That is, I could not be in favor of Franco. Franco had been so damned by Herbert Matthews, and other people writing in The New York Times, that he was considered to be a terrible ogre.

When you graduate from the National War College an officer comes over from the personnel department and says, "Well, here, we're going to talk about what your next assignment is, and we're going to give you some choice. And here are the four jobs that are open." One of them would carry the rank of minister, as US representative to UNESCO.

I said, "Well, that sounds good."

But the answer was, "You don't really want that job!"

I went through all those three jobs that I thought they were offering me, and he'd say, "Well, that's not a good job for you. A good job for you is Spain."

I said, "I've never been an economist."

He said, "There's an awful lot of economics in your political reporting, so we know you can do it."

Well, I had had some government economic experience in Latin America. We didn't have major political problems with the countries that I was dealing with, there was a lot of economic activity. So they finally said, "That's the job for you."

It was an interesting job, because it combined being the embassy's Economic Counselor with being the Deputy Director of the AID mission. And that put me in the position of coordinating and controlling the two activities.

The Director of the AID mission was a political appointee, a classmate of Ambassador John Davis Lodge at Harvard. He was a theatrical producer, president of the National Theater, had been married to Gertrude Lawrence. He was there as a friend of the Ambassador and as a good PR man. He wasn't terribly interested in running a mission, though he followed events, was interested in knowing the key government officials, and in general, helping to make the mission successful.

*Q: It doesn't sound like a very good, professional AID person, somebody who's in the arts.*

BARALL: He was there to satisfy an Ambassador who had a lot of political clout. Lodge and Nixon had been junior first-time members of the House together; they were the founding members of the Chowder and Marching Society.

I want to say this. Lodge had a lot of critics, too, but he was the right man, right time, right place in Spain at that time. Because Spain was run by Franco and a handful of people, a lot of them aristocrats, with whom John Davis Lodge felt quite comfortable.

*Q: This was, of course, the Franco regime. It was well-established, and he was at the height of his powers, too.*

BARALL: Yes. And he had, curiously enough, a cabinet that was full of technocrats, people who were not political. I was informed that Franco didn't interfere with them. They were said to be all Opus Dei, or the principal ones at least were said to be Opus Dei. We evidently didn't know much about it, and we still don't know much about Opus Dei.

*Q: Could you explain what Opus Dei is. It's a work of God, isn't it?*

BARALL: Opus Dei is supposed to be an organization of sincere, good, practicing Catholics, who believe that you do God's work out in the world in a regular suit, not with a reverse collar. They were very competent technocrats. But it was hard to know some of them well and our reporting on them, in the files, was sometimes inaccurate.

For example, I had read about the Minister of Commerce, an important man there because he controlled the exchange rate and could favor certain imports or exports. Before I met him for the first time, I read in the files that he was abstemious, very sober, didn't smoke and was perhaps the head man of the Opus Dei. The first time I met him, at a luncheon, he had two martinis and he smoked almost incessantly. Because the AID Mission allocated some 200 million dollars per year as economic assistance to Spain, in part for the use of very important air bases, I dealt fairly often with Cabinet members such as the Minister of Finance, Commerce, and my counterparts in the Foreign Office.

(It was a big secret that we had nuclear weapons on our B-52s. But after one of them dropped into the ocean, much after my time we couldn't keep it secret.) So our AID program wasn't just eleemosynary, we were getting quid pro quo. We had the airbases, one of them just right outside of Madrid. And we were building a major naval base on the Mediterranean, at Rota.

*Q: What's the name of the airbase?*

BARALL: Torrejon, near Madrid.

*Q: We want to come back to the bases, but first let's talk a little about the relationship in the embassy. Did you find it difficult running the AID mission? I mean, you had a putative boss who was more a sidekick of the Ambassador.*

BARALL: And he had the rank of Minister.

*Q: And he had the rank of Minister, which I guess was the real reason why he was given the job, wasn't it, because he wanted to have a high rank? And particularly in those days, the AID man in a major country was often a rival to the ambassador. In this case I don't know so much if it was.*

BARALL: There had been a lot of rivalry, actually, in many countries, at the time of the Marshall Plan. Because sometimes those in charge of aid were not subordinate to the Ambassador, and could just go about their business. Some, like Harriman, could report directly to the President.

*Q: I know, I was in Greece and heard rumblings about what had happened early on there. How did you find that this worked? There was an awful lot of administration responsibility. Was this difficult in that scenario?*

BARALL: No, it wasn't difficult at all. It was clear, first of all, that I was in charge of all economic reporting, and nobody ever tried to interfere with that. So I had the economic side of the embassy all to myself. I was the Economic Counselor. Nobody else supervised me in that job except, theoretically, the DCM and the Ambassador. On the AID side, I think Richard Aldrich and I really became good friends. Once again, as I had done with Roy Tasco Davis, anything I sent in on the AID side went through him. I never bypassed him, but he allowed me a lot of leeway. I worked with the program officer and the other people in the AID Mission, regularly. And I was very pleased to supervise the work of the AID staff and work on the budget and the allocations of funds because that gave me access to a lot of people. It also helped my economic reporting.

The economic and aid programs were major interests in Spain when, under Franco, there was little or no political activity. So I felt I had a key assignment.

*Q: I found this. I had served as consul general at a number of posts, and often people would come to me because I was dishing out visas for their relatives. They were far more interested in that than just talking to somebody on the political side.*



BARALL: So I really had no problems. It worked out very well, and I got into a big negotiation, a three-way negotiation. I think I did my best work for the US government in Spain.

Lodge was interested in big issues. He wanted to get Spain out of isolation and into the world, to be part of Europe. He wanted to get them into NATO. And he wanted them to start being economically competitive, stop running things out of ministries and whatnot and get some competitive enterprise. And I think that was exactly the right kind of position for the US ambassador to take.

It's difficult under someone like Franco because he controlled everything. But I didn't have any evidence that the ministers on the economic side--minister of finance, minister of economy, minister of commerce--had to go to Franco with everything. They seemed to have lots of leeway, so long as it was not anything that Franco was interested in, and they were doing good things for the economy.

This idea of having Spain as part of Europe led to talk about a three-way deal between the government of Spain, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States government, in which Spain would modernize its economy and they would get a standby loan from both the United States and the International Monetary Fund. The key action was going to be the devaluation of the peseta.

*Q: Peseta being the national currency.*

BARALL: The assistant director for Europe of the International Monetary Fund came regularly to Spain, and he would talk to officials. He would drop in on the embassy and tell me what he'd heard; I'd tell him what I knew about the thinking in the Spanish government.

Eventually we got to the point where the Minister of Commerce told me privately: "I am going to devalue. And I'm going to deny it until the day I do it." Which is exactly the right policy, because people can make an awful lot of money, as you know, on currency exchange if they know it's going to be devalued.

I was so scared of that information that I telephoned it in from a public booth out in the street. I didn't want anybody in the embassy to know that, even the Ambassador, who was not strong in economics and might have revealed it inadvertently. The Ambassador knew everybody important, spoke Spanish fluently, was very attractive, gave great parties. But I didn't think that he could exercise the restraint necessary not to tell his relatives or friends. I also respected the secrecy of the information the Minister of Commerce had provided.

*Q: Oh, boy. Oh, boy. Well, who did you let know?*

BARALL: John Leddy in the office of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Dillon. I had met Dillon. He and Senator Fulbright visited Spain to look around. They wanted to play golf, so I borrowed some golf clubs. They took off their coats and ties, they were wearing suspenders and regular clothes. I scrounged some shoes and we went out and played golf. And that was a great time to talk about economics.

I developed a most great admiration for Dillon, a non-career man who had been Ambassador to France. He had great insight about international affairs in part from his family's famous vineyard in France. He asked direct questions, and he knew what he was talking about. He evidently developed some respect for me through our post-golf talk. We were playing informally and had a beer afterwards. It was a wonderful chance to talk. I had never sat and talked at length with an Under Secretary before.

I think it also ruined my career, because when he went back and they were looking for an economist to help with what became Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Mike Barall was the guy...

This is a digression. John Jova was then a personnel man with Loy Henderson. He wrote to me and said I was to be transferred to the Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America, the first one on the economic side. You can fight it, he said, but it's been approved by Dillon; Tom Mann, who was Assistant Secretary; and a skillful and respected Director General of the Foreign Service, Loy Henderson.

*Q: But to go back to this. Here is something where you've got something very hot. I mean really hot. In other words, the beginning of wars and all, this is interesting. But the actual news that the country is going to devalue, I mean people can make big bucks, or big pesetas on this. Can you even tell your people at the embassy?*

BARALL: No one. I told no one, not my wife or anybody.

*Q: Why would he tell you this?*

BARALL: Because he knew I was talking for the United States in this particular problem of trying to work out the three-way deal with the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the government of Spain.

*Q: This is a minor thing, but how would you tell Dillon over the open line?*

BARALL: Well, I didn't tell Dillon, I told John Leddy. There was no evidence of censorship. It was a public booth out in the street. They had gone to get John to answer. I'm sure I talked around it. I could write, you know, official-informal or something like that. John Leddy had been there, he knew what the deal was, and he talked with the assistant director for Europe of the IMF, just as I did. I knew that he would tell the Assistant Director of the IMF, and Dillon but probably no one else.

*Q: Well, here you've got a man that you felt was doing the right thing, and took an interest in politics in the country, and was trying to get Spain into NATO and the Common Market and all this...*

BARALL: And into the economic mainstream. The Common Market hadn't...

*Q: That's right, it was before the Common Market. What was the attitude of the other officers towards Franco? I mean, here was a regime that really, for most Americans, kind of smelled. It was the last remaining major country that had a Fascist regime. We had military interests there and all, but still it was sort of a noxious regime in the eyes... What was the attitude and the feeling of the officers, the Americans that you worked with there?*

BARALL: The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939, and I'm talking about the period 1957 to 1960. Time had worn much of the animosity, and there were no acts of brutality that you could see, no acts of government oppression. I think the people in the embassy generally accepted, some may even have been favorable towards Franco. You don't have any problems with a guy like that in charge.

To give you an example, one of the terrible public relations problems the embassy had was all the GIs, all the airmen and whatnot, stationed in the Madrid area. And, of course, as they do everywhere, they would occasionally get drunk and they would drive cars. They had cars when the Spaniards didn't have cars, and there was a lot of jealousy about that. But they also might hit a pregnant woman and kill her, or cause her to lose her child or something.

And even though there was censorship of the press, sometimes that would be put in the press. It depended on whether they wanted to slug us that day or not. There was a Minister of Information who decided.

We wanted to have good relations, and we sometimes were able to avoid the unpleasant publicity. We tried to keep the United States from being pilloried unnecessarily in the press. Some Americans found it quite convenient to deal with a government that could control such publicity.

We did have a big military mission there, headed by a lieutenant general, and a military aid program.

*Q: Did we feel at this time that if Franco left, that God knows what would happen and maybe the Marxists might take over? How did we feel about it?*

BARALL: I think it was clear that the Marxists were totally disorganized and demoralized, and that they didn't appear to be a threat. We followed that kind of thing casually, even in the AID program. My responsibilities included supervision of labor reporting. Some of the people our labor man talked with might have been labeled radicals or Marxists or whatnot, but they had no real influence, even if they did some work of organizing people, as a labor union does. So long as they were acting as a labor union, they didn't have much authority or power because the government could squash it anytime it wanted to. But we had some contact with people like that, and they would tell us things.

But, as I say, you didn't see or feel police brutality. There was almost no crime because the people knew that crime was going to be dealt with severely. And the Spanish people appeared to be very honest and trustworthy. It was easy to become fond of Spaniards working with you, or servants, who were devoted and dependable. Much more competent than the equivalent in Latin America.

I think one of the big gaps we had was the lack of information. With censorship of the press, you had a Catholic press which would tell you everything about what was happening in Catholicism, but it didn't tell you much about what was happening elsewhere in the world. So you'd get the Herald Tribune, the English edition, flown down regularly. But it was very difficult to get information about what was happening in Spain, because that didn't appear in the papers.

As a matter of fact, I had a particular problem. When they convinced me finally that this was the job for me, I said, "Well, I think I can handle economics, but finance, that's a special field, and I'm no expert on that."

The personnel man said, "Don't worry at all. Two men in the AID program--one a former professor of money and banking, Ph.D., and the other a professor of finance, Ph.D.--will give you all the information you need."

Well, that proved to be all about as wrong as could be. Spain did not have a press that revealed anything and there were no journals or magazines telling you what's going on and publishing statistics and all that. So you had to go out and talk to people--if you could get someone to talk to you. These professors couldn't speak Spanish, and I could. So I ended up doing the financial reporting myself.

I got to know the head of the Bank of Spain quite well. Bought him a lunch about every two weeks at The Jockey, the best restaurant in town, in my view. We had a martini and a nice luncheon with wine, and we talked. He told me about what was going on, and I would report back information faithfully to the department so everybody could know about it.

John Lodge was no great economist. He would go around in the regular staff meetings and ask the staff what's going on. He might argue if he didn't like what you said or even subject you to ridicule. I tried to keep him and the staff informed. But sometimes I had to resort to a spiel of economic mumbo jumbo. He stopped calling on me.

But he gave the DCM, Park Armstrong, a terrible time. I arrived in Spain about a week before Armstrong. And when I called on Lodge, he was steaming because he was reading an article from The New York Times which listed political Ambassadors who were unable to speak the language of the country. It said John Lodge was in Spain and he knew no Spanish. That was all wrong. Lodge was absolutely right. He was almost bilingual in Spanish, he told jokes, he spoke colloquially, and he could make a wonderful speech in Spanish. So that was very unfair.

But Lodge also said, "Furthermore, I've been put through the paces by the former DCM. This is Park Armstrong's first post. I am more experienced than he. I'm going to run the embassy."

Ambassador Lodge, with his fluency in Spanish, knew what was going on. He talked to people, and picked up a lot of inside information that was, of course never published. Armstrong, who didn't speak Spanish, couldn't keep up with him and, in fact, the Ambassador ran the staff meetings and the embassy. But it should be the work of a DCM to coordinate staff reporting and work and this fell by the wayside.

*Q: Just to give an idea of how the thing worked, what happened to Armstrong after?*

BARALL: Well, he had a nervous breakdown while there. At least, he was hospitalized for awhile and nobody knew exactly what it was.

**HARRY HAVEN KENDALL**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1957-1961)**

*Harry Haven Kendall was born in Louisiana in 1920. He joined the Institute of International Education (IIE), a predecessor to USIS, in 1950. His career included posts in Venezuela, Japan, Panama, Chile, Vietnam, and Thailand. Mr. Kendall was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1988.*

KENDALL: We arrived in Madrid in November 1957. There was no language problem. My Spanish had become quite fluent in Caracas and I was able to move easily into Spanish circles. We had a much larger staff than in Caracas. It was not as large as the one in Tokyo, of course. I think at the time you and I were in Japan there were about 60 USIS officer in the country. In Spain, I think we had about 20, including the branch posts. I worked in the information section.

*Q: Who was your PAO at that time?*

KENDALL: Joe McEvoy was PAO. Joe had been transferred from Caracas to Madrid and he'd asked that I be assigned there when my transfer came up. Jack Higgins was information officer. He handled press, radio, and such television as there was at that time. I took on films and exhibits. I had a staff of about half a dozen people in each section and tried, successfully as it developed, to combine the two into a working unit in support of my major effort during my three-year tour in Spain, a community relations project carried out in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force.

Under the Spanish American Bases Agreement the U.S. Air Force had established a number of bases around Spain; the U.S. Navy had one in Rota. The Air Force was encountering public relations problems out in the provinces where they had set up aircraft control and warning (AC&W) stations. There were about a dozen of these sites around the country, often in isolated areas, each staffed by about 90 to 100 men who lived on base or nearby with their families. The sites had been selected for technical and strategic reasons without regard to cultural or other considerations such as the proximity of a major city. Their presence in rural, unsophisticated areas was creating public relations problems because the local citizens simply didn't understand why the Americans were there or what their purpose was. Some thought the installations were nuclear weapons sites. Their most prominent aspects were two large radar antenna which would go around and around or up and down. The Spaniards referred to them "la loca y la tona," the crazy one and the foolish one.

Most of the American personnel manning the stations had no training in the Spanish language or culture. Even their officers had minimal contact with the Spanish public or even with the officials. My job was to develop a community action program to promote more personal contacts between the American personnel and the people in the communities where they lived. After some consideration we decided to use a program technique called "American Weeks" that had proven popular on previous occasions in Spain. These would be based on a combination of exhibits, films, lectures, and such cultural performances as we could organize. We prepared a large photographic exhibit on the work of the U. S. Air Force at the AC&W sites and exhibits on different aspects of American life and culture, science and industry that would convey an idea of what the American people were like in their own country.

We put on week-long programs in conjunction with local Spanish authorities in provincial capitals, at regional and national fairs, at universities and at city halls. The U.S. Air Force assigned a Spanish speaking officer to work with me and loaned me the Air Force Band for a number of the programs. I recruited lecturers from the Embassy and from visiting American scholars. I even programmed myself with lectures on American movies and a slide lecture on the history of American painting combined with an Agency-provided exhibit on the same subject. My wife, an artist, was amused by my audacity because I had never had any formal training in art, but I took an Agency prepared lecture, translated it into Spanish, and sallied boldly forth. Of course I was careful to let the pictures speak for themselves and never allowed time for discussion. One of our more interesting art exhibits was a collection of original works by American artists resident in Spain. I still have several pieces in my personal collection presented me by participating artists who were grateful for the exposure.

I don't recall how many of these American Weeks we put on, but I have the feeling that I conducted programs in almost every province in Spain during the three years I was assigned there. I felt very good about them because I got to know many of the local cultural and political leaders. You don't get on a first name basis as easily in Spain as in the U.S. It's a much more formal culture, but I got to know many leading Spanish personalities quite well and was able to conduct these programs wherever it seemed necessary.

Perhaps I ought to say briefly how we went about it. If we found a problem in a particular area, say, in Zaragoza where the U.S. Air Force had a major base, I would go to the mayor of the city and explain our purpose and the type of program we proposed. Then, working with his people, we would develop a week's schedule revolving around our exhibits, some kind of program each day--a lecture, a film showing, a concert--culminating with an open house at the American base where the public would get guided tours of the facilities conducted by Spanish speaking American personnel. These programs generally produced a sense of good feeling or, at least, a better understanding of what the Americans were doing there and why.

*Q: Did you ever have any indication afterwards that any of the locally assigned Americans were continuing their contacts with the Spanish after you left?*

KENDALL: Yes, on frequent occasions they did. Some of them came to me and said, "Say, I really enjoyed that. I got to know the mayor. I had never known him before." Also, on return visits some of the Spanish authorities would go out of their way to compliment me on the

programs and tell me how much they had improved Spanish-American community relations. My Air Force counterpart, a major from Puerto Rico, also kept in touch with the base personnel and told me that things improved noticeably after our American Week programs.

In addition to the U.S. Air Force base programs we also conducted American Weeks in some of Spain's ancient cultural centers such as Salamanca, Sevilla, Villareal, and Valencia. One would really have to be jaded not to have his spine tingle a bit at the thought of lecturing in site as steeped in culture as the University of Salamanca.

One of our more successful exhibits, and this is interesting in retrospect, was on atoms for peace. You will recall that we had an "Atoms for Peace" exhibit in Japan too, and that our really big coup was showing it in the Atomic Bomb Museum of Hiroshima. In Spain we showed the "Atoms for Peace" exhibit in four major cities--Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, and Sevilla. In those days we promoted atoms for peace with vigor, if in ignorance of developments yet to come, and I think we tended to oversell. At least we showed what the Americans thought atomic energy could do. This was President Eisenhower's special program, and we worked very hard at it.

We didn't know nearly enough about nuclear energy in those days. We were driven by visions of a great new energy resource unhampered by the knowledge of the problems of nuclear radiation and residue facing us today. Nevertheless, we looked upon it as a good program, and I enjoyed working with it during my three years in Spain.

I should note that this was during the Franco era. He was at the height of his power when I arrived in November 1957 and was still in control when I left at the end of 1960. I recall watching the parade put on by the government on the 25th anniversary of Franco's assumption of taking power. Their slogan was "On to another 25 years!" Working under a dictatorship such as Franco's has its limitations, one of which can be the illusion of accomplishment in a system where the major sources of information are closely controlled, but I thought we did very creditable work.

You asked me about the Public Affairs Officer. When I arrived Joe McEvoy was my PAO. He was succeeded by Frank Oram who was there when I left. You remember Frank?

*Q: Yes, I know him. He was my boss at one time when I was deputy director for Latin America. I've heard a lot of stories about Frank. Was Jake Canter there at that time?*

KENDALL: Yes, Jake was our cultural affairs officer. Wonderful person. Jake took over from John Turner Reid who was also there when I arrived. So in Spain I worked under both my previous bosses in Caracas, John Turner Reid and Joe McEvoy.

*Q: Now you're supposed to be the one being interviewed, but the reason I asked you about Jake is because the reason he was there was something I got very deeply involved in. I'll take a few minutes to explain it.*

KENDALL: Please do.

*Q: Jake was cultural officer in Mexico and he was doing an exceedingly excellent job. He had all the bigwigs of Mexico practically in the palm of his hand every time he put on a cultural event. He got them all. A wonderful person.*

*The ambassador was Bob Hill, who was a political ambassador and trying to run for Congress from Mexico City. He took a great dislike to Jake. He came up to see Frank Oram who was my boss as head of Latin America and I was the deputy. He said, "I've got to get this guy Canter out of there. He's just too arrogant. Whenever I talk to him he tilts back his head and sort of flares his nostrils, acts as if you've got a bad smell around. I just don't want him there. He's a detriment to the program. So you've got to come down and tell him he has to leave."*

*I was the guy who had to go down and tell Jake that he was persona non grata with the ambassador. We had to take him out of there and move him to Spain which was a great benefit to Jake in the long run but it was a terribly embarrassing situation at the time.*

*On the night that I was there preceding the day I had to tell him this, we had some visiting American attraction. I've forgotten, I think it was a symphony orchestra or at least a musical presentation of some kind. Jake had practically everybody of any consequence in Mexico City there and the ambassador was sort of taking a second place. I could see why immediately. Everybody greeted Jake, and the ambassador didn't know two-thirds of these people. Anyway that's how Jake ended up as being the cultural attaché in Spain at a time when otherwise he would have been another year and a half in Mexico City. Bob Hill is dead now. There were a lot of stories about him as ambassador in various places, but we won't go into that.*

KENDALL: Thank you for sending us Jake, because he was a wonderful person to work with, a good personal friend.

*Q: That habit is still with him. He still tilts back his head and sort of looks this way and that.*

KENDALL: It may be a hearing problem. I don't hear well in my right ear and I turn my left ear toward the speaker, but that only means I'm listening more closely. As you say, these are personal idiosyncrasies and I think it's rather small of an ambassador to take personal offense at a thing like that.

*Q: I think the offense was not at that. That was simply something he devised as a means of getting rid of Jake. He was really jealous of the man because Jake was doing much more than he was.*

KENDALL: But let me tell you that not everyone is like that. As I said, I had a great many contacts throughout Spain. My ambassador at the time was John Davis Lodge whom you know well. He and the chief of the political section, whose name I don't remember at the moment, wanted to get a better handle on preparations for local elections which were then under way. They didn't know the local mayors so they came to me for help.



"You know, Harry," the political officer said, "I want to meet the mayor of Almeria and Villareal and several other places. Do you know these people?" I said, "Yes, I'd be happy to introduce you."

So they took advantage of my contacts. Ambassador Lodge was very helpful. He had his own idiosyncrasies which I won't go into, but he did recognize that some of his staff had knowledge and contacts which were quite useful to him. He took advantage of them.

Let me tell you an amusing story about Ambassador Lodge's wife, Francesca Braggioti de Lodge, as they called her in Spain. She was a dog lover and was intensely interested in a program for seeing eye dogs. There were a lot of stray dogs on the streets of Madrid, and she had an idea that she could use them in her seeing-eye-dog program. At this time the Spaniards had not yet developed a program to help remedy this situation and set about an education program to tell Spanish social workers about it. So on frequent occasions she asked me to get documentary films on American seeing-eye-dog training programs.

We would show these films in the USIS auditorium and Mrs. Lodge would enter the auditorium in grand style with two or three dogs in tow. Knowing the Lodges was an interesting experience. They were movie types, public entertainment types. As you know, John Davis Lodge was a former movie actor and governor of Connecticut who was appointed ambassador to Spain by President Eisenhower. In his staff meetings he occasionally referred to his wife's affinity for dogs by remarking, "A dog's life? In my house dogs live a wonderful life."

As a result of these activities I became rather close to Mrs. Lodge. I served her purpose and she appreciated it. When I got ready to leave Madrid Mrs. Lodge asked her husband to hold an official lunch in my honor. She told me to invite anyone I wanted to, up to 22 people. So I invited a number of my Spanish friends. She had a very formal, very lovely lunch at the Embassy residence. Ambassador Lodge gave a little toast in my honor to which I responded, and then Francesca said, "Mr. Kendall, I don't normally give toasts at these luncheons but because you have been so helpful to me I want to say the dogs of Madrid will miss you."

**CHARLES W. GROVER**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Valencia (1958-1960)**

*Charles Grover was raised in Gloversville, New York after several years of moving when his father was permanently assigned. He earned a major in American History from Antioch College in Ohio and then received his master's in history from the University of Oregon some years later. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 and in 1971 served as principal officer in Medellin, Colombia. In addition to Colombia he was posted to Bolivia, Spain, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador.*

GROVER: I went from [USIA] which I found very interesting, to become a vice consul in Valencia, Spain for two years from 1958 to 1960, a post that closed maybe three or four years

after I left. It was in many regards the most satisfying post I had, at least in apparent responsibility, it loomed very large. We used to have fleet visits with thousands and thousands of American sailors hitting the beach there, and on the first occasion I was in charge of the post so I thought, "Well, if this is the kind of responsibility you get as a vice consul, there are a lot of things to be said about this profession." But I found you could go for many years without seeing that again, and serving as extensive charge time in a constituent post which is an awful lot of fun.

*Q: Were you the American at the post? How many Americans were there in Valencia?*

GROVER: There were two Americans at post, a consul and a vice consul. The vice consul was essentially in charge of all of the consular activity, and the consul presumably did political reporting. In mid-Franco, which is the era we were there, there wasn't too much political reporting to do, but there were a few people that would drop by, or people we'd see, but there was certainly no organized socialist party, for example, in Valencia at the time that you could talk with. I don't think that anything we did there was more than an education for the future. Certainly we weren't doing anything significant which the Spanish desk officer delighted to tell me when I got back to the Department and went in to see him. He said, "We throw out your despatches. We don't have time to read them."

*Q: What were the relations between the US and Spain at the time--very cordial, were they not?*

GROVER: They were cordial but strained. We had established several bases there, and the exchange was that we would do a great deal for Spanish development and also for the Spanish armed forces. The line that I recall was, that it was our association with the Spanish people and not an association with the Franco government with which we had many differences at the time. It was really paper thin, the real issue that had us in Spain in such large numbers, and I say the Army and the Air Force particularly although there was also a Naval base there, was east-west relations which...it may have been mid-Franco, but it was also early cold war and that was overriding in our judgment at that time in trying to establish a relation with the Spanish government. There were radar bases all over Spain which were essentially to protect the Spaniards from a Soviet attack, I guess. There were three Air Force bases--one in the north, one in the south, and one right outside of Madrid. And there was a Naval base at Rota, and at Cartagena--one and a half Naval bases, I guess. So there were a substantial number of US troops, or I should say service related uniformed forces, to say nothing of tech-reps, and equipment provided for the Spanish army. I don't believe there were any troops assigned there as such; they all had a training purpose or were home-ported in a Spanish port for duty at sea, or in the air for that matter.

*Q: That makes it sound like it was really a very important post. Why were they so cavalier about your despatches in Washington?*

GROVER: Well, it was important, I think, as things increasingly happened this way. One of the big differences in the last 80 years or so is that we have decided that we don't have time for things that haven't happened in the provinces. The relationships between principals in capital cities, and the whole development of the Foreign Service moving from 700 consular establishments in 1900 to maybe 150 nowadays, with the embassies going in the other direction -

the embassies increasing in number. That could start a whole line of comment but I think the nature of things is that we haven't had time in the decision levels in Washington to consider things that are happening in the suburbs, or beyond the suburbs. I think this is one of the reasons why so much of what's happened a year or so ago came as a surprise to us. We didn't have time, or staff, and maybe it's principally staff, or the use of staff, to try to understand better what was happening in people's minds and what they were about to do.

*Q: I know what you mean, I think, by a year or so ago, but since this recording is for posterity, maybe you'd better tell me.*

GROVER: Well stated. The changes that nobody predicted that began a year or so ago were the destruction, the disappearance of Eastern Europe as it was constituted under the Warsaw Pact. An alliance with the Soviets is just a world that the Soviets could no longer hold together. We missed all of that, and we've missed a lot of things other places too. I wouldn't say it's all the fault of our people, it's partly the way we manage our resources. I think that if we had lent some importance to what people are saying in the provinces, we might have had a few more clues as to what was about to happen. I hate to be overly critical because I know there have been some very hard decisions on resources. The Foreign Service really hasn't grown in 30 years, so you have to reprogram the people to do different kinds of things. And an increasing number of people are used in non-substantive areas. They are communicators, they are security people, instead of political, economic and public affairs people. And as soon as you do that your eyes and your ears become a little less receptive. You're spending too much time internalizing on your own problems, which I'm afraid is part of what happens in a world that's fraught with uncertainty and terror.

That's another thing, protecting the constituent post. I was principal officer in Medellin, Colombia at one point, and I asked Ambassador Tom Boyatt once why he closed it, and he said, "I simply couldn't guarantee the safety of the people assigned there." And I think that's a major reason why we...but that's not the major reason, that's an important reason, but not the major reason. I think the major reason is that we somehow or other didn't have time to try to understand the more complex set of signals in each country.

**SELWA ROOSEVELT**  
**Spouse of Archie Roosevelt, Station Chief**  
**Madrid (1958-1961)**

*While attending Vassar College, Ms. Selwa Choucaire met Archie Roosevelt, whom she later married. Throughout Mr. Roosevelt's career in the CIA, Mrs. Roosevelt accompanied him to posts in Turkey, Spain, and England. Mrs. Roosevelt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.*

*Q: You were in Spain from when to when?*

ROOSEVELT: About '58 or '59 to '60 or '61.

*Q: What was your husband's position at that time?*

ROOSEVELT: He was the Chief of Station (the CIA).

*Q: Was this one of those announced positions?*

ROOSEVELT: No, he was under State Department cover. He was Special Assistant to the Ambassador. Our Ambassador was John Lodge who was a close personal friend of the family so it seemed logical.

*Q: Were you there when the hydrogen bombs got dropped accidentally?*

ROOSEVELT: I remember that but I don't think it was while we were there. I remember the incident very well, but I don't think we were there.

*Q: How did you find your position? What were you doing there?*

ROOSEVELT: Well, I was still a very young woman, yet because of my husband's background and all that we had very early introductions to the Spanish establishment (i.e. the aristocracy.) My husband liaised with the Franco government, but he also worked with the opposition so we had a quite broad introduction to the world of Spain. We loved it. Spain was, of course, under the dictatorship of Franco, but frankly it didn't have any affect on us. I mean it was a fairly benign government in terms of most people. Obviously, if you were a communist you probably were in deep trouble with Franco, but you know people exaggerate quite a bit about the "cruel Franco dictatorship." It was an authoritarian, repressive government but it was not something horrible like Saddam Hussein or Hitler.

*Q: How did you find the people you were talking to? Were they for the most part supporting ....?*

ROOSEVELT: Very pro-American, and very happy that we finally had good relations. Remember there was a time when we had very bad relations. By this time we had had a couple of exchanges of Ambassadors that were very effective. John Lodge was extremely popular, spoke Spanish and was a bit of a showman. He was an actor once. My husband and I both spoke Spanish. We learned it there immediately. We had a wonderful life for four years. I don't think I ever enjoyed anything more and the Spanish people were so pro-American, so happy to be with America.

*Q: Did you get out in the country a lot?*

ROOSEVELT: All the time. We traveled all over Spain. There was hardly a place that we didn't go.

*Q: How did you find the reception there? Was it different?*

ROOSEVELT: It was always very cordial, but sometimes they didn't even know where America was if you went into some back village. It was touching. Don't forget, there wasn't much television then. I don't think there was any as I remember. Their idea of America and Americans was very limited. My husband and I were both very interested in castles. We made it a point to go and visit a castle every weekend we could. We would drive to these remote villages where there was hardly anyone, maybe three or four hundred souls. We would talk to them and they would ask, "Where are you from?" and we would say Madrid. They'd say, "Oh, that is very far away." Now, it's so much more sophisticated. It's changed.

*Q: It's the spread of the road system, the phone system, and television.*

ROOSEVELT: Television is what really did it. But the Spaniards are a beguiling people. I really love them. I think they have kept a certain reserve and dignity and attractiveness. Every time I go back, I again realize how much I love Spain.

*Q: Did you run into any problems while you were there those four years?*

ROOSEVELT: Personal ones?

*Q: Yes, or ones that affected the operations of the embassy?*

ROOSEVELT: Oh, no. I think Archie found total cooperation with the Spanish. They didn't much like the fact that he went over to see the King in Portugal, but they knew it and they turned a blind eye.

*Q: This was the King before Juan Carlos.*

ROOSEVELT: This was the father of Juan Carlos. Archie was in touch with him all the time. The Count of Fontanar who was the King's representative in Madrid was a friend of ours. There was never any attempt to hide it. I'm not even sure that Archie may have told the Spanish equivalent of the CIA what he was doing. They didn't seem to mind. I think Franco always intended that the monarchy would return.

*Q: I'm not sure at what point, but he took Juan Carlos under his wing.*

ROOSEVELT: I met Juan Carlos at that time. He was very much around us. We would go to a party and here was this young prince. He was either studying in college or the equivalent, military school or whatever he was doing. He mingled with a certain number of people. He was a very attractive young man who later became King.

*Q: You came back to Washington for a short time?*

ROOSEVELT: One person I want to mention that I met in Spain was Simeon. He was King and now is Prime Minister of Bulgaria. He was in exile, of course. This was when the communists were still in Bulgaria. Now he has gone back not as King, but as Prime Minister. He's a wonderful man. It's too bad he didn't go back as King. We came back to Washington and we

were here one year before we were ordered to London in a big hurry because the Station Chief in London had become very ill. Archie and I didn't have children and were mobile. Archie was very young to be Chief of Station in London – but they ordered us to London. We were home one year. In that year, I had a job with the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. I was the first person Roger Stevens hired. It was then the National Cultural Center (it was before Kennedy died) and so I was working to raise money for the National Cultural Center. That's when I began my career as a fund-raiser for non-profits, and I've been doing it ever since.

**PHILLIP W. PILLSBURY, JR.**  
**Junior Officer Trainee, USIS**  
**Madrid (1959-1960)**

*Philip W. Pillsbury, Jr. was born in Chicago in 1935. He received a BA from Yale University in 1957 and joined the Foreign Service in 1959. His overseas posts included Spain, Italy, Mali, Madagascar, Zaire, Iran, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Charles Kennedy on February 28, 1994.*

PILLSBURY: I went to Madrid as a junior officer trainee.

Q: *This was in '59?*

PILLSBURY: In '59. It was a fascinating time to be in Spain because Franco was still very much in power and had just succeeded in getting what he wanted, recognition in the United Nations and becoming a member of the family of nations in return for the bases that we needed, that the US needed in Spain for the communist threat, you know ... And Eisenhower was the first president to visit. Eisenhower came there in the winter of that year, so that it was a fascinating time to be there, and they had a good training program for the junior officers.

Q: *What sort of things were you doing?*

PILLSBURY: Well again, it was a good training program within the context of USIA. There was very little or nothing like what a USIA officer gets today in terms of working ...when in an Embassy, working around an Embassy and working in the various sections. We had a little bit of contact with the political/economic/consular/etc. sections, but not much. The training was really based on USIA activities. Which in those days were kind of old-fashioned, I mean, they used a lot of going out with mobile units, showing movies in the countryside, things that they don't do anymore.

Q: *How did you find ... going out with the mobile units ... Of course this was before television. The Spanish had been isolated for a long time, so in many ways that made sense to do that kind of thing.*

PILLSBURY: Yes, it did. I think that the film program of USIA which obviously was going to be eliminated with the advent of the much more accessible television and VCR. Was at the time

a way of personally reaching large groups of people, because there would be showings and then afterwards inevitably there were crowds of people asking questions about the United States. It was an opportunity to meet people and yes, distribute literature and yes, it could be called propaganda, indeed it was. I never felt anything wrong with that. But it was a very personally based operation and I just loved it, you know.

*Q: Did you have a problem? Here you are in a village square whatever it is, wherever you set up your film showing it in a provincial town. You are in a place where you're talking about America. When you say America, you think of democracy and all that, and you're at the height of a dictatorship there. How did you handle this? How did the local authorities react?*

PILLSBURY: Well, Franco at the time .... I mean Eisenhower's visit was, I remember, somehow criticized for giving the Franco government more or less stamp of approval by coming. But within the context of the cold war we needed the bases that Franco made available to us very much. Still do for that matter. Zaragoza, Cadiz, Torrejon, and others. And so that's on one side, then, as you said, the Spanish had been ... Franco had isolated them quite effectively from the currents that had taken place ever since the end of the Spanish civil war. So that I found it was kind of an intellectual time warp for many people. They were fascinated and desirous of knowing more about the United States. There was very little anti-Americanism, I found. There had not been an opportunity for the sometimes negative impression created by of large groups of Americans, either tourists or military who don't know the sensitivities and sensibilities of another country. So that we were something new and kind of rare, and they were very interested.

*Q: What about the local authorities, because in any organization, particularly a dictatorship, you get your real apparatchiks who aren't very flexible or anything else down the line at the village level you might say. Would they get nervous when you'd come, was it a problem?*

PILLSBURY: No, not in Spain then. Franco's control was absolute, there was no doubt about that. They would have got very nervous if we'd started to talk about democratic reform as applied to other countries. Then they would have started to be nervous, and there again as you said, before we talked I, as a junior officer, was not privy to decisions being made by Ambassador Lodge at the time or the political office. USIS was part of the mission of course, but our senior officers watched what we did, and as a junior officer trainee, I did what they told me to do.

*Q: Sure, just wondering. I don't want to belabor this, but it's interesting. You are down there and somebody says: "Well how does your government work?" in other words all these questions. I think every one would be loaded. You know, every person has a vote, there's competing parties, all this stuff.*

PILLSBURY: Well, we did get that. Franco even then was beginning ... He knew that Spain was going to enter the modern world, economically and politically, and even then I think that Franco had ideas about whom he wanted as a monarch. He had some ideas about when and where eventually democracy would take place, but he wanted to do it on his terms. So I think that at the village level like that there wasn't a whole lot of concern about questions being put to an American film team coming through, or British for that matter. Then, the Voice of America and the BBC were being listened to a lot, so that it wasn't as if Franco felt that he could put up a big

SDI system, you know Space Defense system against information coming in. It was much more apparent that ... Your question is much more relevant and valid for the time I spent in Iran twelve years later because then we had to be very careful. The Shah was very, very tight on that.

*Q: As a junior officer, you know, junior officers always have bigger ears than later on. It's a new world, you're looking around. What were you getting from the Embassy and the more senior people, what was their view of Franco? This is '59 and '60.*

PILLSBURY: Yes. The whole policy was geared toward that base system and nobody wanted to upset that, and I think it was right at the time too. So that Franco, first of all, was recognized as a person who really did control things, there was no doubt about that, and looking back, he had successfully kept Spain out of World War II. So that in that period, I think one of the frustrations of my junior officer experience (which, again has changed in recent years in that the JOT does the training, and then gets an onward assignment in the country so that you get at least two years) was that I left after nine months and it was really frustrating.

*Q: I would think. It was sort of a foolish idea, because you had both the culture and the language ...*

PILLSBURY: And the people. I never felt that I had ... As a JOT I had access to university students, to the younger elements of the population and they liked my wife and me. We were very popular. I felt that another year and a half I could have made real contributions to the Embassy's understanding of where the generation which is in control today was going.

*Q: It sounds, from what I gather, with the psychological thing, this training and all, at that point sort of the management of USIA was in the hands of academics, or somebody who really didn't understand what the thing was.*

PILLSBURY: Well, I think there was ... I wouldn't want to completely agree with that, but I think that certainly in the management of that initial assignment for JOTs, that that nine month thing was a mistake, because I didn't really have the opportunity to dig in the way I knew I could dig in in Spain at the time. That was shared by other members of my class.

*Q: I'm sure it was. Well, after that nine months you were untimely ripped from Spain, where did you go?*

PILLSBURY: It was hardly something to complain about, it was a relatively short drive from Madrid to Florence. We drove ... Put our stuff in our little station wagon and drove from Madrid to Florence and it was a very pleasant drive along the Riviera. There was nothing we could complain about, and the two years I spent in Florence were ... it was a paradise assignment. It really was.

*Q: Before we leave Spain, what were you doing, and what was your impression of the Eisenhower visit. Presidential visits always get big ... Were you dragged in to carry suitcases or something like that?*



PILLSBURY: I do remember ... I didn't have an idea how important it was because I went to the PAO, Public Affairs Officer, at the time, Frank Oram, and said: "Mr. Oram, my parents are in Paris and I'd like to go and visit them over this period." And he said: "Do you have any idea who's coming?" And I said: "Yes, the President is coming." "So, let me explain to you. When a president comes there's no leave. Everybody works for a presidential visit." So that was a good lesson early on.

Q: *Yes. One presidential visit is the equivalent of two earthquakes.*

PILLSBURY: Yes, exactly. And I saw what it does to an Embassy. Eisenhower was at the end of his second term. The United States was absolutely number one in the free world. I remember Eisenhower going down, I think it was the Paseo Castellona, in an old-fashioned carriage with Franco in his funny old hat. It was very impressive. It was the old world and the new. I was very proud. That was the impression I had that it was great to be an American. Very, very impressive.

**FREDERICK H. SACKSTEDER**  
**Aide to Ambassador**  
**Madrid (1959-1961)**

*Frederick H. Sacksteder was born in New York in 1924. He received his bachelor's degree at Amherst College and served in the US Navy during World War II. His career included positions in Germany, France, Spain, Tunisia, and Mexico. Mr. Sacksteder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

Q: *You were in Madrid from when to when?*

SACKSTEDER: I was in Madrid from '59 to '61, for two years, then I went back to Barcelona, Spain, six months later after the mid-career course.

Q: *Let's stick to the '59 to '61 period first. What was your job in Madrid?*

SACKSTEDER: I went to Madrid as the aide to the ambassador.

Q: *The ambassador was?*

SACKSTEDER: John Davis Lodge.

Q: *Could you talk about Ambassador Lodge? What was his background and how did he operate from your perspective?*

SACKSTEDER: John Lodge is a man who, over his 80 odd years, has had something like six careers. He was educated as a lawyer at Harvard, first undergraduate then law school. After practicing law for a time he became a movie actor and had significant roles in Hollywood where he lived for a number of years. Then he served in the navy during World War II in liaison and

staff type jobs in England, North Africa and Europe. He then went into politics and served in Congress for I believe two terms from Connecticut, then he became governor of Connecticut. When he failed to gain reelection as governor in 1954, he was appointed ambassador to Spain and this began another career. He served as ambassador to Spain for five years from '55 to '60. Next, he ran "Junior Achievement" from New York City. He later served as ambassador to Argentina for about five years and he was a delegate to a UN General Assembly before finally serving as ambassador to Switzerland for a couple of years. It could be said that his ambassadorial service took up the larger part of his multifaceted career.

*Q: He had been there for about four years by the time you arrived and you mentioned before that he was very popular. What made him popular? How did he operate in Spain from your perspective?*

SACKSTEDER: He was a master at public relations and he had a personality that appealed to Spaniards. He was a linguist and was fluent in French and Spanish. Not too many of our ambassadors are that fluent. He had the kind of outgoing personality which is admired among Spaniards. There is no other word for it, he was very popular, and he took advantage of this because his popularity made it very difficult to keep him under covers. My job was really essentially running his office. From the point of view of a Second Secretary, it was not for me a good career assignment. I had been assigned as head of the political section in Nicaragua in Central America and my assignment there was broken on orders of Undersecretary Loy Henderson because John Lodge asked for me. John Lodge had a way of being persuasive when he wanted somebody. He was intensely loyal to people he knew and trusted. For instance he attempted to reconstitute his Madrid team in Buenos Aires, and he did largely do so. He wanted me to go to Buenos Aires but for family reasons I couldn't.

The reason I think it made it a difficult assignment for me was that I had been the desk officer and willy-nilly the ambassador began relying on me on matters which were really the concern of other officers, section chiefs. As I said, he had asked for me because he knew me as the desk officer, knew me well enough that he wanted me. I was named secretary of the "country team." In country team meetings he'd say after something was discussed "Fred, what about that, What do you say?" I could only say "When we drafted that instruction this is what we had in mind."

*Q: How well connected was our embassy, other than Lodge, with the Franco regime?*

SACKSTEDER: I would have to say that the relations were close at all levels of the government because, for instance, of the fact that we had this important base and military assistance program the head of which was an air force general, Stanley Donovan, known widely as "Moose," since his West Point days.

*Q: I've interviewed him.*

SACKSTEDER: I thought you might have. "Moose" is my neighbor at the Westchester and a friend. Moose was an integral part of the mission. The country team was really fully a country team. I would have to say that all the way from our political section to our consul general, they had excellent relations with all levels of the Spanish government. Our military staff within the

embassy were sort of a fifth wheel because the bulk of the military interest was in the bases and in the military assistance program which was not run by the attachés. The attachés were somewhat frustrated I think.

*Q: Did you find that say within the political or economic section, there was a division because after all this was a dictatorship, sort of the classic dictatorship with various Spanish manifestations and we are moving into a period of rising concern, especially on the part of young people, with more democracy, Africa is being freed up and all. Did you find that there were sort of young Turks in the political or economic section wondering why don't we do more about Spain, or not?*

SACKSTEDER: I can't say that I perceived this at all. No I didn't. If there had been I wonder how effective it might have been, but there wasn't. There were occasional disagreements. To take an example, our relationship with the Ministry of Commerce was quite close because among other things the sister of the minister of Commerce was married to an American, a one time I. T. & T. colleague of my father. At the same time the Minister of Commerce at that time was considered perhaps the most corrupt member of the Franco government in that he had the opportunity, controlling as he did the import licenses that were required to import things like luxury automobiles, to please people to his own benefit. Our administrative officer on the other had, an upright and very moral individual, thought that this was utterly scandalous and that we ought not to do any business with that corrupt ministry. The commercial attaché was between the two. The rest of us said live and let live. After all this is not a really important issue and what is important is our base rights and the basing of our nuclear capable long-range bombers. But really there was very little of this. Lodge, of course, I don't think would have been very tolerant of it were it to come to his attention.

*Q: What about the social life there? One thinks of the Spanish as being rather formal and that at the higher societies they would not have welcomed the Americans or not. How did you find this?*

SACKSTEDER: Quite the contrary, depending upon the individual of course. In fact one accusation which might have had some grain of truth to it was that John Lodge and his wife were overly solicitous of the nobility. The nobility, now the monarchy in Spain, was and is still a factor, and you can't ignore the dukes, the princes and the counts, simply because we were a democracy and Spain wasn't. Yes, they had a lot of friends in the nobility. As Embassy protocol officer, I quickly learned not to invite a cabinet minister and a duke to the same dinner. Why? Because dukes out-ranked ministers! Have you ever served in a Latin American country?

*Q: No, I never have.*

SACKSTEDER: The Spaniards are a very proud people at all levels of their society. It is said with some truth that every Spaniard is a king. The way they show their respect for you, the way they show their friendship, is to put you on their plane. In Spanish you have the "tu," the familiar form, and the "usted," or you, the formal form. It startles Americans who are not accustomed to this to be immediately greeted by a Spaniard in the familiar form. Some may feel offended, but on the contrary, the highest form of respect that a Spaniard can show you is that he puts you on his plane, you become his friend and equal. This attitude permeates the society there. They really

normally only speak formally to their servants and those who otherwise serve you. With those whom you consider your friends, you always use the familiar the way I have always, for example, with the present ambassador here in Washington.

*Q: Were there any difficult spots in the American Spanish relationships during this '59 to '61 period?*

SACKSTEDER: No, I don't think so.

**ELINOR CONSTABLE**  
**Spouse of Peter Constable, Vice Consul**  
**Vigo (1959-1961)**

*Ambassador Elinor Constable was born in California in 1934. Constable graduated from Wellesley in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. Constable met her husband, Peter Constable while in the foreign service and resigned to care for her family. During her break from the Foreign Service, Constable traveled overseas to Spain, Honduras, Pakistan and helped organize the domestic Peace Corps. Constable rejoined in 1974 and returned to the Economics Bureau serving as an office director and later a deputy assistant secretary. Constable also served in Pakistan in AID and Kenya as ambassador. Ambassador Constable was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: Where did you serve?*

CONSTABLE: Our first overseas post was Vigo, Spain, [and gosh, that just feels like ancient history.] In Washington, Peter was assigned to the Public Correspondence branch which was part of Public Affairs, which some years later was moved over to USIS out of the State Department. He moved up to be chief of the division at the end of the second year, in charge of answering correspondence, and I'm sure he put this story in his oral history, I hope he did. In late '58 or early '59, there was a dust-up over Quemoy and Matsu islands off mainland China. And the Chinese were doing a little saber rattling, and we were responding with some rather aggressive rhetoric. It was making people nervous. A New York Times reporter by the name of E.W. Kenworthy called Peter, and asked if he could come and interview him about how the mail was going. Peter checked with his boss, and his boss said yes, sure. Peter said, "What do I tell him?" "Well, just tell him the truth," which Peter did. The next day there was a headline in the New York Times, "80% of the American public opposes Dulles' policy on Quemoy-Matsu." Well, it wasn't quite right. Some people opposed the saber rattling, some people opposed the rhetoric, some people thought we should be more aggressive, some people didn't care. It was more complicated than the headline. But the headline captured attention. This was a Saturday. Everybody had left town for the weekend, and the only person that the reporters could find was one Richard M. Nixon.

*Q: He was Vice President.*

CONSTABLE: The Vice President of the United States, who said, "Well, anybody who says that has to be a traitor." There was a banner headline in The Washington Post the next day: "Nixon accuses State Department official of treason." So we started looking at other careers. But the upshot was interesting. Peter was called in, explained what had happened, and the Department backed him all the way, refusing to release his name. Drew Pearson who wrote the predecessor of what is Jack Anderson's column today, also had a radio show, and he somehow got Peter's name. This was harder to do in those days. If something like this happened today, the Foreign Service officer's name would be in the hands of the press in an hour. Back in 1958 you actually could keep things quiet. He released it on his radio show, describing Peter as a "well-meaning young Foreign Service officer from up-state New York." We didn't like the "well-meaning" part. But it died down and Peter's career never suffered, which was a miracle.

At the end of our Washington tour we were posted to Lima, Peru. We were thrilled. In those days you had nothing to say about where you went, absolutely nothing. You saluted, and you went. About ten days later the word came down from personnel, no, we're changing Lima, you're going to Vigo. We were embarrassed. We didn't know what continent Vigo was on. Vigo turned out to be a small two person consulate in the northwest section of Galicia Spain. It's been closed for decades. It existed then because Francisco Franco, who was then dictator of Spain, came from a town called El Ferrol, which was not far from Vigo. So, politically it had some significance. Communications were very cumbersome then, and you actually had to gather information on the spot. The other reason why Vigo was important to us was that Vigo Bay was the center of the wolfram trade during World War II.

*Q: Wolfram [wolframite] being part of steel, or something?*

CONSTABLE: I guess. I'm a diplomat, I don't know anything about steel.

*Q: All I know is that our whole policy with Spain during World War II revolved around this thing called wolfram, which I've never heard of before or since.*

CONSTABLE: And Vigo Bay was where it came in. The third reason we had a post there, this is really ancient history, was because there were a lot of American citizens of Spanish origin who had retired in Vigo, who had Social Security checks which had to be processed individually at the consulate and sent to them. That's like horse and buggy. As the war receded, as communications improved, as the need to process these checks diminished, the post became less and less important. But it was our introduction to the Foreign Service.

I had an epiphany in Vigo which I've tried to share with my colleagues ever since, and it's not peculiar to the Foreign Service. I hated Vigo with a passion the first year I was there. Absolutely hated, loathed, and despised it. It was rainy. Sunny Spain? Not Vigo. It rained all the time. We had a small apartment that was on the first floor, and it hung out over a trolley line. The trolleys ran from 5:00 a.m., and when they went by the window of our bedroom the whole place shook. It was built into the side of a little hill, so it was infested with all kinds of bugs. It was cold. Everything smelled of rancid oil, rotting fish and urine. Oh, it was a great place. And I was sick a lot, and had one small child who wasn't terribly well, and I was trapped in this apartment. I had

no work, I had no friends. I was pregnant with our second child and not feeling well with that, and the world was just awful.

We would travel a lot and I found Spain harsh, difficult, dark, and nasty. And about half way through, I don't know where this came from, I said to myself, "Elinor, either learn to like it or leave." Simple, right? I started looking around with a completely new set of eyes. What was dark and nasty became beautiful and dramatic and exciting. What was limited cuisine...oh, you couldn't get a decent meal there. I mean, it was awful. You couldn't get any American stuff. No frozen peas, no chocolate cake. Suddenly the cuisine became the greatest; giant crab like I've never had in my life. I still dream about it...it's called centolla. Oh, it's heaven. What was desolate and lonely, became beautiful and austere. I started taking photographs. I still have them. And I fell in love with it. But, you know, it wasn't because it did it to me. I just suddenly said, "Wait a minute. There's no symphony here, oh, big deal. There's no ballet here. There's no American food here. But there are all these other things." It sounds Pollyanish and sophomoric, but boy it saved the rest of my life. In the Foreign Service you can cope with some awful places, Ouagadougou, Mogadishu, those are awful places on one level, but they become interesting. They become challenging, they become exciting. I learned Spanish, I was practically a 4 - 4 in Spanish when I left there. I started exploring. It was heaven. Now I was ready for the Foreign Service. I hadn't been ready before. You couldn't send me anyplace after that that I couldn't adjust to. People would say, "Spain, Spain must have been wonderful." Spain was the worst hardship post we ever had.

*Q: Also, it was a very difficult time. It was very austere. Spain had not recovered. But at the same time the bones were there.*

CONSTABLE: Peter was the vice consul, and learning on the job. I remember he was home one weekend, and got a message that a cable had come in. In those days you decoded cables manually. He went to the office and came home several hours later, "I can't decode it, I can't do it. I don't know what to do. I'm too embarrassed to call my boss."

It wasn't a typical post for what we still call a dependent spouse, because it was a two-man, as we called them in those days, post. The principal officer's wife was a delightful woman and she and I became fast friends. There were no requirements levied on spouses because there was so little going on. You didn't have to do any entertaining. There were no organized charities. Every once in a while there would be something that would come up, but because she and I were good pals when she'd ask if I would help with a charitable activity, I'd say, sure. Once we sat on a balcony in downtown Vigo, sipping sherry, while volunteers came to us with little boxes of money they had collected. It struck me as a little ridiculous.

**PETER D. CONSTABLE**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Vigo (1959-1961)**

*Ambassador Peter D. Constable was born in New York State in 1932 and received his bachelor's degree from Hamilton College. He earned his graduate degree from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in 1957. After joining the Foreign Service, he served in Vigo, Tegucigalpa, and Lahore. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 17, 1990.*

*Q: Your first two posts, because we're going to concentrate more on your senior times, but first was Vigo, Spain, from 1959 to '61, and then you were in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, from '61 to '64 as a Political Officer. What was your impression of your first post in Vigo?*

CONSTABLE: Well, it was a very isolated thing -- you might as well have been in the Third World somewhere. Spain had still not come out of the Civil War and World War II experience. They were desperately poor, and economic recovery had not really begun. It was just in its initial steps and was not even evident out in the provinces.

We had a two-man post there, which was closed three or four years later (probably should have been closed earlier). There wasn't an awful lot to do, frankly. The advantage of the post, from a personal point of view, was its isolation and that there were very few English-speaking people about. Spaniards didn't speak English, so I really learned Spanish there. I might have done that somewhere else where I could have been more... I got some reporting experience and that kind of thing. I don't suppose the reports were ever read by anybody, but at least I learned how to write them.

**ALLEN C. HANSEN**  
**Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1959-1962)**

*Mr. Allen C. Hansen joined USIA in 1954. His overseas postings included Venezuela, Spain, British Guiana, and Mexico. Mr. Hansen was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry in 1988.*

*Q: You went on from British Guiana in 1959 to Madrid, where you were ACAO in charge of the new textbook translation program and, obviously, some other cultural duties. What about this assignment?*

HANSEN: That was rather interesting in the beginning. There existed about \$500,000 (equivalent in Spanish pesetas), which was a considerable sum of money in those days, in a fund for a new textbook translation program. These were PL 480 funds that we could use. No one had found the time to make use of these funds, so they established a new position and I suppose that having been at this hardship post in Georgetown for 18 months, they knew Madrid would be a nice place to which to transfer me.

So I went there to run this program. The idea was that it was to be a five year program--\$100,000 per year. But in the first year there was a devaluation of the Spanish peseta. Overnight the

\$100,000 was reduced to \$65,000 (equivalent). Nevertheless, I went down to Barcelona, which then, as now, is the publishing center of Spain, if not the entire Spanish-speaking world, with this \$65,000 in my pocket, so to speak, and made arrangements with various local publishers to translate and publish American textbooks. In the first year of the program we made contracts to publish 43 titles, which I thought was pretty good, and I think everybody else did.

But then, the following year, they decided that the remaining funds (originally \$400,000) would be used for other purposes. So the textbook program which had begun so auspiciously abruptly ended.

It is ironic that more than two decades later USIA established a regional book office (for Latin America primarily) in Barcelona! I had strongly argued for that at the time, using all kinds of evidence that we won't go into here, but finally a book translation office was established in the publishing center of the Spanish-speaking world. (Note: In 1987 the newly-established Regional Book Office was closed except for one employee due to budgetary and other considerations.)

*Q: Life in Madrid, then, was pleasant for you at that particular time. How large a post was it? What about Spain?*

HANSEN: Spain was just marvelous in those days, and I've been back several times since. It's still marvelous. But I had thought that in going there from Georgetown, that this is going to be a piece of cake, because I'd been there before and I would adjust easily. I did not realize that it would be so different. When I was there before, I was a bachelor. Now I was coming back with my wife, in fact, our three-month old son as well. When I look back, I think I had a more difficult time adjusting back into the Spanish culture than I had in any other country. For one thing, we had to adapt to Spanish hours whenever we wanted to eat out, and you couldn't begin to eat dinner until 8:30 or 9:00 PM at the earliest which was highly inconvenient with a baby in the family. When we first arrived, we were living in an apartment that was cold, so on and so forth. But eventually, of course, as in all posts, we adjusted and we settled down. Then it was absolutely marvelous, that Spanish living.

I had a lot of other duties as assistant cultural attaché, but there were at that time three ACAOs. Jake Canter was the Cultural Attaché originally, and he was replaced by Leopold Arnaud, former dean of the School of Architecture at Columbia University. Both of them were delightful persons to work for.

*Q: So Arnaud, then, was one of that big group of cultural attachés throughout the years who have come from academia or outside the agency, brought in because of their knowledge of the country.*

HANSEN: This man--its a debatable thing. He certainly brought a lot of prestige to the embassy and USIS. On the other hand, as far as the nitty-gritty was concerned, that, of course, ended up being done by one of the ACAOs, Dick Phillips in this case. Not the well-known Dick Phillips (during this era) of the State Department.

*Q: USIA?*



HANSEN: Yes, a USIA officer.

*Q: What level textbooks were these, college textbooks or high school?*

HANSEN: College, university.

*Q: Upper level textbooks?*

HANSEN: Yes.

**FRANK ORAM**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1959-1962)**

*Frank Oram entered the Foreign Service in 1940 as an auxiliary officer of USIS. His career included positions in Brazil, Spain, and Argentina. Mr. Oram was interviewed in April 1989 by Allen C. Hansen.*

*Q: This is a continuation of the interview with Frank Oram retired USIA officer who was former Assistant Director of USIA for Latin American and former country public affairs officer in Spain, Brazil and Argentina. Today, December 6, 1990 he will discuss some of his experiences in Spain. The interviewer is Allen Hansen and this interview is taking place in DACOR House in Washington, D.C.*

*Frank you were in Spain as PAO in what years?*

ORAM: Mid 1959 to mid 1962.

*Q: And what was the size of the USIA staff in those days?*

ORAM: We had about 9 American positions.

*Q: I see. And what were some of the major American interests and concerns in our relationship with Spain at that time?*

ORAM: Well, they were increasingly vital in view of the cold war effort. Remember that Spain was still recovering from the civil war then in 1939. The economy was weak, political issues were suppressed by Franco. There was a very strong hand of the government in everything. And Spain was not really accepted, the question of fascism, and the Falange, and so forth, was very real. It was worth recalling when President Eisenhower brought in John Foster Dulles, there was a concerted effort to develop reasons for countries around the world and bases. The base program was central and Spain was brought into this by the visit of Admiral Sherwin (phonetic), in 1953 which is the opening effort to gain what later became the forward SAC bases in Spain, Torrejon

outside of Madrid and the Naval base in Rota. Spain, as I recall was excluded from the UN, for example, until 1955. Again because of the memories of World War II and Franco's "neutrality", but I think we have to remember that Hitler did not succeed in Spain as he had hoped to, as it were, dominate the Spanish peninsular. He did not succeed. Franco played his own cards for his own purposes. He played them very well.

By 1955, Ambassador Lodge came to Spain; the expressed purpose was to gradually develop an acceptance, a relationship with Spain, a workable relationship. The USIA role there was quite effective because Spain had been closed and very much isolated. The whole cold war propaganda effort was significant. There was the question of US military personnel actually in Spain, on base in Spain. We had to have a troop relations program. We had to reach out to Spaniards to try to develop what for other European countries was very normal ties. All this was new work in Spain.

*Q: Were the America Weeks a program designed to smooth relations with so much American military there?*

ORAM: Yes, it was a very good device of getting Spaniards and Americans together in a very simple setting to literally get to know each other. I think we have to remember that Spain as some say is more Catholic than the Pope and has a very, very strict code which was strange to many, many of the military and other Americans who found themselves living in Spain. The political tension in the Spanish society could be understood when you realize that when Alfonso XIII abdicated in 1931 the Republic came into being and disestablished the Church restricted the Church privileges and secularized education. This was a radical departure from the Spanish Church tradition. So, being suddenly exposed to the world, as it were in the late '50s was something new for Spaniards at every level.

*Q: The Catholic Church had always played a major role in--*

ORAM: And under Franco it was restored, of course. And there was a very strong Church role throughout the Spanish society at all levels, yes.

*Q: Were there any indications then that the Spanish political system was moving towards a more democratic form?*

ORAM: Well, there were signs, but then the figure of Franco was so dominate that a great deal was discounted and of course the question always was, "After Franco what?" Well, now we can see 30 years later that Franco actually prepared a transition into a modernized Spain. Not he alone, but the role of Juan Carlos as the young king, of course was vital too. But it was clearly a great transition and the whole question of ideas and information overcoming the years of suppression, censorship, etc., and the conflict between socialists and communists on the one side and the monarchists and conservatives on the other. All of that was part of the mix.

One of the amusing things to me was that there was a ministry called the Ministry of Information and Tourism headed by an old line Falangist who I am sure hadn't had a new idea in a long while. On the one hand he was the chief censor, that's what information meant. Information did not

mean giving out information, it meant control of information. On the other hand his assignment was to bring tourists to Spain because that would be profitable. At that time the only tourists in any numbers that came into Spain were the French across the border up near San Sebastian, who brought their own cheese and bread with them and spent practically nothing inside the country. Whereas Italy had already developed a flourishing tourist trade which was held up as a model. So this ministry was supposed to be doing these two totally contradictory things at the same time.

*Q: And what was the Spanish economy like in those days?*

ORAM: It was weak. It had been isolated and you must remember the Civil War cost Spain a million dead in a population of 20-25 million people. The economy was totally ruined. And the recovery was long and very slow.

*Q: And the U.S. Government at that time was criticized in some quarters for what people said was getting into bed with Franco.*

ORAM: True and with good reason, because Franco symbolized an aspect of World War II and earlier. We have to remember the Lincoln brigade from the United States and the role of the Germans, Italians and the Russians, and so forth in the mid-30's. This was what everyone understood to be the great ideological conflict and it had all occurred there in Spain. And the idea of getting together in any practical way with the very person who symbolized all this was a serious issue for many and understandable.

*Q: And one of the reasons the military agreements were signed between the U.S. and Spain, if I recall, was that we had lost our bases in Morocco.*

ORAM: Yes, yes that is true. The location of Spain was central, there was no question about it. The forward SAC base was right outside of Madrid and if you knew where to look when you drove out to the airport you would see the high tails way off on the horizon and at that particular stage given the capability of planes and so forth and so on, Spain's location was essential.

*Q: So would you say that there were at least two major reasons for the bases: a need for the bases to act as a deterrent against the Soviet Union at the time, on any other, or the efforts that were made, particularly where USIS played a major role in at least helping those forces who wanted to see the country become more democratic.*

ORAM: Yes, very much so.

*Q: There are some authors, I think, that say today that Spain was a good example for some Latin American countries that had suffered from dictatorship in the past. Would you agree?*

ORAM: Well yes, Spain has been a model for a number of Latin American countries. The role of Argentina during World War II is relevant here. It is quite natural to look at what Franco was doing in his own way and try to do the same thing maybe not for the same reason but similar reasons.

*Q: The end result is certainly interesting as we look at Spain today.*

ORAM: Yes.

*Q: The physical plant of USIS. You were located in the Embassy and had a library...*

ORAM: Well, yes. That was the Casa Americana. The Embassy was one of the new efforts of the Department's Foreign Buildings Association so it was a newly constructed building.

*Q: Didn't the Spaniards call it a pigeon roost because it was a rectangular shape?*

ORAM: Well, it was two things actually. One was a rectangle on end which was the office part and the other was a 3-story horizontal level of living quarters which was the Residence. But Ambassador Lodge refused to live in the Residence because he felt that he would do much better in a typical Spanish residence. And I certainly think he was right about that. Well that large establishment was empty and so it became the USIS headquarters, including a library, a large printing plant which was located where the kitchens would have been...

*Q: And a theater also.*

ORAM: Oh yes, a lovely theater. Yes, it was excellent. And facing on a park area with lots of trees.

*Q: What about the Fulbright Program. Was that just beginning or...*

ORAM: You mean beginning in Spain?

*Q: Yes.*

ORAM: Yes, yes. It was a very important means of drawing Spaniards out and getting them in touch with American institutions. Here again there had been these years and years of literally no contact. And often what contact there might have been was tempered by the political issue which was always in between the individual Spaniard and what he might want to do in his own professional way such as traveling and writing freely, and so on. The Fulbright program was a very important instrument, yes.

*Q: And how were the working relations between USIS and the rest of the US mission?*

ORAM: From my point of view they were quite comfortable and we had a very effective country team. The country team included everyone even the military from the JUSSMAG, the Joint U.S. Spanish Military Mission. It met religiously every week chaired by the Ambassador and there was a full exchange of views.

*Q: Was there a large AID program?*

ORAM: Well, the AID program wasn't large in numbers of projects or people. It was mainly a matter of extending credits and getting certain aspects of the economy moving. But Dick Aldrich, you recall, who was minister-counselor and director of the AID program was very effective.

*Q: I wonder if you will comment a little bit on how the culture of the U.S. and the culture of Spain interacted. For example, during Eisenhower's visit.*

ORAM: Well, as a general proposition, I think that one doesn't realize how different Spain is from the rest of Western Europe. The Moors came in to, actually they were Berbers, came in to Spain in 711, as I recall, and stayed there until 1492. The big date for Spaniards was not Columbus doing something in 1492, that was the year that the last Moors, the last Muslims, left Spain. The Kingdom of Granada fell in 1492. That was the big event. And that of course was when Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand decreed that all those Muslims and Jews in Spain, and there were many, had to convert or get out. This was a very difficult period. This was the period of the Inquisition and so forth. And the events of that period of the 15th, 16th, 17th centuries are very real to the typical educated Spaniard or even to the Spaniard who was filled with the folklore and traditions of the country. Thus Americans are apt to find rather strange that there is such a hold, as it were, of this old tradition on the way things should be done currently.

And we had an example of that in the visit of President Eisenhower. First let me mention that this is President Eisenhower in 1959, December 1959, which was more than 6 years after the initial opening by Admiral Sherwin in 1953. In other words there was nothing hasty about what President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles laid out as a program. It was slowly, gradually, steadily developed relationship with Spain, both diplomatic and public--

*Q: And this was the first U.S. Presidential visit?*

ORAM: Yes. This was nearing the end of Ike's term. It was laid on after the annual NATO meeting in Paris and he would come to Madrid, there would be a banquet and then he would fly off. It was timed out of 23 hours on almost the shortest day of the year. Jim Hagerty, who was more than Ike's press officer, was in charge of all the doings. One of my assignments was to work out the details of the arrival, etc. This was to be a public meeting but restrained, not a hoopla and all that, just public meeting. So of course TV by that time was already the information medium for this sort of thing in Europe and the United States although very limited in Spain I might add. The focus was to be on the meeting of the two generals and then underplay all the rest of it. That meant that the whole arrival ceremony had to work just right. So the White House set up an advance post in the embassy and we were all working hard at this and along came the lay out scenario for the arrival and I went over to the Foreign Office to discuss this with my opposite number.

In the middle of my presentation he said, "That, we cannot accept." I said, "What is it you cannot accept?" He said, "You don't have the procession correct." I said, "The procession?" He said, "The arrangement of cars coming out of the airport and driving down the big avenue." This was where everyone was to be assembled and see all this, where the television cameras would be grinding away. He said, "You have it all backwards." I said, "I'm sorry this is what the White House does any time at a ceremony of this sort." "No, we don't do it that way," he said. "Under

our protocol, which I remind you dates back to before Queen Isabella and which we have followed very carefully ever since, the principals are preceded by all of the underlings." I said, "You mean to tell me that there is going to be this long procession of limousines, etc., and at the very end there is going to be General Franco and President Eisenhower?" He said, "That's the way we always do it." So I said, "Well I'm sure we are going to have a battle because the hour of the day, getting dark and so forth will not be received very well." I reported this back and of course we got an absolute blast about it.

*Q: Just the opposite of the American way of doing it.*

ORAM: Right. So I went back the next day and said, "Look, we've got to work this out." "No, not a chance," he said. I said, "Well, what you are saying then is because of your protocol which you remind me was established before we were ever discovered you are going to forego television coverage of this event. It will not be seen anywhere in this country, in Europe, in the United States." I said, "We can't do that. We are coming here for a visit, a public visit. We are not coming here in the middle of the night so that nobody knows we are here." I said, "This is the moment to do what both governments have been working on for some years. And to do that Franco and Eisenhower have got to be at the front with only one vehicle ahead of them and that is a TV truck." Fortunately, he, who had had an assignment in New York, personally knew all this, but the people he had to deal with didn't. To make a long story short, after a week or so of obviously very difficult internal debates they finally agreed that for this occasion to drop their protocol and adopt the American system. Even so we had to hurry because it was getting so dark so fast. But it did get televised.

*Q: And like any Presidential visit USIS was very much in the thick of things.*

ORAM: Well, that is right. There were two action officers, I was one and the other was my opposite number, Bill Fairley, the political counselor. The two of us were in charge of the whole thing.

*Q: Do you recall any particular problems or did everything work out okay? Other than the protocol problem.*

ORAM: Well, no, there were no problems with substance because it was agreed there would be no substance, whatsoever, it would be strictly formalities. So the National Palace, the War Palace, in Madrid, has nearly 3,000 rooms and in the great hall there is a table that seats 140 people. I remember that banquet, it was quite a sight. The 140 chairs were filled and both President Eisenhower and General Franco made their toasts. And I said to Dick Walters, who was traveling with us as an interpreter that he had rendered Ike's toast and marks in marvelous fashion. He impressed the Spanish tremendously, that this American could speak Spanish with feeling and deliver it the way Ike could deliver it. So Jim Hagerty who at first was in every bit of this was personally very, very pleased with how it went off.

*Q: And what was the general reception of the Spanish people to Eisenhower's visit?*

ORAM: Very well, because even those who didn't understand maybe the international complications of this fascist kind of hangover, this World War II image, had a naturally warm feeling towards Americans who were outgoing and simpatico, and they thought this was a very warm generous gesture by President Eisenhower. Well received.

*Q: I guess in a short activity like that, a 23-hour visit of the President, as well as in the longer range things, USIS has had a vital role to play.*

ORAM: Very much so. It is not often that one encounters a situation just of that sort where there are all these complications, all these negative elements in the historical background and yet something is obviously fermenting, opening up as a matter of coming in and making a real contribution towards understanding. And I am confident Juan Carlos who I knew as a teenager at that time in Madrid was exposed to many, many things. He was not as has been true of some royal heirs restricted in a way, or indoctrinated in an essentially negative way. He wasn't and this is a credit to his father, Don Juan, who stepped aside, as well as to Franco. Juan Carlos personally was encouraged to open up and be exposed to ideas and the people.

*Q: Well, I think I have asked you the questions that I had in mind and we covered your other experiences on the other tape. Is there anything more that you might want to say either about Spain or about any of the other countries where you worked and when you were Assistant Director of USIA for Latin America?*

ORAM: Well, I was struck by the fact that President Bush being in Brasilia and...

*Q: You mean just a couple of days ago.*

ORAM: Just a couple of days ago...

*Q: And still in Chili today.*

ORAM: But knowing in Brazil that there was a military revolt in his second stop--in Argentina. He was in Argentina yesterday, wasn't he?

*Q: Yes.*

ORAM: And greeting the Argentine President and congratulating him on moving toward democracy and away from dictatorship. The Latin ability to fall into the dictatorship trap is, of course, well documented. I certainly hope that Argentina is going to keep moving ahead.

*Q: You mentioned earlier about the Berbers ruling Spain.*

ORAM: Yes.

*Q: There were 7 centuries...*

ORAM: Nearly 8 centuries...

*Q: Nearly 8 centuries of Moorish rule or Arabic rule over the Iberian Peninsula. Do you see that reflected in Spanish culture today and taking it a step further, in Latin American culture?*

ORAM: Well, I think the Arab influx never conquered all of Spain. They never got into the northwest. And over the years the northern Spaniards gradually ate away at the Moorish kingdom so the relationship was always one of on the one hand conquest and then re-conquest. Now a great number of people during these nearly 800 years before the Kingdom of Granada collapsed in 1492, there was a great number of Catholics, for example, that became Muslim; or Jews that became Muslim or remained Jews. I don't know whether middle class was accurate for that time period, but there was a fairly large number of people between the nobility, let's say and the peasants. The shopkeepers, the merchants, etc., a fairly large element. When the decree was laid down that you either become Catholic and convert openly, publicly and practice Catholicism or get out, and this was at the height of the Inquisition, this meant that a large, I don't know what the numbers were, but a large portion of this shopkeeper, and merchant class, professionals, too, left Spain. But I am not sure how you could define the Spaniard today in Muslim terms. As far as I know it would be to say that Spain was not a participant in the Renaissance as it occurred in Europe. It held on to all those things that it succeeded in keeping up in northern Spain from the Moors or in regaining by reconquering the Moorish kingdoms so that they had this fix on earlier times and situations. When the Renaissance came along it missed Spain almost entirely.

The greatest influence on Spain was opening up the new world and suddenly becoming enormously wealthy. So it could afford all kinds of ventures such as the Spanish Armada--which from anybody's point of view was extremely disorganized. In other words what happened in Spain and this does have bearing on Latin America they had the appearance of greatness because they had this money but it was destroying its own economy. I remember being told that Spain had quite a wool, weaver trade in the 1400s but lost it in the 1500s to the British because they, the Spaniards, had the money and just bought the material, they didn't need to make it any longer. The idea of the appearance of wealth and acting as if one had a solid base in the wealth was something which over the long run was damaging to Spain. It inhibited Spain's development as a modern country. And there is no question that the Spanish model has been a great influence throughout Latin America. It is a model which has had in it many, many limitations, many negatives.

*Q: Perhaps Spain being behind Western Europe the way it was as the Franco era ended in the same way, sort of stagnation of political development, it was the Spanish influence imposed upon Latin America, Spanish speaking Latin America, the same type of thing happened.*

ORAM: Well, I think so. For example, the land system. We all know in Latin America that in a typical country the chances of a poor person ever owning any land is a literal impossibility.

*Q: Brazil, I was reading the other day, one percent of the population owns...*

ORAM: That's right.

*Q: 95% of the land.*



ORAM: Brazil currently has the greatest gap between the top and the bottom. In the whole world, the greatest gap. This is the Iberian tradition, both in Portugal and Spain. They had all of this land, just as there is all this land in the United States. But, except for Costa Rica, it wound up in the hands of a few people. Costa Rica as far as I recall is the only country in Latin America where there is something like a small farmer who actually owns his own land. This helps explain why Costa Rica is so much different from everybody else. This model of the established gentry, landed gentry, was the idea that everyone has his place, there is a permanence in things. You are born here and you stay at that level, born up here you stay at that level. You have the means by being born to it to continue to be at the high level. The idea of mobility, up and down, has been foreign to Spain as it was throughout Europe, but Spain did not have the benefit of the Renaissance and other influences. So in effect the Spanish system was simply transplanted into a new virgin continent and Latin America pays the price every day for that tradition. It is so difficult to break.

*Q: And that makes it even more dramatic the political development of Spain in the post-Franco era.*

ORAM: Oh yes, yes. And again, tremendous credit is due Juan Carlos as the symbol.

*Q: And no doubt, although the strong US-Spanish relationship was based on the military bases, there must have been some tremendous influence on the part of rubbing shoulders with the Americans at that time.*

ORAM: Yes. No question about it.

*Q: Well, very interesting. Is there anything else?*

ORAM: I'd just like to comment that I am sure that anyone who is looking around the world today with all the changes occurring the last 12 months will have to go back to the books and think through what foreign policy objects are and what the USIA role is, etc. After 40 some years of concentration on the cold war problem and its many aspects there is now a new deck of cards which is a bit different. It must be a fascinating time for younger officers who are going off on jobs the way you and I once did.

*Q: The two major objectives of USIA over the past 40 years were the anti-communism on the negative side, you might say, and on the positive side the benefits as we saw them of the free private enterprise and political freedoms and democracy. That hasn't changed has it?*

ORAM: Well, no...

*Q: I mean the anti-communism thing, of course...*

ORAM: One of Ed Murrow's formulations was under the word modernization as a transition from something to something. The USIA role is as interpreter, demonstrator of what is what, into what, by what means.

This reminds me of a friend of mine who just came back from a trip to Russia. He mentioned his experience concerning telephone books. He was told there were no telephone books in Moscow, but there are a fair number of telephones. The surprising thing that he was told was that people didn't want their names in a telephone book. The statement was, "I know my number, I give my number to people I know because I want them to have my number, so why in the world should I want anyone else to know my number?" Just stop and think about that for a minute. That means that there is an infinite range of things that are impossible to do. There is no concept of advertising, let's say, or even the simple things like a voluntary effort of some sort, a phone bank, you know. All these things are not only foreign but not wanted even when told they would have some benefit.

Why do they feel that way? Well, this fellow feels that way because he grew up in a place where information was dangerous. You didn't want to know certain things. You didn't want to be involved because it would be dangerous. Very simple. He was very logical in his point of view. There are no credit cards in Russia, are there? I believe they have yet to establish the first credit card.

Well, in Spain where after the years and years of the fighting to the death down in all the villages, killing of priests, what ever it was, the feelings about the problem became so real that the constant propaganda from government sources and so forth on this, that and the other thing, lead Spaniards to become highly skeptical about a lot of things. Very suspicious. It took some doing to say well, now wait let's look at what the real facts are, let's start building these little blocks together, stepping stones. So you are right, that is a constant as to the nature of the task.

*Q: In our earlier discussion you had mentioned when you had referred to the Rockefeller organization that they had handled cultural information and technical and thinking as you mentioned there is a new role for USIA that perhaps remains to be defined and certainly discussed. Maybe it is time to come back to putting that all under, or at least closer together than it has been in the past. The technical being the modernization that could meet the needs of societies like the Soviet Union.*

ORAM: That could well be.

**A. DAVID FRITZLAN**  
**Consul General**  
**Barcelona (1959-1964)**

*A. David Fritzlan was born in India in 1914. He moved to the United States in 1932, and received a B.A. degree at Northwest Nazarene College in 1934 and an M.A. degree in at the University of Kentucky in 1936. He joined the Foreign Service in 1938, serving in Italy, Iraq, Iran, Morocco, Jordan, Spain, and Greece in addition to Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

FRITZLAN: I got orders to go to Barcelona as Consul General. I had said to the Department, "I frankly would welcome a European post." I had been so long and deeply involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Barcelona happened to be vacant. We had at that time a son who or three, and a son six months old. So it came as a welcome assignment, and I was there five years. But one of the things that happened as a result of this was, that with the new administration of Kennedy, with a wholly new Middle Eastern Bureau staff, that I knew few of them, and I'd dropped out of their minds completely. For five years I was Consul General in Barcelona. It was a pleasant, agreeable post. The work wasn't all that exciting, a lot of Sixth Fleet visits which I could have done without. Few in NEA had any interest in me, didn't even know me. In other words, I had to pay a price. In the normal course of events I could have expected to get a mission.

*Q: ...as an Ambassador within the Middle Eastern world.*

FRITZLAN: Of course. I had all the qualifications for it. But it didn't come. On the other hand, I and my family lived in a salubrious climate, in a nice attractive city, with a lot of cultural opportunities, and my district included the Costa Brava, Andorra, the Balearic Islands, and so I spent a lot of time on the road, and that was good. For a young family that was fine actually. Early in my stay in Barcelona, I came back on a Selection Board, and Gallman was then Director General of the Foreign Service. He said to me, "Are you interested...we're opening up missions in lots of African countries, and would you be interested in one?" And I said, "Frankly, the answer must be no. I've been in Barcelona less than a year, my family is young, and I don't want to expose them to the rigors of an African post. And secondly, if I'm to be a Chief of Mission anywhere, it makes sense to be one in the Arab world." And he said, "I understand that."

Our Ambassador in Madrid was John Davis Lodge, a nice fellow and all that, very amiable, but his one idea was to cultivate close ties with monarchists, people with titles, support Franco in every way possible, and I took issue with him on this, saying that we ought to put out lines to opposition groups and people in the cultural mainstream. In Barcelona I did make a point of seeking out, and cultivating in an informal way, people who were known to be members of a so-called opposition which was obviously an underground movement.

*Q: This of course was towards the shank end of the Franco regime.*

FRITZLAN: But one could see that things were approaching a critical stage. Franco wasn't going to live forever, and that there was going to be change, and I took the view that we should not be unprepared for it and taken by surprise; that we should have contacts with the people in the underground opposition who were inevitably, of course, to the left of center, and that we should be prepared for a Spain after Franco that had a government that would be left of center. This was almost inevitable in a country like Spain with its history and so on. But Ambassador Lodge was quite unreceptive to the idea. It didn't stop me from doing what I did and sending reports in. He thought I was not on the right track at all but he never tried to censor my reports. Anyway we had good personal relations.

I don't have anything further to say about Barcelona except the Sixth Fleet was frequently in port and most of my time seemed to be taken up with representational duties which I found rather boring.

*Q: Speaking as a former Consul General in Naples, I agree with you.*

FRITZLAN: Every Rear Admiral who came into port thought he was blazing a trail. He came saying in effect, that I'm sort of the Ambassador for the United States. It got to be rather tedious, and boring.

**JAMES L. MORAD**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1960-1961)**

*James L. Morad was born in California in 1934. He received his BA from the University of Southern California and his MS from Columbia University. His foreign assignments include Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, Fortaleza, San Salvador, Madrid, Brussels and Paris. He was interviewed on June 9, 1994 by Allen C. Hansen.*

*Q: Madrid was where you got both good news and bad news because I was there at the same time you were, as you recall. The good news was that you met your future wife there, and I guess the bad news was that you became ill during the course of your tour.*

MORAD: That's right. Both were in some ways related to each other. The fact is that I came down with hepatitis, which was not diagnosed properly by, I should not say a Spanish, but an Austrian doctor who practiced in Spain. Literally one day I could not get out of bed. I mean my body was so weak that I decided to go out to Torrejon Air Base for an examination. I had resisted up till that time.

*Q: That was a joint American-Spanish Air Base.*

MORAD: That was the joint American-Spanish Air Base, which had a modern American hospital and medical facilities. I resisted going there primarily out of ignorance, but also because it was inconvenient. I was admitted to Torrejon Air Base Hospital for treatment. I have to go back a bit. First, I spent a couple of weeks at the Anglo- American Hospital in Madrid and then was released, and it was during that period that I met my wife. It was through a mutual friend. She had come to Madrid to study art at the San Fernando Academy. During the period of my recovery from hepatitis after my release from the Anglo-American Hospital I met my wife and we dated and went out quite a lot. As you would expect from two relatively young people in Madrid, we had a great time. I did not properly take care of myself and I had a relapse. It was because of this relapse I ended up in the Torrejon Air Base hospital for over 6 weeks. I couldn't even officially call her my girlfriend; she was somebody I had just met recently and we dated but she came out to the hospital 15 miles from Madrid every day to visit me. It was very inconvenient for her because she had to take public transportation.

*Q: It really impressed you!*

MORAD: Every day, in fact, every day for six weeks. She kept me from going crazy in that hospital. We spent a lot of time playing gin rummy, in which she won a lot of money from me. But it was because of that experience that we established our relationship. Then my assignment was extended in Spain for further recovery. I had received an assignment to Bolivia as Assistant Information Officer, but because of the illness, the assignment was canceled and I was extended in Madrid. Six months later, I returned to the United States on leave without pay for an extended period of time for further recovery.

*Q: My! Leave without pay.*

MORAD: What had happened was that since the illness came shortly after joining the Agency, I had no accumulated sick leave, so I had to borrow the maximum two years advance sick leave. I used all that up and then went on leave without pay and spent three months at home in Los Angeles; then I returned to Washington on detail for another three months before being assigned to Rio.

*Q: Before we get into that, how many months were you training before you got ill?*

MORAD: Actually, I completed the formal training program, and the illness kind of coincidentally took place at the end of my training program in Madrid. So, what it resulted in was an extension of my assignment there, and during that period I was assigned as Assistant Cultural Officer, mainly in charge of the library, distribution of materials and a variety of things connected to the cultural section.

*Q: How was the training in general? Was it worthwhile, or was it not so good?*

MORAD: It was hard to call it training, per se. It was kind of an accumulation of experience. I mean, you are there, you are assigned your task, you perform those tasks and in the process you learn the job. It wasn't training in the sense that somebody was standing over you saying something should be done this way, or that way. It was essentially work experience. You were gaining experience at it, and your supervisors were expected to take into consideration that you were a trainee and give you a wide array of tasks. In their evaluation of your performance, they also took into account that you were a trainee and not experienced on the job.

**ROBERT W. ZIMMERMANN**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1960-1966)**

*Robert W. Zimmermann was Born in Chicago, Illinois and was raised in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received a degree in economics and political science from the University of Minnesota. He graduated from Harvard Business School in 1942. In 1947, after Serving in the U.S. Navy during World War II, Mr. Zimmermann entered the Foreign Service. He served in Washington, DC, Peru,*

*Thailand, the United Kingdom (England), and Spain. Mr. Zimmermann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

*Q: What were you doing in Madrid?*

ZIMMERMANN: I was the deputy chief of the political section when I went. Later I became political counselor. We were there for many years, probably too many, but we were hardly going to object. We found it very interesting. My wife, particularly, having been Cuban, her grandfather having been born in Spain, etc.

*Q: What was the political situation? You came in 1960.*

ZIMMERMANN: The construction of the bases had just been finished a few years earlier.

*Q: These were American bases?*

ZIMMERMANN: Torrejon, Zaragoza and Moron. Rota was there, but had not become a major installation yet. We didn't have the nukes coming in, that came later.

It was always the constant question of keeping in touch with the opposition as much as you could without annoying the Franco government too much, combined with attempts to push in subtle ways the government to more openness. It was a period of considerable economic aid and military aid to the extent that a lot of Spanish opposition became annoyed at the extent of military aid. They thought it supported Franco's continuing rule.

*Q: You talk about the opposition. What was the situation? Was there an opposition within the governmental structure?*

ZIMMERMANN: The government structure wasn't monolithic. There were degrees of support for Franco.

Let me say something about at least one opposition leader, not an important one but one who made this comment that reflected the feelings of a wide spectrum: "We don't like Franco, but if the transition can be carried out in a peaceful manner, it will have been worth all the years under Franco."

There were many people who thought that. But more rabid opposition wanted Franco out, period. They thought all our economic and military aid did nothing but support the regime.

A lot of this led to ambivalent attitudes toward Spain by the rest of the world. The Spanish regime was still sort of a pariah in parts of Europe, especially to the labor parties in Scandinavia, Italy, England and France.

But I think the US opening, obviously done to obtain the bases, did in the end wear down some of this opposition, soften it. Spain did not fully become an accepted member of Western Europe

until many years later when Spain finally became a member of NATO. That wasn't until well after Franco disappeared in the fall of 1975.

It was a very interesting period. We had contacts not only with the opposition, but also with some of the ultra supporters of the Falange.

*Q: How could you characterize the people you were meeting? Were these really hard-nose fascist types?*

ZIMMERMANN: Some of them, yes. That type of person with very few exceptions was probably in second and third echelon positions, not in top positions. Many of the top cabinet officers, obviously, were supporters of Franco or they wouldn't have been there. But they tended to be quite able people, some of them basically technicians more than politicians or political advocates of one side or another. People like Lopez Rodo who was basically a technician, a very fine economist. He did a lot for Spain, bringing it out of the economic basement.

This was a period when Spain was changing very rapidly. I remember early in the first year (1960) taking drives outside on a Sunday with the kids around Madrid and you didn't have to go very far to see people still cultivating the fields with Roman ploughs. Two years later there were tractors everywhere unless you were way off in the hinterland. By the end of my tour it was hard to find a Roman plough except at an antique shop. It was a period of great changes.

*Q: Could our policy be summed up in one word, bases, as far as Spain was concerned, or were there other considerations?*

ZIMMERMANN: Well, the bases go back to strategic problems with Russia, obviously. That was the name of the game. I think the only reason we were concerned about bringing Spain back into the Western community, so to speak, was for that reason...to keep Spain on our side. There was concern about Spain's orientation. There was a saying that Africa begins at the Pyrenees, not at the Mediterranean. There was concern that Spain really wasn't going to be a partner of the Western coalition.

I think that overshadowed any other consideration.

*Q: Did you have contact with the Communist Party?*

ZIMMERMANN: No, that was done through another office.

*Q: Did you have any feeling for what you were getting from our cousins about where they stood? Communist parties by this time were beginning to develop distinct characteristics. The French was a real tool of the Soviet Union. The Italians were sort of going their own way.*

ZIMMERMANN: The Spanish Communist Party was pretty well decimated by the Franco machine. They were there, yes, but they were not a big noise. They worked largely on the labor side and some of the Socialist parts of the labor movement tended to be more communist than

socialist. You also had a lot of returning exiles from Russia at that point that were being subjected to an interrogation program.

I would say that more noise came from the Basque Separatists, that sort of thing, and the Catalan separatists, who really had nothing to do with the Communists.

Just as an aside, one person described the difference between the Basque and the Catalan movements: "Catalan separatism is an intellectual thing; the Basque movement is emotional. Therefore the Catalan will never carry it through, because they know they are too tied to the Spanish economy." Barcelona up to that point had been much more of an industrial center than Madrid...certainly as a banking, publishing and textile center. But that has somewhat changed.

*Q: How did you find the political section? Was there a problem of getting sort of smothered and coopted by the wealthy upper class?*

ZIMMERMANN: There was always that problem and that was an accusation that was leveled against Ambassador Lodge, of course. That is not original with me. But that really wasn't a problem down the line. The upper wealthy class were really more interested in the Ambassador and DCM than anyone else.

*Q: What was John Davis Lodge like? What was your impression of him.*

ZIMMERMANN: At one point I wondered whether I could take a full tour. Lodge loved to sing "Madrid" at every party; his conduct at staff meetings was imperious, not really listening, trying to put people down. At that point he and the DCM were not even talking to each other. I can't really remember very many specifics. Anyway, he left six months after my arrival.

*Q: He was replaced by Tony Biddle. What was he like?*

ZIMMERMANN: He was an absolute prince. He had the ability to be friends with everybody. He wasn't there very long, as you well know. He went home and died of cancer. You may remember that the heads of the Spanish government at that time moved up to San Sebastian every summer for two or three months. The Ambassador rented a house there and we would rotate as assistants to him...one secretary and one assistant. I was fortunate to have spent a month up there with him, which was absolutely delightful.

He was a great raconteur telling about his experiences with the exile governments in London during the war and that sort of thing. His death was a great shock.

*Q: He was replaced by Bob Woodward. How did he operate?*

ZIMMERMANN: A top pro. There was no question. He was extremely knowledgeable, careful, exacting. Just excellent. There is no other way of putting it.

*Q: Having been an ambassador three times previously. Also he had been Assistant Secretary for ARA.*



ZIMMERMANN: That is right. It was a great pleasure to serve under him.

*Q: After a while, you were there so long you had one more, Angie Biddle Duke. How about him?*

ZIMMERMANN: Well, he wouldn't let me out. He was a little like my old Naval Commander. At this point I could see that I was spending too much time in Madrid. I also had been fingered to be political counselor in Venezuela under Bernbaum. Finally Bernbaum said he couldn't wait for Angie to release me so the whole thing went up in the air. I finally came back to Washington with no specific assignment and Joe Palmer took me on in the Director General's office as assistant for presidential appointments.

**JAMES M. WILSON, JR.**  
**Economic Counselor**  
**Madrid (1961-1964)**

*James M. Wilson, Jr. was born in China to American parents in 1918. He received a BA from Swarthmore College in 1939, graduated from the Geneva School of International Studies in 1939, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940, and Harvard Law School in 1948. He also served as a lieutenant colonel overseas in the US Army from 1941-44. Mr. Wilson has served abroad in Paris, Madrid, Bangkok and Manila. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: What were you doing in Spain?*

WILSON: I was supposed to head up the combined economic section and aid mission, but unbeknownst to me, my predecessor was asked to stay on a while. He left in due course. In those days, Congress in its wisdom saw fit to give Spain 20 million dollars annually in economic assistance, plus a large chunk of military assistance.

*Q: This was quite big money in those days.*

WILSON: It was quite a lot of money in those days. In 1964, we finally persuaded Congress not to give the Spanish any more economic aid at least (Military aid continued.). At that point, I started to look around for something else to do.

*Q: You were in Spain from '61 to when?*

WILSON: From '61 to '64.

*Q: What was Spain like in those days?*

WILSON: Franco was still very much around. He was in his mellow period, and our relationships with the government were very good. In terms of living arrangements, also very good. It was a time when there was a significant relaxation in some of the domestic political restrictions, and Spain was beginning to open up economically. So, it was a good time to be there.

*Q: What type of work were you doing and what was in the aid program?*

WILSON: We had a whole basket full of things. There were excellent relations with the Spanish Foreign Office and Ministry of Finance. The Spanish side was headed by a guy who later was ambassador here, Juan José Rovira. His deputy, who was later deputy foreign minister, was Gabriel Valderrama. They were both young career diplomats, very bright, aggressive, able, and a pleasure to work with. On the Foreign Office side was Angel Sagaz, also later Spanish ambassador in Washington.

What we tried to do was to work out a series of basic infrastructure projects and a number of technical assistance arrangements. There had been some major developments in hydroelectric dam building in Western Spain. There were major irrigation projects of one type or another and a host of agricultural projects. I'll give you an example. Part of the technical assistance money was used to establish a ladies' shoe industry in an area north of Valencia, honchoed by a former vice president of I. Magnin. It turned out only too well and sales soared. We had some protests from American manufacturers and had to persuade the Valencianos not to expand into the mens' shoe business as well.

*Q: Were there any problems with the local chief or something, trying to get you to pass contracts to the local flange, or relatives, or anything like that?*

WILSON: No, no, nothing like that.

*Q: It was a pretty straight forward business type atmosphere at that point.*

WILSON: Thanks in large part to the people we were dealing with in the Spanish government.

*Q: How did you find the Spanish bureaucracy?*

WILSON: Our dealings were primarily with the Spaniards in our own coordinating group who handled most of the dealings with Spanish bureaucracy. This made it relatively easy for us.

*Q: Had we put in our bases there yet?*

WILSON: Oh, indeed, yes. They were established way back in 1951-1953.

*Q: Did these have any influence on what we were doing at that time?*

WILSON: They had a great deal. The military assistance program in particular was geared to what we were doing with the bases. But there were arguments as to whose bases they were, whether they were under Spanish or American flag, this sort of thing.

*Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?*

WILSON: The ambassador when I first got there was Tony Biddle. But he got sick almost immediately, had to be hospitalized back here and died. Bob McBride was for a long time chargé. Then Bob Woodward took over. He was absolutely wonderful.

*Q: Yes, I've interviewed him. As this was moving did you see both society and maybe the political side beginning to change in Spain?*

WILSON: Oh, yes. You could see a slow development along the way. Franco by that time had committed himself to restoration of the monarchy. There was considerable liberalization on the political side.

*Q: Were there times that you asked the ambassador to go to Franco because of problems?*

WILSON: No, there were no problems at all along those lines. We would go and see the foreign minister every now and then but not any major issues that I can recall specifically. We used to go see the foreign minister primarily on the economic side of the house. I had two hats; one on the aid mission and one on the embassy economic side, including American commercial interests, where we worked very closely with the American Chamber of Commerce. We also got in the business of establishing the first nuclear power plant in Spain.

*Q: What about commercial interests? So much of our effort for really quite a bit of time after World War II was aimed at building up countries; we were in a way building up commercial rivals. Were you able to sort of introduce American goods and that sort of thing?*

WILSON: I don't recall any particular arguments that we had. Primarily we were concerned with sales of major items of equipment, this sort of thing.

**OSCAR J. OLSON, JR.**  
**Administrative Officer**  
**Barcelona (1962-1964)**

*Mr. Olson was born and raised in Texas and was educated at the University of Texas, Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Primary a Commercial and Economic Officer, Mr. Olson served in Venezuela, Spain, Germany, Mexico, Panama and Ecuador. In his Washington Assignments he dealt with Management issues. Mr. Olson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

*Q: You went on to Barcelona in 1962. How did that assignment happen, and did you have some training in between or go directly?*

OLSON: I had a very long home leave in between, waiting for child number two to be born. Michael was born in Venezuela, and Kirsten, our daughter, was born in a hospital in Winter Park, Florida. As I left Caracas, I did not have an assignment. We, my wife, were pregnant again. We didn't think we could afford to have a second child in Caracas, so my wife flew back with our son a couple months before I left. That meant we didn't get to go back by ship—we sailed to Venezuela on the Santa Rosa.

*Q: You flew back. Did Pat have family in Winter Park?*

OLSON: Close by. She flew back first to my family in Corpus Christi, and I joined her there. Then we went to her family in Apopka, just outside Orlando. I did not have an onward assignment which meant packing in Caracas was a problem. Items had to be separated and marked, what was appropriate if we were provided furnished quarters or not, or if we went to a tropical post or not, and so forth. Anyway it was a bit of a maze trying to sort things out. Actually, being provided furnished quarters didn't happen very often back in those days, as you will recall. So sometime when we were in Texas or Florida, I got my assignment to Barcelona. I was told that for the first six months I was to fill in for the administrative officer, who was being 'selected out' (forced retirement). Then I was to replace the economic officer, who was due to leave in six months. We were scheduled to sail from New York to Barcelona at the end of March.

*Q: '62?*

OLSON: Yes, '62. The American Export Lines would accept a child six weeks old but no younger. Which meant that the baby had to be born in a timely fashion.

*Q: In time.*

OLSON: To the day. Our daughter was born on Valentine's Day, which happened to have been the birthday of her grandfather, with whom we were staying. And it was six weeks to the day that we sailed on the S.S. Excalibur. So that little bit of timing worked out. However, the timing of the assignment proved to be a problem, as when I got to post I found that the economic officer had extended his tour. So I remained admin officer.

*Q: For the full time?*

OLSON: For the full time, yes. It did prove to be an interesting experience.

*Q: Did you have a particular training to be an administrative officer?*

OLSON: None. I had a very good foreign service national staff to help with my on-the-job training. The biggest help came from a Philippine gentleman who had been running things for a while. His name was Joe Luling. I learned a lot from him. He would occasionally remind me of the fact that the U.S. government apparently had reneged on a promise to given American citizenship to natives of the Philippines who fought with the Americans in World War II..

*Q: How did he happen to be in Barcelona, in Spain?*

OLSON: Good question. I don't remember.

*Q: How large was the consulate general in those days?*

OLSON: I would say, medium sized. What does that mean? We had a consul general, deputy principal officer, economic-commercial officer. No, we had an economic officer, that I was to replace, and also a commercial officer. Then an admin officer and one, two, three consular officers, a political officer, a USIA public affairs officer, a Binational Center director, and the consul general's secretary. So that was about 12 Americans.

*Q: That was pretty good sized.*

OLSON: Pretty good sized, yes.

*Q: Probably near its peak, I suspect now it's smaller maybe?*

OLSON: Yes.

*Q: Probably gradually got smaller over the years.*

OLSON: Yes, now it's smaller, and there are periodic threats to close the post. There were five American consulates general or consulates in Spain when I was there, in addition to the embassy in Madrid. Now Barcelona is the only one left. The consulate general there, after some 200 years in rented quarters, now has its own U.S. government-owned building, so some think it is time to close. I am reminded of our visit to Tangiers while we were assigned to Barcelona. We went to see our A-100 classmates and good friends George and Frances Ogg and Ed and Heather Peck. The oldest piece of real estate the United States owns outside our borders is the old legation in Tangiers, a gift from the Moroccan Sultan early in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It was in continuous use as legation or consulate until the security folks discovered that it's right in the middle of the Medina, the oldest section of the city. It has common walls with its neighbors, and so the consulate couldn't stay there. They built this modern, three-story glass box out on the edge of Tangiers—and then closed the post. At that point they were using the old legation as the FSI (Foreign Service Institute) school for Western Arabic (which is where Ed Peck was in training). FBO (Foreign Buildings Operations) was desperately trying to find tenants to occupy the soon to be deserted Tangiers consulate building—Voice of America or anybody that need a regional office in North Africa. Once I was driving around Barcelona with Joe Luling, my admin right hand, and we came to a spot in central Barcelona. He remarked, "Someone tried to give this half a block to the American government twenty years ago, and they wouldn't take it". When I arrived, the consulate general had just moved to a new building overlooking the Cathedral Square, occupying most of the fifth floor.

*Q: Rented space?*

OLSON: Rented space, and at that point in Barcelona you built a new building trying to make it look like it was at least one hundred, maybe two hundred years old. It was adequate, but I wasn't

very impressed with the space. But everyone would say, “You should have seen what we moved out of. This is terrific.” Anyway, according to Joe Luling, someone had tried to give us some real estate. But we apparently said, no, we’ve only been here since 1798; we don’t want to be bothered with property. We did not own a residence for the consul general or any of the staff when I was there. I think just before the Olympics in Barcelona, FBO finally obtained an office building out on the edge of town. The story I heard was that Barcelona would have closed at that time except for the Olympics.

*Q: Who was the principal officer at the time you were there?*

OLSON: David Fritzlan. He was a Middle East expert. He went on then to be Consul General in Alexandria, Egypt. Born in India of missionary parents; he had a British wife.

Barcelona was a fascinating place, especially for a romantic that loved seafood—guilty on both charges. And also our very own Catalana, our daughter Kathy, was born there, just before Christmas in 1963. My wife and Kathy were the only patients at the Foreign Colonies Hospital over Christmas. Nevertheless they were serenaded with Christmas carols because of a visit by a group from the local underground Baptist church. Protestant churches did not exist legally in Franco’s Spain. The English-speaking community attended the Anglican Chapel, which operated under the auspices of the British Consulate General. It was a small gothic structure, obviously a church, but without markings except for a small card on the door reading, in English, “For information, call ...” and then a telephone number. We went to church there, and in fact I substituted as organist. They were really hard up, because the organist had to lead the many sung responses in this high-church Anglican service. I had no experience with such a service and was only an amateur organist to begin with.

The preceding Christmas had also been memorable, our first White Christmas! It never snows in Barcelona, or so they said. Our second story bedroom opened onto a small “Juliet” balcony, with a beautiful view of the city and the Mediterranean. That morning as I attempted to open the shutter doors to the balcony, I felt resistance. Eighteen inches of snow, completely unexpected! Barcelona was totally unprepared, with the nearest snowplow in Andorra. People were skiing down the streets from the upper reaches of the city. Fortunately there was an excellent subway system that continued to operate.

We had good times and some difficulties. After Kathy’s birth, Pat had several medical problems. And early on we were not well advised as far as our search for living quarters. We had two small children and thought we had to have a house. Well, houses were difficult to come by. Most people lived in apartments, and there were nearby parks where children could play. But somehow that word didn’t quite get through to us. As a result we were in a hotel for four months, two children in diapers, waiting to find a house. There were no paper diapers, no Laundromats—Pat washed the diapers in the bathtub. What we needed was a FLO (Family Liaison Officer) to offer helpful advice.

*Q: So eventually you found a house?*

OLSON: We found a house.

*Q: Way out?*

OLSON: No, it was in town, a good location, a 'romantic villa.' My wife said, "If you ever again tell me we're moving to a 'romantic villa,' I'm leaving you." Tall ceilings and impossible to heat, plumbing problems, and so forth.

*Q: Within the housing allowance?*

OLSON: I don't think that was a problem. Just that it was inappropriate, not very convenient. The plumbing went out, and we were without hot water for quite a while, even without any water for periods. So, it made things a bit difficult. Still Spain was a great place to experience. If you want law and order, we had law and order in Franco's Spain. You could walk down any street with a feeling of security. The one thing that got me out of the office, the most interesting part of my duties, was my role as the principal liaison with the U.S. Navy. Barcelona at that time was the most popular Mediterranean liberty port for the Sixth Fleet; we had fleet visits constantly. I would take the ranking skipper to make a courtesy call on the Spanish admiral and translate. The consulate had a little Studebaker Lark compact car, and sometimes I would be taking a 6'3" U.S. Navy skipper in his dress uniform with sword in this car to make his call. People would line up on the streets just to see him try to get into and out of that tiny car.

*Q: Did you have a driver?*

OLSON: We had a driver. I really got to know and appreciate the U.S. Navy in Barcelona. I grew up in a Navy town, and my uncles and cousins who served in World War II were all in the Navy. But I didn't know that much about the Navy. The liaison work was greatly assisted by a Greek gentlemen, Mr. Kureshi, who had the contract for provisioning our ships. Whatever they needed he could come up with. There were very few problems. He was very cooperative with the consulate. We also had excellent liaison with the police. One Spanish police officer, a very smart fellow, was the permanent contact for the U.S. shore patrol. Barcelona had been welcoming sailors for centuries, and the only times we had problems were when there were simultaneous U.S. and a British fleet visits. Then we knew there would be fights, if not near riots, in some popular bars or spots. So they would have extra police on duty. It was really a joy to have the Navy there. Again without commissary or PX, we would occasionally be able to pick up on a visiting ship a special cough syrup or something we weren't able to find on the local market. And as a young vice counsel, it was pretty heady business being piped aboard a ship and greeted by an occasional admiral. One memorable visit was the first arrival of a nuclear carrier, the Enterprise. It anchored outside the breakwaters, but sent boats in for the public to come aboard. We were invited to dinner at the officers' wardroom, and ate with several of the ship's doctors. Pat was pregnant, eight months plus! Those doctors really wanted to induce labor, I think looking for a headline in the "Navy Times" reading: "Carrier Enterprise Opens Maternity Ward."

*Q: Did the consul general have much to do with these ship visits?*

OLSON: The consul general did especially if we had a flag visit. Then the Naval Attaché or his assistant would also come up from Madrid.

*Q: Flag meaning an admiral?*

OLSON: With an admiral, right. The commander of the Sixth Fleet would visit about once a year, and the consul general would have a reception. I believe the consul general also took the admiral to make a call on the Governor General. I was not directly involved in that. It was usually a Navy captain that I accompanied to visit the Spanish admiral.

*Q: Yes, as the skipper.*

OLSON: The ranking skipper, I would take to call on the Spanish admiral and then a courtesy call on the consul general. He would sometimes host a reception if it was a very large group of ships, even without an admiral.

*Q: Was there resistance on the part of the Spanish authorities or the Spanish people to these constant Navy visits, or did they welcome the dollars?*

OLSON: Absolutely, they welcomed the dollars and welcomed us. The U.S. and Spain had very good relations militarily at that point, having already built the air force base at Zaragoza, not too far from Barcelona, and the navy base at Rota.

*Q: Was that in your consular district too?*

OLSON: Zaragoza was.

*Q: And Rota was...?*

OLSON: Rota was in the district of our consulate general in Seville. Those of us at the Barcelona consulate would make consular visits to Zaragoza, primarily for registration of American citizen births and provision of notarial and other consular services for U.S. Air Force personnel and their dependents. That duty was rotated, so occasionally I would travel to Zaragoza for that purpose.

*Q: Did you do much else as the administrative officer outside of Barcelona, outside of the consulate? Was there much local travel that you would do other than occasional visits to Zaragoza?*

OLSON: No, and I only got to Madrid once for consultations at the Embassy, carrying the classified pouch.

*Q: So you were pretty much out on your own.*

OLSON: Yes.

*Q: Did you have anything to do with other consulates in Spain?*



OLSON: We did not have any consular meetings. Barcelona, Catalonia, was the center of the opposition during the Spanish Civil War, and so Franco visited only once during the two years we were there. I can remember he passed by in a closed car, and there were police on the rooftops. He was not a welcome visitor. During my two years there, Barcelona “celebrated” the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Spanish Civil War, ’39-’64. There were posters all over the city: Veinte-Cinco Anos de Paz (25 Years of Peace). A number of them had ‘Paz’ (Peace) crossed out and ‘Paciencia’ (Patience) written in (25 Years of Patience). The hope was to live through this Franco era, which of course most of them did.

*Q: Was there much feeling in Catalonia, in Barcelona, toward the United States since we were seen as having a good relationship with the Franco regime? We had these military facilities in the country. Or was there more feeling against Franco than opposition to the United States?*

OLSON: There was a very strong bond again with our president, our young and vibrant, Catholic president, John Kennedy. His assassination was very much felt in Spain and certainly in Barcelona, in Catalonia. I recall when we received the news. We were on our way to the Binational Center on that Friday night in Barcelona to see a film. As we approached the entrance, the center director came out and said that President Kennedy had been shot. In astonishment, my wife said, “You’re kidding.” Of course, he wasn’t kidding. We went home immediately and turned on the short-wave radio. I can recall that our maid said, “And so you will have a civil war.” She was certain that if Franco were shot, another civil war would begin. I told her, “No, we don’t think so.” My most vivid memory was of the funeral. As I recall, this was one of the first live transatlantic television transmission by satellite to Spain. So we witnessed the funeral procession with de Gaulle and all of the leaders walking from the White House to St. Matthews Cathedral. That was most impressive.

*Q: Yes, we were in Vienna at the time and I don’t remember whether it was live there or, you know, taped earlier.*

OLSON: We saw it live which was quite a feeling. Then mourning in Spain was something not to be taken lightly. As admin officer I ordered stationary with a black band around the edge and a memorial book for people to sign. And there were hundreds and hundreds of people that came to pay their respect. The Kennedys were very popular. We wore black ties, black armbands, for I think six weeks.

*Q: 30 days.*

OLSON: 30 days, yes.

*Q: Okay, anything else about your time in Barcelona, ’62-’64?*

OLSON: I guess I can tell a tale about my lack of perception at the time. Young Juan Carlos, the Spanish prince, had just been taken under Franco’s wing and was in school to begin his grooming as a future head of state. There was some disastrous flooding just inland from Barcelona, to the extent that the government in Madrid felt it had to take note of this. So I imagine some high official thought someone needed to make a visit to express sympathy, and

why not Juan Carlos. He needed to start getting use to making such ceremonial visits. Juan Carlos was probably in his early 20's. We went to the airport as his special plane landed, at this time of devastation and sadness. Juan Carlos stepped off the plane in his double-breasted blazer with ascot tie looking like he was on his way to a polo match or ready for the tables at Monte Carlo. The costume and attitude did not appear appropriate to the occasion. We had already heard rumors that he was not too bright. I thought, "Oh, what a disaster this is going to be for Spain," eventually having him as king. I could not have been more wrong, as Juan Carlos turned out to be the savior of Spanish democracy.

*Q: You mentioned that you had a lot to do with the U.S. Navy on ship visits. Were you involved at all with U.S. shipping companies? Commercial ships, passenger ships? You traveled on the American Export Lines.*

OLSON: Somewhat. Primarily when there was a problem with an American seaman, which occasionally happened. The one incident that I do remember concerned a seaman from one of the American shipping lines who missed the ship when it sailed. So we were involved in repatriating him to the U.S. or getting him on another ship. For whatever reason, a consular officer brought him up to the consulate, to our offices. He was drunk or on drugs, in a bad way, and whatever the consular section was arranging for him he didn't like. He suddenly saw one of the old type fire extinguishers with the ring around the top mounted on the wall. He tore it off and started down the hall swinging this extinguisher by the ring over his head. At which time the admin officer was called on to get rid of him. We managed somehow to calm him down and decided not to wait for the next ship but to get the shipping company to pay his airfare back to the States. That was a bit of excitement.

*Q: Well, you did not have a security officer, I'm sure, or Marine Guards, so you were responsible for security, or at least overseeing that.*

OLSON: Yes, nor did we have a communications staff for classified cable traffic, most of which we would get by classified pouch. Anything received telegraphically had to be decoded by means of a one-time pad, very time consuming. Once during the problems in the Congo the Department found that one of the leaders of that civil war had been exiled and was spending time in Barcelona. So someone in Washington decided to put Barcelona on as an info addressee on a steady stream of cables about a debate on the Congo crisis in the United Nations, all coming telegraphically. Which would have kept us going for six weeks with our one time pads, but we were finally able to get off the telegraphic addressee list for that.

*Q: How did you receive and send classified pouch material? Did you have a courier come? Or did you have people come back and forth to the embassy?*

OLSON: We had people coming back and forth, mostly embassy folks who wanted to visit Barcelona. The one time that I got to Madrid for consultations with the admin section was when I was carrying that classified pouch.

*Q: Okay, anything else on Barcelona?*

OLSON: Barcelona. The lesson learned—it's hard to judge an assignment in advance. Even though Barcelona can claim to be one of the most delightful places on earth, circumstances dictated that our time there was not all peaches and cream. Then we were sent to Juarez, easily considered a hellhole, where we had a marvelous experience in many different ways. We did enjoy the trip home via the SS. Constitution.

**FREDERICK H. SACKSTEDER**  
**Executive Officer**  
**Barcelona (1962-1965)**

*Frederick H. Sacksteder was born in New York in 1924. He received his bachelor's degree at Amherst College and served in the US Navy during World War II. His career included positions in Germany, France, Spain, Tunisia, and Mexico. Mr. Sacksteder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

*Q: You were in Barcelona from '61 to '63?*

SACKSTEDER: No, from March '62 to March '65.

*Q: What was the political situation in Barcelona then?*

SACKSTEDER: Barcelona is not Madrid and you might say it's a different world. Barcelona is the capital of a portion of Spain that considers itself a country, Catalonia, with its history, its tradition, its language. At that time, it could not be denied that Catalonia was repressed by Madrid. Catalan was not taught when I was there. It was not used officially. It was not used in published papers; they were all published in Spanish. The Catalans felt put upon by Madrid but then they had always been put upon by Madrid. Their history with respect to Madrid was that Madrid had colonized this industrious, smart, hard working people of Catalonia to the benefit of Madrid. It was inevitable that eventually they would assert their differences with Madrid, and, for example, change all street names to Catalan, and publish the newspapers only in Catalan.

My colleagues who followed me there, some of them, have told me that it became essential for them to learn Catalan, to speak Catalan. Although even in my time Catalans used their language, whether it was officially allowed or not, anybody with an ear for Romance languages could learn enough Catalan. It's close enough to French, Italian, Spanish that you can understand what they are saying but, of course, I didn't have to speak it.

*Q: Were we reporting on regional differences back to Washington?*

SACKSTEDER: Yes, we were.

*Q: Was there anything from the embassy saying they didn't like that type of report to come out?*

SACKSTEDER: No, not at all.

*Q: Because sometimes this happens. Sometimes an embassy sits at the middle and doesn't want to have people from the periphery reporting on discontent or anything else like that, but you didn't find that?*

SACKSTEDER: No, we didn't find that.

*Q: Who was our ambassador during this time?*

SACKSTEDER: Lodge left before I did, and for several months I worked for Anthony J. Drexel Biddle Jr., Tony Biddle, who unfortunately was already a sick man when he came to Madrid. He had to return to the States and died of cancer within a year. He was followed by Robert Woodward, a career officer, who was ambassador for a good part of the time I was in Barcelona. Of course he brought to the embassy a different approach. Bob Woodward was not a John Lodge. His mode of operation was much lower keyed. He knew how to run the embassy and did so, not just the embassy but he ran the whole operation very well. He was not the kind to have his speeches published in the newspapers. In fact, he was not the kind to give many speeches. Since he is still living I would defer to him.

*Q: I have interviewed Bob. What were the issues that sort of engaged the consulate general?*

SACKSTEDER: In many ways Barcelona was a larger scale version of Lyon. The economic center of the country, it was the site of its textile industry. As Executive Officer, I supervised a three-officer economic section as well as devoting a good deal of time to economic and commercial work. I served ex-officio as a Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain, which was located in Barcelona, and much of the American business presence in Spain was there. And Barcelona's annual International Trade Fair, like that at Lyon, was well patronized by American business.

Being a port city and a very popular port of call for the Sixth Fleet, we did a good deal of work with the Sixth Fleet accommodating their needs for facilities and frequent visits, both there and in Majorca which was in our district. Incidentally, I had served in the Navy in World War II and I was a naval reserve officer for a number of years. I also had temporary active duty with the Sixth Fleet. Encouraged by the commanders of the Sixth Fleet, I made it a practice to speak to Sixth Fleet personnel when they visited Barcelona. I developed a briefing about Spain, its history and its prospects for the future.

*Q: Were we at all watching for any signs of democratic movement at that point or was the situation not one in which we felt there would be much change?*

SACKSTEDER: For example, when I concluded my briefings to the officers of these Navy groups coming into Barcelona, I always ended with an explanation that Spain was not a democracy but would eventually become a democracy. How come? Because I said they had no alternatives. Dictators can't name successors. Certainly Franco could not have named a successor. His successor was already named because his successor was going to be the king, but it was a king who was going to be a constitutional monarch. To be a constitutional monarch, you have to

operate in a more democratic context, and I think that's really what we all felt at that time would happen.

*Q: On the economic side, what were our interests in Spain particularly from the Barcelona perspective?*

SACKSTEDER: Spain was neither an important market nor an important source of imports for us. It really wasn't. Spain was still the same Spain that we were dealing with when I was on the desk and the same Spain I was dealing with when I was in Madrid, i.e. it was a country where we had major base rights and military interests. One of our major bases was in Zaragoza which was part of my district. Occasionally situations would arise there that required some intervention on the part of the consulate general. Not the least of which was mending local relations in Zaragoza after the occasional faux-pas by someone at the base, due to inadvertence, or lack of appreciation, or lack of knowledge. In other words, it was a bit of hand holding.

*Q: It wouldn't be of our concern but I recall around this time there was much looking at Spain as being the bad example of what you should do for tourism. It seemed like the whole coast was being bought up by German tourists who were to the equivalent of bringing in their own wurst and salami with them and having enclaves so that the Spanish and others were being almost preempted from the coast. Was this happening at that time?*

SACKSTEDER: It was just beginning at that time. It really became a serious problem, certainly it became a massive presence, in the early '70s.

*Q: I was in Greece at the time and the Greeks were looking at Spain and saying we are not going to let that happen here.*

SACKSTEDER: It's true that they have in a sense spoiled large sections of the southern coast of Spain by building their, you could almost call them, tenements. They are not very attractive, they are cheap. But they brought a degree of economic prosperity to portions of the country that were really very poor because there were no other resources except, perhaps, almond trees.

*Q: Were you in Barcelona when President Kennedy was assassinated?*

SACKSTEDER: Yes.

*Q: I was in Yugoslavia and I was really astounded at the reaction there of the Yugoslavs, both the government and the people, the empathy and all. What happened in Barcelona at that point?*

SACKSTEDER: It was the same thing. I recall this as though it happened yesterday. Around 11:00 at night the telephone rang and it was the Captain General of Catalonia who was on the phone. I had not heard the news, the word hadn't gotten through to me. He began by expressing his condolences and I almost had to say "about what?" then I got the context of it and realized that he was saying that the President was dead. He asked me to call on him first thing the next morning because he wanted to coordinate with us what he said should be a proper expression of national sentiment about this. After clearing with the embassy, we opened a condolence book. I

don't recall how many thousands signed, but it was thousands and thousands. We held a memorial mass with all the pomp and circumstance which the Spaniards know how to give to such an event with everybody who was anybody there. The press and media just couldn't stop talking about it, writing about it. I do think that this extended down to what you might call the "little people." Kennedy was immensely popular.

*Q: He represented at that time I think both the new world and the younger generation coming up. I think certainly in Europe and in other places, I think he represented a younger, very competent, and attractive reflection of the United States as compared to what appeared to look to be an older and almost tired type of leadership that was elsewhere.*

*How about Soviet influence? Obviously Spain came out of a right-wing political system which had fought the Soviets. Did the Russians have any presence there at all?*

SACKSTEDER: No, they did not at that time, and the Spanish Communist Party was a party in exile. The Spanish police authorities were very much on top of any type of subversive activity which was primarily in the former labor unions. The former unions were not operating but the former membership was known and it was kept under surveillance. Some of the Spanish authorities were almost paranoid about it and they thought that if one communist were allowed to come in, he would subvert the entire country.

This may be too long a story to go into in any detail, but we had an episode involving an American citizen who was mistaken by the Spanish authorities as an envoy of Spanish republican exiles to the so-called internal opposition in Spain. The way this came about was that during a week when I was duty officer, I got a telephone call late at night from a very agitated woman who said that her husband had been arrested by the Spanish police. He was being charged with being a communist agent and could I come help, which I did. At one or two in the morning I went down to the police headquarters and they indeed had this American in a holding tank. They brought him out to speak with me, and this became quite a story. This individual was a friend of a number of people in New York who were publicly identified with the exiles from the Spanish Republic, people like Victoria Kent, Mary McCarthy, prominent liberals. Their names were in his pocket address book. The individual in question was a man by the name of Gabriel Javicas, who was, by profession, an importer of rare woods in New York and who traveled extensively in connection with his business. The lady who identified herself as his wife and was traveling as such was actually his friend and a practicing physician in New York. Mr. Javicas gave me his story of what happened, and I then promised that we would make arrangements to get him out of the police headquarters the next day. As it turned out, it didn't prove to be the case because the commanding general of the Guardia Civil in Catalonia was utterly convinced that he had caught a real bad one who was probably not only an agent of the communists, a courier for the communists, but maybe even a terrorist. He was moved to the modern prison, and we lined up a defense attorney.

This began an episode that lasted several months. It turned out that Mr. Javicas had a family relationship with Erskine Childers, the former president of Ireland; his daughter was married to the son of Erskine Childers. The Irish ambassador at Madrid was under instructions to intervene at "highest levels," even a higher level than our embassy was willing to go on behalf of Mr.

Javicas. This dragged on, and dragged on. Meanwhile, we visited Gabriel regularly, about every day. We took him his mail and arranged for his meals to be brought in from a restaurant across the street from the calaboose. As he admitted later he said he had a wonderful time because of the people he met there. He was of that nature. He met such interesting people that he said he had material for several books. He had been a writer for *Fortune* in an earlier life and it appears that some of his writings were anti-Franco during the civil war period. But that was in the records and that identified him with the “wrong people.”

As I say ultimately the Spanish had to admit that they really didn't have anything on him. They said he was a very foolish man to have done the things he did, but they let him go. I put him on a plane to Paris, where he was to stay with Mary McCarthy! Afterwards we kept in touch until his death some years later. He never wrote the books he talked about.

**ROBERT F. WOODWARD**  
**Ambassador**  
**Spain (1962-1965)**

*Ambassador Robert F. Woodward was born and raised in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He entered the Foreign Service in 1932. Ambassador Woodward's career included Deputy Chief of Mission positions in Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba, and Sweden. He was ambassador to Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, and Spain. Ambassador Woodward was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.*

*Q: What were your major instructions in going to Madrid? What did we want out of Spain at that time? This was 1962.*

WOODWARD: Our relationship with Spain was very well established by that time. There were no special instructions. It was obvious to me that, because of our air force and naval bases there, we should maintain the best possible relationship. I mentioned to you that the U.S. had already carried out a rather large aid program, supplying Spain with very badly needed materials for their economy. We had spent quite a lot of money, since 1953, when the base agreements were first signed, under the aegis of Jimmy Dunn, who was a very able ambassador, for three very active air bases and a naval base, which was really the beginning of a pipeline supplying fuel to the three air bases. The naval base was used as a staging place for crews that were going onto the ships of the Sixth Fleet, operating in the Mediterranean. There wasn't a real Sixth Fleet base there, but there was some warehousing of parts and equipment for the fleet. It wasn't until a couple of years after I went to Spain that we arranged for the basing of a squadron of nine submarines and a tender at Rota, which is right across the mouth of the harbor from Cadiz-- Cadiz on one side and Rota on the other.

*Q: You were there during a major base agreement. I think the ten-year one had run out, and now you had to renegotiate the five-year.*

WOODWARD: No, I didn't really have much to do with the actual negotiations. That was all handled in Washington. But I tried to contribute as much as I could in my conversations with the foreign minister and other key Spaniards. They were placing great importance on the aid we were giving them, both military aid as well as economic aid, and on the expenditures that were being made in the operation of the bases, and in our loans back to them of the local currency we got for the materials that we were giving them under the economic program. In addition to these considerations, I felt that the Spanish authorities considered it very important to have this kind of a relationship with the U.S. I expressed some doubts to them as to whether we needed the bases anymore, and I believe this may have had some effect in toning down their rather excessive demands for compensation.

*Q: We were phasing out, weren't we, the B-47s at that time, the medium-range jet bomber?*

WOODWARD: No, we weren't. We had a squadron of refueling planes that were refueling bombers from the U.S. every day. There was a daily flight of bombers from U.S. bases to the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, and I think they refueled twice, once on the way east, and again as they returned west in order to give them enough fuel to get back across the Atlantic. This refueling was taking place mostly from the air base at Torrejon, right outside of Madrid, where the fleet of refueling planes was based. The rendezvous between bombers and refueling planes would take place at a relatively great distance from Madrid, such as at Santiago de Compostela up in northwestern Spain. The refueling operation was quite difficult and a large part of it was done over the water, over the Atlantic or over the Mediterranean.

It wasn't until sometime after I left Spain, when Angie Duke was the ambassador, that a bombing plane cracked up in the process of refueling, and it dropped a hydrogen bomb down on the southern landscape of Spain. There was no explosion, and apparently no danger of one, but the nuclear fuel was spread over the farming country, along the Mediterranean coast of Spain, in one of the poorer provinces of Almeria.

This resulted in the Spanish deciding that they should prohibit refueling over their territory, or even having the refueling planes there. So then a switch was made, and the refueling planes were taken out of Spain.

*Q: Maybe to the Azores. I'm not sure.*

WOODWARD: I don't know. But anyhow, then I think they put in a squadron of fighter planes to make use of the base at Torrejon. They had some training activities up in northern Spain, there was an air base in Zaragoza, a large barren region not far from there was entirely uninhabited. This became a practice bombing range after the U.S. air base in Libya was closed down.

*Q: Wheelus.*

WOODWARD: Wheelus. Yes.

Anyhow, as a result of the accident I mentioned, I understand that the cleanup operation was followed by the gift of a desalting machine to the community where that hydrogen bomb had



spread radioactive material around the landscape. This farming community badly needed more fresh water, because it was a very arid section of Spain. The U.S. Defense Department cleaned up all of the debris; it took a long time; they had to sift it out. Angie Duke handled that very well. He went down and bathed in the ocean where the hydrogen bomb was found; do you remember?

*Q: I remember this very well. During your watch in Spain, did you have much dealing with Franco at the time?*

WOODWARD: Not very much, no. I called on him several times, and I got him to visit a U.S. exhibit of one of our space capsules, which we had at a fair that took place, and a few things like that. He knew that he wasn't in very good favor with several governments, and he always had doubts about U.S. popular opinion which had its roots in attitudes during the Spanish Civil War. So he delegated to his Foreign Minister practically all discussions on foreign relations. I made courtesy calls on him, with high-ranking visitors, such as the Director of the CIA and U.S. commanding officers in NATO. I talked to him several times, but I dealt with the Foreign Minister on all business matters and occasionally with the chief of the Spanish Joint Chiefs of Staff, a very influential general, who was the only living general who had been close to Franco before he ever became dictator. This General, Munoz Grande, was in North Africa with Franco, and had fought with him through the Moroccan campaign, and, incidentally, was in command of the Spanish "Blue Division" that fought on the German side in World War II.

*Q: How did you find dealing with the Spanish Government? Was it a difficult government to deal with, to get decisions from?*

WOODWARD: No, I didn't find it difficult. The foreign minister was a very intelligent, capable man, Castiella, very much trusted by Franco. I liked the old general who was head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, despite the fact that he had been the general in command of the Blue Division that helped the Nazis in Eastern Europe.

*Q: In Russia.*

WOODWARD: Yes, in Russia.

*Q: Did you get any particular instructions on how to deal with the Spanish? Things were on a fairly even keel when you were there.*

WOODWARD: Things were on a fairly even keel, and that was a rather happy situation so far as concerned my relations with the CIA in that country. In the first place, the man who was in charge of the station there was a very amiable and cooperative fellow named Jim Noel. He knew that it was very important for us to have a stable relationship with the Spanish Government, because we wanted to operate the bases, wanted to get as much cooperation as we might need for the benefit of our armed services.

So there weren't many CIA activities that could constitute an embarrassment to the United States if discovered. At one point, the CIA wanted to send a political leader who was opposed to the Franco Government on a trip to the United States as a reward for his cooperation in providing

information. I was asked to meet this man, and when I found out that, as a guest of the U.S. Government, he was planning to make a statement in the United States opposing the Franco Government, I asked that the trip be canceled so as not to take any chance on disturbing our relationship.

*Q: The trip was to have been Government-sponsored?*

WOODWARD: Yes. Well, I don't know whether he was publicly going to admit government sponsorship. In any event, I said, "I think this is kind of silly. Our primary mission should be to see that our defense relationships are maintained fully." The CIA people were very amenable to canceling the trip; no problems about it. I always thought very highly of Jim Noel.

It was a good three years. I enjoyed the assignment in Spain thoroughly, and I visited every one of the 52 provinces in Spain, many of them several times. I took a great personal interest in getting around, always trying to admire anything constructive that was going on, even if we had nothing to do with it, and particularly if the United States Government was participating in any way with its local currency loans or in any other way, I admired enthusiastically any progress that was being made. It was a kind of technique learned in Latin America and adapted to the European environment.

*Q: Did you find, coming from Latin America, that Spain was a fairly easy transition because of the Spanish heritage? Or was it a somewhat different world for you?*

WOODWARD: It was a very enlightening and very stimulating change, because I found so many intelligent, able Spaniards, many of them amongst the uneducated people of Spain. I found so many of them who had very good minds that I thought, "As these people improve their educational system, which the Franco Administration was doing, and as they improve their health system which they were doing systematically, and as they get on their feet economically, Spain is going to be a very important country, because they have 33 million people with great potential." And I think that's true. I became very sold upon the average man in Spain.

What I consider to be the most important thing in U.S. relations with Spain that happened, from the viewpoint of the well being of the Spaniard, during the time I was there, occurred without any intervention on my part at first. The Director General of Public Health heard that Dr. Sabin, who developed the oral polio vaccine, was going to go to Rome to get some kind of an award, so the Director General got in touch with him through the Spanish Embassy in Washington, and asked him if he would stop for maybe as much as a week in Spain, all expenses paid, of course, and give them advice on planning a program for the elimination of polio. Spain had annually a large number of crippling cases of polio, many deaths, I think as many as 1,500 to 2,000 seriously handicapped every year. Dr. Sabin agreed to give them the advice they wanted.

Well, as soon as I heard this, I was, of course, absolutely delighted, and I wanted to get the United States Embassy identified with this as much as possible. I got in touch with the Director General of Public Health and offered to do anything I could to cooperate with him. We had a couple of get-togethers. I did manage to get the embassy pretty well identified with this program. Sabin explained to the Spanish authorities just exactly how they should proceed. He

recommended a company in Great Britain called the Wellcome Company, as a source of the three different pills for the three varieties of polio. One pill is given first, and then a couple of weeks later, the other two. This inoculation is given to all children from two to seven years of age, to eliminate the possibility of an epidemic. Dr. Sabin then recommended that, for an initial trial, the Spanish select three provinces out of the 52 provinces, to convince the authorities and the public that the vaccine does not give anyone polio. As you know, there was some suspicion that the vaccine might actually cause polio. This preliminary program was successful, and the Spanish then carried out a nation-wide program.

They had various organizations in Spain, the Falangist Party Organization, doctors' associations and whatnot, so they were able to gather the recipients of the vaccine in all the villages of Spain on successive Sundays, so the program was carried out very methodically. The expense for the whole country was not over \$750,000 or \$800,000, and polio was virtually eliminated from Spain. I think that was probably the one most significant thing that happened during the three years I was in Spain.

**GEORGE W. LANDAU**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1962-1965)**

*Ambassador George W. Landau was born in 1920. He graduated from Pace College 1941 and from New York University in 1942. Ambassador Landau served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1947 and joined the State Department in 1957. His posts included Uruguay, Spain, Paraguay, Chile, and Venezuela. He was interviewed March 11, 1991 by Arthur Day.*

LANDAU: [Robert Woodward] told me one day, "If you want to come to Madrid I might have an opening." I immediately agreed and after Bob got to Madrid he dropped me a note saying that much to his surprise he thought he had an opening in the economic section but this did not turn out to be true. The only position was the third one in a six man political section. I immediately told him that I would take it although I had been chief of a section before.

*Q: So you had been chief of a section but you were prepared to take this post?*

LANDAU: Right, I spent three wonderful years in Spain with Bob, in the political section and I advanced from the number three position to the number two position, which was very interesting. I dealt with the opposition and the Foreign Office. I learned a great deal. From there I went to the Canadian National Defense College and again I had quite a lot to do with the military. I had fully expected after the Canadian Defense College to be assigned to Ottawa, which I should have with the knowledge and contacts I had acquired, but Secretary Rusk in 1966 reorganized the Department and did away with the unnecessary layer of deputy assistant secretary. Of course you never 'do away' with these, like certain insects they just burrow in the ground and survive. He cut out the idea of another layer. What he wanted to have was the Secretary, the assistant secretaries and the country directors. He started the idea of the country directors. At the time he was

concerned with upcoming base negotiations with Spain and Portugal and so he decided to take out those two countries from the Office of Western European Affairs and make it into a new country directorate. I was tapped for that job and came to Washington and became the country director for Spain and Portugal.

**H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, JR.**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1963-1964)**

*H. Freeman Matthews, Jr. was born in Bogota, Colombia in 1927 during his father's tour there in the Foreign Service. While growing up, his family also lived in Cuba, France, and Spain. He enrolled at Princeton University, but his graduation date was pushed back because of his service in the Korean War. After graduation, he went to work for the State Department in 1952. In addition to Egypt, he served in Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Vietnam, and Mexico. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 20, 1993.*

*Q: What was the political situation in Spain when you went there in 1963?*

MATTHEWS: Well, Franco was in charge, very much in charge. We speculated for years about what would happen after Franco died. Everybody thought that was probably going to be imminent. It took 12 more years ----- There were some efforts at liberalization, trying to make the regime less oppressive. But it didn't turn out to amount too much. It was only later, considerably later, that Franco started paying serious attention to who and what kind of regime might succeed him.

In the end, the Spaniards did a remarkable job, with considerable luck, in how they handled the succession. The pretender to the throne Don Juan was considered sort of a joke, but he had a son, Juan Carlos, whom Franco had taken under his wing. He tried to assure that he got a proper education, went through three military academies, so he'd end up with as broad a background as possible as the time approached. Franco finally died in '75. I guess in '73 or '74 it became clear that Juan Carlos was going to be the person to succeed Franco and that's what happened. The transition ended up being very smooth.

But when I was there in Spain, the fear was that there would be another bloody revolution. It looked bad and I think the bitterness of the civil war was still very strong indeed. Franco did nothing to try to appease those who had been on the other side of the civil war. His Valle de los Caidos, outside of Madrid, is a monument only to those on his side who lost their lives.

*Q: American interests were bases and trying to prevent...?*

MATTHEWS: ----- Our interests in Spain were trying to see that Spain became a full fledged member of Europe; democracy to the extent that it could be promoted; that there be a peaceful transition from Franco to whoever succeeded.

Our primary interest at the time were the bases, so very important. They became increasingly critical as we lost air fields and other facilities in North Africa.

*Q: Libya, in particular Williams Air Base.*

MATTHEWS: Also Morocco. So that Spain became the primary training area especially for the air force. We also had the major new interest in Rota, the Polaris submarine base. We also had some commercial interests.

*Q: What were you doing in Spain?*

MATTHEWS: This was interesting because here I'd been the Spanish desk officer, dealing directly with the Ambassador on most things, correspondence back and forth on a professional level, and I was an FSO-4.

*Q: About, in those days, equivalent to a Major.*

MATTHEWS: I had a pretty good promotion record so I was a 4. Then I went to Madrid and all of a sudden, here I was the second most junior person in a 7-man political section and the area that was spelled out for me was the Falange. I was supposed to do reporting on the Falange which was the government political party which by then was pretty decrepit. They were not very appealing, and very hard to get a handle on.

So I'd gone from what seemed to be an important role player in Spanish-American relations to a junior guy. I suppose this is typical of most European embassies because of the desirability of the posts. They tended to be pretty top heavy in terms of personnel. Bob Woodward was the Ambassador, he was a wonderful Ambassador. Bob McBride was the DCM, the Political Counselor was a guy named Pete Watrous, Bill Fraleigh had been the Counselor for years but he left by the time I got there. Watrous was the Political Counselor, Bob Zimmermann was the Deputy, George Landau was also there, there were some others, a first tour political officer. That was just the political section. There were a whole lot of people there.

Spain was a fascinating place, it was really great to be there. The kids were put into the American School there, very happy with that. My wife loved Spain very much and we found a nice house. The whole personal and family side was fine.

From a job standpoint, I was pretty low on the totem pole. In that sense I think I was lucky that we'd been there just about a year when I got a telegram saying: off to Saigon.

**HARRY COBURN  
Consular Officer  
Madrid (1963-1966)**

*Harry Coburn entered the Foreign Services in 1961. His overseas postings included Spain, Italy, and the Fiji Islands. Michael Mahoney interviewed Mr. Coburn in 2002.*

*Q: So, you arrive as a very junior officer in 1963 in Spain and what was your sense then of the United States' relationship with Spain and the issues that might have characterized relations between the two countries?*

COBURN: Well, I could say something about Madrid at the time because under Franco it was a country that had suffered through a civil war and it was still very evident that the country was still recovering from the devastation of that war. There was I think little crime. You never felt any sort of threat living there. We had individuals called "serenos" who patrolled the street in the evenings and kept tabs on what was going on in the neighborhood. Traffic was very light. We had no trouble driving anywhere anytime. In fact I had to purchase a car in Madrid. There weren't any cars sold in Spain except a type of Fiat, an Italian manufactured car which was called Seat. It was possible for diplomats or people on the diplomatic list to import automobiles. At the time many individuals brought in first class luxury cars which they used for two years or three years and then when they departed post they were able to sell them locally which gave them good profit. Unfortunately, by the time I left the policy had changed and the money that you made had to be donated to charity. I did drive a Mercedes for the first and last time in my life.

The relations between the Spanish government and the United States government as best I could see were close. We depended upon the Spaniards for the use of military bases. There was a military base at Madrid and a naval base on the Mediterranean at Rota. We had free use of these bases and during my time there when there were problems in Africa, we had over flights which required refueling in Spain. The Spaniards always cooperated in allowing our military to use their facilities when emergencies developed.

*Q: So, from your point of view the bases were at the center of Spanish and U.S. relations?*

COBURN: That's my impression. Spain was very well located for our transfer of troops from NATO to the U.S. back and forth and for any problems that developed in Africa that required deployments from the United States..

*Q: And what the Spanish got from us was in effect an active legitimacy for Franco's government. I mean we recognized them. We had relations with them and that was to his benefit presumably.*

COBURN: I think so. I think he saw that as part of his effort to gain some respectability among the civilized countries of the world because he was considered by many people to be a brutal dictator. There was nothing resembling democracy in Spain at the time we were there. The question on many peoples' minds was what would happen when Franco left the scene. How would Spain make the transition from this rather rigid system, heavily influenced by military interests, to a more western democratic process. That was one of the things that the junior officers did get involved in because the aforementioned Deputy Chief of Mission wanted the young officers of the embassy to interact with young Spaniard officers, military and diplomatic.

We were encouraged to open our doors to them. In fact we had to report to him every month our contacts with local nationals.

When I left Madrid one of the tasks I had was to escort a group of young Spanish military officers, probably at the grade of lieutenant captain around the United States on a tour. The embassy was engaged in trying to open lines of communication to these men. I say men because at the time women weren't in positions of influence in Spain. In fact, my consul general was Margaret Husman who was the first woman assigned to Madrid in that job and it raised many eyebrows at the time because some thought the Spaniards would not want to deal with a woman. Margaret was a very effective consular officer and a woman who gained credibility with the Spaniards. It was rare in 1963 or '64 to see women in any positions of authority in Spain. Women who went bathing, for example, under the Spanish rules had to have coverage down to their knees. So, the bathing suits had skirts. You would see the garbage collected by men who actually had suit jackets. They were rather shabby, but they were suit jackets. Everyone dressed very formally. None of the kind of casual clothes that we see today. Spain in 1963 did not have air conditioning, so it was very, very warm. In fact, in Madrid you didn't go out to dinner until ten because it was so hot you couldn't really get comfortable until the cool breezes in the evening. It was a very structured hierarchical formal society and we operated as best we could in it and had to the best of my knowledge pretty effective relationships with all levels of Spanish society.

My experiences in the consular section were not too pleasant because at the time the Cuban situation had deteriorated. Fidel Castro had come to power in Cuba and was expelling anybody who didn't want to cooperate with his regime. Planes from Havana were full of Cubans. Most of them as soon as they got off came right to the American Embassy and sought entrance into the United States. The problem was that the immigration naturalization law at that time, in 1963, allowed any native born Latin American to have free access into the United States. There were many Cubans who were born in Spain and had immigrated to Cuba and when they were ejected from Cuba to Spain they fell under another provision of the immigration naturalization act which required them to apply for immigrant visas under the numbering system which limited by geographic country of origin how many people could enter in any given year. So, as a consular officer, I was faced with these cases where people would come and their children, having been born in Cuba were free to go to the United States, but they, having been born in Spain, were not. The emotions in the office, as you can imagine, were strong with people crying, shouting, screaming, threatening. I used to go home at night saying I don't think I can face another day because you had to keep saying no. We had to uphold the law and yet there were these terrible situations. All you could say was wait until your children become citizens. (End of tape)

*Q: You were saying that the visa people had terrible working conditions.*

COBURN: It was a difficult environment with the waiting rooms full of Cuban refugees, some of them with just the clothes on their backs who wanted to leave immediately to go to the United States. My impression at the time was that the various aid agencies and assistance units hadn't caught up with the problem, which was mushrooming. We did the best we could. We caused a lot of turmoil in the chancery proper because of the noise and disorder of large families with emotional encounters with the consular staff. Again in 1963 we didn't have any security

protecting the staff, neither the Spanish employees who assisted the consular officers nor the consular officers themselves. Behind the counter the Spanish employee had a desk and behind the Spanish employee the visa officer, non-immigrant visa officer had a desk in the open room. The immigrant visa section was in another part of the consulate and that was quite a different operation altogether because the requirements to get an immigrant visa were fairly complex and the documentation required people to come in after their paperwork was done. So it was a processing question, not a decision question, at least not as open a decision question as we had. We were dealing with a lot of Spaniards who didn't like the office being cluttered with all of these refugees and they wanted to get their visas and had to stand in line with everybody else.

*Q: Would you say this number of Cuban applicants or people coming in from Cuba was in the hundreds, thousands, was it pretty big numbers or was it just the individual cases were so emotional?*

COBURN: I think the individual cases were emotional. There were daily flights coming in from Cuba and we were dealing with hundreds of requests a day.

*Q: I mean did you have the sense of being in effect really working flat out all day every day on these kinds of cases or was it a few every day?*

COBURN: No, it was somewhere in-between. It wasn't a few and it wasn't people standing around the block to get into the chancery. It was a constant group of people coming in all the time.

*Q: And very worked up people.*

COBURN: Very worked up people. Remember this is 1963. We had Arabs in Spain and a number of them came in trying to get tourist visas to the United States.

*Q: Were they mostly from Morocco?*

COBURN: Jordan, Palestinian refugees, Syria, a wide range of young men who were looking for a door to the United States.

*Q: Fascinating.*

COBURN: Yes, well I was glad after a while to be moved upstairs to the passport office which, since it dealt with American citizens, was on an upper floor of the chancery away from the hullabaloo of the non-immigrant visa office.

*Q: That was your first connection with passports, which came to occupy a significant part of your life later?*

COBURN: Yes, it was my introduction into the passport adjudication and issuing system. We had a very interesting category of Americans living in Madrid. There was a large expatriate community since Spain, at the time, was very inexpensive.



*Q: The dollar really went a long way, huh?*

COBURN: It went a very long way. You could have a villa with servants on a modest income. We also had an active American movie colony there. The high moment of my passport work was meeting Audrey Hepburn who came in with her child. Audrey Hepburn was a movie star of some fame and magnitude at the time.

*Q: Oh yes.*

COBURN: But she was a Belgian, even though she spoke English like a well bred British lady.

*Q: She was a Belgian citizen?*

COBURN: Yes, a Belgian citizen but she married to a Puerto Rican, Jose Ferrer, and their son had an American passport. I thought that it said something about her that she came to the Embassy by herself with her son to get his passport and did not send a staff member and was not escorted around with staff and assistants. Just a mother bringing her son to get a document.

*Q: She was a pleasant person?*

COBURN: Very sweet, just like her appearance on film and very grateful when I took care of him and issued the passport. She went off happily. I thought it is nice to know that some of these folks can be genuine people.

*Q: Not a demanding figure at all.*

COBURN: Not like some of the self important people you witness in Hollywood or in the political life. I was still taking my turn as duty officer and had to deal with some of the self important political officers in the embassy who did not like to do the duty because it was consular work. They were constantly writing memos suggesting that the duty should only be done by consular staff because they didn't know how to issue passports or deal with welfare cases.

*Q: A theme, which continues to this day.*

COBURN: Does it really?

*Q: Sure, of course.*

COBURN: The consular officers felt that we had that work all the time and we should have a weekend off. While I was there it remained that all the Foreign Service officers had to take their turn. Some of the weekends were pretty grisly. I remember one in particular. I was called by a marine guard at 3:00 in the morning. Somebody was burning to death in a terrible accident. They wouldn't send an ambulance to pick them up until the embassy gave a guarantee that we'd pay the cost of the ambulance. Unbelievable. Another time I was called by the military, also like 2:00

in the morning, and told that I had to get the DCM to come to the U.S. military facility. They had a highly classified cable and we couldn't send anybody to pick it up. I couldn't go get it and give it to him. He had to come and see it himself. I had to call the DCM and tell him that there was a sergeant who was being very difficult and demanded that he read this message within the next hour. He had to come in person. The DCM was not very happy. He said, well, come and get me and I'll go. So, I drove over and picked him up and he grumped the whole way. When he got to the building, the office was apparently on the eighth floor, but the elevator was broken. So, he had to walk up eight flights of stairs and when he came down he was as hot as a pistol. He said, "That will not happen again. I will guarantee it." The consular work on the weekends had its moments and here almost 40 years later I remember those two instances.

**STANLEY J. DONOVAN**  
**Base Negotiations**  
**Madrid (1963-1967)**

*Stanley J. Donovan was born in Maine in 1910. He graduated from West Point in 1934 and served in the U.S. Air Force. His assignments abroad have included Buenos Aires, Madrid, and Turkey. In 1996 he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: And were the bases complete by then?*

DONOVAN: They were about 99% complete, when I left. I went down to Tactical Air Command, down as Deputy Commander of Operations in Langley Field, Virginia, and at this time the military was dealing with the foreign ministry; they were the ones that negotiated the 10-year agreement and every five years they renegotiated. So in 1963, it would do the first five-year renewal, and I was sent back to conduct those negotiations. I thought that I'd be coming back when those negotiations were finished, but I remained there until 1967.

*Q: Now, with these negotiations, what were the Spanish demanding and what did we have to offer?*

DONOVAN: Well, we had the military assistance advisory group [MAAG] that I was also in charge of, and under that we were training and providing equipment for all three services. In all countries we had this military advisory group, and we looked into what the situation was and then, if you could help them in some reasonable way, then we would put in recommendations on that.

*Q: It seems as though every time our base renewal agreement comes up with Portugal we have a very difficult time it's always a difficult negotiation, but I take it that the Spanish one you had was not.*

DONOVAN: It took just about six weeks to get the negotiation through. I had a very close relationship with Munoz Grandes, who was chief of the high general staff. He was an Army

general and he was number two in the government, right under Franco. One time he told me, "Donovan, between the two of us, we put everything on top of the table, we can do anything. But one time under the table, nothing." I leveled with him every time. I just happen to have a little thing here that kind of proves that point that he had. This was the atomic bomb we lost, you know?

*Q: Oh, yes, hydrogen bomb, as a matter of fact.*

DONOVAN: Yes. This is something. Do you speak Spanish?

*Q: No.*

DONOVAN: Well, it says "Who was the first one to advise Spain?" I won't read the whole thing, you know, I just take... This is in one of the Spanish newspapers, El Pais, yes, Sunday, 26 May, 1996. And, it came out and said "Who was the first one to keep Spain advised?" Well, it goes on all about, and it says "In 1985, the North American General Stanley Donovan, \_\_\_\_\_," which means "the number one representative of the United States," I guess. It talks about how always after I spoke about the bombs that fell there I went directly to the ambassador of the U.S., Angie Biddle Duke told him about it, and he went to see the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For my part, I saw Munoz Grandes, who was chief of the High General Staff and the vice president of government. Here's what I told you about reading Spanish. " \_\_\_\_\_ [We put everything on top of the table.]."

*Q: Describing this, because this is another and interesting episode, could you describe how you heard about this accident?*

DONOVAN: It was a B-52 and a tanker, and they were refueling the B-52 off the coast of Spain, and they collided. The B-52 dropped it's bombs due to the collision. Three were on the ground, and one in the drink. There was a fisherman who said that he had seen what looked like a man in a parachute in the bay there, but we didn't pay much attention to that. We got three or four hundred of our airmen, and we put them shoulder to shoulder going through the surrounding area looking for the bombs, all four of them at the time. We found the three sites almost immediately, and then the Navy sent us a whole crew under a very fine admiral, and they had these one or two man submersibles. Jon Lindbergh's son was one of the crews on one of these small ships, and they had found the bomb at about the limit that these submersibles could go. It was on kind of an undersea mountain there, and they were afraid that if they misjudged it, it would slide down and we couldn't go that deep to get it. The navy did a terrific job on that. They pulled that one up. Around where the three bombs had landed on the ground, a little high explosive explosion had sent some plutonium flying around there. Our people from atomic energy had tested those, and there was nothing there, but the Spanish were a little concerned about that. So we scraped off around the three sites and a few inches of dirt, and put in 55 gallon drums and put them on a freighter. I don't know what happened to it after that. Went out beyond my control then. The Spanish were very satisfied with that. The atomic energy people went in made another investigation, said, "We can still grow tomatoes here." That was the only stumbling block we had, the Spanish were very cooperative. Of course, we did all the work back there, they were only in the beginning stages of their atomic energy program.

*Q: Did you get involved in the famous swim with the ambassador at that time? I've interviewed a man who was a junior officer at our embassy at that time, and you know, talking about the famous swim.*

DONOVAN: As somebody had the idea, Ambassador Duke and General Donovan, would they have a swim in the water where the bomb dropped? We said, "sure" and some smart aleck said, "Well, sure, but do you think they'd take their sons?" So Angie took his son and I took my son and we bathed in the water. Not a bit of contamination. Prior to that, there was a hotel there that had closed for the season, but they kept it open so that the officers from the 16th Air Force and others there for the search were quartered there. The owner had graciously kept it open so that we could have a place to stay. All of our troops were in a tent camp nearby. I decided that I would have a paella at the hotel. All of the fish and everything in that paella would come from the waters that were supposedly contaminated. Then I had all of my officers over for lunch. Everything, the cooking and all, was up in that hotel. The owner of the hotel, who happened to be a Spanish general, General Cabanus, came by. I knew him and he said, "What's going on here?" And I said "Oh, we're going to have paella. People seem to think that the waters are contaminated, so everything going in that paella, except the rice is going to come from the supposedly contaminated waters." He said "Do you have room for one more?" That convinced a lot of people that we were on the right track.

*Q: When you first heard about this accident, other than saying "Oh, my God" I suppose, what was your immediate reaction and of your staff? How did you arrive at the conclusion about how you were going to treat this and what you were going to do? Because you were the first person in authority to find out about this.*

DONOVAN: Yes, that's true. We knew that there were hydrogen bombs aboard that aircraft, and we knew that from eyewitnesses down there that lots parachutes had come out of it. The B-52, what I knew of it - we had at that time B-52s ready to go in case of emergency, and that they were loaded with atomic bombs. And I think, we got the word from SAC. Those things happen fast with something like this.

*Q: When something like this happens, the initial thing is "What are we going to do?" Could you talk a little bit about this?*

DONOVAN: From my point of view in Spain, as soon as I heard about it I went to see the ambassador. I told him about the A-bombs. And he, he went to see the foreign minister to tell him. After I finished with Munoz Grandes, I told the ambassador that I was leaving to find out what all this was about. Incidentally, I told Munoz Grandes that there were atom bombs on board. And he said, "Good God! I didn't tell the Foreign Minister." So I said, "You'd better get your tail end over there right away and tell him," which he did. And then a question came up from Washington: "On whose authority did you release the words that there were atomic bombs?" I told them "The ambassador's and my authority released the information. If you want to do anything about it, just do it." I don't know why they expected us to cover it up. And fortunately, very fortunately, a young Spaniard working for UPI was wandering around down there and he got in touch with a couple airman who were conducting the search, and he said, "What are you

guys doing down there?" They said, "We're looking for some atomic bombs" So he reported... Hell, it hit worldwide press. Wouldn't it have been nice if the Spanish government had heard that through the United Press rather than the United States authorities? Good God.

*Q: But I assume the initial reaction back in Washington was "Let's try to keep it quiet."*

DONOVAN: Evidently yes, otherwise I would never have received the message "On whose authority did you release that information?"

*Q: In many ways, I would imagine, after that incident, it would have in a way strengthened the relationship between the Americans and Spanish, because it showed that we weren't playing games, and we were dealing with this in a straightforward manner.*

DONOVAN: Trying to keep it a secret would, I think... We'd have been really stupid. This between Munoz Grandes and me, the on-top-of-the-table served us so well there, I don't know where anybody got the idea that I was going to do anything other than what I did. Several times, we had State Defense messages coming into the embassy JUSMAAG [Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group]. For example, the atomic subs, we wanted to put them in Rota, had them up in Scotland, so the word was that "Oh, you'd never get it," and then somebody put the B on me and they said well let's see what he can do about it. After everybody in Washington said it couldn't be done, I went to see Munoz Grandes, and talked to him and he said, "Well, what's going on?" And I said, "They're atomic submarines, and they're atomic powered submarines, and they use atomic bombs." And so, he said, "Now, how long did it take you to reach an agreement in Scotland?" I happened to know... We had been talking with them for I don't know how many years and we still didn't have a written agreement, and so I told him that. And I said, "But this isn't going to take us that long, is it, General?" He said, "Move 'em [them] now. Keep me advised." If you're a Spaniard, if you're level with them they'll go all the way with you, they'll do everything they can, but you can't go 99, 44 one hundredths of the way, you've got to go all the way, and I think that that proved so on a number of occasions.

*Q: You left there in 1967, I take it by that time the bases were well set and things were going very well.*

DONOVAN: All set up, were going very well, no problems to speak of, and then of course the thing came up under Gonzales government, socialists. Before the election, he said "No bases, and no NATO". After he got in, he changed his mind about NATO, and was still involved. Not militarily, like France. Also, he changed his mind about the bases, said "now we got a little bit of NATO going, might as well change what to do about the bases."

*Q: Did you go back to Spain a second time?*

DONOVAN: No, that was it from 1963 to '67. '55 to '60 was the first time.

*Q: Franco was still very much in power when you were there.*

DONOVAN: Yes. I was back in Spain when he died. I remember going to his funeral.

*Q: How did you find your relations during both this 55 to 60 and 63 to 67 period with the embassy?*

DONOVAN: I was very fortunate, John Lodge was the ambassador during my first five years there. We got along just absolutely fine, no problem whatsoever. I had several ambassadors during my second term: Bob Woodward, of course, Angie Duke, and Wells Stabler. They were all very fine men. We got along just perfectly, no locking horns or anything. We discussed things and arrived at an answer.

*Q: Did the [other] American military attachés play a different role than you did?*

DONOVAN: Yes, they had nothing to do with my job, although I'd get a lot of advice from them. The two things were entirely separate.

*Q: What about one of the most difficult problems, always is having troops in a foreign countries. I was an enlisted man in the Air force, in Germany, Korea, and Japan, and I know, because I participated, I know what young men can do. Do you have any great problems, and how did you deal with it?*

DONOVAN: Well, [there was one] particular incident, [which was over] what you'd call jurisdiction. I went to the Ministry of Justice, and worked out a perfectly reasonable and I thought very fine way of handling [any] situation. We had just managed to have it so that all American servicemen, whether they were living there or had just come in for a visit, anything they did other than anything against the State of Spain was placed in my hands. They handled everything against the government of Spain. One young man ended up in jail, for just a holding time, I guess, and he complained bitterly, because he only had a ration of two beers a day. I had a congressman back in the States saying that one of the sons of his constituents was being maltreated and everything in jail and what was I going to do about it? I almost got myself court-martialed or something because I sent a message back to him saying what I thought about that young lad being mistreated by not getting beers.

*Q: What were the main problems you had with the troops there?*

DONOVAN: The commanders of the units, they were the ones that had the problems. The main problems were these lads getting a little drunk and raising hell downtown. We had one case where a Navy ship came into Malburn, and some of the crew went into a bar, and finally threw everyone out, closed the doors, and raised hell in the bar. The captain of that ship was really great, he sent word to the mayor, saying "Let me know the cost to repair the damage to everything in that bar, all the liquor, all the tables and chairs, cause they had really raised hell." The commanding officer of that cruiser was really great, did a good job. When I went there, everything was smoothed over. There were some really serious things, we had a couple of rape cases, which were difficult to handle.

*Q: How did you handle rape cases? This comes to mind because we've just had a very nasty one at Okinawa.*

DONOVAN: At that time, we didn't have any real trouble, because there were only one or two that I knew about (There may have been more.), [and they involved] prostitutes. I'll never forget that, because the Spanish reaction was "We consider raping a prostitute as bad as raping any other woman." And they were right; rape is rape. But we didn't have much trouble at all.

**ANTHONY G. FREEMAN**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Valencia (1964-1966)**

*Anthony G. Freeman was born in New Jersey and graduated from Rutgers University and Princeton University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1961 and has served a variety of posts in Argentina, Spain, Bolivia, Brazil and Italy. He was interviewed by Don Kienzle in 1995.*

FREEMAN: After Argentina I was assigned to Valencia, Spain, where I was political officer and vice consul for two years in a small consulate. That was a rather quiet post, not terribly exciting. On weekends the U.S. 6th Fleet would come into port so that the sailors could have shore liberty and we would take advantage of these visits by inviting the local Spanish authorities from our consular district aboard the Admiral's barge and aircraft carrier flagship for dinner parties or lunch. I really didn't do any labor work except on the margins. What was interesting was that there was the beginning of an anti-Franco movement at that time which was disguised as a Valencian regionalist autonomous cultural movement. That was virtually the only permissible civic activity allowed at the time outside the official Falange. Poetry reading in the Valenciano language, actually a subdialect of Catalan, was the medium by which semi-oppositionist political activity could take place, thinly disguised as cultural events. We prided ourselves in that small consulate on getting out and meeting these people, cultivating them, and sending them to the United States on leader grants. We had contact with the student movement then. I also had one or two contacts with trade unionists, one of which once produced a small problem. Some old timer came in to see me one day claiming to be from the CNT, the old anarchist trade union movement that had been eliminated by the Franco regime, and we talked for about an hour, mostly about the Spanish Civil War. I didn't think much of the conversation, but later it turned out that this guy was either an agent of the Spanish intelligence or was picked up later and interrogated by Spanish intelligence, and he told them all about his great conversation with me, and I subsequently got a little blast from the Embassy. The Spanish had complained through their intelligence channels with the Embassy and this led to a query from the Embassy asking why I had met with this character.

*Q: He was a walk-in into the Consulate?*

FREEMAN: He was a walk-in. But we were rather active and aggressive in getting out and meeting people who made no bones about their being in opposition to the Franco regime. We maintained an open door policy in the Consulate. Basically, the struggle which was taking place at that time sub-rosa in the political opposition was between the Communists and the Socialists.

*Q: This would have been in 1964?*

FREEMAN: 1964 to 1966. Once I attended a trial of some Communists. It was really a fascinating experience. There were about 10 to 15 Communists, many of them factory workers, who were tried in the Valencia court for subversion, and I was assigned by the Embassy to report on their treatment. That was quite an event.

*Q: Were any of the Communists involved in trade union activities?*

FREEMAN: Yes, but we didn't know very much about it at the time. They were involved; they had infiltrated the Spanish Syndicalist trade union. Franco had his own Fascist-type or corporate state trade union movement. It was a State-controlled trade union movement and the Government party, the Falange, designated the labor leaders, but there was, in fact, a lot of rhetoric in the Falange ideology about defending the workers and the little guy. There was actually a segment in the Falange who were genuinely socially conscious and fighting for the workers within their system. But it turned out that at the factory level some of these guys were clandestine Communists who had infiltrated the union. The Communists were already beginning to organize in the factories. The Socialists were not strong in the factories at that time; they were in the universities among the students, but not in the factories or the unions.

**ALEXANDER F. WATSON**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Madrid (1964-1966)**

*Ambassador Alexander Watson was born and raised in Massachusetts and was educated at Harvard and Wisconsin Universities. In 1962 he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to the Dominican Republic, the beginning of an impressive career specializing in Latin American Affairs. His other overseas posts include Spain, Brazil, Bolivia and Colombia, serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in the latter three countries. He had several Washington assignments, the last being Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. From 1986 to 1989 he served as United States Ambassador to Peru. Ambassador Watson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 199.*

*Q: Spain. You went to Spain from '64 to when?*

WATSON: To late '66, two years.

*Q: What were you doing in Spain when you initially went out?*

WATSON: This is kind of a funny story if you will bear with me.

*Q: Sure.*



WATSON: When I joined the Foreign Service, I had studied much more about Asia than about Latin America. I might have mentioned that in our last interview, because there were many more courses on Asia than Latin America, although I liked Latin America. So when I came in, I put down as my three posts I wanted to go to three Latin American posts, Montevideo, Buenos Aires and Mexico City and I got assigned to Mexico City and at the last minute switched over to the Dominican Republic. For my second assignment I wanted to go to Asia. So, I put down on my list of places I wanted to go several points in Asia. Some place in India, Chiang Mai and Thailand, which nobody had really heard of them. The Vietnam war, remember, was just sort of getting underway and Kuala Lumpur. I was sent to Madrid. I was furious. I was walking around and stomping in semi-adolescent style about, God dammit, I didn't want to be another consular officer again in Madrid. We had this system where over complement – I think I discussed this last time – we were supposed to spend six months in each section of the embassy. I spent three of those six-month periods as a consular officer and one of them as a political officer. I didn't want to be a consular officer again, I thought, and this is infuriating and I wanted to go to Asia. After hearing me fume for a while, some of the old hands came to me and said, "Look, Watson, we have been struggling our entire careers to get to Madrid and we've never gotten there and it falls in your lap, so please shut up about it."

*Q: Because this is the one sort of European spot that the ARA people can aspire to.*

WATSON: In those days I think that was probably right, or maybe you could also have gone to Portugal. We had several posts in Spain in those days. We had consulates in Valencia. We had a consulate general in Barcelona. We had a consulate general, I think it was in Seville, a consulate in Bilbao, as well as the embassy in Madrid. We had consular agencies elsewhere, but there were quite a few posts. So, off we went to Madrid, where I was the consular officer in charge of taking care of Americans with problems.

*Q: Who was the ambassador and, sort of, what was the style of the embassy at that point?*

WATSON: In Madrid?

*Q: In Madrid, yes.*

WATSON: Let me tell you a story about getting to Madrid.

*Q: Okay.*

WATSON: I thought that when I left the Dominican Republic I had been issuing visas, I had been in the political section, I was perfectly fluent in Spanish. I mean I was, if not Cervantes, good, in terms of my mastery of the language. So, we got off the ship. In those days you could still go by ship and the State Department, in its wisdom, always sent you in the cheapest possible first class accommodation which meant the first class section of the ship, but with no windows. Everybody was an octogenarian, at least to the 24-year-olds, or 25-year-olds, whatever we were at that time. We much rather have been in second class, where there were people more like us there. We went across on the ship and we had to get dressed up for dinner and our 14 month old

son immediately sized up the situation and began winging peas all over the dining room. There was nothing we could do about it and he chortled and we were mortified until an older Foreign Service couple came up and said, don't worry, we remember this happening to us years ago and we are watching you with great amusement and fond recollection for those difficult times. Anyhow, we got off the ship in Algeciras in the southern part of Spain near Gibraltar and got on the train to go to Madrid. Got into our little stateroom, if you will, and I went out to order two beers and two sandwiches for our lunch in my perfect Spanish. As I requested this simple menu from the steward on the car, he just stared up at me, without saying anything, with his eyes open. So, I repeated myself in my perfect Spanish, and he hesitated again and then he replied, I'm sorry, in Spanish, I'm sorry, Sir, but I don't speak French. For this Castilian my Dominican Spanish sounded so foreign that he thought it was French, and we had similar problems when we got to Madrid. We were looking for a house and my wife was looking for a place. I think she said, three [inaudible]. [inaudible] is a Dominican word for bedroom. When she told that to the real estate guy he looked at her quizzically and said, where did she learn that word, from reading Cervantes? Because they hadn't used that word in Spain for 300 years. They used [inaudible] or something else for bedroom. So, we found that our Dominican Spanish, with the combination of an incredibly slurred accent and archaic words, was almost incomprehensible to the Spaniards, so we had to relearn the stuff.

When we got to Madrid, this was at the beginning of the first big wave of tourism to Spain, when Franco was opening up the economy of Spain. The economy was opening up and they were seeking to attract tourists and it was an enormous success, but that meant that Americans were pouring into that country; Americans of all sorts. This was the day of traveling in Europe, especially in Spain, for \$5.00 a day, and you just had every kind of person you can imagine, plus you had very large military establishments in Germany and elsewhere and a lot of the military personnel, especially the young enlisted people. When their tours were up, rather than immediately going back to the U.S., they would wander around Europe. I can tell you in this job I worked almost, it seemed, almost 24 hours a day. The phone was ringing all night long, all the time, for two years. In fact, when I left, they made it into a two-person job. I saw every human foible up close during that time. It was a tremendously educational experience and my previous time working in the psychiatric hospital in my home town before entering the Foreign Service proved to be of even greater benefit than it had been in the Dominican Republic in the sense that it really prepared me for dealing with a very wide range of human behavior.

*Q: Was the drug problem prevalent or was this pretty much at the marijuana stage?*

WATSON: It was hashish.

*Q: Hashish.*

WATSON: It was hashish and it was prevalent and I spent lots of time on it. American, young Americans who had, some who had gotten out of the army, others who would just be wandering around as tourists, would go to Morocco and Tangier and these kinds of places and then they would come across into Spain. They would get nailed with hash in their knapsacks. If I remember correctly, Spanish law was unequivocal. Ten years and a day in jail and \$10,000 fine. No ands, ifs or buts. That was it, bang. Also, we were given to believe – and I have no reason to

doubt this – that there were people in Tangier who would sell hashish to Americans and then tip off the Spanish authorities and receive a prize for doing this, a reward for doing this, so they won on both ends. These American kids were getting nailed all the time and being put into prison. Part of my job was to deal with this and get them attorneys and go see them wherever they were. I tried to get most of them moved up to a prison outside of Madrid, not for my own convenience, but because it was a prison, one in which they had some television, something to do at least, because the other prisons had nothing. You've got to remember what Spain was like in the mid-'60s. It was a place where you could work out in the fields. You could work your sentence down by working the fields whereas in the other prisons you could not do that. So, I tried to get our guys transferred up there. Wherever they were I tried to visit them and I have a thousand consular stories about this time that I won't bore you with, but each one wilder than the other.

*Q: But to give a little flavor of the times, could you give me, if you can't use consular stories, what was the Spanish police reaction to this wave? Because at a certain point the police say, enough of this, let's get rid of these people because they are more trouble than they're worth. Were you able to, in one way or another, sort of get people expelled from the jail and back to the States at a time or were they serving their time?*

WATSON: Very, very rarely. The system was very rigid. It was Franco's Spain. You did not want to fall under the hands of the Guardia Civil or the police. The jails were pretty bad and people were getting thrown in there all the time. In dealing with psychiatric cases, I tried to do everything I could to keep people from falling into the hands of the police, putting them in the private mental hospitals when I could talk them into it and this sort of thing, because once you got in the hands of the legal system, it was very difficult to get them out. I can remember one case that was extraordinarily though. It was a young man who was traveling around. He got caught with hashish coming across the border and was thrown in jail. He was convicted on a charge of being an accomplice to smuggling of illegal materials because he persuaded the court that he had been given this material by two guys named Doug and Martie – I'll never forget this – in Tangier and asked to take it up to Germany for them, this package. He really didn't know what was in it. Well, who the hell knows, but he, the upshot of it was that he was convicted not of smuggling drugs per se, but as being an accomplice to smuggling drugs. He got the same sentence as someone who would have received it for actually doing the smuggling. I wrote a letter with an amazing young lawyer who worked with me, who has become a very successful advertising executive in Spain. We wrote a letter to the minister of justice suggesting that the punishment did not fit this crime because it was a lesser crime with the same punishment and could they reduce it. Meanwhile, Senator Warren Magnuson, chairman of the senate appropriations committee at that time, was all over us with letters pounding us, telling us get this guy out of here. It's unfair. It's outrageous, do something. Perhaps that spurred us to be more aggressive on this case than we otherwise might have been, but I think not because we were intrigued by having discovered this legal, what looked like might be a legal loophole, that we might be able to at least shorten his sentence. Lo and behold, not only was his sentence reduced, they released him completely. I joyfully wrote a letter – we didn't use telegrams very much for this stuff – back to Senator Magnuson's office to tell him about our enormous triumph on behalf of his constituent. I'm still disappointed to this day that we never received any acknowledgment whatsoever from Magnuson's office, nor did Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke, who you thought

might have received something since he was the chairman of the democratic party for New York State before he became ambassador to Madrid.

*Q: It's intriguing that in a way you couldn't almost work deals. This sounds like maybe at a certain point, not a deal, but often a consular officer can find, if you've got too many of these cases, they just wanted to be shucked of them, but not this.*

WATSON: No, no, this is Franco's Spain.

*Q: You keep telling me.*

WATSON: No, these games were not played. I have made many, many deals to getting people out of things and out of court, psychiatric cases and all sorts of stuff, but the drug thing was dead serious. It almost, the arrests always took place out on the frontier far away from Madrid. By the time we were on top of it, it was several days later, and this was not anything to mess around with. You've got to remember, this is a time when you did not take pictures of military establishments. Your camera would be taken away, you might be thrown in jail. You did not protest anything. It could be wrapped up and the water trucks would come in and blow you away. American students over there had to be very careful to behave in an American-type student fashion of the early '60s in Madrid or they got themselves in trouble. It was a liberalizing Spain, but it was still Franco's Spain.

*Q: What about the psychiatric cases? How were these handled?*

WATSON: Well, the way I handled them is when I came across one, and there were lots of them, I tried my best to get them into a private psychiatric clinic that I used, but that meant that I had to get some money. As I mentioned before, we didn't use telegrams very much in those days, and we used to have to write memoranda back and forth and get people back and so it took a long time. I would have to go out on a limb and get these people into a private clinic and then try to find some relatives and get them to pay for the clinic, plus pay for transportation, and cover any other debts and expenses they had to have. I had a psychiatrist who was enormously helpful to me in this regard, and a good friend. Of course, I had to persuade the people to go in the mental hospital. I couldn't put them there. I had no authority to. I sure didn't want to put them in the hands of the police, so it was always a process of enormous negotiation in gaining the trust of the, usually rather hostile and suspicious, person and trying to convince them that it was the best thing for them, they were in deep trouble, they didn't want to fall into the hands of the police, they had no funds, they had no place to go, they were going to end up there if they didn't follow my advice, and persuade them to voluntarily go to this psychiatric clinic until I could find a way to get them home.

*Q: Did you find the support system back in Washington very helpful?*

WATSON: No. Wait a second. It wasn't really any support system. Even people in the Foreign Service today probably cannot imagine what it was like to go overseas. I mean you went overseas, like in the Dominican Republic. You had a housing allowance. It was a certain amount of money and that was it. I mean you didn't have any community liaison officers. You didn't

have any lists of housing in the embassy or anyone who did anything for you. You went out there and found yourself a place to live and if you couldn't find a place to live for the amount of money that they gave you, you had to pay extra. You couldn't have a big house because you didn't want to be ostentatious, and you certainly didn't want to have a bigger house than the higher ranking people did. You were on your own and, in terms of the consular support services, every now and then you could write a telegram in very elliptical form that would go back. Virtually everything was done by operations memoranda, which would take usually a week to get there and usually a week to get back. You didn't use the phone. I mean, anyone today would think of it as almost 19th Century in style, but that's the way you had to do it. You were on your own. I had a fund of money from the local American business community which they donated from where I could make loans. I was authorized to make loans of up to \$25.00, which in \$5.00 a day Europe got you through almost a week if you were real careful. Then I tried to get people to repay those and replenish. I was not always as successful at getting it repaid as I was in disbursing the money. When I'd run out I'd have to go by and the business people would give me more money. It sounded like a lot to me, and it probably was in those days. It was something where you really had to use your wits and make a whole lot of contacts.

I can remember at my farewell party offered by the head of the consular section, Ambassador Duke came by. He was going to drop in just as a courtesy, which was very nice of him. Although he had told me when I first got to that country, he took me up to his office; he said, as far as the image of this embassy in the United States is concerned, you, Watson, are the second most important person after me. Any support you need from me, ask for it. I didn't need it too often from the ambassador, but that was heady stuff.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

WATSON: For a 26-year-old, or whatever I was at the time and he came by my farewell party which was like something out of Charles Adams. It was a farewell party of the morticians at the air force base, of the psychiatrists, of judges, of cops, of jailers, all the people that were essential to getting my job done, and Ambassador Duke was going to drop off for five minutes and go on. He stayed all evening talking to this incredible array of some of the netherworld, if you will, of Madrid that he never had come in contact with. We semi-legally used the U.S. air force base mortuary facilities for embalming and all that kind of stuff. We saved American citizens enormous amounts of money and red tape, although it was frustrating to the local Spanish funeral industry. We really had no real right to do it, but no one ever called us on it and we managed to do it. We had many Americans dying in Spain. You can just imagine the flock of tourists and sometimes elderly people and sometimes accidents, a great variety of experiences. I could go on for hours and hours with consular experiences, which would shed some light on the situation.

*Q: I'd like one or two if you could— any problems particularly with death cases or psychiatric cases?*

WATSON: Let me give you two or three real short ones. I'll give you the absurd end of the range. I mean, I remember having a person, a man, come right from the airport in Madrid, directly to the consular section of the embassy, to complain that he could not find Barbasol shaving cream in the airport store. We at the American Embassy had an obligation to get him

Barbasol; no other kind, Barbasol shaving cream, immediately. So what do you do? Send him up to the supermarket and they say they don't have any.

A woman came and she was traveling with her large Doberman Pinscher dog. She had sent ahead, to every one of her stops, dog food for this dog, which was in the post office, and she could not get the dog food out of the Spanish post office for some reason. She demanded that her American Embassy produce some dog food or get it out of the post office for her because her dog had to have this particular kind of dog food, nothing else.

I had a guy who was a very high ranking, he was the secretary of the Chicago Bar Association, if I remember correctly, came into my office with his wife and he was furious. He sat down in front of me and he ranted and raved. He had been at the Hilton Hotel and, after all, Hilton is an American chain, and they had treated him absolutely outrageously. Then they had presented a little basket of rolls for breakfast and his wife had eaten only one roll out of the basket and they charged him for the entire roll for something called a continental breakfast. This was absolutely unheard of and the embassy had to do something about this right away. He was there for half an hour pacing my office, ranting and raving, and I was sitting there behind my desk saying, what on earth am I going to say when this guy finishes. I learned a very valuable lesson because, when he finished, he sat down, and before I could say anything, he said, thank you very much, Mr. Watson; you've been very, very helpful. I think we're all set now and goodbye. He needed to vent and have a cathartic experience. My sitting there patiently listening to him was apparently all he needed.

You had this stuff many times every day. You know, then we had serious mental cases and death cases. There was a major robbery. There was suicide of a wealthy heiress from North Carolina. I had all of her furs in my safe for a long time. A major robber of Shreves in San Francisco, a major jewelry house related to Shreve, Crump and Low in Boston. The diamonds that were left, most of them there were caught in the Canary Islands with these people. They were arrested in the Canary Islands, millions of dollars of diamonds in my safe for weeks. We had depositions all the time, death cases where you had to go and see the body, which was always nerve wracking, and collect all the effects and stick them in the corner of my office and make a long inventory of the effects and find a next of kin and write to them and get the death papers and get the body out to the U.S. air base and get it embalmed and get it paid for and get it shipped back to the U.S. Each one of these cases took hours and hours. It seems to me you had at least one a week when I was there.

You had the case of a woman who was a sociopath, absolutely brilliant sociopath. This was a woman who could convince anyone of anything. She convinced everyone. She talked her way into the U.S. air base, convincing physicians there that she was a doctor and that she had been participating at least as an observer. I'm not sure she did anything in a birth inside the obstetrics ward of the air force base hospital. She convinced a fellow Foreign Service Officer in the American Embassy to loan her \$5,000 and that she would let him and his family use her parents' wonderful summer cottage in Vermont which, of course, did not exist. She had bills all over town and could talk her way through anything. A lot of people were coming to the embassy saying, you've got to get my money back, I'm an American citizen, etc. I remember finally tracking this woman down in the uppermost room in a hotel and sitting down with her. She was

very elusive and finally finding her and talking to her and explaining to her what she was really up against, I convinced her to go to this mental institution. I got her in there though she damn near persuaded me out of all this. I mean, she was so incredibly persuasive because she was a sociopath. Because when she's talking to you she believes what she's saying or at least she manages to give every indication that nothing is boloney. She was a very poor woman, Puerto Rican extraction, from the Bronx, had nothing, never finished college, she had never been to medical school, she hadn't done anything. Her sister was not terribly wealthy but produced funds to get her back. I remember standing there in the airport watching that plane go until it was absolutely out of sight, fearing that she would go up to the cockpit and convince the pilot to bring her back. I can tell you, Stuart, that after I left Madrid, she came back and was doing it all over again. This kind of stuff happened all the time.

*Q: How about rapes or women who were even beaten by their husbands and that type of thing?*

WATSON: We didn't, we had a case where a couple of women were hitchhiking. I remember this clearly, in southern Spain. They got picked up by a truck driver. I won't embellish the story at all, and they rode in the back of the truck. It was a gravel truck, if I remember correctly.

The driver pulled over to the side of the road and said it was time to sleep. He couldn't drive anymore. He took them off into the woods beside where he parked the car in some sort of a little tent-like thing or something. The women said, accused him of making advances to them. I don't think anything happened, but they were extremely upset and they came to the American Embassy to get justice. I had to try to determine who this truck driver was and get them in touch with an attorney and head them in the right direction and sympathize with them and suggest they be more careful and all the things you would normally say to people.

I also had a man who came who had a similar experience. I think this man was a homosexual and he was very upset about advances that had been made to him.

There were very rewarding things that happened. I remember going to the Anglo American Hospital in Madrid to visit an American there, and here was this guy who was lying there with kind of serious emphysema. I don't remember how old he was now; he seemed very old to me. He must have been about 70. He was a trumpet player, a black guy, in the bed. I started talking to him. He was indigent. He had been around Madrid. People knew him. He even knew this woman I told you about before. She had been in the club where he played. The more I talked to him, the more it occurred to me that his emphysema might have come from his having been gassed in Europe in World War I. I wrote to the Veterans Administration office in Rome, who handled our affairs laying out this whole case for them and, lo and behold, they came back and said right on. He gets a pension; it's retroactive and all this kind of stuff, and the guy's life turned around. Of course he was perpetually grateful to me for that, but I was just doing my job. The Veterans Administration I found was extremely responsible. They had quite a few people. You've got to remember this was a, Spain was a cheap place to live. People without a lot of income and people who had some experience in Europe already could live there relatively inexpensively. You had a lot of Americans that were right on the brink of poverty, I remember, and a lot of them were veterans because this was not that long after World War II, actually. I found dealing with the Veterans Administration very rewarding. They responded quickly and as positively as they could,

unlike the Social Security Administration, which would take forever to handle things. We had enormous numbers of social security recipients in Spain. I can go on and on, I don't want to bore you with this.

*Q: No, you're not boring me, I'd like to capture some of this experience.*

WATSON: Another whole universe of people, which was the American movie industry, was making spaghetti westerns. They came to be known as spaghetti westerns later, but they were made in Madrid at this point, and all sorts of major films were made while I was there. The most important, being Dr. Zhivago, was made there with David Lean as the director. There was this guy - what the heck was his name - that made these epic films. It wasn't Cecil B. De Mille. It was another guy. I can't remember. He made many. So, you had American actors all over the place getting into all kinds of trouble at the time. In fact, in Dr. Zhivago—the son of this Foreign Service Officer who made the loan to this sociopathic woman and never got it back of course, his son is the small child in Dr. Zhivago, Geraldine Chaplin's son in this thing. This guy now is a professional dancer and a professor of dance at a university in Colorado now with his wife and kids, just moved there by the way. They also did a lot of dubbing of films that were made in Spanish or in Italian into English. You had a lot of people there hanging around; the fringe people on the movie industry that do dubbing. Those people got into trouble.

I remember one guy who was a very serious alcoholic. I won't mention his name, but he filled every open space of my life I think for a year and a half. This guy was always getting thrown in jail and the stories are just marvelous. At one point he was in a small hotel down on the Calle Echegaray, which is downtown Madrid, which is where you went to have these tascas—a fabulous part of town. The guy in the room next door to him was a bicycle salesman. Anyhow, this guy, not the bicycle salesman, the other guy that I dealt with, so often was a huge, powerful guy. Somehow he tore off the faucet of the sink in the bathroom of his room. He got this bicycle salesman who had a bunch of wrenches and they went down into the basement in the Hotel Ingles. It was probably, like, almost an 18th Century basement under there and were looking around for pipes that could do something, valves that would stop the water from flowing. So, he was down there like a madman. If you witnessed this thing, it was something out of Groucho Marx or something. Undoing things until finally the police came and arrested them and threw them in the jail.

Another time, after a number of drinks, he hid in his closet naked except for an overcoat, and when the chambermaid bent over to make his bed, he popped out and leaped at her and he was arrested again. Another time he went to some sort of a hotel lobby to go somewhere and he got mad and he ripped the switchboard out. Another time he went to a hotel and he got mad and he smashed his fist into a marble wall and cracked it. He was always in jail and I was always getting him out and he was always drunk. He was doing dubbing for these films.

One day – I've got a hundred stories of this guy – one day he came into my office and he closed the door and he pulled out of his pockets a massive sopping American currency which he dropped all over my desk and he told me that he had just gotten paid \$5,000 for dubbing this film and he'd gone out in the evening and now there was only \$4,000. He doesn't remember exactly what happened, but he had enough presence of mind to get back to his hotel room and he hid it



and could I guess where he hid it. I said, no and he said, well, I hid it in the back of the toilet tank, the reservoir tank and that's why it was all wet and he dropped it on my desk and he said, I'm afraid I'm going to lose all of this money. You know I get into trouble and I drink a little too much and could I help him out. You could never do this today.

*Q: Oh, no, no.*

WATSON: I took this money – it was soggy money – up to our budget and fiscal officer who was a very, very tough person, gave him this wet money and asked him to make out a U.S. government “clean, do not fold mutilate or spindle” check in the name of this person for this money, and he did it. So, I gave this check to this guy. This guy, after running and getting back to your story of the kids having drug offenses and hashish offenses, being thrown out of the country and that not happening, but this guy had so many run-ins with the law that they finally threw him out of the country. He went up to France and in July of '66. I remember getting an operations memoranda from the American Embassy in Paris sent to our budget and fiscal officer, who brought it down to me asking if in fact the U.S. Embassy in Madrid had really issued check number so and so in this amount to this person, because this person had come into the embassy with it all wadded up into a ball and had said that he wanted to cash it. They wanted to be sure. This guy, I mean the stories about this guy go on and on and on.

One time, well, this, one time I had a guy in my office – it may have been this guy, as a matter of fact – that was complaining about having been picked up by a truck driver and it was well after hours and it was, you have to understand that the consular section was chaos. This was still not that long after the Castro revolution in Cuba. There were Cubans all over Madrid. The waiting room of the consular section was jammed with people. All day long the Cubans are trying to get visas to go to the U.S. It was like a station full of, training station, full of refugees all the time. There was a guy who had severe psychiatric problems who was originally a Spaniard, a naturalized American who had been in the U.S. military and had gotten a pension. He would come and he would regale these people all the time. He had an alarm clock that he carried around his neck and a cross with the arms not perpendicular to each other and he would regale, we had to throw him out. He'd keep coming back in. These were the days long before heavy security in embassies and that kind of stuff. It was chaos there.

I was there late in the evening and this guy that I mentioned about the check and the dubbing came late in the evening, and that's when my wife would come to pick me up from work and drive me home. She was sitting there in the consular section all alone. It had been cleared out and it was unusual. He came in there to find me and he said, “Where's Alex?” My wife said, “He's in there with somebody. The guy didn't seem to want to leave and Alex would never throw anybody out.” He said, well, I'll take you. This guy comes in and he slams open my office door, boom, slams a shot pow behind at this great huge guy standing there. This other guy is sitting in the chair and this guy charges through the office and says, “What are you doing here, what's your name?” The guy says, “Carter.” “Carter, Carter's your name?” He picks the guy up and says, “Carter, my grandmother used to use your little liver pills and when she died they had to beat her liver to death with a stick. Now get the F out of here” and threw him out of my office. I said, “You can't do this. I'm the consul here. I'm in charge here.” I had no control over anything.

It was just incredible. But there were stories like this about this individual that I could go on and on and on.

I had other cases with people in marital disputes; each side of the marriage; one day one, one day the other, one day one, one day the other, custody of kids, on and on and really complicated stuff. I had depositions, legal cases and it was, you would have thought this was, a pretty lowly jog in the Foreign Service.

*Q: Oh, no.*

WATSON: It was one of the best jobs. People my age in the political economic sections were literally reading and clipping newspapers. That's what they were doing all day long. I at least had my whole world that I had to deal with and it was a very active, amusing, interesting one. I learned a hell of a lot about Spanish culture because I was down there in the courts in cases helping to persuade judges to let people off. Things like that.

*Q: I know the answer to the question, but I'd like to get it on the record. Today in 1990's we live in a time of great training, psychiatric training, preparing you for how to deal with all sorts of crises you have crises counselors and all that. What sort of training did you get for dealing with all these problems when you were in the State Department?*

WATSON: Well, they had a consular course that I took before going out the first time. We learned about visas and all the stuff you have to know. I don't remember too much about this. I don't think we were trained on this stuff; there were regulations, the book. You read it through about what to do with effects. I mean, we must have had part of that course which would have been two and a half years before I actually had to use it. Part of that course must have been how to take care of Americans when they are deceased and everything. But it was basically common sense and keeping your wits about you and trying to build the kind of contacts you need in an emergency and using them. I can remember a strange thing, Stuart. I think this is true. My boss there was a female Foreign Service Officer and what I remember being told is the truth, although I don't know this independently, was that the Department or the ambassador had agreed – it might have been Ambassador Woodward who was there before Ambassador Duke.

*Q: Bob Woodward, yes.*

WATSON: I don't want to attribute this to really anybody. The decision was made to allow a woman to have this position – think how different the times are today – as long as there would be a male in the job that I ended up having. She could not be expected to do this kind of work, so I was sent to Madrid, if I recall correctly. Now I was supposed to be the passport and citizenship officer and at the last minute I got switched into this protection and welfare job, which is a much more strenuous and much more interesting job. A friend of mine ended up being the passport and citizenship officer.

*Q: Who was the chief of the consular section?*

WATSON: Margaret [inaudible]. I saw her for many years afterwards. We went to her house. In fact she lived very close to where we now live, right around the corner, but she's not there anymore.

*Q: She was one of the first women ever to be, one of the first consular officers ever to be promoted.*

WATSON: She was the American Consul General, the head of the consular section and she did a very good job. She had good judgment, gave me support whenever I needed, but I basically did this stuff on my own. Her more serious problems were really managing this enormous visa demand and keeping a large visa section going. As long as I would take care of these Americans and handle these cases she could focus on this larger management problem of making sure we had enough people in the right organization to deal with these controversial cases. You've got to remember these Cuban cases in the '60s were in addition to all the Spanish cases. They were complicated.

*Q: Well, I thought we might quit at this point. It's a good time to stop.*

WATSON: All right. Let me give you one thing to quit on. You need to know that during this period when Ambassador Duke was there we remained very good friends up until he passed away last year or maybe it was late '96 now. No, I think it was, well, I don't know.

*Q: It was in that period of time.*

WATSON: Yes. It was in the last year or so.

*Q: Rollerblading.*

WATSON: Yes, rollerblading out in the Hamptons. Well, if you got to go... He was about 80. I had seen him not too long before. In any case, this was the time when the U.S. air force lost a couple of atomic bombs in the Mediterranean, and even that had its enormous consular, well, the political implications were far, far greater than any consular ones obviously. But we had a mutiny of the crew of the vessel which serviced one of the submarines which is looking for the bombs and I had to deal with that using, dragging out all that old seamen and merchant men stuff out of the regulations which no one ever uses anymore to deal with this. We'll leave this session on that note.

*Q: Alex, you left Spain?*

WATSON: 1966.

**EARL WILSON**  
**Director, USIS**  
**Madrid (1965-1966)**

*Earl Wilson was born in 1917 and raised in Washington, DC. He attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and George Washington University. Mr. Wilson joined the IICA (USIS) in 1947 and spent his career in China, the Philippines, France, Thailand, Mexico, Hong Kong, Spain, Malaysia, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1988.*

WILSON: I got to Spain in the spring of 1965. Angier Biddle Duke, who had been Chief of Protocol, was made ambassador. Typical of political ambassadors, he wanted to get a number of people on his staff from his old staff, his cronies. One of them he wanted to be Deputy PAO was Dave Waters. I don't want to get entangled in all of this, but I had more personnel problems in Madrid than anywhere in the world before or after. Sometimes I think officers say they'll do anything to go to certain posts--Paris, Madrid, Rome, something like that--and when they get there, they still find the old problems, the work hasn't changed that much, and they become frustrated, they want to do something else.

Anyhow, Dave Waters was basically working for the ambassador, not for me, and here I was overwhelmed with work. I just blew up. I didn't give a damn what happened. I called him in one morning and I said, "Look, goddamn it, first off, two things. You're going to go around and meet every one of our senior local staff, like every other officer does that comes here. Second, I don't care if you've been up 'til 5:00 o'clock in the morning, you're going to get in here on time. Third, you're going to start being my deputy and take some of the work load off of me." Well, Dave, who was a likeable guy, had this thought that a lot of Washingtonians seemed to have about the merry life of the Foreign Service. Now he was finding that it wasn't all that merry. Anyhow, he eventually asked to be relieved. So they let him go back to the protocol job in Washington.

Also in Spain, just two or three incidents I'll try to go over quickly. One was during World War II, the Gestapo had one of these palacios, a big mansion, on the Castellano, the main street. When the U.S. finally recognized Spain in '53, they took over that building as its embassy. Then, as time went by, they built a new embassy right across the street, which had a high block for offices and a low block for the ambassador's residence. Very modern, but the various ambassadors wouldn't live in that place; they rented homes. So as time went by, the old embassy palacio contained a melange of things--AID stuff, or as they closed USIS branch posts, junk from that. Then part of the living quarters across the street in the new embassy became our library. It was a mess. Some congressman going through there raised hell and said, "By God, they built that, and the ambassadors are going to live in it." So Duke was forced to live in the new embassy. About the time I went over there, due to budget cuts, they were closing a number of branch posts.

I determined to try to turn that palacio into the best cultural center in Spain. I won't go into it all. I had to get the ambassador to agree to let me keep some of our other offices in his residence, which he finally did.

When De Gaulle pulled France out of NATO and our troops left there, it changed some of the military logistics. Our military in Spain was changing all the time. I managed to get cooperation of the 16th Air Force in Spain to give us furniture and other things so that we could decorate our

Casa Americana. We didn't have the budget. I started a small art gallery there. Our library was there, and it was a beautiful place. I got six leading Spanish sculptures to have an exhibit in the garden, the first time, I was told, in Madrid. We got publicity all over the place, newsreels, magazines, etc. So that was something I was proud of. The only trouble was then Congress decided money for new buildings abroad had to come from the sale of surplus buildings and property, and they determined to sell our cultural center. I resisted, fought it, and at least they didn't sell it while I was there. It went on for another year or two after I left. That was something that I thought was kind of fun. Lots of colleagues have gone through things like that, I'm sure.

One other thing that was interesting. They had in the embassy a large easel with charts on it to be used in briefing the streams of people that would come through that wanted to know what the American government was doing in Spain. There was a blank cover sheet on this easel to protect the sheets from dust or something. Spanish language teachers at Torrejon air base said they would like a briefing during one of their holidays or whatever. Since they were teachers, this project was handed over to our Cultural Attache to handle, Taylor Peck.

The day of this briefing, Peck got up, introduced the political officer, who turned the pages and showed the charts about how Franco was an authoritarian figure. Then the economic officer got up and went through his drill. Last was Peck, who was a Latin American specialist, spoke fluent Spanish. He turned back all the sheets, said he wasn't going to use any charts. The top sheet was blank. He noticed some of the teachers got up and went out, then followed by others. What he didn't know was that some of these teachers were Spanish citizens who somehow had been included. It was thought all were American citizens for what was supposed to be a semi-classified briefing. These teachers of Spanish, who generally had very poor comprehension in English, thought they were being insulted, their country, and their government. Everybody knows about Spanish pride. One of the Spanish teachers was a cousin or something of the Foreign Minister. She was the ringleader. They thought these American Embassy officials had said Franco was a dictator, the economy was terrible, poor, and they thought the cultural officer had rendered the final insult by pulling down this blank page and indicating that was Spain, a country with no culture. So they wrote indignant letters to the Foreign Minister and others.

The Foreign Minister turned all the letters over to the man in the foreign office who dealt with American affairs. Soon after that, there was a meeting Franco had, and one of the ministers sort of casually asked across the table, "Whatever happened to that business about the American Embassy being insulting?" Franco picked up his ears. He said, "Thank God somebody stands up for Spain." A cable went off to the Spanish ambassador in Washington. The Spanish Ambassador went to the State Department, got hold of the head of the cultural side of things, demanded an apology and demanded that Peck be declared persona non grata.

I went to the ambassador and said, "This is ridiculous. None of this happened. None of this was said. We've got to make a stand." But he wouldn't. As a result, Peck was declared persona non grata and left. His wife remained and she was something else, demanding revenge, given to saying four-letter words in a very loud voice at cocktail parties, before that kind of thing was recognized as much as it is today. She really was a bit of a problem. Taylor went off to study French and was going to be made Cultural Officer for Vietnam. He decided he didn't like what we were doing there and he quit.

One major thing that happened in Spain. Of course, you know there was the crash of a bomber and a refueling plane when four H-bombs were lost. I was called the afternoon of January 17, 1966 by an officer from the Air Force base at Torrejon, who said they had a "broken arrow," code for a plane crash with nuclear weapons. I had a sinking feeling. Right after World War II, when I was still in the Marine Corps, a captain at that time, I flew in the co-pilot seat over Hiroshima. We circled around looking at that devastation. In this particular accident, the planes were lost, and four H-bombs, each had 75 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

They told me the Commanding General of the 16th Air Force, whose name was Wilson, was informed of the crash within three minutes. The communications of SAC were phenomenal. I played golf with a deputy out there one day who had a telephone on the golf bag on his cart. The phone rang. He was talking to some general. I thought he was talking back to the control tower. It kept ringing. He would tell the general about our golf game. I learned he was talking to the SAC Headquarters in Omaha.

Anyhow, General Wilson, as soon as he got the flash, got hold of another one of his officers and his public information officer, and they flew off in a small plane to near where the crash was, was Palomires. It was very remote. They had to wind up taking a taxi to get to the site. The senior American military man in Spain was Major General "Moose" Donovan, Chief of the JUSMAAG. He and I were good friends. He had a special rapport with Franco's deputy, General Munoz. So "Moose" immediately went off to see General Munoz. General Wilson, with his aides, arrived on the crash scene. His public information officer, incidentally, was Lieutenant Colonel "Skip" Young. He was a fighter pilot, a bomb disposal guy, a very gung-ho guy, but he didn't know from his backside about information. (Laughs) So there we were.

The first thing I did was to run up to tell the ambassador. It was lunchtime. The ambassador told me to go down and get the contingency plan from the military. I went to the military attaché's office. Nobody was there except a secretary. We rummaged and rummaged around. She finally came up with this so-called contingency plan. I took it up to the ambassador's office.

*Q: Was this the military attaché's office?*

WILSON: Yes, in the same building as the embassy. So I took it up to the ambassador's office. He and I sat together on a couch and looked at this document. We both came rapidly to the conclusion it had absolutely no relevancy whatever to what was happening.

He asked me to call the air base and talk to the man who was in charge there in General Wilson's absence. We were not getting the telegraphic traffic. I called, and the colonel at the other end said, "Well, I'm sorry, you're not going to get it. This is going back from the military to the Pentagon in Omaha, to be distributed."

I said, "Wait a minute. I'm not calling for me; I'm calling for the ambassador. As a matter of fact, I'm sitting at his desk, using his phone."

He said, "Tough." Well, that, unfortunately, was the way it was.

It got to be wryly amusing, because Harold Milks, the Associated Press bureau chief, had a stringer down at Palomares, where they had only two telephones, one in a bar and one in a ratty hotel. General Wilson's people found one of these phones, this stringer found the other. He was telling Milks, Milks, would tell me, and I would tell the ambassador what was happening the first day or two down there.

At the embassy, I was Chairman of something that had a very inelegant name, PAWG, Public Affairs Working Group. We met once a month with representatives from JUSMAAG, the 16th Air Force, the Sixth Fleet, Rota naval base, embassy politico-military officer, and myself, to coordinate.

All of this bomb business, of course, is well known. I'm trying to stick to some of the USIS aspects. Because of this difficulty of getting information, the ambassador got General "Moose" Donovan, who had his own plane, to go with him and me to fly down to the nearby town of Almeria, and from there take a helicopter to go over and talk to General Wilson at the crash site. Of course, lots of troops and military stuff were rapidly building up there. The Spaniards living in the area were frightened. The military was taking a very hard-nosed line with the foreign correspondents. They were barred from the area. Incidentally, I later was able to get one of my officers who was fluent in Spanish and a political officer to tool around the countryside to find out what the people were really thinking, because I thought this was asinine, not dealing with that local situation.

I found General Wilson was responsible for the land search, and Admiral Guest, responsible for the Navy task force that had been assembled. They were hardly speaking to one another. They found three H-bombs on land, believed the last one was in the water. That was a tough one. We went out to Guest's flagship. He showed us maps and the charts. They were beginning with the conventional minesweeping type of operation. The best technology in the world for an underwater search was beginning to be assembled. But Admiral Guest wanted nothing to do with the press. I said, "What on earth? You don't have anything classified out here other than that bomb down there." But it didn't make any difference.

The Communists, of course, were broadcasting anti-American material to the people of Palomares and to Spain. The matter was beginning to pop up in Parliaments around the world. I wrote endless cables and memorandum to the ambassador and joint ones for the State Department and Pentagon, constantly urging a more realistic press policy. It just so happened the James Bond movie, "Thunderball," with its underwater search for a nuclear weapon, was a current big hit. A lot of people formed their ideas from watching that movie.

The people were getting worried the bomb somehow, without going off, would poison the waters of the Mediterranean. Our nuclear submarine base at Rota could become an object of extreme interest. I found out that a new tourist hotel was to be inaugurated very close to Palomares. What a lot of people didn't realize was the U.S. had helped in the buildup of tourism to a major industry in Spain. These hotels were part of our assistance. I pointed out this was an excellent opportunity for the ambassador to go down there and get involved, use that as an occasion to help straighten things out. It wasn't my suggestion, but that of one of the foreign correspondents,

an American, who suggested the ambassador swim there. It was a stroke of genius. The photo appeared in the front page of papers all over the world, proving the absence of radiation in the waters.

*Q: I remember that.*

WILSON: Duke always said that no matter what he did, this was the only thing he'd ever be remembered for. It wasn't just the ambassador, but Spanish officials, journalists, wives, children, and USIS officers who went swimming. So then they got tiny submersibles hunting for the bomb. On April 7, 1966, 80 days after the crash, one of the little subs, Alvin, located this thing and pulled it up. I suggested--and I guess there were others--that for credibility, we let the press see this bomb before it was shipped back to the States. For the first time, the Pentagon agreed. It was exposed for photographs before being taken away.

I had written back and telephoned many, many times to Bill Weld, who was the European area director. I got the impression that neither he nor the Agency were taking this thing very seriously. Later, USIA Director Leonard Marks had a PAO conference in Paris. He wrote me the H-bomb business could be a topic for the agenda. I wrote back and said I didn't see any point, if the Agency, which said it was responsible for dealing with these type matters, simply let the Pentagon grab the ball and run with it.

*Q: What was Marks' reaction to that, by the way?*

WILSON: Well, they just didn't do much about it, passed it off at the conference.

One other thing, come to think about that PAO conference. I don't have the date in front of me. It was, let's say, maybe '66, something like that--1965, 1966. John Chancellor, head of VOA, George Stevens, head of motion pictures, were both at this conference. The Agency had been trying to get everybody to work like hell on the Vietnamese War, getting acceptance and understanding, and it was very hard for them to find speakers who were knowledgeable on all aspects. I suggested that four lecture-type movies be made on the strategy and tactics of the Communists, militarily, economically, politically, and so on, balanced with what we and the Vietnamese were trying to do.

George Stevens said, "That's not a picture. That's a thing." John Chancellor got right behind him on that. As a matter of fact, Stevens said, "All you can show about Vietnam are bombs raining down on people." Marks, to give him credit, asked the PAOs to raise their hands, those who were interested. I'd say 90% raised their hands. Later, the Agency made, reluctantly, a short lecture film on Vietnam, dull as dishwater, deliberately, I'm sure. They showed it to a test audience in Berlin, who said it was a dud. They dropped the whole thing. So much for that kind of movie.

**ANGIER BIDDLE DUKE**  
**Ambassador**  
**Spain (1965-1968)**



*Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke was born in New York, New York in 1915. His Foreign Service career included positions in El Salvador, Washington, DC, Spain, Denmark, Argentina, and an ambassadorship to Morocco. Ambassador Duke was interviewed in 1989 by John McKesson.*

*Q: Moving on to your tour in Spain, you indicated your two main problems that you dealt with were the succession problem and US military presence. Would you care to comment on them?*

DUKE: Yes, the item that was uppermost in everyone's mind was how Generalissimo Franco was going to arrange his succession. It was important that the embassy should be in contact with those who would inherit power and also those who would lead the opposition. I made it my policy to try to meet as many elements on the political scene as possible. This caused some problems. My old friend Antonio Garrigues came around one morning informally for coffee and to let me know that in his opinion I should not prejudice my otherwise good relations with the Franco government by fraternizing with opposition leaders. I thanked him for his interest and concern, and assured him I would, of course, accede to his government's request in that regard. However, I never heard anything further from official sources. That made me understand how unhappy the government was with my opposition contacts but was not willing to prohibit them. So I went on doing it. I would have lunch with opposition figures at their residence or Bill Walker, my DCM, would give a luncheon at his house and I would attend. We would thus have an opportunity to exchange ideas about the future of Spain. In brief, we kept in touch with the opposition, and I also kept in touch with the members of the royal family such as Don Juan. He was living in exile in Portugal and on visits to our embassy in Lisbon I periodically sought him out to get his ideas on how the monarchy would play its role in the post-Franco period. And then whenever the young Juan Carlos, who had been named by the Generalissimo as the Prince of Spain, came to be generally accepted as the successor to Franco, I would call on him every month or two. So in that way it was quite possible to be on top of the situation. It was, I think, ill fortune for me that Franco didn't die when I was serving there. I would have loved to handle the succession for the American government; but that was not to be.

My other preoccupation was the American military presence. The bases agreement was scheduled to be renegotiated in 1965. I was very disheartened when late in January of that year President Johnson called me to come back "to be at his side" (as he put it) when he ran for reelection. His telephone call from the White House came during a dinner for American newspaper correspondents who were stationed in Madrid. I was totally surprised by his words but there was nothing I could say in reply other than: "Mr. President, I am in the middle of preparing for the base negotiations and I need time to disengage myself from the process," and he said, "How much time do you need?" I said, "Give me until April 1st," to which he replied, "I'll see you on April 1st."

I came home just before April 1st, on the last day of March and my wife and I were looking at the 8 o'clock broadcast speech of the President when he stated that he was not going to run.

I was very disappointed to be pulled out of the embassy in Spain before we got into the heart of the military negotiations. The base agreements were the most pressing problem we had in Spain.

The opposition felt that the US military presence was an index of our support for Franco. The one serious mistake that had been made when we negotiated our agreement in 1952 was to place our major air base at Torrejon. To have such a large American presence so near to the Spanish capital was bound to make trouble and I am surprised in retrospect that it remained as a US base as long as it did. My job, of course, was to make it as palatable as possible.

*Q: Angie, you had occasion to deal with General Franco; would you care to give us an assessment of the man and the leader as you saw him?*

DUKE: Franco was a very surprising personality. He stands in sharp contrast to other more charismatic Mediterranean dictators. He was short, fat, bald and unprepossessing in appearance. He was very formal, official, even cold in manner. When I went to say goodbye on my farewell call he did not permit me to bring an interpreter or note-taker. We spent a whole half hour alone together and we discussed in detail and at some length the problems in relations between our two countries. He was a career officer, a functionary and bureaucrat, and obviously had great intelligence and shrewdness, but certainly he was not electrifying to be with. When I told him my views on the US presence in Torrejon he wouldn't reply to me. I have read the account of his meeting with Hitler at the Pyrenees and how Hitler was exasperated with his uncommunicative manner. Well I had been there a few years and was used to his manner but wish to emphasize that I found him a most difficult personality.

*Q: In retrospect, would you say that American relations with Spain were good at the time, and how would you say the future would lead American relations to be?*

DUKE: There is no doubt but that Americans are held in warm regard. For one thing we are far away from the old, historic rivalries and conflicts that have marred Spain's relationships with England and France. We come into the orbit of the Spanish with an almost unmarked slate. Strangely they feel closer to Germany more than to any other European power. The German Federal Republic today and Spain are very close to each other. We are, because of our distance, and because we admire them as a people, our relations with Spaniards are quite good. However, the memories of the Spanish-American War are much more vivid to the Spanish people than they are to us. The fact that Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines are gone due to our intervention has lived on in many peoples' minds. The identification of the American government with the Franco government is also a source of friction. But this is counterbalanced by the admiration for our form of government and ideals; and on the whole our relations were good. They admired John F. Kennedy, for example. I learned this first-hand on an official visit to the ancient University of Salamanca. This was one of the very few times that I had a disagreeable reception during my entire time of service in Spain. When I was introduced, the students banged their desks and shuffled their feet and made it impossible for me to speak. Mind you, this was in a so-called police state. I waited for quite a long time, and the way I handled it was to bellow at the top of my voice, "John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy," and at that the audience of several hundred young people fell silent.

*Q: Would you care to comment on your contacts with Juan Carlos?*

DUKE: When you asked me to speak about Franco I haven't been very complimentary. That does not mean that I did not respect the Generalissimo; I respected him very much, and I respected the nature of his power and the importance he had for US-Spanish relations; and I made it my policy to get along with him. But I had a very different, very warm relationship with Don Juan Carlos of Spain. I would call on him at the Zarzuela Palace and we would have coffee alone, the two of us. He would talk to me very frankly about the relationship between himself and Franco and the relationship between himself and his father Don Juan. He would sometimes touch on his own vision of the future. He could be quite amusing and personal. Franco treated him like a school boy and often put him to various tests. One morning, on one of our regular visits, he told me he had just been through quite an experience. It was a Friday and the day on which he was scheduled for his weekly meeting with the Chief of State. On this occasion (just a few hours previous) he was met by an El Pardo palace functionary who escorted him to an unfamiliar reception room. As two huge doors were thrown open, the Prince was told, "His Excellency the Generalissimo has requested that you preside in his place at the cabinet meeting today." Juan Carlos told me he took his seat and asked for the agenda. It went off quite well, but it was the type of thing that Franco would pull on him, testing him for his ability to handle himself.

**RICHARD K. FOX, JR.**  
**Administrative Officer**  
**Madrid (1965-1970)**

*Ambassador Fox was born and raised in Ohio and served in the US Navy in World War II. Educated at Indiana University, he served with the Urban League in several states before joining the State Department in 1961. His Washington assignments include the senior positions of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Personnel, of the Bureau of Management and of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs. He was appointed Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago in 1977 and served there until 1977. His other overseas post was Madrid, where he served from 1965 to 1968. Ambassador Fox was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.*

*Q: You then went to Madrid first as Deputy Administrative Officer and later promoted to Counselor for Administration. What did those jobs entail in the period of 1965-1970?*

FOX: I had, of course, been selling the Foreign Service. I had been talking about the Foreign Service as a career for black people for three years plus. Now it was time for me to begin to move into the Foreign Service and to accept my responsibilities in this area and to prove that it was a viable career option. I went to Madrid obviously quite interested and hoping to learn a lot and to make some contributions as well, based on my earlier experiences both in and outside the Department. I found out very quickly that the administrative area is one of the most difficult ones to work in.

*Q: It is certainly the most technical. You can't play it by ear as you might in the political area.*

FOX: It is very much result oriented. You produce or else you have a lot of unhappy people around you. Part of it of course has to do with your responsibilities for comfortable housing, an adequately staffed Chancery which is appropriately maintained. But there are a lot of other problems too: personnel problems, the difficulties of obtaining sufficient financial resources to operate the Mission, and working with the foreign nationals which is not always an easy task.

*Q: You had two quite different Ambassadors. First, you had Anger Biddle Duke who although technically was considered as a non-career ambassador but had been around for a long time. And then you had Robert Wagner. What was the difference?*

FOX: They were certainly very different in personality, in style and in their approach to problems. You were right about Angie Duke. He had been around for a while. He had been Chief-of-Protocol in the Kennedy Administration before going to Madrid. I think he also had had a previous Ambassadorial appointment. He was certainly no stranger to the Foreign Service. He fitted in very well. He spoke Spanish; he had a great interest in Spanish culture and was well liked and highly regarded by the Spanish hierarchy. He did very well. I was with him for three years. He had a strong staff.

We had a number of interesting problems during this period. The US Air Force lost a nuclear weapon off the coast of Spain. All this started with an air-tanker that was refueling one of the SAC bombers. There was a crash. The SAC aircraft was carrying three or four nuclear weapons several of which landed on shore, but one of which was lost at sea. We stated that we would take every step possible to recover the bomb and did in fact recover it after some time. The concern of the Spanish government and certainly of the Spanish people was that the water at this beach, which was in the south and a great tourist attraction, had been contaminated by the nuclear device. The American government decided we needed to convince the Spanish that this was not the case. We came up with the idea that the American Ambassador would go swimming in the waters as proof that there was no threat of any kind. So he and the Spanish Minister of Tourism, Fraga on a chilly day in April went swimming in those waters while a host of us stood off on the beach urging them on and recording the event with cameras. It was quite an event and captured considerable attention. It also proved the point very quickly that there was no problem.

*Q: How was the Spanish government from an administrative point of view? Did you have many problems with them?*

FOX: No, we didn't have a lot of problems with them. The Spanish government had the same kind of bureaucracy with its attendant slowness that you find in a lot of other governments. I suppose we may be guilty on the same score in the United States. I didn't have any great problems with them. They were obviously quite friendly to Americans. We had adequate consultations with them and things worked pretty well.

We had the problem of the American military presence that we had to contend with at the Torrejon airbase outside of Madrid. We also had a base at Zaragoza, and at Moron and a big submarine base at Rota.

With all that American military personnel in the country, there was concern about their activities and their comportment and what happened in the event of any problems between the American military and the Spanish civilian authorities.

*Q: Did you have any particular problems working in the Embassy during the five years you were there? With the staff? Or the Ambassador?*

FOX: Robert Wagner was a very interesting man and entirely different from Angie Duke. Duke was a very sophisticated, socially active man who represented the United States very well. He and his wife, Robin, were very attractive people. Robert Wagner came to Madrid after a long stint as Mayor of New York City. He probably had traveled overseas before, but certainly this role of Ambassador was something entirely new. He arrived unsure of what he was supposed to do and how he was to do it.

Wagner was a very intelligent man who listened well and he very quickly discerned that the people around him were there to help him, not to hurt him. He listened to their advice and performed very well. The Spaniards liked him because he was a politician and they loved politics. They were particularly interested in New York politics and Bob Wagner could sit and regale you for hours with stories about New York politics. He also had the advantage that as Mayor of New York he had met and greeted a number of Spanish figures upon their arrival in New York. So there was a group of people in Madrid that he had met at one time or other during their visits to the United States.

But he had a very short tenure in Madrid. He was there for only one year and was replaced in the summer of 1969 by Robert Hill, under whom I also served. You might remember that President Johnson left the White House in early 1969 after Nixon was elected as President in 1968. Robert Hill was President Nixon's appointee to Spain.

Mr. Hill arrived in early 1969 after having served as Ambassador in Mexico and somewhere in Central America. He was an entirely different personality from his predecessors. So I had the experience of working with three Ambassadors in five years, which keeps alert.

**BURNETT ANDERSON**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1967-1969)**

*Burnett Anderson was born in Wisconsin in 1919. He entered the USIA in 1953. His career included assignments in Iran, Spain, France, and Sweden. Mr. Anderson was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on January 5, 1990.*

*Q: You were leading up to the point where you were in the mood to go overseas again, which would have been about 1967.*

ANDERSON: 1967. I had been designated for Argentina, but a health problem delayed it. Instead, I was lucky enough to go off to Spain at an absolutely fascinating time in the history of that noble peninsula. The situation there was that Franco was more or less on his last legs. He was still nominally in charge, but the very tight dictatorship was crumbling a little bit at the edges, and the so-called opposition was being able to articulate itself more and more.

My principal contact was Fraga Iribarne, Minister for Information. We met early in the game and had a very frank talk when I first called on him, and I remember saying, among other things, "I plan to operate here in normal fashion. I hope to be in touch, as we are everywhere, with all segments of your society. If there are people who for some reason you don't want me to be in touch with, it seems to me you've got two choices." This was the time when there were student riots and so on and evidences of unrest of all kinds. "You can either take the person out of circulation yourself or you can declare me *persona non grata*."

I was very eager to work with these emerging parties, because obviously the clock was running, and the end of the Franco regime was inevitable. The old theory, you know, you've got to stay in with the outs or some day you're going to be out with the ins. They were bright people who were, in effect, preparing themselves and in various ways organizing and publishing some fairly incendiary stuff against the day that there would be a change. In fact, I designated one member of my staff, in effect, as the principal liaison with these emerging groups, particularly the young people. This was being watched, and I thought it might lead to some trouble at some point, and it did.

*Q: Were there any specific restrictions placed upon our activities at that time?*

ANDERSON: Nothing specific. Nothing specific. We presumably would use good judgment, but we did meet with people who were known as oppositionists. What eventually happened was that sometime during 1968, late 1968 or early 1969, there was a crackdown and several people were picked up and put in essentially domestic exile, house arrest, if you will, or something bordering on it, in towns outside of Madrid, including a couple of good friends of mine.

Then I got word that my staffer, who was operative in this area, was going to be declared *persona non grata*. I was not able to establish that with certainty, but what I did was I called up Fraga and said that there was this rumor floating around, and I hoped it wasn't true, but if it were true, and if they did declare him *persona non grata*, I would leave before he did and I would have a press conference if I could before departure or immediately after arriving in the next capital, explaining why I left. So that *persona non grata* business never happened, as far as I know.

I was fascinated by Spain and delighted by the way that the transition could be made peacefully, the Spaniards apparently finding their way into the latter part of the 20th century and into an integrated Europe without bloodshed or civil war. Civil war was the thing to be feared. If the military had been unwilling to accept a transition to a more representative society, it could have been a very bloody thing. Happily, that didn't happen.

**JAMES N. CORTADA**  
**Consul General**  
**Barcelona (1967-1970)**

*James N. Cortada was born in New York in 1914. He grew up in New York, but spent his high school years in Havana, Cuba. He attended college in New York five years, until 1932. Mr. Cortada joined the Foreign Service in 1942. His career included posts in Cuba, Spain, Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

CORTADA: While I was there, one day, a friend who was the Administrative Officer for the European Division was taking German language studies, as he was going as Deputy Chief of Mission to Austria. We were in the elevator and I asked him if he wanted a ride back to the Department. While in the elevator he asked if I had kept up my economic skills. I said that I had kept up with the theory. "Why?" He explained that "We've got a serious problem in Italy. We need a Minister Councilor for Economic Affairs, will you take the job?" I responded negatively indicating that I had no intentions of going on anymore of these jobs. The fact was that I was thinking seriously of retirement in the not too distant future. When we were crossing the Roosevelt Bridge, he asked me if I was serious about retiring in a year or two? I said: "Yes, I'm thinking very seriously about it. As a matter of fact, I don't see any job at home or abroad that fascinates me. I'm getting more and more interested in my own country. In fact, there is only one post that I would really seriously consider. Barcelona for sentimental reasons, because in our youth my wife and I had a wonderful time there when we still had stars in our eyes." He said: "John Ford is the Consul General there and he has a lot of children, they're scattered all over, and he wants a curtailment of his assignment and back to the United States. If you want the job, it's yours. As you know, it's a Class 1 post, John is a Class 1 officer and that's a plush post." And that's how we wound up in Barcelona for three and a half years and they were magnificent. I also did a lot for my country.

*Q: What were the main things that concerned you in Barcelona? This was from 67 to 70.*

CORTADA: Well, it was very active. To begin with, we had the 6th Fleet or the 7th Fleet in the Mediterranean?

*Q: It is the 6th Fleet.*

CORTADA: The 6th Fleet. Well the 6th Fleet used to come to Barcelona regularly as a port of call. I had to make sure that everything was smooth. I worked out an official visit routine whereby unless a Rear Admiral was on board, we did not run all over the place. When I got there, there was practically an official visit every week. The calls were a nuisance for everybody. The Spanish officials were very pleased with the new arrangement.

An interesting and touchy problem concerned the visit of a troop-ship with several thousand marines coming in directly from Vietnam. I saw a potential problem with shore leave and the poor quality of nightclubs.

With the closest cooperation of the Spanish authorities, we assembled a fleet of buses the authorities turned over to us Montjuich Park, the place where the Olympics were recently held. The Marines were taken from point to point into the park where they saw a full program of entertainment and had some beer. Four or five hours later they got on the buses and back to the ships before they could get into trouble in the nightclubs. Those things were worked out very well.

The Spanish educational system was going through a revolution. I had been a dean at the Foreign Service Institute, and a resident diplomat at UCLA quite recently with the rank of a senior professor at large, a circumstance known to Barcelona Academicians, friends from my first tour in Barcelona sixteen, seventeen years earlier. First thing I knew, I was part of a round table of professors, looking into changes in the University of Barcelona. Another situation concerned help in reorganizing the Graduate School of Business Administration of the Province of Barcelona for which I got a silver medal from the Spanish government.

What I did was project an image in the area that American diplomats were not a bunch of ignorant asses. We were their equal academically and with kindred interests. Just because you are a diplomat doesn't mean you are just punching out visas. We had a constant flow of American entertainers and troops, opera stars. We all went out of our way to make sure that interrelationships with all social groups were broad and smooth. It was a super PR job. We managed to get one of those capsules that went to the moon. We had something like 150,000 visitors. It was a very major PR operation in the full sense of the word. Now, I was very fortunate in that Rich Brown was on the staff, then a very young officer, now he's Ambassador to Uruguay. Rich Brown had been in Vietnam as a Foreign Service Officer, and from there came to Barcelona. A very fine man. We had a very able group of officers.

Majorca had become the focal point for hippies at that time. I had them all in my district and that required special handling. Once in a while one would wind up in jail because of drugs, but there were other situations.

We had GIs whose parents were Spanish born. When they filled out tourist forms and entered Spain, the Spanish wanted to put them in the army. We worked out a solution whereby after arrest if that happened, the GI would be given leave of absence, come to the Consulate, be given a regular passport, put in a car with a Vice Consul and off to France. A lot of the kind of troubles tourists got into could have been solved by American Express, but would wind up in our hands. On the whole, I reaped the benefits of seeds planted seventeen years before.

**STEPHEN BOSWORTH**  
**Economic/Commercial Officer**  
**Madrid (1967-1971)**

*Ambassador Bosworth was born and raised in Michigan and educated at Dartmouth College and George Washington University. Entering the Foreign*



*Service in 1961 he served abroad in Panama, Madrid and Paris before becoming Ambassador to Tunisia, where he served from 1979 to 1981, to the Philippines (1984-1987) and to the Republic of Korea (1997-2000). The Ambassador also was a member of the Department's Policy Planning Staff, and he played a major role in the US-Japan Foundation and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. In 2009 Ambassador Bosworth was named the President's Special Representative for North Korean Policy. He was interviewed by Michael Mahoney in 2003.*

*Q: So, you had taken the economics courses and had worked on Panama and so what comes up in the summer of 1967?*

BOSWORTH: I was assigned to Madrid, Spain as an economic officer.

*Q: At your request?*

BOSWORTH: At my request.

*Q: I see. In those days did they have an open bidding system by then that you could?*

BOSWORTH: Yes. It was a long time ago, I'm trying to remember, but yes I think they did. You did a sort of a preference.

*Q: You wanted to go to Madrid?*

BOSWORTH: I wanted to go to another Spanish speaking post, the notion of going to Europe was appealing to me and I wanted something that would solidify what I had been studying in the area of economics. I went off to Madrid as the number two economic officer in a small two person unit and focused on the internal and external economic relations with Spain.

*Q: How big was the overall economic section?*

BOSWORTH: The overall economic section then was probably eight to ten officers, a fairly significant commercial office, there was a counselor, there was one or two people who did civil aviation and that sort of stuff.

*Q: Who was the ambassador then?*

BOSWORTH: The ambassador at the outset when I first arrived was Angier Biddle Duke and he was followed by Robert Wagner who was the former mayor of New York.

*Q: Duke was also a political appointee?*

BOSWORTH: Duke was a political appointee, Wagner was a political appointee and then when Nixon was elected in '68 Wagner left and a fellow named Robert Hill arrived as ambassador.

*Q: Was he also a political appointee?*

BOSWORTH: He was also a political appointee. The reality is I never worked for a career ambassador in all of my posts.

*Q: That's interesting. So, you get to Spain and what were the prime issues that you dealt with yourself would you say?*

BOSWORTH: The major issue was whether or not Spain's by that time remarkable economic progress would continue and importantly the nature and content of Spain's relationship with the what was then the European Community. Spain had decided in the mid '60s basically it was going to orient itself toward Europe. After a long period of alienation following the civil war. They were engaged in an effort to negotiate an affiliation agreement with the EU, with the EC and that was of course of great interest to the U.S. both economically in terms of trade policy, but also political because even then there were people who thought that Spain should be brought somehow into NATO. There was a feeling that if you could build economic connections between Spain and Europe that that could make the process of NATO entry easier. Spain of course at that point was still governed by Francisco Franco. It was without question a dictatorship. It was not by that time a very bloody dictatorship and you could live there as a foreigner without being conscious every hour or every day that you were living in a dictatorship. Without question he was an authoritarian, the country was still badly fractured ideologically and socially by the outcome of the civil war. Many Spaniards have not forgiven the other side and Franco was there in a way that maintained political stability.

*Q: the U.S. interests then would you say that the prime interest was for the U.S. was the NATO military base structure in Spain and the GATT?*

BOSWORTH: Yes, our principle interest was a complex of military bases. We had the naval base, the submarine base at Rota it was very important because it was an essential station for our submarine patrols throughout the Mediterranean. Given our competition with the Soviet Union and the state of our submarine technology at that point we had to be able to put submarines into the Eastern Mediterranean as part of our strategic doctrine. We also had the air base of Torrejon, which was very important to us, because again they back up what we were doing in our presence in Germany and France. We had substantial numbers of American forces where they were not as visible as they might have been, but they were there and the Spaniards knew about them. Our presence really was a mark of legitimacy for the Franco regime without question. As in other places around the world at that time those who were opposed to Franco tended to be very suspicious of the United States because they saw us as providing legitimacy for his continued rule.

*Q: How many years were you in Madrid?*

BOSWORTH: I was there four years.

*Q: '67 to '71.*

BOSWORTH: '67 to '71.

*Q: You focused all that time on these particular issues?*

BOSWORTH: I focused on the economic side. It was a strange time in Spain because a lot of people who under a more liberal system of government would have been in politics, particularly in a moderate opposition, didn't see much prospect of affecting the future that way. So, many of them became economists, many of them went into the government on sort of the technical side where it wasn't all that technical. They were making an influence on decisions which had a fundamental impact on Spain in which, for example, opening up the economy of promoting Spain's closer association with the rest of Europe had very substantial political effects over time. The embassy, particularly under Hill, we had the rather strange notion as a country at that point that because we had strong ties to Franco and he was our sort of anchor point in Spain that we should not be dealing with anyone who could be said to be in the opposition. So, Hill particularly was very adamant that no officers in the embassy should be talking to people who were in the political opposition not that there was all that much of an open opposition. There was still the communist party in Spain of substantial strength. They were working in economic ministries. There was the Bank of Spain, Banco de Espana. So, these were all people who were legitimate contacts for me, but who were actually oppositionists and through them I would meet other people. I would write these memoranda of conversation, which at that point in the State Department's affairs was a fairly common way of conveying information. Now of course it's all done on e-mail. The people in Washington were fascinated by all this stuff that I was giving them. I had lunch a few times with Felipe Gonzalez when he was still a sort of renegade professor at one of the universities there long before he became Prime Minister of Spain. Hill never quite understood there could be anything in the area of economics that would have any relevance to what was happening politically in Spain. So, I had a good deal of flexibility, which was not enjoyed by all the other officers in the embassy.

*Q: What was Hill like as a manager would you say?*

BOSWORTH: I found him very authoritarian.

*Q: What was his background?*

BOSWORTH: He came from the Boston area. I think he worked for the United Fruit Company at one point. He had been an ambassador. I used to refer to him as a career Republican ambassador. He'd served in El Salvador and in Mexico as ambassador and from Spain he eventually went on and was ambassador in Argentina in the Ford administration I believe.

*Q: Basically did he sort of see himself as the chief political officer?*

BOSWORTH: He was the chief of everything. He did not delegate with great ease. He was very committed to the notion that we had to remain glued to Francisco Franco forever.

*Q: Was that because the Department told him that or?*

BOSWORTH: It was a view in Washington in some ways in the wealthy American establishment at that point. Remember, again, this was the Cold War. There was a feeling that our friends were our friends and we should support them. There was no clearly identifiable democratic alternative at that point in Spain. There was a great deal of concern that should something happen to Franco or should he be politically weakened that Spain could find itself in a kind of domestic chaos that it had experienced in the '30s. Of course we didn't want to see that happen. Spain was important for the stability of Europe.

*Q: This is an everlasting question isn't it? I'm sure you encountered it later and we can talk about the issue of supporting the people and the status quo or trying to push against it especially if the status quo is nondemocratic. So, that's an old, very difficult and certainly very common issue of our history of our relations with Latin America.*

BOSWORTH: It is in Latin America and many other places. At one point I told people and friends that I specialized in countries which were governed by aging autocrats, I was in Spain in those years and then years later I was in Tunisia. Then of course in the '80s in the Philippines with Ferdinand Marcos.

*Q: So you met people like Gonzalez in Spain and wrote a memorandum of conversation about them. Did you show them to Hill?*

BOSWORTH: They just went out as normal embassy communications and they did not rise to the level of his attention.

*Q: Which meant he didn't try to stifle your contacts.*

BOSWORTH: He didn't try to stifle my contacts.

*Q: Then you also did I suppose regular reporting on these economic issues?*

BOSWORTH: Yes, but at that point we used to write something which was sort of like an economic quarterly looking at current trends and projections in the Spanish economy. That was used by the analytical community all throughout Washington and it was also consumed by American businesses, banks, etc.

*Q: Well, when you say the analytical community back in Washington, who would that be would you say?*

BOSWORTH: Well, it would be the Treasury Department. There was no treasury attache. The analytical side of Commerce, we had commercial officers in Spain, but they were generally in the trade promotion. They would also be in the agency, in DIA and throughout the U.S. government.

*Q: How did you find, now Madrid is a big post and you were still a pretty junior officer coming from Panama, so how did you find the living in those days in the sense of the embassy community or whatever?*

BOSWORTH: Actually it was good. I had some trouble from time to time with Hill in my last two years I was there. After the first year there was a cost reduction exercise in the State Department. Fortunately for me the position of my then boss, the number one person in this two person office was eliminated and so I became the sole occupant of this series of this little unit and reported directly to the economic counselor. After that my life got a lot better. It was good living in Spain in those days.

*Q: Was there a sense of community?*

BOSWORTH: There was a pretty good sense of community, yes. There was an expat business community in Spain. There were other embassies there of course. At the time I made several friends some of whom I still see from the British embassy, a fellow who then worked for the economic intelligence unit in Spain and various other people that my first wife and I tended to socialize with. I was fortunate in that I was able to travel throughout Spain. My Spanish was by that time good enough so that I could go to Spanish universities and give lectures. I was generally welcomed at universities. It was not, the anti-Americanism was not at a fever pitch by any means. I would develop talks on various books. I remember doing a talk that I probably did 12 times on one of John Galbraith's books. I used those as ways to educate people about American culture, the American economy, etc. Anyway, I got to travel all over Spain. I loved the country. I still do. Probably in terms of personal comfort and enjoyment, probably the highlight of all the places that I've lived in.

*Q: Now, in talking to people like Gonzalez, did you get a sense at that time that there was some reasonable prospect down the road that there were sensible people thinking about serious questions. You were writing these up and sending them back and people were quite interested in them?*

BOSWORTH: People were very interested. I would get notes from people asking if I could develop more information on this particular question. Yes, I had the sense that clearly Spain was not frozen in amber. Franco by this time was aging. On the economic side liberalization was well underway. State control which had been the governing philosophy of economic management there since the mid '30s was rapidly being dismantled. Spain was lowering its barriers to imports encouraging foreign investment. There was a group of people within Spain who were in the process of acquiring very substantial influence; that was the Opus Dei. They basically ran the economic side of the government. The minister of planning was an Opus Dei member. The vice president was too. The minister of foreign affairs. So, these guys were all dedicated to the prospect of changing Spain economically. They were not all that eager to see change in the political skew, but that did come.

*Q: Was Franco in accord with that approach?*

BOSWORTH: I think so, yes. I mean one of the interesting things is nobody has ever, at least I'm not familiar with it, it's been written sort of obliquely, look at Franco's thinking in those years, what he was really trying to do other than just survive.

*Q: Was it going on in a sense in spite of him, that he didn't pay any attention?*

BOSWORTH: Well, I think to some extent it was going on in spite of him, but he did one very significant thing at that time. He brought Juan Carlos as the Prince in Waiting so that when Franco died Juan Carlos became king. At the time nobody was very impressed with that because it seemed kind of an archaic move that you would bring back a monarch. Juan Carlos went through a training period where he was farmed out to individual ministries for a few months at a time. Generally the people that he worked with or was associated with there had tended to conclude that he wasn't very bright. So, there was a good deal of surprise when after he became king and after Franco was gone he became basically the pillar of stability. I think probably he deserves an enormous credit for how Spain has evolved since 1975 and Franco should have some credit for having put him there.

*Q: So, you were there four years?*

BOSWORTH: Right.

*Q: And basically had the same position all the way through except that you got to be in charge of much of your own unit at one point.*

BOSWORTH: Right.

*Q: So, you spent four years in Spain and then what did you do?*

BOSWORTH: Then I wanted another language and I had met some people.

*Q: You wanted that because you thought that was important to you career?*

BOSWORTH: I thought it was important to my career. By this time I was kind of turned on to what was happening in Europe.

*Q: Right.*

BOSWORTH: The European Union, European Community, Transatlantic.

**JON DAVID GLASSMAN**  
**Junior Officer**  
**Madrid (1968-1971)**

*Mr. Glassman graduated from the University of Southern California and Columbia University. He served in numerous posts including Madrid, Moscow, Havana and Kabul. He was named ambassador to Paraguay in 1991. He was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1997.*

*Q: So you were a Junior Officer in Madrid?*

GLASSMAN: That's correct.

*Q: Which function did you have?*

GLASSMAN: I was three weeks in the consular section, six months in the economics section but ended up in the political section for the remainder of my tour. We had two ambassadors there; the first was Robert Wagner, the former Mayor of New York City. He left shortly thereafter and was replaced by a man named Robert Charles Hill who had been a close collaborator of John Foster Dulles and a protégé of John Davis Lodge who also had been Ambassador to Spain. We saw a lot of Ambassador Lodge as time went on there.

*Q: If I'm correct, Franco finally died in 1975 but you must have been there for shall we say his declining years. What was your impression of Spain at the time?*

GLASSMAN: Franco was preparing for the succession so he opened up the political process for what he called associations as opposed to political parties. A number of semi- democratic politicians began to emerge. He also decided to bring back Prince Juan Carlos to be his successor. You may recall the true successor to the Spanish throne was Don Juan who lived in Estoril in Portugal. He was considered unreliable and somewhat of a leftist so Franco had taken Juan Carlos and put him in a lot of Spanish Military Schools. He was considered a person who might be malleable, might be brought into Spain as a potential successor and would not be a danger. I should say that also in the embassy we had the same impression of Juan Carlos, because he had a U.S. Army man who was his karate instructor and the idea was they were going to bring Juan Carlos back into Spain and perhaps bring the karate instructor along with him and this would be a source of continuing influence. There also was a Spanish military man named Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, who was Franco's Prime Minister. He was also considered to be an important person favoring U.S. interests in the transition. Franco would phase out, Juan Carlos would be brought in as a kind of entity who would reign over this and then Carrero Blanco and the military would be key figures running the country. There was also a group of economic ministers associated with Opus Dei, the Catholic lay movement, and they were called technocrats. They were very much partisans of the Western economic model so you would have a transition from a fascist corporate state to modern capitalism with the military backing up the alliance with the United States. You may recall that we had air force bases and naval bases in Spain, including a nuclear submarine base at Rota. We had Torrejon Air Base just outside Madrid and Zaragoza from where U.S. strategic bombers could reach the Soviet Union. So, it was a very tight relationship. The U.S. 16<sup>th</sup> Air Force headquarters were in Spain at that time. Because of its air and naval strategic roles, Spain was considered to be very important to the nuclear balance of power. Accordingly, the transition from Franco was quite sensitive.

Concerning Prince Juan Carlos, there was some controversy about whether he would be merely a symbolic figure. Ambassador Robert Hill thought that Juan Carlos would be a strong ruler. If I can recall an interesting anecdote, I was asked to write a paper on Juan Carlos as a potential ruler. I and the other political officers thought that Juan Carlos would reign but not really rule. In those days, the embassy didn't work on Wednesday afternoon so Ambassador Hill asked me to stay

late. I was sitting in the embassy waiting three or four hours and the embassy was just empty, quiet, no one there. Then about six o'clock, Hill called me into the front office and he said, "You just made a terrible error." I said, "What is it, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "This paper you've written says Juan Carlos will reign and not rule." He said, "I can tell you that's false." I said, "How's that, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "Well, I was down at the Cortes (Parliament) and I saw how Juan Carlos walked. He had the walk of a ruler and if you look at his blood... You haven't mentioned anything about his blood. He has the blood of Polish kings, of French kings - all strong rulers." He said, "You must mention his blood." I said, "Yes sir, Mr. Ambassador. I'll certainly do that." So, I went back and rewrote an airgram - actually said that Juan Carlos was likely to be a strong ruler. Among the things I mentioned pursuant to the Ambassador's instructions, was his blood. We sent it in to George Landau, who was then the Country Director for Spain and Portugal. He came back and said, "Are you people insane?" The Ambassador, indeed, held strong views and he thought Juan Carlos would be a good ruler. In fact, notwithstanding the somewhat eccentric basis for his conclusions, Ambassador Hill was correct in asserting positive views about Juan Carlos' potential.

*Q: Were you able to form effective opinions on how the embassy functioned from your relatively low position? Obviously you dealt with the Ambassador.*

GLASSMAN: Oh, yes, it was very interesting. Hill was very much an absolutist. He wanted to impose his personality on the embassy. We would have country team meetings. Hill would insist on having his staff meeting in the auditorium, in which would participate not only the section heads, but every officer and every secretary, every American there. So, we would have these large staff meetings in the auditorium and then Hill would call up the heads of section to stand in front of the crowd with him. Then he would proceed often to humiliate them in front of the crowd. This was his technique to maintain control. He also had some, of course, close confidants. One of them was a man named Harry Bergold, who later became an Ambassador. Harry had been also the assistant of Wagner, who was a liberal Democrat. Hill was a right wing Republican. Harry readily changed his perspective. He would come over, have drinks with Hill every night at the residence, which was attached to the embassy. That would be a sort of inner circle, then Hill would have the larger staff meeting in a way I just described. He would also bring in guests from the States such as Ambassador John Davis Lodge, and Holmes Alexander, the columnist. They would also speak in front of the entire embassy staff. One instance I remember was when John Davis Lodge was there. He had been an actor who had played in the film the Scarlet Empress (about Catherine the Great). He styled himself as a great authority on Russia.

Another thing Ambassador Hill did, he would have a weekly football games flown in by TWA. All officers had to assemble every Friday afternoon to watch the football games together and Hill would have a running commentary on the game while this was going on. This was his absolutist style.

*Q: In Madrid during the time of student demonstrations around the world did any intrude on your life in Spain?*

GLASSMAN: American students would frequently come and hold demonstrations outside the embassy. Ambassador Hill requested on one occasion that the police arrest the students. We tried



to reason with him, saying that all these students, as reprehensible as they might be, have congressman back home and this would be a very troublesome thing. So Hill reluctantly agreed finally not to have the police used against the students and had them instead come in and speak to him. Of course, Hill hated the demonstrators.

I remember he also would go back to the States during the time and see the demonstrations occurring. He would then hold his typical large embassy staff meeting and commiserate over the bad situation in the U.S.

**HORACE Y. EDWARDS**  
**Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Barcelona and Madrid (1969-1971)**

*Horace Edwards was born in Texas in 1915. He completed graduate work at the University of Colorado and at the University of Pennsylvania before he was turned down for military service. He went into North American Aviation defense work and joined OMGUS after the war. Mr. Edwards served in Mexico, Uruguay, and Spain. This interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1989.*

*Q: How long were you in Barcelona?*

EDWARDS: I was in Barcelona for two years and then Bob Hill, Robert C. Hill became our Ambassador.

*Q: Who was that?*

EDWARDS: Bob Hill.

*Q: Oh, Bob Hill. That's right.*

EDWARDS: Yes.

*Q: He did move to Spain, didn't he?*

EDWARDS: Yes, and dragged me kicking and screaming to Madrid. Well, not that I didn't like Madrid but I had become so fond of Barcelona by that time that I didn't really want to leave.

*Q: I'm interested because Bob Hill didn't like Jake Canter.*

EDWARDS: No.

*Q: When you were in Mexico, Jake was Cultural Affairs Officer, and Hill was Ambassador. And it fell to me to tell Jake that he had to move because the Ambassador didn't want him. It was a terribly embarrassing experience. Jake went from there to be CAO in Spain. That must have been in the late '50s, probably around '58 or '59, couldn't have been later than '59 because I went to the War College at that time. Wasn't he in Spain as CAO when you were there?*

EDWARDS: No. Jake was in Mexico as CAO for a while and after he was removed to Spain, he was followed by Dulaney Terret. Ambassador Hill couldn't stand either of them.

*Q: It would have been ironic if Bob Hill had come there to find Jake as CAO again.*

EDWARDS: In Madrid.

*Q: Yes, I mean in Madrid.*

EDWARDS: Yes.

*Q: We got off a little on the Bob Hill versus Jake Canter bit, but what was your position when you were called up from Barcelona to go to Madrid?*

EDWARDS: I went to Madrid as CAO. It was very nice but Madrid was a little bit more difficult to make contacts than Barcelona was. But I'd also had the problem in Madrid that my wife had just died and two of my children were still with me and we had to find a place to live in Madrid. But the people were so very, very nice in helping us. For example, we'd stop at an apartment house, a large apartment house, and one for example, I remember the doorman there said, "Well, no, we don't have a thing here. But there is a very nice building down in the next block and you tell the doorman" -- and then he said, "No. Don't. I'll go with you." And so he accompanied us all the way down the block and introduced us to the doorman at the next place. You would have insulted him had you offered him a tip. It was that sort of niceness in those days that was so attractive about the Spaniards.

My stay in Madrid was rather uneventful. I remember one thing; there were some University student problems, some student unrest. I did meet with some of the students in Madrid a few times and found out about some of the protests that might have been planned and so on. The Spanish government at the time was planning to arrest and bring to trial some students, four students, who the Government claimed had been responsible for the death of a Spanish guard. I think, but I'm not sure, that it was one of the guards in one of the provinces. I don't know how the person was killed, but they had no evidence whatsoever that these students had been responsible. The Franco Government just wanted someone to punish.

I went to Ambassador Hill, Bob Hill, because he was going to the States the next day. I called him at night and said, "I have to see you before you leave in the morning." And he said, "All right. Come over right now." So I went over and said, "I know what is being planned. You know that these four students are going to be arrested by the Spanish government and tried, and of course convicted. You will have access to people in the United States, both the Spanish Embassy and the American authorities. You will know, they will know, how this will all appear in the

papers of the United States and every paper in the United States and Europe will carry it. There is going to be a tremendous protest meeting in Spain. There's going to be students marching all over Spain in every university in this country if the Spanish government goes through with all of this and you may be able to put a stop to it because you have very close contact with the people now who are influential in the Spanish government." I said, "I haven't said a word to anybody else about this." And he said, "Well, thank you very much."

I knew that he had very close contacts with pro-Franco people. So sure enough it didn't happen. And he came back from the States in about three or four days and at a big meeting of every American in the Embassy. He said something to the effect that there are things that go on here that you may not know about, but there are important things that -- and he mentioned my name, for example, something that Tex and I know about that the rest of you don't. So there are a lot of things that go on and that's all he said about it. But he had stopped it. He had stopped what surely would have been a tragic confrontation between students and Franco forces.

*Q: Well, I think that can be a great achievement on your record?*

EDWARDS: Well, it was because it stopped a lot of young people, I know, a lot of young people from being seriously hurt and many surely killed in Spain.

*Q: Oh, yes. When they put on those protests under the Franco regime their lives were in danger, even the lives of family and friends.*

EDWARDS: I knew professors who were taken out of their classes for no known reason and taken out into the country where they could not be in contact with even a telephone. They weren't put to death the ones that I knew of, but they were completely isolated. Their families didn't know where they were and some of them were gone for as long as six or eight or nine months at a time and the families didn't know whether they were dead or alive.

*Q: No.*

EDWARDS: And this was evidently for just something that they may have said in a classroom. My son had a very good friend named Carlos who wasn't even in protest, he was getting out of class at the University of Barcelona, was walking through just a crowd of young students who had gathered on the sidewalk. Carlos was just trying to get through them, and Spanish guards came up on horses, rode right through them, and beat him over the head until he was unconscious. He was in the hospital for about two weeks and then they put him in confinement and never told him, never told his family what the charges were. He was as innocent as you or I. He was just trying to get through a crowd to get home. It ruined his life. They kept him for two years with no charges. He was a recluse for over two years and then entered training to become a priest. So I know that what Ambassador Hill did could have saved untold suffering in Spain.

*Q: I'm sure!*

EDWARDS: To say nothing of the four young men who were to be tried who, for all anyone knew, were innocent. They had just picked out some people to be tried for the thing. Other than

that there weren't too many things that were of special mention in Madrid. It was a difficult period. And of course, very soon after I left Franco died and it was all over with.

*Q: You left in what year now?*

EDWARDS: I left late in '71.

**DOUGLAS WATSON**  
**General Services Officer**  
**Madrid (1969-1971)**

*Mr. Watson was born and raised in the Washington, D.C. area and was educated at California State University at Los Angeles and Harvard University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1966, he served in a variety of posts throughout the world, including Cairo, Athens, Madrid, Saigon, Quito, Islamabad and Port au-Prince, Haiti, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in the State Department in Washington, on Capitol Hill in the Pearson program and was a member of the US delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1991. Mr. Watson was interviewed by Thomas J. Dunnigan in 2000.*

*Q: In Madrid, what were some of our problems as General Services Officer that took your time and energy?*

WATSON: There was a political appointee as the Ambassador, Robert C. Hill. I never cared for him, nor for his wife, Cecilia. Nor for either of their young boys. Their BMW the boys succeeded in wrecking. Problems? They were mundane, but significant for me. The swimming pool? How do you keep that heated and all the rest of it? After all, the USG installed it. The Chancery building ran on an east-west axis so the south side of the building was always too hot and the north side of the building was always too cold. So, how do you fix that? Just dealing with the ambassador on that simple issue was terribly time consuming. And the Residence was actually a part of the Chancery. I was literally at their beck and call.

Those were interesting times, too, regarding U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. I decided on the heels of the Spain tour to go to Vietnam for a variety of reasons. It was the time of our incursion into Cambodia. While we in Spain were not dealing with Southeast Asia, folks had points of view. I recall Steve Bosworth, at that time the third officer in the Economic Section, taking a forceful and principled position concerning the Cambodia incursion, and was one of several Officers who wrote a petition and brought it to the attention of the Ambassador. I think Steve and his colleagues convinced the Ambassador to receive personally a petition from a significant number of private American citizens, and to meet and reason with them. Steve went on to become a very successful officer, Ambassador to Tunisia, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in ARA, head of Policy Planning, Ambassador to the Philippines during Marcos; downfall; then following retirement names Ambassador to South Korea.

*Q: Did you have any dealings with our military there? There were a lot of them in Spain.*

WATSON: Yes, as a matter of fact, at Torrejon air base, and these were very positive relationships. It was the first time our family had experienced a facility quite like that. The Torrejon facility provided opportunities for embassy people to get together there in an “American” environment, which some people need more than others - English language library, the health unit, the hospital, the clinic, the PX, the school, all of these things. Those were all very positive. We had a good relationship with the airbase.

**BARBARA MERELLO**  
**Director of Binational Center, USIS**  
**Barcelona (1970-1972)**

*Barbara Shelby Merello joined USIA in 1959. Her overseas postings included Brazil, Peru, Spain, Costa Rica, and Argentina. Ms. Merello was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 2000.*

MERELLO: I was a director in Barcelona later, and I wouldn't take anything for those years, a tremendous, wonderful experience - even though Madrid would meddle too often. But that's always true.

*Q: Well, yes.*

MERELLO: There's always the field and headquarters, and my sympathies are always with the field. I used to wish I were an old-fashioned “remittance woman.” They didn't exist, but just pay me to stay out of the country and just leave me alone. I think a lot of us felt that way. We'd like to be at a one-man post where nobody ever visited. Anyway, the Binational Center - it was enormous. It was extremely important in Barcelona. It was the only institution where parents would trust their daughters to come to a dance unchaperoned, and it was an amazing place. There were something like 6,000 students studying English, and there was constant cultural programming. Every day there would be some sort of program. There were former students who stayed on and helped organize these special programs, and it was marvelously exciting. And we celebrated our 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary while I was there, in the 1970s, and I cherish those memories. It was wonderful. And I don't know what's become of them now. They don't have American directors any more because, again, we couldn't afford them. The advantage of having an American director was that occasionally you could get a little money and that you knew what performers were coming, and sometimes you could get an art exhibit. We had art exhibits in the old days, too. Even in Peru we managed to have a few. There was one especially interesting one - or two. One was on weaving. No one has ever exceeded the ancient Peruvians in their weaving. It's just a marvel. No one has ever equaled it. So they're very interested in textiles. And we had some examples of modern weaving, and that was a very interesting one for them. And another one was making jewelry out of - not trash - inexpensive materials. They found that extremely interesting, because all of their jewelry is silver or gold, and they enjoyed this. They enjoyed this idea that you could just pick up a few pieces of something and make something beautiful out of it.

Those are two that I remember especially, that were especially successful. So we had exhibits. We had books. We had libraries. English teaching in those days was very important, and again, now it's not necessary because everyone's teaching English or learning it. But in those days the British had their institutes of British culture, I think they were called - *cultura inglesa*. And we had the Binational Centers, and there were always plenty of students for everyone. In Barcelona we had 50 American teachers, who gave me more trouble than the 5,000 students and everyone else put together. But they were good. They were good teachers, and the students really learned. They learned, I think, more than they do now here. They learned actually to write compositions. They actually learned good English. So that was all very fulfilling.

It was marvelous. I was director of the Binational Center, and the Center had a very distinct place in the community. And Barcelona, again, is a city of very competent people, but also dreamers, all sorts of artists and architects. The architecture in Barcelona is incredible - not only Gaudí, but everything. The turn-of-the-century architecture is magnificent and not like anyplace in the world. Some of it is very bizarre, wonderful. And also I found that the Catalans, unlike almost all the rest of us, will always do more than they promise. If you make a friend in Catalonia it's always a friend. And I had no time or there was no one to teach me Catalan before I left. I wanted to study it. Then after I got there I really had no time to study it systematically, but I got some children's books. At the time, of course, Franco was still in power, and he allowed the intellectuals to have their magazines in Catalan. He was very shrewd. They could read in the café's. They could criticize all they wanted to. They could have their little magazines. But he had forbidden Catalan to be taught in the schools, and they had changed all the street names. So as a result, of course, Catalans all taught their children Catalan. If he told them they had to speak it, they probably would have stopped. Catalans are very stubborn, and I admire them greatly. And they have very good children's books, so I got some of those and I learned a little, but I never was able to learn as much as I would have liked to, but at least a little.

And I was given the great privilege there... Everywhere I went I would try to join a good chorus. I've always loved singing, and this was something I always tried to do, and in Barcelona - Barcelona is a city of choruses, great choruses - they're renowned for that, their music in general. They were the first opera house to present Wagner after Germany. And they have wonderful choruses, and I was privileged to be able to join one directed by a legendary man named Auriol Maturel, and he was something of a hero in Barcelona. He was considered a real one of the Catalan stalwarts, and everyone admired him. And I was in a constant state of panic. I was very much honored, but I was probably the weakest sight-reader in the group, and I was always terrified that I would make some mistake. They were just tolerating me, anyway. But it was very, very exciting. We did great music, and there's nothing quite as... There's an ecstasy in singing great music in a great chorus that's not like anything on earth, I don't think. We sang in the Palau de la Música, which again is a unique building in the world. It was built about 1900, and I can't really describe it. There's no way to describe it except that it's the *art nouveau* style of that time, and a great concert hall. And we sang marvelous things - the *Saint Matthew Passion*, the *Saint John Passion*, the - oh, what were some of the other things? - Stravinsky's *Symphony of Psalms*, and then a Christmas program that I've never forgotten, with children. And I managed to survive it without ever making a serious mistake. I'm very grateful that they allowed me this honor, because it was a privilege. And I felt very much a part of that place, because the center was important to it. I had a good friend who would take me to opera, and the opera in those days in

Barcelona was... I suppose it was like Covent Garden, in a way. There were greengrocers who would be coming in early in the morning. Well, there was club next to it called Le Club du Museo, where people would go and have dinner during the intermission, and some people would never come back, some of the gentlemen especially would just linger there and the ladies would go back to their boxes. The opera would start at 9:30, which was the hour of the *apéritif* and then they would have this long intermission, so you wouldn't actually get out of the opera until one or two in the morning. By that time the greengrocers would be coming in with their vegetables and fruits and so on. And the contrast - and people *really* dressed up. You had to wear a long gown and all your jewels - this contrast of people going to get their cars with these other people coming in was something that, again, has been lost because people started wearing blue jeans and so on. They don't know what they're missing. It was very dressy in those days.

So directing the Center was quite a responsibility, because there was a board of directors, mostly Catalans. The Catalans had actually founded it, but there were always some Americans on the board, long-time residents, really marvelous people. And everything was going very well, and year after year the board of directors would vote not to give social security to the American teachers, which was quite wise of them because they were never going to get it. They would only come for a couple of years, and it would have been a lot of money. And the teachers also would have had to pay something. And so they decided every year they would just take the chance and not do it. However, one year, the accountant came in, white-faced, and said there was a man from the Financial Ministry outside and wanted to see the books. Well, the books were quite well kept. He looked at the books and said, "You haven't been paying social security all these years." (This is Spanish social security, I should say, which, of course, the teachers were never deriving benefit from. That was why the board of directors always voted to take this chance). Well, they got caught, and so they probably would have put us out of business, because the fine would have been enormous, as so many years had gone by. And so finally we were able to work out a deal that we would pay a fine, but it wouldn't be so big, but we had to start paying social security. So that meant that the teachers had to pay some, too, and they rebelled at that. They didn't want to do that. It was quite a nuisance, because it meant that each one of them had to go to various offices and so on, and go through all this. Well, we explained that we couldn't afford to pay it all, that they would have to pay their share of it, and this was the tensest moment that I've lived through, except for the time when the accountant came in in the first place. But that all passed, and I'm not sure what they're doing now. Some of the teachers decided they would stay longer, but I don't think any of them ever reaped the benefits.

**CURTIS C. CUTTER**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1970-1972)**

*Curtis C. Cutter was born in Sacramento, California on October 27, 1928. He attended the University of California at Berkeley and then entered the U.S. Army. Mr. Cutter joined the Foreign Service in 1958 and served in Cambodia, Peru, Brazil, and Spain. He Cutter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

*Q: Continuation of interview: March 3, 1992*

*Curt, we were talking, we had just sent you off to Madrid. You had sort of been in this limbo before because of the State Department. I'm referring to it as a "institution" which really didn't want to deal with you on your potential kidnapping situation. You mentioned that the ambassador in Madrid said, "Okay, come on over." He was a non career ambassador, Robert C. Hill. How come he picked you up to come there? What motivated him and what was he like?*

CUTTER: Well, Robert C. Hill was actually a very interesting person. He had held a number of ambassadorial posts, always in Republican administrations. When the Republicans were out of power, he was always one who spent a lot of time working for the party. So that he was usually rewarded when the party came back into power. He was very conservative but he had a certain admiration for people who would take direct action. I think he saw what I had done in Brazil as something that he could identify with. He was a former football player and really believed in getting out there and being aggressive about things. He was not very sympathetic about the Department's wishy washy attitude about getting me reassigned. I think he just felt, "Hey, here's a guy I'd just like to have on my staff. He's the kind of person I think I could identify with." I think he probably thought I had a more conservative outlook than I did.

I will say for him that one of the most interesting parts of my service in Madrid was actually watching him evolve. During the year and a half I was there he went from being unalterably opposed to having any contact with the emerging opposition in Spain to a much more open attitude. Several of us in the Embassy finally brought him around to the point of view that these are people that are going to have to be dealt with and that it was important for the U. S. ambassador to hear their point of view. We began to organize little groups here and there, where he would drop in and sit down and listen and have an exchange with the left about what was concerning them and what was actually going on behind the scenes in Spanish politics. He didn't want to do it openly. That might have looked as if he was challenging Franco and the administration. But he was quite willing to do it quietly. As a result of these encounters and, as a result of his growing disenchantment with the Nixon White House by the way, he was quite willing to listen and, I think, changed his positions on a number of issues fairly substantially before he finally left Spain.

*Q: Well, why would he be disenchanted with the Nixon White House? This is very early Nixon. We're talking about 1969-70. Nixon just came into office in..*

CUTTER: No, actually we're talking about 1970, 1971, and 1972.

*Q: Oh.*

CUTTER: He had actually spent a lot of time, working closely with Nixon when Nixon was not in office. During the years when Goldwater ran for the Presidency...Nixon, to get himself back in the good graces of the party, went out and campaigned very rigorously for Goldwater around the country. Hill was his aide de camp. Went around with him, sort of ran the headquarters while Nixon was out on the stump every day, was there waiting for him when he came in in the evenings. This process, this close association with Nixon was a very disagreeable experience for



Hill, I think. Hill was a man who came from a rather patrician background in New England. To watch Nixon operate who he really felt was basically a vulgarian in many ways was a shocker for him. He always told the anecdote that one of his main jobs was always to have a drink and a dirty story ready for Nixon when he came back from a day's campaigning. And the dirtier the story, the more scabrous the story, the better Nixon liked it. He'd just sort of sit down and lap it up. After a little while this grew very thin for Hill. He had to find a new, dirty story every day and tell it to Nixon. And furthermore, he wasn't a person who liked that sort of thing. He just found the man personally somewhat repugnant.

Then he began to hear rumors through his friends in the White House, people like Finch and Rumsfeld who eventually left the White House who were also not comfortable with what was happening in the Nixon White House, with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. They paid a visit to Spain. I was their control officer, but they spent a lot of time with the Ambassador and a number of us and were planning to leave government because they were not happy with what was going on in the White House. The enemies list, and all of this kind of thing that they mentioned specifically. As a result, Hill was moving away from the administration--quietly, but making very disparaging remarks in private about what was going on in Washington. Well, that basically sums it up, I think.

*Q: Well, you as a political officer...*

CUTTER: Right.

*Q: What was the political situation? Let's sort of break this into two parts. There is Seville, but we're talking about Madrid. You were in Madrid from when to when?*

CUTTER: I was there from August, 1970, until January, 1972.

*Q: What was the political situation like, from our eyes?*

CUTTER: Well, it was the waning years of the Franco administration, when you had what they called the "Opus Government."

*Q: You mean "Opus Dei?"*

CUTTER: That's right. Several of the ministers, including both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Planning and Economy, Lopez Bravo and Lopez Portillo, were members of the "Opus Dei." One was actually a celibate member. Lopez Portillo was a lay person but he was actually living in an Opus home, a residence.

*Q: You might explain what Opus Dei was.*

CUTTER: Opus Dei is a religious movement started in Spain, which is fairly conservative in its outlook. It believes in education and training and hard work as the ways to get ahead in life. It is very conservative in its religious doctrine. It was responsible for building, perhaps, the best private university in Spain, a university which is very much focused on business-oriented kinds

of training in Pamplona. It sponsors schools all over the country and has expanded into an international movement now. Opus is very active in Latin America and has had some influence in the rest of Europe. It tends to draw on people who are very concerned about the directions that society is taking and want to take some action to improve society, but improve it in a conservative direction. So it gets very dedicated followers, usually fairly comfortable, in many cases wealthy followers. But its people who do have a conscience, a conscience of a particular kind, but they do have a conscience.

*Q: Well, how was this manifesting itself in the Spanish context?*

CUTTER: Well, what it brought to power then in the so-called "Opus cabinet" were technocrats, people who believed that Spain could be modernized through a series of planning moves. In other words you would, by organizing economic development in a certain way, bring about conservative economic change, but with a philosophy that "rising tides lift all boats." The way they attacked it was, as they called it, "mortgaging the coast." They opened up the coastal areas of Spain to rapid development, usually by foreign investors, focusing on the tourist trade. And they used the foreign exchange that was being earned by the coastal development to invest in infrastructure development in the interior of Spain that foreigners were less interested in, building new roads, investing in plant, building infrastructure in towns and villages, so that foreign investors would come in. Of course, in Franco Spain there was a tremendous amount of state-owned industry. Monies were pumped into that to modernize them and to move the economy along. What you had was a very dynamic government under an aging dictator. Actually, the average age of the cabinet under Franco during his last years was the lowest in Europe--about 42 years of age, as I remember. You had very young, very dynamic people in office--dynamic, in a conservative sense. They weren't people who were greatly concerned...Well, that's not, that wouldn't be accurate. They had a social conscience, but their view was that if the top prospered...It was very much like the Reagan approach to economics in this country.

*Q: Called "trickle down."*

CUTTER: Right, "trickle down" economics. If you could get the industrial and entrepreneurial sectors of Spain moving and going and get investment at that level, eventually it would lift everybody.

*Q: Well, of course, there too, unlike the United States, things had really stagnated for a long period of time.*

CUTTER: They had stagnated. Yes, of course they had stagnated during the war period. And in the post-war period Spain was isolated by actions of the allied powers. So it was very difficult for it to develop then. The real boost came when Western Europe began to prosper and you began to have tourism, which could take advantage of this phenomenon I had described earlier. As they came to Spain and the foreign currency started coming in. The other thing, the other aspect of Spanish development in this period was, of course, the fact that with Western Europe booming, lots of Spanish laborers were able to go north to find jobs. And that meant that there were substantial remittances coming back to Spain. So the two flows of capital towards Spain were coming at a very propitious time. You had an aggressively, pro-development government in

power. You had lots of foreign exchange flowing into the country through tourism, and you had a lot of foreign exchange flowing into the country through remittances from Spanish laborers. The combination began to develop sort of a critical mass in terms of development in Spain. You begin to have this very positive investment in the infrastructure and in industrial development.

*Q: Well, I know that I was in Greece at the time, and one of the things that was debated a lot was, "My God, we can't go the Spanish route because they have sold away their birthright." The entire coast was considered a German enclave. The talk was that the Germans brought all their salami and all and sort of froze the Spanish out. They lost their coastline without an awful lot of gain from it. How was that perceived in Spain at that time?*

CUTTER: Well, I think that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Spain now is, I think, a developed country by almost all measurements. They took themselves from very serious underdevelopment to where now Spain is literally booming. Although there are still some structural problems of unemployment, especially in the South, Spain, I think, is miles ahead of most of the other countries on the periphery of Europe. The approach, certainly in the long run, has proved to have been a good one. But, they'll never be able to unbury the coast. It is buried in tons of concrete, and very ugly development in many cases. So they can't undo that. But the rest of Spain has very definitely prospered, as a result.

Now the other thing that was very important was that this Opus group, while conservative, was extremely honest. They were very dedicated and extremely honest people, so that there wasn't corruption. Franco himself, actually, was a fairly incorruptible kind of person. The structure of the government was an honest one. Nobody was ripping it off, while this development was going on. It was really being turned around and put back into the society.

*Q: Now, again, we're trying to go back to this time. In the Political Section how did you see what American interests were there and how did we pursue those?*

CUTTER: When I arrived in August of 1970, the base agreements were the big issue between Spain and the United States. The major negotiations on the base agreements were already completed. What was being negotiated, when I got there, was the Status of Forces agreements, which were subsidiary to the main agreement. Status of Forces agreements are agreements which govern the way your forces will be treated by the domestic power, when they are stationed in that country. I spent the first eight months I was there, working on the base agreements. I practically never went to the Embassy. I went to the Ministry of Defense, where we were having these meetings. The biggest issue was the amount of extraterritoriality we would have, and how many benefits our military would receive which the average Spaniard could not receive. In other words, import privileges for vehicles and food for the commissaries and extraterritorial rights on the bases, freedom from being hassled by the Spanish police and being subjected only to U. S. military policemen, and things of that kind. That was the big issue that was at stake: how far these rights should go.

It was fairly clear to me at the time that, while the Spanish military were willing to go along with us, and were actually going to be the dominating force in the negotiations, the people from the Foreign Ministry were very unhappy. They felt that the long term effect of this was going to be

very negative. Their reading of the situation was that the Spanish people already were becoming annoyed with the special privileges that American servicemen had, especially as Torrejon Air Base was right there in Madrid, the capital city. Spaniards of all walks of life could see the Americans with all kinds of special privileges--special stores they could shop in, goods that were not available for the Spaniards, cheap gas, all kinds of things, so that they could drive their big gas guzzlers along the small Spanish roads. These were all things that were very irritating to the average person in Spain. The Spaniards were very definitely pushing. What they would have liked on the Foreign Ministry side was to close down Torrejon and to limit severely these extraterritorial rights that the American servicemen had. But, as I say, they were overridden by the military. Franco went along with the military, so that we got our way on almost every issue. We got our way, but I was convinced that, down the road, we'd have to pay the price for it. One of the reasons that the Torrejon was finally closed and we were forced out of our facilities in Spain went back to these negotiations in the early 1970's.

*Q: Well, did you find...In other interviews I've done, dealing with other base agreements, one of the dynamics in this was that...It's been said that the military--and I'm talking about the American Department of Defense--legal side has no appreciation or had no appreciation of the situation abroad. And that they wanted everything that they could possibly get with no "give" at all. So often the negotiation was really not with the Spaniards or the Portuguese or what have you, but with the Department of Defense legal side. Did you find this?*

CUTTER: Well, any time you proposed backing off on our demands in these areas the Defense Department closed in very quickly and would say, "No, no way." There was no appreciation of the domestic impact as far as the military negotiators went. There was the occasional officer who could understand the argument if you made it that in the long run, you were doing yourself a disservice by pushing for more than the Spaniards really wanted to give. I think that a certain arrogance had grown up, that what we want, we should get, because we were there, defending Western Europe. Certainly, there was the feeling at this point in Spain that Franco would back us in our demands and that the political authorities in Spain were not necessarily to be listened to because, in the final analysis, we would get a decision from on high which would back whatever position we wanted. Very short-sighted.

*Q: Well, was there unease on your part and on others about how we were pushing?*

CUTTER: It comes down to a personal prejudice on my part. I've never been in favor of us having special privileges. I'm not in favor, in fact, of Embassy commissaries. I think that if you have an international commissary for the Diplomatic Corps, I've always felt that Americans should take advantage of that and not have their special privileges. I think it creates a kind of ghetto mentality in people when they can trot down and do all their shopping in the basement of an Embassy or on a military base. It separates you from the people you're supposed to be learning about. Frankly, I've never had much sympathy with this anyway, so I found myself very uneasy, defending these kinds of privileges. It was my job to do it, and I did it, but I felt very uneasy doing it. I found myself very often sympathizing with my Spanish colleagues from the Foreign Ministry, who told me quite frankly, "Look, you'll win this time on any point you want to take on, but in the long run, you're going to lose, because Spain is not moving in that direction."

*Q: Well, then, how did you perceive the political situation? Again, both you- -your instructions from the desk and EUR [Bureau of European Affairs]--how was this falling out at that time?*

CUTTER: The career Foreign Service, as represented by the desk and the people at the political level in the Embassy, was definitely looking to the transition. We were looking ahead. We all knew that Franco was not immortal, although he seemed to think he was. A good joke at the time was about Franco in the hospital. His wife was with him, and a big crowd gathered outside. They were saying something outside, and Franco said to his wife, "What is that they're saying?" She answered, "They're saying, 'Adios, Caudillo.'" He said, "But where are they all going?" But everybody knew that the regime was coming to an end and that something was going to replace it. Nobody was clear about what it was, but it would obviously be something to the Left of the situation that existed. Consequently, there was a move on the part of the professionals in the Embassy to get out and get to know the people that might very possibly be part of this change. As I say, we had some luck in bringing the ambassador around to this position, too. So that our reporting was pretty good, I think, during that period, in terms of reflecting what was going on.

What I think was underappreciated by the Embassy was the influence of the Socialists, because the Socialist Party's base was mainly in the South. Andalusia had a very strong role, a very dominating role, actually, in the Spanish Socialist Party. It was not very well represented in the Madrid area. So what you found was that the Embassy was talking to a lot of the old school socialists who really were not any longer the true spokesmen for socialist thought in Spain. But that was all right, because basically they were echoing a lot of the same views.

There was also, of course, this whole group of people, supporters of the Opus Dei position. They were not Fascists. They were conservatives of a different ilk--Christian conservatives who were looking to change Spain in another way. And to move it ahead in terms of development but development from the top down, and not from the bottom up. And we had very good contacts with those people, of course, too. People represented by Fraga and Suarez-- people of that kind who were going to play a very important role in the transition period.

*Q: Well, did you have any trouble from, say, the Franco regime in reaching out and talking to other people? Were there protests?*

CUTTER: I remember my first--I had just come from Brazil, as you recall. And in Brazil you were very cautious in contacting anybody from the Left, because the government was violently opposed to it. It would have been looked on as a very, very serious step if you made overt contact with people from the Left. The first business lunch I went to in Madrid with another fellow in the Political Section--we went to a very crowded restaurant near the Embassy, meaning crowded with Spaniards, and met with two people from the Left in Spain.

*Q: That would mean, what? The Socialist Party?*

CUTTER: The Socialist Party--Tierno Galvan's group from the Socialist Party. We met with them. They were talking in fairly loud voices about when we get rid of Franco, when this country begins to change, and all that kind of thing. I was looking around, kind of wondering when the

secret police would...Because, you know, I had the same impression that everybody does of a dictatorship and the secret police were probably everywhere, and these guys were going to be snatched away from our table and carried off right in front of our eyes if they continued talking this way. But I looked around, and nobody was paying any attention. They didn't seem to have any fears at all.

Of course, I learned that Spain really was in transition. Although, at an official level, it wasn't changing, at every other level, it was. Everybody was aware of the fact that soon, things would be quite different. The minute Franco died, there was going to be fairly radical change. The truth of the matter is that the government was not very active in trying to close down this kind of discussion. The government was quite willing to let this take place, as long as it was at a non official level and didn't directly attack Franco or in writing.

*Q: How did you view the Spanish political spectrum? I speak as an absolute non knowledgeable person on this. I remember reading, I guess it was Hugh Thomas' book, "The Spanish Civil War." I've never seen such a fragmented group of people, everybody hating each other and all this. I mean, how did you feel this thing was going to come out? Were they going to work together or were they going to go back to the old mold that caused the Spanish Civil War and actually the rather reluctant appearance of Franco? And, you know, to cut out this nonsense?*

CUTTER: That was the big debate. In a sense Spanish politics were frozen in 1936, and the perceptions many people had of Spain in the 1970's were that everything had been forced underground and frozen, so that probably the strongest groups were really the Communists and the Anarchists. The Socialists were probably somewhat less strong, and then you probably had a very strong Nationalist, arch conservative bloc. I think that's basically how Spain had split up during the last democratic elections, which were in the 1930's. So the debate, really, a lot of the debate, focused on post-Franco planning...And when you talked with politicians, military, or almost anyone in Spain about what was going to happen in post-Franco Spain, the debate really would turn around what will the strength of the communists be? You know, if we really had free and open elections, won't the communists be able to take over again? Won't we find ourselves right back in the same situation we were in back in the 1930's? In many respects the whole debate was over what the strength of the far Left was. If you're going to have elections, how are you going to organize those elections either so that the Left can participate or so that the Left, the far Left, can be excluded. What are the merits of the two cases? Should you allow the Left to participate and have more legitimacy in the process but with the possible danger of having a communist or a very far Left government come to power that way? Or should you try and restrict their access and bring about what would be, in effect, a transition government which would allow semi-open elections but would exclude certain elements? Generally, the military favored excluding the Left from the elections. But wiser heads, I think, were saying, look, these people have lost influence over the last 20 or 30 years, and they're not really as much of a force or a threat in this country as the military, or the United States feared. There were many in the U. S. who, I think, would have favored the military's position that the Left should be excluded in the elections. I think that most of us in the Embassy were pretty convinced that open elections would undoubtedly bring a more liberal government to power, but that it would not be a runaway election in the hands of the far Left. And, as a matter of fact, that's the way it turned out.

*Q: Did you have any contact with the anarchists, the communists, or...*

CUTTER: Santiago Carillo was the old leader of the communist bloc, and he had been slipping in and out of Spain, clandestinely, for years. He was more or less resident in Spain, even in the last years of Franco. Everybody turned their head away. We had contact with those people. We did. We knew younger members especially in the South, when I was in Seville. I had a lot of contact with people from that element of Spanish politics. There's a Spanish saying that there were "cuatro gatos"--just four cats. You could tell, almost, that they had lost contact with mass thought in Spain.

*Q: As we saw at the time, there were two models in Europe. One was the Italian model and one was the French model. The French model was absolute subservience to the Soviets. The Italian model was that they couldn't care less. I mean, they went their own way, and they were much more nationalist--let's get along and, well, respectable communists.*

CUTTER: You had two forces at work on the Left in Spain. One grew out of a sense of gratitude that continued into modern Spain for the role of the Soviet Union during the Civil War. The Soviets were the ones who really stepped forward and gave substantial support to the republic. So you had a sense of gratitude by the left towards the Soviet Union for that. On the other hand, Spaniards are never subservient to anybody. There's a strain of independence in Spaniards that doesn't allow them to kowtow. Though Santiago Carillo had always had very active support from the Kremlin, he was very much of a Spaniard first. This was pretty obvious, even when open, free elections started in Spain, that he was not going to be a slavish follower of the Kremlin's line.

*Q: Well, were you getting a feeling, while you were at the Embassy, and you might even have carried this over when you went to Seville about the influence, say, of Henry Kissinger, who was, most of the time, national security adviser, and he was in sort of direct conflict with William Rogers, the Secretary of State. Kissinger seemed to be calling the shots. So we had this idea of everything being in an East-West context. Did you have a feel of where Spain was fitting in, or not, or was this just a sideshow?*

CUTTER: Well, there's no question, I think, that policymakers in Washington were comfortable with Franco's government in Spain. It wasn't a problem for them. You didn't have to worry as long as Franco was in power in Spain--you didn't have to worry about where Spain was going to go, in this whole East-West conflict. Of course, it made people uneasy to think of what might happen in the post-Franco years. Certainly, in that respect, Spain was looked on, I guess, as a sideshow in many respects, because people weren't worried about it, in the short run.

**ROBERT W. ZIMMERMANN**  
**Consul General**  
**Barcelona (1970-1974)**

*Robert W. Zimmermann was Born in Chicago, Illinois and was raised in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He received a degree in economics and political science*

*from the University of Minnesota. He graduated from Harvard Business School in 1942. In 1947, after Serving in the U.S. Navy during World War II, Mr. Zimmermann entered the Foreign Service. He served in Washington, DC, Peru, Thailand, The United Kingdom (England), and Spain. Mr. Zimmermann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

*Q: You were Consul General in Barcelona from 1970-74. What was the situation in Barcelona? How different was it from Madrid?*

ZIMMERMANN: Well, let's remember that this is the end of the Franco regime. Franco died just a little over a year after we left. One of my ambitions in Spain was to be there when that transition took place, having spent that much time in Spain. But I never succeeded.

The situation was that the conditions had loosened considerably, certainly economically, and even to some extent, politically. It had been a gradual thing over the years. There were still hardliners, Franco supporters, in Barcelona, but they were not as evident as they were at an earlier period in Barcelona. The Catalan Separatists were still noticeable. This was an intellectual thing more than a strong emotional thing. There were a few evidences of physical violence once in a while, but not like in the Basque area.

The US was quite welcome, I think, always. The Sixth Fleet was in there all the time. There were the usual relatively minor problems with the Sixth Fleet when all the sailors came ashore. But on the whole they were welcomed.

It was a period, perhaps, of declining importance for Catalonia economically. A lot of their industry, textiles specifically, had become very antiquated and needed a great deal of modernization...I am not sure it has ever taken place. Publishing was going very well. It was one of the great publishing centers of the Latin speaking world.

The people were rather different, I think. And we were in a good position to observe because, after all, we had had six years in Madrid and then many connections and friends in Catalonia.

One small example of a difference. People at a large cocktail party in Madrid would say, "Oh, you must come out to our finca for the weekend. We will be in touch." You never hear from them again. In Catalonia they call the next day and say, "When is it convenient to come out." They really want you. There is a great difference in approach there. Both of them were very friendly and very nice. Perhaps it was a little harder with our background in Madrid to get to know the Catalans well, but once we did they were very good and very loyal friends. My wife goes back now and some of those friends continue to pick her up at the airport. My oldest son married a girl from Barcelona although it wasn't until after we were back here.

It was also interesting, and perhaps untypical from a Consul General's point of view that successive ambassadors in Madrid, I believe, recognized my long experience in Spain. Therefore I had a relatively free hand in my methods of operation in Barcelona. I was very careful to keep them informed, of course, of everything that was going on.



There was a very active binational center in Barcelona which was very useful. But also, the Sixth Fleet was a great tool because it brought in a great show band which at that point was at its zenith under Admiral Miller which led to an interesting incident, if you are interested. It also was a great forum for entertaining all the provincial governors and military governors in my district. When a Fleet carrier was in, it would go out in the Mediterranean and mount exercises to which we could invite the officials. We would invite the Ambassador or the DCM from the Embassy to come up as well. These were highly successful events. They kept us in very close touch with the military authorities in the Barcelona district as well as the civil officials.

The one incident I started to refer to earlier was that the show band was such a good thing that the Admiral of the Sixth Fleet would want to mount a performance every time the Fleet came to Barcelona, which was about every three months. That was great the first couple of times. But after that even Barcelona got a little saturated and also it was hard to find halls because the Navy could not charge admission, and most halls wanted to charge us for the use of it.

Earlier we had a little incident involving one of the big helicopter carriers that had come in from Vietnam. The Marines all...this was about Christmas...decided to go skiing in Andorra, which was in my consular district. It was not under the Embassy. I was the only one who had real official access to Andorra, although I didn't even have an exequatur because of the conflict between the two "princes." Anyway, many of the Marines had never been on skis before and kept cracking themselves up by skiing into boulders and that sort of thing. There also was substantial damage to one of the hotels there, which created a bit of a problem for us.

I had an excellent admin officer at that time so we avoided the regulations saying any claims over a certain amount had to be referred to Washington but by breaking down every claim below that amount we paid them off in small sums avoiding delays of several years. Nevertheless the end result was that we owed a certain debt to the Andorran people in principle, PR.

Some time later the Department sent me a very thin, little silk Andorra flag that had been carried by one of the Apollo missions to the moon with instructions to present it to the people of Andorra on a suitable occasion. So on the next occasion the 6th Fleet show band scheduled a visit to Barcelona, I suggested taking the band to Andorra for a needed PR effect while at the same time presenting the Andorran flag that had been to the moon. The event was a tremendous success, although the French government became upset and even tried to stop the performance because I didn't (nor did the representatives of other countries) have an exequatur signed by the French co-prince of Andorra (i.e. the President of France). By the same token, there were no exequaturs signed by the Spanish co-prince (i.e. the Bishop of Leo de Urgel) either. But the show went on.

**ROBERT C. AMERSON**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1971-1973)**

*Robert C. Amerson joined USIA in 1955. He served in Venezuela, Italy, Colombia, Spain, and in Washington, DC with both USIS and the State Department. Mr. Amerson was interviewed by Allen Hansen in 1988.*

*Q: Your next overseas assignment was to Madrid as Director of USIA programs in Spain. Can you tell us about that?*

AMERSON: Well, anyone who's learned Spanish and lived in Latin America a lot welcomes the notion of returning to the "mother country." I had visited Spain years before on a private basis. So the idea of returning to live at the source of Latin America's Latin culture, Spanish-speaking Latin America, was a very satisfying thing. But those who assume that going to Spain is like going to another country in Latin America make a serious error, as you well know.

Spain is European, it's Arabic, it's Spanish -- Mediterranean, not Western Hemisphere, not Latin America. And it's not a little underdeveloped country even though it is behind in economic development compared to much of Western Europe. So Spain and Spanish culture are unique. And the Spanish position in the western hemisphere, in the European and NATO context, is also different as we're seeing these days with more nationalism being exerted there and U.S. planes being asked to leave.

My time there fell in what were expected to be "the last years of Franco." And, of course, there were interesting times because you'd never know from one day to the next how much longer the old man would last and what would happen when he disappeared. Can I tell a Spanish joke?

*Q: Sure, that would be great.*

AMERSON: Political humor is always worth citing, I suppose, and this one provides a little bit of insight. It has to do with Franco, 90 some years old, doddering and weak and lying in what was generally assumed to be his deathbed. And the great crowds of Falangistas and other Franco supporters were outside his window sensing that the grand old man was about to die. And after 35 years of Spanish rule they wanted to pay their last homage to this venerated leader, the Caudillo. And, so outside his palace they were shouting "O Franco, adios Franco, adios!" And Franco up in his room, pale as the sheets he's lying between, raises himself up on one elbow and says, "Adios, adios? They are telling me adios. Where are they going?"

He in fact lasted another couple of years and it fell to my successor, my old pal George Rylance, as PAO to observe Spain's transition from dictatorship to democracy. But Spain was very richly rewarding as a place to be, for many reasons -- including its diversity of cultures -- I have long been a fan of flamenco music and Spanish folklore.

*Q: And the American military bases were then in full swing, weren't they?*

AMERSON: Yes, fully operational. And in the Franco years the U.S.-Spain military agreement was renewed periodically without much controversy, publicly. There was always concern on the part of the USA as to how long it would last, obviously. Spain provided an important strategic or logistical piece of geography -- as you know in Spain the sun shines and you can fly airplanes

when you can't in northern Europe, as regards Western defense strategy. And the submarine base at Rota on the southern coast, near the Mediterranean's choke point off Gibraltar, was terribly important from the strategic point of view.

*Q: So USIS had programs related to the bases agreement, didn't it?*

AMERSON: Some, yes, but never very much emphasis. We tried to avoid controversy. We had a good cultural center in Madrid, did a lot with the library and exchange program as well. And we never got very political in our output, as such -- though I might add that our CAO, Lee Johnson, had established some of the best political contacts possible with opposition figures especially around the universities. I'd hoped to see more of this develop during a second two-year tour there, but this was interrupted by a phone call from our Agency personnel director, Mosley, saying -- this is the segue into our next chapter I suppose -- saying, we're going to need somebody who speaks Italian to go back to Italy. I had mixed feelings about that. And my wife certainly did. Our two kids in school, the idea of moving every two years, and all that.

**DAVID E. SIMCOX**  
**Political-Military Officer**  
**Madrid (1972-1975)**

*David E. Simcox was born on November 25, 1932 in Frankfort, Kentucky. He received his BA from the University of Kentucky in 1956. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 and has served in many countries throughout his career including Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Ghana, Spain, Brazil, and El Salvador. Mr. Simcox was interviewed by Kristin Hamblin on August 26, 1993.*

*Q: Then, from September, 1972, to September, 1975, you were assigned as politico-military officer and as the counselor for political affairs at the American Embassy in Madrid. How were these two positions different?*

SIMCOX: I went to Madrid as politico-military officer, as we have a number of Naval and Air bases there. Much of our diplomatic interaction with the Spanish involved military matters, so that we had a full-time position for that. The politico-military officer is accountable for all of these problems, and he also sits as an ex officio member--or he did then--of the Joint U. S.-Spanish Joint Military Commission, which had one general officer from each of the countries and one civilian. It was really an interesting job. We had been involved in those bases since the 1950's. The Franco regime was still in the saddle and still pretty much in control, but everyone saw the end coming. So nationalistic attitudes among the Spanish about the bases and about Spanish rights at the bases were becoming more prevalent. Public opinion was beginning to matter more noticeably in Spain.

So when I left that job and moved up to become political counselor, many of my activities also involved the whole military relationship with Spain. But there were other things happening in Spain at that time that made it very interesting. One aspect was the approaching end of the

Franco regime: what would happen; would Spain become more democratic; what should be the United States role. The issue of human rights in foreign policy had just begun to surface. This was creating new pressures on us to take positions on Spain that, in the process, we had never taken before. We had pretty much refrained from questioning Franco's behavior internally. We began to take a more skeptical and more pro-democracy attitude toward the Spanish Government on human rights practices. There were two things in Spain's own foreign policy that had a lot of significance for the United States.

One aspect was the beginning of the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara, part of which is now included in one of the countries of Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario guerrillas were beginning their first campaign to try to drive out the Spanish. The Moroccans were starting their efforts to try to pick up pieces of the Spanish Sahara. Spanish rule ended peacefully, and this was all tied up with the politics of the Arab world. So it was an interesting process. Spain also, as you may remember, or whoever reads this interview may remember, simply let the Spanish Sahara go, under the aegis of the United Nations [UN]. Much of the territory was absorbed by Morocco. The Polisario guerrillas are still fighting to gain control of much of it.

The other aspect was the beginning of Basque terrorism in Spain. There had been a very strong Basque nationalist movement before then. It shouldn't have caught us by surprise that this movement would have such intensity and display such skills in terms of terrorism, in all of its dimensions. Probably the most important development during my tour in Spain was the day that Basque terrorists, known internationally as the ETA (initials standing for the Basque term, "Euzkadi Ta Akatasuna," meaning Basque Fatherland and Liberty) mined a street two blocks from the Embassy that the Prime Minister drove over every day on his way to Mass. They waited for him to pass and detonated the mine just as his car passed over the spot and assassinated him. This was Prime Minister Admiral Carrero Blanco. The assassination of Carrero Blanco, in many ways, hastened the process of change in the Franco administration.

*Q: When Spain executed five, convicted terrorists--I think this was in 1975--a number of allies condemned this. As you say, we had a big human rights movement active at the time. We were trying to renew our military bases arrangement in Spain. Secretary of State Kissinger was in Spain at the time, I think. How did the U. S. react to those executions and how did it affect our relationship with our allies?*

SIMCOX: As far as our relationship with our allies was concerned, there was some strain with the Western European countries, particularly the Scandinavian countries and, to some extent, Britain and the Netherlands, due to the fact that we had such close contacts with Spain. In their view, Franco was a fascist and a virtual fellow traveler of Adolf Hitler. He led a fascist movement in Spain, overthrew a republican government back in the 1930's, and allegedly conducted mass extermination campaigns. Those European countries were never comfortable with the idea of our being "in bed" with Franco. For these reasons Spain was not admitted to NATO all of those years, even though the bases in Spain contributed to the NATO effort. So while we became more familiar with human rights concerns, I think I had left Spain by the time those particular executions took place. But it seems to me that one interesting sideline was the fact that the Department of State was more concerned about the appearances of these executions. The reason was that Spain still used the garrote to execute criminals, which is a process where

you strangle a person to death by tightening a wire around his neck. I recall getting instructions from Washington to find out how garroting actually works, what is the degree of pain and suffering, and how long it takes someone to die who is garroted. So I sent in a little report on that, including some pictures I found. The Spanish were always saying that this was one of the most humane forms of execution--far more humane than hanging, since death comes more quickly.

*Q: How did you find working under Ambassador Horacio Rivero?*

SIMCOX: Well, he was my favorite. He was a Navy admiral, and I had high regard for him. We got along very well. He gave me a lot of leeway to do my job, such as when it looked as if there might be a war in North Africa between Algeria and Morocco over the Spanish Sahara. We were deeply involved in that together. So I think that he was a good choice to be a chief of mission. He spoke Spanish perfectly, of course, as he was Puerto Rican by origin.

**CURTIS C. CUTTER**  
**Consul General**  
**Seville (1972-1975)**

*Curtis C. Cutter was born in Sacramento, California on October 27, 1928. He attended the University of California at Berkeley and then entered the U.S. Army. Mr. Cutter joined the Foreign Service in 1958 and served in Cambodia, Peru, Brazil, and Spain. He Cutter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

*Q: Well, then, you went to Seville as, what, consul general? You were there, then, from 1972 to 1975? Could you describe sort of where Seville--I'm not giving the Spanish pronunciation but I'll give it the Americanized pronunciation--where it fit into the Spanish context, as a place. And then within the Embassy-Consulate relationship.*

CUTTER: Andalusia was the forgotten area of Spain. The South, the poorest area, it's sort of the natural capital of the South, of Andalusia. It's located fairly near the Straits of Gibraltar, about 90 miles North of the Straits of Gibraltar. So, as the Spaniards themselves who live there always say, "We're from the North of Africa" because it's really--in many respects--closer to Africa than it is to Madrid. It had always been the forgotten area. It's primarily an agricultural area, high unemployment, because there wasn't enough employment on the land, a great exporter of labor during the boom years in Northern Europe.

*Q: Even during the colonial period it was the where the conquistadors and...*

CUTTER: They all left from there. So it's always been a kind of forgotten part of Spain. It's always been a very radical part of Spain. The communists had very strong influence during the republic in the South, and the socialists are very strong in that area. Under the surface it's a very radical area. On the surface, of course, it was controlled by latifundistas, by a few families that owned enormous extensions of land, a small, upper class which had controlled this life for generations, except during the period of the republic. Although those people were dislodged

from their positions of power during the republic, once Franco took power, they quickly reassumed their position in society. You had, on the surface, and at the top in Southern Spain, a very conservative element controlling the situation, but a potential for rather radical change, once the iron hand would be taken off. Very few people were ever chosen from the South to be a part of the government in Madrid. Most of the people who ran Spain during all of the Franco years were from Castilla--the area around Madrid--or from the North or from Catalonia--the area around Barcelona--and the Basque country, around San Sebastian. The South was basically forgotten, both in terms of programs and in terms of personnel. People were just not pulled up to Madrid to represent the South. So it was an area where there were a lot of festering problems to be resolved.

*Q: Well, did you have a problem with the Embassy? I speak with some experience. I was consul general in Naples, which is in the Mezzogiorno, the South of Italy. And I found that there was a real prejudice against the South within the Italian community, and it permeated even to the Embassy. You tended to dismiss anything from the South. Did you find yourself having to stand up, within the Embassy for the southerner and southern interests or not?*

CUTTER: Oh, very definitely, there was very little concern about what was happening in the South. The major interest of the U. S. Government in the South was that we had two major bases there. We had an Air Force base in Moron de la Frontera and we had a big naval base at Rota. And, looking at the job from the consular point of view, we had over 30,000 Americans retired and living in the South of Spain. There was an enormous, consular burden in the South. The post was looked on by Madrid as a post primarily for servicing American interests there. The Embassy was only marginally interested in our political and economic reporting in the South, because they felt that things were really happening in Madrid and the North. The South, in this view, was a backwater.

*Q: Well, again, I'm going back to the Italian context. I found that in Rome they would see the focus on any minute change within a cabinet. You know, the Italian situation is such that nothing really changes, except some personnel. Getting terribly involved in the capital and not having a feeling for the country as a whole. Once you got outside, did you find, did your perspective change?*

CUTTER: Well, my perspective certainly changed. I'm not too sure, although we did a lot of reporting from the South, I'm not too sure that the Embassy's perspective necessarily changed. The fact that the government that's now governed Spain for almost all of the last 20 years came from the South was a horrible shock to everybody who, in those days, was operating in Madrid. I talked to my old colleagues who were in Madrid at the time. They paid no attention to the names we were naming as future, possible leaders from the South. This seemed like a fantasy.

*Q: That same thing, I think, was replicated in Turkey. Bob Dillon said that he was a fairly junior officer and was the only one who knew these people coming from basically southern and coastal Turkey. It is one of the problems that embassies run into. They become the captive of the capital.*

CUTTER: That's right, and they go to all the same cocktail parties, talk to all the same people. You have these political celebrities that move around. And they become the conduit to the

country, in many respects. I will say that when Hill left, he was replaced by an Admiral, Horacio Rivero, former vice chief of naval operations of the Navy, a man of Puerto Rican background. Spoke Spanish fluently. Rivero made it his job to visit every one of the provinces of Spain while he was ambassador. So a little bit of the insularity of the Embassy was modified by his approach. He spent a lot more time in the South than any other ambassador had. He came and stayed with me on numerous occasions. He liked it down there. He felt this was the real Spain and made a big effort to get to know the authorities and probably listened to what we had to say, reporting out of Sevilla, more than anybody else had for many years. So, in that respect, my job was a little bit easier.

*Q: Well, how about your contacts with the emerging, political leaders that were coming from the South, their interest in America?*

CUTTER: I can kind of sum that up. The official establishment in the South really didn't want you to have contact with the Left. So, when I arrived there, I tried to focus on what my job really was. I knew that my primary function there was to take care of American interests. No question about that. I couldn't jeopardize our relations in the South because of the bases and because of all the Americans living there by being too aggressive in reaching out to other sectors in Spanish society. So what I tried to do, during my first six or eight months or even the first year in Sevilla, was to cement my relationships with the authorities--the military, the governor-general, the governors, and all those kinds of people--on whom I had to rely to get my job done. But I asked my staff to begin to start fanning out and building contacts. Fortunately, I had a couple of very bright, young officers working for me, who were not totally satisfied doing just visa work. I organized the work load of the Consulate so that they could have time to go out, make contact with student groups, make contact with labor groups--do that kind of thing, while I kept up the facade of total dependence on the old establishment. But after a while, I felt that I had to start reaching out to other sectors, as well. One of the most interesting, one of the most useful people to us there was the chief of police, a man who was best known as "the butcher of Barcelona," because he had suppressed, very violently suppressed, a couple of radical movements in the North. He was very important to us in many ways. We had lots of young Americans in prison there, because of drug related activities. And we needed to have good relationships with the police so that we could do our job and help take care of these kids. So he had been a person whom I had cultivated to a certain extent. One night I was having a few young Sevillanos in for dinner, and they asked if they could bring along a friend of theirs, a man by the name of Alejandro Rojas Marcos who was in exile, actually. The Spaniards had a system of exiling people in Spain from their own community.

*Q: Oh, yes, internal exile.*

CUTTER: Internal exile, quite right. And Rojas Marcos had been in internal exile. He was exiled from Sevilla to Madrid and had just been released from that status and was back in Sevilla for the first time. They asked if they could bring him along for dinner. I said, well, of course, bring him along, forgetting that I was going to take everyone afterwards to the theater. The Lope de Vega Theater was right down the street from the Consulate. I had a box there and I was going to take all of my dinner guests to a theater production there. But, I wasn't going to back away from this. We all went down, and Rojas Marcos, I guess, was sitting right next to me in the box. I looked

across the way, and there was my friend, the chief of police. He waved at me, and his hand slowly fell as he looked at who was sitting next to me, and I think we never spoke to each other again as he was so incensed over the fact that I would make a public appearance with a Leftist, a dangerous Leftist, like Rojas Marcos. That was, in a sense, putting the American stamp of approval on this dangerous fellow. This fellow, by the way, has risen to great prominence in politics in the South.

*Q: How did you find the attitude of, say, the Spanish Left? I don't mean to exaggerate. I mean, almost anybody was to the Left of, I guess, the Franco Government. But I mean the people who were really going to move into mainstream politics. How did they view the United States at that time? This was obviously under Nixon. We were involved in Vietnam, but we were opening up to China. How did they view us?*

CUTTER: Really, across the spectrum you had every kind of view. I think that the oligarchy in Spain looked on us very favorably. They liked having the American presence there. In many ways more moderate people looked on us as having an influence for change as well. They had seen--since we had opened the bases in Spain--that Spain had moved. It wasn't nearly as repressive as it had been before we had come in. Spain had begun to move towards modernization and change. I think that there were people who gave the U. S. presence a certain amount of credit for this. But when you got to the Left of the spectrum, you found all of the same attitudes that you found in Latin America and in other areas, where the U. S. was looked on as an imperialist power, trying to impose its vision on the world in supporting old and reactionary governments. Certainly, there is an argument to be made that, because of our close association with Franco, the kinds of economic and financial support that we'd given Spain, in return for the bases, we had prolonged the Franco period. It might have died a more natural death, in the minds of many people in Spain, if we'd not been there to support that structure. But you had the whole spectrum of views on the U. S. role. The period I was there, of course, was the period when Nixon had to resign, and the whole Watergate scandal broke out. There was a general lack of comprehension about what was happening in the United States.

*Q: I was in Greece. Nobody could understand what it was all about.*

CUTTER: You know, this kind of thing was everyday activity in country X, Y, or Z, and that the U. S. could get so exercised about this was a little surprising. Even the Left didn't understand it or sympathize with it too much.

*Q: Well, what about the American population, the 30,000 American expatriates living there? Were they a problem or not?*

CUTTER: They were a huge logistic problem for us. We had only three American officers, beside myself, in the Consulate. We had a very heavy citizenship load. Most of these people lived along the coast. Seville is inland, as you know, so we had a big problem in how to service them. We tried to attack the problem in several ways. First, we opened an office, a branch office, in Malaga. One of us--we all took turns doing it--would go down. We had a certain day when we were open down there, or a couple of days we were open every month. We would go down, and people could come to that office and get passport and citizenship services. We also had a



large prison population of young Americans, whom we would try and visit regularly. So we tried to service it that way, but it was really overwhelming. I came up with what I thought was a pretty good idea. I sent out a letter to about 50 prominent Americans living on the coast, Americans who had some position, either in business or who had some leadership capacity in the various communities along the coast. I asked them all to meet with me at a hotel in Marbella. Americans have this commitment to public service, usually, and they like service organizations. I thought that if I can get the American community somehow organized, we'll be able to use them to handle a lot of our problems. Actually about 80 people showed up for this meeting. We organized something called "The American Club of the Costa del Sol." We organized it in chapters so that there would be an organization up top, and then we would have chapters in each of the cities along the coast. We elected a retired dentist, Paul Costelle, as our first president. I picked him as the logical person to be the leader of this group, a person who would be willing to give time to it. We put together a pretty good organization. I gave them a list of jobs I thought they could do. First of all, I thought they ought to have "Welcome Committees" in every community along the coast, where they would go out to greet new Americans coming in. Don't forget that Spain was then looked on as a cheap place to retire. So lots of retirees were coming in there with Social Security checks. Usually, they didn't speak the language. They were isolated once they arrived. A lot of the beauty of the place seemed to go right over their heads, because they were so worried about their every day life and how to adjust to this new and foreign environment. So the first thing was to organize "Welcome Committees." Then "Prison Visiting Committees." From this grew a whole series of services. It just took off like a rocket. Before long, in every community we had a welcoming committee. It reduced the problems enormously that we were getting in the Consulate. We got them to visit the people in the prisons on a fairly regular basis. At least once a week somebody from the community was coming in to bring little "Care" packages to our young people there. A lot of the problems we had been having really were being taken care of by this kind of a volunteer organization. We had our own little "thousand points of light" along the coast there. They still looked to us for a lot of guidance.

Then I got the authority to appoint a consular agent who turned out to be Paul Costelle, the president of the organization. He stayed on for a number of years in that capacity. Really, it became a solution to a lot of the citizenship problems. The American Club of the Costa del Sol is still, by the way--going strong.

*Q: It sounds like an excellent idea. How were Americans being treated in prisons? This is still the height of the drug business, and the hashish coming over from...*

CUTTER: Spain has had very tough drug laws. Anybody who was caught with any amount of narcotics on their person was probably going to be given six years in prison. Bang, just like that. Of course, you know, under the Roman law system, if you have a finding that somebody should be indicted, that's almost being convicted. Either they were released or they were held in prison until the trial, and the outcome of the trial was almost certain, and they were going to be found guilty. There were some miscarriages of justice, I felt. There were some Americans who were kind of "mousetrapped" by the situation, but a lot of them were just plain drug smugglers and deserved to be where they were. They were treated like anybody else in Spanish prisons. They were not given any special privileges, nor were they particularly singled out for abuse in any way. Spanish prisons are not nice places. They are not country clubs. They are cold--especially in the

South, where...People think that basically it is a warm climate. They have cold and damp winters down there, but they have no central heating, of course, nothing like that. You probably lived in your overcoat if you were in prison, if you were lucky enough to have an overcoat and prison food is not particularly appetizing. Young Americans found this to be quite a learning experience. I will say that many of them actually took it as that. Many of them learned to speak Spanish quite well. Many of them were quite philosophical about it, once they were trapped there. Others were not, and we had a lot of very serious psychological problems to deal with. I think that, overall, the Spaniards were pretty good about trying to, if they could in any way do it, pass the Americans on to us--get rid of them if they could, and get them out of the system. But, usually, they were in there for two or three years, minimum, before they were able to get out.

*Q: Well, is there anything else that we should cover on Seville before we move on?*

CUTTER: No, the US military actually behaved themselves quite well in the South.

*Q: The military takes care of itself.*

CUTTER: They do. My relationships with the military were excellent. They looked on me as kind of the senior American in the area. Whenever any kind of problem of community relations turned up, they usually would turn to us for guidance. I spent a lot of time working with them, actually. I tried to develop good relationships with the base commanders. The base commander at Rota was a good squash player, and he had the only squash court in the South. I got to know him pretty well. I went down and played with him fairly regularly. So our relationships were good.

**JAMES L. MORAD**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1972-1976)**

*James L. Morad was born in California in 1934. He received his BA from the University of Southern California and his MS from Columbia University. His foreign assignments include Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, Fortaleza, San Salvador, Madrid, Brussels and Paris. He was interviewed on June 9, 1994 by Allen C. Hansen.*

*Q: So, when you finished there, then Bob Amerson did come through and you did go to Madrid as the Information Officer?*

MORAD: I returned to Madrid and found a completely different country from the one I had left 12 years earlier. It evolved so much. Spain in 1960 and 1961 still was largely, one could say, in the 16th century, evident not only in the architecture but in the way people lived their lives. And it was a very poor country still, poor with dignity. In 1960, Franco had an iron grip on the country and the government, and maintained a repressive regime with little flexibility. Much of that changed 12 years later. Franco was still in power; the structure was still there, but society

was changing around him. The people were becoming increasingly free, and the country was more prosperous, especially in the cities. The people were more Westernized, Europeanized and even Americanized in their thinking, and in their interests. By then the country alas had been open to massive tourism for over a decade, so that in the summer Spain doubled its population with tourists. All of them had a major influence on the social and political thinking of Spaniards.

*Q: What were the other influences beside tourism? The economic programs of the United States?*

MORAD: There were two major influences. The establishment of our military bases there in 1953 began the opening of Spain to Western Europe and to our allies and really to the 20th century in many ways. That gave some legitimacy to Franco that he had not had since the end of World War II and then that legitimacy gave rise to other developments. The tourists gradually came to the country giving Spaniards exposure to other people for the first time. The Swedes, the Germans, and the French helped to open the country to modern ways and Spaniards themselves changed as a result. There was also American and Western European investment. The AID programs did not seem relatively as important as the other elements, the military and, what I think was extremely important, exchange programs. As a component of our military assistance, as part of the price we paid for maintaining our military bases in Spain, we had a very large economic and cultural assistance program. As part of that, educational exchange was a major component and a lot of Spaniards over the years came to the United States and Americans went to Spain on those programs, including the Fulbright Program.

*Q: The Fulbright Program was just starting when you and I were in Spain, when you were there the first time.*

MORAD: The Fulbright Commission actually was in charge of administering the military side of the exchange program as well, so it became probably one of the most important Fulbright Commissions in the world because it had all of these additional resources and responsibilities to administer. Over the years, little by little, all of these people coming to the United States and American students studying in Spain had a truly a major impact.

*Q: What about the American Center when you were there the second time. That was a new location.*

MORAD: It was there and very centrally located. The Center played a major role in domestic politics of Spain at the time. It was close to the end of the Franco regime which was still repressive but becoming increasingly benign. If opponents did not directly challenge the legitimacy of Franco, the military, the church, and the monarchy, basically they could say almost anything and get away with it, and there were a lot of challenges. The big question was when was Franco going to die and what was going to happen after him. Nobody was overtly trying to overthrow Franco at that time because it was just a matter of months when he was expected to die; as a matter of fact, there were a lot of jokes about Franco's death and mortality at the time. One joke had it that he was lying on his deathbed and millions of people gathered at the window below his bedroom and were shouting "Franco, Franco, Franco" and he whispered to his wife and said: "What is that?" She said: "It's the people". "What do they want?", he asked. She said: "They have come to say goodbye". Then he said: "Where are they going?" Another joke had him

at an annual pilgrimage to Lourdes, amidst hundreds of thousands of people and he collapsed and died on the spot and everybody was looking down at him and they all started shouting "milagro, milagro" (miracle, miracle). There were a lot of jokes like that at the time. Anyway, the Cultural Center programming was strongly influenced by the CAO, who I admired very much, who discreetly allowed the Center to be used as a forum for discussions of internal Spanish politics mainly among the democratic opposition. As a result a lot of lectures, seminars, discussions, and round tables were held and would draw full houses, I mean literally, people cramming to the walls. The crowds would have these tremendously animated discussions having nothing to do with the United States, but solely with Spanish politics and Spain's future. The fact that the United States Embassy through its Cultural Center made the forum possible gave us more credit and goodwill than we could have gotten doing anything else in Madrid at the time.

*Q: Would you say that the United States Government and USIS in particular helped influence the movement toward a more liberal type of government?*

MORAD: I think we did. The United States government was heavily criticized by liberals for supporting the Franco regime. Their argument was that we were sacrificing Spanish democracy and freedom for the sake of our military bases, which was basically true. On the other hand, our presence there also helped to stabilize the situation. While it may have prolonged Franco's regime, our presence allowed the country to evolve sociologically, mentally and gradually in a way that permitted a peaceful transformation from Franco and dictatorship to democratic institutions after his death. The people were truly ready for it and there was no longer any serious opposition to democracy. An old guard fringe of right wingers did try to cause some disruption, but they had no support whatsoever.

*Q: Do you think Spain was a good role model then for Latin America-- a lot of countries in Latin America with military dictatorships?*

MORAD: I don't really know that with certainty, but my own feeling is that Pinochet patterned himself after Franco. Pinochet saw himself as saving the country from communism through what was a socialist government not a communist one, but in those days distinctions were not often made. Essentially Pinochet sat on Chile in a repressive way but allowed some freedom mainly in business and economics. He created a free market economic system with American advisors. That in itself influenced the political situation, and as it evolved, the country also gained some prosperity under Pinochet as Spain gradually did under Franco. Similarly, when Pinochet finally left you had a peaceful transition to a real democratic regime.

*Q: Do you think the Spanish model might be valid in regard to the U.S. embargo against Cuba and the recent controversy about China..... whether we should stop trade or continue it? The United States embargo has been in effect for 30 years against Cuba, and there are those who think it should continue, particularly the Cubans in Miami. And there are those who think lifting the embargo would have a much greater influence on encouraging democratic development in Cuba.*

MORAD: I guess I side with the latter. I think Cuba has become a domestic political issue more than a foreign policy issue in the United States. Without the influence, the very strong domestic

influence that the Cubans have in the United States today, and policy would be the latter in Cuba. I mean, Castro does not pose a serious threat to anybody anymore, and I think opening up Cuba as we did in Spain would render Castro obsolete in his own country even if he remained in power. And that is what happened to Franco; he essentially became obsolete though during the last five years or so of his regime nobody paid much attention to him.

*Q: Is there anything else you would like to say about your tour in Spain? Your second tour.*

MORAD: You asked the question about the role the United States had in influencing the situation. Well, we also had a negative role in that we caved in to Franco government pressures not to have any contact with the democratic opposition. So for years these people were very frustrated because they couldn't get anywhere, and it was State Department and American Embassy policy to bar them, basically put them in the same category as communists. In defiance of that short-sighted policy and the same USIS officer who gave a forum to democratic opposition at the cultural center, developed personal relations with a large number of the democratic opposition, which later became the power elite in Spain. He was doing this because he was personally liberal and very idealistic. The ambassador at the time got wind of it and wanted to PNG him. He was allowed to stay on but it stalled his career. He didn't advance as fast as he should have, and he was never given the credit or recognition that he deserved for being the only embassy officer who for four years toward the end of the Franco regime, cultivated contact with these people. The CIA may have had some clandestine contact, that I don't know, but at least openly and officially they were barred. Finally through serendipity a new ambassador arrived the year before Franco died. That ended the tradition of assigning political appointees to Franco Spain, which was considered of marginal importance but a nice plum for political supporters. The Senior State Department career officer assigned was Wells Stabler. He was able to analyze that the end of the Franco regime was approaching and had to pave the way for new leadership. During that last year, he cultivated that same people befriended by the USIS officer. I was also part of that effort. I used to bring journalists to lunch with him usually 3 or 4 journalists from the democratic left. By the time Franco died, our relationships were very good with these key people. It was very fortunate because it just as easily could have happened the other way; if Franco had died a year or two earlier, we would have been faced with a lot of people who had become important and were hostile to or resentful of the United States for having barred them from participation in or serious discussions about the future of their country. Franco died the year before I left Spain. He had a six-week death vigil in which there were more than 2,000 journalists in Madrid waiting for his death. Because they could get no information at all from the Franco Government, they came to the next best source, the American Embassy. I had to feed morsels to journalists from all over the world even though it was not our responsibility to be spokesman for the Franco Government. We should not have been saying anything about Franco's condition and we didn't officially or openly. Informally, I did share the little information we had in an effort to be open and informative while trusting the journalists not to reveal their sources. Of course, we didn't really know that much ourselves, but we were able to help the journalists produce copy during that prolonged vigil. Spain also turned out to be an exciting assignment in other ways. We had three vice presidential visits and a presidential visit while I was there. Also at that time Kissinger's Middle East shuttle was going on and he always had to stop off at Torrejon Air Base for a refueling stop on his way to the Middle East. The refueling always took place in the middle of the night. Kissinger was there with a plane full of journalists too, so I and

my USIS colleagues would have to go out there and set up an entire press operation to make sure these guys could file copy when they got off the plane. This was always at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. Complicating the visits was the Spanish Foreign Minister always insisting on being there and Kissinger's annoyance at having him there. Because the Foreign Minister insisted on being there and we could not refuse him, we had to set up a whole protocol situation for what should have been no more than a technical stopover. I remember one night about 3 o'clock in the morning; we were all there, in a large waiting room, Kissinger with his entourage, the Spanish Foreign Minister with his entourage and three or four of us from the embassy. The Spanish Foreign Minister got up and excused himself to go to the bathroom, just as he walked out of the room, Kissinger asked in a loud voice: "How do you say horse's ass in Spanish?" We were all shocked. The other Spaniards were still in the room and they all spoke English fluently. We thought we were all going to be PNGed the next day.

**RICHARD S. WELTON**  
**Assistant Attaché, Foreign Agricultural Service**  
**(1973-1975)**

*Upon graduating from the University of Maryland, Mr. Richard S. Welton joined the Foreign Agricultural Service in 1956 and soon assumed posts in Argentina, El Salvador, Spain, and Mexico. Quentin Bates interviewed Mr. Welton in 1996.*

WELTON: Spain was a short tour. The family didn't really enjoy it very much there. It was interesting in many respects, but some key differences, perhaps, worth noting was that being a cosmopolitan city, Madrid, there wasn't a very strong embassy wives' group, and everybody sort of did their own thing. I thought Helen really missed that. I said early in my career that I knew of two American wives that really enjoyed the foreign service -- Helen wasn't one of those, but she went along with it pretty well, and was a good sport and good host on most occasions. I probably pushed it a bit when I took some of our cattlemen in to see her in the bedroom when she was suffering from a particularly bad case of Montezuma's Revenge. I was in the process of showing them around the house. I thought I should at least introduce them, but she would have just as soon I'd passed on.

And then of course it was a different experience. I had been Attaché in El Salvador, and then I went to Spain as the Assistant Attaché. The Attaché was Clarence Miller, who had been an Assistant Secretary years earlier, in the Eisenhower Administration. Clarence had not had experience before that as an Attaché, so we had to take care of a lot of things in supporting Clarence. Clarence was very good with visitors and in the market promotion side, as well. I think probably the most rewarding post in many ways was Mexico. I was there also a fairly short time -- only two and a half years -- but I have asthma, so that was a drawback there. But we had a lot of programs going on. Lots of visitors, including Secretary Butz, who came there shortly after his ill-fated trip, when he told the joke that got him in trouble. But he was a great visitor.

**OWEN B. LEE**  
**Political Officer**  
**Madrid (1973-1976)**

*Owen B. Lee served in the U.S. Navy during World War II. He graduated from Harvard University in 1949 and studied in Paris, France at Institut d'Etudes Politiques. His Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, Bolivia, Romania, and Spain. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on December 4, 1996.*

*Q: In 1973 you went to Madrid where you were a political officer under Ambassadors Rivero and Wells Stabler.*

LEE: That was a very interesting time. I enjoyed it because I was there reporting, more than anything else, and talking with the upcoming political forces. I was there at the time of Franco's death in 1975. It was interesting because there were so many misconceptions and elements of misinformation about Spain. I will give you an example.

Shortly after we arrived, it was only four months, the Prime Minister, Carrero Blanco, was assassinated (December, 1993). We could feel the explosion in the embassy because it took place on the other side of the Jesuit church just opposite. The ETA, the Basque terrorist organization, had observed that he went every morning at the same time to mass, entered by the same door, and parked the car in the same place. They drilled a tunnel under the road and planted explosive there with a timer. It went off so perfectly that it lifted the car completely and dropped it inside the courtyard of the church. The whole bottom was blown out. It left a gaping hole that covered the whole street. I soon afterward got a telephone call from New York, from one of the major TV networks, I can't remember, asking if they were demonstrating in the streets, whether the people were upset and whether there was going to be a revolt. The only thing I could say to the poor man who asked the stupid questions was to say, "Look, people are out in the streets doing exactly what people are doing in New York. They are out doing their Christmas shopping. They don't seem to care that much." They were going about their business and to me this was one of the signs of change. There was no demonstration or other sign of disorder.

Later, I had an interesting argument with a colleague in the economic section. I was told that the Spanish government, the interim government, had immediately gone on to the stock market to buy and make sure nothing went wrong in terms of a falling stock market. My colleague said they couldn't do that. I said, "Yes they can." Well, the fact is, they did showing evidence of what you might call a growing bureaucracy and machinery of government. They wanted to be sure there would be no political fallout. This in effect was evidence that the transition from Franco was already underway before his death, in late 1975.

Vice President Ford came for Carrero Blanco's funeral. I can remember that he made a big impression because he marched down the street with the Acting Prime Minister in the funeral procession without security in the middle of Madrid. In mourning, Spaniards showed impressive

discipline and respect for public order. It is illustrative of their attachment to personal--and national--dignity. No secret service. It made a tremendous impression.

*Q: It was known that Franco was winding down and the change over was going to have to come. What was the role of the Catholic church during this period?*

LEE: The Catholic church was divided. Remember the supreme Catholic figure in Spain is the Archbishop of Toledo, not Madrid, and he was a cardinal and very conservative. Archbishop Tarancon of Madrid was a liberal and played a very important role in helping with the smooth transition to a parliamentary democracy, albeit under a King. There were other people in Spain who sought to make the church more open. As a matter of fact I have right here a book by a former Jesuit, Jose Diez de Alegria, whose book had to be circulated in Spain surreptitiously because he criticized the Catholic church and its money, arguing that the church should be the church of the poor and the defender of political freedom. The interesting thing about this particular man was that his brother was a 3-star general and shortly before Franco's death was the chief of the general staff. It was a famous family and the book was quite significant. But the church, itself, overall was more liberal than conservative in 1973-76 than at the start of the Franco period.

*Q: That was what made me ask the question.*

LEE: To give you another part of the answer to what you asked, I had a German friend, the correspondent of a major TV network (ZDF) in Spain, who gave me two invaluable tips about what was really happening in Spain. I have never forgotten those tips, they proved to absolutely right. This contact originated with some of my Social Democratic contacts in Germany. He told me to look into a Spanish industrial giant known as Mondragon. Why? It was the largest industrial cooperative in the world. It was in the Basque country and manufactured guns, and other sophisticated equipment. The guns were all sporting weapons, some of the best in the world. It was organized by a priest. I mention it because it tells something about the church and also something about cooperative enterprise which was very strong in Spain. The second tip was home ownership. He asked, "Did you ever look at home ownership in Spain? It is the highest in Europe." Why is that? Franco had much to do with this. He had promised home ownership much of it condominium apartments. This did much to give people a stake in private property with all its political implications.

*Q: I suppose Franco saw that a person who owned a home had a stake in it, a stake in the well being of the society there, etc.*

LEE: The servant we had in Madrid was a fine lady from Asturias who owned her apartment, her home from where she came from and was planning to buy a new car. (Her husband also worked.) The point is that home ownership was one of the things that had transformed Spain.

*Q: Then Franco passed from the scene.*

LEE: Yes, in the Fall, 1975.



*Q: And Vice President Nelson Rockefeller came over for the funeral. Was that an important period?*

LEE: Yes, it was. Shortly before, in June, 1975, President Ford made an official visit to Spain. The dates chosen for the visit corresponded exactly with the date of my daughter's graduation from college in New York. It happened to be the daughter whose first communion we could not attend in London because we were in Romania. I had made up my mind I was not going to let the college graduation go without someone being there. I had the choice of staying to be with the President, my job, or being with my daughter. I chose the latter. I went to the Ambassador, Wells Stabler, and told him about it and he understood. My wife stayed behind and she helped as much as she could, and I went back for my daughter's graduation. It was one of those hard choices that one has to make.

*Q: I had a similar one that I will tell you about later. I think you did make the right decision. The visit went off very well I gather?*

LEE: Yes, it went off very well, except that my wife had a story to tell. She was standing next to Henry Kissinger and some kid came and asked for his autograph. He wrote his autograph and handed it back to the kid and said, "How much are you going to get for that?" His remark didn't go over well.

*Q: What was the effect in Spain of the military coup in Portugal that took place in late 1974? Did that have any effect?*

LEE: Tremendous. That is a very good question and one that is not asked enough about Spain's transition to democracy. The historical relationship between Portugal and Spain was very important. The Spaniards at that time had already progressed enough economically, that about 6 million Spaniards were vacationing each year in Portugal. Remember also that the Bourbon Prince Juan Carlos's father was living in Escorial, outside Lisbon. There was a certain coming and going among the then and future political class in Spain, between Escorial and Madrid. Many of the people who have since worked with the King Juan Carlos were people who had been in contact with his father, Don Juan. I am not saying the father had direct influence. He didn't. But if there was any way at that time to set up a return of the monarchy for his son later on, he could do it under Franco with whom he had previously agreed on the education of Prince Juan Carlos in Spain. So, all these Spaniards saw what was happening in Portugal. The effect was enormous because, as I mentioned earlier, Spain had turned over a leaf and become a developed country and a pragmatic country. Spaniards felt that the economic disruption that Portugal went through, even though it was a non-violent, was unacceptable. The Spaniards didn't want any economic disruption. If there was anything the Spanish were agreed on, and there were a number, number one was no economic disruption, don't upset the apple cart. Every budding political party believed that. I think it is very hard for observers to appreciate why. We think it goes back to the upheaval of the civil war in 1936-69, but it is more than that. What I mean by more is it has been two hundred years, not just forty, that Spain was in constant strife and decline. They had fallen behind the rest of Europe. Suddenly they were beginning to move forward. No one wanted to compromise that. It was as simple as that. It was 200 years of Spanish decline that was being

overcome. And, so when they saw what was happening in Portugal, most Spaniards decided that it wouldn't happen in Spain when Franco left the scene.

*Q: And the fact that they saw the communists causing trouble.*

LEE: That's right, they didn't want to have anything to do with them. It was very important to them.

*Q: What about the importance of the Opus Dei?*

LEE: I am no expert on Opus Dei. It had a number of people whom we would call technocrats imbued with the idea of economic recovery, but a recovery that would somehow preserve values, some spiritual values. Members of the Opus Dei were Catholic laymen, highly educated elite dedicated to Spain's modernization. They represented what a political party might do in terms of carrying out a political platform.

*Q: So, they were helpful?*

LEE: Definitely.

*Q: Let's talk a little bit about our military bases there. We had to renew the agreement during your period (1973-76) and I believe Secretary Kissinger, himself, was involved in that.*

LEE: Bob McCloskey handled the negotiations.

*Q: Bob McCloskey came over for that. Tell us a little bit about that.*

LEE: This is a little bit of a value judgment I am going to give you here. Remember I had come from Berlin where we had worked on the Four-Power talks. I worked for a man who was very tough in many ways, David Klein. But, David Klein knew something that was essential to the Foreign Service. He knew that if you want to be in the ball game at all you had to be a player and be active. What I mean by that is that when the Four-Power talks started in Berlin, it could have been managed from Bonn, not Berlin and we had a very able man in Bonn who wanted to do that, Jonathan Dean. Dean was in charge of this whole operation for Ambassador Rush and made sure that we knew it in Berlin that he was going to run things. Well, Klein knew that he was on the front line and wasn't going to twiddle his thumbs. He made a point of making sure that we worked hard at the mission to anticipate issues, develop them and fire off our telegrams before Bonn had thought of the issues. And the telegrams went to Washington as well as to Bonn. In other words, if you want to be in a negotiation, you sit at the table and go to work. That is for background.

In Spain I was not involved in the negotiations because I was in a different section. The political/military section dealt with the bases. At the time these talks were initiated, Ambassador Rivero had left and a new ambassador had not yet arrived. We had a DCM, who was a Foreign Service officer, a good officer, but a very cautious, prudent, hesitant officer, who was unwilling to take any risks. He was not going to take any initiative on the talks on the base agreements.

Even though I was not involved in the talks, I spoke to him and told him about my experience in Berlin. I said in effect, "If you want to be in on the negotiations, you have to jump in, pile in, make yourself heard." What happened is Washington sent out Larry Pezzulo and Ambassador McCloskey to run the negotiations and in the end the mission had very, very little to say about anything.

That is the story about the negotiations. It is also a story that I think tells you something about the Foreign Service.

**JOSEPH CHEEVERS**  
**Deputy Chief Consular Section**  
**Madrid (1973-1977)**

*Joseph Cheevers was born in 1933. His Foreign Service career included positions in Morocco, Spain, France, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Senegal. Mr. Cheevers was interviewed by William Morgan in 1988.*

Q: *How did you get Madrid? Tell us. Did you know somebody? (Laughs)*

CHEEVERS: Yes, I knew somebody. (Laughs) The tale goes on, sir: I happened to be on the same ship returning to the US as the officer who was to be my career counselor. Career counselors are the guys, as you know, who orchestrate your assignments and allegedly plot your career. We struck up a wonderful friendship, I clearly had an inside line on the assignment process.

Q: *Are you saying that assignments aren't made in a very dispassionate and impersonal way?*

CHEEVERS: I am saying they're made that way, too, sometimes.  
(Smiling)

Q: *Are you saying you brought influence to bear?*

CHEEVERS: I'm saying that I certainly did. I brought everything but the kitchen sink.

Q: *What would you advise contemporaries to do?*

CHEEVERS: I can say that you'd better learn how the bureaucracy works, because it's in your interest. If you expect the system to take care of you entirely, then you will be a has-been very quickly.

Q: *We'll pause long enough for that to sink in. (Laughs) Tell us, now that you perchance got this assignment to Spain, why did you want it, incidentally?*

CHEEVERS: It was a very, very good job.

*Q: Deputy Chief Consular Section. What does that mean?*

CHEEVERS: It meant that I was deputy to the consul general, and the consul general was not a very well man, thus allowing me more opportunities to manage than would be generally available, because his many absences from the post for health reasons.

*Q: So you really were kind of the consul general?*

CHEEVERS: Yes.

*Q: At a mid-rank.*

CHEEVERS: Yes, I was an 02 at that time.

*Q: Which is an 04 today.*

CHEEVERS: Right. My counselor said to me, "Look, this is really the kind of job you want, because you'll have an opportunity to do everything." I didn't realize until shortly after I got there what this really meant. I had a supervisor, who was a very fine man, but for a variety of reasons was managerially inert. The protection workload, incidentally, was higher. Higher than any of the other services, and very time-consuming.

*Q: But he was not well?*

CHEEVERS: Correct. But he also had a very, very relaxed attitude toward management.

*Q: Do you have any advice to give on how you, maybe from your own examples, how you work in a situation like that, where you respect the boss, but . . . ?*

CHEEVERS: One of the first things, some management sage said to me was, "Learn to manage your boss."

*Q: I think I said that to you in Paris, didn't I? Right.*

CHEEVERS: I think you did. That stuck with me these many years. Yes, if there ever was a truism, that is learn to manage your boss. I knew what his strengths were, and I certainly knew what his weaknesses were. I must say that I am grateful to him for having given me the opportunity. There's no ill will here.

*Q: Did he let you pretty much . . . ?*

CHEEVERS: No doubt about it except attend Consular Conferences, when he was always well enough to attend.

*Q: How did the rest of the embassy look at you as a substitute consul general?*

CHEEVERS: They looked at me sympathetically and as a pillar of the consular section, because they knew that the Consul General was very unwell, hanging on to his post desperately, but not ill enough to surrender the perks that went along with being consul general. He was not pulling his weight. For example, I, as the deputy, ended up as the representative to the Anglo-American Hospital, an institution of great importance to the US community in Madrid, and one which required about 25% of CG's time.

*Q: What did that involve?*

CHEEVERS: The financial condition of the hospital was shaky. It meant monitoring the management of the hospital resources and the medical services furnished to the American and Anglophone community. The CG also played an important public relations role, as did his opposite number in the British Embassy. There were many demands on a CG's time for hospital activities.

*Q: Is this the kind of job you think consular officers should have?*

CHEEVERS: Yes. I thought it was a terrific opportunity, because you got to meet more than just the American business community. Really essential for a Consular officer.

*Q: How big a section was the consular section?*

CHEEVERS: It was the largest section I had served in up to the time. There were seven officers including the consul general, and about 22 FSNs.

*Q: Was this the biggest experiences as a manager.*

CHEEVERS: Up until that time.

*Q: What particular things do you want to tell us about managing such a section?*

CHEEVERS: There were a number of things which were really new to me. Serving in the Third World, you had to work around the "frailties" or lack of experience of your FSNs. In Spain, you had highly qualified FSNs with great dedication. We recruited those people in the 1950s. We'll never do as well again, because Spain's economy was small at the time, and even top-quality people couldn't find jobs. We therefore got the best. What I'm saying is that we had some superb FSNs. There were problems of course, probably because of the nature of the people. They're a very proud people, but volatile. You had to sensitize yourself to a number of things, but it was worth the effort.

*Q: They were so qualified, didn't they certainly know far more than those "stupid vice consuls" that are brand-new?*

CHEEVERS: They certainly did. One of the problems there was how to educate the vice consuls.

*Q: How did you do that?*

CHEEVERS: You sat them down often individually. You also met with them as a group, have meetings, for example. There were not only meetings of the officers; you had to have meetings with the top or upper level FSNs, so that they would have an opportunity for talk and interplay. I was not always successful in educating some of our officers. Few believed that a non American, non officer knew more than they did.

*Q: Was this an ego problem of a young person?*

CHEEVERS: Oh, sure. All young officers are setting the world on fire. "I'm a Foreign Service officer, and I'm going to do it my way." Perfectly natural, and perfectly amusing to watch as reality sets in.

*Q: Some of these, I presume, were rotational officers that maybe resented being in the consular job?*

CHEEVERS: No doubt about it.

*Q: How did you handle that? This tape doesn't reveal the smirk on your face.*

CHEEVERS: Not easily and not always well. The educational process is a long one. It's frustrating! Sometimes you're successful and sometimes you are not.

*Q: Practically speaking, can you think of some examples of how you "did in" one of these arrogant little vice consuls, how you taught him?*

CHEEVERS: I would make sure that when they went off on their first prison visit or they went off to a hospital visit, that they had one of the FSNs with them. There were two reasons for this. There was the experience situation, and there was the question of language. Many of them coming out of FSI knew their Spanish but hadn't practiced it in real life consular situations. In a lot of cases, they came away saying, "I wouldn't have been able to accomplish anything had it not been for Maria José, because Maria José (the FSN) explained to me what was really going on."

We had several FSN experts. We had an extradition expert who doubled as a secretary, plus we had an arrest expert, who knew the penal code and judicial systems inside and out. Officers relied on these experienced staff members and mutual respect grew out of shared experiences, in most cases.

In other cases, a minority, no matter what you did, you could not educate them.

*Q: From the non-FSN position, how else did you train these junior officers to grow up, if you will?*

CHEEVERS: By giving them as much responsibility as they could handle. I never, at any time that I can recall, said, "I'll do that." We had brief meetings in the morning, and I'd say, "Look,

this is what has to be done today. You, John, I'd like you to take a look at this, and I'd like you to call or visit the police station to check on such and such a case and report the outcome to me. They were always doing busy, and they always had and examine what they did later on, because they'd have to answer to me. We had no problem with that.

*Q: One of the classic examples of the junior officer that made the visa decision, for example, the boss tries to convince the junior officer that really, that's not the way to go after an intervention or whatever. How did you work with the junior officer?*

CHEEVERS: Not easy. Not easy.

*Q: Did you just overrule them and take the case away?*

CHEEVERS: No. I never had to do that. I believe that if you worked long and hard at it, sooner or later they were persuaded; they would come around.

*Q: Can you give an example of how they come around? What do you do to them, other than pull your rank on them?*

CHEEVERS: I hope that I never did this. Although age and experience do exert subtle influence. That never happened in Spain, but allow me to jump to my Paris assignment and tell you that at one particular time, we had a Haitian case, an official of his government, seemed to be the worst and most unqualified individual I'd ever come across. I said "that's a pretty bad case. If I were doing that adjudicating, I wouldn't have issue." And then we would go down the line on citing various scenarios, what the regulations said, what the attorney concerned was trying to do. It was an educational process for a new officer, and very time consuming.

*Q: So what you're saying is, you really try and walk through the particular elements of a case, and hopefully as a learning process, the vice consul will come to the same decision.*

CHEEVERS: It took time and patience. Unfortunately, in Paris we didn't have an awful lot of time, as you very well know. There wasn't a lot of time for the explanations, but I don't recall having to go through such exercises in visa cases more than once with the some officer, except one, but that's another story.

*Q: Before we come to Paris, one other question on Spain, especially in the position you were in, far more responsible and certainly more involved with the total management of the mission. Do you have any new lessons that you learned in your role with the rest of the embassy? Anything that you did differently as a result of Spain, with your colleagues, with the DCM, with the ambassador?*

CHEEVERS: I can't think of that offhand.

**HERMAN REBHAN**

**General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation  
Washington, DC (1975-1976)**

*Herman Rebham was born in Poland and raised in Germany. He came with his family to the United States in 1938 and settled in Cleveland, Ohio. After working in auto manufacturing plants in the Midwest, he became Administrative Assistant to United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, and dealt with domestic and international labor matters throughout his career. In 1972 he became the United Auto Workers Director of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. Mr. Rebham died in 2006. Mr. Rebham was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle in 1995.*

*Kienzle: On political issues?*

REBHAN: Political issues. That [is still the practice] in the IMF. That made the meetings more interesting and more worthwhile, and we moved the Central Committee meetings around. We didn't have them just in Geneva, because people got tired of coming to Geneva, especially in the fall when it usually rained. We had them in various countries and the meeting gave prestige to the country and to the union. I also moved the Executive Committee meetings around to different places. When the Executive Committee meeting [was held] in a small country, we would meet with the prime minister and with the labor party people. That gives the local organization some prestige.

Then let me just mention some other things: We reorganized our publications. Then at that time Franco was still running Spain. The IMF had a very good tradition about Spain. The IMF supported the Spanish workers during the darkest days of Franco. We supported people in exile, and we supported people in the underground.

*Kienzle: This was financial support? Communications?*

REBHAN: Financial support, communications, and if they were in jail, support for the family and things like that. The Germans were very good on this question, because they had conscience pains because of what Hitler did to Spain. Then I started going to Spain. Spain was wide open at that time, and there was no problem [entering]. Meetings were held with the UGT [General Workers Union] in churches. The only thing you had to watch was when you left not to leave all at once, [i.e.], to leave in small groups. Policemen were around. I spoke to UGT congresses being held quietly. We spent a lot of money and a lot of effort in Spain.

*Shea: You knew Redondo then?*

REBHAN: Oh, sure. Redondo and all those people. We bought them mimeograph machines and copying machines and other equipment. They did a very smart thing. Felipe Gonzalez developed lawyers' offices to take care of workers' problems like unemployment compensation, accidents and so on. They were basically fronts for the union. We gave them money to run these offices. So this was very good.



*Kienzle: In which cities were they located?*

REBHAN: They were located in the Basque country. They were located in Barcelona and in Madrid of course. And Seville. It was illegal, but Franco was dying and everything was changing. These were some of the highlights that were great.

*Kienzle: This would have been in the middle 1970s.*

REBHAN: Yes, 1975 and 1976. Then Portugal came shortly after that. I remember that Woodcock was very good about this. He came personally to Spain to all these big meetings and traveled. He went to Portugal. We gave a lot of money to Mario Soares, the socialist [leader]. A little episode: The [American] Labor Attaché was Dale Povenmire, and Carlucci was the [American] Ambassador at the time. Woodcock and I had a meeting with Carlucci and Povenmire, and Carlucci said, "Mr. Woodcock, I'm having a big argument with Kissinger. Kissinger doesn't want to do anything for Mario Soares. He thinks that the socialists are going to lose. Mr. Woodcock, the best thing you can do is to raise as much money as you can for the Socialist Party because *that is the only game in town.*" Then we met with Mario Soares, and he said, "Kissinger called me the 'Kerensky of Portugal.' " Later, after Mario Soares won the election, we saw Mario Soares again and he said, "Kissinger apologized to me." And that was unusual thing for Kissinger. Woodcock personally went out and hit up the rich IMF affiliates to get money for Mario Soares.

Then the other highlight was South Africa.

*Shea: You had Felipe Gonzalez elected in Spain.*

REBHAN: No, he lost the first election and nearly had a nervous breakdown. They couldn't find him for three days. You know how we knew that? We scheduled a meeting of our Executive Committee for right after the election, because we thought this was going to be a big thing. So we had the Executive Committee meeting, and Felipe was going to talk to our Executive Committee members, and we couldn't find him. Finally he showed up, and he made a good speech, but he was very upset that he had lost the first election. He thought he was going to win that one.

**WELLS STABLER**  
**Ambassador**  
**Spain (1975-1978)**

*Ambassador Wells Stabler was born in Massachusetts in 1919. His Foreign Service career included positions in Palestine, Jordan, Italy, and France, and an ambassadorship to Spain. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

*Q: We come to the time when you served as Ambassador to Spain from 1975-78. How did you get this appointment?*

STABLER: Well, during the Cyprus affair Kissinger decided whether he liked people or not who were involved in some way or another. He decided that he liked Jack Kubisch and sent him as Ambassador to Greece. At one point somebody said to me, "Oh, Kissinger is thinking of making you Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs." I said, "Well, I'm not really wild about that. Frankly, I don't think I particularly want that." That amused me because years before somebody told me that Dean Acheson, when I was a very junior officer was thinking about making me Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. That didn't come about either, but in any case I wouldn't have wanted the ARA one.

Time went on and I got involved as Deputy Assistant Secretary in some of the discussions with the Spaniards in Washington on the base negotiations which had begun. McCloskey had been made the chief negotiator and I knew him very well and had worked very closely with him on Cyprus. Indeed he had been Ambassador to Cyprus for one very brief period when Kissinger called him back to handle press matters for him. There was clear evidence that Kissinger did not care for or think that the Ambassador to Spain, who was a former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Area, Naples, CINCSOUTH was doing a good job and wanted to get rid of him. I was told that Kissinger was thinking of sending me to Spain but that this depended on whether or not Peter Flanagan would get the job. Peter Flanagan had been in Nixon's White House and involved in the recruiting of political ambassadors of people who were Republicans and important contributors to the Republican Party. Peter had pretty much the say of who would and who wouldn't be appointed an Ambassador. I had known Flanagan in the latter part of 1968, I believe, in Washington in connection with his interest in US relations with the Vatican. In fact when the Department was slow in obtaining for me a letter from Nixon according me the personal rank of Minister in Rome, I went to Flanagan to ask him to expedite it - that was in 1969 before I left for Rome. When Flanagan came to Rome shortly after I had arrived, he brought with him the letter from Nixon. The department never got over this maneuver, but there was nothing they could do about it. The only thing I had to do was to date the letter - that had been forgotten in the White House.

In any event Peter came to Rome for discussions with the Vatican on how to reinstitute US relations with the Vatican without going to full diplomatic relations. These talks led eventually to the reinstitution of the Office of the Personal Representative of the President to the Vatican. Henry Cabot Lodge was appointed at that time and took up residence in Rome for periods several times a year.

Because of Flanagan's service to Nixon, I think that President Ford may have been asked by Nixon to look after his friend, Peter Flanagan. So Ford sent Flanagan's name up to the Senate as Ambassador to Spain. Peter had a lot of good friends in Spain. He had been a banker before and had many friends abroad.

Senator Eagleton from Missouri decided that he didn't like what Flanagan did in the White House--selling embassies and what not. Eagleton got the Foreign Relations Committee aroused about all this and at the end of the Senate session...

*Q: I might mention that some of the Nixon appointments, particularly towards the end had been a little bit rank.*

STABLER: I think it was fairly blatant. They said, "You hand in a big check and we will probably get you a good job." In the case of Flanagan he came from a very wealthy family and I am sure he got the job through his father. This was the reward Nixon was trying to give him.

By the end of the Senate session that summer the nomination lapsed. That fall I was told by Larry Eagleburger that Kissinger still intended that I should go to Spain but that Ford felt he had to make another effort for Flanagan. So when the Senate reconvened in January 1975 Flanagan's name went up again. At the end of a week, one of those curious instances, I was in the Department on a Saturday afternoon and the telephone rang. I answered it and this voice said, "This is Peter Flanagan, is Arthur Hartman there?" I said, "No, he is not. This is Wells Stabler." He said, "Well, I was just calling to let you all know that I have asked to have my name withdrawn from the Senate." Needless to say it was all I could do not to say, "I am glad to hear that."

Then I was told later that at some point that fall, I guess after Flanagan's name had been withdrawn, Ford flew over to Japan and on the plane was Eagleburger, Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld and the President. On the way over the President, Kissinger and Rumsfeld were talking about various things and the question of appointment of ambassadors came up. Kissinger said that he wanted to propose me as Ambassador to Spain. Donald Rumsfeld said he didn't really agree with that, that he had a man working for him who was a Foreign Service Officer by the name of Gene McAuliffe who had been DCM in Spain for four or five years, and he was the one who should really get the job. So at that point Kissinger said, "Well, why don't we call Eagleburger in because he knows both of these people and let's be guided by what he says." So Eagleburger was called in and they said, "Eagleburger, it is between Stabler and McAuliffe. Who would you recommend?" Fortunately Eagleburger said me. So they said, "All right, he will be Ambassador to Spain."

So then I was told that I was definitely going to have the job. The papers were sent out to Ford who was then skiing in Vail. This doesn't seem possible, but it happened--the papers got lost. So they had to start the whole process over again. Eventually the papers were approved and the agrément requested. So it was late January, 1975 before I was formally nominated...the appointment had leaked and was in the press in December. In due course, possibly February, I had my Senate confirmation hearing presided over by John Sparkman, the Senator from Alabama who was then somewhat in his dotage. Curiously enough I think I appeared on the same day that McCloskey appeared to be Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The only question Sparkman asked me was whether I was related in any way to the University of Alabama football star. This was not something I would immediately know. But I somehow knew through my younger son who was an aficionado of professional football that the person he had in mind was the quarterback of the Oakland Raiders, Kenny Stabler. So I was able to say to him that if I hadn't been related to Kenny at the beginning of the season I certainly was by the end of it. That satisfied him and he went off to sleep. Then I was asked other questions, but very few about Spain. Javits, whom I knew quite well, and Hubert Humphrey, whom I also knew and in fact had traveled twice with him when he was Vice President, were very friendly. Humphrey was the only

one who got into substantive discussions about the Mediterranean. I was somewhat concerned that I would be asked awkward questions about the Franco regime which would be difficult to answer because you certainly didn't want to say something unfriendly and then find yourself in Spain a couple of weeks later.

Time was moving on, the former ambassador had already left. So I had to step on the gas, particularly as the Spanish had told us that if I arrived prior to the middle of March I could present my credentials immediately. Otherwise I would have to wait until after Easter. I arrived in Madrid on March 11, which was very quick, and presented my credentials to Franco on March 13, 1975.

*Q: Before you went out...the bases agreement has always been a problem but that was being covered by a special setup wasn't it?*

STABLER: The first phases of the negotiations began in 1973 in Washington--I think Bill Porter was Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Then it got going more actively in 1974 and McCloskey was named special negotiator. I became more involved in that because of the European's Bureau interest in it. The man who was sent over by Spain was Juan José Rovira the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He ultimately became a very close friend of ours in Madrid. So the negotiations took place now in Washington and now in Madrid. I didn't come back for the Washington ones, but I played a very active role in the negotiations in Madrid. Ultimately I directly negotiated three or four of the chapters without McCloskey. It was a question that the Spanish were beginning to feel rather strongly that we had too much for too little and they were particularly concerned over the presence of...well, they weren't "bases" - they were called "facilities" because the fiction was that these were Spanish bases on which Americans had facilities. So the flag at the entrance to the base was the Spanish flag not both flags, although there were American MP's along with the Spanish.

*Q: This was at Torrejon.*

STABLER: This was at Torrejon. We had a big facilities at Torrejon and we had another one at Zaragoza which was basically an all-weather bombing range which was used by our squadrons from Germany. We had another big standby operation in Moron, not too far from Seville. And then we had a large naval base in Rota, where we also had nuclear vessels.

The Spanish were troubled by this large facility in Torrejon so close also to the main airfield of Madrid, Barajas, which was practically on the same pattern. In the air you could see the two airports side by side practically. They were also a little concerned by some of the tankers that we had up at Zaragoza and by the Polarises at Rota.

But the main concern was Torrejon. So they pressed very hard indeed for the elimination of the facility at Torrejon. The negotiations in 1975 were tough ones because of all of this.

During that time I would see the Spanish Foreign Minister, Pedro Cortina Mauri, quite frequently on a whole series of things. In May, 1975, Ford chose to make a visit to Spain. It was one of those rather curious things where the decision is made in Washington and the Ambassador is

simply told that he is coming. I guess, in all honesty, I wouldn't have tried to oppose it, although at that time--I digress a bit here--there was the feeling on the part of quite a few Spaniards, particularly those in the so-called democratic opposition, which existed but was very closely controlled by the Franco government...but there were stirrings, the Socialist party was around, it wasn't legal, and there were others who were taking views that were somewhat different than the Francoists on the political constitutional construction of the country. There was some feeling that we were unnecessarily supporting Franco. That we were the big friend because we had these facilities.

When I heard about the visit I suggested to Kissinger and the President that while the President was in Madrid he ought to receive a number of the so-called democratic opposition, but not going as far as the Socialists, which would have been a bit more than the traffic could have borne. I got the green light to set this up and I went to see the Prime Minister. My strategy had been to wait until the Foreign Minister had gone out of town. He had gone to Paris to an OECD meeting. I thought the Prime Minister, Carlos Arias Navarro, would be perhaps a bit more receptive to this idea.

So I went to see him and told him that the President would like to meet with this group when he was in Madrid and showed the Prime Minister this highly innocuous list - I pointed out that they were all people who freely expressed their views and were well-known to the Government and to the Spanish people. He blanched and quickly gave me the list back and appeared horrified and immediately got in touch with the Foreign Minister who was in Paris. The Under Secretary called me and asked what was this that was going on. Then the Foreign Minister got in touch with Kissinger in Paris and said there was no place for this kind of meeting in the State visit.

I regretted very much that we caved. It is difficult for me to put myself in Kissinger's shoes, he had supported this thing, but he obviously didn't want the Spanish visit to go awry. I think, myself, in retrospect, I could have perhaps been instructed to say to the Prime Minister: "The President really wants to do this, there is ample room in the program for it, they are all Spanish citizens and the President would like to meet with them. If this doesn't seem possible, then perhaps he had better not come to Madrid." It would have sent a very good signal to have done that. Instead I was told to drop the whole thing. Later, I sat next to the Prime Minister at lunch with the President and raised this matter. He said it was not a question of the people but that it just wasn't appropriate in the context of a State visit. Well, of course, that was ridiculous. What it really came down to was that they didn't think Franco would accept the idea of the President seeing anybody who was even remotely associated with what might be called an opposition.

The Socialists, particularly, were very resentful that we had the visit. They felt we were propping the regime up. I feel myself that if we had had this meeting it would have sent a good political signal that we were open to other points of view. This was almost as bad when several years later--I will come back to the bases in a minute--when Adolfo Suarez, the Prime Minister of Spain, came to this country for a visit. Carter was then President and received him and riding over to the White House with Secretary Vance and George Vest, I was told out of the blue that the President was about to tell the Spanish Prime Minister that Vice President Walter Mondale, who was going to Europe shortly after this, was also going to Spain. This was prior to a Spanish election and I told Vance and Vest that I thought this was an overkill. We really shouldn't appear

to be selecting a chosen instrument and that Mondale could perfectly well go somewhere else and not come to Spain. We just had the Prime Minister in Washington. We did not have to have the Vice President in Spain. And they agreed. But, of course, by the time they got to the White House, the Prime Minister was already there and in Carter's office. Carter told Suarez that Mondale was going to Spain and that was that

Later I recommended that when Mondale was in Madrid a reception be held at the Embassy to which I could invite leaders of the democratic opposition parties. The Communist Party leader would, of course, not be invited, since Embassies abroad were under strictures to have no contact with that party. The Prime Minister was the head of the Union of the Democratic Center which was a coalition that had been thrown together. But there were other legal opposition parties, including the Socialists. This would have been the first time many of these people would have been able to meet one of our two principal elected officials.

I couldn't believe my eyes when I got a message from Washington saying, "This has been turned down because it would be considered undemocratic for the leaders of the democratic opposition to come excluding the communists. And although we had a very strict policy of not seeing any communists, as the communists couldn't be invited you cannot do the rest of it."

*Q: Where was that coming from?*

STABLER: I sent a message to London where Vance and Vest were. I said I could not believe that this could be correct and gave the reasons why. I got a message back saying that it was. Still to this day I do not know the rationale for it. David Aaron who was the Assistant National Security Adviser to National Security Assistant Zbig Brzezinski, apparently made the decision that you couldn't do something of this sort that didn't have all of the political parties. Yet only a short time after all of that happened, we got a message from Washington saying, "You are strictly instructed not to have anything to do at the ambassadorial level with communist parties although you might be able to have some contact at a lower level." When Aaron came with Mondale, I asked him about this, but he just didn't have a very good explanation. So it was that sort of thing that drove one wild.

*Q: Sort of a tinkering by people who really didn't know what they were doing.*

STABLER: Basically again where you have a professional ambassador on the spot he knows what the situation is, he knows what should be done, he knows we don't have any relations with the Communist Party. No one in Spain would have had the slightest concern at the fact that the communists hadn't been there. The others would have come, they wouldn't have minded. They wouldn't have boycotted the thing if the Communists were not there. At all the receptions and things that I had at the Residence I never had a communist at them and all the others all came.

Anyway, what started me on this long digression was the reference to Pedro Cortina Mauri, the Foreign Minister, with whom I had many talks concerning the negotiations. In these discussions with him, he was trying to present the idea that in our negotiations on these "facilities" we should set up a structure which would in effect duplicate the structure of NATO. Spain, obviously couldn't be a member of NATO as Franco was still around, but they wanted to have something

which was more than just an arrangement on facilities. In Spain you had...in the NATO you had a council, a political committee, an economic committee, a military committee etc. He would draw a diagram of the NATO structure and then he would draw a little diagram, little boxes, etc. with all the structures he wanted on the Spanish side and then there would be a line between the two which would be the US. In other words the US would be the link between NATO and Spain.

I used to tease him about this because one day he repeated his diagram drawing circles rather than boxes. So I said, "Oh, Mr. Minister, I am very interested to see that your policy has totally changed." He looked terribly surprised and said, "What do you mean?" I said, "You are talking about circles today, not squares." Cortina, who was quite serious and of whom I was quite fond, had to smile

The negotiations went on and we got into tough discussions because the Spanish in effect said, "No agreement unless you leave Torrejon." We were not prepared to do that. Then came the fall of 1975 when Franco had decided to execute five or six Basque terrorists who had killed civil guards and policemen. This caused an enormous storm in Europe. Most of Western Europe withdrew their ambassadors, etc. I happened to be in the States at that particular time so there was no question about my being withdrawn.

This was the time that the General Assembly was starting and the Spanish Foreign Minister came over and asked to see Kissinger. We met in Kissinger's suite in the Waldorf. The thrust of all this was-- "My mission from Franco is to get agreement, get something signed. Therefore we are prepared to let you keep everything that you have. The only thing we ask is that before I leave to return to Madrid we sign a framework agreement which can then be fleshed out into a formal executive agreement."

So we sat down and with circles and boxes we created with the Spanish exactly what Cortina had originally talked to me about. We met in Washington at the Spanish Embassy and Kissinger and Cortina initialed the framework agreement, which set up this new sort of structure for the facilities agreement. It was understood that we would keep everything that we had in Spain, including Torrejon.

I went back to Spain and shortly thereafter Bob McCloskey came to have another round of negotiations. We sat down in the conference room in the Foreign Ministry and the Spanish delegation started again with extremely stiff statements about the need to get out of Torrejon, etc. So McCloskey and I looked at each other in considerable surprise. We said we really couldn't understand this because this was exactly diametrically opposed to what the Foreign Minister had just said in the States and indeed which had been incorporated in a document. We, therefore, requested a suspension of the session and requested an immediate meeting with the Foreign Minister.

We went to see him and told him what had happened. He told us that he was embarrassed to say that he had not told his delegation anything of this yet and they didn't know what had been agreed to. The only thing that he would ask of us was to perhaps give up Moron, the standby base. We said we saw no problem with that, if that was what they wanted.

We didn't resume negotiations immediately because the Foreign Minister had to inform his delegation what they were to do. So far, I think this had been between himself, Franco and the Prime Minister.

Shortly after that Franco became ill and everything stopped. It wasn't until after he died and after the King had taken over in November that a new government was formed and José Maria Areilza, the Count of Motrico, became Foreign Minister. Areilza requested an urgent meeting with Kissinger. Both Kissinger and Areilza were in Paris for an OECD meeting. I had been at a Chiefs of Mission meeting in London and went down to Paris for this meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister and Kissinger. At that meeting the Foreign Minister said that it was important for Spain to have an agreement with the United States just after the King's advent to the Throne to show that the United States was fully in support of the new government.

He asked only three things - one, that we turn the previous Executive Agreement into a treaty, secondly, that we remove the Polaris submarines from Rota, and thirdly, that we somehow manage to appear to be giving Spain a billion dollars. He said that in return for that Spain would agree that we could keep everything.

The Polaris submarines was due to return home anyway, so that was no problem. Kissinger felt that, in light of the change in the regime with the King taking over and the possibility of a democratic government, we probably could do a treaty. He said we would certainly examine how much we could come up with to satisfy the third request. It was agreed that Kissinger would come to Madrid on the January 24, 1976 to initial a paper along the lines of what had been discussed. It was to follow the framework which had been previously agreed with then former Foreign Minister Cortina Mauri.

So we set to work in early January with the Spaniards in Madrid. McCloskey came over and worked closely with the military side. The cultural, political and economic parts of the agreement I did myself. By this time the Spanish delegation was aware of what had been agreed to with regard to our keeping the facilities.. The only thing was the question of Moron again. We said that we had agreed to give that up and wanted to point out to them that, in agreeing to give it up, we were no longer responsible for its maintenance, physically or financially. At this point, the Spaniards said we could have it back again. They didn't want to have to pay the maintenance. So the result was that we kept everything we previously had.

Then we set about putting it in treaty form and agreed to a phased period of removing the Polaris. Then we went about trying somehow to establish the billion dollar figure. We did everything, including practically adding in the page numbers, just to reach that figure. There was some grant military assistance, some military sales guarantees, and a whole series of things. So when you put it all together it looked like a billion dollars, but in point of fact we gave them basically a few million in military grants with the rest in military sales which they got at a reasonable rate but for which they paid. But somehow it looked as if we were giving them a billion.

Kissinger appeared in Madrid and on January 24, 1976 initialed the Treaty which had been prepared. In due course it was sent to the Senate.



In early June, 1976 King Juan Carlos came to the United States on a State Visit. When Ford was in Madrid in May 1975 we tried very hard to arrange it so that the President would meet with Juan Carlos with only Kissinger and me present. This was to take place after lunch at the guest palace, the Moncloa Palace, where Ford was staying. That Palace is now the Residence and office of the Prime Minister, or as he is called in Spain, President of the Government.. After lunch all the Spaniards left including the Foreign Minister, my friend Pedro Cortina Mauri. We thought this was fine and could now have the meeting, as we had planned. But much to our horror, Cortina returned just in time for the meeting with the Prince. I told Kissinger that the only way we were going to be able to deal with this was that he would have to stay out of the meeting, and obviously I would too, because that was the only way we could keep the Foreign Minister out. That would be the only way that the Prince would feel he could talk very freely. So that was what happened. Kissinger hated it, but he realized that if he went in then so would the Spanish Foreign Minister, and the Prince wouldn't say a thing. The Prince made a big impression on Ford and spoke very freely and frankly. Kissinger ultimately became quite a close friend of the Prince. I should add here that before I went to Madrid I was given briefings in Washington to the effect that the Prince was a handsome fellow but pretty lightheaded on top. After I got there and had talked with him a few times, I told Washington that wasn't true.

*Q: Where was this type of information coming from do you think?*

STABLER: It came largely I think from the trips the Prince made overseas and when he had to be terribly careful what he said and did, so he didn't talk much.

*Q: Was he sort of playing Prince Hal waiting to become Henry V?*

STABLER: I think to some extent. He also realized that he was created by Franco for this and therefore publicly had to be very, very careful. So he was all smiles and dances, charming and glittering and lightweight most people thought. I don't know to what extent my predecessors really got to know him because I would have thought if they had they would have realized that there was a good deal more than met the eye. So the conventional wisdom of my briefings in Washington was that while he was a nice fellow, he was sort of a lightweight with no particular role. Fortunately, he was very outspoken and used to talk very freely, which used to surprise me at times. But it all led me to believe that he had a certain amount of native intelligence, that he was no one's prisoner and that he had many people that he knew from his travels with whom he kept in touch. People like Bob Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce. They were both yachtsmen. He used to talk to Kissinger on the phone. All sorts of people that he would meet and talk with and get ideas. By the time he became King, Kissinger realized there was someone here of considerable substance, so he was invited to the States very quickly after he became King.

Juan Carlos prepared a speech for him to give before a Joint session of Congress in Washington. This had been written by a variety of people, including members of his staff. The King sent it to me to help with the English translation. I took it as my cue to make suggestions on it, which I did. In the draft the first part went on at enormous length about the history of Spanish-US relations. The second part, relatively brief, concerned the events in Spain and his vision for the future

I recommended to him that he flesh out the second part and cut down the first part. I also suggested that At the outset he say that his speech would be in two parts, the first on history, the second on current events in Spain. I said that without that preamble he would simply lose his audience who would think it was going to be a lightweight speech about the history of US-Spanish relations.

He did that and the speech was a remarkable one and very well received. He outlined in the second part the democratic Spain he envisioned. It was partly, of course, for the US Congress, but basically it was for the audience at home. He felt that he could more safely do that sort of thing abroad rather than at home, because he was a constitutional monarch and was not supposed to be involved in the political evolution. Let me add parenthetically that the King said to me more than once that he had to be careful, because he was not only once a Bourbon, but twice a Bourbon. This, of course, referred to the fact that his grandfather, Alfonso XIII, had meddled in politics and had been forced to abdicate. Juan Carlos was a Bourbon through his father and through his mother.

The speech, delivered by the King in his excellent English, also the added effect of making the Senate pro-King and pro-treaty. So when the Treaty finally came to the Senate it was approved by an overwhelming majority. For the first time we had a Treaty rather than an Executive Agreement incorporating the facilities and setting up this structure which was somewhat of a carbon copy of the NATO structure.

*Q: Sort of a shadow NATO.*

STABLER: A shadow NATO. Of course, now Spain is a member of NATO. The Treaty has been written with that in mind and we had not given up Torrejon.

*Q: Continuing with the treaty business, was there the feeling that when Franco goes that Spain very likely will go under NATO?*

STABLER: Well, I don't think so. I think there was a lot of misgivings. A lot of people in Europe and elsewhere felt that the King simply would continue the Franco regime...the Franco structure would remain in place and he would simply be a figurehead of the Franco regime, version II. In fact, when he came to this country in June, 1976, he had a meeting with newspaper publishers, etc. here in Washington and they said to him; "Well, we don't see that anything has changed in Spain. You still have Arias Navarro as Prime Minister. He was Franco's Prime Minister. You have this, you have that and you have the other thing. You don't seem to have changed anything." The King replied, "Well, I will also say to you that you don't seem to have changed your people. The newspaper people reporting on Spain today are the people who reported on Spain under Franco. They don't see what is going on, what is changing." That was in early June and on July 4, a month later, he dropped Arias Navarro and brought in Adolfo Suarez. This was all being done in steps. It couldn't be down overnight.

He had to feel his way. Suarez had been brought up as a functionary in the Falange, which was the Franco political structure, and had followed a career up the ladder as a Franco functionary. Suarez had no idea basically what a democracy was. He was young, attractive, a good TV

personality, liked the King, the King liked him, and he was ambitious. There were many people associated with some of these younger Franco people who recognized that you couldn't carry on the regime without Franco and that indeed you could, without too much difficulty, modify the Organic laws of the Franco regime as a transition towards democracy by simple changes. And that is what happened. By simple changes, they maintained the same structure with a new Prime Minister, ultimately leading, of course, to rewriting the constitution and leading to elections. The constitution wasn't finally finished until sometime in 1978, so the first elections under the new constitution was in '78 or '79. But in the meantime, Spain had moved from the dictatorship of Franco into a democratic regime without changing any of the laws. I mean without revoking these fundamental Organic laws - they were simply adapted to the new situation.

That was one of the big arguments I used to have with some of the members of the democratic opposition, particularly the Socialists and the Christian Democrats who said that the slate needed to be cleaned. It was essential to start from scratch. I would say that that was a very dangerous thing to do. You had to have something in place and work on that and gradually work into the next phase. But don't just destroy everything and start from the beginning, because that would lead to immense trouble because you would have no reference points. Now you have a reference point which with certain changes will lead towards what you eventually want to do. Fortunately that is what they finally did. Some of them recognized that it was far less dangerous to do it gradually than to try to do it all over night.

*Q: I would like to go back to one final thing about the base negotiations. How did you find...often the hardest thing with the base negotiation is not with the foreign government but with that other foreign government, our Department of Defense...they dealt...after all if you had a standby base and you had a base Torrejon which has high visibility close to Madrid, wasn't there a feeling on your part or someone else's part of "Oh, hell, let's just move it over to Moron and put it there and not"...did you get the feeling that once our military gets established and used to a place for perks or other reasons or were there substantive reasons?*

STABLER: I don't think Moron would have been able to handle the type of thing that existed in Torrejon. Moron base was a standby base which had hospital equipment and things like that. It was not up to the standard that we had at Torrejon. It would have meant basically an enormous structural job and I don't think the Spaniards would have been wild about having it that close to Seville either. The alternatives were keeping it or getting out.

I think when our military had to examine what the Spaniards were demanding they had to make then the decision of which was more important--Torrejon or Moron. You could have Rota and Zaragoza. But you couldn't have Torrejon. Zaragoza was the only all weather bombing range we had in Europe. It was essential.

At that time we had not told the Spanish that we were prepared to go from Torrejon. Obviously blood, sweat and tears were being produced in Washington over getting the Pentagon to agree that's what they would probably have to do. I wasn't really involved in that. It was all done in Washington.

I was very fond of Bob McCloskey. It never struck me as if he had a great grip on all of this, but I may be wrong on all of that. Obviously here in Washington when it came to the business of dealing with the Pentagon, it wasn't just Bob McCloskey who got involved. There was the Deputy Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of EUR, Political Military Bureau, etc. So it was then the weight of the institution that was being brought to bear on the whole Pentagon. I don't doubt but that they had quite a time to get the Pentagon to agree to this. But I always found these negotiations frustrating because again to try to get our government organized into action with somebody making a decision about something could be awfully painful.

We had not yet gotten to the point of telling the Spanish we were getting out of Torrejon, and when the time actually came to do it, I don't know what would have happened--whether we would have done so or not. If the Spanish had said that there would be no facilities agreement of any sort unless you do this, that was the price we were apparently prepared to pay. But in the final analysis at that time we did not have to make that agonizing decision. Indeed, it is the price we are prepared to pay today but in different circumstances because Spain is part of NATO. The Italians rallied around and gave us additional facilities and now you have the whole changed situation in Europe anyway.

But I think one of the most difficult things of all is that negotiations with foreign governments are difficult enough, but negotiations within one's own government are sometimes hopeless.

*Q: This is a continuing interview with Ambassador Wells Stabler. Today is July 30, 1991. Mr. Ambassador we covered a good number of things in Spain already. Particularly the bases issue, how you or one dealt with Juan Carlos, etc. I wonder if we could talk now a little about the period when Franco fell ill. There was sort of a death watch. Was this as the Spanish would put it a parenthesis in the Spanish political developments--everybody was waiting for the shoe to drop? How did you deal with that?*

STABLER: I had seen him at the "Dia de La Raza" (Columbus Day in Spain) ceremonial function at the Institute of Ibero- American Relations, which was a creation of Franco. Apparently at that function on October 12, 1975 he caught a chill. Four or five days thereafter he had a heart attack and was extremely ill.

*Q: This was when?*

STABLER: In October 1975. As I said earlier, we had still been negotiating the base agreement. When Franco fell ill, basically everything stopped in Spain. The whole system of government just came to a halt. No business was conducted. Indeed, there was this incredible sort of death watch that went on as the man lay ill and was then operated on two or three times. There were incredible tales about the operations being performed in the El Pardo Palace where he lived and how a room had been turned into an operating room and how all the hangers-on gathered in the room right next to it. Doors were swinging open between the reception room and the operating room with people going in and out. It was utterly chaotic. But, of course, this was an enormously traumatic thing in many ways. He had been in power since 1936. That was 39 years and everything had rotated around him. The process of government halted.

Of course, at about that time there was one major development which caused problems in Spain and also basically for us. That was the famous Green March in Morocco where the Moroccans had started a march to take over Spanish Morocco.

*Q: This was led by the King.*

STABLER: Well, essentially led by the King. The problem here was that, with Franco lying gravely ill, there was no one clearly in charge and the Spanish were nervous about it. The military wanted to take military action. Others felt this would be a very serious thing and in any event Spanish Morocco wasn't all that important to Spain, far more important were the enclaves in the northern part of Morocco, Ceuta and Mellila.

Then the TV programs, of course, showed this Green March and showed at one point a man struggling along carrying an American flag. So the Spanish became very suspicious that we were involved in some way behind it. I, of course, assured them we were not. I had some residual suspicions that in some way we may have given some logistic or planning support to King Hassan of Morocco with respect to the Green March. It was quite a few miles from the Moroccan border to the capital of Spanish Morocco. We had some very difficult times with the Spanish over this. Then at one point, Juan Carlos, as Prince of Spain, made a visit to Spanish Morocco to show the flag and assure the Spanish residents that Madrid was standing behind them. I don't know if he was able to do a great deal, but it is quite possible that he played even more an important role than was known at the time.

We, of course, tried to urge calm and that they not take up arms. Interestingly enough, that was what happened. I say interestingly enough because obviously the Spanish felt rather strongly that the Moroccans were taking advantage of Spain at a moment when Franco was ill. They had all sorts of delegations, negotiations involving people from the government, private emissaries. In any event this all got by without any serious consequences.

*Q: How does one operate in this? Here you are the American Ambassador. You know we have had very close relations with Morocco since 1796 or something like that. You have this lurking suspicion that perhaps at least somewhere within our government, by either CIA or military or something, may be giving some underhand assistance there. Did you go back to Washington?*

STABLER: In something of this sort instructions were received from Washington. I reported obviously what the Spanish were telling me and the conversations I had had with the government, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Chief of the Military Command, the Minister of the Army, etc. who all had this suspicion that somehow we were involved. I was instructed, of course, to go in and tell them that we were absolutely neutral in this thing. We had nothing to do with it. It was hands off. We just didn't take sides.

It was a little difficult because the Spanish felt that they had a right to some support from us since this was, if you will, an aggressive act by the Moroccans. It had not been brought about by any action of the Spanish. It was entirely a Moroccan thing to take the Moroccans' minds off their local problems and the Polisario who were the rebels supported by the Algerians who were

trying to take away some of the Moroccan territory. This was really, basically as I looked at it, a move which was started entirely by the Moroccans.

*Q: Did you at some point call in your station chief, CIA man, and the defense attaché and say, "Now listen, are you sure there is no monkey business going on?" Or in a way did you not want to call them in?*

STABLER: I didn't, although in point of fact I had a daily staff meeting of all the heads of sections which met in my office around 10:00 for the purposes of finding out what was going on, and giving them my instructions of what I wanted done. If it had been something that was a CIA operation, we wouldn't have been told that. Maybe the station chief would have been told, but he would have been told not to tell the Ambassador. In saying this, I don't say that I have any fixed knowledge that we were involved except it seemed to me that shortly before this began, Dick Walters, who at that point may still have been Deputy Director of CIA, made a visit to Rabat. Whether it had anything to do with it or not, I don't know. Whether the Spanish suspicions were founded, I do not know. They couldn't come up with anything very specific. The only thing that they came up with really was why was the American flag being carried in the Green March.

I pointed out that it also might have been in the Moroccan interest to have it appear that we were behind this. It would not have been too difficult to give the flag to a Moroccan or whoever, and tell him to wave it so that the cameras would pick it up. So I told them that I didn't think that was a very valid point. I made very clear to them, as I was instructed to do, that their protests were really groundless and this was not something that we had anything to do with and that we were urging, as we usually do, tranquility and calm and moderation.

In any event, this was all overtaken by the death of Franco. It was one of these things where there had been many reports that he had died, which proved not to be true. One of them, for example, which I cite because it seems to me a good object lesson of what should not be done. One afternoon there were reports around town that he had died. I had checked these reports and touched base with a number of people I had confidence in who had told me the reports were not true. But the Defense Attaché, whom I had kept on--he had been the Army Attaché under the previous Ambassador--came in to see me and said he had heard reports. I said that I had heard them too but was absolutely certain that they were not correct and therefore was not going to send a message. I thought I might, in due course, telephone to tell Washington that the rumors were not true. He agreed and left the room.

I called the Assistant Secretary, Arthur Hartman, in Washington and told him that there were a lot of rumors around and he may have seen tickers, etc., but I could assure him they were not true. He said that he couldn't quite understand this because he had just gotten from my Embassy a CRITIC message --which stops everything...

*Q: Designed to report coups, deaths of chiefs of state, outbreak of war and this type of thing.*

STABLER: It is the top, priority emergency message and gets distributed in a flash around Washington.

He said that the message said that Franco had died. I said that I didn't know how that could be because I certainly sent nothing and it is not true and I was calling to tell him this.

Well, after digging into this a little bit and asking my station chief to find out for me what sort of message it was, it turned out that the Defense Attaché had gone directly from my office, up to his office and had sent without any authorization from anybody the CRITIC message saying that Franco had died.

*Q: I find this incredible.*

STABLER: Well, it was incredible. It made me absolutely furious. I called him in and ripped him over the coals and said that if he wasn't about to be leaving anyway and retiring, he would be out of Madrid that night, because I would not keep him. I made it clear that he would send a message to Washington and take full responsibility for the telegram which he did without any authorization. He did this. The Defense Department was rather angry with me for making him do it, but I said that this was exactly the sort of thing that is intolerable in an Embassy--someone who can send wires on his own.

I think this is one of our great weaknesses that everyone from a different agency has access to their own communications and can send any message they want on their own.

At one point CIA wanted me to agree to combine the State communication center in Madrid with the CIA communications unit which would be run by the CIA. I absolutely flatly refused. They said, "What, don't you trust us?" And I said, "It isn't a question of trust. If I could be assured that I would see every message going out of that communication center no matter what it was, I would agree to it, but I will not agree to something where I do not have total control over my communications and I do not want ever a situation to arise when I am sending a message and am told it can't be sent because the station chief's message takes priority." So I said, "I refuse flatly. I will keep my State Department communication and you keep yours. I am not going to have a situation arise where the Ambassador's messages are put to one side."

*Q: What was the motivation of sending a CRITIC message?*

STABLER: It was very clear to me what it was. He thought that he was getting a scoop and he would be the one who scooped the Embassy by getting the message in first. He was convinced that he was right, although he didn't say he disagreed with me when I talked with him. But it was true, he went directly from my office upstairs to send his message.

*Q: But he knew what would happen.*

STABLER: He thought he was right, but he wasn't. It was a very undisciplined effort by him to gain glory. That was all there was to it, very simple. As I say, if it hadn't been for the fact that he was leaving, I would have asked for his removal at once.

*Q: What happened to him subsequently?*

STABLER: He eventually left and retired. He was teaching somewhere in a college somewhere in Pennsylvania. He was a very nice fellow, but I was terribly disappointed to think that he would do something of that sort.

I mentioned it because it just seems to be an object lesson in a way. You run an embassy, you work...I did not ever agree to the use of country team in the embassy because I didn't consider it a team. The Ambassador was the ambassador and everyone worked for the ambassador. We had very close communications via staff meetings, etc. But I didn't want anybody to feel in a sense, as this fellow apparently did, that you are all part of a team and maybe there is a *primus inter pares* but you are a team member and go and do your thing.

*Q: I find this interesting because I served in embassies where I was part of a country team, but it never occurred to me that we were there to do other than contribute.*

STABLER: Well, I wouldn't even let the name be used because I didn't really, frankly, believe it was necessary. I will say this and I have talked about Graham Martin and how difficult a person he was when Ambassador in Rome, there were some things that I thought he was right about. He was the one who actually used the term Diplomatic Mission and would not use the term of Country Team. I thought he was right on that, so I copied him when I went to Madrid. And it worked, I think it worked well. It wasn't that I was aloof because I had these daily meetings with all the top members of the Mission and once a week a much larger meeting involving section heads and all the peripheral people.

*Q: What was the reason for having these larger meetings?*

STABLER: The larger meeting, once a week, was designed to bring in elements that were in Madrid and had functions, but who were not strictly speaking part of the Mission, such as the 16th Air Force and the Office of Special Intelligence of the Air Force. This gave the possibility for these other elements to be plugged in to some extent as to what we were doing. They very rarely offered any comment of particular interest, but it was an opportunity for everybody to get together.

Of the two I found the morning meeting most useful. We tried to keep it to no more than 15 minutes. This was an opportunity for all the principal section heads, including the head of MAAG -

*Q: Just to give an idea, who were the principal section heads?*

STABLER: Well there was the DCM, the political counselor, the economic counselor, the political/military counselor, the consular counselor, the head of MAAG, the Defense attaché and other military attachés, and the station chief. At the bigger meetings you added the FBI man, the Narcotics man, Agriculture, etc. At that time the economic counselor also covered the commercial side of things, otherwise there would have been the Commercial man as well.



It was a way that I could then find out from them what they were doing and what was going on; and then I could say what I was doing this and to give, my guidance on how certain matters should be dealt with.. It was a very useful coordinating tool and I think it worked well.

Franco finally did die. I had been at a dinner party the night before. There were some Franco relatives there. They were called to the telephone during dinner and then disappeared. Well, one obviously couldn't ask what had happened, but I had arranged with someone who was well plugged in to call me the minute that he heard that Franco had died. About 4:30 or 5:00 the next morning I got a telephone call from this friend who said the end had come. That ended this era. I immediately informed Washington.

Then, of course, the question was who was going to represent the United States at the funeral. Because he was Franco, although there were a lot of people who didn't want to come, there were many who wanted to. President Ford took quite some time to decide. But they made the wise decision that they would appoint Nelson Rockefeller, then Vice President, and me as the US representatives. In spite of a lot of pressure the President and Kissinger wisely decided that they were not going to make a circus out of this thing. They were going to limit it to just two people.

Franco died on the 20th and I think the King's swearing in took place a couple of days later. Rockefeller came right over. Then we had rather an amusing thing. In the parliament building there was very limited space so it was agreed that only the principal delegate from each nation would be allowed to come to the parliament for the swearing in. I was rather indignant about the whole thing because it seemed to me that I was not only delegate but Ambassador. A lot of my colleagues were both Delegates and Ambassadors so they all could go. At one point Mrs. Rockefeller thought she might want to go so I got two tickets for the Vice President and Mrs. Rockefeller. When I said I was not able to go she decided that perhaps she shouldn't go and I should take her ticket. So I did. Of course the Spanish protocol people were upset. I was the only non-chief Delegate Ambassador who had been able to attend. But I was determined that somehow I would participate in this event.

That went off very well. The King became King. There was no crowning. There was a crown on a stool representing the monarchy, but he wasn't crowned, but sworn in. He made a speech and I congratulated him on it and he said, "Yeah, but I wish you could have heard my knees knocking." Then, several days later there was the formal funeral in front of the main royal palace in Madrid. To appease my Spanish Protocol friends I agreed that I would not sit with Rockefeller, but with my Ambassador colleagues. Afterwards we all drove out to the Valley of the Fallen which was a huge underground basilica where many of the fallen in the Civil War were buried, including a few of the Republicans, and, of course, the main leaders of the Franco period. And that is where Franco was buried that day.. Rockefeller was there, of course, for that. We both went to that. Others there included Pinochet of Chile, King Hussein of Jordan. I might add that on the way out with the Vice President and Mrs. Rockefeller in the Vice President's car flying the American flag and his Vice Presidential flag, he was greeted quite warmly by the crowds lining the road.

*Q: Pinochet was President of Chile*

STABLER: King Hussein of Jordan was there and a lot of others. But most of the European countries were represented by their ambassadors. We, obviously had a special relationship with Spain because of the military facilities and that is why Rockefeller came.

Rockefeller stayed on during the week. The next event was a week later. It was to be the King's Day--a mass at the Los Geronimos Cathedral in Madrid, at which many foreign delegations would come, including Prince Philip of the UK and a lot of the European royalty and leaders who were acknowledging that there was a new Spain after Franco's death. During the week before the King's Day I didn't see much of Rockefeller because he wanted to be left alone. He and his wife went on their usual buying sprees. He was a compulsive buyer and bought everything in sight, not one but dozens of them. My wife and I did have lunch with him and Mrs. Rockefeller one day, but that was it.

Then came the King's Day and we went to the Cathedral. The Cardinal of Madrid, Cardinal Tarancon, who was quite a liberal Cardinal...at one time Franco support depended on the Catholic Church, the military and the wealthy class. The wealthy class and military remained supporters, but the Church had begun to change and take strong exception to the dictatorial form of government. At this service Cardinal Tarancon delivered a homily which was nothing short of a political statement. It was quite democratic and liberal in terms of what had been going on. I mention this because I was very much interested that after the service, Rockefeller, who was always regarded by some as being fairly liberal, was absolutely aghast to think that the Cardinal had given such a liberal homily. I think those who thought Rockefeller was a liberal were perhaps rather wrong. Basically he was very conservative.

Then we went on from there to the Royal Palace - the Palacio de Oriente, as it was called. There was a big function there. It was amusing because, of course, I, as a Delegate went into the part of the Palace where the foreign delegations were--Prince Philip, royalty from Liechtenstein, everywhere--(I must say that I discovered there that Prince Philip has a good sense of humor. He was very funny talking about various things in Spain and what not.) Rockefeller and I stood together. After the King and Queen came in and greeted each one of us, I went scooting through various back ways of the Palace, which is a very big one, to another part of the Palace where the King and Queen were receiving ambassadors accredited to Spain. So I took my place there, and when they came by they did a double take and said, "Haven't we just seen you some place else?" It was quite an occasion and the Spanish did it extremely well. It was a joyful moment when the King took over, although at that point no one really knew where this was going to go.

*Q: During the Franco death watch, and during the period when the King took over but was obviously the new boy on the block, etc., what were you looking at? Were you looking at the army, etc.?*

STABLER: I had felt long prior to Franco's death that there was a tendency in Spain to move towards an updated concept in the political system and the recognition by a great deal of the younger people that Spain had to move on and catch up in the 20th century to where a lot of other countries were and had been for many, many years. It was also fairly clear to me that the creation by Franco of a middle class in Spain had brought about a rather moderate attitude. There

were a lot of people who had made great improvements in their standard of living and didn't want anything to happen that would interfere with that.

I also had come to recognize that the military as such was a fairly disciplined group and probably would not take any action on their own. And then it was also clear to me from talking with Juan Carlos, as Prince before, that he was on the right track with all this and it was likely that the transition would go peacefully.

So one was in very close touch with the King, with the government, with leaders who were coming into the new government. For example, before the new government under the King was announced, I went to see Count Motrico, who had been Spanish Ambassador to Washington, and who had been in almost every part of the political spectrum at one time or another, was regarded as a mild opposition to Franco. It wasn't very severe. He had been, after all, Franco's Mayor of Bilbao, and Ambassador to Washington. I went to see him and he gave me the list pretty much of people who were going to be ministers in the new government. He became Foreign Minister.

Now Juan Carlos did the intelligent thing. He kept Franco's Prime Minister, Arias Navarro, as the Prime Minister. He did not want to oust Arias immediately because he did not seek a confrontation with the loyal Franquistas which would cause a great upheaval. But he brought people in who had been somewhat in opposition to Franco, such as the Count of Motrico, José Maria Areilza.

*Q: The King, by the way, under the former government could form the cabinet. It wasn't a parliamentary democracy as such.*

STABLER: He was Chief of State. All of Franco's Organic laws were still in force. So the Chief of State could appoint the government--the Prime Minister, and see to it that the right people were brought into the cabinet. And he brought in a number of younger men who were more modern, if you will, in their approach. The people believed nothing had changed because here was Arias Navarro, the Minister of the Army was the same, etc. Therefore, what had changed? It was just a continuation.

But it was a clear strategy to not upset the apple cart right away and there was a lot of nostalgia for Franco who, after all, had been around for a long time - forty years. So throwing everybody out on the street would have been more than the traffic could bear.

My object in this period...and let me say here that in those situations, you don't get instructions as to what to do. You pretty much do what you think should be done and tell Washington what you are doing. But no one says you should go in and do this or that. My effort in all this was to encourage democratic elements in playing the game and trying to persuade those people who had been strong opposition to Franco, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, not to try to force the issue to the point of throwing everything out and making a new beginning. And not go through a period when nothing was on the table as you try to write a new constitution. Not to turn the thing into a trauma. It was important to believe that the King was going in this direction and to play the game along with him and not to rock the boat in the extreme sense.

And, of course, we did what I mentioned to you before regarding the facility negotiations. When Kissinger met with Foreign Minister Areilza in Paris in December, 1975, we disagree to the treaty and things of that sort so that it would demonstrate that the United States was backing the new government. The whole aspect of this was really to support the King and the forces that wanted to change the system in Spain, but to change it gradually and in a rational way. I mentioned to you earlier that part of this was the negotiation of the Treaty, part of it clearly was inviting the King to make a State Visit to Washington in June, 1976.

And, of course, an extremely important part of this process also was the support, advice, counsel, etc. that came from the Europeans who felt that with Franco gone it was a new situation and that some of these new parties should be supported. As you know, there are the various political foundations, particularly in Germany, representing the different political parties.....

*Q: Each one representing...the CDU, the SPD .....*

STABLER: Then there was another one the name of which I can't remember the, a liberal one. They had representatives in Madrid and a lot of money passed through those people to help the various political parties. Willy Brandt was very helpful in terms of the Socialist Party in trying to convince the Socialists not to do anything drastic. The Christian Democrats were sort of at sixes and sevens. Even today they don't have much of a role in Spain.

It was interesting because one of the leaders of the Christian Democrats, Ruiz Jimenez, had been Franco's Ambassador to the Vatican. He had even been Minister of Education under Franco. Then he went totally in opposition and, of course, those parties were legally banned.

So this was my main preoccupation to support the elements that wanted to move towards a democratic system. The King's speech before the US Congress was all aimed at that. I mentioned my role in that. It really went, I think, quite smoothly.

The King recognized, of course, that he couldn't go on for very long without dismissing Arias Navarro. He was a very nice man but had also been a Minister of the Interior, in charge of the secret police and the security police in Spain. It was in the air that the King had to make a change. He called Arias Navarro to the Royal Palace in Madrid and, I think, totally shocked him by telling him that he was finished. It was a courageous thing to do.

It was unknown before that he was going to be called in so a new Prime Minister hadn't been designated. It was rather amusing that I had separate visits from three or four gentlemen, each one of whom thought he was going to be named Prime Minister - each one assuring me of that fact. One was a man who had Christian Democratic leanings although he had not been a member of the Christian Democratic Party as such. Another was former Foreign Minister Areilza. I was quite sure that none of them would be Prime Minister, but they thought so.

Much to everybody's surprise came the appointment of Adolfo Suarez, who had been in the new government, although at the moment I can't remember exactly what he was doing. He was young, he had no background in democracy whatsoever. I talked to him many times. He had no particular grounding. He came up the ladder as a functionary of the Franco party - the Falange.

But he was young, attractive looking. He obviously got along well with the King, the King liked him and the King picked him out of the young element and made him the Prime Minister. It came, as I say, as a great surprise to most people. I had a call from someone in the Palace while I was having the 4th of July reception, telling me that the new Prime Minister had been chosen. They wouldn't tell me the name, merely that it was someone that I knew and somebody who was an insider and I would probably like it.

Then the King in July, 1976, about a month after returning from the States, took the occasion to shuffle the thing around. Some of these people who had thought they would be Prime Ministers found themselves with no jobs at all. My friend Areilza wasn't anything. His Under Secretary, Marcelino Oreja became Foreign Minister. He was a young fellow, also with Christian Democratic tendencies.

All of these people were part of the democratic element and I mentioned this before. When Suarez took over it became clear that eventually there would have to be an election, certainly within a year's time, even though the new constitution hadn't been written. So Suarez and all his friends created the Union of the Democratic Center - the UCD -which was a collection of people from all walks of life, but who were not the nostalgics, who believed in the consolidation of a democratic state. There was the Alianza Popular which was creation of Manuel Fraga who had been Minister of Interior in the first government of the King. He created this rather right wing party. Then there were the Socialists who had social-democratic tendencies, but who were regarded by many with deep suspicion as a stalking horse for the communists. On the far left there were the communists led by Santiago Carillo who had, with official but unacknowledged concurrence, been allowed to reenter Spain sub rosa after years spent in exile. The center party became quite important because as we went towards elections, there was a strong feeling that the Socialists were going to do extremely well and this frightened lots of people. So lots of people in this right wing party of Alianza Popular voted with the Union of the Democratic Center out of fear that somehow the Socialists might get in. And the Socialists were regarded as the nemesis of all the vested interests in Spain because they had been associated with the communists during the Civil War and were considered basically the enemy. So that's what happened in the elections of 1977--the Union of the Democratic Center won a landslide majority.

About this time, or just before the elections took place, the decision had to be made as to what to do about the Communist Party. The Government decided that it simply couldn't declare nonexistent a certain element of the population. So they waited until Good Friday, when all of Spain ceases to function for a whole week, the military and other public opinion leaders go out of town, papers do not publish, etc. They selected that moment to legalize the Communist Party to try to reduce to the extent possible the outcry of some parts of the press and military, etc. It really worked remarkably well because by the time some of these people got back into town the thing had been done and there was no time to organize anything. So the Communist Party was legalized.

The Prime Minister asked me once at a long lunch I had with him before he went to Washington about the whole thing. I said, "I suppose officially speaking I would have to say that we don't approve of the Communist Party, we don't like them and don't think they should play any role. But if you ask me privately, I would say that it was the only thing that you could do. You could not declare them nonexistent and therefore you did the right thing because you minimized the

dramatic effect by legalizing them. If you had banned them you would have made a crisis out of it."

But this Union of the Democratic Center was a bastard type of organization. It had all sorts of people in it. They tried to structure it as a regular party and ultimately, after my time, it fell apart. The Socialists came in and that was that.

This was a fascinating period to be there because to watch a country that has been almost 40 years under a dictatorship gradually turn itself into basically a very successful democracy is, from a professional point of view, a fascinating thing to watch.

*Q: We are so used to dealing with the exact opposite.*

STABLER: Exactly. So the creation of a monarchy to boot was quite astounding.

During the early period I was involved rather heavily in all of this. I do not mean to suggest that I was writing constitutions and that sort of thing, no. But trying to encourage this process. Trying to facilitate it. Trying to keep us from being too much in bed with one group, which I wasn't always very successful in because of the strange way we do business in Washington. And supporting this whole process in one form or another...through visits, the Leader Grant program and that type of thing which was useful.

As time went on it was quite clear to me that my particular role in this was coming to an end. It is never very desirable in these situations to have a terribly close involvement of the American Ambassador in these things. We had situations where when Suarez was Prime Minister I was in Washington on consultation and the word came to me that the Station Chief wanted to have direct contact with the Prime Minister and understood that the Prime Minister would like to have regular contact with him. I went to see whoever was head of CIA at that point, Stansfield Turner I think it was, and said absolutely not. I was not going to have the situation where we had two channels into the Prime Minister. There was no reason for it.

*Q: It is also dangerous. All of this comes out later on.*

STABLER: Also in our system where the CIA chief can do things and write messages which he doesn't have to show to the Ambassador you lose control. To my knowledge it never occurred. He didn't like it, but I made it clear that this was not to be. If they thought they were going to do this then I was going to resign. I just think that it is a very awkward situation. We had no Spanish programs in Spain. I could see from the Prime Minister's point of view that he wouldn't mind that sort of thing, having little back channels and so forth.

You get to a situation in this type of setup where eventually one party believes that you are being unfriendly to them and too friendly to the other party. And that began to be the situation. Suarez began to feel that I was being too friendly to the Socialists, and the Socialists thought I was being too friendly with Suarez.

As 1977 rolled along I felt that I had probably done all that I could do and was beginning to spend an awful lot of time fighting with bureaucracy in Washington. I was getting very tired of it. There comes a point where if you are spending most of your time trying to get Washington to do things, to focus on things, a sort of diminishing returns set in.

*Q: What type of things were...?*

STABLER: Well, personnel for one thing. Secondly there was one rather difficult case involving a contract we had with the Spanish through the Defense Department and, I think, General Electric, to establish a whole communications network for them for their military, a sort of command control structure which they didn't have and contracted with us, involving quite a bit of money, to do. We didn't do it very well. It didn't pass any of its tests. We kept charging more money and the thing became intolerable. I got thoroughly involved in it. Just the business of trying to get the Department and the Pentagon to focus on the damage that this was causing us was absolutely monumental. It was the type of thing that drove me wild because I couldn't get anybody to focus on it and take seriously what it was that we were doing and where we were wrong. We documented it in every way and eventually they did.

The Department imposed personnel appointments on me which had no reason.

*Q: Madrid is one of those places where you send either lower level or politically connected people. The cultural officer who is a friend of so and so.*

STABLER: We didn't have much of that really. But for instance, I wanted a certain person who spoke Spanish for my political counselor and had thrust upon me a man who spoke excellent Mandarin and had been in the National Security Council who had no more reason to be in Spain than the man in the moon, except that they had to park him somewhere. It was quite clear that they were only going to leave him there for a short time and this was purely parking. I objected to that but was told that this was going to be it. So he came and he wasn't very good. I got tired of that sort of thing.

So eventually I told George Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, that come 1978 I thought I would be quite prepared to move on. As it turned out, of course, I probably would have moved on anyway because then they had to find a job for Terry Todman, who was then Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs and who had fallen afoul of the Carter Administration over his, I believe, decision not in some cases to make the human rights thing a make or break issue. Other things have to be considered too. But he was considered rather weak on that so they decided that they wanted to get rid of him. Spain was in the cards as I would have been there for three years. I had gone back to Washington in '77 and thought that the thing to do was to call on the Secretary Vance and was told by the staff that he couldn't possibly see me. I went to see Phil Habib, who was then Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and talked to him about some of the things that were going on in Spain and he said I should see the Secretary. I said that I had tried to but was told no way. He simply picked up the phone and said to the Secretary's Assistant, "You make an appointment for Ambassador Stabler." It was to be on a Saturday. I was called Saturday morning and was told that the Secretary was preparing to go to Moscow and there was no way he

could see me. So I called Phil Habib and told him the situation. He said I had to see him. He called back in ten minutes and said, "The Secretary will see you."

*Q: This is sort of the gatekeeper complex.*

STABLER: Yes, the gatekeeper complex--You are an Ambassador so what is important about that.

And there were certain things. There were things about the visit of the Prime Minister that was coming along, there were things about the base negotiations, there were a variety of things that had to be discussed. And also what were their plans for me, which I think I had every right to have some idea about.

So finally I went in to see Vance and had a good talk with him. He said they would like to have me stay on for another year--this being in '77. So that was about it--I left just about a year later.

In the first few months of 1978 Frank Church, a Democratic Senator from Idaho, who was about to become Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, decided he wanted to come to Spain. He had been invited by the Basques, there were a lot of Basques in Idaho, to come to Bilbao, which was a very important part of the Basque country--big industrial center up there--for the ceremonies which were being permitted for the first time celebrating Basque national day. In Franco's day it was absolutely banned.

*Q: Because there was a very strong Basque separatist movement.*

STABLER: Very strong Basque separatist movement with a terrorist organization.

But this was to be a civic, civil ceremony in Bilbao and Church had been asked to come to it. When I heard this I called Church and said, "Frank, please come to Madrid first. The government is very sensitive to all these things. While this ceremony is officially sanctioned, Madrid still is the capital and the government is there. Even though it is a new government, they are sensitive to anything that appears to delegate from the authority of the central government. So please come to Madrid first." He said, "I understand that and I will. I am glad that you told me. I will come to Madrid first and then go up Basque country."

Well, that was the time that the Panama Canal Treaty was being negotiated in the Senate and Church was very much involved with it. He was held up and had to go to Bilbao first. I had an appointment for him to see Foreign Minister Oreja. When I had heard that he was going to Bilbao first, I called up the Foreign Office and said, "This has happened. He was going to come to Madrid first, but he has been held up. He has got to go to Bilbao, but I want to make sure that everything is still in order and we still have the appointment." I was told there was no problem.

So he went to Bilbao and then gave an interview to the press which was very innocuous and not unfriendly to the central government. He arrived in Madrid and we drove down to the Foreign Office. We sat in the antechamber; we waited; we waited 10 minutes; we waited 15 minutes. Finally I got up and said that I wanted to know what was going on here. They came in to me and



said that they were sorry but I didn't have an appointment with the Foreign Minister. I said, "Now, wait a minute. I went all through this and was told that the appointment had been confirmed. No one had called me to tell me it had been called off. We came down here and this is an enormous insult. I will see to it that my displeasure is reflected."

We returned to the Embassy and I called the Foreign Minister and couldn't get him. Then I called the Under Secretary and absolutely lashed into him. At this point I had also been told that the Prime Minister would not see Church. So I called a man who was very close to the King and who had absolutely direct access to him whenever he wanted it. I said, "Here is this man who is going to be Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. You want friends there. You are just in the process of making an enemy of somebody who will never forget this sort of high-handed rude insulting treatment, not only to him but also to me as the American Ambassador. I am frankly extremely displeased with this thing. The only way to save it is if the King sees this Senator."

It wasn't 15 minutes later before this fellow called me and said that the King was very upset by what happened. He was extremely annoyed and would, of course, receive Senator Church. Frank Church was, I must say, very good about the whole thing.

*Q: He was politically savvy about understanding...*

STABLER: He understood what was going on. He understood what I said to him about coming to Madrid first. He realized what I was trying to do to rescue the situation. He did what I asked him to do.

So we went to the King. The King apologized for this. Later I understood he ticked off both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister for their behavior. Everything went off very well. Then I had a call from the Foreign Minister saying that he was sorry things hadn't worked out, etc. He asked if Mr. Church would come to see him at his residence. Well, I said, "I don't know, I will have to see if he will or won't." I told Church this and said, "Obviously we mustn't play their game. We must go down to see them and not give them the satisfaction of refusing to see them because that plays into their hands." So we went down and it was all right.

They were foolish, overly sensitive to the Basque business. Of course, they have had some terrible times with the Basque business. My very good friend, the Duke of Veragua whose real name in life was Cristobal Colon or Christopher Columbus, was assassinated by the Basques. He was an admiral in the Spanish navy and they made a mistake thinking he was somebody else and assassinated him. A lot of people were killed unnecessarily.

It was this sort of thing, the Church episode led one to believe that Suarez had been there too long. He had hung on too long. He was finally dropped by the King, I think before I left, and a new man Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was put in. That may have happened actually after I left.

I left in May, 1978. When I heard that Todman was coming I told George Vest that as far as I was concerned I would stay for another month, I wasn't going to wait forever for him to come. I would just as soon go.

At that time the Union of Democratic Center was still in power with Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo who actually had become secretary of the party before that and who had been in the first government of the King as Minister of Commerce. He had been an industrialist in Spain and well connected. A member of the somewhat privileged group. But then things began to disintegrate in terms of this Union Democratic Center. When the constitution was written which was completed in December 1978, there were elections in the spring of 1979 under the new constitution. The Socialists won hands down and have been in power ever since.

*Q: One of the elements, before we leave Spain, you mention that the wealthy class were one of the pillars of the Franco regime. This is also a problem for an ambassador and embassy. I mean this group can over embrace you and all. They have the money, the social know how and end all. It is very easy to become captive of them. Did you have a problem with this?*

STABLER: I didn't have a problem with that because I spent really a lot of time on the political side. One had to keep in touch with them, no question about it. I met them all shortly after I arrived in Madrid. The American Ambassador was a personality and these people were used to knowing the Ambassador and they were all very friendly. I must say we had a lot of good friends amongst this group which were by no means parasites. They were hard working people. But they had made a lot of money. They had been given various facilities and income tax was not very great and they had prospered well under Franco.

Franco had reintroduced into Spain the nobility which is a very complicated thing in Spain and taken very seriously. The book of peerage is a huge thing...and there are different degrees. You have dukes, marquesses, counts, viscounts, barons, who are Grandees of Spain. and you have the same titles, except for dukes, who are not grandees. All dukes are automatically Grandees. So you have someone who is a marquess who is a grandee and one who is not a grandee, the one who is a grandee sits ahead of the one who isn't. There are lots of Spanish nobles. That had been facilitated by Franco and played an important part. As you know, Franco was a monarchist and it was his decision that he would be succeeded by a King.

Under those circumstances one must never allow oneself to be captured by any particular group. When one entertained in the early days that I was there, you entertained the power structure. You could not entertain the power structure of any banned political party, that simply didn't work. If you tried to have Felipe Gonzalez, which you wouldn't dream of doing, with the Duke of Veragua or somebody, it simply wouldn't...

*Q: Felipe Gonzalez was at that time...*

STABLER: Leader of the Socialist Party, which was illegal. They didn't know any of these people and it would have been a scandal. You would have had an illegal politician with a member of the establishment. Now, interestingly enough, when Franco died and new government came in, we began to have functions where you would have some of these people and some of the political people. You would have a useless duchess or something, but you would have people who had an interest in what was going on in Spain. They were fascinated in meeting

some of these people on the political spectrum they had never, ever laid eyes on before. Sometimes that worked very well.

But I spent a great deal of time in getting to know the political and the economic side as well as the intellectual side, although to a lesser extent because they didn't play any particular role, curiously enough, in the development of the society. But some of the intellectual people who had been exiled during the Franco period and came back, people of that sort, I made a particular point of meeting as they presented a different approach to the situation. They were not sort of the element that had supported Franco. The Franco period when I was there for me only lasted until March, 1975 to November, 1975, and then it began to develop into the new thing. So by the time that I left you had a whole new structure. You had had elections, although under the old laws because the constitution had not been finished. Some new people were coming into this picture. People who had been exiled. The King had the power to appoint a number of royal senators to take into account some of the people who were distinguished in life and many who had been exiled who then came into the picture that way. So you had an opening of the situation. A whole new element had come in which made it more interesting. So, of course, it was essential to try to keep in touch with all these people the best one could.

*Q: I had a rather bizarre story told me by Jack Binns, who was DCM under Tom Enders, about an American woman who was married to a count, Count Romanones who tried to destabilize Enders because she thought she might even get the job. Do you know anything about this?*

STABLER: Well, I knew Aileen very well. Aileen Romanones came to Madrid during WWII, possibly in 1940 or thereabouts. She came from a small little town in New York State. She was a secretary in the OSS Office in Madrid. A very pretty, tall woman. She got around Madrid society. She fell in love with a grandee, Count Romanones, who was a very wealthy person and who apparently had other sexual preferences. His father said to Aileen when she was going to marry him, "You understand about my son, don't you?"

She had built up over a period of time a position in Madrid and all the nobility. She had an attractive house in Madrid, a lovely place out in the western part of Spain - the Extramadura - a beautiful house down in the Costa del Sol. She made it her business to know people and when we arrived, we were immediately asked to quite a few things. I have to say it was very helpful because she knew all the power structure of the Franco regime and in a very short period of time...mind you I arrived in March and had Ford arriving in May so it was essential for me to know who the players were. Through her and these dinner parties and so forth I met a huge number of the principal players in the Franco regime, including Franco's daughter, granddaughter and people like that.

As time went on, of course, the situation changed. She had a little problem making the transition because she was closely linked with the Franco power structure. Then she became very friendly with the Alianza Popular, Fraga's thing. She would come over here and give lectures and talk to right wing organizations here in Washington. Then she began to find it amusing to meet some of the new breed of political people. She was very much the figure of the ancien regime, but she found it amusing at political salons to gradually meet some of these other people who had been

out of the political picture because they had been banned and got to know a number of these type. I am sure she met Gonzalez and others in the political spectrum.

She knew Todman. I don't suppose she was of much use to him. Don't forget that by that time the new Spain was well on its way. The Socialists were in power and she was less relevant. She would come over to this country and made a lot of money going around the rubber chicken circuit giving lectures about the American wife of the Spanish count. In Peoria this beautiful woman with all her emeralds describing the life of Spain and her part in it was fascinating. She got involved a bit in the political thing too on the right wing, the Alianza Popular side. She has written a couple of books which most people agree are highly fictional, although they claim to be real, about her exploits in the OSS, etc.

I can't answer the question specifically as to whether or not she tried to destabilize Enders. I just don't know. He may not have paid much attention to her.

*Q: I think he was warned not to, or something like that before he went to Madrid.*

STABLER: I think that may have been right. If I had been talking to someone going to Madrid at that time I would have said to meet her but then steer clear.

*Q: According to the story she tried to absorb him very quickly into her social group before he got his feet on the ground. He cut that off. But she had a direct line to Nancy Reagan and enmity was built up.*

STABLER: That I have heard. And I have heard that Enders basically left Madrid because Nancy wanted him to. It certainly was true that Aileen Romanones was at the White House quite frequently under the Reagans. I don't doubt that that might have been a true story. But I think that Tom Enders did absolutely the right thing and anybody in their right mind would not have permitted themselves to be consumed in this manner.

When I first went to Madrid it was just the opposite way around. It was extremely useful for me to meet the Romanones. As time went on one saw less and less of Aileen. She had become decreasingly relevant.

*Q: I think this is very interesting because it helps show social life for an ambassador is not social life. It is a working function and quite rightly so and you have to figure out how goes the social play as far as whom you meet, the influence you have, etc.*

STABLER: Yes, that is about it and I think you have to be very careful to balance it. When I first went there a lot of these people...the sort of social, social people...had a role and one, therefore, couldn't ignore them. You didn't want to antagonize them, but it didn't mean you had to climb in bed with them. But you did include them, and you did have dinner parties. But as time went on it became less relevant.

I had an interesting thing that came up and made a decision which I know was the right one, although I am sure some of the Spanish didn't like it. I had a lunch or dinner, whatever, after the

election, the first popular election, where people were elected to the parliament representing a constituency rather than a particular walk of life or organization as in the Franco days. When one had a function you had members of parliament and then maybe a grandee or two, people who had some function and were not just grandee do nothings. Well my protocol person said that the grandee had to be put first. I said, "Absolutely not. I am going to establish a new thing. You have an elected member of parliament and quite honestly I think he rates being the top of the heap." So I did it. Certain eyebrows were raised, but then of course, it became fairly normal, that was what was done.

I think any ambassador in a situation which has been fluid has to keep changing with it and adapt to the new thing. At no point should one ever allow oneself to be regarded as a captive of a group. It is sometimes unfortunate when you are regarded by one group as being too friendly with the other group, if the other group thinks the same thing. It means that you are in the center.

I was told, for example, that my immediate successor was regarded as being unfriendly to the Socialists. I don't know why they hold that. But his successor then passed the word along that the Socialist Prime Minister had said to Todman's successor, "Oh, let's get rid of this fellow." What is true there?

In any event, I put this in because I think that the one thing that an ambassador should not do under any circumstances is to speak ill of his predecessor. I think it is a cardinal sin. You can simply say you don't know. But don't spread stories about a person, it doesn't help.

I think that the Binns tale is fascinating.

**CLINT A. LAUDERDALE**  
**Administrative Counselor**  
**Madrid (1975-1979)**

*Clinton Arlen Lauderdale was born in 1932 and raised in Texas. He joined the U.S. Army during the Korean War, serving in Germany. Upon returning to the U.S., Mr. Lauderdale received a bachelor's degree in political science from the University of California at Berkeley. He has also served in Mexico, Germany, Brazil, and Spain. Mr. Lauderdale was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 16, 1964.*

LAUDERDALE: I was assigned to be Admin Counselor in Spain from Bonn in 1975. Similar circumstances -- Wells Stabler was coming out as a new Ambassador. I think the tour of the previous administrative officer may not have been up, but I remember that Stabler wanted a new Admin Counselor and he wanted what he considered to be a first class, competent, active, can-doer, and it was worked out that I was the guy. I had been in Bonn three years, and Stabler, unlike Hillenbrand, was tough. One might say difficult, but certainly hard, and that made itself felt right from the beginning. I was due home leave, and I've got a wife and kids. So I was going to leave in June when my time was up, go on home leave, and report to Madrid in August. He

said "No." So I said "Well I haven't had home leave." He said "Nothing goes on here in August. I don't need you here in August, the whole country goes off to the countryside on vacation. I want you to come in June and then you can go on home leave in August." So I said, well how do I do this? I've got to arrange it as kind of a direct transfer, deferred home leave. I'll raise it with Washington. They approved it. So I went direct, left my family behind, direct to Madrid in June and worked in Madrid in June and July, went on home leave with my family in August, and came back in September. And when I got there in June he told me "This is a sleepy little Mediterranean post that we're bringing into the 20th century. We're going to make it a first class Embassy, you and me. So pull up your bootstraps and get at it!"

*Q: What was the political situation like...you were in Spain from '75 to '79. Let's start when you arrived. What was the political situation like at that time, as we saw it?"*

LAUDERDALE: Franco was dictator. He had been dictator ever since the civil war. He ran the country with an iron grip, with the Guardia Civil. He controlled the press. There was elements of a rough Parliament, which he controlled. Basically a police state. He was getting on in years, was in ill health. Was expected to die several times even before I came. Somebody told me, "You may be in Spain when Franco dies. Two successive tours of officers have thought they were going to be in Spain when Franco dies." He outlived their tours. So when Franco was going to die and who was going to succeed him was a big part of the reporting. And how its going to...is there going to be another civil war? Will there be strife? Transition to democracy, is it going to be another military takeover, some other general going to step into his boots? So keeping up with that was a full-time occupation.

Because of this sleepy little Mediterranean post thing, because it was a military dictatorship, the role of our military attachés was very important because the press were controlled and the Parliament was limited the role of our intelligence agencies was important. So it was basically a military/intelligence post. Our political officers were a little bit in the backwash. No democracy, no press, no parliamentarians to go talk to. The people who know something are the generals, so we send our colonel over to deal with that. Economic affairs was low-key. Of course if Franco died and it became a democracy or a democratic monarchy, that changes things. That's what Stabler anticipated and he was 100% right.

*Q: Okay, you're the Administrative Counselor and you're going to turn this sleepy Mediterranean post into a 20th century dynamo. From your perspective and the Ambassador's perspective, what did you do?*

LAUDERDALE: I worked on infrastructure and some basic services. Get the telephone answered when it rings. We'd got a 19th century switchboard with inadequate lines, the old pull-cord type. So one of my programs was to get a new, modern switchboard so that we don't need three operators to pull cords when one or two could do it pushing a few buttons. And maybe the phone gets answered. Beefing up the duty officer situation so we're in operation 24 hours a day seven days a week. First class! None of this business that we can't find a duty officer, school will keep til Monday. Office space arrangements. Getting the telegrams distributed earlier within the Mission and getting enough copies. Which was the same story, they had old copying machines

that were slow and didn't make enough copies and you couldn't make copies in color and this and that. So I revamped all that to get better communications going. Things along that line.

What dominated the staff meetings at that time was Franco's death. Franco was going to die practically every day. It used to take up all the time of all the staff meetings, and we would get urinalysis reports from the military attaché who got them from the Army doctor. His urinalysis shows that he's got bile in his liver or whatever and he's going to die within 24 hours. The station chief sent out a critic message that Franco had died. Ambassador Stabler called me at home about 10 o' clock at night, demanding to know how he could send out a telegram when he chose, but the Ambassador had to give two hours notice to do so. Apparently the station chief had given him that excuse for sending out a critic message instead of reporting to the ambassador to do so. I explained that he had a communicator standing by at the embassy, in case he were needed, but we had to call one in for duty when required, because we did not have the overtime money to keep one on duty routinely, and he did. Stabler said this was unacceptable. I suggested he tell the station chief not to send cables without his permission instead of chastising me about the communications structure; he said "you let me worry about that." Well it turned out that Franco had not died, they put him on a dialysis machine. They had to send a cancellation to the critic message.

But one day he did die. It was about the first year of my time there, it must have been '76. And Stabler was kind of doing the same thing I was. He was getting a first class team. He got Frank McNeil as Political Counselor, which was an excellent choice. So he was on hand and in place when Franco died. When the Spanish wanted to talk about a new constitution or parliamentary democracy we had Frank McNeil there who could...we might have brought experts from the States, probably did, but Frank had a lot of this stuff right in his head. And he did a lot of groundwork with the foreign affairs people and with parliamentarians and so forth. And Stabler had excellent contacts, right from the King on down to discuss all of these issues. So I think the U.S. was able to play a facilitating role and offer some good counsel in the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

*Q: What were our concerns with Franco gone? What were the issues and the problems?*

LAUDERDALE: Well one real problem, which actually occurred later, was the threat of a military coup. Not exactly a coup, but that some other military general would step in and say "I'm going to succeed Franco." Of course our goal was to move Spain, or to see Spain move to a parliamentary democracy. And as you may recall, the sword was passed to King Juan Carlos as the sovereign, with a parliamentary democracy, with a prime minister, and there was actually on the floor of Parliament, and a colonel with a machine gun and they were going to close down Parliament and take over the government. And King Juan Carlos was able to cut that off with his charisma and leadership. So that was the real threat we were all worried about.

The second thing was to make it governable. You don't need a lot of fragmented parties like you had in Italy, where nobody had a majority, nobody could rule. There was also concerns about retribution, the same thing we're concerned about now in Haiti. When you change from a Franco government to a non-Franco government there's a lot of people who have grievances going back to the civil war. Are some of those people going to come out on the streets? Is there going to be a

new civil war? Are there going to be killings in retribution for what happened in '36? Or even '56? Mostly that didn't happen. Mostly it worked. There were some strikes of course.

*Q: What was our estimate before Franco's death...I mean obviously you're sitting in on country team meetings and all, what were you getting the impression of Juan Carlos...he became King, later he gained in stature, but before something happened what was sort of the feeling about him?*

LAUDERDALE: Favorable, but with some kind of lingering doubts because he had kept a low profile. He hadn't really stepped forward and said "This is who I am, this is what I stand for and this is where I'm going to take Spain." I think he felt he couldn't do that with Franco alive, so he stayed in the shadows and nobody knew for sure what kind of sovereign he was going to be. So there were some doubts, some 'let's watch carefully,' but with an overlay of optimism. He seems to be the right guy, he seems to want to go where we want to go. So, general favorable impression but some doubts because that impression wasn't based on in-depth knowledge.

*Q: Well, on a more practical level, here you were, you were going to turn it into the 20th century. You've just come from Germany, where you have an extremely competent -- maybe overcompetent -- foreign service national staff, how did you find the Spanish employees of our Embassy?*

LAUDERDALE: Very good. Very competent, none of this "siesta" kind of stuff that you might visualize. Basically we cranked up the tempo, and some people told me to my face, Clint, you guys ruined that post. Spain used to be a "good" post, why you could go out there for two or three years and play golf out at the airbase on Friday afternoon and have weekends to yourself to travel, and you guys are out there were working the ass off of people. Coming in on Saturday and you don't have time for golf! Well, that's exactly what happened. Two of my staff members were out playing golf on Friday afternoon when I arrived. I stopped it. I said "no golf on duty hours." I was a real you guess what, I was a real son of a bitch. So we cranked up the tempo. We had more work and we mostly did it with the same number of people. There were some shifts in staffing, I think we got another economic officer, we got a political officer, and we probably cut an intelligence agent and a military attaché to make up for it. But the volume of production and work probably doubled. So it was a spinning operation when I left.

*Q: On the death of Franco was there a change in the nature of our representation? Did you see a real change in how one dealt with the Spanish?*

LAUDERDALE: Ambassador Stabler, yes. And it caused some stress within the Mission. Our three colonel-level officers, Army, Air Force, Navy, they were used to dealing with the Spanish officials on a lot of business. They were used to seeing the Minister of Defense, and Stabler reined them in. He said, "I'm the Ambassador here and I will deal with Cabinet officers. You will not. No member of this staff will call on a Cabinet officer without my approval and advance knowledge. And I may want to go and interview them myself. And I may want to take you with me and I may not." The response was "You can't do that. Why can't we go and see the Secretary of Defense? Why we're old drinking buddies!" And he said "I don't care. You're not going." He moved it out of the military-intelligence arena into the diplomatic arena. And more work shifted



from the military officers, who used to get the information from the military, to the diplomatic officers who were now getting it from the Foreign Office, parliamentarians, from the Prime Minister's office, and so forth. So it changed the emphasis of our reporting, it changed the source of our information as this occurred.

*Q: Just to emphasize what you're saying is that one of the problems we have with governments that are basically totalitarian is that the relationship between intelligence officers and military officers and their counterparts gets to be a little too chummy, a little too cozy. We're too comfortable with the situation and we become part of the problem instead of trying to further what are essentially American interests, which is the free, open give-and-take rather than the closed little circle. Is that your feeling?*

LAUDERDALE: I think that's right and I think Spain was an example of it. What we were doing in Spain was cozying up to the military, who were in power there -- when I say we, I'm, talking about the military officers in the Embassy -- and their relationships were kind of military-to-military and they got invited over to military clubs for a drink and they had the colonels and generals out to their house for a drink and the whole thing was really very cozy. And they cooperated and exchanged information, without the equivalent occurring in the diplomatic arena.

*Q: Looking at this, I was in Athens between '70 and '74, where that kind of thing was happening too. And it blew up in our face. Was the example of being too close to the colonels in Wells Stabler's mind at all, because he was coming out of EUR at the time. I mean, did you get any feeling that he was looking at this as being sort of a bad example, because the repercussions were just being felt when he arrived?*

LAUDERDALE: I think what you and I said about what happens in military dictatorships, I'm sure Stabler knew that and felt that, but I don't think that was his primary motive. I think his primary motive was to take control, to manage the relationship with Spain himself, and to do it with diplomatic officers like Frank McNeil who know about diplomacy and constitutional law and democracy and so forth. That was the keel upon which he wanted to base our relationships with Spain, and to do that, he's got to put the military down, put them in place. He can't have them going off independently, doing their own thing, and saying God knows what outside his control. So he brought them in control and he shifted the emphasis to Frank McNeil and his staff.

*Q: Well one of the problems I would think would be that no matter how you slice it, the air bases there and Rota, the submarine naval base, can get to be a controlling element as the Azores were...everything we did with Portugal was based on the base in the Azores. Did you all feel the heavy weight of trying to keep those bases going?*

LAUDERDALE: Yes, yes, and it was a source of stress. The presence of Torrejon particularly, that's the big air base next to Madrid. The naval base, the submarine base at Rota, was from a strategic standpoint probably more important to us, but it was off to one side and it wasn't an embarrassment to the Spanish the way this big airbase right outside the capital, with all these Americans out there and these fighter planes coming in and taking off, and the GIs from the base smoking pot or getting arrested -- all these were potential political problems for the Spanish. So we had to walk softly on that. Also, Spain was very conscious of their sovereignty, they were

very afraid and very tough on the issue of our using Torrejon as a launching base for non-Spanish operations, in the Middle East or somewhere else. So even if we're headed off to bomb Qadhafi or something, we're not going to land at the Spanish airbase and refuel or something else without their permission, and mostly they didn't want us to do it.

*Q: This came up in '73, particularly during the '73 war between Israel and Syria and Egypt.*

LAUDERDALE: It came up many times when I was there, including some cases involving Qadhafi, when we wanted to send planes over to make a point or whatever and for convenience or geography or whatever they wanted to refuel at Torrejon, and they said "No, we don't want you to."

*Q: I think we've mentioned all of them, but what would you call your main problems while you were there. Anything that we haven't talked about?*

LAUDERDALE: No. I can summarize... Our major problems were infrastructure, the telephone system, office space -- we built an annex on the chancery -- we expected with the democratization process that the cost of operations, the travel would increase, the visa workload would increase. We had to prepare for that. You don't wait until they're standing in the waiting room. So we remodeled the consular section. Simultaneously we were doing things on security. So we remodeled and enlarged the consular section, we put in bulletproof interview windows for security reasons. We built an extra wing so some of the operations could be consolidated -- Administration, GSO. We got better communications equipment, we improved the security of the vault, the communications vault so that we could operate really 24 hours a day, seven days a week on alert basis. And ginning up the tempo.

*Q: How did you find the...was there a change in dealing with the Spanish government with the demise of Franco, from your point of view.*

LAUDERDALE: Yes, after Franco died obviously our way of doing business and all our contacts and relationships changed markedly. There was a period of a few months when there was some stress, dealing with the palace where Franco had lived and dealing with Mrs. Franco's aspirations and demands. But by and large the Embassy disengaged from dealing with the Franco aides and Franco household and so forth. There was an election, an elected prime minister. So you now had a constitutional monarch, an elected prime minister, you had the Cortes, a parliament, so our business was with the prime minister, the prime minister's cabinet and his aides and members of the Cortes whom we wanted to influence and also learn their views. And of course the Ambassador met periodically with the King. The Secretary of State came, I think still Kissinger at that time, and called on King Juan Carlos, and they made some arrangement whereby the Secretary of State would visit Spain once a year. That still happens to my knowledge, it may change because of the NATO relationship. Spain was not in NATO. The U.S. met with NATO officials, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense met with NATO every year and here's Spain out in the cold. So, the Secretary of State will come to Spain every year. So it did change quite a bit, yes.

*Q: Did you find when you arrived that the social life and all was around sort of what passed for the nobility? Was it captured by "high society" of the Franco era, as opposed to a more representational thing?*

LAUDERDALE: Yes. Exactly, it was.

*Q: Because I had a feeling that again, not only on the military and intelligence side but on the diplomatic side it's very easy to get caught up with the not very influential but high society of a country. Socially prominent, they've got the money and the houses and they entertain well.*

LAUDERDALE: And they like the Americans...

*Q: They like diplomats dangling around and all...*

LAUDERDALE: That's it, you've got it.

*Q: This is one of the curses of our business, and how you disengage from that. Did Terence Todman come while you were there?*

LAUDERDALE: Yes he did.

*Q: Now he's another old hand, but coming from quite a different area. How did he use you, and what was your impression of how he operated?*

LAUDERDALE: He came...he had been Ambassador twice, but just as important he had been Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs. When he first arrived we found his style a little bit imperial. More demanding of support and services than a small Embassy can provide. The Bureau could provide, in terms of press briefings, translations of major press articles by 8:00 every morning. It was a fairly big strain. He was also very much of a written person, as opposed to Stabler who was oral. You could tell Stabler almost anything orally. Todman wanted things in writing more often, and as you know writing takes more time, etc. etc. So, on the other hand, he wasn't the hard driver that Stabler was. Stabler was kind of a hard driver, demanding on the staff in terms of output. Todman was softer, one might say, he wasn't as demanding in that way which offered a little respite, on the other hand he tended to demand...his immediate office required more support. But I must say he was very effective in dealing with the Spanish and I thought he had the right attitude. On some occasions in staff meetings and such where I saw him correct officers, I thought he was absolutely right.

*Q: Could you give a feel for what his thrust was where maybe the officers might be disagreeing?*

LAUDERDALE: We had some dispute with the Spanish about the use of Torrejon Air Base, and we had an officer who almost every day, full time, would call the Spanish every day based on cables coming in from the military wanting 3 F-15s to land tomorrow or two C-30s, and the Spanish required that we get approval for every one. That were outside of the planes that were stationed there. These were planes that would stop and do something and go on. I think our officer tended to talk tough to the Spanish on these issues, because sometimes they might say no

or whatever, and he felt he had to push and demand and so forth. And I remember on that issue and another issue Todman asked: "Aren't we supposed to have friendly relations with the Spanish? Why don't we tell them that's what we're here for? We want friendly relations. We want to treat them fairly and we want to be treated fairly, and here's our need and can you help us. Let's watch out for the desk-pounding and strong language, because I don't think that's how you promote friendly relations. I don't think that's even going to get you a positive response!" And it seemed to work. We didn't always get our way, but...

*Q: Again, you left there in 1979. What was your feeling about whither Spain and all, at that point?*

LAUDERDALE: I was very hopeful. My concern was primarily about the economic side of Spain. Two or three things happened when King Juan Carlos came into power and democracy, along with that came a lot of abuse, a lot of pent-up resentment that produced abuse. The press wasn't a self-disciplined press. Suddenly you could buy Playboy magazine which had been banned for 30 years, so guess what, the newsstands were just filled with girly magazines, just to excess. Boys and girls who weren't allowed to kiss and hold hands on the park benches for 30 years now would kiss and hold hands not only on the park bench but in restaurants and just about everywhere else! Crime went up. There was no crime before, at least you didn't know of any because it wasn't reported in the press. And the Guardia Civil ran a tight ship. Now there was rampant crime, pickpockets all over the place. There was a demonstration...I had a good relationship with the chief of police, who was an army colonel, until they got democracy. There was a demonstration while I was there and the police beat up a number of demonstrators, which caused quite a flurry. I had lunch with the chief of police and he told me "You know, I have a hell of a time re-directing the police. They've been used to beating people with a club for 30 years when they don't get out of the way or do what they're told. And I'm trying to tell them this is democracy now, and we don't hit people over the head, you can steer these crowds down dead-end streets or cul-de-sacs to get them out of the way. There are other techniques we can use to defuse these crowds without hurting a lot of people." So I was confident that some of these things would peter out, and it did, and it all worked.

The economic side -- unemployment was high, the economy was kind of stagnant, and that took a little time. It's still true today, by the way, even though they joined the Common Market and the economy is up, unemployment is higher in Spain today than most other countries. So they still have an economic struggle.

**SAMUEL D. EATON**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Madrid (1975-1979)**

*Samuel D. Eaton attended Drew University in 1940 and served in the Army Air Corps in 1943. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His first post was La Paz, Bolivia. He also served in Brazil, Thailand, Peru, Spain, and Ecuador as Deputy Chief of Mission. In 1979 he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin*

*American Affairs. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in October 1990.*

EATON: I went to Spain, to an embassy where I wasn't wanted by the ambassador. I met him here before I went. He was a very interesting person and I admired him. He was a very able man, very intelligent, very smart.

But he made a mistake and he didn't last very long. He had been deputy chief of naval operations and he thought he knew, and he did know, security issues. We were coming up on base negotiations, and he decided he knew what the outcome of those base negotiations should be. So, well before the negotiations and before I arrived, he had told the joint chiefs of staff and anybody who would listen in Washington that it was time for us to give up one of the bases, Torrejon, and that's the way that the negotiations...

*Q: Torrejon being the major air base outside of...*

EATON: Madrid, which, fifteen years later, we are in the process of giving up. But nobody had a mind to give it up at that time. And so it was very quickly decided in Washington that he was not a man to stay around and that, moreover, he shouldn't conduct the negotiations. But I thought he was awfully good, and I thought he was right on this--eventually we were going to give up Torrejon. But from the point of view of the Washington policymakers and the bureaucracy, this wasn't the time.

*Q: Particularly because it was an Air Force base and he was an admiral.*

EATON: Exactly. But also he did not report, and, of course, reporting is the life blood of the Foreign Service. But he was used to the Navy and being in charge of his ship; he ran the ship and he didn't have to tell anybody how he did it. And he had very good access to the top people in the Spanish government and he concentrated on that. He had excellent access to Franco and to the prince, and he would see them, and then he wouldn't report. He would tell me what happened, but he said, "I'm not going to report this, because, you know, nothing is confidential, you can't really protect it. We know how to operate under them, but..." But that made people in Washington think he wasn't doing anything. Well, he was.

And one of the things he was doing (and the main thing I would like to talk about) is that he was beginning, slowly, the preparations for our future relationships with Spain. Because there were really two major issues before us at that time in Spain. One was the base negotiations, which were coming up; they came up every five years, and they were coming up. And the other was how to prepare for a relationship with Spain after Franco, who had been ill for a long time. Although people began to wonder if he wasn't going to live forever, it was obvious that someday he would go, and so it was very important to begin to prepare for the future by broadening the contacts of the embassy.

The embassy had been very insular and had been very limited in its contacts under Bob Hill, one of the previous ambassadors. But Rivero, to his credit, recognized, on his own, nobody gave him any instructions...

As a matter of fact, what I found curious in the European Bureau was that you didn't think through these things as we had customarily in Latin America. You didn't have this policy planning rigmarole which you went through, which meant that you dealt with these issues, intellectually at least, every year. Nobody ever, to my knowledge, debated this issue.

But Rivero had come to his own conclusion, and he began to have the embassy broaden its contacts, which I thought was obviously the thing that ought to be done.

Well, he was recalled after I had been there three or four months, and I was chargé for several months. During that period of time, I proceeded as he had been doing and expanded our contacts. We entered into a program of trying to identify the people who would be important in the future, and systematically seeing them. I would invite them to lunch, along with our political counselor or our economic counselor, whomever, to get to know them, get to know what they were thinking and so forth.

Then one day, the head of the American division of the foreign office called me and said, "Sam, I have something important I need to talk to you about. So let's have lunch and talk about it." He said, "Invite me to lunch."

So I invited him to lunch, and he said, "It has been noted in the government that the embassy is having contacts with really some rather dangerous people, Socialists even, and people who are very much in opposition to the government and what it's trying to do. And we don't believe that's appropriate and proper."

And I had to disagree. I felt that was an appropriate role for an embassy, to have broad contacts. I said, "We're not having contacts with the Communists, and we will not have contacts with the Communists, but I believe that it is a proper function, and the function that we should have, to have contacts with all other groups in the society."

We went back and forth on this, with no conclusion. And I think he was making a pro forma complaint, so far as he was concerned, because I later learned that he was personally close to some of the people that we were seeing. So I let it drop, I didn't even report it, and we just left it there.

But then, about a couple of months later, an assistant secretary, or a deputy assistant secretary, for international security affairs in the Department of Defense came through, who had served in Spain and was close to people in Spain, and they gave him an earful on this. He said to me, "Sam, I think you shouldn't be doing this."

And I said, "Harry, I think I should be doing it, and I will continue to do it unless we're instructed otherwise."

And so he came back to Washington and he complained to the State Department, to as many people as he could. And so I got a letter from the office director, describing what had occurred and asking me to explain my position. So I took my time answering the letter, but I told him my

reasoning and I said I think that Harry Berghold is entirely off base, that he's wrong and that this is the policy that we should be following, and I intend to follow it unless I'm instructed otherwise.

I never heard anything more and we continued. But I am sure that if the point had been raised officially, there would have been all sorts of heartburn over it, it would have been debated endlessly, and it would have been very difficult to get clear instructions.

*Q: Well, I mean, you're talking about a couple of things, for somebody who's looking at this. One, hearing you describe this, it seems as though this were part of the, you might say, the coziness of the relationship between our military and the...because we considered Spain a vital base at that time, that don't rock the boat, and stay, which has often proved to be such a dead end in places.*

EATON: That's part of it. But my view on that was that the people we were dealing with were temporary and they were going to change, and our long-term relationship would be much more solid if we developed a basis for it.

In any event, Wells Stabler came as ambassador. He was an outstanding professional. And he, quietly, without fuss, continued. We never really discussed it, but he continued the same policy and broadened it. He managed it himself. He and the political counselor developed contacts with Socialists, and I continued my role of helping the political counselor and the economic counselor and others meet with the young leadership that was developing.

And the result of this was that when Franco died and the prince became king, of the first three Cabinets that the king had, about two-thirds of the ministers in those cabinets had been in my house for lunch before and we knew them.

I called on the new Under Secretary of state for foreign affairs, to congratulate him on his position in the first cabinet. He came from the opposition. He had been with the Franco government, and then he had left it, in opposition to it, and he had become quite an articulate writer against it. I congratulated him on his new appointment, and he said, "I want you to know one thing. We're going to disagree on some things. We're going to have some issues on which we disagree. But I will always appreciate the contacts you maintained with us when we were in opposition."

Now that, I take, is only one indication of the value of what we did.

*Q: Well, obviously the word was out, too. I mean, what you were doing was not done in a vacuum.*

EATON: Oh, correct. Everybody knew in Spain what was going on. Not a lot could be published, but you could read between the lines. People knew what was going on, what people were doing. It was sort of like criminology.

*Q: Here is something really very interesting, starting with Admiral Rivero and your carrying it through, really a change in policy. In other words, we're going to open up and not be captive, to make sure that we keep the Franco people, but yet, probably if somebody were to look at the official documents, nothing's going to appear on them. If somebody's complaining, a letter comes to you, you write a letter back, and the only paper trail is sort of this unofficial informal or something.*

EATON: There's nothing on it.

*Q: Plus the fact that by never raising it...*

EATON: It was never debated.

*Q: You never debated, which is probably just as well.*

EATON: I think it was just as well, because I can *imagine* all the heat that would have come out of this debate, and we would have done nothing while we were waiting for the answer, and then the final answer would have tried to micromanage what we did.

*Q: You're sending in who your guest list would be. No, but I think it's very, very important for somebody who's looking at the documents to understand. This is the sort of thing I think that oral history can illuminate, because it's just not going to get in the paper trail.*

EATON: It's the sort of thing where if you're experienced enough and sure enough of yourself, you would and should handle it this way. But you can be very wrong, too.

*Q: Oh, yes, it can go the other way. I'm looking more at the system than at the actual thing. This is the type of thing where often there are undercurrents going on that just aren't going to appear in the official documentation. Were there any other major things? This, of course, is an extremely major thing that was happening in that particular time that you were there.*

EATON: Well, I think that that was the major thing. And the base negotiations were significant. And why Spain did as well as it did, contrary to the expectations of so many people. But I've written a book about that.

*Q: Could you give the name of the book and where it was published and dates and all.*

EATON: It's called *The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974-'79*. And it was published in 1981 by the Hoover Institute. But this is the product of the four-year experience there--the last year of Franco and the first three years of the king and democracy-- and it's an explanation of the forces at work and why the transition went as well as it did.

One was so full of this, because, after all, we had systematically met with the people who were involved. We participated in their discussions. That is, at least we listened to them talk and think out loud about how they would face issues. So at the end of the four years, I did want to write



about it. And I did. And I didn't have to do the research, it had been done over the four years. So I'm very pleased with it. It was published, and it's in a certain number of libraries, but it's not...

*Q: Well, that's actually what you're trying to do.*

EATON: Actually, it's been translated into Spanish, and it's in the USIS libraries in Latin America, also, in Spanish.

**JOHN HELM**  
**Communicator/Consular Officer**  
**Seville (1976-1980)**

*Mr. Helm was born and raised in Tennessee and educated at Carson Newman College. Entering the Foreign Service in 1973, he served in posts throughout the world, primarily in the field of Administration, including General Services, Communications and Foreign Buildings. His overseas posts include: Banjul, Gambia; Panama City, Panama; Seville, Spain; Quito, Ecuador; Mogadishu, Somalia; Tbilisi, Georgia; Bonn, Germany and San Salvador, El Salvador. His Washington assignments were also in the field of Administration. Mr. Helm was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

HELM: I picked up the phone and I called my career counselor. I said, "The Inspectors have just come. They're going to break the assignment. My tour is over. You've got to find me a place to go."

The Career Counselor said, "Um, well, I don't know." Then he said, "Well, a fellow came in here a few minutes ago and turned down Seville, Spain because it didn't have an American school for his children." I said, "I don't have any children. I'll take it. Right now. Consider it sold." And so I got Seville, Spain.

*Q: Oh, shucks.*

HELM: I really wanted out, and they fooled around for months getting me orders and officially terminating the assignment. I wanted to go that week. I was ready. But I filled out my time and was sent back to FSI for another 10 weeks. I was supposed to go to the Department to hang around the bureau. When I went back to Washington, I had the language test again because I was still on language probation. Not only did I fail it; the instructor was very upset with my language. I'd been working primarily, as assistant GSO, with the mechanics, the carpenters, the drivers, and people on sort of a lower plane, and had picked up some fairly rough language. I wasn't even aware of how rough I was. She was shocked, absolutely shocked. The ordinary sorts of things, an electrical receptacle, in Panama at that time was called an *enchupe*, because you put something into it. That's what it means; to stick something into something else. And so I would go around and say, "Okay, we need an *enchupe* here", and the electrician would come and wire it in. Well it

turns out that the verb *inchufar* has a whole different meaning of something stuck into something else, and this lady was absolutely shocked.

I was summarily reassigned to FSI for 10 more weeks so that they could force me to unlearn this absolutely obscene language and get off language probation. I went, and I studied, I memorized the little dialogues, I took their tests, and I got a two plus. I didn't quite make three. I went on to Seville, Spain. Between Panama, between FSI the second time, and Seville, I went and got married.

*Q: To the young lady from the Peace Corps.*

HELM: Yes, that's correct. She was in Michigan. I started trying to check out of the Department and was stopped and told that I would be the communicator in Seville, and I had to go to a communications course. Orders were cut for me to attend a one-week course in communications. It was going to run right up until through the Friday before I got married on Saturday. This was terrible. I went down to the communications course, I walked in, and the guy was there that had taught me the same course a year and half or two years, earlier. He looked at me and said, "Haven't you been here before?" And I said, "Yes." He said, "Well, we have to give you this course." I said, "Well, what are you going to teach me?" He said, "We're going to teach you to use this big teletype machine." I said, "Well you already taught me that." He said, "Well yes, but we have to teach you again." I said, "Look it up in your book. Is there one at my next post?" He looked it up and there was another small machine at my next post. He said, "I'll have to teach you to use the small machine." I said, "I already know how to use that machine." "I have to teach you how to do diplomatic pouch and mail." I said, "I already know how to do that." He looked at me and said, "What am I going to do with you?" I said, "You're going to sign this time and attendance card right here on the dotted line, and I'm going to get out of here, and we'll just not do it and pretend we did." He looked at me and said, "Well, I guess that's all I can do." So he signed my card, I had credit for having attended that course twice, I flew to Michigan, and got married. Married on Saturday night, came to Washington on Monday, got Gail a passport, and arrived in Seville, Spain on Wednesday.

*Q: You were in Seville from when to when?*

HELM: 76, 78. I missed the bicentennial celebration in Seville. The wedding was July 23<sup>rd</sup> and I got to post on July 27th. It was wonderful. Seville was a two-year honeymoon. I just loved Seville.

*Q: Who was consul general when you were there?*

HELM: Bob Fouché. It was a four-officer consulate with an excellent FSN staff. The FSNs had been around for years and years and knew everything there was to know about their jobs. It took me a couple of weeks to figure out that if I didn't disturb them or interfere with them, everything would work just fine. I made it my duty to not cause trouble and let the FSNs do the work. They would bring papers that I would dutifully sign. I hate to sound lazy, but I didn't have a lot of duties. I was the communications officer, but we had very little classified communications. I did the pouch, which really meant that I drove to the Air Force base at Moron de la Frontera every

week. I did Admin. tasks that included bringing the inventories up to date, procurements, facilities maintenance and whatever needed to be done. I was staying on top of things.

The consul general noted that I was perhaps under-employed. So he said, "We're going to give you some more duties. From now on, you're the Deaths Officer." There was a huge American retired community in Malaga, Algeciras, and the Costa del Sol area. On the average, one of them a day dropped dead. So I spent a good part of my time processing death certificates, dealing with relatives, and arranging to ship the remains home. I usually didn't get personally involved with them. It was just a matter of paperwork, sending authorizations, and collecting funds from the relatives. Mainly paper pushing. I would produce a death certificate, sign it, and place the Consular seal on it. People would need 10 or 20 original sealed copies, for the courts, insurance companies, for each state where they owned property, et cetera. There was a lot of just signing a name and putting a seal on it.

There was one fellow had died and the remains were shipped to Greenville, Ohio. We got a call from Greenville, Ohio: "Where's the body?" "It's been shipped. I have the airway bill. It's supposed to be there." "No it's not. We went to the airport, met the airplane, and there was no body." So I started trying to trace the body, and it was absolutely untraceable. We had lost grandpa, and weeks went by, no grandpa. About six weeks later I got a call from Greenville, South Carolina, from the TWA (Trans World Airlines) agent who asked me if I'd lost a crate? We found grandpa on a warehouse shelf in a TWA storage warehouse in Greenville, South Carolina and immediately shipped him to Greenville, Ohio.

*Q: Were the Spanish authorities a problem?*

HELM: The Spanish authorities were the easiest people in the world to work with. They would do anything for you. I never had a problem. They were always just excellent. I think the fact that I had a very positive attitude about the country and about them helped a lot. There was never an issue.

*Q: How about the other officers, as compared to Panama. Was it a pretty positive group of people?*

HELM: It was a very positive group of people, and I can't point to another place that I've been where I thought there was such a uniformly good group of people. Norman Alexander was the consul, a wonderful guy. Dan Vernon was vice consul. Dan mainly did visas. I did admin and anything else, any odd jobs, and Fouché was an excellent Consul General. Things just worked very well there.

*Q: I have a vague feeling I heard that the ambassador had sort of an apartment there to which he used to repair from time to time. Was that in Seville?*

HELM: The consulate had been built as the American exposition to the 1929 Worlds Fair that was in Spain. It was an interesting building. It had an oddly shaped courtyard that had been made to suspend a full-scale model of Lindbergh's airplane, so it was misshapen in order to fit the shape of the airplane. The consulate offices were one side of this roughly triangular building.

The consul general's residence was the other two sides. There were guest rooms that the ambassador stayed in when he came down. Later, when the consulate was closed, they retained that building and it became almost a guesthouse for people from Madrid to come and stay there. I think that's what you're referring to.

*Q: During this period, Portugal was going through its revolution. Was that spilling over at all?*

HELM: No, there was absolutely no sense of any troubles in Portugal anywhere else in Spain. The big thing that we were dealing with was American tourists, and narcotics. One of the extra jobs that I took on was visiting the prisoners. Each month I ran a route to all of the major prisons. This was interesting - you would go to a prison and announce yourself, that you were from the Consulate and you were here to see this list of one or two or three, usually young men. You'd go in and have coffee with the warden, and when you finished, you'd be led down to an interview room. It would be like a fairly spartan living room. The individuals would be brought in singly, or sometimes in groups, and you'd just talk to them. "How's life here? They treating you okay?" We had vitamin pills so each prisoner got a month's supply of pills. The prison authorities would censor their mail. I would bring mail from their parents or whoever in my coat pocket and give them their mail, and they would give me outgoing letters. The parents would send money to the Consulate and I would deliver the money to them. If you were in jail and had money you could buy things like tennis shoes, cigarettes, candy. So I would give the money, always cash, 20, 30 dollars at a time, or pesetas. "See ya next month." These kids would have eight, 10 year sentences, or more, and they weren't going anywhere. They were just surviving, hanging out.

*Q: Did the thing work the way it so often did, that you'd get maybe an eight, 10 year sentence and after three or four they'd be essentially paroled and gotten out of the country?*

HELM: It was an interesting system in Spain. You would be arrested and taken that moment before a magistrate who would pronounce your innocence or guilt right there. No lawyer, no witnesses, no process. If you were arrested at 10 o'clock at night, by midnight you were declared guilty and in jail. 18 months to two years later you had your official trial. At this trial, there'd be lawyers, witnesses, and a formal process. If at the trial you were found innocent, you'd be turned loose. If you were found guilty, you'd be sentenced and the time served would count toward your sentence. With narcotics, they would take the quantity of narcotics that you had and send it to the laboratory in Madrid. The Lab would return a report of the purity and the weight of the narcotics. The normal sentence was one day in prison per gram of pure narcotic equivalent. If we heard that you were arrested and we could get a lawyer to you before you were pronounced innocent or guilty by the magistrate, a lawyer could get a postponement. If you got a postponement, then you'd be tried in a more formal setting during business hours. At that setting you could have your lawyer and witnesses. Your odds of getting off were much greater. We had to be ready. The duty officer rotation was a very serious thing because the DO would get a call at three o'clock in the morning that someone had just been arrested. If the DO could find a lawyer in that town and get him down there within 20 minutes or half an hour, we could very often save a kid from being in jail for several years.

The ones that were in prison tended to be in for a long time. For instance, one kilo of pure hashish, a thousand grams of pure cocaine equivalent - that's three years. And they tended to

have many kilos when they would be caught. In some cases the kids were being used as mules, in some cases they were themselves doing it. If you could make it across from Morocco into Spain, you were home free to Amsterdam.

We had one horrible case. A beautiful 19-year old girl, kind of a hippie. She'd gone to Morocco, had been smoking dope and living with a Moroccan guy. The Moroccan guys just saw these girls coming and took every type of advantage. The Moroccan guy and the girl got on the ferry to Algeciras and just as the ferry was pulling up to the Spanish dock, the Moroccan guy grabbed his stomach and said, "Oh, oh, I'm having cramps." So he ran off ostensibly to go the bathroom. When the ferry docked, the crew of the ferry chased all the passengers off of the ship but the Moroccan guy hid on the ship where he could see out. If he saw the girl, carrying his backpack and hers, get through the police station, then he would run off the ship, get through immigration empty handed, catch up with the girl, take his backpack and they would continue on. He would have gotten his narcotics through. Of course if he saw her get caught he would stay on-board for the return trip to Morocco.

Well, she got caught. It was pretty obvious - you have two backpacks, many kilos. Maybe five kilos which is eleven pounds of hashish. She was caught. It was very pure. She was in the women's prison at Puerto Santa Maria, the same building that Christopher Columbus visited to get the prisoners for his ships. The conditions were horrible. Her family came over to visit and her mother cried in the Consulate for two days. "Isn't there something you can do?" And there was nothing we could do. That girl was in for at least ten years, and yes she could get one fourth of her sentence off for good behavior, and she could get time off for working in the prison industry. But no matter how you cut it she was going to be in for five, six years. We visited her every month, and every time we visited she would cry. It was just too sad.

I remember another case involving three nice young men from New Jersey. They had brought a moving van full of furniture from Morocco, and were moving to France. The moving van had an extra fuel tank, and that fuel tank happened to be filled with hashish oil, which is a purified version of hashish. They were arrested in Algeciras. A couple of days later, three men came to the Consulate and demanded to see the Consul General. One was a fairly dapper fellow, probably a man in his late 50s, early 60s, very well dressed – nice suit. The other two were enormous men in their late 20's or early 30's. They were big enough to be pro-football players.

The fellow with the good suit was a lawyer representing the family of one of the young men. The other two fellows were his "assistants". The Consul General told me to put them in the car and drive them to the prison at Algeciras where to visit their client. It was something straight out of some old movies, just like The Godfather. I put them in the back seat of the consul general's Chevy sedan and the Consul General's chauffeur and I sat in the front seat. All the way down there they were talking to each other about how they were going to get this young man out of jail and get him out of the country quickly.

I'd been to that jail several times. The guards knew my face. At the prison there was a huge wooden gate with an iron knocker. "Klong, klong". A little hatch opened and a face appeared that recognized me. A small Judas gate was opened and you would enter an airlock type arrangement. The guards recognized me and sized up the others and held us in the airlock for a

few minutes. We were joined by three Guardia Civil officers with automatic rifles. They put the rifles to the backs of the heads of the three visitors and said, "What would you like to do?" I said, "We'd like to visit this prisoner." They said, "You have to go see the warden." (You always had to go see the warden.) So we went to see the warden. He had two chairs in front of his desk and then there was a sofa facing the desk with a couple of feet between the sofa and the wall. The lawyer and I sat in the chairs, the two "assistants" sat on the sofa, and the three GC officers with the machine guns stood behind the assistants with the guns level with the backs of their heads.

The warden said, "How may I help you?" The lawyer said he wanted to see his client. The warden sent for the young man, who came to the warden's office. The lawyer asked "Are they treating you okay?" and prisoner said "Yeah, they're treating me okay." The warden dismissed the prisoner, then turned to the lawyer and asked "Is there anything else I can do for you?" They said, "No, thank you very much," and we all walked out and got back in the car and drove back to Seville. Not one word was said all the way back to Seville. As we were coming back into town I said, "Is there anything else I can do for you?" The lawyer responded saying "Please take us by our hotel, let us get our suitcases, and then drive us to the airport." "Certainly, sir." We went by and got the suitcases, took them to the airport, made sure those three goons got on the plane, and that was that. It was just so out of - The Sopranos.

*Q: The Mafia program. Well I guess they thought they could bully their way.*

HELM: Yeah, that they could either bribe or bully and get the kids out. It didn't happen.

*Q: Did the hand of the embassy rest heavily on Seville, or did they leave you alone?*

HELM: I think that the majority of people at the embassy didn't know we were even there. We were so low-key. We didn't want to bring any attention to ourselves, so we didn't. I tried to avoid going to Madrid, as we all did. Nobody came from Madrid to see us much, so it was wonderful. I sent my reports up to Madrid, money reports, administrative paperwork that had to be done, and that was that. Life was good.

**KEITH C. SMITH**  
**Desk Officer for Spain**  
**Washington, DC (1978-1981)**

*Ambassador Keith C. Smith was born in California in 1938. While attending Brigham Young University he received his bachelor's degree in 1960 and master's degree in 1962. He entered the foreign service in 1962. His career includes positions in Mexico, Venezuela Hungary, Washington D.C., and an ambassadorship to Lithuania. Mr. Smith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2004.*

*Q: You moved over to sort of the Spanish desk in '79, after two years?*

SMITH: In 1978, probably late in '78. I was there for two years.

*Q: So we're really going up to about '81. What was the situation in Spain would you say in '78?*

SMITH: There was uncertainty. The conservative government was trying its best to overcome the legacy of General Franco. Even with a conservative government, there was considerable unrest within the very right-wing military and the Civil Guard. There was serious terrorism being carried out by the Basque radicals and there was political separatism growing in the Catalan region. The military and Guard wanted the government to clamp down on civil liberties in order to combat Basque terrorism. I made several trips to Spain during that period. A lot of my time was spent dealing with military base negotiations. We occupied military bases in three parts of Spain. They were considered important strategic bases designed to counter or deter a possible Soviet attack.

*Q: You hadn't got involved with the Azores or..?*

SMITH: Earlier on I'd gone to the Azores. By the time I worked on Portugal, there was no longer the question of whether the Azores were going to declare independence. But the U.S. use of the Azores airbases was the subject of a lot of negotiations, in which I participated. I made a trip to the Azores in the middle of the winter in order to consult with our airbase commanders. The issues were complex, but interesting.

During the first re-negotiation of the bases, the Portuguese were willing to give us whatever we wanted. They were still grateful for our support of democratic government after the death of the dictator, Caetano. During the next negotiation, they became more demanding. By then, they had a better idea of the military value to us of the bases, and about how much assistance they get from us.

The Spanish negotiations were much more complex, in part because the important Barajas airbase was within the Madrid city limits, and the Spanish Government wanted to close it down. We also occupied a major tanker re-fueling base at Zaragoza in the west. And we used a major naval base in the south at Rota, where we based nuclear submarines. The Spanish were more concerned about national pride than were the Portuguese, and Madrid insisted on having more control over operations at bases on their territory.

*Q: Were you in charge of the Spanish desk by this point?*

SMITH: Yes. Fortunately, I had deputies that were really terrific. I thought that we all worked well together, even though the work was time consuming and at times tedious.

*Q: With Spain, by this time did we feel there was a stable system that was going to work, that could change parties and all?*

SMITH: We were fairly confident that things were going to work out in the long run. We maintained close ties to the governing parties and with the Socialist opposition. Of course, in 1981, there was a serious coup attempt. The Guardia Civil took over the Parliament and held

parliamentarians prisoner until King Juan Carlos talked them into surrendering. The King was a key figure in the success of Spain's transformation to democracy. On two trips to Spain, I met with the King and the Prime Minister. I also escorted the King to meetings in Washington on one occasion. For a desk officer, I had very high level contact with Spanish officialdom. The Spaniards sent an ambassador to Washington who had been a businessman. He immediately treated me like I was his most valuable contact in Washington. He was a very decent person, and had the good sense to listen to his professionals in the Embassy. The Spanish were competent diplomats and I developed some good friends within the Spanish Embassy. But the Spaniards would never give anything away. They were real merchants, and they demanded a price for any concessions, particularly on military bases.

They really wanted to get the U.S. military out of Madrid, and wanted to wind down the U.S. military presence in Spain. The Spanish never did feel any threat from the Soviet Union, unlike most other Europeans. Madrid wanted us to reduce the number of tanker planes at Zaragoza, and send home the Polaris subs that were stationed at Rota. The U.S. Navy saw Rota as a key location at the entrance to the Mediterranean. They were determined to maintain our facilities there. There was also an airbase at Rota, used for regional operations by the U.S. Navy. So there were a lot of bilateral political/military issues being negotiated. During my assignment on the desk, I traveled extensively around Spain, visiting the bases and talking to people. I spoke Spanish from my Latin American days, and it was easy for me to develop good relations with individual Spaniards.

*Q: Where stood Spain vis-à-vis the European community in those days?*

SMITH: They weren't even considered to be a candidate member. The big issue was Spanish membership in NATO. In the early 1980s, the Spanish joined NATO, but did not join the military committee, at least until much later. This did not sit well with the Pentagon or with State. However, the Spanish bases were not only important to us for Cold War defense, but also for possible action in the Middle East. In the 1960s and 1970s, we stationed B-47s and B-52s armed with nuclear weapons at the bases in Spain, but the nukes were pulled out after a famously publicized case of a B-52 accidentally dropping two nuclear bombs off a popular Spanish beach. The nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the airbases, but not from the Polaris submarines. I found it unnerving to walk among the tightly clustered missiles while on board a submarine stationed at Rota.

*Q: Yeah B-47s, those were our second strike planes, they were the reserve down in Morocco and in Spain.*

SMITH: Yes, they had them in Spain, but by the 1980s, they had been retired. There was always the nagging question of whether the Spanish would let us use the bases in case of a crisis in the Middle East. We were constantly talking to the Spanish about when we could or could not use the bases to re-supply the Middle East. The Spanish would always avoid giving us a straight answer. Because of Spanish history and the country's geographical nearness to North Africa, they were reluctant to irritate the Arabs. They also attempted to use the issue as leverage to get us to support their position opposing Morocco's assertion of sovereignty over the disputed North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The islands were on the Moroccan coast, but were



controlled by the Spaniards. Madrid wanted us to clearly come out and say that we recognized Spanish sovereignty. We refused to. Another issue was Gibraltar, that the Spanish wanted to take back from the British. That was one issue on which we didn't want to defy London, our closest ally. There were almost too many bilateral issues being dealt with at once. We were also trying to help Madrid counter terrorism that came from Basque extremists. We wanted the French to cooperate with Spain in controlling the cross-border movement of the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) people. The French were not cooperative at the time. Years later they became more cooperative, but in the early 1980s, Paris was more worried about upsetting its own Basque population. I made two trips to Bilbao, the center of Basque influence, and met with local officials, including representatives of the Basque Nationalist Party. I did not meet with ETA members, of course. It was fascinating to go to northern Spain and talk to the more moderate nationalists. During World War II, there had been close cooperation between Basque nationalists, including people who later participated in ETA, and U.S. intelligence agencies in combating Nazi influence on the Iberian Peninsula.

*Q: OSS.*

SMITH: Yes, the OSS. We believed that even though we had a consulate in Bilbao, and were clearly supporting Madrid, the extremists would not attack Americans. We rightly assumed that ETA feared that the United States could crush anybody, at anytime, anywhere in the world, which of course was not true. ETA never did attack any Americans, even though bombs and assassinations were commonplace in those days.

*Q: How did you see the role of the king at that time?*

SMITH: The King and Queen always played a very positive role. Spaniards had expected very little out of the King, since he was put in place by Franco. Over time, his consistent support for democracy gained him enormous prestige. The King and Queen became very popular role models. They were both very decent, down-to-earth persons. We saw the King as a real positive player in Spain's transition. I hate to think of the difficulties Spain might have had without the King's strong support of transparent government and his positive attitude toward the United States and NATO.

*Q: Were you on the desk when this Guardia Civil coup attempt took place? What do they call the parliament there? I can't remember.*

SMITH: The parliament is called the Cortez. I wasn't on the Spanish desk at the time, but during the Guardia siege of the Cortez, I was brought in to direct the crisis task force in the Operations Center. I was there all night with an open telephone line to the embassy. It was feeding me live radio broadcasts from inside the Parliament building. The next morning, I was asked by EUR to brief Secretary of State, Al Haig so that he could demonstrate our support for Spanish democracy. Unfortunately, I couldn't get to Haig. His staff wouldn't let me see him. So Haig came out of his office the next morning after that coup attempt and said exactly the wrong thing to the press. He said that the coup attempt had been an internal Spanish matter, and he didn't want to comment on it. The very suspicious Spanish press immediately interpreted this as a sign that the United States was supporting the coup attempt. It was just a disastrous public relations exercise on Haig's part,

but typical of his view that he was always smart enough to wing it with the press. We spent months trying to recover from that his faux pas. Meanwhile, the Embassy and the rest of the U.S. Government, was assuring everybody that we were supporting Spanish democracy and deplored the coup attempt.

*Q: Was there a Franco wing to the political movement?*

SMITH: There was a very conservative individual who led a party that was considered by some to be pro-Franco, but I came to believe that he had become a committed democrat. The Socialist Party of Spain, which started off as a Marxist party, kept trying to brand him as the successor to Franco. I disagreed with the Socialists. I met with this man several times. He wasn't a fascist or anything like that. He always played strictly by democratic rules. There was no threat of a resurgence of Francoism in Spain apart from the coup attempt of the Guardia.

*Q: Were we watching a change in Spain of going from almost a medieval country to a modern country?*

SMITH: I never saw Spain as a backward country. Spain was a pretty modern state when Franco died, even though it was economically behind most of Europe. It was far ahead of Portugal, the Balkan region and of Eastern Europe. Modernity is relative. I saw Spain as a country with a lot of potential. Basically we assumed that Spain's economy would rapidly modernize as it integrated into Europe. We didn't have any massive loan program or assistance programs, outside of those that were payments for military base use. I remember that we encouraged the IMF and World Bank to finance long-term infrastructure projects and to stabilize the currency. In the end, Spanish integration into the European economies brought rapid growth to the country.

*Q: Did you have any run-ins, this is during the Carter time, with the human rights bureau, Pat Darien and all that, or were things in the Iberian peninsula pretty stable and no particular human rights problems?*

SMITH: No, I don't remember any serious issues. We were generally supported on the issues of separatism in the Basque and Catalan regions. We had consulates in Barcelona and in Seville. They are all closed now. This is a pity. We really closed too many consulates in the 1980s and early 1990s.

*Q: Yeah, the savings are small and the results are negative.*

SMITH: As desk officer, however, I made several trips to Barcelona and Seville. Each was very useful. I have been back to both places, giving me a chance to see firsthand the enormous change in Spain.

*Q: I think while you were on the desk there was this Madrid conference on the Helsinki accords and all?*

SMITH: I think that was later, but your memory of some of these things is probably better than mine.

*Q: I know because Pell came over. I was consulate general in Naples in 1980, November or so when we had a bad earthquake. And Pell came over from this conference, I think Max Kampelman was... but this is just where they put it. This wasn't particularly your involvement.*

SMITH: I don't remember it. It sounds familiar. There were so many Madrid conferences, some dealing with Middle East issues.

*Q: This was the Helsinki accords.*

SMITH: Yes, I do vaguely remember this. I don't remember the timing, but now that you mention it, there was a Madrid conference around that time, at which we were trying to force commitments from the Soviets, particularly on "basket three" issues dealing with human rights issues.

*Q: It probably didn't register because this would have been European-wide. What about the Soviets. Were the Soviets playing any role there at that time? Were we concerned about them or had that..*

SMITH: The Soviet Union did not have much influence in Spain. The Soviet Embassy was always trying to convince the Spanish to expel the U.S. military and to stay out of NATO. They were not very successful, however. There was a communist party in Spain, but the Socialists had the overwhelming support of the left. They were led by Felipe Gonzalez, who later became Prime Minister. Most of the people in the Socialist Party leadership came from Seville and started off with some ridiculous left-wing ideas, but they quickly moderated their views. There were some people in the U.S. government who worried that the sky would fall if the Socialists came to power. Some Socialists opposed to NATO membership. I remember going to New York to listen to a speech by Felipe Gonzalez and I talked to him afterwards. This was before he was Prime Minister. We argued some about defense policy, but it was a friendly argument. When I used to go to Spain I would go with an embassy political officer to a nightclub, where the Socialists would speak extemporaneously about policy issues.. People would just get up and start talking about politics and the debating would start. There was a very good political officer at the Embassy, and he introduced me to many Spanish politicians, including quite a few Socialists. In any case, when the Socialists came to power, they carried out quite moderate policies, and there was no talk about leaving NATO.

**SERBAN VALLIMARESCU**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1978-1982)**

*Serban Vallimarescu was born in Romania in 1922. He immigrated to the United States in 1940 and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He received his BA from Harvard University in 1942 and served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945 and again from 1950 to 1952 as a lieutenant. Mr. Vallimarescu worked at Voice of*

*America before entering USIA in 1956. His career included positions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, France, Spain, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Cliff Groce in 1989.*

VALLIMARESCU: Dan Oleksiw was then chief of inspections. He found out that I was doing crossword puzzles and figured I was capable of doing something else. He got me on the inspection staff. That was a big relief because I had something substantive to do. I went on a couple of inspections. During the last one I was on -- I was chief inspector and it was Stockholm and we are talking now of May, 1978 -- I get a call from the chief of Foreign Service Personnel saying, "Val, how would you like to go to Madrid as PAO?" I said, "How would I like to?!" I had asked John Reinhardt -- while I was on the inspection staff I did get an interview with John Reinhardt. He asked to see me. He apologized in effect for not having talked to me, not having given me the news of my dismissal and then said, "We want to do the right thing by you. Where would you like to go when and if an opening arises?" I said, "Well, I would love to go to Madrid as PAO." He said, "Well, we'll keep that in mind." That had been about a year before I got this call in Stockholm. The chief of Foreign Service Personnel told me there was one more hurdle -- I had to get the approval of the ambassador-designate to Spain, Terence Todman, who was in Washington waiting for his confirmation hearings.

I get back to Washington and of course the family is quite excited at the thought of going to Madrid. I make an appointment with Ambassador Todman at the State Department. He greeted me very courteously two days later and proceeded to ask me why I wanted to go to Spain as PAO, what my background was. He had my file, but he wanted a man-to-man discussion. Then he started speaking to me in Spanish. He said, "I know you're rated 4+, 4+, but I've learned not to trust FSI ratings fully." Well, he saw that I did speak Spanish quite well and we spent about 45 minutes discussing Spain and Latin America. Then he tells me, "Well, Val, thank you very much, but I have two other candidates to interview. I'll let you know."

About three days later I get a call early in the morning. He says, "Val, are you packed?" I said, "Who's this?" "It's Ambassador Todman. I want you to go to Madrid as PAO." And he wanted me to get there a couple of weeks before he was scheduled to arrive. So I did. I arrived there in July of 1978 and he came a couple of weeks later. And that was the beginning of a wonderful four years in Madrid with Terry Todman -- who happens to be the ambassador in Buenos Aires now.

Spain was an exciting post because it was returning to democracy after many, many years of Franco. Franco, of course, died in 1975, but three years later the Spaniards were still celebrating the return to democracy, which manifested itself, among other things, with a slew of newspapers, magazines -- pornographic and not pornographic, pornographic movies. Some of the Spaniards were absolutely desperate -- if this is what democracy means, we don't want any part of it. I'm exaggerating, but the fact is it was a release of tensions that manifested itself with a little bit of what they call in Spanish "libertinaje."

*Q: Liberty becomes license.*

VALLIMARESCU: Yes. But they settled down to serious business and Spain is a success story today. I think one of the interesting things of my tour there was the fact that we had a treaty of friendship and cooperation, as it's called, with Spain, which in effect allowed us to keep four military bases on Spanish territory -- in return for which there was a cultural element in the treaty, which was really what the payoff was all about. It provided for cultural exchanges, cultural grants, money for Spanish universities, and we also had a very active Fulbright Commission there, with the Spanish government contributing some money to it. Of course, some of the money they contributed came from us anyway through the treaty. (Laughter)

But it was a very active program. And it was during that period, in my last year there, that we renegotiated certain aspects of the treaty, including the cultural element of it. I attended most of the meetings, and I also headed our mini-delegation which was renegotiating the cultural part. It was a very productive and fascinating time.

We also had during my time there a presidential visit. Carter came to Spain. As a matter of fact, he came to Madrid from Belgrade. And there are some anecdotes. Are you interested in anecdotes?

*Q: Of course.*

VALLIMARESCU: We were informed from Belgrade that the President would give his toast at the official luncheon which the King and Queen were giving for the Carters at the palace. He would give his toast, which in effect was a speech, in Spanish. Both Ambassador Todman and I cringed, because we remembered a rather unfortunate experience that Carter had had in Mexico where he tried to speak Spanish and used the wrong words and all hell broke loose. So the ambassador sent a cable to Belgrade urging that the President speak in English because the King spoke fluent English and liked to speak English, and that it's usually more appropriate that official statements, official speeches, be given by heads of state in their respective languages. But we couldn't budge him; he was going to speak in Spanish. So Alice and I, and Todman and Mrs. Todman and quite a number of other people arrived at the luncheon at the palace. I kept my fingers crossed through a scrumptious lunch with magnificent wines. When the time for toasts came I had a very irregular heartbeat. The President did a magnificent job. He spoke for 15 minutes in Spanish, and he only stumbled over two or three long words. I've always said that people who prepare speeches in a foreign language for someone should avoid using words that are very difficult to pronounce.

So everything goes very well and we get up from the table and move into another room for liqueurs and coffee. It just so happened that Alice and I were among the first to follow the King and the Queen into the room. The King was alone for a minute. Knowing that he had a good sense of humor, I said, "Your Majesty...

I have to back up a bit. In Spain restaurants are given forks instead of stars. Four forks are the equivalent of four stars -- the best you can get. So I tell the King, "Your Majesty, this was a superb meal. Allow me to give the royal kitchen four forks." And the King says, "Well Mr. Vallimarescu, I have news for you. This meal was catered by the Jockey -- Jockey was the best restaurant in Madrid -- and they already have their four forks!"

But then he said, "You can do something for me. Right behind me is your President, with your ambassador, with my ambassador to Washington, with my prime minister (Suarez), with Mr. Brzezinski, and with Santiago Carillo (who was the secretary general of the Communist Party; the King invited all the heads of the political parties to luncheon), and they are laughing very hard. I would like to know what makes them laugh." I said, "Your Majesty, I'm sure you'll find out before I can, but I'll do my best." By then there were people pushing behind -- you know, "Don't monopolize His Majesty." So we move on, and the little group that the King had mentioned was just breaking up. I go to Ambassador Todman and say, "The King wants to know what you were laughing about." He said, "Well, I'll tell you. The old fox, Santiago Carillo, the Communist secretary, had been congratulating the President on his Spanish. But he said, 'Mr. President, you did have problems with longer words, such as autoritarismo -- authoritarianism.' And Carter, God bless him, said immediately, 'Oh, but Mr. Carillo, this is a concept so alien to us that we cannot even pronounce the word.' And that broke them up."

Now this anecdote reflects a little bit what the relations between Carter and the White House press corps were. I tried to buttonhole several of the journalists, White House press corps people who were there, to give them this anecdote. I felt that U.S. News and World Report could publish it as a "Whisper," for instance. They couldn't care less. They didn't like Carter, and they weren't going to publish anything that made him look good. But I did get it in two Madrid dailies.

And if I can make a parenthesis here, many years later -- 1984 or 85 -- when I was PAO in Buenos Aires, the Carters came to Buenos Aires on a private visit. They stayed at the residence; the ambassador was out of town. The DCM was very busy. There were meetings and a press conference and when the time for them to leave came, the DCM, who was chargé, was very busy and couldn't go to the airport. I was number three in the embassy and he told me, "Val, you have to accompany the Carters to the airport." Carter wanted a press conference at the airport so we tried to arrange one. We arrived at the airport about an hour and a half ahead of time in order to meet the screaming reporters. Well, there were no reporters, except for one guy from one of the radio stations. I was quite embarrassed. Furthermore, I had about an hour and a half to spend alone in the VIP room with the Carters. I decided to remind him of the story I've just told you. I said, "Mr. President, you may have forgotten, but you made us all very proud when you were in Madrid" -- and I told him the story. He said, "Oh, Val! That's right! I had forgotten about that." And his wife, who obviously was much more bitter than he was about having lost the election, said, "You see, Jimmy, you see. I always told you that those journalists, that White House press corps, hated you and did everything they could to sabotage you." To me that was an interesting vignette of how she felt. She was still very bitter about losing the election and about the way she felt the press had treated her husband.

**TERENCE A. TODMAN**  
**Ambassador**  
**Spain (1978-1983)**

*Ambassador Terence A. Todman was born in 1926 and raised in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. He attended the Polytechnic Institute of Puerto Rico and served in the U.S. Army. Ambassador Todman received a bachelor's degree from Syracuse University. His Foreign Service career included positions in Tunisia, Togo, Chad, Guinea, Costa Rica, Spain, Denmark, and Argentina. He was interviewed by Michael Krenn on June 13, 1995.*

*Q: You mentioned that an ambassadorial post came open, and that was Spain.*

TODMAN: Yes.

*Q: That was, going to there, that was certainly the largest embassy you had worked in, to that point.*

TODMAN: Yes.

*Q: One of the questions that I wanted to get back to was, you had mentioned early on your relations with the military and so forth. Here was a large embassy where you were dealing with representatives from the military, you had your CIA representatives there, and so forth. What kind of job for an ambassador is it to keep all of those people, as you said, going in the same direction?*

TODMAN: It's a tough job; it's a very, very difficult job. Fortunately, from the time of Kennedy, there is the ambassador's letter, which gives the ambassador, and it is put there in writing, and is sent to all the agency heads, that the ambassador is the president's representative, responsible for everything except military under a separate command. Not military in the embassy, but if there is a command established, then the commanding general of that has his responsibilities. But everybody else, including any military there, all are under the ambassador. That's specific from the president. And if an ambassador is determined that he's going to make it stick, he does. And you just tell them all, "Look read this," the day you go in, and you let them know right from the beginning, this is the way it's going to work; policy is set by me. Nothing is going to go out from here that is not consistent with what is established. You're not going to go through any back-channels. And one of the things that I did which made an enormous amount of difference was to meet with the secretary of every agency that had any representation in the country, and to meet with the assistant secretary in charge of the area, and to pledge to them that I was working for them and that they could count on me, and that if there was anything they wanted in the country, please come to me directly, in addition to whatever they're doing with their own people. And they could count on me to be fully supportive. If I had any differences I would be open and above-board in letting them know about it. But I wanted to make sure that they understood that. And since their representatives in the field knew that I knew their bosses, this made it very easy, because they didn't know their own bosses, quite often. You know, they knew of the office director. But if they knew that I knew their assistant secretary and secretary, I had seen them and see them regularly when I go back, then it's a totally different thing. And the chairman of the joint chiefs I knew and sat down with, both before going out and on several visits back. But you have to make that effort; you have to inform yourself very, very well, on all of the issues affecting all of the agencies. Because if you don't know the agencies and you don't care about

them, you can't say I want it this way. Therefore, it requires an enormous amount of work. But if you do that work and let them know, then there is not problem.

*Q: Once again, like so many of your assignments, you got to this nation at a very interesting time; a tumultuous time, but an interesting time. It was only a couple of years after Franco's death that you got there. Spain was in the middle of sort of a tumultuous push toward democracy. And I think there were at least three Spanish governments while you were there?*

TODMAN: Yes, yes.

*Q: Was it difficult to establish a working relationship with that kind of situation going on, the turmoil and tumult and this constant changing of governments?*

TODMAN: Well, you had to work at it. So you do. And the role of His Majesty, also. But again, this was critical, really critical at this time. But you know, once you establish that you consider them as a proper, equal partner in activities, once you deal with people on the basis of equality, not trying to put over anything on them, not backing away from anything, you develop a friendly, open, and honest interchange. Then it gets to be very easy to deal. No hidden agendas, no tricks that they're going to discover later that you lied to them. That sort of relationship went well. You didn't attempt to interfere in their policies. You're straightforward about what the United States is doing, what we want, what we can respond to, and you let them run their own country. But you keep in touch with everything that's going on, and you keep in touch with all the various groups. And by doing that, by keeping in touch with all the groups, then you get to know what's happening and you can reach out and get things done. If you establish that you don't have a preference for one group or another and that you represent the United States and you're going to work with those who are there, that you believe in certain things that are fundamental--then you're able to keep going. And I didn't find any particular problems. While Adolpho Suarez was in I met with the Socialists. When he was changed, for their own internal reasons, to Calvo Sotelo, again we continued working with them. And we kept in close touch with all sides. So that when Felipe Gonzalez came in we knew them already, we had dealt with them before. There's a recognition that politicians have to say things for political purposes, and you hold them to it when it seems important to do so or helpful, but at other times you're understanding of things they're saying or doing. And this worked very well.

One of the things that was so critical in Spain was the negotiation of the bases agreement, which was very difficult, frankly. Difficult because many of my colleagues from the Pentagon did not appreciate that the world had changed, one, from the Franco times in Spain, and two, from the overall situation after the war, where we dictated terms and got them accepted. The fact that they didn't appreciate it, meant that they were trying to insist on things that the Spaniards were absolutely never going to tolerate and it came close to the breakdown of the negotiations, several times. But the important thing is that we did negotiate, we did reach an agreement during the time of Calvo Sotelo. However, before the treaty could be ratified, the Socialists came to power. The Socialists signed and accepted the exact same treaty, with no changes, except the cosmetics of taking some paragraphs from within the body of the treaty and putting them up front. For example, to say that either side can denounce this treaty and have its termination within 90 days, or whatever it was. It was right there in the body, but no one would have seen it. You bring it up



front--"This is what we made them do." No nuclear weapons will be based on Spanish soil, again in the body of the treaty. But you bring it up front, and you can say, "We made sure of that," and several things like that, that were done. But, basically we had negotiated an agreement, which was fair, which was beneficial to both sides, and when they came to power and sat down and looked at it, they didn't need the rhetoric of denunciation anymore, because the opposition government was gone, and they had to deal with it. On NATO, they, were talking about no NATO. We started joint exercises with them, using NATO doctrine, then the Italians did some, other people did some, always using NATO doctrine, so that by the time it came to a decision on NATO, what was the big issue? We'd been doing NATO things all along. But they couldn't come out before and say that. And this was the critical thing.

I think the most difficult task I had was introducing the Reagan administration to the Gonzalez administration because--I was sent there by Carter but stayed over with Reagan--there was a feeling of mistrust, from both sides, without knowing each other. The Socialists thinking, this right-wing Republican is coming in, and the Republicans thinking of these left-wing Socialists out there. Early on, very early on, the Secretary of State, Shultz, decided to come visit, and I sent back a briefing book on things to raise, things to expect, answers to give, the whole thing. And the trip was on. He went to Paris before coming to Madrid, and I went over to Paris to meet him to fly back with him. And while he was at dinner that evening, I took his briefing book and read it in total disbelief, because back in Washington they had changed everything a hundred and eighty degrees. Things I told him not to say, they put in for him to say. What he should say were out. What to expect was changed, how to respond was changed. And I sat up that night in total disbelief and made notes, not marginal notes, notes to myself, and the next day when we got on the plane I said, "Mr. Secretary, you've been set up for total disaster by what they've put in your book." He said, show me what. I sat down and talked to him about it. And he said, "OK, I'll go back to what you had recommended, but if this doesn't work, it's your neck." And I said, "Of course. That's what it's all about. If I mislead you, I shouldn't be around. But if you follow what it is that I suggest you do..." So he switched and followed what I suggested. The trip went beautifully, and at the end he said, "You know, this was one of the nicest trips I've had." I said, "Of course. I know these people, that's why I told you what I did." But it's the kind of thing you meet with. And actually, frankly, that was more difficult than dealing with the transitions within the Spanish government.

I suppose there was one thing that came out that created a certain amount of misgiving, when there was the Tejerazzo, the attempted coup, which the King had to work so very hard to abort. And he, personally, made the difference. Secretary of State Haig was caught coming out of meeting with someone back in Washington, and was asked what did he think of what was happening in Spain. He had not had any briefing. He had been in this meeting all the time. So he comes down from the meeting, no opportunity to be briefed, and he answers, "Well, what's happening in Spain, that's their affair." And this was read back that he was supporting the military and that presumably was because I was supporting the military and we didn't care about democracy, we just cared about who we could deal with that would do things that we wanted. And it really was one of these things. Al, instead of saying, "No comment," just made this statement which was his no comment. But it gave rise to a good period of misunderstanding, which, of course, was attributed to presumed information that I had sent. Although the fact is that I had worked very closely with the King, and had given him all of the possible assurances of

support to keep democracy going. We really worked extremely well on this. And there wasn't the faintest doubt about our total support for democracy and against the attempted coup. But that one little comment, caught at the wrong moment, created some doubts. But eventually we were able to nip that down.

There's one thing, again, I should go back to Latin America and talk about, because it's critical. That's the nuclear problem, particularly between Argentina and Brazil, both of whom were coming moving very, very well on it with all of this animosity there. And Brazil was getting some assistance from Germany. So the very first thing that the administration did was to have the deputy secretary go over to Germany and say, "There will be no more of this going to Brazil." No consultations with Brazil, no conversations at all, nothing. And, of course, they learned about it. And as Assistant Secretary I had to go down on my first visit with this as the background. Furthermore there had been a memorandum of understanding under which there were ministerial consultations with the previous administration and Brazil. And there was no decision made on this by the incoming Carter Administration. So when I landed in Brazil it was one of the most difficult, tensest situations I have ever walked into. Because their feeling was that here was a representative of an administration which had no regard for Brazil, no respect for Brazil. They had gone ahead and unilaterally done what they did, cut out things, without ever so much as a word of consultation with them. No indications on the high level consultations. And so it got off to a fairly rocky start. Again, it's one of these things. I took the job with the full intention of having this kind of exchange, but it was torpedoed exactly right off. So it took a long time to be able to get back the confidence of the Brazilians that we did have every intention of treating them as equals and gradually that program would work through. It's interesting that the whole question of the nuclear business still, however, never was fully resolved. And only recently, while I was in Argentina, thanks to good cooperation with the Argentines on the nuclear issue, we were able to get that spilled over into the Brazilian mess. I thought it was worth mentioning, because, again, it was essential to our policies.

*Q: Well, what you describe there, too, before we go back to your episode with Spain, that seemed to be a problem you have described a number of times. And I guess the best way of putting is the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing. You're either out in the field, or as Assistant Secretary of State, trying to promote what you think are the policies that should be followed, and suddenly something comes out of the blue here. Why does there seem to be that lack of coordination between people, usually in the White House, higher-ups, going off in one direction, and leaving people in the State Department--because I see that in the State Department memoirs all the time, people talking about that--why is there that lack? Why don't they make better use of the chain of information and command?*

TODMAN: It's a personal and personality thing, and it's a question of grabbing for, or manifesting, influence. "I'm able to do this, so here goes." And it's too bad. There isn't real serious coordination. The NSC should be the place that does this, but every now and then you get people in the NSC who decide that instead of coordinating, they're going to go ahead and act on their own. And so they add to the problem, instead of relieving it. And the rest of the time, there's no bringing of agencies together. One of the things that I did as Assistant Secretary of State was to hold regular meetings with all of the agencies, you know, my counterparts, in all of the agencies dealing with Latin America. And we would talk about what's happening, and what are

the problems, how are things working out. And just that conversation allowed for coordination. Because there was a great deal of sharing of information then. And there was no attempt to imposing anything. You have lunch occasionally, or whatever, but if you just sat down and talked about what's happening, then people themselves would say, "Correct". They may say it in the meeting, or they may not. "I'll adjust to something that I was doing or was thinking of doing." But there's a need for that conversation which doesn't occur. And a tendency to go off on their own, is part of it. Some of the Secretaries, I know the Secretary of State, for example, have breakfast with their counterparts once a week or once every two weeks. This serves for some things, but quite often they're agenda items. And lots of the things that happen come up in the middle of the day or something. And if you don't have an exchange that's a full one, you can't be sure that you can do something about it and the others will understand. It just happens.

*Q: You mentioned one interesting thing about your Spanish tenure, and that was that you had really sort of more difficulty in the change of the U.S. government than you did in terms of the Spanish government. The Reagan Administration comes in in 1981, very different, very different take on foreign policy. First, let me ask you this. There's often a great deal of reshuffling of diplomatic posts and ambassadorial posts and so forth. Did you think in 1981 that, OK that's it for Spain, I'll probably be reassigned by the new administration?*

TODMAN: Not really, because we were in the middle of negotiations. And it seemed to me, obviously we would want to conclude them, because it's important, the bases are important to us, we would want to conclude them. We were making progress. And it seemed to me that it would make sense for me to continue in the post. So I didn't expect to be asked to move at that time. And as it turned out, I knew Al Haig quite well, so... No, I didn't think I would be asked to move. I couldn't be sure, obviously, but I didn't think I'd be asked.

*Q: Well, that sort of answers the next question I was going to ask. You said that you had such a wonderful relationship with Vance during the Carter Administration. And the question I was going to ask--and I guess you've sort of answered it--were you worried about now working with a new secretary of state under the Reagan administration?*

TODMAN: No, because I'm career. I've worked with lots of secretaries of state. I knew I wasn't going to be changing the way I am, what I am. No, I haven't had any real problems with people. So, it didn't bother me. And the other thing is, quite frankly, and I think it's a great thing about the American system, is that we operate from the middle. There's a slight move to the right, slight move to the left, little nuances. But fundamentally we don't get any radical changes in American policy from one administration to the other. The rhetoric is one thing, for campaign purposes, but when it comes down, people win on the vote in the middle. And our policies come out in the middle. The changes that occur are not of so significant a nature that one needs to worry about it. OK, so on policy there's no problem. The question of personality: and you can't really guess what's going to happen in terms of your dealing with one or another. And I haven't worried about this. I figure that I'll manage with whoever comes in. I haven't ever, ever been worried about that.

*Q: You were in Spain; that was your longest assignment.*

TODMAN: Yes, yes.

Q: *You were there about five years.*

TODMAN: Five years, yes.

Q: *Were there any problems, did you think, connected with being in one country for that length of time?*

TODMAN: No, not at all. As a matter of fact, I think, I think five years is about a good time. Because it takes you, you know, a little while; half a year certainly, to begin to get to know people around, for them to feel comfortable, for you to really get confidences, for people to be willing to talk to you in confidence about things that they feel, for you to know what to weigh, how to take things. Because people will lead you on, and if you're not able to tell what to believe from what not to, that will affect your ability to evaluate, to judge, to measure what it is you're hearing, what it is you're seeing, what does it really mean, how to deal with it. It takes a while to develop it in a different cultural setting. And people feeling at ease with you and telling you the kinds of things that they really feel and really matter, that takes a while. And it's only after you develop that that you really begin to be useful. And then it takes some time to use that. Then before you leave a post, if you know the next post you're going to, you inevitably begin a certain amount of transition, preparing for the next place. So, if you think of what is your useful time, it comes in the middle of that. And we have lots of cases, we used to have, of people moving in two years. The government doesn't get anything out of that. You know, they've just gotten to know the people, for people to feel comfortable with them, and then it's time to start thinking of moving on. So, five years isn't too long, I think. Four or five years is very good.

**ROBERT E. BARBOUR**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Madrid (1978-1984)**

*Robert Barbour was born in Ohio in 1927. He graduated from the University of Tennessee in 1948 and attended The George Washington University. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1949, his career has included positions in Iraq, Japan, Vietnam, France, Italy, England, Spain and Surinam. Mr. Barbour was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

Q: *At a certain point you became the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western and Southern Europe, basically just more responsibility but within the same framework that you'd been dealing with before?*

BARBOUR: In the meantime the Office of Western European Affairs had undergone a change. With the revolution in Portugal in the spring of 1975...

Q: *Was this within your province?*

BARBOUR: No, it was not, but two things were going on in the Office of Liberian Affairs. One was we were renegotiating a base agreement, another was that Portugal underwent a dramatic, if bloodless, revolution in the hands of people who wanted to move it very far left. People who were, as it turned out, much more harmless than they seemed, but they seemed at the time to be almost fuzzy Maoist in the things they said, and the things they said they wanted to do. Anyhow, it was a major crisis for us, that Portugal was a major crisis for us. That office was overwhelmed. At the same time we were negotiating a base agreement in Spain that was not going extremely well, and there were an awful lot of leaks coming out of the American delegation and being printed in the American newspapers. The result was, they decided to incorporate Spain and Portugal into the Office of Western European Affairs, and I gave up Benelux. So Spain and Portugal came onto my particular scene, and demanded far more time in those days than France and Italy had.

*Q: From interviews, and almost corridor talk, but one of the great stories of the Foreign Service of this period, was this whole Portuguese thing, where you had the Secretary of State and a very active ambassador, Frank Carlucci was sent out there, who were quite in disagreement on how to go. Could you talk about what you saw, both when you dealing actively with it, and also from the sidelines about this.*

BARBOUR: Portugal was generating a lot of anguish in Washington. Frank Carlucci went out, was there when Portugal and Spain came into Western European Affairs. I had never met him.

*Q: He was basically sent out to replace what was considered a sort of weak team out there, if I recall. I think we had a political ambassador, and a DCM who was not very strong.*

BARBOUR: We were taken by surprise. Of course, they weren't the only ones. CIA was just about to close its office at that very time, saying nothing here is going to happen, its not worth it. Frank came over from HEW where he was Under Secretary, I think, and went out to Lisbon. A lot had transpired when I came onto the scene, I had never met him. But it is true that he and Kissinger saw things differently. Carlucci's position was more or less, ride it out. Ride it out, don't over react, it may not be as bad as it looks as though its going to be. That was the position he had taken before I came on that scene, so I hope I'm doing him justice.

*Q: That was my understanding, that Kissinger at least verbally was making all sorts of threats. I mean not what we could do, but we were huffing and puffing.*

BARBOUR: We were quite worried because all the things they were saying, it was wild and woolly leftist stuff.

*Q: These were young officers.*

BARBOUR: These were young officers, headed by...I've forgotten their names. Then you had the Portuguese communist party which had been I guess illegal for a long time, certainly prominent on the scene in the hands of a real Stalinist who made no bones about it. I don't mean

communist, Stalinist, he went down being a Stalinist and he's still alive today, I'm sure he still is the last one in Europe.

In the meantime, the Azores were giving us lots and lots of concern because of an Azorean independence movement. It wanted to break away from pro-communist Portugal and attach themselves to the United States, or at least under the American umbrella. And it wasn't only awkward politically, but we had an important base in the Azores, Terciera Island, the largest. And the Azorean movement was to some degree financed by wealthy Portuguese Americans. So they were saying things that caused some people to bite their fingernails, and the revolutionaries in Portugal were saying other things, remove the rest of the fingernails, or generate other kinds of worries. Anyhow, Frank was there and not on the same wave length with Kissinger. So he came back on consultation, I'd been in the job briefly, and Frank came home on Sunday night. I shall never forget meeting him at National Airport. My introduction to Frank was, that he had lost his credit card and had to pay for something at the airport, so I lent him my Visa card, and I had the job of telling him the Secretary wanted to see him Monday morning, and he was mad at him. Oh well, Frank is not bothered by that.

Anyhow, the revolution continued for a while, and then gradually the leadership changed and appeared to become less inflammatory, but still revolutionary. Abolishing this, and abolishing that, and instituting this, and instituting that. I don't remember the many, many details of every day life with the Portuguese revolution. But I do know that in time it became less inflammatory. The first leader to come here, I think, was a Major, who came to Washington and was received by Kissinger, received suitably. They had a long conversation, and then at the end of the meeting met privately.

Carlucci meanwhile had reached out to these people, and had developed all kinds of contacts with them. I don't mean that he was sympathizing with them, but he was in touch with them, and so was his embassy. They did some excellent reporting during that period. First hand reporting, what was going on and how people were thinking, etc. And then there came a break with...well, a little counterrevolution developed, an admiral took it over. An admiral was in the streets with his people, and the embassy, I must say, was in the streets with him, and Carlucci was in the embassy. We were in close touch with him. So I wrote a telegram with instructions to Carlucci saying, "Go see the Admiral, or get in touch with the Admiral, and tell him various things, the meaning of which was, he enjoys our sympathy and support. I was office director still, we went up to see Kissinger who wanted to talk about that. And he said, "But does he know that we are with him?" I had the great pleasure of saying, "Mr. Secretary, the telegram is on your desk," as indeed there was. And literally he went over, and by George, there it was. So we embraced this new counterrevolution.

*Q: Had it already achieved power by that time?*

BARBOUR: No, it had not.

*Q: Were we taking sides?*

BARBOUR: We were indeed taking sides, very clearly. Fortunately they won.

*Q: I was just going to say, it's always a dangerous period.*

BARBOUR: It is, but we wanted there to be no doubt, and we also believed obviously that awareness of American backing would be a factor and support. Anyhow, they won. Came the change and Mario Suarez became Prime Minister. I had been to see him several times in Lisbon with Carlucci, who had very close relations with him. Carlucci spoke Portuguese, Suarez, I think, spoke nothing but Portuguese. They had established a very close relationship before Suarez came back into power. So when he did become Prime Minister, we were very well installed. Suarez came to Washington as Prime Minister and I remember there was a dinner at the Portuguese embassy. He arrived, his wife had a full length mink coat. I said to my wife, "I think we're going to like Socialists like this." These are the right kinds of socialists. He turned out to be not only a good Prime Minister, but very friendly towards the United States. Carlucci had said consistently he would be, and Kissinger doubted it.

*Q: Was the Bureau of European Affairs, in your role in this, were you playing sort of a buffer between Carlucci and Kissinger. What was the attitude?*

BARBOUR: No, I don't think it ever came to that. Kissinger respected Carlucci, and he sometimes felt like hitting him over the head with a baseball bat, but he did respect him.

*Q: Carlucci came in a way with his own Washington power base, didn't he?*

BARBOUR: Well, he was Weinberger's deputy. But I think it was just the integrity he demonstrated as ambassador, and his constant energy, and the fact that he had had the courage to say things to Washington that Washington really didn't want to hear. Washington was much more prepared to be told how desperate these people were, and how awful things were going to be. But Carlucci, to his great credit as a person, and as a diplomat, maintained a very steady course, as I said from the beginning, ride with it, it'll probably work out, it isn't going to be as bad as they say they're going to be. And in the end of it, he was fully vindicated.

*Q: How about with the Spanish side? About the Azores? How did you fend off these separatists?*

BARBOUR: With the change in the political climate on the mainland, the separatist movement lost its steam, and lost its whole reason for being. I might tell one little story about Portugal before we move on. Before the actual counterrevolution took to the streets in Lisbon, there crumbling around the edges. The poor Portuguese ambassador there was having a terrible time because he was trying to be loyal to his country, to a government to which he had no sympathy whatsoever. He got very few communications. Sometimes he wasn't paid, and he wasn't able to pay his staff. The revolutionaries were simply waiting until they had full power to make all the changes. So he was here at the end of a very long, very dry pipeline in terms of both information and money. So he relied on us in the Department to sort of tell him what was going on. One day there was a ticker item about a farmers demonstration in a little town in the northern part of Portugal, in which they had burned down the local communist party headquarters building. So I called the Ambassador, and gave him a little summary, and I said in such-and-such village the farmers have burned down the building that is used for the communist party headquarters. And

there was a little pause, and he said, "Oh, oh, oh, that building belongs to my father-in-law." And then he said, "But he won't mind." He was a splendid man.

*Q: How about with the Spanish and the base negotiations. Franco was still in power at that point?*

BARBOUR: Yes, Franco was still in power. The Spaniards wanted a closer military relationship than we were prepared to give them. And they demonstrated this desire in various requests for consultations, for planning, for this or for that, and there was a difference between the Pentagon and State over these issues. Not a very big difference. But the Pentagon was more disposed to be conciliatory as much as possible, and State, being aware of Congressional attitudes toward Franco, was the defender of her(?). We had made a mistake, I think, in letting the American Air Force commander in Spain, the senior negotiator, so there were periodic inter-agency problems that had to be reconciled. But they were not major, they were moving along slowly, and they came to a conclusion that fall in New York when the Spanish Foreign Minister came, met with Kissinger in New York for the final conclusion of the negotiations. At issue were a lot of a) whether it would be a treaty, or an executive agreement. The Spaniards wanted a treaty, we thought a treaty would never get through the Senate. We wanted an executive agreement, and a couple of other things. These final meetings in New York, with Wells Stabler as the ambassador, was also present. And the Foreign Minister, who had been ambassador in Paris, and looked like a 16th century Goliath painting, I've forgotten his name. His staff lived in terror of him. They negotiated the final issues just sitting across from each other. One was the amount of aid they wanted, a grant aid, we had offered them 10 and they wanted 20 or something. I remember Kissinger saying, "Well, if we're giving them 10 I suppose we can make it 15," and that was done. Then they got on to the subject of there's \$15 million per year grant, plus all the other things. Then they got on the subject of a treaty which the Spaniards wanted more because obviously it's more senior standing. Kissinger made the point that, "If I propose a treaty to the Senate, the streets will be full of people." The Foreign Minister looked him straight in the eye and said, "As ambassador in Paris, I've had the streets really full of angry people, they don't bother me." So they worked out that issue and it was finally an executive agreement. There were a couple of small points and the Spanish Foreign Minister was unrelenting. He was like a little terrier that had Kissinger's leg and would not let go. Finally at one point Kissinger said, "You're a high roller." And we had to explain what a high roller was. Anyhow, they reached agreement, the executive agreement was signed in the Spanish embassy on a Saturday afternoon. And that Senate negotiations were taken care of. But Franco was alive, he was doddering. The year before his Foreign Minister, Blanco, had been blown up by a bomb. We sent the Vice President to the delegation, Porter went with him, I didn't go because I went out to the airport to meet my Mother and missed the plane. But anyhow, Porter came back saying, "He's ga-ga," referring to Franco. They had an audience with him and he said Franco just sat in his chair, and he drooled, and didn't say anything at all. I gather in fact Franco had periods, some periods he was quite lucid, other periods he was like that. But Franco was obviously past his prime.

And then in the fall of 1976, I remember there was just a routine ticker saying the Spanish cabinet meeting had been canceled because Franco was indisposed. So I took it back to the Spanish desk officer, Matt Durkey, and said, "Keep your eye on this situation." And little did we know that in fact that was the final crisis. He lingered, and was made to linger I think quite indecorously, for days and days. They kept him alive. They were so frightened of what would



happen, and what might happen, when he died that they prolonged his life by every possible means. It was unfortunate. There was operation after operation. Finally he died, and there was indeed great rejoicing in Spain. I had the impression then, and I think it's still correct even after living later in Spain, the rejoicing was not only relief, but it was an end to boredom because in fact a lot had been done during the last years of Franco's regime in ways except the psychological. It was still the old regime, it was still the stultifying psychological, and especially cultural atmosphere. Things were going smoothly, the country was prospering. The margins had been, of what was permissible, had been widened consistently over the years, but people were bored, and they knew that with the end of the Franco period, life would change and become more interesting. And to a large degree I think that was in fact the case. The reaction in the country was virtually zero. There was no reaction. In the succeeding years the Francos were gradually edged out of power, voted out.

*Q: What were we thinking? Obviously having just gone through the trauma of the Portuguese thing, we must have been looking everywhere to see who were the wild men who might take over, weren't we?*

BARBOUR: Oh, yes. But there was an element there that we pinned some hopes on, but they were very uncertain hopes, and that was the King. The King had been brought up as creature of Franco. He had been trained in a military academy.

*Q: King Juan Carlos.*

BARBOUR: King Juan Carlos, yes. He'd been brought up in a Francoist mold. Franco had made him his heir and successor, and apparently really had great affection for him, and probably even was reciprocated. But there was always a question as to what the real role of the King would be, and nobody knew. There were indications, and there were signals that the succession would be a respectable one. And as I said, the last years of the Franco period, things that would have brought about a jail sentencing, were tolerated, were permitted. Fewer people were going to jail for political crimes, and once in jail they were not being badly treated.

To leap ahead, when I was in Spain the then Minister of Justice, a socialist, led a parliamentary commission to visit some prisoners. To one of them he said, "Ah, this is where I was for..." whatever the period was, and he said, "it really wasn't so bad." But nonetheless, the changes away from the previously brutal years had created an atmosphere that was essentially nonviolent, it was tolerant. The socialists had lived in France in exile for most of the time, they were back in Spain. The parties were dormant, you might say, but they were working, they were building. Felipe Gonzalez had returned to Spain, this young pro-France(?) some years before. Wells Stapler had invited him to the embassy. So things had already begun to move. There was not the fear, there was uncertainty, but there was not the fear of what might happen in Spain, as there had been in the case of Portugal. There was a transition, a Francoist transition, the Prime Minister whose name I've forgotten, who, although a Francoist, took some steps in a less illiberal direction, but he didn't last very long. He was replaced by Suarez, [Adolfo?] his first name but starts with an A, I know, because we had a message saying, there will be a new Prime Minister, and his initials are A.S., so we quickly got out the list...a serving minister. Well, there were two, and one was Suarez, and the other was somebody else. Suarez, who had been a Francoist, a

Minister of Youth and Sports in the Franco regime. The King made this choice, he was the new Prime Minister. Young, rather attractive, close to the King, and he began, you might say, either an active or a passive dismantling of the Franco regime and structure. And it was done from within. It was done by those concerned. The extremists were gradually edged out and the less extreme for a while were kept in. It was an amazing transition. There was fear of the bunker, which was the Francoist political-military-industrial-financial establishment. Lots of cartoons at that time showed the fortress, the bunker. And it was believed that when elections were held, as they were scheduled to be held very soon, the bunker would show that it controlled enormous force, influence and resources. All the forces and influences that were imputed to it. Everyone assumed the elections were held, and the bunker, the Francoist parties received a very small percentage of votes, maybe as much as 15%, I'm not...that may have been it. The communists, who of course were the other party, received also a very small percentage of the votes. So the transition regime continued in power, gradually changing, riding an economy that was doing well which of course helped, and settling in for a long haul. And maybe there we ought to stop because I better get my car before they get it.

*Q: Okay. Let's put on tape here what I'd like to do the next time we get together, before we leave EUR, a bit about how you saw the transition between the Ford administration, and Kissinger, and the Carter-Vance administration regarding western Europe, and we'll pick it up from there.*

*Today is April 10th, 1995. Bob, you heard that last statement where we'll pick it up. You were what, the DAS for Western Southern Europe. You were there during the transition period.*

BARBOUR: Transition from the Nixon-Kissinger period to the Carter-Vance period.

*Q: In some places that can be rather stressful for the professionals around because you have new boys on the block, and they want to stretch their muscles, and do something different and make their mark, and always there's a sort of learning curve problem. Did you find that in your particular area, or not?*

BARBOUR: It was not as dramatic, not as sensible, as I had expected it to be. There was a change, of course, in the Assistant Secretaries, a very gradual one. Arthur Hartman left and went to Paris. George Vest came in from being director of political-military affairs. So it was a change of names and faces, but not of substance, or really of style. Both were extremely impressive individuals, both of them. Over time however, I'm talking after three or four months...I should add, to go back a bit, dealings with the NSC were also easier than I had expected them to be. They were well-meaning, well intentioned, certainly competent people, so the transition in the early days was quite smooth. What we found out later on was, first of all at the NSC level, the people we dealt with, despite having the personal and the professional qualifications that I mentioned, showed themselves at times to be extremely, well, naive. It was reinventing the wheel sort of idea, and what were proposed to us as really innovations and ideas, frequently were things that we had long since tried, and had not worked. So, we were frequently in a position of deflecting what seemed to be new ideas from going very far because they were not new, and we knew they would not go very far. It was not an unpleasant situation, it was just somewhat frustrating.

*Q: Often this requires more diplomacy than dealing with foreign countries.*

BARBOUR: Personal relations were always good, they were always accessible on the telephone and we met with some regularity. But we were, as I said, frequently in that situation of turning aside brilliant innovations on the grounds they were not innovations, and that we too had thought them brilliant some months or years earlier.

The more difficult, more profound, differences were at the top. With Nixon and Kissinger, of course, you had the ultimate pragmatists, very perceptive, very sensitive to the American interests in any particular situation. And well versed, very comfortable in the concept of the use of force to achieve a particular purpose. I don't mean military force, I just mean the power of the United States in its general terms as an element in the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. We went from that, in which areas were well defined, interests were primary, etc., to a situation in which interests were present but less vigorously pursued because of other complicating factors. And, of course, I realize a lot of people today would say, oh, yes, Chile and all that sort of thing, but we found that it was difficult to get clear cut decisions, and when we got them we would have a decision one day, and then maybe before long it would be changed, not in the White House at the staff level, but frequently by the President himself. The great example of that was the so-called neutron bomb.

*Q: Yes, that was a major one, and you were dealing with that, weren't you?*

BARBOUR: Yes, I remember it.

*Q: Can you explain what the so-called neutron, the whole issue because I think it's very important.*

BARBOUR: Well, of course, I do not recall the technical aspects. It was designed to be effective against armor, as I recall, by the penetrating power of these lethal neutrons. It was a new type of weapon whose explosive powers were dispersed in killing power, rather than destructive power. Right or wrong, the administration decided that we would pursue that new weapon because of its vast military potential. So it made a great, great effort to do so with the NATO.

*Q: Did you get involved with all of this?*

BARBOUR: Not directly because it was done mostly in NATO. Of course anything we did in a bilateral area, yes, with my countries I was involved in. We were unrelenting and unyielding in our pursuit of it, and, of course, at the same time the Russians, for exactly the same reasons, were putting out their best efforts to defeat it, demonstrations and everything they controlled in western Europe was out in the streets, or in the newspaper columns, developing all of the thousand of arguments why it was not a good thing to do. And you remember one of them was, it saves buildings but kills people.

*Q: Yes, its a capitalistic weapon.*

BARBOUR: Exactly.

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*Q: Before you left in '78 were there any other major issues in your bailiwick? In Spain, Italy, France.*

BARBOUR: Relations with France were always friendly but prickly. The French always had a way of developing their own ideas as to what events in Europe should be within the Alliance, and that sort of thing. It was a chronic day-to-day problem. We had some difficulties really within multilateral institutions. We could never count on support for doing things. Now there were times when they would come through bravely, brilliantly, and I think proved that when national interest coincided, they were the ultimate pragmatist. When their interest coincided with ours they could be counted on 100%, when they didn't then they made it clear that we were quite wrong.

In Italy the political situation bubbled and bubbled. The problem there was seen, I think, historically the wrong problem. The problem was, how to keep the communists, not just out of power, but away from power. We did not talk to anybody in the communist party at that time. The ambassadors were not only enjoined from doing so, but had no interest whatsoever in doing so. So one of the things we did do was to get...I remember specifically, getting a telegram, a short one going out, saying, "If you think it would serve the interest of the United States government to have contacts with the communist party, you are authorized to do so, and you are the judge of whether it would be." So there was that that moved along.

Fortunately, this was somewhat earlier, but we had the vestiges of the Portuguese revolution. This was 1975, by that time I was Director of Western Europe, we may have talked about it. We still had the vestiges of that. The Portuguese, after a period of internal turmoil but virtually no blood, pulled themselves together, brought in Mario Suarez, and the government first was left center, and then moved back to the center.

Spain, we had the transition. Franco died in 1976, I think, when I was in Western European Affairs. By 1978 the effects of the transition were becoming clearer. It was by no means given that it would succeed, but it had moved along. It was not the crisis that it had been at one time, but it was still a very interesting and important situation. The revolution from within, by means of which of using ex former Franco people, they threw out their old system, and brought in a new one. It was fascinating to watch.

In Malta we had Dom Mintoff. That was one of the countries that we had to work with. Dom Mintoff was a fantastic political phenomenon, utterly, utterly I think without scruples, very effective, and a real tyrant in many ways. Not at all above bending the laws, using a little elbow and muscle here and there if people were causing trouble. We had no serious problems with him because Malta didn't count all that much, but it was potentially troublesome.

**WARREN ZIMMERMANN**

**Vice Chairman, US Delegation, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
Madrid (1980-1981)**

*Mr. Warren Zimmermann entered the Foreign Service in 1961. His career postings included Venezuela, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, France, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria. Mr. Zimmermann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.*

*Q: Could you talk a bit about 1975 to '77, nationalities and ethnic problems as you saw them then.*

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, Funnily enough I don't think I saw any problems in Yugoslavia. I don't think I dealt with that at all. We were very concerned about Spain. We were very concerned about Corsica.

*Q: You are talking about Spain the Basques and the Catalans.*

ZIMMERMANN: The Basques and Catalans. With Corsica, the problems between the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium and so forth. I mean it was the general idea that Europe did have problems with these things, but I guess the prognosis was that things would be all right. The big issue of that period was so called Eurocommunism. That is, the power of communist parties in Western Europe particularly in Italy and France. I was kind of asked to look after that. My conclusion which I am quite proud of actually, was not to worry. "The French communist party," I said, "has a kind of a limit at about 20%. They are not going to get more than that."

*Q: And also they weren't really Eurocommunists if I recall. They were still Stalinists at the time where it was sort of the Belinguers and all in Italy who were more receptive.*

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. It is true the French communists were very Stalinist in their approach. What happened in France was that Mitterrand, who had tried all kinds of different ways to get into power, picked up a socialist party which was in very bad shape, and linked it to the communists, because they had a lot of electoral votes. There was a lot of nervousness in the United States about that. There was a feeling that Mitterrand was going to be taken to the cleaners by communists. Pretty soon we are going to have a communist led government in France. It would be a mistake. Mitterrand said, "Don't worry about a thing. I am going to have them help me get to power and then I am going to destroy them." That is exactly what he did. So, I was pretty relaxed on that score as was Hartman by the way. As for Italy, there the Italian communist party was of course, very much like a middle class party. It had learned how a party works. You take care of things that people need and they are going to vote for you. Again there was a tremendous fear as their numbers crept up. They got over 30% of the votes in the mid-'70s, that Italy would go communist. It was a kind of a panic. Kissinger was almost hysterical on the subject. Again I think the EUR approach was not the approach of our ambassador in Italy, Dick Gardner who was also getting very concerned about it. The general view in EUR was this is not dangerous. Yes, the Italian communists have a lot of foreign policy positions which are opposed to the United States particularly on the stationing of the intermediate range missiles which we wanted to station in Italy. If we take too rigid an anti communist attitude, that might make them

stronger. Basically I predicted that Euro communism was a passing phase and would not be a major event or process. I think that prediction turned out.

*Q: Were you at all involved at this time in the rather traumatic events that were happening in Portugal?*

ZIMMERMANN: Not directly, no. That was an extraordinary story, I think, in which we were talking about the importance of the Ambassador on the ground.

*Q: Frank Carlucci.*

ZIMMERMANN: I think Carlucci made an enormous difference there by keeping his cool. Again Kissinger got quite hysterical about the communists taking over. Basically he had written Portugal off. Carlucci just hammered away and the Germans and other European countries made efforts to strengthen the democratic socialist party in Portugal, and ultimately the communists were marginalized, and Portugal became a democracy which it has been ever since. I think Carlucci had an enormous role.

*Q: I did a short interview with Carlucci recently on that, because I think it is another one of the great stories of the foreign service.*

ZIMMERMANN: Yes it definitely is. Tad Szulc wrote a long piece in foreign policy on this as I recall, 100 pages long, in which as I recall he gave Carlucci full credit for doing what he did. I visited Lisbon shortly after the communists had been beaten back, and I stayed with Herb Okun who was the DCM under Carlucci. Herb took me around town and there were all kinds of wall paintings and graffiti that said "Death to Carlucci." I mean this was a serious business.

*Q: Well what about on the Spanish situation with the Catalans and the Basques? Was there sort of anything we could do, or were these situations where we really had to let it get played out locally?*

ZIMMERMANN: Well, I think there was, Franco was pretty rough on them, on nationalists. We had a fairly favorable approach to Franco. After he died, there was a successor government which was young people from Franco's entourage. Suarez was the first one. I happened to be in Spain in 1980, this is jumping ahead, to a CSCE meeting. Again, I think the U.S. position toward Franco was perhaps too friendly, but I have to say that whether by design or by accident, Franco provided for political succession which led directly to democracy, to economic prosperity, and to Spain's being embraced by NATO and by the European community. It was a great success story. You had a parallel situation in Yugoslavia, another multi national country on the border of Europe where everything went the opposite way.

**LESLIE M. ALEXANDER**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Madrid (1981-1983)**

*Ambassador Leslie Alexander was born in Germany of American parents and grew up primarily in Europe. He was educated at the Munich campus of American University, after which he came to the United States and, in 1970, entered the Foreign Service. Speaking several foreign languages, including German, French, Spanish and Portuguese and some Polish, he served in Guyana, Norway, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Haiti, where he twice served, first as Chargé, and later as Special Envoy.. From 1993 to 1996 he served as Ambassador to Mauritius and from 1996 to 1999 as Ambassador to Ecuador. Ambassador Alexander was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.*

ALEXANDER: I was an economic officer. I had the “cats and dogs” portfolio. Fisheries and aviation issues. Things of that sort.

*Q: You were there from '81?*

ALEXANDER: From January 1981, in fact I arrived a week or two before the coup. The famous coup.

*Q: Was this the national guard?*

ALEXANDER: Exactly. Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, ‘Tejerazo’, pulled out his pistol, shot the ceiling and called the parliamentarians the equivalent of “you dumb bastards, get on the floor.” What was shocking was Spain was emerging, or so they felt, to be a western democratic nation. It was going to take its place along with the French and Italians and then they have a coup in Western Europe, a military coup. They thought that Western Europe was way beyond that. I think to this day there are people, like yourself, I’m constantly amazed by people who say, “Was this the Lieutenant Colonel?” I mean, the number of people who still remember the details.

*Q: Sure. It was a small thing. The king proved himself.*

ALEXANDER: The king proved himself, exactly.

*Q: He put on his uniform and said “cut out this crap.”*

ALEXANDER: Exactly.

So I was there from January 1981 to the summer of 1983.

*Q: Who was the ambassador?*

ALEXANDER: Terry Todman.

*Q: What was the situation in Spain when you got there?*

ALEXANDER: You had the old Franco regime; they still cast a long shadow. Many of the Francos were still in government. They were slowly but surely being pushed out, but there was still a lot of sentiment in favor of that type of government. You had the younger Spaniards; the Felipe Gonzalez crowd was trying to move Spain into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. So you had a very vivid, very animated dynamic there between the old and the new. The old Spain, backward, shut up behind the barrier of the Pyrenees, De Gaulle having said Europe stops at the Pyrenees, that sort of thing. Again, Spain wanted very much to be European; it wanted to rejoin Western Europe after 40-50 years of political isolation, and to a certain extent, geographic isolation.

So this made for a fascinating mix of tradition in politics and culture. It was a great time to be in Spain because I saw the old Spain and the new Spain—the old Spain which was dying and the new Spain which was being born. They went into the European Union and the Common Market while I was there. Both of these things would have been considered highly improbable if not outright impossible five or six years before. Spain went from being a rather rural country to a rapidly industrializing one. It was a great time to be in Spain.

*Q: Even before Franco, Spain was a very backward country. What were you seeing? I imagine, although you had the cats and dogs thing, you must have been seeing a great sense of awakening of young people.*

ALEXANDER: Absolutely. I did other things, particularly when my colleagues were on leave. I had a lot of friends in the banking community. That was a very dynamic sector. The pirate banks were being capitalized with money from abroad. They were getting bigger. American banks were coming into the market, French banks.

*Q: And this was the engine...*

ALEXANDER: Exactly. They were coming in to help fuel the industrialization of Spain—the transformation from a heavily rural country to a modern European one. New factories and industries and what have you. During that time, for example, General Motors built what was then the most automated plant in Europe in Zaragoza. They built an Opel factory there. Spain was exploding. It had the advantages of climate, cheap labor, low taxes; there were many, many advantages for European companies in particular that wanted to relocate operations from northern or central Europe to the Mediterranean, to Spain. A lot of this money from the banks was used to fuel this very quick expansion. The Spaniards themselves were, like the Chinese today, eager to buy products that up until then had simply been out of reach, or unavailable. So you had a very rapidly expanding consumer market there for everything from automobiles to the latest high-tech—whatever was being manufactured in those days. So it was extremely dynamic. It was a happy time because everything was going up. Incomes were going up. Expectations were going up. Life expectancy was going up. New streets, new highways, new buildings were going up; very dynamic. It was a time of great happiness. Restaurants were filled. People were happy. The Spaniards, particularly after Felipe Gonzalez took over, had cast off this image of the somber, morose, dark, primitive Spaniard of Franco's time, the civil war and all that nastiness. They were the new kids on the block.

*Q: Was he a socialist.*



ALEXANDER: He was a socialist. But I think we can use that term rather loosely. Certainly economically.

*Q Well, this is the Reagan administration. And socialist. Were we initially kind of nervous?*

ALEXANDER: No. Absolutely not. I think it was one of the few times an embassy in Europe really did have an important role in the nurturing of European political leadership; the kind of role that we hadn't had since maybe in the forties. To clarify a little bit what I mean, the probability of the political counselor in France today, or in Rome, dealing with, meeting with, having dinner with the guy who is going to be prime minister next year is slim to none. But we actually socialized. I knew two or three of Felipe's ministers. They weren't ministers at the time. They were young guys, my age. It was clear to us. I think we did a great job of identifying the emerging leadership. We sent them to the States with the IV (International visitor's) program and we used to take them out and socialize with them, party with them, what have you. When he took over, he named as his minister of labor, or commerce, or whatever, he named guys that we had as contacts. In fact, one of my little moments of irritation with my leadership at the embassy was once these guys became ministers; we were told we could no longer talk to them. I remember approaching the DCM and saying, "the minister is a personal friend of mine. What do you mean?" "Well, ministers are the ambassador's contacts." I said, "Well, that's stupid. That's absolutely stupid. That's not a way to leverage our resources here." "Well, when you become an ambassador you do what you want. But this embassy, the ambassador deals with the ministers."

*Q: Terry Todman had the reputation for being one of our imperial ambassadors.*

ALEXANDER: Yeah. He worked hard. I think he was a very smart man. But yeah, his style was an old-fashioned kind of style that I certainly didn't follow. He was not one of my models. In fairness to him, he gave his officers an exit interview. When I left post in 1983, he said, "had you been me, what would you have done that I didn't do?" I said, "Mr. Ambassador, quite frankly, I would have gotten out of this office, I would have walked around this embassy, and walked into offices like mine, and sat down for a few minutes, half an hour, and asked them, 'what are you doing and why are you doing it?' We never saw you, you sat up here, you were untouchable." The other thing I mentioned to him was the business about the ministers. I said, "You know, I knew two or three of these guys personally. I worked hard nurturing these guys and trying to inculcate them with certain values as I understood we were supposed to do. And they become ministers and all of a sudden we're not allowed to talk to these guys anymore." He was very gracious. He said, "Well, those are certain pointed observations." He didn't get angry, he didn't seek to defend himself; he didn't say much of anything.

*Q: Did you get involved in any aviation crunches or problems.*

ALEXANDER: No. My headaches with the aviation were, unfortunately, plane crashes. We had a couple of really bad plane crashes with several hundred people perishing. Those were always very nasty. My biggest headache was the fisheries portfolio. Because Spain was a major fishing power; I guess it still is. Unfortunately though, the Spaniards were predatory fishermen. They were always violating their quotas and doing illegal things. Whatever quotas we gave them in

our fisheries were never enough. So there was this constant friction between what they wanted and what we were willing to give them and constant problems because they were always over-fishing and doing things that they weren't supposed to do. So that was a major, major headache.

*Q: How did we deal with it?*

ALEXANDER: Well, we would catch their ships with too many fish in the hold. We would fine them, very high fines, and send them packing. I think on one or two occasions we seized the ships and held them; the fish spoiled and we released them after sorting that out. But there was no resolution. Again, the Spaniards always wanted higher quotas. No matter what we gave them it was never enough. So there was this constant tension.

*Q: With a socialist government, did you see developing in Spain the same problem that I think France and Germany had? Such a generous social net: unemployment insurance, difficulty to fire people. This social net is beginning to destroy Germany and France. The Brits under Margaret Thatcher sort of got out from under it. Did you see that developing in Spain?*

ALEXANDER: I didn't see it because by the time I left, the socialists had only been in power for about a year. So they weren't able to implement those kinds of programs to any meaningful degree. Actually, I left believing they were not going to institute these kinds of programs despite their being this socialist party. They were very pragmatic. They had very good ministers, very well educated, young ministers who had already discerned some of the problems with this social welfare state and they weren't going to take the country too far in that direction. I think there were more immediate, pressing economic and commercial issues for the government. For one, just sheer development. Spain was so far behind in so many things. They had to do that. They had to dismantle the Franco state. Spain very much resembled Italy of the 1950s, where a significant portion of the productive sector, industry, was in the hands of government. These big government corporations were inefficient, but controlled so much of the economy.

*Q: Like big steel?*

ALEXANDER: Big steel. Auto manufacturing. They were dinosaurs, exactly. They had INH in Spain and that was the counterpart of Eni in Italy. The point is, it was a very large state-holding company that had tentacles into so many sectors of the economy. Inefficient, the source of patronage jobs, these institutions had to be dismantled. I think that the new socialist government was much more concerned with dismantling that than they were with building their own version of it.

*Q: Did you have much contact with the universities?*

ALEXANDER: I didn't have much contact with the universities.

*Q: How about the labor side?*

ALEXANDER: I was on a first-name basis with the gentleman who became the minister of labor. But with labor, the same with unions, we had a labor attaché. That wasn't part of my bailiwick. So, no, I didn't really.

*Q: How about Barcelona and Catalonia? Was that sort of off limits? How was that treated?*

ALEXANDER: It wasn't off limits. But we had a consul general and he served as the ambassador to Catalonia. He did not welcome the embassy officers running around his territory. He insisted, and he was able to make it stick, that we would fly into Barcelona, we would go to the consulate and he would come with us on our calls. He also, to the extent that he was allowed, would dominate the conversations that embassy officers had.

*Q: What was his name?*

ALEXANDER: I can see his face. I think his last name was Wyams if I recall correctly.

*Q: Was Catalonia developing in a different way?*

ALEXANDER: It was more developed industrially. It was more developed than Madrid. Historically I think that had always been the case.; closer to France, on the Mediterranean. It was more cosmopolitan, more outward looking.

*Q: Madrid is right in the middle.*

ALEXANDER: Right in the middle, out there in the high plateau. Maybe it's an unfair comparison. Washington and New York: New York is a financial capital and Washington is a political capital.

*Q: What about the Basque territory?*

ALEXANDER: The Basque territory was more like Catalonia. More developed, ship building, steel making, things of that sort. Again, but if you look, they're on the water, bordered France, more outward looking. They were independent minded, spoke a different language, saw themselves as different than the folks in Madrid; different than the folks in Spain.

*Q: Were there problems? People blowing people up and that sort of thing?*

ALEXANDER: Oh yeah. The Basques very much wanted an independent state. I dare say there wasn't a week that went by that they didn't kill somebody.

*Q: What was our feeling? Did we think there could be a viable Basque state?*

ALEXANDER: No.

*Q: Did it make sense?*

ALEXANDER: Absolutely not, no. Our policy was to keep Spain whole and intact. This meant keeping the Basque region in Spain. The Spaniards came up with this sort of autonomous regions; they toyed with ways to give the Catalans and the Basques and others a certain degree of autonomy, but within a strong central state. That's what we supported.

*Q: What about American investment? Were you and others in the economic section seeing Americans and encouraging Americans to come in and invest? What was the response?*

ALEXANDER: We were. I mentioned, for example, General Motors built the most automated plant in Europe in Zaragoza, an Opel plant. We were interested in many, many sectors: electricity generation. Fast food restaurants: McDonald's. Banking. We had several American banks that opened. I don't remember all the sectors that American business was interested in. We viewed Spain as being a wide-open, new place to do business.

*Q: One of the things that happens, we've seen this phenomenon, a country that has been very backward, when it jumps in usually ends up getting the fanciest, new equipment. So it catches up. Instead of stringing wire, it has wireless phones or more automation. Were we seeing Spain turning into a fairly modern economy?*

ALEXANDER: Yeah. Again, I have to be careful here, because I left in 1983. What Spain is now, it became after I left. But certainly it was easy to sense that that was where Spain was going. It was going to have factories that were cutting-edge relative to other places in Europe. It had the work force capable of rapidly grasping these new concepts and new technologies. Spain might have been less advanced relative to its European neighbors, but it wasn't Third World either. It was clear to me as I was leaving Spain that Spain was going to become very, very quickly a modern European state and probably within 10 to 15 years would be virtually indistinguishable from most other economies in Europe.

*Q: How did you find your Spanish contacts? You mentioned in Poland everybody was sort of depressed.*

ALEXANDER: I was very impressed with my Spanish contacts. They were well educated. They were surprisingly friendly. I don't know if they were pro-American. They certainly weren't anti-American. Open minded, talented people.

*Q: Okay, this is probably a good place to stop. You left Spain in 1983 and then wither?*

ALEXANDER: Brazil.

**FRANCIS M. KINNELLY**  
**Science and Technology Attaché**  
**Madrid (1981-1985)**

*Francis M. Kinnelly was born in Brooklyn, New York in October of 1935. Mr. Kinnelly received a bachelor's degree in European history from Bowdoin College in European history in 1957 and a master's degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Mr. Kinnelly then entered the U.S. Army, serving in Korea from 1960-1961. His Foreign Service career included positions in Manila, Bonn, and Madrid. Mr. Kinnelly was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 6, 1997.*

*Q: You were in Spain from when to when?*

KINNELLY: Let's see, from December '81 to the summer of '85 - three and a half years.

*Q: What was your position in our embassy in Madrid and what was your role?*

KINNELLY: I was the science and technology attaché in the Economic Section. I was also the deputy economic counselor. My main role was interesting and unique. We had a large science and technology cooperation program with Spain, which we funded as part of the bases agreement. Spain was the only country receiving this type of economic support assistance from the U.S. that had requested that part of the assistance be in the form of science and technology cooperation. So, the program started at several million dollars annually. It was at \$4 million when I arrived and ratcheted up to \$7 million, which in terms of science and technology cooperation was a very heady sum. We had a joint secretariat in Madrid which managed the program in terms of giving out the grant assistance and monitoring the cooperative programs. The State Department and the Spanish Foreign Ministry were the lead institutions. The Spanish assigned very good diplomats, Fidel Lopez Alvarez and later Antonio Oyarzabal, to the task of working with me in overseeing the program. Oyarzabal is now the Spanish ambassador in Washington. With the additional funding, I wanted to expand the program to cover a wider range of areas. It had concentrated in agriculture, energy, and marine science, and we were able to get remote sensing and especially biomedical research programs with NIH going while I was there.

Several years before I arrived, complaints had been made by people at NSF, the National Science Foundation, that the program was not being managed well. As a result of those controversies, NSF had pulled out. They felt that the science wasn't good enough and there wasn't adequate review of the projects that were being approved. So, one of our most important achievements was in improving the project selection and review process to the point where we were able to get NSF back into the program. So, with money to spend, you're always in a nice position. I visited a number of the Spanish universities and research institutes, telling them about the program and trying to encourage more competition.

*Q: When I think about it, I don't think in today's terms. I'm sure this will change. But in the past 50 years or so, at least, I don't think of Spain as being one of the places where there would seem to be much in the way of rather interesting scientific development. I mean, one would think Germany and France, maybe even India, Japan, other places. Was this a fairly one-sided thing. I mean, were we trying to help the Spanish thing, up their science capacity, or was there an exchange? What were we doing?*

KINNELLY: The initiative was on the Spanish part. I guess there was a feeling of getting left behind because of the civil war in Spain and then World War II. I had arrived just several years after Franco's death, and there was a feeling that they really had to get themselves into a more competitive position and that science and technology was important to that aspect. Here they were getting economic support assistance from the U.S. under the bases agreement, so why not ask the U.S. to open a window on its science and technology community? The program was designed to bring Spanish and American investigators together. Proposals for joint research were put forth by American investigators, too. For some of the Americans, this was another opportunity for grant assistance. There was never enough from NSF or elsewhere. So, there was a bit of that. But the best researchers on the U.S. side were attracted to the program by the opportunity to do research that could not be done in the U.S. itself. One of our larger projects involved a team of marine scientists headed by Ken Tenore from Georgia Tech, who subsequently came up to direct the Chesapeake Bay Laboratories in Solomons Island. They were interested in doing research on the Spanish *rias*, the long inlets on the Galician coast. There were very strong upwellings of water on the Atlantic shelf outside the *rias* that brought in water very rich in nutrients. As a result, there is a tremendous production of mussels and other fisheries inside these *rias*. The *rias* are a unique area to study. A whole series of academic papers were produced. At the same time, Spain had very little in the way of academic programs in marine biology. The Spanish fisheries institutes would hire somebody with a bachelor's level degree in biology and then train him. Well, under this program, we brought young Spanish scientists to the U.S. to work on their doctorates. After five or six years, these young scientists formed the basis for much more effective and higher level Spanish research capability in marine science.

There were other areas, such as solar technology. We helped Spain build a solar tower, which would reflect the sun's rays onto a large set of panels of solar receivers. We have this technology in California, too, but southern Spain, in Almeria, was a very good place to do this research. In this case, the American researchers were interested in developing and testing new technology. At the same time the Spanish gained a lot of technology themselves, as well as training and experience in using it.

*Q: This '81 to '85 period was really sort of the beginning of the explosion of the personal computer and the ability to do a lot of things that before had been limited to a few major labs. Were you able to tap in? Were the Spanish able to tap into this change in the ability to look at things?*

KINNELLY: I guess it was a bit too early for that. However, some Spaniards were starting to move. They were making links with laboratories in other parts of the world, with northern Europe and with the US, moving back and forth. But in my travels, I found that many universities and many of the labs were very insular still and rather protective. It was rather difficult to get them to move out of their shells, even when there were so many opportunities to work with American scientists.

It was a very interesting time for Spain. The country was just moving out of the long Franco period, wondering where to go. There were debates, very serious ones, on whether Spain should join the European Community and suffer the competition from Germany and France and all, or whether it should instead try to build up ties with the old colonial world in Latin America, look

to the North African littoral, this sort of thing. Spain finally ended up choosing Europe. Spain was also being pressed by the U.S. to join NATO, and was unsure for a long time whether to do so. So, a lot of changes were taking place in Spain's role in the world as well as in Spain itself. When I got there, there were still signs of the Falange around and there were posters in the metro about the new liberal constitution that had just been promulgated, with big crosses over these posters, "We don't need a constitution," a lot of that going on. But then within only several years, the whole new democracy was being more broadly accepted.

*Q: How did you find the Spanish bureaucracy at that point, both academic bureaucracy and governmental bureaucracy in your dealings with them?*

KINNELLY: On the whole quite effective, quite serious, the Foreign Ministry especially, where there were very well-trained people, really dedicated and open as well. Elsewhere, , a bit of a mixed bag. There were a few institutions that had been built up under the Franco period and, instead of being cut out, were just left to wither in backwaters where people were not doing very much. The science labs that I dealt with, in Madrid especially, and the nuclear establishment, they were really very good.

I should speak a little about the nuclear. It was a very interesting time. Spain had, rather surprisingly for one's image of Franco Spain, already made a sizable commitment to nuclear energy. There were eight or so major power reactors already built and in operation, with five or six more under construction. There was a major research facility with a large research reactor in Madrid doing technology of some sensitivity and some concern for the US. This all started turning around soon after I arrived. The completion of one set of major power reactors in Bilbao was being attacked by the ETA separatists there, and the whole project was brought to a halt.

*Q: These were the Basques.*

KINNELLY: The Basques, yes. Directors of the project were being attacked and assassinated, there were fires, threats. Finally, this pressure forced the utilities to put a hold on completing these reactors. There was also a growing concern about nuclear energy, and the realization that the Spanish utilities had been too ambitious in their building plans. The government then forced the halt of construction of three or four reactors. This question of where Spain would be going with its nuclear programs was at issue. The major U.S. nuclear engineering companies, Westinghouse, GE, were involved. At the same time, Spain had not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as most of the Western European countries without nuclear weapons had done. We were pushing Spain to do so. They refused. We had a time with that issue.

*Q: Why were they refusing?*

KINNELLY: This I can talk about now. General Electric and Westinghouse were both working with Spanish counterparts in building a modern plant to produce nuclear fuel for the power reactors, typical low-enriched uranium fuels for light-water reactors. Nothing wrong with all of that. But then we learned that the Spanish military had other interests in mind concerning this fuel fabrication plant. They were worried about protecting the Canary Islands. They had lost Spanish Sahara not too many years before. They were looking at the concept of having several

nuclear powered submarines which could go out there and sit for extended periods around the Canaries. They needed fuel for the submarines and they thought this plant would be a very good place to do it. They were not listening to their civil nuclear people, who knew full well that this plant could not be used to build fuel for nuclear submarines. It's a far different fuel and requires much more protection, too, because it's more highly enriched. It would be much more radioactive, much more dangerous to deal with than the fuel for power reactors. When we finally found this out, we were able to explain to the Spanish military that if they joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the treaty permitted countries to develop nuclear technology for defensive non-weapons purposes,. They would be free to build a nuclear powered submarine, but they would have to do this on their own, without outside help. Under the treaty, they couldn't put nuclear missiles on these subs, but they had no plans to do that in any case. We also had experts explain to them that the technology involved at this fuel fabrication plant just wouldn't work. So, finally, they decided to join the Nonproliferation Treaty. And they eventually gave up on the idea of building nuclear subs.

Q: *You left there in '85, is that right?*

KINNELLY: Yes.

Q: *Who was the ambassador most of this time?*

KINNELLY: Todman, a very fine man, who was liked and admired both by the Embassy staff and by the Spaniards. I had mentioned that Spain was changing so much. While I was there, Spain decided to join NATO and the European Union. There was a lot going on. I think Todman wanted to be sure that the bilateral science and technology program ran all right and would not give rise to a problem for him. He was not interested in the management of it; that was my responsibility. As for the nuclear, that, of course, he took an interest in.

**McKINNEY RUSSELL**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1982-1985)**

*McKinney Russell was born in New York, New York in 1929. He graduated from Yale University in 1950 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1951-1953. Mr. Russell's career included positions in Germany, the Congo, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Spain, and China. He was interviewed on May 10, 1997 by G. Lewis Schmidt.*

RUSSELL: I had hoped to go to London from Brasilia and had put in a bid for it. Someone else had put in a bid earlier and had gotten a prior commitment from the Director that if he went to a post where he absolutely didn't want to go, he could go to London thereafter. So we did not go to London, and we did indeed, instead, go to Spain for 3 years and ran the program there from '82 to '85. Here again, it was a question of having a crash course in the language as we had had to do for Portuguese. Spanish was easier to learn because I knew Portuguese very thoroughly after the



four years. I remember scoring 4+ in Portuguese and then immediately proceeded to forget it. When you plunge into a new thing and are concentrating all day, every day on learning Spanish, the similar language begins to fade. After learning Spanish, I ran into the man who had tested me in Portuguese 6 weeks before, and I was barely able to say hello. Very embarrassing.

The tour in Spain began at a time when Spain had been rid of the Franco dictatorship only 7 years, and various forms of democracy were taking shape. It was a very interesting time to be there. The whole society, from '36/'37 when Franco won the civil war until '75, had been in effect a closed autocratic dictatorship. A lot less severe than the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, but one nevertheless.

We had a very lively program in Spain. A lot was going on. A principal effort there was to get a really effective cultural center in place. We had a small library out of the way, dark, and fairly miserable when I got there. One of the early things I set my sights on achieving was to create a really state-of-the art cultural center. It took about almost two years, but we did do it and it has been extremely active and successful ever since. Right downtown, right around the corner from the Parliament, we had set it up so as to be a major source of information about legislation, about legislative procedures, about judicial activities in this country. It was a really very political move that the Cultural Center was opened in downtown Madrid.

As always, in Agency matters, it's terribly important that we know what is going on back in Washington and that funding is sought when timing is right. We were able to get, I recall, in the German program \$280,000 for a major renovation of the America House in Hamburg on the last day before the fiscal year ended, because last-minute funds became available and we had already an approved plan in place to spend it.

When I got to Madrid, there was an operation in Barcelona, a Branch PAO office in Barcelona, rather small and not extremely active. There was nothing in the south and there was nothing in the north, and we were able to open branches, one in Seville and one in Bilbao, during my time there. They were headed by foreign nationals, and did very good work in public affairs outreach. The exchange program was extremely important. When I arrived, the level of funding that we had for IVs, the International Visitors program in Spain, was only enough to send 18 a year, and we felt a need to persuade Washington that that was not nearly enough. We needed, given the fact that Spain had had this long, long period of authoritarian rule and was now building a democracy and new parties, to have a substantial number of IVs. We managed to increase the IV budget during the first year I was there from 18 to 55, and we sent many politicians, journalists, and others from Spain for the kind of intensive exposure in the United States on the IV program. Fulbright was also very important, and the Fulbright Commission became a vigorous, very well-funded bilateral effort. There were as many Americans as were the Spaniards on it. There were funds for Fulbright as part of the military bases deal with Spain.

An unusual law in Spain requires banks to reserve some 5% of their profits for cultural affairs. We were able to make a lot of use of those cultural centers attached to banks as places where we could have performing arts, poetry readings, concerts by U.S. artists. At the same time, we persuaded a number of banks to contribute to the Fulbright fund. The wealthy Banco de Bilbao, regularly every year, gave a million dollars in support of the Fulbright program. The total

exchanges budget between the United States and the Spanish Government and private Spanish sources, as I recall, was between \$10 and \$12 million a year. And we helped it grow and it was very important because it brought in American teachers into Spain, and it got Spanish academics out to this country. I think that the USIS effort in Spain during the early '80s was one of the really important contributory elements to the anchoring of democracy in Spain.

**ROBERT E. SERVICE**  
**Political Counselor**  
**Madrid (1982-1987)**

*Robert E. Service was born in 1937 in China to American parents. He received a B.A. from Oberlin College and an M.P.A. from Princeton University. His postings abroad have included Managua, Salvador Bahia, Mexico City, Santiago, Madrid, Buenos Aires, Brasilia, and Montevideo. Mr. Service was interviewed in 1998 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

Q: Today is the 6<sup>th</sup> of May, 1998. Bob, let's start in Madrid. You went there in 1982. What were you going to do in Madrid?

SERVICE: I went there as political counselor.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

SERVICE: The Ambassador when I got there was Terrence Todman who had been the Ambassador for four years when I arrived, and stayed there for one more year.

Q: You were there from 1982 to when?

SERVICE: 1987.

Q: Wow. This is supposed to be the ARA reward, isn't it? I'm surprised they let you stay that long.

SERVICE: I think I went there on a four-year assignment. At some point, I thought of changing it to three years straight, but didn't. Then when we had finished four, our daughter was a senior in high school. Furthermore, there had been a lot of changeovers, including the DCM and ambassador at about the end of the fourth year. So, the Department accepted my staying a fifth year. I was the continuity.

Q: What was the political set up in Spain when you arrived there in 1982?

SERVICE: First, let me say, I had been in the Foreign Service at that point for 21 years. Spain was the first democracy I served in. As a matter of fact, I served in only democracies after that. Franco died in 1975 and he had designated Juan Carlos to become the King over his father. The

six years before I got there, was a period of reinitiating democracy and a rather delicate time in some respects. There was a famous incident in, I think, February of 1981. Some Guardia Civil officers took over the Congress and shots were fired. People were in there for a long time. The country survived that. All of a sudden, Juan Carlos, who had been looked at as a rather difficult, not very bright, not very capable, royal started to look pretty good. The country was ruled by moderates, moderate-right governments from 1976 to 1982. There was still considerable fear by those who had supported Franco and who remembered the Civil War. I got there shortly before the election of 1982. The Prime Minister was Calvo Sotelo. The election, in October, was won by the socialists led by Felipe González. That was a very big step forward in healing wounds of the Civil War and strengthening democracy. For that, Felipe González deserves a great share of the credit because he is one of these people who is not antagonistic. Everybody seemed to like him. He reassured everybody that “socialists” can come in and rule the country sensibly. That was the situation when I got there, or very soon after I got there.

*Q: Can you give a little idea of what the political counselor was doing in Spain in a democracy at that time?*

SERVICE: Well, we had a very large section to start with. We had about 10 officers and three or four secretaries. That is almost as big as the entire embassy in Paraguay in terms of Foreign Service officers. We had a political-military office, which actually was a separate section when I got there. Later we combined the two. It dealt almost entirely with the bases issues and Spain's membership in NATO. The rest of us tried to keep track of what was happening in the evolving political situation in Spain, which was not threatening, but there were a lot of people and parties we had not followed very closely during all the years of Franco and which were in the process of regeneration and change. We divided up the parties and leaders and tried to get to know them and talk with them, your usual political reporting and analysis.

*Q: Did we have some catching up to do with the socialists or had we developed pretty good terms with them already?*

SERVICE: There was a little bit of catching up to do, although some of my predecessors in the political section had become close to some members of the inner circle. By and large they were eager for contact because they saw this as proving their democratic and non-extremist credentials. Soon after I got there, but before Felipe was elected, we had a visit by George Shultz. I went to see the foreign relations secretary in the Socialist Party, Elena Flores, and said “We’ve got the Secretary of State coming. He would like to meet with Felipe. Any problem?” They said, “No, no.” It was all set up. Felipe came to the Ambassador's residence and they met there. Some of the elements of the Socialist Party wanted to keep us at arm's length. They still had an ideological mind-set that we were not really sympathetic to them or friendly. They tended to hold against us our relationship with Franco in the 1950s, the bases deal, which in their imagination, helped prolong the Franco regime. I don't think that is true, but that is what some of them did believe. However, most of them, and certainly the ones we got to know best, were friendly.

*Q: Did you find that the cast of the Socialist Party was sort of doctrinaire as far as nationalizing industry and various elements of the society?*

SERVICE: No. They had changed greatly. This was Felipe's great accomplishment. I've forgotten in which year, but there was a Socialist Party convention prior to his winning office in 1982. Felipe insisted that they take out the explicit Marxist reference in the basic document of the party, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). This created a big conflict within the party, the same thing the British labor party has gone through more recently. Felipe resigned, but only briefly. The bulk of the party asked him to come back. They knew they needed him. On one occasion Felipe is supposed to have said "Look, I'd rather be mugged in New York, then live in Moscow." He was very pragmatic, very moderate. Soon after he came to power -- this, you will remember, is following Mitterrand's initial attempt to apply socialist economics in France, but soon had to back off -- Felipe said something along the lines of "Look, there are no longer socialist economics and capitalist economics. There is only one economics in the global marketplace, and if we want to participate and benefit we have to have the sense to get on board." There were socialist-controlled labor unions, and there was a left wing of the party. The Vice President, Alfonso Guerra, was widely considered to be leader of the left side of the party. But Felipe was the commanding voice in the party, and was a moderate, is a moderate.

*Q: Were we able to keep track, of say, the unions, because the unions are always such a powerful force in the socialist government? Did we have good contacts with the unions?*

SERVICE: Good, but not close. We had a labor attache. He spent a certain amount of time with them. The AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] was in one of those labor confederations with the socialist-controlled unions, but it was not a close relationship. Most of the unions in Spain, at that time, if I recall correctly, were either socialist-dominated or communist-dominated. There was no Catholic, or Christian-Democratic movement of any significance. We had a formally good relationship, but not a close relationship.

*Q: What about the Communist party, internally within Spain at that time?*

SERVICE: Fairly small, about 10 percent of the public, or even less by the time I left. They, of course, were still proscribed in the immediate aftermath of Franco's death. It was only in 1977 or 1978 when Adolfo Suárez was Prime Minister, that they were legalized. After the 1981 incident in the legislature (referred to above), there was a massive national parade of solidarity. You had the Communist leader marching arm-in-arm with Manuel Fraga, who had been a minister under Franco and was the leader of the conservative party (Acción Popular). The intent was to send a message, "We are all in favor of democracy. We are all against military direction of the process." At one point, I thought it would be useful to get to know something about the Communist Party. Tom Enders was the Ambassador then. I ran it through him, and he had no objection. I had lunch, every so often, with somebody who was rising in the party, not somebody at the top, but one of the younger lights.

*Q: Was there the feeling that the Soviet Union was still trying to sort of fish in troubled waters or had that pretty well ceased?*

SERVICE: I don't remember much concern about the Soviets. We had certain relations with the Communist party, but they were not Moscow-line Communists. They were Euro-Communists, democratic Communists, whatever.

*Q: What about France? Did France play much of a role in Spain as we saw it? They were so close in many ways. I was wondering whether the Spanish looked to the French or to the French socialists, or anything.*

SERVICE: Spaniards have the feeling that the French look down on them. Just the way the Brits used to look down on the whole continent, Africa starts at Calais, or wherever. For the French, Africa starts at the Pyrenees. There wasn't any great love lost between the Spaniards and the French, although, people like Felipe and others had studied, spent some time in France and spoke French. There were a couple of issues that counted. One was that Spain wanted to become a member of the European community and the French position on that was very important. And Spain wanted help with the Basque separatists, because, as you know, there are French Basques, and there are Spanish Basques. The Spanish believed that the French Basques provided refuge to the Spanish Basques. So that was a continuing area of interest, friction, and perhaps some cooperation.

*Q: Speaking of the Basques, did we have concerns that we might be threatened by the Basques because of terrorist activities and all?*

SERVICE: We?

*Q: The American presence in Spain.*

SERVICE: Not a great deal. Although there was one incident when two rockets were fired at the Embassy from one of the streets nearby. I can't say with certainty that was a Basque operation, but it was the work of one of the terrorist groups which may have had some affiliation with the Basques. In general, I think, our attitude was that this was an internal Spanish matter. The Basque didn't have any interest in getting us involved. Obviously, we supported the integrity of Spain and we cooperated with the security services. Let me add one other thing. There was some concern... This was the period when Central America was very hot. We got reports from time to time that there were a lot of Basques in places like Nicaragua, that they were members of ETA [Euskadi Ta Askatusuna, e.g. Basque Homeland and Liberty]. We passed this onto the Spaniards and said, "You guys ought to take a look at this. These are people who may be there because they can't be here, or may have done things here, or are working actively with the Sandinistas, offering their assistance," and what not. The Spaniards sort of shrugged. The Spanish position, the official position, was basically that we shouldn't be doing what we are doing in Central America, that the problems there were internal. They weren't eager in getting involved on our side, or against the Sandinistas, even if this meant ignoring some Basque terrorist ties.

*Q: How was the Reagan administration perceived because of Central America and also Grenada?*

SERVICE: It depended on whom you talked to, of course. I think, by the center to the left, it was viewed in rather negative terms. Of course, you have to remember that the Spaniards still view Latin America as, not their colony anymore, not their empire anymore, but an area where they have a particular expertise and a particular interest. In a sense, therefore, they view us as their rivals for influence. They looked for anything we did which would play poorly there and rejoice

in it. That is probably too strong, but not inaccurate. The left, in general, thought we exaggerated the communist menace. Latin America had real social problems and we could not solve them by strengthening the right to suppress dissent or by sending in military assistance. You have to let such things play out, however, they are going to play out. They tended to downplay the extent of Soviet influence and involvement, and to some extent that of Cuba. The Spanish right was somewhat more supportive of our policies in Latin America, but not all that much.

*Q: What about our policy toward Cuba?*

SERVICE: The Spanish government under the Socialists thought our policy a mistake, and that we should be trying to build bridges to Cuba and to the Castro government. I think most of them saw the eventual end of the Franco dictatorship as the product of the gradually increasing interaction of Spain with the rest of Europe, starting in the 1950s. The fact that you had millions of tourists coming down to Spain every year from democratic countries, and the opening up of cultural exchanges and access to publications of one kind or another, made it very difficult to maintain a non-democratic regime in Spain. They thought the same would happen in Cuba if we stopped isolating it.

*Q: Did you have a problem explaining our Cuban policy, because the way I see it, I've never really dealt with it, but it's really determined by the very strong Cuban exile movement in Florida, more than looking at it in any really rational way?*

SERVICE: As one of our Assistant Secretary's of State for Latin America said when asked a Cuba question, "I thought we were going to talk about foreign policy today." Yes. No question, because (1) the Spanish didn't think our policy was the best policy; and (2) and they were also aware that it was driven by the anti-Castro Cuban lobby to a significant degree. You'd have to explain, "Well, you know, that is foreign policy in a democracy. All are allowed to express their opinions and attempt to influence policy. We have our Israel lobby, we have our Greek lobby, we have our China lobby. You may not agree with them, but they certainly have a right to express their view." They would sort of nod, but, they still thought our policy was a mistake.

*Q: Was there much of a contrast in the Embassy between the way Terry Todman operated and Tom Enders?*

SERVICE: Do you know them both?

*Q: I only know Todman vaguely, and just know much about Enders. He is sort of a legend in the Foreign Service.*

SERVICE: I had three Ambassadors while I was there. I had Terry Todman the first year, I had Tom Enders for the three middle years, and I had Reggie Bartholomew for the fifth year. I must say they all three are/were (Enders is dead) exceptional people, but in quite different ways. They were also, at times, difficult to work with. It was a relief when I went to Argentina and Brazil and had ambassadors who were more normal human beings.

*Q: A little too close to the furnace.*

SERVICE: Terry Todman, was not well liked by the officers on the staff because of his style, his way of running the Embassy. I would call it an imperial style: "Everybody is here to support the Ambassador. Two hours of your time is not worth even five minutes of the Ambassador's time." In my view there was a lot of make-work. A good bit of what we did was not really necessary but was done because the Ambassador thought it just might be helpful to him in some way. By the time I got to Madrid Todman had been there for four years. He knew all the people. He knew all the issues. He knew the background. But he still wanted briefing papers on everything and for every visitor. It seemed unnecessary although, in fairness perhaps, Todman saw this as an educational technique for the newer personnel. He was always trying to keep us up to snuff and making sure we were doing the best job we could. One thing that was almost a fixation with him was if he were the first one to hear of some piece of news, it made him quite unhappy. He felt that we all should be listening to the radio or watching television just as intently as he was, and somebody should have called him.

Anyway, Tom Enders was totally different. Tom Enders was a superbly qualified, extremely intelligent person. Sometimes he gave me the impression that he really didn't need you at all because he could do it all himself, in half the time you could do it. He was a much easier person to work with because he didn't make what I would call "marginal demands" on people. If you had something important to say, fine. Otherwise, you just did your job and interacted with him as appropriate, but didn't dance attendance all the time.

Reggie Bartholomew was a combination of the two. Reggie is an actor. He loves to perform. We used to spend hours in his office, listening to Reggie think out loud. He would say, "Now, I am going to say this to him, and then he is going to say this to me, and then we are going to do this," etc. It was his way of working through things in his mind, of preparing himself. It was quite entertaining for the rest of us, but also time-consuming and wearing. My tour ended after a year with him, and by then his style of leadership had begun to pall a bit. Each one of these men was very effective on the outside, despite their different styles. It just proves that there are many ways to be a successful ambassador. They were each interesting people in their own rights.

*Q: What were our major interests in Spain at this time?*

SERVICE: Our overriding interest was the military alliance. Spain had become a member of NATO in about 1980, or maybe 1981. This was over the objections of the Socialist Party, and the Communist of course. The Socialists said they would take Spain out of NATO when they came to power. Later that position was modified to say that the issue would be put to a referendum so that the Spanish people could decide. The debate over NATO membership dominated the first three and a half years I was there. After much delay, the referendum was finally held in March, 1986. It was nip and tuck right up to the end. The polls, two weeks ahead, which is the latest they could do them, showed that NATO membership was probably going to lose. In fact, a small majority voted in favor.

The NATO issue played back on the question of bases, although we had had the bases for years without Spain being in NATO. But, that relationship was evolving too. The Socialists had come in committed to renegotiating our military presence in a downward direction. Ironically, the fact

that continued membership was approved may have made it more difficult to negotiate the kind of continued base presence we preferred.

Spain was important to us because of its relations with Latin America. Although those relations were not as strong and as important as the Spaniards liked to think, we consulted them. We tried to bring them along on issues we thought were important and get their support. We also consulted them on Middle East and North Africa matters. Spaniards see their country as a bridge to the Muslim world because it had 700 years of Islam. I went to the Foreign Ministry and talked a lot about Iran and Iraq, and also the problem with Morocco and the separatist movement there. We tried to coordinate our policies, work together as best as possible.

*Q: Was this really a matter of sharing views or were there any possibilities for cooperation?*

SERVICE: It was more sharing of views. The Spaniards did not have much of a projection at that time outside of Spain. There was not much they could do to be helpful in a real sense, apart perhaps from shipping or not shipping arms. We tried to discourage shipping to whomever was our principal enemy at the moment. It was Iran most of the time. We were arguing that Iraq was the good country and Iran the bad guy. The Spaniards were not so sure. They were proved right, in a sense.

*Q: Well back to NATO. What was in it for the Spaniards as far as we projected, but also what was the thinking of the Spaniards as far as what was good about NATO and what was bad about NATO?*

SERVICE: The Spanish left still had a romantic idea of the brotherhood of nations, and believed that military alliances are basically conservative and reactionary and tend to work against the evolution of man and the move toward socialism, and therefore are bad things. Very few had any rosy views of the Soviet Union by that time, but that had this philosophical bias against military alliances, particularly when the alliance is lead by an extra-continental power like the United States. Those who were in favor of continued NATO membership pointed out that Spain was at the same time trying to gain admission to the European Economic Community [EEC]. It was unrealistic for Spain to want to enjoy the economic benefits that came with being an accepted, democratic member of Europe, without at the same time sharing the defense responsibilities. I think that helped influence opinion to some degree. Probably, the Spanish military saw membership in NATO as a channel for its modernization, for its becoming a respectable, better qualified military force. There was some support in the business community for joining.

*Q: What about the Spanish Army? Were they becoming a smaller, more efficient Army when you were there? Was NATO having an effect on that?*

SERVICE: I don't know the figures. I think they had been in the process of force reduction for quite some time, and there had been limited modernization. I don't know how big they were at the time I was there, but it was not an oppressive military presence. You never had the feeling that it was this huge, bloated structure that had to be cut down by half or two thirds. It was still run by people who had been around a long time. Some of them fought with Hitler on the eastern front in the Blue Division in World War II.



*Q: How was Spain responding during this time to the European Economic Union (ECU)?*

SERVICE: We used to call it EC, didn't we? I think it was the European Economic Community, which later became European Community [EC].

*Q: Yes.*

SERVICE: There were petitioners to join. They had their requests in. I forgot when it finally happened, whether it was January 1, 1986 or 1987. It was sort of marching along. But there was a certain amount of doubt until it actually happened. As I recall, France didn't oppose it and Germany didn't oppose it. They were the ones who could have blocked it. In the European mind, Spain's membership in the EC was seen as a way to preserve and strengthen democracy there. More recently the same argument is being made with respect to the countries of eastern Europe.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that you were watching a positive change in Spain, both economically and politically while you were there?*

SERVICE: Yes, very much. It was an upbeat time to be there. I think the economy generally did fairly well. Felipe projected optimism. His style was quite unlike the name-calling we have around here. It was a time where they still felt they should all work together. Felipe was the kind of guy whom even the opposition had a hard time calling names. That is a nice situation to be in, particularly, I suppose, if you are a Spaniard, but it is also nice for the foreigners looking at the internal dynamics of the country.

*Q/ Was there any concern about the British and German takeover of the coast and all? There were so many northern Europeans in the places along the coast that it seemed to have turned them into Little Brightons or Little Hamburgs, or something like that? Was there a certain xenophobia building up?*

SERVICE: I personally avoided them. I never went to those places. So, I can't say whether this was the case or not. Certainly, there wasn't any that I noticed in Madrid. There were not columns and articles about that. I think it was viewed as, if you want to come down for a few weeks or a month each summer and spend your money here, that is fine. There may well have been some at the local level, but I never saw it.

*Q: What about the media? Did you find that the media was a normal, democratic-type media, covering the spectrum?*

SERVICE: Yes, I would say so. There were conservative papers, the middle-of-the-road papers, those that were more leftists, etc. I'm sure there were things on the far right too.

*Q: Did you have a problem with the American military? Were there planes crashing or GIs getting drunk and doing things, and that sort of thing?*

SERVICE: Yes, there is always a certain amount of that, especially when you have three major bases in Spain and a lot of little tiny things. Some of them were radio stations, or this that and the other. We had been doing this since the mid-1950s. There were established guidelines for how you handled the inevitable problems that came up. It was all sort of automatic, hum-drum. I don't remember any particular scandals.

Q: *I don't recall any planes dropping a hydrogen bomb on the countryside, or just off the shore.*

SERVICE: As had happened earlier.

Q: *Yes.*

SERVICE: In Palomares, and it ended with a picture of Fraga and our Ambassador wading out in the waters to prove that they were not contaminated.

Q: *It was a chilly day outside. Tim Towell, the Ambassador's aide had arranged this.*

SERVICE: Good old Tim.

Q: *Yes. Oh, one thing that I am just curious about. I heard at one point at one of these society things there was a lady whose name I can't remember, who is an American citizen, but who is married to a local Count who had the ear of Nancy Reagan, and was trying to depose Enders and take over the job. Was this actually happening?*

SERVICE: The Countess of Romanones or something, and an author too, by the way. She wrote the Spy Wore Red, something like that.

Q: *The Spy Wore Silk Stockings, I think, or something like that.*

SERVICE: She did a number of them. She was an OSS [Office of Strategic Services] employee who went to Spain in the Second World War, worked in Madrid. She married this Count Romanones. I'm not sure I ever met her. I heard the same thing. I heard from somebody that she was out to get Enders. I'm not sure exactly why, but it may have been true.

Q: *How did you find working with the society there? I would think it would be a little bit of a problem just trying to carry on social duties because of the hours.*

SERVICE: Yes. But in some ways, it was not as bad as Latin America, some parts of Latin America that I have been in. In Madrid, of course, lunch can start at 1:00 or 1:30, and you may not get back until 4:00 or 4:30, or 5:00 in an extreme case. For dinners you weren't invited until about 9:00 or 9:30, but you ate fairly promptly, and you might be out by 11:30 or 12, whereas in Latin America, in some countries, you might be invited to come at 8:00, but wouldn't eat until 11:30 or 12:00. Of course, the Spaniards, themselves, wouldn't go into work until 9:00 or 9:30 the next morning. The Embassy said that you had to be careful about how late you stayed out, which is not usually a problem with me.

*Q: After the trying years in Spain, I take it by the time you left there, things were all looking up and that it looked like a country well on its way to getting involved in everything, becoming a solid member of Europe.*

SERVICE: I think that is fair to say. I think some of the more striking progress has been made in the years since then. In late 1980s or early 1990s, they had a good growth rate for a number of years, which helped. Unemployment is still quite high, although one always has to wonder about the unemployment rate of 20%. It doesn't seem to get much lower. Whether that is really a valid figure, I don't know. The Spaniards started investing abroad quite a bit in Latin America. They have become an accepted part of Europe, a serious part of Europe, not a basket case, not a poor relative. There is now a Spaniard as Secretary General of NATO. The country has come a long way since that referendum in 1986.

*Q: Were you sort of staying up late at night and making your predictions and keeping your fingers crossed on the NATO referendum?*

SERVICE: Yes. We were essentially. The polls a few days before vote still showed a majority against staying in NATO. But we said that movement was in the right direction and it might be enough to change the result by the day of the referendum. And that is what happened.

*Q: Was there anything we could do or was it a matter of just sit back and report?*

SERVICE: It was basically sit back and report. Of course we talked to everybody we had contact with, but we weren't swinging many votes that way. In the final analysis, the fact that it was pretty obvious Felipe Gonzalez and the King both wanted Spain to stay in the Alliance carried the day.

*Q: What about the universities? In some countries, the universities, are, sort of, a power of their own. Many of the students are usually taught by leftists in the University and there are leftists in Latin America. Then, when they come out, they turn into good, solid business people, and all that. Was Spain of that caliber or was it different?*

SERVICE: It was not an issue while I was there, in part because the Socialists were in power. There were no marches about national issues that I recall. It was a fairly quiet time as far as university students went.

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*Q: Back to Spain. You were there just after the Falkland's War?*

SERVICE: Yes.

*Q: How was that playing? At a certain point, we came down, and tried to be an honest broker, but we ended up by supporting the British. Was that a problem in Spain?*

SERVICE: As I recall, the Spaniards had a rather equivocal position. Their sympathies were with Argentina, in part because Spain has its own long-standing territorial dispute with the UK [United Kingdom] over Gibraltar. But, because they were both members of the NATO, Spain had not taken a position against the UK. They tried to straddle the issue.

*Q: Of course, Argentina had such an odious government, anyway, at the time. It was not for democracy. It was not an easy one to support.*

SERVICE: And, there had been the intense repression in the preceding years, which many in Spain didn't condone or approve of. I probably told various of my Spanish contacts about my role in the Falklands affair, but I don't remember much explicit criticism of our policy.

Before we leave Spain, I want to record an incident that is of some historical interest. I've forgotten exactly which year, but there was an incident in the Gulf of Sidra involving U.S. and Libyan planes. The Reagan administration decided to strike back at Libya using bombers based in England. The question was how they would get to Libya, would any of the intervening countries give overflight rights. Enders was the Ambassador at the time. He was told to see González and make a request. As I recall, González did not say okay, but he did say something to the effect that they probably wouldn't notice if we did fly over Spanish territory. In the end, we elected to fly over the water, sending the planes down the Atlantic and then in through the Strait of Gibraltar. But the Spaniards, and particularly Felipe, got at least half marks on this one.

**JACK R. BINNS**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Madrid (1984-1986)**

*Jack R. Binns was born in Oregon in 1933. He received a bachelor's of science from the Naval Academy in 1956 and subsequently served overseas with the U.S. Navy. In 1963, he joined the Foreign Service, serving in Guatemala, La Paz, and San Salvador. Mr. Binns was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

*Q: You then went to Madrid as Deputy Chief of Mission to Ambassador Enders, starting in 1984 and stayed there until 1986. Was the offer to be his deputy come as a surprise?*

BINNS: You could have knocked me out of the chair with a dust feather. Enders was a good guy to work for because he was open to reasonable arguments; you could talk to him; you had to make a pretty persuasive case if he had other views. There is a theory that I would subscribe to that Enders is very good to work for--he encourages the people who work for him, he reinforces their efforts, he rewards psychically at least, he is bright and exciting--but does not work well for others. His problems, as illustrated by experiences in ARA, were with other people--the White House (which really didn't know what it wanted to do), the Seventh Floor, etc.

*Q: What was the situation in Spain and what were you particularly involved in?*

BINNS: Spain had a socialist government. A couple years before an attempted *coup d'etat* by some elements of the military was defeated, probably through the intervention of King Juan Carlos. The whole military did not support the attempt and therefore democracy was saved.

This socialist government had been in power for about a year and half when I arrived. We wanted to get Spain into NATO. The Spanish popular opinion did not support Spanish membership. We also had the problem of renewal of base agreements. We also had to deal with Spanish entrance into the European Community.

We certainly felt quite strongly that Spain remain a part of NATO. They had started the joining process under a previous government and we wanted them to continue. We encouraged the Germans particularly and the British and the French to use whatever persuasive efforts they had to convince Spain in its membership drive. In some sense, we may have been pushing on an open door. Early on, Felipe Gonzalez had decided that Spain was going to be come part of Europe. This drive towards "Europeanization" included membership in NATO. He viewed the presence of US bases in Spain as somewhat of an anachronism which he didn't particularly like. On the other hand, he recognized that there were some valid strategic interests for those bases--especially the Rota Naval Base near Gibraltar. So he decided early on, as any good politician would, that he would try to serve as many ends as possible with the same initiative. He felt that by keeping Spain in NATO he would strengthen Spain's European credentials, please his European allies and his colleagues in the European Community so that they would accede to Spain's membership and would get rid of at least part of his "bone in the throat" over the bases. He saw staying in NATO as a means of reducing our military presence in Spain which he didn't like.

*Q: Were the bases a major problem for the Embassy during this period?*

BINNS: They were not a major bone of contention. It was a problem largely of our making in that we tend to approach negotiations on those issues is to make everything high priority and do not ourselves engage in a determination of importance of each of the issues. The Defense Department's position in any base negotiations is to get everything and, if possible, get a little more. That is not a very realistic way to approach negotiations, but in a highly charged, ideological administration, to suggest otherwise would have undermined one's own credibility and standing. Felipe Gonzalez told Tom Enders early on that he would do everything he could to stay in NATO; he thought he could bring it off, but the price would be that we would have to close the Torrejon Air Force base, just outside of Madrid. That was the home of the 401st Tactical Fighter wing, which in a crisis situation is moved to a forward base in Turkey on NATO's southern flank. That is how the Spanish Prime Minister viewed the situation evolving. He had to turn popular opinion around in Spain--which reflected a 70% opposition to NATO. He also had to swing his own party around which had a long standing position of opposing Spanish membership in NATO. So he saw the base closing and Spain's membership in NATO, and therefore Spain's integration into Europe, as trade-offs.

Enders understood that position. We had to be very cautious, as I suggested earlier, how the issue was framed to a very highly ideological administration. It didn't want the facts; it just wanted to accomplish what it wanted. It was hard to address because Enders was fearful that if the issue

was addressed frontally and openly, the Defense Department would tag Enders as a "liberal whose loyalty to the administration has been in question and whose judgement has always been dubious". Such a DoD attitude would have killed any chances of finding a solution before the bargaining had even begun. On the other hand, the European Command understood what the situation was and was willing to try to find a compromise and to address the issue in a rational way. But they never prevailed on the civilian side of DoD--the Richard Perles of this world--who wanted everything we had and a little more.

While I was there, Spain held a referendum which Gonzalez played like a fine violinist plays a Stradivarius--with loving care with a good melody. The Spaniards reversed themselves and voted in favor of Spanish membership in NATO, with certain qualifications, such as that military forces would not be integrated into the NATO command structure. We tried not get involved in the internal debate. The US position was quite clear and we didn't have to announce it repeatedly. It became somewhat screwy because the Conservative Party in Spain, which had traditionally supported NATO, now urged voting against Spanish membership in the referendum because they viewed a favorable vote as a vote of confidence for Gonzalez.

*Q: Does Spain's membership make much of a difference?*

BINNS: Does Luxembourg matter? Germany contributes the land upon which the battle will be fought and a substantial army. Spain has a good air force; it has a small, but respectable navy; the army isn't much but in view of Spain's geographical location, it is hard to see why a large army could be maintained. Strategically, if you look at armed combat on in Europe, Spain would serve like the U.K. in Northern Europe-a reserve depot logistic support base. That made sense strategically and militarily as well as politically because the way you helped preserve democracy in Spain is to link Spain ever closer to Western Europe. You institutionalize that democracy. Belonging to NATO is another element binding Spain to Europe.

**THOMAS R. CARMICHAEL**  
**Rotation Officer, USIS**  
**Madrid (1984-1986)**

*Mr. Carmichael was born in Iowa and raised in Illinois and Florida. He was educated at the University of Florida and Florida State University. In 1984 Mr. Carmichael joined the USIA Foreign Service and served variously as Cultural Affairs Officer and Press Officer in Madrid, Le Paz, Poznan, Kuala Lumpur, Ulaanbaatar and Hanoi. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters and the State Department in Washington, DC. Mr. Carmichael was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010.*

*Q: You were in Madrid from when to when?*

CARMICHAEL: '84 to '86, something like that. USIA would send their recruits to their first post for a "junior officer trainee" position, and then, if there was a follow-on position, you could

stay on. There was no follow on for me there; however, and I was assigned to Bolivia as cultural affairs officer after 18 months or so.

*Q: Let's talk about Madrid. How did you find the embassy?*

CARMICHAEL: It was a big embassy, so for training there was sufficient staff that I could leave my core assignment in the USIA press section and rotate through practically all the USIA and State Department elements. I worked not only in our information section and cultural section, but I also worked in GSO and handled basic consular section work for a bit. I got to know political and economic section work, as well. This whole experience told me that everybody's working in an embassy, it just looks different in different sections. The first time I walked in the political section after working in the press section where everybody is yelling, sort of a "press pen" attitude; I was surprised that the section seemed so quiet. I thought, "Heck, these guys aren't doing anything – just reading papers." Then I handled a couple assignments during my rotation there, and, yeah, it occurred to me "That's why they are so quiet -- because they are thinking."

The same thing with GSO. They may have had a lot of very competent FSNs, but problems still percolate up and an officer has to put in some hard work to get things back on track. So I gained a respect for everybody's role in the embassy simply by passing through the embassy. Interestingly enough, you know what they say about State Department managers not being able to manage. Well at that time I don't think our Foreign service culture had reached the understanding that you just can't yell at people to make things happen. There was more yelling then.

*Q: Who was the ambassador?*

CARMICHAEL: Tom Enders. One of my assignments in the political section was to write a cable about the monarchy and its background and speculate what we thought could happen to the monarchy. So I wrote the cable, and my supervisor in the political section was pretty complimentary about it, but we sent it up to the ambassador and nothing ever came back. I asked, "Doesn't he say anything – good, bad or neutral feedback?" The political officer said that he hardly talked to the political section. He was just one of these aloof guys. Now, I think that Foreign Service culture expects ambassadors to be more personable with their staff.

*Q: Enders is considered by many to be one of the most intellectual of the ambassadors, and has quite a reputation for that but not for being warm and fuzzy.*

CARMICHAEL: Right, I can't argue. His wife was quite a charming, but theatrically inclined, and rather aloof as well.

We had a good DCM there. Bob Service was the DCM.

*Q: Oh, yes. His father was John Stewart Service of China fame.*

CARMICHAEL: Yes, and I was always impressed with him. I remember one day watching him review a cable. Someone had asked him to look at the cable. He glanced at it, and penciled out a

couple lines with a swift stroke – and the whole thought of the cable was clarified. He was a guy that had that sort of focus that was impressive. I still see him every once in a while at Main State.

*Q: What was the political situation in Spain at the time?*

CARMICHAEL: The big issue at that time was getting Spain to join NATO. Franco had not died all that long ago, and the Right still was a political force. We wanted the Spanish to go into NATO so that was one issue, and the Right was having a resurgence. Some Spanish were aggravated with changes under Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez. I remember being out on the square one time after there had been a robbery, and everybody was at the window and screaming about the Socialists not protecting us. But NATO membership was the big hot issue.

When I got there Ronald Reagan was coming over for a state visit with Gonzalez. I, being the junior guy in the service, actually got the best job. I got to go every night to the “countdown meeting” and report back to our offices how the schedule and our assignments were changing in the run-up to the visit -- how the logistics had changed and all that stuff. The “countdown” was held each evening at one of the major, historic old grand hotels, I believe the Ritz, where Hemingway used to stay – in its grand ballroom.

The Reagan advance team was the best led group I ever encountered in my career. Their advance people were led by a doctor. That group has always set the standard in my mind in terms of quality, in terms of professionalism for running one of these state visits. They never skipped meetings. They drilled down on every detail, of course.

*Q: I realize you were sort of at the end of the food chain, but how did the visit go?*

CARMICHAEL: It went pretty well. They were able to get positive statements from King Juan Carlos about U.S.– Spanish relations, which was helpful. The leftists want to focus on U.S. support for Franco. I guess there was one big image that the media there loved – that of General Vernon Walters shaking Franco’s hand -- which is what the left wing always wanted to bring out for us. Nevertheless, we did push changes in Spanish attitudes. It was going to be a long process, we knew it, but the Spanish also wanted to become part of the European Union and they weren’t going to get membership to one without the other.

*Q: Did you get much USIA work?*

CARMICHAEL: Yes, I did some press stuff. At that time Charles Wick was still head of the USIA and he’d come up with this WorldNet proposition. People didn’t want to deal with it. I mean, to me it was a smart thing to do, but Foreign Service officers, USIA whatever, are sometimes conservative, and didn’t care for it, but I worked with it and saw some great press work. At that time things in Spain were booming in our budget because of Wick, and also this was an important place to work. We had renovated a two million dollar cultural center near the embassy and held the WorldNet programs in it. I got talking points to the speakers in Washington for the program, and made sure they knew what media people were going to be in the audience.



I also worked on the cultural side. I remember that we hosted a poet who read his work for about an hour and a half for a honorarium of about \$100. It seemed like a lot of money to me at the time for sitting around reading poetry. But only five Spaniards showed up for this thing. It was a small format meeting, so I know now it wouldn't be tragic. I came back from the program and mentioned to my older, more established colleagues that I was disappointed that "You know, we had five Spaniards there. We gave this guy a hundred dollars." The fellows just laughed and said, "Yeah, but were they the right five people?"

I also got to work with the traveling White House press and the Spanish press during the official visits, the most important being the Reagan visit. During that visit, I was site officer for several rooms in the National Palace. As site officer, I had to move all this press around and escort them through back corridors and through the kitchens, back through the old museums room in the Palace to make sure they came out the right doors so they got the right photos of the President and others. That was important. This was all, you know, as big as you get – the White House press catching the King and the President in a room together and asking questions while they are taking photos of them. It was exciting USIA work, knowing your site by heart and all the passage ways in and out, leading the press through the bowels of the palace for the shots.

We also got to work with Congressmen on CODELs from time to time.

*Q: The House of Representatives.*

CARMICHAEL: Yes, and there was some agriculture issue at the time I recall and the head of an agricultural committee was visiting Spain to address some touchy issue with the Europeans. In any case, I was sent over there to make sure an important Spanish editor was given access to the congressman for an interview. Just as the editor was supposed to arrive for the interview, one of the congressman's aides began telling me how he really wanted me to go out and find a certain type of olive for them -- "You know, the one with the little red things in it." I said, "Well, I've got this thing to do. I am pretty sure the Congressmen wants me to help him with the interview." And the aide started steaming that I wouldn't go out and get olives for him. It was just an interesting insight in the way things run early on in my career. Just like it was interesting the first time I ever saw an American flag burned by an angry mob -- just as I was getting ready to go into the National Palace to do my site work there. I didn't think it would feel so profoundly unsettling – but it did.

*Q: Who was, was this?*

CARMICHAEL: It was the communist, anti-U.S., and anti- NATO group.

*Q: How did NATO fit within the Spanish context, did you feel when they were entering? Was it something they basically welcomed? Was there opposition or was it sort of forced on the Spanish people or what?*

CARMICHAEL: It is hard to remember what was really going on, but it was one of these things that they didn't particularly care for. They had had American bases there for a long time there, so it shouldn't have been a big leap – the Spanish just expected a difference after they elected the

Socialists. Some also pressed for reductions in our base presence. But they finally figured out that NATO participation was one of the responsibilities that go with European Union membership. You can't get the goodies without doing this. As I recall, it that was the way it was accepted. You have responsibilities, if you want to be a major power and move out of the Franco era and the isolation it had meant. NATO was just what you have to do. As I recall it, in our negotiations, we also suddenly announced unilaterally shrinking our bases around 10%, without even giving them a chance to pressure us, nullifying the PR advantage of standing up the U.S., making it clear that we were not to be pushed around, and underlining that base reductions were a mixed bag on economic level.

*Q: You weren't there when we bombed Libya, were you?*

CARMICHAEL: Yes, in fact, that was interesting. We bombed Libya while I was there. I think we bombed them more than once, but, in any case, after one bombing the press attaché was very careful about being photographed by the press. It would have made him a known target. But there were other bombing besides those related to Libya.

*Q: This was the?*

CARMICHAEL: The Basque, ETA, and I just mention that because I remember two mornings waking up and looking out the window of our apartment near the U.S. Embassy and seeing big clouds of black smoke rising a few blocks away. The Basques were targeting the Spanish, but some of the targets were close to embassy activities.

*Q: You were there about a year and a half?*

CARMICHAEL: Yes.

**GARY S. USREY**  
**Principal Officer**  
**Bilbao (1985-1988)**

*Gary S. Usrey was born in North Carolina in 1948. He graduated from the University of Maryland in 1970. His postings abroad during his Foreign Service Career included Baghdad, Buenos Aires, Alexandria, Bilbao, Panama City and Rabat. Mr. Usrey was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 21, 2002.*

*Q: You were on your way to Bilbao?*

USREY: Yes. Looking forward to that.

*Q: This was 1985?*

USREY: Yes, the summer of 1985.

Q: *You were there until when?*

USREY: Summer 1988, a three-year tour in Bilbao.

Q: *This is a small little coast city one doesn't hear about, but you're right in the middle of a real mess there, with the Basques. What was the post like, and what was the situation?*

USREY: Well, I was the principal officer. Besides myself, there was a junior officer who did the consular work, and some political reporting. We also had a secretary/communicator. She used one of those old teletype machines where you would encrypt a classified message and send it to Madrid for onward transmission. Anyway, the Basque region, because of shepherd immigrant to the U.S., played an important role in Congress.

Q: *Oh, yes. Nevada played a very large role in various immigration programs.*

USREY: It was quite remarkable. They had special laws written on immigrant visas for Basque sheep herders that were outside the normal quota process, which was amazing. I think that's why the post was... (End of tape)

So the issues we mainly followed were ETA terrorism and more generally, Basque separatism.

Q: *The name is spelled E - t - a?*

USREY: Yes, ETA, which is an acronym for, "Basque fatherland, and freedom," or something like that. The ambassador was Tom Enders at the time. He was extremely interested in this phenomenon for a number of reasons. Felipe Gonzales had just gotten elected a couple years before as prime minister of Spain, a leftist socialist with a somewhat anti-American, anti-NATO bent. He had gotten elected on the campaign promise that he would subject Spain's continuing membership in NATO to a referendum. If the people said, "pull out," he would hold to it. He probably regretted that later, once he got in office. But, the referendum was coming up, and we were worried sick that the alliance, for the first time, would have a member country withdraw voluntarily. It was a real danger. So, in the months, weeks, leading up to the NATO referendum, Enders was calling for reports from the constituent posts. There was one in Seville, one in Barcelona, and Bilbao, and the big embassy in Madrid. All the posts were reporting on what it looked like in the regions. It was very, very close. The Spanish people narrowly voted to remain in NATO. There were five of the Spanish autonomies where it lost. These were the Basque country, Madrid, Barcelona, and then Navarra, which is the province right next to the Basque country, where Pamplona is, and for reasons that are different, the Canary Islands. Enders was very worried. The White House was concerned that they were going to have Spain pull out of the NATO alliance during the Cold War.

The second reason Bilbao was important is because Spain joined the EU. Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986, so there were worries about the economic transition. But, in the middle of all this, there was this wave of ETA terrorism, that was on a big upswing, blowing up police and judges, and military guys up there. So, my job was to not make contact with, of course, ETA, but

we did have indirect contacts with something called Iterri Batasuna, which is like the Sinn Fein of ETA. It was a party that was the political wing of the ETA, and they had a seat in the Basque parliament. But, more important was the Basque Nationalist Party, the moderate, conservative, mainstream Basque party, which held the Basque presidency... So, I did a lot of reporting. Enders said it was good, and Jack Binns, who was the DCM liked it. Then, when Reg Bartholomew arrived later, he took an interest, I guess, partly encouraged by Enders, in the Basque issues. I always got lots of attention and lots of money for representation. So, I was sort of in a neat position. A signal of the importance which they attached to the Basque country was when we went through, again, one of these post-cutting exercises. The Department basically said, "Embassy, Spain, or mission Madrid, you're going to have to lose one of your constituent posts." Bilbao was the logical one in my opinion. Barcelona was big, a big city with several million people.

*Q: The Olympics were coming up too, weren't they?*

USREY: That would be later. They just had the soccer World Cup in Spain. In Seville, something like 20 million tourists went through Andalucia, every year, many of them American. It would seem inconceivable to me that it wouldn't be Bilbao that would be closed. Enders, at the time, so cherished the reporting on the Basque stuff, that they closed Seville, and kept Bilbao open. That was amazing. I took that as a signal that I could keep doing more of what I was doing, so I was all over the place.

We had a pretty interesting district. We had the Basque country, the three provinces of that: Navarra, La Rioja, where they grow the wine, Cantabria, just to the west, where Santander is, and then Asturias, on the north-central coast. They were all unique areas, and I traveled to them frequently, and made many contacts. We had an IV program, and sent lots of people to the states. It was an interesting time. Spain was working through an important transition. Spain had had a dictator for a long time, who had repressed the hell out of the Basques. In fact, ETA was a response to Franco. Under the Franco reign, it was illegal to use Basque in school. You couldn't speak your own language. One story was that Basque children would be forced to wear a special bracelet if they used a Basque word in class. It was sort of a snitch system. You could snitch on your fellow pupils. It was humiliating. I really think Franco contributed to violent Basque separatism. The attacks, however, were directed at Spanish military and police, and not at Americans.

We did receive one communication once from them, which was a warning. I don't know if it was real or not, but it certainly scared me. These guys were the most deadly, efficient terrorists going. They are very good. You did not want to be targeted by them. I was worried that we might have problems with dependents and security. In fact, it didn't work out that way. I had a wonderful time in Spain. It's a great country.

*Q: What was our stand? Was it that we didn't have a dog in this fight or that we were mouthing, "We want to see a unified Spain?" or "Let the people choose?" How were we treating this?*

USREY: Mostly, we didn't have a dog in the fight. I still look to Spain when we talk about, for example, the Kashmir dispute. I look at the Spanish model as the best model I've ever seen for

solving regional, ethnic, autonomy disputes. They have a system of “autonomias,” autonomous regions, however many there are, 25 or something. Each autonomy has its own parliament, its own flag. Basque and Spanish had coequal status, as languages under the Constitution. They had their own police. They had their own parliament, and the Basque country was one of only three in Spain that had the right to raise its own taxes. They raised taxes locally, and then as a result of a negotiation, paid back to Madrid, stuff that was central, like foreign affairs, defense, communications; and kept the rest for local schools and stuff. So my question was, what did ETA want? They had their own president. But, they had a list of seven demands to be met by Madrid before “armed struggle” could stop. The list was a little slippery, intended to change. They basically were representing a very tiny percent of the Basque people. They weren’t typical. The Basques rejected them too. We really didn’t have a dog. We were antiterrorism, obviously, so whatever was pro-terrorist, we were against. We strongly supported the Madrid government as a NATO ally, and a democracy and trading partner, and all that stuff. But, we kept a low profile. I certainly didn’t go out making speeches about the “insidious” ETA. My job was to stay in touch with that end of the spectrum, and sort of report on where it was going, which I did. One thing you did hear from all Basques was their affinity towards the U.S. You may know about it. During World War II, when France was occupied, the Basques evidently played a particularly important role in moving resistance and apparently some U.S. intelligence, and troops through the passes in the Pyrenees into Spain.

*Q: Well, there were a lot of flyers who went out that way.*

USREY: Yes. Whenever, you got into these long boozy lunches with the Basque PNV (the Basque National Party) contacts, who on the one hand, denounced terrorism, they would say, “Remember the Basques, we were your friends and we have never been paid back for that,” sort of suggesting that we should be more helpful in fighting terrorism. I had no instructions in this area, and so I was unable to be responsive. We didn’t. The average Basque was a perfect citizen. I would like to have them all come here to the USA. They were hardworking, quiet, family-centered, industrious, smart. All the bankers in Spain are Basques. All the heavy industry, steel, and shipbuilding were all started by Basques. They was not sitting under olive trees, taking siestas. These are the workers of Spain up there. They are cool people.

*Q: Have we seen within the ETA movement, a Marxist, a Maoist, type thing, or was it pretty much self-grown?*

USREY: In other words, did they receive foreign support?

*Q: Or was their philosophy Maoist, or what have you?*

USREY: It wasn’t Maoist. It wasn’t scorched earth. I read carefully the Basque press. That’s how my Spanish got to be so good. I read something like six papers a day. One of them was Egin, the Iterri Batasuna publication, where you got the ETA party line. It contained a fair amount of Marxist lexicon and imagery that was popular in Europe after WWII. So, you had that. But, the truth of it was that it was pretty much home grown, and it was a phenomenon specifically responsive to the dictatorship. Franco had started it all. The French too played an important part, because again, those Pyrenees were there, and if the Spanish had come chasing after those guys,

and could give hot pursuit into France, ETA would have faced a tougher situation. But, France had its own Basque region. They didn't have a Basque problem, because they had different historical roots than the Spanish did. But, we always thought the French could do more in security cooperation. The French didn't particularly like Felipe Gonzales. I stayed in close touch with the French consul general about this, over the period. Toward the end of my tour however, the French attitude changed. ETA had committed a few large-scale attacks in France that produced innocent victims. The French said, "Enough already." They started cracking down, and made some arrests. Suddenly, ETA got very quiet. Their network was broken up. It looked like when I left, and the few years after, it might be going the way of the dinosaur. But it has come back. ETA, for the last two years has been active again. So, it's not gone. It only takes five or six people to do this. Terrorism doesn't require large numbers of operatives.

*Q: I know. Speaking on the NATO thing, were you all pounding the pavement, escorting NATO?*

USREY: We were poll taking. Obviously, when people ask questions, we would say, "Alliance is important. It is in Spain's interest," but it wasn't so much proselytizing, because that could have backfired in that environment. Ambassador Enders wanted to know how bad the numbers were. So, it would be local polls. We would do our own "feel of the street" reporting. It was very touchy. It lost, as I said, in Bilbao. I don't think Enders wanted to preside over the unprecedented step of a NATO member pulling out of the alliance. He is a brilliant guy, by the way, very smart.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

USREY: A really impressive man. I liked him. What drove the NATO thing? Spain was going through this socialist phase. You know how some of the European countries went through this phenomenon? The Italians did it. They were being goofy. Alphonso Guerra was Felipe's deputy prime minister. He was a real nut. They fancied themselves as sort of the opposition to Franco. They had come in with the job of carrying on the fight from Moncloa Palace. One thing that didn't help was, there was a NATO bombing range, up north, near Pamplona. I don't think we used it much, but there had been, over time, bombing operations by the U.S. Air Force in that area. That inflamed local opinion though. The Americans were seen as dropping bombs on a NATO ally. It was stupid really to do that. I think we finally stopped that policy. That didn't help. But, America wasn't really popular then. We had our image problems in Spain in the mid-1980s.

*Q: What was the root of this?*

USREY: The lack of popularity?

*Q: Yes.*

USREY: They didn't like Reagan. Few Europeans did, except for Maggie Thatcher. Most Europeans were very disdainful of Ronald Reagan. The cowboy, sort of, image. There was that. What else was happening around the world in the mid-1980s that I should be remembering here? Vietnam still rankled quite a bit, even though the war was over. That was always highly unpopular with the Europeans. Somehow, Russia was viewed, and other countries with socialist leaderships, as more enlightened powers somehow, incredibly. Now, it couldn't be more

different. You have a conservative government with the Spanish president now, Jose Maria Asnar. They couldn't be more for us. He's almost as pro-American as the Italian, Silvio Berlusconi. He's fanatically pro-American. I think after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, and now Afghanistan and 9/11, I think America's image is quite different. But, we were fighting an image problem. Then, there was the Iran-Contra scandal, and our Central America policy. Spain views our Cuba policy as, frankly goofy, which I don't disagree with them on. It's a former colony of Spain. So, there were a lot of little international things that we were at odds with Spain on.

*Q: Were you there at the time we bombed Libya?*

USREY: Yes.

*Q: How did that play?*

USREY: It didn't play well at all. Enders came up on his first official big, two-day trip to the Basque country. I was worried that I wouldn't handle this right. I managed to get the Basque president to throw a lunch for him at the official Basque residence, up in Vitoria. It was delicious food, and it helped to put him in a good mood. Then, the president brought up the attack on Libya. He said, "What was America's thinking on that?" Enders made some seemingly flip comment. I couldn't believe it. They all reacted. If you recall, we dropped a bomb on Qadhafi's tent, and almost killed one of his kids, or something. Enders said, "He'll think twice before doing that again." I'm sure the Spaniards thought that was an odd comment from the U.S. ambassador about something as serious as bombing another country's capital. So, a lot of the things we were doing... When was Granada? That was later.

*Q: It was about 1982, or something like that.*

USREY: The Europeans thought that was laughable. The spectacle of the world's most powerful military unable to communicate with itself via military radios. That was not seen as our high point.

*Q: The Soviet Union was going through early Gorbachev, and all that. Was there a communist party? If there was, how did they stand?*

USREY: There was a communist party, and a pro-communist labor movement. The communists enjoyed a certain esteem in Spain. In fact, you'll recall that famous incident when the civil guards opened fire on deputies in the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament?

*Q: Yes.*

USREY: Only two people didn't dive for cover. One was the former Spanish prime minister who remained standing in the middle of the line of fire, which was very noble. The other one was the head of the communist party. Its labor party was the strongest in the Basque country, where they made the steel and built the ships. Remember La Pasionaria, the old woman who made the speech?

Q: *She came out of the Civil War.*

USREY: She was Basque, and from Bilbao. Because of the heavy industry there, it was an ideal environment for left-wing support. But, your question was?

Q: *I was wondering how did you treat the communist party there?*

USREY: We had occasional contacts with their people. They were correct with us. This is the Cold War. Spain was slower than most European countries to come around, and jettison the old Marxist rhetoric. The dictatorship had been there. So, we didn't focus on the communist issue. My mandate was the Basque nationalist movement, so we stuck to that task. I had very good relations with the Basque government. It was really funny because the Basques just didn't like Madrid. Madrid was the enemy. They had their own government in Vitoria. They didn't have contact with Madrid-based embassies. I was sort of like the U.S. ambassador up there. It was kind of fun. They did everything through me. If they wanted to send a message, I passed the message to Washington, via Madrid. We didn't get many back, but when we did, it was fun to deliver them. I sort of had a direct policy line into an elected regional president. It was very rewarding. I think we helped during those three years. We helped report to Washington on trends in Basque separatism. More important, I think the Basques understood the U.S. better because of our work. We did a pretty good job, given the number of people we had up there. It's still my favorite country. I love Spain.

Q: *Did you find that when you talked to Spaniards not of Basque descent? I'm going back to my time when I was consul general in Naples. When the northern Italians would come down, they would look down their noses at the barbarians, and what they called the "Mezzogiorno," the southern part. Were the Basques held in a certain amount of disdain?*

USREY: There was loathing of Basque terrorism in Madrid. They had blown up the prime minister. Remember that assassination that resulted in the prime minister's car on top of an apartment building roof?

Q: *Yes.*

USREY: They were knocking off admirals. It was very, very bad. Obviously, they had the right to be highly opposed to the Basque terrorist element. But, per capita income, even then was higher up in the Basque country. With the Basques, some had blonde hair and clear eyes. They would refer to the Castilians as "monkeys of the Meseta," essentially Moors, who lived on the wrong side of the straits. The Basques felt they were the Europeans, and they really related more to Europe. I don't know if you were in Naples then, but there was a fashion to talk about "Europe of the regions," Corsica, and the Basques, instead of existing nation-states.

Q: *The Catalans as well... That has sort of died, I think.*

USREY: It has somewhat died out. It's funny, because with a single European currency, you would think that that would still be alive. Basques could say our future lies in relating more to



Brussels, than to Madrid. That is sort of gone. But, despite all the political and social progress and the fact that Spain is a very rich country now, it's like the twelfth in world economy, very prosperous place, there is this small group of ETA nuts who act as if none of this stuff ever happened. It's shocking.

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USREY: Franco died in 1975. Then, Spain departed from what was then called Spanish Sahara, leaving a vacuum. It was later turned over to a UN peacekeeping mandate, called MINURSO, a French acronym. MINURSO was a UN peacekeeping mandate. The Moroccans ended up fighting a proxy war against the Polisario. Polisario was the Algerian-backed force, with some Soviet support. It was all a Cold War thing. The U.S. had an interest in solving the dispute, not only because U.S. troops were in the peacekeeping force there, but also because, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, we wanted to see UN resolutions on the Western Sahara carried out.

**WALTER B. DEERING**  
**Assistant Regional Security Officer**  
**Madrid (1986-1988)**

*Walter Deering was born and raised in New York and was educated at Hobart College and the University of Virginia. After service in the US Army in Counter Intelligence, he joined the State Department Bureau of Security in 1978 and worked in that Bureau in the US and abroad. His foreign assignments include Madrid, Damascus and Beirut, serving as Embassy Security Officer at those Embassies. In the United States Mr. Deering was posted to Field Offices in Los Angeles and Miami. In 2003 he was appointed Director of Field Operations of the State Department's Bureau of Security and served in that capacity until his retirement in 2004. Mr. Deering was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

*Q: Let's see, we're in 1986 and you're off to where?*

DEERING: Off to Madrid by way of ten weeks of Spanish language training.

*Q: So, you got to Madrid when?*

DEERING: I guess it was in December of 1985, January of '86 when I was assigned and had language training for ten weeks, I think it was April to June and I reported there at the end of June of 1986.

*Q: And you were there from when to when?*

DEERING: I was there from June of 1986 until July, I believe it was, of 1988, late July.

*Q: What was your job?*

DEERING: I was the assistant regional security officer at the embassy and it was my first overseas tour with the Foreign Service.

*Q: Now, what was the sort of political situation in Spain when you got there?*

DEERING: Well, the political situation in Spain, it was kind of interesting. There were several things going on that had direct impact on the embassy security program. You had the Basque separatists active all over Spain. They were targeting members of the Guardia Civil and industrialists. They were blowing up cars. They were doing kidnappings and they were very active. Of course any time there's a threat of terrorism where there are Americans there's the possibility of involvement, being at the wrong place at the wrong time. ETA, the Basques, never had a history of targeting American interests but the acts of terrorism directed against the Spanish government were in close proximity to the embassy, often, so there was always the possibility of people being in the wrong place at the wrong time. And then we're in the scenario of the continuing fallout from our attack against Libya in, I guess that was 1984, '84 or '85. And there was an active network in Spain of, well throughout Europe and actually in other places, where there was an interest in retribution because of that act. Whether the ties were directly to Libya, I don't think was ever known. But it was a very, very busy environment in Spain. In the two years I was there, there were at least a half dozen incidents where U.S. diplomatic, military facilities were targeted by terrorist groups.

*Q: Now, before we get into that, your regional responsibilities covered what?*

DEERING: Well, there was the RSO and myself at the embassy and our responsibilities were the embassy in Madrid, the consulate general in Barcelona. There was a small consulate up in the Basque country, Bilbao, it was a small consulate. Then there were five or six consular agencies in various places. Now the consulate in Seville, which was an absolutely gorgeous facility, had been closed down and when I was there the facility still belonged to us and they would send people down there from time to time to do some business but there was no formal representation at the time in Seville. So we traveled quite a bit around the countryside and so being a new assistant RSO, my first assignment overseas, of course within a week of being there, Fourth of July weekend, I get duty officer responsibilities which was a joy on the Fourth of July weekend.

Crime was a huge problem in certain areas of Madrid and Americans were getting ripped off all the time, the old snatch and grab purses. They'd come into the embassy, their faces were cut up, their passports were stolen, their purses were stolen and it was a continuing problem. In fact, it got so bad while I was there the U.S. government used the old heavy handed approach to the Spanish authorities that if they didn't start looking at the crime situation targeting tourists Madrid would be put on the list of places that you shouldn't perhaps visit for a while. There was a big controversy over that. But there were a lot of incidents involving American tourists, snatch and grab and things like that. Not only in Madrid but also in Seville and Barcelona. In fact, I remember when we had visitors come see us from the States they flew into Barcelona and were at the train station to take the train to Madrid and they got involved in one of the scams where

someone sitting in the balcony above them poured something down on top of them. The other one comes and brushes them off and walks off with their handbags. So there were a lot of things going on in Spain. It was an excellent assignment but I kept busy the whole two years I was there. And we changed RSOs so there was a gap where there was no RSO there also.

*Q: Who was ambassador when you were there?*

DEERING: The ambassador arrived shortly after I arrived. That was Ambassador Bartholomew. I had worked with him on the investigation of the bombing. Worked with him, I actually, I had to interview him several times concerning what happened in Beirut in 1984.

*Q: Did you feel that or did we all feel, the security apparatus feel, the ambassador was at threat at that time?*

DEERING: Yes, absolutely. There were several incidents where homemade rockets were shot or attempted to be shot at the ambassador's residence. Unfortunately, the ambassador didn't always feel he was at threat. Ambassador Bartholomew didn't feel he was at threat in East Beirut, either. Perhaps if he had, that wouldn't have happened.

*Q: How did one go about protecting the ambassador?*

DEERING: We had local guards at the embassy. We had a contingent made up of locally hired folks and some Spanish national police, as I recall, that had a protective detail on the ambassador, that traveled with him when he left the compound, if he wanted. There were times when he would kind of disappear without his bodyguards and we'd find out about it later on but that's not unusual. It's unfortunate but it wasn't unusual in those times. There was also what we believed an active threat from elements of, from other terrorist groups planning some action in Spain that we worked very closely with a couple of other countries and ultimately was resolved favorably. But there was a lot going on, there was a lot going on. There was an attack, a bombing, at the consulate general in Barcelona, on the stairs, a package bomb. There was an attack on the USO facility in Madrid. There were two incidents of rockets being aimed at the ambassador's residence. There was an incident of a homemade mortar device being launched from a hotel across the street from the embassy, at the embassy, that exploded outside the window. There was an attack on an air force communications facility with a, they blew up a fence and then planted another device so that when the investigators would go to see what happened they'd step on it but they fixed the explosive the wrong way. The pressure device was facing the wrong way and didn't blow up when they stepped on it. That would have been nasty. There was a, I mentioned the attack in the USO facility, a hand grenade attack, the day after Christmas 1987, during which a sailor was killed, a U.S. sailor.

*Q: Well, let's talk about, sort of, these individually. What, the Barcelona, the bomb, the package bomb there, do we know who was responsible?*

DEERING: No, I don't think we ever, as I recall, there was a group called the Terra Lliure, and there was some belief, it was an internal separatist group for the Catalonians, I believe that was Terra Lliure, I'm a little fuzzy here, we thought perhaps they'd been involved in that. The others

we believed were part of what was called at the time, it was associated with, they were kind of terrorists for hire. Called themselves the International Brigade and they were associated with the Red Army Faction. We believe they were funded probably by Libya and others at the time and they were just a nuisance. You recall there was the incident on the New Jersey Turnpike where a state trooper stopped an individual, searched his car and found a fire extinguisher that actually had explosives in it. The guy was driving up to New York City for something, probably. We believe these groups were all interrelated. There was a series of incidents against our facilities in Indonesia at the time and other areas of Southeast Asia. So it was very active, hostile environment.

*Q: First place, was the ETA*

DEERING: ETA was the threat to the Spaniards but there was never any indication, there was never any specific information that ETA was ever interested in targeting American interests.

*Q: Well, was there at all the type of relationship in the United States that the IRA had in the United States? In other words, were there Basques in the United States who were supporting ETA?*

DEERING: Hard to tell. We believed there was possibly a developing relationship between the IRA and ETA, in terms of arms shipments and things.

*Q: How good was the relationship with the Spanish security forces? Were you kept, I mean were you all working pretty closely together?*

DEERING: I think, again, there are a group of individuals that we often overlook as far as their value to the embassy. That's our local employees. There was a very good group of local investigators at the embassy. A lot of times, as always when we're dealing with these folks, a lot of the things they did were self-serving. They liked to maintain the Spanish community were an important part of the embassy, which they were. A lot of times we would go overboard. I had a staff there that was very good, that had very good contacts with the local Spanish police, both the Guardia Civil and the Spanish national police, who were also, by the way, the Guardia Civil were the border police, the Spanish national police were national police and they sometimes had their differences, competitiveness. But we had good working relationships with both sides. I met very frequently with contacts in the Spanish National Police and the Guardia Civil over issues involving embassy security. Especially on the issue of embassy employees being the targets of criminal acts. If you were assigned to the embassy in Madrid for three years, there was pretty much, it was a given that you or a member of your family was going to be the victim of a criminal act. My own family, it happened to. We were out at a party at the DCM's one night. We had a high school girl at the American School who happened to be Spanish also; she babysat for us all the time. And while we were gone, someone broke into the house with the babysitter there, with the kids there. The police came immediately. We went right home. The next day, met with the police and said this is unacceptable. The DATT, in fact, the defense attaché, he was having a dinner party downstairs in his house and while he was downstairs one of these guys had crawled up on to the roof of his villa and into the upstairs and robbed him. So this was a major problem. But they had this guy in custody within 24 hours who had broken into their house. He was a

heroin addict. That was a big problem there at the time, heroin addicts.

*Q: That was more or less the source of the...*

DEERING: Yeah. And he had no weapons. He picked up a baseball bat out in the front. He admitted it to us. And the disturbing thing was while we had good relationships with the police when it got turned over to the judicial side, the feeling was, this guy had a record a mile long, they put him back on the street and their idea was, well we'll find him dead in a gutter one day because he's a heroin addict. Didn't resolve the problem of his going back into other people's houses, but crime was a big problem. Like I mentioned earlier, crime was a big problem for the tourists but it was also a big problem for embassy. We had our guard force for the high profile individuals in the embassy. We had set up a checkpoint to see if anyone was being followed. We had a protection program set up using our local resources.

I think a keystone to the success we had with the national police was that in 1987 we, through the antiterrorism assistance program which was kind of in its beginning stages then, we arranged for a contingent of Spanish national police, about 15 or 20, to go to the United States for two weeks' training with a local sheriff's department in Florida in use of helicopters in tactical police work, unheard of concept in Europe. Helicopters were not used like we use helicopters here. They were for military uses or for commercial uses but they weren't being used at all for traffic control, for emergency evacuation, for police tactical situations. So we sat down with the Spanish and right up to the level, up to the director of the Spanish national police and said, "This is an important program. Why don't you take us up on this?" And they did. In fact, I was the escort and the liaison for the team with the local police and we also gave them a tour of Florida, did the Florida thing. So it was a very good liaison program and probably started the Spanish off in the direction of how they could utilize other resources, hopefully in the war on terrorism, also.

As I said, it was a very active environment. At the same time, we had other, more routine things that we do at the embassies, including investigations and security checks and working, liaison with our other folks in the embassies, trying to keep up with what was going on. You're the sheriff of the embassy, the RSO, the RSO's the sheriff of the embassy. So it was a busy time. One of the things that I, like I say, I think what I learned early on in my career was the importance of good liaison and reaching out and establishing relationships with the various folks in the embassy. By that time, as you're well aware, State Department employees were the minority in the embassy. We were the caretakers almost. So you had to have good relationships. In Spain there was a large military contingent. There was a JUSMAAG was there. There was a military assistance group there. There was a naval group there and a large commercial section, a large agricultural section. No AID. A large USIA operation. So it was important to reach out and get these people on board as allies, not opposing, not make life difficult so they wouldn't cooperate. Although if you're doing your job in security it makes life difficult. So it was a busy time.

*Q: At that time I guess there were two major forces internationally in terrorism. One was Libya and the other was the ones connected with the Palestine, PLO, Abu Nidal and other ones. Were those, and Spain being Spain, I would think they would be, have ties in that.*

DEERING: Iranians, also. I don't think Spain, Spain was totally consumed by problems with ETA. Hard to convince, I think, at times, hard to convince them that they had these other elements there but it was an environment ripe for a culture that had ties, whether they wanted to admit or not, back to the Moors. The senior local investigator, who I thought highly of, sometimes he'd drive me nuts, I think it was a love-hate relationship but he had very good contacts with everybody. I remember we went to, went with the ambassador, the ambassador's first trip to Barcelona and there was some local Catalanian mayor was doing the address and the mayor started spouting off in a direction of the Catalonians are separatists, we're our own. I remember Joe, sitting next to me, the local investigator, just mumbling and grumbling because he was from Madrid. Actually he was from up north. The part of Spain that he was from where the Moors never got that far north. I finally got a way to get at Joe. I said, "Joe, your name is Jose M. Oreste. I've done some research, Joe. Done some research on your family tree." Spoke English very well; in fact he had worked in England a number of years. He said, "What do you mean?" I said, "I went back and I spent some time working on this, Joe and I found out that you've been told throughout your life that your middle name is Miguel, Jose Miguel Oreste. I found out, Joe, you'll be really disappointed. Your middle name is Mahmood, Jose Mahmood Oreste." The typical Spanish response but Joe, he's a good guy. As I said, the Spanish, very proud people, could be very standoffish. We were lucky. We got housing in a, it was a standalone, there were five apartments and there was like four levels, the bottom, the first, the second and the third. Person who built this lived in one of the units. Two of the other people were high school buddies and they were all professionals. And the fourth person was a German engineer and his Spanish wife, or German wife and Spanish engineer. So we lived in this building with these folks and they kind of took us in, under their wings and we became very good friends with most of them and socialized with them, which was not usual for getting close in a short period of time with the Spanish people. But it made for a more enjoyable time there, no question about that, also. If something happened, if something went wrong, that night the robber broke into our thing and that was through outside security and inside security and he just came in and they were there, as soon as the babysitter woke up and went running for help. So, again, making sure that you have friends wherever you are is important.

*Q: Were you there and my dates are a little confused but when that whole area was sort of in a turmoil over that Achille Lauro business?*

DEERING: Yeah that actually happened, it think it happened, Achille Lauro happened, was it '85 or '86?

*Q: I'm not sure. It was in that time...*

DEERING: It was in that time frame because as we go on to my local guard contractor in Damascus, my next assignment, he was the one that went with the RSO in Damascus, the RSO sent him up to one of the port cities in Syria where they had recovered the remains of the American. Klinghoffer. And he had to bring these remains back to the embassy. But it was in that time frame, around '86.

*Q: I was wondering whether there were any repercussions there. Things were happening in, well obviously, Egypt and then in Italy with Sigonella, the plane being forced down and all. I was just*

*wondering.*

DEERING: There were anti-American demonstrations from time to time outside the embassy but, again, I think the Spanish were more consumed and ETA was extremely active. Right after I got there, a week after I got there, not even a mile from the embassy a car bomb blew up one of the vehicles that was carrying senior Guardia Civil officers. And then there was the incident where one of the big generals, his car was, they had planned for years and had burrowed under the street. So when his car parked there, blew the car up over top of the building. I don't know whether you remember that incident or not. So they were very, very consumed. We had to keep reminding them, hey, there are other people here that want to do you harm.

*Q: Did we pick up any stuff about ETA that we passed on, that you know of?*

DEERING: Yeah, we were working very closely with the Spanish authorities on providing any kind of assistance. I know the FBI legal attaché, located up in Paris and the assistant legal attaché would come down, covered. They were working with the Spanish authorities on trying to resolve the kidnapping of a senior, that's not the right term, a well-known Spanish industrialist who had been kidnapped and was being held for ransom. The Spanish government was working very closely with the FBI on some logistical support for trying to locate and recover this person. So, yeah, there were on-going discussions.

*Q: Did we have any contacts regarding Spain with, say, the Moroccan authorities or anything that you know of?*

DEERING: We didn't have any contacts along those lines. Our contacts were strictly with the Spanish national police, the Guardia Civil and the security related environment for the embassy. Now that included investigations. Again, investigations, there were also, we had some major investigations. Every time there was one of these incidents it had to be investigated and there was no FBI in Madrid. In fact, they had pulled out of Madrid and said there wasn't enough work there, back in the late Seventies. Of course, they wanted to get back in again and there was some question and I still question, they have limited authority to do anything anyhow. The legal attachés are there for liaison, they're not supposed to be conducting investigations in the foreign country. They were trying to get back in, I know they're back in now, at the embassy but anytime anything happened, under our protective intelligence responsibilities, DS has a role in investigating these incidents. Now, from the criminal side, under the Omnibus Terrorist Act, it's the FBI's responsibility. Well, the FBI, as I said there were many incidents in the two years that I was there. Of course, myself, with my local investigator, we were there 24 hours before the FBI. The FBI didn't like that. My comment to them was, hey, folks you're in Paris. "Well, you're supposed to call us." My responsibility is to the embassy first. If I'm directed to do something, that's what I will go and do. I will get in touch with you, eventually. The incident involving the navy enlisted man that was killed in the grenade attack on the day after Christmas and we were down there within 12 hours, the next morning interviewing, working with the Naval Investigative Service on shifts. The FBI guy was not happy about that, because they couldn't get anybody down there because all their people were on leave.

*Q: Well now, who did the grenade at the USO?*

DEERING: That one was another one that was never solved and you know what, it's an incident that has been forgotten. It's been forgotten. I would venture to guess that, other than the guy's family, probably nobody even remembers that incident. What happened was, somebody came by, rolled a grenade into this bar that the USO sponsored. It was not in a good area of town. I remember when I went there, we went there to look at the place, there was still blood on the floor and there was a park right outside where there were needles. It could have been anything, could have been anything. The guy could have been somebody who didn't like the GI's going there. Who knows? That was never resolved. I believe it was part of this infrastructure of this, Red Brigades, International Brigade, Red Army Faction, yeah. Japanese Red Army was the other one that was very active. But there again, remember, they were kind of terrorists for lease. And we believe they were active, also. Mikimoro, we believe that, not this guy who was caught, believe there were three or four of those that were operating in Europe. A lot of that was never resolved as to who it was. And again, you have to remember that there still was only a fledgling response in the U.S. government to these incidents.

*Q: Well, of course, there was a measure of response to the bombing of the nightclub in Berlin. That was the bombing of Libya, which led to*

DEERING: We believe there were some other ties into that one, too. The Syrians probably had some influence over that one. That was a time where I think it was an easy operating environment for these groups because the Spanish were more concerned with ETA and these other separatist groups in Spain. So literally they went down at a main intersection in the middle of the night where it was set up – this homemade rocket launcher that had like tubes and these things at night. That kind of duded, out but I mean this is a major thoroughfare in Spain. And, again, launched successful attacks against our facilities there which today would draw a whole lot of attention and a whole lot of response. But there just wasn't the response at that time. It was, "Go find out what you can find out." I did a lot of reporting on that stuff.

*Q: How about our consulate in Bilbao, sort of the heart of Basque country?*

DEERING: It was but there were no, I do not recall any major problems up at Bilbao. I think I visited there only once. A small consulate, I think three people, that's all. No, as I said, the Basques did not target American interests directly.

One other thing I didn't dwell on. I mentioned earlier, I think, while I was there investigating the very unfortunate incident. As I mentioned, there was a great concern over all these activities and their attempts to get at us where we were. We got a call one day from, I guess it was from Washington that Immigration in Florida had called DS headquarters and said, "Hey, we got a situation here. We got this Iranian we grabbed because we looked at his passport and he got a visa, a legitimate visa, in Madrid, Spain. But when we questioned him he said he'd never been to Madrid, Spain and there was no stamp on his passport, on his Iranian passport, which showed that he had entered, that he had ever entered Spain. He couldn't answer any questions about how did he get this visa." "Well, I just got it." And then another one popped up, somewhere along the east coast of Florida.



So we determined early on that these were, in fact, legitimate visas issued in Madrid. I mean legitimate, they weren't counterfeit. So we had a real problem, then, on our hands, major problem. What's going on here? Well, again, this is the fall of 1989. I'd gotten there in the summer. And, with everything else going on, we then had to launch a major internal investigation in conjunction with the consul general and bring him into our confidence and of course the ambassador, DCM. Something is wrong here. This has got major ramifications. There are visas being issued here in Madrid to at least we know two Iranians, we don't know how many more. It turned out there were quite a few more. What happened was, there was a very aggressive assistant U.S. attorney in the Southern District of Florida, in Miami, who said, "I'm going after this. This is my case now, it popped up first, first entry in Miami." He took over the investigation under the direction of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and once that happens then you can't just let these things go. We worked very closely with the consul general, who was very upset. This can't be happening on my watch, kind of thing, what's going on here.

Well we started the investigation in a couple different directions. One looking at how these passports were getting into the embassy, who might be involved. Who's involved in the embassy? We determined that it had to be an American. We also determined that there was another individual involved. We did some phone checks. We did some other checks. And we found out that there was a consular officer who happened to be the chief of the antifraud section who had some classic bones to pick with the system. He had been; I think it was the consulate in Belfast and the IRA had blown up a car across the street. He had gotten hurt in the explosion. His household goods had been lost at sea and he'd been passed over for promotion a few times. We found out that he had, on home leave, had been seeing an Iranian doctor or some connection to an Iranian doctor out on the West Coast of California. We then determined that this was a person that was bringing these passports in. And we also were able to, through basic police work with the Spanish authorities, we found the guy had been at a hotel at the time that phone calls were being made in and visas were being brought in. We put the whole package together.

The consular officer was a very popular member of the embassy community and as a result I and the RSO, when word gets out, word something is going on here and then the ambassador basically had to call in the consular officer and say, "You've got two choices here. You can curtail, go back to an over complement thing while we resolve this thing or I will declare no confidence." He left, went back to Washington. Investigation continued, of course. Our reputation became sullied that we were on a witch hunt. This was people that didn't know what was going on. It was a difficult time and it went on for about three or four months. Also, the consular officer in question had a major accident right before Christmas outside his house where he fell down off a ladder and had shears go into his throat. Unfortunately, the doctor who did the surgery and the person who found him and everything else, I believe it was a suicide attempt. It was a very, very unfortunate chain of events. Ultimately, the officer in question was arrested back in Washington and he spent three years in prison for visa fraud. We still don't really know the amount of what he was getting in return was not significant. It was just a very, it was the worst of the Foreign Service. It also showed that the system worked.

*Q: For somebody listening, to put in context, when you say Iranian visas, one today thinks in terms of terrorists, particularly in those days. Well for years, Iranians have been trying to get*

*into the United States, getting the hell out of their country. These were often families of relatively well to do people. As a consular officer, as soon as an Iranian would show up, anywhere, you'd say, "Oh, my God" because they were basically shopping for visas. We had Iranians coming in from American Samoa.*

DEERING: But what was wrong here was that none of the Iranians ever came to Spain. They were never there. The visas were being brought in and the problem there is you don't really know what you have until you can find all the people, as you're well aware. Were there ever any indications that terrorists were using it? No, I don't think we ever determined that but I'm not sure that we ever found out how many there were.

*Q: The problem of people buying illegal visas is a tremendous concern. I've been a consul general four times and this is something, I wiped out an entire section of locals, of foreign service nationals, in Seoul, Korea.*

DEERING: Quite frankly, that's what we were looking for. We were looking for the local connection here.

*Q: But you're always worried about the Americans. It unfortunately is one of the few places where Foreign Service Officers can be tempted. Most of the rest of the time, I mean outside of a little finagling and contracting and all that, I mean this is a commodity.*

DEERING: As we say, it's the gold standard. U.S. passport and visa are the gold standards for all other documents. It was a major problem. These cases become public knowledge. When an arrest is made, I'm trying to remember, I don't know if there was even a trial, I think there was a plea agreement on that one. Still, it's out there. It's part of the Foreign Service training but yet greed, greed has no social...

*Q: Sometimes it's even, I'm not condoning it at all but sometimes it's compassion. Sometimes there isn't even money involved. Sometimes there's sex, too.*

DEERING: Oh, yeah. Believe me, I've seen them all. I've been involved with many of them. You're right, there is, with the visa, if you have a weakness, a character weakness and you're in that position, that certainly is one of the positions in the Foreign Service, other than on the espionage side, where you can be exploited. People think exploitation's only for intelligence matters. Not true.

*Q: No. Tell me, this of course puts you in a very difficult position when you, you've got information that you can't share with the rest of the community. Did you find that the rest of the community, of the sort of Foreign Service community in Madrid, sort of came around to realize what had happened?*

DEERING: I think ultimately, yes. It stretched out for a long time. I think it was actually after I, it was at the time I was leaving that things were finally, totally resolved. But I can remember people who were close to him, nobody ever was nasty, it was just little snide remarks. "Don't you have something better to do?" When you're conducting an investigation you do not divulge

what you're doing. It's not a matter of discussion for the community. Unfortunately it becomes discussion.

*Q: And erroneous data*

DEERING: And erroneous data and people don't want to believe that the guy that they went to dinner with, the guy that they socialize with, the guy they worked with, my God, no, no, not him. What are you guys doing? I had one political officer basically said that to me. Pulled me aside in his office, "Let's talk about this thing." It was his wife who found him lying on the ground that day when he fell off the ladder and they were very close. They lived in the same neighborhood. "Come on, come on, what are you doing, what are you doing? This is crazy. You can't be focusing in here." I said, "Look, it will go where it goes and I'm not going to discuss it with you." Oh yeah, myself and the RSO, Gary Schatz, we took some shots on that but in the end

*Q: Well, it's what you've got to do.*

DEERING: You gotta do what you gotta do.

*Q: I have to say as a consular officer we used to get a lot of shots. "What do you mean by refusing this?"*

DEERING: Sure. It's a lot easier to give than refuse, isn't it? But again, that was major it consumed a major part of our time there, along with all this other stuff going on.

**EDWARD C. McBRIDE**  
**Cultural Attaché, USIS**  
**Madrid (1986-1991)**

*Mr. Edward C. McBride joined USIA in 1964. His career postings included France, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain, and England. Mr. McBride was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.*

MCBRIDE: I went to Madrid after coming back to Washington for Spanish language training. But the job in Madrid which I went to in 1986...

*Q: You were there until when?*

MCBRIDE: I was there until 1990. I had quite a long time in Madrid as it turned out for a reason that will emerge later, but it will be very easy and really fast to explain. But I went to Madrid to be the cultural attaché, again my own choice. I was happy to do that because Spain was just becoming a big player on the European stage having shaken off the last vestiges of the Franco regime. The new socialist leader of the country, Felipe Gonzales, was making a big splash in the world, and Spain was really opening up. We were eager to be in on this, and we wanted to

particularly expand the Fulbright program in Spain, and so that was my main mission and mandate when I was sent out there. It was to try to expand and develop the Fulbright program, and to use another program that was a vestige from another earlier agreement that we had had with the Spanish government, the NATO Bases agreement we called it in shorthand. It was the part of the agreement that we had signed with Spain that allowed the American military presence in Spain. So we had many American military bases at that time in Spain. Part of the agreement at the insistence of the Spanish was that a percentage of the resources had to be used for education and cultural exchange to benefit the Spanish. The so-called bases agreement generated a fair amount of money for us to run these programs. The agreement generated a separate pot of money from the Fulbright program but related to it, and ultimately was administered by the same bureaucracy. What we had in Spain was a binational commission of long standing which had basically been there since the days of Franco, but with fairly restricted opportunities. Nonetheless we pressed for and got a new Fulbright executive director which I helped to find and hire. Suddenly, we had this incredible opportunity to channel these funds from the bases agreement and to commingle them with the Fulbright money that was from the two governments. My job was to try to put this together and make it a bigger and better program. It turned out that the way we were able to do that was to involve the private sector in these programs in a big way. I think if I look back on it, that would be my most significant accomplishment in Spain. It was possible because we had a very sympathetic ambassador named Reggie Bartholomew who was also involved in the negotiation of the bases agreement. He understood very well what the various components of the bases agreement were, including the one that generated the money for these cultural activities. So he was very supportive. What he also was eager to see was how we could creatively involve the private sector in these programs. So with his complete blessing, we went out to expand funding for the Fulbright program. The public affairs officer and I did this together. We were both on the Fulbright committee together. But our job was to try to develop a program that would be as much focused on the private sector as we could and still preserve the integrity of the program. Now, I guess it is easy to say this, our control of those programs. We didn't want to surrender control for the money. And it was a very tricky road to walk here. But what we did was to go out to various corporations, largely American, which were very eager to expand. I mean there were plenty of Americans already there, but we found very receptive partners in the big American corporations who could see that Spain had a lot of catch up to do in fields like education where they had been cut off for a very long time. The Spanish to build up their institutions. We saw this as an opportunity to get their engagement and involvement in supporting these programs. So the long and the short of it was that the Fulbright program when I arrived in Madrid was a big program. It was funded at about 2.5 million dollars, and it was a good program, and it was well supported by both the Spanish government and the American government. But when I walked away from the program four years later, the budget had just passed 10 million dollars, the bulk of which came from the private sector. Suddenly there was a massive infusion of money and a huge jump in the size of the program. We were working with companies like IBM, Ford, a couple of the big banks, Merrill Lynch, all of whom had become partners in these exchange programs. It was particularly important with respect to Fulbright. We persuaded the sponsors to fund the scholarships was that we need to set a brand to the scholarships which would be co-branded. It would be the Fulbright- IBM scholarship or the Fulbright- Ford scholarship. The agreement we struck with the companies in exchange for their contribution was unique, and they had no say so on the selection or the discipline or anything. They were very generous about it. But what we did agree was the candidates who went off on

these grants, when they came back to Spain, the IBM or whoever the sponsor was, had the first crack at employing that individual, and if they wanted to offer him a job, that was fine. He had no obligation to take it, but they had the first right of refusal so to speak. It worked very well. It was a pattern that was ultimately picked up by several other Fulbright commissions around the world, and the Fulbright program became a model in the sense of how to build public private sector partnerships. We did it with a lot of enthusiastic support from Washington because the Fulbright budget at that time was in decline. We were able to sustain a program, not only sustain it but to build it up over the years and to respond clearly to both American and Spanish interests. With the addition of the money we had from the bases agreement as it was called, we decided to use that money for what we called the cultural presentations program. We brought the performing arts; we sponsored art exhibitions; we did publishing ventures. We used the other piece for the educational exchange. So we had an enormous program in Spain that involved big exchanges of exhibitions that had another unique dimension in terms of cultural programs in other embassies. We could not only bring Americans to Spain, we could send Spanish projects to the United States, because we could use the bases money for that purpose as there was no restriction. So, for example, we worked very closely with the Guggenheim Museum in New York and did an enormous Miro exhibition that went to the Guggenheim thanks to a generous grant from this bases agreement support. We sponsored Spanish performing arts. We cosponsored the Spanish National Ballet which did a tour in the United States with a grant from this foundation. We also supported arts exchanges. Artists would travel around Spain and have an artist in residence program which we could not have funded under the Fulbright program. So we had the best of all worlds in a way with a program that not only allowed us to bring the best of American culture to Spain, but we could also sponsor Spanish cultural activities to the United States. The Spanish loved it.

*Q: How did you find sort of the Spanish community, the arts, the intellectual community you were dealing with?*

MCBRIDE: They knew that America was the cutting edge in things like the arts, particularly dance and the fine arts. The Spanish were really eager to catch up. They wanted to go and see and study, and they wanted to bring those exhibitions of artists, those works to Spain. So it was a wonderful time to be in Spain. The intellectual community was highly supportive. The universities wanted to establish new chairs. They wanted to wipe up some of the old vestiges of the bad old Franco days, and they turned to America to do that. So it was a great opportunity to expose America to Spain and Spain to America. We did it with the creative use of a lot of these programs, and a lot of money from both Spanish and American sources, public and private. It was almost an ideal way to see the programs blossom and develop because the receiving side was just as eager to benefit from them as the sender.

*Q: Did you run across any, I won't say problem, but I mean here you are talking about the Reagan administration and the Bush administration, and you have got a socialist administration in Spain which was highly supported and touted particularly in Germany and Sweden and the socialists in France, the socialist side of things. Did you find yourself sort of in competition or did this come up?*

MCBRIDE: It frequently came up, and I was always as surprised as I could be that we had such a warm and cuddly relationship with the socialist government, that in many ways was particularly out of tune with the government in the United States at the time. Because Filipe was pretty far left on the scale anyway, and dealing with President Reagan, President Bush was not always easy for him. But he was a pragmatic politician, and I think he deserves a lot of credit for that because he wouldn't let things get in his way if he saw in the end that Spain was going to be better off for it. So the Spanish really were wonderfully receptive. The political leanings of one government didn't get in the way of the other, and the Spanish intellectual class was very happy to pursue things American because they say that in the disciplines where weaknesses existed in Spain, the strength was in America. So forging links between universities was relatively easy and straightforward. That made the Fulbright program work very well. So we were really lucky that all these stars came together at the same time. Madrid proved to be from my point of view certainly if not the highlight, a very close competitor for the best job I had in the foreign service, simply because we had so many good things going on. The one downer which will lead me to wind this down was at the end we were in the doghouse in Spain with the government. By this time the Bush administration was well established. I worked very closely on this with a new ambassador, Joseph Zapala, who was keen to make a big statement in 1992, the quinqucentenary of Christopher Columbus. The Spanish were eager to have us as strong partners because after all, we are the big success story of Christopher Columbus in a way. The idea was that we would be a very strong presence in the world's fair that was going to take place in Seville. The Spanish had been very actively courting the United States to make a strong statement and be a big presence at this event which was going to be the jewel in the crown as far as they were concerned for commemorating the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus. I came to the States a couple of times with the ambassador because we were getting trouble from USIA about participating in the Seville World's Fair. This position dated from Director Charlie Wick who promised Congress that we would not do any more worlds' fairs leftover from the Charlie Wick days that we would not do anymore world's fairs. But the Seville event was a world's fair. There was no way to participate without going back to Congress for a supplemental budget request. Nonetheless, I returned to Washington with the Ambassador to make the pitch. He was particularly keen to do this project and he wanted me to manage it. We went to see USIA; we went to the Department. We went to the White House. We got one of the trips to deliberately timed to coincide with the visit of the King of Spain. The King goes to the White House. Bush promises the King that we are going to be there. This is very reassuring until we go back. But USIA was hearing none of this and the money was not forthcoming. In the meantime we had however made a commitment to the Spanish to take the biggest plot on the whole fairground to put up this dazzling American pavilion. But the long and the short of it was we never got the money. It was clear to me after about a year into this, that the congress was not going to budge. We were not going to be able to get money from the private sector unless we had a pretty good infusion of public money to start it with, and that money was not there. Zapala, the ambassador, was pretty upset by this because he felt in a way that he had engineered this commitment by the President to the King of Spain that we would do this. So we got busy at the last minute trying to find a person who would go out and raise the money and would do so with minimal financial participation by the U.S. government, but that we would be nominally up front on it, but it would all essentially be private sector money. The person chosen to raise the money, selected by the Bush administration was not successful in convincing the private sector sponsors that we turned to to support this. As a result, we bitterly let down the Spanish. We had a recycled geodesic dome that was designed by

Buckminster Fuller in the '60s that had been in storage somewhere that we built on the Seville site. As a result, we really made a non-statement of U.S. participation in this, and it was very embarrassing for everybody. At this point I left Spain having extended, having been extended at the request of the ambassador, to take on this job. I finally just went up to him and said, "You know, I am really sorry to be as bluntly honest as I have to be with you, but I don't see this coming together." He admitted that he didn't either. I said, "As a result we can no longer justify my continued presence here because there is not going to be a big exhibition." There is not going to be justification for my involvement as deputy commissioner general. I said, "That is just not going to happen. There is going to be no show to run, and I feel that it would be unfair for me to stay here. USIA really wants to reassign me and send me somewhere else. I want to leave on a good note. I don't want to just run and jump from a sinking ship. I can see nothing further that I can do here, and I would like to get your permission to pursue another assignment." He wasn't happy about it, but he was very gracious. At that point in 1991, I guess it was, I left Spain, and did so very sadly because by this time I had persuaded the FBO to re-open the consulate in Seville which we had closed, to use as the residence for the commissioner. I had in fact moved down to Seville, and was in my fifth year of an assignment to Spain But I reluctantly left and declared that phase of it over. I am glad I did because the Spanish never missed an opportunity to tell us how disappointed and how sad they were that we dropped the ball as far as they were concerned. And indeed we did.

**PERRY W. LINDER**  
**Administrative Counselor**  
**Madrid (1988-1992)**

*Perry W. Linder was born and raised in California. He attended San Jose State College and the University of California at Berkeley. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and held several positions in Germany, Jamaica, Honduras, France, Benin, Belgium, Jordan, Greece and Spain. He was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1996.*

*Q: Perry, we're talking about Madrid, and I was asking a little bit about the Olympics and Barcelona, so why don't you talk about that a bit.*

LINDER: Well, from the moment of my arrival there in 1988, we knew that the Olympics were going to take place in Barcelona, and there would be some obligation on the Embassy to do something about that, to participate; we weren't quite sure to what level. And it also happened that at the same time there was going to be the International Exhibition in Seville.

*Q: Where we would have an official pavilion.*

LINDER: Representation, and a pavilion. So, both of the events were pending from the moment that I arrived. In Barcelona, just before I arrived a bomb had been placed in the consulate, which was in an office building, and it had injured a couple of people, our local employees, and destroyed part of the office there. So, we knew we had to get out of there, we wanted a more

secure building, and that became tied in to the events for 1992; I mean, if we were going to move out, we needed a place that was up and running by 1992. So we were looking for property right from the beginning of my tour there in Barcelona. That got me down to Barcelona with a fair amount of frequency. It was difficult to find property in Barcelona. I was told that like Tokyo it's one of the most densely populated cities in the world.

*Q: And therefore, quite expensive real estate.*

LINDER: It's expensive, and there's just not much available. We didn't want to be in another office building after our experience there, we wanted a free-standing building. Anyway, we finally found an old villa, and it was out of the central part of town, which was some concern, but the consular function in Barcelona was less important than it was, we weren't issuing visas there anymore. So, the fact that somebody might have to get on a bus or take a taxi to reach the consulate that's on the edge of town rather than in the center of the town no longer played as a big issue.

We bought that house or villa; it was owned by the Red Cross at the time, they were using it as an office building, and it had some historical significance within Barcelona. So it was a very complicated negotiation, and the Red Cross were tough negotiators. I think we paid nine or 10 million for the property, and then we had to refurbish it and put in all the security, and anticipate what special needs might be required during the Olympics. So I spent a lot of time with all of that, and we got people from FBO out there working on the refurbishment, and we finally made a special arrangement with A Navy CB Battalion to come in and help complete the project.

Anyway, we finally succeeded in getting it set up in time for the Olympics, including a very special security facility to house and monitor security at the Olympics, and to be able to react in whatever way might be necessary, whatever assistance we might be called on to provide we could provide. So we put a lot of electronic gear and special equipment and special rooms into that consulate to set up this operation which was run by State and CIA and the US military in coordination with the Olympic Committee and everybody else. Anyway, we got it in, and that was okay, and fortunately, there was no incident down there.

In other terms of the Olympics, the Ambassador visited. We had a new Ambassador by then, his name was Capen; he'd come out just before the Olympics. All the arrangements had been done with the previous Ambassador, but he decided that he wanted to leave before the Olympics, before the new US election, presidential campaign, and so we got Capen, and he was very interested in presenting himself, and being present, and being seen around, and took on a staff aide. We had to get tickets for him for every event, and his family and relatives. He was very visible as a visitor during the Olympics. But otherwise, we were not overly involved. In preparation, we had gotten information from Seoul, where the previous Olympics had been held, and learned what the Embassy did in Seoul, and we went over all this. The Ambassador's instructions to me were, in planning for the Olympics, pull out all the stops, we're going to do it right, get all the resources you need, and that's the way we started out. But it was gradually whittled away by the Department, and in a correct manner--how many people, how would we implement the staff in Barcelona, how big of a consular role could we expect, just what would we be expected to do in the way of providing support for press, and all the US businesses that



were down there, and so forth. But it really came down to just supporting the Ambassador, supporting the official USG representatives to the Olympics.

*Q: Some of whom had official connection with...*

LINDER: Yes. There was a group of representatives appointed by the US Government. So we had to provide some support for them and see that they had hotel space, and all of that, we had the whole Olympic security issue. We set up the facilities for the security group, and our political counselor was down there as a liaison, and the Station Chief was down there, but that operation was out of our hands.

*Q: What were some of your other main challenges or accomplishments in four years in Madrid?*

LINDER: There was Seville. We had a consulate in Seville, and we had closed that consulate down but kept the building. It was an old building, there was a world exhibition in Seville in 1926, I think it was, sometime in the '20s, and a building had been built for the US pavilion, but in modern terms, a small building. It was a delightful building; it had wonderful tiles from Seville, and it had an interior courtyard, it had old Roman columns that had been picked up here and there and built into the building. It was a magnificent old place, and the Embassy was reluctant to give it up. The consulate closed, but we kept the building open as an office. The building was ours for 75 years, rent-free, and I think the lease would have been up in the year 2002, something like that. So we had that building used as an office by our Consular Agent in Seville, and one FSN who worked in the building. The Consular Agent was an American academic working in Seville. We also had a caretaker and a cleaning lady in the building and people from the Embassy could go down there and use the building to stay on a weekend. But it was an awkward situation; and difficult to maintain the building.

Anyway, with the International Exhibition down there, a commissioner was appointed, and this only after a lot of hemming and hawing, but they finally appointed a commissioner. Not the important name who was initially expected, but a person of lesser rank, an able person whose name was Bush. He was a fund-raiser, a very young guy, he lived in Chevy Chase. Anyway, the idea was he'd move into that building, that would be his residence and office. And so we worked up a scheme to make it habitable and representational. It would be not only his house, but the office as well, and of course, he would have to have a staff, and then we were going to build an American Pavilion on the exhibition grounds.

*Q: At the fairgrounds.*

LINDER: At the fairgrounds, and the commissioner would be responsible for seeing that got built up, and for everything that went on in it. So anyway, we were involved in this, so was the US Information Agency, the whole project moved very slowly. They kept redoing the plans for the pavilion and time was passing by, and finally they got this old geodesic dome that had been used previously; they brought that in, and our showing at the exhibition was not what had been anticipated. But nevertheless, we did put up a pavilion and it was done on time. A lot of imagination was used to provide the funding for refurbishing that consulate building, and it turned into an outstanding residence. Bush, his wife and three kids, lived there for a year, and

they had a good time, and he entertained a lot of people. He made good use of that place. The furniture was contributed, people came in and painted murals on the walls, and turned it into a real showplace. It was a lot of fun having Bush there, he did a good job.

Anyway, that all took a lot of time. Afterwards, of course, we were saying, what do we do with the building, and for all I know, that's still going on. There was a big to-do following my departure over that building in Seville, the cost of upkeep and how it could be used.

There was an administrative issue in Madrid representative of the changing status of diplomatic immunity and an embassy's responsibility for its local employees, and its obligations to the local law. A former employee of the embassy had been fired before I got there. He had been one of the security people, a local employee. The embassy fired him for cause. Even though we paid him \$3,000 and he signed a waiver that he was satisfied he had gotten all that he had coming to him, he had second thoughts about that, and sought recourse through the press. He gave interviews in which he identified the Station Chief and where the Station Chief lived, and then he got on talk radio, he got a lawyer, and kept after us and kept after us and kept after us. The embassy hadn't documented the cause for dismissal properly. There may have been good reasons to have fired the guy, but the incident that precipitated it wasn't one that would stand up in a court of law, a labor court. So we finally had to sit down with the guy and negotiate an agreement, and we ended up paying him a couple hundred thousand dollars, and still, he wasn't satisfied. You look at this incident over time, it wasn't considered a problem back in the beginning, and it was not something we hid from the Foreign Office. We had written the Foreign Office many times, and the Foreign Office had always stood behind the Embassy and said, "You can't do that, the ex-employee's case has no validity, the Embassy is okay." But when push comes to shove, the Foreign Office can't stand by you, because they can't go against their own legal system. It's a change that I've seen in the course of my career in the Foreign Service. Privilege has significantly narrowed and basically no longer applies to meet administrative issues.

*Q: Well, the role of lawyers and litigation has certainly in America and what we're also saying is it happens elsewhere as well.*

LINDER: It happens elsewhere as well. In my last two posts I established strong relationships with law firms, and used them a lot. In Madrid, the Embassy's bank account was frozen.

*Q: This is this disgruntled former employee?*

LINDER: Yes, frozen through court order. Fortunately, I had a good relationship with the bank and was able to delay imposition of the freeze so it didn't harm us. But, this is the sort of thing that you didn't have when I first started in the Foreign Service.

**LARRY COLBERT**  
**Consul General**  
**Madrid (1991-1994)**

*Mr. Colbert was born in Ohio in 1940. He attended the Universities of Ohio and Missouri. After a tour in Turkey with the Peace Corps and a year as an assistant on Capital Hill, he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to Viet Nam as Regional Advisor. His subsequent postings, where he served as Consular Officer include: Ankara, Turkey, Oran, Algeria, Dublin, Ireland and Manila, Philippines. At Tijuana, Mexico, Madrid, Spain, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and Paris, France. Mr. Colbert served as Consul General. Mr. Colbert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November, 2006*

*Q: So you are off to Madrid. All of a sudden you were learning about Spain. What was sort of the situation in Spain in was it '91?*

COLBERT: Well in '91 the country had been democratic for sometime...democracy had been restored for a number of years. Back, I don't remember how far back, there has been a sort of a quasi-attempted coup by the army and the King of Spain, Juan Carlos, who is clearly on the side of democracy put that down. There developed a healthy multi-party system. Spain had joined NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and when I arrived we were in the process of shutting down the airbase that we had operated at Torrejon, outside of Madrid. We had already closed down an Air Force base that we had operated near Barcelona, and we had mothballed a large base that dates back to the Eisenhower administration near Seville. The American military fingerprint that predated Spanish membership in NATO had gotten much, much, much smaller. So I think at this point the only substantial and I use that qualitatively, I mean relatively the only real base that we have left in Spain was at Rota, which began as a Polaris submarine base, and now it's sort of a multi-purpose Naval facility. It doesn't do much for submarines anymore because they are no longer there.

So the military footprint was much smaller, they had joined NATO, the country was democratic, it was conservative party, which had roots back in the Franco era, and there was a Socialist party which had roots back to the pre-Franco era, but it was a true democracy. There was some terrorism based from ETA, the separatists from the Basque area. But there had been a lot of devolution of power and there were regional governments; the Basque's were allowed to use their language; the Catalans were allowed to use Catalan language. There were a lot of defederalization, power from Madrid to these various a sundry areas.

It was a markedly more prosperous and more advanced economically and political country than I remember from my days in Algeria ten years before.

*Q: Well then while you were there who was the ambassador? Could you describe the embassy a little? Was there a different feel from say the Philippines or anywhere else?*

COLBERT: Well I would say it was a medium sized embassy as opposed to a super large one like Madrid or London. I arrived there and there was a political appointed ambassador who had married money and then made more money I think in development. I can't remember his name, I'm sure we can look it up. He was an Italian-American, sort of a wheeler-dealer type. I think my recollection was that he was very popular with the Spanish officials; they liked him. He had been there during the Gulf War and he done I think a good job. He was informed about what was

going on. Every Friday each major element of the embassy had to write a little memo as to what, I think it was every Friday, but once a week a memo to the ambassador through the DCM explaining what significant things had happened in your particular area of responsibility. I think he took a regular interest in things.

However, when I arrived we were heading into a presidential election. George Bush senior was, the first George Bush, running for re-election on family values. I must have said re-election, this would have been after the Gulf War and it was sort of ironic given what happened with the next president and set of values but he had a sort of problem on his hands because this particular ambassador was having a raging affair with a former Spanish model, a woman very attractive and a good deal his junior. I didn't know it at the time; I mean when you arrive you don't know these things. But I remember I went to a country team meeting in the normal environment where you have those things and sitting at this big long table and I sort of said in a voice about the level of what I am using now, "Does the ambassador have a dish on his roof?" I wanted to watch football and I thought if the ambassador were away somehow I could get the U.S. football game through Armed Forces Radio, you could get it with a particular dish.

*Q: We are talking about a TV antenna.*

COLBERT: Yeah, a special kind of TV antenna. So I wanted to see the Redskins and asked, "Does the ambassador have a dish on his roof?" One of the section chief replied, "Yes, every night sometimes more than once." (Laughter.) Of course everybody laughed except me because I didn't know what was going on.

About this time the wife found out and so...

*Q: That is usually the way...I've always found out about post affairs through my wife.*

COLBERT: Exactly. Well, she found out somehow and the reason I knew she found out is that my wife and I had gone into the embassy on a Saturday or a Sunday just to pick up some newspaper, because the newspapers were sort of dropped at a central place and between the consular section and the main foray there was a big steel door. If you went down this corridor beyond the door you found the consular section, but if you went further on there was a sort of secret passage way or a not so secret passage, not secret in that people didn't know it was there, you could go directly into the residence. So she was coming out of her residence into the Chancery and she opened this door without any warning, this big steel door about decapitated both of us and went by without speaking but clearly in a very unhappy mood. Then that same day she flew out of Madrid. So he had to be replaced because we couldn't have an ambassador having an affair when the president is running on family values.

He was replaced by with a born-again Christian, or I don't know whether born again but certainly Christian with a large C who carried his religion on his sleeve. He didn't take a real interest in what was going on, he enjoyed being an ambassador and traveled a lot and it was very Christian, with a big C. Obviously staying in a Christian country, it was predominantly Catholic but it was a European Catholic.

*Q: He took the wrong path.*

COLBERT: But they don't carry their religion quite as much as he did. I think probably one of the best examples of that is a story that I will tell you is getting invited to a black-tie dinner at the ambassadors residence and there were maybe six or eight tables of ten or twelve people. The ambassador welcomed everybody in English; he didn't speak any Spanish at all and then sat down so everybody else sat down. But then he stood up and he said, "Oh I forgot that in our home and this is our home we always say grace before meals so that I would like everybody to hold people's hands around and I will say a prayer to the good Lord." Or something in that sense.

So I take the lady's hands on either side of me, one from the left and one from the right. The one to the left was a very sophisticated woman looked and her husband I found out latter was the head of the Jewish community of Spain. He was the senior Rabbi, and he was the official Jewish representative to the State Council on Religions, which I will come back to or whatever it is called. The lady on my right was maybe in her very early twenties. This was her first time in this level of society and her husband was very recently selected as young entrepreneur of the year kind of thing. The one on my left took my hand without any great trepidation, without any great tension having understood in English. She was in fact multilingual, being originally from Morocco The lady on my right clearly I could feel the tension in her hand, "why are these two me grabbing my hands." So we said our little prayer, at least he did and we all sat down. I turned to the lady on my left and said, "Madam, I don't know you very well, but I do want to apologize. I did hold your hand but I didn't touch your knee with mine because he didn't mention that." She laughed out loud and I never got invited back to another black-tie dinner. I don't know if I...but he left after about a year and he was preceded by my third ambassador in three years, Gardner, former ambassador ...

*Q: In Italy.*

COLBERT: In Italy and...

*Q: Richard Gardner.*

COLBERT: Richard Gardner, right. Mrs. Gardner...

*Q: Danielle.*

COLBERT: Danielle was an interesting lady. I suppose I will just leave it at that. There was some question as to who ran the front office though. He certainly knew what was going on and was well plugged in with the Carter White House, because he was a career Democratic apparatchik. I think...

*Q: Not the Carter White House but the...*

COLBERT: Clinton White House because he had been ambassador to Rome under Carter. I misspoke, sorry. I'll tell you a story, which I think is maybe something for all of us to bear in mind.

While I was there near the end of my three years, I'm getting a head of myself but it is still about the ambassadors, the DCMship came open or was kept open. The Department because of pressure from the NSC, the National Security Council, and Sandy Berger in particular, nominated an FS-01, an FS-1 to be the DCM. There were four minister counselor running the various State Department elements, me as consul general and then one for Econ, Political and, of course, Administration. This didn't really affect me at all. One, as consular section chief who the DCM is doesn't really matter very much. He writes you but he doesn't really understand what you do anyways, poor kid. And two, I was getting ready to leave anyway. But the two or in fact the three other minister counselors particularly the econ, political and the econ and the political were very unhappy about this fact that they were minister counselors and they were going to be supervised by a person two grades lower than them in a job which actually called for minister counselor rank.

But the Department because of pressure from the NSC was going to make the assignment. You can imagine there were a lot of bidders to be DCM in Spain. But it was going to happen except then the Ambassador weighed in and said, "This really was a problem." He pointed out to the NSC that they were looking for an entry level person who worked in the NSC and they had apparently identified a candidate for this entry level professional job, a person who turned out to be a minority, graduate of Harvard who had gone on scholarship and been interviewed selected on merit. Ambassador Gardner apparently reportedly said, "Well look I have a son who would really like to have that job." So he had real affirmative action working here. They dumped the guy that they offered the job to who was a minority who had gone to Harvard on scholarship and gotten the job on his own merit to hire the ambassador's son. The Gardners certainly weren't poor; he was a lawyer from Manhattan and a professor at...

*Q: Columbia.*

COLBERT: Columbia, and so we had affirmative action. The FS-1 came to Madrid and Gardner's son got the job in the White House. In fact the guy who came as a FS-1 DCM I'm told did a good job, I wasn't there.

*Q: Who is this?*

COLBERT: I don't want to say because I am not certain of the name, but I think the point is the person who got the job got the job because he had been working in the NSC and the National Security Adviser shoved him down the throat of the establishment. Interesting.

Pardon the diversion.

*Q: No, no, no but it gives the feel for the...how things happen. I won't say how they work but how they happen.*

COLBERT: Well when I arrived in Madrid I was in charge of supervising the two consulates, Bilbao and Barcelona and running the consulate in Madrid. The Olympics were going to be in

Barcelona and the new principal officer didn't want to be supervised by a consular officer; she wanted to be supervised by a substantive officer.

*Q: Who was that?*

COLBERT: A lady whose name will come to me in a while.

*Q: Ruth Davis was it?*

COLBERT: No, this was a person who followed Ruth Davis. She made somewhat of a fuss about it, but on the other hand this is the way it was and this was the way it was going to be. But then suddenly in the case of Barcelona with the Olympics everybody was telling her what to do, everybody was going to Barcelona for reasons related to the Olympics, security, military, agency, everybody was giving her instructions and I found that I had the responsibility but I didn't have the authority. So I went to the DCM and said, "You know this is really not a good situation here. I'm theoretically in charge, but I don't know what the hell is going on and it's clear that in some instances I'm not going to know what is going on." So he said, "Well what if I were to supervise?" I said, "Well, if you would like to supervise the two posts that was fine by me." I've been doing it for a year and you've been happy but if you want to take it over..." He said, "Well I will take it over." So in the end, I simply gave up responsibility for supervising her. I continued to be responsible for the consular aspects of the post but I gave up supervising the post. I don't know whether my successor liked that or not but I was comfortable with it.

Bilbao was subsequently closed. I think it is really funny because I'm not sure whether I proposed giving it up or the DCM proposed giving it up because there was a very difficult situation that occurred in Bilbao. Shortly after I had agreed to give up supervising the two posts overall, and at this point I'm not sure in my mind whether I proposed it or the DCM proposed it but something happened in Bilbao, which was quite difficult. It was a two-officer post and the more junior person, who was called me to complain about how he was being treated by his superior – "being hit on in a word" It was a very delicate matter so I went to the DCM and reported the situation to him. He said, "Well what are you going to do about it?" I said, "Ah, as you recall this is now your problem so he was stuck with a very difficult and potentially very embarrassing situation, one which I was glad was not mine to deal with.

To go back to the operation of the embassy there were really good people; there was really first class organization. If I can give an example, the Army attaché had minored in Spanish at West Point, had taught Spanish at West Point as a mid-level, probably a captain or fairly light major, then had done a detail, or sort of assignment at a Spanish military school at the lieutenant colonel level. He knew everybody in the Spanish military, everybody in the Spanish Army at least. The station chief told me once over a drink that nobody that he knew outside the theater, that is to say outside the operational zone, nobody in Europe had done more to assist us in terms of getting cooperation, getting things to happen during the first Gulf War than the Army attaché. It was because of his tremendous contacts with people who are now generals and very senior commanders in the Spanish army. The Spanish did not send troops to the Gulf but they had been heavily involved in Iraq in a way, which was important for us. I think he was able to get great

cooperation. As an example, the political counselor was very, very good at what he did, I mean everybody there was professional mind you, a very good embassy.

Unfortunately, there were clashes as there always are. The second admin counselor - the first admin counselor was very low key, very proficient, very experienced - the second one was very energetic, very direct perhaps and got things done but he broke lots of eggs to make his omelet. For reasons, which were never quite, clear to me a war broke out between the senior military attaché and the admin counselor. Both of them accused the other of all kinds of things. The inspector general of the State Department came to investigate in large measure the admin counselor because of accusations that he thought came from the senior military attaché. In the end they ended up screwing each other, I think the Air Force colonel would have made general had he not gotten involved in this ... I dropped the \_\_\_\_\_.

*Q: You were going to say a pissing contest.*

COLBERT: I was.

*Q: But we won't say it.*

COLBERT: We won't say it but in this context. It was ironic because they both liked and I think both respected me so they would periodically come into my office and vent about the other one, and I had to sort of just listen and nod and not take sides. I think both of them helped make a difficult situation worse. But I think part of it in large measure was the admin counselor when he decided to go a particular way he went. If 99 percent of the embassy didn't want to go that way and he thought it was the way to go he could make it happen and we would go that way. On the other hand he was very competent I will give him that. It was very unfortunate.

Both DCMs were very good..

In consular operations there really were not that many problems. We had the normal ACS type cases which we do everywhere within Europe and I had a very good team of people. We had several very difficult extradition cases, which went well.

*Q: Do you recall any of them? I mean what...?*

COLBERT: I do and one in particular comes to mind. A Cuban refugee from Castro had managed to get through Columbia or Yale medical school, one of these established medical schools and at some point established a practice in Florida that more and more dealt with Medicare and Medicaid patients. There's a rule that no more, or there was a rule at that time that no more than a certain percentage of your practice can be Medicare and Medicaid. He got an exception to the rule from either, I think from the Reagan or the Bush administration; he got the exception from however you get one. Then it came to pass that he embezzled or cheated the government out of perhaps \$200 million of overcharges and fraudulent claims. But he had gotten this exception, and then he fled to Venezuela and apparently there was not really a really strong effort to get him back. There was a warrant out for his arrest but he was in Venezuela.



When the administration changed or shortly before the administration changed and Clinton came in he had fled or proceeded to flee to Madrid where I inherited the headache. He took a Spanish wife. Under Spanish law if you have a Spanish wife it's virtually impossible to extradite a non-Spanish person from Spain. However, he brought his American wife along too, and he had her in one house and he had his so-called Spanish wife or Spanish wife in another house. So my job was to move this extradition forward. I think the role of a consular officer or the consular section in such instances is at most you are just sort of just a postman. You take the legal papers to the MFA over and bring the response back and forth. You might try to massage the system a bit but it either goes right through or it becomes political. If it becomes political then your role becomes very finite.

But in this case we did the paper work correctly and everything was moving along but it was taking a long time. This was now a new Department of Justice under new leadership, and they would like to have this "Republican" crook back, as it was a Democratic administration, not that these things were ever political. But they wanted this guy and so we were working the problem and I get a phone call saying from the Department of Justice that they would like to send over a Department of Justice person and an FBI agent to assist me. I said, "Well assist me how?" "Well, assist you in making this happen." I said, "Well, I don't even see any way you can assist me. I've sent the paperwork over, I figured I was going to check on it and make the right motions that it goes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Ministry of Justice to the judges to make the determination. I don't really see what we are supposed to do here." But I was told they were coming, so they came.

I had a wonderful FSN assisting me who was a lawyer who handled all the legal stuff. So she called over to the senior judge who did extraditions and said these two people are in town. So she got a call back; she knew them very well; I knew them as well. The judges had told her that provided that she and I would come along the judges would like to invite the two American visitors to lunch, very unusual. Normally, diplomats treat government officials to lunch; rarely do government officials treat you to lunch, very rare. But certainly we were honored and we accepted.

On the appointed day the four of us, in a government vehicle, were dropped off at a restaurant that I didn't even know existed. I thought I knew most of the restaurants in the area before. Of course, there are a lot of restaurants. Anyway we go into this lovely restaurant and there is a waiter there and he offers us all a glass of champagne, a very nice champagne, and introduces everybody including one of the judges who was a person I admired a great deal, he was in a wheelchair because ETA had tried to blow him up on a couple of occasions and one time they nearly succeeded.

So we are having the champagne with these judges and a couple of hangers-on in the main room. Then we proceeded into the dining room and we have taken over the whole restaurant. Also if you look down the street the street had been blocked off with soldiers with machine guns, not for our purposes but to keep the judges alive because every where they went they went with body guards and they were going to be in this restaurant for a period of time so we had the whole restaurant. So we sit down to this fabulous meal, it was soup and that sort of meal. Maybe after the second course, by that point or at least the second serving of a different wine, the FBI leaned

over at me and said, "What do you think this meal is costing?" I said, "I don't know." He said, "Well, would it be more than my per diem?" I said, "Well, it would probably be per person about what your per diem per room board and incidentals for two days and certainly for one day." He said, "Well, I can't stay, I can't afford it." I said, "You don't understand, they are paying." He said, "Well no, our regulations say that I can't eat a meal unless I pay for it." "Well this is overseas and you are under their auspices, their treat. Sometimes I treat them but not usually, not this luxuriously or which ever but certainly this is their treat, they invited you. You are their guest, they are having a feast." "I can't stay" he said. I replied "If you get up and leave then I would say the chances of getting the good doctor back on extradition has dropped substantially. You will have insulted these folks and our hosts only have to say no, there is no appeal, and the good doctor will stay here in Spain." He said, "You mean I have to stay here and enjoy myself?" I said, "Yes." So he stayed and I thought that was funny. Afterwards he said, "Do you have to do this often?" I said, "Occasionally."

I have never forgotten that he was going to walk out because he couldn't afford it under his per diem. In fact, we did get the good doctor back and I think the meal helped a bit. It is just a different world out there.

*Q: You were talking about American services. Can you think of... I mean just to get a feel because in Tijuana you had what the daily going to the jails and cleaning them out. What sort of things did you have?*

COLBERT: The problems we had there were mostly street crimes involving American tourists or American residents - dying, people getting sick. We had a horrible, horrible problem with people arriving at Madrid airport and picking up their rental car and then on the super highway coming into the city having a flat tire and a "good Samaritan" stopping to help them and robbing them instead. When I first arrived we had maybe ten of these a week, certainly ten of them a month. They were constant. We tried everything. We tried to get the rental car company to pass out a flyer, to post and pass out a flyer which warned people if they got a flat tire to just keep on driving and ruin the tire but don't stop. Go into a filling station or go to a hotel but don't stop on the highway because you are going to be robbed either by being conned and think you are getting help or the person will simply rob you period. When we went to the Spanish police about this problem we were told that these were Peruvians or these were Chileans. They were South Americans who they deport and they just come back again because they didn't need visas. But we really were getting nowhere and we were getting very frustrated because these people were either being ripped off and we felt sorry for them. Also it was a big workload problem for us. We felt that we should be able to solve this problem. So finally the occasion arrived, a person came in who had this happen to him. I asked the vice consul to bring this person into my office. I said, "Well certainly at the Hertz, Avis, National, whatever rental car company they did give you this flyer didn't they?" "No they didn't." I said, "Oh, well we had an understanding with them that they would do this and we are really sorry. It really would be wrong of me to suggest that you sue the company. So I won't suggest you sue them because if you were to sue them and I had suggested it that would really be a terrible thing. So please don't sue them." I said, "This vice consul here sitting behind me is my witness that I am not suggesting that you sue them. This is really a serious problem." The guy sued them despite my not recommending it.

We got an irate telephone call from the general manager of one of the big car rental companies saying that I had suggested that Americans sue them and that he was going to be doing something nasty to me. I said, "Well, I can tell you categorically I did not suggest that they sue. I did not suggest that and I have a witness to that affect." I said, "If you ask the person who is suing you if I suggested that they sue you, you know, he will tell you under oath that I didn't suggest that." But strangely enough after they were sued all of the staff at the rental counters started passing out the flyers, and I thought that was a good thing. The kicker was that I didn't suggest that they sue.

*Q: I have to add that it's not quite coming across on the transcription but the tone of voice, I think, saying that let's say there was a leading inference in...*

COLBERT: I have say for the record say that I did not suggest him to sue.

*Q: I understand completely. But tell me, this sounds like it had to have been an inside job.*

COLBERT: It was, we determined that there was a person watching the people getting the rental car contract and then another person with a cell phone spotter and it was a team. They (the thieves) observe, that the persons (or persons) is obviously coming from the United States or Canada and renting a car. When it is apparent which rental care the traveler(s) is getting, somebody would put a needle in a tire. Some people involved were even working in the car rental company.

*Q: That is what I imagined I mean because...*

COLBERT: It was a very, very big problem. I don't know whether the problem has resurrected or not but I was happy that we were able to do something to force the car rental companies to take an interest in it. Their position seemed to be well; it's not our problem. This happened off our property...but it was their problem.

*Q: Yeah, well it sounds, I mean if you are renting a car and you take the car off the rental car agency property the initial insertion of ice pick or something had to take place on the property.*

COLBERT: The rental companies were flaming mad, but that was something we dealt with. There were lots and lots of muggings, occasionally knifings. There was a problem unfortunately of the Spanish police harassing people of color, not in a sense that they were picking on African-Americans or Hispanic Americans of darker skin. They were really looking for Moroccans and Tunisians and others. So when we said we don't want you to single out our citizens, they would say we are not singling out your citizens, we are looking for people who don't belong here and who are here illegally. So we occasionally got some complaints about that. I never did find a satisfactory explanation. I did urge people to carry their passports or at least a copy of their passports with them so they could avoid something, which shouldn't have occurred but did occur.

*Q: Were there any problems involved with the Basque conflict for Americans?*

COLBERT: Well I think there is always the risk that if the Basque terrorists did something nasty you could find yourself inadvertently in the middle of it. The Basque for the most part would usually phone a warning before they blew something up or did something. They targeted police and military for the most part. This is not to say that I approve of that but the chance of an American being killed was definitely low. Bombs went off in and around us, and at least in a couple of occasions within the block or two of the American embassy which is right in the best section of Madrid.

*Q: How involved was Richard Gardner with the consular operations?*

COLBERT: In my recollection, not at all. I know that many, many consular section chiefs have had negative experiences with front office getting involved in visa decisions primarily. My recollection is - from 15 or so years back; it's been so many years now - that we did not. I can't think of a single time that he tried to influence a visa decision one way or the other.

But then while I was there I finished up something that my predecessor had started which was negotiating things inclusion in the visa waiver pilot program. So that Spaniards didn't need visas for a period of up to 90 days in the States, as tourists, certainly to get a company exchange L visas or H1 visas or H1B temporary worker visas. If they had the petition, they got the visa. Student visas were not a problem. So no, I think the only people that had problems getting visas would have been non-Spaniards particularly non-Spaniards from other than European countries and most European countries had the visa waiver anyway. So I didn't really see it as a problem.

I had two very good visa chiefs, oh...and interesting story which I can tell you. I had just come to work and my secretary said, "Senator from Georgia..." who had been there for a long time, Senator Nunn. "Senator Nunn was on the phone and wanted to talk to me." He knew my name, that's never good. I came on the phone and indeed it was the Senator. But he said, "Are you Larry Colbert?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Well I want you to know that the illegitimate daughter, the daughter of Fidel Castro, is in such a such hotel right now and I would like you to arrange for her immediate entry into the United States." I said, "Well Senator that would probably require humanitarian parole and with all due respect the immigration office, immigration service is right down the road from the Senate and I have to get their authority. Maybe you could call them?" I said, "I'm saying that respectfully but this is really an INS issue rather than a State Department issue." He said, "I don't like to work with those folks..." He was in the Senate and he was very powerful, he was at the time a senior member of the Senate, "I want you to make this happen.", he told me. I said, "Well, give me your name and number and I'll get right back to you."

Now I was reasonably competent I could work this out. But what I didn't know was whether the information was true; probably was true; but my next unfortunate decision was to go up and tell the DCM that this whatever her name was, not Castro, was in Madrid having what turned out, been smuggled out by exchanging her passport for that of a Spanish tourist. It was a rigged deal, the Spanish tourist looked like her, went in and Castro's daughter left with the Spanish tour group. So I go up and tell the DCM that unbeknownst to the Spanish government and unbeknownst to us until my phone call, we now have a unexpected guest! Anyway, is in town. Suddenly everything had to be handled on an Eyes Only situation. Don't tell anybody, we've got to talk on a secure telephone, we are going to do this, we are going to do that all by secure means.

Meanwhile I had promised the Senator I would call him back. I was told by the DCM I couldn't call the Senator back - it will all be handled in Washington. I was thinking this was not going to work this way. But this was not really a State issue. But anyway, so I'm told to go over to the hotel with the number two person in the political section who was a Cuban-American and see if this really was the lady in question. In fact, he even knew who she was and confirmed her identity right away.

While with the DCM, I neglected to tell my boss that I told my visa section chief, my unit chief, about this. Then we have to make an appointment to go talk to the head of American affairs at the M F A and tell him that this lady was in Madrid; we have to call on the secure phone to Washington, etc., etc., etc. Everybody is being mobilized in Washington; at this point the whole government is gearing up. I come back to my office after several hours of all this "burn before you read" type cables and telephone calls to find out that my subordinate on his own initiative - bless his heart - had simply called down to Rome, got the INS officer in the regional INS office on the phone, explained who the person was and recommended humanitarian parole and got the parole.

So the Department is still trying to decide what to do, whom to talk and I go back up to the DCM and I said, "Well, the Immigration Service has decided to grant humanitarian parole effective immediately and will draw them up a letter." He said, "We don't have any guidance." I said, "You don't need any guidance, the Immigration Service has decided to do this, our job is simply to provide the lady with a transportation letter." "Oh," he said, "Well, umm, I have to send an immediate classified cable back to the Department." I said, "OK, can I call the Senator?" "No." I was thinking this is not really going well at this particular point. Luckily I went down and the phone rang and it was the Senator saying you owed me a phone call. So I said, "Senator, we are going to have a sort of off-the-record telephone conversation right now." I said, "My instructions are to let the Department of State talk to you, not to phone you.. At some point in the next millennium they will be calling you." He said, "You're being sarcastic." I said, "Well, just a little. But off-the-record it's all arranged and it's been agreed to and she will be on this Delta flight into Atlanta tomorrow." He said, "Really?" I said, "Really." So he was there, there was a nice photo op.

In the end I convinced the DCM to let me send a vice consul along with her since she spoke no English, was well into the "free booze in her room, as well as the existence of Castro agents in Madrid and finally because we had paid her way. That was a nice propaganda tool and everybody was happy but it was a consular issue that was rather straightforward but became unduly complicated because of...

*Q: This so often happens. This is why most of us learn only if you want to delay advise the furthers up.*

COLBERT: I thought in the case of who she was we had to let the DCM know that she was in the country. But I did not expect that it would then become a federal case or unduly bureaucratic. But it was a success and I credit my sometimes overly energetic officer, I mean the same officer on another occasion came to me to say that we had gotten this message that there were people being smuggled into the United States through Madrid airport and that they were looking and

this had been on going for some time and they had been investigating it. He was very upset that the Department knew this, or if the Bureau of Consular Affairs Anti-Fraud Office knew about this why didn't they tell us. He was very agitated, because he was also the fraud officer. I was very calm about it when this happened but unfortunately for me Mary Ryan, the Assistant Secretary was coming to Madrid the next day, and I was involved in making her schedule and taking care of her. So I said, "Just handle it." He brought me a cable he was going to send back which was very intemperate. I was very busy, and I said to him, "Tone it down, just tell them why we think they are not handling this right and send it off." I never saw it again and he sent out one that was toned down but not enough so that the DCM called me up and said that he was very upset with the cable and that we can't talk that way to the Department of State and he was going to personally withdraw the cable or have it cancelled, or something. He was very upset with me. I said, "Well it is one I dropped and I had told my subordinate to tone it down and I thought he would. I was preoccupied with other matters, I didn't check." So he was unhappy but it went out. But actually it reappeared because it was the only negative thing in my EER that year saying that I let a cable go out that I shouldn't have. I thought well in the greater scheme of things that's OK. So the young man who saved my bacon in one case perhaps fried it a bit in another which always. It all worked out.

*Q: Well then did you, how did you find, what was your sort of I don't know impression of Spanish society? You'd been in other countries and then what was your impression of Spain?*

COLBERT: I think it was hard to make close Spanish friends I think. You have acquaintances, but I don't think we made many Spanish friends that were of the type that would invite me to their homes, a few but not very many. But they were gracious, kind; it was a pleasant three years. I was able to leave after three years. I thought the food was fresh but not spicy enough to my taste.. I thought the life style was very pleasant, I think that they knew how to live life. I think that the little cafes that sprung up and one could go get yourself a fino and olives and some other things to munch on around six o'clock or seven o'clock in the evening the stroll around. No, it was a nice place.

It's hard I think being in such a civilized place where everybody seemingly gets along very well to realize what it must have been like in the middle thirties when they were killing each other right and left – no pun intended.

**RICHARD OGDEN**  
**Political Counselor**  
**Madrid (1992-1995)**

*Richard Ogden was born in Norwalk, Connecticut, in 1939 and grew up in New Canaan. He attended Stanford where he majored in economics and went on to receive his masters from the Fletcher School in the spring of 1963. He entered the Foreign Service in 1964 and in 1966 he began service in Bogota, Colombia as part of the Economic Section. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to Thailand, Argentina, Peru, England, and Spain.*

OGDEN: In the summer of 1992, I went to work in our embassy in Madrid, Spain. I was there from 1992 to 1995. It was an interesting time to arrive in Spain because of the Olympics going on in Barcelona. We cooperated closely on a variety of security issues. Also at the time, there was the World's Fair in Seville and the celebration of the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus. It was sort of a big party to celebrate Spain's emergence from isolation to normalcy and influence.

The Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) had been in power for ten years. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was first elected in 1982. When I arrived, Gonzalez was serving his third term. During that time, Spain had joined NATO, joined the European Union, reformed the military and created a strong economy. There was a lot to celebrate and Spain's prospects looked very good.

*Q: What was your job?*

OGDEN: I started out as the Political Minister-Counselor under Ambassador Richard Capen. He left in spring 1993 to make way for the Clinton team and Ambassador Richard Gardner. I served as Deputy Chief of Mission for about nine months pending the arrival of Ambassador Gardner.

*Q: Wasn't Spain sort of out of your way?*

OGDEN: Not really, because I had a Spanish and Latin American background. Then, I'd switched to Europe so I was familiar with European issues. Also, Spain was a country in which I had always wanted to serve.

*Q: How did you find Spain during this time? What were your impressions of how it was beginning to fit into Europe?*

OGDEN: In general, I would say Spain was about as pro-European as possible. After years of isolation, Spain had joined the European Union in 1986. Europe was viewed as a touchstone of Spanish identity and a key to Spanish stability. Spain always promoted Mediterranean interests within Europe. It successfully lobbied for cohesion funds for the poorer countries. It generally favored "deepening" of the Union over "widening" to include Eastern Europe. And it always sought to ensure that Spain was considered one of the "core" countries of Europe.

*Q: Was there any concern from the Spanish perspective about, I remember by this time we'd had the reunification of Germany and the falling apart of the Soviet bloc?*

OGDEN: Of course there was a lot of interest. But Spanish concern at the time was focused more directly on the Mediterranean and North Africa. They viewed the biggest threat as coming from that region. Relations with Morocco were good, but there was concern about the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The state of near civil war in Algeria was very troubling to the Spanish. Usually, the Spanish were interested in regional approaches to North Africa and promoted the idea of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. More broadly, Spain had been quite pro-Arab. It was one of the last European nations to recognize Israel though relations with Israel were then close and normal.

*Q: What was the concern over Algeria at the time?*

OGDEN: Spain got a lot of energy from Algeria and as I recall had several major investments there. The government was concerned that the vicious Fundamentalist attacks in Algeria would spill over into Spain in the form of terrorism, or in other ways destabilize Spain. Spain frequently took the lead to seeking to promote better relations between the Algerian government and the Fundamentalists.

*Q: What about security issues more broadly?*

OGDEN: You recall that there was a referendum on Spanish participation in NATO in 1986. The Spanish voted “yes” to NATO, coupled with a reduction in the US military presence in Spain. Tough negotiations resulted in our virtual withdrawal from the Torrejon air base outside Madrid. That left the big naval base in Rota and the Moron air base in central Spain. The Spanish were very helpful in the Gulf war, and while I was there we never had a problem using the two remaining bases for emergencies.

*Q: Torrejon was shut down while you were there?*

OGDEN: Yes. We essentially withdrew from Torrejon while I was there. That was tough for some members of the American community. The commissary was closed and there were a lot of other changes involving housing and schools etc.

*Q: How did you deal with the Spanish government at this particular time? What kind of government was it?*

OGDEN: Felipe Gonzalez was the Prime Minister of Spain. When I arrived, he was in his third term. Elections in Spain were held in 1993. By that time, Spain was facing some serious economic problems and senior PSOE officials were being accused of corruption. Moreover, there was serious infighting between the hard liners led by Alfonso Guerra and the liberals led by Carlos Solchaga. In the end, Gonzalez won an unprecedented fourth term, though he had to form a minority government with support from the Catalan and Basque regional nationalist parties.

*Q: How were bilateral relations?*

OGDEN: They were very good and got better while I was there. But there was still a lot of popular mistrust of the United States in Spain. Some of the Socialists still blamed us for supporting Franco for too long. And most Spaniards still remember the Spanish-American war and the loss of Cuba with bitterness.

*Q: How did you operate in Spain? As political counselor and then as a DCM, where would one go?*

OGDEN: We had a lot of dealings with political leaders. We sometimes attended sessions of the Spanish parliament and invited Spanish politicians out to lunch. Of course, we had a broad range of contacts with the Spanish Foreign Office at all levels. We were following Spanish foreign



policy issues closely. Then, we had frequent contacts with the press and various think tanks. We also had some contact with cultural leaders and students. We traveled a lot and sought to meet provincial and local officials. Then we also had useful talks with business and financial leaders.

*Q: You were there when the Clinton Administration came in. Did Clinton have any contact. Was Spain on his agenda in 1993?*

OGDEN: Not so much. The Clinton team was focusing on domestic issues and the White House was pretty disorganized. I remember that King Juan Carlos had a good visit, but we had a lot of trouble getting the White House to focus on a date for a visit of Prime Minister Gonzalez. That was too bad because the Spanish were looking for a chance to improve relations with the U.S. Eventually, as I recall, Gonzalez did have a productive visit but it took time.

*Q: Who were your Ambassador's again?*

OGDEN: During the last of the Bush administration Dick Capen. Then during the Clinton administration Dick Gardner.

*Q: Well, Gardner had certainly been around. He was my ambassador in Italy and had been assistant secretary for international affairs. How did he operate in Spain?*

OGDEN: I think he did a terrific job. He was a real intellectual and so there was a lot of work for the embassy staff. He asked a lot of the embassy officers, but also gave them great support. Because of his background and knowledge, he did a lot of public speaking and attended a lot of conferences even outside of Spain. He was so well known that he gave greater prominence to Spain internationally and within the Clinton administration. I think the Spanish recognized this and gave him a lot of credit for it.

*Q: Just as Canada was always looking for recognition more in the United States than we were probably willing to accord it, I would imagine Spain had been so far out of things that part of your effort, as you said, would be to say Spain is really part of Europe. Most people look at Britain, Germany and France with a little to Italy and the other countries so far in between. Spain was just off the radar.*

OGDEN: Yes, we did have trouble initially getting Washington to focus on Spain. But I think gradually Washington began to appreciate Spain's growing importance. Spain's economic growth had been very strong, and there was even talk about Spain's joining the G-7. Spain was playing a leading role in Europe, and a big part in Bosnia. We were cooperating closely with Spain on Latin American issues. Our bases in Spain and the bilateral security relationship generally were very important. And we were cooperating closely on narcotics issues.

*Q: Were there any major issues that you were dealing with? You had the security issue.*

OGDEN: Well, the political section covered a lot of ground. We reported on domestic politics including the 1993 election, regional political issues and the labor scene. We had security issues including Spain's role in NATO, the bilateral relationship and Spain's important role in Bosnia.

There was Spanish foreign policy to follow including Spain's role in Europe, North Africa and growing cooperation in Latin America. We reported on the Ibero-American summits and Spain's activities in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. We also were active in joint efforts to knock out narcotics trafficking.

*Q: What about Cuba? Was there much support for Castro?*

OGDEN: No, I don't believe there was much support for Castro. But the Spanish still feel deeply about Cuba, and there are a lot of bilateral ties still left. Like Canada, Spain felt engagement was the best path to promote reform in Cuba and ease the suffering of Cubans. There was a significant Cuban exile community living in Spain. The Spanish had significant amounts of investment in Cuba. I think there were a number of efforts to get Castro to come and retire in Galicia, but he didn't seem very interested.

*Q: Were you watching the Spanish military, or by this time, figured that the military was not going to be a political factor?*

OGDEN: By this time, the Spanish military had ceased to be a political factor. But we were watching very closely the important Spanish role in Bosnia as a peacekeeping force. There were over 1,000 Spanish peacekeepers in Bosnia and the Spanish armed forces suffered several losses. The Spanish were justifiably very proud of their role in Bosnia. I remember the King visiting the Spanish contingent. This was a new task for the Spanish military; staying out of domestic politics, but participating actively in western defense and peacekeeping activities.

*Q: I take it that while you were there, there was a very positive feeling towards this country.*

OGDEN: Yes. Spain had transformed itself into a stable democracy and a close ally. In the next election, the Conservative Party (PP) won a large majority showing that Spain can peacefully transfer power. This was a big step because the PP had never won an election before. It was always successfully attacked as having too close links to Franco and the past. But a new generation of young PP leaders now has overcome that legacy. Spain's prospects are very good. Its biggest problems are ETA terrorism and managing regional issues and differences.

**DAVID N. GREENLEE**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Madrid (1992-1995)**

*Ambassador Greenlee was born and raised in New York and educated at Yale University. After service in the Peace Corps in Bolivia and the US Army in Vietnam, he joined the Foreign Service in 1974. In the course of his career the ambassador served in Peru, Bolivia (three tours), Israel, Spain and Chile, as well as in the Department of State, where he was involved in Haitian and Egyptian affairs, and at the Pentagon, where he was Political Advisor. Three of his foreign tours were as Deputy Chief of Mission. He served as United States Ambassador to*

*Paraguay and Bolivia. Ambassador Greenlee was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.*

*Q: In '92 you were off to where?*

GREENLEE: In '92 I went to Spain as deputy chief of mission.

*Q: And you were in Spain from when to when?*

GREENLEE: I was in Spain from June or so of 1992 until about June of 1995.

*Q: How did that job come about?*

GREENLEE: At one point it looked like I might get on the list for an ambassadorship, but I didn't, and frankly I didn't lobby for or express any interest in an ambassadorship. I didn't know how to go about it.

I think today the Department asks you what you're interested in, but not in my time. Basically, you'd have to rely on word of mouth or an ambassador or senior person in the Department pushing you. I just laid back. One of the things that I looked at was deputy chief of mission in Madrid. It was on the bid list. I thought, "I've been a DCM twice and I'm tired of being DCM, but I don't want to go back to Washington and I would like to go to Spain." I loved Spain when I studied there and I thought my family would love it. So I bid high for Spain, but didn't think I would get it. It was a plum European assignment, and under the control of the European bureau, where I wasn't connected.

Then I got a call from Ed Casey. He was the DCM there. I knew Ed because he had been economic minister in Cairo when I was the deputy in the office of Egyptian affairs. He said, "Are you really interested in this?" I said, "Am I competitive?" I was an OC (counselor level) at that point, I think—not an MC (minister counselor)—and it was a senior MC slot. Ed said, "The bureau is going to let us in Madrid control this. Yes, you're competitive, but there are 27 people on the list." I said, "I'm very interested."

The ambassador to Spain was Joseph Zappala, a political appointee. He had had been a fundraiser for George H. W. Bush. Zappala wanted to have a real competition and he looked at a lot of people. Or so I was told. With Ed's help, I was the one selected. Tony Gillespie also weighed in strongly. But then it got to be about April or so, and Tony had left several months before that. Curt Kamman was ambassador, a good guy. Well, I got a call from Zappala, who said, "Look, David, I want to tell you something. I'm going to be going back to the States, and will be replaced, so the selection process will have to be re-opened."

*Q: This was right before the election.*

GREENLEE: That was it. Zappala was going to go back and raise funds for Bush's reelection campaign. He had selected me to be his DCM although I had never met him. But he said, "Don't worry, I'll put in the good word with my replacement when he's announced." I frankly thought

the assignment would fall through. The new person was Richard Capen, who had been the publisher of the Miami Herald. When he was announced, I got in touch with him and said, "I just want to tell you that you have no obligation to me. I'd like to be DCM in Madrid, but I'm not going to press. Look at the field and do what you want." And he did. He looked at the field, and he came back to me. That was that. I went to Dick Capen's swearing in, met him there, and then went to Madrid just after he got there.

*Q: When was this?*

GREENLEE: This was in early July of 1992.

*Q: Were you looking at the election thinking, "I could have another ambassador in a few months?"*

GREENLEE: The feeling then was that probably Bush would win. He had won the first Gulf War. This was before Clinton began to hit home on the economy, which was still in a downturn. Certainly the expectation of the new ambassador was that Bush would win. But, yes, I was very aware that there could be a reshuffle of ambassadors, and that's what happened.

*Q: Back to the usual question: What was the status of Spain at the time and our relations with it?*

GREENLEE: We had a good and developing relationship with Spain. It was the Felipe Gonzalez government, a socialist government but a very practical one. Spain wanted to develop as a modern European nation. It wanted to be a responsible and reliable player in NATO. There were or had been bilateral military bases that were not NATO-linked. One was in Zaragoza, one was in Torrejon near Madrid—air force bases—and a third, a naval base on an installation shared with the Spaniards, was at Rota, in the south.

The bases had become issues of contention between the U.S. and Spain well before I arrived. The U.S., I think, had wanted to keep the air force bases going, but we had already left Zaragoza and were in the process of pulling out of Torrejon. There was a nasty fallout from Zaragoza. Some of the facilities were damaged or left in disrepair, and the Spaniards were quite angry. Torrejon was handled better.

When I arrived in Spain there was still a pretty large military group. It had been big because of Torrejon, but remained fairly large to handle our withdrawal from there. There was still a PX and commissary, but they were quite small. We had access to the commissary. Within several months, it disappeared.

What was left, then, was the naval base at Rota. But that was not a source of friction. It was OK. There was not a problem with that. I think the Spaniards didn't want our military close to Madrid, but had less of a problem with Rota, far to the south. Also, the Spanish navy depended on our sharing the cost of that base.

*Q: Did we find at that time Spain looking more toward the European Union and in a way becoming more European?*

GREENLEE: Spain was clearly understanding that its best prospects for development lay with the European Union. By the time I got there, Spain was starting to reap impressive benefits from that. An awful lot of capital improvement had happened in the country—highways, rail-links, modernized airports.

There were two things I saw right off that were really eye-popping. One was the Olympics in Barcelona. I had the chance to go to a couple of events and to be involved as a U.S. diplomatic representative. The other was the Universal Fair—the World Fair—in Seville. These were e were huge, transforming undertakings. They heralded the new Spain.

When I was a student in Spain in 1963-'64, there was still a sense that Europe stopped at the Pyrenees-- something Napoleon reputedly said because he couldn't consolidate his is control on the Spanish side. The Spain I experience as a student was catholic and a dictatorship. It was the Spain of Franco. But when I came back to Spain as the deputy chief of mission, after what was called the *destape*, Spain was modern and progressive and integrated into Europe. The U.S. was not a small factor, because we were in a sense Spain's hedge with Europe. The U.S. was a power to be cultivated.

*Q: How did you find your ambassador? He didn't have much time there.*

GREENLEE: He didn't. He was a very fine man. He knew very little about the foreign service, and he didn't know how our system functioned. He relied on me to help him understand our bureaucracy. He sort of floated over the embassy, but he had some strong ideas. He was a very religious man, a protestant. I don't know if he was "born-again," but he seemed in that mold. He had very particular ideas about projecting his faith as a part of American values. Religious faith was clearly a strong part of his life. For example, in the lunches and dinners he hosted, he would say a grace and have the Spaniards around the table hold hands with each other. This was something they weren't used to, and it seemed to make some uncomfortable. But I respected the man because he was projecting his view of how things ought to be. He relied on me to manage the internal issues of the embassy, and to keep us connected with Washington.

I think that there were some things here and there that we had to work on. He was a very ethical man, but wasn't used to the kind of scrutiny we have in government. But he listened when things were brought to his attention. He also wanted to help me in my career, but he didn't have a clue about how to do it. So I was on my own in that sense.

*Q: What were the living arrangements like?*

GREENLEE: We lived in what was called a *palacete*, a 19<sup>th</sup> century carriage house. It had four floors and an elevator and wonderful old furnishings. It had been owned in the '20s by the principal collector for William Randolph Hearst's San Simeon estate in California. He was an American architect named Byne and the residence was known as the Byne House. Byne encrusted and furnished this place with 16<sup>th</sup> Century and earlier pieces of marble, paintings and antiques.

He put cornices from the 11<sup>th</sup> century Moorish period on marble columns set into the walls. He put a medieval monastery roof over the dining room. There were two fireplaces, among the first in Europe, from the 17<sup>th</sup> century—one of them had inscribed in the stone mantle “1613,” in fact. There was a third century Roman fountain in another place.

This was a wonderful old museum of a house. It had been bought by the U.S. government in the 1940's and used as an information office, a kind of propaganda platform, during the Second World War. Spain was neutral and there were representatives of both sides in Madrid. The house functioned for a while after that as a library and finally was taken over as a deputy chief of missions' residence sometime in the '50s. It was well located, just half a block off Serrano, Madrid's “toniest” street. It was across from Gucci's and close to lots of specialty shops, cafes and restaurants. The street it fronted was Ramon de la Cruz.

We lived in that house, and every ambassador, it was said, coveted it. But it was surrounded by tall apartment buildings, so it wasn't secure enough for an ambassador. Still it was large, about 11,000 square feet, and a cultural landmark, really, in downtown Madrid. Why didn't the U.S. government sell it? It would have been cheaper to get rid of it than to keep it up. If a pipe burst, there were no plans, and the repair people had to figure out how to punch in and fix the problem without creating other problems. But the U.S. government kept it because it was national patrimony of Spain and couldn't be demolished for an apartment building, and few Spaniards could have afforded to buy it and maintain it as it was. It wasn't worth selling, and for cultural reasons it was certainly worth keeping. It was a wonderful place.

I think Dick Capen expected to stay a long time as ambassador. But in November George H. W. Bush lost to Bill Clinton. Capen saw the handwriting on the wall and wisely, rather than waiting to be told, he announced in December that he would leave by early February. When he left, I became Chargé for about eight months.

During the Capen period there was one issue that became exclusively mine. It involved the transfer and destruction of some sophisticated weaponry that had been in the process of being developed some years before in another country. It was a tricky three-way negotiation, which in the end was successful and contributed to the strengthening of Spain as a strategic partner.

I found the management of Embassy Madrid to be very complicated compared to of the management of the embassies in La Paz and Santiago. Maybe it was characteristic of European embassies, but there were a lot of people who were quite senior and at the end of their careers. They weren't going to put up with things they would have tolerated earlier in their careers. If they had an opinion, they'd give it unvarnished. If they had a bone to pick with another counselor, they'd pick it. This created quite a lot of friction, and a lot of it came to my door.

You would think that at a desirable post with a lot of bidders, you'd get the best people. The truth is the embassy staff was pretty uneven. Some were excellent, others not very competitive. There were hard chargers and dead-enders. We had both in abundance.

It was an embassy that was turbulent in the personnel sense. It was the same across the spectrum of agencies. For example, there was a big military group that was getting smaller because the air

force base at Torrejon was disappearing. These people's lives were being disrupted. There was a natural friction between the guy commanding the military group and the defense attaché. Each thought he should be the defense secretary's representative, and the Defense Department wouldn't sort it out.

There was another problem between the defense attaché and the administrative counselor. The administrative counselor was effective but abrasive. He cut into what the defense attaché considered his prerogatives. The administrative counselor upset others in the embassy by unilaterally reorganizing the parking lot. This was within his responsibilities, in one sense, but he did it in a way almost calculated to raise temperatures. I liked this guy but ultimately he was bad for the embassy. After he left post, he tried to sue the defense attaché for comments in the defense channel that he thought affected his onward assignment.

*Q: I have to say that when one really gets right down to it, one of the most critical things in, I suppose, most business, parking ranks right up at the top. When I was at the senior seminar, I went around and did a study of foreign consulates in the United States, and parking at the airport was by far the major problem.*

GREENLEE: I agree. Parking is a really big deal. Staying on the administrative side, it ended up costing a lot of my time. It was something that occupied my time initially during the period when I was chargé, but it projected through when the new ambassador, Richard Gardner, arrived. The administrative counselor had a more positive relationship with the ambassador's wife than with most of us in the embassy, and this contributed to the tension.

*Q: I wonder if you could talk for a minute about Mrs. Gardner. I know when I was consul general in Naples, Richard Gardner was the ambassador up there in Rome. I didn't have much to do with him. People's eyes were shifty when they would talk about Mrs. Gardner. Without getting overly... Not trying to tell tales, but from your perspective, what were the problems?*

GREENLEE: I'm married to a strong-willed woman myself. It's not that that its a problem, it's a question of relationships. Richard Gardner is a very smart man, a person who was qualified for his job.

*Q: He has written a lot, a professor, also he was a senior State Department officer at one point. .*

GREENLEE: He had been on in the international organizations area during the Kennedy administration and was later ambassador to Italy. He certainly had a background that qualified him in every respect for being an ambassador. His wife's a very smart lady and very much interested in the arts. She was on the board of the Guggenheim Museum and brought very good, very challenging artwork to the residence in Madrid. She wanted everything the embassy did publicly to be first-rate. I appreciated that. But not everyone in the embassy understood what she was trying to do. She became involved in things related to the internal workings of the embassy. The administrative consular worked well with her. Others kept their distance.

Another challenge was that Mrs. Gardner wanted to embassy wives to support her in a very particular way. My wife had her own circle of contacts, and she was content to let the other wives do that. So that was not a good relationship.

*Q: It gives a feel for it. There you are. Let's talk about the ambassador. Let's talk about Richard Gardner and what he was doing, and then we can move on to the various elements and your time in Spain as far as the government and issues.*

GREENLEE: Gardner, again, was very qualified. He's written a lot of op-ed pieces. He was a law professor and had written a seminal book the creation of the international monetary system after World War II. In fact, that book was re-issued in Spanish while we were in Spain, with a new introduction he wrote. It was quite a prodigious undertaking. When he was named ambassador, I was talking to the head of the Americas Division at the Foreign Ministry, with a guy named Rodriguez Spiteri. On granting agreement, he said, "This is good—all the right Harvards and Yales." Gardner had a great CV.

Gardner's style was deliberative, not spontaneous. He was a bit professorial, a bit stand-offish. Professionally, he was effective, I think, but he didn't have much to do with the workings of the embassy. In that he was probably like a lot of non-career ambassadors. I don't mean that as a criticism. Some career ambassadors are too much the other way, and get bogged down by their embassies. But Gardner had little time for his staff. He left most of that to me, and I guess I bear some responsibility for not creating a happier environment.

This was a time of severe budget cuts, and these affected all of us worldwide. We had won the Cold War, and the U.S. public was looking for the peace dividend. Clinton came in with an unspoken mandate, and then an articulated mission, to downsize government.

The State Department budget was shredded. But how do you downsize a big bureaucracy? One target was the system of bi-national centers and libraries that had served our missions so well during the Cold War. Why have books when, increasingly, the content of books was being put on-line?

Nobody at post felt too good about this. Certainly, Richard Gardner didn't feel good about it, and he was very opposed to dismantling the libraries and cultural centers. This is one place where cuts were being made. Another place was the embassy itself. We were told to consolidate positions and be prepared not to do "more with less," but, realistically, "less with less." With the communications revolution that was gathering force, there was less need for informational reporting. So we looked at ways to cut back our political and economic sections. In fact our solution—really my solution—was to combine those sections—a step that in later years was reversed.

Our consul general was Harry Jones. He was a published author. He had written a book called, I think, Shadows in a Weary Land, a novel about the Israeli-Arab conflict. I thought he would be an effective political-economic counselor. I put it to him and he was interested. Gardner agreed he had the intellectual background and heft for the job. So we pushed Harry for the new position of combined political-economic counselor. We also downgraded the consul general position, the



slot he vacated. Mary Ryan, the assistant secretary for consular affairs, for one, was not amused. In retrospect I am not sure we did the right thing, but we were told to think creatively, and we did. At least I did.

*Q: This was “reinventing government.”*

GREENLEE: That’s right, but the real driver was the budget. We didn’t have the money. We weren’t going to be able to sustain the kind of embassy we’d had.

*Q: Was there any residue of annoyance? Fourteen ninety-two, five hundred years later, it’s 1994. The United States is going through a politically correct period: Wasn’t it terrible what Columbus did to all the native Indians?*

GREENLEE: There wasn’t that. But there was some of that reaction from Latin America—but actually more of a reaction against us. We are seen there as the *imperio*, the “empire.” In Spain I didn’t detect anti-U.S. sentiment, or particular resentment against the U.S. for Spain’s loss in the 1898 War. Spain is a very self-confident country. It looks at the U.S. as a new country, like a strong but inexperienced adolescent.

I remember this guy at the foreign ministry in a rather condescending way saying, basically, that our mistakes in the world are understandable, because we are still learning to live with our power. It was sort of like moneyed rich talking about the new rich. We had to learn how to fit into systems that had been established by history and by years of experience.

The Spaniards were comfortable and respectful of things quite alien to us. The monarchy, for instance. King Juan Carlos was a unifying symbol. Great attention was paid to ceremonial things. The king’s father died when I was in Spain—he had been heir to the throne but Franco selected Juan Carlos over him when he cleared the way for the restoration of the monarchy. I went to the funeral at El Escorial. It was attended by Prince Charles and a lot of heirs to thrones of countries, like Greece or Romania that had become republics.

We would run into these people who were minor royalty, like counts, or in some cases dukes. We would see them socially. They would have an attitude toward themselves that was alien to me. It was fascinating in a way. My wife tells a story that reflected wonderfully on Richard Capen’s wife, Joan Capen. My wife said one time they were at a lunch and a count at their table was talking about his social environment. Finally, he said, “You Americans know nothing about royalty and hierarchy.” Joan Capen said, “We had a war and settled all that.” [laughter]

*Q: I hear people say that in France they’d get caught up in protocol with people with these titles. Were they Napoleonic or were they Bourbon types? Which took precedence? Some people get captivated by royalty and offshoots of royalty. Did this occur in Spain?*

GREENLEE: The dukes and the counts and so forth were invited to functions, but were not regarded as important politically. There was a clear understanding that these people didn’t count for anything. The exception, of course, was the king. He was crucial for Spain and its sense of itself as a unified nation.

The king was especially respected because he had intervened on behalf of democracy at a time when it came under threat—when a disgruntled Guardia civil officer and some followers laid siege to the parliament in 1981. It was a right-wing attempt. The king's position was crucial, and he pronounced for democracy. People remember that. He had real moral authority. His wife, Queen Sofia, was also greatly respected.

*Q: Let's compare and contrast. You had had your time in Latin America. You talked some about how the Spaniards were not defensive in their relations with us. How did you find them as far as the bureaucracy is concerned? Was there a difference from your Latin America experience?*

GREENLEE: Yes, in the sense that the Spaniards were very First World in the way they managed their bureaucracy. Their foreign ministry was very professional. I must say the Chilean system was good. The Bolivian system was not. The Spaniards were serious, very good. Having a relatively small bureaucracy, they could move fast when they needed to. If there was something delicate that needed immediate attention, you could get it done. They were very good at that, a little bit like Israelis.

*Q: Moving to a different field, what about the business world? One of the problems that one sees in Germany and very much so in France today is that you can never fire people once they are embedded in a job. The brightest and best have been leaving France and heading to Ireland or England or the U.S. to get in business. Did you see this in Spain?*

GREENLEE: Yes. As I recall, a business could hire someone without a contract for three years. At the end of that period the person had to be put on contract, with lots of benefits. So a lot of good people were let go just before that point. There was high unemployment. The benefits were very good for those who had jobs. I got to know a little bit more of this after I left, because our oldest son married a Spaniard. It's a very nice social welfare system if you can get into it, but it's something that over time, it seems to me, will have to become more flexible. It's sort of like France: When the truckers strike, the public turns out to support them—because they want to protect their benefits, too. But it's a drag on efficiency.

*Q: You were saying Spain was benefiting by being part of the European Union. During the time you were there, they had this system which would make major companies be leery about moving in. How did you see the business world?*

GREENLEE: There was an active U.S.-Spain chamber of commerce and there were a number of other business groups. We had a very good commercial counselor, Emilio Iodice, who was enthusiastic about opportunities for American business in Spain. I remember one time hearing him speak to an American group, business people living in Madrid. Emilio made his upbeat pitch and a guy stood up and said, "Emilio, I keep wondering if I came to the wrong room or maybe if we are living on different planets." So the views weren't uniform. But there was a lot of investment and the economy was getting stronger and stronger.

Spain had and continues to have the problem of Basque separatists, things blowing up. One time there was an attack on a van full of military people in Spain. Spanish military were killed. The

getaway car was a little Fiat. The Basque terrorists abandoned this car about a block from the embassy, and blew it up. This car went up about four stories. You could see it from the embassy, pieces of this car in the air. There was a real problem with Basque terrorism. In fact, one of the contacts we had, the head of their political-military system, was assassinated, blown up in a central part of Madrid.

Thinking about people I have known in different countries, at least a half a dozen were assassinated—in Bolivia, Chile, Egypt. Being a politician in some of these places can be very risky.

*Q: How about the parties? How did we see them?*

GREENLEE: There were parties on the right and parties on the left, but two main parties. One was the *partido popular*, the PP, roughly equivalent to our Republican party. The other was the socialist party, the PSOE, on the center-left, which identifies more with our Democratic party. But the reality is that if you were to superimpose these parties on our political spectrum, you would find that Spain's right-wing party, the PP, was probably a little to the left of our Democratic party.

When I was in Spain, Felipe Gonzalez was the prime minister, but he was reaching the end of his political dominance. He had been prime minister, or president of government, for about ten years.

*Q: He was the socialist party.*

GREENLEE: Yes, he was a very sensible socialist. He would speak of the need to expand the pie before trying to divide it. The opposition was headed by Jose Maria Aznar, who was elected several months after I left Spain.

It was the end of the period of Gonzalez. I attended a meeting once with Gonzalez, with Ambassador Capen. I also met with Aznar, at an arranged social gathering, when he was campaigning for election. Aznar wanted to assure the U.S. that, if elected, he would be a good ally. He lit up a nice Partagas cigar.

*Q: I take it we were comfortable with both parties, the basic parties.*

GREENLEE: There was no problem.

*Q: What about the Spanish unions? Was there anybody saying that they had too much clout, that they were a disadvantage to the country's good?*

GREENLEE: Sure. There was a realization that, for example, the subsidies for the agricultural workers in the south, when they weren't employed in the off-season, were too costly. The wealthier parts of Spain paid for the inefficiencies of the poorer parts. That's the way the system worked, and has worked for years. And there were political considerations. The deal with the Basque people was different from the deal with the Catalans. And Andalusia was different from both. The Basques had their own police and could collect their own taxes. They had rights

deriving from the old *fueros*. The Catalans had a different kind of autonomy. Spain is a mix of different nations, really. Anybody in political office, a prime minister, had to think about how to balance the equities.

*Q: How did we view Catalonia? They have their own language....*

GREENLEE: My first experience in Spain was in Catalonia. This was the summer before I began studying in Madrid, the summer of 1963. I found work at a day camp on the outskirts of Barcelona. It was the Franco period and Catalan, the language, was not permitted in public discourse. But everyone I met spoke it. It was the ethnic language, the language of the Catalan nation. Today, Catalan is the official language of Catalonia, on the signs and the menus. Spanish is for tourists, and the other Spaniards.

When I went back to Spain, passing through as a tourist nearly 20 years later, I was astonished at the changes. I couldn't recognize some of the city names. For example, Lérida had become Lleida. Barcelona was spelled differently.

There was a comment that a Spaniard married to a Catalan woman made to me once. During the Franco era, her mother was talking on the phone in Catalan with someone in Madrid. The operator came on the line and, interrupting, said, "*Hable en Cristiano*." That is, "Speak Spanish (Christian), not Catalan." I lived in Spain during that period as a student. But everything had changed by the time I came back.

After Franco, Spain went wild. This was the *destape*, literally, the "uncapping." All of sudden, there was nudity in films, whores and transvestites openly soliciting in the streets--a huge change in public acceptance of other forms of being, of personal expression. In fact, one of the interesting statistics was that Spanish women had become the most promiscuous in Europe. That was not the case when I was a student in the '60s.

*Q: We had a consul general in Barcelona.*

GREENLEE: Carol Lee Heilman was the consul general. I didn't see her that much. Once every several months I would see her. She came to Madrid at times. The things that I did in Barcelona were really cultural or symbolic. They had an effective regional leader named Jorge Pujol. When I was chargé, Pujol invited the diplomatic corps to Barcelona for a kind of cultural visit, an exposure to Catalan art and music. It was fantastic. We had dinner to chamber music under orange trees in the patio of the Generalitat, the governor's palace. A balmy, wonderful evening, with this world-class politician as host and raconteur. Pujol was a class act.

*Q: How about the Basques?*

GREENLEE: There were Basques who were culturally committed to being Basque and reviving and expanding their language. But they were also committed to being part of Spain. Then there were the separatists, and among them the small minority who were from ETA and were violent. I think less than 15 percent of the Basques wanted independence from Spain. With ETA, which

worked also out of southern France, there were incidents, of course, and that was part of the political landscape.

I didn't get to the Basque country very much. I went to our small consulate a couple of times and attended a few events, such as a factory opening. I saw the site of the Guggenheim museum, in a depressed, industrial part of Bilbao, before construction started. There was a lot of excitement about the Frank Gehry design and the tourism it would bring.

*Q: During the Franco period, we never really crossed Spain off the list, at least to the extent that the major countries in Europe did. And now Spain is very much part of Europe. Correct me if I'm wrong. Maybe that's not true. It's as if there are two magnets. One would be the European Union in Brussels and the other the United States. Were we on the shorter end?*

GREENLEE: I think I mentioned this before. The Spaniards wanted to have a positive, constructive relationship with the U.S. and saw the relative weight of the U.S. in world affairs for what it was. After the fall of the Berlin wall, people were talking about the U.S. as the hyper power. Spaniards knew that. They saw that. They wanted to be players with us in many things, but they also were part of Europe, and the European Union. They were playing this dual track.

I'll give you an example of one of the issues I confronted as chargé. There was the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, in 1991, almost a year before I arrived at the embassy. Spain played an important role as host.

*Q: It was right after the Gulf War, I believe.*

GREENLEE: Right. The Madrid conference jump-started a new peace-making effort. The process ultimately led to the Washington conference that Clinton hosted, the one that brought Rabin and Arafat together for their famous handshake. Well, the invitations went out for the Washington gathering, but Spain was not included. When the Spaniard realized they were not on the list, I got a frantic call. The message was, "How can it be that the British were invited and we were not. Don't you remember the Madrid conference? Where's our invitation?"

I got on the phone, and I talked to Beth Jones. She was the executive assistant for Warren Christopher. I said, "Beth, you've got to get Spain an invitation." She said, "I understand what you mean, but the White House is handling everything and it's really tight." We agreed that I should send a first-person cable, and she would put it in front of Christopher. I did the cable. I don't know if Christopher saw it, finally, but Spain got its invitation. It shouldn't have been that hard.

*Q: This sounds like White House management.*

GREENLEE: Exactly, but it also shows a rather cavalier sense of—and we get into this from time to time—of taking other countries' contributions for granted.

*Q: Was there anything going on with immigration from Africa or relations with Morocco and Algeria at that time?*

GREENLEE: There were the issues with the Polisario, a nomadic north African group with connections to Spain. The Spaniards were interested in seeing its dispute with Morocco resolved. I was not much involved in that but it was an item on our political agenda. There were also issues, human rights issues, with Equatorial Guinea, which had been a Spanish colony—and where large oil deposits were being discovered. The language of that little island country was Spanish, and we had an ambassador there. We later closed down that post—but re-opened it when the oil started to flow.

Morocco was the most important African country for Spain. Spain had two enclaves on the African coast surrounded by Morocco—Ceuta and Melilla. The Spaniards looked at them as a part of Spain. When the Spaniards would complain to us about the British in Gibraltar, what they didn't want to hear was, "What about your enclaves in North Africa?" Moroccan immigrants, legally and illegally, were also a factor. A lot of them passed through on their way to other parts of Europe.

*Q: Was terrorism an issue?*

GREENLEE: No, not then, in the sense of anti-U.S. terrorism. That came much later.

*Q: What about Cuba?*

GREENLEE: Cuba was and remains an area where the Spaniards disagreed with us on approach. They wanted to engage with Cuba, while we wanted the Castro regime isolated. That was part of our dialogue. The Spaniards thought our policy was counter-productive. They had a point. The Spaniards were sophisticated enough to know that our policy was driven by certain electoral and regional realities in the U.S. and that we had legislative as well as executive policy curbs on what we could do.

Cuba was always a very special place for the Spaniards. It was considered the "pearl" of their overseas holdings and also an island that had been stripped from them not by revolution, as in other parts of Latin America, but by war with the U.S.

*Q: I'm not sure exactly how it played in 1998, the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary. They have a different fix on it.*

GREENLEE: They certainly do. I never got into conversations with Spaniards when I was DCM about the Spanish-American war, but when I was a student in Spain I remember a Spaniard, with some heat, saying, "I've read every book about what happened in 1898, and the U.S. invasion was totally unjustified." It wasn't good grist for social conversation. That page for us has been turned. Maybe not so much for them. We have a similar overhang with the Mexicans.

*Q: I assume there was a Cuban ambassador there.*

GREENLEE: They had relations with Cuba. I'm trying to think if I ever saw the Cuban ambassador. I can't remember if I came across him. The diplomatic corps is quite large in Spain and I can't remember what the Cuban ambassador looked like.

*Q: I always think of the Spanish starting their dinners at 11:00 at night. The social life in general, how did you find that in Spain?*

GREENLEE: The way the Spaniards schedule their lives is certainly quite different from rest of Europe. I like it. The Spaniards don't get up early. They will have a light breakfast and go to work from 9:00 to 12:30. Then they'll break for a heavy lunch, a break from about 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. Then they'll work pretty hard until about 7:30. These were not the embassy hours, and we were out of synch sometimes when things needed attention.

From 7:30 pm until about 10:00 pm, a lot of Spaniards don't go home. They go to cafes and bars and eat *tapas* and drink *copas*. They're on the streets. After 10:00 pm they have a light supper and then maybe go out again. Movies, for example, start at 11:00 p.m. At 1 a.m., on weekdays, I suppose most Spaniards are in bed. Weekends are another story. Some are out almost all night.

The Economist had an article about how long Europeans sleep, and claimed the Spaniards averaged, factoring in siestas, about one hour less than everyone else. That might be something leftover from the old days. When Spaniards lived in dingy, cramped apartments, it was more congenial for them to meet and hang out in cafes. This was certainly true when I was a student. The life was in bars and cafes. Some people in those days got their mail at their favorite café. It was like their office. They would sit over coffee or a drink for hours. This was central to their lives.

The ritual of meals is important to Spaniards. Coffee, cognac, smoking—cigarettes during meals, between courses. Men would light up cigars in restaurants. The waiters had cigar cutters. Maybe that has changed now, with concern about passive smoking. But in the early and mid '90s, Spain remained wreathed in smoke. Smoke in the air, dog crap on the sidewalks. That was the Spain I knew.

The city of Madrid is absolutely wonderful. It's going all the time. In summer, on the grassy strips beside the great avenues, there are temporary cafes called *terrazas*. Some of them have music. At three in the morning, the streets are alive. There is more traffic on a Friday or Saturday at that hour than at 3 in the afternoon. It's wild.

*Q: How were your days?*

GREENLEE: On my workdays I would have a lunch that wasn't really leisurely. I could walk home for lunch or could have it in the cafeteria, or if I would go out if there were something official, a luncheon event. But at the embassy I was for the most part the inside person. I wasn't the ambassador. Even when I was chargé, I was a locked inside more than I wanted.

I would put in a regular hard workday, but around 6:30 or 7 pm, I would go home. There was a lively social life, and we often hosted fairly elaborate official functions—receptions, lunches and dinners. My wife, Clara, was famously good at that—in Madrid and at our other posts.

We had lots of official visitors, more than at my other posts--writers, poets, artists, intellectuals, as well as people from Washington. My old English professor from Yale, Harold Bloom, gave a lecture. Joyce Carol Oates, William Kennedy, E.L. Doctorow, the poet Gary Snyder—interesting people—came to Madrid as part of our public diplomacy program. I remember that Alan Ginsburg was offered to us, but Gardner didn't want any part of him. Then of course there were congressmen and senators. The acting head of the CIA had breakfast at my residence with his Spanish counterpart. The Spaniards closed off our street—to the astonishment of our Polish butler. It was a very rich cultural-intellectual life, political and diplomatic environment.

*Q: When you were there, were there any particular problems you had to deal with or incidents that maybe weren't mentioned before?*

GREENLEE: I had mentioned before that the internal workings in the embassy were complicated. I worked with three different administrative counselors, two of whom were easy to work with. One was complicated but competent. As I mentioned before, he got things done, but at a great price in terms of internal friction. I spent a lot of time trying to calm people down. With a political ambassador, I realized I was pretty much on my own in trying to broker my next assignment. Gardner in fact tried to be helpful. The problem was more that I didn't really want to press for anything I saw on the horizon.

I looked at the DCM post in London, but the person in that job decided to stay on there. I was in contact with the ambassador, Admiral William Crowe, and also, indirectly, with Pamela Harriman in Paris. That was through Gardner, who wrote a nice letter on my behalf. Harriman liked my credentials, but noted that I really didn't speak French. Then I had a shot at DCM Mexico, but that fell through, really to my relief. It frankly didn't make sense to do a fourth stint as DCM. One ambassadorship was dangled, but it would have been an unaccompanied tour. I didn't want it.

Then I got a real rush from a guy who was the political advisor to the army chief of staff. I'd been an army officer. He put the arm on me. He said, "You've got to do this. You've got to come over and replace me as political advisor for the next army chief of staff. I thought, "Well, the Pentagon. It might be an interesting world," but I also thought it would be career Siberia. How do you make your way back to State from the Pentagon?

*Q: Particularly since you really didn't have a firm foot in a regional bureau. You didn't really have a bureau.*

GREENLEE: Right. Then there was another possibility, to be the #2, the deputy over at ONDCP.

*Q: Good God! What does that mean?*



GREENLEE: That's the Office of Drug Policy Control. The head of it actually has cabinet rank. The job was open, but the guy at the top was leaving. So nothing became of it, and I went with the Pentagon option.

Summing up Madrid, there is not much more to say except that if you can arrange a European tour in your foreign service career, you ought to take it. But one tour, for me, was enough. The work can be more interesting elsewhere.

**GILBERT R. CALLAWAY**  
**Cultural Attaché, USIS**  
**Madrid (1995-1996)**

*Gilbert R. Callaway was born in Tennessee in 1938. He received a B.A. from Rice University, an M.A. from American University, and served in the U.S. Army from 1963 to 1965. His postings abroad included Caracas, Zagreb, Moscow, Bologna, Rome, Managua, and Madrid. He was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

CALLAWAY: In the summer of '95 I went off to Madrid as the cultural attaché.

Q: *You were there from when to when?*

CALLAWAY: I was there from '95 to '96, one year. Several things were happening. This was the year, as you will recall, that the government closed down. It was yet another year in which, as we had mentioned earlier, the resources and programs of USIA were being curtailed greatly. What we were doing was closing down cultural centers, closing down libraries, letting loyal and faithful Foreign Service national employees go. When the crisis of the government totally closing down around the end of '95/'96 happened, I was actually the acting public affairs counselor. My immediate boss was back on home leave in the States and I was suddenly dealing with all this stuff. I went home one day and said to my wife, "I am dismantling everything I have worked for years to build up. Before I become a bitter old man, I think I am going to retire."

USIA had been offered a transition course, what was called a career transition course at the State Department. They had informed us that because USIA was probably going out of existence, this would be one of the last times that we could opt for this program. There was a friend of mine that I had worked with in educational exchange programs, who was back in Washington and who had set up a private organization, and he said, "Why don't you come back and work with me?" I told my wife, "It looks like the stars are crossing." Reluctantly, from the point of view of Spain which we enjoyed tremendously, and the programs which we were cutting back, I decided now is the time to retire. It was 30 years and a few months. I announced reluctantly to my boss who told me, "You go tell the ambassador. I'm not going to tell him that you are leaving." I came back in the summer of '96 and retired from the Foreign Service and went to work with FEMA.

Q: *FEMA being what?*

CALLAWAY: The Federal Emergency Management Agency, which responds to disasters in the United States and has its own public affairs reserve corps which sets up press centers, interviews with journalists, and provides general information about how the United States government is responding to disasters. There is a big difference and yet some similarities to my Foreign Service career.

*End of reader*