

TURKEY

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William Parks	1948-1955	Marshall Plan, Washington, DC
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Lawrence J. Hall	1950-1953	Assistant Information Officer, USIS, Istanbul
Alan W. Lukens	1951-1952 1953- 1954	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Ankara Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Istanbul
Virginia Edwards	1951-1954 1960-1962	Secretary, Marshall Plan, Ankara Secretary to USAID Mission Director, Ankara
William M. Rountree	1952-1953	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1952-1955	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris, France
Daniel Oliver Newberry	1952-1956	Economic/Commercial Officer, Istanbul
Lewis Hoffacker	1953-1955	Economic Officer, Istanbul
Sidney Sober	1953-1956	Economic Officer, Ankara
Franklin J. Crawford	1954-1956	Vice Consul, Izmir
William A. Helseth	1954-1956	Economic Officer, Izmir

Leonardo Neher	1954-1957	Consular Officer, Ankara
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1955-1958	Turkish Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Wilbur P. Chase	1955-1959	Political Officer, Ankara
Keith Earl Adamson	1956-1958	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Turkey
John C. Leary	1956-1958	Economic/Commercial Officer, Istanbul
Nelson C. Ledsky	1957-1959	INR Analyst for Greece, Turkey and Iran, Washington, DC
Victor Wolf, Jr.	1957-1959	Consul General, Istanbul
William A. Helseth	1957-1960	Political Officer, Ankara
Anthony D. Marshall	1958-1959	Vice Consul, CIA, Istanbul
Archer K. Blood	1958-1962	Cyprus Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Parker T. Hart	1958-1961	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
George Quincy Lumsden	1959-1961	Consular Officer, Izmir
John W. McDonald	1959-1963	U.S. Economic Coordinator, CENTO, Ankara
Beauveau B. Nalle	1959-1961 1961-1963	Consular Officer, Iskenderun Political/Military Advisor, Ankara
Stuart Van Dyke	1959-1964	Mission Director, USAID, Istanbul
William N. Dale	1960-1964	Counselor, Ankara
Robert S. Dillon	1960-1962 1962-1965	Economic Officer, Izmir Political Officer, Ankara
Charles W. McCaskill	1960-1964 1964-1967	Economic/Commercial Officer, Cyprus Cyprus Desk, Washington, DC
Carleton S. Coon, Jr.	1961-1963	Greek/Turkish/Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC

Raymond A. Hare	1961-1965	Ambassador, Turkey
Maurice E. Lee	1961-1963	Public Affairs Adviser, USIS, Ankara
Richard Podol	1961-1965	Public Administration Advisor, ICA
John R. Countryman	1963-1965	Rotation Officer, Istanbul
Charles A. Mast	1963-1965 1974-1977	Peace Corps, Kastamonu Economic Officer, Ankara
Howell S. Teeple	1963-1966	Public Affairs Officer, Adana
Barrington King	1964-1966	Greek Language Officer, Cyprus
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Lloyd Jonnes	1964-1967	Program Officer, USAID, Ankara
John H. Kelly	1964-1966 1966-1967	Vice Consul, Adana Economic Officer/Political-Military Officer, Ankara
G. Lewis Schmidt	1964-1967	Consul General, Izmir
Arnold Schifferdecker	1965-1966	Consular/Political Officer, Istanbul
George A. McFarland, Jr.	1965-1967	Political Officer, Istanbul
Nicholas G. Andrews	1965-1968	Political Officer, Ankara
Parker T. Hart	1965-1968	Ambassador, Turkey
Christopher Van Hollen	1965-1968	Political Counselor, Ankara
Robert A. Lincoln	1965-1970	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Ankara
Stuart W. Rockwell	1965-1970	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Morris Draper	1966-1968	Turkey Desk Officer, Washington, DC
James Alan Williams	1966-1968	Rotation officer/Staff Aide, Ankara
Christian A. Chapman	1966-1968	Deputy Assistant Secretary General of Political Section, North Atlantic Treaty

	1968-1971	Organization, France and Belgium Office of Political and Military Affairs, Washington, DC
Norman W. Getsinger	1966-1971	Commercial Officer, Ankara
Stanley J. Donovan	1967-1969	U.S. Representative, CENTO, Ankara
Arma Jane Karaer	1967-1969	Consular Officer, Istanbul
Thomas D. Boyatt	1967-1970	Director, Cypriot Affairs, Cyprus
William C. Burdett	1967-1970	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Leon Picon	1968	Cultural Attaché, USIS, Ankara
Seymour I. Nadler	1968-1969	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Ankara
Bruce H. Millen	1968-1970	Executive Assistant to Secretary General, CENTO, Labor Attaché, Izmir
Myles Greene	1968-1971	Political Officer, Izmir
William R. Crawford, Jr.	1968-1972	Deputy Chief of Mission, Cyprus
Kenton W. Keith	1968-1972	Cultural Attaché, USIA Istanbul
Dorothy A. Eardley	1968-1973	Secretary to the Ambassador, Ankara
William E. Rau	1968-1971 1971-1973	Political Officer, Izmir Consul General, Istanbul
Robert F. Ellsworth	1969-1971	U.S. Permanent Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels
Daniel Oliver Newberry	1969-1971	Consul, Adana
Larry Colbert	1970-1973	Political Officer, Ankara
Robert S. Dillon	1970-1971 1971-1974	Economic/Commercial Officer, Istanbul Director, Office of Turkish Affairs, Washington, DC
Morris Draper	1970-1974	Political Officer, Ankara

James W. Spain	1970-1972 1972-1974	Principal Officer, Istanbul Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Richard W. Boehm	1971-1974	Political/Military Counselor, Ankara
Donald C. Bergus	1972-1977	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Alan Flanigan	1973-1975	Deputy Principal Officer, Izmir
Wells Stabler	1973-1975	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
William B. Macomber, Jr.	1973-1977	Ambassador, Turkey
George A. McFarland, Jr.	1973-1977	Political Counselor, Ankara
Myles Greene	1974-1975	Political Counselor, Ankara
Frederick Z. Brown	1974-1976	Deputy Chief of Mission, Nicosia, Cyprus
Paul F. Gardner	1974-1976	Counselor, Mutual Security Affairs, Turkey
Mike Metrisko	1974-1976	Political Officer/Staff aide, Ankara
Jack B. Kubisch	1974-1977	Ambassador, Greece
L. Bruce Laingen	1974-1977	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Nelson C. Ledsky	1974-1977	Deputy Director, Office of Southern Europe, Washington, DC
William R. Crawford, Jr.	1974-1978	Ambassador, Cyprus
Herman Rebhan	1974-1989	General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation, Washington, DC
Alan Flanigan	1975-1978	Political Officer, Ankara
S. Douglas Martin	1976-1978	Deputy Secretary General, Economic Affairs, CENTO, Ankara
Alphonse F. La Porta	1976-1978	Political-Military Officer, Ankara

Ronald D. Godard	1976-1979	Political Officer, Istanbul
Raymond C. Ewing	1976	Deputy Director, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
	1977-1979	Director, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
	1980-1981	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
	1981-1984	Ambassador, Cyprus
George S. Vest	1977-1978	Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Patrick E. Nieburg	1977-1978	Public Affairs Officer, Istanbul
Robert S. Dillon	1977-1980	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Ronald I. Spiers	1977-1980	Ambassador, Turkey
Alan Flanigan	1978-1980	Turkish Desk Officer, Washington, D.C.
Dennis Kux	1978-1980	Political Counselor, Ankara
Galen L. Stone	1978-1981	Ambassador, Cyprus
Beauveau B. Nalle	1979-1982	Consul General, Izmir
G. Clay Nettles	1979-1982	Economic Counselor, Ankara
James Alan Williams	1979-1982	Turkey Desk Officer, Washington, DC
James W. Spain	1980-1981	Ambassador, Turkey
Michael W. Cotter	1980-1982	Political/Military Officer, Ankara
Richard W. Boehm	1980-1983	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Lucian Heichler	1980-1983	Politico-Military Affairs, Ankara
Arma Jane Karaer	1980-1983	Commercial Officer, Ankara
Arnold Schifferdecker	1980-1983	Political Officer, Ankara
Alfred Joseph White	1980-1984	Financial Officer, Economic Section, Ankara

Christian A. Chapman	1982-1983	Special Assistant on Cyprus, Washington, DC
David M. Evans	1982-1986	Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces in Europe, London
Frank Perez	1983-1984	Deputy Chief of Mission, Ankara
Arthur A. Bardos	1983-1986	Public Affairs Counselor, USIS, Ankara
William E. Rau	1985-1988	Consul General, Istanbul
G. Clay Nettles	1985-1990	Economic Counselor, Ankara
W. Garth Thorburn	1987-1990	Agricultural Attaché, Ankara
Nelson C. Ledsky	1989-1991	Cyprus Coordinator, Washington, DC
Morton I. Abramowitz	1989-1991	Ambassador, Turkey
Mildred A. Patterson	1989-1992	General Services Officer
Katherine Schwering	1991-1992	Economic Officer, Ankara
Richard C. Barkley	1991-1994	Ambassador, Turkey
G. Jonathan Greenwald	1993-????	Chief Political Officer, US Mission to the European Community, Brussels
C. David Esch	1993-1996	Chief of Party, Academy for Educational Development, Moscow, Russia
Richard McKee	1994-1997	Political Counselor, Ankara
Mildred A. Patterson	1995-1997	Wife of Ambassador, Ankara
Alphonse F. La Porta	2000-2003	Political Advisor to Commander of NATO Forces in Southern Region

RAYMOND A. HARE
Consular Officer
Istanbul (1928-1929)

Ambassador Raymond A. Hare was born in 1901 and raised in Maine. In addition to being a consular officer in Turkey he served in Iran, the United Kingdom, and Washington, DC, and held ambassadorships in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. Ambassador Hare was interviewed by Dayton Mak in the summer of 1987.

HARE: In my senior year at Grinnell I was asked by the Dean if I would assist him in his freshman introductory course in which the head of the departments or professors would give a lecture or two so as to give the freshmen an idea of what the professors and their courses were like. One day the dean called me in to say that the Near East Colleges Association, which included Robert College in Istanbul, had written to say they had several openings in their teaching staff at Istanbul and did he know of anyone whom he might suggest. He asked if I were interested. Here was the chance I had been waiting for. My association with Professor Paine had sparked an interest in foreign affairs, and I had been thinking of foreign journalism as a possible career. This seemed to fit with what I had in mind and I jumped at the opportunity.

So I went to Robert College as what they then called a tutor, with a small but adequate stipend. This was a very rewarding experience, perhaps more so than I realized at the time. It gave me the rare opportunity to associate with a variety of young men from that part of the world -- from Bulgaria, Romania, Albania as well as a few from Turkey. There were also refugees -- Russian Jews, some local Greeks, Armenians, etc. In thinking back on those years I wish that I could have been a more experienced teacher, better able to impart to the students what knowledge I could have given them. It is tempting to wish that I could still try a stint of teaching. I think that it would be interesting.

It was at Istanbul that I sowed a rather late blooming seed -- an interest in Islamic architecture. On weekends we used to wander about old Istanbul with its marvelous monuments. I became very interested in those magnificent remains and in their history and, without realizing it acquired an interest in Islamic architecture and buildings per se. Since then I have done a lot of work in pursuit of this hobby and have in fact, given the Smithsonian Institution about 2,000 slides I had taken over the years. Perhaps this interest of mine may have had something to do with one of my son's having chosen to be an architect.

In my last year at Robert College the Secretary of the American Chamber of Commerce resigned and I was offered the job. We were a small organization with only three other employees, all Jews descended from Jews who had been driven out of Spain centuries ago. We issued a little monthly publication and generally tried to help American firms trying to maintain trade relations in the Middle East.

My work at the Chamber brought me in contact with the American Consulate, which proved to be the contact which launched me into my career in the Foreign Service. First, an opening occurred in the commercial section of the consulate, and I was hired, with the condition that I would be permitted to take the examination for the Foreign Service. I studied hard for the exam and finally took it under the punctilious supervision of Consul Allen, who was apparently acting in that capacity for the first time and wanted to make sure that his performance was above approach. I think he was more nervous about the whole thing than I was. In any event I passed

the written exam and returned to Washington where I passed the oral exam at the State Department.

I was duly appointed Foreign Service Officer and, sent back to Istanbul, where I did much the same work as I had done before. My chief duties were in the consular visa section. However, rather than facilitate the immigration of aliens into the United States, we were in a period in which the policy was to discourage immigration. This was not a very congenial task. I also had duties in the shipping section of the consulate, which put me in touch with the American ship captains, who would come in with their ship's papers. They were mostly big, rough old fellows who seemed to delight in calling me "sonny," I being apparently "a callow youth." There I hit the idea of growing a moustache to make me look older. I still have the moustache.

As I recall, one of the main American products with which we dealt at the consulate was petroleum exports to the United States for refining. In those days the United States was a seller of oil products to the Middle East, not buying or extracting it as is the case today. Turkish tobacco, having a special aromatic quality and fineness of texture was particularly desired in the US, and several major American companies maintained permanent offices. Sausage casings were another export.

It was during my stay in Istanbul that the famous Turkish figure Ataturk emerged as the strong man of Turkey. Ataturk was a very dynamic and yet a rather imaginative figure in many ways. He was a hard, tough man, yet he was very imaginative. Though he had been a distinguished and successful military officer, his main interest was not military but political. Upon gaining power he quickly had a natural following of very fine people, very high class Turks both military and civilian. His idea of course, was to westernize Turkey and so rejuvenate it. He quickly outlawed the veil for women, discarded the traditional tarboosh and ordered the substitution of western script, with slight alterations, for the old Arabic script. None of this came about easily, and to my knowledge many of the older Turkish officials continued to surreptitiously use the old script. Interestingly enough, one of the Ataturk's stronger supporters, Inonu, an aristocratic, finely tuned gentleman, laboriously took notes in my presence in the new script, determined as he was to maintain the changes instituted by his leader.

The revolution of Ataturk was not just a struggle for power. It was really a revolution for change, and the revolution became the instrument of that change. One asks "What about Ataturk? How was he regarded?" At the time I was there he was a rather awesome figure, regarded with a certain fear. His methods were often abrupt, even cruel, but, as time went on he became a sort of demi-god, particularly among the young people. I recall a youth celebration in later years and remember clearly a young girl declaiming the great achievement of Ataturk; she was literally foaming at the mouth in her excitement. It is still not easy to define the attachment that Ataturk holds over the Turks even now. The fact remains that he did indeed change the country and its orientation. After him Turkey was never the same.

From Istanbul I was sent to Paris to study languages at L'Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes.

One day someone from the office of Chester Bowles, the then Under Secretary of State, came into my office and asked what I would like to have as my next post. That was in the early days of

the Kennedy administration and there was a general movement in posts and that sort of thing. I hadn't thought much about it and I said, "Well, one post that would be interesting would be New Delhi." He practically turned white, and he said, "Chet wants that!" So in consequence I went to Turkey, and I am glad I did.

HERBERT DANIEL BREWSTER
Consular Officer
Ankara (1941-1944)

Herbert Daniel Brewster was born in Greece of American parents in 1917. His first posting in Greece was as a clerk at the embassy in Athens from 1940-1942. He then served as a Foreign Service officer in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, France, Germany, Italy, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brewster's career focused on Greek affairs. He was interviewed in 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

BREWSTER: We came through the Balkans and ended up in Istanbul, and then I moved to Ankara for fifteen months as a clerk. But they had opened a listening post in Istanbul to cover the Balkans now occupied by the Germans.

Q: There had not been a post in Istanbul before?

BREWSTER: Yes, the post was there; it was converted into a place where the United States had a Romanian desk officer following events from Romania, interviewing Romanian refugees. Lee Metcalfe was there, he did Yugoslavia; I did Greece when I came down with Homer and Margery Davis. He was the president of Athens College who also came to Turkey. So we had three persons on Greece and one each on the other countries. Greece was very heavy because we had to cover Smyrna, or Izmir, as the boats called "Caiques" were coming out that way and a lot of the leaders came through on their way to set up the Greek government in exile in Cairo.

Q: You were in Ankara then for eighteen months or more?

BREWSTER: Just fifteen months and then I moved back to Istanbul.

Q: You were then in Turkey for most of the war. What was the thrust of our policy in Turkey as you saw it during those years?

BREWSTER: Turkey was the big listening post for all. We had a tremendous number of newsmen because it was the country where the planes which struck Ploesti came down. Other US planes also landed in Turkey.

Q: This was an Allied raid on the Ploesti oil fields?

BREWSTER: Yes. Two or three planes got away and the crews came to our Fourth of July party. The Turks were letting them out; they handled neutrality by trying to make everybody happy and

were not very strict with it. We had US newspaper men galore; in fact on Pearl Harbor Day twenty-seven of us were out playing softball. Everybody was there; you had representatives on the British side. Von Papen there on the German side, you had one Yugoslav agent who was blown up carrying some bombs right on the main street. There was a lot of intrigue and action. But I was the pouch clerk and the only time I was called down by the Ambassador and his wife was when I forgot to pick the lobsters out of the bottom of the sack and lunch was just about to be served. They had arrived from Istanbul in the morning and I was busy picking out the documents and getting those arranged and didn't realize that there were 2 or 4 or 6 squirming lobsters in the pouch. Mrs. Steinhardt was something else; she called me down. It was a center of intrigue and the Turks were playing the neutral game. But a lot of negotiation had to be done, they didn't give up easily on letting someone be released. Robert Newbegin, Third Secretary was there, Robert Kelly was Counselor, and Joe Satterthwaite, First Secretary.

Q: At some point you moved from being a pouch clerk to being a Vice-Consul, didn't you?

BREWSTER: Yes, that was when I went to Istanbul on January 1, 1943.

Q: What were you doing there?

BREWSTER: I was one of three on this interrogation team for all the Greek visitors coming out. It was a political type job, interviewing the visitors. Homer Davis and Margery stayed in Istanbul and I did the shuttling down to Izmir where I spent a lot of time -- that's where the ships were coming in -- reporting on those events. It was the first political reporting job and that is where I got my Vice-Consul title.

Q: What was our particular interest in Greece at that time, 1943-1944?

BREWSTER: I think we saw the handwriting on the wall. We were getting ready to go into Greece, to fly in; we were setting up OSS teams in Naples and Italy. There were a lot of flights in. We were active with the guerrillas. I didn't know much about it at the time, but OSS was deeply involved with going in and helping the forces that were trying to fight the Germans and Italians.

Q: As the war came closer to Turkey and was more favorable to the Allied cause, did you notice a change in the Turks as far as how we worked in that area?

BREWSTER: Yes, I think so. They are very shrewd people and I think they could tell how this was going to come out. I think we probably had much better responses to our requests for the release of someone or getting a plane in or being able to supply things for the people who were interned. I don't know how many fellows there were; maybe sixty or eighty came in and were interned.

Q: These were American fliers?

BREWSTER: These were American fliers who came in and the Turks took credit later -- I turned out to be Turkish desk officer from 1955-1958: They would say, "What do you mean we didn't

participate in the war? We did as much as those damn Greeks did."

Q: From your interrogation of the people coming out of Greece, did you get some feel for the sharp divisions that were developing in Greece between the right and left wings? And were we blowing warning whistles or taking sides, how were we dealing with it?

BREWSTER: The first two winters it was a question of getting Swedish ships to go in to feed them. We were taking care of the population. The numbers of the guerrillas, the mountain people, were not great. After the December 1944 events when our Embassy team was already back in Greece it was a little early to be taking sides. Later on, we did. General Van Fleet came and the big aim was -- let's get these Greek soldiers and officers out of the cities and out there fighting.

Q: But that came later.

BREWSTER: Yes, 1947. In this early stage I did not see any traces of that.

Q: One more thing before we leave Ankara, did you ever have a beautiful spy going after you? You always hear about Istanbul being the spy center. Did you have the feeling that this was a local spy center, with everyone exchanging information?

BREWSTER: Yes, they were great spy centers, though I wasn't involved in it. Although I guess I can say that I had three months of free rent when the agency wanted to have a place in Istanbul that they could use just three hours a week.

Q: Then it was the OSS wasn't it?

BREWSTER: Yes. This was when I first got there and they were glad to let me have it rent free provided I vacated it Wednesday from 1:00 to 4:00. So they were doing their work. There was a lot of milling around and I think it is like any big event. When you get thirty-five or forty American newsmen they create a lot of news. They could probably tell some of the best stories of whom they talked to, where Van Papen was sitting when this or that happened, and so on. We were stuck to our desks more.

JOSEPH A. MENDENHALL
Economic Officer
Istanbul (1946-1949)

Joseph A. Mendenhall was born in Maryland in 1920. He graduated from the University of Delaware in 1940 and from Harvard University in 1941. Mr. Mendenhall served in the U.S. Army from 1941 to 1946 and joined the Foreign Service in 1946. In addition to serving in Turkey, he served in Iceland, Switzerland, Vietnam, Laos, and Madagascar. Mr. Mendenhall was interviewed in February of 1991 by Horace Torbert.

Q: Do you want to describe what you found when you got to Istanbul?

MENDENHALL: I went over on the boat with another officer who had just entered and when we arrived in Istanbul we learned that the Ambassador in Ankara wanted to assign one of the two new arriving officers to the single political slot in the Consulate General in Istanbul. I already knew that political work was supposed to be the glamor part of the Foreign Service so I was eager for this assignment. But I lost out to him because his French was better than mine. I could read French perfectly on the basis of what I had done in college, but I didn't dare open my mouth anywhere. He had some experience during the war as a liaison officer with the French. The Ambassador to my disappointment, but I must say quite fairly, chose him over me for the political assignment.

So I went into the economic and commercial section. It was largely a commercial section. I had some economics in college, but I must say it had done very little in the way of preparing me for Foreign Service economic work. When I arrived there were two of us in the economic section. An old officer who had been in the commercial service of the Department of Commerce first and later been integrated into the Foreign Service, and myself. He left after several months. He was not at all a trainer. I learned very little under him, but after he left I had to sink or swim because I was the only officer in the section for a while.

I began to dig in after several months and did begin to learn my way around. I took over, for example, his monthly financial reports which were of significance because although the Embassy in Ankara did the financial reporting on the budget of the government, most of the other financial reporting was done for the country as a whole from Istanbul because it was the financial and commercial center of the country.

I really had to learn my way around in that field. I remember interviewing bankers every month to get my information for this report and I scarcely knew what questions to ask. But I guess I came through all right because I remained friends with these bankers and I began to get some commendations on my financial reports from Washington.

Then I began to do several other types of reporting in this field. One of which in particular I have always remembered. I prepared a special report, voluntary report as we used to call them at that time, on the foreign investment policies and procedures with respect to Turkey. Today that wouldn't sound very significant with all the private organizations as well as official organizations that prepare this sort of thing. But 45 years ago that kind of thing didn't exist. There was nothing at all in private or official literature on how to go about making foreign investment in Turkey. I prepared this report and was told later by an official here in the Department that report remained the standard one on foreign investment in Turkey for upwards of a decade. So I have always been rather proud of what I did on that. I remember I gathered all the information I could and wrote the report and then submitted it to the leading American businessman in Istanbul for review. He had very few comments to make. In fact he indicated that as far as businessmen were concerned it met their requirements.

The other thing that I did in the way of reporting of some significance in Istanbul was to prepare

special reports on the import and export systems of Turkey and also on barter trading which at that time in Turkey was called compensation trading. The Turks had learned a lot from the Germans during the previous decade. The Germans had been very significant in furthering barter and clearing trade as it is called. The U.S. had never been very much involved in that, but even today there is considerable barter trading between the West and Eastern Europe. Certainly there was before the East European countries got their freedom. I suspect with their foreign exchange shortages there still is. And that was the main reason for so much barter trading then. Nobody had much foreign exchange.

One of the things that I had to do as part of my financial reporting in Istanbul was to try to dig out of Turkey's central bank branch in Istanbul what the foreign exchange reserves of the country were, they were classified at that time, and how much might be made available for imports. At that time, the American businessman who came to Turkey, including such significant firms as General Motors, came in and his principal question was "Do you have any idea how much foreign exchange our distributors might be able to get in order to import from us." That was the day of the dollar shortage all over the world. Just the reverse of the situation today -- there is such a big dollar surplus everywhere. Interesting how history changes.

These, Tully were, I think, the more significant things that I did during my service in Istanbul.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

MENDENHALL: I had three Consuls General while I was there. The first was Robert Macatee, a very senior Foreign Service Officer, who left within three months after my arrival for assignment as Consul General in Jerusalem. Mr. Macatee was a rather meek and mild man, but I have always considered him a man of considerable courage because his predecessor as Consul General in Jerusalem had been blown up in the great bomb explosion in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Macatee was chosen as his successor.

He was succeeded by Clarence Macy. Macy was only an FSO-3 when he came there. He was close to retirement age. He was a man whose career was greatly handicapped by his wife. Macy was a soldier in World War I and met a French lady afterwards and married her. Macy was a man who always had to speak French with his wife. He was absolutely fluent in French but his accent was pure Missouri. His wife had handicapped his career because of a certain peculiarity in her personality. She was pleasant enough to subordinates but she was always nasty to superiors which is just the reverse of what often happened in the Foreign Service. Therefore, poor Macy hadn't gotten ahead nearly as far as I thought his ability warranted. He was a man who had as much common sense as any Foreign Service officer I ever encountered. But the poor fellow had to retire after 18 months in Istanbul at the age of 60 because he had reached the retirement age.

He was succeeded by a man by the name of John McDonald who had been our Consul General in Taipei. McDonald was a younger officer than Macy, who was thought to have considerable future in the Foreign Service, but for some reason he never went very far. I don't know what the story was there. My two and a half years in Istanbul were up within a few months after his arrival and I don't know what became of him afterwards.

C. ROBERT MOORE
Student
Istanbul (1947-1952)

Ambassador C. Robert Moore was born in 1929 and grew up in Galena, Illinois. In addition to serving in Turkey, Ambassador Moore served in Cambodia, Guinea, and other assignments in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. He was interviewed by Dayton Mak in May, 1988.

MOORE: I might speak first of Turkey, because that's where my experience has been most prolonged. Turkey, of course, has existed as country with a government for over 800 years. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it passed through a period where as the Ottoman Empire, it was known as the "Sick Man of Europe" and had to submit to various infringements of its sovereignty in order to survive, but it did survive. The revolutionary regime that took over in 1923, with the new boundaries of Turkey, as a much more heterogeneous state, became very sensitive about its independence and recognition of its independence, and very proud in the spirit which was fostered by Ataturk, very proud of Turkish nationality. Every Turk was very proud of being a Turk and encouraged to be proud to be a Turk. But with the result that sometimes slights which were not intended became quite serious.

I recall that Webster's Dictionary was ordered out of the Robert College library by the minister of education because it contained an offensive definition of a Turk. It seems that one of the definitions given, not certainly one of the favorite definitions, but a secondary definition, was "a licentious person." Some student saw this in the dictionary, reported it to the ministry, and the ministry ordered the dictionary to be removed.

Another time, a professor at Robert College took friends around to see the old walls that surrounded Constantinople, took a picture of his son and a Turkish boy with their arms around a donkey, and underneath it, he entitled it "three friends." A Turkish student at the college saw this picture in the album, reported it to the authorities, by then he was away on leave and was not allowed to return to Robert College. Finally, it was settled after many, many months of absence. Of course, speaking of a Turk in relation to a donkey is certainly a very offensive suggestion, but, of course, his meaning in showing "three friends" was entirely an innocent one and a friendly one.

But it does show how sensitive countries can be, which was a very good experience for me, because I appreciated at a very young age - I was then 16 or 17, with classmates of 20 different nationalities - that one had to be very careful not to tread on the particular nationalist sentiments of one's colleagues. I found this in very good stead in other parts of the world where I served. I think I came to realize, no matter where I was, that many of these countries are, in a sense, looking for any slight that suggests that you don't consider them your equal, or that you're looking down upon them.

BEN FRANKLIN DIXON
Greek Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1948-1951)

Ben Franklin Dixon was born in North Carolina in 1918. As a civil servant he was the officer for Greek Affairs in the Department of State. As a Foreign Service officer, Mr. Dixon served in Morocco, Thailand, Pakistan, and held various positions in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: How did we view Turkey? I mean, you were on the Greek desk and there's always the Cyprus issue. How did we view Turkey in those days?

DIXON: Well, Turkey didn't get involved in the Cyprus issue very much. It was the British versus us. And we had lots of hard sessions with the British, telling them to get off their ass and have some elections there and get some local government going on. They didn't have to rule the island, but have cities have their own mayors and do anything. The British picked out a labor leader they thought would attract attention, and he turned out to be a weak willy. Their efforts in trying to get their own party started there, these things were so good. We said: What difference does it make, you know, if you just give them some measure of self-government and let them do certain things? Which they were not. The British kept picking them up and interning them and this sort of thing. And we felt that they were being pretty stupid about it. And there's a long series of things in the, you know,...what are those things we put out every year about foreign affairs?

Q: Foreign relations series.

DIXON: ...of memos I wrote about these meetings, that I think give a pretty good insight to what we were trying to do there.

Q: You worked with George McGee quite a bit, didn't you? He at that time was the assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. What was your impression? How did he feel about the situation that you were dealing with? What was his style of operation and how effective was he within the department, would you say?

DIXON: George McGee is a very able guy. He has a new idea about every five minutes -- ninety percent of them no good, but ten percent of them pretty good. But he's got objectives in the back of his mind. You know, he parlayed himself into this position. He went to Oxford. He was a geologist and he wrote on a potential oil-bearing shale in Algeria. The French government, I think he saw that they got a copy of his paper on this. They sent him down to Algeria, and they brought in oil. And they gave George some money. George's idea was to make a million dollars by the time he was twenty-five. He came back, and he knew Will Clayton, he got himself a job in the State Department, and then he got this job as assistant secretary for NEA. But, in the meantime, he'd brought his money back from England, bought some property in Texas, and made I don't think a million but three million by the time he was twenty-four and half, or

something like this. And then he came in the State Department. He had a very agile mind and was quite capable, though he was very voluble, said too much, pushed too much on the ideas that were not really good. They had a lot of trouble talking him out of things. But I think the overall effect of his reign in NEA was very positive and very good. Well, I was very much impressed. There was this guy named, I think, Suderose, who was sent over by the rightists in Greece, who wanted to go ahead and set up a certain kind of government, which, in effect, obviously, they could control. And they felt that the reaction against the Andartes was such that the Greek population as a whole would have voted for this in their current mood. McGee perceived this right off, and he said, "Look, I realize that you feel you can get a friendly vote for this kind of government, which is a bit too strong, it seems to me, by taking the vote right away." But he said, "I'd like to see really a more measured time, when people would look at both sides of the question before we go into this." And I thought he showed great perception. He just said this, and McGee, in responding to it, that was his off-the-hat response. And I think it was very wise.

They did put off elections until things had calmed down some and they didn't have soldiers at everybody's village and that sort of thing. When that didn't go off, they wanted to put off elections for a good while. And finally they did hold elections. And Papagos, who was a general who had been nonpolitical, was elected. In Papagos, we got a government that was fairly moderate. They had effective people in the thing. The old cabinets had been primarily political alliances between the Venizélos and the Tsaldaris parties. Papandreou, who was a very able guy, had this...

Q: This was not...

DIXON: This was the father of the one now.

Q: Andreas is the son.

DIXON: Yes, Andreas's father was prime minister for a short period. And he was a pretty good, level-headed fellow. He was an eccentric. I'll never forget, when I went down to the Peloponnesus, we came past this village and he was making a speech. And I had been to see him. The embassy said, "We haven't had much time to pay attention, it would be nice if you went down and talked to him." So I did go in and talk to him. We got to this village, and he was making a speech in the village square. So I walked in to sort of see what the reaction was and so forth. He saw me there, and he was very pleased that I'd come to hear his speech. It was only accidental. But he gave me a book that he had written, which he signed. He lived about a block and a half from the embassy, and I saw him a couple of times after that. He was very pleased that I had taken the trouble to go down to hear his speech.

But, generally speaking, the main political people were the Tsaldaris and Venizélos. They went out. The Greek government, for the first time, began to finance itself in about '52 or '53, and to start paying on their debts, which they had not paid since 1824 when the bishop raised the flag over the fortress in Patras.

We felt that things were going really well. Then Greece and Turkey joined NATO, and we began a more serious effort to help them with their forces. With a different objective -- not fighting the

Andartes, but to be able to defend that part of Greece.

Q: Well, at that time (again, we're trying to go back), everything was not predicated on Greece versus Turkey. I mean, this was not the focus of balancing these two antagonists.

DIXON: That happened much later on. Greece and Turkey both were being helped. We were advising both of them to take it easy with the other. The thing that brought this on, there was a soccer game between the Italians and the Turks in the stadium in Athens. The Greeks all cheered for the Italians, and the Turks were about to break off diplomatic relations with them. We worked hard on trying to keep the peace between Turkey and Greece.

When they both came into NATO, they were of course allies. Things got even more difficult, because some of the Greek islands, you know, are right on the Turkish coast. And I remember one day the Turkish ambassador came in and said that they were very much concerned that you could hear a cock crow from one of the Greek islands off the southern part of Turkey, and that the Greeks were putting soldiers there, and they were, in effect, putting soldiers onto all those islands. Where they had been all along -- well, some of them. There wasn't much Andarte fighting in the islands, but there had been soldiers there. Well, all of a sudden, they became very sensitive to it, and we had a hell of a time trying to placate the Turks and the Greeks and keep them working in the NATO saddle, so to speak.

The thing that really got this off on a bad footing was Cyprus. I remember, when I left the Greek desk doing work for George Allen, who was assistant secretary after McGee, we had had Archbishop Makarios come almost every year to the U.N. and ask that Cyprus be joined to Greece. Senator McCarran, from Nevada, had a big Greek constituency there and he was very beholden to Makarios. Before Jack Perifoy went to Greece, McCarran came with Makarios to call on Perifoy, to say, in effect, that the Senate would not vote on any appropriation for the State Department unless we allowed Cyprus to join Greece. This made a big impression on everybody in the State Department. It didn't work out that way, but, you know, the warning was clearly there, and McCarran was still pretty strong in the Senate. We had followed a policy of trying to get the British to behave better, to get the Cypriots, through our consulate, through Bill Porter there, to calm down, to take it easy and not do anything rash. We tried to explain to the Turks what we were doing and not to get excited. And we were able to keep the lid on the Cypriot thing.

When I left the desk, they were getting ready for the... Every year, we had this, when the General Assembly came open, because it came up before that, and Makarios would show up, and McCarran and so forth. They said they thought we ought to take a new look at our policy, that maybe we should stand for elections for self-government and so forth and so on. Rather than just tell the British they ought to do it, they wanted to come out.

And I said, you know, here we've tried this for a number of years. And the thing that seems to work best is to keep the wraps on this thing until we can get the British to turn it around. We think, in due course, they may do something. And we think that's the best way to unlock this situation, rather than trying to get it open and try to stand for elections or talks on different things publicly, what we were trying to do with the British.

They didn't take my advice, and they started on a different track. And exactly what I said would happen if they did this did happen. My name was mud in GTI, you know, for being right.

Q: Oh, there's nothing worse. Nothing worse.

DIXON: They hardly spoke to me for six months after that.

Q: I wonder if you could explain a bit, looking back but from your experience then. When you were doing this, you were a civil servant, is this right?

DIXON: I took the 1968 exam and went in the Foreign Service. You know, after you've been employed, I think, for two or three years, you could take the oral exam, which I took, and I was qualified for the Foreign Service.

Q: When was this?

DIXON: Nineteen fifty-one, something like that I think.

Q: Well, I was wondering if you could give a feel about how the Civil Service operated within the Department of State before there was a Wriston program and all. Civil Service occupied most of the positions within the State Department per se, except at the very upper level, and the Foreign Service was basically above. Wasn't that the situation there until around '53 or such?

DIXON: Well, all of the major jobs were held by Foreign Service officers. The assistants and so forth were Civil Service. Well, Link White was a civil servant. He was the spokesman for the department. There were very few.

Q: How about the desks?

DIXON: The desks all were held by Foreign Service officers.

Q: Ah. Well, now, you were still within NEA, but from 1953 to '55 you were the political-military...

DIXON: Right.

Q: Working with George Allen?

DIXON: Yes.

Q: What were you doing? What was the main concern then?

DIXON: Well, I handled the NATO program. I tried to develop the Middle East defense organization, which became CENTO. I did all the basic work on CENTO, to even telling the Iraqis and the Turks how they ought to do the treaty. They were getting the treaty all screwed up.

And Val Whittington, in the legal office, and I kept sending suggestions -- much to the displeasure of George Allen, who wanted to let them do it. We said, "Look, there are certain things, like, for example, this word in here will permit the Soviets to join CENTO, and we don't want the Soviets in CENTO." And I don't know, there were lots of things that were objectionable in the treaty. We finally got it mostly dressed up. Also Gorman, who was in Iraq, didn't want to say anything to the Iraqis. Most of this was transmitted to the Turks, and they listened to it. And I talked to the Turkish Embassy here and explained that there were serious problems in this thing. I sort of did it on my own and off the cuff. Because George Allen was reluctant to tell them what to do, and so was Gorman. Gorman was an absolute monkey wrench in the works.

Q: He was our ambassador to Iraq.

DIXON: Yes.

Q: What was his problem?

DIXON: I don't know, he was just a do-nothing. Anyway, we got that thing straightened out.

I then spent a lot of time on the military assistance programs. You know, writing up what needed to be done, making the presentation for Congress and so forth and so on. I also did the base negotiations for Greece and Turkey. And I did the beginnings of one for Morocco. I actually did the negotiations myself in Morocco later on. But I did the Greek and Turkish.

Q: With our base negotiations, which later became very controversial because of political developments, did we pretty well get what we wanted?

DIXON: We did, with the Greeks. The Greeks were very cooperative. The Turks were goddamned difficult. And, you see, we used to have extraterritorial rights in Turkey, and one of the things we were asking for was that our military people there would not be subject to Turkish law. And we fought on that for a couple years. We finally had to give up.

Q: Of course, the Turks have lived with capitulations, I think, for a couple of centuries. When the young Turks took over, they weren't about to... I mean that was something that you couldn't mess with. Did we understand that early on?

DIXON: The Defense Department raised hell about this, and we had a terrible time. The Turks absolutely would not hear of it; Defense would not hear of not having it. And that was one of the reasons that thing was held up so long. And the Defense Department finally had to give in.

Q: Were you, at State, and others trying to get across to the Defense Department that we were really up against history?

DIXON: Yes, yes.

Q: This was one of the times when a knowledge of the history and the politics of the country was just vital.

DIXON: A big difference to them. I remember Bud Howard, who was the counsel for the Air Force, was particularly difficult. By this time, Hank Byroade had taken over, and Bud Howard complained to Hank that I was pushing them too hard on this subject. Hank Byroade called me in and said, "I don't know what this is all about, but they say you're being too overbearing and pressing them too hard on this." I tried to explain it to Byroade, but he wasn't particularly interested. Jernegan was the deputy, so I went in and talked to Jack about it. And Jack, I think, got it straightened out. But it was over this point of extraterritorial jurisdiction. They didn't like my saying that the Turks wouldn't stand for it. And they didn't. But I got sort of a black eye in Hank's eyes from insisting on this.

Q: Well, I wonder, in talking about two people you were working with, both Hank Byroade and George Allen, how were they, both in their style of working in the department as assistant secretaries and also their effectiveness?

DIXON: For Byroade it was not much. He had been a brilliant young general or something like that, but I think...

Q: I think one of the youngest generals in the Army or something like that.

DIXON: He had so many interests in having a good time. He was mainly interested in, I think, Egypt or something like that. I didn't see him very much; I worked closely with Jack Jernegan. And he had his mind on a lot of other things -- I won't say what, but I didn't think he was very effective. I didn't have much dealing with him. I used to go to the staff meetings and, you know, talk, but he rarely ever said anything much.

Q: How about George Allen?

DIXON: George Allen was very, very good. He was, I think, an excellent diplomat and a good administrator. He was easy to work with, he took advice. He was a little stodgy at times. I know...who was it?...somebody who was a deputy assistant secretary under George was asked to go up on the Hill because George had gone somewhere and he had disappeared, and they'd called up and said they wanted to have people up there right now. So whoever this was, after trying to find somebody else, went up on the Hill because the congressional liaison people said they had to have somebody. So, when he came back, he said, "You know, I couldn't find you anywhere, and they said they had to have somebody, so I went."

George said, "Well, you seem to take things on yourself pretty easily."

But he forgot about it. I mean, George was sort of miffed because he didn't go up there, because I think he wanted to say something.

But, you know, during my political-military times, Bob Murphy went to talk to the JCS every Thursday morning at eleven o'clock. And whatever the subjects were, they'd bring people from different parts of the department to go. I used to go with Murphy. One day, I went Murphy, and George Allen was there on something else. I've forgotten what it was; it was not a political-

military thing. Murphy was then the political-military under secretary and liaison with the Defense Department, in effect. We got in there, and Admiral Carney, who was then the member from the Navy, had a terrible prejudice against the British, because he grew up in the Navy where they were inferior to the British. We were talking something about Turkey, and he said, "Well, you know, the British tried to give them something and the Turks just looked out of the window. They didn't want to put up with the British." And so forth and so on. And somebody said, well, they thought that perhaps that kind of ship would be useful to Turkey. And Carney was very hard on this. And somebody brought up Yugoslavia. Carney said, "Who the hell gave military assistance to Yugoslavia? They ought to be put in jail. They not only give them military, but aid and so forth and so on."

George Allen said, "I was the ambassador that signed the agreement with them." He said, "They had given up the Soviets and were cooperating with us against the Soviets. And I recommended and I signed the treaty, and if you want to talk any more about it, I'll be glad to come around to your office and talk about it." But he put Carney in his place. And I thought Carney was entirely out of place. Of course, Murphy, who would never cross anybody, said, "Oh, well, I don't know that..." And George got pretty irritated with it.

Q: That's interesting. Murphy I always thought of as being a sort of a hard-charging person.

DIXON: Well, in a light sort of way. Yes, when he had to, he brought up embarrassing things, but he avoided anything he could. My experience with him, in talking to the JCS, was he would avoid anything that was sort of difficult. But I suppose he thought, well, Christ, you know, Carney can get this off his chest and that's the end of that. But George Allen was pretty annoyed by it, in addition to the fact he didn't think they should go off with the idea that we had had some Communists in the woodwork who had made us give aid to Yugoslavia.

Let me tell you one other thing I thought was very amusing. We were putting an installation in Turkey, which is very, very highly classified. We wanted to put one there. And I was working on the project. It was the end of '52, just before the Republican administration came in, and there was a guy...what was his name? He was the secretary of defense then. He was under secretary and he taken over secretary.

Q: Gates?

DIXON: No, it was something like Foster. Anyway, we had a big fight on this, and we had to take the thing up to him, to sort of decide what Defense was going to do. William C. Foster his name was, I think. We went in to see him, and I explained this to him at great length, what the problems were and this sort of thing, and he concurred in it. But, in the meantime, the basic telegram that we had drafted was, you know, a hodge podge of God knows what. You know, anything that a committee, so to speak, does, it comes out pretty badly. I brought the thing back, we passed it through the channels, through Murphy, to the secretary's office. Of course, the secretary had to agree on it. I got a call from Jeff Kitchen, who said, "Come upstairs quickly. The secretary's mad." So I went into Acheson's office. He was very polite. He said, "Have a seat." And he said, "I'm afraid Jeff hasn't done his staff work. He can't explain this to me, and I'm sorry to bother you, but could you go over this." He said, "There is something in here that has a double

meaning and it's ambiguous, and I'd like to get it cleared up."

I said, "Mr. Secretary, this thing has been written and rewritten fifteen million times. We've gotten the clearances of everybody here on this particular text."

Well, he said, "I'm the secretary of state, and I'm going to sign the telegram. And if I understand it properly, it's going to go out the way I want it to." He said, "This is the ambiguity here." And he read me something, and, sure enough, it was. He said, "What was intended?"

I said, well, you know, what was intended was so and so, but it's been rewritten so many times that's the reason it's gotten to be like this. We were trying to, you know, hedge between this and that.

"What did you intend to say?" he said.

So I said what it was we intended to say.

He said, "Well, that's the way we're going to say it."

And so they retyped that page of the telegram, he signed it, and it went out.

But, you know, that's one thing that happened there. But, in those days, David Bruce was the under secretary and sometimes the acting secretary. I used to get Bruce calling me on the phone, or get called up to Acheson's office. I think, today, you know, people in that position never get anywhere near that anymore. And, you know, it was perfectly normal; it wasn't anything unusual.

One time, when the Bulgarians took over the islands in the Ebro River, there was a big thing in the paper: BULGARIANS INVADE GREECE and so forth. Bruce was the acting secretary, and he called me and said, "What's this about?" I went up and explained it to him, and said it wasn't terribly dangerous, that it could start a fight, but we hoped it would come down all right.

He said, "It's on the agenda for the White House tomorrow. Will you be ready at nine-thirty, I'm going over there. I want you to come along in case we need you."

So I went over and sat in the White House anteroom, on the outside. They never did ask me in, but, you know, that never happens anymore.

Q: No, I think we're talking about the growth of bureaucracy, with probably less insight- -more administrators and less operators. But then you...

DIXON: Well, you were asking me something about Turkey. When I was in this other thing, I had a lot to do with the Turks because the prime minister came over here with the defense minister. The defense minister was Zorlou and the...what was the prime minister's name?

Q: I want to say İnönü, but I'm not sure if he was then.

DIXON: No. Maybe I'll think of it as we go along. Zorlou, who was a nasty piece of work but a very effective guy, caught on to the fact that I was attending the meetings with the prime minister and Zorlou and their people. And the ambassador had been very nice to me, they asked us to dinner there with different people, and even when I was on the Greek desk, was always very friendly to me. Somehow Zorlou caught on to the fact that I was the one working on the Turkish military program, which they were primarily concerned about. They were concerned about NATO, about the Soviets, and about acts with the Greeks. Zorlou found out where my office was and came around and talked to me about various things about the program and so forth. Harold Stassen was the guy who was running the military aid and, I think, also the economic aid.

Q: And neutral security or something like that.

DIXON: Yes, yes. And Zorlou wasn't quite sure -- he was getting one tune from Stassen and another tune from Dulles -- and he was trying to find out various and sundry things so they could make their presentation. I was going to night law school then. Finally, the prime minister wanted to talk to me, so I went and talked to him. I reported all this to George Allen when it was going on. But they were making a serious effort to try to find out things from me and so forth. And I was trying to be sure that I wasn't telling them anything I shouldn't tell them. But we got to be quite friendly. And as we finally wound things up, there was a misunderstanding. Stassen promised them X, and the rest of the government promised them Y. There was this big fight on this. Anyway, they had a final meeting at which we were going to announce what we were going to do. And the prime minister asked me if I were coming to the meeting. And I said, "No, I've got a law exam tonight. I've done everything I can do on it, and I'm going to go on off and study this afternoon."

He said, "Well, could you come to the meeting and bring your law books and read them there, just in case you're needed to straighten something out."

So I did that. I sat in the back of the room and read my books. They never called on me, but that apparently made him happy.

But I found that rather unusual, to have that sort of thing happen. And it also made me a little nervous as to what they were trying to find out and what they were trying to do and that sort of thing.

Q: Were you involved in the decision to put missiles, I think they were Jupiter missiles, in Turkey, or did that come a little later?

DIXON: That came later.

**WILLIAM PARKS
Marshall Plan
Washington, DC (1948-1955)**

William Parks was born in New York in 1915. He was highly involved at the State Department in administering the Marshall Plan to Greece and Turkey. Mr. Parks was interviewed by Melbourne Spencer in November 1988.

PARKS: Mel, thank you. What I'm about to say as I research the mists of my memory going back some 40 years, may at times sound much like stream-of-consciousness meandering, because this is unscripted, as I guess it should be.

Let me begin at the beginning. I was recruited in January of 1948 to assist in the then-Greek-Turk aid program, one of the Truman historical decisions, partly to participate in that endeavor, but also partly to help, as needed, in some preliminary planning for the ultimate creation of what became known as the Marshall program, or to give its formal legislative title, the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.

Most of the staff work, as I recall, leading to the development of the Economic Cooperation Administration had been done by the Department of State, which seemed to have assumed that, if Congress approved this pioneering endeavor, administration of the program would be entrusted would fall to the Department of State. As events subsequently transpired, that turned out not to be the case.

At that time, the Greek-Turk aid program was housed in the Department of State, headed, as I remember, by the late C. Tyler Wood, assisted by his senior aide, Edward E. Kunze, both of whom reported to Wilt Clayton. I believe Clayton then was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Department of State.

The major role of this office was to plan and approve the provision of essential supplies needed by Greece and Turkey, which at that time was seriously threatened by the Soviet Union. This program clearly was an emergency stopgap measure intended to keep Greece and Turkey afloat in the wake of the war, and designed, obviously, to keep both countries from falling within the orbit of the Soviet Union.

I'm trying to recall basically how the procurements were carried out. The basic commodities, as I remember, were essential civilian requirements such as agricultural commodities (wheat, for instance), coal, and, I believe, petroleum products. Actual procurement was undertaken by other arms of the United States Government, particularly the Department of Agriculture, Army, and, I believe, by the General Services Administration predecessor. In any event, the procurement was, in effect, done on a bilateral country-to-country basis with the U.S. Government assuming the role of purchasing agent on behalf of the two countries involved, Greece and Turkey.

Q: What would be procured was decided by the two countries? Or did you just give Greece and Turkey a blank check?

PARKS: No, no. As I remember, the determination of the requirements was, to a large extent, based upon the data provided by our embassies abroad. I believe there was an economic unit attached to each embassy charged with the responsibility of the economic planning, but please

don't hold me to that because I wasn't that close to the overseas arrangements then prevailing.

Q: Did this include anything beyond civilian? Military?

PARKS: No, these were basically essential civilian requirements.

In those days, we were using a simple internal U.S. Government requisitioning device to authorize procurement and shipping. I mention that because it assumed some significance shortly thereafter when the Marshall Plan began operating.

A curious little footnote here. With the enactment of the E.C. Act in April of 1948, to the surprise of many people (including, I suspect, the planners in the Department of State), the Congress, in approving this \$20 billion, four-year program, which was the conceptual framework of the Marshall Plan, decided that under no circumstances would it entrust this highly operational program to the Department of State. It insisted upon the creation of an independent agency, to be called the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), to assume this awesome responsibility. Beyond that, the President determined that the program should be headed by an outstanding, prestigious U.S. citizen with a proven track record in business and management. He selected the late Paul Hoffman for this purpose. Again, as I remember, Paul Hoffman was a Republican, underscoring Truman's objectivity in reaching out to tap a member of the opposition political party to head this pioneering enterprise.

I also recall -- and again this may be a small diversion -- the then-awesome dimensions of this program. Twenty-billion dollars in those days was a considerable sum of money.

Q: You could almost call it 200 billion today.

PARKS: Yes. As were the other dimensions of the program. In effect, the ECA was being asked to play a major role in restoring the shattered economies of Europe in the devastating wake of World War II, to the point of self-sufficiency within an incredibly short time frame of four years.

I vividly remember the degree of skepticism that prevailed on the part of many economic and political theorists, that this was a monumental task and highly unlikely to be successful. There were even some opponents of the program, who saw no need to provide aid to Europe, or, in fact, even saw a potential economic threat to the United States in rehabilitating the economy of the major European countries.

Q: They'd see it as a competitor, I guess, in the long run?

PARKS: That was one theory expressed, I recall. In any event, despite this widespread skepticism, and as history now records, the program was not only successful beyond the wildest imaginations of its proponents, but it did, in fact, achieve its basic goals in less than the four-year time frame envisaged by the planners. However, that aspect of the total endeavor is not quite what we're here to talk about.

We are here to talk about how the Marshall Plan went about its business, what features of the

program were unique experimentally, and how the overall conceptual approaches of the administrators of the program succeeded in achieving the goals that had been set out.

As I remember, in April of 1948, Hoffman and a few carefully chosen advisors set up shop initially in the Statler Hilton Hotel, in temporary quarters, in Washington, D.C.

Q: 16th and K Street, Northwest.

PARKS: The Maiatico building, then still under internal construction adjoining Lafayette Square (literally a stone's throw from the White House), had been rented to house the newly created ECA. The new ECA officials, including Hoffman himself, had decided for whatever reasons that they did not want personnel from the Department of State itself made available to the new agency. We, having heard this, were disappointed, but the scene rapidly changed.

Administrator Paul Hoffman made it known that he wanted to begin operations at full speed, and issued orders that he wanted to make available the first grants of U.S. assistance within a matter of days after the passage of the bill.

Q: Days!

PARKS: It must have occurred to somebody in the group surrounding Hoffman that this laudable objective looked like an insurmountable administrative problem. They weren't quite sure how to go about this, which was understandable, given the circumstances at the time. So a frantic call was made to the little Greek-Turkey aid office with which I was then associated in the Department of State, asking us if we could prepare on a crash basis, the first documents which would, in effect, authorize the initial shipments of commodities to some ten or 12 European countries participating in the program. We assured them that we thought we could handle this small problem, and we did. We worked frantically almost overnight, adapting the procurement documents we had been using to authorize shipments to Greece and Turkey, making appropriate changes in the terminology and the text of these instruments.

I should back up and say that these documents, these procurement authorizations, were designed as a bilateral instrument, with the country's signature, thereon indicating that it was a formal request to the U.S. for the required goods and commodities, and which, when approved by the U.S., in effect, constituted a contract.

Q: Who would sign the document, someone here in Washington from the embassy?

PARKS: Yes, the country's embassy, usually and its own economic staffs who were concerned with the Marshall Plan.

**NORBERT L. ANSCHUTZ
Greece Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1950)**

**Political Officer
Athens, Greece (1951-1953)**

Norbert L. Anschutz was born in Kansas in 1915. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Greece, Thailand, Egypt, France, and Washington, DC. Mr. Anschutz was interviewed in July of 1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. While we were still in Greece, on March 7, 1947, I was in southern Albania some place, the Truman Doctrine was announced. The Truman Doctrine, which provided for the support of Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure, had been influenced, I think it is fair to say, to a degree by the reporting of the Commission. I do not say it was crucial or critical, but the reporting from our embassies and from Mark Ethridge, I think certainly tended to support the decision to declare the so-called Truman Doctrine. This was a decision which was taken before the final writing of the report and before the consideration of the report by the Security Council. But it was part of a general political reaction to Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey.

Shortly after I came back I was assigned to Greek Affairs in the Office of...I have forgotten exactly what it was called. There was an office set up to implement the providing of assistance to Greece and Turkey under the terms of the Truman Doctrine. It was called the Greek-Turkey office. George McGhee, who was later Assistant Secretary of State, was appointed to be the director of the office. I was in charge of the Greek segment under that. I spent some time, a year or so, in that capacity.

Subsequently I was assigned to the Greek Desk, I think first as an assistant and then became the Greek Desk Officer. During this period while I was the Greek Desk Officer, Jack Peurifoy was assigned as Ambassador to Greece. It was in that connection that I met Jack for the first time. I did the usual things that the Desk Officer would do in arranging briefings, background and other activities to prepare Ambassador Peurifoy for his post. As it happened, Jack went to Greece and came back on consultation about a year after going out. In those days, this would have been early 1950, people from the Desk went out to meet the Ambassador. So I carried my spear and stood strictly at attention as the Ambassador returned. He got off the plane and greeted everyone warmly, as was his wont. He then took me by the arm and said, "Norb, you are going back to Greece." Well, in point of fact I did.

I arrived in Athens in October 1951...

Q: I would like to backtrack just a bit. While you were working on the Greek Desk and Greek-Turkish affairs, these sort of meld into each other, George McGhee was running things. How did he operate? He was an important figure in the diplomatic equation in those days.

ANSCHUTZ: George had been a very successful petroleum engineer. He also married the daughter of Degauja [ph], who was a very well-known petroleum engineer. So George had made a lot of money and I think his wife's family had a lot of money. He was, I think, very well established with the Democratic machine. He was a very intelligent, able fellow and had a businesslike approach to problems. He approached his problems with great energy.

I have another little anecdote about George. Some years later, when I was in Athens, and George was Ambassador in Turkey, George came over to Greece to make a visit to Mt. Athos. In those days less use was made of the radio and telephone and telegram and more use was made of despatches. So in the course of human events, I received in Athens a copy of the despatch that George had written describing his visit to Mt. Athos. He described in great detail the dilapidation and general deterioration of the situation which he found there. But the thing that I have always remembered was the final sentence of this despatch which is a typical McGheeism. He said, "What this place needs is some young, vigorous monks."

Q: While you were in Washington, what was your impression of how things were going in Greece?

ANSCHUTZ: This would have been in the late forties and maybe 1950. We, the United States, under the Greek-Turkey program was spending what was a very substantial amount of money at that time. We had developed an aid mission and a military mission which was to train and support the Greek armed forces. In a sense they worked well because the Greeks were so needy. They were highly cooperative and with the American military supplies and some American military counseling from the Joint US Military Advisory Group, the sort of shattered Greek military organization was gradually put into some sort of workable organization. And the work of the guerrillas was somewhat circumscribed.

I think it is also fair to say that as the American assistance increased so did the assistance from Yugoslavia and north increase. So there were some rather significant military conflicts during that period. But, basically, it went reasonably well, as we all know, and the guerrillas were vanquished or expelled.

In that period too we had not only the military thing, but, for example, there was a campaign of abducting Greek children and sending them up to Bulgaria, Eastern Germany and possibly Poland.

Q: I think also to the Soviet Union, around Odessa.

ANSCHUTZ: That's possible. I don't think I ever knew where they all were.

Q: We are talking about significant numbers, thousands.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes.

Q: Were you getting some of the heat from what appeared to be sort of a bureaucratic problem in Greece at the time where the economic assistance mission had direct access...I heard that when a diplomatic reception was held all the Greek officials would head towards the head of the economic assistance group and leave the Ambassador sort of standing by himself. Did you catch any of this feeling?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, certainly the senior members of the economic mission were very important and I am sure that they were cultivated by the authorities. But I didn't have the feeling that the

American Ambassador was ever eclipsed by them. I wouldn't have said that. We did have a large American presence there. There was the economic mission, the military mission, the CIA and all of the Service attachés had substantial staffs plus the fact that there were Air Force units stationed down there at Hellinikon Airbase for various types of support missions which were conducted, I think, in a number of countries in the Balkans and Turkey. It was an important airbase to the whole region. We also had, which I think was more important later, important communication and monitoring facilities in Greece.

Q: What was your impression of the reporting of Ambassador Grady? What was your impression of him and Peurifoy?

ANSCHUTZ: I think Grady was an able fellow. I never served directly under him. I think I made a visit there once while he was ambassador. I think Grady was adequately in control of the situation there. I guess part of this time under Grady, Sophocles Venizelos was prime minister.

Jack Peurifoy was a very different sort of man. Jack had come from the administrative side of the State Department and, I think, he had been very active in organizing things like the United Nations Drafting Convention in San Francisco in 1945, in his senior administrative position. Jack was a very warm personable fellow. He made many friends and as a result of friends both in the State Department, but also in the Congress, he was then appointed Ambassador to Greece. For the most part I think he was a very effective ambassador.

I came to know Jack very well because I worked for him twice. I have always accorded him very high marks for leadership. Jack had courage to make decisions, but he also, which was almost equally if not more important, inspired loyalty and effort on the part of his staff. People liked to work for him because he was very genuine and warm, but also because he took the general attitude that your function, whatever it was, was to tell him what you thought the situation required. He did not try to pretend that he understood more about everything than everybody else. This, at least in my experience, is the kind of thing which evokes response out of the subordinates. If the subordinates have the feeling that the superior is looking to them for guidance, it tends to invoke a strong loyal effort on the part of the subordinates.

In his relationships with the Greeks he was very warm. I think the environment within the Embassy was highly satisfactory under Jack Peurifoy. He did not pretend to be the world's greatest expert on Greece or Greeks, but he was open to comments and advice and frequently accepted it with appropriate appreciation.

Q: Were you either on the Desk or at the Embassy when the Polk case came up?

ANSCHUTZ: I guess I was on the Desk at that time.

Q: I can't remember his name.

ANSCHUTZ: George.

Q: George Polk, a correspondent who was killed in Thessaloniki.

ANSCHUTZ: I don't remember whether I was on the Desk or still handling Greek affairs in the Office of Greek-Turkish Affairs. But I had very little to do with that except to read about it.

Q: Then you went out to Athens and were there from 1951-53. Had the situation pretty well cleared up? Were the Greek Monarchy forces pretty much in control by that time?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. They were. By the time I left, they were very definitely so. Of course, the monarchy, King Paul and Queen Frederika, were extremely able and gracious people. They invariably made a very good impression on visiting American dignitaries, Congressmen or other government officials. And they also recognized early on that the Central Intelligence Agency was very a effective and relatively direct route into the White House. They played that accordingly.

Q: Did we see Queen Frederika as a problem at that time, or did that come later on?

ANSCHUTZ: I would say that became more of a problem later on. In the early days she was lady bountiful. She was very effective in going through beleaguered areas and bringing various types of relief supplies, etc. She developed something called the Queen's Fund, which supported various types of Greek handicrafts. She did a number of those things. She was extremely effective in public relation activities.

Q: What were you doing at the Embassy?

ANSCHUTZ: At first I was in charge of political/ military affairs. One of the things I got involved in was the Greek application to become a member of NATO. There was always the problem of military budgets as well.

Then I was shifted over to become the Political Counselor the second half of my tour there.

Q: What was our initial reaction when the Greeks applied for NATO membership? Were we encouraging them?

ANSCHUTZ: I think basically we supported it. I remember one of the early issues was who should be in command of the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. The position which I took and which was accepted by Charlie Yost, who was our DCM, and by Peurifoy, was that it wasn't a question of trying to displace the British in the Mediterranean. The British at that time didn't really have the capacity to do it and the Greeks wanted to be on the side of the angels. They wanted us to have control in the Mediterranean and to have our substantial employment in the Mediterranean and that was finally accepted.

Q: It became CINCSOUTH stationed at Naples.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes.

Q: When dealing with political/military affairs you must have always been looking over your shoulder at the Turkish situation? Did you feel that you were the Greek advocate and somebody

in our Embassy in Ankara was the Turkish advocate, or were you trying to work together to balance this very contentious relationship?

ANSCHUTZ: Well, there was that. Of course, at that period the Greeks weren't sufficiently vigorous so that they could make much of an issue about the Turkish thing. So those relations that were historically very tenuous and were at that very particular moment not so bad...I guess the question of Cyprus had not become very acute at that time...

Q: It was still really under British control.

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, that is correct. I wouldn't have said that at that time the Turkish problem was too great. I don't remember whether there was the question of sovereignty of some islands or not.

Q: When you were running the political section there...later this became a very split area over how we should approach Greece...but in this period were the people looking at the Greek picture and dealing with political affairs pretty unanimous on how we were going to operate?

ANSCHUTZ: I think there was always some tension in the situation between what might be called the conservative and the liberal factors in the body politic. There were elements in the government which were basically anti-monarchist. I think at that time the general feeling in the Embassy was that the monarchy was a very useful unifying political force in the country. There were leftists in the government or at least in the Parliament, who were anti-monarchists. I am thinking now of George Cartalis [ph] who was a very intelligent man who was an officer or minister in the economic sphere. And there were people who had been involved in the non-Communist resistance in Greece. There were elements who felt that the monarchy had sort of eclipsed itself and gone off to Egypt during the war after the German invasion. In Greece there are always, as you know, many different points of view.

Q: Was George Papandreou a factor in those days?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes, he was. I wouldn't say he was a terribly important factor, but he had been at one point Prime Minister. I remember we used to see him from time to time.

Q: One further thing before we move on to your next assignment. Later, when I served there from 1970-74, I had very much the feeling that our Embassy was dominated...some embassies are AID embassies, some embassies can be military embassies or State Department embassies and some CIA embassies...I had the feeling that we were in a CIA embassy, that it was running things. How did you feel about the role of the CIA, we are talking about the early fifties?

ANSCHUTZ: The role of the CIA was important, very important. When I first arrived in Greece the Station Chief was a Greek-American by the name of Tom Karamessines, a fellow for whom I had very high regard. I think they worked fairly closely together...the Embassy and the CIA Station. Because of the general situation there, that is to say, the political fragmentation and the economic poverty, it was a fairly rewarding environment in which to operate. As is so often the case, one wasn't always sure just what relationships some of your contacts in the Greek government had with other agencies in the American government.

Q: Well it was a period when the CIA was being generous with payments to people, which has its negative side as well as its positive side.

ANSCHUTZ: I remember, for example, when we were there the first time, we developed a very close relationship with Caramanlis, who was, I think Minister of Roads, or something like that. We used to see each other socially because he loved to go to the movies and his favorite movies were what were when I was a boy Saturday afternoon serials. He liked those and, for example, we would occasionally go and they would have an evening of, shall we say three or four sequences, or something of the sort. Then we would go out to supper. Caramanlis came to be well regarded and I am sure when he became Prime Minister that he had sympathetic assistance from the American apparatus.

There is no question about that and, of course, these are the operational challenges of any large mission, whether it is Greece or any place. Each one of the services wants to have its finger in what it considers to be its pie. And I was much more aware of this in my second tour in Greece. The military mission would have its tentacles into the military organizations. The Air Force people would have their tentacles into one part of it, the Service attachés would have their tentacles into another part of it. The Agency would maybe have tentacles into the whole thing.

Q: Well, then, you left Athens in 1953 and moved rather quickly to Thailand. Is that right?

ANSCHUTZ: Yes. We went back to Washington and for a period of time I was the officer in charge of political/ military affairs for NEA. At that time we, of course, had continuing military support for Greece and Turkey, but the question of Egypt had become very active.

Q: Nasser was just appearing on the scene at that time.

ANSCHUTZ: That is correct. Nasser, I think, appeared in 1952. We had a period there when we were trying very hard to find common ground with Nasser. I think it is fair to say that in general we were sympathetic to some of the objectives of the revolution.

Q: Wasn't that around the period when one of the most significant arms deal was made when John Foster Dulles presented a 45 to Nasser?

ANSCHUTZ: That may be true, I don't remember that. First let's all realize that Nasser was fanatically nationalistic and tended to be somewhat anti-Western because he felt that his country had been subjected by the British and the West. So Nasser in his early days was trying very eagerly to rehabilitate the Egyptian armed forces. There were very significant military equipment agreements with Czechoslovakia, which was very disconcerting to us. The United States had passed legislation which may have been the initial embryo that may have been in the Greek-Turkey Assistance Act, whereby under certain circumstances the United States would provide arms and assistance. But in order to provide arms and assistance, the host government would have to receive a US military advisory assistance group.

LAWRENCE J. HALL
Assistant Information Officer, USIS
Istanbul (1950-1953)

Lawrence J. Hall was born in New Jersey in 1920. His Foreign Service career included assignments in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, India, Iran Vietnam, and Washington, DC. Mr. Hall was interviewed by Hans Tuch on August 23, 1988.

HALL: I was with ECA-OSR until October 1950. I had become bored with working at what I regarded as the headquarters and wanted to go out to the field -- one of the 18 Missions. I made such a request to Wally Nielsen.

Wally said, "Even Turkey?" and I said, "Even Turkey". It was considered the least European country in the European recovery program. So, I went off to Turkey as Assistant Information Officer, the Information Officer being the top of our little operation.

Q: Still ECA?

HALL: Still ECA, yes, but called the U.S. Operations Mission to Turkey.

Q: Still ECA to Turkey?

HALL: Yes.

Q: You worked?

HALL: For Tom Flanagan who was the PIO, as we called him.

Q: Public Information Officer?

HALL: Right.

Q: For ECA Turkey?

HALL: Which was the Marshall Plan mission to Turkey, right. It had its own establishment and its own building was quite separate from the Embassy and from USIS as well. In fact, when I say "completely separate from the embassies", there is a little bit of humor there because in the early days of the Marshall Plan, the ministers who were the heads of the Marshall Plan missions were frequently disliked by the heads of the regular diplomatic missions.

Q: Because they had the money?

HALL: Because they had the money and many of the government ministers broke a trail to their offices and ignored the embassies.

Q: I see.

HALL: So, Ruth and I and our infant son went to Turkey in October of 1950 and I worked there for almost three years, both as assistant to Tom and eventually as acting Information Officer when Tom was sent on a couple of special assignments.

He became one of the few people in either USIS or the Marshall Plan Information Operations to hold jobs in both organization. This was done with a view to the eventual amalgamating of these services. Tom was made PAO-Turkey and our Information Officer in London, Joe Phillips, was made PAO-London.

In any case, in Turkey we practically ran our own shop, occasionally asking for help from USIS or offering it and making suggestions from time to time -- for VOA coverage of Marshall Plan activities, for instance. We were not invited to attend USIS staff meetings or anything like that.

We knew all the USIS people. We worked with them individually but there was no attempt to integrate the policies. We knew our policies. The Marshall Plan was very clear-cut. We were trying to accomplish certain economic goals and also to make people aware of American aid and what it was doing.

ALAN W. LUKENS
Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Ankara (1951-1952)

Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Istanbul (1953-1954)

Ambassador Alan W. Lukens was born in 1924 and raised in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He attended Princeton University. In 1943, he was drafted into service with the 20th Armored Division in Europe. Following his service, he returned to Princeton and received his degree in 1948. He went abroad for a year and upon returning worked towards his M.A. at Georgetown University. Ambassador Lukens then joined the Foreign Service (USIS) in 1951, serving in Ankara, Istanbul, Martinique, Paris, Brazzaville, Rabat, Dakar, Nairobi, Cape Town, and the Congo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1989.

Q: You were in Ankara from '51 to '52 and Istanbul '52 to '54. What was the situation as you saw it in Turkey? Our relations with Turkey in those '51 to '54 period?

LUKENS: That was a very happy time. We'd just started the Marshall Plan. Ambassador Wadsworth was one of the old timers -- he built golf courses, and so on, but he was succeeded by George McGhee who was of course a political appointee but one with a great deal of clout and

energy. And we began our whole military and aid programs at that point, very small then compared to what they are now. But the Turks were reaching toward us and I think it really was a very historic period of opening up to Turkey with the Truman Doctrine.

Q: What was the feeling of our people at the Embassy and our Consulate General? Do you think the Turks were going to use the term "make it" or did we feel that this was sort of pouring money down a rat hole.

LUKENS: I don't think so in those days at all. There was tremendous enthusiasm, there were so many things to do, roads to build, schools to work on. We worked hard in USIS then, and I did an awful lot of English teaching. I ran up and down from Istanbul to Edirne, a little town on the Bulgarian border where the mayor, whose curious name was Ataktark, was a great buddy and I gave him private English lessons. I remember when he took me up to the forbidding-looking Bulgarian frontier where we climbed up a scaffolding and peered across the Iron Curtain. But the Turks were tremendously friendly. I made quite a lot of progress in Turkish, so I could get along and I've been fond of them ever since, and still try to keep up. Since then, of course, they've had all kinds of ups and downs in the military regime and so on. But at that particular point it was a rather stable country and they were so busy developing that they hadn't yet gotten into some of their internal squabbles.

VIRGINIA EDWARDS
Secretary, Marshall Plan
Ankara (1951-1954)

Secretary to USAID Mission Director
Ankara (1960-1962)

Ms. Edwards was born and raised in Virginia and graduated from a Business School in Richmond VA. After passing the Civil Service Examination she worked with the State Department of Health in Richmond before moving to Washington, D.C., where she worked with Naval Intelligence. In 1951 she joined the Department of State and worked in both Washington and abroad as secretary to AID and Marshall Plan Office Directors. Her foreign assignments took her to Ankara (twice), Katmandu, Tel Aviv and Recife. She retired in 1964 and continued working in various organizations. Ms. Edwards was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: How did you end up in the State Department?

EDWARDS: Well, then after I finished this Censorship arrangement, the government wanted to transfer every one of us as a block to the State Department, all secretaries. I said, no, I don't want to do it. I went to a resort hotel and worked down in Mountain Lake, Virginia, that summer and came back and I decided that I wanted to go to the State Department. I applied and went over there and they took me over there and interviewed me and sent me off on KLM to Turkey. I'll

tell you the big joke about that. They said it was to Europe. I said, "Oh, that's wonderful. I want to go to London." They said, no, Turkey, "but that's not Europe." They were organizing in such a way EMENA [Europe, Middle East and North Africa] included Turkey. That's how they got me to Turkey.

Q: When did you get into the State Department, what year?

EDWARDS: Let's see, well, Turkey. I remember that '51 is the time I first went, that's it to Turkey.

Q: In 1951.

EDWARDS: '51 to '54.

Q: All right.

EDWARDS: Those were my first two years because you got in in late October wearing those wool dresses feeling so hot and getting out early two years later, so that's when I got in and I just stayed in and out and in and out.

Q: Well, 1951 to '54.

EDWARDS: Yes.

Q: What was your job in Turkey?

EDWARDS: I was working in those days, my first assignment, I've told you about my arrival in Turkey, haven't I, and not a word in Turkish?

Q: How did that come out?

EDWARDS: The fact was that I did not know that there would be no one to meet me. They sent me by plane, as I told you, by KLM, Scandinavian. I had to stay in the guest quarters overnight in Istanbul and was going by the Orient Express the next day through Ankara, but the thing about it was that it was Turkey. So, we got right in Ankara in the morning, early Friday morning, because the train was an overnight one. There was nobody to meet me, and the conductor said there was a man right there who worked at the American Embassy and he could take me with him to the Embassy in downtown Ankara. So, he came and told me he was from the "sefareti" and I didn't know until later that American Sefareti is the Turkish word for American Embassy. He said he would take me there, so I rode with him there, so that's the way I got in with no Turkish. Later on, the State Department in all these countries gave us 14 units of the language if we wanted. Of course, they almost insisted we take it, and I loved it!

Q: Well, now, what type of work were you doing?

EDWARDS: Oh, I was then put to work right away in what they called the Starch group. There

was this old Elmer Starch who was from Montana and they always called him Dr. Starch, but he was not really a doctor and he wanted to make everybody understand he was not a doctor, but Mr. Starch had gathered all of these agriculture people from his state, Montana, whatever, or some nearby state, in the fields of dairy and agriculture, crops and I've forgotten what they were. He knew the best people in agriculture to bring to Turkey. Our job was to help Turkey's agricultural program. I knew secretarial work. Any place I worked, I did secretarial work. We in Turkey were helping on the very first Marshall Plan program.

Q: This was part of the Marshall Plan?

EDWARDS: Yes, exactly. We had this wonderful situation. We got to know everybody. They got to know their counterparts. Our counterparts were the boys who moved things in the offices, and the interpreters were so good. They had had to learn some English from us to give the agriculture interpreter. They educated them and Mrs. Sengelli was one. I've forgotten the name of the other one.

Q: Well, then what were you doing?

EDWARDS: Secretarial. I kept the records, too. I would put the cross reference too so that if somebody wanted to find something and they couldn't, then I would say, well, try so and so and they'd find it.

Q: What was Turkey like when you were there?

EDWARDS: It was nice as could be. In fact, I always felt at home from the minute I arrived and since it was the beginning of the Marshall Plan, great groups of us got there at one time and we had these girls, all of us, staying at the old Yuksel Palas hotel. We just thought it was wonderful. We could go to work, still didn't know any Turkish, but could pick it up from other people. Then after we'd been there, we'd learn our way around and find an apartment. So, two of us went off and got an apartment. That was what it was when we first went there, we didn't know anything. We were close from the very beginning. I remember getting together in the bedrooms after we'd go upstairs and we'd sort of get together at night in our room to room upstairs. They would say, "now you know, they told us to be careful what we say, because the walls have ears." So, we had to be pretty careful.

Q: What was Ankara like in those days?

EDWARDS: It was really nice. I lived downtown. I mean after I got my apartment. It was the second floor of a large house that was owned by the diplomats at 39A Mithat Pasa Caddesi in downtown Yenisehir. The old city, Ulus, was way over there in the east. We found our way there, too and there was a wonderful dining place over there up at Ulus. I'll tell you about that later if you like. I wasn't afraid at all. I'd go into some of these completely unknown places. They'd give me some tea and I'd sit there, with not much Turkish at all. It was just nice as could be. The people downstairs where we lived were nice as could be. The ambassador's wife had a boy, a houseboy, who would bring things upstairs, fruit from the orchard. I felt real bad about this, but he wanted to get my coffee dregs because they had the Turkish kind, but he wanted to

get some of the coffee dregs. I just drank it one time and hardly used it and he had cooked the dregs again and ground them and did something with them, I don't know what.

Q: Oh, yes, you can get some more out of it.

EDWARDS: I'm sorry, now looking back on it, that I didn't give him pounds. He was young, so we had that.

Q: The people you worked for, who were you working for?

EDWARDS: Well, I was working for the Starch group in the Agency for International Development. In those days you probably may or may not know it was the ECA, FOA, MSA, well, much later it was called AID, well, it was that group.

Q: Did you get out on any field trips or anything like that?

EDWARDS: No, not officially, I would never have gone on a field trip as a secretary, but many times while I was in Turkey (I was there two years and we went out and did great things), there was a girl in our office who was Elly Vithynos, a Greek girl (you know, the Greeks had a pretty hard time there). For a while she went out and she came back in and she was working up in the business office. She conducted a tour for us to the Holy Land. I have 100 photos and a story this long to the Holy Land. We did other things and various others. No field trips, but we saw a lot of the countryside, thanks to Elly and various other people. You could also rent a taxi. We had a bad joke about the taxi driver, I'll tell you about that later.

Q: What about the relations with the rest of the embassy? Were you a part?

EDWARDS: Yes, at that time I wasn't that close to them, but I felt part of them and seems to me I knew his name, but I don't remember now. Oh, there was one Mabel Wright who was a really nice person to me and she had lived in Japan for a while and some other places. She had me take care of her cats one time and I'm scared to death of cats, but I don't remember, but I don't remember that we were really caught up so much in the embassy work. As an example, if one person gave a party, everybody in our mission would go to it, but I'm not sure, in my case; there wasn't much crossing over in that, except that time. Later on when I went back for a second tour of duty in the same country, ten years later, Kathy the secretary to the ambassador was always on the phone to me to be sure that I had scheduled the calendar right because I worked for the Mission Director and she worked for the Ambassador and those two had to keep together.

Q: Well, did you feel there was any threat or was there any problem being in Turkey?

EDWARDS: No, never. I never felt afraid. Never, never did they treat me in any way but the most friendly way.

Q: You were there to 1954 was it?

EDWARDS: From '51 to early '54 and then I went back again in '60 and stayed until '62.

Q: '62. What were you doing in Turkey?

EDWARDS: Well, in '62 I was there with Stuart Van Dyke.

Q: What was his position?

EDWARDS: Oh, I got Mr. Van Dyke, headed up because I was with Paul Rose in Kathmandu, but this was Van Dyke, he was the mission director. But the thing about it was, I was thinking about this girl this morning, Ella Lawson, she was his secretary before I got there, but she was not used to doing that type of work. I mean not at a high level. They eased her out and put me in and then when I got there I got instruction from her as to how she did things when she was sitting here and I would go to Ella, now what would you do about this. She was a wonderful, wonderful person and I'm in touch every now and then. I was working for Mr. Stuart Van Dyke, the mission director and I was there from '60 to '62. Then my time was up, but I should tell you, he was a wonderful person, but he had this mission deputy who I've forgotten, he just, you know.

Anyway, then there was another person there, Wade Latham. He's dead now, you'll read it in the book and find he's dead, but Wade Latham was sitting there. He had an office and he was Economic Officer for the American Embassy, which meant he was hand in glove with Mr. Van Dyke and he would sometimes show him things that I didn't even know he had, you know. Oh, another thing about his wife, Mrs. Van Dyke was a real, real problem. She wanted us to send a car for her little boy. She would want me to send a car for her little son to go and play baseball or something. I thought I got my instructions from the boss and not from the boss's wife and I had to be as nice and as gentle as I could, not to hurt his feelings, but anyway, I got over that. Then I came home after that and that was '60 to '62.

WILLIAM M. ROUNTREE
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1952-1953)

William M. Rountree was born in Georgia in 1917. In addition to serving in Turkey, he served in Iran, Greece, Pakistan, Sudan, South Africa, Brazil, and Washington, DC. Mr. Rountree was interviewed by Arthur Lowrie on December 22, 1989.

Q: Was it recognized at the time that the far reaching interpretation of the Truman Doctrine that it later took on that it really kind of applied across the world, rather than just to Greece and Turkey?

ROUNTREE: The real significance of the Truman Doctrine was exactly that. We embarked on an entirely new policy. The decision here was the forerunner of the Marshall Plan in Europe. The success of the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, I think, stimulated many other efforts in the Truman Administration, such as Point Four Program and the expansion of bilateral and multilateral treaty

arrangements with many countries in various areas. All of these things taken together were the most significant aspect of our ability to cope with Soviet expansionism.

During the course of my assignment to Greece, I was asked to return to Washington to become Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. The first director of that newly-created office under a reorganization plan was Jack Jernegan. The newly-designated Bureau of Near Eastern/South Asian and African Affairs under George C. McGhee, included, for the first time, an office to deal with Greece, Turkey and Iran, all peripheral to the Soviet Union. The reason for that is obvious. Those were the countries directly confronting the Soviet Union which had been subjected to the greatest pressures. They had a number of points in common as far as the execution of US policy was concerned. Jack remained as Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs a few months after I returned, and in May 1950 I took over as director.

Q: Were Greek-Turkish relations a big problem in those days?

ROUNTREE: In those days relations between Greece and Turkey did not constitute a major problem but, of course, historically relations between the two countries have never been close. During my period as director, I took on a special project to bring about the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO, an objective which had the full support and participation of my boss, George McGhee. It seemed to me that the strength in NATO was diminished by the absence of those two countries, and that logic required their inclusion. This view was very strongly held by George McGhee as Assistant Secretary and was strongly supported by the Turkish and Greek Ambassadors in Washington. After considerable effort on our collective parts, Greece and Turkey were admitted and, for some time after their inclusion in NATO, relations between the two countries were quite good. It was only later when events in Cyprus created concern on the part of the Turks that Enosis -- or union of Greece and Cyprus -- might take place that severe strains again appeared.

Q: Well, you had the opportunity of seeing both sides of that since, after serving back in Washington and having served in Greece, your next post was as DCM in Ankara for a little over a year anyway. Were there any big issues by that time during your assignment?

ROUNTREE: In Turkey my superior officer was again George McGhee, who left the position of Assistant Secretary of State in 1952 to accept an appointment as Ambassador to Turkey. I joined him as the Deputy Chief of Mission soon after his arrival at the post. I think the most significant aspect of his term of office there, and mine, was facilitating the effective entry of Turkey into NATO, and the negotiation of new agreements dealing with military facilities. The importance of our aid to Turkey, and our continued support for the Turks in building up their defense capabilities and improving their economy as a member of NATO and as an ally became increasingly important.

Q: In those early years of the Cold War and given the importance of those countries, what were the relations like within the Mission, say with the military, between the Embassy and the military aspect with the Pentagon, with the Economic Cooperation Administration? In other words, the interagency working. Were the State Department and the Ambassador pretty dominant at that

period, or more like it is today with some of the other agencies, particularly the military, being dominant?

ROUNTREE: I mentioned the problem in Greece before the decision was made to put all of our operations in Greece under the direction of a single man, the Ambassador. Once that was done in Greece, interagency relationships were better than good, they were excellent. And although there were inevitably differences of opinion among Washington agencies as to priorities and so forth, I would say in retrospect that difficulties were within very manageable proportions and relationships did not impair the effectiveness of our overall effort. In Turkey, during my tour of duty there, I think we had an almost ideal relationship among the country team, and there were relatively few differences among the Washington agencies. We had a strong and influential Ambassador, as well as able representatives of the military and other government departments. So I'd say that unlike the situation which no doubt has existed in some countries, our interagency problems in Greece and Turkey during this critical period were minimal.

Q: Do you think it's because there was a strong consensus about what our policy was or did it also have to do with a predominant role that the State Department had under General Marshall, under Acheson, under Dulles, or a combination?

ROUNTREE: I think it's all those things. There were very few differences among agencies with respect to the main thrust of American policies and certainly we were all operating under the direction of the President who was, as indicated by the Truman Doctrine, deeply interested in and instrumental in the execution of policies to achieve the objectives which he had set.

HERBERT DANIEL BREWSTER
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Paris, France (1952-1955)

Herbert Daniel Brewster was born in Greece of American parents in 1917. His first posting in Greece was as a clerk at the embassy in Athens from 1940-1942. He then served as a Foreign Service officer in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, France, Germany, Italy, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brewster's career focused on Greek affairs. He was interviewed in 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Let's go back to Paris; you were in NATO from 1952 to 1955. What was the relationship between Greece and Turkey that you were dealing with?

BREWSTER: Greece and Turkey were both admitted to NATO in November of 1951. That was the time when NATO was set up in Paris; Lord Ismay, the NATO Council, the whole shebang. We had nine officers who worked with Burke Elbrick and Edwin M. Martin: Martin Hillenbrand was "Mr. Germany;" Joe Scott, Mr. Italy, and so on. I was assigned to the two newest members that came in. The significant part was that they were new boys on the block and not very welcome. The Danes had voted against them, they had to be pulled around. What you were basically doing was having two-thirds of GTI suddenly a part of Europe.

Q: *GTI being Greece, Turkey and Iran?*

BREWSTER: Which is what we were a part of. It was like saying "You are now Europeans." They had a time adjusting. They both sent in first class teams to make the best impression on others; it was their first multi-lateral venture. Frequently they would come to us and say, "Well how are you going to vote on this?" "Tell us what that meant." "How do you see this as an issue that will affect us?" We were the listening "colleagues" where we could sit down with them and say, "Come on now, don't hold this one up just because of that word. This is what's being achieved." It was breaking them in. I was assigned primarily because I had been in Turkey and Greece and it made good sense, and I spoke the one language.

Q: *I remember many years later I was in Naples talking to a man, in the position you later became political advisor to, saying that really the Greek-Turkish combination was strictly that they were both keeping their eye on each other and that the Soviets were not the prime concern of either. What was the attitude here in the early fifties; how did our Greek and Turkish representatives look at the mission of NATO?*

BREWSTER: They liked it; it was bringing them into a new club and the club was influential countries where you could see people -- foreign ministers would come by. It was bringing them in from the outposts. And they weren't mad at each other; they were both as good as they could be but they didn't have bilateral problems. They didn't have overflight problems and things of that sort in any major way. They sent in their best teams in an effort to impress the other teams, the donor countries, that "we're deserving."

Q: *So they weren't at each other. But this was at the height of the Cold War, the Korean War was not yet over; how did they feel about the Soviet threat?*

BREWSTER: The Turks never spoke about it that I can think of, and the others -- I think it was just a reflection of their own guerilla war. I don't think they were worried about a Soviet thrust, but they were glad to follow what was being designed for Europe even though they were on the periphery of it: the strengthening that was being done in Germany, the role of Germany, the role of France in it. They were tag-enders; perhaps 10% of the effort was devoted to Greece and Turkey, the big issues were amongst the big countries involved.

Q: *Things had not settled down at that time; NATO was still growing, still in its early development stages.*

BREWSTER: There were big issues between the Germans and the French, in the rearming of the Germans. That was key.

Q: *How did you find your role? You had your two clients there; did you find yourself spending a lot of time with other Americans, and maybe other NATO representatives, acting as the friend in court for the Turks and the Greeks? Explaining their interests and desires to people maybe looking askance at these people from the periphery coming in?*

BREWSTER: No, I didn't sense that. In my contacts with them I didn't want to be interpreting what I thought the Greeks wanted. I didn't want to be in the role of an advocate because with a Greek or Turk you never know whether what they are saying is the position or whether they are going to go back and revise it. And then the boss says, "You never should have told them that." Bingo! There is so much in play on that side. But I was there at their beck and call; had they not come in I wouldn't have been there, that job would not have had to be filled. It came at a very good time and led in to the Turkish desk officer job.

DANIEL OLIVER NEWBERRY
Economic/Commercial Officer
Istanbul (1952-1956)

Daniel Oliver Newberry was born in Georgia in 1922. He received is bachelor's degree from Emory University in 1943. He then served overseas in the US Army from 1943- 1946. His career included positions in Jerusalem, Turkey, New York, Laos, Iran, Turkey, and Morocco. Mr. Newberry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.

Today is December 9, 1997. We are continuing with an interview of Dan Newberry. Dan, perhaps you can go into how you were assigned to this commercial course. When did you take this course?

NEWBERRY: It began at the end of 1951. During the last five months of my assignment to the consulate general in Jerusalem, I had been on temporary duty at the embassy in Tel Aviv, doing economic reporting. I received my "Home Leave" orders in September, 1951, with no "onward assignment" mentioned. However, I learned that I was being assigned to take a training course at the Department of Commerce after taking home leave in Atlanta. This training course was designed to teach younger Foreign Service officers how to do economic and commercial reporting.

So I reported to the Department of Commerce before I went on home leave. I learned some very instructive things about how the Foreign Service training system really worked, if you'll bear with me.

Q: Yes!

NEWBERRY: My supervisor at the embassy in Tel Aviv, Owen Jones, who, praise the Lord, is still living, told me: "I know the man who is in charge of that course at the Department of Commerce. His name is Herb Cummings. I'll write and let him know that you're going to be taking that course. When you get to Washington, look in on him."

When I arrived in Washington and reported in at the Department of Commerce, a secretary there said: "Mr. Cummings is on a field trip, but I'll make a note of your name. When he comes back from this trip, we'll arrange for you to come in and call on him."

Well, a couple of weeks went by, and I was well into the training course. Then I received word that I should come in to see Mr. Cummings. It turned out that Mr. Cummings had just come back from a trip to Turkey. I was very much interested in what was going on there. While Cummings was on this trip to Turkey, the chief of the Economic Section in Istanbul called his attention to the fact that a woman officer who was assigned to the Economic Section was about to leave on transfer to another post. The Department had not assigned her replacement. The chief of the Economic Section told Cummings: "What I really need is a bright-eyed and bushy-tailed, young Foreign Service officer, because there is a lot that can be made out of this job."

So, as it turned out, I was the first FSO who walked into Mr. Cummings' office, and he said: "How would you like to go to Istanbul?" If some other guy had walked into Cummings' office, he would probably have asked the same question, but it happened to be me. This was a very important event in my professional career. In fact, as we'll get around to talking about later, I did three tours of duty in Turkey and became something of a Turkish "specialist." This all got started because I happened to walk into Cummings' office at the right moment, and he asked me if I would like to go to Istanbul. I said: "Yes," but it was not as easily arranged as well this.

Q: What about the training course itself? What was the attitude in the Department of State toward the Department of Commerce at that time? Attitudes toward assignments to Commerce have varied over the years. I was wondering what attitudes were at that time.

NEWBERRY: My impression was that the attitude of State Department officers toward the Department of Commerce was very "cooperative." There was no particular resentment or disdain on the part of the younger Foreign Service officers attending this course toward an assignment to do economic or commercial work. Granted that my colleagues and I were fairly low down on the totem pole. I think that the guy who served the longest in our group taking the Department of Commerce course had been in the Foreign Service for about eight years. Of course, I had been in the Foreign Service for less than three years. We had not developed the tradition of disdain that you may have seen in other people.

Q: What was the emphasis in the training program?

NEWBERRY: A lot of it had to do with statistical analysis and how to gather and make use of statistical data. There was a lot of emphasis on what international trade agreements required the U.S. to do and what trade preferences were. It was sort of an undergraduate course in foreign trade. It was more or less "Foreign Trade 101."

Q: What was your impression when you completed the course? Did you feel a little more ready to tackle the problems of being an economic and commercial officer?

NEWBERRY: It might have been an illusion, but I did feel that I was better prepared to do economic and commercial work than I had been before I took the course.

Q: Then how did your assignment process work out?

NEWBERRY: That's what I wanted to add a footnote to, because everybody concerned seemed to be delighted that Dan Newberry was being assigned to Istanbul. I wrote all of the usual letters to the consul general and the ambassador. I began making my travel preparations and made a reservation on a ship, because we had to travel by ship in those days. I went on home leave. When that was over, I still had not yet received my travel orders to proceed up to New York to take the ship to Istanbul. By this time it was early in the New Year [1952]. I still didn't have any travel orders, and the Department didn't answer my letters.

So I came back to Washington. While I was waiting in the Office of Personnel, I overheard a conversation between two people. They had these "modular" walls [about five feet high and fairly thin] in those days. I heard a lady saying to her colleague: "We can't let Newberry go to Istanbul and replace a woman. There are very few places in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] where it is established that a woman can work effectively. I want to put a woman in that job." However, I was not to be deterred. So I got in touch with my "new friend," Mr. Cummings, over in the Department of Commerce and told him: "There are people over here in the State Department who are trying to 'thwart' you. They don't want me to go to Istanbul." He said: "I'll take care of that."

That was the last I heard of this problem. Within 48 hours I had my travel orders. I went up to New York and put my car on the ship I was traveling on, which was one of the group of ships known as the "Four Aces." That was the way we traveled in those days if our posts were on a sea lane. So that's how I went to Istanbul in early March, 1952.

Q: So by your fortuitous overhearing this conversation, you were able to resolve the problem. This is an example of a "low level, bureaucratic block."

NEWBERRY: It was, indeed, a "low level, bureaucratic block." It was simply a matter of the Office of Personnel trying to preserve a "slot" which they had earmarked for a woman. You might call it "reverse discrimination" in these days. Fortunately, I was lucky enough to be able to outmaneuver them. I got to Istanbul, and this was the beginning of a long and happy association with Turkey.

Q: This time you were in Istanbul from when to when?

NEWBERRY: From March, 1952, to August, 1956. This was rather a long time for a lower-ranking officer.

Q: Istanbul was a consulate general.

NEWBERRY: Right.

Q: What was your job at the consulate general in Istanbul? What was the official job title?

NEWBERRY: My assignment was to the Economic-Commercial Section in the consulate general. I had certain, specific reporting responsibilities. The most "picturesque" job was to prepare the quarterly report on "Filberts," or "Hazelnuts." This was in the days before we had an

agricultural attache in the embassy in Ankara. In the division of labor the embassy in Ankara had assigned the preparation of the "Filbert" report to the consulate general in Istanbul because most of the Turkish "Filbert" exporters had their offices in Istanbul [or "Stamboul" in French; the two names for the city were used interchangeably]. If you'll pardon my expression, I really "sank my teeth" into those hazelnuts and had a ball with them.

Also, I did a lot of the reporting on Turkish customs practices. I spent a lot of time studying and getting acquainted with the great, bureaucratic "maze" of Turkish import customs, because we had so many American business firms which were registering complaints of the difficulties and delays they were experiencing. Of course, as a junior officer, I fell heir to the most irksome duties to handle, but I found this quite an education.

Q: Could you talk about any of the problems created by the Turkish bureaucracy for American firms which were trying to work in Turkey in those days?

NEWBERRY: As I look back on this period, it seems to me that the Turkish restrictions were not particularly aimed at Americans, Europeans, or anyone else engaged in exporting goods to Turkey. Everyone faced the same, bureaucratic hurdles. Even to this day the Turks have not entirely shaken off the heritage of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Although by the 1980s the system had been relatively simplified, in the 1950s the old, Ottoman bureaucratic procedures and regulations were still very much in play. It was just impossible to get things done expeditiously, even by "passing money under the table," as some of the foreign businessmen did. The Turkish system was very old-fashioned. It was designed, not to encourage imports, but to protect what the Turkish bureaucracy thought was a budding, Turkish industry. In some cases there was no Turkish industry in a given field at all, but the Turkish bureaucracy was still "protecting" home industry, just in case it emerged.

Q: What did you do as a junior officer in the consulate general in Istanbul in dealing with these problems?

NEWBERRY: I set about systematically getting acquainted, mainly with the English-speaking officials in the Turkish Customs Office and in Turkish banking institutions. I was also picking up economic data along the way. In the whole Economic-Commercial Section of the consulate general we had three officers, plus the Section Chief, so there were four of us. We had a certain list of economic "indicators" which we had to collect data on.

We systematically made the rounds of our contacts in the market. In my case I could speak French. In those days most of the Turkish Jews spoke French, rather than English, so it was very useful for me to talk to Jewish businessmen in French. However, it took me a long while before I learned enough Turkish to conduct business in that language. So during the first two or three years that I was in Turkey I did not use Turkish as a working language.

Q: From your perspective, what was your impression of the Turkish economy during the period 1952-1956?

NEWBERRY: My impression was that it was really stagnant. All of the industry in Turkey of

any size at all was owned by the Turkish state. This was Kemal Ataturk's principle, which they called "etatism," or state ownership. Ataturk had decreed that at that stage of Turkey's development all industries should be owned by the state. In effect, state enterprises constituted perhaps 90 percent of the Turkish industrial base, with all that that entailed. There was the usual lack of vision that you get when so much of the economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises.

So this situation was very frustrating for American businessmen to deal with. Although the Turkish National Assembly passed a law to encourage foreign capital investment, it did not yield any results to speak of. Certainly, as far as traditional American exports like Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola were concerned, these were not available in the Turkish market. No foreign soft drinks could come into Turkey in the 1950s, for example. The same thing was true of textiles. The Turks had their own textile industry, and they certainly were not going to allow foreign competition for that industry. The import duties on textiles were very high. For example, if a Turkish lady went abroad and bought three meters of silk cloth in Paris to have a dress made out of it, she would probably have to pay three times the price of what she had paid for it, in Turkish customs duty. This is an example of how prohibitive it was for the average Turk in the 1950s to import anything into Turkey.

So it was rather a bleak scene, and the city of Istanbul looked that way. I had the impression, when I first arrived in Istanbul, that nothing had been done to "freshen up" the city since 1914!

Q: What was the Turkish government like? Obviously, Ankara was where the American ambassador was stationed. From what you gathered from your own observations and from comments of your colleagues, what kind of government did Turkey have when you arrived there in 1952? Did any changes take place during your first tour in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: It was something "new" for Turkey. The 1950 general elections in Turkey had been the first, really free and unfettered, democratic elections. The party of Ismet Inonu and his colleagues who had inherited the traditions of Kemal Ataturk was voted out of power. A new party, called the Democrat Party, led by Adnan Menderes, came into power in 1950. When I arrived in Turkey, this new government was still very much in the "bloom" of its success and riding high. Of course, the American government was smiling broadly on this phenomenon of a freely and democratically elected government in the Middle East. The only other such government that the American government could point to was Israel.

This situation had its pitfalls. Adnan Menderes was very shrewd and quick to exploit this situation. He spread the notion that he was the "chosen instrument" of Washington. We played this game, consciously or unconsciously. The first thing we knew was that Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party began to abuse their power. The American government was also "tarred with the same brush." We were regarded as not only condoning but encouraging Menderes to abuse his power. It was that kind of atmosphere.

Q: You say that Menderes was "abusing his power." We're talking about the situation during your first tour of duty in Turkey. What did we see as constituting an abuse of power?

NEWBERRY: There were very strong restrictions on the role of the other parliamentary parties and what they could do. There was a misuse of police power. Tax breaks were accorded to important members of the governing party, the Democrat Party. I can't give you a catalog of these abuses, since I was not assigned to the embassy. Therefore, I was not in the "direct line" of reporting.

However, since I was assigned to Istanbul, and Istanbul is really the capital of Turkey in every sense except politically, we would encounter Turkish national, political leaders and other leaders, whose "home base" was Istanbul. They might have been in Parliament or even in the government, and we had a chance to talk to them. Although I was a fairly junior vice consul, I managed to talk to some of these Turkish political figures. Certainly, I heard from our consul general and more senior officers what they were picking up and reporting.

The whole atmosphere was very difficult from the point of view of a "constituent post" under the embassy in Ankara. I'm sure that other people, recalling those years, observed a common phenomenon that the American ambassador and the embassy, in the capital, felt that they had the best vantage point for looking at the government that they were accredited to. They tended to the view that "all of those people out in the provinces" just didn't understand the situation. That was very much a part of the attitude of the American embassy in Ankara toward American officials stationed at the consulate general in Istanbul. For our part we thought that we were living among the "movers and shakers" and that we had a special point of view.

Q: Who was our ambassador at that time? Were there several ambassadors who served during the time you were in Istanbul?

NEWBERRY: There were several. Let's see. When I first came to Turkey, George McGhee was still ambassador. He was a political appointee of the Democratic Party in the U.S. Despite the fact that Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election of 1952, the Republicans didn't get around to replacing Ambassador McGhee until the late spring of 1953.

I wouldn't fault Ambassador McGhee for the relatively narrow view taken by the embassy in Ankara, because he used to come to Istanbul often. He kept an apartment in the building of the consulate general, which used to be a combined residence and office when the American embassy was in Constantinople, as Istanbul used to be called. Ambassador McGhee balanced the outlook of the Istanbul metropolis with the views of the relatively "provincial" capital in Ankara. He did this very neatly by often visiting Istanbul himself. He was gracious enough to talk even to the junior officers in the consulate general. He learned their points of view himself. He got to know what our people in the consulate general in Istanbul were hearing and thinking about.

I would have to say that his successors as ambassador, and the comparison is rather invidious, took a different point of view. His immediate replacement was Averill Warren, God rest his soul, and then Fletcher Warren, and God rest his soul, too. I think that Fletcher Warren was American Ambassador to Turkey for a longer period of time. Fletcher Warren was really a "Latin America" hand. He had been Ambassador to several Latin American countries. He was a very distinguished gentleman. However, I think that he was really "out of his element" in the Middle East. His idea of being an effective ambassador was to give Prime Minister Menderes whatever he wanted, if it was in the power of the United States government. Ambassador Fletcher Warren

did not want his "constituent posts" reporting things that reflected against Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

Well, we've heard that before. I'm sure that you've interviewed people who served in Iran and who were discouraged from sending in reports which reflected adversely on the Shah.

Q: Oh, yes! Did you feel, even in your position, that you were getting from other reporting officers in Istanbul sort of a feeling that they couldn't report the kinds of things that they wanted to report?

NEWBERRY: I certainly felt this myself. I'll give you a very specific instance. I'll have to "jump ahead" a little.

Q: Could you stick to the 1952-1956 time period?

NEWBERRY: All right. I'm now jumping ahead to 1955. There had been the so-called "Cyprus riots," and we can come back to that. However, just to make this point. I had become acquainted with a person whom I considered a rather "elderly" American citizen. He was a naturalized American citizen who lived in Istanbul. He doesn't seem so "elderly" in retrospect. [Laughter] He must have been at least 65 at this time I am speaking of.

Q: My God, that's old!

NEWBERRY: He was married to a granddaughter of Sultan Abdul Hamid. He and the granddaughter lived in sort of "seedy splendor" across the Bosphorus Straits in one of those great estates that the Ottoman Princes and Princesses and wives of the Sultans had. He lived right next to one of these estates, which had no heating at all, I must add. It was very uncomfortable to go and visit him and have tea in the wintertime. However, I went, because I was fascinated. Actually, this American citizen's mother-in-law was the last surviving widow of Sultan Abdul Hamid, [the last Turkish Sultan, dead by this time]. He was living in the same building with her son-in-law. However, she never emerged, so I never met this old lady, who really was well on in years. She must have been in her 90s at this time.

What I'm leading up to is this. One day, in the middle of a snowstorm, at the end of 1955, I guess it was, I had received a telephone call from this Turkish-American. He said that he had something "terribly important" to tell me and that he had to see me right away. He said that he couldn't come to see me at the consulate general because his wife was "indisposed." He said: "Dan, you've got to come over here. I've got something terribly urgent to tell you."

So I went out to see him. From his point of view what he had to tell me WAS terribly urgent, because what he had picked up from the Turkish military garrison right next door to his wife's estate was an open discussion of the beginnings of a plot by the military to overthrow the Adnan Menderes government. I listened to him very carefully. As soon as I got back to the consulate general, I made my notes and drafted a report about what I'd been told and what questions I'd asked my friend. I didn't talk to any of the military attaches assigned to the consulate general. I felt that my Turkish-American friend was pretty astute, and he took this report very seriously, as

I did.

I showed this report to the consul general. The consul general looked absolutely terrified. He said: "Well, I think that we'd better send this to the embassy in Ankara. Don't send it to Washington." So that's what I did. I sent it in the CONFIDENTIAL diplomatic pouch to Ankara, and that's as far as it went. It was never reported to the Department. Then, lo and behold, the Turkish military overthrew the Menderes government. Washington might have had a good two years of lead time to collect additional intelligence on this event, because the report was in such detail. According to my friend, the military officers involved in this coup d'etat talked about their contacts throughout the Turkish military structure. At least this report could have assisted our intelligence people, if no one else, in tracking down what was going on. However, our embassy in Ankara decided to "bury" Dan Newberry's report.

I was in a position to check out what, if anything, had happened to this report. A few years later I was assigned to the Turkish desk in Washington in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs]. I went through the files, and there was no sign that my report had ever reached Washington. That's how I knew that the embassy in Ankara had simply "buried" this report.

Q: Who was our consul general at this time?

NEWBERRY: At the time I wrote that report the consul general was Robert McAtee.

Q: Were reports normally sent directly to Washington from the Consulate General in Istanbul, rather than through the embassy in Ankara?

NEWBERRY: Yes. Our consuls general, for the most part, exercised their discretion. If I may say so, Mr. McAtee was "retired in place." He knew that Istanbul was his last post in the Foreign Service and, by his body language and other behavior, he let everybody know that he really didn't want to "trouble the waters." However, the other consuls general in Istanbul, and I guess that I served under four of them during my four and one-half years in Istanbul, included Burt Matthews, Arthur Richardson, and Bob Miner, who was the last of them.

These consuls general were all quite insistent on their "right" to report directly to Washington. They "got away" with it, although they had to be somewhat circumspect about this. There was really a "running battle" between the consuls general and the embassy in Ankara. Naturally, the ambassador didn't like such "independent minded" consuls general. Most of the consuls general were very distinguished, senior Foreign Service officers who weren't about to be mere "flunkies." If they learned something that Washington might not know about, they reported it.

I'm coming up to a specific case. I mentioned the "Cyprus riots." This is another case which I will tell you about.

Q: Before we come to the "Cyprus riots," how did you handle daily business there in Istanbul, just to give us a "feel" for the atmosphere? You were sent out there to be a "bright-eyed, bushy-tailed" young officer. How did you behave under the circumstances?

NEWBERRY: All right, if I can "brag" about myself.

Q: Sure! It's your microphone.

NEWBERRY: One of the first things I did, while I was still "getting my bearings" in Istanbul, was that I talked to the chief of the Economic/Commercial Section about this quarterly "Filbert" or "Hazelnut" report. I said: "I can't very well write reports on 'Hazelnuts.' I've never seen a hazelnut bush or tree. I've studied the map, and all of the hazelnuts grow out on the Black Sea [northern] coast of Turkey. I would like to go out there and look at them." Apparently, nobody had ever bothered to do that before.

It turned out that there was what they called the "Friday Mail." This was a coastal boat which left from Istanbul and touched at all of the ports along the Black Sea coast of Turkey. I took along an interpreter from the consulate general, and he and I went on this ship. It was a very picturesque experience. It was my very first time out of Istanbul. I was really getting to see some of the heart of Anatolia.

For me this trip was just a "ball," even before I started to report on hazelnuts! So we got off at the port farthest from Istanbul, Trabzon. We went to a local hotel. I think that we paid the equivalent of about \$0.50 for our beds. Then we took cross country "jitney taxis" from one place to another. I visited a number of little, hazelnut exporting places along the Black Sea. Of course, hazelnut plants are not just shrubs. They sometimes grow into full size trees. I saw tens of thousands of them and learned a lot about hazelnut cultivation. I talked to the local owners and growers of hazelnuts. In addition to having a wonderful time getting to see part of Turkey, I had a basis for understanding what hazelnut production was all about.

The reason that all of this was of such interest to the United States government was that the hazelnut or filbert producers in Northern California and Oregon were determined to keep Turkish hazelnuts out of the U.S. market. The U.S. Department of Agriculture constantly wanted updated information on Turkish hazelnut production. There was an elaborate procedure for deciding what the tariffs should be on imported, Turkish hazelnuts. Anyway, I learned about Turkey, and the information which I obtained played right into my hands.

I remember that one of the "by-words" around the consulate general in Istanbul, because I had so much fun with this, was that people called me the "Attache aux Noisettes." This was French for calling me the "Hazelnut Attache." On one occasion someone was visiting my office and said: "Oh, where is Mr. Newberry?" The reply was: "Oh, he's probably gone out to count the hazelnut trees!" [Laughter] Anyway, that was more picturesque, and it did not occupy all that much of my time.

Q: No, but it helped you to get out and see the situation. You can talk much better about it. In fact it represents one of the "dangers" that officers, and particularly economic officers, can get involved in. That is, they may tend to rely on reports that come into the office.

NEWBERRY: That's right. That's one of the pitfalls you face, and I learned to remind myself to avoid it. The Turks had a superb, research institution in Istanbul called the "Turkish

Development Bank." This bank had some of the best analysts, statisticians, market researchers, and so forth. I could just have gone down to the Turkish Development Bank, obtained a copy of their "handouts," and written my reports without going anywhere out of Istanbul. This bank turned out really first-rate reports, but that was not what I wanted to do.

Like many people in the Foreign Service, I very early developed the feeling that I don't like to write about things that I don't understand. This was one of the impelling things about my reporting responsibilities. Before I wrote anything, I wanted to understand it. My way of understanding it was on a "hands on" basis.

Q: Something that you just mentioned strikes a chord with me. I never served in Turkey, but I've observed it from other places. In particular I have spent about nine years in the Balkans. One thing about Turkey, even in those days, is that it sounds as if the Turks still had this almost "Byzantine" bureaucracy. At the same time they were developing some very bright people. The Turks seem to have gone very well into banking and statistics and were very modern people in this sense. They had a cadre of well-trained people, which is still true today. Did you notice this "dichotomy" between a "Byzantine" bureaucracy and very bright and capable people?

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. Even as an experienced, older officer, I was struck by the irony between the clever way that officials in the Turkish government often behaved and all of these "idiotic" customs regulations which they had adopted. Actually, the Turks had been very far-sighted in sending their bright, young men, and sometimes their bright, young women, off to Europe and the United States for graduate studies and so forth. They had set up, even during Kemal Ataturk's time, and he died in 1938, a program to train people in up to date techniques. So the Turkish government had the resources in terms of personnel and brainpower to do a lot more than their policies allowed them to do.

When the time came, when it was politically possible to break out of these antiquated and restrictive practices, the trained cadre were in place. So at a certain point in modern Turkish history this process sort of exploded, because the people were ready and willing to do more and, in fact, were even "raring" to do so.

Q: I know that when I was in Athens, in the 1970s, my wife was teaching at a private school. There were several Turkish students in her classes. I think that they were all young women of high school age. My wife was particularly impressed by both the willingness to study and hard work displayed by these Turkish students, as well as their "patriotism." They wanted to do something for their country. Did you find that this was a very prevalent attitude among the educated classes in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: Yes, I can say "Amen" to that. Patriotism is something that you find among most Turks. Of course, Kemal Ataturk and the so-called "children of Ataturk" of that generation were raised in that way. The whole "liturgy" of public life really "drove home" the message of Turkish patriotism. However, I found this attitude particularly among the educated women. Over the years of my exposure to Turkish society, I came to understand that modern Turkish women understood that Ataturk's "revolution" is what made it possible for women in Turkey to be something other than bearers of children. Therefore, the Ataturk "revolution" was something to

cherish and work for. That was the wellspring of Turkish women's patriotism, which they passed on to their sons and daughters.

Q: What about social contacts, in particular? How did you find social contacts with the Turks, as a young officer?

NEWBERRY: Actually, it was a great blessing to be the lowest ranking officer in the consulate general because I was often not included in the usual, representational functions. I was "free as a bird" most of the time. So I could go out, make new Turkish friends, and spend time with people who had nothing to do with my assigned reporting responsibilities.

As a consequence, by the time I finished my first tour in Istanbul, I had a very broad range of acquaintances, especially in the cultural field. We'll come to that part of it in a minute. As a consequence, during my last year in Istanbul, I was seconded to USIS [United States Information Service] to be the cultural affairs officer. This assignment was given to me because I had exploited the opportunities available to me. Nobody had been paying attention to what this young vice-consul was doing socially. I hope I didn't use this opportunity inappropriately.

Q: Did you find that the official, social life was almost a form of "entrapment?" This is often a problem at an embassy.

NEWBERRY: I found what I saw of the official, social life to be tedious in the extreme. It seemed to me that at the senior level social life consisted of most of those 25 or 30 foreign consuls general in Istanbul entertaining one another. I remember reading an economics textbook in college with a chapter called, "Taking in One Another's Washing." I saw that among the consuls general. I swore that if I ever got to be a Consul General, I would not indulge in that kind of activity. It was very much a "way of life" for people at that level. An awful lot of their time and meager, representational resources were spent entertaining other consuls general.

Q: Well, how did this business of "taking in each other's washing" work out, as far as the work was concerned?

NEWBERRY: I think that one of the most easily detectable effects of it was that senior officers picked up traditional prejudices from one another. Most of the consulates in Istanbul in those days, in the 1950s, still had non-Muslim, local employees. They were often ethnic Greeks, ethnic Armenians, and ethnic Jews who, for various reasons, tended to look down on the Muslim Turks. That attitude had a whole historic and cultural side to it. In this way the consuls general and the foreign staff in the various consulates picked up, and this applied to the American consulate general, too, most of their understanding of what Turks were like, as filtered to them through the eyes and ears of a minority group of non-Turkish employees who worked for them.

Q: Could you characterize the prevailing attitude of the upper echelon of the officers in the American consulate general and perhaps even of our embassy toward the Turks at this particular time?

NEWBERRY: I wouldn't want to do an injustice to anybody. I think that the attitude of

particularly senior officers varied from person to person. I know, for example, that Bob Miner, who was the last consul general in Istanbul that I served under, really had a great fondness for the Turks. He had taken the trouble, over the years, to learn to speak enough Turkish so that he had a real "feel" for Turkish culture and attitudes. I really don't know about the attitude of the other consuls general in Istanbul. Some of the middle grade officers in the consulate general simply regarded Istanbul as another post in the Foreign Service. Some of us, like myself, found Turkey a very "special" place and the Turkish people a very "special" people. This was just my own prejudice, but I felt that there were all too few Americans who realized what an opportunity it was to be in Turkey and what a remarkable people they were living among.

Q: Could you talk about the "Cyprus riots," what they were and what led up to them?

NEWBERRY: This may be a little bit out of sequence, but in the mid 1950s the British were indicating to us, as they had done in Palestine, that they wanted to reduce their responsibilities in the Middle East. In Greece they had turned over their responsibilities to us in the late 1940s. They indicated to us in the mid 1950s that they were going to give up Cyprus. So there was a lot of political maneuvering going on. As I look back on the situation in Istanbul, it strikes me that up until 1955, by which time I had been in Turkey for three years, I never heard anything about the subject of Cyprus. Cyprus did not appear to be something that was part of the "liturgy" of Turkish patriotism, and so forth.

This may only be "hearsay" on my part, and I suppose that the historians have dug into this. There are a lot of Turks today who feel that the British government deliberately aroused the interest of the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on the subject of Cyprus to "mitigate" Greek influence on that island. The British have often used the tactic of "divide and conquer." At least, that is often the Middle Eastern view of British statecraft. These Turks, of whom I speak, think that the reason why the Turks were so stirred up about Cyprus is that the British put them up to it. Of course, by 1955 Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his Foreign Minister, Fatim Rustu Zorlu, were desperately looking for "distractions" because the Turkish economy wasn't doing as well as it should. There were pretty good indications that in the next elections they might not even be the majority political party. So the Cyprus issue came to them as an invitation to "stir up the Turkish people," and that is precisely what they did.

Q: Could you explain what the situation was in Cyprus?

NEWBERRY: In 1955? Well, the British were still exercising sovereignty over Cyprus. What they were doing was to look for a way to sort out, not only the Greek and Turkish Cypriot interest on the island but, more importantly, what the governments in Ankara and Athens would have to say about Cyprus.

While all of this maneuvering was going on, someone set off a bomb in early September, 1955, in the house in Salonika, Greece, where Kemal Ataturk was born. When Ataturk was born there in 1881, Salonika was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of all of the difficulties between Greece and Turkey, the house he was born in had until then been preserved as a kind of "shrine." Immediately after this incident was reported in Turkey, and the first thing anyone knew, there were anti-Greek mobs in the streets of Istanbul and Izmir. The mobs were protesting against this

"outrage." Then it later turned out that the Turkish government had arranged for the bomb to be thrown against Ataturk's birthplace.

Q: Good God!

NEWBERRY: It really was an outrageous, worthless thing for the Turkish government to do. Of course, I was there in Istanbul and I saw the riots developing in Istanbul on September 6, 1955. I saw Turkish government trucks bringing in people from the outlying slums of Istanbul to demonstrate against the Greeks. This could only have been done with the connivance of the Turkish government. The mobs in Istanbul simply went wild, destroying all of the shops in the central part of Istanbul which they imagined to be owned by foreigners. Since most of the foreign shops were owned by non-Muslims, that meant pretty much all of the shops in downtown Istanbul.

As it turned out, at this time Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his retinue were on a train, going back to Ankara. It was hours before they could get the news to him that the whole riot in Istanbul and Izmir had gotten out of hand. So it was not until about midnight, as I recall, before the word got back from Prime Minister Menderes. He "blew the whistle" and stopped the riot. The Turkish government sent in the Army with tanks to get the rioters off the streets. So this riot went on from late afternoon on September 6 for six or seven hours. However, the strange thing about all of this was that there was no loss of life! Apparently, the rioters had instructions to destroy only property but not to hurt anybody.

Now I'm coming up to a point about this business of reporting. Naturally, as soon as the riots were over and we had to pick our way over all of the broken glass around Istanbul, Consul General Arthur Richards deployed all of us to get as much circumstantial, eyewitness material as we could get. He conferred, first of all, with the Greek consul general who naturally had heard many of the "horror stories" about the riots. The Greek consul general assured him that nobody was killed.

The point I'm leading up to is that as soon as we could get a reporting cable on the riots back to Washington, Consul General Arthur Richards sent it into Washington, with a copy to the embassy in Ankara and a copy to our other Consulates in Turkey. Well, the ambassador in Ankara was furious that the consul general in Istanbul had sent this report directly to Washington. However, Consul General Arthur Richards stood his ground and continued to report directly to Washington. What happened was that, from the ambassador's point of view, about three or four days later he sent one of his second secretaries, a Turkish speaking embassy officer, down to Istanbul to do an "independent" report. The consul general saw what was happening. He called us in and said: "Be courteous to this embassy officer. He's going to cover the same ground that we have, but don't interfere with his reporting. But don't get into any 'who struck John' conversations with him. Let him do his work." This is what the embassy officer did, but we never saw a copy of his report.

Q: Were you reporting that these riots had occurred with the connivance of the Turkish government and that trucks were bringing in the rioters from the countryside?

NEWBERRY: I asserted, without really researching the matter, that I had personally seen trucks with the markings of Turkish state enterprises, bringing these people into Istanbul. Although, in the strictest sense, I wasn't taking pictures of the trucks, as it turned out, everybody in Turkey has now acknowledged that the riots were "contrived" and organized by the Turkish government. We reported this, and that's what upset the ambassador in Ankara so much.

Q: When did it become apparent that the Menderes government had actually arranged to have the bomb set off at Ataturk's birthplace in Salonika?

NEWBERRY: That became clear much later, although suspicion that this was the case was widely reported. I think that it was several years later before somebody sort of "spilled the beans" and provided circumstantial evidence that the bomb was planted by agents of the Turkish government. That little bit of "clandestine information" took a long time to surface.

Q: Why were these called the "Cyprus riots"?

NEWBERRY: Because Cyprus was in the atmosphere. Negotiations on Cyprus were going on, and the slogans being "flung about" on the airwaves and newspapers all had to do with Cyprus. The explosion of the bomb that went off at Ataturk's birthplace in Salonika was associated with some sort of slogan having to do with Cyprus, although I would have to research this further. Anyway, everybody understood that the Turks were rioting over Cyprus, and these disturbances have always been referred to as the "Cyprus riots." On a smaller scale riots were going on in Izmir, too. However, since I wasn't in Izmir, I won't go into that.

Q: During and prior to these riots in 1955, had there been much in the press about the plight of the poor Turks in Cyprus who were a minority, what the Greeks were allegedly doing to them, and all of that?

NEWBERRY: No, there was very little material of that kind in the Turkish press. It all just seemed to surface during 1955. Certainly, during my first year in Istanbul [1952], the situation facing the Turks in Cyprus was not something that you heard about. Now, the Turkish minority in Greece was another matter. The Turks were always complaining about them. That's a complicated story, because the Turkish minority in Greece, in Western Thrace, was supposed to be assured of having certain rights by the Treaty of Lausanne, just as the Greek minorities in Turkey were assured of certain rights under the same treaty. Those were the issues that we read about in the press. However, the condition of the Turkish community in Cyprus was just something that never came up in the press.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Greek community in Istanbul?

NEWBERRY: Very much so. In our Economic-Commercial Section in the consulate general in Istanbul three of our five Foreign Service nationals were ethnic Greeks. Through them I got to meet a lot of people in that community. At that time I made friends with some Americans, art restorers, who were cleaning the mosaics and frescoes at the church of Kariye Camii St. Saviour in Chora, that little jewel of a Byzantine church in Istanbul. Through them I met a lot of other Greek Orthodox people. So I had lots of contacts with the Greeks.

In those days before the "Cyprus riots" the Greek neighborhoods of Istanbul were among the most interesting places that you could go in the evening. There were Greek "tavernas" where everybody, Greeks and Turks alike, were singing and getting drunk together. There was a wonderful atmosphere there. However, all of that came to an end after the "Cyprus riots."

Q: How did that manifest itself?

NEWBERRY: First of all, the Turks just stopped patronizing the Greek restaurants, tavernas, and so forth. The ethnic Greeks in Istanbul were obviously beginning to think that maybe they ought to "get out" of Turkey. So Greeks and Turks kept their distance from one another after that, and a lot of Greeks emigrated from Turkey.

Q: While you were in Istanbul, as this Greek-Turkish distrust became more evident, did you have any "feel" about the political pressure coming from the United States? There is no particular Turkish vote in the U.S., but there sure as hell is a Greek vote in our country. Did you feel any of that at this time?

NEWBERRY: Not at this time, Stu. I think this whole issue of Greek-American pressure on the U.S. government was a little slow in developing. After all, the British were still the sovereign power in Cyprus, and the status of Cyprus was considered a British, not an American problem. It was only after the British, Greeks, and Turks worked out what were called the "London-Zurich Accords" in 1959 or 1960 that there was an occasion or vantage point from which the United States could legitimately be expected to exercise pressure on the Turks. And the pressure came, for sure.

Q: When did Turkey become a member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]?

NEWBERRY: I believe that Turkey was actually voted into NATO at the end of 1951. It may have been December, 1951, or something like that.

Q: So you arrived in Istanbul...

NEWBERRY: In March, 1952.

Q: So Turkey was already a member of NATO.

NEWBERRY: It was a brand new member, and so was Greece. They were the two, new members of NATO.

Q: From your perspective and from what you were hearing at the consulate general in Istanbul, did Turkish entry into NATO make much of a difference?

NEWBERRY: Oh, very much so. This development certainly got everybody thinking about our relations with Turkey and why Turkey was important. Turkey was now being integrated into the whole scheme of Western defense in the stand against Soviet aggression and so forth. Oh, yes.

This made Turkey definitely important. Of course, Turkey had already gained some repute from the behavior of the Turkish Brigade in South Korea during the Korean War. The fact was that the Turks had already shown what they could do on the battlefield in South Korea, where they performed marvelously, of course.

Everybody seemed to think that the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO was "great." The Europeans clearly felt the same way. There were no misgivings, except back in the political capitals of Europe where there were people who didn't want either Greece or Turkey in NATO. However, the admission of Greece and Turkey was due to U.S. pressure. We "twisted arms" to accomplish this. In 1951 George McGhee was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He was generally credited for "masterminding" the whole strategy of bringing Greece and Turkey into NATO. Naturally, when he came out to Turkey to be the American ambassador, he was a "super hero" and is still so regarded by the Turks. Ambassador McGhee, thank God, was still going strong at the time. He went back to Turkey and is still regarded as one of Turkey's favorite Americans!

Q: How did you view the threat from the Soviet Union against Turkey at that time?

NEWBERRY: I don't think that the fact that we were in Turkey made so much difference as the fact that most Foreign Service officers were convinced that the Soviet Union had "aggressive designs" and that international communism was something that prepared us to take the whole danger of Soviet aggression very seriously. And, of course, the fact that Turkey was geographically that much closer to the Soviet Union only reinforced that view in Turkey.

However, I knew that most Foreign Service officers in the 1950s had no doubt that the path of wisdom was to stop Soviet aggression before it went any further.

Q: When you were talking to your Turkish friends, was the Soviet Union a subject of concern to them?

NEWBERRY: It was, in some instances. I should say that it was more on the mind of the Turks than in our minds. The Turkish attitude toward dealing with the Soviet Union was epitomized, in my mind by what a young Turkish diplomat said to me back in the 1950s. This came up in regard to some outrage which the Soviet government had committed, and the American government had given a rather lukewarm response to, in the minds of the Turks. This Turkish diplomat said: "I know that you don't want to use the atom bomb, but give us a bomb, and we'll drop it on the Soviets." That sort of epitomizes the Turkish attitude in those years.

Q: Were there any other developments in Turkey during this 1952 to 1956 period that come to mind?

NEWBERRY: Regarding the period from 1952 to 1956 I can tell you some things that were NOT going on. The Turks were sublimely, if I can misuse this word, oblivious to the rest of the Middle East. The Turks have traditionally disdained the Arabs. They feel that the Arabs "stabbed them in the back" during World War I. They were not particularly interested in their Arab neighbors, except for Iraq. They took great care to stay on speaking terms with Iraq. Apart from

that and in retrospect, considering what was going on in the Middle East, the fact that the Turks were so little involved is the reverse of something that happened. It was a "non happening." Furthermore, at the end of 1956, when the British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt, this came as a big "thunderbolt" to the Turks. This reminded the Turks that the Middle East was right there, South of Turkey.

Q: You're referring to the "Suez Crisis."

NEWBERRY: Yes, the Suez Crisis.

Q: One last question on this. What about the visits to Turkey of ships of the Sixth Fleet of the U.S. Navy? Did you have any such visits to Istanbul, and how did they go?

NEWBERRY: We had many visits by ships of the Sixth Fleet. Of course, the Turks were delighted to have these visits. One of the great things that I have often pointed out is that the most important, single event in the history of U.S.-Turkish relations happened before I arrived in Turkey. It happened in 1946 when the battleship, USS MISSOURI, arrived in the port of Istanbul, bearing the remains of the Turkish ambassador to the United States who had died in Washington during World War II. This was the first opportunity to return his remains for burial in his native soil. President Harry Truman saw this as an opportunity to drive a point home to the Soviets, so he chose the most famous battleship in the U.S. Navy and sent the remains of the Turkish ambassador back to Turkey. The Turks understood this symbol very clearly.

To this day, in 1997, Turks continue to remember just exactly where they were standing when they caught sight of the USS MISSOURI coming into the port of Istanbul. It was like Americans who can remember where they were when they heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 or when they heard about the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. Many Turks remember that event in 1946. This is a rather long-winded response to your question. However, that was the first ship visit to Turkey. Then, when Turkey became a member of NATO, it became a matter of routine for ships of the Sixth Fleet to visit Istanbul. There were never any problems, nobody demonstrated against these visits, there were no "Yankee, Go Home" meetings, or any of that. The USO [United Services Organization] came out, and the American community rallied around. The Sixth Fleet ship visits were always a great occasion for members of the American community to show their pride.

Q: Did the problems of the Kurds or the Armenians arise at all, or was that more or less in the bailiwick of the embassy in Ankara?

NEWBERRY: Both of those subjects were pretty much "suppressed" in those days. As a matter of fact, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1950s, and for many years thereafter, would never acknowledge that there were such people as Kurds in the Republic of Turkey.

Q: They were referred to as "Mountain Turks."

NEWBERRY: They were called "Mountain Turks" or simply non Turkish speaking Turks. It was that bad. You simply could not have a discussion with any Turkish government official

about the Kurds.

As far as the Armenians were concerned, this was all about a fairly hideous memory of what had happened to the Armenians in 1915 and previously. However, the Armenian community that was left in Turkey was mainly in Istanbul. Of course, the Istanbul Armenians were never subjected to all of that persecution. They may have had relatives who lived in other parts of Turkey and who were driven out of their homes, perished on the road, and so forth. However, I believe that, whether the Turkish government inspired these anti-Armenian actions in eastern Turkey, they never did anything like that in Istanbul. So there was only the memory of the horror and not the direct impressions of it on the part of Armenians living in Istanbul.

Q: What about the cultivation of hashish, opium poppies, and all of that. Was that an issue at this time?

NEWBERRY: It was not an issue. We were aware that there was some illegal trafficking, on a localized basis, in opium and opium derivatives. However, now that you ask me about it in this context, I think that the whole issue of the world-wide trafficking in opium and opium derivatives had not developed to such an extent by the early 1950s that Turkey was brought into the controversy. However, the traffic was definitely going on. Of course, the Turkish government had a stake in this traffic because it was getting revenue from the legitimate or licit cultivation of opium for use in legitimate medicines. The opium went into the Turkish government's own factories which were producing authorized "alkaloids."

However, the traffic in hashish and opium was not a big, political issue and was not something that the American embassy and consulates had to worry about in the 1950s.

Q: Today is December 16, 1997. Dan, we have you coming back to the Turkish desk in the late summer of 1958. You were on the Turkish desk from when to when?

NEWBERRY: I don't remember the exact dates, but it was from the late summer of 1958 until November, 1959.

Q: How did the Turkish desk fit into the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at that time?

NEWBERRY: Turkey was one of three countries in an organization called the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, also known by the acronym of "GTI." Although Cyprus was beginning to be treated as a separate entity, I recall that Archer Blood was working in GTI. He later went on to greater glory. Cleo Noel was working on Cyprus, and Grad Mawser was working on Iran. The Turkish desk was larger in those days, so I had an officer senior to me as the officer in charge of Turkish Affairs, Guy Hope. I was the number two officer on the Turkish desk. We worked under the general direction of the office director for Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Owen Jones.

Q: During the 1958-1959 period what were the major issues that you found yourself dealing with on the Turkish desk?

NEWBERRY: The major subject that I recall, and I'm sure that I dealt with many others, was the whole set of problems associated with the growing, American military presence in Turkey. The Pentagon, the State Department, and other U.S. government agencies found that it was very convenient for us to have an "open door" in Turkey. The Prime Minister of Turkey was very glad to have his country seen as a "chosen instrument" of the United States.

I remember vividly, I must say, and on my own initiative, since I had seen the signs of this tendency before I left Turkey in 1956, that I prepared a paper pointing to the dangers of the growing American military presence in Turkey. The number of American military personnel in Turkey was approaching 10,000. I thought that a presence of this size was full of potential trouble and was already beginning to reflect such trouble. This was in terms of the inevitable collisions of American servicemen with Turkish traditions, institutions, and traffic. The American presence in Turkey was beginning to be a big, big problem.

This was a time when the NATO "Status of Forces" agreement was being negotiated with Turkey. The application of a "Status of Forces" agreement standard allowed the American military to "declare" an incident involving an infraction of Turkish law as being committed while the American serviceman involved was "on duty," in which case it was beyond the reach of the Turkish courts. This was already giving us a lot of problems and was going to create even bigger problems later on.

I recall that this was the main problem that I worked on. Of course, I worked on other subjects. There was the growing, political dissension and the exasperation of the Turkish body politic with the regime of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. It became more and more repressive, putting restrictions on opposition parties, which I alluded to in an earlier part of this oral history. There were signs that the Turkish military was plotting to get rid of the Adnan Menderes regime. Lo and behold, the Turkish military did just that, shortly after I left the Turkish desk early in 1960.

Q: Going back to the American presence in Turkey, did you have any contact with people at the Pentagon on this matter, or did you have any discussion with your superiors on this issue?

NEWBERRY: No. There were discussions on this subject, but I was not directly involved in them. My immediate superior, Guy Hope, and his superiors had their own liaison arrangements with the Pentagon. That was just not one of the things that they assigned to me to handle.

great deal of this liaison was handled in the field between the American embassy and the MAG [Military Advisory Group] or, as they called it in Turkey, the JUSMAT [Joint United States Military Advisory Group in Turkey], as well as the U.S. Air Force in Turkey. This was a very "stormy" relationship. At one point, in 1959, I found myself on a visit to Turkey, right in the middle of a big investigation of a currency scandal, involving a full colonel in the U.S. Air Force and a lot of people on his staff. The American military in Izmir were caught "red handed" in large scale, black marketing of American currency. In short, we had a huge array of problems, on which the American military was not very sympathetic with the State Department.

Q: Was it part of your job to monitor the problem of the American presence in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: Very much so. We were in contact, either by telegram or by letter transmitted by pouch. The embassy and the consulates knew very well that the Turkish desk back in Washington was very much aware of these problems and welcomed more alert and detailed reporting on this matter. We always commended the embassy and the consulates for what they were doing in this respect. One of the "stranger" duties of the junior officer on the Turkish desk was to write evaluations of reports from the field. These evaluations, by the way, were signed by my superior officers, but everybody knew that Dan Newberry was writing them. I'm proud to say that, despite the fact that I "chided" some of the drafting officers for "overlooking" some things, they are still my friends today.

Q: What about the political situation in Turkey? You say that the coup d'etat which overthrew the Menderes government happened...

NEWBERRY: On May 19, 1960. I left the Turkish desk in December, 1959.

Q: Were you getting reports on the situation within the Turkish Army, and were you on the "alert" that this coup d'etat was brewing? You mentioned before that in the embassy in Ankara there was a tendency to "pooh-pooh" such reports.

NEWBERRY: Well, the indications of a possible coup got worse.

Q: Did you talk about the situation and how you saw it?

NEWBERRY: Yes. How I saw it and how my colleagues saw it, because we used to wring our hands and mutter about it among ourselves. Although there were plenty of signs of unrest in the Turkish Army, even reports to this effect in the Turkish press, insofar as the newspapers would dare to print such material and risk having the papers closed down. The level of discontent was rising. There were even demonstrations here and there against what the press considered repression by the Adnan Menderes party, even before I left the Turkish desk.

however, Ambassador Fletcher Warren in Ankara was a very capable Foreign Service officer. He is now dead. He lived to a great age, well into his 90s, in Texas. Fletcher Warren considered that America's interest in Turkey would be best served by preserving Adnan Menderes in power as Prime Minister. He simply did not encourage any adverse or, shall I say, disparaging reports on the state of Adnan Menderes' government. Some of these disparaging reports managed to be sent to the Department of State, one way or another, but basically his approach to Washington was to protect the reputation of Adnan Menderes. I would say that, although I'm jumping ahead of this story, people who have studied modern Turkish history know that eventually the military, revolutionary government which overthrew Menderes sent him to the gallows. He was hanged.

Fletcher Warren still tried his best, right up until the end of the whole drama, to save Adnan Menderes, because he considered that Menderes had been such a good friend of the United States.

Q: What view was taken of the reports coming into the Department from Ambassador Warren and from other parts of our embassy, as well as the analysis that we were getting? Was it

apparent in Washington that there was a real, "split view" of how things were going in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: It was evident to me, mainly from talking to people senior to me. I was not privy to a lot of the highly classified traffic, so I don't know actually what went on. I have forgotten what my rank was at the time. Even though I had been in the Foreign Service for nine or 10 years, I looked much younger than that. People tended to treat me as a junior officer, even though I had nearly 10 years of experience. However, I wasn't "cut in" on a lot of the reporting.

Q: When you talk about highly classified telegrams, I was thinking that this usually means at the ambassadorial level, or something like that.

NEWBERRY: I'm only guessing, Stu. Since I didn't see these cables to which I refer, maybe they didn't really exist.

Q: Who was the Director of the Office of GTI Affairs, and who was the Assistant Secretary for the Near East?

NEWBERRY: In charge of GTI was Owen Jones, whom I referred to before. Owen Jones had an excellent background. He had served in Ankara as the Economic Counselor in the fairly recent past. He knew the situation and knew Ambassador Warren, who was out there in Ankara. So Owen Jones was about as good a choice as we could have to be the Director of GTI in that situation. His deputy was Millau Williams, who had previously served in Greece. Williams went on to be an ambassador in Central America. He, too, is now dead.

bove the Office of GTI the Assistant Secretary was William Rountree. The Deputy Assistant Secretary with whom I dealt most was "Pete" Hart, or Parker T. Hart, who is very well known and well considered in the Foreign Service.

Q: Do you feel that Owen Jones shared your concerns about Menderes and company?

NEWBERRY: I think so. At least that's my recollection. However, given the way that the State Department was organized in those days, an FSO-1 [high rank] didn't spend all that much time talking to an FSO-5 [more junior officer]. Owen Jones was a busy man, and he had Greece, Iran, and Cyprus to deal with, as well as a lot of other people to talk to. I don't begrudge him that. I admired him, and he's still a great friend of mine but I didn't spend all that much time talking with him.

Q: Dan, while you were on the Turkish desk, did you run across the "Greek Lobby" at all, during this 1958-1959 period?

NEWBERRY: I knew that it was there but I think that they had not "geared up" as well as they obviously did later on. It had not yet become a major feature of the Washington scene, but it was very much there.

et me remind you that the British were still governing Cyprus at this time. There was a time when I was on the Turkish desk when the Turks had that horrible, airplane crash. Adnan

Menderes and his whole retinue were on the plane, and several people were killed. They were on their way to discuss the Cyprus problem with the Greeks and the British. So that is another reason why I think, in retrospect, that the Greek Lobby in American politics had not yet become a major factor. Cyprus was still a British possession.

Q: What about the Turkish attitude toward NATO and, more particularly, toward the Soviet Union? Were we at all concerned that the Turks might try to do business with the Soviets or not?

NEWBERRY: Absolutely not. On the contrary, the Turks have the reputation of being our "staunchest ally." Regarding NATO, the Turks wanted more NATO infrastructure projects, and they got a lot of them. The defense of Turkey's eastern border with the Soviet Union was consciously strengthened by the Turks and by NATO. Our relations with Turkey, in the NATO context, were very productive during the years I served in Turkey. After the coup d'etat of 1960 a lot of questions began to be asked, but this is jumping ahead of the story, and I was off the Turkish desk by that time.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Turkey still played a secondary role in American policy in the Near East at that time?

NEWBERRY: Yes, very definitely. We felt in many ways that whenever Turkish cabinet ministers came to Washington, it was always a struggle to make sure that they got in to see the "right people." Of course, the Turkish desk was not the only desk that had that problem.

Q: Did you also find that within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Turkey was a country of "secondary interest," as compared to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia?

NEWBERRY: Oh, not at all. Turkey was one of the leading countries in NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] which, in those days, included South Asia and Africa. It was a big bureau, but Turkey was regarded as at least as important as Egypt, but not as important as Israel. Israel has always had a very special place in the American foreign policy scheme of things. Nobody had any illusions about what was the "number one" country in NEA.

Q: You left the Turkish desk in 1959.

LEWIS HOFFACKER
Economic Officer
Istanbul (1953-1955)

Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker was born in Pennsylvania in 1923. He received his bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1948 and then his master's degree from Fletcher's School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949. He then served in the US Army from 1943-1946. His career has included positions in Teheran, Istanbul, Paris, Algiers, and Leopoldville and ambassadorships to both Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Ambassador Hoffacker was interviewed by

Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 17, 1998.

HOFFACKER: The summer of '53. Then I was assigned to Istanbul as vice-consul in the Economic Section.

Q: So you were in Istanbul -

HOFFACKER: From '53 to '55, in the Economic Section, dealing with labor affairs and other economic matters.

Q: Again, from your viewpoint in '53 from Istanbul, how did you see the Turkish situation at that time?

HOFFACKER: It wasn't as if I'd been in the capital, Ankara. I looked at it from an economic point of view and a regional point of view, because we didn't try to cover the whole country. We just covered the Istanbul end, which was largely commercial and economic. But of course, it was a listening point there for Eastern Europe. Very much so. There were CIA people there watching the commies. It was quite a change from being in a glamorous capital like Teheran. It was a pleasant historic, cultural city, with emphasis on the economic. Those two years came and went, and we had our first baby there. Then we moved on.

Q: Who was consul general while you were there?

HOFFACKER: Bob McAfee was consul general. He has since died. He ran a very low-key operation there. I got along with him quite well. Kay Bracken was the number two. She was a Foreign Service officer who did great work. She was a linguist, Persian, Turkish and so forth. Those were the top two during that period. And then I moved on from there back to Washington, in '55.

Q: What about the economics from Istanbul's perspective?

HOFFACKER: Heavy inflation, and trying to accelerate development, because Turkey was still a largely agricultural country, and most of it was primitive. And we were trying to beef it up across the board. Militarily we were very powerful. The Turks accepted all this. We didn't have the communist problem there we had in Iran. They weren't around us; the Turks took care of them in their own way. Thank goodness for Turkey. Turkey is a keystone there. We'd better take care of Turkey. They took care of us, and let's take care of them. It would be a pity to see Turkey influenced by the sickness of Iran or other Islamic fundamentalism. With their revolution under Ataturk, Turkey was supposed to be secular from here on. The military are pretty tough on human rights and as far as democracy is concerned; they have their own ideas about that. We are right to give Turkey priority.

Q: You are an economic reporter. Did you rely pretty much on your Turkish staff to help you?

HOFFACKER: Yes. We had a good Turkish staff. We picked up some stuff on our own. We traveled around that part of the country and talked to the locals and the labor people. The Turks

are well educated. You could talk to them. There was no suspicion of us that I was aware of. We had a good Turkish staff, some of whom were Armenian, or Greek - Istanbul is that sort of a place - and I was very pleased to have my economic training there.

Q: Were all of you watching the ships that went through the Bosphorus, trying to figure out what was what?

HOFFACKER: Yes, that was exciting. I used to go out on the Bosphorus every now and then on commercial fishing boats. That was fun. Up into the Black Sea, and eating all that wonderful fish. Now the city has grown. It doesn't have the same charm as it did back in '53.

Q: Was there any concern about Greece from the perspective of Istanbul?

HOFFACKER: All the time. It was endemic. The prejudice against Byzantium and against the Greeks was there. We had riots. Greek shops were burned. And then over in Cyprus we had problems between Greeks and Turks.

Q: Yes. Were the Turks talking about attacking the Greeks, the military, or did you find that the concern was more with the Soviets?

HOFFACKER: They had the right idea about the Soviet Union. They were a stalwart defense against the Soviet. I don't know if they wanted to invade the Soviet Union - I never heard that - but they were very glad to cooperate with us. The Greeks and Turks could never agree on where the boundaries were on Cyprus; that is just a running sore - deep, deep enmity. The Greeks, of course, in Istanbul resent the Ottomans' having taken over. They can't forgive them.

**SIDNEY SOBER
Economic Officer
Ankara (1953-1956)**

Sidney Sober's Foreign Service career included assignments in Madagascar, Czechoslovakia, Iceland, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 21, 1990.

Q: Then you were assigned from 1953 to 1956 in Ankara, Turkey. Was that at your request?

SOBER: No. I don't recall what I had requested. Well, I take it back. At Northwestern, I did a paper or two relating to eastern Europe, and as I recall it, my memory may not serve me right, I had the idea of going back there. As it turned out there was a job in Helsinki as a senior economic officer, and I thought maybe I would go there. This was the McCarthy period. Fortunately I was not involved with that but there were delays all over, and I was assigned to Ankara. Again this was one of those things where the headquarters people in their overall wisdom had decided what was good.

I had no complaint about that. In fact, we looked forward to our stay in Turkey, and we enjoyed our stay there.

Q: Could you explain how the embassy worked at that time? How Avra Warren, the ambassador, operated at that time?

SOBER: Avra Warren was a very experienced foreign service officer, knowing in the ways of working abroad. I don't think Warren ever had a senior job in Washington, but he came from Pakistan to Turkey and went to Finland, later on.

He was very much in charge. He knew what was going on. I've seen this in recent years even more than then, in terms of how he had run the embassy in Pakistan, through work that I've been doing, reviewing documents for the Foreign Relations of the United States series covering the time he was ambassador in Pakistan.

Very much in charge. When he was in Turkey, one of the interesting things that happened was the development of our collective security network in Asia. Turkey was already in NATO and we had established a close relationship with Turkey. During the time we were there you had the Turco-Iraqi Pact in 1955 which developed into the Baghdad Pact, to which Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom adhered. Turkey was a key element in that collective security network because it was the link between the collective security system eastward toward Asia and westward toward NATO. So we had a very deep interest in Turkey, a close relationship, and a large aid program which was not without troubles, because the Turks were always running into some serious problems and always wanted more aid than we were able or willing to provide.

But Warren was much in charge of what was going on.

Q: You were an economic officer. Was there someone above you?

SOBER: Yes, the economic section followed a line that was different from the norm, but it was a line that was being pushed at that time, very shortly after we arrived. (We and the Warrens arrived at just about the same time; in fact we crossed over by ship with Mrs. Warren, and Warren came along soon after). It was decided that the economic section of the embassy would merge with the economic aid mission, which was not AID at the time, but ICA or something. The economic counselor, Owen Jones, who was my immediate boss, was made the deputy economic aid mission director. We were housed in the economic aid building rather than the new embassy chancery itself.

Now we were part of the embassy. We attended embassy staff meetings. Nevertheless there was something of a link through the aid mission. I think that was all right. Some of it was justified. Some of us were a little uneasy and thought we were being pushed aside a little more than was called for. But I don't recall that it inhibited the reporting that I was doing. I was doing economic and financial reporting, had good contacts, and I never had any undue pressure from anyone from the aid mission to tailor my reporting along the lines that they would have liked. I don't think it made that much difference one way or another.

Q: How did you go about doing this economic and political reporting. What were you interested

in and why?

SOBER: Well, on the financial side, they were running into financial problems. They had large arrears in paying their bills and that was a serious political issue and caused some heartburn. They felt that the United States was being unduly negative in giving in to their desires. We, for example, insisted that they take on some policy reforms to improve their situation.

The nature of the arrears and what they were doing in their domestic situation obviously impacted on their external situation. I had great contacts at their treasury department, the finance ministry, and used to get a lot of information and report it. That was of continuing interest. And we dealt in other things. Their investment law, petroleum exploration and things like that. We did try to coordinate with the people in the aid mission who were obviously interested in macroeconomic things, and complemented what they did and benefitted from some of the information that they were getting also.

Q: How did we view, from your perspective, the Turkish government at the time?

SOBER: The Turkish government was under Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister. He was the leader of the Democratic Party which had come into office in 1950 when the Republican Party under General Ismet Inonu was defeated. Inonu stayed as the major opposition leader.

Menderes was a strong man with very strong ideas. He very much supported Turkey's membership in NATO, very much valued and depended upon the relationship with the United States. Of course it was a very strong point in US/Turkish relations, although we had some troubles with him and President Celal Bayar, on the question on economic assistance. They thought we were being miserly, and we thought we were being realistic and helpful by insisting that certain things be done. By and large the relationship was cooperative.

Now there were some uneasy developments in terms of Menderes' desire to stay in power. I left in 1956 and it was about three or four years later that he was overthrown by the army and later executed for his internal political excesses. That was several years after we left but there were signs even when we were there that serious troubles were possible. He was too hard a political infighter and tried to make sure that the opposition did not have a fair chance. There were signs of this. But I would say until the time we left, in the middle of 1956, these concerns were not very severe.

Q: How did you view Turkey. Did you think that it was always going to need assistance or were we going to be able to turn it into a strong self sufficient country?

SOBER: I'm trying to recall my state of mind at that time, 34 years ago. Turkey was somewhat an undeveloped country but clearly was looking towards the west in terms of its economic outlook. I'm not talking about social systems in the bush where people were sometimes subsistence farmers, but by and large, the national outlook, such as it was, was towards the west.

Geographically they might be in the Middle East, but tied to NATO, they considered themselves part of Europe only a small piece of land, where Istanbul is, is in Europe. But they were looking

that way.

Q: This is reflective of Ataturk's attitude, isn't it?

SOBER: Sure, he was a great reformer who had done, to my mind, some marvelous things under the circumstances he faced. They were rather modernistic in their outward approach, although they had an enormous distance to go. They were producing good amounts of food. They could feed themselves. And they had intelligent people and they were very trainable people. I could see that they had a long way to go and that they would not be a major world economic power but they could make it on themselves, at a low, but an increasingly good, level of subsistence for their people.

Q: I served in Greece 15 years later and everything seemed to center around the terrible Turk. How much did Greeks entered into the Turkish psyche.

SOBER: Much less than Turkey figured in the Greek psyche. Much less. That's a factor of difference in size. Turkey was and is more confident of itself and its great concerns are other than its relations with Greece. Although that's a serious problem, sometimes a serious irritant.

When we were there there were some terrible incidents of violence against Greek communities both in Istanbul and Izmir. That was 1955 as I recall. Basically this was over Cyprus. I remember the slogan of the day was, Kibris Turktur ("Cyprus is Turk"). So you did have that problem, and there were very unfortunate incidents in the mid fifties. But by and large that was not something Turkey was mainly worried about.

I could see the difference in Greece. Afterward I worked back in the Department on this area. I was there at the time of the Colonels Revolt, and I was in regional affairs.

The Greeks, by their size, have much more to be concerned about with Turkey, than Turkey, with its size, has to be concerned with Greece.

Q: One last question on this. How did you find the relationship between the embassy and the consulate general.

SOBER: I don't remember any disputes, or serious differences of any type, between what we were doing in Istanbul and in Ankara. I went to visit Istanbul every now and again. I remember, coming back to this question about Greece that you mentioned, going down in September of '55 to the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank which happened to be held, that year, in Istanbul. It was very soon after these very mean events had taken place. I remember going to the university where the bank fund meetings were going to be held and the outside circle was ringed with tanks because there was sort of a martial law situation.

I went down and collaborated with our people in Istanbul. If there were any troubles between us, they never came to my attention.

FRANKLIN J. CRAWFORD
Vice Consul
Izmir (1954-1956)

Franklin J. Crawford was born in Ohio in 1927. After earning both his bachelor's and master's degree from Ohio State University in 1949 and 1950, respectively, he received his law degree from George Washington University in 1974. He also served in the US Navy from 1945 to 1946. His career has included positions in Hong Kong, Izmir, Isfahan, Teheran, and Colombo. Mr. Crawford was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in January 2002.

Q: You got assigned in 1954 to Izmir.

CRAWFORD: Right. First, I was assigned to Iran, to Meshed, but then that assignment was canceled before I got there, and I went to Izmir instead.

Q: You went there as consular officer and administrative officer?

CRAWFORD: Yes, I think it was an informal arrangement, but I did the administrative part of it, but I was [also] a vice consul.

Q: How large a post was it? How many Americans?

CRAWFORD: There were four Americans. There was a consul, a man named Ed Waggoner; and a vice consul, who did economic stuff named Bill Helseth; and myself. I was the junior member of that staff. There was also an American secretary.

Q: What were some of the problems there that you encountered?

CRAWFORD: First of all, I just loved the place. It was a crummy place to live compared to Hong Kong - the housing was awful, and you couldn't get this or that, and the Turkish lira wasn't worth anything and we were forced to deal at the official rate for most of the time that I was there. But I loved it, I was delighted to be in the Middle East and to the Turkish lessons, most of which I'd forgotten. The thing I liked about it there, every weekend you could go out someplace and see some historical, archeological site, which was a thing you couldn't do in Hong Kong, and I enjoyed it enormously.

The problems - I don't really remember the problems. We had the usual consular stuff. The big problem we had was with the military. We had a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] headquarters in Izmir. The consulate got along fine with the NATO headquarters, we didn't have any problems, but they had a lot of young servicemen. I forget the size of that operation, but anyway, there were a lot of them around. They weren't always getting in trouble, but they sometimes did. We had some funny episodes. They had what they called these bars in Izmir, they were pick-up places. We called them "bowling alleys," because the girls who worked in the bar would sit next to some client and order "champagne," so-called, and they brought it in a great big bowl. That's why they were called "bowling alleys."

One of the servicemen got into a fight at one of these bowling alleys and he was arrested and accused of insulting the Turkish police. Because I was the consular officer, I had to go to see these people if they were in jail. I went to this man's trial and I remember it vividly.

Q: Didn't we have a status of force, an agreement, with Turkey?

CRAWFORD: Yes, but the status of force had just come into force, I think sometime in 1954, I remember reading it at the time.

The NATO headquarters, which had a liaison in Istanbul, and they got someone in the Turkish army who was a lawyer, a Jew from Istanbul. He spoke all the languages, he spoke Turkish, and English, and French, and Armenian, he spoke everything. He came to represent this soldier. Nobody spoke English except the defendant and the lawyer. I wasn't involved, I was just sitting there. The landlord, the proprietor, of this bar was testifying that this man had insulted the Turkish police. The judge said, "What did he say?" The bar owner said, "He [the soldier] said, 'Toorkish police, fack you!' ('Turkish police, fuck you!')." Nobody understood it and so, they said, "What was that?" And they kept repeating it, because people hadn't heard it. Finally they got to, "What does this mean?" The judge asked the bar owner if he spoke English. He said, "No." And the judge said, "How do you know that's something bad?" The bar owner said, "Oh, all the sergeants say it." This smart lawyer from Istanbul explained to the court that this was a throwaway phrase and that there were examples in every language and it didn't mean anything. Finally, the judge bought it. The guy was let off and I think he left that night.

Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?

CRAWFORD: The ambassador when I got there was Avril Warren.

Q: Did he ever visit Izmir?

CRAWFORD: Oh, yes, he came down to Izmir. I have a nice picture of him. He and his wife came down. They were sort of fun, because he wasn't stuffy at all. He went to be ambassador of Finland. There was a picture of him on the front page of the *Times*, of Ambassador Warren stark naked at one of these Finnish saunas. He was out lying in the snow being beaten with bush rods. I don't think the Department [of State] thought that was so hot.

Q: How were your relations with the Turkish authorities in town, and in the region?

CRAWFORD: They were good. The consul, Ed Waggoner, was the one who kept in touch with the governor and most of the officials. But, I had some dealings with the police, because with visa applicants, you're always checking on whether girls were really straight out of the convent school if they said they were.

Q: How large was your consular district?

CRAWFORD: It was enormous. I couldn't tell you what the boundaries were, but it included

most of southwest Turkey. The town called Manisa was the northern boundary, and it went down to the Mediterranean, and east as far as Antalya and Alanya.

Q: Did you get to travel much?

CRAWFORD: A fair amount. I went to Alanya and Antalya on the Mediterranean coast. I took a train from Izmir to a place called Burdur, and then from Burdu took a bus, a real adventure, down to Antalya.

I went with Ed Waggoner's wife, and a young woman who was working in the consulate. Oh I forgot, I said we had three [Americans in the consulate], we had four, because we had an American secretary.

Q: Did we have an intelligence presence there, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]?

CRAWFORD: Not when I was there. There had been one before, and he left and wasn't replaced. Occasionally people would come down from Istanbul. There was a big event, the Izmir trade fair, a commercial fair that was held in Izmir every summer for a month. Someone from Istanbul would often come down, someone from the [Central Intelligence] Agency, would come down for that. And they'd be in the office. Actually, I met my wife that way. She worked for the Agency in Istanbul. I had met her before, once in Istanbul when I was on a trip. She came down one summer for one of these fairs.

Q: We were giving military aid to the Turks at this time. Did that come into your purview at all?

CRAWFORD: Not really. I mean, we were aware of the connection between the NATO presence and our military assistance. There were some "MAAG" operations around, but we weren't directly involved unless they needed some consular service.

Q: Of course, with the headquarters there and U.S. offices right there, you probably wouldn't get deeply involved.

CRAWFORD: Yes, the consul was in regular contact with the American officers, the commanding generals, and they had Turkish and Greek social affairs, and so we were all interested in the Turkish-Greek relationship. It was not very good and got worse.

Q: Was the Soviet bloc active in your area?

CRAWFORD: They didn't have a consulate there. There was a British consul general and a French consul general, and there was an Italian. But I don't think there were any Soviets.

Q: I'm surprised the Soviets weren't there in force, what with the NATO headquarters there, you would think they would want to be snooping around.

CRAWFORD: I think the Turks were very cautious about this sort of thing and kept them at arm's length. And of course, they had to support the United States. Of course, they (the Soviets)

had a consul general in Istanbul.

Q: Have you thought of anything else?

CRAWFORD: Well, the big event happened when I was on leave in Italy. They had anti- Greek riots in Izmir in early September of 1955. There was a lot of destruction, more in Istanbul than anywhere else. There was some destruction in Izmir, but in Istanbul there was an enormous amount of destruction - Greek shops, and Armenians got the spillover. But, there were these riots in Izmir, and some mob got to the Greek consulate there. The Greek consul, whose name I can't remember, took refuge at our consulate. He came, and it was quite a ways away. By this time, Ed Waggoner had left and a temporary replacement, Will Chase, was there. He [Mr. Chase] took in the Greek consul and his wife and child. They stayed at the consulate for a couple of days.

I was off living it up in Italy, so I missed that. I missed the riot in Hong Kong, because I was on the wrong side. I missed the riot in Izmir. But, it was quite a development in Greek-Turkish relations.

Q: My experiences with Turkey lead me to believe that the Turkish police can control what they want to. They're pretty tough. They must have looked the other way during some of this.

CRAWFORD: Well they certainly didn't go out of their way. I don't really remember. I said there was some destruction, but I'm not sure. I don't think the Greek consulate was severely damaged, maybe a window was broken, but it wasn't burned down or anything.

WILLIAM A. HELSETH
Economic Officer
Izmir (1954-1956)

William Arthur Helseth was born in Florida in 1925. He graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1948, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949, received a PhD in 1962, and served in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1946 overseas. After entering the Foreign Service in 1950 his assignments abroad have included Frankfurt, Izmir, Ankara, Tehran, and Kabul. In 1996 Mr. Helseth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

HELSETH: '53. I came back on home leave to the Department knowing then that I was being transferred to Turkey, Izmir.

Q: You and your now no longer bride but wife were in Izmir from when to when?

HELSETH: We went to Izmir in the spring of '54 because our second son was born on home leave, was two months old when we arrived in Izmir. The first boy was just a little over a year, 14 months.

Q: He was born in 97th General Hospital, I assume.

HELSETH: Exactly.

Q: As was my daughter.

HELSETH: Our boy was there and the second boy was born in Florida, as a matter of fact.

Q: So, you were in Izmir from...

HELSETH: '54 to '56.

Q: What was your job in Izmir?

HELSETH: Economic officer, number two in the consulate.

Q: What was the Izmir consulate district?

HELSETH: The Aegean region, southwestern Turkey, a very large area. When we went out to make our trips around the area, we used the consulate jeep. Usually I drove it myself and took an interpreter with me because, while I had been studying a little bit of Turkish by then, I only had about four months under my belt. I really wasn't able to carry on extensive conversations, so, I took an interpreter with me. The jeep could only hold two people, so obviously, the driver as well.

Q: How big was the consulate? Was it a consulate or a consulate general?

HELSETH: It was a consulate at that time. It later became a consulate general, but at that time it was a consulate. Ed Wagner was the consul when I arrived. Ed left after the first year and Kay Bracken came down on assignment there as consul. But in between her arrival and Ed's departure was a period of three or four months. The embassy in its wisdom decided that two young FSOs down there, two young vice consuls, shouldn't be left alone to run the consulate in Izmir. They detailed a more senior officer to come down for that three month period. Will Chase was his name. So, Will was there in between Wagner and Kay Bracken.

Q: Now, during that time, what was sort of the political situation in Turkey at least from the perspective of Izmir?

HELSETH: Tight, rough, and just waiting to get at the Greeks on Cyprus. I arrived in Izmir at the height of one of the anti-Greek demonstrations with each politician struggling to outdo the other in that "The time has come to reclaim our native territory on Cyprus. If we have to attack and do it by bloodshed, we will, etc., etc."

Domestically, it was the Menderes period. He had come in succeeding Ismet Inonu and the Republican Party about four years before then. So, he was riding high, wide, and handsome at that time. The Republican opposition was not all that strong and Menderes was able to rule pretty

autocratically then, which he did for the rest of the decade.

Q: In talking to some of the Turks, did you find a strong anti-Greek feeling there, or was this more at sort of a mid-level or something?

HELSETH: No, it was a widespread feeling. The ordinary Turk felt that it was time that they should get Cyprus back. I was in Izmir. Will Chase was there, too.

Q: Wilbur Chase.

HELSETH: Yes, Wilbur Chase was there at the time that we had attacks on the Greeks in Istanbul and Izmir. That was in '55. That was a pretty scary evening or two in Izmir because we were hiding behind doors. This was the time when the Greek consulate came to the American consulate and asked for protection. Will took him in and gave them that protection at the consulate property. There was some vandalism in Izmir at that time, but it was more just...It was prudent not to be out on the streets too much for that 24, 48 hour period. In Istanbul, there was fairly serious property damage.

Q: What was the major thrust of the Turks that you were talking to, the politicians, about Cyprus? Was this their country or was it simply Greeks doing something?

HELSETH: Cyprus had been part of the Ottoman Empire's years before and for a longer period than anybody else. If the Brits were going to leave the island, as they were preparing to do, well then the Turks said, "We're the logical ones to take over, not the Greeks." That was unanimous essentially in the Turkish view, in talking to Turks up and down the line, whether it be talking to the businessmen or the government officials in Izmir, or talking to the local officials out in Bola or Sparta or anyplace else where you traveled or whether you were talking to the peasants in the villages where you would stop to have coffee or tchai with them. It was across the board. "The Greeks should not have it; it's ours if the Brits aren't going to stay."

Q: Of course, the Brits had been basically driven out by not being willing to put up with this guerilla war that they had with the...

HELSETH: Colonel George Grivas and his colleagues.

Q: EOKA, I think.

HELSETH: EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston-trans. National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was the name of it and Grivas was the head of it for most of the '50s until... In fact, they never did capture him in all that time. He eventually, after peace and the accords had been reached in '59 or '60, then he peacefully left the island.

Q: Did we have military installations in your area at that time?

HELSETH: One was beginning at Cigli, just 10 or 12 miles northeast from Izmir. There was a big airfield beginning there. But we had a portion there of a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Southeast Command, which was centered in Izmir at the time. It began there in the

early '50s and was on its buildup phase by '53. By the mid-50s, it was a very large operation.

Q: How were your contacts with the Turkish as an economic officer? What sort of contacts did you have?

HELSETH: Well, I had easy entree. One of the more important things was following the developments in tobacco because that was a major economic export of the Turks at that time from Izmir. The people there were engaged in the tobacco business. There were a lot of Americans there, 15 or 20. There were a few Brits and other Europeans representing the foreign companies that bought the Turks' tobacco. So, that was our main economic interest. Others were in the mining business, particularly export of chrome down in the south. They grew other agricultural crops, but the major export business was in tobacco and chrome.

Q: Were poppies a problem at that time?

HELSETH: No.

Q: Later, it became...

HELSETH: There was, and you could see some growing there when you traveled in the countryside. But it was not thought of then as being a major problem. I don't recall any message to us on that subject. That is, coming to us from the Department or from Ankara to go out and check on this. I don't recall that. But in the mid 50s in Izmir, no.

Q: Did you have any reflection of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there? Turkey was an Islamic country.

HELSETH: At that time in Izmir, no. Later when I was assigned in Ankara, we had a little bit of it there, but in Izmir, no.

Q: Did you do any consular functions there at all?

HELSETH: We had sort of general responsibilities, particularly if the consul was out of town for whatever reason, on a trip in the area, visiting Ankara, or out of the country for a short time, then we sort of would be responsible general-wise. But primarily, I was doing economic work.

Q: I recall that at a later period, and probably this was going on while you were there, there was quite a Social Security problem in that there were some Social Security recipients in that area who would sort of... The number of their children was immense. One was not quite sure... There was a lot of hanky panky going on and it was a little difficult to get to the bottom of it.

HELSETH: I can appreciate how it could have been done, but when I was there, I don't recall any major instance of that kind. We had a second vice consul, a third officer, assigned to Izmir, I guess, about a year after I had been there. He did more of that work. But I do recall, there were a few instances of trying to find out if the person may have passed away and, if so, when? The check was still coming and still being cashed. But there was not any major hassle, major problem

involving Social Security checks when I was there.

Q: Did you get at all engaged as far as observing the political parties in there? You were saying it was pretty much a done deal with Menderes.

HELSETH: We got engaged, yes, and every time I traveled out in the province, even though I was economic officer, obviously, we were picking up political tidbits or finding out what the strengths were of the parties there and what the thinking was. But it was pretty much Menderes country. He came from the Aegean to begin with, plus the fact that the Republican Party of Inonu really did not have specific areas where they were dominant. They were the second party throughout the country.

Q: Were they any minorities where you were?

HELSETH: The Greeks were the major one. A small Jewish population. Also those who had left the Jewish faith, become Muslims. I don't recall any others off-hand. Those were the major ones there.

Q: Were there many Greeks there? I always think of 1921 or something and the horrible exodus of the Greeks from then Smyrna, now Izmir.

HELSETH: Yes. Inonu was the general then, who then pushed them into the sea, so to speak, on their march from Ankara towards the Aegean. Yes, there was a tremendous population change at the end of the conflict, with many Turks coming home from Greece and many Greeks going home. But they didn't all go. I don't know how many there were numbers-wise, but there was a small Greek community in Izmir in the 1950s, a much larger, but still not terrifically large community in Istanbul. But they were some obvious tensions between the two communities, basically just words though.

It was only in 1955, when the riots got out of hand in Istanbul and spread to Izmir on the arguing over Cyprus and feeling that something had to be done, that we saw overt actions taken against the Greek minority in Izmir.

Q: Then, you left there in '56 was it?

HELSETH: No, I left there in '55. By then, the Department had acceded to my request for Turkish language and area training. Well, they had agreed to that while I was in Germany. They said, "First, we've got to assign you to Turkey. You'll study Turkish while you're there." I had two months of Turkish study in the Department in '53 when I came back on home leave from Germany. I then went to Izmir and studied while I was there. I then came back in '55 to Washington to FSI (Foreign Service Institute) for six months of language training and then went to Princeton for the nine months in its Middle East program focusing on Turkish studies. There were five of us who went up that year, I think, in Greek language, Turkish, and Persian. There were various numbers of us studying that. So, I was in the Department then until August of '57, when I came out to Ankara.

Q: What was your impression of the view of Turkey that you were getting from Princeton? Some universities have almost their own version of things and all. Did you find Princeton was pretty much standard or were they looking at Turkey in a way that was not sort of the State Department way, or not?

HELSETH: I didn't find anything there that surprised me or upset me from the point of view that "Hey, that's not the Turkey I saw" or "That's a different Turkey." Turkey was not in the forefront of Princeton's interest. Princeton was focusing on Iran. That was their main interest in the Middle East. The head of the department was an old Iranian hand. He led us in that direction. Thomas, the western Middle Eastern Turkish [expert] was gone the year I was there. So, Fred Lattimore was brought in to do the Turkish language portion while we were there and, I guess, teach a course also. Then we had some courses with others in the department. So, the focus was not really on Turkey while I was at Princeton. But it was a good year there. I was able to not only keep up the program that State wanted us to do, but I was able to do the first draft or the first half of my eventual Ph.D. thesis.

Q: What was the subject of your thesis?

HELSETH: By that time, it had changed. When I joined the Service five years before, I had a German topic to work on. But I had no time really in Frankfurt. So, I persuaded Fletcher to let me change. My diplomatic advisor there agreed. I changed to the general subject of the US-Turkish relations. That was okayed by Fletcher so that I was able to do a lot of research in Turkey in Izmir and particular on some Turkish sources - not too many then, but a few. So, when I came back to the Department here and went up to Princeton, I was able to work extensively with the materials in Princeton's library on Turkey. I got some help from the Department and some documents, some papers, I was able to either peruse or get copies of. So, I did the first half of the thesis while I was there. I was able to do more then when I got back to Turkey in Ankara. (Finished the thesis and was awarded my degree in 1962.)

Q: Were you focusing on early or later times in US -Turkish relations?

HELSETH: Through the whole period. From the very beginning of relations in the latter part of the 18th century up to the current time. There was not a single monograph in the literature on US-Turkish relations at that time.

Q: As I recall, at the beginning, we got a little bit more favorable treatment than most other nations. It was a rather aggressive type, I think.

HELSETH: It varied. But one of the key early personalities was the retired admiral, Admiral Porter, who went there around the 1840s and '50s. He was sort of accustomed to a certain amount of treatment, but he also was sympathetic with the Turks, helping them and their own reformation process, their desire to westernize or to adopt some of the western ways. We had helped in the 1820s, before Porter, providing them some shipbuilders to build up their fleet, which had been destroyed in the Battle of Navarino (1827), and replace their ships. In Istanbul, Americans were there building ships, or helping the Turks build the ships. This American assistance was received favorably because we were not one of the European powers that the

Turks thought were not all that friendly disposed toward them or looking for their pound of flesh, whatever. We were apparently seen as different. We were helping them. There were good relations at that time.

Q: Also, the university system that we had there, too.

HELSETH: That, of course, came later. The missionaries started in the 1830s, I think it was, when the first ones arrived there. Before that, the 1820s, most missionaries had gone to Iran and Syria and Palestine, parts of the Middle East. But by 10 years later, they were into Turkey and they remained there. They became involved in education, medical works, and they did a very good job over the years in both those fields, and eventually helped set up schools. The genesis of the current Robert College, of course, was a missionary school. Then they had girls schools, too, that the missionaries set up. There was one in Izmir that was going strong when I was there in the '50s, the Kiz College. That is still there. I think it has a different name now. I think it's been taken over by. I'm not sure of that. But it's no longer a missionary school, as I understand it.

LEONARDO NEHER
Consular Officer
Ankara (1954-1957)

Leonardo Neher was born in Ohio in 1922. He received a B.A. from Green State University in 1948 and an M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1952. From 1943 to 1946, he served in the U.S. Army overseas. Mr. Neher joined the State Department in 1954, serving in Turkey, Morocco, Vietnam, Syria, Zaire, Chad, the Dominican Republic, and Burkina Faso. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 18th 1989.

Q: What did you do in Ankara?

NEHER: I was assigned as Vice Consul. I did Consular Affairs for the whole two-and-a-half years except for a stint of perhaps four or five months in the Political Section when my replacement had arrived and there wasn't enough fiscal year money for me to return to the U.S. for home leave and transfer before the new year began.

Q: Well, we're going to be obviously concentrating on the latter part of your career, but what was your impression of the Foreign Service when you were in Ankara? You came, I take it, with a certain almost chip on your shoulder. What was your impression?

NEHER: I was still the very liberal product of my academic background, of course, so I saw those around me through a political prism, and I found the Foreign Service at that post to be very conservative compared to my own political environment in Chicago. Both Ambassadors who were there during my tour of duty, and the head of the Political Section -- a really stiff New Englander -- were very conservative. Foy Kohler came as the Deputy Chief of Mission after he had had a security problem at VOA. The Turkish government was cracking down on dissent at

the time and had arrested several journalists. I was shocked to hear him say at one staff meeting that it was probably a good move on the government's part to make those arrests. But as I grew in the Foreign Service I realized that rather than "conservative" views, these were more often very pragmatic ones, looking after U.S. interests in a rather short run and not visiting U.S. values on foreign societies.

After a year and a half or so, at the post, I took a look at the Foreign Service and at myself, my family, my situation, and in discussion with my wife, who was even less ambitious for high rank than I, decided that the real reason I had joined the Foreign Service was to see the world, to learn the languages of the world, to travel everywhere. I decided to opt always for assignments on different continents, with different languages and different types of work. I wanted to develop a dilettantism, or a polyvalence, to assure me that I would move around all over the globe, do all the kinds of work the Foreign Service had to offer and see the whole world. And that's what I tried to do. I made that a policy through my whole career, made some key decisions along the way that were for the purpose of seeing the world rather than moving up in the Foreign Service.

HERBERT DANIEL BREWSTER
Turkish Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1955-1958)

Herbert Daniel Brewster was born in Greece of American parents in 1917. His first posting in Greece was as a clerk at the embassy in Athens from 1940-1942. He then served as a Foreign Service officer in Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, France, Germany, Italy, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brewster's career focused on Greek affairs. He was interviewed in 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Well you wouldn't have been focusing on that. Then you came back to Washington for about three years; from 1955 to 1958 you were the Turkish desk officer. What were the main things you did?

BREWSTER: Setting up all of the meetings that the Turkish Embassy wanted in State or with Defense, participating in those, screening the reports from Turkey, the messages and telegrams and so on, answering all of those. The Turks were very polite, very good; they are excellent diplomats in their manner, their suaveness. The Ambassador, and another person, paid attention to us -- we had a Deputy Director above us. They know how to go about keeping the desk officer informed and a part of it as if they appreciated your value, your worth. The one difficult thing was the horrendous night in Istanbul when they wiped out a lot of the Greek stores. That was on my watch, just about as I came on board; I don't think I had been there more than a week.

Q: Didn't they attack the Patriarch or something? These weren't Easter riots were they?

BREWSTER: No. It was in the middle of '55. It was what led the Greeks to cut down their community from something like 40,000 to 8,000 in subsequent years. It was just an outrageous riot. Are the historian's books out yet for '55?

Q: I don't know.

BREWSTER: That was the only difficult part. It was basically a normal desk job. (In the case of Greece I was Country Director.) The Turks were responsive to things we asked them to do. I think, but I would have to check it out, that we did ask them to cut the oil off at one point, in the '56 crisis. And they did it.

Q: This was '56; this was the Suez crisis?

BREWSTER: Suez. Again, I would have to dig into that to find out what they did. One thing on the Greek-Turkish thing that I have run into is that the Greeks will not acknowledge that the Turks have ever done anything for the Americans. "They never were at your side." I took one Greek Vice-President into see our Vice-President and he came right back and said, "Well now, from what I hear they did pretty well in Korea. I understand they were rather outstanding, almost brutal, soldiers on the Korean front, and they saved our neck a number of times with the way they thrust their sixteen hundred men into the thing." -- That's my last memory, forget about World War II. That's something that the Greeks never think of, it's a question of who's done what to whom. The Turks were fierce fighters.

Q: How were the relations between the Greeks and the Turks in those days? With the riots, etc., were you finding yourself sort of the Turkish advocate in NEA as opposed to the Greek one for matters of aid and others like that?

BREWSTER: No. That was one bad case; we were all against the Turks on that one. I put up no defense or anything of that sort. I choose not to say I was Turkish desk officer when I am around Greeks. But I exaggerate because my thesis on economic aid and all that is that in most cases a good handshake and a glass of beer and sitting down with key people can save you \$30 or \$50 million dollars if you only explain your reasons. That's why this joining NATO was useful. They were being brought into a big club and they were on their best behavior. That was the time when you could have gotten almost anything from them. So I came off well with the Turks because they all knew me from the work I had done for three years with them. The Turks do not complain; if they have complaints they keep them quiet. The Greeks will operate differently and you are exposed to much more complaining.

Q: We can agree because I spent four years as Consul General in Athens and I found it wearying; I was very glad to leave. Individually I liked the Greeks very much, but I found the constant complaining and accusations of the Americans being behind everything just gets tiresome after awhile.

BREWSTER: And it goes on now. The Macedonia thing; we are to blame for everything.

WILBUR P. CHASE
Political Officer

Ankara (1955-1959)

Wilbur P. Chase was born in Washington, DC in 1919. His career with the State Department included posts in Canada, Germany, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Philippines, and Washington, DC. Mr. Chase was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 24, 1990.

Q: We've now reached the point where we can move from Haifa to your next position, which was in Ankara. I have you being there from 1955 to '59. Does this make you a Middle East hand or something?

CHASE: I have a lot of affection for the Middle East, but I never became a linguist. I think I would have continued further in the Middle East except that one of my children had school problems and I felt it was best that we stick to places where I could get better schooling, or at least hopefully better schools. Like a lot of these things, your career doesn't always evolve quite the way you'd think you would like it, but it turned out well.

I liked Ankara. When I first got there, I arrived on, I think it was the 4th of July, and Webb Balance, the administrative officer, came down to the hotel and said, "Well, how do you like going down to Izmir?" This took me by surprise. I suddenly found out that the consul down in Izmir was leaving, and the new one wasn't going to come for quite some time, and that he wanted me to be down there to run the office. So I went on down and I had a good time in Izmir, I enjoyed it.

It was interesting to me that, when I had been living in Israel, Cyprus was a place that we used to visit from time to time, and the problem with EOKA, the Greek community of Cyprus that wanted to join Greece. First of all, the British were resisting, and then it became the Turks who were resisting, since a very sizable portion of the population is Turk. I became aware of these tensions over in Cyprus, from visits when I was in Israel, and when I was en route from Haifa to Ankara, I had stopped off there while the boat had stopped there, and all these notices about EOKA dangers.

Well, I ended up and went down to Izmir. My first job in Ankara, I'd been sent there to be one of the political officers. The Izmir trade fair was coming up. That is a big international trade fair, and there was going to be an American building there for us to show off our wares. We wanted to know what was happening there, we also wanted to see a great deal what the Soviets were doing, what were the Eastern Europeans doing.

I'd been intrigued with Turkey for quite some time, even going back to Basra days. I can recall a John Van Ness, who was a missionary out there, and his daughter then married Bill Brewer, who was in the Foreign Service and became Ambassador Brewer. And John Van Ness was saying, "The Palestine situation, what we need are a few Turks to take care of that."

And Turks do have, I think rather successfully, a managerial sense. They know what it is to run things. You can argue whether it's done well or not, but being an administrator, be it a governmental administrator or a business administrator, being an administrator or director is an

admired profession in Turkey. The government pays fairly low salaries, and families would subsidize one of their members if they would go into the government. So they're used to it.

Well, in Izmir, it is definitely Middle Eastern, with a heavy overlay of remembrances of things Greek.

Q: It used to be Smyrna.

CHASE: I know that the Greek consuls general would call it somehow Smyrna, but not I.

Speaking of a colonial atmosphere, this was a Levantine sort of an atmosphere: tobacco growers, agriculturalists, a foreign community of missionaries, business people, educators who had been living there, some of them for generations. They weren't Turks, they were French, they were British, they were what have you; it was a colorful sort of an environment.

They came up to celebrating the occupation of Smyrna, the beginning of Izmir, and I was the only foreign consul who went down for these celebrations of the Turkish National Day. The people invited me, but it was not a formal sort of a thing, and I found out that the foreign consular people were aloof to it. It wasn't that they weren't welcome, they just didn't become involved. I went down, and the Turks very much noticed that an American was there. And they appreciated it.

The commanding general took me off and said, "You notice that." Down at the dock where the main formalities were taking place, the ships were in the Mediterranean moorings, with the stern to the dock. And here, right there in front of the reviewing stand, was a Greek ship with a Greek flag. And the general said, "Past things are past." Nothing was said against Greeks, it was all completely neutral. This was a day that we had occupied Izmir -- not occupied it from whom -- but occupied it. And I was quite intrigued with the way that they were phrasing it and trying to say we are in NATO with Greece and Britain.

However, a few days later I was down at this big international fair. I'd been in one exhibit and when I came out of it I noticed there was some fire and a certain excitement around. All of a sudden I realized that it was the Greek pavilion that had been torched. This was relating very much to the Cyprus issue. The Turks had been fairly quiet, but, for reasons that are still under debate, anti-Greek riots took place in Istanbul, and in Izmir they torched the Greek pavilion.

I got into my car with my wife and we started driving down to the Greek consul general's home, to warn him and tell him what was happening. We got there, and as we came up, the first head people of the mob had outrun our car. They had gotten there first and they had torched the house. The Greek consul general, his wife, and a child were there, but they were able to escape through the back door. Nobody was injured. But about three o'clock in the morning, I was wakened by the Greek consul general calling me and saying he wanted to come and seek asylum at the American Consulate. So we gave him asylum. His wife and child, oh, everything they had had been destroyed; it was quite a sad event.

For the next four and a half years that I was in Turkey, my occupation was Cyprus and the

Greek-Turkish...

Q: How did you get involved?

CHASE: I was a political officer in the embassy. Now that was the thing I was working on.

Q: This is very interesting because we have had quite a few interviews with people who, mostly later on, but who were involved, but almost always from the Cypriot point of view.

CHASE: Toby Belcher among others.

Q: Yes, well, I mean they just happened to be there on this. Every time you talk about Cyprus, you have to talk about a specific time, but really it doesn't change a bit, I guess, the feelings. This was '55 to '59, what was, let's say, the official Turkish attitude at that time, as opposed to maybe the street attitude, towards Greece and Cyprus?

CHASE: I think, in talking to the Turks I met when I was on Cyprus: shopkeepers, fellows with me out sailing, Turks, and the Greeks, it's like a number of these areas where you have a minority, that if a Turk went in to get a job on Cyprus in a bank, he would maybe be hired to be the janitor, but he would never dream of becoming a clerk. He hit an economic ceiling that he couldn't penetrate. And, seeing what was happening to the Arabs in Israel, again you hit your ceiling, you become very, very much constrained.

The Turks would tell me on Cyprus about, "Look, if there's an earthquake over there in Turkey, the spring that I get my water from here in Cyprus turns muddy." So there are connections.

But when I arrived in Turkey, the first few weeks I was there, I was aware that people were very conscious of things Greek, and that some of this was completely unrelated to the Cyprus issue. There is enough other history of the Turks and the Greeks having problems.

I was asked to go down to Istanbul and talk to the various members of the community. The ambassador didn't like what the consul general in Istanbul was sending in, but he liked the things I was reporting, so he asked me to go and look around in Istanbul -- which the consul general in Istanbul didn't particularly appreciate.

Q: The ambassador was Fletcher Warren at that time?

CHASE: No, that was Avra Warren.

Q: What was the Istanbul man sending in that the Ankara man didn't care for from the consul general in Istanbul? Do you know?

CHASE: Oh, it was in part this issue of how deep-seated, how much animosity is there between the Turks and the Greeks; how much was this a definite governmental-directed, government-managed riot that took place; how much was it that maybe the government encouraged or suggested that it be done, and then the dam of self-control was removed and the natural desire for

anger at the Greeks took over. And so, as I believe, the ambassador was disturbed that the Istanbul consul general was sending in too much: This is a government-directed, -run, -managed plot. And he wanted to find out a little bit more of comments from people who would say that this is a thing that the Turkish people are deeply concerned about. And from my reporting in Izmir, he had liked the things I was sending in from there. So when I was returned to Ankara and took up my assigned position as political officer, he then asked me to look into this thing and see what I could find out.

Q: After you looked into this, how did you see the official Turkish attitude towards the Cyprus problem and Greeks? Again, we're talking about the Fifties.

CHASE: At that time, the Turkish government began to feel that Greece was trying to put a stranglehold around them: taking up all the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, going through Rhodes and Cyprus, that this would be encircling them. There are a whole lot of other things that kind of filtered into this and fed it along the way. But at the time, in '55 when I arrived in Turkey, the Turks were not particularly concerned about Cyprus, in that they were convinced that the British were going to stay on forever.

Q: When did the British leave?

CHASE: Just when I left, in '59. It was the Geneva Accord, when Menderes and (I can't think of the name of the fellow in Greece) finally met and signed an accord which established the dual Greek-Turkish government of Cyprus.

But at the same time that I was arriving, the British had given signs that they were going to pull out and turn the island over. So from '55 to '59, the Turks were adamant that Britain will not leave Cyprus under conditions which will allow Cyprus to be joined to Greece. At the beginning (and to an extent I still think there is a lot to it), the Turks didn't have any really latent, deep anger with Greece. But they did react, and I think it was popular, they reacted, saying that Greece is fine, it's over there, but they will not come and dominate us.

Q: It's funny. I served, as you know, some years later in Greece, and I had the feeling in Greece that the Greeks used the Turks as the bogeyman all the time. Anything that happened, they were concentrated on Turkey. Whereas the Turks, from my distant observation, really weren't that interested in the Greeks per se. I mean, they were more concerned about the Soviets and others, and that the Greeks were an annoyance but not a major preoccupation -- unless they started messing around in Cyprus with the minority there.

CHASE: I would agree with that. The Turks didn't have an obsession with things Greek. Generally, they couldn't care less about what the Greeks were doing. They felt rather superior to the Greeks. They were very much concerned about the Soviets. They were concerned about the Kurds in eastern Turkey. They were concerned about Syria and Iraq and Iran, their neighbors there. They share water and population and transportation problems. At one time, we had tried very much to get the Turks to become involved with the Arab-Israeli thing. The Turks weren't particularly willing to be brought into that squabble.

Q: When you were there, this was the Menderes government. What was your observation of the role of the Turkish military at that time?

CHASE: Whenever you start talking about Turkey, modern Turkey, I think that it's important to start out almost with a little summary of Ataturk and his six principles.

Ataturk instilled in the Turks a terrific sense of nationalism and self-confidence, an attitude on the relationship of people to the government, government to the people, and the importance of democracy. Even though Ataturk was a dictator, he was devoted to the concept of real democracy.

And the spirit of democracy was such that the military have never felt that they can do anything other than support Ataturk and his devotion to democracy. The military was in the background, solely as a defense of the homeland, not for interfering with politics. And they got, I think, reluctantly dragged into the political fray with the Menderes government and then several other subsequent governments not being able to govern properly. And so the military took on the mantle of governmental rule most reluctantly.

Q: Did you have the feeling in your dealings at that time that the civilian government was sort of taking a more pragmatic stand on the Cyprus issue, and that at least the leaders of the military really wanted to have at the Greeks, at least on Cyprus?

CHASE: The military didn't want to become involved with Cyprus. They looked at Cyprus as being something that wasn't their bag, because they were concerned with the Soviets and Eastern Europe, and somewhat with the Arab frontier, but that was more of a peacekeeping thing. See, at that time the Baghdad Pact was alive, and the Turks were very much key supporters of the Baghdad Pact. These were the areas that they were thinking about, and Greece wasn't a threat to them. In a military thing, they'd see Cyprus as something that was going to be handled through negotiation and through diplomacy.

Q: How about in our embassy? You have the Cyprus thing, and these negotiations were going on. Were we playing any role, from your vantage point, during the gradual breaking away by the British from responsibility in Cyprus?

CHASE: Oh, we played a very active role in the Cyprus dispute. We didn't ever become a party at the negotiating table, but we were constantly in the background, arguing with the Brits, the Greeks, and the Turks about let's keep this thing as a diplomatic tug of war, not a military tug of war. In fact, none of us even really thought of that as being a realistic concern. This did not come out, really, in the conversations, about the threat of a military intervention.

But we were constantly trying to assess what were the minimum conditions that the Turks would accept, what were the minimum conditions that the Brits would accept, and what were the minimum that the Greeks would accept. I think that we did fairly early come out with the thought that Cyprus should not become a part of Greece, enosis should not be fomented.

We toyed with trying to push the British to continue on to rule there. But the British were broke

and they were getting their soldiers killed, so they thought they had to pull out.

We talked to Makarios, in trying to get Makarios to be rational. Maybe coming from the Turkish background, I think Makarios was a dirty old scoundrel. Toby Belcher, I know, liked him. I think Toby also realized...

Q: Toby Belcher was our ambassador...

CHASE: He was our consul general. We of course had in Cyprus at that time some very major installations: USIA, the CIA, and our radio transmitters. So we had an interest, and to a large extent I think it's still there.

Q: Actually, it was a place where a lot of our interests intertwined. We had bases we considered very important at that period in Greece, in Turkey, and in Cyprus. So there was no feeling that we should just duck it and let everybody else play a hand?

CHASE: No, no, we were an active participant even though we shied away from acknowledging that we were a part of the negotiation.

Q: What was the reaction in the embassy and with yourself to the agreement that was signed in Geneva, the Geneva Accords on Cyprus in '59?

CHASE: [A sigh of relief] At last. We knew it was tricky and it might not succeed, but we were just so relieved that we thought "thank goodness". I arrived in Turkey with the almost breakdown of Greek-Turkish relations, and when I left, here the two governments had signed an accord. It was the answer to the maiden's prayer. With good will, we had a feeling that this is a viable solution. That if the Greeks and the Turks on the island would really try to make this succeed, it could succeed. That each side's basic interests were protected. There was enough opportunity for them to make a successful marriage.

Q: While you were there, what was the embassy and sort of from your vantage point the view of the "Soviet menace" as far as Turkey was concerned?

CHASE: Did we think there was a true Soviet menace?

Q: Yes.

CHASE: I'd say absolutely yes.

Q: In what regard? What was our nightmare that would happen? How would the Soviets do something in Turkey? Invasion? Subversion?

CHASE: There are a couple of things to be considered. One, we had extensive military capability in the country. We had an extensive espionage network.

Q: Not espionage, but a listening post.

CHASE: Not just listening posts. The U-2s came out. But then there are a couple of other little incidents that you may recall. We were flying military aircraft along that Soviet border to pick up what the Soviets were doing towards scrambling their planes and what sorts of radio signals that they were doing. So that our planes were going along that border.

There's a story that I, I know I'm right, but I talked to a friend of mine who was there at the time and he doesn't remember it the way I remember it. And I know I'm right. One of our planes that we knew was doing this, and the Soviets were protesting all the time, we flew a plane out there, and the dirty old Soviets shot the damn thing down. It had actually penetrated into Soviet airspace and it crashed in Soviet airspace. We denounced the Soviets for their taking hostile action at a friendly aircraft, but we all knew what was happening. We then demanded that the bodies of the airmen be returned. As I remember it, we never got back all the bodies, and there was suspicion that maybe some of these people survived the crash and were prisoners of war over there. This friend of mine, Bill Helseth, went there to the border and asked about the..., they were talking to the Soviets, our military people did the talking, Bill just watched, and saying, "Well, where are the other bodies?" And the Soviets said, "These are all." I don't know and I've not found anybody else able to go back and clarify this, whether I even remember this and whether even I made a mistake and I remember it incorrectly, but the idea was that they'd shot down one of our planes, and the plane had gotten into Soviet space because those dirty old Ruskies fiddling with the navigational stuff, so that as our planes flew in, they jostled those things around so our plane didn't realize precisely where he was and he strayed over into the other side. Now there's that incident. And the Turks were very much concerned about that.

Now the other thing was, in 1956, I think it was, all of a sudden we were becoming very much interested in the study of clouds, and we started putting up big balloons in the air. And we were flying them so they were drifting across the Soviet Union. What we had was all sorts of camera and this stuff, hoping that the balloons would carry way over into the Philippines or China or someplace where we could recover them. And the Soviets objected to this strenuously -- these crazy guys. These balloons were being floated from Turkey, and we got a couple of them brought back. They never got across the border, and we picked them up and brought them in and put them in the parking lot back of the embassy. And so here were these damn things laying out there. And you could walk over and see the lenses that they had. These were very definitely spy jobs. What made us have trouble with the Turks was that all of a sudden, out of Washington, we apologized to the Russians and we said we wouldn't do it any more -- and we didn't tell the Turks until afterwards.

We were rather high-handed with the Turkish military. And a number of our officer were, I think, rather superciliously arrogant with them. But the Turks were definitely concerned by what the Soviets would do if we weren't there. As long as we were there, they were ready to thumb their noses at the Russians. The idea that there could be an atomic war, the Turkish people we talked with in the Foreign Office said, "Well, we Turks have fought the Russians, what is it, a hundred times over the so many centuries." They had a long history of major wars. And they said, "Well, we lose some, we win some, but we will not let the Soviets push us around." And atomic weapons? "We all have to die sometime." They were tough.

And Joseph Alsop, the columnist, came out there because there was a big hullabaloo over the threat of atomic war. And the Turks were being put upon by the Soviets with threats. Joe Alsop came in and he talked with us, and he was just so distressed. And he came to Ankara, which was supposed to be the center of the hurricane, and everything was peaceful. The Turks said, "The Russians are making a fuss. They've made fusses before. We are here, and we will not move." And Joseph Alsop was quite irritated at the Turks because he wanted them to be more excited.

Q: He wanted a story. There were three events that happened while you were there. Two in 1956: the Hungarian uprising and the Suez Canal attack on Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain. How did Turkey react to Suez?

CHASE: Let me just add that there was another major event that took place, and that was our invasion of Lebanon.

Q: That comes later. I was going to ask, July, that would be '58.

CHASE: Yes, '58, that was later. But the invasion of the Suez Canal, I was in Ankara at that time. The Turks weren't too much concerned. Our embassy was more concerned than anything else. The Turks were somewhat disdainful towards the Arabs, and they did not like Nasser. They very much disliked Nasser. Remember when Nasser formed a union with...

Q: Yes, the United Arab Republic, I think. Was this the one with Syria?

CHASE: Yes, with Syria. I can remember there was a Turkoman at the Foreign Office. With glee he said, "You know, Nasser shouldn't have ever made that visit to Damascus. Because the Syrians looked at Nasser, when they saw him in the flesh, and said, "My God, we've allowed ourselves to be ruled by a nigger." They didn't like Nasser from the beginning, and anything that could cut Nasser down was in their interests.

Now I have to add the note that I was out of Turkey during part of this time. I had gone back to the States on home leave and taking the mid-career course.

Q: Well, now, coming back, from '56 to '58, there you had two things almost: July 14, the overthrow of the Iraqi ruler, Hassan, and the end of the Baghdad Pact in effect, or at least Iraq and the Baghdad Pact. And also, almost concurrently, was our invasion, or whatever you want to call it, of Lebanon.

CHASE: The Turks were badly shook up by the collapse of the Iraqi government. They didn't have any deep affections for the Iraqis, but at least they felt that they gave them a security, and it also gave them a greater degree of eminence, because they were members of this viable Baghdad Pact. And they were getting a number of goodies from the United States. You talk about the military, they were always interested in getting better planes, better ships, better technological equipment from the United States. They knew where their bread and butter was coming from. And with the Baghdad Pact collapse, this made them feel uneasy. For one reason: What does this mean in Iran? They were aware that the forces that overthrew King Faisal were also operating in Iran. They didn't want to have Arab nationalism, they didn't want to have a turbulent neighbor.

They were enough annoyed with what was going on in Syria, they didn't want to have also Iraq as a problem.

Q: And how about our going into Lebanon?

CHASE: They were very much concerned with Lebanon, the feeling that this was one of those points of igniting further troubles in the Middle East. Chamoun was one that they felt deserved and needed support, and they had advised us to find ways to give Chamoun support. When the final decision was made...

Q: Chamoun was the president of Lebanon at the time.

CHASE: Yes. Bob McClintock was our ambassador in Lebanon at the time. But our planes that were going in there to help support our invasion came out of Europe, and they flew down and landed in Adana at our air base down there. The planes were coming in low and landing, sweeping in, just these big planes, there was lots of noise. And the evening news that was then on the radio was talking about Adana members attending some sort of farm fair, and he was kissing babies...What are all these planes? They called up the radio station and they couldn't get any news. The people at Adana were just scared to their wit's end. They didn't know what was happening, why all these planes were coming in, and they needed at least an indication that the Turkish government knew what was going on in their own country. But the Turkish people were very happy. The government was happy and the people were happy with the invasion of Lebanon.

Q: Mainly because it seemed to be stopping a spread of sort of what was then called Nasserism.

CHASE: Nasser was not involved in Lebanon. But it was a spread of disintegration. They feared communal rioting. That's happened now in Lebanon.

One other aspect of this. Thinking of Turkey as a country, and that Turkey is one of the countries that I think is very much misunderstood in the American public. The Turks have a tremendous history. We went in there in 1947 with a Truman Doctrine, and the way Turkey looked then, and the way Turkey looks today is so different. The average bus ride, as I understood, public bus fare was only something two or three miles long in 1947, because the buses couldn't go any place; there were no roads.

Q: ...50 miles.

CHASE: Fifty miles. I may be wrong. It took our road man, who went over there to build roads in '47, he said when he got to Ankara and went to a place called Konya, which is about 130 miles south of Ankara, it had been a three-day drive to go down there, and now it's about a two-hour drive. Now this has made over that country terrifically, all the different infrastructures that they had. If you think of the old Point Four Program, remember that glorious slogan? It also goes back to Truman with the Marshall Plan maybe. Israel is also a country that has had a tremendous development. The country is just revolutionized because of massive infusion of capital and technical know-how. Turkey has also been changed from one country to a completely different

country because of a tremendous amount of foreign help.

KEITH EARL ADAMSON
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Ankara (1956-1958)

Keith Earl Adamson was born in Newton, Kansas in 1917. His career with the State Department included assignments in Washington, DC, Egypt, Turkey, Colombia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. He was interviewed by Earl Wilson on January 12, 1988.

Q: You wanted to get out of motion pictures, you said, and you went to Turkey in 1956.

ADAMSON: Yes, as deputy PAO.

Q: To Ankara?

ADAMSON: To Ankara. My boss there was C. Edward Wells, who had come out of Iran, after a very fascinating experience. Turkey was, again, a very surprising thing to me. It wasn't until I got to Bogota that I began to see the differences among Egypt, Turkey, and Colombia. The Turks had the greatest confidence in themselves and knew what they were capable of doing, even though it was a little exaggerated, but they did somehow keep products, equipment, and so on running almost the way we used to when I was a kid on a farm in Kansas, with baling wire and chewing gum. It was amazing what they could do.

But the Egyptians had no confidence in themselves, no hopes for the future, and, at the time, they were probably about right, under the monarchy.

In Colombia, there was no confidence, but they had every reason in the world to be confident. They had a well-educated middle class. It was all very different .

In Turkey people looked to be just like everybody else you'd known all your life. They were wearing Western dress. Ataturk had changed a lot of the old Near Eastern customs of dress, as well as language, and so you expected them to be just like the guy next door, but they weren't . They were still Turks!

Q: What were the program objectives there?

ADAMSON: Of course, we were very much involved in defense agreements with Turkey, both SEATO and NATO, and we had a fairly large military presence in both the Air Force in various bases, as well as the Izmir Headquarters of NATO. We wanted to underline the importance of friendly relations between Turkey and the United States and the need for the security treaty.

We had some very strong opposition and a lot of it was from American-educated intellectuals at

the university. I don't know if we ever succeeded in doing any more than have them do a balancing act, to be undecided to which way they wanted to swing, left or right.

Q: Did you have any operational problems? With such a large military establishment there, was there policy guidance?

ADAMSON: We had the responsibility for trying to keep the military out of being too evident, too overexposed. In the areas where the military had to be, we tried to get community relations-type programs going, and to work closely with the press, so when there was a problem we could ferret out all the facts instead of having headlines that would really damage opinion of the United States. It was fairly successful, both in Izmir, as well as elsewhere and we had a fairly large economic program through AID.

Q: But did you travel around the Middle East very much?

ADAMSON: When I was in Egypt, I traveled to Gaza, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus and Beirut. Not very long in any one of the places, but because I was sort of considered an unofficial regional motion picture officer, I stayed a week or so and consulted in each place. I didn't get to the eastern parts of Turkey along the sea, but I did get to the southern part and the Izmir area. Later I was transferred to Istanbul as public affairs officer.

The most fascinating experience in Turkey, since I was learning Turkish, was when I went along as chaperon-interpreter for two busloads of American school kids who went to visit Tarsus where St. Paul was born, and some of the remains of the Greco Roman Empire. We went up to Cappadocia and spend the night in the limestone caves that had been carved out by the early Christian as they fled persecution, and saw the paintings on the walls of their chapel. That was fascinating. I enjoyed Turkey very much.

Q: Did you have any problems there that you can recall?

ADAMSON: The only problem was the one I mentioned earlier, that we were fairly close to a sizable group of young, thirtyish, up and coming Turks, I guess you'd call them yuppies. They were either coming up in business or in the academic world as professors or as leaders, who were very critical of the United States, and they'd been educated in the United States. I don't know. Maybe they knew us too well. On the other hand, I went back to Washington with the feeling that the experience people have in the United States kept them isolated from certain aspects of Americans in America let them go home with serious misconceptions and misunderstandings. It was during that period I tried my best to get the cultural exchange program to revise its method or add to it, which is one of the reasons, by the way, when I got to the East-West Center, I said, "Now we've got the answer to the exchange program. We're doing some of the things that should have been done for years."

Q: I remember visiting Istanbul in 1961, and it sticks in my mind. When did you leave Turkey?

ADAMSON: I left Turkey in August of 1958, having been selected for the Army War college in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Except for Cairo, every post I've had, I had intended to go back, but then I ended up getting a new assignment instead.

Well, we discussed Turkey briefly. As I mentioned, we had C. Edward Wells. We finally learned one interesting thing that most people don't know: the "C." stands for Charlemagne Edward Wells. Before he came in government, when he was still an Oriental arts dealer, he planned a trip to China back in the Thirties, early Forties, but nonetheless, in a telegram his name, Charlemagne, got translated as Great King of Europe, and he really got the red-carpet treatment on his arrival in China.

Ed had come out of Tehran, where he had had a very interesting experience enduring Mossadegh's ups and downs. He'd been there prior to that, involved with the military aid pipeline into the Soviet Union during the war.

Nonetheless, in Turkey, we had a very difficult tightrope to walk with the Greeks and Turks being at odds over Cyprus. I got to Turkey shortly after they had had a very serious riot in Istanbul and where they had done a great deal of damage at Taksim Square. Later I was transferred to Istanbul and lived on the edge of that stick of dynamite for a year.

In Turkey, our problem was really to -- and I think I got into this the last time we talked -- our problem was to try to keep Turkey aware of U.S. policy, understanding America better, especially our commitment to our treaty obligations, because they were not quite sure whether to trust us or whether to turn to the Soviet Union for the kind of support they wanted, more for economic development that they did from a military point of view. They thought they could handle themselves militarily with most anyone. They, of course, did have the background of the Turkish involvement in Korea, and they were very proud of that. They had done well and had a good reputation, so we, of course, referred to that in a great deal of material we were doing, regarding military presence and the relationship between the Turkish military and U.S. military.

Q: I want to ask you a double-edged question. One, you had come out of the Army War College, and , therefore, perhaps had some actual military contacts in Turkey from your old classmates. Another thing, what were your professional relations with the military? In other words, how did the military assist you in doing you job?

ADAMSON: Of course, I went to the War College after I'd been in Turkey, but I can respond to the question regarding relationships with the Turkish military. They were good. They were much better than our relations with university faculty, and it was because , as I said earlier, we had the Korean experience in common, where we had fought together, where we had been allies. We were regularly going to the Turkish military academies and presenting materials for their library on U.S. military history and other kinds of textbooks that they wanted for reference, so we did have very good relationships there.

Q: I didn't make my question clear. I really am thinking in country after country, where the U.S. military presence was very big at that time, and we, USIS, were rather small, we had to work with our own military for common objectives. That must have been different from country to country.

ADAMSON: It was different in Turkey, and it was primarily because our major military

presence was, of course, NATO and its Long South East (LSE) Command, as a result of which relations with that command were primarily in Italy for that portion of the NATO Command.

We did have a branch post in Izmir, where the LSE Command is located. It was our one USIS operation with very few local employees plus the Consulate General. By the way, G. Lewis Schmidt was our Consul General there during one period, and when you get back, you can ask him. He can answer that question much better than I can. But we did maintain good relations with both the provincial officials and the military, the U.S. and our allies in that area. We did not have as much to do in either Ankara or Istanbul.

Q: Let's move over to Istanbul. You say you lived for a year on the stick of dynamite. Did you have any personal unpleasant experiences there?

ADAMSON: I would guess the most unpleasant experience I had -- it was embarrassing, not necessarily unpleasant -- was when one member of the U.S. Congress who came to Turkey and we had a press conference for him. The first question, of course, that the Turks wanted to ask was, "What are they saying in the halls of Congress about the Cyprus issue?"

And his answer was, "They never discuss the Cyprus issue in the US. congress." Of course, he was on the Foreign Relations Committee, and that kind of struck the Turkish press as rather unusual. So they marked him, and because we were not in a position to argue with the gentleman, since he had controlled our purse strings, we had to let that tone go. I was rather embarrassed.

Nonetheless, we did have to have a hands-off position on Cyprus. In other words, that was an issue for the Greeks and the Turks, and all we could say is, "We want you to settle it peacefully." So that was the kind of shape that we were in.

Greek-Turk relations during the period I was in Istanbul? The Greek patriarch was right down the block from my office and that was usually the focus of protests and demonstrations. But during the period that I was there, they were still recovering from the excesses of that earlier demonstration when people were killed and property destroyed. So I was fortunate. I inherited the calm after the storm.

JOHN C. LEARY
Economic/Commercial Officer
Istanbul (1956-1958)

John Charles Leary was born in Connecticut in 1924. He received a BA in 1947 and an MA in 1959 from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Army overseas as a lieutenant from 1943 to 1945. His postings abroad have included Cherbourg, Dusseldorf, Istanbul, Tokyo, Ottawa, Vienna, Sao Paulo and St. George's. Mr. Leary was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1998.

LEARY: Then we moved on to Istanbul, Turkey. Where again I was an economic/commercial officer.

Q: Again, you did not have the Turkish language instruction.

LEARY: No. We began taking Turkish language lessons in the consulate general, but unfortunately, shortly after our arrival the language teacher became ill and lessons ceased. Therefore, I was left struggling with Turkish, but French was widely used in Istanbul and there was a French language newspaper.

Q: You arrived in 1956. What was, as you said you were the economic/commercial officer. Were you the officer doing that?

LEARY: No, by then we had three officers. I was also the labor reporting officer so I spent quite a bit of time dealing with the officers of the Turkish labor unions.

Q: Who was headquartered in Istanbul?

LEARY: That's right. Istanbul was the major economic and commercial center in Turkey at that time. Trade Unions who were relatively lacking in power at that time, but nevertheless were active, so we dealt with them quite a bit.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit about the political situation there in Turkey while you were there. What sort of government did they have and what was the relationship? Istanbul, as you said was the economic/business center of the country, probably a much larger population than the capital of Ankara.

LEARY: Turkey had a number of economic difficulties. Among other things they began to develop a very high rate of inflation. The government tried to intervene to help the inflationary process. One of the things that they did was to impose drastic price control. This had, I suppose the expected effect of causing a lot of things to disappear from the shelves of the markets. The black market became very active. The system that they were using was to require sellers of everything from food stuff to clothing to put a sign on their goods to show the price at which they were purchased and the selling price and the difference could not be more than 30%. The result was, as I said, things disappeared from the shelves and people went to the black market to buy everything from potatoes and eggs to shirts and shoes.

The Prime Minister at the time was Adnan Menderes and one of his projects was to make Istanbul a more modern city. Having grown topsy-turvy over the years, it was full of narrow streets and small lanes and he began to bulldoze major thoroughfares through the city. He provided very little advanced word with people whose homes were about to be bulldozed. This created tremendous political opposition and to make a long story short, about a couple of years after we left the post, about 1960, he was hung in the public square. But in the meantime he had done what probably was in retrospect a useful service. Making it possible for the city to become a bit more modern and livable place.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about the U.S. role in Istanbul and maybe about the consulate. Was there a USAID program underway then?

LEARY: Yes. There was a large USAID program that was principally administered out of Ankara, the capital. We had numerous visits from these people to Istanbul to observe their project and so on. We had also a missionary presence there and a college called Robert College, which was an established mission of the American missionaries. It was one of the best secondary schools and also colleges in the area. We had a number of American scholars there working on antiquities. I recall in particular one of the old mosques, which had been a mosque and then a Christian church back and forth over the centuries, had been discovered that its last use was as a mosque. Its walls had been white washed and it was no longer a mosque. And they discovered that under the white wash were some beautiful mosaics. We had a group from Harvard, I think it was called the Byzantium Institute that was there with fine brushes and picks taking the paint off and uncovering the beautiful tile mosaics underneath. I had a chance to view their work a few times and it was very interesting. Istanbul is a fascinating city from a historical point.

Q: Was there much American business present at the time?

LEARY: No. Very little. We had a number of Turkish businesses who were representing American firms interests at sales and so on. And there was some interest, which we were trying to encourage, on the part of American investors, but at that time it did not become very significant.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the movement of shipping through the Straits?

LEARY: We used to report on shipping through the Straits, in particular Soviet vessels, Soviet Bloc vessels that were coming through. We had observers watching these things in our section and we used to acquire from a local source a daily recording of the ships that came through, what cargos they were carrying, etc.

Q: In the late '50s when you were there, the consulate was located in an old building.

LEARY: That's correct.

Q: It had once been our embassy or legation when Istanbul was the capital.

LEARY: Yes. I think that's no longer the case, but at that time we were in an old building and next door to the consulate general was a hotel called the Pera Palas. Legend says that the famous spy, Cissero, made his contacts in the hotel. We used to go there for lunch because it was very convenient.

Q: Turkey was quite secular at the time or were you...?

LEARY: Yes, quite secular. Beginning of course with the "Ataturk" Regime beginning in 1920, there was an effort to secularize Turkey. I would say certainly, and especially in the city of Istanbul, it was very much Western in that city in terms of dress and so on.

Q: The consular district for the consulate general in Istanbul included European Turkey and what more than that?

LEARY: Yes, parts of the nearby areas of Asian Turkey. In those days we didn't have a bridge across the Bosphorus, so in those days we had to cross by ferry. We had responsibility for a fairly wide area in terms of a geographic stretch and the bulk of the population, which was also the population most interested in consular services, was in the immediate Istanbul area. We did have a military base in the Asian portion and occasionally the consular officer would go out there to provide consular services.

Q: Was there a post in Izmir at that time?

LEARY: Yes, there was.

Q: Was there tension between the consulate general and the embassy would you say? From your perspective?

LEARY: No, I don't really recall any problems. In the early days of Istanbul, it was my understanding that the embassies in Ankara had summer embassies in Istanbul. And some of the Europeans still do that. They move their embassies to Istanbul for the summer season. We didn't do that.

Q: But the Ambassador visited?

LEARY: The Ambassador and other officers from the embassy came on a regular basis. We had a good working relationship with them.

Q: And did you have a boat or launch?

LEARY: We did. That was one of the great perks. Some time, I guess it was back in the 1920s or maybe '30s, the consulate general had acquired a rather nice boat that was donated to them by one of the American oil companies. It was manned by a captain and two crew members and it was very well appointed. It was used to take visitors around the court areas and on the Bosphorus and so on, CODELS and that sort of thing and take them out on the boat. And when the boat was not otherwise being used, it was made available on the weekends for the staff on a rotational basis. You'd put your name on a list and when your weekend came up you could take the boat out for a day and sail out onto the Sea of Marmora and have a picnic and do some swimming and so on.

Q: Could you go as far as the Black Sea?

LEARY: No, that was a little out of our reach.

Q: What was the name of this? Was that the Hiawatha?

LEARY: It was the Hiawatha. Right.

Q: I think it's gone the way of other such perks now.

LEARY: We had a couple of interesting developments on the water scene during that period. We had the Suez crisis, which caused a tremendous shortage of petroleum products in Turkey. Whether it was entirely due to the crisis, or the crisis was used as an excuse to save foreign exchange, I'm not sure. But I recall we were using, at our home, a kerosene heater for heating and suddenly our supply of kerosene disappeared and there were long lines waiting to fill up on kerosene to take home. We found ourselves standing in line, eventually the administrative officer, the consul general made an arrangement to secure certain limited amounts of kerosene on a more limited basis for us. The other problem was that the Greeks and Turks were arguing then about Cyprus. Nothing really happened, but there were occasional scares. The Turks would move a few tanks into the street to maintain order.

Q: Okay, we were talking about the Greek presence and the problems about Cyprus and Turkish and Greek relations. You were saying that a number of foreign service national employees were Greek and Armenian.

LEARY: That's correct. Yes. When we had inspectors come through they would try and recommend that we employ more Turks, but most of our staff was made up of people who had been there for many, many years and they were very competent employees. It was kind of difficult to do any quick change in that regard.

Q: And they were Turkish citizens?

LEARY: They were Turkish citizens, right.

Q: But they were ethnic minorities. Part of the minority mosaic in Turkey.

LEARY: When some of these tensions arose, they were beginning to get a bit nervous because of the possibility that they would be back in the streets and so on.

Q: The Greek minority in Istanbul, of course was a very long tradition or history and the seat of the Greek Orthodox Church is there as well. Were you much involved with the Greek community as an economic/commercial officer? Probably not.

LEARY: Well, yes to a degree, because so many of the business people were Greek or Armenian. And also we had a large group of Jews who had come to the Middle East from Spain many, many years before and they were very active in business there. In fact, the presence of ethnic church in the business community was quite limited, but their influence was growing. They were still largely controlled by the other ethnic elements, which of course was also a cause for tension in the community.

Q: Let's come back to the tensions over Cyprus for a minute. You were there from 1956 to 1958. This was before the treaties that led to the independence of Cyprus in 1960, but it was a time

when the Greek Ohi element was beginning to be active in Cyprus, seeking enosis. The tensions that you felt in Istanbul were not so much directed at the United States...

LEARY: Oh, not at all at the United States. We were just observers there.

Q: Did it actually lead to problems, to actions against the Greek minority in Istanbul? Or more of a fear that it might?

LEARY: A fear that it might and a show of force by the government to make sure that nothing would really happen. As I recall, there were a couple of days towards the end of my tour that they created martial law. And we saw lots of tanks and soldiers in the streets. But again, nothing really became of this.

Q: Okay. Anything else we should say about Istanbul in that late '50s? Any children born there?

LEARY: No. We kind of took a rest there. [laugh] I did have a rather severe case of hepatitis while I was there. The only time in my foreign service career when I really had to use my sick leave. The result of eating something or drinking something that caused this virus to appear and I was knocked out for quite some time.

Q: In contrast to Dusseldorf or Cherbourg, Istanbul was much less developed, poorer... certainly Turkey at the time was far behind Western Europe. Did you really feel that in Istanbul? The poverty?

LEARY: No, I don't think that Istanbul one got a sense of poverty. It was a growing city. It had been that way for centuries. There were obviously poor people, but poverty, per se, was not any special problem.

Q: I know later on there was a tremendous influx from the rural areas, particularly Asia Minor and so on, into this big city of Istanbul and it became a tremendous urban metropolis.

LEARY: That was after my time. I had a report from my eldest daughter, the one who was born in Cherbourg, who went back to Turkey, probably in the 1970's, and reported on the traffic congestions and so on, and the tremendous overpopulation. We didn't really observe that.

Q: Did you have a chance to travel within Turkey that much?

LEARY: Yes, we went to Izmir and to Ankara a few times and north to the Black Sea coast and south as well. We went over to the western part of Turkey near the Greek border.

Q: Who was the consul general?

LEARY: The consul general was Bob Meyers. I know that Bob had been in Turkey many years before as a teacher at Robert College and his wife was a member of the old Levantine family, so he had strong roots in Turkey and spoke the language very fluently. He was a very capable consul.

Q: At that time Turkey, Istanbul, came under the Near East Bureau of the State Department.

LEARY: Right. GTI was the office for Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Q: But yet Turkey already at this time was a member of NATO, certainly looked toward Europe. Did you have a sense of being right there in the middle of, really the junction of Europe and Asia that you were really in Europe or that you were really in Asia.

LEARY: I think that in Istanbul, we felt we were in Europe, but on the fringe. Yes, you mentioned the military. The American military presence was beginning to build up in Turkey at that time. We had established a number of bases. In fact, during the time I was there we established a fairly large headquarters there in Istanbul, which resulted in the opening of an American dependents school. My oldest daughter went to first grade there. The Turks also, of course had been with us in Korea. A rather small, but active, fighting force in Korea.

Q: Which was probably still there at the time that you were there.

LEARY: I think it was.

Q: And they've done very well.

LEARY: Oh, very much so. I recall during the time I was there General Lawton Collins, one of the senior commanders in Korea, came to Istanbul and was invited to speak to the Propeller Club, which was a club of people involved in shipping and exists in most major port cities in the world. He talked about the bravery of the Turkish troops in Korea and received a resounding ovation for his comments.

Q: We talked a little bit about Cyprus and the tensions there. Did you have much sense that the Turks were terribly interested in Cyprus? Or they were concerned that Greece might do something to hurt their community there? Or to what extent do you recall that was a subject of much discussion?

LEARY: This was not really in my bailiwick, but my recollection was that they were principally concerned about their community on Cyprus. The fear that the Greeks were going to try and take over and control their community. They were not prepared to accept that.

Q: You were responsible, as you said before, for labor reporting. Why don't you talk a little bit about that. The role of the unions. Was that a major part of your responsibility or just something that you did a little bit on the side.

LEARY: Well, it was sort of a little bit on the side. Not a great deal. We had a Labor Advisor in the AID Mission in Ankara at the time and he made numerous trips to Istanbul, where the two of us would call on the labor leaders. We were attempting to promote, as we were elsewhere in the world, democratic trade unions in Turkey. The Turkish business community was not very enthusiastic about this program but gradually the unions were getting more and more of a say. It

was a very, very slow progress but moving in a positive direction.

Q: We sent some labor leaders to the United States.

LEARY: Yes, we had a program of sending people back here to see the United States and also their American counterparts. We had a similar program in Germany. I remember meeting such people as John L. Lewis at the consulate general in Dusseldorf.

Q: Anything else you want to say about Istanbul?

LEARY: I guess that's about it.

NELSON C. LEDSKY
INR Analyst for Greece, Turkey and Iran
Washington, DC (1957-1959)

Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department's Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

Q: Did you begin to develop some ideas about what geographic area you wanted to specialize in? Was the Middle East still your focus?

LEDSKY: Yes. I hoped that I would be assigned there. I think when the preference questionnaire came out, I asked for posts in the Middle East, but someone in the Personnel office hinted that my religion would probably be a serious obstacle to getting an assignment in that area. As I remember it, he was not someone directly involved in personnel assignments, but was in the Personnel office. He told me in a fatherly manner that I had picked the wrong post – at the time, I was trying to get an assignment to Iran. Although I don't think he went any further than that, I got the message. This was said to me just before I was assigned to INR to work on Iran and Turkey and Greece. At the time, I don't think the hint really sank in and it didn't bother me because it had no practical consequence then. However, the subject did come up early in my Foreign Service career.

I had had some German language lessons in college and in graduate school and I thought I was pretty good at it – even though I did not pass the FSI's language test; so I think I probably mentioned that as well. As I mentioned, I had some knowledge of Farsi, which I hoped I would be able to use.

Q: Looking at your bio, I have to assume that you did not get assigned to any post that you had listed on your preference questionnaire.

LEDSKY: It is true that my first assignment was to a Washington position. I asked to go overseas and was assigned to INR. This was toward the end of 1957. I don't know why I was chosen for INR; I was never informed.

I became an analyst in the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (GTI). I was located in the Department building called SA-1.. I guess that was partly the Middle East. I was perfectly happy with the assignment since it allowed me to live a little longer in Washington, which we had not done. We had rented an apartment on the assumption that it would be a very short term lease; we turned it into a long term one since I was supposed to be in INR for at least two years. Not ever having been overseas, I had no tremendous urge to go; I was happy to stay in Washington.

I had no idea what INR was, nor why I was not going to work in Main State. But that didn't bother me; I was all too new for that. In fact, I liked the assignment very much; I was happy in INR. There were three or four wonderful people in the office. They were primarily civil service. Harrison Symmes, a Foreign Service officer, headed the office. He hated his assignment, since it was viewed as being out of the "main stream." He later became ambassador to Jordan. He was very nice to me and we quickly became friends. One of my colleagues was a man of Turkish origin, Karim Kee, a long time INR staffer. He died recently. Ashley Hewitt was also assigned to this office. We worked together on adjoining desks. Ed Freeman was the Iranian analyst; the Greek analyst was Charles Lakadagos. He served in INR for something like thirty years. Each of the senior analysts had a civil service assistant. The two junior officers were there in addition; we may have been the first junior officers to be assigned to that office. There were a number of us scattered throughout INR. Andy Steigman was one of them. I also first met Bill Lewis there when he worked in INR. He was in the office next to ours working on North Africa.

I was to help the civil servants in their research and to write papers. The civil servants had the reputation of being very good researchers, but not good writers. I spent much of my time editing the papers written by Kee and Lakadagos, to make them desirable products. As time passed, I became interested in Iran. Ed Freeman took me under his wing and helped me to learn about the Iran of the 1950s.

GTI was a bustling office. The three countries it covered were always in the news. We essentially had two tasks: to write quick, short notes for the daily briefing given by an INR officer to the secretary and to the undersecretary, and secondly, to write analytical papers. It was fun. The building was terrible. It was not air conditioned, which made the summers something less than pleasant. The equipment we had to use was very out-dated. However, as I said, I was very content. The work and the atmosphere were not too different from my Edgewood Arsenal experience.

Q: You finished your INR assignment in 1959. At the time, I assume that you were asked what onward assignment you would like. Do you remember what you sought?

LEDSKY: I think I asked for an assignment to Iran, Turkey or Greece. Those were the countries on which I had worked and knew something about. My assignment in 1959 was to Georgetown, Guyana.

VICTOR WOLF, JR.
Consul General
Istanbul (1957-1959)

Victor Wolf, Jr. was born in New York in 1927. His Foreign Service career included posts in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, Denmark, East Germany, Poland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Wolf was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 31, 1986.

Q: Moving from the rather unprofitable, uncomfortable time in Iraq, I notice that you became an Iranian specialist, having taken language training and serving in political positions for the most part in Tehran, Khorramshahr, and Tehran again. Your next significant consular assignment was as a vice consul in Istanbul from 1957 to 1959. Could you describe the position of the Consul General in Istanbul and what you were doing there?

WOLF: First of all, you must always bear in mind that the people in Istanbul never really were pleased with the idea that from the time of the republic, the capital became Ankara. Istanbul was and still is, really, an imperial city, and there was always an underlying resentment on the part of the people in Istanbul that they were no longer at the place where decisions were made about Turkish life -- real decisions made about Turkish life. This is, of course, quite correct. The political headquarters of the country was Ankara. Now, a lot of the economic control and a lot of the economic decisions were still made in Istanbul, because that's where the banks were, that's where the money was, that's where, I guess you'd call it, the sophisticated management structures and staffing were located. But as far as political decisions, as far as political power was concerned, this, by that time, had all been shifted very largely up to Ankara.

This being the case, the people in Istanbul were always looking for ways, if you will, to make themselves bigger than the political reality was. We, in a sense, acknowledged that position, because in those days we had a rather large staff in our consulate general in Istanbul. The consul general was a very senior officer, he was usually an old FSO-1.

Q: When you were there, who was the consul general?

WOLF: Robert G. Minor.

Q: You were doing what?

WOLF: I was the head of the consular section.

Q: How large was the consular section?

WOLF: One officer, myself, plus some part-time help from another section in the consulate general. That was usually one of the CIA officers assigned there, who did actual consular work when I had a real glut of work. Then I had an American administrative assistant and eight local employees, eight non-American employees, because they were not all Turkish citizens. One of them happened to be an Austrian citizen who had lived virtually all of her life in Istanbul, and another one was a Greek citizen who had lived all her life in Istanbul.

Q: What were the main areas that you were dealing with in the time you were in Istanbul concerned with movement of people, refugees, visas, and the like?

WOLF: The real problem that we faced were really immigration or disguised immigration problems. These were centered almost exclusively on two of the three minority communities in Turkey. One was the Greek community, the other was the Armenian community. The Jewish community was the third community, but there wasn't much immigration there, and the Jewish community was, frankly, quite content in Turkey. There was no enormous pressure on the part of Turkish Jews to leave. They were in a pretty good situation.

The situation with Armenians and Greeks was quite different. The Armenian attitude toward living in Turkey had been largely shaped by the massacres and deportations of the Armenian community during World War I, when, as you know, many hundreds of thousands died, were displaced, what have you. From that time on, the Armenians loathed the Turks, the Armenians loathed Turkey, and they were quite willing to express their detestation of Turks and Turkey. The fact that this exacerbated an already difficult situation was not considered by the Armenians. They were so distressed and angry and full of hate for Turks that they did not bridle their tongues and exercise a certain sensible discretion. We've seen this pattern continue and expand, so that now you have Armenian terrorist organizations going around, blowing up, and shooting Turkish diplomats and consuls all over the world, including the United States.

Q: Where did the Armenians fit in the community of Istanbul?

WOLF: They were shopkeepers, small merchants. They treasured, as much as they could, any kind of a link with a foreign community, with the British community, with the American community, with the French community, and the like.

Q: How did your organization, as head of the consular section, become involved?

WOLF: Because they all wanted to immigrate to the United States, but there weren't enough numbers available.

Q: When you say numbers, what do you mean?

WOLF: Immigration numbers. In those days, we had a certain number of immigrant visas that would be issued per country based on place of birth. This is the so-called national quota.

Q: So they would come under the Turkish quota, but no Armenian quota.

WOLF: They would come under the Turkish quota. I think the numbers were 500 or 1,000; I don't recall. Something like that. So what the obvious solution was to go as a non-immigrant and figure out a way of staying once you got there. In those days, the rule was that if a person was registered for immigration, he could not get a non-immigrant visa, because registration for immigration indicated that the intent was to immigrate. You had to demonstrate that when you got a non-immigrant visa, that you would return from that trip. It became extremely difficult for Armenians to show that this was the case, because in actual fact, it wasn't the case. We had all sorts of problems.

The classic way this problem worked itself out was, I would have to deny a non-immigrant visa, and there would be an immediate appeal to the consul general. The reason why that was done was that Bob Minor, the consul general, had lived many years in Istanbul as a teacher at Robert College, and was married to an English-Italian woman whose family had lived in Turkey for many, many years as members of one of these foreign Levantine communities. So the Minors, Bob and Nettie Minor, were very well known to all of the people of Istanbul. So when this young punk of a vice consul would turn the visa down, they would immediately have recourse to the Minors, husband and wife.

So almost as soon as I got to Istanbul, when I was invited to dinner with the Minors, they both said to me ahead of time, "Look, we are not going to get involved in these cases, if at all possible, but from time to time, we may ask you. That doesn't mean we want you to change your mind if your judgment tells you you shouldn't. It's simply because of our relationships with all of these various people in Istanbul, we have to go through some motions." And I must say, Bob Minor not once put any kind of pressure on me to change a decision in these cases.

Q: Were you getting much pressure from the United States?

WOLF: Well, a little bit in Armenian cases, but rather more in Greek cases. The Greek situation was, again, different. The Greek situation stemmed from the fact that relations between Greece and Turkey had never been all that good, of course. There was the memory of the Greek adventure in Asia Minor in the early 1920s.

Q: The burning of Smyrna.

WOLF: The burning of Smyrna and all of that, the massive invasion by the Greek Army into Asia Minor. But the real problem came over Cyprus. The curiosity about Cyprus was that in those days the Turks had a sense that for once they were on the right side of a minority issue. The Turks have had a certain reputation in the world as being very bad in their treatment of minorities. In Cyprus, it is the Turkish community that is in the minority, and the Turkish Cypriots were frightened that if there was a union with Greece, which is what many in the majority Greek Cypriot community wanted, they would be discriminated against and persecuted by the Greek majority in a province of a Greek state. So they appealed to their brothers on the Turkish mainland to protect them, and the Turks were very glad, for once being on the right side of a minority issue, as it were.

The problem culminated in 1956, when Greeks in Salonika burned the birthplace of Ataturk in Salonika as an anti-Turkish protest. The result was almost immediately widespread anti-Greek manifestations principally in Istanbul. Now, there are all sorts of stories about how many Greeks were killed, whether Greek women were raped, and all that sort of business, in Istanbul. The fact of the matter is that there was no real recorded case of killing or raping. There was a lot of burning, there was a lot of looting, and there was a fair amount of disorder, and there is some evidence that the then-Turkish Government was behind some of these anti-Greek manifestations.

Q: Was the burning of Ataturk's place, was the Greek Government involved in that, do you think?

WOLF: I don't know the answer to that question, but I wouldn't be surprised. I wouldn't be at all surprised, because my impression is that neither of the two governments were beyond staging things that would be useful for their particular purposes, whatever those purposes.

Q: Given these riots and all, what happened to the consulate?

WOLF: Then the Greeks wanted to get out.

Q: How many are we talking about, the ones who wanted to get out?

WOLF: It's difficult to tell. The whole Greek community probably was between 50,000 and 100,000.

Q: So it was a sizable community.

WOLF: That was approximately the size of the community. I could be wrong, but my impression was 50,000 to 100,000. And a significant number of those Greek Turks, meaning citizens of Greek extraction, were also registered for immigration, and we had the same kind of problem that we had with Armenians, that they wanted non-immigrant visas, we weren't able to give them non-immigrant visas if they were registered, unless they showed that they really were not intending to stay behind in the United States on that trip in a permanent way.

We had much more pressure from the state because there were a number of states or constituencies, districts within the United States where there was a large Greek community, and the Greek lobby, the Greek community, was very well organized in the United States, in many respects much more organized, at least at that time than the Armenian community. You have a Greek-American organization called AHEPA, I believe. I don't know what that stands for.

Q: I think it's American Hellenic . . .

WOLF: Ethnic Protective Association?

Q: Something like that.

WOLF: At any rate, AHEPA. They were very interested in seeing that as many visa applications

of Greek ethnics in Istanbul were approved, and we got a fair amount of attention from AHEPA. The congressman who were very interested in this was John Brademas, a Democrat of Indiana.

Q: *Who is of Greek extraction.*

WOLF: Who is of Greek extraction. There were also some districts in Massachusetts where there was a lot of interest. In Maryland there was a lot of interest, in Delaware.

Q: *We're really talking about places where there was a large American-Greek community.*

WOLF: Yes. This was the kind of pressure that went on, and there was a fair amount of that. I would say those were the movement of peoples issues that I had to deal with.

Q: *How did you resolve the Greek problem?*

WOLF: You didn't resolve the Greek problem. All that you could do was deal with it on a case-by-case basis. I always took the position if there was any possible explanation, if in an individual case one could plausibly assert that a person was coming back, I tended to issue the visa, simply because why look for trouble? It's going to come anyhow on cases where you can't, really can't issue the visa. So if there was any possible justification in coming to the conclusion that the person would come back from a non-immigrant trip, I would issue the visa.

I have to say, in fairness, that a significant number of Greek ethnics to whom I did issue non-immigrant visas did, in fact return, and many of them would call me up at the consulate general or come to see me at the consulate general and say, "See? You weren't sure whether I would return. Here I am. I want to prove to you that I was an honorable man." Because I would always ask them to swear the oath, the oath that the statements they made on their visa application were true.

Q: *Which you included the statement that they were returning.*

WOLF: Which you would include a statement that they were returning or the period that they were going to be there or the purpose of the visit. My own impression, frankly, is that one of the reasons why a number of these people did come back was that they were very impressed in those days by the concept of an oath before God.

WILLIAM A. HELSETH
Political Officer
Ankara (1957-1960)

William Arthur Helseth was born in Florida in 1925. He graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1948, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949, received a PhD in 1962, and served in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1946 overseas. After entering the Foreign Service in 1950 his assignments abroad have

included Frankfurt, Izmir, Ankara, Tehran, and Kabul. In 1996 Mr. Helseth was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You went back to, what, Ankara?

HELSETH: I went back to Ankara, the Political Section.

Q: From when to when?

HELSETH: August of 1957 to June, just after the coup d'etat, of 1960.

Q: First, who was our ambassador in Ankara when you got there in '57?

HELSETH: Ambassador Warren was there then, the second Warren. Averell Warren had been the first Warren to be ambassador to Turkey. He was there when I was in Izmir. He had left. His tour ended. The second ambassador Warren came. He had a Latin America background. We met here in the Department when I was still here. He okayed my assignment so that I went out in August '57 with Mr. Warren as ambassador. He was still there when I left in '60. He left in '60 also, as I recall.

Q: Having served in a consulate in Izmir, your first view was obviously provincial. All of a sudden to be in Ankara, which is the capital and certainly has a different perspective. What was the view from Ankara as you and members of the Political Section saw it in 1957?

HELSETH: You mean the Turkish view? The view of Turkish politics, the Turkish government, economy, and what Turkey was up to. Once again, the focus was on Cyprus. It hadn't gone away. We got it much stronger in Ankara than in Izmir because, as you just pointed out, it was the capital. It was international politics there. That was the primary issue for the Turks, Cyprus. Also, in Ankara we got more of the flavor of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) involvement. Of course, Turkey had been in NATO since '51. That was while I was in Izmir, too, that they entered NATO. We had Lans Hovy's headquarters, as I mentioned earlier. But in Ankara, you got the fuller play of their participation in NATO. We began to get rumblings that they were interested in joining Europe in the European community (small letters; later on in capital letters), but they were interested in becoming more of an integral part of the European Community. That attitude became much stronger in the very early '50s and late '60s. But at this time we were still getting the idea that Turkey was a Western country that wanted us to know that they looked west. They didn't face east towards the Muslim side. They didn't want to deny their Muslim brethren. They wanted to still have good relations there, particularly trade relations. But they basically wanted to be looked upon as part of Europe and to be seen in the international political scene as a European actor. So, that was very strong.

We had, of course, our contacts with the leaders of the government, not leaders of the province, but leaders of the government. So, they were interested in those national level issues also.

Q: What was the attitude, would you say, that you picked up from the Political Section or that you developed yourself about the viability of Turkey as a European power at that time?

HELSETH: They had a long way to go. It was not going to be an immediate transition. They probably, in a sense, "deserved" to come in. They were eager to. And we would not, however, think in terms that they could immediately play too much of a role or be a power. It might be a long learning process. Certainly, that's proven true in the intervening decades. They've sought to become a part of the European Community in the economic sense, to be admitted as a full member. Still trying.

Q: It was still the Menderes government, wasn't it?

HELSETH: Yes.

Q: How did you look at this as a political officer?

HELSETH: First of all, he was in charge. He had won in free elections and he had a majority of the government. All the political tools, democratic elements, functions, were in the Democratic Party's power, in Menderes' power. The Republican Party minority was still under Inonu, but was not strong enough to really challenge him. They would come in perpetually with 30-35% of the vote so that they could not in any way change or threaten Menderes' regime. He was in complete charge. We dealt with him. He was the man.

Q: As a political officer in Turkey, can you tell me what you would do for someone who doesn't know what a political officer does? How, on a typical day, what you would do?

HELSETH: Let me broaden that a little bit. I went there as the number three man in the section. I was the one with the domestic political portfolio. We had the political counselor, Jack Goodyear, who ran the overall office, and reported directly and daily to the ambassador. Then Wilbur Chase returned in Ankara. He had gone from Ankara to Izmir for that short period of time. He was now back in Ankara. He was the international officer, the one who covered Turkish foreign policy and multilateral issues. So, I was doing the domestic scene. I was a Turkish language and area officer. Neither Will nor Jack had the language. I did. Later that year, one and then eventually two more young officers arrived, Turkish language and area officers as well. So, we had others who spoke the language and were able to talk to the Turks. As the domestic reporting officer, my responsibility was to meet with officers of both the major parties and any other smaller party, if they'd talk to me, and meet with the deputies in the assembly. My responsibility would be to follow up where I could, what the individual parties were going to do, how they were doing it, as well as follow what the government was doing on the domestic side. In trips in the countryside, we checked how that translated into activities at the provincial level by making calls, not only on the officials in the province, but upon major provincial actors in economic or political fields. So, my job was to try and find out politically at a level where I could reach, what the Turks were planning, what policies were being implemented; whereas Goodyear, of course, and the ambassador at their level, talking to the upper echelons, were being told what the government planned or how they planned to do it.

Q: Were you feeling any discontent with the Menderes regime at this point?

HELSETH: Well, the Republicans all the time were against it. Inonu, Ecevit, and others at the party level with whom we had access and talked to, were all very much opposed to Menderes and his colleagues. They were very strong in their denunciation of him - the "I can do it better" syndrome. But they would have no chance because they were a minority and there was no possible way they were going to be able to form a government. But then it had lost in two elections. Eventually, they lost, I think, two more.

Q: What about corruption? Was that much of a problem?

HELSETH: Yes, as in most countries of that area, there was a problem of corruption. There were politicians who were getting rich through a cut here and there. There were a lot of rumors of corruption involving the very highest of the officials. But it really wasn't as blatant as I've observed in some other places since then.

Q: The military, did we have any line on them or were we watching the Turkish military and what they were going to do?

HELSETH: Very closely at the time. We had the military mission there. We had close contacts with the TGS, the Turkish General Staff, that ran the military. Our military people there at the same level, general to general and on down to colonel to colonel, were in close touch with them. We had military officers, younger officers in a language program, and they would be assigned to the country for a year or two to do nothing but improve their language capabilities. That is, they didn't have straight military functions. They were there in a training capacity. So, we had entree at many levels. This doesn't mean we knew exactly what was going to happen when the coup came in 1960, of course, but we did have good contacts in the mid '50s. That continued on into the latter part of the '50s, too, with the Turkish military.

Q: There was a major development in that part of the world, on July 14th, 1958, when Brig. Karim Qasim and his people slaughtered the royal family of Iraq.

HELSETH: Yes.

Q: Eventually, we put Marines into Lebanon. There was considerable concern about a radical socialist regime in Iraq and a radical nationalist regime in Egypt. What was the reaction at the beginning? How did it develop from the point of view of our embassy in Ankara at that time?

HELSETH: The Turks were very upset by this, very concerned about the events in Iraq and potential threats from Syria, particularly if it was going to be augmented with any type of unity with Egypt. To back up a bit, when I arrived in August of '57, I had been in town about a week, I guess, when the ambassador called two of us up to his office and talked to us along the following lines. "I have here in my hand a piece of paper that Menderes (Prime Minister) just gave me. He says it represents a series of war plans for an attack on Turkey. They are very concerned about it. I need to have it translated, but I don't want to give it to our Turkish personnel to do the translating. You boys are going to have to translate it." He obviously wanted it pretty quickly. It was a fairly long document and we went over it for the next three, four, or five days translating it for the ambassador under strict order to report only to him. It turned out it was not so much a

specific war plan, as it was a general assessment of possibilities. But we got it done. Menderes, when he gave it to the ambassador, had expressed his grave misgivings over events in the Middle East. This was before the Iraq coup. The Syrian threat is very concerning, that Syrians is going to march onto southeast Turkey, that they were going to try to reclaim an area, which Ataturk had obtained in the '20s when the Turkish Republic was set up and the Syrians had never acquiesced to that. They looked upon that as irridenta, a land base they should be able to have back. Menderes and Zorlu, Foreign Minister, were very much afraid that at almost any time, Syria might attack them and they were going to need US help to forestall this.

So, when the Iraqis staged their coup and Karim Qasim came into power, the Turks were very much concerned as to what this meant. However, a difference in the Baghdad Pact, which had been formed in 1955, three years previously...

Q: It destroyed it.

HELSETH: Yes, Qasim abrogated the Baghdad Pact, a mutual security pact for involving Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The remaining three countries reorganized themselves as CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization. The Turks were solid supporters of that in the beginning. But they were still very much concerned as to what Syria and Egypt (particularly if Nasser were really going to get a foothold in Damascus), what they were going to do. So, there were intense consultations then, telegrams flying back and forth while we all watched with extreme care and interest as to what was going to transpire. Eisenhower sent the Marines in. The Turks basically supported that. They saw it as a means of maintaining stability there, not as a threat to the area. Of course, it wouldn't be a threat to them. If it were a threat to anybody, it would be to the Arabs there. The Turks would not be adverse to that. So, they welcomed the Eisenhower initiative there.

Q: What about the Turkish-Soviet relationship? How was that during this period?

HELSETH: Still very tense. The Soviets were still sniping by clandestine radio at the Turks. They were still being very demanding, still pushing the Turks on the Dardanelles, on the Bosphorus. They had not withdrawn their claims on lands bordering the Black Sea in the northeast. Moscow would raise these claims in some of the Soviet press from time to time. In some of the academic meetings that they had Soviet presenters would give papers on people, the laws and other issues, whom they said were really Russians, Slavs, and had to be protected, and the Turks weren't doing this. Moscow hinted that it might after some time move in to protect these people if the Turks weren't being careful enough with them.

The borders were very tightly controlled, with military defenses all around. This was before what you might call beginning in the early '60s, the campaign of smiles, when the Soviets backed off and began to change their tune. They did the same thing with the Iranians, too, in the early '60s. But in the '50s, the Soviets were still pounding on the Turks diplomatically. The Turks were still looking towards us and NATO for protection.

Q: What was your impression of relations between our consulate general in Istanbul and the embassy in Ankara? Istanbul, the former Constantinople, which has always been sort of the

cultural, intellectual heart - sort of the New York to Washington relationship. At that time, how did you find things?

HELSETH: It was a very good working relationship. We were the political center of the country in Ankara, due to the fact that the government was there. But the economic and commercial center of the country was Istanbul. Of course, you counted directives from the Turkish central government going out there. But as far as really knowing economically where the Turks were going, that was Istanbul's responsibility. Bob Minor was consulate general (CG), excellent choice to be there and a wonderful man as well. A very good CG. He worked very closely with the ambassador and with the other members of the embassy there. So, the relationship was excellent.

Q: How about the US military? Did that increase while you were there?

HELSETH: Very much so. When I left Izmir, the military was there, but it was not all that pervasive. When I came back to Ankara, the military was very pervasive. We were having status of forces problems. That caused several major incidents when things happened and the US military insisted on its jurisdictional rights under the SOFA (status of forces agreement). When a Turk had been killed or severely injured, there were one or two instances when that really grated upon US-Turk relations. Then there was some opposition in Turkey, although the Menderes government was fully behind it. Basically, I think, Turkish public opinion was behind it. But there were some newspapers and a minority in public opinion that felt that Turkish sovereignty was being overridden by the NATO ties in general and the American ties specifically. So, there was some opposition that developed to the use of Turkish military bases for some US flights in the area, particularly vis a vis the Soviets. Gary Powers, who is one specifically, coming up in 1959/60. There were one or two instances...

Q: These were U-2...

HELSETH: U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union. Some local media asked whether or not we were using Turkish bases in the crisis with the Iraqi, and then, the Syrian problem of '58 and '59 continuing, whether we were using the Adana military base for US interests there. There were some pictures in the Turkish press of US planes taken from the perimeter of the Adana field. There was public discussion of Turkish sovereignty being violated, but these were overall relatively minor. But the US military presence was there, well known, and did cause some problems from time to time. But overall, I think, the majority of the Turks realized and wanted that American presence there.

Q: How did the crisis of the coup situation in 1960 develop? How did it hit the embassy? Where there rumblings or did it pretty much come out of the blue?

HELSETH: There was a buildup. The Turkish domestic scene was extremely tense. There were daily meetings of the GNA, the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish Congress, so to speak, at which there were raucous disputes amongst the deputies. The press was playing it up. There were charges on both sides of what they were doing that was wrong and unconstitutional. But it did not seem to any element of the embassy that I am familiar with (that is, State, Defense, and the station, Central Intelligence Agency), that we were on the verge of military action. That it was

tense, yes. That there were serious problems, yes. But not that the military was going to act. I recall the day before the action started, before the coup took place. I had a meeting with one of my best Democrat Party contacts, a senior deputy in the Party, one of the officials whom I had known almost as long as I had been in Ankara, and we met very frequently and chatted. That afternoon when we met, he told me, "Bill, I can't take this anymore. We were actually fighting in the GNA today, not just calling each other names or shouting at each other, but there were fist fights there. I can't take it. I'm going back home. I'm going back to my farm in Giresun. I'm going to stay there." I went back to the embassy that night to write this up. The next morning was too late; the military acted that night. They took charge.

Q: Were these just exaggerated normal political disputes or where they major issues?

HELSETH: Menderes had become more autocratic. He had begun to think that only he could do it and he had to do it. He was still winning elections. He was being pretty autocratic and pretty dogmatic in everything else. The opposition deputies were figuratively up in arms about this. They were trying to call him at every turn. There was more evidence of corruption then, of monies going into private pockets. They were trying to make a real issue out of this and make the evidence public. They were saying that their own freedoms were being restricted and to some extent they were right. There had been a couple instances of censorship of the newspapers. So, the situation was very tense at this time. It was one where, I guess, the embassy, realized we were at a potential watershed, but there was no advance warning that the military was going to act the night they did.

Q: It's always interesting to see how an embassy responds. You know there's a problem. You go to bed one night. First, how did you hear about the coup and what did you do? What was the embassy doing during this immediate post coup time?

HELSETH: That morning, I was up and ready to go into the embassy. I think I noticed that out where we lived in Baccilielaire, which is a residential suburb of Ankara about two and a half miles from the embassy, there seemed to be activity, but I got up and drove to work. There was a pay station about a quarter of a mile from my house. There was a lot of activity there, but I was able to get through. I went on up to the main road to go to the embassy and was about half way there, when I met a cordon. The area was cordoned off. I couldn't go any further. There was no way I could talk my way through it. I tried to get through to go to work, nothing worked. "No, you can't go. Just go home and wait." So, I went home. I was able to get through on the telephone to the embassy and learned more detail about what had happened, why the troops were out. At the embassy, the ambassador apparently had gotten in. There were four or five people that lived close to the embassy and had gotten in to work. So, they were a nucleus there, reporting back to Washington what was going on. The rest of us who were not able to get in were feeding them what we could about what was going on in our specific neighborhoods, what was happening there. Essentially, that everything was quiet, everything was under control, but no one was able to get on the streets.

Q: Was there the usual problem if the military takes over of trying to figure out who the hell these guys are? It often happens that when the military takes over- I'm thinking particularly of Greece in '67. Nobody quite knew who they were. But the ones who took over in Turkey, were

they pretty well known?

HELSETH: Different situation. The top level took over in Turkey. The TGS, the Turkish General Staff, took over. In Greece, it was the colonels or generals (whichever coup you're talking about).

Q: The first Greek coup was when everybody was waiting for the generals to take over.

HELSETH: And they were not known.

Q: Yes.

HELSETH: But in Turkey, they were known. They announced immediately who they were and that they were in charge. People knew who they were. The general who was in charge (I forget his name right now.), there was no problem in that sense. So, there was not a question of "Well, who is going to come out on top?" They announced that they were going to maintain basic freedoms in Turkey, that foreign relations would continue as before, they would honor all their commitments, treaties, etc. It was just that "The domestic situation is now out of hand. We can't have this type of feud between the parties, the government and the opposition. That's got to go."

Q: Then, we did not have a feeling that here was an unsophisticated bunch of people taking over, which often happens. A group which adversely impacts on international commitments and that sort of thing.

HELSETH: No, not in that sense. They might not have been "sophisticated" fully in the international political scene, but they were people who had been around, who had been involved in the decision making for many years. We knew various ones at different levels from the top general of the TGS down to the middle grade officers. There was some contact, but not a lot at the lower levels, of course. But down to the colonel though, we had good contacts. American military had various entree into these groups there.

Q: What about the foreign ministry and all? Were the professional civil servants more or less kept in place?

HELSETH: Yes, in time, however, the foreign minister, and some political ambassadors were removed. But the Civil Service, so to speak, the bureaucratic level in the Foreign Ministry remained. In fact, it seems to me that the General Secretary (That may not be his exact title.) came and was named Acting Foreign Minister. He was a man we had been dealing with for many years.

Q: Essentially the top professional Foreign Ministry.

HELSETH: Yes, he had been there for years.

Q: This was when in '60?

HELSETH: In summer of '60?

Q: So, did this put any strain on our relationship? Were we making protests about the military and that sort of thing?

HELSETH: The protests we were making were mostly trying to do what we could to ensure the Turks didn't kill or give the death penalty to the deposed civilian leadership. We did make some demarches in favor of no bloodshed. There was no bloodshed in the coup that took over. So, we tried to emphasize to them to continue that. Now, my time in Turkey ended in less than a month later. I had been there three years so that I left Turkey at the end of June, a few weeks after the coup. I was then scheduled to come back to the Department to be on the Turkish Desk for two years in GTI, the Office of Greece, Turkey, Iran Affairs. So, I left Turkey later on that same month, in June.

Q: I was just thinking, this might be a good time to stop for this and pick it up the next time when you were the Turkish desk officer.

HELSETH: That will be fine. It sounds like a reasonable place to stop.

Q: Today is the 25th of February, 1996. You said you have a footnote to add to the Ankara time. Eisenhower visited there - when was this?

HELSETH: This would have been in the late '50s - '58/'59. It was the first time a US president visited Turkey and the Turks went all out for this. After all, they saw the visits as a milestone in Turkish-American relations, their entry into NATO, their activity and participation in Korea, as well as, of course, Point 4 and the Marshall Plan. So, the Menderes administration really wanted to make this a memorable event both for themselves and, they hoped, the Americans. Anyhow, the city was decked out terrifically for the visit, including ceremonial arches. The number 23 comes to mind. I'm not sure how many arches there were, but there were a phenomenal number of arches from the airport in Istanbul into town. Then in town, every major intersection had an arch decorated and emblazoned with appropriate words of welcome, etc. for President Eisenhower.

The footnote I wanted to mention was something that I attribute to my colleague at the embassy, Matt Smith. Since Eisenhower, being a former general, was going to review Turkish troops anyhow. I mean, as the President, he would have. But as former general, it was all the more appropriate. Matt suggested that we propose that the President greet the Turkish military, the soldiers that he would be reviewing, with a traditional Turkish statement, which was in Turkish, "Fellow soldier." Eisenhower picked this up. At one point in this review and hokey time, he uttered those words and almost was blown back by the resounding (Turkish) from the Turkish military, acknowledging his greeting and wishing him health. It made quite an impact at the time, I think. I'm not sure it's ever been noted. As I say, I attribute that to my colleague, Matt, who is now in retirement in Texas. But it was a good thing to have done. It really sort of brought it down to Earth, that traditional military greeting to the troops.

Q: Now, on to the GTI desk?

HELSETH: I was the deputy on the desk, the number two, the political slot in GTI.

Q: GTI being...?

HELSETH: Greece, Turkey, Iran at that time., in the Bureau of Near East Affairs It was later submerged and re-submerged. At that time for Turkish affairs, we had an officer in charge and then a political and an economic assistant. So, there were three of us on the desk. I came in to be number two in the political slot.

Q: What were the years you were there?

HELSETH: I left Ankara in late June/early July for a bit of home leave - not much - 1960. I remained on the desk for four years. After two years, I was promoted to officer in charge. So, the last two years, I was officer in charge. I left there in late summer/early fall of 1964.

Q: How did you find the fit at that time with Greece, Turkey, and Iran being lumped together? I can understand a bit combining Greece and Turkey, but Iran seems to be sort of a strange bedfellow in that particular mix.

HELSETH: Well, yes and no. They're all northern tier, non-Arabic members of the Middle East. Greece, of course- Turkey saying, "We are Europe and we don't have anything to do with that." While perhaps a little uncomfortable being grouped in there, Turkey was striving to become westernized, to be a part of the West panoply of nations and, in fact, had already been accepted into NATO at that time. Iran, a little bit different, but still non-Arabic a northern tier country. Dulles had originally thought in terms of geography, although GTI had existed long before then. Plus, the fact that Cyprus being the issue that it was between Greece and Turkey, having Greece and Turkey in the same complex meant that the people handling Cyprus were meeting daily, so to speak, and were housed next door to each other in the GTI complex. So, I think it made sense geographically as well as politically. Iran being a little bit outside the pale, but at the same time, they fit better there than with any Arab country, or with South Asia.

Q: Let's look at this '60 to '64 period through these separate countries. What were the major issues that you dealt with at this time?

HELSETH: I was the one that followed this along with the officer in charge of GTI. The main thing was, of course, the Cyprus issue and trying to work out some agreement between the Greeks, the Turks, and the Brits over the future of Cyprus at the time. That was the overwhelming political issue that we faced still, as it had been in the '50s while I was in Ankara. It was the same thing coming back to GTI.

Q: I can't remember, was Cyprus an independent state at this point?

HELSETH: No. The agreement had not been reached. About that time, late 1959/early 1960,

they did have the accords that were reached in London that was going to establish Cyprus as an independent state. So, it was in the throws of being set up, organized, recognized or not recognized, as the case may be. It was beginning at that time ('60/'61) a definite part of the political horizon. There were the troubles that arose on the island. The Turks particularly coming in all the time to complain that the Greeks and the Cypriots weren't adhering to it, that Makarios was being too heavy handed or too devious or whatever the situation might have been. But I met almost two or three times a week with the deputy in the Turkish embassy. The officer in charge of GTI would meet with the ambassador, but my counterpart was the number two man in the Turkish embassy, the deputy there. He and I would meet, as I say, sometimes two or three times a week. But certainly once or twice a week, we would get together. Usually, he would have a list of complaints that the Turkish government had - or if not official complaints, they would just be musings on his part about the problems they were encountering on the island of Cyprus.

Q: As I think of this fit, you were familiar with Turkey, but Greek politics are a thing apart. In a way, the two countries collide over Cyprus and over other regimes. It's always a decimal collision. But each has its own dynamics. So, I think it would be very difficult for somebody to sort of walk in and be dealing with Greek politics, all the internal physics, Papandreou and the various governments at that time. Was there somebody handling the Turkish side and you had to meld the problems together? How did that work?

HELSETH: Let me clarify. I think maybe there's a misunderstanding. I came in on the Turkish Desk of GTI. I did not come in as the overall of GTI. I was on the Turkish side. There were our counterparts on the Greek side as well as on the Iranian side. So, there were three of us on Turkey; there were three on Iran; and three on Greece. We worked together there in these problems. I dealt almost exclusively with the Turks because my colleagues across the way was dealing in the same fashion with the Greeks and their problems as they saw it.

Q: Dealing with it from the Turkish side, did you run across reflections of what I can only call the Greek-American political buzz saw at that time of the various Hellenic-American associations and all that would tend to skew our policies towards Cyprus in favor of sort of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots?

HELSETH: That was a favorite theme of the Turks that time, that the Greeks had better access, they had a better press, and they were able to influence US politics. I'm not sure how deeply they believed that really, but it was a favorite argument that would be trotted almost pro forma from time to time.

Q: But did you feel that? I mean, did you feel that policy at a certain point would get kicked up high enough so it would be in the sort of American political scheme of things, so that in Congress and all that we would seem to be taking the Greek side? Did you ever feel that? Each period is different. This is '60-'64. This did happen later on. But at this time, did you feel it?

HELSETH: Not really. We knew that AHEPA was very strong politically and had their own merits.

Q: The American Hellenic Education and Protective Association, right?

HELSETH: That they had their entrees into various high level personnel in the Congress was obvious, but it didn't appear at that time that they had a dominant voice as the administration sought to defuse an issue, as it sought to find some way of bringing sizeable force together, and to implement the accords that had been reached before.

Q: How did both you personally but also your colleagues on the Greek Desk look upon this creation of Cyprus as a viable entity, as a sovereign nation?

HELSETH: I think we all thought it was a rather fragile development that is rather precarious because neither side on the island trusted the other and the Turkish government was very concerned about the future of its compatriots on the island, the Turkish Cypriots. They were 17 or 18 percent of the population, but the Turks always round that off to 20 percent, of course. It was obvious that it was going to take support from all the interested powers, Turks and Greeks first of all, but also the British and ourselves to make this work because there were constant complaints about Makarios: the fact that he was not as intent on implementing some visions that the Turks regarded as core elements of the agreement, and their feeling that the Turkish Cypriots were definitely a second class citizen on the island and therefore, they needed outside support (read: Ankara). This meant that for Cyprus to really survive, there had to be some continued agreement.

We couldn't let it go down to the fighting that might break out at any time and did occasionally break out. In fact, that was the essential feature that the Turks were always bringing to our attention, that there had been more attacks on the Turkish Cypriots, that sometimes there would be deaths as well as woundings, and maybe some destruction of property. The Turkish embassy was constantly bringing these sorts of situations to our attention. It was obvious that there was a lot of hand holding to be done to try and get both sides to implement the accords. It had to be done across the board for Cyprus to survive. As we know, they did survive. They have survived now for 35 years, a little over that. But there have been some major altercations and fighting on the island during that period.

Q: What about Colonel Grivas? Was he a factor at this point or had he departed the scene?

HELSETH: He had left. That was part of the agreement, that Grivas would leave the island. In fact, he did leave the island after the accords had been reached. The British were quite perturbed that all those years in the '50s, they had never been able to apprehend him.

Q: Who handled Cyprus during this time from our point? Was there a Cyprus desk or was it sort of an offshoot of both the Greek and the Turkish Desk?

HELSETH: There was a Cypriot desk. GTI became GTIC, with the creation of a Cyprus desk within GTI so that there was an officer in charge of Cyprus affairs and other officers as well. Colleagues at our level were reassigned..

Q: What were sort of the internal Turkish developments in this '60-'64?

HELSETH: This was a very difficult period for the Turks politically and economically, but

especially politically. The Menderes government had been overthrown in the Turkish Revolution in June 1960. A military government had come in and they were a very fragile institution themselves, as they were seeking to reestablish, they said, and they did try to reestablish civilian control, to return the government to the civilian politicians. But Turkey was so divided politically, although Cyprus was a unifying factor, but each side in Turkey thought they could do it better, of course. But there was no single party then developing in the aftermath of the Revolution that could be dominant and could by itself form a government. It had to be a coalition government. The former leading politicians at the top level of the Menderes party, the Democrat Party, were in Asia, where they were awaiting trial and eventually did undergo trials. As a result, Menderes and his colleagues were hanged, Menderes being the Prime Minister and Zorlu being the Foreign Minister. The President, Celal Bayar, was not. Turkey, politically speaking, was in turmoil. This was reflected in their stance on Cyprus. Whoever was in power in Turkey felt they could not be the ones that yielded anything to the Greeks on Cyprus. It was too much a national issue. As weak as the central government was in each year in these early '60s, it reflected upon the ability of that government to reach an accord over Cyprus if that accord meant surrendering portions of part of the Turkish claims.

Q: How did the trial of the former civilian Turkish leaders unfold? How did you deal with the Turks? Hanging a prime minister is... The prime ministers all have dealt with other countries and other countries dealt with them. How did this play out and what were the problems?

HELSETH: United States government had dealt with Menderes for 10 years with both of the Democratic and Republican administrations. So, there was some respect for him, some feeling for him, not that he was seen to be a paragon of virtue by any respect. But at the same time, he had been in power - for 10 years, we had been dealing with him. So, at all levels in those early '60s, we were, to the extent we felt it politically expedient as well as that we were politically capable of doing so, urging restraint upon the Turkish military and those civilian leaders who were emerging in power. We were urging that they not resort to capital punishment for any of the former leaders. We were trying to convince them that there were other forms of punishment that would be just as effective and that death was not necessarily the best means to send the message that this would not be tolerated. Again, the autocratic type of government that Menderes had developed in the last five years of his rule...

Q: Were there any political reflections within the American Congress or out in the public particularly of...

HELSETH: I don't recall any really significant expressions of that or any real forceful demonstrations of such feelings. But I think it was accepted within the Congress that they shared this feeling that capital punishment would not be the best way to go. But it was difficult to express this to the Turks at the time. That's why I say we did it to the extent that we felt we were able to do it effectively.

On the public side, there was very little in the public press about it. The occasional article in The New York Times or The Washington Post something like that, reporting on the trial and hoping (I guess that would be the best way to put it.) that there wouldn't be capital punishment. But no organized movement that I recall within the United States in the political side or the public side,

any of the broadcasting stations or anything like that.

Q: While you were on the desk, did you get involved with Armenian-Americans? Did they have any sort of campaign about Turkey at all during the time you were there?

HELSETH: Not a full fledged, organized campaign. There were probably some behind the scenes activities. They did work with a few members of Congress. They did have, unfortunately, some Armenians here who resorted to - I don't want to say "terrorist activities" because that means too much now. There was a Turkish consul in California, San Diego or Los Angeles, that was shot by Armenians. We would get in Congress from time to time a resolution to commemorate this or that Armenian event.. The Turkish government would, of course, come in each time and protest. When the Armenians were able to get their entree into Congress and there was some resolution or some sense of feeling on the part of Congress being considered that was favorable to the Armenians in response to their request, the Turkish government would always come in and complain about this both to the embassy in Ankara as well as to the State Department here in Washington. So, yes, there was some expression of the Armenian's wishes and desires, but it was not a major factor during the time I was on the desk.

Q: Speaking about protests, did you get involved at this time - I'm not sure when it came out - with the movie "Lawrence of Arabia." Did this come out about on your watch. I was in Yugoslavia when it came out. The Turks protested violently to us that we could not show it to the rest of the non-American diplomatic community. Was that a factor when you were there?

HELSETH: That movie was released in 1962 and won the Academy Award for best picture that year, so it was hard to miss. It was a factor to the extent that the embassy came in to see us a time or two. The ambassador came in at his level and spoke about it. Their unhappiness with the film, their thought that it depicted Turks in a wrong light and that it wasn't accurate, etc., yes, they did complain about it.

Q: What about Kurds? Were the Kurds at all a factor while you were there?

HELSETH: Peripherally, they were. Of course, the Turks still at that time maintained the fiction that there were no Kurds in Turkey, they were just mountain Turks stemming back from the '20s and '30s and the time of Ataturk. But, yes, it was a factor there, particularly with the troubles across the border in Iraq. From time to time, there would be some incursion into Turkey. But it was not the problem it became later when the Kurds became more active politically in Turkey and began to organize a political movement. That came later.

Q: What about relations with the Soviets? Was it a difficult time vis a vis the Turks and the Soviets, the communists?

HELSETH: This was slowing down. About 1960, we see the beginning of the Soviet campaign of smiles towards both Turkey and Iran. They were not brandishing the sword quite as much and they did in the past. They were still there. They still made their feelings and presence known, but it was not with the assertiveness that they had shown in the late '40s and most of the '50s. So, they were always there. It was a problem, but there were more exchanges now between the Turks

and the Soviets. There was some desire and, in fact, some implementation of that desire, to invest on the part of the Soviets in Turkey, to extend some aid to them in helping with their economic development, which the Turks rather generally examined and accepted some of it.

Q: Did we see the Communist Party in Turkey as being a threat or a problem for us?

HELSETH: No. It was outlawed, minor, and not very active at all in Turkey at this time. Soviet radio broadcasts sort of toned down in the '60s. As I say, the campaign of smiles; the clandestine radios had been broadcasting so much. The anti-Turkish tirades didn't cease, but slowed down.

Q: What about relations with Syria and Iraq during this particular period? Any particular problems?

HELSETH: There was always the fear on the part of the Turks that either or both of these countries were going to cause some border problems. They remembered and well knew the Syrian desire to regain part of Alexandretta, as they called it, now the country around Iskenderun.

Then there was the trouble over the waters there. The Turks were building dams on the Tigris and Euphrates, building or wanting to build. The Iraqis and the Syrians were both extremely upset by the possibility of having their water, which they depended on as well, of course, interrupted or substantially reduced by the Turks. So, you had not only the border problems and the desire for some political readjustment of boundaries, but you had the water problems, as well as the potential threat of the Soviet aid which was going to Iraq and Syria.

If I may just make a last point to pick up again. The Turks, even though the Soviets were being "nicer" to them, still were very concerned about the continued and increased Soviet assistance to Iraq and Syria. They were fearful that, if something did go wrong, they could be attacked from three sides: the north, the south, and from the east. So, this was a continuing, to them, very legitimate concern. We didn't view it with the same worry that the Turks did, but we realized it was possible. The Turks wanted to have their NATO ties enhanced and wanted to make sure that NATO would come to their aid if the Soviets did something directly or through their surrogates launch an attack on Turkey.

Q: Then there was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Could you talk about how you all on the Turkish Desk viewed the Cuban Missile Crisis? There was a Turkish factor in that whole thing.

HELSETH: Yes, there was. Those were the Jupiter missiles that had been installed in Turkey beforehand and which were now thought to be ineffective, outdated, and should be removed, but the problem was that the Turks did not want them removed at that time because they felt that it would weaken their stance vis-a-vis the Soviets and that it showed the US was no longer as interested in Turkish defense. They were arguing all along that these should not be touched. But the administration, particularly President Kennedy, was intent on removing these missiles and wanted them taken out of Turkey as a result and in combination with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Eventually, they were removed. They were a thorny issue at that time. The Turks were adamant in saying "These can't be removed."

Q: Prior to the Missile Crisis, were you working on trying to persuade the Turks to allow these missiles to depart?

HELSETH: At our level (that is, on the desk), no. I don't recall any instance where anything trickled down to us - at a higher level were really pushing this. I don't recall any memo of conversation with senior State officials and the Turkish embassy or Ankara government having to do with this particular issue. It sort of surfaced during the Missile Crisis.

Q: Did somebody come running down to you at some point during the Missile Crisis and say "What the hell is this about these Turkish missiles" or anything like that?

HELSETH: That was about the way it happened, I guess. It had not been an issue up to then. I frankly don't recall seeing any paper before then stating that these missiles should be removed, that they were now obsolete and not capable of performing a function, and they could be replaced with something else, something like this. I don't recall any study on that.

Q: What was the reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis as far as the Turks were concerned What were Turkish contacts with our mission in Ankara saying?

HELSETH: The Turks were very concerned about it from the point of view of what it would mean to them directly with regard to the Soviets. If the Soviets were able to maintain and continue what they were doing on Cuba, the Turks were very much afraid that this would have a bad effect upon them and their relations. So, they were hoping that we could stand fast, that the issue could be diffused in a way that would not enhance the Soviet reputation or position. They felt that could then be used against them. But as far as high level, or even our level, demarches on it, not really. They weren't involved to that extent. They were part of the discussions with NATO about it. They were briefed that way. They were briefed with the other NATO countries in Washington. They were kept informed of what was going on. To the best of my knowledge, that seemed to satisfy them that we weren't working any back door route, that we were intent on preventing the Soviets from prevailing. That was their hope the way it would end.

Q: My understanding was that there was sort of an either tacit understanding or maybe even a secret understanding that "You've got to get those missiles out of Cuba and, by the way, we're already planning to take missiles out of Greece anyway." So, it gave the Soviets at least a feeling that, by doing this, they had gained something, but it could be interpreted by the Turks as leaving the Turks dangling. Did that come up at all?

HELSETH: I don't recall it in that context, except in so far as it would leave the Turks dangling. That was some of their problem with the whole thing, that it would leave them exposed, that it would strengthen the Soviet hand against them and, even though things had been going a little better for a year or two, they still knew that the sword was there and it could be unsheathed at any time. They didn't want to see any enhancement of the Soviet capability. So, that's why they were against it. That's why many in the State Department argued within our own circle, argued against agreeing to remove the missiles then. In the end, the missiles weren't taken out right away. It was quite a bit later. I don't remember the exact time, but many months later, the missiles were actually removed. So, it didn't appear to be in implementation a part of the agreement at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But in actuality, that, of course, is where it

started.

Q: Did you feel any change in our policy on the advent of the Kennedy Administration in early 1961? This was not particularly of major interest on the part of the new administration?

HELSETH: Not a particular change that you could ascribe to that development. There was this change in view of the Turkish Revolution, the fact that there were new people there and that they were trying to reorganize their government, trying to set up a more democratic government. I think they were sincere about that. The question was how to do it. We had a new administration. They had a new administration. Both were equally determined to maintain the basic US-Turkish relationship, the close ties that had existed and increasingly so since 1945. So, I don't think there was any deeper attachment or any feeling that, "Hey, we ought to change the policy. We don't want to be that close to them." It was mutually seeking ways to maintain the relationship in light of, one, the new US administration, and two, the new administration in Turkey.

Q: How about the American listening posts and regular American military stationed in Turkey as part of NATO? Were there any problems, changes with these relations and troops in Turkey at that time?

HELSETH: Not at that time, but the seeds for a problem that matured later and for the Turks backing off a bit, were laid at that time. The earlier experience of the 10 years under Menderes when at least if we wanted something, it was almost automatic that it was given to us. That came to a halt and the need arose to justify more solidly our request to the Turkish military and the later civilian government. But those issues were not at that time an immediate factor of discord. Later, they became symbols and the Turks in some instances thought there were derogations of their sovereignty. They were extremely cautious, continued to be, and particularly more so about the use of the airfields at Adana and Cigli to some extent. Cigli is near Izmir.

Q: How about U-2 flights? Did that come up? Were they ceased by the time you came in?

HELSETH: Well, when the U-2 flights became public knowledge in Adana, with the Gary Powers incident in '59 or '60, those effectively had ceased. But many Turks in and out of government were always concerned that the Americans regarded Adana as an American base, as American sovereignty. They insisted, and we also went along that this was a NATO base. It was not an American base. But let's face it, the US was running the show. These were our planes there. To a great extent, we made the decisions there. But there was this deference shown to the Turkish feeling about sovereignty, which was very strong all along, but became stronger after 1960 because Menderes was gone and the new people themselves felt that this was an issue that had to be made clear that this was Turkish sovereignty there.

Q: Did you run across the problem that so often arises with the old Ottoman Empire, that is, what flags could be flown where? Were flags becoming an important issue?

HELSETH: No, only to the extent that on some occasions, we had some desecration of the Turkish flag by American servicemen who came on shore leave in Izmir and Istanbul. But as far as flying the flags was concerned, that was never a problem because that was the US flag or the Turkish flag. There were the two quite rigidly set forth, when and where they would be flown.

Q: What about hashish? Was the cultivation attempt much of an issue at this particular time?

HELSETH: No. That came later. There was the cultivation of hemp. There were also poppies that were grown extensively in Turkey and harvested. But for one thing, we had not as a government turned our attention to it so much as we did in the next decade. So, that was not a major issue with the Turks, almost, I would say, at any level at this time.

Q: You left there in 1964, is that right?

HELSETH: I left there in '64, but remember, in '63 we had the big flare-up over Cyprus.

Q: Oh, yes. Let's talk about that.

HELSETH: That was the first time that we deterred the Turks from invading Cyprus. They had finally had all they could take, the government felt, from Makarios and what they felt were his double dealings and his ingenious ways of evading the issues of not giving the Turkish Cypriots a proper role. Public sentiment, which was always very high, could be easily inflamed against the Greeks and the Cypriots, and in '62 to '63 focused on Makarios as evil incarnate. There were continual fighting outbreaks in Cyprus that led to more and more Turkish deaths, more infringement of the Turkish zones, as the Turkish embassy pointed out. My meetings with the Turkish embassy representative came almost daily at this time.

Finally, in the summer of '63, the Turks were prepared to move. We got wind of it or surmised it from what was going on. If I recall correctly, Ambassador Raymond Hare literally sat in the hall outside the room where the Turkish cabinet was discussing whether or not to send the military. Furthermore, the military were poised on the Turkish Mediterranean coast ready to set sail, but he literally sat outside the door importuning the cabinet not to invade and was successful in restraining them and in convincing them that they should not attack Cyprus at this time. The State Department in Washington was also importuning the leaders involved. But I give full marks to Ray Hare who really executed US policy at that time and persuaded the Turkish government not to invade Cyprus in '63.

ANTHONY D. MARSHALL
Vice Consul, CIA
Istanbul (1958-1959)

Ambassador Marshall, the son of Brooke Astor, New York City socialite and philanthropist, was born in New York and educated at Brown University. After service in the Marine Corps in World War II, Mr. Marshall joined the Department of State in 1950, transferring to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the following year. In 1958 he was assigned to Istanbul, after which he left the Agency and worked in the Private Sector. Returning to the Government in 1969, Mr. Marshall served as US Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic (1969-

1971); *Trinidad and Tobago (1972-1973); Kenya (1973-1977) and concurrently, the Seychelles (1976-1977). Ambassador Marshall was interviewed in 1998 by Richard L. Jackson.*

Q: Did those years in Istanbul while you were there for a year and a half coincide with particular violence against the Greek community and the exodus of most of the Greeks living there? Or was that a slightly different timeframe?

MARSHALL: A lot of that happened before. But of course the Turks are such a nationalistic people that they really don't care for anybody except the Turks. It's a little hard to identify sometimes because it depends on whom you're talking to. The traditional definition of a Turk is a Seljuk Turk from the center of Asia Minor. A lot of Greeks had left, but there were a great many while I was there. And afterwards, there was another exodus. And, of course, the Jews who came from Portugal were looked down on and the Armenians were looked down on. I remember one time an Armenian whom I knew whose last name was not spelled "ian" or "yan", and therefore was not clearly identifiable as Armenian, and whose family had changed their name three generations beforehand, had applied for a permit to have a stall at a trade fair in Izmir and was denied it because he was Armenian. There was and is a great deal of discrimination in Turkey. But there was no great Greek problem. There was, of course, the Cyprus problem, but that would be going on through Star Wars.

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Cyprus Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1958-1962)

Archer K. Blood was born in Illinois in 1923. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Greece, Germany, Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed in 1989 by Henry Precht.

BLOOD: I spent two years in the secretariat. Then I went to NEA. Probably my favorite job of all in the Foreign Service. I became the first Cyprus desk officer.

Q: This is 19 --

BLOOD: This would have been 1958. Cyprus, of course, didn't achieve independence until 1960. It was still a British colony. There was an insurrection going on in Cyprus of the EOKA (PHONETIC), the Greek Cypriots trying to achieve union of Cyprus and Greece. Many negotiations with Greece, with Turkey, and the British. It was coming up in the U.N. brought by the Greeks every year.

The great part about it -- I was a class four officer then -- was that I was the only person I think in Washington who was solely concerned with Cyprus. There were, of course, many people above me who were partially concerned with it. But all the policy papers and virtually everything, I drafted. It could be changed, as they often were, but it was a feeling of

responsibility, sort of a focused responsibility. It was such a challenging job. I was dealing with the British, Greek, Turkish embassies. It was a great job.

GTI -- that was the office of Greek-Turkish-Iranian Affairs in NEA which has now been subsequently transferred to European Affairs. And that was a great office. Tremendous people in it.

Q: *Who was in charge?*

BLOOD: Owen T. Jones was the director, and Mennen Williams was deputy director. Bruce Laingen, and I shared an office. I was the Cyprus officer; he was the Greek desk officer. Then, of course, when he was away or on vacation, I also handled Greece. And when I was away, he handled Cyprus. And then Roy Atherton subsequently became, when I left the job, the Cyprus desk officer.

Q: *Was the Secretary seized of the Cyprus problem at that time period?*

BLOOD: No, he was not. The people we did work with primarily were Bill Rountree --

Q: *Who was the assistant Secretary?*

BLOOD: Assistant secretary for NEA. Bill Dale who was then director of British affairs in EUR. Bob Murphy who was --

Q: *The Under Secretary.*

BLOOD: The Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And he was the one that the Greeks and the Turks would come to, particularly the Greek ambassador would see him. The Secretary and the Under Secretary rarely got involved in Cyprus. I think, as I recall, Bob Murphy was really the senior most person with whom I dealt on Cyprus.

Q: *Now, what was the U.S. trying to accomplish at that time?*

BLOOD: Well, we were trying to, of course, bring about a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem that would secure our military concerns in the area and not upset Turkey too much. We were trying to block, the time I was there, the Greek efforts to use United Nations General Assembly to sort of try to force some action with respect to Cyprus.

Q: *We favored an independent Cyprus eventually.*

BLOOD: Eventually we did, but we didn't start off that way. I remember drawing up a plan myself that called for enosis of Cyprus with Greece with Turkish bases on the island.

Q: *But was that --*

BLOOD: That didn't get very far either. I've always thought that the Greeks misplayed the

Cyprus -- Makarios particularly, the Greek Cypriot leader misplayed the Cyprus issue. If they had -- and this is my own theory -- if they had accepted the early British offers for limited self-government and had not --

Q: *Under British sovereignty.*

BLOOD: Well, yes, initially under British sovereignty, but the British were doing this throughout the world, and everywhere it was leading to independence. At this time, the guerrilla, the Eoka guerrilla movement, had not begun. The Turk Cypriots were sort of quiescent and relaxed. And I think if they had done that, accepted the British offers, that eventually and gradually just like in many places of the world, and without Turkish resistance, Cyprus would have become part of Greece. But the resistance sort of --

Q: *We were talking about Cyprus. Would you continue where I interrupted you?*

BLOOD: All right. The Greek Cypriot resistance worried and antagonized the Turkish Cypriots and then the Turkish government. When the Turkish government became intimately involved, the problem became much more intractable. The chance for *enosis*; that is, union of Cyprus with Greece, which I always had favored myself, disappeared.

The key event, in my own analysis, in the move toward independence was the defeat of the Greek effort at the United Nations in November of 1959. The Greeks had made the mistake of allowing Krishna Menon of India to stage manage their effort.

Q: *What was our position?*

BLOOD: Our position was against the Greek initiative. We were getting many telegrams from Greek-Americans throughout the country urging us to support Greece in the United Nations. The queen of Greece, Queen Frederika, had a very long-standing letter writing relationship with George Marshall, who was, of course, retired by then. But she was pressing him to intervene on behalf of Greece. And the queen and the palace, particularly the queen, was also approaching White House and other people trying to get the United States to change position.

Q: *The Greek position being move to enosis and union with Cyprus. Am I incorrect on that?*

BLOOD: Well, that was the Greeks' ultimate goal, yes. I forget exactly the technical nature of their proposal in the General Assembly. It wasn't that bold, but it was leading in that direction.

I also recall it was Bob Murphy who held the line in a rather key decision not to go along with the Greeks even though Henry Cabot Lodge, who was our ambassador to the U.N., was urging that we accept the Greek position. Our feeling was that if the Greeks realized that they couldn't get anywhere in the U.N., then they would be forced into negotiations with the Turks and the British. And we wanted to stop, once and for all, the U.N. effort which had been conducted on a yearly basis. We wanted to make it clear to the Greeks that they better give up this U.N. route and resign themselves to negotiations. After the failure of their --

Q: Was this a position that the British wanted and we accepted the British argument, or was it something that we independently arrived at?

BLOOD: I think we independently arrived at it. We had, at that time -- our primary contacts were with the Greeks. They were in constantly berating us. The Turks came to see us much less frequently. And the contacts with the British were not as frequent as with the Greeks and the Turks.

Q: But you don't think at a senior level, there were consultations with the British?

BLOOD: Oh, there were. Of course, we had an excellent consul general in Nicosia. At that time, of course, it was a consulate general, Toby Belcher, who was superb and had a wonderful relationship with Lord Caradan. But in Washington, no, I don't think so. And I know that if there had been, I would have known about it because whenever the Secretary and Under Secretary were not involved in Cyprus, Mr. Murphy was. When anybody ever came in to talk Cyprus to him, I was there as the note taker.

Q: What about the Turkish position? They were just too preoccupied with their own internal affairs, or why didn't they take a more active role? Why did the Turks leave the problem alone at this stage?

BLOOD: Well, the Turks were playing to their strength. They had won our gratitude in Korea. They were, in terms of military significance to NATO, more important than Greece, and they knew it. And they, I think, sensed that we were probably not going to accede to Greek wishes. They weren't importuning to us to do anything. They were really concerned that we not adopt the Greek point of view; and they knew we weren't, so they were rather relaxed.

Q: You indicated earlier that they might have been prepared to accept union with Greece.

BLOOD: Before the troubles began, yes. And if the Greek Cypriots had not come into active hostility with the British. If the offers of limited self-government had been accepted, it could have played out gradually over a period of years without strife or violence. Yes, I think they would have accepted that.

Q: How significant was Greek pressure, Greek-American pressure, on the State Department at this time?

BLOOD: Not very significant, really. They were always behind the curve in the sense that the cables which we would receive asking us to vote for the Greek resolutions in the General Assembly would usually arrive at the State Department after the vote had been taken. And we were, therefore, able to send off a standard reply, "Well, thank you, but, you know, this is already after the fact."

Q: What about through the Congress? There was no organized effort --

BLOOD: At that time, the Greek lobby was not that as sufficient as it later came to be. There

were a few congressmen -- I remember John Brademas of Indiana, who is now president of NYU -- who was interested. But even then, he was very sympathetic to all the other considerations and not blindly in support of Greece. In fact, we discounted the Greek-American pressure and could afford to do so.

Q: Greek money wasn't important politically? There were no wealthy Greeks who had a --

BLOOD: Oh, you had people like Tom Pappas who was a wealthy Greek-American from Boston close to President Eisenhower, but their lobbying efforts weren't really well focused.

Q: So how long did you have this job?

BLOOD: I had it for two and a half years, and then I left to go out to Dacca in the summer of '62.

Q: That was a big change jumping from the Mediterranean to Pakistan.

BREAK

BLOOD: Then came actually, I think, a critical point in my career. I said I was promoted to class one, you know, February or so of 1968, and my tour was coming to an end in the summer. Of course, it was where would I want to go to next. And NEA came forth with some suggestions that didn't -- like political counselor in Ankara and Athens that didn't intrigue me too much.

Then Bill Hall, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Pakistan when I was in Dacca the first time, was assigned as ambassador to Ethiopia. And he wanted Chris Van Holland as his DCM, but Chris was in Turkey, I think, and they wouldn't let him go. And so he asked me if I wanted to go. And I said yes. I thought, "Gee, DCM in Addis is a chance to break into Africa, you know. I think if you want to get an embassy there, if you had been DCM in Addis, you might get an African embassy might be possible there." And I very much admired Bill Hall and Jane, his wife, and would love to work with them.

And then I suddenly got word that I had been transferred to Athens as political counselor. Subsequently, Bill Hall told me he thought I preferred Athens. And I said, "No, I never. If I'd had any choice, I would have jumped at Addis." Because the troubles that Mike Crosby -- I don't know if you remember Mike Crosby. He was serving as DCM in some African post. He had been in Greece when I had earlier. He was supposed to go as political counselor to Athens, but his ambassador was brought back as deputy secretary so he couldn't go. So the job was open. Since I was in NEA, they threw me into the breach.

But if I had gone to Addis, I think it would have been a completely different career because one reason I went to Dacca is because I was very unhappy in Athens.

Q: You really didn't want to get back into the Greek region again?

BLOOD: No, I didn't. And they asked me to -- well, Phil Talbot was the ambassador. Phil Talbot had been assistant secretary in NEA after Rountree so I had worked with him and liked him. But

when I got there, I realized in terms of rank, I would be about the fourth person in the embassy. I had been DCM and chargé in Afghanistan for a long period of time.

Also, the junta was in charge. The CIA was very supportive of the junta. CIA people had very close contacts with the junta. The political section, we were anti-junta.

Q: *Why were you anti-junta?*

BLOOD: Well --

Q: *Because of your democratic values?*

BLOOD: In part. I think in part because most of us in the political section had served in Greece before. We had known the Greek politicians. The military would serve the king. We were very fond of them. We didn't accept the argument that these people were baddies. Everybody that we had known before were bitterly opposed to the junta because they were political people.

I've never been in a post that was so divided.

Q: *Well, what was the CIA rationale for support of the junta?*

BLOOD: Well, a very good one really. Because the leadership of the junta had come out of what the Greeks call the CIA which was the Greek military intelligence. And so they had been the normal working contacts of the CIA before the coup. Suddenly the people that they knew, their working contacts, were now the rulers of the country. So this was obviously advantageous to them, and they like them and worked with them.

Q: *But you said the embassy was quite divided?*

BLOOD: Well divided, yes. Well, primarily the military -- and there were many, many Greek-Americans in the CIA and among the attachés. We had also a large MAG mission. They were without exception, the Greek-Americans, 200 per cent for the junta. The people who were opposed were in the political section. Bob Keeley was my deputy there for a while and bitterly opposed. And the USIA, I would say most of them were pretty unhappy with the junta. The economic section was sort of neutral.

Q: *The DCM was McClelland?*

BLOOD: DCM was Ross McClelland. Phil Talbot left in January after the election which brought in Mr. Nixon. And for the next year, over a year, there was no ambassador. And Ross was the DCM. I mean, Ross was the chargé.

Q: *Why didn't we have an ambassador appointed?*

BLOOD: Well, I think in part there was a feeling that you didn't want to show too much enthusiasm about the junta. I mean, there was many, many Greeks opposed to it. And they didn't

get around to it until they appointed Henry Tasca, who didn't get there until, I think, January in 1970. And so most of my period was working with Ross as the DCM.

And he was in the very difficult position of running a divided embassy. It was really a bitterly fought struggle. The staff meetings were hostile. I've never been in a place where you couldn't, you know, as American officials speak frankly about the local government. But if you said anything mistaken as critical about members of the junta, the CIA would explode in anger.

Q: Would they relay it to the junta members?

BLOOD: I hope not. I doubt that. And then if they would, you know, started in staff meetings charges about political leaders that they were no damn good or can't be trusted, then I would rise to their defense. And there was much, much friction. And a lot of our military there felt that this regime was very popular. And our argument was "Well, if they are that popular, why don't they expose themselves to an election?"

"You don't need an election in a democracy, you know. They are popular. You can see that just by talking to people. That is our feeling."

I admit it must have been very difficult for Ross McClelland at that time. Because Greece is a country in which if you have ever served there, you do get emotionally involved. Most people there were emotionally involved in that issue.

Q: But Washington was surely aware of the problem in the embassy. Did Washington not give guidance or take --

BLOOD: No. I think perhaps they wanted both views coming out. And then I heard that Tasca was coming as ambassador. And, actually, a friend of mine in the Foreign Service, Bill Crawford, who had served as Tasca's DCM in Rabat, wrote to me and said that, "I know both of you. I know you and he will not get along." He didn't have a very high regard for Tasca. And I guessed that when Tasca came, he would opt for a particular position in support of the junta. And I was right in that.

Then the issue involved primarily then was the sale of military equipment to Greece: tanks, aircraft, artillery. The position that I took and the leader of the political section took was that, "Okay, we didn't mind selling it to the Greeks for NATO purposes but not on the justification that the rest of the CIA was using that this would bring them back to democracy. These people will never bring back Greece to democracy. And this is a lie. We will sell it to them only for purely security purposes and tell them that, but don't operate on the delusion that you are doing this as a way of encouraging democracy because that is just false." Anyhow, then when Tasca came, he did say let's give them . . .

So that's when they, NEA, knowing that I wanted out, said there is this opening in Dacca. And they knew I had served there before. Would I be interested in going?

Q: This is 19 --

BLOOD: '70. I guess the assignment was really firmed up at the end of -- no, about the end of '69, the first part of '70. I left Athens in March '70 to go to Dacca. Actually, I was chargé because Ross went on home leave for a couple months. When Taska arrived, I had been chargé for a month or so. It was I who greeted him when he came to Greece.

Q: *When you left Athens in March --*

BLOOD: This was direct transfer, yes.

Q: *Direct. Did you have a feeling that the junta was there to stay indefinitely?*

BLOOD: Oh, no.

Q: *How do you think the issue between Greek opposition to the junta and its authoritarian policies were going to be resolved?*

BLOOD: I didn't know. I didn't foresee that the junta would make such a stupid mistake over Cyprus that they would bring about their own downfall which was what happened. But I just felt that it was an anomaly that the Greeks wanted a democracy, that this was an abnormal situation, that sooner or later would fail. That was my feeling, but I didn't know when it would take place or how it would take place. I was rather pessimistic at the time seeing that they were in for a long haul, and Agnew had gone over right after I left to visit them. It looked like the United States was moving from a rather cool position to a warmer embrace of the junta.

Q: *Did you think that whatever opposition there was the body politic would work against us in the future?*

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, that's what we kept telling Washington that we are going to pay a price for supporting a non-popular government here, that the Greeks are going to remember this and hold it against us.

Q: *But there was no reaction from Washington? Did you get any resonance from Washington to those arguments?*

BLOOD: I think they -- no, no, I can't remember any. But Washington was divided too. I mean, there was no, you know, great enthusiasm for the junta certainly. And as I say, it took us well over a year before we moved into a warmer relationship with them. And even then, I think they were still uneasy about it because the rest of the NATO countries were damning them and were unhappy with them. It wasn't, you know, a close embrace ever.

Q: *In this division of American official opinion over the junta, where did the White House figure? Where did they come down? The Johnson Administration at least.*

BLOOD: Well, my feeling is that they took sort of hands off approach; wait and see what would happen. And it was actually during the Nixon Administration that we moved toward a closer position.

Q: I see. But they were not activists in one way or another trying to encourage any kind of evolution of --

BLOOD: Oh, yes, we were always talking about we encourage a return to democracy, yes. The question was did you trust the junta to bring it about.

Q: I see.

BLOOD: And I didn't, and all of us didn't. Or did you think that well maybe like some people thought we would have nice law and order in a country, remember, was solidly behind us in NATO, cooperating with us militarily and every way they could. Maybe, you know, why worry about it? That was the thing in the short run, but we were arguing the long run that we are going to pay for this because the Greek people are not happy.

Q: Did you personally have much contact with the junta leadership?

BLOOD: No, and they didn't like -- they liked their contacts with the people who were fully supportive, and they knew that we weren't.

Q: So if the State Department sent you an instruction to see someone at a high level, then you either had to have somebody else do it from CIA or you went to see somebody else --

BLOOD: Well, I don't think I ever got an such instruction. I don't think Ross did. I think the pattern was the CIA did it. But we had a fellow named -- what was his name -- [Peter Peterson] he was the consul general, who was a Greek-American, and he was very close to Patakos (PHONETIC), who was number two in the junta. He often was used for this.

Q: All right. Any last minute thoughts on Athens before we move again?

BLOOD: No, except I think it was probably the most painful experience I had in the Foreign Service.

Q: Had you gotten a reputation by that time as a "troublemaker," if I can ask a direct question?

BLOOD: I don't think so, no.

Q: No.

BLOOD: I think Ross probably felt that I was difficult at times. Of course, you know, I would argue with him about -- sometimes I was trying to protect Bob Keeley who was much, much, much more vehement than I was in his views, but he was working for me, and I was trying to protect him against, you know -- Ross felt he went too far in his reactions to the junta.

PARKER T. HART
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1958-1961)

Ambassador Parker T. Hart was born in 1910. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Brazil, Yemen, Kuwait, Washington, DC, Egypt, Syria, and ambassadorships to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Ambassador Hart was interviewed by William R. Crawford on January 27, 1989.

HART: One day we had a message from Turkey. Bill Rountree said, "Look. The Turks have urgently asked for either the Secretary or the Under Secretary to come out to Turkey to talk about Iraq. Neither the Secretary nor the Under Secretary are about to do this. They have other things that are much more demanding than that. Would you go? I can't go. I've got other things that would keep me here. This will give you an opportunity to see your bailiwick." I had a speaking commitment of a certain date in May 1959 and this was already April. I felt I had to get back for that engagement, but I went off to the Middle East.

I went first to Greece to get acquainted with our people there in the embassy and have a briefing. I went on to Cyprus. Toby Belcher was there as chargé. It was a fascinating transition period with Sir Hugh Foote as governor. He was phasing out British rule but still living in his sumptuous quarters with his wife. I met a number of the Cypriot political leaders. I met Archbishop Makarios, Glafkos Clerides, Papaioannu, who, I think, was head of AKEL, the communist labor party. He was a very young man at that time. I also met Fazil Kucuk, head of the Turkish community, and several of his senior men. Toby Belcher had a group of us out to his place in the area of Kirenya. That was a very interesting meeting.

Then I went on to Turkey. When I got to Ankara, William Fletcher Warren was ambassador and I stayed at his residence. We had some rather intense discussions about Iraq, arguing over policy toward that revolution. Fletcher embraced the principle that Iraq was about to fall under total communist influence and I said that I didn't believe it. He wanted the U.S. to take action and I asked what sort of action we should take. He got quite steamed up. We had a problem that developed later with respect to his senior personnel and I'll come into that in a moment.

A meeting was immediately arranged for me to see Fethi Rustum Zorlu, the Foreign Minister. We had a preliminary meeting in the Foreign Minister's office, the same one that I was later to get to know well. He said, "For our discussion about this question of Iraq, I'd like to transfer the venue down to Istanbul. If it's all right with you, we'll meet in the Hilton hotel which has just been built on the Bosphorus."

We met at that hotel, where we had practically the entire top floor to ourselves. I found my old friend and associate, Adnan Kural there from Damascus and a number of other people. I had someone from the Embassy in Ankara with me as well. The purpose Zorlu had in mind was to try to convince us that we should not intervene in Iraq. I at once told him, "We have no intention of intervening in Iraq." We could have finished the whole conversation in five minutes, but he kept pounding away, apparently not believing me. I kept answering him the same way. We discussed all the ins and outs of the situation in Iraq so that we could match our versions. We had

lunch and went on for a while in the afternoon. Finally, he accepted the fact that our policy was pretty firm and we saw things very much as they saw them.

I went back to Ankara. I think I was there one day and then flew to Tehran. I had briefings there from Ambassador Tom Wailes (*Edward T. Wailes, Ambassador to Iran, 1958-1961.*) and then went on to Afghanistan stopping in Kandahar. I think I flew in a C-47 aircraft owned by the Afghans. We landed in Kandahar and it was hot. We couldn't proceed any further because the airport in Kabul had been closed. Prime Minister Prince Daud was going to use it for some kind of a trip and was about to fly out, but no one knew exactly when. We had to wait until he had cleared. We waited a long time and we fried. We walked into the terminal every now and then which was not air-conditioned. At least it was a change and better than sitting inside the aircraft. Finally, after we had been there a couple of hours or so, we were told we could proceed. We flew up to Kabul and stepped out into that lovely mountain air and it was just beautiful. It was a simple grassy airport with a windsock and not much else, quite adequate for a C-47.

I was taken to the embassy residence where I stayed with Henry Byroade, who had been my chief in Cairo 1955-1956 and had been assistant secretary when I was directing Near East Affairs under his supervision. We knew each other well. I got a pretty good briefing there. I called on Prince Naim, who was the foreign minister. I didn't get to see Daud, of course, since he had gone. The king was not on my program for some reason. I guess he may not have been available or maybe they didn't consider me to have high enough rank. It was a hurried trip and I would have loved to have stayed there a week, but I had this unfortunate schedule back in Washington that I felt I had to meet. In retrospect I wish I had canceled it, but I felt I would have been letting down a lot of people.

To get out of Kabul it was decided that I would go best by car to Peshawar. They provided me with a driver and car and we drove down through the Kabul Gorge. The road which was still raw and barely completed. It hadn't been surfaced and it was sharp gravel. It was a fascinating ride and very picturesque, as Kuchi tribal families were migrating out of the hot Indus Valley to the Afghan highlands.

I spent the night in Jalalabad where we had a small AID mission who were trying to help people build their own roads. In fact, the Kabul Gorge Road had been built with advisory help from this team. I sat up late in the night listening to the woes of these American engineers, who said, "You know, we are here to advise them on how to build a road, not to build it ourselves. The Afghans are blaming us all the time for not building the road, but we can't do that. We don't have the men or the equipment. We're trying to teach them how to use their equipment. They can ruin even a rock crusher. They'll wreck one thing after another. They don't understand the machinery."

I went on from there.

Coming out of Jalalabad we drove to Torkhum which is the frontier station with Pakistan. There was a very picturesque assembly of trucks waiting to get through the Khyber Pass. They were beautifully decorated Afghan trucks with pictures drawn quite artistically all over the sides and even the front and the hood. I guess a lot of people know about the Khyber Pass. I went on to the consulate at Peshawar where I spent one night and got a briefing there. Barrington King was the

Consul there and gave me a very nice welcome. Many years later, in 1978, I was to occupy his house temporarily in Carthage when he was away and I had my wife, two daughters and their husbands on a Tunisian holiday. Ed Mulcahy, who was ambassador at the time, gave us a great welcome.

I flew down then to Karachi where our embassy was located. The ambassador there was James M. Langley and he met me at the airport when I arrived. We had an evening together. I spent the night and then flew back to Washington. I would have loved to have gone on to a more extensive trip to India, for example, and other places but I had this commitment.

Langley resigned shortly afterward and went back to live in Concord, New Hampshire. He was a newspaper man and a very nice guy. He was very helpful to me in the brief time I was there.

That brings us to the summer of 1959. In that year, 1959, there was a meeting between Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes, which was very significant for the future of Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus matters in particular, because their initial meeting -- and I've forgotten the exact date -- in 1959 had led to the Zurich agreement in principle on an independent republic of Cyprus ruling out enosis and partition. This was a change in the position of both sides. It was an act of statesmanship which gave us great relief in the State Department because it meant that the heat was off for a while between Greece and Turkey and reduced the threat the Cyprus question presented to the unity of NATO. It led, of course, in 1960 to the London meetings so that the London-Zurich body of agreements emerged into very elaborate arrangements with respect not only to the sovereign base areas that Britain would retain on the island but a great number of smaller sites which they would lease from the government of Cyprus for an indefinite period for purposes of military communications, surveillance and training.

About this time Dulles became desperately ill with cancer. I can't remember the date when he went to Walter Reed for his last stay. His place was taken by Christian Herter. We had what I remember as a period in which the Foreign Service really came into its own. Herter had the respect for the Foreign Service and believed in using it to the full and I think he had the utmost confidence in Loy Henderson as did the whole administration, especially Eisenhower. I found myself attending meetings when Bill was absent or in the interim between Bill Rountree's departure for Pakistan and Louis Jones' entry as assistant secretary. Loy Henderson was usually at meetings held by the Secretary to discuss the Foreign Service and the Department's organization, but he was frequently called upon, also, to express his opinions on substantive matters, especially including the USSR. Sometimes we'd have some very interesting exchanges on the subject of Soviet intentions and policies.

Herter was sworn in after Dulles' death as I remember it. Eisenhower wanted him and a number of us met him on his return from the Senate where he had been approved right away. He served as Secretary of State for about a year.

Quite apart from the Cyprus agreements, Turkey in 1960 had an upheaval. The military took over the government. The embassy was caught short on this surprise event and it was realized in Washington that reporting out of the embassy had been very deficient. Doug Dillon, who was the under secretary, i.e., number two in the Department, went out on a special reconnaissance trip to

see why we had not had reports of the developing crisis. Reports had been pretty rosy. He found that, starting with Ambassador Fletcher Warren, all the top positions were occupied by people who had no experience in that area or even in the Middle East. Two of them were old colleagues of mine, friends from my Foreign Service class of 1938. The Deputy Chief of Mission, an older man, had had much experience in Latin America as in fact had Fletcher and at least two of my classmates. This lack of familiarity with Turkey may have been responsible for some of the uncritical acceptance of the Menderes Government's versions of events as they were developing. Doug Dillon, exploring the matter in greater depth, became incensed that we should have such poor representation from the standpoint of experience. They were perfectly fine officers, but were just out of their depth. Dillon wanted to fire Fletcher Warren but he didn't. Instead he fired his number two, whose name I can't remember. Fletcher Warren, in due time, was retired and replaced by seasoned veteran Raymond A. Hare.

This move by the Turkish Army is a long story but it was triggered by a developing crisis in the parliament in which the Menderes forces, heavily outnumbering the opposition, seemed to be directing their efforts toward crushing what was left of the opposition by very high handed methods. There were complaints about Menderes' expenditure of American aid money. Menderes knew how to please the top levels of the American government, especially the Eisenhower Administration, by his staunch anti-Communist posture, and his willingness to assist in the formation of the Baghdad Pact back in the early 1950s. I am afraid he got the idea that he could almost write a blank check on American assistance by being a great ally. I don't think Menderes had planned to spend a great deal of time thinking about his Arab neighborhood. I don't think he understood the Arabs and what was really going on in that area. I got the impression from Zorlu, that Menderes had a positive policy toward Iraq. That policy was that they were going to keep Iraq on the friendly side because both countries had in common the Kurds.

The thing that triggered the final military action was two things as I remember it. One was that Menderes was beginning to lose the battle for the minds of the students and they were all in an uproar against him and blaming him for suppressing news as well as for suppressing them. Then Menderes went ahead and put on trial the leaders of the opposition, and, to cap that, arrested Ismet İnönü, great patriot of the republic. This was too much for the Army to take. They said that the whole structure of government was threatened. Since the Army in Turkey considers that its mission is to preserve the republic and the Atatürk principles from dangers from within as well as from outside, they moved in and Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan (Minister of Finance) were tried and executed. Others were tried and imprisoned. Celal Bayar, the President of the Republic, who was an old war hero of World War I period, was tried and just separated from politics but treated gently. Quite a few others were kept on Yassiada in the Marmara Sea for a while and then eventually allowed to come back to their homes but not to get into politics. The Democratic Party, Menderes' party, was abolished. The Republican People's Party thus held the leadership position. That's the party of Atatürk, the founding party of the republic, headed by İnönü.

While all of this was unfolding, Turkish financial difficulties were mounting. The new government which came into power -- with the military putting civilians in many key positions -- sent delegates to Washington for financial assistance. Under Secretary Doug Dillon took the active part in meeting them, being the top economist in the Dulles-Herter State Department.

GEORGE QUINCEY LUMSDEN

**Consular Officer
Izmir (1959-1961)**

George Quincy Lumsden was born in New Jersey in 1930 He graduated from Princeton University in 1952 and served overseas in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant from 1952-1955. His postings abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1957 include Izmir, Bonn, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait and Paris, with an ambassadorship to The United Arab Emirates.

The assignment came up and it was Tehran. So, I went to the Iranian desk and spent about a week there. Then all of a sudden I came in one morning and they said, "Your assignment to Tehran has been changed. You're going to Izmir." "Where is Izmir?" "It's in Turkey. It's ancient Smyrna." "Why am I going there?" "Well, we've had a bit of a problem there. The vice consul got sick and then there is some difficulties with the armed forces people who are there. There is this question of smuggling currency in and out of the country." Apparently, they were just putting in a whole new team there. The vice consul had been ill. So, I ended up going to Izmir after studying three months of German.

Q: You went to Izmir from when to when?

LUMSDEN: I arrived in Izmir in October of 1959 and left in November or early December of 1961.

Q: During this time, 1959-1961, when you arrived in Izmir, how would you describe the state of relations with Turkey, between the United States and Turkey? What were our interests there?

LUMSDEN: In Izmir - I can't speak for Ankara, where the embassy was - it was a bit tenuous. This was an old Levantine town into which we had, because this was the height of the Cold War, built an intermediate an intermediate ballistic missile base. We had the headquarters of the two NATO commands, Land Southeast and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force, there. We were attempting to combine Greek and Turkish military units. This was before the Cyprus blowup. On top of this sleepy Levantine town, this scandal at the PX blew up. The Turks were trying to protect their currency by nailing a fixed exchange rate which bore no relationship whatsoever to the value of the currency. So, they were using the APO, these guys, to send money out, get dollars in, and things like that. Then we would send them out to get exchanged at a realistic rate and get dollars back in for the people and also get dollars out to deposit. So, that was a big mess that had to be cleaned up.

The town was one that would have fit very well into one of Lawrence Durrell's Alexandria books. You had old entrenched Ottoman families and old entrenched European families that were there because of the Ottoman concessions to set up their own post offices and do the fig and tobacco business and things like that. So, it was sort of delightfully corrupt. It was an eye

opening experience for me. I was the vice consul extraordinary and plenipotentiary, stamper of passports, the getter of drunk military personnel out of jail, trying to counsel them against marrying the B girls down at the Paradise Bar and things like that. I think you probably know the bit. However, I lucked out. The chief of staff of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force was a Greek general officer, a war hero, who had flown everything from canvas sided wooden propeller planes up to eventually qualifying for supersonics, about 18 different types of fighter intercepting aircraft, a bona fide hero. His young daughter graduated from college in Greece and came to live with her parents. I met her on her 18th birthday. I met her under the following circumstances. Picture this compared to the way young people meet today. A mutual friend, a Greek-American, a contractor building on the air base, invited me... My mother was in Izmir at the time visiting me. I think she was mainly staying because she was a great reader of books and she knew about the east and things. She said, "You know, I'm afraid that a gay old bachelor is now going to turn into a lecherous old bachelor." I was 30 years old. We met at this Greek-American's house, I with my mother and my wife with her mother and her father and we were introduced. It was par hazard (French: by chance), but my mother promoted this thing. I must admit that I was very attracted. That was in January. We were married in June 1961. We were married by the governor of the province.

Q: Her father was a Greek general.

LUMSDEN: A Greek general. I signed her immigrant visa the first time she came to the United States.

Q: Knowing the Greeks, I would have thought that marrying outside the Orthodox faith and outside the Greek Orthodox faith was sort of a difficult thing.

LUMSDEN: Therein lies another interesting story. One, I was not married outside of the Orthodox faith. I was married by Father Timothy, a Greek Orthodox priest. I was married at the Church of St. John of Smyrna. The Church of St. John would surprise you in appearance. It looks like something that is in Kent, England. It was built by the English business community. The original Church of St. John had been destroyed lo those many years ago during some sort of disturbance back in the 17th or 18th century and was sort of in rubble. The British built a beautiful Anglican little stone church that you would find in southern England there. At this time because of the 1922 situation in Smyrna, there were no Greek Orthodox churches. Because of the military agreement and the stationing of a certain number of Greek troops in the area, they were allowed to have a chaplain. They had most of their services just at home. However, in that the Anglican church, was not a Catholic church.

Q: It was also in communion with the Orthodox Church.

LUMSDEN: That's right. When we went to get married and my parents came out and they talked to the Anglican priest, who was going on his summer vacation anyway and turning the operation of the church over to Father Timothy, the Greek Priest, he said, "Well, there is nothing you have to do that is the same communion. The sacraments of the Orthodox Church for marriage, funeral, everything, are one and the same. So, it's perfectly acceptable." So, we were married in ancient Smyrna, now Izmir, by a Greek priest and have a Greek wedding certificate.

The day before, however, because of Turkish law, we had a civil ceremony, where we were married by the wali of the Willamette of Izmir on the 22nd of June and we had a religious service on the 23rd. This all goes to show that either I was a very good or a very bad diplomat. Being assigned to Turkey and marrying a Greek, I don't know. You can draw your own conclusion. We have been married all these years and have two children.

Q: Tell me, I served for four years as consul general in Athens during the colonel time. I am very much aware of Greek-Turkish feelings. I would have thought a Greek general would come home every night and swear at the damn Turks or something like that. What were you getting from your father in law and your wife at that time?

LUMSDEN: My father in law spoke Turkish. He was born in Comotini in northern Thrace. His father's business was practically all with Turks. He was sort of "Ah, the Turks... But they're there." He was actually well liked by the Turks. He got along extremely well. Of course, he was air force and not army. They had a few army officers there who had a much more difficult time, I think. But Labros, my father in law, fit in very, very well with the Levantine Turkish European community that dominated social life in Izmir. I never have known him to be vengeful about the Turks. My mother in law, yes. It's unfortunate that he has Alzheimer's disease now. His current memory is almost all gone. He can still remember bouncing a 500 pound bomb off a Spitfire that was hung as he tried to re-land at Hellenikon Air Base and things like that, but his memory in recent years has declined to the point where his interest in politics has declined also. I don't know what his reaction would be at the current impasse, if in fact it is an impasse. I don't know. But I do know that he was an international person enough to know that Greeks and Turks have simply got to figure out some way to get along. Of course, he was virulently anti-communist. Basically, he was really still a royalist when it comes down to it. He went and joined King Paul in Greece. That is a fascinating story. He fought the Italians... He was captured by the Germans and exiled to a small village and escaped Greece disguised as a novitiate Orthodox priest (He is not very religious. That's interesting.) with a group of Jews from Salonika and snuck across the Aegean to Izmir. That is where the British consul general met and sent him to Cairo, where he joined this group of Greek pilots that they were getting together with King Paul and he flew Spitfires. They fought their way back.

Q: As a consular officer, you probably have a closer view of officialdom down at the police level and elsewhere, the documentary level. What was your impression of the Turkish bureaucracy?

LUMSDEN: Very bureaucratic. If you get away from the international Levantine, Lawrence Durrell type set, you got into a bureaucracy that was extremely proud of the fact that they had had the revolution of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and had separated religion from the state. But at the same time, they were very suspicious of foreigners, rather xenophobic. Of course, these suspicions around Izmir were fed by the highlife behavior of the clique in which all of the diplomats, consuls, and businesspeople moved. They were very sincere in their idea of doing things correctly, but in so many ways, they just didn't have a clue how to do it. You'd go the emergency ward at the hospital and there would be a cat sitting on the operating table. Check into the country coming back on leave, having bought an LP record of Perez Prado or some damned thing like that, and having the customs inspector take this single record and write into your passport that this phonograph record must be re-exported from Turkey because you're

coming in as a consul... Getting an idea, but not really knowing how best to carry it out. Of course, the economics of self-sufficiency and everything has been disproven, but these people worked on a set of principles that they thought was modernizing Turkey. In my opinion, it wasn't modernizing Turkey. It was isolating Turkey. Just as we see today, they still have a great many barriers to overcome, as do the Greeks.

Q: Did you run across the problem of federal benefits and fraud in those cases? I know later on, anyway, back in the hinterlands of Izmir, there were people who had relatives who had American ties and all that. Did that cause you any problems?

LUMSDEN: As a consular officer, there were always problems with a Social Security check. Was the person to whom the check was made out somebody who was still alive or not? When somebody applied for a tourist visa, was that really their intent? That was incessant. I guess, given their background, you can't blame them for doing the things that they did. That Social Security check was a godsend. The getting to America was also an opportunity to get out of this moribund situation. I keep thinking of Alya Aglan's book, America, America. Well, this was the area. There was a lot.

Q: Was it a consulate or a consulate general?

LUMSDEN: It was a consulate and it became a consulate general just before I left.

Q: Who was the principal officer?

LUMSDEN: When I got there, Donald Eddy - no relation to the other Eddys - was the consul and then Kenneth Burns became the consul general. Then he was still there when I left.

Q: Did you get any feeling at that time for a Turkish corps within the Foreign Service or was this just another job?

LUMSDEN: No. There were several Turkish specialists, who I admired. I took this assignment as a consul still with the idea that I wanted to get back to Europe and do economic work. One particular friend that I made and who was an usher at my wedding was Bob Dillon.

Q: I've had a long interview with Bob.

LUMSDEN: You did? My best man was the vice consul from Aleppo, Bill Clevenger. He had country expertise, which I admired very much. I used to go with Bob Dillon. I asked the consul general, "All I do is passports, services, and seamen. I never go anywhere except down to the bar to dig somebody up. Can't I go out and see some of the country?" So, he let me go with Bob a couple of times on reporting stints through the consular district down in the wine areas of Fetier, and places like that, which I much appreciated. It was very good and very helpful for me to get me out of just the daily routine of nothing but passports, visas, and seamen.

Q: Bob Dillon was mentioning that when he was in Izmir (I think at this time) that he got to know many of the figures who later became rather prominent when there was a change of government

in Ankara. His contacts that he made in Izmir. These were sort of country cousins that came into power in Ankara and he knew them.

LUMSDEN: There were a number of these people. Of course, it was his bread and butter. He was the one that did this. I was the lowest of the low in the embassy. In May of 1960, they had the revolution against Menderes. I think it was May 1960. The government changed. There was a lot of shifting around in the new government and Bob indeed did know a number of these people and was doing a very good job.

Q: Were you thinking about being an area specialist in this area? What was ticking over?

LUMSDEN: No. This was the Middle East. I found it very interesting. I loved the history. Meeting the woman you're going to marry, courting, going to the ruins at Dedema and Ephesus and things like that, that was all just marvelous. But I was not an area person at this time. Unbeknownst to me, I was soaking up some area know-how, but I was still East Europe focused.

JOHN W. MCDONALD
U.S. Economic Coordinator, CENTO
Ankara (1959-1963)

John W. McDonald was born in North Dakota in 1929. He graduated from the University of North Dakota in 1953 and served in the U.S. Army from 1951 to 1952. His postings abroad have included Berlin, Bonn, Paris, Ankara and Cairo. Mr. McDonald was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

MCDONALD: I created and led the first ever governmental regional program in the history of the United States. That is saying a lot. I was the U.S. Economic Coordinator for the Central Treaty Organization, U.S. Coordinator for CENTO [Central Treaty Organization], based in Ankara, Turkey. I arrived there in March 1959. It was the Baghdad Pact created by Mr. Dulles as a shield to prevent the Soviets from marching into the Indian Ocean.

Q: Something happened on July 14, 1958.

MCDONALD: There was a little coup in Baghdad. [CENTO] was originally made of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, the UK and the United States. Then the coup took place and they dropped out and the Secretariat moved to Ankara, Turkey, and I arrived there a few months later.

Q: You were there from '59 to?

MCDONALD: January 1959 to January 1963. Four years exactly.

I was not a part of the International Secretariat. I was the U.S. Coordinator but I worked closely with the CENTO Secretariat. I was accredited to three countries: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and to three Ambassadors. I worked with three Mission directors. My mandate was regional and was

negotiated and approved by the Secretary of State. So I came out of the State Department with that mandate, but I was working with AID money and the mandate was to do what CENTO was trying to do but did not have the funds or direction to do. That was to link Turkey-Iran-Pakistan physically. They were next door neighbors for thousands of years but they had no physical links. So one of my major chores was to build a railroad linking Turkey and Iran, to build a microwave system, to build roads...

Q: You say "microwave system," this is communications?

MCDONALD: Yes, this is a line of sight, 3,000 miles long, the longest in the world, with 103 towers directing microwave systems across the deserts and mountains for 3,000 miles, which is basically a telephone backbone system to link the three countries by telephone. And that is what I did for four years. And again it was a unique opportunity for a U.S. diplomat to have that kind of hands-on work.

When I arrived I had an assistant and a secretary and that was it. Four years later I ended with 35 Americans on my staff with branch offices in Teheran and Karachi, a U.S. contractor of 250 people working on the microwave system and 10,000 Indians, Paks and Turks working on my projects. That was a dramatic growth, shall we say, in management responsibility.

Q: Where did the initial idea come from and what was the rationale for it?

MCDONALD: I guess it would be Mr. Dulles' vision, because when the Baghdad Pact collapsed with Baghdad, this was just proving his point, as far as he was concerned, and he wanted someone to get off their rear end and do something. I think that was basically the drive behind it. Nobody knew quite what to do but they knew something had to be done because he wanted it done. So there was discussion about the idea of a regional office.

Now a regional office had never been done before and for a very important reason, and that is the ambassador, but particularly the Mission director, who had all the money in country, always thought about their country [only]. I saw this all over the world when I traveled with the Administrator. You would go into a Mission director's office and there would be a map for his country, and there wouldn't be any other country on the outside of it. It was just isolated by itself. You wouldn't see which was the North, South, East or West. But that was his country and his total focus was that. Cooperate with a country next door? It never crossed his mind. So when you are trying to connect two countries by rail, or three countries by telephone, you obviously had to talk to each other.

Here I was coming in and telling them to do something they had never dreamed of doing and they didn't want to do. So it was a revolutionary concept. Everybody was totally turf oriented and here I was trying to take some of "their turf" away from them. Well, I wasn't, I was trying to build a broader vision, but I had hours and hours of argument over this very issue with mission directors, particularly, but also with the ambassadors. It was only because my mandate, which I would carry around with me, was signed by the Secretary of State, that I was able to get away with what I did, which was to help them think regionally.

Q: Did you have much tie to the CENTO organization itself?

MCDONALD: Oh, yes, I met with them daily. They were the political cover. All the projects that I did passed through the Economic Committee in CENTO, approved by them. That is the way you got the other governments involved in the whole process. Let me just take the railroad, because that is a classic example.

Ataturk in Turkey, and the Reza Shah in Iran in 1936 signed a treaty in which they said they wanted to link their two capitals, 1,500 miles apart, together by railroad to show a sign of togetherness. So they started in that direction. World War II came along and they stopped, World War II ended and they started up again. They finally got to where there was a 300 mile gap, which was across the mountains and lakes of what is Kurdistan, where the Kurds are in both countries, and nothing happened.

The Number One economic project that the CENTO Economic Committee agreed on was to finish that railroad, link it together. That became my job because I supposedly had the money. That is how that particular project was conceived.

Linking the three countries by telephone. You know you can't operate in today's world, or even the world of 1959, if all your phone calls have to go through London or Paris or somewhere else, always a great problem. So this was a backbone system to link the three countries with the most modern communication that was available.

So that's the kind of thing that I was doing.

Q: I'd like to capture a little of the spirit of CENTO in very early 1959. We mentioned Baghdad. The King had been slaughtered along with his family in a very violent coup on July 14, 1958, which took a very promising country, Iraq, a major country for the area, out of CENTO. What was the spirit of all the sudden losing this linchpin or what have you, at that time?

MCDONALD: There was a great deal of concern. There was fear. Where are we going? What is going to happen? Who is it going to happen to next? A lot of concern, and CENTO was the only regional organization in the area of any kind. So there was interest in making it work, because I believe they felt this was important to their own continuity and their own reputation. So they wanted things to happen and they were cooperative. They didn't have the wherewithal, but they were very responsive to the kinds of things that I was doing. So I had ready access to any Minister in any one of the three countries and would get them personally involved in the kind of projects that we're talking about.

I also started something in the technical assistance field that I think was rather remarkable and I'm very proud of. What I wanted to try to do was to build trust between the three countries, there was a great deal of distrust between the three countries. The Turks didn't like the Iranians and the Paks didn't like the Iranians and didn't know the Turks who were too far away, so there was tension.

What I decided to do was try to bring professionals together in a particular field, from all three

countries. I would pick the country that was ahead of the other two in that particular field. The first one I did was on mining. I brought people together in Turkey. Now this was a basic resource that was needed in all three countries.

So I brought mining engineers and government people from Pakistan and Iran to Turkey. We had a ten-day seminar. We had experts from the UK and the United States. And then we toured several mines in Turkey to see how they worked. Then a group of Turkish mining experts went with their Iranian-Pak colleagues to Iran for a week and looked there, on the ground. Then they all went to Pakistan and looked there, to see how they could bring some practical know-how to bear and help at that level without just the U.S. imposing its know-how.

At the end of that first gathering, actually at the very beginning of that first gathering, the head of the Turkish delegation came up to me and said, "You know, I don't trust those Iranians, I don't know why you are really trying to get us together." I said, "Well, I want you to learn about each other." About ten minutes later the head of the Iranian delegation said, "You know, I don't trust those Turks, I'm very skeptical about this meeting." I said, "Well, just stay with it awhile, and see how it evolves."

By the end of not only the week but by the end of the time they finished touring they became friends for life, because they were all professionals, had all spent their life in the mining field, and they bonded and those differences passed. The second one I did was in Pakistan on economic development. They had had a Harvard contract and were really doing a lot of good things and we met in [the mountain resort of] Murree, Pakistan, for ten days and brought economists together and had that same kind of interaction.

The third one was in Iran and was in preventive medicine. We had an expert come out from Johns Hopkins. There were eighteen medical schools in the three countries, and only one of them, in Shiraz, had one course in preventive medicine. None of them had ever even heard about it and had no interest in it. Well, we had a meeting of 150 people there for a week or so, with experts, and in that whole field it was sort of pre-Shiraz and post-Shiraz. Three years later every one of the eighteen institutions not only had courses, they had whole departments of preventive medicine.

So we were able to generate new ideas through this whole process. And that was done even after I left, I think it was done about 25 times and it brought professionals together, the same basic concept. And it really worked beautifully. We would publish after each one of those, so there is a whole library of reports available for people to read and beyond that. So that is the kind of thing that was done.

Q: Did you feel any threat, I mean both from the CENTO side then also internally from what you were doing with communications and all from the Soviets? Was there a problem from the Communist movement?

MCDONALD: No, nothing direct at all. I was also able to put together an air to ground navigation system which built on our line-of-sight communications link. It turned out that there were very, very few ground to air communication links in those days. This is, again, during the '59 to '63 period.

There is a fairly narrow corridor between Russia and Syria. Maybe it is only 60 miles wide, with Turkey and Iran sort of meeting in the Tabriz area. Several aircraft would stray into Yerevan because of the fact that there weren't any signals. This really pushed CENTO and the U.S. to work in that area. We moved very quickly on an air to ground navigation system throughout the whole area. Pan Am was flying through there in their round the world flights at that point and it was a great boon to air traffic along the way. But that was the only interaction, the Soviets let us alone totally.

Q: I wonder, can we walk through each of the countries a bit to characterize. First, starting with Turkey, how did you find the officials in dealing with the Turks and all?

MCDONALD: Well, Turkey had a very strong, nationalistic feeling. Felt it was obviously superior to Iran and Pakistan because of its links with the West and so forth. So it did have a superior attitude. But it also realized it had a very long way to go when it came to development issues.

I had a family in Ankara for four years, four kids. There were only hotel accommodations available in Ankara, Istanbul, and one or two in Izmir. There was nothing else that was useful or possible in those days. We wanted to see the country so we camped all over Turkey with a tent, because there was no place to stay. You had to carry your own water with you and, of course, you could get your own food but you had to be safe on water. That was a great experience for the kids. In fact, my son and wife and their two kids, my two grandchildren, are going to Turkey in two weeks to go back to the places that he remembers from when he was a kid, which is pretty funny.

It was a very poor, developing country at that point with a great deal of State-ism. The State controlled much of the industry and was very careful about trying to let go. It had a long way to go.

Q: How about dealing with the bureaucrats?

MCDONALD: They are very proud of the fact that CENTO was based in Ankara. That was a plus. Since everything I did was under the CENTO label, I had access to them. I went through a coup with the military there in 1960, but I didn't have any problem. It is fascinating to me, though, looking back on it that no Turk that I met, really, in the government had ever been East of Ankara. That was another world. A lot likes New Yorkers certainly never going west of the Mississippi, nothing, or even to the Hudson. Even back in '59, when I would announce to my Turkish friends that I was going to Diavacur or to Van or to Katzvan, they'd almost have a stroke. They'd ask how I could do that, wasn't I worried about my life, and so on. I worked in that area for four years and never had anything ever happen to me and I was always welcomed wherever I went. I had great relations with the Kurds in Turkey and in Iran. But that was a mindset that they had even in those days, that they wouldn't go east because of what was out there. And of course that is where there were great agricultural expanses that weren't even being utilized appropriately in those days.

Q: In moving to Iran, how did you find Iran? Were there differences in dealing with the Government and how things were done?

MCDONALD: Well, some of my friends who were later from Iran had great difficulty with my saying this, but I knew it and absolutely agree with it to this day. This was the Shah's heyday. He was not only a national hero; he was an international hero. He was moving them out of the poverty of the past and he was innovative, he was trying new ideas, he was welcoming development. He gave power to the women of Iran, which had never been given them before. He encouraged them to take off the veils and to go to college and to wear modern clothes. It was a very exciting time to be there. Very positive. He was a hero.

His Ministers were very well educated, very sophisticated. Many of them, most of them, trained in the West and wanted to rebuild Iran. So all of the things I was doing resonated with them. Whenever I wanted to meet with the Minister of Telecommunications or the Minister of Railroads, it was just a matter of calling up and they'd shift their schedule around and welcome me. We'd talk about any problems I might have.

In all of those [projects] we divided up the tasks, and that took a lot of negotiation. They handled all of the local costs for all of these projects. We [were] only [responsible for] the foreign exchange. They had to provide all the manpower. We would bring in the equipment, the steel and all that sort of thing. But they had to put it together. So this was a major commitment. These were really joint projects. For the manpower, they had to build the access roads to these towers and houses to store them. We just provided the equipment for them. That was still 200 million dollars, but they had major commitments. So this was constantly having to push them to push their own people to do the things that they pledged to do. Very open.

Q: How about corruption? Was there a problem there?

MCDONALD: Not from my point of view, I never saw examples of that. Certainly it was there but they never had any corruption on my watch, on my projects. There is an interesting point, though, about that. In those days, and maybe still to this day, I don't know, but the highest compliment that one Iranian could give to another when they introduced me to them was, "This is an honest man." That was the highest praise that could be given. I am sure there was corruption but they didn't with these international projects, I think, because the esteem with which it was seen, because it was CENTO, it was international, and they had a major part to play in making it happen.

Q: How about bridging that 300-mile gap by the railroad?

MCDONALD: Well, that was a tough one and we were very innovative in our efforts. Part of that 300 mile gap was Lake Lan, which is one, I think, of the third or fourth largest, highest body of water in the world. That was at about 5,000 feet or so and it was ringed by mountains all around. So we built a railroad car ferry across the lake, it is about 120 kilometers long, something like that. That was very innovative and is still going, by the way. You had to bring in the ships piece by piece, put them together so you had to build a little seaport and so there were a lot of challenges for that.

There was a major bridge that had to be built in Iran that took some extra time and some money. The engineers that both the countries provided were fascinated by the challenges. Across the plains of Eastern Turkey we had to build snow barriers right in the middle of nowhere because the wind patterns would pile up snow during the winters. They have very heavy winters and so the working season for building the railroad was restricted.

I went back over that railroad in 1976 with my wife and we had a wonderful time. We crossed onto the ferry and did the whole bit. It was very exciting to see it all having been finished, it wasn't finished in the four years I was there but the funding was finished.

Let me tell you about the funding because this is a very interesting story. You know you can tell by my stories that I learned something about how to manage bureaucracies and this is what you have to do to get innovative ideas through any kind of bureaucratic structure.

By this time ICA had turned into AID. And the AID economists took a look at my railroad because I kept asking for more money. We needed another 20 million dollars to finish the whole thing, to finish the bridge and all that sort of thing. It was going to be a loan, not a grant. The economists in AID did a major study and called me back to Washington and told me that the cost-benefit ratio was unproven. I went ballistic and said this was something that started in 1936 and now they were telling me, when we had maybe fifteen miles to go or something like that, which is where the money had to go, that it was now not cost effective! You know we really tangled on this one and I got nowhere. I went to the Administrator, who was a Mr. Bell by that time and he turned it down. Well, I wasn't going to accept that. To me this was AID looking at it just from an economic development point of view and not seeing the broader military as well as political perspective.

So what did I do? I went back to Turkey and by this time I'd been there awhile and I knew everybody. I met with the Military Committee of CENTO, separately, not collectively or officially. I met with the three-star American General and the three-star Turkish General and the three-star Iranian General. The Iranian and the American were very good friends over the years. I laid out the problem and I said Washington-AID is looking at this from a very [narrow] perspective. They all wanted the railroad completed from a military point of view, because there was no way to carry heavy equipment across that part of the Middle East. So I said what I wanted them to do, if they agreed, was to meet and pass a resolution talking about the importance, from a military point of view, of the completion of that railroad. Then with the British and American and the three regional parties send it back to the Pentagon and then we'd see if the Pentagon couldn't talk to the State Department and then let the State Department talk to AID.

They agreed and that's exactly what happened. The Secretary of State then got the picture and he reversed AID and we got the money and the project was completed. Twenty years later I met Mr. Bell and told him who I was and he said, "Oh, you're the guy." He still remembered. He said, "Do you know you are the only person who ever got me reversed in my four years as Administrator?" I said, "No, I didn't know that...Sir." He never forgot, never forgot. And I had not met him. Anyway, I just thought that would be an interesting story.

It shows you, also, the narrowness of a piece of bureaucracy and where the State Department can have an impact because it has a broader perspective. So this is an important element in the larger picture we are dealing with today.

Q: What about Pakistan? Where did that fit into the equation, was it sort of thrown into CENTO? What was the feeling about Pakistan that you got?

MCDONALD: The U.S. had had a long standing support in Pakistan of major AID programs and so forth, for a long time because there was always friction with India. India was always flirting with the Soviets and they were always an unknown factor in some elements in Washington. Pakistan never had that problem. Pakistan was clearly supportive of the United States and clearly anti-Indian and therefore anti-Russian. Again, they were most welcoming of the kinds of things we were doing.

Because the microwave system and some of the other projects - not the railroad - went through their territory we were dealing at a practical level on a regular basis. As a matter of fact, I had three airplanes assigned to my office because we had long distances to travel and a lot of this for the line-of-sight system was doing it by air to make sure the location was appropriate. I was on the road more than 50 percent of the time traveling so this was a very useful thing to have. They were welcoming wherever I went.

There was one thing they didn't listen to me on, of course, in looking back it's one of those "I told you so," but it is sad that it happened. The whole bureaucracy in Karachi in those days was totally focused on what we call West Pakistan. Again and again, I would try to bring East Pakistan experts into the things that we were doing.

Q: East Pakistan being now Bangladesh.

MCDONALD: Yes. And they just didn't pay attention. It was such an obvious, egregious oversight year in and year out that anybody who looked at that part of the world and looked at any map knew that this was going to happen, except the Pakistanis in West Pakistan, who were in a state of shock when it had. But people told them that repeatedly, many people, and they just didn't do it. You know they were a different religion, basically, and they were different ethnic backgrounds and they were always at the bottom of the list. It was very sad.

Q: Was Pakistan sort of melded, were there any particular projects that were of particular interest?

MCDONALD: Yes, the telephone linkage, the backbone thing, went through all of their country at the Iranian border all the way across and down to Karachi, along the line of sight. They were very interested in improving their air travel and their air capabilities and so they were very interested in both of those key projects. It would directly benefit them, and benefit tourism and benefit business, so they were quite supportive in that sense. They really wanted to become involved in all of the technical assistance exchanges because they saw the benefit. They were all learning from each other and by rotating this I kept the egos of all three countries stabilized. So

they were not offended. They got the picture. Whoever was ahead in a particular field would host that particular session. That balance kept them all involved.

Q: What about Afghanistan? Did it come across your radar at all?

MCDONALD: There was a point, several points, during my four years there where it did. There was even talk of trying to bring it into CENTO. There were actual discussions at the political level on how to expand that. People from the CENTO Secretariat went up to Kabul and talked. It was all informal. But they never got their act together to decide they wanted to do that, but there was definite effort. During that period I also went to Kabul myself, but it didn't work. Because the Afghans weren't convinced, if they had said yes I think it would have helped.

Q: What about the Ambassadors in those three countries, obviously during that period you probably had some changes. How did you find they responded?

MCDONALD: They were terrific. They were all wonderful. The first thing I did was to call on them each time I was in the country, tell them what I planned to do while I was there, and kept them all always briefed. We also had newsletters and publications and they always got all of those and they liked it, because they saw things were happening in their country that they could take credit for and would be beneficial.

The only AID mission director that I had real problems with was in Ankara, because it was Lt. Gen. Riley, a former Marine Corps General, who couldn't stand the idea that I was in his building, but not reporting to him. He really had problems with that. He went back every three months to Washington to try to get my mandate changed and was never successful.

But they understood what we were trying to do and finally realized that this was U.S. policy and that they should follow it. Over the long term I think it helped them to see beyond their own country border.

Q: Did India play any role with what you were doing in Pakistan?

MCDONALD: No, none at all. And Iraq had never gotten back in the business either. Now the UK was always supportive, they could put up no money but they would come to all the meetings. They would provide experts for the technical assistance projects that we were involved in, and that was their role, so it wasn't just a U.S. [program], but the U.S. was the one who put up the money.

Q: What was the feeling you were getting from the Turks, the Iranians and the Paks about the developments in Iraq?

MCDONALD: Hardly even discussed. That was off my plate because that was political, that just never was an issue. I don't even remember having discussions about it, it was just something that happened and was in the past.

BEAUVEAU B. NALLE
Consular Officer
Iskenderun (1959-1961)

Political Military Advisor
Ankara (1961-1963)

Beauveau B. Nalle was born in Pennsylvania in 1927. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956, serving in Washington, DC, Turkey, Uganda, Liberia, and Belize. Mr. Nalle was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on April 19, 1994.

NALLE: So that was my first assignment and then as you said, because of my experience at Robert College, I was sent for a year's language training at the Institute. And then to Iskenderun, Turkey with my wife and our 2 children.

Iskenderun, also known as Alexandretta, is a post that we opened in the late 1930's, kept open during the war, closed it, then reopened it again, I don't know what all. But anyway, I went there in the Summer of 1959. There was a principal officer Malcolm Thompson and his wife, Marion; an American secretary, Jonny Margaret Whitley; and myself and my wife Sheila and our two small children, aged at that time about almost 3 years and about 2 years.

It was a fascinating and awful experience. It was awful for my wife, as is typical of the way the wives were treated in those days, and up until not more than 5, 6 years ago I would say. We lived in an indescribably uncomfortable and small little apartment in the same building as the office.

The Consul lived directly over our head. He was a middle-aged man with no children. The secretary lived across the stairwell from us. She was an old time secretary who had been in Iron Curtain posts and had been an Ambassador's secretary at one time in her career. And wanted a little peace and quiet where she could drink scotch and coke to her heart's content. And our two children were like other children, they'd fuss and they'd carry on, their cries could be heard throughout the building. Sheila was mortified and was angry.

There was little or no electricity in the building. Water was sporadic and an open sewer ran by the front door.

Sheila had not one single minute of Turkish language training. There were none I suppose in Iskenderun, less than 10 people who could speak English. One of the tragic memories of my life was seeing Sheila sitting on an overstuffed ottoman talking to the wives of Turkish generals and business people who couldn't speak English. It was a terrible experience for her. And I think embittered her towards the Foreign Service for the rest of my career.

Q: What did you do, what was the real work in the office?

NALLE: We had a huge consular district that extended all the way east to the Iranian border, the Iraq border and the Syrian border. Most of it was off limits. The Embassy contended that since

the Turks gave us all Exequaturs for those provinces, we were allowed to go there. The Turks said we had to ask permission first. The Embassy said, "We don't ask permission."

And so the Consul, Mac Thompson, and I would each take a long swing through the consular district. He would usually go in the spring, and I would go in the autumn. We'd be gone for about 2 weeks. We tried to visit every province except Hakkari, we agreed to the sensitivity of that. The problem was of course the Kurdish problem. The Kurdish problem then was no different from what it is today.

I, at least twice, was shot at and in each case I assume it was by Kurds. And in one case, they hit the old green jeep station wagon we had, and I drove home cheerfully with a bullet hole in the rear end of the car. There was that.

There was a very interesting group of U.S. social security recipients who lived up the mountains. We had to take care of them, getting them their social security checks once a month, there were about 150 of them. We distributed a lot of money out there through social security. There was modest American investment.

There was in the city of Izmir a U.S. army transportation corps port detachment, 2 officers and 3 or 4 enlisted people. And in the city of Adana, some 110 miles away, there was the famous Incerlik air force base.

Q: Excuse me, you talked about Izmir, did you mean Izmir or Iskenderun?

NALLE: Iskenderun, I'm sorry.

Q: I just wanted to straighten it out because I know there's quite a distance.

NALLE: There is indeed.

About 100 miles from Iskenderun there was the famous Incerlik air force base which made history as the take-off place for Francis Gary Powers. I knew Powers reasonably well, had a lot of dealings with him. And was amused. One time he came to me, (I used to go up to the base once a week to do consular services) and wanted his passport renewed. It was a Department of the Air Force civilian special passport. I said, "Well, Mr. Powers I'm sorry, we don't normally renew passports until a couple of weeks before they're due to expire." I said, "But look, you get me a letter from your supervisor asking for early retirement and I'll be more than happy to do it." He said, "No sweat."

Q: Not early retirement.

NALLE: Early renewal. He said, "No sweat." And I went back the next week and there he was with his letter. It was addressed to -- Beau Nalle, Vice Consul; Subject-Powers, Francis Gary; social security number so-and-so; Passport-Early Renewal of, Request For -- that kind of army/air force talk.

The body of the letter said -- "It is requested that the passport number so-and-so of Francis Gary Powers be renewed early since Mr. Powers frequently travels in areas of the world where U.S. consular services are not readily available." And about a month later when he was shot down, I thought to myself, yes sir-ee there's no consular office in Central Russia.

Q: *How true, how true.*

NALLE: Actually I was on the base the day that the bird had been shot down. It was pretty exciting. You used to see, what do they call them? The thing he'd flown?

Q: *The U-2.*

NALLE: The U-2. You used to see those things flying around Iskenderun quite often.

They had sort of 3 different cover stories. The first one was, what airplane? We never saw anything. The second cover story was, yeah, it's a special high altitude research plane that we're using for weather reconnaissance.

The third one, if you had every clearance known to man and a few more, they would admit that what the thing used to do was to fly up along the Russian border, but still well within Turkey's airspace, analyzing Russian ground to air defenses and what they call "quick alert reaction" or "quick reaction alert." To see how long it would take to scramble the Russian air force when a hostile aircraft flew into radar view.

The original story they handed out was that the airplane crashed inside Turkey. And I told the guy who was my contact up there, the Deputy Commander, that both the consul and I knew that area intimately. We traveled there a great deal, we knew the governors, we knew the police officials, and if we could do anything by going out on the spot, we'd be very happy to do so. But it all came out in the mail, in the laundry, so to speak. We never did anything more.

Q: *Can I write that after several years in Iskenderun you were transferred to Ankara?*

NALLE: Yeah I went up to Ankara as acting head of the Consular section for 3 or 4 months while the incumbent was on home leave. And then I went into the Political/Military section, working for Bill Dale who was Counselor. That was a wonderful embassy in those days.

The Ambassador was one of the very few heroes that I look at in the Foreign Service, the late Ambassador Raymond Hare, a man of enormous ability, a man of enormous integrity and decency and skill and everything else that he ought to be. I rank him right along with Loy Henderson and perhaps even a little bit ahead of Henderson.

Q: *What particular issues did you deal with there?*

NALLE: I got all of the scraps that fell off the table. Bill Dale spent most of his time on very heavy serious matters, Turkish-American political/military affairs. Anything that he didn't do I kind of did.

I had to negotiate or help negotiate a labor agreement between the Turkish trade union that worked on the bases and the Tumpane Company. Tumpane was based out of Ohio and looked upon trade unions as something only less dangerous than perhaps Aids. The Turkish unions were just starting to get fairly antsy and, as it were, militant. And the negotiation was kind of interesting. One of the sticky points was -- what do you do with the bacon fat left over from the grill at the Officers Club and the Enlisted Men's Club. That took us a couple of days to arrange.

What other things did I do? We got involved in a case when a couple of young kids got drunk. To put it bluntly, carved up a Turkish whore with a butcher knife and nearly killed her. And took off across the Anatolian plateau in the middle of August with the temperature over 100 degrees, trying to go to Syria. We caught them, or the Turks caught them. We, very properly, would not issue a duty certificate although some felt it would have been appropriate!

So they went into a Turkish jail and eventually we got a letter from the Senator of their home state. Ambassador Hare brought it down to me and said, "Give me a draft reply." I said, "Fine, Mr. Ambassador, how do you want to handle it?" He said, "Tell them the truth, be short, be blunt." And I said to him, "Well Sir, I've just gotten from OSI some photographs of the woman taken after these guys did their trick on her. Would it be useful to send them along?" And he said, "Yeah, it's a great idea."

The letter from the Senator was talking about these fine young American boys and how they're being subjected to brutal Turkish torture and one thing or another. So we replied and the Ambassador sent the letter. We never heard another word from that Senator. I tell you, sending the photographs did the job.

Another time, one of the major news magazines had a stringer in Beirut who was not an American citizen, he was Lebanese. He was driving through Turkey on his way to Paris, was in an automobile accident and killed a Turk, and was in jail. We were aware of it. The man was not an American citizen, he was an employee of a news magazine but there was nothing we saw that we could do. And it kind of bounced around between political/military and consular section.

Finally the Paris Bureau Chief came to Ankara, had an interview with the Ambassador and I was asked to sit in as a note-taker. And the man first of all got a briefing from the Ambassador as to the status of the case, then wondered if the Ambassador had talked to the Minister of Justice. And the Ambassador said -- no, he hadn't, furthermore, he didn't see really why he had any right to talk to the Minister of Justice on a matter like this. The Bureau Chief had trouble accepting that fact. And then he asked the Ambassador, somewhat obliquely, if he had any funds available for taking care of judges. And the Ambassador said very tartly, that he didn't do business that way, nor did the US government. Finally the guy said, "Well Mr. Ambassador, I should tell you my magazine has a very wide circulation in Washington. And I would hate to see anything unfavorable towards you or your Embassy appear in the pages." Then the Ambassador stood up, looked at me and said, "Mr. Nalle, would you show this gentleman downstairs please."

He was livid. His little moustache was sticking out like this, his eyes were sparkling. He would have physically assaulted the man in another minute, I think.

Q: It wasn't very diplomatic of our "friend." Now, those were the years, were they not, of great unrest in Turkey? The overthrow of the Menderes government as I recall?

NALLE: Well, yes indeed there were. In fact that happened when I was still in Iskenderun. But yes, there was enormous turmoil then. The army stepped in. Menderes was hanged along with Zorlu and 2 other members of the Cabinet. I think there were a total of 4 people hanged. There were various military interventions and various efforts at intervention.

We had found a little house, there was no government furnished housing in those days. So we had a kind of grubby little house not too far away from the embassy. I used to walk to work everyday. Come home for lunch, walk home from lunch, if I wasn't doing something else.

One morning, quite early, we heard a jet flying very low over the house. Sheila kind of jumped over the bed and said, "My God, it's the revolution!" I said, "No, it's just Pan American flight 3 coming in early." Because the airport wasn't that far away. Well they kept flying back and forth and I realized that something was wrong. So I got up, got dressed and walked down to the embassy.

That was the Talat Aydemir revolt. And that's the one and only time that I've ever taken live fire from the Turkish air force. We were out front of the embassy and the Swiss Military Attaché came by. I'd never seen a Swiss officer in dress uniform, a pretty impressive sight. And then a column of troops went by and the Assistant Army Attaché asked me if I would walk along with him and interpret while he talked to the troop commander. I said, sure. And these were loyal to the government, they're the presidential bodyguards.

Then we walked down, if you know Ankara, the embassy's not all that far away from the Parliament and the offices of the general staff. So we walked down there and the cadets from the military academy, the Harp Okulu, were trying to seize the general staff headquarters, There was sporadic firing going on. And we were marching along and suddenly one of the Turkish F81s or 85s, came in behind us flying very low and cut loose with a couple of bursts of something-millimeter cannon, I don't know what millimeter it was. But we could see the shots hitting the ground. They were coming in short, they were aiming at the cadets but they were coming in more directly at us and the troops.

I'm a civilian! I'm not paid to get shot so I took off and ran. I've never run so fast in my life. I jumped under a tank, which I'd noticed, it was lying there. And behold, the Assistant Army Attaché was about 2 seconds behind me.

Yeah, there was a lot of political stress in those days. It was very interesting because through my work I got to know a great many of the senior Turkish army officers. Ambassador Hare did not want us in the Political/Military section mingling with non-NATO diplomatic personnel. He said that our work was not understood by most of the NATO people, let alone the rest of the world. In particular, he wanted us to have nothing to do with Soviet personnel. But he encouraged us to make contact with Turkish military people and of course with JUSMAT and TUSLOG, the 2 big US military organizations there. The drawback to the job was that I had nothing to do with

Turkish political affairs. Except peripherally I might get material of interest. I was able to build up some contacts with the Turkish Socialist Party.

But our kids went to Turkish school. Indeed, we began to worry when our older daughter came back from school one day and said, "Mommy, Daddy, you know next to God I love Ataturk best." This is when we decided we better put them in the American military school.

Another indication I forgot to mention in Iskenderun how things were. Our 2 little girls, little tiny things, 3 and 1 ½ year old, in 2 separate cases were molested by a dirty old man who hung around the front of the office. We didn't know about it until a couple of days later when the children mentioned it to us.

Q: *A Turk?*

NALLE: In this case he was not a real Turk, he was one of the many minorities, he was an Alawi. We complained to the police and the police chased the guy away but he kept showing up again. It was one hell of an introduction. I found it utterly fascinating but it put a strain on our marriage.

Q: *Was this the period when Vice President Johnson came out to Turkey?*

NALLE: Yes indeed it was. I suppose you've gotten stories of that but it was funny. He wouldn't stay with the Ambassador. He wanted to get next to the people. So we hired the top 3 floors of the best hotel in downtown Ankara. And set-up a control room there that had to be staffed 24 hours a day by a Turkish speaking language officer-an American, by one of the Marine security guards and by a Secret Service special agent.

Since we only had 4 or 5 Turkish speaking officers, we spent a lot of time in that control room. There was Marty Polstein, there was myself (Marty's dead now, a nice guy), Tom Metcalf who retired a good many years ago. Who else? George Harris I think took his turn down there. I can't remember the other language officers we had. One of the USIS chaps was a language officer.

It was fun, it was interesting, it was an education to see how the mighty and the omnipotent move around the world. The person we all fell in love with was Mrs. Johnson. When the party left, the Vice President went down in the elevator, down to his car and the word came in, "Spear," that's his code word, "Spear had departed." We had the Gunny on duty and myself and a couple of other fellows. The Gunny knocked the head off of a bottle of whiskey and we were all having a drink.

Suddenly the door opened and somebody walked in and we heard a voice saying, "I'd like to thank you men." And we turned around and there was Mrs. Johnson. She walked around and shook hands with everyone. And said, "Now, you understand that when the Vice President and I travel we're a tremendous burden for you people. We make a mess and things get confused, it's your job to clean up after us." But she said, "I want to tell you how much we appreciate the way you do it, the way you don't complain, you're always friendly and cheerful. We really genuinely thank you." Well, as they say, there wasn't a dry eye in the house.

If she said, we make it bloody messy, we're sorry to bother you folks, we'd -- sigh -- drop dead lady. But here she was, she said, we make a lot of trouble and you guys clear it up. She was honest, she was candid, and she was utterly charming. And if she had been running for President, every man in that room would have voted for her. It was a brilliant performance.

Q: I know, I feel the same way having met her later, she was just wonderful.

NALLE: She picked up all the pieces.

Q: One other question that I would like to ask you about while we're talking about Turkey. Was Cyprus boiling at that time?

NALLE: Yes, very much so. I did not get involved in the Cyprus issue. It's a matter of infinite complexity. But it was very much involved with us. We were very much involved in it. It was handled by the Political Section, Charlie Tanguy was the Cyprus specialist for the embassy. As I say, I was in no way involved in the Cyprus problem.

I was working at that time, do you remember the old multilateral force idea?

Q: I was doing that in Bonn.

NALLE: They were going to put out missiles. They were going to take the Jupes, the Jupiters out of Turkey. They were going to mount these things on a boat with a multinational crew that would sail around the world. The problem existed -- Who is going to push the button? And we made it clear that no matter where the missiles were, how multilateral the crew was, we would push the button. Well it didn't get anywhere.

I was also there for the Cuban missile crisis.

Q: I wanted to ask you about that because as we know, the administration proposed apparently to take our Jupiters out of Turkey in exchange for the Soviets taking their missiles out of Cuba. How did that play there?

NALLE: That thing was frightening. It's the first time and one of the few times in my life when I have felt real heart wrenching fear. There was something, it may have been Kennedy's speech, it may have been some step we were going to take. But because of the time difference, we knew about it before the actual event took place in Washington.

And I remember Bill Dale had briefed me on it even though it had such secret security restrictions, you couldn't believe it. But he said, "There are only 2 people in the embassy right now who know about it, the Ambassador and me. I want to brief you." I guess he was being overly dramatic, I don't know. He said, "In case something goes wrong, somebody else ought to know something about it." Well I thought that was a tad silly, I don't know. But anyway it was frightening.

And I remember walking back to my house for lunch. It was a lovely day and there were some

birds singing, I'm a bird watcher by hobby. I remember just being afraid that the war might begin, the first nuclear war might begin. It was a terrible, terrible experience for me.

Q: How did the Turks take it?

NALLE: The way they always do, in a business like manner. My memory tells me, God this is a long time ago, but my memory clearly tells me that we had started discussions with the government of Turkey prior to the Cuban business, about withdrawing the Jupiter missiles. That there was no quid pro quo for the Russians in this matter.

The Jupiters were terribly old. I think it took them some 3 hours to get them actually in the air from a cold start. And if they were in their intermediate position it still took an hour to get them to fly. And you never could tell if they were going to blow up in the pad or anything else. So I'm convinced that my memory serves me right, we had entered into serious negotiations prior to the missile crisis. Then we also offered, this is kind of interesting, in return for the removal of the Turks, we agreed that we would keep an SSBM on station within the general Eastern Med region. Once again this is a long time ago and my memory is vague, but I'm pretty certain that that is the case. We even brought in, I think it was the Sam Houston, to Izmir harbor and offered to take Turks out on board for a demonstration. Just so they could see how effective, how powerful these vessels were.

Q: And see those missiles on board.

NALLE: And see those missiles on board The Turks weren't interested.

Q: They were not?

NALLE: No. They had a funny attitude. We used to laugh about them and say that the old Turkish generals were convinced that the submarine would go down under water, sail submerged the length of the Mediterranean, through Gibraltar and back to the United States without telling us. They might have been right for all I know.

Q: Well, you certainly had an interesting beginning of your career, both in Washington and in Turkey. Now I notice that your next move was to something quite different, East Africa. Was this a request or by direct assignment?

NALLE: In September of 1953, I was in my office on a Friday afternoon getting ready to go on a camping trip with Sheila and the children along the Black Sea coast. I'd signed up for 2 weeks vacation, we had tents and stuff in the car. The phone rang, it's Bob Barnes, the DCM. He said, "Beau are you sitting down?" I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "I'll read you a cable." Which said I was to depart post immediately, go through the counterterrorism course. Do you remember that?

Q: Yes, I took one.

NALLE: Take the counterterrorism course and was assigned as Officer-in-Charge of Uganda affairs. I said to Bob, "My God, where is it?" He said, "I'm not sure but I think it's in East

Africa." He said, "Come down and we'll talk about it." He was a superb DCM, a wonderful man, Bob Barnes. We chatted a little bit about it. "Look," he said, "I think it's a good job." He said, "I think you probably ought to do it." But he said, "If you don't want to do it then I'm more than willing to call the Department and fight for your assignment." But I said, what the hell, let's give it a shot.

STUART VAN DYKE
Mission Director, USAID
Istanbul (1959-1964)

Stuart Van Dyke was born in Idaho in 1915. He graduated from Indiana University in 1935. Working for ICA and USAID, Mr. Van Dyke served in various countries including Germany, Turkey, Brazil, and Chile. He was interviewed September 18, 1997 by Scott Behoteguy.

Q: That was the first time, I guess, that you had been out in the field since your European experience.

VAN DYKE: That's right. Turkey was almost a complete unknown to me. I had been there only once. I knew little about its history. But it turned out to be a remarkably interesting and rewarding assignment. Shortly after I arrived the current ambassador left and Raymond Hare took over. He was one of the finest men I ever ran into -- a fine human being as well as a skilled diplomat. I was lucky to be able to work with him for the next four years. The deputy director of the AID mission was also economic counselor of the Embassy -- Wade Latham, whom I had not known previously but who was a tower of strength. The mission staff was top-rated. We even had one super-star. On the program office staff was a young man on his first assignment -- Ernest Stern. Stern later joined the World Bank, was promoted rapidly to become number two on the staff, and served in that capacity for many years. He now is a vice president at J.P. Morgan.

In the nineteen '50s, Turkey was a key player in the cold war. It had NATO's second largest defense force. The US thought it needed Turkey in its strategy of containing the Soviet Union, and Turkey thought it needed the US as an ally and a source of arms and economic aid. The Turks are tough fighters. Turkey had a common border with the Soviet Union, and a history of confrontation. They were anxious for our friendship. So these years may have been a high point in the Turkish-American relationship. It was a pleasant assignment, a rewarding assignment in terms of getting things done and getting the Turks to work with you. Besides, the weather was agreeable, the countryside was loaded with archeological treasures, and Turkish men and women turned out to be an unending delight as friends and acquaintances.

Q: I can agree with you on that. When I was nominated to go to Turkey as CENTO director in 1964, I was hoping to renew acquaintances with you. We had met a few times in Washington. But by the time I got there in '64, you had just gone.

VAN DYKE: Yes. My wife happens to have been born in one of the countries which the Turks

occupied for five hundred years -- Bulgaria. Although her parents were American, teaching in an American school, she had absorbed some of the Bulgarian feeling about the Turks, who were looked on as cruel oppressors. Even she was surprised to find that they were friendly and pleasant. We loved the country and we loved the people. Of course, everything wasn't wine and roses. When I arrived the prime minister was a man named Adnan Menderes. He and his government were under strong criticism from the military, which in Turkey considers itself keeper of the Kamal Ataturk legacy. Inflation was high, charges of corruption were being bandied about and -- perhaps most serious -- Menderes was accused of pandering to the Moslem clerics in defiance of Ataturk's admonition to keep the religious hierarchy strictly separated from affairs of state.

When I arrived in Ankara, I paid the usual calls on various ministers and high officials. The two ministers with whom I expected to have the most business were Foreign Minister Zorlu and Finance Minister Polatkan. Both greeted me warmly.

A few months later I made my first trip back home for consultation. When I switched on the radio in my Washington hotel room the morning of my arrival, I heard the news that there had been a military coup in Ankara and that Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan, along with some others, were under arrest. Shortly thereafter they were executed by public hanging.

Q: Do you remember the nature of the AID program? The organization was now AID. As I recall, AID came into existence after President Kennedy's inauguration. So it was 1963 when we became AID.

VAN DYKE: It was ICA when I arrived and AID when I left. At that time, the Turkish program contained about every element which had been devised for an aid recipient. After all, Turkey, along with Greece, had been one of the two original recipients of foreign assistance, dating back to 1947. Along with economic assistance, it was also receiving considerable military aid. Even today, it still gets both military and economic support, although the economic support now takes the form of a check made out to the Turkish Government. For the past fifty years, Turkey has been considered one of our staunchest allies. As long as the Soviet Union survived, Turkey was manning the front lines. Now it exercises special influence in some of the old Soviet states, such as Turkmenistan, because of linguistic and historical ties. And as a non-Arab Muslim country, it can often serve as an intermediary in disputes involving the Arab countries.

In 1960, the program included grants and loans to buy industrial commodities, PL 480 foods, project assistance, and lots of technical assistance. The most visible of the projects was highway construction. Our financing literally changed the map of Turkey. The Ottomans had built few roads, since they feared that good roads would encourage invading armies. Beginning about 1950, we began to help the Turks develop a modern highway department. We brought highway engineers to Turkey, and we sent dozens of Turks to the U.S. for training in highway construction and maintenance. We financed the purchase of heavy construction equipment, and helped train drivers and maintenance staff to operate it. We helped design a system of roads which connected the major cities, north to south and east to west. To limit costs, most of the surfaces were gravel, and when I was there you could drive all over Turkey on beautifully designed and stabilized gravel roads. The concept fit the mold of what a good development

project should be. It responded to a felt need. Built into the financing was the development of the institution which would carry on after our aid stopped. It was affordable and its maintenance costs were within the financial capacity of the recipient. The whole project was one of which we could be proud, and we were. Later on the Development Loan Fund offered to finance a steel mill. We also helped modernize the coal mines. The small technical staff which we maintained in Ankara helped screen the ideas which were presented for possible financing, and if financing was approved, would then monitor the project's progress.

In Turkey I became an enthusiastic supporter of "participant training". That is the program under which promising foreign nationals are sent to the United States for training at our expense. Part of Kamal Ataturk's legacy to Turkey was a commitment to broader and better education, and modern Turkey had developed a number of excellent schools. But those who could manage it, went abroad for specialized courses or graduate work, and their country of choice was usually the United States. By the time I arrived in Turkey, dozens of Turks had already benefitted from this program, and I was touched with how much they had learned and how their time in the United States had strengthened their attachment to our principles and our goals. During my time in the country, we sent hundreds more, and I made it a point always to meet them before their departure, and, upon their return, to present them with a certificate attesting to their training. As these "participants" assumed leading positions in business, education or government service, they became a built-in source of public support. The very first Turk to be sent to the U.S. for training was a young engineering student named Suleiman Demirel. He later got involved in politics, became head of a party, then prime minister, and for the past several years has been President of the country.

After about five years in this pleasant and rewarding environment, I was ready to move. At first I was scheduled for Vietnam, but just at that time the ambassador to Vietnam was also being replaced, the whole situation was in a state of flux and under critical scrutiny, and the new ambassador along with others involved in the selection process decided they preferred someone else. After a couple of weeks of home leave, I was given the job in Brazil and started studying Portuguese.

WILLIAM N. DALE
Counselor
Ankara (1960-1964)

Ambassador William N. Dale was born in the Washington, DC in 1919. He entered the Foreign Service in June 1946, serving in Turkey, Israel, and Washington, DC, and became ambassador to the Central African Republic. From 1952-1953 he served on the NSC staff. Ambassador Dale was interviewed by Henry E. Mattox on September 19, 1988.

Q: As counselor of the embassy in Ankara, what were your primary duties?

DALE: That was a very interesting job. The country team concept had been carried quite a long

ways in Ankara because of the large number of American military, some 20,000. They represented a lot of different commands. There was the NATO command in Izmir, there was what was called TUSLOG, the logistics group, in Ankara, then there was JUSMAT, the military aid mission in Ankara, as well. Then there were a number of stations along the Black Sea, in particular, which were for information gathering, directed towards the Soviets.

Q: *Electronic?*

DALE: Electronic information gathering stations. And all kinds of American military were on Turkish territory, doing any number of things. I remember once a man in the foreign office with whom I worked on this question, named Osman Olacy, saying to me, "Look, Bill, your people are doing something or other out at a place called Site 31. What on earth are they doing? There's a great pile of dirt there."

Well, I went out to try to find out what they were doing. It was a terrible job to find out. Apparently, they were digging a hole, and they dug and dug and dug. The idea, I guess, was to see, if they got deep enough, if they could detect nuclear explosions and measure them in some way from the Soviet Union. But I've never been able to confirm that.

I got back on leave at one point, to Washington, and tried to see if there could be some control on the number of American military coming in, so that they couldn't just come in from any part of the American very thriving military establishment and set up business in Turkey, without any controls, without anyone really knowing who was there. So I went to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Bill Bundy, and he said, "I can't do anything about it."

Q: *That's in the Pentagon.*

DALE: Yes. "The services run free on this."

Q: *The people who were digging the hole were military?*

DALE: Yes.

Q: *In charge of a lieutenant?*

DALE: I could never find out. They weren't telling me either. Consequently, the Turks, with very little resistance from us, said, "We must have a much tighter treaty to see if we can control what it is that the American military do in Turkey. They have *carte blanche* to operate anywhere they want in the country, they do not tell us, and they apparently do not tell you," which was true. They did not. And they did not tell each other, because there was no central point in the Pentagon where these things were vetted.

So the last part of my stay in Turkey was devoted to trying to write an agreement with the Turks, to see if we could arrange for some kind of Turkish control or at least knowledge of what the Americans were doing." We also had, of course, the Status of Forces Agreement to work out, so this was an agreement covering a good many phases of our activity there.

Q: This was in the early 1960s.

DALE: Yes, 1960 to 1964.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

DALE: The first one was named Warren, and the second one was Raymond Hare. Most of the time I was there, Raymond Hare was the ambassador. He was much interested in the military, and he was a lot of fun to work with and for, so that he and I used to do our best together to keep track of what they were doing.

All this was part of the country team, you see, because the head of the logistics group, the general, came to the country team meetings. So did the head of JUSMAT, the military aid mission. The military aid people cooperated very closely with the embassy.

I neglected to mention one large military organization, that was CENTO. We had a good many officers there, and the highest ranking general we had there, who was a lieutenant general at the time, was Robert Porter. The others were mere major generals. The head of the logistics group was what my late wife used to call a "buck general," a mere brigadier.

Q: To continue on Turkey, you've mentioned the embassy problem of coordination. What was the most important bilateral problem between our two nations at the time, bilateral issue or question?

DALE: When I first got there, the only issue we really had at all was the question of the Status of Forces Agreement, and also the activities of the American military. There were no real political problems between us and the Turks. I suppose you could mention an economic problem, in that the Turks wanted more aid than we felt we could give them. They were getting sometimes about \$100 million a year. We had a large economic aid mission there, as well as a large military aid mission. My job was to coordinate the two together for the ambassador, as well as ride some kind of herd on the military. So the job had a great many aspects in that sense.

For instance, the Turks had a great many men under arms. After the Americans and, I suspect, the Germans, they had the largest force in NATO, but they don't really have an awful lot to do barring a war, which there wasn't. So we tried to work out programs for civic action which would involve the military in such activities as building roads and schools and that kind of thing. That involved both the military aid mission and economic aid mission. So the person in my job could take a lead in activities such as civic action, and that worked out very nicely. The Turks, after initial objections from the military, did agree to do some of that. I think it helped a good deal. So that was a rather large aspect of the work.

Q: It was a hot item at that time in the early Sixties.

DALE: Yes, it was.

Q: *All around the world.*

DALE: Because all these troops were under arms and not doing anything.

Q: *Latin America also.*

DALE: We had other things, too, which involved both. Then we had the Peace Corps, so we had that to coordinate with the economic aid mission. Altogether, the coordinating work that was done through the country team apparatus was also under my purview and was a fascinating job.

Q: *Was there much in the way of what we might call civilian economic relations between the two countries, trade and investment?*

DALE: There was not a great deal at that time, Henry. Americans were interested in some metals that Turkey produced. There was very little oil, only a small amount. The Turks themselves were ambivalent about foreign investment. It has always been a problem in Turkey between people who thought the state should control enterprise and that foreign investment should be limited and strictly controlled, and those who thought that you should have more free private enterprise and loosen the rules under which foreigners could come into the country and develop mines and export.

At this time, under Prime Minister İnönü and the Republican People's Party, which was in power for much of it, those who were *étatist* in outlook tended to have the upper hand. That made it difficult for American firms to come in and under conditions they thought were necessary to make any kind of profit. They had trouble getting dollars out, there were rules on what land you could own, and things of that nature. So there were considerable barriers to American investment.

Q: *Who are étatists?*

DALE: Those who believe the state should play a very large role in the economy.

Q: *État, yes.*

DALE: You see, in Turkey, I think now about 50% of the industry which the country has is controlled by the state. At least that was the last figure I saw. It's slightly over 50%, but I think the present Prime Minister, [Turgut] Ozal, has reduced that. They've gone the other way now towards a freer enterprise. Chromite was one of the things we were interested in.

Q: *Our military-political interests in Turkey were fairly substantial then.*

DALE: Yes.

Q: *Our economic and investment interests were slight?*

DALE: I wouldn't say slight. They were significant, but built on future hopes. They were not developed.

Q: Anything else about your senior assignment there?

DALE: I think I should mention one thing, the work of the Status of Forces Agreement. I haven't mentioned that. The Turks are a very patriotic people, and the Turkish flag is to them a very sacred object. American soldiers, when they came into Turkey, were told that, but they didn't always remember it. We had difficulty, a great deal of difficulty with a soldier who, when he first came to Turkey, had been warned to be careful about the flag, he went to a house of ill repute one night, got very drunk. When he came out, he went downstairs. The ladies were standing around in a balcony, which ran on three sides of the building. He saw a Turkish flag and, like laughing in church, he couldn't help but pull it down and threw it in the garbage pail, whereupon the ladies, who were interested in love most of the time, became very patriotic, piled on him, brought in the police, and he was arrested. His defense was very unique. He said, "I saw the flag was falling (because he was pulling it) and I wanted to keep it from touching the grounds, so I let it go into the nearest receptacle there was, which happened to be a garbage pail."

So he had a long jail sentence as a result of this, and we thought that was unfair. The Turks, however, are very sensitive on this point, so we had a good deal of political difficulty at first over questions pertaining to the Status of Forces Agreement and Americans' behavior relative to the Turkish flag, relative to the Black Market, and cases of that nature.

Later on, a genuine issue did come up, and that was over Cyprus. The Americans were trying to keep the Turks from invading Cyprus, and in the end, Ambassador Hare, one of the real feats I've ever seen, the best feats of diplomacy, did manage to talk Prime Minister İnönü out of invading the island of Cyprus. This was in 1964, when the ships were loaded with troops, landing craft were ready. He went into a Cabinet meeting, couldn't get into the room, sat outside, managed to persuade the prime minister not to invade, a real tremendous feat of diplomatic initiative.

Q: How?

DALE: How did he do it? He managed to persuade them that if they did, they would have no support, that it would endanger their tie with NATO, which was very important to Turkey at that time. I guess it still is, but it was extremely important. He told them that it would certainly make it difficult for the United States to continue and on the scale it was and the aid which Turkey needed to develop. Lastly, he said it wouldn't solve the problem at all, because it would tend to isolate Turkey, and they would find they couldn't hold onto whatever they had won, because they would be so isolated from the West. Turkey has a strong desire to be associated with the West, because they need to balance it against the Soviet Union, which for centuries they've looked on as the major threat.

Q: Who did he talk with?

DALE: Prime Minister İnönü. That issue overwhelmed all the other issues by that time. The Status of Forces Agreement, the problem of what the military was up to paled in significance when the Cyprus issue came up.

Q: In this particular diplomatic feat that you're talking about, was Hare operating on instructions, or exactly how did he take this initiative?

DALE: He was operating on instructions, but the instructions were general. He used the instructions to support the pitch he had already determined. I was waiting for him in the embassy, and he was down at the foreign ministry. We were giving a dinner party. I knew the dinner party started. I could almost tell by my watch what course was being served. I got back in time for dessert. By that time, we'd reported back to Washington that our naval attaché, who was stationed in Iskenderun, where the troops were loading, could see the troops filing off the ships, back to their barracks, and we knew that the crisis was over.

Q: That was quite a coup.

DALE: That was quite a coup. That man was good.

Q: When was Cyprus eventually partitioned?

DALE: 1974, ten years later. Later on came other events, such as the famous Johnson letter to the Turks, which was very unfortunate. But this was before that.

Q: You left in 1964.

DALE: Yes.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Economic Officer
Izmir (1960-1962)

Political Officer
Ankara (1962-1965)

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Illinois in 1929 and raised in the Chicago area. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Turkey, Italy, Venezuela, Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Lebanon. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 17, 1990.

Q: It is true that during the period you describe much of the Foreign Service was driven by an almost missionary impulse. We thought we had something to contribute and the more difficult the country, the larger the challenge it became. We were not only interested in reporting events; we were going to be involved in fostering change!

DILLON: Right. We were very activist in our outlook. We were eager to be analytical reporters, but we also had a lot of the missionary spirit in us. We did think that we were going to change things. We saw that very much part of our mission.

Q: Let me now start by asking you about your first assignment after Turkish language training which was in Izmir from 1960 to 1962. What were your responsibilities there?

DILLON: I was the economic officer. In those days, Izmir was a fairly large Consulate General - now I think it is considerably smaller and may only be a Consulate. In the early 60s, we had a Consul General, a consular officer, a political officer and an economic officer and, as a matter of fact, while I was there the staff was increased with a politico-military officer. The latter was added to handle community relations created by the presence of a large number of U.S. troops at the air force base. The staff may have been slightly too large, but Turkey was important in those days. We had a large aid programs with many Americans living in Turkey handling those programs. Treasury had a couple of officers at the Embassy and it was Washington's view that economic reporting was very important to the determination of its assistance and other policies.

I didn't at the time question the need for the job; I was delighted to have it. It was a very good job for someone who had just learned Turkish; my duties were not demanding so that I had time to improve my language skills. I also had an opportunity to travel so that I could report on tobacco which was a major source for export to the United States where it was blended with our home grown varieties. We also had cotton in our region which is another commodity of great interest to American agriculture. On reflection, when I think about those long, fascinating reports I wrote on tobacco and cotton, I can't believe that any one could possibly have been interested.

There was some work related to commercial disputes, but that wasn't a heavy work load. Turkey's economic conditions were in very bad shape. They had limited foreign exchange reserves, even with the very tight controls that they exercised. The key to success for a Turkish businessman was to obtain import permits; that objective became a game in itself. The confusing, multiple exchange rates made the permits very tricky, but also potentially very rewarding. There were different ways of getting permits, including bribery, which was a minor problem.

They were tricky about categories. I remember that soon after my arrival, I noticed large American ambulances in the streets. That struck me as somewhat odd. The explanation was that in Turkey then, and it is still true today, there was a shared cab system called the dolmus, which was something like the old American jitney system. It was a cheap source of transportation provided by independent operators who followed prescribed routes and therefore, once you understood the process, could take you anywhere. The busses were cheap, but in terrible condition and overcrowded. So I used the dolmus myself. Ambulances were used for this private transportation system because Turks could get import licenses for ambulances, but not for trucks, cars or busses. So some bright entrepreneur bought six ambulances and converted them into dolmus.

In Ankara trade complaints were a major workload generated by a variety of practices in both countries. I remember several concerning an American steel mill which had been sold to the Turks. First there were questions about the quality of the product and then there were questions of timely payment. The steel mill was from Minnesota so that some of the complaints came to us via Senator Hubert Humphrey who was a major political figure. Although there were lots of crates and boxes lying around, the mill was never assembled and never used. We put great

pressure on the Turks to pay for it and I think eventually they did.

Q: How were the relations with the American military?

DILLON: That was an active relationship. Izmir was the headquarters for LAND-South East, which was NATO's south eastern command. There were a number of American officers assigned to that command. There were also small American support and intelligence detachments in our region. We also had the 6th ATAF, which was a NATO Air Wing, commanded by an American general. The general at LAND South East was a three star, and a two star general was at 6th ATAF. We probably had a couple of thousand Americans in the area.

In later years, it seemed to me that the Air Force became more sophisticated in handling community relations and in alerting and orienting its officers to the required sensitivities. In the early 60s, the Americans were very poor in these areas. They were naive, arrogant; so that the issue of community relations was a constant preoccupation. Our Consul General, Ken Byrnes, who had had similar pol-mil experiences before while serving in Europe, was very interested in Turkey although he had not had much background on the country. Ken in effect served as a political advisor to the Commanding General. I often attended their parties because they had a great lack of Turkish speaking personnel -- they may have had one competent Turkish speaker. Since there were two of us at the C.G., one of us was always invited. I particularly remember that when the military would entertain, the problem was often the wives of the Turkish military because many of their husbands spoke passable English. So I became very expert in women's topics. I spent much time at these parties talking to the Turkish women because there were no other Americans who could communicate with them. The NATO officers and their Turkish counterparts spoke English together and I would spend the evening chatting with the women.

We did have problems, such as black-marketing, landlord issues -- some got very nasty. The fault was not always on the American side, but Americans were not very well equipped to handle those problems. Turkey was in very severe economic straits, which fostered a certain resentment of foreigners, particularly those with access to the PX, which was a big issue. Americans were constantly under pressure, which was not sufficiently resisted, to provide Turks with goods from the PX and commissaries, either on a gift or sale basis. There was a tendency on the part of the American military officers to protect enlisted men who were caught in smuggling or black market operations. In later years, that changed entirely, but the military tradition required that loyalty flow down as well as up. That is understandable and laudable in certain circumstances, but for Turkey in those days it was a bad misjudgement. For example, the Commanding General's chauffeur -- an American NCO -- headed a very large black market operation, which was very successful and engaged in all kinds of nefarious activities including currency smuggling. When the guy was caught, the General's first reaction was to protect him from any Turkish prosecution. That was wrong. The Turks therefore had little confidence when we requested that the perpetrators be turned over to us for processing. We said that we had a system of justice, but what they saw was a system of protection. If we had been tougher with our troops and if it had been evident to the Turks that American military justice would work in such cases, the Turks would not have been so insistent on alleged violators being prosecuted in Turkish courts. We had constant problems on this issue. The "Status of Forces" agreement, stipulated that an American military man who was accused of a crime committed in the course of his duties was

to be handled by American military justice. But if the deed was committed outside of his duties, that man would be subject to local authorities and law. In fact, in those days and for many years, the American military authorities maintained that all conduct was in the course of duty, thereby making the American military person untouchable by local authorities. So when an American military person, and it was usually an NCO, got caught in the middle of the night, he invariably showed up a couple of days later with a duty certificate, immunizing him from local jurisdiction. This devalued the duty certificate, which the Turks after a while just didn't take seriously. These problems were very much part of our lives, since the Consulate General got involved in these disputes. When I returned to Turkey a few years later, it was clear to me that the American military had learned its lessons and these kinds of problems were greatly reduced. The Air Force, in particular, became more sophisticated in handling these community relation matters; they were much better at preparing people for life in Turkey, much smoother at handling the problems. They increased their Turkish language training -- not that many were fluent, but a number would give it a try.

It was never clear to me what military value our NATO establishments had. Both were headquarters staffed by officers from seven or eight countries -- not all NATO countries were represented. The troops were all Turkish. One of reasons the U.S. continued to be interested in these headquarters was because these were organizations in which Greek and Turkish officers cooperated, which was rare. Greek officers were assigned to these headquarters and that seemed very important to Washington. Of course, whatever spirit of cooperation was developed, never survived the first Cyprus crisis in 1962. Nevertheless, I think those headquarters are still alive, even if their purposes are more mysterious now than they were in the 50s.

Q: Of course, these bases may have been in the Persian Gulf crisis, but they certainly weren't originally set up for those reasons.

DILLON: That is true. Originally, there was one operating base at Cigli which was being built at the time I was in Izmir. Missiles were to be located at that base; those were the missiles that were withdrawn following the Cuban Missile Crisis. We of course have always denied that a deal had been made with the Soviet Union; the Turks never believed us. The placing of those missiles cost a lot of money; the site was completed just before the Crisis, in October 1962. Within a couple of months of the USSR withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba, our Jupiter missiles were taken out of Turkey. So the whole thing was just a great waste of money. Although we said that the missiles were obsolescent, the Turks were very upset because they recognized for the first time that we were quite capable of making a deal with the Soviets behind their backs on matters of direct interest to them. So that episode had a considerable negative impact on US-Turkish relations. Cigli became an Air Force base for a short time and then was converted to a civilian airport, which it is still. We then centered our air activities in Incirlik, which is in southern Turkey right outside of Adana. That airfield is very active; it is huge, staffed by a large American contingent and I am certain that its planes were involved in the Iraq war and the aftermath.

As for the political situation in Turkey during my first tour, the Turks, after World War II, moved down a democratic road. Ismet Inonu was the virtual dictator of the country from 1938 on -- he had been Ataturk's lieutenant and had inherited his powers. To his great credit, he permitted free elections, partly because he thought that his Republican party (the lineal descendent of

Ataturk's party) would win. In fact, it didn't; it was beaten by the Democratic Party, led by Adnan Menderes. The 50s were therefore the Menderes' years. The Western powers and the Americans in particular were very pleased by these developments. Menderes was a civilian who wanted to liberalize Turkey and achieve many things we believed in. In his early years, Menderes was successful and Turkey was frequently cited in American publications as a glowing example of a country that had graduated from a dictatorship to a democracy.

But as the 50s wore on, the Turks got into tremendous difficulties, particularly in the economic sphere. Menderes himself became increasingly autocratic. Inonu and his Party, really the party of the Turkish elite, was in adamant opposition to Menderes. They sabotaged the government in many ways; they were strong among bureaucrats and army officers. Menderes reacted repressively; the situation went downhill. Just before I arrived in Turkey, a coup took place May 27, 1960.

So when I arrived in Turkey, a military junta had just taken over. Inonu and his party had not been involved, at least not directly. The junta stayed in power for about 18 months, until it could arrange elections. Menderes was tried and hung along with two others, including Zorlu, the Foreign Minister. There was wide spread feeling in Turkey, including among the military officers themselves, that there should be elections. Although some may have had reservations about elections, the military saw their job as leading Turkey back down the democratic path.

When the elections came in 1961, it was generally expected that Inonu and his Party would win. He didn't. He did manage to obtain a plurality of the votes, but he had to form alliances in the Parliament with three smaller parties. One was an old party; the other two were new and had been established to compete for the old Democratic Party votes. That had to be done in veiled ways because it was illegal to criticize the coup or to invoke Menderes' name. I remember one very skillful politician whom I got to know well. He had strange green eyes. He would stand up before crowds and say: "Look into my eyes and you will know who I support". Everybody knew he was referring to Menderes and would cheer wildly. One of the new parties was called the Justice Party. Without saying so, everyone understood that that Party stood for "justice" for Menderes and the old Democratic Party. That eventually became the largest party in Turkey and took over the government. The roots of the Justice Party were in the Aegean region. Menderes was from Aydin, which was the next province south of Izmir. The Justice Party had tremendous strength in that region, among peasants, businessmen, land-owners. This was significant for me personally because having spent two years in Izmir, traveling around the Aegean (for which I had plenty of time since I was not overburdened by official duties), practicing my Turkish, drinking a lot of tea in small Turkish towns, I had an opportunity to observe the birth of the Justice Party and became acquainted with a number of its early leaders.

I transferred to the Political Section at the Embassy in Ankara in September 1962. Ankara was very different from the Aegean region. It had been the center of the Republican Party. Inonu was widely admired. There were a number of bright, impressive, younger members of the RPP (Inonu's Party). Some spoke English, some spoke French. The Embassy people knew them. So I arrived in Ankara, a young officer in my early 30s and was assigned to report on internal political affairs. I discovered that my new colleagues were enamored of the RPP. They saw Menderes and his successors in a very bad light because they had been in Ankara when the coup

took place. Many of the embassy's staff, having witnessed the events and failures of the last year of Menderes were sympathetic to the objectives of the coup. With the exception of the Ambassador, the senior officers in the Embassy had lost respect for Menderes and his government. This legacy continued through the coup and the subsequent elections. I arrived with a different view, since I saw the Menderes' natural successors as respectable people; at least, that is the way they were being viewed by the Turks in the Aegean area. They may not have been as sophisticated as the RPP crowd and you had to have known Turkish to know them since few spoke other languages. I thought that in the competition for Menderes' mantle and votes, the Justice Party would win. I also thought that once they had achieved their electoral victory, they would take over the government, unless the military interfered once again. The Justice Party had leadership problems. In order to protect itself from the military, the Justice Party had found a retired Lieutenant General as a figure head. He was a nice man, but certainly not an influence. The real power belonged to a younger group of politicians, some of whom were related to members of the former Menderes government. They were split between the so-called "revanchists" and the moderates. The "revanchists" were in a minority, but were very vocal. They wanted to push to the extreme some kind of redress of what they considered the crimes perpetrated against Menderes. The moderates were inclined to let bygones be bygones because they understood that they would have to learn to cooperate with their opposition; they wanted to make it clear immediately that there would be no revenge, no "witch hunts" if they came to power. The moderates got the upper hand, which was important both internally and for Turkey's relations with other countries. I observed all these events in 1963. I was in a crowded movie theater in Ankara where the Justice Party met for three days. The issue was who would become the new President of the Party because the old general had passed away. The debate was heated and victory was not clear until the very end. The hall stank of tobacco and I sat in the balcony for those three long days with a couple of other diplomatic observers -- most of the diplomatic corps didn't bother to attend. Some newsmen covered the event; we all had a great time watching this assemblage. In the end, in a very dramatic election, Suleyman Demirel won. He has served as Turkey's Prime Minister seven times since then. I knew Demirel; I had met and been in his office many times and had become quite friendly with him. Demirel was eager to have a contact in the American Embassy; none of the senior officers knew him, so that I, although only a Second Secretary, became the contact. I returned to the Embassy after my visit to Demirel to write up our first contact and predicted he would become Prime Minister. Ambassador Raymond Hare, a senior career Foreign Service officer, was good about letting junior officers write up their experiences in messages to the Department. He would let Second Secretaries report what they wanted as long as it wasn't too stupid. The DCM would review the reports and delete the more outrageous commentaries, but essentially we were free to write reports. Hare would draft a beautifully crafted telegram from time to time which would set all events in a context, correcting whatever impressions the staff reports may have left on Washington. Hare was a good Ambassador, although quite conservative. By today's standards, he undoubtedly would be considered "old fashioned". But he was good and an exquisite writer of the "old school", which I still admire. His messages were models of both subtleties and clarity. So I was permitted to report my contacts and views, but the Embassy was careful, on another level, to put my views in what it considered a proper framework, so that my enthusiasm for Demirel would not overwhelm the existing consensus that Inonu would turn out to be the victor. Inonu was the "grand old man"; people admired him and I shared that with others. But I did think that he had peaked, that his Party would not win and that it would not retain control.

The Justice Party grew because it had become recognized widely throughout Turkey that it was the lineal descendent of the Popular Democrat Party and of Menderes. A lot of the smaller parties, who had been very cautious, joined the Justice Party, enlarging its representation in Parliament. Demirel, although not even a member of the Parliament, became a major political figure. He had come to the U.S. on an Eisenhower fellowship many years earlier. He was an engineer by profession -- he built dams in the Menderes administration. When I first met him, Demirel was in his late 30s -- young by Turkish standards. He was called Suleyman Morrison by his detractors, which was a reference to the fact that he had once been a consultant to the Morrison-Knudsen Company.

Within the Embassy, some of the younger officers agreed with my assessments, the older officers didn't. It was a classic situation. We had a wonderful Military Attaché, who spoke Turkish, whom I liked very much. He tolerated me, but I remember him shaking his finger at me and telling me: "Don't sell your Inonu stock!". There was no bitterness among the staff, but there certainly were sharp disagreements. But we had no limits on our reporting, as has occurred in other Embassies, such as Tehran, which was much to Raymond Hare's credit. He did periodically "straighten it out" by making sure that his views were understood in Washington, but he never repressed his officers' reporting. I did feel some inhibitions within the Political Section because the Counselor was a cautious and not too competent officer; he was worried about his staff going off in their forecasts. The DCM, Bob Barnes, was very competent and did not seem disturbed by reports which were somewhat out of the "mainstream". I confess that I was guilty of "end-runs". I ended up working not through the Political Counselor, but with his boss, the DCM, who had been the former Political Counselor. He actually protected me; the Political Counselor wrote negative reports on my work; they weren't outrageous, but certainly not enthusiastic. Barnes, then as reviewing officer, would repair any damage done by the Political Counselor. The processes frustrated and worried me. The Political Counselor would never believe my reporting. He just didn't believe it because his antenna always went up and never down; he sensed that the Ambassador's view was different than mine and therefore was not about to run those rocky shoals. In any case, those efficiency ratings didn't hurt my career, but to lack support from your supervisor is inhibiting. The early 60s were a time when we could have used a different kind of Political Counselor; we were just lucky that the DCM had previously been the Political Counselor and therefore took a great interest in the work of the Section. If the DCM had come to Ankara from outside, then I could have been in serious trouble.

First, there were local elections which suddenly took the form of a national referendum. There were general predictions that the RPP would increase its strength. I was free to travel, which I did. It became my view and I so reported, that instead the local elections would be a landslide in favor of Demirel and the Justice Party. It happened often that the Political Counselor would approve my reports, but would delete my conclusions. He would say: "Let the facts speak for themselves". Of course, that really left the reader up in the air; facts had to be interpreted. I got around these reporting restrictions by writing up verbatim conversations which no one edited and then I distributed them as widely as I could. In any case, I felt after that the Justice Party would triumph by a wide margin which would have Parliamentary consequences. And indeed that is what happened. Everybody professed great amazement, including the Turkish press which was not on the Justice Party's side. In fact, the trend was evident to anyone who wanted to look in the

countryside.

Inonu resigned and I was there the day that happened. I was almost the only diplomat in the Parliament who observed this major event. The debate leading up to the resignation was heated; Inonu was a small, but a very stern and angry man. But in fact he had lost his majority. After the adjournment, I went down and stood with the newsmen at the Parliament's exit. Inonu stomped out. In those days there were no security guards so that we could all mill around watching the proceedings from close up. As he left, Inonu said that he would be back. I returned to the Embassy and wrote a report calling the resignation the end of an era. That is when the American military attaché made his comment about Inonu. In fact, Inonu never came back and Demirel became Prime Minister.

Q: Did you find that your observations, when proved correct, enhanced your position in the Embassy?

DILLON: I suddenly became a key person in the Embassy, rather than the obscure junior member of the Political Section. My situation was greatly enhanced. During my last year in Ankara, we got a new Political Counselor, Chris Van Hollen, who was a terrific officer. He was a good professional. My relations with him were excellent from the beginning. Interestingly enough, he did far more editing of my reports than his predecessor, but he really improved them. Chris had a very good eye for organization and would almost invariably suggest that I rearrange my paragraphs and lines so that my views could be better understood. I gladly did that. We also in that last year had a new Ambassador -- Pete Hart -- and a new DCM -- Ed Martin. Both were good officers -- smart, professional.

It was a lot of fun. In those days, we still had the "despatch" which went by pouch, enabling the reporting officer to take as much space as he or she wanted. So most of them were rather long. The daily reports went by telegram, which in the early 60s were far fewer than today and much shorter. There were restriction on the use and length of telegrams, which made it different than the despatch. The latter was typically 3 or 4 pages; sometimes just one, sometimes twenty. I regret that we gave up the despatches. In the Political Section, in dividing the work, each officer had two responsibilities: one was a subject -- in my case it was internal politics as I mentioned earlier -- which required me to write a brief telegram every day because Washington was very interested during this period on what was going on in Turkey. Each officer also had responsibility for major subjects, which would lend themselves periodically to a full dissertation and interpretation of events which we would send in as despatches. I wrote on a number of subjects -- it was hard work, but fun. I wrote an important despatch on "Whither of the Justice Party" which gave me an opportunity in five or six pages to lay out the history of the Justice Party, how and why it developed and where I thought it was going. Even though a despatch had to be approved by a senior officer and the Ambassador's name at the end as it did on all communications from an Embassy, the drafter's name appeared usually on the front page. It was widely understood by all readers that this was essentially the work of the drafting officer, despite the fact that some -- or in some cases, substantial -- editing had been done by superior officers. Of course, in many cases, the editing improved the despatch, but a reader of a despatch always looked for the drafter's name and the system judged an officer to a certain extent by the quality of those despatches. In my case, Van Hollen used to send back my draft with a lot of editorial

comments; he did not criticize the content, but the presentation and organization. The despatch on the Justice Party gave me an opportunity to prognosticate on the future of the Party and Turkish domestic politics. I didn't write about external affairs; Charlie Tanguy wrote about Cyprus for example. But I found that making that analysis was very satisfying; my sense is that we do far less of such analysis today.

The Political Section in Ankara was a large one. We must have had six or seven officers in it. One followed CENTO affairs, one Cyprus as I mentioned; everyone had his specialty. There were two of us who specialized in internal affairs, which I think was the most important work of the Section. One of the two or three most satisfying experiences that I ever had was when we returned to the U.S. on leave to be able to talk to some INR people about Turkey. Some official, whom I did not know, pulled out my despatch on the Justice Party and said: "There is the Bible". That was very rewarding!

Embassies still analyze situations in long telegrams and I occasionally see them, but the despatch was a different medium. The very fact that it was not a telegram gave it an certain aura. The problem with despatches was that the very busy policy maker at the top never had time to read them; he would never even see them. The desk officers could read them carefully and summarize them for their superiors. INR people would read them; often staff of other agencies would see them. INR loved them because they contained a lot of facts and analysis. Ultimately, because of the success of the "Whither the Justice Party", I wrote one on every Turkish political party to make up a series of about six different papers. They all of course were not perfect and not every prediction came true, but I had the opportunity, which I really enjoyed, to reflect on the Turkish political scene, which was interesting. I had the opportunity to lay out the political map in some perspective. I enjoyed writing that series so much that I always looked forward to doing more of the same in other assignments, but in fact, after I left Turkey in 1966, I never wrote anything like that again.

Q: What are your views on an Embassy's capability to cover the thoughts and aspiration of a foreign military institution?

DILLON: This was the subject of a lot of discussion among the Embassy staff. Obviously, the military was a vital element of Turkish society and their views mattered greatly. Our Attachés and political officers were always trying to probe. We would talk to our JUSMAAT -- the military assistance group -- who were very reluctant to discuss the state of mind of their Turkish counterparts. They viewed their conversations with the Turks as confidential and felt that any appearance of "spying" would be damaging to their relationships and their program. So we had to cultivate some of the JUSMAAT people the same way you would cultivate a foreign official in order to gain their confidence.

But penetration of the Turkish military was very difficult. They were professional, well disciplined, somewhat secretive, although probably no more than any other military establishment. It was difficult to know what they were thinking. In a general sense, we knew they were pro-Inonu and then later anti-Justice and anti-Demirel. Of course, the important question was whether they had any coups in mind and whether there were any leftist or rightist sentiments among the military. I think we understood them fairly well; rumors of coup plotting

came to us as quickly as they went anywhere.

We did have two coup attempts during this period; one occurred just before I got to Ankara. This was led by the Commandant of the Military Academy. It turned into a stand off and he and the other members of the uprising were pardoned and went on with their military career as if nothing had happened.

After I had been in Ankara for about a year, there were constant rumors of coups. I lived outside the center of Ankara. One midnight, I got a call from a friend who told me that there were tanks in the streets. I put on my clothes and went to see. At key points around town, tanks had been stationed, manned not by regular troops but by cadets, which was a sure sign that another coup was taking place. It was a very interesting night! The government did not trust its junior officers, so that, although it mobilized the Army to oppose the coup, the troops were led by very senior officers and senior NCOs. Most of the company commanders and platoon leaders were told to stay away because the senior officers felt that their junior commanders might be reluctant to fire on the cadets. Everybody loved the cadets; they were the heroes. It was a great prestige to be a cadet at the Turkish Military Academy.

I went to the various checkpoints where I was met by very nervous cadets. They were very nice and polite as they had been taught, but also very naive. When they stopped me, I would tell them that I was a member of the American Embassy and that I was collecting information for the Ambassador who would certainly wish to know what was going on. I "gilded the lily" somewhat by adding that if I didn't find out what was going on, I could lose my job. So they would tell me although none of them would let me pass their checkpoints. In a little while, a few other foreign observers began to gather. We went to the place where the Turkish army was preparing to attack the checkpoints; it was there that I realized there were no junior officers at platoon and company level. In the Turkish military, an enlisted man could not become an officer. If you were a draftee, you could aspire to becoming a corporal -- they wore red stripes -- but never beyond that. There were some professional NCOs who would serve for 10-12 years; they wore yellow stripes. Then there were the officers. Each of these groups were highly compartmentalized. There was no upward mobility. So I saw no "yellow stripers", but several colonels and generals; the "red striped" corporals were in charge of the platoons and companies. It made me wonder how the Army would perform. I followed them and found that they performed admirably. The cadets were in danger of being overwhelmed and they withdrew back into the city, where they occupied a few strong points. There was some firing, but not a lot of casualties. The Army was not anxious to kill any cadets; there were a few soldiers killed.

I followed the troops that went to the Ministry of Agriculture which was right in the center of Ankara -- a great big building with thick walls. A group of cadets had taken refuge inside. The corporals handled their responsibilities very professionally. They deployed their troops in a textbook manner around the Ministry, periodically they would advance on the building, set up a firing point and wait. Slowly, but surely, they closed on the Ministry. When the final assault came, I just walked in behind them. There was some shooting; all of a sudden the cadets ran out of some rear doors and disbursed. That was the only close unit action that I watched; it was interesting and gave me something to write. That shows you how much I loved reporting.

Q: That is obvious. A more seasoned diplomat might have said that following troops is beyond the diplomatic scope. But I am sure it was fun.

DILLON: It sure was. The coup was suppressed and the cadets were expelled. The officers who led the uprising were tried. That was an interesting process. I attended the trials which dragged on interminably. Most of the Embassy wondered why anybody would want to sit at the trials day after day. My Turkish was pretty good, but the trial was hard to follow. The exchanges were emotional and everybody spoke rapidly. My vocabulary failed me from time to time. But in the course of the trial, I learned more history of the Turkish Republic than I knew, on such matters as the philosophy of the professional officers' corps, which was used by both the prosecution and the defense for their purposes. It was a terrific educational experience for someone interested in Turkish history and mentality. In the end, the leaders were hung including the very charismatic leader.

At the same time, I spent a lot of time at the Parliament so that I was not in the office very much. I have always believed that there was an intrinsic value just being in a location. Eventually, if you keep visiting it long enough, you become part of it. People begin to neglect you and you are not pointed out as a member of the American Embassy. So I became known as "the guy who is there all the time" both at the trials and the Parliament. I would be invited to join people at tea. In every Turkish building, there is always a tea parlor where you can go and have a cup. In the Parliament, much of the work was done in the big Tea Room which was just off the floor. You couldn't enter without an invitation from a member. I would stand around the entrance looking forlorn and inevitably some kind M.P. would invite me to join him for a cup of tea. That enabled me to absorb the atmosphere and periodically, I could talk to other members who congregated there. It was fun!

Q: You mentioned earlier the Cuban missile crisis and the withdrawal of missiles from Turkish bases that we agree to. What was the Turkish reaction to this "deal"?

DILLON: Very negative. The Turkish perception was that they had been betrayed. It was not as much an issue of the missiles, but rather that we had dealt with the Soviets unilaterally on matters of concern to them. We never admitted to the Turks that we had negotiated with the USSR. I think we did, although I have no direct evidence. But the Turkish perception was certainly one of betrayal. It was true that many of the Turks didn't like having the missiles on their territory, but that didn't minimize their outrage at the withdrawal -- a familiar situation. They were upset, that six months after putting them in place, we would withdraw the missiles without real consultation. I am sure that the record will reflect some consultations, but the US had reached its decision before it talked to Turkey. In answer to the question of "Why?", the best answer we had was that the missiles were then obsolescent. Not only did argument raise the question of how they became obsolescent so quickly, but the Turks also reminded us that they were better than the nothing which was to be the outcome from the withdrawal. Our arguments were not credible.

This missile crisis was just one event that shook Turkish confidence in the US. A little bit later, there was a "Johnson letter" to Inonu which warned the Turks that if they got into difficulties over Cyprus -- e.g. Soviet intervention, which I didn't think was a real possibility although others

did -- none of the NATO arrangements would apply. NATO was a defensive alliance; we wanted to make sure that the Turks understood that if they took any offensive action -- on Cyprus, in this case -- the NATO agreements would not be applicable, regardless of justification. So these two major events -- the missile removal and the "Johnson letter" plus some more minor occurrences such as Turkish disappointment with the level and effectiveness of our assistance programs -- created an atmosphere of mistrust and, as I said in the case of the missiles, actual betrayal. There was a tendency to believe that an alliance was an alliance and that the United States, being the leader of such an alliance, had a special commitment to both the spirit and the letter of the agreements. The Turks also felt that the alliance was a two-way street, which they had marched down by sending troops to Korea. For political reasons, we greatly exaggerated the accomplishments of those troops; they were not bad, but they certainly were not the super-humans that we painted them to be. We took every opportunity to overstate their accomplishments which the average Turks of course fully believed. So when the missiles were removed, the outrage was enormous. Old Korean veterans protested in front of the Embassy by throwing their medals in the doorway. I think every Turk who served in the front lines in Korea must have received a bronze star because we certainly collected a bushel full of them during the demonstrations. Many of my colleagues and I felt that we could have handled the issue better than we did. We didn't have to be so abrupt about the missile withdrawals. The "Johnson letter" which I understand was written by Secretary Rusk personally could have been more felicitously phrased. On the other hand, it was necessary to tell the Turks that although we were allies, there were limits beyond which we could not support them. The Turks were somewhat unrealistic about US support and it was very important that Inonu and his advisers understand that they did not have a free hand to muddy the waters in the Eastern Mediterranean. In essence we were right in delivering the message; we could have been better in phrasing it. As far as the missiles were concerned, I am sorry that they were ever put there in the first place.

Q: During the period we are discussing, how did we view the Soviet threat to Turkey and the latter's possible responses?

DILLON: These issues were constant preoccupations of ours. There had been a direct Soviet threat against Turkey in the late 40s. The Soviets did have their eyes on the Strait of Bosphorus. The Soviets did attempt to get an agreement on the use of the Straits including free passage. Their objective was of course full control. Despite the passage of years, these Soviet actions were still very much in the Turkish mind. Most Turks saw the Soviets as very threatening. The Americans saw the Straits as very strategic real estate which had by all means to be kept out of Soviet hands. Our military assistance and Turkish military strategy centered on that objective. One consequence of that policy was the development of a Turkish armored force, which was semi-modern for the times. This force was to be based in Thrace which was great tank country. The assumption was that the Russians would strike Turkey through Bulgaria into Thrace. The Turkish First Army, which was always the best equipped and supplied, had the responsibility of stopping the Soviets. The Turkish Third Army, which was the other combat ready large unit, was stationed in the East in very rugged terrain, inimicable to the use of large tank forces. That area of Turkey was viewed as another invasion route, but the two potential battlefields were very dissimilar. We had JUSMAAT officers located in both areas near Turkish borders. They lived under fairly spartan conditions and worked with the Turks on use of American equipment.

In any case, we viewed the Soviets as a potential military threat to Turkey. We also saw an internal threat from a small Turkish Communist movement. George Harris wrote a book about that. Despite suppression, the communist doctrines remained attractive to a small group of Turkish intellectuals. It is very easy now, many years later, to look back and see that the threat was greatly exaggerated. But at the time, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, there was concern. Many discussions were held: was Islam a barrier to Soviet expansion? Was the innate conservatism of the Turkish peasant a barrier? It was certainly true that the peasant conservatism was a barrier to change of any kind. Whether Islam was a barrier was debatable although I believe it probably was.

The domestic left movement was very Turkey oriented and contained some very extreme points of view. These were people who later became deeply involved in terrorism in Turkey. They were not tools of the Soviets; they were not particularly responsive to the Soviets. They were interested in the Soviets. Like leftist and revolutionary movements elsewhere, they had appropriated the vocabulary, but they were fundamentally Turkish -- in some cases, very dangerous, but first and foremost Turkish. We worried about them. The Turks worried about them. They did try to suppress these movements; it was illegal to be a communist. "Socialism" was a very suspicious word. Only by the late 60s, could a Turk admit to being a socialist without being immediately suspected as a communist and jailed or otherwise ostracized. It should be noted that all this phobia was overcome later, although policy makers always saw Turkey on the front lines against the Soviets and they did see Turkey as endangered. Turkey was viewed as a barrier against Soviet free access to the Mediterranean. Greece and Turkey were viewed as one in the sense that although Turkey may have been the key element because of its location, the cooperation between the two in defense of the eastern flank of NATO was vital and the strength much greater than if each country worked alone. That is one of the reasons why we wanted bases in both countries and were so intent on somehow obtaining Greek-Turkish cooperation. This was of course a very frustrating strategic objective, something like mixing oil and water. I think the hatreds were less virulent on the Turkish side because their historical perspectives were different than the Greek ones. The Turks were less obsessed with the Greeks than vice versa. On the other hand, the ideal of real cooperation between the two seemed unachievable. I don't think any Turks believed it was possible and viewed us as obsessed by this silly idea and therefore paid lip service to the concept, but they didn't break their backs in trying to achieve this cooperation. It is easy now to say that we were over-obsessed, but when you analyze our position within the atmosphere of those days, it is far more understandable. Some people today find it hard to understand what all the fuss was in Europe in 50s and 60s, but they fail to recognize the impact of such events as the Czech coup of 1968 and the Hungarian revolution and repression of 1956. One could argue that the Soviet block was never as tightly woven together as we believed and that it was in fact weaker than the West gave it credit. I always had some doubts about the Warsaw pact strength, but I certainly and most others did not view it as fragile as it subsequently turned out to be. There is a tendency today to minimize the dangers as perceived by the West. The fact was that a threat was perceived; it did not go away. In retrospect, after Stalin's death in the Spring of 1953, followed by the Korean cease fire a few weeks later, it is possible that from then on the threat was different, but it was perceptible at the time. It took some years to see the difference. After Khrushchev came to power we had some signals from the Soviets that their policies had changed. Khrushchev was a different leader and an important figure in the post-World War II period. The Russians maintained massive armed forces on the Turkish borders.

They had overwhelming armored superiority. The Soviet missions abroad were very aggressive. In Ankara, for example, they had a huge mission, larger than ours. It was staffed with lots of Turkish speakers -- large number of Azerbaijanis -- a big KGB contingent. They were very active making extensive attempts to influence the press and leftist parties. I used to see the Soviets occasionally, including an officer we believed to be the KGB chief, although we could never be certain. He would show up in some of the places which I frequented. His Turkish was very good. He would delight in joining me when I was speaking with some Turks, spouting his rapid, fluent Turkish non-stop trying to convey the impression that he spoke better Turkish than I did, which was the fact. I held my own and wasn't disturbed by these interruptions. But the Soviets were aggressive in those days and it was many years before their behavior was modified. When I returned to Turkey in the late 70s, their behavior had modified considerably, but in the period of 1960-66, even though there were changes in Moscow and in Soviet Union in general, their representatives in Turkey were very aggressive.

CHARLES W. McCASKILL
Economic/Commercial Officer
Cyprus (1960-1964)

Cyprus Desk
Washington, DC (1964-1967)

Charles W. McCaskill was born in South Carolina in 1923. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Germany, Greece, Cyprus, Washington, DC, Iran, and India. He was interviewed on July 7, 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You were in Cyprus from 1960 to 1964. In the first place, what was your job when you went out to Cyprus?

McCASKILL: I arrived in Cyprus almost exactly one month before independence, which occurred on August 16, 1960. I went as Economic/Commercial Officer but found after I got there that I would also be doing the consular work because the Department had taken a budget cut, and we had lost the consular officer position. The position was restored in about a year, but until then I did the consular work in addition to my duties as Economic/Commercial Officer.

Q: Can you describe Cyprus at the time you arrived, what the political/economic situation was?

McCASKILL: The London-Zurich Agreements establishing the new Republic of Cyprus had been signed in February, 1960, and there was some relief (obviously premature) among all parties concerned (except the Greek Cypriots) that the Cyprus Problem was "settled". Athens was truly anxious to put the Cyprus Problem to rest, to get on with solving some of Greece's problems. It should be kept in mind that Greece was at war longer than any other single European country -- from October 28, 1940 to the end of the Bandit War in 1949 -- and the Greek Government wanted to get on with rebuilding the country. The Greeks had been completely preoccupied with Cyprus from the early 1950s and time and energy that should have

gone into reconstruction of Greece were devoted to Cyprus. The international community was fed up with Cyprus, which had been at the center of the world stage for some years. So the feeling in Greece, at least in Thessaloniki, was one of relief that the problem was settled. It was our perception that the Greeks were relieved.

When I arrived in Cyprus I was surprised to find a general feeling among the Greek Cypriot community -- which was 80% of the population -- that the London-Zurich Agreements would not work, that the safeguards written into the agreements for the Turkish Cypriots were extreme, that the agreements were "not fair", and on and on.

In truth, the agreements were an extremely complicated set of agreements which did, in my opinion, give the Turkish Cypriots too many safeguards. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball described the Agreements as an "impressive diplomatic tour de force" which were "too complex to be workable". Most objectionable to the Greek Cypriots, Turkey could, under the Treaty of Guarantee, intervene in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community's vetoes, legislative and executive, could bring the government to a standstill; the Turkish Cypriots, 20% of the population, were given 30% of the civil service and the legislature. The Greek Cypriots vigorously opposed the concept that the two communities on the island were equal partners, that there was no majority community and no minority community, that they were both equal participants in the government.

The Greek Cypriots, including Makarios, felt that the agreements had been imposed on Cyprus by circumstances, that Makarios had been "forced" to sign ; no Greek Cypriot was present when the Greeks and the Turks reached agreement. Makarios stated later that he signed because the British threatened to partition the island if he did not agree to the agreements, and he feared that intercommunal fighting like that of 1958 would begin again. Moreover, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis rebuked Makarios rather strenuously at the first meeting in London and threatened to withdraw Greek support if Makarios refused to sign the agreements.

Makarios had indicated in 1958 that he could accept a solution of an independent Cyprus rather than insisting on union with Greece. Great Britain by 1958 had reviewed its security position and had decided that bases on the island would satisfy its security requirements and that it did not need to hold the entire island. All of this led to the conference in Zurich and later in London.

I've gone beyond the political/economic situation on the island when I got there but this does give a little flavor of what we were hearing when I arrived. I might add that I have thought about the London-Zurich Agreements over the years, and I have concluded that it was probably impossible for a small group of Greek and Turkish diplomats to work out, even in outline, such complicated agreements, and I have wondered if the agreements were drafted in London and slipped to the Turks who then put them on the table in Zurich. You may recall that they met in Zurich for less than a week and drew up an outline of the agreement; they then met in London a few days later to sign them. Many of the provisions had been contained in previous British proposals -- most recently the MacMillan Plan -- but one still has to wonder if the Greeks and Turks had the diplomatic expertise for such an undertaking.

Speaking of the pressures on Makarios, Ambassador Nikos Kranidiotis, the Cyprus Ambassador

in Athens for many years, in his book entitled Difficult Years says that Makarios anguished all night over whether or not to sign. He received calls from Queen Frederika in Athens, from former Governor of Cyprus Hugh Foot, and from the leader of the British Labor Party, all urging him to sign. As a footnote, I asked Frederika, whom I came to know fairly well when I was Consul General in Madras, if the story were true and she said her husband spoke to Makarios. The King only called, she said, because they were afraid that the Karamanlis government would fall if Makarios refused to sign. She indicated that fear that the government would fall justified what otherwise could have been termed "intervention" in Greek internal affairs. I believe Kranidiotis' version, and have always felt, that for whatever reason, Frederika was dissembling with me.

Cyprus was dubbed by some over the years as "The Reluctant Republic", since it was felt that the solution really desired by the majority Greek Cypriots was union with Greece rather than independence, and that independence was "forced" on Makarios.

Those very early days were very interesting and exciting and even humorous as we approached independence. There was a story on the island that Makarios, by then the President-elect, and Turkish Cypriot Vice President-elect Fazil Kucuk realized rather late that they had not even thought of a flag. After all, every country had to have a flag on independence day, and they agreed on a temporary flag which was a sort of yellowish-clayish outline of the island on a white background with olive branches underneath. That was to be temporary, and they were to design a more appropriate flag later with their help of time. Nobody has yet designed another flag of Cyprus and that one is still used as the official flag.

I rode around Nicosia, the capital, a good bit on independence day, and I saw Greek flags in the Greek quarter and Turkish flags in the Turkish quarter. This is what a former governor referred to as "the flag nuisance" in Cyprus. Under the British occupation, the Greek Cypriots traditionally brought out the Greek flag on holidays, rather than the Union Jack. This tended to grate on British nerves but they never found a way to counter it.

Q: What was the feeling when you arrived in Cyprus, from your colleagues at the Embassy and in Washington, about where Cyprus was going. What was the feeling at the time?

McCASKILL: There was actually widespread interest in Cyprus when it became independent. It was one of the first newly-independent small republics. With a population of 600,000 it was considered a very small country in those days, and there was considerable interest in seeing that it worked. Because of the long fight against the British and the fact that the problem was debated at such length in the UN, everybody knew where and what Cyprus was.

Our own interests were several: (1) to deny the Soviets access to the Mediterranean through Cyprus. There was a well organized Communist Party of 10,000 members on Cyprus and in 1960, this was of considerable concern to us. (2) to insure the continued function of US facilities -- our Federal Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) facility, our relay facility, etc. -- on the island; (3) to insure the continued functioning of the British Sovereign Bases (SBAs) on the island; (4) to work to prevent Cyprus from disrupting the southeastern flank of NATO by becoming an issue between our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

These are given in no particular order, though there was some preoccupation with the "communist threat" in Cyprus, and even President Kennedy was said to be taken with the island and the problem in the early days.

Q: FBIS is not a covert intelligence operation. We would monitor broadcasts, translate them, and then pass them out to anyone.

McCASKILL: It is an overt monitoring service, and that particular location was highly effective for monitoring internal domestic broadcasts in the Soviet Union. It was said to be one of our most effective FBIS stations. Secondly, we had a tremendous radio relay station, only a relay point. Communication facilities were not as sophisticated as they are today. The relay station had direct lines to Washington. Messages would go, for example, from Beirut to Cyprus, off of one wire onto another for direct transmission to Washington. And then there was another facility referred to just as a station. I suppose it was an NSA facility.

Q: National Security Agency.

McCASKILL: It was staffed when I was there by US Navy personnel because during the Greek Cypriot terrorist campaign against the British life became so tense that the Department had problems getting civilians to go there. We had a rather large complex of facilities and a very real interest in the island. We wanted to protect our interests and keep Cyprus from falling under Soviet influence. Remember that the Soviet fleet was active in the Mediterranean at the time, and our interests in Cyprus were real.

To show our interest we wanted to get off to a quick start. One possibility we had was a PL 480 program which we were able to justify on the basis of a drought of several years. It took some doing -- we did not even have a copy of PL 480 in the Embassy when we started talking about it with the Cypriots. A couple of AID types came over from Amman to help us out, and we drew up a program for 50,000 tons of wheat and barley. We gave it to Cyprus under Title II of PL 480. It was worth several million dollars and the Cypriots appreciated the gesture. The British had given Cyprus a golden handshake, really in return for the sovereign bases, and ours was the first assistance of any kind outside the British. We also began an Exchange Program and other USIS activities. And significantly, Makarios paid an official visit to Washington, and Vice President Johnson paid a return visit to Cyprus. Two visits in the first couple of years of Cyprus's independence were proof of our interest in the island.

The Soviets had a tremendous diplomatic establishment in Nicosia, and we concluded that it was a regional Soviet base. They had an excellent Turkish language officer in their Embassy, and one or more Greek speakers.

Our Embassy was relatively small. The Ambassador, the DCM, a Political Officer, an Economic/Commercial Officer, and a rather large administrative section because we gave administrative support to FBIS, the relay base, etc. The station was composed of three officers and two clerical staff. But, as I said, the Embassy proper was very small.

Q: The Ambassador the whole time you were there was Fraser Wilkins, wasn't it?

McCASKILL: All but about six months.

Q: One, how did he operate; and two, what was your impression about how he felt about Cyprus?

McCASKILL: Ambassador Wilkins arrived in Nicosia in September, 1960. I do not know for sure, but looking back I believe his only instructions were to encourage the Cypriots to make London-Zurich work. I have recently read some declassified materials that would seem to indicate that Wilkins did not believe the Agency's reporting and did not seem convinced that trouble was on the horizon. I had heard this from some of the Agency people some time ago, but only recently have seen a few things indicating that it was indeed the case.

As I mentioned previously, it was suggested that we might use PL 480 as one of our instruments, but I am relatively sure nobody was looking at the possibility that London-Zurich would not work, nobody was doing any contingency thinking, let alone contingency planning. I think those were the Ambassador's instructions and I think he hewed to that line.

Q: When you were on your economic/commercial side, what were your main tasks?

McCASKILL: Interestingly there was a fair amount of commercial work, inquiries, etc. Even in a population of 600,000, merchants were looking for new products to sell. And American firms were looking for business in Cyprus, which let it be known that it needed a new power plant and a small refinery. Remember that Cyprus was oriented toward the UK; on independence, people began to look elsewhere. The economy of Cyprus was not doing badly at independence. The income from the British bases was a significant factor in the economy; the "Golden Handshake" was a boost. I have forgotten the figures but the per capita income of Cyprus was much higher than that of Greece or Turkey. And there was great interest in the economy. Just before independence, it was announced that the UN would send a team out, under an eminent American economist, Dr. Willard Thorp, to draw up a five-year plan for Cyprus. The UN delegation consisted of several good economists so I drew on their expertise to some degree.

But there was not all that much pure economic work in a post that small, especially with the UN team and our own AID mission, when they came in about a year, so I sort of gradually slipped over into political-type work, talking to people, getting out around the island, etc. Cyprus was a wonderful place to work, and access was easy. I still remember those days very warmly as among my best in the Service.

Q: What about your contacts with the Turkish side?

McCASKILL: I had fairly good contacts on the Turkish side, but in truth the Greek Cypriots were the dominant business/commercial/banking forces in the island. To give you an example: I gave a party in the port city of Limassol, a sort of get-acquainted party. Limassol was the business capital of Cyprus, and instead of asking 50 or 60 people to drive to Nicosia, I gave the party in Limassol. Even in the business capital of the island it was difficult to find Turkish

Cypriot businessmen of any significance. One of my best friends in Nicosia was a Turkish Cypriot who ran a well-known bookshop, but he was relative small scale then.

Q: You were saying there was a ten thousand-strong dedicated Communist Party which is really a very potent weapon. Ten thousand disciplined Communists in any place can be a problem. Did we have much contact, or feeling for what they were doing?

McCASKILL: Yes, we had contact with them. The Political Officer had contact with them, and we would see them at parties occasionally. Makarios never considered them a danger. He was in many ways relatively naive politically. He considered them members of his Greek Cypriot flock, no danger to him. He actually made a deal with them in the first election. Makarios was not unopposed in the first election held just before independence, and he gave the Communists five seats in the first Parliament in return for their pledge not to oppose him. He felt in the final analysis that he could control them, that he really did not have to worry about them. I guess you could say that he actually was proven right. He seemed to think we overplayed "the threat". We were very conscious of them and their very strong labor union. To counter the communist union, we worked closely with the non-communist union and did what we could to strengthen them through grants, exchanges, etc.

Q: As the new republic began to take shape, what was CIA up to, what were they doing? Or was that beyond your camp?

McCASKILL: You may remember that Agency reporting was distributed on a need-to-know basis, and since most of their reporting was political, I was not on distribution for their material. However, I knew the Agency people very well -- we were good friends in fact -- and while I did not see their reporting, I knew what they were talking about. The Chief of Station was also a good friend of mine. So while I was out of the loop officially, I was nonetheless privy to the substance of what they were sending to Washington.

One of the things that has haunted me about Cyprus, and continues to haunt me to this day, is that the Agency apparently was reporting that the island was going to blow up, that the two communities were arming themselves to the teeth, and that a blow-up was inevitable. In fact, in early 1963, the Chief of Station indicated his strong belief that the situation would blow before the end of the year. What haunts me is that if they were reporting this back to Washington, wasn't anybody reading it? And why did we not do something to head off the crisis? In their book entitled Facing the Brink, reportedly based on Mr. Ball's papers, Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett said something to the effect that it was "inconceivable" but true that no advance planning was done for the "predictable" Cyprus crisis. Mr. Ball says in his own book that the effort to maintain a balance between the two communities "was bound to fail".

So, based on all of this -- recognition that the Cyprus "experiment" was bound to fail, good CIA reporting, etc -- why did we do nothing to head it off? We admitted in retrospect that Cyprus was a very strategic piece of real estate between two NATO allies which alone should have pushed us to try to head off the "predictable" crisis. And of course this was on top of the fact that we had failed to recognize the problem for what it was in the 1950s, that is, simply another problem of a colonial people wanting self-determination. It was complicated by the fact that self-

determination for the Greek Cypriots meant union with Greece. And the fact that 20% of the population was Turkish Cypriot made it even more difficult. However, we handled it poorly all along, and that is something else which has haunted me all these years. It is of more than passing interest to me, in looking at the problems in the area overall, that the Turkish Kurds constitute 20% of the population of Turkey, as the Turkish Cypriots were 20% of the population of Cyprus.

Q: Did you have any feeling about what the CIA -- I'm not trying to drag out dirty secrets- -but any feeling how the CIA types were getting their information? What were they seeing that you weren't seeing?

McCASKILL: I have reason to believe that they had a very good source, very close to the government. Everybody knew everybody else in Cyprus, and after I became Cyprus Desk Officer and did read their reporting, I tried to figure out who the source was. I finally decided that it was A, B or C. I tried this on one of my old Agency friends from Cyprus, telling him that I never could figure out who that source was. "Who do you think it was?" he asked. I replied that I thought it was A, B or C. He replied laughingly that those were good guesses but that he could not tell me more than that. I now think I know who it was and it was indeed a very good source close to the center of things in Nicosia.

Q: What were you getting, both from Ambassador Wilkins and the rest of the Embassy who were dealing with it, and you yourself, about Makarios at the time, how effective he was, for example? What was your impression of how he was handling the situation?

McCASKILL: I say with hindsight that the person most responsible for the failure of the London-Zurich Agreements was Makarios. While we recognized that he was determined to amend or revise the agreements, I am not sure we really knew how far he was prepared to go, and in truth Nancy Crawshaw, the British writer and authority on Cyprus, says that Makarios was taken aback by the reaction to his suggestions for constitutional amendment. The government was a presidential system, with, constitutionally, a president who was always Greek Cypriot and a Vice President who was always Turkish Cypriot. Of the ten cabinet ministers, 7 were Greek, 3 were Turkish. (Of course, Makarios gave the Turkish Cypriots the less important ministries, he thought, though it did not work out that way entirely.)

It bears mention that certainly in 1963, and maybe even earlier, Makarios thought he had UK support for constitutional reform. I myself accept that the Brits did indicate some support for reform, and must perforce accept some of the blame for the blow-up. As a footnote, this is documented in Clerides's book.

With Makarios, one never knew where the line between president and priest came, since he continued to exercise such priestly duties as performing marriages, presiding at engagement ceremonies, baptizing children, etc.

Another thing that has bothered me in retrospect is that I think we never realized that, under his clerical robes, there was a Cyprus peasant priest. He was very shrewd, you might say cunning, but underneath he was a Paphos peasant who wanted to put the Turkish Cypriots in their places. He was determined from the very beginning to revise the constitution, even though the London-

Zurich Agreements did not allow revision. The popular perception of Makarios was that he was a wise, intelligent, world figure who could hold his own on the world stage. I believe, as I said above, that he was a very shrewd village priest skilled in the way of the Byzantines, always pushing his adversary to the brink, but always with his eye on the prize, which was a Cyprus dominated and governed by the Greek Cypriot majority with adequate safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority,

Q: Was his determination to revise the constitution supported by most of the Greek community that you talked to? Were there real problems, or were there perceived problems with the Turkish minority?

McCASKILL: While some Greek Cypriots may have been more moderate than others, all, deep in their hearts, felt that the Agreements were unfair and that the constitution needed revision. For all of its shortcomings, the London-Zurich Agreements could have worked with a modicum of good faith on both sides. I think, for example, if Makarios had given freely the 30% of the civil service to the Turkish Cypriots, if he had been more generous with the Turkish Cypriot community, it might have worked. The Turkish Cypriots were simply not up to partnership with the Greek Cypriots, and they would have been overwhelmed by the Greek Cypriots in time. I am speaking here of the long term. But in that regard we must remember that Cyprus became independent in 1960, 33 years ago. Who knows what might have evolved, peacefully, by now. I personally feel, as I may have said previously, that Cyprus would be a unitary state dominated by the majority Greek Cypriots.

The Turks were very aware of what London-Zurich had given them, and they would have opposed each Greek encroachment strenuously. But I still feel, that over time, the Greek Cypriots would have had things their way.

Q: I gather that it was a fairly submissive, not overly educated community. In other words, it did not have strong leadership?

McCASKILL: The Turkish Cypriot community had one real leader, Rauf Denktash, very bright, very fast on his feet, and heads and shoulders above anybody else in the community. Fazil Kucuk was the nominal leader, but in truth Denktash had pushed Kucuk aside. I believe that, after the troubles started, no solution but partition was acceptable to Rauf Denktash, and the Greek Cypriots played right into his hands. In the late 1950s, the Turkish Cypriots had countered the Greek demands for union with demands for partition. In fact, the Turkish Cypriots had traditionally taken that tack. So partition was not a new concept.

As I indicated previously, Denktash was very, very bright. He had been a Queen's Counsel, in Cyprus, and had tried some very delicate Greek Cypriot cases during the EOKA period, I think maybe the first cases of Greek Cypriots sentenced to hang. It is not beyond the realm of reason to assume that the British pushed him to the fore in the Turkish Cypriot community. It is the kind of thing the UK did throughout the former colonies.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Greek Government in Athens was meddling in Cyprus's affairs?

McCASKILL: On the contrary, Athens was carefully trying to distance itself from Cyprus in those early days after independence. The two Greek Ambassadors during that four years were highly able career men who were apparently under instructions to try to make London-Zurich work. At least one of them, to my knowledge, would become very irritated with Makarios's headstrong ways, and I personally heard him talking about Makarios in very uncomplimentary terms at a cocktail party. I thought, in fact, that his remarks on that occasion bordered on indiscretion. When Makarios was hellbent on constitutional reform, then Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff wrote him a rather strong letter advising against such a move. Averoff himself told me once in Athens when I was last stationed there that those first three years of Cyprus's independence were "a real honeymoon" between Greece and Turkey. Averoff blamed Makarios for the blow-up, and made no effort to hide his resentment concerning the way things had gone. In that regard, the London-Zurich Agreements were concluded when Averoff was Foreign Minister, so he had a personal stake in seeing them work.

Q: What about Grivas and the other EOKA people? Where were they?

McCASKILL: Grivas had left the island by that time. I can't remember just when but he left after the Agreements were signed. He went to Athens where he formed a political party, I believe, and fell flat on his face. He did not go back to the island until 1964, after the troubles had started again. Many of the original EOKA fighters had been taken into Makarios's government, many of them as members of the Parliament.

Q: How did the blow-up happen? How did you and other in the Embassy see this thing? Give us some personal accounts.

McCASKILL: We had good information from the Agency that both sides were arming, were forming paramilitary units to oppose the expected attacks of the other. That both communities were arming has been confirmed by Glafcos Clerides, the present President of Cyprus, in his book entitled My Deposition. The Greeks had even begun patrols around the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, under the leadership of the Minister of Interior, a former EOKA fighter and real gunman. Apparently the Greek Cypriots had information that the Turks had received several shipments of rifles that they were going to distribute. Each side knew the other was arming and tension was escalating between them.

On the night of December 22, 1963, a Turkish Cypriot car with four Turkish Cypriots in it was returning to the Turkish quarter. They were actually in the red light district of Nicosia, a sort of no man's land between the two quarters, though in thinking about it I guess the red light district could not, per se, be a "no-man's land". Anyway, the Turks were stopped by a group of Greek Cypriot policemen and ordered out of the car. Shooting ensued -- who knows who fired the first shot -- two or three Turkish Cypriots were killed and a Greek Cypriot policeman was killed. That started it. An incident like that started it.

We were having a party that night; it was the day before our wedding anniversary and we were having some friends from the Embassy in for dinner. We went ahead with the party despite the fact that the tension all over town was unlike anything I had ever experienced, an almost warlike-

atmosphere all over town. Houses were shuttered up, traffic was at a minimum, there was a feeling that people were preparing for something.

A Turkish Cypriot Embassy driver who helped at parties was to work at our house that night. He stopped by about 5:00 p.m. to say he could not work: he may have been exaggerating, but he told me that if he were not shot coming out of the Turkish quarter, he would be shot going back in. He was obviously terrified. He got back into the Turkish quarter all right and I did not see him for three or four months. He could not come to work, and I made arrangements to go into the Turkish quarter one day three or four months later and see him.

We made it through the party and our guests got home safely. The next day, a Sunday, December 23, dawned clear and tense. I will never forget the tension throughout town. Nobody moved. People were obviously hunkered down. A firefright broke out in the early evening about a mile as the crow flies from my house. You could smell the gun smoke in my yard. The whole staff headed over to the Embassy, though I can't remember what we did except to try to get a handle on the situation and report it to Washington. Everybody on the staff seemed to realize that that was the beginning of what would be a very bad period.

I can't remember the details, but I know that we went on to a sort of war-time footing, certainly an emergency footing. We set up an Operations Room (I think that's what we called it) which followed events closely and began regular sitreps to the Department. Our DCM was on home leave at the time, so we were missing one of our substantive staff. This threw some burden on the rest of us. As I recall, the Political Officer, the Consular Officer and I manned the Control Room; the Consular Officer and I did a good part of it. It is my recollection that I actually drafted many, if not most, of the SitReps. We were working long, hard hours, with almost no time out even for Christmas dinner. For a time, we were working around the clock.

An interesting note: we had, to my knowledge, three overflights of two planes each by the Turkish Air Force in the period right around Christmas. In a Security Council meeting of December 26 or thereabouts, the Turks denied all but one of the overflights, and I believe the Turkish Ambassador in Washington denied the reports when he was called in by Assistant Secretary Phil Talbot. The Department instructed us to be very careful in reporting overflights, but there was no doubt in the minds of many of us that overflights had occurred. Who else would be breaking the sound barrier over Nicosia in fighter planes with red markings?

Ambassador Wilkins and the Acting British High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard, were very active in trying to dampen things down and work out a cease fire. (The British High Commissioner was in England when the trouble broke, for reasons I cannot recall.) The city had rapidly become divided, as the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into what was obviously a preconceived position in the northern part of Nicosia in the direction of the small port of Kyrenia on the north coast. Information available to us indicated that their emergency planning called for them to take the Kyrenia road as far as the pass in the Kyrenia mountains, since Turkish relief for the Turkish Cypriots would come through the north and into Nicosia through the Kyrenia pass. That is in fact what happened in 1974 when the Turks invaded. The northern coast of Cyprus was only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland and that was the logical route for an invasion force.

But right away the city became divided, a sort of miniature Berlin. Sir Duncan Sandys, I believe Commonwealth Secretary at the time, came out to try to help keep the situation under control and cobble together a cease fire. The Green Line, the line dividing the two communities, came into being when a British army officer engaged in the peace efforts drew a line on the map with a green crayon. The Green Line stands to this day, though it has undergone some changes in the 30 years since it was drawn.

One time, Ambassador Wilkins was returning from the Turkish quarter where he had gone on official business, and he was stopped at a checkpoint and some young punk, a member of one of the paramilitary groups roaming the city, pointed a gun at the Ambassador's head. Ambassador Wilkins never confirmed that story to me, but I have always believed it. It gives a little of the atmosphere in the city at the time.

Q: You were saying you all were working around the clock . What were you, as an Embassy, doing?

McCASKILL: As I said, we were manning the Operations Center, reporting developments on the island in as great detail as we could. Remember that the possibility of war between Greece and Turkey seemed very possible and we were doing anything, everything we could to dampen down the situation to avoid Turkish action. We wanted the Department and Athens and Ankara to be as fully informed as possible since they were working as hard as we to avoid any further tragic developments. All Embassy staff reported everything they heard to us for reporting and we reported up everything we got.

Q: Other than reporting were we playing any role?

McCASKILL: Of course. Ambassador Wilkins was in touch with the government all along. For example, there was a reported sighting of a Turkish flotilla off the northern coast of Cyprus. This was the sort of thing that could have provoked a reaction from the Greeks; it terrorized the people on the north coast, including some of our FBIS people. It was assumed of course that the Turks were headed toward Cyprus. The Embassy checked this out with Washington, which checked it with Ankara, and we were able to tell the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that it was only a "Turkish exercise". Of course, it was gunboat diplomacy, a show of force, but we played a key role in reassuring the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that they were not under immediate threat from the Turks.

When we received that word, the Ambassador went to the Presidential Palace to inform Makarios. He could not find Makarios so delivered the message to some of his people there. When the Ambassador twitted Makarios about this later, the Archbishop said he figured that if the Turks were determined to invade, there was nothing he could do to stop it so he said his prayers and went to bed.

But that was the kind of thing we could do: act as middle man between the Turks and Greeks, and try to put out the fires as best we could.

Q: Were you getting much from out embassies in Athens and Ankara? Did they appear to have

"gone local", as some of our embassies have been accused of doing? Or did you find reporting from there pretty professional?

McCASKILL: I think we found them very professional. They were advising caution and restraint, certainly in Ankara. In Ankara Ambassador Hare was advising the Turks not to do anything precipitously because we did have reports from Ankara that the Turkish military was very steamed up about how Turkish Cypriots were getting killed. There was one awful incident that understandably aroused the Turks: a Turkish army officer's wife -- remember that there was a Turkish army contingent on the island in conformity with the Treaty of Alliance -- and three children took refuge in the bathtub, where they were found by some Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces and killed right where they had tried to hide. Pictures of the bodies were circulated in Cyprus and on the mainland, and according to reports, really got the Turkish military steamed up. So the Turkish government needed to be cautioned to exercise restraint. The reporting from Ambassador Hare was, as would be expected, very professional and very helpful. There were three very real invasion scares in the space of several months. One was the last week of December; one on Friday, March 13, 1964; (I remember well because I was the Embassy duty officer; Ambassador Hare really thought they were coming then); and one was in June. when the so-called Johnson-Inonu letter was sent to Ankara calling off the Turks in very blunt terms.

Q: When did you leave Cyprus?

McCASKILL: I didn't leave until July, so I was there for seven months of the emergency.

Q: During that seven months, what were the main things you were doing and experiencing?

McCASKILL: Well, we were reporting on what was going on, as I have mentioned. I did not do a lot of economic reporting during the seven months after the troubles started, since it was difficult to focus on it when the island was threatening to go up in smoke. I was doing more political work, getting out and talking to people.

It was interesting how the violence spread from town to town. I have forgotten the precise sequence, but it started in Nicosia, and went from there to Limassol; from there it hopped over to Paphos; then to Famagusta, and finally to Larnaca.

The United Nations PeaceKeeping Force in Cyprus, known popularly by its acronym UNFICYP, came in March, and we followed its progress as it settled in. In addition to the peacekeeping force, two high ranking UN officials came to the island about the same time: the UN Mediator, Former Finnish Prime Minister Sakari Tuomioja, and the Secretary General's Special Representative on the island, former Ecuadoran President, Mr. Galo Plaza. There was also a UN police contingent. We kept in touch with all of these organizations and people, exchanging information and views in order to broaden our understanding of the situation.

Q: While you were there, was it true that the Greek military was beginning to get involved again?

McCASKILL: Yes. This became known to us in the summer of 1960. Before I left the Greeks

had started putting troops on the island surreptitiously because they felt that if the Turks took action, Greece would be at a marked disadvantage. The Greeks were, in effect, trying to get a jump on the situation. I would have to check the numbers, but they stayed until the confrontation of 1967 when Athens agreed to withdraw them. It is interesting that they went in in 1964, when George Papandreou was in office.

Q: Were you hearing about it?

McCASKILL: Yes, the Agency was getting reports on it, but the troops were pretty well hidden up in the hills, in restricted areas. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots did a good job keeping it quiet, bringing the troops in at night, drawing the curtains on the buses, etc.

Q: By the time you left, what was your feeling, and that of the rest of the Embassy, about whither Cyprus?

McCASKILL: When I left the island I think the general feeling in the Embassy was that the situation could not go on for long. The Turkish Cypriots were suffering some privation. Fresh vegetables and seafood were limited in the Turkish quarter because of travel restrictions on the community; a friend of mine who had been a ranking officer in the Ministry of Agriculture told me that they received only two gallons of gasoline a week. This same friend said that he felt "terribly hemmed in", with no place to go. Make no mistake about it: the Turkish Cypriots were under siege. They had only two telephone lines in and out of the Turkish quarter at one time. Their electricity and water were never cut, simply because cooler heads on the Greek side knew that such drastic action would bring Turkey in for sure and prevailed on the more radical elements.

When I told one good friend goodbye, the day before I left the island, I honestly felt that they could not hold out another six to eight months. And there, of course, was one of our basic mistakes. I think my view was held by many people, but we were obviously wrong. I see in retrospect that the Turkish Cypriots, with Turkey's support, were prepared to sit there until hell froze over. But I think many of us felt that the Turkish Cypriots would, within several months, probably fold up. One mistake we Americans make in diplomacy is to think in short terms; in the Middle East, a year is as a day, or something like that, and things move slowly, slowly.

Q: Was there a feeling that the Turkish Government could not stand by and watch them fold up?

McCASKILL: When I say "fold up", I think we were thinking that they would come to terms with the Greek Cypriots, decide that anything was better than the way they were living, and just decide to live together again on the Greek Cypriots' terms, that is, with the Greek Cypriots as the majority, the Turkish Cypriots as the minority with certain safeguards.

One of the primary goals of the United States then was to avoid seeing Turkey humiliated. We simply would not stand by and see Turkey humiliated by a settlement. The Turks knew that, of course, and they exploited it for all it was worth. This has become institutionalized in the Department, I believe, and this attitude, perhaps modified over the years, continues until today.

In the spring of 1964, there was a rumor in the Turkish quarter that we were considering an exchange of populations settlement. I am sure this was kicked around in the Department but I do not know that it ever reached the Seventh Floor. Our reply to inquiries concerning solutions was that we would support any solution arrived at by the parties. We were obviously very much involved in the search for a solution -- i. e., the Acheson mission in the summer of 1964 -- though we would have denied that we would try to force a settlement on the parties.

I have wondered over the years if the Cyprus Problem were not a Muslim-Christian problem, and I am not sure that is not at the root of it. I could never satisfactorily explain why people who otherwise seemed normal would want to go out and wantonly kill their fellow islanders.

Q: Look at what is happening today, in 1993, in Yugoslavia particularly. Ethnicity is such a strong, strong force that it permeates everything. And this seems true of some of the Muslims, who carry the virus on many grounds. At least they make the ground fertile.

McCASKILL: I just wanted to make one last point before we break, and that is that there seemed to be a sort of lemming instinct in Cyprus. Certainly the Greek Cypriots seemed hellbent on self-destruction. We used to talk about this in the Embassy and agreed that it was true.

Q: This is September 21, 1993. You said you wanted to add something about the Ball visit and how the system worked?

McCASKILL: Under Secretary Ball came to Cyprus in mid-February (1964) with a peace plan, accompanied by Mr. Sisco, then Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Ambassador Jack Jernegan, an old NEA/GTI hand who was then a Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA, and I believe a Mr. Greenfield, who was Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Mr. Ball apparently decided during the trip that the problem required a change in Ambassadors, and after his return, Ambassador Wilkins was called home on consultation.

We learned soon after he left that then FSO-2 Taylor G. (Toby) Belcher who, you remember, had been Consul General in Nicosia from 1957 to 1960, was coming out to "cover" in Ambassador Wilkins' absence, a most unusual sort of move. The DCM, who had returned from home leave, was pushed aside and was understandably irate, since this didn't say much for the Department's confidence in him. Toby told us in a staff meeting that he would actually be the new Ambassador. But it was an embarrassing situation, for Wilkins, for Toby, and for the DCM. The Department was late in getting Toby's orders to return to Washington to him, so he was still in Nicosia when Wilkins arrived back. We had, at one time, Ambassador Wilkins, "Ambassador-Designate" Belcher and a DCM, all there together. To say it was a bit awkward is putting it mildly, and the Department handled it very, very poorly.

On the action side, in early February a bomb exploded at the Embassy and Ambassador Wilkins rather quickly ordered the evacuation of all dependents. It was a controversial move, but he announced it on Cyprus television the evening after the bomb exploded and he could not back down. Whether we should have evacuated would probably still be argued among those of us who were there. Not all of the Embassy wives had left by the time Mr. Ball arrived and I heard that he was furious that some were still there and gave the remaining dependents just a few days to

leave. My own wife and sons were among those who had not left and as I remember they had about two days to get packed and get a booking home. I felt then and still feel that evacuation was probably not called for at that time, but in truth there was a large American community -- communications dependents, etc. -- and I think Ambassador Wilkins felt personally responsible for them all.

Q: You came back to the Cyprus Desk where you served from 1964 to 1967?

McCASKILL: Actually I was assigned to NE/E at first. In those days there were four offices in the old NEA Bureau: the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (NE); the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (GTI), where the Cyprus Desk was located; the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA), which included India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka; and an Office of Regional Affairs. I was assigned to the economics section of NE and I worked on Arab/Israel economic affairs for about six months. Gordon King, the Cyprus Desk Officer and a friend of mine, wanted to make a change and left to go to the Peace Corps.

When I went to GTI, every Desk Officer in the office had served in the country for which he was responsible or otherwise had experience in the area: I had served in Cyprus for four years and my number two had served in Turkey; the Turkish Desk Officer and his assistant had both served in Turkey; both officers on the Greek Desk had served in Greece, and both of those on the Iranian Desk had served in Iran.

Q: A very strong office.

McCASKILL: We thought so at the time. The Office Director herself had actually served in Greece, Turkey and Iran.

Q: Who was that?

McCASKILL: Kay Bracken. I think she was an FSO-1 at the time. Her deputy, John Howison, had served in Iran and I believe Turkey. So we had a tremendous amount of area expertise in GTI. I think those two years in GTI may have been among my most enjoyable in my 35 years in the Service.

Q: While you were on the Cyprus Desk, what were the main issues you had to deal with?

McCASKILL: The main issue, of course, was the Cyprus Problem and a solution for it. We had very knowledgeable people not only in GTI but in all of Washington. I felt at the time that there was probably as much Cyprus expertise in Washington as there was in any capital. We spent an inordinate amount of time "looking for a solution", trying to get a mix that we thought would fly. We were an ad hoc kind of group: we had coffee together, we had lunch together, we took a walk after lunch during the day, all the time bouncing ideas off each other.

A corollary was keeping the Greeks and Turks apart. The UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus was a relatively large force when it came into being in March, 1964, 6-7,000 men.

I might digress to tell you an interesting anecdote. Dr. Ralph Bunche, the Number Two in the UN, visited the island in March, 1964 to see the problem for himself and report to the Secretary General. At his departure statement he said that he was glad that he had come to Cyprus to see this "incoherent war" for himself, since one could not always understand it from New York. However, he went on, once in Cyprus, one could not always believe what one saw. I still have the clipping reporting his press conference and even started a paper one time entitled "The Incoherent War", giving Dr. Bunche the credit for the very apt description of the situation.

Cyprus was obviously getting top billing, with a Bunche visit, and the appointment of Mr. Tuomioja and Mr. Galo Plazo, both of whom I have mentioned.

To get back to my original point, another focus of our activity was keeping the Greeks and Turks apart with the help of the United Nations.

Q: There wasn't a real line was there? I mean there were Turkish villages and Greek villages all intermingled.

McCASKILL: There was the line in Nicosia which I have mentioned known as "The Green Line". There were fairly clear dividing lines in all the five towns, where the Turkish Cypriots had withdrawn into the Turkish quarter for security reasons. But in the countryside, there were still some mixed villages. There was not much interchange between the two communities, and even the villages were divided to some extent, but not to the degree the towns were divided.

Q: You were saying you were sitting around with your colleagues trying to find a solution. Was there any consensus? I mean, what did you feel were some of your options, and what were the thoughts at the expert level?

McCASKILL: It's hard to remember what some of those were. One of our first approaches was to try to find out precisely what Turkey wanted so that we could work with them from there. We had the problem of trying to find a solution that included ironclad safeguards for the Turkish community. I think we believed that the Turks could not hope to regain their "equal community" status they had gotten from London-Zurich.

I have wondered over the years where the "equal community" concept came from and have concluded that it was an outgrowth of the old Ottoman millet system, when the Ottomans administered minority communities in the Ottoman Empire through the community heads. In Cyprus, for example, the head of the Greek Cypriot community was the Ethnarch, who happened to be the Archbishop of the Church of Cyprus at the time. All taxes, administrative decrees, etc., directed at his community, were administered through him.

Our task was to find some balance that would satisfy the Greeks and the Turks, with security the first consideration. We got some indication of the Turks' requirements out of the Ankara, four or five things that all meant the same thing: no domination of one community by the other, equal participation of both communities in the government, and that sort of thing. The Turks spoke about "not upsetting the balance of the Treaty of Lausanne in the area" but one hears little of that out of Ankara since Turkey itself upset the balance with its invasion in 1974.

We spent a lot of time working on this. We considered such things as territorial compensation for the Turks if the island were united with Greece. For example, former Secretary Acheson's mission in the summer of 1964 envisaged a permanent Turkish base on the island. This was unacceptable to the Greeks; when it was scaled down to a long-term lease base for the Turks, they rejected that. In looking back, it may have been impossible to find the right package at that time. And that itself is meaningful, that is, "the right package at the right time", since timing was extremely important.

Q: Was the general feeling that the Greeks would not treat the Turks kindly if they got control?

McCASKILL: I'm not sure that feeling was prevalent. I think there was a feeling among the working level types that it should be a "Greek Cypriot solution". The Greeks were, after all, 80-82% of the population. I think that we all felt that it had to be a majority rule. The precedent in Greece led us to believe that the Greeks would not, could not, persecute the Turks without fear of intervention from Turkey. Still, the Greeks looked upon the Turks as the hewers of wood and drawers of water, and would not be happy until they were firmly relegated to that status. The Greek Cypriots, like all Greeks everywhere, felt themselves culturally superior to the Turks, and would find it difficult to accord the Turks anything but minority status.

Q: I've heard people come back and say, when all is said and done, that the Greeks really aren't very nice to the Turks.

McCASKILL: Let me answer that with an anecdote. When I gave the party in Limassol I referred to previously, I was standing at the door of the restaurant greeting my guests. I was chatting with a Greek Cypriot businessman from a rather prominent family, when another guest approached. When the man was within earshot, the Greek Cypriot said to me "Oh, Mr. McCaskill, here comes Mr. So-and-So. He's a good Turk." I thought that if I had been that Turkish Cypriot I would have hated that Greek Cypriot's guts. Mind you, if the shoe had been on the other foot the same attitude might have prevailed.

Q: Did you think it could be solved?

McCASKILL: I think I did then. I must have. I was told one time by a colleague, who was then Political Counselor in Ankara, that I never "gave up". So I must have thought so then. I've become jaded over these 30 years. I've lost some of the enthusiasm I had then, but I can only believe that I must have thought so at the time.

Q: What was the thinking in the higher reaches of NEA, and even further up in the Department about Cyprus. Was this just a pain in the neck, fouling up NATO? Also how was Makarios viewed?

McCASKILL: Cyprus had top level attention in the Department from late 1963 for several years. There was some commitment on the Seventh Floor, where our efforts were led by Mr. Ball, that Cyprus would not be allowed to destroy NATO. Mr. Ball himself tried to put a solution together, again determined not to let Cyprus ruin NATO. It is hard for me today to remember the amount

of very high-level this problem, which seems small potatoes when compared to the Balkans, was getting.

I have mentioned our concern with the Communist menace. I don't think I mentioned that three of the five mayors in the island were Communists. I mentioned the large Soviet mission. Cyprus was disrupting NATO; the southeast flank was impaired by Cyprus. President Kennedy, before his death, felt we should do something, though I never saw what he wanted to do spelled out.

Makarios was looked upon back in Washington as a very unsavory, untrustworthy, unpredictable man, and, I might add, very uncooperative. That was in part because he had taken Cyprus into the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, looking ahead to the time when he would need Non-Aligned support in the UN. Mr. Ball had a very bad impression of Makarios, regarding him as very slippery (though he referred to Makarios once as one of the most intelligent people he had ever dealt with.) Mr. Ball never really understood that Makarios was a genuine Byzantine. Andreas Papandreou referred to Makarios once as a "tribal chieftain." I don't remember where I got the impression, but to recall that President Kennedy and Makarios got along very well during the Archbishop's official visit to Washington. This is in fact another example of the attention being given to Cyprus. Kennedy told him, much to Makarios's chagrin, I assume, that he thought the London-Zurich Agreements were about the best he could get and that he should in effect grin and bear it.

People back here did mistrust Makarios a great deal. He was not yet, at that time, known as "the Red Priest" or "the Red Archbishop", or the Castro of the Mediterranean". This mistrust carried over to the Kissinger days.

Q: In an interview with Bill Crawford, regarding the meeting of Kissinger and Makarios in the elevator, Kissinger remarked that "In person, Your Beatitude, you're really very charming." Makarios looked at him and said, "It only lasts a little while."

McCASKILL: Actually, a man who knew Makarios very well, Patroclus Stavrou, told me that Makarios was at heart a royalist. Peter Ramsbottam, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus back a number of years ago, said the same thing in an article he wrote. Stavrou told me that Makarios had pictures of the King and Queen in his bedroom, and that if Makarios were anything, he was a royalist. He was a Cypriot royalist, if we believe these two men who knew him well. He was on fairly good terms with Greek King Constantine, Greece's last king, though I can't remember whether it was Stavrou who told me that or Ramsbottam who mentioned it in his article.

Q: From your vantage point, what were our priorities in that part of the world? Obviously we were concerned about the Soviets, and worried about the southeast flank of NATO. In the Greco-Turkish relationship, we always had to observe a kind of balance. I always had the feeling that Turkey really was the military leader, and we just had to sort of keep the Greeks happy for its real estate, but not much else. What was your feeling?

McCASKILL: As I mentioned earlier, I think our tilt toward Turkey has become institutionalized over the years. I can well understand the military/security priority given to Turkey: its control of

the Straits, its long land border with the then-Soviet Union, etc. You only have to go through the Straits as a tourist -- as I have -- to recognize their strategic value over the centuries. But the Turks have exploited their advantages, as I have said before, and this was always a matter of great chagrin to the Greeks.

The Greeks traditionally point to the fact that they fought with us in both world wars (while Turkey did not), that they have a big Greek-American community here, and on and on. But down deep, I think they have come to accept it. Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou have both said publicly that "the road from Athens to Washington passes through Ankara" or something like that. A Greek Foreign Minister, addressing a group of American visitors some years ago, said that if, for the sake of discussion, we accorded Greek and Turkish membership in NATO a weight of 100, Turkey would be 65 of that and Greece would be 35. But, he said, if Greece should withdraw from NATO, Turkey by itself would not be able to carry the whole load, and would not be weighted at 65 by itself.

Over the years, Turkey has created the perception that it is the more dependable ally, due in large part to the influence of the American military. But I wonder if this would bear close scrutiny. For example, I have heard, but never confirmed, that Turkey would not permit us to use our bases in Turkey when we were mounting the effort to free our hostages in Iran. Secondly, Turkey would not allow us to use our bases for the re-supply of our people in Lebanon in 1982-83. And there have been three military governments in Turkey since 1960, though Washington Turkologists are quick to point out that Turkish military governments are "different" in that the Turkish military mounts coups to preserve democracy!! I cite all of these things because the Greeks are aware of them and it intensifies their chagrin at what they regard as Turkey's favored position in Washington.

The ratio in military assistance was set at 10 to 7, I believe in 1976, though I am not sure whether it is still in effect. As I remember it, in 1976, a multi-year agreement was negotiated with both Greece and Turkey, but never signed, giving Turkey 1 billion dollars worth of assistance, and 7 hundred million to Greece, an obvious ratio of 10-7. The Greeks grabbed on to this, since it enabled them to maintain some parity with Turkey, which had suffered somewhat from the arms embargo following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Greeks felt that 10-7 was to their advantage, and fought to keep it in effect. As I noted, I do not know whether we still adhere to it, but I think that we do not.

Q: What about the Greek Lobby when you were on the Desk? How did they affect you at that time?

McCASKILL: The Greek Lobby really was mobilized only after the invasion in 1974. They were not a political force when I was on the Desk, though AHEPA and the Archbishop were not averse to throwing their weight around if they thought it would be helpful.

Q: Were there certain Congressmen, particularly of Greek ancestry, sort of on you? Or was that a fairly benign period?

McCASKILL: It was a benign period, as far as that was concerned. We had other worries, of

course, that arose when Greece and Turkey almost went to war in 1967 and Secretary Vance went to the area to promote a settlement.

Q: I can't remember which happened first, Vance going out or the April 1967 coup? Which happened first?

McCASKILL: The coup occurred first.

Q: Were you on the Desk at that time:

McCASKILL: I was on the Desk when the coup took place.

Q: Could you talk about how that came? I'm sure you must have been involved and what were the reactions to it?

McCASKILL: Much of this is hazy to me, because we Cyprus types were not directly involved. The Greek Country Directorate, as it had become in 1966, had primary responsibility under the direct supervision of the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary.

The coup occurred on April 21, 1967. Greece had been terribly unstable politically since Karamanlis resigned in 1963. You may recall that he had some difficulties with the palace over an official visit of Queen Frederika and her daughter Sophia to Britain. The Greek constitution required that the royal family had to secure permission of the government before any member of the Royal Family could travel abroad. There was a rather famous old Greek Communist, Tony Ambatielos, who had been imprisoned by Greece during the war and who, after his release, was still involved in anti-government activity.

Ambatielos's wife Betty, who I believe was British, was quite active in Britain, particularly in anti-Greek demonstrations, etc. She threatened, with considerable support from communist/leftist groups, to demonstrate again Frederika and Sophia if they visited Britain. I've forgotten the details of the trip, but I believe the British Royal Family had invited Frederika, and I have forgotten why Frederika was so determined to go. But the Karamanlis Government refused to give her permission. She went anyway, there were demonstrations against her, and she and Sophia on one occasion had literally to run from a mob. Karamanlis resigned over the issue -- I believe in July of 1963. A caretaker government was formed, elections were held in November, 1963, and George Papandreou obtained a plurality. Since he did not have a working majority, he took a chapter from John Diefenbaker's book and right away dissolved the Parliament and called new elections in February 1964. Papandreou and his liberal party won. I've forgotten what they called the party by then but it was essentially the old Liberal Party.

George Papandreou governed until 1965 when the great "apostasia" occurred: enough of Papandreou's deputies were bought off -- and I mean that literally -- to bring his government down and from then until the coup in 1967 Greece was in a period of great political instability. There was a succession of weak governments until elections were finally called for May 1967.

It soon became clear that Papandreou was running very, very strong and would probably win. It

was being bandied about that if Papandreou were indeed elected, a coup would take place. This centered for the most part on speculation concerning the so-called "palace coup" or "generals' coup", a coup by a group of high-ranking Greek officers with palace blessing. When the coup finally took place, on April 21, 1967, it was led by three colonels: Papadopoulos, who emerged later as the real brains of the group; Patakos; and Makarezos. They were unknown in Washington. I called a contact in Langley the morning the coup occurred and asked who Papadopoulos was. My interlocutor professed not to know, though I think in retrospect that he was probably dissembling with me.

Q: Colonel Papadopoulos was on their payroll at one time but there are a lot of Papadopouloses.

McCASKILL: But it is a fact that my contact told me, and as nearly as I can remember his words, "We don't know who he is." Let me repeat that we thought that if there were a coup, it would be a palace coup at least with palace blessing. And Embassy Athens was doing what it could to head off that possibility. When it came, it was a real shock here. I would like to say again that the Cyprus people were on the fringes of what was going on -- we worked closely with the Greek people, of course -- and some of my recollections of this period are hazy.

Q: What was our feeling? I mean once the word came, what were you all doing in NEA in your particular office?

McCASKILL: I think, first, that we -- NEA -- were trying to figure out who these guys were and what we might expect from them. And, of course, recovering from the shock of a military coup in a NATO country. I learned later, from Merle Miller's biography entitled Lyndon that there was some concern in the American academic community that Andreas Papandreou, whom the junta had imprisoned, would be shot. At J. K. Galbraith's request, Johnson intervened and whether or not that was decisive, Papandreou was obviously not shot. When the exercise was over, Johnson sent a message to Galbraith through Nicholas Katzenbach that "I've told those Greek bastards to lay off that sonofabitch, whoever he is." Papandreou told this story himself sometime when I was last in the Embassy.

But what the Department was doing, as I recall, was trying to determine who was in charge, what had happened to the democratic process in Greece, whether our old friends in Greece were in any danger, whether people were being arrested and imprisoned, and so on.

Q: Was there concern about the NATO side of things at that time or was it felt that this was going to be pretty much an internal thing and this wasn't going to affect Greece internationally?

McCASKILL: As I have indicated, I am a bit hazy on much of this. Certainly as I said before, we were concerned that a military coup had taken place in a NATO country. Andreas Papandreou has always said that the colonels used a NATO plan at the base of their own plans. It was considered a very efficient coup as coups go. It was boom-boom and all over and done pretty quickly. I can't remember when the question of recognition came up. The question of military shipments came up -- whether these would continue.

I think history has established that what triggered the coup was the fear of the election of George Papandreou and the role of Andreas in the Papandreou Government. You recall that Andreas had returned to Greece in 1959, and had immediately gotten into politics with his father. The Greek military had a deep-seated fear and mistrust of Andreas. It was the perception among the military that if George were elected -- and it was increasingly apparent that he would be -- Andreas would have a key role in the government. The military felt that that would be disastrous for Greece.

Let me give you an example of the influence he had on his father. You recall that Dean Acheson had been asked by George Ball to go to Switzerland in the summer of 1964 to help the parties work out a solution to the Cyprus Problem. He was in fact there for several weeks. This resulted in what has come to be known as the Acheson Plan for Cyprus, generally regarded as an enosis solution, with Cyprus going to Greece in return for the Turkish base I referred to earlier, first in perpetuity, secondly on a 99 year lease.

When I was last stationed in Athens from 1979 to 1983, I heard from two people who were in a position to know -- one of them in Papandreou's cabinet -- that Papandreou was prepared to accept the Acheson Plan. According to one version I heard, Papandreou actually informed the cabinet meeting one evening that he was prepared to accept. Then Makarios got to Andreas, Andreas got to his father, and the Prime Minister reversed his decision. There is little doubt that he did have considerable influence on his father. I believe that Christopher Woodhouse, in his little book The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, mentions that Andreas persuaded his father to back away for support for the Acheson Plan.

There was fear in the Greek military that Andreas was "leftist", "radical", etc. Papadopoulos and his cohorts were all rabidly anti-communist, actually more than a little unbalanced; they were men who had earned their bars fighting in the communist guerrilla war. I think it is true that a man of Andreas's stripe could have so aroused their fears and suspicions that they took the ultimate extreme of implementing a military coup against the legitimate government of Greece.

Q: What was the reaction from the Cyprus Desk? Here were some ultra nationalists, known to be super nationalists. You were sitting on a powder keg. What was your concern about Cyprus with this new crew in there?

McCASKILL: We were concerned about how they would move, as indeed they did in 1974. Greek Army officers in general were always dedicated to enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. They also had a deep mistrust of Makarios, whom they considered "red". There was a meeting in Alexandroupolis, near the Greek-Turkish border, to try to negotiate an enosis solution. There were other meetings with the Turks where they tried to negotiate an enosis solution, a rather serious effort in Madrid. Makarios was repulsed by the very idea of a military coup, and was as suspicious of the colonels as they were of him. He, Makarios, knew they would try to negotiate a settlement of the problem with the Turks and impose it on the island.

Q: Were the plans for enosis that they were talking to the Turks on of a practical nature did you feel? Was there any chance of anything"

McCASKILL: I would have to go back and check the provisions of various negotiations. I have the recollection that the Greeks were surprised that the Turks did not accept the proposals. Toby Belcher always said that the greatest mistake we made with Makarios was in thinking we -- meaning Greece, Turkey, the UK, the US, NATO -- could impose a solution on the island. Toby felt, and history proved him right, that Makarios would find a way to scuttle any such efforts. The failure of London-Zurich is itself proof of this, since as I said before, it was Makarios who engineered the scuttling of the Agreements.

Q: What was our reaction as the Papadopoulos regime was beginning to settle in? It was obviously very anti-democratic and aroused an awful lot of opposition, certainly within the European intellectual community, and somewhat within the American academic world. How long were you dealing in NEA at that point?

McCASKILL: Actually I left Cyprus Affairs in the summer of 1967, shortly after the coup occurred. I was assigned to Farsi training in September 1967, with an onward assignment a year later to the Political Section in Tehran. At that time, we were still feeling our way in Greece.

Q: This was not a regime that we (1) expected, or (2) were comfortable with. I served in Greece from 1970 to 1974, when Greeks pointed the finger at us saying "Oh, the CIA did this and this is your government."

McCASKILL: I don't believe that for a minute and have always refused to accept it. I do think it was a surprise to us. I had a dear friend in Northern Greece who said the same thing to me. When I denied it, he told me that he believed me when I denied that I knew anything about a coup. But, he was always quick to add -- and we discussed this more than once -- I was too junior to be privy to that kind of information. You are right; it was a government that we had not expected and we were not comfortable with it. I think we grew more comfortable with it later. Greeks were always quick to point to the number of high level visitors to Greece, including Spiro Agnew. As you know, the Greeks must blame somebody for their problems, and this was a good example of that unfortunate trait.

Q: It is one of their traits. So what prompted you to go into Farsi training, and go to Iran where you served from 1968 to 1972? What got you going on that?

McCASKILL: I felt I needed to get out of Greek-Turkish-Cyprus affairs, and the Number Two job in the Political Section in Tehran was opening up. I would ordinarily have gone out in the summer of 1967, but the incumbent extended for a year, leaving me in limbo since I had given up my Cyprus job. The NEA Personnel Officer, then Orme Wilson, suggested that I go to Farsi training.

I ended up getting a 3-3 in Farsi, which delighted me since I was the oldest of the three students and the other two were really very good language students. The tutor told me later that they rated me second among the three, which pleased me no end. But then he might have told the other guy the same thing for all I know.

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Greek/Turkish/Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1961-1963)

Ambassador Carleton S. Coon, Jr. was born in France in 1927. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Germany, Syria, India, Washington, DC, Iran, Nepal, and Morocco. Ambassador Coon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 26, 1989.

Q: Then shall we move on to...you then came back to Washington. You were in the Department from 1959 to '63. Was the whole time in Cyprus affairs?

COON: No, no. The Cold War had taken on an economic dimension in the '50s. The Russians were extending aid to all these places, instead of just trying to undermine their governments. Congress didn't understand what was going on. A Congressional committee grilled Doug Dillon who was at that point Under Secretary, and said, "What are you going to do about this? This new and insidious form of the godless communist threat." And Dillon, thinking fast, gave the standard bureaucratic response. He said, "We're just now setting up a staff to study it, sir." And I came back and I was recruited on to that staff. It was called U/CEA, Communist Economic Affairs. So for the first year and a half, a year and three-quarters after I was back, I was a member of this small illustrious think-tank -- a bunch of mavericks who thought heretical thoughts about what the Soviets were doing. And Bob Terrill, the director, had this big map up of the world with different shades of red and pink on the various countries. African states were just then beginning to emerge, and most of them were fairly feverish at that point and we set up various mechanisms for compiling statistics. And I helped organize an annual report on economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc that was levied on each country to the woe of my peers. A lot of people have not admired me for my role in that. But it was a pretty good requirement when it started. It got corrupted by bureaucratic processes. I got one good field trip out of it. And then Roy Atherton took pity on me. Roy at that point was Cyprus desk officer, and he was leaving and he wanted a suitable successor. So he and I connived and I got myself into GTI. That would have been fairly early '61.

Q: GTI means Greece, Turkey and Iran?

COON: Yes. That was the third branch of NEA at that point. The first branch being the Arabs, and the second branch being the South Asians, and the third being GTI.

Q: What was the situation as we saw it on Cyprus when you were there? This would be around '61.

COON: '61-'62. It was fairly calm but lots of problems. I had a very bizarre situation in dealing with the Cypri embassy because the Ambassador, Xenon Rossides, was in New York all the time. He was a Greek. And the Charge in Washington was a Turk and his subordinate was another Greek. And they were fighting a civil war even then. They were just fighting with words more than bullets. So I would have to have one set of responses for the Turk, and another set for

Rossides when he would come down every now and then to contradict everything the Turk said. I really loved that assignment because it gave full scope to my propensity to argue heatedly about emotional issues, because there's nothing more emotional than the issue of Turks to the Greek Cypriots, or vice versa.

I think in small ways I contributed to a sensible policy, and things were going along very well until the fall of '62 when the Chinese attacked the Indians. The Indians crumbled and John Kenneth Galbraith decided it was time for us to set up a major arms program for India, and came back and decapitated several senior Foreign Service officers in the Office of South Asian Affairs. And the Bureau wanted somebody to honcho the arms sales program to India. So they looked around and decided, "Coon isn't doing anything. That Cyprus thing is quiet." So they told me to move across the hall and occupy a new position on the India desk. And I said, "I can't because Cyprus will blow up if I do." They said, "Oh, nonsense." So I moved across the hall, and Cyprus blew up -- Christmas of '62.

Q: What happened?

COON: What happened? They started fighting. No, I should consult the record before I make such a glib statement. Makarios did something that sort of deeply offended the Turks. In effect he declared that the Turks would be getting a bum deal in the future; the Greeks would be running the Turks, or whatever. Makarios was very slippery, very astute...he was one of the two or three great statesmen of the century, in my opinion, in terms of just sheer brain-power.

Q: A big leader for a small country.

COON: But anyway, he pulled a fast one and the Turks knew it was there. Nobody else did, and they started reacting the way Turks do and they got very, very dicey. So I went back without instructions, the desk being vacant, and just continued working as the Cyprus desk officer until the end of the year when they hauled me back because things were really heating up on the Indian arms sale business. So I was quite busy during that period. Then finally they got somebody else to replace me on the Cyprus desk, and things have been in bad shape ever since on Cyprus.

Q: Let me just go back. Were we playing much of a role in Cyprus?

COON: No. Fraser Wilkins was our Ambassador there, and no, we weren't.

Q: Could we have?

COON: Yes, we could have.

Q: Doing what?

COON: Talking, diplomacy. What diplomacy is supposed to be all about. Seeing an emergent problem, and taking steps to make its emergence less likely. Chipping away at the hard rocks on which the comity between the Greeks and Turks eventually floundered. But we weren't that

concerned. We were a little concerned because Cy Sulzberger wrote an article about Cyprus when I first took over the desk that said it was heading for the rocks. And for a couple of minutes there, there was a flurry of White House interest. And in fact, there was a young staff assistant at the National Security Council, named Hal Saunders, who came around and talked to me for quite a while. Oh, I might add that my Cyprus incumbency overlapped the inauguration of John Kennedy. In the Eisenhower years the bureaucracy had been very, very straight laced and highly organized, and if Hal had strolled into my office and sat on the corner of my desk, and said, "How are things in Cyprus, Carl?" the whole structure would have quivered, and I would have immediately have had to do a practically verbatim MemCon, which would have gone straight up, and been read up the line. Everybody would have been snuffling and snorting, and saying, "What's this interloper from outside the Department doing talking to one of our desk officers?" But as soon as Kennedy was inaugurated, in came Hal and said, "What's going on in Cyprus, Carl? Tell me what you really think." And I did.

Q: Was there much more of that...

COON: It was loose, and open. The old-timers didn't like it. I thought it was wonderful. It was a chance for me to explain what the real situation was, someplace where it mattered other than to my immediate superior who already knew but nobody beyond him cared, or had time to. I wouldn't say they didn't care, but they didn't have time to care. They were too damn busy even then with places like Lebanon.

But anyway that was an interesting permutation that took place during the Cyprus thing.

What was your question again?

Q: I was just wondering. You say diplomacy would have helped. I'm just wondering. Do you think diplomacy could have really done much in terms of...I mean, after all, the Greeks and the Turks have been going at each other since the time of Darius or something.

COON: Yes, I know, I know. Well, one never knows. It's a "what if" question, and not having separate time capsules to check these things out...let me just say, I was dissatisfied with the flaccidness of our policy and would have appreciated a more aggressive effort to isolate and erode some of these hard points in the relationship.

I returned to Washington and FSI where I took the Turkish language course starting in September, 1959. The course was ten months long. During the first few months, I thought I had made a terrible mistake because I just didn't seem able to retain the vocabulary and I couldn't manipulate the sounds. After three or four months, something snapped and I made progress. After about six months, I was doing well with the language. There were nine of us studying Turkish; Foreign Service officers, someone from CIA, and a couple of military officers. It was too many; the class had to be broken up and teachers had to be added. There were two people who were far ahead of all of us; one was Duke Merriam who stayed in the Foreign Service for a few years and then went to work on the Hill and the other one was a young Air Force officer who was a natural polyglot. These two were far ahead of everyone, but when the class was broken up, a third person was needed to go with these two outstanding students. I was chosen and it was

probably the luckiest thing that ever happened to me. The result was that I was pressed, but our group finished miles ahead of all the others. We ended up being ranked "3-3" -- professional level in both reading and speaking. I was very lucky because the other literally pulled me along. The other classes managed at best only to reach "2+", even though a couple of the students later became very fluent in the language.

Duke Merriam, who remained a friend through the years, had spent a year studying economics at Harvard. He had been interested in Turkey for a long time; he had served in Amman and Munich. He had the view that we would go to Turkey and help them solve their miserable economic problems. My view of Turkey was more representative of a "Cold War" view of the world; I saw Turkey as being on the front line of "containment". The U.S. provided large amounts of assistance, both military and economic and I looked forward to the prospects of a very exciting tour.

There were two other Foreign Service officers, perhaps a couple of years younger than I, who were very interested in what later became known as "Pol-Mil" (political-military). They saw Turkey as an excellent place to begin their career in this new professional field. In one case, the officer was the son of an Air Force general who had been in charge of the first military assistance mission in Turkey. He had therefore lived in Ankara as a boy and that made Turkey an attraction. The Turks, in these days, were viewed as exotic. They had come out of the Korean War with an outstanding reputation for bravery. Their brigade had served outstandingly and for political reasons, great publicity was given to their exploits. So there was a lot of interest in Turkey. That country was also undergoing a great experiment in democracy. In 1950, Ismet Inonu allowed free elections. Adnan Menderes and his Democratic Party won the elections. During the 50s, Turkey made great progress. It received a lot of American assistance; democracy seemed fairly well established. By the late 50s, a terrible inflation had set in and serious political problems manifested themselves. Opposition to Menderes grew strong; he reacted in a very autocratic fashion which ended in May 1960, when a military coup overthrew him. The Turkish language students had a view of Turkey, which I now recognize as having been romantic and sentimental. I suspect that today it would be more difficult to find a group willing to learn the language and devote much of their career to Turkey.

RAYMOND A. HARE
Ambassador
Turkey (1961-1965)

Ambassador Raymond A. Hare was born in 1901 and raised in Maine. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, the United Kingdom, and Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. Ambassador Hare was interviewed by Dayton Mak in the summer of 1987.

HARE: I arrived in Turkey in a rather troubled period in a way. After Ataturk, when Inonu and others were in charge, the Republican Peoples Party had carried on. Then an opposition party

arose, which tended to have certain relations with the religious people, who did not subscribe to what might be called the principles of Ataturk, to which Inonu and most of the military had so faithfully adhered. Subsequently, elections had been held, and the opposition party, the Democrats, had come in power for several years. Then the military, which backed the more traditional policy, staged a coup and put on trial several of the leaders of the Democratic regime, including the former Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. When I arrived in Ankara, the government was in the process of holding trials out on the island called Yassida. This cast a gloom over the place because the prospect was that the verdict being sought was the death penalty. This was strictly an internal Turkish affair, and the American government played no overt part in the political side of the matter, but Turkey was a friendly country, and the idea of this severe punishment for Adnan Menderes was very distressing to us. I received instructions from the Department to make known our negative reactions, which I duly outlined to Sarper, the Turkish Foreign Minister. Sarper was a fine man, and he, too, was very disturbed by the trials and opposed to the idea of executions. He asked me, after I had made my comments, if he could have a copy of "that document of yours," referring to my talking notes. I said, "I'm sorry. I don't have a document, all I've got is just my notes. If you want, after I get back to the office, I will jot down the points that I have made to you," emphasizing that I was passing them on to him - not officially, but in a friendly way. He said "Fine." So I went back to the Embassy and wrote out the notes, which were essentially my instructions; but they weren't delivered as a formal document from the American government. They were delivered as my personal speaking notes, reflecting ideas that came from the American government. This had its utility. It got the idea across without having to be stuck with a formal document.

Tragically, Menderes was executed, despite our attempts at intervention. Incidentally, I had a telephone call the other day from George McGhee saying there was a lovely Turkish young woman, who I think he said was the grand-daughter of Menderes, and she was here seeking some information regarding the fate of her grandfather. (I think that was the relationship). She was supposed to telephone me to see if I had any thoughts on the subject from memory. I haven't heard from her, however -- it did serve to call to mind that this thing is still alive, though it goes back some years. These problems drag on forever, just like the Cyprus question, a large problem that drags on forever.

As you know, Cyprus is a small island off the southern coast of Turkey. It is actually visible from Turkey. Inonu once told me that they, the Turks, had made many concessions to the Greeks, and the only thing left in the South was Cyprus. There has been violence on Cyprus because of the fact the majority of the population there was of Greek origin with a smaller Turkish population. The Greeks had tried to push their policy of Enosis, which in effect would unit Cyprus with Greece. This had been accompanied by a terrorist campaign led by one Colonel Grivas. The British, who had been in charge in Cyprus, gave the country its independence and in a way washed their hands of the problem. The Archbishop Makarios, whom the British had deported for his troublemaking, returned to the island and was elected President. The old problem of the two ethnic elements rose again, and real violence erupted. We became particularly interested in the problem largely because it involved two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus problem was typical of some situation where both parties can state their positions, but neither can go beyond a certain point without feeling that they are giving something away. This gets so crystallized, so stylized that, though you talk of negotiations and

try to promote a reasonable solution, you aren't actually prepared to do so. For instance, in the case of Cyprus, if you talked about the country in terms of the "people" of Cyprus, that means that you were pro-Greek. If you talked about the country in terms of the "peoples" of Cyprus - in plural - that meant you were pro-Turk. Actually, the Turks never aspired to have the whole island. Their idea was to have full association in the government or a partition of the island.

This problem of Cyprus came to the boiling point while I was Ambassador to Turkey. The situation reached a point where there was imminent danger of hostilities. We had established a sort of "watch committee" at the Embassy to keep tab of the situation, and each morning at our daily staff meeting we would go around the table reporting items of interest and views on what was going on. One day in the morning staff meeting after listening to the various reports, I said, "I feel there is something different about what you are telling me." They told me, "No, Mr. Ambassador, it's the same" I said, "I know it's the same, but it sounds different somehow. I just felt it." After you have worked with something long enough you sort of get a sixth sense in the way you feel about it. I said "prepare a telegram" (what I called an "amber" telegram), saying that this situation should be "watched."

Later in the day I got a small piece of information that fit exactly into my suspicions. I felt that something was in the wind as far as the Turks were concerned. I telephoned the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and said, "Mr. Minister, I have a very urgent matter that I would like to discuss with you." He replied, "I'm sorry, I can't do it now. I'm going to see the Prime Minister in a few minutes". "This is really very urgent, I said. "Please!" He said, "Well, I have to see the Prime Minister in twenty minutes. Can you get here by then?" "Surely," I said. Getting there was made a bit easier by the fact that the Foreign Ministry was not far from our office, and the offices of the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister were on the same floor in the same building. I got there and told him, "We are both acutely aware of the situation in Cyprus. We both follow it, and somehow today I had the impression that perhaps something was different which might indicate an intention on your part to take military action." He looked at me funnily and said, "Well, perhaps you are not wrong. As a matter of fact the decision on the subject is going to be taken at eight o'clock tonight; and if the American Government has anything to say about it, they should say it by that time." This was about five o'clock or thereabouts in the afternoon. I got back to the office very fast and wrote a very urgent telegram. I got a reply right back, it was mostly boiler plate, all the obvious things. I was to tell the Turks, please don't do this; you could cause this, you could cause that and everybody would end up in a dangerous situation. I don't remember exactly what the telegram said, but I think it said in effect, "Use your own devices."

I went around to the Foreign Office; it was about 7:30 or so when I got there. Anyway, it was before the meeting time. The Foreign Minister suggested that we should go in to see Prime Minister Inonu, which we did. I started out my plea with him, which was nothing special, mainly boiler plate. Inonu said, "Well, it's quite true that we are thinking about a military movement into Cyprus." He explained that this was a move to protect the Turkish community there, the Turkish enclave. I had my instructions to dissuade them from military action and also, having been around in military situations a good part of my life, I felt that this was a very dangerous move for the Turks to take. First of all, I knew that they were not really set up for an amphibious operation of this kind. Such an operation takes time and it requires all sorts of special equipment. So, if the Turks

were going to try a landing, that would be serious and things would probably get much worse. On the other hand, if they used their Air Force, that would be disastrous because their air force was very strong and the results would again be disaster. Either way they chose the prospect would be dangerous.

Inonu got up several times to leave, and each time I would say something to make him wait a little longer. Finally, he said, "Mr. Ambassador, all my people are waiting in the next room to discuss this matter; they are waiting for me, Mr. Ambassador, what do you want?" Well, I had no instructions to say what we specifically wanted, but I had learned -it's the old thing when in doubt, play for time. So without hesitation I said "Twenty-four hours, sir." He said, "Well, I don't know. I will see what I can do. We are supposed to go at eight o'clock tomorrow morning." Well, they didn't go. The move had worked. Meanwhile back in Washington they had developed a letter to the Turks from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu. It was called the "Johnson Letter," but I've learned since that Dean Rusk and Joe Sisco had worked on it. I don't know if Johnson ever saw it or just gave perfunctory approval. It was a very tough letter, but it was reasonable in the sense that it was a warning. Here we were, joint members of NATO; we were friends of both Greece and Turkey, and if Turkey should make a movement whose end we couldn't see or predict it all might have wider and graver consequences. We could not guarantee what we would do, we couldn't guarantee our support in a situation of that kind. The letter was not well drafted, however, and there really was no necessity for its severity. After all, my play for time had worked, the move had not taken place. This was a time to act firmly but with diplomatic restraint.

I took this message to the Prime Minister and gave a copy to Erkin. When Erkin had read his copy of the letter he became really furious: "Mr. Ambassador, after this the relations between Turkey and the United States will never be the same," he said. Inonu on the other hand said, "Mr. Ambassador, I think I'll read the last paragraph first." The last paragraph was a very nice one asking him and his Greek counterpart to come to the United States to discuss the matter. It is very hard to understand how Inonu would think of something like that, that he could draw on such wisdom. He had had no time at all to study the message or to consider it. His reaction was instant and amazingly wise.

For a long time after the Turks were fairly boiling over this famous letter. It seemed to me, and to some of my Turkish friends as well, that although the letter was a difficult one, a tough one, it would have been better to have published it and let people see what it was and what it was not. Otherwise the Turkish public could imagine that just about anything was in the letter. The imagination can run wild in circumstances such as this. Well, the letter was indeed published eventually and the flap subsided to a certain extent. However, people sometimes like to keep tucked away in the drawer of their desk such sensitive issues and pull out and start all over again in certain circumstances regardless of the original problem. This letter is that kind of thing. People have been bringing up the Johnson letter ever since. The other day, in fact, a student or journalist - journalist it was, came to see me about it. He had been commissioned by his editor in Turkey -I think the paper was HURRIVET- to do a research on the Johnson letter. He had talked to George Ball, who had worked in it back on this side and now he was coming to see me. We talked about the thing for some time, and then I got, I must say, annoyed. I said, "Look here. This was something that happened a long time ago; it might have been done better, but it was done in

good faith. What is it and why does your editor wants to raise the Johnson letter again after all these years. What for? Frankly, I resent it, and I want you to know it! This is gratuitous provocation!" I don't usually get tough with people who are with the press, but that's the way I felt about it. It's like dragging a dead cat around and dropping it on your doorstep.

During my stay as Ambassador to Turkey, our relations with Turkey were of many types. Of course they were a member of NATO, but most of the problems concerning NATO were geared to what seemed to be a continuing round of visiting NATO officers doing the circuit. We had a perpetual group of NATO officer coming in. The Turks were very good hosts, and this includes the Turkish military. The NATO people weren't the only ones who came to visit. They came in various capacities. There were so many that I forgot them

But my earliest visitor of importance was Dean Rusk, who came with a delegation to attend a CENTO conference and all stayed with me at the Embassy. My wife had not yet arrived; so here I was entertaining an entire CENTO delegation, and I had only just moved into the house myself. Dean Rusk endeared himself to me when, while we were sitting around having a drink, he announced, "Tomorrow we will all have breakfast at eight o'clock, and everybody will have scrambled eggs." So we solved that prospective culinary difficulty. I've always thought about that with a great appreciation.

Another visitor of prominence was then Vice President Lyndon Johnson. Prior to his coming a whole advance group came and informed us of things that had to be done; it was really awe-inspiring the things we were told had to be done; otherwise presumably the world was coming to an immediate end! Sure enough, when he came he was difficult. He used to go through the motion of harassing his whole staff nearly every day. Fortunately, I got along with him fine for some reason. He wanted all sorts of things. If it was a hotel, he didn't want anybody else on the same floor. He wanted always to have a massage, and he would go through several masseuses before he got one he liked. His arrival in Ankara was particularly interesting. It was a Sunday, and I went out to the airport as did Inonu, who was obviously terribly disturbed about something. He rushed up to me and said "Disaster, Mr. Ambassador, disaster!" I asked, "What's the matter?" "Nobody here, nobody in the streets. It's Sunday afternoon and everybody's sleeping, nobody is in the streets!" I said, "Don't worry," but Inonu again remained very agitated. So Johnson arrived, and I rode with him accompanied by a very able member of the Foreign Office, who had been in Washington and spoke excellent English. As we went along we would come upon a hovel or something of the kind on the side of the road, and Johnson would shout, "STOP!" He would get out of the car and go over the hovel and try to talk to somebody. He did this several times along the way into town. By the time we got to Ankara people were practically hanging from the chandeliers. Johnson told me Afterward how he did this. "When you go in like this and you want a crowd you stop and the little boys run ahead and pretty soon the crowd begins to form for you!" Some days later on, when he visited Istanbul and we were to pay our respects on the Governor, he said to me, "Now today - you saw what I did in Ankara - today I will just bow to the people along the way." As we went along he would bow gracefully to everybody. There were people along the street, but no crowds congregated. He was an unusual man, in some ways very intemperate. His feeling towards the Kennedys, for instance, are well known. I've heard him give vent to this feelings once, and I found it embarrassing. He did have very strong dislikes, but also he could be very pleasant.

I met Johnson again during my final tour in Washington as an Assistant Secretary for NEA. As a social gesture arrangements had been made for him (he was President at that time) to host a boat ride on the old Sequoia for Chiefs of Mission from the Middle East countries. It was very pleasant. The Sequoia had two decks, I was on the top deck, and so was Johnson. He started going down the stairs, and I was following dutifully when he turned around and said, "Ray, why are you leaving me?" I said, "Mr. President, this job of mine is only a temporary one; prior to my previously arranged retirement, I am in no sense leaving you." He said, "I don't understand why you are leaving me," and he meant it. That shows that, as you often find, it is a mistake to caricature people.

As I mentioned, Dulles also had his softer sides. Nasser had other sides, too. One of the greatest mistakes is to categorize someone for "that something," which may be just one-tenth of his character, you just don't know except by experience.

We had other important guests as well in Ankara; Duke Ellington came, and we had a big reception for him. He had just left the house when we had a telephone call telling us that President Kennedy had been assassinated. The Turks' reaction was immediate. All public places of entertaining were closed throughout Turkey, they even named a street after the President. Peasants and people from all walks of life came walking into my office just to shake my hand and leave. It was very touching. But Washington said "The Ellington show must go on". "Like hell the show will go on" I said. It would have been absurd and totally inappropriate to put on a concert, no matter how good, when Ankara was in mourning. So the good Duke, a splendid fellow, did not get to play.

The Frederick Marches came, so did Fulbright and Martha Graham too. Then the Ruler of Sikkim came, along with his American wife. The Indian Ambassador called me and asked if the Ruler and his wife could come to the dinner party I was giving. I said "Sure." They were a strange couple. He was very outgoing, liked a good time, and he drank with gusto. His wife, the American girl, used to sit with her head bowed and her hands folded like she thought a demure little Nepalese should, I guess. It was a bit ludicrous.

Little incidents tend to stick in my mind, such as when our first astronaut made his historic flight. I was giving a dinner party that night, and I kept leaving the room to listen to the radio reports to see how things were going. Luckily, I was able to walk back into the room with the news "He's down" just as it was time to serve the champagne. Nice!

I look back on Turkey with a great deal of pleasure. I had become interested in Islamic architecture when I was at Robert College and used to go visiting the sights. I was not conscious of doing anything serious at the time, but apparently I was absorbing it, as in a museum. As time went on, and particularly after I became Ambassador, I had facilities for getting around that I wouldn't normally have had. As a consequence I undertook a quite extensive survey at monuments, which I would first study in available literature, and then visit, photograph and take notes. All this material is now in the Smithsonian for research purposes, in the Sackler section.

Turkey is a large country, and there was a lot of ground to cover. But having airplanes and

service people, part of whose duties was to keep up their flying hours was fortuitous and gave special dimension to my exploring, in addition to long trips by car. In so doing it apparently got around that I was interested in architecture and so, if it was known that I would be coming to a certain place, there usually would be an old man among the group meeting me who would be a sort of local historian, sometimes with a little notebook covering items of interest in the area. They were always very pleased to share their knowledge and would sometimes guide me to monuments, not included in the tomes of scholars. I enjoyed it immensely and to be frank, was also aware that in Turkish eyes, it reflected well on my position as Ambassador. It brought me closer to Turkish reality.

MAURICE E. LEE
Public Affairs Adviser, USIS
Ankara (1961-1963)

Maurice E. Lee was born in Erie, Pennsylvania in August of 1925. He joined the U.S. Army and served in the 104th Infantry Division in the European Theater. After finishing his tour, he attended the University of Missouri where he received a B.A. in journalism. Later on in his career, Mr. Lee received an M.A. in international affairs from George Washington University and graduated from the National War College. Mr. Lee served in Japan, Germany, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and Israel. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on February 9, 1989.

LEE: After leaving the Office of Private Cooperation, I was sent out on an unusual assignment. That was as Public Affairs Advisor to the Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in Ankara, Turkey. Now, many people don't know what CENTO is, or was, because it's defunct. But it was a treaty organization set up originally in Baghdad and called the Baghdad Pact. When the Iraqis suffered a revolution and dropped out of it, it was moved to Ankara. It consisted of the countries of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Great Britain. The United States was a participant but not a member per se. We did provide staff for the secretariat and funds.

I found out after I got there why they wanted a USIS man so much; USIA had a big printing plant down in Beirut. And by having a USIS participant they could get their printing needs free. I designed and edited the publications and would go to Beirut to make sure the printing met our specifications.

As I mentioned earlier, I also advised the Secretary General on public affairs matters. We had a fabulous Secretary General. His name was Khalatbary.

Q: How do you spell that?

LEE: K-H-A-L-A-T-B-A-R-Y.

Q: And he was the Secretary General?

LEE: Yes, he was from Iran and later became Foreign Minister, he was the first official that Khomeini had shot after the revolution. A fabulous man, a distinguished career civil servant.

I'm not sure CENTO had any real impact, perhaps some in the region. It did have some technical programs that were useful. But one of the interesting things for me personally was the annual conference with the foreign ministers of the CENTO countries, including the U.S. I accompanied the Secretary to these conferences. I was able to sit in on some very interesting meetings with Dean Rusk, Bhutto, Lord Hume and others.

Q: Was any of the work that you did for CENTO, outside of the design and bringing to life the publications, which we might call public relations work for them? Or how else did you serve?

LEE: Well, we did a lot of pamphlet work. And these pamphlets were printed in the languages of the region and distributed in those countries. The principal message was the security of the region. And as I said there were technical programs. For instance a microwave was built linking the countries of the region. There were some roads built and things like that that were an offspring of CENTO's efforts.

An interesting little anecdote about CENTO that affected the Agency. There was another USIS officer assigned to CENTO who will remain unnamed, who, as it turned out, was doing covert work in the information field for CENTO. The word got back to Mr. Allen the Director back in Washington. One day when I was back on home leave I got summoned to his office. I thought, my God, what have I done? I walked in. He looked at me straight in the eye. He said, I want to ask you something. Is there another USIS officer out there? Is he doing covert work? I said, well, sir, when I want to meet him I have to meet him either in his home or on a street corner away from CENTO. So I gather there must be something strange he's doing. But I don't know what it is. Well, it wasn't long before this gentleman was pulled back. Later Mr. Allen made a statement that no one in USIA was doing covert work and there never will be one. And I think that's true to this day from what I know.

Q: I'm a little confused on the dates here. What dates were you in CENTO?

LEE: I was there from '63 to '65.

Q: Well, now that couldn't have been.

LEE: I'm sorry, '61 to '63.

Q: Allen was only -- Allen resigned at the end of '60.

LEE: Well, it was early --

Q: I'm sorry. He resigned at the end of '60.

LEE: Well, maybe I have my directors mixed up.

Q: Yes, because Murrow came in in March of '61. So it must have been Murrow that you were talking to. And what he said sounds very much what Murrow would have said.

LEE: Well, I thought it was Allen. But at any rate, it was in the Director's office. Another interesting aspect of this assignment was being seconded to the State Department and in turn seconded to CENTO. You did get a lot of travel and it gave you a chance to see a lot of South Asia and the problems that exist there.

RICHARD PODOL
Public Administration Advisor, ICA
(1961-1965)

Richard Podol was born in Chicago in 1928. He attended the University of Iowa, where he received his B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. He became involved in the Foreign Service in 1954. Mr. Podol has worked in India, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Zaire, and Uganda. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in September 1996.

PODOL: Yes. I always had it in the back of my mind that I wanted to work overseas, but I wanted to work in development more than I did in traditional State Department type activities. In 1960, AID wasn't AID at that time. It was ICA, but it was in a period of expansion. So, jobs were available. The first time, I was asked if I wanted to go to Vietnam in public administration.

Q: How did you hear about AID? Where did you learn that they were looking for people?

PODOL: AID was sending people out to various parts of the country on recruiting drives at that time.

At gatherings of Societies, like the Public Administration Society, they would have people there recruiting. This was really my contact with AID. I was asked if I wanted to go to Vietnam. This was in 1959, '60, but the Mission out there said I was too young. I was only 32 and that wasn't old enough for them, so they turned me down. How I got with AID was, I happened to be in Washington on a short term assignment, and I went into AID to see what was what. They said, "Hey, how would you like to go to Turkey?" So, it was by chance, of being at the right place at the right time, you might say, and I said, "Sure." And so I went to Turkey in January 1961.

Q: What position were you?

PODOL: I was a Public Administration Advisor. Those were the days when we had very large public administration programs and also very large Missions. My first job was with the equivalent of the Turkish GSA, again as a Management Advisor. My first function was to set up an Organization Methods Unit, train the staff and then carry out various studies. This was the first O&M Unit in the Turkish Government. Other government agencies found out about it and they sent people to me for training also. So, this was my first tour.

My second tour, I was assignment to the Central Personnel Office, situated in the Prime Minister's Office. My function there was to help them set up the government's first Inservice Management Training Program and various programs and courses, which I did and then taught throughout the country in various government agencies.

Q: You were really more a part of the project than a part of AID Mission management?

PODOL: Exactly. The only time I was in AID was to pick up my mail or for the weekly staff meeting. I was a loner, you might say, I was the only American AID person in the offices in which I worked, so I was working pretty much on my own.

Q: Was there a project created for this or was there just-

PODOL: In those days, I really had no idea how AID functioned from a management standpoint. When it came time to do the annual budget and work program, there was a program assistant in the office, because it was a big Public Administration Office. He came out and said, "Hey, what do you want for next year?" And that's all I knew about the system.

Q: Were there a lot of other public administration people?

PODOL: Yes, quite a few in various government agencies. As my reputation grew I was able to involve other members of the Mission and also worked with staff of the Public Administration Division in setting up programs in their counterpart agencies.

Q: But you were the only one doing the training program side of it?

PODOL: That's right. And I also did a lot of public writing and publishing and did a booklet on modern management methods that was published in 8,000 copies and distributed throughout the country.

Q: In Turkey?

PODOL: In Turkey; in Turkish.

Q: Who was in the Mission at that time. Do you remember?

PODOL: Stuart Van Dyke was the Mission Director. But it was one of these Missions that was so large that you could go there for two years and not really meet people. And also, not working in AID, I had very little contact; and Mission management had very little contact with me.

Q: You found that worked perfectly well? Did you have any issues or problems?

PODOL: No, I found it worked very well because the Turks were very cooperative. I didn't have a lot of problems working with them.

Q: Who were you working with specifically in the Turkish system?

PODOL: In both cases, with the head of the two organizations because my counterpart was the head.

Q: You were supposed to be training them as well in the inservice training?

PODOL: You raised a good point and let me get to this one. First, I want to say, I came back to Turkey in 1975 - I'd been gone 10 years - to visit old colleagues and friends. Just by chance, one of the leading newspapers in Istanbul was running the articles that I had written a dozen years earlier in their newspaper as a series. A lot of this took. In fact, one of my key assistants when trained is still today the head of the Management Training Institute of one of Turkey's largest conglomerates. So even the people I worked with did spread out.

Getting back to your question, let me put it this way. One of the first things I learned was that, to be a successful agent of change - and this is what we were; we were agents of change - you had to understand the culture of the country in which you were working and the culture of the organization.

Organizational cultures do vary, as you know. So, you had to learn both. You had to learn why people did things the way they did. I found that this frustrated a lot of Americans, who would come in with an

American point of view: "This is common sense. Why in the world aren't they doing it?" At that time, we were just thrown in. There was no training, no attempt to gain an understanding of these local cultures and their importance in how they worked. With the Turks, there was very little up, down, or lateral communication among various people in an organization. The reasoning is that they felt communication, or telling people what they knew, would mean a loss of power and a loss of control. So, they didn't do it.

This, of course, was very frustrating to outsiders and also insiders at times. When they tried to find out what was going on, they couldn't. There was a meeting of Regional Administrators from one organization in which I worked, which was the equivalent of our Commodity Credit Corporation. They did the procurement of grains and so on. These people came in and I had one day with them. I asked them to list the kinds of things they would like to see changed or improved upon. And this was the first time this had ever happened, and they gave me a long list of items which I took to the head of the organization. But subordinates would never think of doing that. This was outside, in the cultural sense, of the way they functioned and operated. You didn't ask people's opinion. You just told them what to do - very structured, military type organization, society. This is what Turkish society was: structured in the military sense at that time. But it was changing. There was quite a difference between those over 40 and those under 40. The younger people, their attitudes were different and you could see the differences in the way they operated.

Q: In what way?

PODOL: They were far more open to change, far more open to talking about problems, ideas than were the older people. People over 40, as a foreign language spoke French or German. Those under 40 spoke English. I'm not saying that is what made the difference, but it shows you

the generational change in the view of the outside world.

Q: Did you speak Turkish yourself?

PODOL: Yes. That is, I could make myself understood and I could understand what was being said to me and I could travel all over the country. I got to 60 of the 67 provinces in Turkey - a great highway system, built by NATO. Yes, I could. In complex meetings, though, I relied on an interpreter because you could make mistakes in nuances and so on. But in normal conversation, yes, I could speak Turkish.

Q: What were some of the issues, apart from the one of communication, that you had to deal with? What kind of problems were you trying to address?

PODOL: Because of the nature of the society and at that time - this was 1961 - they had minimal exposure to either Europe or the U.S. to outside influences. They weren't attempting to join the European Community and so on. So, they had been cut off pretty much from the latest technology and thinking in the field of management. So, what we were trying to do was introduce them to my field, what we would call more modern or different techniques and technologies that could be used. A simple thing it may sound like. But in the GSA in which I worked, everything was done manually. So, if somebody went down to the warehouse to get supplies, he'd pick them up in his arms and he'd carry them off. I went to our PX and got a grocery cart and brought it over to them. Now they used a grocery cart to put the things in and that increased efficiency in a small way. What I'm saying is, this was the state of the art at that time. Getting back to your question, we developed what I called a "management in depth training approach." I found out very quickly, you could, let's say, have training programs with middle management and they could implement some of the things you wanted them to do, but their subordinates could kill it because they felt threatened by it or their bosses would kill it because they didn't understand. So, if you really wanted to do something, you had to train at every level in an organization - training in depth in the organization. Then you could begin to see changes being made.

Q: So you had joint classes or separate courses for each level?

PODOL: Separate for each level.

Q: But it was the same concept, roughly?

PODOL: Yes. Different levels of details, of course, for different levels.

Q: And you found that worked pretty well?

PODOL: It worked better than anything else. Over time. You don't change people's thinking overnight.

No, it takes time.

Q: What were some of the major areas of change that you were pursuing and seemed to take

over time?

PODOL: In my first job of setting up the Organization Methods Unit, the head of the GSA equivalent really wasn't convinced this was a terribly good idea. So, he gave me to train, people he thought were excess to his operation, instead of his best people. But once they went to work and demonstrated what they could do to improve methods, which didn't threaten people, he changed his mind completely. It became an important part of the organization. They did various studies that led to improvements in the way supplies were handled, purchased, things like this.

Q: So you did a lot of studies of the systems that are used and you yourself came up with recommendations for change?

PODOL: I started, but, once I trained people, my job, in my mind, was to institutionalize this by letting them do the work and then they could consult with me if they had a problem.

Q: So, you institutionalized this Organization Management Unit to do both the studies and training?

PODOL: Yes, in several Turkish government agencies.

Q: How big were these units?

PODOL: Three or four people.

Q: And they stuck, they lasted?

PODOL: They did during the time I was in Turkey. I, of course, have no idea what it's like today.

Q: But then you said you went back and you found-

PODOL: I found that the ideas were still percolating around, but I didn't visit the organizations that I'd worked in, so I don't know what was happening.

Q: How did you find living in Turkey as far as just the general social environment?

PODOL: The best of any country I was in. The Turks considered themselves to be Westerners, or they were trying to become Westerners. They had never been colonized. In fact, they'd been the imperial power. So, they didn't have that kind of resentment or barrier, where they looked at Westerners as the dominating, controlling force, as I found to be true sometimes in Africa and Asia. Also, when I went to Turkey, I was single. I made friends with Turks my age, some of whom had been educated in the U.S. We traveled all over the country this way. They didn't feel at all hesitant to make friends and be seen with Americans. I must admit to having a strong bias toward Turkey. I met my future wife there. She was an AID employee on her first overseas tour, and our two children were born in Ankara. I can say that both my personal and professional life really began there.

Q: You found that they were fairly often friendly to you?

PODOL: Once they come to accept you - it may take a while, because they're not outgoing people - you can't have more loyal friends. In fact, 37 years later, I'm still in contact with some of those people.

I've been back to Turkey twice and stayed in their houses and traveled with them and so on. A great sense of loyalty. That changed a little bit over Cyprus. When I was there, the Turks were ready to invade

Cyprus, when Lyndon Johnson pulled the plug on them. That soured relations a bit, in general - not with specific relations I had, but in the press and media in general. Before that, they were extremely pro-American.

Q: Was the general atmosphere one of modernization and leadership and change?

PODOL: The generation in power was the old school. The Prime Minister had fought with Ataturk in the wars in the twenties. He'd been his number 1 man. But the people that were being trained- the current

President of Turkey, the former Prime Minister, was the first AID participant. He was the head of the water resources operation. And there were a lot of other people that way, that were AID participants that, in my time, were just beginning to get into positions - the junior and middle level positions. Those were the people, I think, that made the difference. Going back to Turkey even ten years later and then more so in the early nineties, the differences in the cities were enormous. You couldn't believe it was the same country. The changes were so great. So, it took - in the West. The East is still a problem, of course.

Q: But the public administration work, that wasn't much appreciated? There wasn't much enthusiasm for it? What is your reaction to some of the concerns of public administration not being particularly relevant to the development process?

PODOL: I guess I do have a bias, but I think it's a mistake. We seemed to fail to recognize in our zeal for the private sector, that government plays a major role in developing countries - much more than maybe here - because of the weaknesses of the private side. If government is not effective and efficient, it's a drag on the entire economy and on development.

Q: Maybe we'll come back to that. So, then you finished up in Turkey in 19-

PODOL: 1961 to April 1965.

But before I leave Turkey I would like to add another piece to my work experience. In the early 1960s, the U.S. had a large military assistance program throughout the world. The Air Force based in Germany had a management training program, among many other training initiatives, for top level officers in the countries where we had military assistance missions as well as with our NATO allies. As fate would have it, their first top management seminar was to be held in Turkey. When they found out I was there, they asked me to participate. The Mission agreed.

Based upon the success of that seminar, I was asked to participate in those upcoming in the next two years. The Mission most generously allowed me to "moonlight" for the Air Force. So I was involved in programs in Belgium, The Netherlands, Spain, Pakistan, Portugal, Iran, Ethiopia, Korea and The Philippines, often as Conference Leader. I won't divert from my AID experience here, but it was a learning and broadening experience for me which I applied to my future work.

JOHN R. COUNTRYMAN
Rotation Officer
Istanbul (1963-1965)

Ambassador Countryman was born in New York and raised in New York and California. He was educated at Fordham University, Miami University and the Frei University of Berlin. After service in the US Navy he joined the Foreign Service in 1962. An Arab language speaker and Middle East specialist, Ambassador Countryman served abroad in Istanbul, Beirut, Dhahran, Tripoli, Libreville and Oman, where we was US Ambassador from 1981 to 1985. In his service in the State Department in Washington, he dealt primarily with Arab Peninsular affairs. Ambassador Countryman was interviewed by David Reuther in 2001.

Q: Fascinating. How did the assignment process work then after the A-100 course?

COUNTRYMAN: I was surprised, happily so, at how sensitive people were, how good from my standpoint it was. I thought it was superb. I was assigned, and I have forgotten now her name, I was given a woman in personnel who was my sort of personal counselor. We had a number of sessions together where she explained where, what one, how one's career could develop, the idea of getting some kind of expertise in an area, and what were my interests and so on and so forth. It was very sensitive and very much drawing me out, but giving me feedback saying, "X" probably won't work. The long and short of it was I was very interested in both the Middle East and perhaps becoming a Soviet specialist, and at some point taking Arabic or possibly Turkish or Farsi, or if I went the other route to be a Soviet specialist, taking Russian. We sort of arrived together at the point where she said, "Well, look, you are not really sure which way you want to go. I think we can get you an assignment in Turkey via a short course in Turkish." At that time Turkish was a hard language, I think it would have been a nine month course. "We can get you through with four months of Turkish, and with your German background you obviously have some facility with languages. You would arrive there in good shape and be a very useful officer to the embassy." At that time the State Department had the central compliment officers at various embassies. I was over compliment. I was not taking a position, so that is what happened. I was assigned very briefly to NEA/P, the Office of Public Affairs (in the Near East Bureau which covered Turkey at the time) until the actual Turkish course began. That was in recognition of the fact that I had been in the newspaper business.

Q: Let me back up a little bit here. Did they have, or was FSI using the MLAT (Modern language Aptitude Test) test? That was this test that demonstrated that you had some capability?

COUNTRYMAN: Yes. I think I did well in that. I think when I came into the Foreign Service we all took exams. I got a 4+/4+ in German. I got something like a 2/2 in French. [Editor's Note: these scores first represent speaking, then reading levels. The 4 level is graded as a college graduate.] So they knew I could handle languages. She referred to that when she said, "... with your language background. Of course, I had Latin and Greek from college. I didn't take the Greek exam, although they said I should have because my ancient Greek was probably good enough that I could have read the modern Greek, particularly as the newspaper relies heavily on the ancient Greek. They were keen for me to take a hard language. They were very happy that I was interested in something like Turkish.

Q: Wasn't it was a bit unusual to receive hard language training as a first tour officer?

COUNTRYMAN: There were a couple of us. One, a good friend of mine, Dick Barkley, who had been in Germany and stayed on, on his own on the GI Bill and had gone to the university at Tübingen or someplace. His German was very good. He wanted to go to Scandinavia. They sent him to Finnish, he went to Finnish which is a hard language. There were a couple of other people. There were a couple of people in my class that went to Greek, modern Greek. Anyway during the A-100 course, people got their assignments. Some people who did not have language training; of course, a lot of people I think did have language training. Nevertheless, some people went directly to their assignments. They left right after the course. I didn't report to Istanbul, I came into the Foreign Service in February, and by the time I finished the A-100 course, my little stint, TDY (Temporary Duty) in NEA, and about four months of Turkish language training, I didn't report to Istanbul until January '63.

Q: So then you arrive in Istanbul in January, '63. But you are over compliment, so what duties are your assigned?

COUNTRYMAN: The arrangement was, within the context of the embassy's own needs, that was the key phrase, the post was supposed to give us about six months in each of the four sections, consular, admin, economic, and political.

Q: To give you a sense of what the different cones and duties were at that time. The Foreign Service still had the cone system.

COUNTRYMAN: I don't think so. I think when I came in there was a sense that you were in it, but it was not formalized as a cone. As a matter of fact, when I came in the Foreign Service, in my oral, I had been also in the Air Force in addition to being a public affairs officer, I also had a stint as an admin officer. They were quite interested in that. That was to my betterment. That was an advantage in my oral. I never really knew if they said well this guy is going to be an admin officer. I think maybe that was something extra that they thought of. But I don't think I went out to Istanbul with any thought that I was in a particular cone.

Q: How did you arrive in Istanbul? Fly from Washington then?

COUNTRYMAN: Yes. When I returned, I came by boat, and when I went to Beirut I went by

boat. Because, I had met with the Consul General, Ben Hill Brown over Christmas. He was keen for me to get out there. I think that he even thought of my being sort of a staff aide to him or something like that, which never worked out. I am glad it didn't, not because he wasn't a nice guy, but I got a chance to do more important things. I worked very closely with him anyway. He put some urgency on it and said, "We'd like you to get out there." So I thought rather than have a good time, I should impress my future bosses, be responsive.

Q: What did Istanbul, the consulate look like in those days? How big, how was it organized?

COUNTRYMAN: The consulate general...I was very pleased when I arrived there. There is an article that I have, I should have brought it along with me, that was in the Foreign Service Journal [Editor's Note: a publication of the American Foreign Service Association, the labor union for Foreign Service personnel], about the old consulate. It is a very interesting building. It is the Palazzo Corpi. It was built in the late 18th century by a Venetian businessman who had business in Istanbul, essentially for his mistress. It was very ornate and had some beautiful frescoes on the ceiling, some rather revealing. But a lovely old building, a little worse for wear by the time I got there. The story is told, and I think it is accurate, that at some point, of course it was the embassy, because the Ottoman capital was Istanbul, not Ankara. So it was the American embassy. At one point in the 20s the American ambassador there, I think was a political appointee, no it must have been before the First World War because it was only after the war when the Turks moved. Maybe it was just after the First World War, before the embassies had been set up in Ankara. Anyway, the story was that a visiting head of the foreign relations committee came and played poker with the then political appointee ambassador who said, "If you win the next hand, you introduce a bill for this to be bought by the United States government, and if I win you do that, If you win, I will buy it for the United States government and make it as a gift." The ambassador won, and the bill was put in and it was purchased. It was a very charming building.

Q: What was your first assignment when you...

COUNTRYMAN: Consular section. And business was brisk. We did a lot of notarials. We did shipping and seamen in those days; shipping and seamen were an important thing. We did a good number of rather complicated visa cases for people who claimed birth in the Soviet Union, because these were Turks from Turkic backgrounds who lived in Turkestan or areas like that and could claim Soviet citizenship. It was still back in the quota days. It was very important to prove that you had been born across the border from Turkey and in the Soviet Union because the quota for Turkey was oversubscribed. So it was very useful to prove you were there.

I got involved in a very interesting case. Of course, there was still a Greek minority in Istanbul, and, of course, a lot of the Greeks had lived along the western areas of Turkey. When the Greeks and the Turks fought, there was an exchange of population. The Social Security Administration noted and was concerned that they were getting a lot of people who claimed birth in Turkey who were Greek-Americans, and that their birth date was such and such. SSA's concern was the dates the applicants provided might not be accurate. Because obviously it was less complicated in those days. It was at 65, you got your social security. Well, these people would prove they had been born two years earlier and you know had been changing their birth date. The Social Security Administration was doubting the validity of some of these records because the records

had been destroyed, and there were no Turkish records. These were church records. People had photographic copies of pages from books in churches. I had to go out to go to a number of these old churches and to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch where they had some of these central records and actually view the records. I am sorry to say that in many cases they looked forged and doctored to me. Well, it was a very difficult thing for this young whippersnapper vice consul talking to this very aged and distinguished Greek Orthodox cleric and tell him that someone had diddled his records, or maybe he himself. I had the full support of the Consul General, and I went through this. It was a very difficult assignment, but I did it to the satisfaction of the Social Security Administration. I think we cleaned up the act. It didn't happen again. We OK'd certain people; other people were disallowed. There were certain procedures that were established...

Q: Was the consular section large enough that some people were doing IV's (immigrant visas) and some were doing NIV's or (non-immigrant visas), or did you do everything?

COUNTRYMAN: Well, we had the consular officer who was Tom Buchanan who was I guess an FSO-5 [Editor's note: the Foreign Service, like the U.S. military has a rank-in-person personnel system. At this time FSO-8 was entry level, second lieutenant equivalent; FSO-1 was the highest rank, a general officer equivalent] in those days. We had a staff of two or three, that was when we still had staff officers, Foreign Service staff officers. She was the citizen and passport, a Mrs. Biddle. She was the citizenship and passport officer. But the consul and I did the non-immigrant visa interviews. Then we had a local hire, a woman, Ms. Bendich, who had been Miss Yugoslavia in 1938 or something. She handled the immigrant visas. She prepared a file, and of course one of the officers would interview the people. Then we had one local hire who did shipping and seamen and another local who did notariats.

Q: Once you got out of the mission did you have the opportunity to talk to local government people or that kind of political reporting?

COUNTRYMAN: That came later. I didn't get out that much except to go to the Greek churches. I think there were a couple of instances where I had a protection of welfare situation where I went to a prison or I went to... I had to go to an insurance company one time on behalf of an American who had local insurance. It was usually the question of delivering papers, but I dealt with the head of this Turkish insurance company.

Q: What was Istanbul like to live in in those days?

COUNTRYMAN: It was very pleasant. It is a lovely city. you had the Golden Horn. I was very lucky in my accommodations. I lived in a very nice section called Maçka in an apartment house. You don't see many in the United States except in a place like New York or a place like Paris where literally you have one apartment that covers an entire floor, you know with four or five bedrooms, kitchen, pantry, servant's quarters. Well, I didn't have that, but that's the building I lived in. I had the penthouse, which was a tiny little apartment that had balconies on all sides with a beautiful view of the city in all directions. I had like 1-1/2 bedrooms. I had a tiny bedroom and kind of like a sitting room off the, kind of a walk-in closet kind of affair, and that was it. But it was a very charming apartment with a lot of woodwork on the inside, a very nice apartment. The owner of the apartment from whom I rented was a fellow by the name of Tefik Bey

Kharadout who came from a very wealthy Ismir family that were in fruits and vegetables. He lived in Istanbul; but the major part of the family lived in Ismir on the southern coast, but he lived in Istanbul to handle the distribution of the fruit and shipping it abroad.

Q: Interesting. So how long were you in the consular section?

COUNTRYMAN: About six months. The Consul General was quite keen that I do that, that that be the system. You will see later on from my story that that broke down to my advantage. But I spent six months in the consular section, about six months in admin, and then only about a month and a half in the econ section, because the more senior consular officer was pulled out quickly, and there was no replacement, so I ran the consular section for about four months. Then the political officer was pulled out, and there was no replacement, and I was made the political officer. So instead of having a tour in the political section, I was the political officer which at that time was like an FSO-3 slot [i.e., senior officer with fifteen plus years of experience], and here I was an FSO-7 or six. But the Consul General had confidence in me and so did the ambassador. I had the Turkish, that was the big thing. They wanted someone who had the Turkish language. We were coming in to, going into elections. Raymond Hare who was our ambassador in Ankara wanted very much to have a sense of reporting, what was going to happen in the elections. [Editor's Note: Ambassador Raymond Arthur Hare presented his credential in Istanbul on April 5, 1961 and departed post on August 27, 1965.] Obviously what was going to happen in Istanbul was terribly important. It was a big city. Ankara was just the capital of...they wanted much wanted reporting that could be done, and someone who reads the press. So, I was very fortunate.

Q: Obviously your opportunity in the consular section and getting out from time to time would use your Turkish. Then you said you moved to admin. There too you would be using some Turkish. Were there any particularly interesting admin issues that you had to deal with?

COUNTRYMAN: I used my Turkish...by the time my Turkish was really quite good. I was quite comfortable with it. On the admin side, one of the things we were doing, we were doing some remodeling in the Embassy, and in the Consulate General. I had to go out and get some bids from Turkish contractors. Frankly, it was something I had no experience in. Here again, architectural drawings, and getting a sense of materials, how much labor costs would be and so on and so forth was quite an experience for me.

Q: You probably had a couple of fairly senior local employees who were assistants in this project. Were they Turks?

COUNTRYMAN: Most of our local employees in admin tended to be mainly Turks, but the others, we had a mixture of Greeks, Armenians. We had a Yugoslav. We had, one of the ladies that later came into the consular section was Maltese. Literally Maltese, not even partly British. I mean she came from the island of Malta.

Q: But the admin section does give you an interesting view of a Foreign Service operation that one normally doesn't get. You moved to econ but that didn't last long.

COUNTRYMAN: No because I was pulled back to the consular section. Then when that was

filled almost coincidentally with that, there was no political officer, and I was in the political section.

Q: So there you were in the political section with Turkish and an election that is coming. What was the mission's election coverage like?

COUNTRYMAN: Without going into a great deal, I have to make sure my facts are right, but one of the... Turkey at that time was an emerging democracy. There had been a military coup. The military had overthrown a dictatorial regime, and the ruling party was the RPP, the Republican People's Party, which was I guess we would think of it as an Ataturk party somewhat left of center. Similar to a labor or socialist party, opposed by the Justice Party that represented more conservative interests and was more of a right wing party. The military had always supported the RPP, the Republican People's Party. The feeling was that Suleyman Demirel, I remember the name, who was the candidate of the Justice party was somebody who was more popular, had a better sense of the people and could continue to make progress in areas where the military thought it was important to make progress. He was from Istanbul, so I got to know Suleyman Demirel, and also got to know General Midonalu who was retired but who had engineered the first overthrow of the preceding government. He indicated to me, and this was a thing that the embassy didn't know was very important, that he would support the election of Demirel. Whereas I think the Embassy and most other people in the country were predicting continued rule by the Republican People's Party. I went out on a limb based on my talks with Demirel and this General Midonalu and suggested that Demirel would win, and he won.

Q: Now you were interviewing them and you were interviewing other business and political types.

COUNTRYMAN: Right next to the consulate general was an old hotel called the Pera Palas. It was a wonderful old hotel. It had a very nice bar there, a bar in the broad sense, not just liquor, but tea and Turkish coffee. I, with a very small budget, would meet people from the Turkish parliament and businessmen in the bar at the Pera Palas. You know, two o'clock in the afternoon, five, six, or whatever time it took to go over and sit around and talk to them. It was very convenient for them to come there. It was a nice place to conduct business.

Q: Now you were recording these conversations as a written memcon (memorandum of conversation) or cable?

COUNTRYMAN: Most of these were, since we were in the country, most of these were memcons. We still had airgrams in those days, and I did airgrams. But the memcons quite often, I forgot how we handled those, I sent those up to the political counselor in Ankara.

Q: Was there any unique aspect to the relationship between the Consulate and the Embassy? Could the Consulate separately cable Washington if it wanted to?

COUNTRYMAN: I think we tended to, yes. We would, but I think we kept it pretty closely. The Consulate had literally a bedroom for the ambassador. Ambassador Hare would come to Istanbul quite often, because quite often, although the government was in Ankara, people would schedule

appointments with him in Istanbul, because they had a house there or they would be there, or it was an excuse for them to go to Istanbul. Actually Ankara and Istanbul are very close, it was only a few hours either by air or by train. So the ambassador was in residence at the Consulate General more often than most ambassadors are in most consulates.

Q: How many American consulates were there in Turkey at that time?

COUNTRYMAN: At that time there were three. We had Istanbul, Ismir, and Adana in the southeast.

Q: Looking at Turkey in a little larger view, were there any particular social strains or political tensions?

COUNTRYMAN: One of the things, of course, is a legacy even today that remains in Turkish society is...of course, everyone today is familiar with Kemal Ataturk, the face-west philosophy and doing away with Turkish being written in Arabic script, making it a secular state, modernization, doing away with the fez. When I was there, particularly the people in Istanbul, the sort of more modern people were very committed to pushing forward that Ataturk revolution and being western. There was a significant group of people who were Islamic, who felt that this was not godly. There had been too much secularization. Turkey after all was almost 100% Muslim. So there was a tension reflected between the RPP and the Justice Party, and the Justice Party having a heavy element of what we would call, I suppose, the religious right, the more conservative people. There were some very great social tensions.

Turkey had a universal education law, and there were, of course, secular schools, but traditionally there had not been. I mean they didn't have a school system set up all over the country. In many areas they had what they called the "Imam vi hatip okulary," the Imam or priest and preacher schools. These are strictly Islamic. Some of them were pretty good, but some were not very good academically. I mean they didn't even teach you to read well, because you memorized passages from the Koran which a Turk couldn't understand because it is in Arabic, and recite from rote the Koran in Arabic. Things like modern Turkish, mathematics, social studies were not taught very well, or so the reformers said. Some of these Imam vi hatip okulary particularly in the larger cities were pretty good. I mean they were just religious schools, but they would match up to the Turkish secular schools. But there was a great deal of argument, for instance, about whether you could get into the technical schools or universities from these religious schools. There was a good bit of sniping back and forth in the press over the question of secularization versus Islam.

Q: How does it strike you now about the larger political relationship between the United States and Turkey at that time? Were they in NATO?

COUNTRYMAN: Not then. But we were very close because we had air bases there. They had fought, of course, with us in Korea. That was a big sort of PR element that the Turks would always talk about, you know our great friends the Americans. We fought with you and were there for you in Korea and the Turkish brigade saved the Americans at the Changjin Reservoir, whatever it was. They felt very much that our relations were good, very friendly. There was a

strain in the...there was an element in the RPP that was pretty far to the left and was quite socialist. I don't think it was crypto-communist, but it was very strongly socialist, and saw the United States as not being that much of a model for Turkey. We were too capitalist. There was a strong socialist side element in the RPP.

Q: Now, you were there at the time Kennedy was assassinated and the whole change in the U.S. Did any of that affect the Turkish situation?

COUNTRYMAN: I remember it very well. I was at home when we got the word. Our budget and fiscal officer for some reason called and said, "John, come down to the Consulate right away. Our President has been assassinated. I feel sick to my stomach." So I left immediately to the Consulate. The Consul General was there. I remember setting up the book that we had, the condolence book. The first person in the door was the Russian Consul General, who signed the book. I remember for days after that people in my office...I had an appointment with some RPP representative. He called me up on the phone and said that he had to cancel our appointment. He was so upset about Kennedy getting assassinated that he was crying on the phone. I mean this was not feigned. He was literally crying. He said in Turkish, "Young, dynamic, and he's been killed. It is terrible." He was crying on the phone. "I just can't meet with you." The Turks can be very emotional. It hit them very hard.

Q: You left Istanbul in '65? Normal rotation?

COUNTRYMAN: Yes, two years almost to the day. I arrived in January and I left in January.

CHARLES A. MAST
Peace Corps
Kastamonu (1963-1965)

Economic Officer
Ankara (1974-1977)

Charles A. Mast was born in South Dakota in 1939. He graduated from Calvin College in 1963 and received an M.A. from the University of Maryland in 1967. His postings abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1967 include Curacao, Tehran, Tabriz, Ankara, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Dhaka and Bombay.

Q: Where did they send you?

MAST: We went to Turkey, to a city called Kastamonu. It's in a valley in north central Turkey, not far from Sinop on the Black Sea. It's a relatively poor province, and it was a very conservative area. In fact, it was the place, in 1927, where Atatürk came to proclaim what they call the Çapka Reform, which was everyone in Turkey will stop wearing the fez and will have to wear a hat. And he supposedly at that time picked one of the more conservative urban centers. It was a small provincial capital, about 20 thousand. It had the only lycée, the only high school in

the province. The province had perhaps half a million people.

Q: First, what were living conditions like? Where did they put you up?

MAST: Well, we rented, I think, four or five rooms. There had been three male volunteers there the year before, and they were transferred to other parts of Turkey because the Peace Corps felt Kastamonu was a little bit conservative, a little rigid for single males. There really wasn't anything for them to do. There were suspicions of young women, you know, that sort of thing. So the Peace Corps decided they would send a married couple there. There was a married couple in the neighboring city, about four or five hours away by bus, and they had been a smashing success, and so I think they hoped that the same thing would happen with us. So we took over the apartment. I think it was about four rooms on top of shops. We had running water, and we had a Turkish-style toilet, cement, which we modified so we could sit on it. We bought a wooden toilet top before we left the capital, took that along with us, and we had a magnificent shower-sauna, because you'd just put in the wood on the bottom of the hot water heater and heat the water and the room together. We had to burn wood or coal, so there was a fair amount of roughing it pioneer style, but probably it was a better life, or as easy a life, as we'd had when we were ten years old on the farm - so it wasn't that difficult for us.

Q: How about the society? How did you find this conservative city? How did you fit in?

MAST: Well, as married couples it was really much easier, because most of the young teachers were married and were very interested in getting to know us. We were constantly being invited out to their homes. Some of these teachers, if they were natives of the region, would live with their parents, or they'd have a large apartment and each have half of it. We also got to know some of the older people that way. We had a wide acceptance, really, in a social context. Then we'd meet businessmen periodically, particularly some of them that were a little more up-and-coming, "We'd like to get to know the foreigner teachers, and my wife's a good cook, we've got a nice house, let's invite these people over and show off a little." And we also had adult English classes where we would have a chance to meet other interesting people. So it was very good socially, culturally. We really got into the culture, and I think this was good background for the Foreign Service, where you eat for your country many times, and drink for your country - mostly eat for your country-or you're placed into situations where you just *have* to try this food, or you have to have this second helping. Well, I very much had that kind of feeling in the Peace Corps, so it was good training for later life.

Q: How about the teaching? How did that go?

MAST: Well, I discovered that my wife had a real gift for teaching and was a much better teacher than I was. She tended to have younger classes, more seventh, eighth, ninth grade level, although she also had one senior class. I started out with a class on the junior level that had 83 students. Well, of course, we had discipline problems. Probably only about 10 percent of our students were really top-notch students. We had about 50 percent who were average, and then about 20 or 30 of them who really were never going to learn English at all, so it was always difficult to know what level to shoot for. Some of these students were excellent. Cheating was an incredible problem in a culture like that. We had a duplicating machine that the Peace Corps had

provided us with, and we idealistically thought we could stop cheating. We made six separate tests - they were all different, all roughly equal, however, in difficulty - and passed them out, one-two-three-four-five-six, spread them all around. Well, I discovered a little bit later in the semester that I had one student who was good enough that she was doing six tests for all the people around her. They would shift these so that she would be filling in the blanks, you know, writing a little bit differently for each one. So the top-notch students were obviously very top-notch, but a lot of them could barely write a simple sentence in English.

Q: How did you find the school authorities? I would imagine that there could be a certain amount of resentment of these foreigners coming in.

MAST: That was true for many of the Peace Corps volunteers in nicer areas - you know, in Western Turkey, around Izmir or Istanbul. There were places like that which were choice areas for teachers, and there was some feeling that, well, my brother would like to come here and teach English, but he can't because the Peace Corps volunteers are here. In our area it was not easy to get teachers, and usually they either had teachers that were married and had decided to stay there, or they had some family there, or they had very young teachers that were maybe being sent there for two or three years by the ministry and just couldn't wait to get out and get to western Turkey. Since we really didn't take positions that were wanted by someone else, so we had a pretty good relationship.

I remember there were some anti-American teachers, politically, very leftist, with whom we probably had a better relationship in terms of academics and how to treat the students - these kids have got to learn, because it's a tough life out there - than we did with many of the more easy-going older teachers who were kind of settled in a rut and said, "You know, we've got to pass this kid. It's going to be hard for his family if he fails." "He can never become an officer in the army unless he gets his high school degree." That was an interesting dichotomy that I discovered among the teachers there.

Q: Did you either get involved or see before you the politics of Turkey at that particular time?

MAST: To a certain extent, we couldn't avoid it. Since we were an early group - we were Turkey 2 - we were taken to meet Ismet Inonu, who was the prime minister at the time, and had a ceremony with him. Right at the beginning we had a little bit of knowledge of what was going on. Turks are very political, and I would discover the intense discussions after Kennedy's death, for example, and people would know that Johnson took over, and where was Bobby Kennedy, and was Bobby Kennedy positioning himself to become President later? Many Turks tend to be a little conspiratorial, but were very well informed. Part of that, of course, was the advantage of a free press, but we would meet people in the bazaar, some illiterate peasants, who would be interested in talking about this sort of thing.

During that period, the problem in Cyprus, which had been going on for decades, flared-up again in 1964, when a number of the Turkish minority were murdered. The Greeks would probably say the Turks had started it, but we had a different perspective. That was quite an emotional time, and there was a fair amount of anti-Americanism. Johnson leaned pretty heavily on the Turks not to invade Cyprus, and we discovered later the Johnson letter, in I think June or July of 1965,

about the time we left. He had really put tremendous pressure on the Turks not to invade and rescue their coreligionists there.

Q: Was there in your area any equivalent to a real sort of left-wing Communist or just plain left-wing element there?

MAST: Not that I really got to know. As I mentioned, there were several teachers that I considered left wing at the time. They were very strong nationalists and secularists. And we would have some discussions, and I had differences with them on issues of foreign and economic policy, but we had a lot of similar viewpoints on educational theory and educational psychology, and many of them became good friends.

Q: How about fundamentalism in Islam? How did Turkey work so hard to sort of dampen it or put it down? How did you find it at this point?

MAST: The teachers we taught with, many of them, particularly the younger ones, were strong secularists, so they would rarely, if ever, go to the mosque. They saw themselves as modern Western Turkish nationalists, secularists. The older people were more religious. You would see many of them going to the mosque. There were mosques everywhere. We would hear the call to prayer from two or three different mosques in the morning or evening. And there were a certain number of Turks who would ask, "Why don't you become a Muslim? Obviously, first came Judaism and then Christianity, and Islam is the culmination of all this in terms of monotheistic religion. It certainly would make eminent sense for you." We had a Peace Corps friend in a neighboring town, whose Turkish was fluent and who later went on to get a Ph.D. in Turkish language and literature at Michigan. We often joked about stories in the Turkish newspapers where any time any Westerner anywhere in the world became a Muslim there would be quite a major story. So there would be such and such an educated person in Germany or Britain or the US who converted to Islam. My friend noted that fellow teachers or townspeople, or particularly shopkeepers, would come to him and say, "Look at this. This intellectual has become a Muslim. Now we've been talking about this. Surely this wouldn't be that difficult for you." So there was a fair amount of that, but on a kind of friendly day-to-day level. And usually we would say, "I grew up as a Christian, this is part of my tradition, part of my culture, part of my mind set. It's not easy to change religions. How about you? Would you find it easy to become a Christian?" "Oh, no, no, we couldn't give up on Islam."

Q: How about the female students? Did they wear head scarves and that sort of thing?

MAST: No.

Q: It might have even been forbidden at the time.

MAST: I think it might have been. I don't remember female students wearing scarves in school.

Q: It's still an issue.

MAST: Talking about female students, I had one little incident. One of my top female students,

Oya, was not particularly modest. She was not at all provocative, but she was just very outgoing and treated boys and girls and male and female teachers alike. She really liked to speak English. We had an English club, my wife and I, and she was one of the star pupils there. Oya and I used to walk home from school together for lunch because she lived fairly close to our place, and I would be coming home for lunch and she would be going off to where she went for lunch. After a few weeks, we started to pick up little murmuring about this. My wife would pick them up, or somebody would say something like, "Why are you walking this girl?" So we decided to stop that.

Q: Did you feel at that point a rather nervous hand of the Peace Corps overlordship, or whatever it is, in Washington, wanting to make sure that none of you got involved in... One, you had to steer clear of the embassy and it was sort of sudden death or poison to get involved with them. Were you getting sort of directives all the time, or were you pretty much-

MAST: I don't remember written directives, but that point of view was expressed. We were far enough away from the embassy so that we got to Ankara very seldom or to Istanbul, but there were a couple of volunteers who were only a three or four hour bus ride away, and I remember there was an older AID woman who in a sense almost adopted these kids. They could come in to do their wash if they wanted to, and she had peanut butter for them. They didn't abuse it; she didn't abuse it. But the rest of us kind of thought, hmm, you know, are they *really* the real hair shirts? And if the director had found out about that, he would have tried to prevent it.

Q: Well, I think it was a period where... I think now the lines have become blurred.

MAST: Oh, much more.

Q: And rightly so, but at the time, the Peace Corps was trying to make it absolutely positive that it was a separate organization and not a tool of the government.

MAST: Well part of it - and to give the Peace Corps credit at that time - there was a great deal of commentary in the Turkish press, particularly the leftist press, about how we were all crypto-CIA agents or were training to be CIA agents. One. Two, the more nationalist Islamic press would pick up on any Christmas tree that any volunteer had or any kind of a little Christmas party and say we were proselytizing. So there was that kind of criticism. And too close an identification with the embassy might have created additional problems.

Q: Early on. I think most people agreed with... So you did this for two years?

MAST: Two years.

Q: This would be what?

MAST: Summer of 1963 to summer of 1965.

Q: How did the death of Kennedy go where you were?

MAST: Oh, it was incredible, incredible. Most people our age, I think, remember where they were and what they were doing when the death of Kennedy was announced. But for us it was a little bit different because it happened during the middle of the night due to the time difference. I turned on the VOA at eight o'clock in the morning, and I got it as the program had started, and they were talking about "he was... he was." It was all past tense. They're talking about Kennedy. What's the *was* part? I started to have an eerie feeling, and then they came in again and talked about exactly what had happened. We decided to go to school, and the teachers wouldn't permit us to teach, and there was crying among the students. So we went home, and we had a steady stream of students and teachers calling on us. It was really very hard for all of us. I think it would have hit them hard anyway, because Kennedy had that mystique in the developing world. For our students and younger teachers, we sort of personified in a sense young, caring Americans and so they knew that we felt sad, though they probably thought we should have been mourning more than we were. We did a sort of stiff upper lip. But it was quite an experience, quite a day. And then, of course, later you saw a lot of pictures of Kennedy in people's houses - many even before he died, but more afterwards.

Q: I was in Yugoslavia, and the whole country had flags at half mast, all over the country, and for years afterwards you could get in little plastic frames pictures of Kennedy down in the very local market, clearly people who were -

MAST: It wasn't for tourists, no.

Q: No, peasant, peasant, peasant markets.

MAST: Very similar.

HOWELL S. TEEPLE
Public Affairs Officer
Adana (1963-1966)

Howell S. Teeple was born in Texas in 1921. He received his BA from Louisiana State University in 1943 and served in the US Army from 1943 to 1945 overseas. His assignments abroad include Seoul, Manila, New York, New Delhi, Adana, Tripoli, Monrovia and Cebu. Mr. Teeple was interviewed by Earl W. Sherman in 1999.

Q: In 1963. You went where in '63?

TEEPLE: We went to Turkey. I had asked for a branch post. I wanted to be a branch PAO. I found out a branch post was just as busy or busier than an embassy press job. Originally, I was selected to go to a branch post in Iran, Isfahan. But suddenly I was reassigned to Adana, Turkey, because the BPAO [branch public affairs officer] that had just arrived there, Jim Brophy, died tragically in a drowning accident. I was very upset about the assignment at first, because I'd never heard of Adana, and I was interested in going to Iran. But I went to Adana. It was a

consular post, and we had a very large U.S. air base adjoining Adana, Incirlik Air Force Base, which is still going strong. Much of my duties was handling community affairs between the airmen and the Turkish populace in Adana. Adana was a town with almost a million population. It was in southeastern Turkey. We could drive in six hours to Beirut from there. It was a wonderful post from that point of view, and we went to Beirut several times. Or you could drive up to Ankara, which was also a six-hour drive, and onto Istanbul. We used to say we were in the armpit of the Middle East.

Q: I can't picture easily how driving from Turkey down to Beirut.

TEEPLE: You had to go through Syria and then into Lebanon and into Beirut. The roads were quite good.

Q: I see, my, you were around the Mediterranean.

TEEPLE: Yes.

Q: I understand.

TEEPLE: At first I was disappointed in the assignment, but then I got to like Turkey quite a bit. I got to like the Turkish people very much. And again, immediately, I had to try to learn the language, and the consul and I had a tutor every morning from eight o'clock to 9:30, a Turkish lady teaching us Turkish, and we became somewhat conversant in the language.

Q: I have a hard question for you to answer. In all of that spectrum of travels and the wide variety of people and ethnicities that you've contacted, from Asia clear over to Europe and all of that distance, is it reasonable to generalize that practically every place you go you can adjust to people, that people are somewhat the same, even though the languages and the cultures are so different, that they respond to you?

TEEPLE: They do respond to you if you have the right approach. And that was, of course, our job in USIS - public diplomacy. We were contacting people directly, much more than officers in the embassy. With the libraries, the cultural and exchange programs, the information programs, exhibits, and the lecturers we brought in, we had intimate daily contact with the local people to schedule and promote these operations as well as the audiences the programs were directed to - this was public diplomacy.

Q: Perhaps my question wanted to elicit, among all of these ethnics, all these different countries, was there one country where people seemed to be warmer, more forthcoming than some of the others?

TEEPLE: They're all a little different, I must say, but the Indians were very affable and very easy to get to know. They liked Americans at that time, pretty much. They tried to emulate us. The Turkish people at the beginning of my tour were more standoffish, and were harder to get to know. I remember it was some time before we were invited into a Turkish home after arriving at the post, but once we got to know the people and associated with them, we found them very

warm. We had some good close Turkish friends and enjoyed them very much.

Q: What was the language, or rather several different languages in Turkey, involved - Kurds, for instance?

TEEPLE: There is a Kurdish language, but Kurds there all spoke Turkish. There was a large Kurdish population in southwest Turkey where we were and we had Kurdish people working in our house. But they knew Turkish. Turkish was the *lingua franca* language. Not as many Turks spoke English as in India, and that was another reason to try to learn the language. They spoke actually quite a bit of French. Southeast Turkey was in the French Levant area after World War I.

Q: Did you develop any skill with Turkish, or was it really too difficult or you were too busy to work with the new language?

TEEPLE: I had a limited knowledge of Turkish, yes. I wasn't fluent at all. The Turks appreciated Americans trying to speak with them, and we had this tutor every morning, Tom Davis, the consul and myself, and we picked up the conversation somewhat. But, we relied a lot on interpreters.

Q: Did you find for the family all of the necessities, for instance, education for the children, schools there?

TEEPLE: There was a school at the air base in Turkey. Our oldest boy was in kindergarten there. We had one son, born in India, and when we got to Turkey he was only nine months old. So he wasn't of school age, but our oldest son did go to the Air Force school at Incirlik Air Base, and that was fortunate. He was in kindergarten, first, and second grade there.

We were three years in Turkey, and again we had outstanding ambassadors. We were in a consular post about 300 miles from the embassy in Ankara. We first had Ambassador Raymond Hare, who was known all over the Department as an outstanding Middle East expert. Then we got Parker Hart as ambassador, and he and his wife would come to Adana quite often and visit with us. Also, we would go up to Ankara for meetings, so I had good exposure to the ambassadors and I found them outstanding people to work with.

Q: What type of housing would you be able to find, for instance, in your location?

TEEPLE: We had a wonderful house in Adana. It was a French provincial large house, two-story, with a full basement. There were some modern large apartment buildings in Adana where a lot of the consulate staff lived. The consul and his family lived in an apartment building there. The housing was quite good in Adana. We lived on the local economy pretty much. We did have access to the Air Force commissary, of course. We could use that and other Air Force facilities, so that helped out. We found the Turkish fruits and vegetables excellent, and the lamb, of course, was first class.

Q: Yes, in those earlier times, smoking, I suppose, by Americans in these foreign areas was

totally accepted and just the pattern of living? I suppose Turkish tobacco had its place there in the local economy and was an export item to the United States?

TEEPLE: It was. We weren't in a tobacco growing area in Adana. We were in what they called the Cuborova area of Turkey, where they grew wonderful fruits and vegetables. All the Turks smoked, pretty much, the men especially.

They had one interesting custom, the Turks, as we learned. The eldest son usually went into the army. The army was all-important in Turkey. The second son usually - those from affluent families - would go into the government or politics. And the third son would go into business. They didn't put that much emphasis on business in those days. Now I think that's changed. And another nice custom was this: when a son was born in Turkey, the father would buy a piece of land, one hectare of land, and plant it full of trees. When the son became 20 years old, they would harvest the trees, sell the lumber, and that would be the son's inheritance.

Q: His legacy, his inheritance.

TEEPLE: Yes. I thought that was a wonderful custom. We were in Turkey at some exciting times, too. It was a time of tension between Turkey and Greece, and especially on Cyprus. We heard the Turkish airplanes from Incirlik Air Base fly right over our house one Sunday on their way to bomb Cyprus. Again, it seems like every crisis happens on a Sunday. The Incirlik Air Force Base was a Turkish base with an American presence. There was a Turkish commanding officer and an American colonel, but it was a Turkish base. The Turkish flag and the American flag flew over the base.

But that Cyprus crisis happened during my tour in Turkey. That Sunday afternoon, when the Turks first bombed Cyprus, the consul and I went immediately to the base to see what was happening. We found the Turkish pilots with big smiles on their faces when they returned from their bombing run. It was the first time they'd been in combat, I think. But it was a problem for us, because we controlled all the petrol for the aircraft, and we threatened to cut off their petrol if they bombed Cyprus again, which didn't make the Turks happy at all.

Q: Yes, the Cyprus... can we call it a "conflict," I expect, or was it termed a war?

TEEPLE: It turned out to be a conflict.

Q: This is between Greeks and Cypriots.

TEEPLE: As I remember it, Cyprus was two-thirds Greek and one-third Turkish, but the Turks felt discriminated against in getting government jobs and being represented in the government. So the Turks attacked to try to get their full recognition. At first they attacked with the aircraft, and then later with land forces and occupied the northern part of Cyprus, which they still do.

Q: It's interesting to speculate that there hasn't been a recurrence of this, that somehow they've been able to resolve the issue.

TEEPLE: I believe there's a United Nations group there observing the line between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. There have been some skirmishes now and then but no major conflicts that I recall. But it's still unresolved, and I don't see how it's reconcilable, frankly.

Q: Yes. You had distinguished visitors come into Adana, I would expect, from time to time, even though it was distant from the main post.

TEEPLE: We got some visitors there, yes, through the cultural programs. We had the Robert Shaw Chorale come to Adana, and we had some celebrities come through to lecture. We had the distinguished actor Frederic March and his wife, Florence Eldridge. We had a well-known pianist and others, but not as many as the embassy in Ankara got, or even Istanbul. We did get a number of speakers and lecturers. Incidentally, Incirlik Air Base was the place where the late Francis Gary Powers took off on his ill-fated flight over the Soviet Union. He was based at Incirlik Air Base.

Q: The famous U-2.

TEEPLE: Yes, that famous U-2 flew over Turkey to Pakistan to refuel, and then flew over Russia and was shot down. This became a problem for us, one of the biggest public relations problems in my whole career. President Eisenhower went on the air and denied that we had any spy plane over Russia, but then a couple of days later he had to admit it when Gary Powers was actually captured. And while we in USIS had put out the President's denial, then we were faced with the embarrassing and somewhat humiliating admission later. Turkish press people, I remember, came running up and saying, "Oh, you said this wasn't true and it was true. How do you answer to that?" It was embarrassing, very embarrassing. The embassy, the consulate, and USIS were only as good as the White House, so to speak.

BARRINGTON KING
Greek Language Officer
Cyprus (1964-1966)

Ambassador Barrington King was born in Tennessee in 1930. As a Foreign Service officer, he was posted to Egypt, Tanzania, Cyprus, Greece, Tunisia, Pakistan, and was ambassador to Brunei. Ambassador King was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: You took a year of Greek training, and then you were sent to Cyprus, was that it?

KING: That's right.

Q: You were there from 1964 to '67. There were really only three places -- Athens, Salonika and Cyprus.

KING: That's right.

Q: What was the situation on Cyprus when you arrived?

KING: Bad. I was supposed to be there on a certain date in August, and my wife was delivering our first child, which was a week or so late. So I got an extension of several days so I could be here when the child was born. I was supposed to leave two days later. Well, I found out I couldn't leave because no airlines were flying to Cyprus because the Turks were bombing Cyprus, and so I was delayed several more days before going there. When I arrived, without my wife -- not because of the child, although that would have delayed her a few weeks -- but because once again we found ourselves in a situation where no dependents were allowed. So when our daughter was six weeks old, my wife flew to Beirut. Now it's sort of ironic, the situation is reversed, because now you might use Cyprus as a safe haven for Beirut, but not the other way around. But Beirut was very peaceful in those days, and she stayed there for a couple of months, and then once again the order on dependents was lifted, and she came to Cyprus. But all during the time there the political situation was tense, there was a lot of violence, and if you were an American you didn't feel safe at all. And as later events proved it was a dangerous place for us. In fact, the Ambassador to Cyprus was shot down right in front of my office door.

Q: Rodger Davies.

KING: That's right -- after I was gone.

Q: Could you explain the political situation, and politico- military, the whole situation on Cyprus at that time?

KING: As far as the United States was concerned, it was a no-win situation because -- I guess this is sort of common to islands -- a very self-centered view of the world. And you were either for the Greek side, or you were for the Turkish. But it was almost impossible to be for both, and since United States policy was trying to be even-handed we had a lot of Cypriots, both Greek and Turks, who disliked us for opposite reasons. It was very threatening. The island about eight months before had been divided in two by fighting, and the green line ran across the island, and ran through the center of the capitol, Nicosia.

Q: When did Cyprus become independent?

KING: Let's see, I got there in '64, in '63. And almost immediately law and order broke down. Vicious fighting, like most civil wars, in which a lot of civilians were murdered. The Turks all retreated to Turkish areas. The Greeks, they had been mixed before a good bit, retreated to Greek areas, and the north of the island became entirely Turkish, and the rest of the island became entirely Greek. You couldn't travel between those points if you were a Greek or Turk, you'd be killed, that's all there was to it; but you could, if you were a diplomat, but it was risky business and several times when I was driving in both the Greek and the Turkish parts of the islands, you'd be stopped by some 15-year old kid with an automatic weapon poked in your face. There were violent incidents all the time. Nevertheless, we had a house on the north coast and we went there on the weekends. It was a short drive of an hour or so. It belonged to an English woman, and they had all fled when the fighting broke out. She could get absolutely nothing for it because

at the end of the street was a Turkish machine gun post. So we lived there anyway, it was close to the water, and we paid 10 pounds a month rent for it. That's what we offered and they'd take anything you offered.

Greeks could go there to Kyrenia, which was a sort of a resort area, but they had to be accompanied by a United Nations armored convoy that left every morning, and came back in the afternoon. No sane Greek would have traveled any other way. We successfully did business with both sides, and as a matter of policy we had a Greek language officer who really never did any business with the Turks. And we had a Turkish language officer also, who never had anything to do with the Greeks. And that is the way it was, and that's about the only way you could operate. I was the Greek language officer.

Q: Who was the Turkish?

KING: George McFarland. He spent all of his time on the other side of the green line. I would go there occasionally but everybody considered me pro-Greek. For some reason people think if you speak their language, you're their friend, which doesn't prove a thing. Why were we training all these people in Chinese, and Russian in those days? Anyway, it was a very interesting tour because there were a lot of attempts to bring about a solution in which we were actively involved. My job, however, as economic officer but being the Greek language officer in the Embassy, I got involved in the political situation a lot. So that was fun. I did spend a lot of time on the economic side of things. One of the most powerful people in the country was the head of the cooperative movement, and he was seen as a potential successor to Archbishop Makarios, as President. It did not turn out that way, but I spent a good deal of time with him. Then I spent a good bit of time with the Cyprus balance of payments, because Cyprus was spending a lot of money on weapons...

Q: You're saying Cyprus. You're talking about the Greeks?

KING: Yes, and what was the legitimate government; you had to accept that. We questioned how well they were going to be able to survive with these large outlays for weapons. As it turned out they did very well. The Greek Cypriots are very industrious, and clever, and despite the fact that the island was divided, over the years they have become more and more prosperous, instead of going down the drain as some people thought they would.

Q: Where was their economic strength?

KING: Tourism, agriculture, mining, shipping. They had a lot of things for such a small country.

Q: Did you have much to do with Archbishop Makarios?

KING: Personally, no.

Q: What is the reflection of this man that you were getting from the Ambassador?

KING: Sort of respect for his uncanny skill in getting things done the way he wanted, and not so

much respect for his motives and what he was up to. I think we tended to regard Archbishop Makarios a little bit like we did Nasser; that he was a potentially bad influence on some of his neighbors, and in the non-aligned movement we regarded him very much as an opportunist. And also we had the same problem, that is that he was getting weapons from the Soviet Union, and had various other arrangements with them, and tolerated, and encouraged the Communist Party, always making sure it didn't get an election majority.

Q: How did we see the Soviet Communist menace there? Did we see it as a real factor?

KING: Well, again, I think the professionals on the ground probably took it less seriously than Washington did. We were concerned. I guess probably the greatest concern was that it was provocative, and that Makarios was going to carry things so far that one day the Turks were going to invade. And, of course, that is eventually what happened.

Q: Did you get any feel that if the chips were down...we obviously wanted to keep these two allies from fighting each other, but if the chips were down where we were going to be standing?

KING: Oh, I think, as you say, we would try to keep some good relations with both. I don't think good relations with Cyprus would have been very important to us, but with mainland Greece, yes. But I think in the end Turkey was more important to us than Greece.

Q: Who was it -- Toby Belcher was the Ambassador?

KING: Yes.

Q: How did he operate? What sort of a person was he?

KING: I think Toby was about what you wanted for Cyprus; very easy going, gregarious fellow. He made a lot of friends, and managed to do it on both sides. About the only person who was really successful at that. He had a lot of good Turkish contacts, and of course, everybody who was anybody in the Greek community, and managed to convince them both that he thought highly of them. He worked very hard at it, and I think was emotionally involved in preventing a disaster happening in Cyprus. And he thought, I believe, that an armed conflict was the thing we must do our best to prevent. The rest of it would take care of itself if we were patient, and manipulated things, and waited. He worked towards that end all the time he was there. Of course, things really went sour after he was gone.

Q: How did we view enosis, the idea of unity between Greece and the community there, Colonel Grivas, and all that?

KING: I think everybody thought Colonel Grivas was a menace of the first order, and that he was deliberately trying to create a conflict in which there would be a war. And I think that's correct. I think we thought enosis was a fantasy. Nothing like that was ever going to happen. The British offered Cyprus to Greece in the first World War, and they refused it; mainly because the King of Greece was married to the Kaiser's sister, and didn't want to get involved, and forever afterwards regretted that, but from then on it was too late. But no Greek politician could ever say

it, you know these facts very well. When finally the Papadopoulos government got itself involved, and then after Papadopoulos was overthrown, they really did something provocative, and all of that. Well, what happened is exactly what you'd expect would happen. I think we had it figured out all along.

Q: So you didn't feel that there was a thirst on the part of the Greek Cypriot population?

KING: That's a funny one. If you asked them, they would say yes; and if you said, "You don't really want it," they would become extremely angry. But, in fact, I'm not sure they did want it because they knew the Greeks looked down on them. Of course, all these Greeks who were there in civilian clothes were Army officers, and they did mingle with the Cypriots, and they had a very low opinion of each other. It's interesting what they called each other in slang. The Greeks called Cypriots, gaidhouria, donkeys. And the Cypriots called Greeks, kalmaradhes, which means people always scribbling with a pen.

Q: Well, you were moving over to the scribblers with a pen. You didn't really move out of the firing line, at least it was certainly an active time. You went to Athens in 1967.

KING: '67.

Q: Before or after April 22, '67, the time of the colonels attempted coup?

KING: After.

Q: Could you describe the situation in Greece at the time you went there? This is 1967.

KING: I think a polarization of opinion both in...well, within the Embassy for one thing, and also I think you had it in the U.S. government. The usual kind of polarization you have. One side seeing a great threat in Andreas Papandreou in the left; and the other side, quite naturally being very much opposed to this imposed dictatorship of the right. And as you know, through the five years that I was there, there was some internal division within the Embassy about what American policy should be.

Q: I wonder if you could describe, when you first arrived there, Phillips Talbot was the Ambassador, and how the Embassy viewed things? You were doing what there?

KING: I was in the economic section.

Q: How did you see the Embassy's internal view of this situation?

KING: I think Phil Talbot was basically quite unhappy with the situation that he had to deal with. But I think that he felt that he had to work with what was there, as best he could, and try to move the situation back to a more democratic regime. I don't think, in fact, there was an awful lot that we were going to be able to do about it until it just played itself out. In fact, that's pretty much the way it was.

Q: Did we have fairly open relations with people? Did you feel we were holding back as an

Embassy, being somewhat standoffish?

KING: To whom?

Q: *To the Greek government.*

KING: A bit standoffish, yes. There was a factor then that was soon out of the picture, and that was the King. And I think we tried to make use of this third factor, to try to bring about a better situation. But once the King made his attempt, and that failed and he was exiled, and eventually, of course, the royal family was finished in Greece, then you had a polarization in Greek politics between the left and the right. The regime tried to make it very difficult for us to have anything to do with the left. They had some success with the U.S. government. I think in particular the best support they were getting was from Spiro Agnew.

Q: *The Nixon administration came in in '69, and we had a new Ambassador there, Henry Tasca, who is a controversial figure. How did you see him? When you were there you saw both sides of two different Ambassadors.*

KING: I think there was a definite change, and I think there was much closer contact with the regime than there had been under Phil Talbot. I think relations with the opposition were a good bit inhibited under Tasca. Tasca saw a lot of Papadopoulos, and his chief lieutenants. I occasionally served as an interpreter and went with him to dinner parties at Papadopoulos's house, and this kind of thing. So I saw a good bit of that, although I was not in the political section at that time. Eventually I did switch over to the political section. I was in Greece, as I said, for five years which was awfully long.

Q: *Long, long. Particularly coming out of the Cyprus pressure cooker.*

KING: As far as I know, I've probably had a longer continuous tour in the Greek-speaking world than anybody in the U.S. Foreign Service in our time.

Q: *I would imagine so, yes. What was your impression of Tasca's operating style? I mean how did this Papadopoulos- Tasca chemistry work?*

KING: I think Tasca was a more secretive kind of person. He was more inclined to concentrate on what he could do personally, without letting other people know too much about what was going on; as compared with Talbot who I think was more open, and led more of a team effort. I don't think people felt very much under Tasca that they were part of a team in which they could influence his views on things. I think a lot of people felt his mind had been made up before he ever got there.

Q: *How did you feel...the potpourri, and the influences...I'm thinking of three different areas that I think were important: one would be our political section, then there would be the CIA, and then there would be the American military; all of whom had a role. Could you describe how you felt about these people coming out, and what they were doing in our Embassy? We're talking about the Tasca period.*

KING: I would say we were being pretty supportive with the exception of some people in the political section of the Embassy. I think we were being pretty supportive.

Q: I was Consul General there for four years at this time, and my impression was that the CIA, for its own reasons, was playing almost a pernicious role. Again, I was coming as a political reporter, but they seemed to discount country team meetings. Sort of a nasty business was going on in the Papadopoulos regime.

KING: That's right. I share that opinion.

Q: And I also felt that our military had too many Greek Americans in it, because of the language and they wanted to come back, it tended to be 110 percent super patriot, and thought this was fine, which was not a very good mix at this time.

KING: That's true, and on top of that, whereas the other parts of the mission that were interested in the politics of Greece, whatever you may think of their opinions, were competent and knew what they were doing. It was my opinion that the American military never really understood what was going on. They had emotional reactions to things.

Q: It was not, obviously, where we were sending our top grade people.

KING: But that's generally true. The Defense Attaché assignment is a dead end. I mean it's well known it's very rare for anyone who goes as a colonel as a Defense Attaché to ever get anything else much after that. No, they don't send their best people. You know you get ahead by commanding troops in the U.S. military, and that's not commanding troops. And they've got this long standing prejudice, so you're not going to get very good quality with personnel policies like that.

Q: Was there sort of an unrest would you say within the Embassy because of at least on the part of the Ambassador, and the CIA, and to a certain extent, at least a tacit, acceptance by the military of our increasingly close relations with the colonels?

KING: Yes. I think there was, and I think at times it got rather bitter.

Q: Can you think of any times?

KING: All the time. There were ups and downs. It depended on what was happening. Something would happen that some people in the Embassy would see as an outrage, and others would, as you said, try to excuse. This happened all the time.

Q: How about from Washington? Were we getting any particular direction?

KING: You see, even though by then I was beginning to get up in rank a little, and even though I was the number two person in the political section, that doesn't mean by any means I was being cut in on a lot of what was going on; particularly since my sympathy for some of it was suspect. I

guess my feeling was that Henry Kissinger, whose main concern was that we do nothing to alienate Turkey -- you know, sacrifice the colonels if necessary. The next consideration was, we wanted stability in Greece, which we allegedly had under the colonels. It proved to be not as stable as people thought it was. And also, Andreas Papandreou turned out to be not as big a threat as many thought. He finally did get into power, which was seen as just a terrible thing to happen; and now he's got himself out of power again by his own corrupt behavior.

Q: At the time though he was considered to be a very dangerous person.

KING: Oh, a tool of the Soviets, and all of that, and without passing judgement on that, he just didn't prove equal to doing anything to a drastic degree.

Q: Greek politics, as usual.

KING: As far as I can see. Of course, I was gone by then.

Q: Were we feeling at all the pressure of the Greek- American lobby? Did you feel that in the political section?

KING: Yes, I guess so. We felt it in both directions though. We got a lot of people whose families felt they were being persecuted by the colonels, who were talking to their Congressmen. And you also had some who would support any Greek government as long as it was Greek, and therefore we mustn't do anything to it.

Q: Granted, Tasca particularly was sort of cutting people out, but did you get any feel about how we were sharing and working as American policy toward this volatile area with our Embassy in Ankara? Or were we just doing our thing, and they were doing their thing?

KING: I think Tasca had a sort of antagonistic view towards the Turks, and our Embassy in Turkey, just from a purely personal point of view. If he'd been in Ankara, he would have had the same feeling towards the Greeks.

Q: So you left there in 1972, and things really blew up in '74.

KING: Yes.

LARRY COLBERT
English Instructor, Peace Corps
Isparta (1964-1966)

Mr. Colbert was born in Ohio in 1940. He attended the Universities of Ohio and Missouri. After a tour in Turkey with the Peace Corps and a year as an assistant on Capital Hill, he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to Viet Nam as Regional Advisor. His subsequent postings, where he served as Consular Officer

include: Ankara, Turkey, Oran, Algeria, Dublin, Ireland and Manila, Philippines. At Tijuana, Mexico, Madrid, Spain, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and Paris, France Mr. Colbert served as Consul General. Mr. Colbert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November, 2006.

Q: All right Turkey, did you know much about Turkey before?

COLBERT: I knew zip about Turkey. I could find it on the map, but no, I didn't know very much at all. In fact when I came back two years after being there my father who had a college education thought I had been in Saudi Arabia. He thought Saudi Arabia and Turkey was the same thing, different cultures, different nationalities, different language but it was sort of vague in everybody's mind just where I was.

Q: Before you went to Turkey talk a bit about your impression of the training. What did they do to get you ready? This is still the early days of the...

COLBERT: I went into the Peace Corps in '64 and the Peace Corps actually sent people in the field in late '63, so I was very early.

Q: Very early days.

COLBERT: I was in Turkey four; there were three groups that went ahead of me, two in '63 and one in early '64. So it was still a very new program particularly in Turkey. The training they lectured to you about the culture, they gave you an hour or so a day of Turkish for six weeks or so, which is basically like given aspirin to a person who has terminal cancer. It's a very difficult language, and an hour a day isn't going to hack it. They made us do folk dancing so we'd be able to show people how we danced so that we could explain our culture; it was sort of some good, some bad. It was sort of amateurish. We were sent off to be English teachers, so I was sent to a town called Isparta where there was already a volunteer who had been there a year already who spoke Turkish very well. His previous apartment mate, had been reassigned to Ankara, the capital, so I was assigned to live with this guy, which was just as well because I was totally incoherent in Turkish. I really couldn't communicate very well at all, so I had to sort of learn the language and what I was doing as I went.

Q: Going back looking at yourself, then many of the Peace Corps volunteers were people who were motivated to go out and change the world and all of that. Was that a normal spirit and did that infuse you a little?

COLBERT: I think it was George Bernard Shaw who said something about 'If you are not a Socialist when you are twenty and a Capitalist when you are forty you have neither heart nor head'?

Q: Yeah.

COLBERT: I think there was some idealism, but basically you hear this is what you are going to do, go do it. So you go and you do it. I should explain that the first year I was in a technical

school for really the dummies; the kids who weren't going to Lycée These were the people who were not going to go to school beyond age 16. Many of them were several years in the same class and too old for the grades they were. Did I make an impact on them? In that group probably I was the first person they had ever seen who wasn't Turkish; I was the first person they had ever seen who wasn't Muslim; I was the first person who had a different mannerism a different way of acting, hopefully properly; and maybe I opened some eyes simply by being different. Did I teach them English? Probably not. Did many of them benefit from my being there? I don't know.

They also recruited me to teach in a small, small village and I had to get on a bus and go about an hour and then walk in this road about two or three kilometers into this very isolated town where the only thing was a teacher training school which basically taught adolescents how to go out and teach school. I taught English there and then to spend the night, walking back to main road to catch a bus the next morning Since I was not a Muslim and male, I could not be put in a private home and there was no hotel or guest house, so a janitor each evening before going home actually made a bed for me in a classroom and I slept in the school Those people in that small village made me so welcome and those kids, I think, I made an impact on. When I learned at the beginning of the next school year I was being transferred to another town and went to village to tell the school officials, the janitor subsequently came me to say that I was the only person who had treated him as an equal in his entire life. He said he was amazed that I didn't make a class distinction. In Turkish there are three levels or ways of addressing people and I addressed him the way I addressed a social equal automatically. Probably as much because I didn't know, I didn't have command of the inferior form of address and I certainly couldn't use the superior form of address which would have been taken as mocking him if I had been smart enough to do that. But I had treated him politely and not as I came to notice people in the country treated those lower in the social strata.

Q: Where were you located in Turkey?

COLBERT: Southeastern Turkey, half way between Izmir and Antak, no just north of Anatolia east of Izmir, maybe an hour, hour and a half in from the Mediterranean. Isparta is famous for its rose oil. It's the center of rose oil production; it's the prime component of perfume.

Q: Did you get involved in...was it around you the hashish or opium business?

COLBERT: No that's around Afyon. Afyon is the Turkish word for opium and there is a town called Afyon. There was no opium grown anywhere near, no poppies near me. If there were, I was unaware of it.

Q: Well this is, you were there from when to when?

COLBERT: '64-'66.

Q: Well this is the beginning of the period of the kids having what European and American kids having their "wander jahre" (wandering year).

COLBERT: I was sort of out of the way. I think in the year I was in Isparta I think two

Australian girls came through wandering through on their around the world jaunt. But I saw no foreigners at all but I was only in Isparta for one year. I think the most dramatic thing that happened to me in Isparta was when I was walking to lunch one day and two Turkish MPs (military police) asked for my ID (identification) card. I didn't have an ID card because I wasn't a Turk; I had a little plastic laminated card that said in Turkish that I was a Peace Corps volunteer.. So I showed him this card. Of course this MP was basically illiterate or semi literate and he said, "No he wanted to see my military or my Turkish I D..." I said, "I don't have one." He said, "Well you are a deserter." I said, "No, I am not a deserter, I am an American." He said, "No, no, you are a deserter, you don't have any papers. You must be a deserter I'm taking you in." I said, "Don't you think I talk funny?" My Turkish was better at this point but it certainly wasn't wonderful. He said, "No, you are probably from Istanbul or one of those other high-falutin places and you talk like those educated people. You are a deserter." Well he had me and he was dragging me away and I would have probably ended up in Turkish boot camp when an officer came by who knew me and got me freed. So that was my incident.

Q: I take it in a Muslim area no dating and all that?

COLBERT: No, no, hmm, one Turkish senior non-commissioned officer got to know me and invited me to his home. He had two precocious teenage daughters, and this family became really friendly to me. I know once he said, "Well why don't you dance with my daughters?" He left me in the room with these two daughters who were quite open and I was terrified, terrified that he would either change his mind or worse.

But actually this family was very nice to me, they liked me a lot; Unfortunately I got transferred to another town so I lost track of them, but they were very nice. I had no Turkish female friends at all. I could speak to the Turkish female teachers at the Lycée where my friend taught, I didn't teach there so I didn't get to know them very well. Had I taught there I think probably I would have become romantically involved albeit Turkish style with one of them who was very attractive and I was attracted to but I was never at the Lycée and when I said I would come visit her family in the summer then I got assigned for a summer project too far away and couldn't and then I came back and got sent somewhere else. So that possible liaison which would probably have almost certainly resulted in marriage, because there was no other outcome. It was basically just a few how are you's and winks and then engagement. I think the NCO (non-commissioned officer) thought that I would become attracted to one of his daughters but then I got transferred out. Nothing happened, nor had I hopes in that direction...these were old adolescents but they were adolescents all the same. So I was very cautious.

I remember it's such a dichotomous society. I remember having dinner with his wife, his two daughters and with him and his son. The son and the old man said let's go for a stroll, "gezmek" (to stroll). They "gezinmeked" right to a "genhani", that's whorehouse in Turkish and invited me to go in with them. I demurred. I didn't want to go into a whorehouse, and they were really thinking what's wrong with this person. But apart from desire not to go in, I was amazed that they had gone straight from dinner at home and taken the guest whom they apparently saw a future son-in-law with them.

Q: He's a little light in the loafers.

COLBERT: They may have thought that. I like women but I don't like whorehouses and I thought this a bit strange I just left the family. We were with the wife and daughters a few minutes ago and now we are going to a whorehouse. So they went and I went on my way. There are some strange things there. This is going to make for some great reading.

Q: Where did you get transferred?

COLBERT: I was assigned to a summer language camp, which I thought was sort of a farce. It wasn't run well but that is where I was sent. I came back to find that I had been sent to a single site which was just opening up in a place called Demirci which is in the West and North of Turkey. It's in a pine forest maybe two hours south of Istanbul, a very isolated place.

Q: Was it up near the Bulgarian border?

COLBERT: No, no, no, not in Thrace. It was in Anatolia.

Q: How was it there?

COLBERT: I had two Turkish roommates; I shared an apartment with them. They had one bedroom and I had one. My Turkish got certainly better because I was the only American there. There may have been one teacher who spoke some English, but I didn't care much for him so I used Turkish all the time. The teachers were nice folks. I taught in a real junior high school, so the students were a little more motivated. I think some of them learned some English. Like many Peace Corps volunteers I think I got much more out of being in Turkey living there, working there than the people got from my being there. I hope I wasn't a negative factor but I certainly think that more benefit accrued to me than to Turkey.

Q: I think this is often the case but you know there is a rub-off on both.

COLBERT: Well I think that if you have lived totally in another society particularly in a society that is totally different you learn something that many people in the Foreign Service never do learn.

Q: I at one point was with the board of examiners, used to give oral exams, and prior I had always had the idea that Peace Corps volunteers are a bunch of idealists and they would make lousy Foreign Service officers but interviewing Peace Corps volunteers I found them much more level headed, well exposed, knowledgeable group than I had imagined.

COLBERT: Well in the '60s a lot of us came back and joined the Foreign Service. I thought for a while they were trying to kill us off because they sent us all to Vietnam, but that is another story.

Q: How did the hand of the Peace Corps rest on you, was it...?

COLBERT: Do you mean how was I supervised?

Q: Yeah.

COLBERT: They had traveling former volunteers who were inspectors who would come around and check up on you and see how you were doing. They had periodic conferences where they would call you in. So you would probably see an inspector once or twice in a year. There would be a conference once or twice, probably once a year. The farther you were away from the center the more you were on your own. I think I was probably totally on my own the second year. I think a person visited me once. But I mean your money came to your bank; it was a small amount of money to live on. You had to go to school and do your job on your own as best you could.

Q: How did you find Turkish officials, did they know how to deal with you?

COLBERT: I think many people thought I was CIA and told me so. Most people in the town just took me as foreign guest – not quite understanding how this alien dropped in on them; they were more concerned with the fact that I was Christian, American and not Muslim and not Turkish. The professional teacher class and other educated types probably thought I was there to favor the other side. That's to say they thought that I somehow was trying to do something to advance the agenda of the conservative religious right, although they could see nothing I was doing was anyway harmful, I must be favoring the other part of the dichotomy. Turkish society is a dichotomy; you've got the people who, well actually it was a three-part dichotomy – if such an expression is possible. There were the people who thought the country should be more socialist, more like eastern Germany or that way - those folks had to keep a very low profile but they were sort of left of center - but they had no real influence in society. A lot of teachers were of that persuasion but perhaps not really - just thought they were. Then you've got the people who ran the society who were basically true "Ataturkists" (Father of the Turks) and "Etats" and they wanted the country to look to West; they wanted Islam to be totally out of the government and totally out of education. They are the ones who ran things.

Then you had the vast majority of the population who were basically still in the thralls of a rather superstitious Islam. So the imams and the people who were religious were very cautious that I not do anything to attack the true way, that is to say, that I should not be a subversive in the society? I'm trying to think of the Turkish word for a non-believer. They were suspicious of me a little bit because I was a Christian; if they had known what a bad Christian I was they probably would have been more suspicious!

Anyway, so all these folks from these three different perspectives are looking at me and watching. They are all very friendly with me but they all think you know, hmmm. This is not to say that they are not the most hospitable, friendly, helpful people in the world. I think Turks are probably just that. If you want to have a friend, have a Turk; if you want to have an enemy don't let it be Turkish'.

I don't think I left with any enemies; I think I left with some friends but even those who have education or at least limited education can sometimes trip you up. One Turkish teacher that I taught with saw a picture of my younger sister - she was in college at the time. He said he wanted to marry her and that I should "give her to him", that is to say, I should deliver her up for

him to marry. I explained that I really couldn't do that and I said I couldn't do that in Turkish and that's "Yapamaz" (I can't do it). That is the 'could not' form. He said, "No, "istemez" (you don't want to do it)." It was inconceivable to him that I didn't have the power as the older son to say, "Carolyn, come over here and marry Ali because I want you to." This was a person who was a graduate of teachers training school so sometimes you ran into strange issues.

Q: Did you have trouble with the local Imam? Did they stone you anything like that?

COLBERT: Never. I made a conscience effort whenever religion came up in school to not discuss it. I never said anything derogatory about Islam, the few encounters that I had with imams I was very polite and I listened to them and they listened to me. No, no problems at all.

Q: What would you do in the evenings? Go out with the boys to have souvlaki at the café or something?

COLBERT: Well, there wasn't a great deal to do. You could listen to the radio, you could read a book, or you could go to the "chaihane" (teahouse). Also, you could go for a walk, and, of course, write letters.

Q: Could you get out and around much?

COLBERT: On weekends and school holidays you could go places. You usually went by bus, always went by bus, in fact.

Q: Were there any political crisis while you were there?

COLBERT: None that would impact on me. I mean I'm sure there were things that were going on in Ankara but I was in two small towns.

Q: Every once in a while they would have a coup or something like that.

COLBERT: No, nothing that impacted on me at all.

Q: At this time did you have any contact with that strange outfit known as the American embassy or consular?

COLBERT: No, well that's not true. I got to know a vice consul in Izmir during my second year. He was the most junior person in the consulate general, and I know he had this absolutely grand apartment on the waterfront with a view of the Izmir bay. And he had Heineken, he had bacon, and he had ham. I could always crash there if I wanted. A very nice man whose name I've long since forgotten and probably must be long since retired. He later married an Indonesian I think. So I occasionally would see him. Then I met a German-American couple; he was a teacher in the DOD US military high school in Izmir. So I would often crash with them instead. But no, I was in the consulate in Izmir once because a Peace Corps volunteer girlfriend of mine, not girlfriend girl friend, but friend who had left her passport behind in Izmir and had gone back to her Peace Corps site. I had to take her passport into the consulate and give it to them so they could get it

back to her. The embassy? I went in the embassy when I left to get a tourist passport, no not really. I took the Foreign Service written exam in Izmir so I must have taken it in the consulate but I don't remember.

Q: What prompted you to do that?

COLBERT: I was living overseas and finding I could do that and I needed to have a job and in the back of my mind was I had thought about this and now I had two languages and I had two years of life experience overseas and a masters degree and thought the world would be my oyster.

Q: Sure. You took the exam this would be in?

COLBERT: I took the exam the first time 1964, and I failed it because my math score was low; that was when I was in Isparta. So I got a math book and boned up on my math to bring it up to the minimal level to pass.. I mentioned earlier that my math was never my forte. So then I passed it but I didn't get the notification for a long, long time and when I got it they said you've got to take the oral and I said, "I'm in Turkey." So they said, "The deadline will pass before you get back." I made a fuss and they agreed that I could take it when I got back.

Q: So this would have been, you came back and when did you take the oral then?

COLBERT: I came back in August of '66 and I took the oral probably in September or October. No, maybe late October, early November because I know they told me that it would be six months to a year before I could join so I scurried around looking for something else but then I got in right away. So I took the oral in late fall and I was in the Foreign Service in January of '67.

LLOYD JONNES
Program Officer, USAID
Ankara (1964-1967)

Lloyd Jonnes was born in Ohio in 1924. He graduated from Antioch College in 1948 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1945. Working for the ECA and USAID programs, Mr. Jonnes served in overseas posts including Switzerland, Austria, the United Kingdom, Libya, Turkey, Vietnam, and Indonesia. He was interviewed August 19, 1986 by W. Haven North.

JONNES: I was transferred to Turkey to be the program officer and economist at the AID mission there. The assignment proved to be a remarkable three-year period. A new mission director, James Grant, an extraordinarily energetic, intelligent person. The work in Turkey was in every sense of the word development work. We had a very large aid program there, both in technical assistance and in large investments. The Turks were in the third year following a military coup a coup that had been precipitated by Turkey's national bankruptcy at the end of the

1950's as a consequence of remarkably irrational economic policies. The military had intervened in 1960, had deposed the prime minister, foreign minister and finance minister and ultimately had executed the three men.

By 1964 they, the Turks, were in the midst of an intensive period of development planning. They had a national development plan in place. They had called upon the OECD and then the OECD to help them make this transition out of bankruptcy and into more powerful development. The OECD had agreed to do this, setting up a consortium of aid donors to help Turkey directly. Also of great interest the OECD had concluded a massive study of Turkey's public investment policies, particularly in their state enterprises. These policies had been one of the principal causes of their economic woes.

When Ataturk took power in 1922, Turkey was truly an undeveloped, agricultural economy. He, Ataturk, and his colleagues were very much concerned to begin to put into place a modern industrial economy. At that time when they looked around for models, there were the Italians, there were the Russians, both of whom put tremendous emphasis of course on public ownership of productive facilities. This was the route that Ataturk followed generally in the manufacturing sector of the economy. And their experiences here were in financial terms disastrous because whatever the branch of industry: sugar, textiles, machine tools, tires, you name the branch of industry, they followed monopolistic, dirigistic policies to the point that the manufacturing sector had become one of the driving forces of their bankruptcy.

The OECD did a series of studies for them in 1960-61, producing a set of recommendations for the government to follow. The government agreed to do it, made a series of institutional changes, but they still did not really do away with the state economic enterprises. So the major player in the Turkish economy was the Turkish government so far as production was concerned. And this was a continuing problem.

We as an AID mission had a variety of priorities. We were helping in the financing of new power sources, most notably, the large dam on the Euphrates, the Keban Dam. The European Investment Bank and several of the European governments were also involved in its financing. We were concerned to help the Turks move away from the government as the economic entrepreneur, using various devices: by setting up sub-lending organizations for private entrepreneurs, by encouraging the investment banks to do more lending to private entrepreneurs. But at the same time we had substantial technical assistance in education with the objective of providing the Turks with well-trained business people.

Q: What was the level of resources there?

JONNES: As I recall that the US government was providing about \$200 million a year, including the technical assistance program, PL 480, and development lending.

Q: There was PL 480 money?

JONNES: Yes.

One of our principal objects was to make sure that the consortium was working. So one consequence of this was that I spent a great deal of time working with the secretary and with the chairman of the consortium. The latter's chairman was a German, Herr von Mangoldt, and the executive secretary was an American, Walter Stettner. They headquartered in Paris.

Q: But the World Bank was not down there in this?

JONNES: Not at that time, as their relationship had suffered during the anguish of Turkey's bankruptcy.. But in a real sense, we were helping the Turks in reestablishing their nation's international economic status, not only with new aid but through restructuring their external indebtedness.

At the time it seemed to us for a variety of reasons that on quite moderate assumptions Turkey had it within its power over the following five years to reach effective self-sustaining growth.

One of the underlying assumptions had absolutely nothing to do with anything we had ever done. Rather, it arose from the construction in 1961 of the Berlin wall, the wall between East and West Germanies. The wall stopped the flow of refugees from the East to the West, and the Germans had to start looking elsewhere for large numbers of workers they needed in their expanding economy. One major source was Turkey. By 1964 the Germans already had more than a million Turks there. Among the questions this presence raised was "What about the transfer of the financial earnings of these workers back to their loved ones in Turkey?" And this quickly became a major source of foreign exchange for the Turks, foreign exchange that eased many of their external financing problems.

Beyond this windfall, Turkish exports were doing very well, they were beginning to produce good quality textiles at more than reasonable prices and they were making life very difficult for other producers in the European markets. And much of the textile production was actually private. The tourism industry was beginning to grow rapidly. The Europeans were beginning to realize that Turkey was just a marvelous place to find the sun and find a cheap holiday.

Thus, it seemed to us that within five years or so the Turks should be in a position to reach a position of de facto economic independence. And in point of fact, lo and behold by 1971, they were in any technical sense, that their foreign exchange situation and balance of payments were in order. They managed to undo their success because of their own internal political problems, including a great measure of domestic terrorism.

Q: How was it working with the Turks at that time?

JONNES: It was very satisfactory. We succeeded in establishing excellent working relations with the senior economic people, with the officials of the Ministry of Finance, and with people in the private sector. In any event, our first chore was to persuade the Turks we were there to help in the development process. Our concern was also to make it possible for our military cooperation to continue, but we had shifted the emphasis, and they had confidence in this.

Q: What was our primary interest?

JONNES: Our primary interest always was to make sure that the Turks were there to hold the right wing of NATO. Remember, we're still in the middle of the Cold War, We had, as you know, major radar bases, listening posts, all over Turkey, and at least until the Cuban missile crisis in '62, we had missiles in Turkey.

Q: Did the bases reflect a major transfer of resources to Turkey or was it not really? The fact that we had our bases there must have meant a large flow of funds into the Turkish economy.

JONNES: I'm not sure that's correct. The American troop presence was minimal. In fact thinking back on the balance of payments calculation, I think the earnings if you will from the American presence were small. So many of the bases were out in the true backwoods where there was little or nothing for the troops to buy.

Q: Did the Turks consider our economic assistance a quid pro quo?

JONNES: I don't really know how they thought of it. The people with whom we worked in the ministry of finance, and in the planning organization and with the prime minister took our aid as an effort to get them over their difficulties, to make their transition to a more modern economy. Now, many of the Europeans at the time were members of the consortium. The Economic Community had concluded agreements with the Turks under which Turkey had associate membership in the Community. But although there were dates given for when this would proceed toward full membership, it's significant that here we are in 1998 and the Turks are still not full members. The transitional phase was loosely defined. But the point I'm making is that most of us working on economic matters with the Turks were reasonably confident that the nation was within striking distance of self-sustaining growth and that this in and of itself was a reasonable justification for helping the Turks.

Q: How big was the mission?

JONNES: We must have had 150 Americans and then a number of contract people.

Q: Mostly working on industry?

JONNES: Not really. As always, the larger numbers are working on technical assistance which is very labor intensive, working on support of the Middle-east Technical University at Ankara, working on a series of schools to support commercial skills: accounting, all the business skills. Public health programs, particularly family planning programs, which I guess are now a no-no on our side. The population growth in Turkey was on the average of 3 percent per annum, and the country is still growing. Working on public administration. That was part of the work at the middle-east technical university on public administration. We had contracts with Cornell, contracts with Michigan State.

Q: What of those programs did you think was most effective? Were they effective?

JONNES: Thirty years later, that is a difficult question, and I don't think I can really even try to

answer it.

Let me go in a different direction. One curious aspect of Turkey at that time was that Islamic fundamentalism had not really begun to show itself. It was very clear there was a problem with the Kurdish minority, but even those problems had not yet really begun to surface except that the population was moving in large numbers into the cities, and a lot of people who were moving into the cities, into Izmir and into Istanbul were from the far eastern part of Turkey where the Kurds are. As the Kurds moved in it was very clear that their customs differed considerably from the customs of their Turkish fellows in the cities. The Kurds tended to solve their problems with violence rather than words, and therein lay the origins of serious problems ten years down the way.

Q: You were working mainly on macroeconomic issues?

JONNES: Mainly on macroeconomic issues, working mainly on making sure the consortium was in good shape, and of course always working with our friends in Washington.

Q: Was there much concern about these parastatal and the need to privatize these big corporations?

JONNES: Yes, quite a bit of emphasis on this out of our Washington offices. As I noted before there had been this tremendous work that the OECD people had put in just before the change to the OECD, this survey of the state economic enterprises and recommendations for dealing with the problems that they perceived in the state economic enterprises.

Q: Were those addressed, were there some changes?

JONNES: Oh yes, they had created a new state investment bank that was to keep very careful tabs on the financing and the P and L lines of the companies. A major problem had been that nobody really knew what was going on in the individual firms. These firms were also highly politicized.

Q: Were we able to persuade them to spin them off into private...?

JONNES: It would be a fascinating study, one I'd be delighted to do, to go back now and see what actually happened. It's very clear now that the last thirty -five years changed the nature of these enterprises. There has been the emergence of a large entrepreneurial class in Turkey now. And this whole question became one of the central political questions of the Turks. Suleyman Demirel became prime minister, (today he is the president of Turkey), in 1965, having made the problem of the state enterprises one of his rallying cries of the election. He was saying, "Look at these incredible misinvestments that we have made over the years, that we are getting nothing out of them except maybe some jobs, but we're getting nothing out of them in terms of economic return. And this is a situation that cannot continue if Turkey is going to be economically viable." He won the election. But how fast and to what extent the effective role of the state enterprises changed is quite a different matter.

Q: Would you consider Turkey then one of our successes?

JONNES: I'd certainly consider it one of our successes, but there were obviously elements there that we never took into account, such as the problems with ethnic groups, the Kurds and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, all of which have had powerful effects on Turkey's economic growth. Yet those are problems we of the US are hardly in a position to speak to, let alone help in devising solutions. They went through a terrible time in the mid to late 70's that brought yet another military intervention. Terrorism was running rampant, and I think, as a personal opinion, that this terrorism was in large part Kurdish in origin.. It was billed as a leftish - rightish tug of war, but I think it had a great deal to do with the Kurds. My wife and I visited Turkey in 1979, and the country was truly falling apart. Within the year they had a coup. It seems almost every ten years this happens. And now one sees the emergence of a major Islamic fundamentalist movement, and where this is going to lead Turkey I don't know.

Q: Do you think that was in any way a reaction to the development that was taking place?

JONNES: Probably in some part, but this I just don't know. My hunch would be that as the Turkish economy grew, and it has grown, as Turkey became increasingly associated with the European economy, the benefits of this were simply just not that visible to everybody. At no time did Ataturk really succeed in breaking the century-long lifestyle of the people in the back country, in the villages. They certainly admired Ataturk as the conquering general but when he sought to remove religion from state control, when he abolished the Caliphate and banished them, he never persuaded the villagers that they should abandon their religion, and the conflict between the villagers and the central government I think has grown because of this, that the villagers have been left behind in the social development process.

Q: Were much of our programs or efforts, or the government program concerned with the villages...?

JONNES: No, I'm talking about how the Turkish economy has moved long since we had anything to do with it.

Q: But at that time were our programs at all oriented toward ...?

JONNES: We had done a great deal in the early years of our program to help agriculture, particularly by providing machinery for wheat farming, by building or financing the construction of the whole system for moving wheat to market, but the level of rainfall in Turkey is, certainly up on the plateau, about 15 inches a year, and this is just at the break point, if you miss a little bit why you're in real trouble. One might almost think of our history out on the great plains, it's almost exactly the same, where you get about 15 inches of rain a year, but some years you get less, and when you get less you are in serious trouble. This happens there in Anatolia, and what can one say.

Let me go back to one of your earlier questions. Certainly one of our most successful technical assistance operations I think is that in the field of transportation, highway construction and management of highway transportation. Our help came in large part in the 1950's and led to an

excellent system of roads in the country, and even more importantly, a bureaucracy that could deal with maintenance of these roads. Now here in the District of Columbia we have the difficulty of understanding the need for maintenance of facilities! But the Turks managed to get this early on, at least for the highway system.

Q: Were our ideas of rural development, community development, not considered?

JONNES: Well you're talking about a large country with some ethnic problems. I think the Turkish interest in helping with the development of the Kurdish villages was minimal, and for many years the Turks simply would deny that there was any Kurdish population.

Q: What about areas outside that were not Kurdish areas? Was there much concern?

JONNES: Not too much. Of course the Turkish military gathered in through the draft many of the young men from the villages. Some of the people from the villages also went to Germany to work. The exposure to the outside world through these sources would be considerable, but still today, the Turkish village is still caught in time and can be an extraordinary mix of new technology and age-old primitive practices. To say the least, it's not at all a simple matter. We as the United States did not have, as I recall, any major village development programs. There were studies being done by sociologists, but these were not in my time translated into programs of any sort..

Q: But the health programs, the population programs, they were all mostly urban-centered?

JONNES: Not really, for the Turks were beginning to try to reach out with small health clinics in the villages...There were Johns Hopkins people in the public health sector. Obviously if you're going to run a national family planning program, you have to have a system and in Turkey village clinics were under consideration. I do not know what happened finally.

Q: Are there any institutions that you know about today that were essentially started through the AID program?

JONNES: Of course. The highway administration for example is one. The Hajatepi Hospital in Ankara which received large amounts of American counterpart was headed by, close to a genius, who persuaded so many of the Turkish doctors who had trained in America to come back from the States and work in Turkey, which was a major sales job. The Middle-east Technical University in Ankara . The iron and steel industry in Turkey is a direct consequence of our investment and counsel. Both the DSI and the Toprak Su agencies, dealing with the management of water and soil conservation were strongly supported by the US and are an essential element of the Turkish government.

One of the more fascinating aspects of working in Turkey was that one constantly bumped into Turkish pessimism. They had been of course at one time the conquerors and rulers of part of Europe and Africa. They were in Vienna twice, in 1525 and 1683. They possessed a mighty empire, and then it began to ebb.. In the nineteenth century, the nation became the "sick man of Europe." For much of the twentieth century they have been plagued with, "How do we deal with

our national fate?"

Ataturk's genius was in a sense similar to that of Washington's as he insisted that Turkey was Anatolia and the Turks should accept this as their national territory and avoid entangling foreign alliances. He made it possible for the Turks intellectually to accept that they were not the Ottoman empire anymore. Today Anatolia is the heartland of Turkey, but in earlier centuries Anatolia was nothing. He taught them to, with the possible exception of Cyprus, not to be involved in foreign adventures. And this was one of the keynotes of his genius. But so many of the Turks when they look outside, when they look at the European nations and look at us, they have this deeply rooted pessimism. And I think that if we in the AID Mission did nothing else we managed to communicate some degree of optimism to our Turkish friends about their future, and to persuade them that there was no objective reason for them to consider themselves in such a pessimistic way. "You can make it. You have it within your own power. You're doing it."

JOHN KELLY
Vice Consul
Adana (1964-1966)

Economic Officer/Political-Military Officer
Ankara (1966-1967)

Ambassador John Kelly was born in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin in 1939 and raised in Atlanta, Georgia, where he was raised. Ambassador Kelly graduated from Emory University with a degree in history and then attended Duke University Law School. Ambassador Kelly served in Bangkok, Songkhla, and Paris. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on December 12, 1995.

KELLY: The Adana assignment was as vice-consul -- the third officer of a three man post. For a while, I was somewhat envious of my colleagues who had managed assignments to the major capitals, but I was reading Harold Nicholson's *Diplomacy* and discovered that his first assignment had been to Adana. He noted that it was far better for a young officer to start his career in Adana because in a small post like that, he would learn to do all tasks whereas if he were to be the junior officer in a mighty delegation in Constantinople, he would be assigned only a tiny portion of the post's responsibilities. An officer at a large post would take years to learn what his colleague would learn in weeks in a small post. I think Nicholson was absolutely right.

Before leaving Washington, I attended the Near East study course, that lasted for three weeks. I also read every book on the area I could find. There was a lot of material about south and southeast Turkey, all of which I tried to absorb. I also talked to some people who had served in Turkey, including the desk, although I must say that he was far too busy to give me much time.

Not all of the class was assigned to consular positions. In fact, we received a variety of assignments. Following the eight weeks of the A-100 course, we then took four weeks of consular training -- all of us in the class. That was followed by four months of French and

qualified to get off language probation, having mastered the language well enough to pass with a 3-3 score. Just as I was finishing language training, we had a son -- David. That prevented my wife from traveling; so in the beginning of June, I boarded a plane in New York and flew directly to Ankara, where I changed to a domestic flight and arrived in Adana. There I was met by people from the Consulate. The next morning, I met the Principal Officer -- Thomas W. Davis, Jr -- who expressed some amazement that I had arrived because he had sent me a telegram a couple of weeks earlier suggesting that I wait until my son was old enough to travel so that the Kelly family could arrive all at one time. I told him that I appreciated his thoughtfulness, but that unfortunately, his message had never reached me.

Davis was a wonderful teacher. He was not a great success as a Foreign Service officer, if we measure that by promotions and an ambassadorial appointment that he so deeply craved, but he was a wonderful teacher. As I said, I was the low man on the totem pole. I started as the post's consular officer -- passports, visas, etc -- and the administrative officer. I also was responsible for a biweekly economic report. This range of assignments was a reflection of Davis' view that junior officers should get their feet in all the activities of the Foreign Service. Later, I branched out and did some political reporting as well. Davis spent a lot of time with me, talking to me about the Foreign Service and its different dimensions. Even though there were only three Americans in the Consulate, Davis devised a training schedule that did give me an opportunity to all facets of Foreign Service work; he also spent time teaching me about various techniques used by Foreign Service officers in doing their tasks. Once, all the junior officers in Turkey were brought to Ankara for a conference -- orientation and training. Davis told me that I should listen carefully and observe who addressed us and how it was done. When I returned to Adana, he asked me which officers I found impressive and which were lackluster and why. Davis was very consciousness about his junior officer training responsibilities. He told me a lot of lore about why certain people succeeded and others did not.

I knew practically nothing about administrative work. I first thought that it was a burden because I didn't really know how to do anything. I was asked to be the Class A cashier -- I was bonded -- I approved all the vouchers, the procurement documents; I wrote the annual reports on language training, on motor vehicles expenses, a post differential questionnaire and heaven only knows how many other annual reports were required. At the beginning, I was of course at the mercy of the local staff, but I soon learned enough to be able to review their work. The local staff was a mixture of some very competent and some less competent people; many had been with the Consulate for many years, but even the "old timers" made many mistakes. We had to dismiss one of my consular local employees for taking bribes. So I learned early in my career about how one gets evidence and acting on it by dismissing an employee -- it is not an easy or pleasant task.

I must say in retrospect that our political reporting was quite shallow. There was little in Adana that really was of interest to the US, except the local politics prior to an election, but near the city was a Turkish Air Force-NATO base that was of politico-military interest. The US had a large US military contingent assigned to that base; it had been the base from which U-2s had taken off -- Gary Powers, etc. -- At one time, we had stationed B-47s there. When I was in Adana, we had F-4s fighters and EB-66 reconnaissance planes; the old U-2 were still there although they had not been flown for four years although the Air Force still had a U-2 detachment -- 10-10 -- assigned there. So the air base had a strategic function -- the bombers -- a tactical function -- the fighters --

and a large intelligence collection function. The American presence created a major consular work-load for us; the bulk of the passports issued were to Americans service personnel. Then of course there were the usual "American citizen protection" responsibilities because the airmen had their usual tangles with the Turkish law. We spent considerable time extricating them from those difficulties and when that was not possible, seeing to it that they received a fair trial in Turkish courts. So I had an early lesson also in the NATO "Status of Forces" agreement particularly the intricate question of when a "duty certificate" could or could not be issued. I found the consular work interesting, although I doubt that I would have liked to have a career in that work. But doing it for a year was very good for two reasons: a) it taught me a lot about human nature and b) it gave me a stock of anecdotes to use at parties for the rest of my life.

The consular district covered all of south-eastern Turkey to the Iran and Iraq borders. So we attempted to report on the Kurdish issue, which was alive then and still is today. We tried to analyze how accepting they were of Turkish rule and how politically active they were. We traveled widely into Eastern Turkey into the predominantly Kurdish areas. One American member of the Consulate staff did that every month, primarily to distribute 400-600 Social Security checks to wonderful, old retirees who emigrated to the US before WW I, had worked in the US -- mostly in the automobile and textile factories -- and then returned home to their mountain villages for their retirement. Their checks enabled them to live quite well in Turkey. One interesting aspect of this double migration was that many of those who had emigrated to the US had not married in the US because there were not enough Muslim women there, but waited until they returned to Turkey before taking a wife. Even after returning for retirement, they sired children, even though some were actually bed ridden giving rise to the question of how they had managed to father a child. With each child, the Social Security benefits rose and it happened frequently enough to give rise to some suspicions about true parenthood. Because of the likelihood of fraud, the Social Security Administration in Baltimore would provide travel funds to enable us to go to Eastern Turkey every month to distribute the checks and to investigate potential abuses. We used these travel opportunities to cover political matters at the same time. I must say that we did a great job for the Social Security Administration, but a somewhat less than satisfactory job of political reporting on the Kurds. Part of that was due to the language gap and part because the Kurds worked very much "underground"; they were reticent to talk to us because any Kurd suspected of supporting separatism or autonomy was subject to severe penalty by the Turkish authority. Therefore the political active Kurds tended to work clandestinely; in fact, it was naive to think that an American representative could enter into a meaningful dialogue with a Kurd or even to take the political "temperature" of the region. We did feel some undercurrents and there were occasional clashes between Kurds and Turkish authorities which told us that violence was not too far below the surface, but it certainly was not nearly as active then as it is now. We also have to remember that Southeast Turkey had been an area closed to foreigners until 1964, unless they had a permit from the Turkish authorities. When I got to Adana in 1965, the area had been open for just one year for any traveler, but the Turkish government was very apprehensive about what foreigners might be up to and kept a close eye on us as we traveled through that area.

I was kept very busy in Adana and I was very happy there. We had a large apartment which was cold in the winter -- no central heating -- with one kerosene heater in the living room to heat all the rooms. But we were young then and enthusiastic and loved every minute. We became friends

not only with Turks, but also with Americans at the base. One of the sad episodes concerned an American pilot, whose wedding to an American nurse we attended; soon after that he was sent to Vietnam and in a couple of weeks he was shot down. That really shocked me and it is an episode I'll never forget. The relationship of the Consulate to the American military authorities was excellent during most of my tour in Adana; towards the end a new Colonel was assigned as the American base commander and then we had some problems. On his first day at the base, the American Colonel refused to pay a call on the Turkish base commander, who on paper at least was the "boss" of the base. So our Consul had to tell the Embassy of the problem; that was followed by direct orders to the American Colonel that he would pay a call on his Turkish counterpart and on any one else that the American Consul deemed advisable. That made for a rocky US civilian-military relationship which had its ups and downs thereafter.

I can remember clearly the spectacle of rescue teams flying over the Black Sea looking for pilots whose planes had gone down in the waters. When they were not found or were not alive, there was a real pall over the Air Force base.

I loved my first year in the Foreign Service. I was almost sorry when I was transferred after only 14 months in Adana to Ankara. This transfer was a result of an Inspection Team's recommendation, after one day's visit, which stated that Adana was not a good first assignment post because the officer's experience was so narrow and limited that his or her career would be stunted. The Inspectors recommended that the junior officer's position in Adana be abolished and be replaced by a regular consular officer position. The Department accepted that recommendation, despite the Consul's objections. I was the third "rotational" junior officer who had been assigned to Adana; I don't think any of my predecessors suffered from their full two year tours in Adana. The Embassy did not intervene, to the best of my knowledge; so I was transferred to the Embassy in Ankara so that my training could be "broadened" -- I don't know what more I could have done than I was doing in Adana. It was obvious that the inspectors had not read Harold Nicholson.

In Ankara, I was initially assigned as the junior person in the Economic section. This was at a time when the assistance mission and the Economic section were ostensibly integrated. The Economic section was physically located in the aid mission building; the Economic Counselor had the title of Associate Director of the assistance mission. That mission was huge -- 400 or 500 Americans. The State contingent in this "integrated" operation was 10 officers, some of whom were not really State Department employees. As the tenth officer in that Section, I had very little to do. I discovered that very early into my new assignment. I think I was assigned to the Economic section to fill a vacancy, although there may have been a training aspect to it since I had not done any economic work in Adana.

So partly to fill my time, I started taking language training -- two hours per day. I also read a lot of economic text books that I borrowed from the Ankara University library. But despite all these extra-curricular activities, I found the assignment very boring; it was my first and last experience with boredom in a Foreign Service assignment. I had practically nothing to do. The Counselor -- Randolph Williams -- wanted me to spend the first few weeks becoming oriented. That essentially meant browsing through files. When I tired of that, I asked Williams for a specific assignment or task. I wanted to do something on my own; the attendance at a very few meetings

was not very exciting or challenging, even though I may have been the note-taker. Williams asked me to take a look at the Turkish State Railroads, which was in the process of buying some railroad cars. He believed that was a piece of action in which a US manufacturer might well be interested. I was asked to make study of the market potential of the Turkish railways. He suggested that I start by reading all available material, which I did for several days. I then went back to Williams and suggested that I was ready to talk to the railway officials. He thought that was a little premature and that I was a little too junior for that; he thought that a more senior officer should make those calls. That really frustrated me; I was almost on a state of panic because I thought that I was being totally stifled. But then, by sheer coincidence, a telegram came from the Department announcing that President Johnson was going to make a tour of the Pacific and that the Department was looking for junior officers to assist in the support of this trip. The Department had designated two junior officers in Ankara to help out and we were instructed to leave for Wellington, New Zealand within 48 hours. Another junior officer -- Bob Blaise -- and I would work for the advance team.

So the two of us left for Wellington to help the Embassy, which was very small, and the advance team to get ready for Johnson and his entourage. We flew thirty-six hours to get there. Willy Woodward, a political appointee, was in charge. Idar Rimestad was the senior State Department representative and we worked for him. I didn't know the first thing about Presidential visits or about New Zealand, as a matter of fact. When we arrived, we were housed on a ship because Wellington only had a few hotels that were all booked up. The ship was an inter-island ferry, named the *SS Hinomoa* -- better known as the *Tilting Hilton*. The ship was tied up to the pier, but it rolled enough to make one Secret Service agent very sea sick. I slept for about twenty hours catching up on what I had lost on the way from Ankara. I then reported to the Embassy, where I was told that I would be in charge of airport arrivals and departures and the motor pool. These were not subjects with which I had much experience, but I plunged in and did what seemed sensible to me. It was an interesting and, in retrospect, a fun experience which gave me something to do contrasted to Ankara.

When I returned to Ankara, I was met with the welcomed news that the junior officer in the Politico-Military section (known as Mutual Security Affairs section) had been transferred directly to Asmara, Ethiopia, leaving a vacancy for me to fill. I never returned to the economic section, but started on my career path in politico-military instead. That work I found stimulating and fulfilling. That section, which was a separate section reporting to the DCM and ambassador, consisted of three officers: Frank Cash was the Counselor for Mutual Security affairs, Bob Pugh was the second officer -- he later became an ambassador -- and I was the third. It was a great situation for me. Cash was another boss who had an interest in teaching junior officers. He was very good. Both he and Pugh were nonsense people. We had a lot of work, generated primarily by the large US military presence in Turkey, which also got us involved in NATO issues. Cash and Pugh would give as much work as I could handle; they were not inhibited because I was only a junior officer.

The experience I had had in Adana stood me in good stead; I knew something about the issues as they arose at bases; what the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) covered and the rights and privileges enjoyed by US military in Turkey. That enabled me to become a working member of the staff rather quickly. I didn't need a long learning curve. SOFA issues arose regularly, both in

specific issues and during bi-monthly meetings we would have with a Turkish negotiating team consisting of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff. In those sessions we would discuss such things as privileges that other NATO countries may have already granted, but which the Turks had not. SOFA issues were unending and a continual subject of discussion. We were always trying to expand the coverage of the SOFA; the core privileges had long been established and acknowledged, but the Turkish bureaucracy was terrible and the most mundane matters, such as custom clearances, often became nightmares. But we would always try to get more privileges. We would build a facility for a specific purpose and then the Turkish Foreign Ministry would complain that we were going beyond the agreed upon requirement and trying to build something extra. We in the Embassy would not have known that, but undoubtedly some American military units went beyond agreed construction plans. There were a lot of US military who felt that if Turkey was really a US ally we should be able to do what we pleased there. The SOFA was in fact our Bible; Frank and Bob knew it thoroughly; I knew the sections for which I was responsible, but they were very familiar with the whole tome. I probably spent part of every day in the office on some SOFA problem or other. Of course, the Judge Advocate's office of the US military command was also thoroughly familiar with SOFA; they had some very good people working on these issues as did the JUSMAT. Many of the problems arose in units that were commanded by some general who resided outside of Turkey. For example, there was a unit called AFTAC (Air Force Tactical Application Command). They operated the seismic network established to detect nuclear explosions. AFTAC had several stations in Turkey, which reported to a command stationed in Las Vegas. The general in command might visit Turkey once every three years, so that he could not possibly be familiar with SOFA. His units were assigned for the US Logistic Group in Turkey (TUSLOG), but in fact they got their support and orders from Las Vegas. They didn't pay much attention to TUSLOG because their careers depended on performance ratings written in Nevada.

As I said, I enjoyed PM work immensely; I liked the people I worked for and with and I was a happy employee. The then Ambassador, Parker T. Hart, had only recently succeeded Raymond Hare, who had been the Ambassador while I was in Adana. The DCM -- Ed Martin -- was a wonderful officer -- knowledgeable, articulate; but he didn't need to become involved in politico-military affairs because Frank Cash didn't really need any help. Martin tried to steer the Ambassador, but he, and all others, were not very successful at it.

Hart's relationship with the US military was not particularly close to the US or Turkish military. I don't think he related to the US military's problems well. I can remember one instance when the US military became very upset with Hart for what I thought were very good reasons. The incident happened on June 2, 1967 -- Italian National Day. The UN forces had been withdrawn from the Sinai giving rise to the likelihood of war in the Middle East. The "Six Day" war started on June 5, as a matter of fact. At the time, the US had a squadron of fighters stationed in Jordan, with Jordanian markings -- I don't know why. Someone in Washington in late May or early June came to the conclusion that it would not be prudent to have an American fighter squadron in Jordan, particularly one that flew under Jordanian markings, if war broke out. So the US decided that they would have to fly out in a hurry. The Embassy got a flash message from the Department instructing the Ambassador to seek immediate permission from the Turkey authorities to transfer the aircraft from Jordan. The explanation of why they were flying

Jordanian markings was not very convincing, but it was made clear that there was no time to have the planes repainted. The American general in charge of US forces in Turkey got an information copy of this urgent message; he naturally was eager that the Washington instructions be followed. When the message came to the Embassy, it was given to Cash for action because the Ambassador was at the Italian National day reception. Frank called me in, gave me the message and told me to scurry to the reception and give the Ambassador the message -- in private. I was also instructed to suggest to the Ambassador that since all the Turkish high officials were also at the reception he might wish to avail himself of the opportunity and talk to the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense or any high Turkish official; Frank thought that the clearance could be gotten right there and then. So I hightailed to the Italian Embassy and went through the receiving line. I had met the Italian Ambassador before; so he knew that I was not on the guest list, but he was very charming, greeting me like all the other guests and thanking me for coming. I then rushed into the large reception area where there were many, many guests eating canapes and drinking looking for Hart. I couldn't find him anywhere. In my search, I bumped into our Air Attaché, Colonel Brady; I decided that he might be a good source for advice, which was a mistake. I pulled Brady away from the crowd and showed him the telegram, hoping that he might pick up the ball in the absence of the Ambassador. He said that he wouldn't get near that issue. Finally, I found Hart and I took him away from the crowd and showed him the telegram. He looked at me and wondered why I was at the reception, bothering him. He said he couldn't read it right then and there because of the presence of other people who had joined him. So I half dragged him into the men's room where he read the telegram. The Soviet Military Attaché came in to use the facility and I thought that I had made a major mistake. But Hart got through the telegram and put into his pocket with a comment that he would take care of it. So I left and reported to Cash what had transpired. We then waited and waited for a word from the Ambassador; nothing was heard. Finally, Cash tracked the Ambassador down having lunch somewhere. Hart said that he had not taken any action; he had not raised the matter with any Turkish officials at the reception because he didn't think it was appropriate. Cash, loyal as he was, showed some disgust and hung up. He then went rushing to the Foreign Ministry to see the Secretary General and to try to get the clearance. Needless to say, the American officers, who learned of this episode, were dismayed and thereafter viewed Hart with some disdain because he refused to discuss an urgent piece of business because he thought that the site was not "appropriate". In fact, the Turks gave permission rather readily and the deployment went well without any difficulties, even though the planes had taken off from Jordan before they actually had permission to land in Turkey. But this incident and his general demeanor towards the military made Hart somewhat less than a hero in the eyes of the American military.

I should also note that Hart was not very much respected by the Turks. I went with him as note taker on several calls when he was supposed to be delivering demarches. Hart would talk about everything except the purpose of his visit, but as he was leaving he would mumble something about how useful it would be if the Turks would do whatever the demarche called for. We would then return to the Embassy where I would write a brief report. Hart would invariably rewrite the report fictionalizing his role and his presentation, emphasizing how vigorous he had been in making demand of the Turks. Those reports were pure fiction; it was part of my education.

The Mutual Security Affairs section had close relationships with the military. Cash had been a West Point graduate; he knew his stuff. So it was a natural fit. With the Turkish military, we had

an arm's length relationship. We had good relations with the Foreign Ministry and the civilians in the Defense Ministry, but the Turkish military at that time was not prepared to have close contacts with the American Embassy. We were not their natural contacts; we were "diplomats" and they probably didn't completely trust us. The Turkish military would talk to the American general in charge of JUSMAT (the Joint United States Military Assistance Team) and the general in charge of TUSLOG (the American Air force units based in Turkey). I think they would have talked to the Ambassador because he was the Ambassador, but they were not interested in talking to lower level diplomatic officials. There was still a fair amount of paranoia in Turkey at the time; Westerns were still viewed with some suspicion. The leftist press was always accusing the CIA of meddling into everything in Turkey.

The annual security assistance budget submission was primarily the responsibility of JUSMAT. They worked very hard on that and we would work with them and help wherever we could. In those days, JCS had issued many taskers -- primarily the JSOP (Joint Strategic Objective Plan). So there was a lot of paper work, which the JUSMAT took very seriously and put a lot of work into completing these reports. We in the Mutual Security Assistance section met regularly and worked closely with them; in fact, we were all on the same wave length and had no major differences with the US military. Our military assistance program to Turkey was huge, including aircraft -- for example, F-86s which were old planes but still very usable -- tanks, artillery tubes - - the Turks were manufacturing their own ammunition -- vehicles, helicopters. We had advisors but I am not sure that they had much of an impact because I think that the Turkish military didn't really feel that they needed a lot of advice. They needed equipment and technical assistance, but not military advice.

The Turks had a mountain cavalry brigade which still in the mid 1960s used horses and donkeys. It was stationed in Eastern Turkey. One of the things that an American military assistance team, supported by the Pentagon, insisted on was that such a unit was a waste of money. We wanted that brigade converted into an air mobile unit -- trade the horses and donkeys for helicopters. That made that brigade much, much more expensive to maintain. That unit was used primarily for internal security purposes against the Kurds; so I am not sure that we gave every good advice on this issue. Today perhaps a mobile unit makes sense; then the conversion was probably premature. I remember attending the last parade that the brigade put on before it got rid of its horses and donkeys in Siirt, a town in Eastern Turkey. It was a wonderful scene because there were probably 2,400 men on horseback riding by; you don't see sights like that anymore.

One of the issues that we were always sensitive to was the use of US military equipment being used for internal security operations. But in the 1960s there wasn't that much action; the Kurds were not yet in active revolt. There were occasional ambushes of gendarmes by a few Kurds, but it was a minor matter. Cyprus was the main concern, both politically and in politico-military affairs. The Turks had bombed parts of Cyprus in 1964 in retaliation, according to the Turks, for the atrocities inflicted on their countrymen by the Cypriot Greeks. You can still today see pictures of Turkish babies laying slaughtered in bathtubs. The Turks had used Incirlik Air Force base as the take off point. That meant that we had watched the planes take off from that airfield although since the Turks often did that for training runs, it didn't necessarily follow that we knew what the Turks were up to. But the Greeks and Cypriots insisted that we could have warned them and I suspect that that was probably true. That incident led to a letter from President Johnson to

the Turkish Prime Minister stating in effect that if Turkey were to become involved in a war with Greece, we might not come to their assistance; that letter was a perfect illustration of what made US-Turkey relationships difficult. It was sent in the hopes that such a threat would head off what the US administration thought might well become a Turkish invasion of Cyprus -- an event that actually did take place, but much later. From 1948 on, we had been perceived by the Turks as their greatest allies; they resented Johnson's letter and viewed essentially as a betrayal. So our relations with Turkey in the mid-1960s were difficult; the Johnson letter was undoubtedly another reason why the Turkish military did not wish to get too close to the US Embassy as a sign of displeasure. On the other hand, the Turks accepted the military assistance ungrudgingly.

There were continual Congressional questions about the use of American arms, especially whether any of them would be used in a Turkish attack on Greece. So our concern was not so much with the use of American arms for internal security purposes, but rather their potential use against either Greece or the Cypriot Greeks. As always, the Greece-Turkey relationships was on a roller coaster and we were always sensitive to those changes. During my tour in Ankara, there was no active Turkish military involvement in Cyprus beyond over-flights which were gestures to indicate that bombings could be renewed. As far as I can remember however, we in the Mutual Security Affairs section did not discuss Cyprus with the Foreign Office; any conversations on that subject would have been conducted by the Ambassador, the DCM and the Political Section.

I was aware of a number of intelligence operations that we were conducting against the Soviet Union, several of which were not even secret then. There were giant radar towers that could be seen which were tracking Soviet missile tests. I visited all of those installations, but I certainly did not go to all of our sites; there was just no reason for me to do so. Frank Cash and Bob Pugh had visited most, if not all, of the American military installations. I think that when Frank first arrived in Turkey, the military had made a plane available to him to take him around to the various installations. You have to remember that were something like 51 separate sites in Turkey ranging from major sites to those that only were manned by a handful of people. I don't think that someone from the Embassy had visited every American installation, but certainly Frank and Bob had visited most of them. The PM Section had a big briefing book which listed all of the installations, so that we knew in some detail the disposition of our forces in Turkey. There was no way that our military presence could have been hidden because, if for no other reason, each site required an agreement with the Turkish government which spelled out the parameters of the site and its purpose. The binder containing all of the agreements was an important and vital source of information for us. Our relationships with the CIA Station were very good, although we did not have too many professional contacts with it.

I did witness a number of anti-American demonstrations in Ankara, stimulated by our position on Cyprus as expressed in President Johnson's letter and other statements. We were perceived as having a pro-Greek bias. So crowds of several thousands of people would gather and then march towards the Embassy. The Turkish police never allowed the demonstrators to get close to the Embassy; they would ward them off a block or two from the Chancery.

I made a lot of Turkish friends, mostly staff members of the Foreign Office. I ran into a few of them later in my career. One, for example, is now the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, although

when we first met, he was a low ranking officer like I was. There were some very fine young officers in the Foreign Ministry and they made the tour in Ankara an enjoyable experience. We would invite them to our house and socialized with them quite often. These friendships and the PM work made my tour in Ankara a very enjoyable one. It started me down a career path from which I did not deviate until towards the end of my career, although even my assignment in Adana had a very heavy PM component to it. But my work with Frank and Bob really wetted my appetite for politico-military affairs; I really enjoyed it and have never regretted specializing in it.

I think that our relationships with Washington on politico-military affairs were very good during these two years. The major area of friction was the levels of security assistance. Not surprisingly, we always wanted more than the Department would allocate. In the mid-60's, John McNaughton was the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Department of Defense. He would come to Ankara periodically to explain to the Embassy and the Turkish government the limitations the US government had in allocating security assistance resources. As a junior officer, I was struck by the fact the Mr. McNaughton had to undertake this task personally; he did it very well; the Turks got his messages, but I found instructive that no State Department official could undertake the same task. It apparently wasn't possible for a State official to tell the Turks the unvarnished truth. I think Howard Furness, from the State's G/PM staff, came to Ankara; I remember that because he asked me to work for him in Washington. But I don't remember Jeff Kitchen, the head of the G/PM staff ever coming to Ankara so that the tack of delivering the "bad" news was left to Defense.

One of our tasks in Ankara was to extricate American contractors from some kind of jam or other. There were a lot of American contractors in Turkey and they always created some work for us. We got involved in labor disputes, particularly those generated on American bases. There were a lot of Turks working with and for the American military; they organized themselves into HARB-IS -- a workers union for those Turks employed on American bases. Annually, the US government representatives would sit down with that union to negotiate a contract. The principal recruiting agency for base staff was an American contractor. We in the Embassy would meet with that contractor and the Turkish unions to talk about labor's demands; I spent a fair amount of time on those matters. I think that illustrates the broad range of activities that the Embassy's PM Section used to get involved in.

Before ending the discussion of my tour in Ankara, I might mention two other events. One was the Six-Day War and the other was an incident that involved an American sergeant from an Air Force intelligence unit. He was arrested by the Turkish police for selling guns -- illegally. He was procuring guns through a US military "Rod and Gun" Club and then reselling them on the Turkish black market. Neither we or the Turks were very happy with that; it was contrary to our regulations and their laws. The sergeant was caught with a number of rifles in his possession; a check of the records of the "Rod and Gun" Club indicated that he had purchased far more than necessary for personal consumption. So the sergeant was imprisoned by the Turks. He was provided American and Turkish lawyers, at the expense of the US tax payer. He was visited regularly by members by our Consular Section and especially Paul Taylor. At one stage, somebody on the Consular suggested that someone from the PM Section visit the sergeant to discuss his status under SOFA. So I went to see him. He told me that he wanted to renounce his

American citizenship. Fortunately, I remembered from my Consular course that at the time you could not renounce your citizenship unless you were physically on US territory, including State Department establishments overseas. The reason I remembered that lesson was because Elizabeth Taylor had renounced her citizenship to an American consular officer which was later held to be invalid because it had not taken place in an American establishment. So I told the sergeant that his wish could not be honored because he could not come to the Embassy. He kept repeating his request and I corresponded with him and saw him on a couple of more occasions. The sergeant kept asking his lawyers to find some way for him to go to the Embassy so he could renounce his citizenship. I tried to prevent that, partly because I thought that it was really not in his interest to pursue that course -- he had a wife and a couple of children who would have been seriously impacted by his renunciation. After all these contacts with the sergeant, I came to the conclusion that he would try to defect to the Soviet Union. He never told me that, but I think I heard enough vibes to come to that conclusion -- he made it quite clear that he was very unhappy with the US and Turkey. I had shared my intuition with the American military authorities who had alerted the Turks. Finally, after spending a few months in the Turkish jail, he was released on bond. Sure enough, the next day the Turks arrested him as he was trying to enter the Soviet Union's Embassy. The Turks had tapped his phone and knew of his call to the Soviet Embassy to set up an appointment. The Soviets were delighted to make the appointment to see him; we were happy that the Turks took the actions that they did. I was pleased that I had been able to detect the sergeant's interest and was praised by my superiors for my insight. The end of the saga came when the Turks decided that they didn't want to pursue the case and our military took the sergeant and shipped him home for trial in the US. We also insisted that the Club's regulations be tightened up so that there was strict limit of guns than any member might purchase in a year.

As for the Six Day War, I have already mentioned our effort to get American aircraft out of Jordan. You have to remember that Turkey was the largest non-belligerent in the area with a significant American military presence on its soil. So our forces played a major role in the evacuation of people from Jordan and Syria. We got involved in those efforts, both in the planning and execution phases. We not only evacuated Americans, but citizens of other countries like Soviets, Germans and the British. Most of the Jordanian evacuations were conducted by the use of US military airlift capacity. I remember that the Jordanian said that the C-130s could land in Amman, but only if they were painted white with nondescript markings. Some American general balked at those requirements; he was not going to paint "his" airplanes white. So the Embassy had to intervene and we had to explain to the general that he had no option except to do what the Jordanians wanted.

The Consulate General in Aleppo was burned with its staff still inside. It made a dramatic escape breaking through a concrete wall in the vault and sliding down a rope to the ground. They suffered major rope burns on their hands; it could have been far worst. I picked them up and gave shelter to one of the staff members; I had to shave him every morning because his hands were so badly damaged and bandaged that he could not hold a razor. When the Embassy in Baghdad was evacuated, the Turks agreed to act as the protective power. So our people handed over the keys to their Turkish colleagues in Baghdad, only to find out at the last minute that the Turkish Foreign Ministry got cold feet and decided not to act as the protective power. Washington sent us a FLASH Message demanding that the Ambassador go see the Foreign Minister immediately to request a reversal of the latest Turkish position, which Parker Hart did. I

remember being on a short wave radio with Baghdad at the time and fielding a stream of request from our people asking what they were supposed to do next. I received the last message from Baghdad announcing that it was destroying its communications equipment and that they were set out immediately over land to try to reach the Iranian border with an armed escort. In the final analysis, the Belgian Ambassador, on his own volition, decided to take on the role of protective power. It was a very strange set of events because while the Turks let us down in Baghdad, their Ambassador in Damascus arranged for the evacuation of our personnel there.

On the second night of the war, we got a FLASH telegram from Washington telling us that the evacuation from Beirut, which had been arranged to take place by commercial airline -- PAA and TWA -- which would bring all of the Americans to Ankara, starting at 7 a.m. the following morning. We were told to expect 6-7,000 evacuees. Frank Cash called me at home and told that me that I would be in charge of the reception process and that I would have to see that they got out of the airport and on to their temporary domicile -- the Embassy's PM Section had been selected because this operation would certainly need the full support of the US military. I frankly had some doubts that we could mobilize the necessary resources with just a 24 hour advanced notice. I was delighted that we had an American military in Turkey; they were just great in providing assistance to such people as the evacuees. We established a receiving team at the airport, shuttled them all on busses to a big hotel in Ankara where we processed everybody and gave them all temporary housing, in hotels, empty school buildings, in American private homes - - anywhere where we could find room for a cot. We took care of 6,000 people on that day. No one went without a bed or food that night or in the following days and nights. Eventually, we moved most of them out of Turkey on scheduled airline flights, but it was a major effort that I must say went pretty well. I worked first at the airport, then at the hotel; our consular people really pitched in as did the US military, which had several hundreds of people at the hotel. We might have been able to handle the 6,000 people without the US military, but there is no question that their presence, willingness to assist and resources make such an operation a hell of a lot easier. The military provided transportation, beds, food; this was first, but alas not my last, experience with emergency situations; there are some basic matters that have to be taken care of in any emergency which I first learned in Turkey and used in subsequent evacuations.

The Turkish government was sufficiently cooperative to waive all entry formalities. It didn't actively assist us; on the other hand, they did not do anything to hinder us. There was no concern about Turkey becoming involved in the war, which made things somewhat easier. I was surprised that the Turkish sentimental favorite in the war was Israel; I had assumed that they would support their Islamic brothers. When I went to get a haircut on the fourth or fifth day of the war, all the Turks in the barbershop were supporting the Israelis. A lot of that support could be accounted for by the historic enmity between Turks and some of their Arab neighbors, which showed itself in disdain for Syrians, Lebanese and Iraqis.

That evacuation was massive undertaking because we took people out of all of the Arab countries. I think it was a job well done.

G. LEWIS SCHMIDT

**Consul General
Izmir (1964-1967)**

G. Lewis Schmidt was born in Washington in 1915. He began his State Department career in 1949. He served in years thereafter with USIS in Tokyo, and in Washington, DC at the State Department as Deputy Assistant Director and Director of Latin American operations. Mr. Schmidt also served in Thailand and finally with the USIA Resource Analysis Staff. He was interviewed on February 8, 1988 by Allen Hansen.

Q: Your next assignment was Turkey, I believe.

SCHMIDT: Yes, but there was an unexpected interlude. Ed, before he became ill, had asked me what overseas posts I preferred. I told him Germany, and he agreed. In March of 1964, I entered the FSI to study the German language. It was a four month course, and I managed to do rather well in it, though I am not a facile linguist. Just a few days before I completed the course, Ambassador McGee in Germany told the State Department that he wanted to appoint Al Hensing, who was the DPAO in Germany with offices in Berlin, to the PAO. My four months of intensive German went out the window, and I was without an assignment.

After a month or so of negotiation with State, I was named Consul General in Izmir, Turkey. At the time, I was deeply disappointed, at losing Germany, but the assignment in Izmir turned out to be one of the highlights of my career.

My first inclination in this account was to exclude any detailed discussion of the Turkey assignment, because it was not a USIA position. However, in thinking about it, I realized that much of what I did in Izmir was similar to USIS activities, so I decided to spend some time recounting the highlights.

Within the first few days I had met and made a close friend of the flamboyant Mayor of Izmir, Osman Kibar. He was a short stocky character of boisterous nature. He reminded me of a cross between Jimmy Walker, the backslapping, public relations genius who was mayor of New York in the 1920's, and Jimmy Durante, who, with benefit of a large nose, he somewhat resembled. We immediately formed a rapport. Kibar was not only mayor, he was also one of the founders of the Justice Party. That party was the successor to the Democrat party that had been turned out of office in 1960 by a military coup that ended with the execution of Prime Minister Menderes. When the Army loosened its controls a bit, the party was permitted to return to politics. It reorganized and assumed the new name of Justice Party, and when elections were again allowed in 1965, overturned the military's supported candidate and won control of the Turkish Government again. Kibar's support during my time in Izmir was invaluable to me in getting entree into many important circles.

My next move was to make contact with the local press. There were three papers in Izmir, the largest, most influential, Yeni Asir, was middle of the road politically, and generally supported the new Justice Party. The other two were radically left leaning. They were knee-jerk radical, anti-American rags with relatively small circulation. I have forgotten their names, but they have

long since failed and ceased publication. My good relations with the principal reporters at Yeni Asir, especially their top man, Haluk Cansin, on occasion during my Izmir days enabled me to counter anti-American stories and get better explanations in print about matters currently riling the Turkish public.

One of my principal targets in Izmir was the Ege (Aegean) University branch of the national student organization. The latter was pretty well radicalized, and delighted in finding some excuse to riot against almost anything American. The Ege national university at Izmir was not quite as irrational as the Istanbul branch, or the national headquarters at Ankara, but they were a reasonable facsimile thereof. Ships from the U.S. Navy's Sixth Fleet frequently visited Izmir, and the students took to holding anti-U.S. rallies on the occasion of one or another of these visits. The most absurd instance occurred on one such fleet stopover when the students, finding nothing else to riot about, claimed to be insulted because the Turkish flags flown by the ships allegedly had misplaced slightly the relative position of the crescent and the star that adorns the national (red colored) flag. The misplacement if indeed it existed at all, was so slight that I could not detect it. The flags had been ordered from a flagmaker specifically for the fleet's visit. Probably the maker was not a Turk firm. The students pretended to be outraged at the insult to Turkish nationalism by the callous desecration of the sacred flag.

I decided to tackle the student antagonists. I had already made friends with the Aegean Regional chairmen of both political parties. The revived Justice Party was one. The other was the Republican Peoples Party (known as the RPP). Interestingly enough, the RPP was the party closest to and supporting the military which at that time governed the country, but it was the relatively radical party as opposed to the conservative Justice Party. I know that the student organization had close ties to the RPP, so I called on my friend who was the RPP regional chairman, and told him I wanted to start meeting with the executive committee of the EGE University student organization once every month or two. I proposed that I meet with them initially at a neutral site. The purpose of the session would be to discuss with them frankly and off the record any point of disagreement they had with American policies. I promised to give them straight answers, and if I could not answer a given question, I would seek the answer later, and give it to them the next time we met. I gave the RPP chairman a couple days to talk to the students, and then I issued them both a written and verbal invitation.

Obviously my political friend had done his work, because the student executive committee agreed. Initially, we met in a hotel party room downtown. After a few meetings they realized that I was not going to try to overwhelm them, but would talk reasonably and seriously. So I was finally able to persuade them to hold the meetings at the ConGen residence. I would invite them for dinner, and an after-dinner discussion.

It became something of a game. After a short time, I could guess with moderate accuracy what they would bring up at the next meeting. I enlisted the help of the Embassy Economic and political sections to get materials on what I expected to have to answer, and would carefully read up on the anticipated subject matter. It worked quite well. In the latter months of my tour, the meetings occasionally lasted into the small hours of the morning, once or twice breaking up after 3:00 a.m. It seems doubtful that if the students weren't interested they would have stayed the course.

I don't claim to have turned the students away completely from their anti-American biases. They were always a little wary of me, but I convinced them by a couple of very frank exchanges that they could rely on me to be honest. I believe the sessions were important and within reasonable limits, successful. At one of our meetings, the then president of the regional student group was little hot under the collar and was making some outrageously absurd allegations. I said to him that I would be very interested to see where he was in his political viewpoint and regarding his thinking about American policies twenty years from that time. I told him I was betting he would have turned around completely in his political outlook, would be rather conservative, and rational about his views of the U.S. I revisit Turkey occasionally. The last time I was there was nineteen years after the time of my bet with the young man. I didn't see him personally, but my friends from my ConGen days told me that he was now a conservative business man, had given up his student day radicalism, and was at least rational about things American.

Another of my targets was the group of men who were then the governors of the 13 or so provinces in my consular district. I arrived at a critical time in Turkish-American relations. Turks were still angry at the U.S. because after persuading the Turkish Government to place missiles in Turkey, and training a substantial number of the Turkish military on how to operate the, the U.S. removed them all shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Turks were convinced the U.S. had let them down, and used the missile removal as a quid pro quo with the Soviets to get the USSR missiles removed from Cuba. I have been told that the removal was not primarily motivated by the Cuban affair, and on the other hand have been told that it indeed was. I am not sure even today. But in any event, another crisis had arisen. In the summer of 1964, it looked as though the Turkish Army was poised to invade Cyprus. President Johnson sent a vitriolic letter to Ismet Inonu, then Prime Minister of Turkey, stating that if the Turkish army did invade Cyprus, and if the Soviet then attacked Turkey in retaliation, the U.S. would not come to Turkey's aid. Of course, this was a complete repudiation of the guarantees inherent in the NATO agreement, and the Turks were rightly outraged. Johnson was absolutely wrong.

I spent much of my time the first few months I was in Turkey visiting all the governors, a few more than once. The Johnson letter was invariably a major point of discussion. I met it head on, agreeing that the letter was contrary to NATO guarantees, and trying to reassure the governors that the U.S. would not have deserted them in the face of a Soviet invasion. It was a gamble, because Johnson could actually have done other wise. I felt, however, that if it came to invasion, the President could not have deserted our NATO ally. Since I made personal friends of nearly all the governors, I believe I contributed greatly to calming down their fears and indignation.

Finally, both the Turkish and the American Military had been rather stand-offish with my predecessor. I was told that neither were on very good terms with him. I undertook to reverse this situation, and did so. I developed close friendships with the commanding generals of both Landsoutheast (the Southeastern command of NATO based in Izmir) and Sixth ATAF (the Air Command of NATO there). I also, with the help of my Turkish political advisor and interpreter, made friends with the Turkish Air, Navy, and Army commanders in the Aegean region. Every time I gave a reception, I invited all the top military commanders, American and Turkish. The Mayor used to stand close to me as the guests arrived to see whether or not the Turkish military would come. They invariably did, and the Mayor would always comment on the fact, saying that

it was a minor triumph to have gotten them all present.

The Turkish Labor Party was relatively small, but loudly activist, and loudly anti-American. In the spring of 1966, they scheduled a large meeting in Izmir, at which the Chairman of the Party, Mehmet Ali Aybar, was to speak. He was a tall, greying, distinguished appearing man with shining expressive eyes, and was a spell binding orator. By this time, my successive meetings with the students and the governors were well and widely known. To my surprise, I received a personal invitation from Aybar to attend the Labor conclave in Izmir. I debated as to whether I should or should not go. I realized this was a challenge to me, and if I didn't attend, I would probably be ridiculed in the leftist press as a cowardly evader of contact with this leftist attacker of American policies. On the other hand, I felt sure that if I did go, I would be ridiculed in some other way. Without consulting the Embassy at Ankara, which I felt might well forbid my attendance, I decided to go. And did. I had my interpreter with me so I could be constantly aware of any slurs or attacks being delivered by Aybar at me personally or at the U.S. Aybar spoke eloquently for more than three hours. He made only a few snide remarks about "our American friend" but took off more sternly against some American policies. In balance, though, his speech was not overly offensive. The next morning, the Izmir leftist press was at it as I expected. There was quite an article on my attendance accompanied by a number of snide remarks as to what prompted the nosey American Consul General to be there. In addition, there was a political cartoon, a caricature of me that was quite recognizable, dressed in a Texas ten gallon hat, cowboy chaps and shining spurs, a pistol at belt, and \$ signs all over my cowboy shirt and trousers. The Embassy was displeased, and told me I should not have appeared. However, the reaction on all sides in Izmir was commendatory, so I guess it played well with the public.

I was gratified at the time of my exit from Izmir. I made it a point, starting a couple weeks before departure, to call on all the top contacts I had made, including the editors of the two left-wing newspapers, to say goodbye. With these last two, I said that I realized our political outlooks were at opposite poles, but that I felt we had exercised an honest dialogue over our differences, and I thanked them for their coverage of my activities (even though on several occasions it was hardly pleasing). Accolades on my two year performance were effusive. Even the leftist papers gave grudging praise for my activities. It was the most direct and satisfying public expression of recognized accomplishment I ever enjoyed. It was the highlight of my career.

ARNOLD SCHIFFERDECKER
Consular/Political Officer
Istanbul (1965-1966)

Arnold Schifferdecker was born in Missouri in 1935, and received his BA and BJ from the University of Missouri. He served in the US Navy from 1958 to 1964 overseas. During his career, he was assigned to Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Kabul, Ankara, Lahore and Rabat. Mr. Schifferdecker was interviewed by C. Edward Dillery on May 14, 1996.

SCHIFFERDECKER: The training lasted, as I recall, 16 or 17 weeks. Then I went into language

training for 4 months only, and almost reached the 3/3 in French, but not quite. Then I was given the consular training and was off to Istanbul as vice consul.

Q: What did you find when you got to Istanbul?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I mentioned previously that while in the Navy I had been in the Far East, but had not traveled to Europe or the Middle East. I found Istanbul quite exotic and very interesting. I, of course, was an enthusiastic, interested junior Foreign Service officer. My wife and I tried to settle in as quickly as we could. I remember apartments were particularly difficult to find.

Q: What kind of housing did you have?

SCHIFFERDECKER: We were required at that time to find our own housing and received an allowance from the State Department which limited us to certain areas and prices of apartments. We managed to find something suitable with a small view of the Sea of Marmora between two other apartment buildings. It was very pleasant getting settled in there. The people all spoke Turkish, of course, and I only had English and French, so I immediately began a post language training course in Turkish and was able to acquire at least a courtesy level of the language during my time there.

Q: Did you think that the old post language programs were useful?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I thought they were quite useful, even essential, just to get around in the city. My wife also took training so that she could get around on her own.

Q: How did you fit the language training into your day?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I did it during my lunch hour at my desk. We had native speakers who would come in and who had been trained in the FSI method, that is no use of English, start right out, sink or swim speaking the language. Of course, we had a workbook or text that I was able to study in the evenings, but basically we used tapes and the native speaker to get the accent and the sound of the language and then a lot of vocabulary and grammar study when we weren't with the teacher.

Q: What were your specific duties?

SCHIFFERDECKER: My first duty was vice consul in the consular section. I handled American citizens problems, shipping and American seamen, and non-immigrant visas. I had one interesting experience on the American citizens services side. There was one American, a young lady who had married a Turk and was stranded in Istanbul. Her husband had taken her passport away from her, gone to the United States to work, illegally I might add, and she was living with his family in a small village on the Black Sea as a virtual prisoner. She had had two children by her Turkish husband by this time. We were able to get her and the two kids a new passport, but we had to arrange for a loan from her family back in New Jersey in order to get her plane tickets. We did manage to do that. The Department was quite interested in the case. I learned from that

how important taking care of American citizens problems were. We ran into a lot of other problems with hippies and others in Istanbul, people who were out of money. We had a small fund in the consulate for helping American citizens who were destitute and needed a little money for a night in a hotel or something like that. But, that was the beginning of the great beatnik or hippie migration into the Middle East and eventually into Asia and India, etc. We had another major problem trying to persuade the Turkish authorities to release a young 19-year-old American convicted of hashish possession. His father came over from the U.S. and virtually camped out on my doorstep. It was tough persuading the Turks to be lenient when we were otherwise pushing them to crack down on drug smuggling. Does this sound familiar?

Q: Were the Turkish authorities responsive to requests for assistance?

SCHIFFERDECKER: They were rather stiff and formal back then--in 1965. There were vestiges of the Ottoman bureaucracy alive and well in Istanbul. We did have a very competent Foreign Service National, who had been employed by the US government way back when the embassy was in Istanbul before the capital was moved to Ankara. He was born in Montenegro and his family had moved to Istanbul during the migrations after the Ottoman Empire was progressively ousted from the Balkans. His name was Abdurrahman Bey and he was the most distinguished looking and acting gentleman I had ever met. He knew, of course, elegant French, Turkish, who knows what Balkan languages, and English as well and we relied on him heavily as our main interface with the provincial and municipal authorities in Istanbul in order to get things cleared through customs, all sorts of problems involving Americans who had either been robbed in the covered bazaar or had run out of money. Abdurrahman was respected and was able to intercede very effectively with the local authorities. In fact, Foreign Service Nationals of that caliber were in many of our embassies at that time in the Middle East and were valuable people whom we certainly miss now.

Q: I think in those days working for the United States government was probably one of the best jobs in any given country. With changes in the value of the dollar and in the governments we still get good people but not quite that layer of really, really excellent folks that we had in many posts that I was in.

SCHIFFERDECKER: I agree totally with you.

There was one other duty I had while in Istanbul which I thought was illustrative of our sometimes convoluted dealings with the so-called Ottoman bureaucracy. In retrospect, it was more a Turkish nationalistic kind of bureaucracy rather than what one might call the classic Ottoman bureaucracy, which at one time was very efficient and a major reason why the Empire lasted over 400 years, but eventually became corrupt like so many bureaucracies do. I was assigned, after my stint in the consular section, to the commercial section to replace the commercial officer who was going on home leave in the summer. My primary duty then was to make arrangements for American exhibitors to obtain foreign exchange allocations to import goods to exhibit at the Izmir International Trade Fair, which was an opportunity for American companies to introduce new products into Turkey. At that time foreign exchange was very scarce and the allocations by the Turkish government for American firms to exhibit goods were strictly controlled by the

Ministries of Commerce and Finance in Ankara. The Istanbul consulate was responsible for taking these allocations and parceling them out to the American importers.

At that time IBM, which had an office in Istanbul, wanted to introduce its new IBM Selectric typewriters with a Turkish typeface...remember the round ball? They had developed the Turkish ball at some cost to the company and they wanted to market it to Turkish consumers, especially government and businesses. What happened was, IBM went ahead and developed their Turkish ball, which was reliable and as good as the English one, assuming they would get their import permit or foreign exchange allocation. To my dismay and the company's dismay, that particular year the Turkish government was interested in marketing some low grade Turkish tobacco languishing in warehouses in Izmir which apparently they had difficulty selling abroad. The government, rather deviously cleverly, I thought, decided to force all latecomers to the Izmir Fair including IBM, to buy an equivalent share in Turkish lira of a quantity of that tobacco and export it in exchange for having a foreign exchange allocation for their exhibits. To cover themselves, the local IBM wanted to claim that I had misled them, but that, of course, was not true. I had, in fact, been very scrupulous in telling them that we did not yet have their foreign exchange allocation even though they went ahead and developed their typewriters.

But in the end, IBM swallowed its pride and disdain for this Turkish method of doing business and bought, I believe, about a hundred thousand dollars worth of Turkish tobacco and dumped it abroad somewhere. I am not sure whether they managed to market it or just dumped it into the ocean. But, it was a good lesson for them and me, that you don't make commitments, especially financial commitments, until you know what the rules of the game are. I ended up being commended for doing the job right, although at one time I thought I was going to be the fall guy.

Q: Did you end up in the good graces of IBM as well as the Department?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Yes. We had a few laughs about it later on after the Fair got underway, and IBM, by the way, did succeed in introducing its product and did exceptionally well in selling Turkish Selectric typewriters all over the country, some still in use today.

Q: Hopefully it was a net gain for them. You mentioned that you changed your assignment. Was it a rotational thing?

SCHIFFERDECKER: We had the rotational junior officer program in effect at that time. Shortly thereafter, I understand one of the Congressional Committees found out about this "training program" and told the State Department basically to knock it off. I believe it was Congressman Rooney at that time who said, "You, the State Department, had told the Congress that you were recruiting people who were able to hit the ground running, so why do you have this training period for them? They don't need training, they are very capable people and you don't need the extra positions for training abroad. Initial training in Washington should be sufficient". So, that program was phased out about the time I was going through it. I was designated as being in the political cone.

Q: You were brought into the Service as a political officer?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Yes. At that time you were allowed pretty much to self-designate your cone and I had wanted to be a political officer. I received rotational training in consular, commercial and econ. I did some econ reporting on Turkish industry. Also in administrative duties for six months. About the time I was ready to go into the political section, I was transferred to Tel Aviv as the ambassador's staff aide, so my political work came later.

Q: Who was the consul general while you were there?

SCHIFFERDECKER: The consul general was Lansing Collins. We had two first rate career ambassadors in Ankara. We had Raymond Hare and later Parker Hart, both of whom are well known Foreign Service icons of the 1950s and '60s.

Q: What were our relations with Turkey like during that year?

SCHIFFERDECKER: During the 1965-66 period there were problems over Cyprus, but they were not as great as they were to become in your time later on and in my time in the early '80s. Relations in general between the US and Turkey were firm, under control, not necessarily warm, but the Turks needed us and we needed them, as the anchor of NATO's southern flank. I would say relations on a whole were steady, without major bilateral issues. We still had a fairly active aid program and of course close military cooperation and ties.

Q: What kind of sense did you have for the internal political climate with regard to Istanbul versus Ankara at that point?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Well, there has always been sort of a rivalry and maybe a little bit of jealousy between the two cities as to which is really the center of the Turkish universe, but it was always acknowledged that Istanbul was the business and commercial capital of the country and Ankara was the government capital. One can see why there might be feelings of rivalry between the two cities but there was not any noticeable tug-of-war between the government in Istanbul and the government in Ankara. That tension still exists, even with the spread of economic prosperity to other parts of the country.

Q: I wondered if there was a sense that Istanbul felt itself to be semi-autonomous, doing its own thing? I know the central government is pretty powerful in Turkey and always has been.

SCHIFFERDECKER: I think because of that centralization the provincial government and the government in Ankara were on the same wave length at that time. The government was headed by Ismet Inonu at that time. He had been Ataturk's right-hand man. He gave way, while I was there to Suleyman Demirel. Elections were held in 1965. Demirel's party came into power shortly thereafter. That was the beginning of a more wide open democratic system, which eventually led to political excesses and periods of near anarchy and which prompted two military interventions.

Q: On a cultural note, I have always felt the consulate and former embassy in Istanbul as one of the most interesting buildings, but clearly very inefficient. I know there was a recent effort to move to a more modern building out in the country. What are your thoughts on that as a former

inhabitant?

SCHIFFERDECKER: The consulate general building in Istanbul is a former 18th or 19th century Italian palazzo on a very narrow, busy commercial street. In terms of our security requirements today, it certainly doesn't meet the criteria, but, it is a beautiful old building and has over time been kept up and restored.

It has marble interiors and some ceiling frescos in the style of 18th century Italian palazzi. There was a story that an early American Minister to the Ottoman Sultan, had won that building in a poker game. I don't know whether that was ever confirmed, but it makes a nice story.

Q: It is a great place and I for one hope we keep it.

GEORGE A. MCFARLAND, JR.
Political Officer
Istanbul (1965-1967)

Mr. McFarland was born and raised in Texas and educated at Southern Methodist University and the Universities of Texas and Princeton. After a brief journalist career, he joined the Foreign Service and was assigned to the Passport office in Washington. His subsequent overseas assignments, primarily as Political Officer, were in San Jose, Nicosia, Istanbul, Lima, Ankara, Brasilia and Antigua, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. He also served as Cyprus Desk Officer in Washington. Mr. McFarland was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 1999.

Q: "Crude," you say.

MCFARLAND: Oh, it threatened that if the Soviet Union intervened against Turkey because of Turkey's actions against Cyprus, we would feel under no obligation to come to Turkey's support. That was its principal proviso. And to Inonu, who was frankly - founded his relationship as Atatürk's chief lieutenant - was frankly like Mohamed, a sacred figure in the cult of Atatürkism.

Q: What was his response?

MCFARLAND: It was a terrible thing to do.

Q: What was the response? The Turks did not invade.

MCFARLAND: Well, the Turks did not invade. They did not intervene.

Q: But they resented it deeply.

MCFARLAND: But they resented it deeply.

Q: Did you consider Johnson pro-Greek? I know he spent time in Greece.

MCFARLAND: I don't know. I don't know if he was or not.

Q: Well, anyway, you would have known if you were on the Desk. I know he visited Greece at least once. I know that he never was in Turkey.

MCFARLAND: Well, there wasn't - and he didn't do anything particular for Greece at the time I was on the Desk.

Q: But he was President then. I think he went to Greece before, when he was Vice-President.

MCFARLAND: We used to send over these snippets for the President's evening reading but had little hope that they would ever be read.

Q: Vietnam was there anyway.

MCFARLAND: There's only so much presidential time available during the day. Anyway, we got past that second crisis, so we stopped the Turks from intervening twice. Now once by threat and once by mediation. To advance a little on my story, in July of 1974 - I was by then acting political counselor in Ankara - the Greek junta tried to depose Makarios and set up a Cyprus for Greece. I cannot understand the prime minister in Greece in those days, Ioannidis. He had spent his life as a neighbor of the Turks. Their prime intelligence target must have been Turkey, and surely should have understood how the Turks would react. And yet he thought that "our great, good friends, the Americans, who had stopped them twice will stop them a third time, and it is their duty and responsibility to do so." (Of course we couldn't.)

Q: The Turks marched.

MCFARLAND: They had a division earmarked for Cyprus. It did a miserable job of command and control, but it got ashore. Then there had to be a second invasion. But Makarios survived. He escaped their attempt to arrest him and fled to the Brits, and the junta wound up being deposed themselves. They paid heavily for their mistake, just like the Argentine junta.

Q: What did they do on the Island? A new line was drawn by the Turkish troops?

MCFARLAND: Yes, they came in the first time, they saved the airfield and a small area around Farinya and then around Alistim. It wasn't a large enough holding, so the Turks reorganized, sent in more forces, and reopened the battle a few weeks later. And it was that second intervention which brought international opprobrium on them, and the first one was considered to be within their rights under the London-Zurich treaty. But the second one just seemed to be gratuitous, and it was on that basis that the United States, in its wisdom, cut off all further supplies of arms to a NATO ally, Turkey. And that was what I suffered under in Ankara. I spent a good deal of time defending that.

Q: Explaining that.

MCFARLAND: Defending the US and explaining its policy, and fighting with people in Washington. I think I must have had to spend as much time arguing in Washington as I did talking to Turks. But anyway, my only contribution to the Cyprus Desk, really, apart from day-to-day forecasting and handling that event - must say, I made accurate forecasts; I only missed once - I developed a proposal for standby mediation, based on the success of the Vance mission. The US would have a mediator briefed and ready to step in, and this proposal was accepted by the ambassadors in all three countries involved, and we took it to Joe Sisco, who at that time was assistant secretary for the UN. Joe Sisco vetoed it. No, Cyprus is a UN concern now. We cannot take this down the road. Better let the UN handle it. And Stu Rockwell okayed my idea, which essentially has come out now with a special coordinator for Cyprus affairs. Well, but nonetheless, this would have been further along the lines of policy that I have seen now as mistaken, the idea of keeping Cyprus as an undivided whole, undivided except for the Greek lines around the Turks, and subject to future trouble.

I don't know if I spelled out my position adequately to begin with, but the problem is that the core of the Cyprus problem is Greece's desire for Enosis, opposed by Turkey's concern that Greece will then control its entire coastline. All the approaches from the Mediterranean and Aegean will have to pass close to Greek Islands. This is anathema to Turkish security planners. Atatürk felt that Turkey must be a secure territory, with no expansion, just secure territory. Turkey, apparently, has no real ambitions for territory in Cyprus. The reason for the partitioning of Cyprus is to prevent Enosis, as I see it, not to breed a terrible financial burden and drain on Turkey of having a separate Turkish Cypriot state which can't support itself.

Q: So there are Turkish troops there, and it's a republic.

MCFARLAND: Yes, recognized only by Turkey. The rest of us seem to want to have a unitary Cyprus once more. Now a unitary Cyprus would simply be another target for the Greeks to try to capture, which would set off more conflict. The best long-term solution for Cyprus is what we've got now, the division, the partition, which is resented by Washington and, or course, most of all by Athens, because it makes Enosis impossible. It's better to make Enosis impossible, and then let's get on about the business of living.

Q: But the UN has a substantial force there.

MCFARLAND: Yes it does.

Q: To avoid conflict.

MCFARLAND: Yes, I doubt that there would be any conflict if the UN force left. There might be some shooting by hotheads. It would depend very much on the leadership of both sides. I read in the newspaper that fighting was going to start again. I doubt that very much. That depends very much on the mainland countries. The problem with Greece's attitude toward Turkey is that as a small country it does not have the power to overcome Turkey, so it keeps sticking its finger into the big guy's eye, provoking Turkey without a rational hope of accomplishing any good end.

Q: Pure nationalism.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and bravura. I understand it in the Greek psyche and the Latin psyche, but it's just not rational, and we should not let ourselves be captured by it as we have let ourselves be captured by it. We went into Yugoslavia, I think, initially with the idea that there should be no partitioning and found that good fences do make good neighbors, or at least neighbors that are some sort of peace. And I'm afraid that that's the only solution for Cyprus.

Q: Greece is part of the Balkans.

MCFARLAND: Greece is part of the Balkans. And Turkey is. Turkey was *the* Balkan power. But this is another Balkan war that's best settled by partition - which we've got in place. There's not been any fighting since partition was established in 1974. Before that there was fighting periodically. They could live on their own without Uncle Sam I'm quite sure. I would hope that Greece and Turkey would little by little withdraw their own forces.

Q: Well, Greece doesn't have any forces there.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, they do. They have 10,000 or 12,000 troops, and Turkey has more than that. I think they have most of a division. And they've even established a university around Famagusta.

Q: A Greek university?

MCFARLAND: No, a Turkish Cypriot university.

Q: Oh, I see what you mean.

Q: That's great.

MCFARLAND: Maybe now's the time to bring it in. I should have gone back to Turkey.

Q: All right, go ahead

MCFARLAND: As DCM, seven years later. I was EUR's candidate. I was the person indicated. I had far more qualifications than anybody else. By this time I had become a senior officer, FE/OC in current terms, and the then ambassador was a political appointee, Strausz-Hupé. He was an Austrian financier who had emigrated to the States just before World War II and had gone into academia and become one of the founders of the Institute for International Relations. And during the Nixon Administration, he had been appointed ambassador to several places - Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, as it was then, and married a Sri Lankan, and Sweden, I think, and then USNATO. Anyway, when the DCM he inherited had to leave, whom I knew, he had the problem of replacing him. I was number one on the list, and he preferred somebody he had known in USNATO who had no Turkish, no Turkish experience. He knew that he wasn't a threat. And somebody who counseled him or had the basis for sending him up said, "There is no way that he would have brought in a Turkish language officer as his number two." He was afraid I would

show him up. Of course, I wouldn't have.

Q: No, of course not.

MCFARLAND: I know what it is to be loyal to your chief. I would have helped him. I had great respect for him.

Q: But he didn't know you. He knew the other guy, yes.

MCFARLAND: He knew the other guy, and this was the reason for my retirement - I'm advancing considerably in my story. This was probably the principal reason for my disillusionment.

Q: Or at least consul general in Istanbul or Ismir - would that have been satisfactory?

MCFARLAND: No, I wanted a DCM-ship. I wanted real policy.

Q: Okay.

MCFARLAND: And I just lived there with the idea to bring my knowledge of Turkey and Cyprus to bear on US relations, and I think I could have made a contribution, and it was never made.

Q: So you

MCFARLAND: They did fill it.

Q: Beg pardon.

MCFARLAND: Well, I stayed in Ankara a total of five years, summing up, a total of seven years in Turkey plus two years in Cyprus plus two years on the Cyprus Desk plus a year studying Turkish. It was a considerable investment. That was my real specialty. And that was the reason why, I think, EUR and the State Department plumped for me as the DCM. Ron Spiers, who succeeded Macomber as ambassador and made me - I thought he made me - a protégé at least, told me after I had retired, when he was undersecretary for management, that my case had been among several that motivated a change in the DCM-ship selection procedures, where ambassadors were no longer allowed a completely free hand.

Q: But in the meantime.

MCFARLAND: It's a hard issue to settle, but I was deeply disappointed. Okay, well after I went on from Turkey to Princeton and then started looking for an onward assignment, I didn't want to go back to Washington because the jobs there just weren't adequate. There was nothing good at all, so I started looking around overseas, and there was an opening as political counselor in Brasilia, which was at least equivalent to what I had had before and was still a stretch assignment. The only problem was that I had never been in Brazil, and I had no Portuguese, but I

had had previous South American experience, and I had been political counselor in a Class I post, a far more challenging post than Brasilia, for that matter, and I had gotten an A in the course. But Robert Sayre was the ambassador there, and for some reason, over the overwhelming contrary advice of everyone in the Brazil Office, he asked for me as his political counselor. And then when I began challenging him on various thing he may have regretted it, but anyway, we moved to Brasilia and it was another quiet time in another military dictatorship, but this time I had what turned into an excellent political section. It wasn't so great at first. I had inherited this same zero quantity from Harvard that I had been taxed with when I started in Ankara, but I persuaded him to move on, and people came in of top quality. I had three Ph.D.'s working for me at one point, having one who moved down from INR. My number two after a year or so is now an ambassador in Africa. I helped both of them. I gave both of them great reviews.

Q: Well, Greece doesn't have any forces there.

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes, they do. They have 10,000 or 12,000 troops, and Turkey has more than that. I think they have most of a division. And they've even established a university around Famagusta.

Q: A Greek university?

MCFARLAND: No, a Turkish Cypriot university.

Q: Oh, I see what you mean.

MCFARLAND: A friend of mine in Ankara has gone there to teach. He retired from teaching at Ankara University and moved down there.

Q: Well, is there a Greek Cypriot army or police force?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I'm not sure what their arrangements are now. They had a police force, which rapidly was converted into infantry at the time of the fighting. And there was a small army, but they depended mainly on the Greek army contingent. Under the London-Zurich agreement, both the mainland countries were permitted to position contingents. And they fought. One of the last incidents of the time when the Turkish invasion occurred. Turkey's difficulty was in communications and maintaining command and control. In Ankara we were contacted by the Turkish General Staff who said, "Our aircraft has reported a Greek destroyer to the north of Cyprus steaming toward Cyprus. This is within an area that we consider unacceptable. Please inform Athens to turn that ship around, or we're going to sink it." We quickly got off a Niact, Flash, whatever it was forwarding a message to Athens. They contacted the Greeks and came back with the response "that's not our ship. We have no destroyers in the area. If you think it ought to be sunk, go ahead and sink it." Well, the Turkish Air Force was unable to contact the destroyer. It was of course flying a Turkish flag on its stern, but of course those perfidious Greeks would do that. And using their US training they peeled off and put bombs onto it. It sank. About a week or so later, crew members on a lifeboat were picked up by a passing freighter, and

the truth came out. The Turks had bombed their own ship. They didn't have common frequency between ship and air.

NICHOLAS G. ANDREWS
Political Officer
Ankara (1965-1968)

Nicholas G. Andrews was born in Romania in 1924. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Germany, Australia, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Poland, and Washington, DC. Mr. Andrews was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 12, 1990.

Q: This is an interview with Nicholas Andrews. I apologize. We have to repeat a little, but you were sent to Ankara in 1965 to '68. Could you explain what you were doing there?

ANDREWS: Yes. I was the second man in the Political Section dealing with Turkey's foreign relations, because I was not a Turkish language expert. And as such I found that Turkish foreign relations I was particularly concerned about were Turkey's relations with Greece, and with Cyprus, because there was not that much going on between Turkey and the Soviet Union, although much concern was expressed, there was not much in reality going on. Turkish relations with the Balkans were rather slim. Turkish relations with the Arab world were similarly rather slim, nothing of great interest. So Greece and Cyprus dominated the topic. And in 1967 there was a threat of Turkish military intervention on Cyprus. Turk Cypriots on Cyprus were being molested and their rights were being trampled on, allegedly by the Greek Cypriots, and at some point the Turkish government had had enough, and we were within a few hours of military intervention when President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance as his emissary to try to resolve the issue.

That was in itself an interesting period when Vance tried to deal with the Turks, and varied proposals and counter-proposals between Athens and Turks, and sent flash messages back and forth. And everybody stayed up, and didn't sleep during about a two to three day period. So the threat of military intervention was set aside, but Turkish feelings toward the United States were not improved thereby. The Turks feeling that we had interfered when they had a perfect right to help their Turkish Cypriot comrades on the island, and President Johnson had been very harsh in his threat to suspend assistance to Turkey if it took action in Cyprus. Turkey feeling that the threat from Russia was one thing, the problem of Cyprus was another, and we were linking the two and saying, "If you do this and such on behalf of your Turkey Cypriot friends then you're on your own vis-a-vis the Soviet Union." So that was, I suppose, a kind of a high point, although it was so quick it didn't last long.

I got more interested in the Turkish domestic scene just because there was not that much to do on the foreign scene. But it was a quiet period without the threat of Turkish military doing anything within Turkey. It was a period of civilian government.

Q: I'd like to go back to the Cyprus thing. What was your impression of what we were reporting from Ankara, what was being reported from Athens, and what was being reported from Nicosia?

I'm thinking about our own. Were there bad cases of looking back on it, or at the time of what you would call localitis, everybody seeing the issue in terms of their post rather than U.S. interests?

ANDREWS: I think there's no doubt that there was localitis. I guess my feeling was also a form of localitis. My feeling, I think, has always been, Turkey is a much larger state than Greece, has a much larger military force than Greece. Therefore, if it comes to war, the Greeks will never win. Therefore, the Greeks should not posture as if they're going to use military force, and as if they could beat the Turks, because that just doesn't fit with common sense.

On the other hand apparently during some of this period, at least the early part, the Greeks did seem to think that they could match the Turks in a war. How exactly they were going to do this, I don't really know. But I think it is that feeling of not being inferior, in the military sense, which tended to fuel the Greek politician's views that that they would defend the Greek Cypriots to the end, and that they would win out eventually. Maybe it was really the feeling that, if push came to shove, we, or others, would help the Greeks and prevent them from being decimated by the Turks, and eventually, because we were on their side, they would win. But my view was that, if we said "a plague on both your houses," we're not going to help either one of you. We don't want to have anything to do with either one of you; maybe that would bring some sense into the views of both sides. Maybe it wouldn't. Maybe the Turks would take advantage of their superiority.

Q: Did you notice a cooling off of relations with the Turks? I mean as far as were sort of entrees being shut down?

ANDREWS: Not quite, but I think there were some hard feelings. I think there were one or two appointments that I couldn't get afterwards because they didn't want to bother to talk to me. I think there were some hard feelings on the military side of the equation where there was some reconsideration as to how soon they should get certain military equipment, and that made things worse. But the point is that over the long stretch of time with some Greek Ambassadors in Ankara who were very friendly to the Turks, who were very genuinely respectful of the Turks, and some good Turkish Ambassadors in Greece, it still hasn't worked out. In other words, relations have improved up to a certain point, and not beyond it. And then, as soon as something came up, the entire package of cards, building a somewhat better relationship, just collapsed again. Whether it had to do with the territorial sea boundaries, or whether it had to do with other things in the Aegean, or whether it dealt with Cyprus.

Q: I served four years in Greece, from 1970 to '74, during the time of the colonels and generals, so I was not that simpatico with the regime then. But we're talking about things that started with mother's milk as far as Greece is concerned, that these are animosities that are so deep that anything can spark them. And there's a certain point in common sense, and rationale, that diplomacy no longer has anything to do with it, which I'm afraid is true of much of the Eastern European area, and particularly the Balkan area. I mean there are these things that have been built in for so long.

ANDREWS: But realism does require, it seems, some kind of common sense in your foreign policy, and I don't see the common sense in Greece, given its size and population and military

standing, being able to take on the Turks on the question of Cyprus or anything else. Just as I don't see the Hungarians being able to take on the Romanians. They may have everything on their side. They've got to achieve their objectives by diplomatic and political means, but not by military means. So waving that sort of threat, or having generals speak out on your foreign policy, is a mistake. Keep it political, keep it internationalized by all means, but don't get into the military end of things.

Q: I couldn't agree more.

ANDREWS: And the net result is, in fact, that the Turks are now on Cyprus, at least the northern part of it. And I don't know how we're ever going to get them out. In fact, I don't think its feasible really.

PARKER T. HART
Ambassador
Turkey (1965-1968)

Ambassador Parker T. Hart was born in 1910. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Brazil, Yemen, Kuwait, Washington, DC, Egypt, Syria, and ambassadorships to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Ambassador Hart was interviewed by William R. Crawford on January 27, 1989.

Q: In our last interview we spoke of the termination of your assignment with some satisfaction to Saudi Arabia and your transfer to Turkey. Would you elaborate on that.

HART: This was a post which I was most happy to be named to. I had had it in my mind for many years that Turkey was a country which I particularly wanted to serve in. I approached Turkey as did my predecessor, Raymond Hare, from experience in the Arab world, we'll say the former colonial empire of Ottoman Turkey, with a background in Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey has for a great many years considered itself as a part of Europe or at least headed toward Europe. Even if it doesn't have both feet in Europe, it has a political drive going back to the time of Mustafa Kamel called Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. As its first president, from 1923 to 1938, he decreed that Turkey should head west. It should be Europeanized, in a sense, and shake off its Middle East cultural connections and customs because they had brought it to ruin. They had brought the empire to ruin and a great deal of what he felt was the backwardness of Ottoman Turkey at the end of World War I could only be overcome by a direct, intimate, and organic association with Europe. Even though Turks are 99% Muslim, it was still a secular state. It is a state without a state religion. In fact, state religion was forbidden under one of the pillars of the Atatürk reforms. I felt that this was a particularly interesting country to serve in, coming out the Arab world. I found almost immediately some parallels, one of which was U.S. bases.

I've mentioned already in discussing Saudi Arabia the sensitivity of the Saudis over the Dhahran Airfield as a U.S. base. Actually, Dhahran Airfield was turned over by the United States Government to the government of Saudi Arabia as their base formally in 1946, when it was

completed. It was always considered to be a facility belonging to the king which we had built for him as a sign of our friendship and interest in his country. The fact was that for quite a few years the Saudis didn't have anybody to run that base. They had nobody trained. We were in a section of Saudi Arabia which was Bedouin and which had not yet become urbanized in any sense of the word. There wasn't at the beginning any middle class. A sensitivity was in the air, all over the Arab world, about foreign bases, as you well remember. The French, the British, everybody had this problem. We had it in a pale reflection down in Dhahran Airfield where, locally speaking, it was not an issue. It was only an issue because of the attitude of third countries like Egypt and other countries where, as in Syria, the Baath Party was also championing the idea that there should be no imperialist remnant left, now that World War II was over, of any European power in the Arab world and no symbol of such imperialist presence such as a base belonging to someone else.

In Turkey there was a sensitivity also. We had at that time a number of facilities which we used. The sovereignty of Turkey was never in question. Who was running the facility? That was the thing that counted. Some American technical forces operating under the general supervision of General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, got accustomed to thinking of it as an American base. I remember going to Diyarbakir. I visited all of the principal sites. When I got to Diyarbakir, there was a big sign over an arch of the driveway going into the facility which said, "Best U.S. base in Turkey."

You can understand how American soldiers feel about that sort of thing. They like to fly the flag. They like to listen to American music and they want to think they are back in the States. They get pretty lonesome out in some of these places. However, that kind of sign wouldn't go and I insisted the sign be changed. I had to go around and inspect all of these bases from the political point of view as well as to find out what they were really doing. By and large, as is generally known, they were part of an intelligence collection system, electronic intelligence, or listening in on communications which were important coming out of Soviet forces or space personnel. We had a string of them across the northern shores of Turkey, the southern shore of the Black Sea. They had grown over a period of time, not by any particularly coordinated plan. In fact, they belonged to different branches of our service. In every case, there was an effort being made to train Turkish officers and men to do the technical work. The information obtained was shared with the Turks as an ally in NATO. Nonetheless, it happened that my arrival in Turkey came at a time when this sensitivity came to the fore. That was because it was an election period under a new constitution. The Republic of Turkey's original constitution, established in the days of Atatürk, had been superseded in 1960-1961 after the 1960 military coup d'état had taken place against the government of Celal Bayar. He was president and rather a national hero, but the real power was in the hands of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes who was a very adept politician and who knew how to handle the United States so as to get the maximum of aid possible. He spent it in ways which increased his popularity. His was the first really elected government under conditions of open contest in the Republic of Turkey. He had headed the first opposition party to the original founding party of the Turkish republic, the Republican People's Party of Atatürk which had been led since Atatürk's death in 1938 by Ismet İnönü, his principal lieutenant and a great military leader, as well as a great diplomat in the closing period of World War I. He negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres.

When this coup d'état took place in 1960, Adnan Menderes' popularity had led him toward a kind of republican and democratic absolutism. In other words, he had gotten to the point where he wouldn't tolerate any opposition to his ruling party which had originally been an opposition party. For ten years he had had everything his own way. He was not only re-elected when he needed to be, but by crashing majorities, and he was spending the country into bankruptcy, some on good projects but many that were not so well considered. He had used strong-arm tactics against people who had objected to his policies. Students began to agitate. He cracked down on the students very hard, with armed forces, and the officers didn't like that at all. Finally, he made the big mistake of arresting Ismet İnönü who was making a speech against him. They even instituted a kind of star-chamber proceeding of judging and convicting the opposition in the parliament. All of this had just preceded my arrival but the military had gotten a new constitution prepared and put in force. They had handed back the reins of authority to a civilian sector which was the Republican People's Party headed by İnönü. They had declared the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes to be outlawed. They had put on trial all of the parliamentary members of the Democrat Party.

Q: The military had done this.

HART: Yes. The military had done this. On the grounds that the military in Turkey is by custom and by Atatürk mandate the guardian of the republic against all threats from within as well as from without, they felt that these men were very guilty (Menderes and some of his people particularly) of violating the fundamental tenants of Atatürk and of what we call the pillars of the republic, more fundamental than any constitution in Turkey. The constitution in Turkey is a mechanism for governing the country, but its obedience to the principles of Atatürk are written right into the document and they may not be amended. One of the pillars is secularism. Another is code of dress -- no more tarbush, or fez. Another is that the country shall always remain a republic and never go back to being an empire. The royalty and all of its trappings are gone. Women are to cease wearing the veil and have equal rights.

In any event, the military tried a lot of these Democrats. They had imprisoned most of them on the island of Yassıada which is in the Marmara Sea. Menderes and his finance minister, Polatkan, and his foreign minister, Zorlu, were all hanged after being judged guilty of violating the fundamental tenets of the republic. Then they had prepared a new constitution which provided by what they call the d'Honte (Belgian) system of proportional representation a national remainder system of utilizing excess votes to broaden political representation in parliament and to provide checks against excessive authority. The checks and balances written into this constitution were such that the Turkish Labor Party, which was really the Turkish Communist party in disguise (communism being totally proscribed and Communist party outlawed) was allowed to function even though it was a cover for the Communist effort in Turkey. It was able, through the national remainder system to utilize excess unused votes, obtained in an urban center such as Istanbul, and distribute those excess votes to unsuccessful candidates in different parts of Turkey where the Party had been defeated. Thereby, more TLP candidates would acquire seats in the national assembly.

The result of this was that the Turkish Labor Party was given a tremendous momentum that it didn't really earn in the electorate. It provided a platform for agitation. One of its biggest charges

was that the United States was really the boss of Turkey. "Turkey is not a free country or a free democracy. Everywhere you go, there are American bases into which no Turk can enter. They don't even know what is going on in there, but certainly what is going on isn't for the benefit of Turkey. It is for the benefit of the United States and it is anti-Soviet. Why should Turkey always be anti-Soviet? Here is our big neighbor who wants to be a friend. Why should we call it an enemy? Why should we belong to NATO? It is wrong."

The propagandists gathered tremendous momentum because they had a newspaper that was important, "Aksam," which means "evening." It was strictly a Turkish Labor Party organ and it was well written, carefully edited, and began to gain a lot of influence. In fact, its influence penetrated into the middle spectrum of the Turkish press and political opinion. Another paper known as "Cumhuriyet" which means "The Republic," which was very strong and was influenced by Leftist propaganda. I found, therefore, that I had a real problem with a gathering strength of political opinion in the parliament (more than in the general public) which was critical of an American presence in so many facilities on the Black Sea and in the heart of Turkey.

Q: Did the Turkish military not feel that they were sharing the benefits of our presence?

HART: Yes. I never heard any complaints from Turkish officers. Now, one of my first calls was on General Sunay who was the chief of staff of all the forces, i.e. the chairman of the chiefs. I called on and became very friendly with the chief of staff of the Army, General Tural, and with the heads of the Navy and of the Air Force. None of these men nor any of their subordinates -- and I went to innumerable functions at the Ankara Turkish Officers' Club which was quite a gathering place. I would go to them to bolster the fraternization between our own military people in Turkey and the Turkish military leaders. I met Ismet İnönü at one of the early functions. Never, at any time from any of these people, did I hear a complaint on this score, but I could begin to feel it in the foreign ministry because of the parliament, particularly because of the criticism that there were bases all over Turkey into which no Turk could enter except, perhaps, the sweeper or janitor.

I set out early on to try to abate this kind of criticism, first of all to check into some of our problems. Another problem, apart from the type of thing that I had run into in Diyarbakir, was the use of the post exchange, the AFEX, in Ankara. I found that this was causing real problems because Turkish officers were allowed to use it as well as Americans who had very good friends among the Turkish military community. They would order -- and place big orders -- for things that were just totally unavailable on the market in Turkey, not only foodstuffs but cosmetics for their wives, cameras, tape recorders, things of that kind which were impossible to find on the Turkish market. They would sell them and we knew that there was a trade going on, sometimes by Turks who would come out with their baskets absolutely loaded with goods and sometimes by Americans who would then turn them over to Turks and be reimbursed. This was becoming a scandal and it was a problem for the Turkish government.

Another problem which had happened to be very acute not long before I got there was the misreading of the Turks by some of our non-commissioned officers and men who were a part of the American military establishment. Some of these people should never have left home in the

United States. Their children had formed gangs and sought fights with Turkish children. Some parents were aiding and abetting this sort of thing.

Still another problem was that we had a provision in our written understandings with the Turkish government that, should an American soldier run afoul of Turkish law -- commit some act which would involve his arrest -- he should be immediately turned over to the custody of his American commanding officer. If he was found to be on duty when this alleged offense took place, then he would be tried entirely by American law. But if he was not on duty, then the Turks had charge of the case.

One day (before I came) an American officer, driving a van from the officer's club in Çankaya (which is up near the presidential palace and also near the American and some other embassies such as the British), ran into the change of the guard at the presidential palace, marching with band and formation as they did every day up right past our place. He ran into the procession with this truck because he was drunk, and he disabled a number of Turkish soldiers, some of them very seriously. I don't think that any died, but some may have been unable to pursue their career because of the injuries they obtained. Then it was ruled by the American senior officer that he was on duty at this time. Everybody knew he was drunk. Our people had great doubt that he was on duty, but that was the way he escaped Turkish justice. He found himself quickly transported back to the United States. What happened to him, I don't know, but it was a scandal. It burst upon the scene at a time of great American-Turkish good will, and put a tremendous cloud over it.

There were other problems, too, particularly the problem of Cyprus. As I mentioned in the manuscript which you've just read, in 1964 when things were going very badly for the Turk Cypriots on the island, the Turks made up their mind that they were going to land forces on the island to protect their own community. Getting wind of this, Raymond Hare, my predecessor, asked for 24 hours to consult Washington because he knew this might involve hostilities between Greece and Turkey. Greece had placed on the island, above the treaty limits of the London-Zurich Accords, quite a few thousand regular Army Greek officers and men to bolster the national guard. They were there presumably to deter the Turkish intervention. In any case, President Johnson signed off on a letter prepared for him in the State Department which was a very tough letter, indeed. One phrase in that letter caused us a great deal of trouble which was, "you will have to realize, Mr. Prime Minister, [that is İnönü], that your allies would not have had the time to determine whether they have to come to your aid in the case of a Soviet intervention."

This really was saying in so many words, "You may not be able to count on us if the Soviets come in and try to break up this fight."

It was a great mistake, in my opinion, to have introduced that phraseology. In any event, it hung like a cloud in the background of people's minds. We had had demonstrations, as my deputy told me when I arrived, the previous year against the United States for the very first time. It had never happened before.

The combination of the Turkish Labor Party efforts to defame the relationship and to spoil it in any way possible, plus some actual things that had happened which I have described in my book

"Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War," did cast a cloud over our relations. When I came in by way of Istanbul, I was prepared that people were likely to question me on the state of our relations. Sure enough, one Turkish correspondent got to me during the period when the plane refueled before going on to Ankara. He asked me if I would comment on the state of Turkish-American relations which he said were not so good. I told him, "I think they are fundamentally sound and good. I intend to pursue every effort to make them better."

He didn't push it any further as an American correspondent might have.

Q: What month in 1965 did you arrive in Turkey?

HART: We arrived in September. There was an election held in late September. This resulted from the fact that the İnönü government, which was the Republican People's Party government, really had not come to grips with some more fundamental things that the Turks needed. Basically, this was an improvement in the economy. The Turkish Republican People's Party was a statist party. By that I mean that they believed that all of the "high hills of the economy" should be in the hands of the government, that private industry could be trusted only with peripheral production and services. Well, private industry existed, and there were several very important industries in the country; but basically it was a small part of the economy at this time. The old traditions of Turkey had not been that commerce and trade be conducted by Turks. These had been handled in previous decades and for centuries before that by foreign elements living in Turkey -- especially Greeks and Armenians, both of which were not necessarily foreign but they were foreign to the Turks in the sense that they were of another religion and another fireside language. There were also large bodies of Europeans who carried on trade. The Turks were administrators and soldiers.

This was beginning to change. Above all, there was a feeling by 1960-1961 that the Republican People's Party was an elitist party which was not close to the people of Turkey. It was time for a change. The leader of the opposition, who had really stepped into the shoes of Adnan Menderes, transferred the people who had always been the supporters of the Democrat Party into supporters of a new party called the Justice Party. It was called "justice" to imply that there had been an injustice, which was the hanging of Menderes and his two lieutenants, and that the trial and proscription of the Democrat Party was unjust. The symbol of the Justice Party was a white horse. As explained to me by Turks in Washington before I left to go to Turkey, democrat was derived from the Turkish demir kiri, an iron-grey horse. It was really a white horse, and it was a way of bringing to the attention of the Turkish people that the popular Democrat Party was not really dead. The leader of the Justice Party was a man of technical background, an engineer named Süleyman Demirel, who was very friendly to the United States. He was a great protagonist of free enterprise and was against state-ism. He did not intend to abolish all state-operated industry, but he would attempt to emphasize the private sector. He won the election. I was there just in time to see it. Certainly, the shortness of the interval between the time that I arrived and the election was such that the American ambassador could not be accused of intervening in the politics of Turkey. The sensitivity of our relationship lay under the surface.

Q: My notes show that the Justice Party won the elections on October 10 or October 11.

HART: I guess that is right. They won an absolute majority. It was not a crashing majority, but it

was a substantial majority which gave for the first time under this constitution -- which was, as I said, filled with checks and balances, including the national remainder vote-counting system of proportional representation. This tended to give a lot of little parties such as the Turkish Labor Party and others un-won seats in parliament. The system tended to favor a coalition governments, and this was later to be one of the great problems of that constitution. At this juncture it didn't operate. Demirel won a full working majority. He could sit there in parliament and get votes to pass laws favoring his programs. It turned out to be a very decisive period of change toward emphasis on free enterprise, private enterprise, and away from state enterprise. It gathered momentum later over the 1970s. It then gathered tremendous momentum from 1980 on, when the current President of Turkey, heading the new Motherland Party took power in 1983 in an election under a new constitution.

The period of my duty in Ankara was very interesting to me because I could see that it was a time of change. Demirel was a very dynamic man. He surrounded himself with dynamic workers who as ministers would help him in identifying opportunities for private enterprise. He was getting a lot of aid from the United States. In 1965 to 1966, he was receiving yearly about \$150 million of grant military assistance and about \$150 million of grant economic assistance. This meant a lot to Turkey. Turkey was a very poor country, obviously, with great poverty in the villages. There were about 35,000 villages scattered all over Turkey, many of them in almost inaccessible places -- up in the mountains, without roads, just tracks and trails. However, under previous American aid programs, they had started a network of basic highways to link the different parts of the country. Up until fairly recently, before my arrival, back in the 1950s, there was hardly a highway that deserved the name in Turkey.

By 1965, I could see, for example, a new surfaced blacktop between Ankara and Istanbul, I could see the old narrow road right along its side, which had hardly room for more than one car. Part of it was blacktopped and part of it was just rutted dirt. The situation in Turkey was that they had a long, long way to go but they were getting up momentum. As Demirel used to tell me, "About this business of the high hills being only in the hands of the government, where are they going to find real experts to do all these jobs? What do you have in the parliament? You have people trained in political science. You have people who speak foreign languages. That isn't going to get your roads built."

I found very soon that this new wave of emphasis was accompanied by a new type of person sitting in the parliament. These were people from the towns and the larger villages, mostly the towns. They were rural people. They came in without any knowledge of foreign languages and they sat there in the parliament and they were looked down upon. The elite was very pleasant for the Europeans and for the Americans because they spoke English, French, German, they played bridge, they were sociable, world travelers, etc. They didn't represent Turkey. Now came the Turks, the real Turks, the Anatolian Turks. Foreign diplomats now had to learn Turkish and we all worked very hard on it, I can tell you. I tried to set an example. I found that interest in Turkish was high, particularly in some quarters of the embassy. I took Turkish lessons every day and sought every occasion to use it. It is a difficult language. It paid off to have even a little of it, because everywhere I went, it was needed. You just couldn't do your job very well if you had to have an interpreter on your right hand all the time. This emphasis was aided by the fact that the Turks welcomed your efforts to learn their language. They help you and they don't look down on

you for not being already proficient. They are very glad to see you try.

In the parliament, there were vigorous exchanges of language and sometimes of fists in the corridors and in the back rooms of the parliament between this new crop of village or town-raised countrymen and the urban elite who were disparaging. Insults gave way to fist fights. Demirel and his people, with his preoccupation in development saw much of James P. Grant, AID Mission Director, and his boys. Grant was very dynamic. Rodney Wagner came in as his deputy for a while, but after about a year he went on to Morgan Guarantee Trust where he has been ever since. I think he is now one of their senior vice presidents. We had a superb group of people. Grant is particularly effective in working up Turkish participation in programs of development training in the United States. When they returned, Grant would have special receptions to support them in their work in the various villages and towns. I used to fly with Grant to these assemblies in order to just bolster the feeling of partnership between our people and the Turkish people, working in the provinces on various programs wherein we supported Demirel's long-range planning.

I mentioned some of the problems and these problems were tackled in the following way. For instance, for the AFEX problem we had meetings right away to establish strict rules about access to products and the amount that could be purchased by any one person at a time. This was to avoid a commercial enterprise circumventing the Turkish customs. We had to work on the APO problem a little bit, too, because that had gotten out of hand. We tightened the rules about the use of the armed forces postal system which was important to us all in our work and in our lives, but it could easily be abused.

On this business of an offense committed by an American soldier while on-duty status, or not on duty status, this was a matter which I felt very strongly about. We had a lot of meetings, and we tightened the rules so that no superior officer was going to loosely give a subordinate a duty certificate when it was clearly not warranted.

With regard to the anti-Turkish attitude of some of our non-commissioned people and even of some of officers, I made it clear that I expected a reverse of that attitude or a transfer out of Turkey. I had as aide Frank Cash, who was the capable political military counselor of the embassy, a veteran of World War II and a very fine guy. We had a program of regular meetings with commanding officers, including such organizations as JUSMAAT which is the U.S. advisory and military assistance mission, and the commander of TUSLOG which is The U.S. Logistics Group (that's what TUSLOG stands for) which is the American cadre which would be activated and reinforced in time of war. TUSLOG stands there as a readiness unit of several thousand which would be swelled immediately in time of crisis by a lot more people. It would be able to hit the ground running in any major operation.

I insisted on a course on Turkey to be introduced in the American schools. We had a complex of schools just outside of Ankara, in Balgat; The George C. Marshall High School, and the lower grades leading up to high school. At a certain level, we all agreed that we were going to have an obligatory host-nation course so that all American students would learn about Turkey, recognize its flag with respect, and become acquainted with its history. This course would be conducted by a Turk. If I found that anybody was making it his business to talk against the Turks, out he goes.

He would be transferred right away, whether it was an officer or a non-commissioned officer.

We had other problems which were not so easy to resolve. Previous AID missions had helped the Turks build a labor movement, a free labor movement so that they wouldn't just develop an organization which could be captured or directed by Communist elements. Türki was the name of it and it was the big confederation of free labor in Turkey. Not only was it free, it was combative. It believed in strikes and it believed in picketing. We really had trouble because the biggest target it could strike against was the TUSLOG. They made life pretty miserable for some of our people in certain bases in Turkey, particularly down at Incirlik near Adana. Turkish strikers who were striking against TUSLOG used some pretty rough tactics against our families down there. The commanding officer came to me in a high state of dudgeon and wanted something done about it right away. I did what I could. I went to see the ministry of foreign affairs right away and made my objections. I found the ministry really not inclined to do very much against the Turkish labor movement. I had a lot of problems. Fortunately, it didn't last too long but it was a severe test of the limitations of diplomacy in the case of a labor movement which we had helped give birth to.

We had a lot of problems of that kind. I mentioned the bases and the complaint that the Turkish Labor Party was putting out. It was beginning to take hold on the other side of the spectrum, in the extreme right, which was just as chauvinistic about this matter as the Turkish Labor Party could be. It was, for the period that I am discussing, a matter almost of a complete parallel of criticism between the extreme right and the extreme left. I organized with the minister of foreign affairs and his deputy, a tour of all of our bases by such Turkish leaders as the Turks decided to send. They went into our facilities and were given a full briefing, as if they were authorized American officers coming out from Washington. They were told exactly what was going on and given a full treatment of classified information. It went off very well. They did quite a tour. When they came back, I probed to find out whether they felt that they had been dealt with openly or whether they felt that essential things had been withheld from them. They had no complaint. I felt that we were making a little headway in a sensitive matter.

There is a certain parallel with the Saudi case of Dhahran Airfield which was one single facility, but we had a lot of them in Turkey. It was an experience in which I think we had enough success that the Turkish Labor Party lost that part of its argument. There were other arguments on which they kept up a drum-fire throughout the time that I was there. The most successful thing they had from their point of view was to arouse the students who were beginning to be very volatile anyway.

This led us to studying the educational system in Turkey. They inherited their system from France and Germany. It was the great lecture-hall system. Students and faculty never get together in a typical Turkish University. I know there have been big changes now recently. In those days, there would be 300 or 400 students sitting in an auditorium listening to a lecture. When the lecture was over, they went home to memorize what he had said, to get it under their belts. They would then use it in the examination. The one examination at the end of the course at the end of the year was the thing that counted. If they didn't pass that, they were out of luck.

HART: I mentioned the parallel, in certain respects, I identified between problems we had in Saudi Arabia and problems in Turkey. I think I should say that sensitivity over relations of this kind where you have a great power like the United States using facilities and quite a bit of real estate in a much smaller and less developed country, is heightened by disparities and living standards between the two, i.e., the way Americans lived in Turkey or in Saudi Arabia at the time that I talked about, not the present period. This, in itself, had built-in problems. When you find American officers walking around with expensive cameras and all sorts of nice automobiles to take them wherever they want to go, living in good houses, and being able to travel when they want a little vacation, along side of them were Turkish officers who may be good friends but who -- [Discussion interrupted.]

The difference in living standards is a problem. The occupation and use of terrain is a very serious one. In Turkey at this particular time that I am speaking about, manufactured consumer products in local markets were pretty meager in terms of choices offered. There were some nice things to be bought, but there were so many other things that were absolutely unavailable. The Turkish currency was non-convertible. It was worth, as a unit, a lot more then than it is now. It is about almost 2,000 Turkish lire to the dollar now, whereas at the time I was there it was officially nine to the dollar. Later it became 15, which is more realistic, but you couldn't transfer the currency. In Saudi Arabia, by contrast, we had a hard currency but we found very little on the shelves. It was a very primitive country compared to what it has now become. The unavailability of commodities which people liked was a problem at Dhahran Airfield where the APEX was misused.

So we had a certain parallel situation, but a great many differences. Turkey is a much larger country in terms of population and has a much more complex history. I must say that the friendliness of the Turks, in spite of all of these problems, was the thing that impressed me the most. As I traveled around the country, I realized that, in most of the countryside, these problems about parliament, voting, anti-Americanism, NATO, and matters of that kind didn't affect people very much. For the most part, they were only vaguely acquainted with them anyway. They felt very strongly that their friendship with the United States was fundamental. Having fought in their own history 13 wars with Russia, there is a gut feeling which penetrates all of Turkey about the Russians. Efforts to try to generate good will toward the USSR by the Turkish Labor Party and by many students and to speak against the United States, passed right over the heads of these people. In fact, those who talked most about those things had the least influence outside Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. Their influence was primarily confined to larger urban centers and a few other places where there was a growing labor force.

The matter of Turkey's capability to play its proper role in NATO and have a defense establishment adequate to the mission that had been established for it in NATO's Supreme Command was one of our big preoccupations. Turkey had a ground force, when fully mobilized, that made it the second largest force in NATO. But Turkey did not have an adequate supply of up-to-date equipment. When we arrived, it was still flying the T-38 as a trainer aircraft. It really didn't have much of anything in the way of fighter aircraft, but it had well-trained pilots.

During the early part of my period, we got a delivery of Northrop aircraft which were F-4

fighters. They were flown in by Turks. I took a flight with one of them when we had a little ceremony at Bandirma to turn over these aircraft to the Turkish Air Force. They had been ferried across to England, and then the Turks picked them up there and flew them the rest of the way.

The Turks had an armament establishment at Kirikkale which is outside of Ankara about an hour and a half drive to the east. This was quite a large complex built many years before for metallurgy and for manufacture of explosives. Most of its capacity was idle. Some of it was usable for making tractors. They had some good machinery, and they had some people who knew how to use that machinery to grind the gears and make the fine parts fit. They manufactured a certain amount of explosives in shells of various calibers which were sold mostly to West Germany. Since they had just opened a new steel mill at a place called Eregli up in the north on the Black Sea, I knew they also could make plate steel in various forms and thicknesses.

U.S. Military aid was being handled in such a manner that twenty-five per cent of all of our military assistance in dollar amounts was going into shipments from the United States to Turkey. This was the cost of transporting, and I felt that this was a terrible waste, particularly for such items as armored cars, tanks, etc. Tanks are complicated and armored cars are simpler to solve because the tanks they had were Korean War tanks, M-48s, which were being retrofitted a little bit here and there. They were still pretty out-of-date. Armored cars were another matter. I felt that something should be done there because, with Eregli steel laminated, strengthened, and reinforced in whatever way necessary, and with their capacity to build engines and gear systems at Kirikkale, they should be able to confine shipments to those special high-technology items which go into armored cars and do the assembling in Turkey. Thus, the heavy-weight, space-occupying elements should be manufactured right in Turkey. This would save enormously on shipment costs.

I began to preach this as I could. Things happen slowly in Turkey and not a great deal was done during the time I was there. I do know that our people in the military, who understood this a lot better than I did and who followed up on these efforts, did make a change eventually so that we wouldn't have quite that amount of military-assistance money used up just for shipment.

We also undertook at Eskisehir a facility to repair jet engines which helped a good deal in the new effort to bolster the Turkish Air Force.

What you had, therefore, was a picture of a very large army, most of the officers of which had not had American training and were rather wedded to tradition. They had a traditional command structure. It was good. In many respects, the discipline was superb. In contrast to much of the Arab world, they always kept their equipment in order. They were good at maintenance, and it didn't matter how old the equipment was. They kept it running one way or another.

I visited a number of Turkish bases, strictly Turkish. In every case where the vehicles parked, they were parked in beautiful order. They all looked as though they had just been oiled and shined, no matter how old they were. Also, all over the place were trees planted with white coating up the trunks to protect them from insects. Every tree was the charge of one Turkish soldier. Atatürk's reforms: Reforest your country! The Ottomans denuded and ruined it. You are going to replant it. You, the young Turkish soldier just arriving from the farm, are going to learn

two things. One is how to take care of a tree. The other is how to read, write and do arithmetic. They would get some basic education. They couldn't get it in many little villages because there were no schools.

The next stage is that the soldier is going to do civic work for the community. He is going to build schools, water systems, drill wells, build feeder roads. Built into the Turkish Army system are positive elements of improving the life of the people among whom they were quartered.

Problems. One was the Kurds, Kurdish communities were basically under the control of Aga. The Aga owned those villages. He owned, sometimes, a multiplicity of villages. If you tried to help the people of the village and you didn't go through the Aga, you were getting yourself in trouble, but particularly you were getting in trouble the people you were trying to help. The Aga was extremely jealous of his power and his authority to control everything that went to his people.

Q: The Agas, themselves, were Kurds.

HART: Yes. I didn't really get a feel for this until I made a trip down to Mardin. There a high-ranking Turkish officer who was my escort told me, "We have got to get rid of those Agas. They really are holding back a whole quadrant of Turkey in the southeastern area where the Kurds predominate. You just can't do anything for them. You want to do all kinds of things for them. We were able to help them in practical ways. If we do it without going through the Aga, you just get those people into serious trouble. If we do go through the Aga, he simply siphons off any money that is involved and just takes it for himself for his own purposes. He distributes his favors as he wishes."

It was quite a serious problem and still is.

In any case, with the Army we had very good officer relationships at the top level, but they weren't as close as they were with the Air Force and with the Navy. Why? Because those fellows had more exposure to American training. A lot of their men had gone to the United States and had been trained for periods of a year or more in the United States. Some had been there longer than that. They usually picked up a lot of English as well as technical education. They were more technically trained than the average officer of the Army.

In the structure of the forces of Turkey, one felt a certain discrepancy between these two branches of the service, the Navy and Air Force on the one hand, and the Army on the other. However, the Army and the other forces were all very distrustful of Russia. I would say particularly the Army. The Army tended to be more conservative and more religious, and they were less likely to feel the winds of change than the Air Force and the Navy. They had good programs going in all three services, but there was a great deal of work to be done. One of our biggest problems was with the Pentagon. At that time, Robert McNamara was trying to see what he could do to cut down on the amount of aid, for budgetary reasons. An evaluating team had just gone out before I arrived, headed by General Bonesteel, to evaluate Turkish requirements under the NATO framework. They made their report and made it to the Pentagon, but they never checked with Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander who was in

Paris at that time. He was furious when I visited him. He said, "Here they go out and do what is my job to know about -- the adequacy of the Turkish contribution to NATO and what is needed to make it more effective. They went and made this check and rigged it so that it would please the Pentagon and be acceptable to McNamara."

This was a problem because it didn't take me long to realize the Turkish forces needed everything. There wasn't anything they didn't need. With a small economy such as they had -- their total exports were less than \$450 million mostly in hazelnuts, dates, figs, tobacco and some cotton products. That was their export. They didn't have a real industrial export capacity. Today, I believe Turkey's exports are 75% free-enterprise industrial and commodity exports. The whole picture has changed. But in those days, there was practically nothing. How could you then be a well-equipped member of NATO with a mission as big as Turkey has -- the longest frontier with the Soviet Union and with the Iron Curtain of any of the NATO countries -- and support this effort on that kind of an economy. It didn't even loom as a possibility. It looked as though Turkey forever would be counting on major military assistance from the United States and, to some extent, from Germany. They would have to continue this way indefinitely when we were one of those periods of budget cutting which frequently descend on our government.

This is a rather long-winded way of describing some of the major issues that we had to face which kept us very busy. I have not discussed Cyprus because I wrote a book (*"Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War -- Cyprus, A First Hand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968," Duke University Press, 1990.*) on it and felt it was rather useless to go into that in great detail here. But that was the major crisis of my time. If you want to deal with it briefly, I could.

Q: I think it is pretty well covered by your book. Any other reflections, however, would be welcome in terms of what you think 1974 showed about underlying Turkish attitudes or where they expect the problem to go now. Are they there to stay?

HART: Shortly after the Turkish military intervention occurred in 1974, a high-ranking Turkish political figure came to Washington. He was an old friend of mine. I referred to the Cyprus problem, and he said, "Pete, there's no problem any more. It is settled."

Well, I knew what he meant, but it is still a problem. It is a problem for Turkey because of public opinion which is constantly being whipped up by Greek and Greek Cypriot political leaders who believe the only method of trying to pressure Turkey is through the United States. They are very active in pressuring our Congress to penalize Turkey for keeping troops on the island of Cyprus.

It all goes back, of course, to the basic syndrome between Turkey and Greece. You all know that. I don't need to go into it. There has been an effort in this recent period to try to break the crust of that syndrome and see what the realities really are. There is no reason, in my opinion, for continued hostility between Greece and Turkey. During the period that I was in Turkey, however, the Greek effort was directed toward Enosis, union with "Mother Greece" by all Greek-speaking communities. The biggest community is really the only one of importance and it is Cyprus. Their effort there, as I learned even before I left Washington from the Greek ambassador, was to have it generally accepted that the London-Zurich Treaties of 1960 were a dead letter. They wanted to start all over again on the basis of Enosis. They felt that they had the

Greek Cypriots with them. They knew they didn't have the Turk Cypriots with them, but they felt they could ride that one out. Greeks had massive superiority on the island in terms of numbers and military force.

The problem was with us in the embassy in Ankara as it was in our embassy in Nicosia and in Athens to try to see what we could do to avoid a head-on collision. It was a problem that hung like a cloud over our international relationships. We knew that it was dangerous. We didn't know how it would develop, but we could see some flash points turning amber toward red. Sure enough, in 1967 it came within a whisker of war between Greece and Turkey. It was very close. Anybody that says that that was not a close shave, is wrong in my opinion because even in 1974 it wasn't as close as in 1967.

In 1974 you had the breakdown of the Greek government in the face of the Turkish invasion. In any case, you had a discreditation of the military regime in Athens with its own people and even with the Greek Cypriots. In 1967 it was different. The military regime had a different leadership. It was a Papadopoulos-led regime in Athens. They hadn't yet given up entirely on their relations with the Greek public. The Greek public, however it may have felt about the regime at that particular juncture, was pretty well under control. The press could not function freely. There were no demonstrations possible in the streets. There was no parliament functioning. King Constantine was still there. Papadopoulos had been plugging for Enosis but it was proven by the crisis of 1967 that, as a soldier, he was not willingly going to go to war with Turkey. He knew Greece couldn't win and that it would be a disaster. What was needed was a face-saving way of getting out of the fix. The confrontation was unraveled by Cyrus Vance because both sides really needed him. Both sides really wanted his help. Public opinion was a bigger problem in Turkey than we had in Greece, whereas normally it would be the other way around. Greece was the place where there were notoriously volatile party politics and street demonstrations. These were absent, but they were not absent at all in Turkey. So we had a problem with public opinion, but the willingness of the Turkish government to conduct secret diplomacy with Cyrus Vance as the mediator was demonstrated over and over again in his visit which lasted from November 23 to December 3, as described fully in the book. Only about seven days during this time were actually spent shuttling between Athens and Ankara.

The Turkish leaders made it easier for him because they, themselves, kept the journalists from invading their premises. They couldn't keep them away from the door, but they could keep them outside. They could call a number of meetings at times when the journalists didn't expect it and didn't know where it would be. They called them deliberately in a place where the journalists would be caught absent. It worked. It permitted a calming of the atmosphere and further discussions to proceed on the issue of war or peace, even though the fundamental problems, the problems of governance of Cyprus, were not resolved. They still haven't been resolved successfully because you have got, in effect, two working democracies now on the island which have not yet found the key to a federation.

Federation was outlawed in the mind of Makarios when I was there. He wouldn't go for federation at all. He still thought that he was going to be able, somehow or other, to be the single master of Cyprus by what seemed to us to be a policy of making life discouraging for the Turk-Cypriot youth. If they went abroad, he made it hard for them to come back. Yet, since there was

so little opportunity for them on the island of Cyprus under the circumstances, the Turk-Cypriot youth had every reason to try to find work abroad. The economy was about 100 years behind that of the Greek Cypriots. I think Makarios hoped that, eventually, Turk Cypriots would just simply migrate away so that the residue would be a lot of old people staying on with no influence and unable to do anything. The young people would be gone. I believe that was his policy at the time leading up to 1967.

Also, he had tremendous influence over the government that preceded the military government in Athens. In fact, he seemed to have more influence than George Papandreou. He probably had more influence than most of the top Greek politicians of that time.

We had a very close relationship between the three area ambassadors -- Phil Talbot in Athens whom I had known when I was working in Saudi Arabia and he was assistant secretary; and "Toby" Belcher in Cyprus whom I had known since 1959 when I had first visited the island. We three got together as best we could to try to see what we could do before the situation got out of hand. When it did begin to get out of hand, we were very close in our evaluations, and we trusted each other's judgements. Neither of us went off at too great a tangent on his own particular track. We tried to keep the main problem in focus. When Cyrus Vance came along, I'm sure he felt that he had good support from all three embassies, and certainly magnificent support in New York.

This was a very intense part of our three missions, working on this problem. It interrupted everything else that we might have been concerned with. I believe that I came to the conclusion that was better expressed by Elie Ledpiero in one of his writings. He said that rule by the majority -- a sort of sacred principle in our part of the world -- works only if the composition of that majority and its outlook can shift and change with issues and with people's feelings freely expressed, so that the majority and the minority not be permanent. Permanence invites fear of oppression by the minority. Where the majority is hardened because it is ethnic and because it is looking out for its own interests first and foremost all the time, the situation threatens the minority of a different ethnicity. Then you've got the makings of real trouble. Until that problem is resolved, the rule of the majority over the minority simply doesn't work. It is the stuff out of which revolutions or civil war are made.

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN
Political Counselor
Ankara (1965-1968)

Ambassador Christopher Van Hollen was born in Maryland in 1922. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in India, Pakistan, Washington, DC, Turkey, and was ambassador to Sri Lanka. Ambassador Van Hollen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 23, 1990.

Q: You went to the War College from 1964 to 1965 and then you were assigned to Ankara, Turkey as Political Counselor from 1965 to 1968. What were the main issues that you addressed in Turkey during this period?

VAN HOLLEN: The key international problem for Turkey then and now was its relationship with Greece; the contentious issue then and now was Cyprus. The task for American diplomacy was to maintain reasonably satisfactory relations with both Turkey and Greece since both were members of NATO and we believed that it was very important to keep a degree of cohesion in the southeastern flank of NATO at a time when these countries were on the verge of war. It was almost a replay of the India-Pakistan situation. It was obviously different, but there were similar elements.

There was a crisis over Cyprus in 1967. Cyrus Vance, later Secretary of State, was involved in it. The main task for American diplomacy was to assure the Turks of continued U.S. support while at the same time we were seeking to maintain satisfactory relationships with Greece. The domestic political equation on the Greek-Turkey question is that there are many more Greek-Americans than there are Turkish-Americans. That created domestic pressures favoring the Greeks. At the same time, Turkey was considered as very important in the NATO context because of its border with the Soviet Union. This was at a time of the Cold War so that there was strong emphasis on supporting Turkey as a NATO partner which was protecting the Eastern flank of NATO and which was threatened by the Soviet Union. This factor was constantly mentioned when the question of military aid arose.

Q: As Political Counselor, you talked to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and others. Were the Turks more concerned about the USSR than the Greeks, whose exclusive focus was Turkey?

VAN HOLLEN: The Turks were very much concerned about the Greek role in Cyprus. They were concerned about the impact of mainland Greek activities on the island vis-a-vis the Turkish minority, which comprised about 20 percent of the Cyprus population. They were very, very sensitive to any efforts by Greece to put into effect ENOSIS which was the union of Greece and Cyprus. While the Turks had the military power and the population advantage to prevail in a military confrontation with Greece, they were less certain on Cyprus, partly because of the geography of Cyprus, partly because of the concern about the international impact of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. When Turkey did invade the Island, this caused a suspension of U.S. aid -- this occurred after my tour. Incidentally, for those who are interested in this period, Parker Hart, the former Ambassador, has just written a book on his experiences in Turkey, including the Cyprus crisis of 1967.

Q: How were the Turks to deal with? Were they greatly different from the South Asians?

VAN HOLLEN: A lot of people felt that they had difficulty dealing with the Indians because of the perceived "Indian arrogance" and India's alleged disdain for America. That was very much overstated. I did not have any difficulty in dealing with the Indians or the Pakistanis, either. The Turks were quite easy to deal with. By and large U.S.-Turkey relationships were fairly good and that may have helped matters. The aid levels were holding up reasonably well. Turkey had a pretty good reputation in the United States. Some of that went back to Turkish support for the U.S. effort in Korea when the Turks sent troops. They also had a very good top level Foreign Ministry careerist by the name of Ilter Turkoman, who later became Ambassador to France and the U.N. I had a very good relationship with him. Over all, the relationship was good. On the

other hand, at the Ambassadorial level, Ambassador Hart took a lot of knocks from the Turkish press on the Cyprus question.

Q: How did the Turks view the Soviets?

VAN HOLLEN: It is hard to judge motivation, but the answer is that they felt threatened because of Soviet pressures after World War II in Eastern Turkey and in the Bosphorus waterways. At the same time, there probably were elements in the picture similar to those prevailing in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. While the Turks were concerned about the Soviet threat, they were also interested in U.S. military assistance in the context of maintaining their military superiority over Greece. In relative terms, the Turks saw a more direct threat from the USSR than did Pakistan, which at the time had the advantage of having Afghanistan as a separation between it and the Soviet Union. There was a bit of ambivalence on the Turkish side as well in the sense that they recognized that emphasis on the Soviet threat enhanced their prospects for U.S. military assistance for themselves.

ROBERT A. LINCOLN
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Ankara (1965-1970)

Robert A. Lincoln was born in New York in 1921. As a Foreign Service officer, Mr. Lincoln served in Syria, Ceylon, Turkey, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt on April 19, 1989.

Q: Well, from there you went where? You went to Turkey from there?

LINCOLN: Yes.

Q: That was when, about 1965?

LINCOLN: It was the end of 1965. I arrived in Turkey on the first day of 1966, I think, as PAO, because - why? Well, because a lot of the changes that we were trying to make in Western Europe didn't suit the newer administration in USIA, and that was understandable.

Turkey was a country I knew pretty well. We had as ambassador Pete Hart, whom I had known for a years and liked immensely. I broke all bureaucratic records. I was in Turkey for five and a half years.

Q: You were there five and a half years?

LINCOLN: Yes.

Q: I had forgotten you were there that long.

LINCOLN: Well, at that time -- I don't know what happens today -- at that time I don't think anybody had ever spent five and a half years in one country.

It happened because Frank Shakespeare became the director of USIA after Nixon's election in 1968. I was then due to make a shift, but Frank and I talked about a whole lot of things and, strangely enough, got along extremely well. I say strangely enough because everyone in USIA thinks of him, and rightfully so, as being far to the right, and I was out of the New Frontier.

Q: You had been in Turkey when Frank came in -- you had been in Turkey about two and a half years, hadn't you?

LINCOLN: A little longer. As I said, I was due to shift and didn't. Frank came out and inspected -- this is a very interesting thing to me, and I don't think it has ever been publicized. Frank came to Turkey and spent close to two days personally looking over our whole Turkish operation. Leon Picon was there as Cultural Affairs Officer, and Leon was a fascinating figure. Art Hoffman was then the deputy.

Q: Was Leon Picon still there as CAO?

LINCOLN: He was still there after I left. Nobody was as good as Leon turned out to be. I really think he was superb.

We were running a left-of-center program, more cultural than informational in the old-fashioned sense. The program was meant to appeal to upper intellectual levels in the foreign ministry, the academic world, the media and so on.

It featured such things as Turkish production by the Turkish National Theater of translations of American musicals. Leon arranged most of those. I remember *My Fair Lady*, for example, and there were a number of others. He would first have Turkish people translate. In the case of *My Fair Lady*, for instance, Sevki Sanle from near Izmir did a superb job, and she explained why. (She spoke, I should add, English just as well as she did Turkish, an amazing woman.)

Sevki pointed out that "over in Izmir, we have an accent in which we drop the H's, just as in *My Fair Lady*." I had never known that.

Now, let me see, I am trying to remember the year, because you were in Izmir as Consul General. Did you ever run into her?

Q: What is her name again?

LINCOLN: Sevki Sanle, S-E-V-K-I S-A-N-L-E.

Q: No.

LINCOLN: I guess she operated entirely in Ankara.

Q: Well, she may have been closely associated with the Turkish-American Association, which is the official name of the binational center there. In my time, its Director was an American USIA officer, and the only USIS representative in Izmir.

LINCOLN: It's possible.

Q: I had a project to do with that, but my job there was not a USIA job.

LINCOLN: Yes.

Q: I don't think I --

LINCOLN: You just did everything?

Q: Pardon?

LINCOLN: You did everything.

Q: No. She -- I mean, I don't think I knew her. Carl Broukman at that time was the Center Director.

LINCOLN: Who was it again?

Q: Carl Broukman.

LINCOLN: Oh, I remember Carl. Benno Selcke later was the PAO over there. Do you remember Benno? He was out of the USIA German program.

Q: Yes. He was the PAO -- he went to the center after that?

LINCOLN: No, he was PAO in Izmir after Carl was director of the center. I don't think Carl was still the director of the center when Benno went out to Izmir, or was he?

Q: I don't know. As I said, in my time there, the only American USIS Officer in Izmir was the Binational Center Director. Carl was still there when I left.

LINCOLN: Isn't it awful how you forget a lot of these things.

Q: I left in September of 1966 and Carl was still the director of the center at that time. I was not aware that USIS ever had a PAO there, as such.

LINCOLN: Benno went to Izmir sometime in 1967, that is my guess. Again, he was PAO and Carl had gone by then.

Q: Yes, Carl would have gone by then.

LINCOLN: Well, at any rate, when Frank Shakespeare visited Turkey as USIS Director, Leon and I were running a definite left-of-center program. Our basic theory was that somehow or other within a few years the leftist party, the Republican People's Party -- it was leftist on the political scene in Turkey -- would come into power.

There had been a mass appeal magazine at USIS Ankara which we quietly eliminated and replaced with a magazine which Leon edited. I don't believe that the only USIS publication in any USIS country post before had been one that came out of the cultural section. Rather, basic publications normally came out your information section.

Q: They also were published often, most of the time, back down at the Regional Service Center in Beirut.

LINCOLN: The old Regional Service Center in Beirut, that's right. However, this time, we published locally. Both Leon and I had a number of friends in the Turkish academic world and we were trying to find a translation in Turkish for the word "horizon" which would be the title. The best translation was "Ufuk."

I don't think I ever accomplished anything else in Turkey as well known back in Washington as to have created a magazine with a title like that. It was broadly noticed. The magazine has been abandoned, don't worry, for many years.

Our goal then was to publish a magazine which would carry only translations of U.S. works from intellectual publications. By intellectual I mean everything from Kenyon Review to Harper's to The New York Times Magazine.

The agency was very cooperative. USIA would make arrangements to get the approval for us to use an article. We published about six articles per issue. The magazine came out every month.

Q: How often did you issue it?

LINCOLN: Monthly. What year did we start it? Perhaps 1967.

Q: Who did your translating?

LINCOLN: Mostly people on our own staff, on Leon's staff specifically. There was one girl, for example, a delightful person, who was absolutely bilingual. I remember Frank Shakespeare asking her (Leon has reminded me of this), "And where did you learn your Turkish?" Good gravy, he thought she was part of our American staff.

Q: [Laughter.]

LINCOLN: Leon was very proud of that, understandably so.

At any rate, the magazine had a very small circulation. It never went above 1,500. Where was the circulation? Selected people from the academic world; all universities - Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul,

people from the foreign ministry, because the foreign ministry had tremendous power in the country, as you may recall; people from the government as a whole -- but, again, individually selected; certain people from the media, selected writers, and so on.

For example, one of the men who liked the magazine very much and became practically an advisor was the editor of the daily newspaper, Milliyet. Milliyet was powerful then. Today it is less powerful, I understand. The editor came from Izmir originally, by the way, although I met him in Istanbul.

Q: Do you know what his name was?

LINCOLN: Abdi Ipekci. He was assassinated later, in 1980. I used to exchange Christmas cards with him. His foreign editor was Sammy Cohen, spelled in Turkish Sami Kohen.

Q: Just as we had an Alex Johnson, spelled in Turkish, Haluk Cansin, who was an editor. I think he was the deputy assistant editor of Yeni Asir, the main newspaper in Izmir.

LINCOLN: Çansin - C, cedilla, I believe. Perfect. The Turks are very sensible at phonetic spelling, you know. My name in Turkish was L-dotted i-N-K-N, perfect - much easier to understand than Lincoln. It made a lot more sense, with the dotted "I" which, well -

Q: It is the short "i" as opposed to the long "I"?

LINCOLN: Yes. For that matter, some people did spell the name L-i-N-K-I-N.

Well, Milliyet was an extremely influential newspaper among the members of the socialist Republican People's Party, and by socialism I suspect that I don't mean socialism as it is looked on by most Americans.

Q: No, it is only leftist in the sense of favoring state enterprise in comparison with the opposition Justice party.

LINCOLN: That's right.

Q: That was his principal stock in trade.

LINCOLN: Correct. At any rate, the moderate leader of the RPP at the time was Nihat Erim, and he Ipekci was an intellectual leader. It took us about two years to get to know Ipekci very well. He simply didn't like Americans but he gradually became a rather good friend.

Sami Kohen, the foreign editor, was the opposite. Sami liked Americans; anyway, he didn't give a darn. He was the stringer for Newsweek, among other things. He is still alive, I think.

Ipekci was assassinated by the same man who later tried to kill the Pope. Erim was assassinated by a terrorist in 1980, as I remember it.

Erim, at any rate, was the moderate leader of the RPP, or socialist party. He had once been the Turkish representative on human rights to the United Nations. He was a professor at the University of Istanbul at one time, a thoughtful man.

He used to come up to the house because he liked Catherine, my wife, very much. She could speak Turkish with him. He didn't speak much English. His French was good. I remember one time at dinner at the house he was giving us the history of the cradle that we had recently bought near Izmir, an old Turkish-Aegean cradle. It was an antique, but he knew all about why and how such cradles were used. He spent half an hour telling Catherine about it.

Son Henry was then probably two years old, so I don't think he remembered any of it afterward.

Finally, the USIS left-of-center program worked. We were doing the right thing. There wasn't any question, so if you ask whether USIS had an impact, yes, we had a huge impact at that time in Turkey.

When the military in 1971 overthrew Demirel's Justice, conservative government -- it was the military who performed a quiet coup, as we called it -

Q: Yes.

LINCOLN: They installed Erim as the prime minister.

Q: (Inaudible).

LINCOLN: Another man with whom we had had dinner at Erim's house, a few weeks before he was named the deputy prime minister and approximately half of the cabinet were people we knew one way or another.

I remember several of them telephoned Catherine to let her know: "Guess what, I've just been installed" and that sort of thing.

Q: You know, as a matter of fact -

LINCOLN: Frank Shakespeare, conservative though he was, approved of what USIS Turkey had done.

Q: When the military had their earlier coup, when they unseated Menderes back in 1960, when they executed him, they were pretty much in the left themselves, strangely enough. The military, in comparison with the Menderes group, a leftist-oriented government. They separated the old Republican People's Party, which was later voted out.

LINCOLN: They overthrew a rightist group.

Q: Well, then Menderes' party was rightist. It was then known as the old Democratic party and was overthrown by the military/RPP combine.

LINCOLN: Yes.

Q: The military overthrew the Democratic Party Government and they were more or less socialist oriented but not strictly so. They were in for more than four years, and they finally allowed an election -- for five years -- in 1965 and the Justice party of Demirel, which was the successor party of the old Democrat party. They roundly defeated the RPP and came to power. That is when Demirel became prime minister.

LINCOLN: Yes. Well, Demirel was prime minister until early 1971, the period I am describing. The Justice party and he were it.

As a result, the embassy and CIA had the closest imaginable contacts with Demirel and the Justice party. They apparently didn't know the RPP very well.

Q: I know. That was a reversal of the 1960-65 period when the Embassy was cozy with the RPP, and didn't know the Justice Party well.

LINCOLN: We did -- USIS did, that is. So when the -

Q: The embassy didn't know the Justice Party when the RPP was in, either. That is the reason that my first year in Izmir was so interesting, because I knew the Justice Party.

LINCOLN: Well, there you are. That's right. Demirel came from Izmir, didn't he?

Q: I can't remember whether he personally came from Izmir or not, but the main strength of the Justice Party was in Izmir. He had an American education, as I recall.

LINCOLN: He had once worked for -- who was it he worked for? The great engineers and builders.

Q: Yes, he was an engineer, I can't think now -- it could have been the Bechtel Company.

LINCOLN: The American outfit. I keep thinking of Kaiser, but that isn't correct.

Q: Well, Demirel got an American degree in engineering as I recall.

LINCOLN: You are right. At any rate, the RPP in early 1971 was, first, pretty much unknown to the official United States except for USIS and, second, socialist very definitely, but moderate socialists. The majority weren't the far left socialists.

I felt that this was beneficial to the United States in this case. They were about to come in and I would rather see the moderate socialists come in than the violently anti-American socialists of the far left.

STUART W. ROCKWELL

**Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near East Affairs
Washington, DC (1965-1970)**

Ambassador Stuart W. Rockwell was born in 1917. His Foreign Service assignments included Panama, Ankara, Jerusalem, Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Morocco. Ambassador Rockwell was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 5, 1988.

Q: Greece and Turkey later were moved into European affairs. How was the situation at the time? This is under the Johnson Administration for part of this period, and then into the early Nixon period, too. What was our interest in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus at that time, '65 to '70?

ROCKWELL: Greece and Turkey were NATO members. We all know the strategic position of Turkey and the Straits, the Greek connection with air bases. Also, the Greek-American community is an influential one here. Turkey has one of the largest, if not the largest, number of people under arms in NATO. Turkey had taken part very honorably in the Korean War. I think that our interests were the traditional ones in that strategic part of the world.

Q: If I recall now, this is the time of the Cyprus problem. Was that at a particular boil during this time? It goes up and down from time to time.

ROCKWELL: I'm sort of unclear about the exact timing. Of course, when I was there in that position, the Greek Government tried to overthrow Makarios and to bring about enosis between Cyprus and Greece.

Q: Enosis is the word for "union."

ROCKWELL: Yes. So that was a big crisis, and that resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. So that was a boiling point.

Q: The Turkish invasion came in '74, didn't it?

ROCKWELL: I don't remember the exact date.

Q: Cyprus is always a problem. Did you have much of a lobbying effort on the part, say, of the Greek-American lobby?

ROCKWELL: Yes, there were a great many people who were opposed to the Greek colonels, and there were people like Tom Pappas, who were very favorable to the Greek colonels.

Q: Tom Pappas was a Greek-American citizen who was head of Esso Petroleum, I think.

ROCKWELL: Yes, he was a businessman and he was, as I recall it, very much in favor of the colonel.

Q: Also, he was very influential in Republican politics. I know because as an aftermath of the Watergate business, I had to serve a subpoena on him because he was on the Republican

Finance Committee and was part of the investigation. I had to subpoena him when he was in Athens, when I was consul general there.

What was the attitude of the Johnson and then the Nixon Administration toward Greece and Turkey, sort of a plague on both your houses? Did they try to leave it to the professionals, or did they get very much involved?

ROCKWELL: I think they left it more to the professionals. There was a general feeling that the Greeks and the Turks were constantly asking for too much money, and that we should give them as much as was needed in order to achieve our interests there, but that we'd been helping there for many, many years and that it was time to taper off. I think there was not a tremendous amount of interest, especially in Turkey, more in Greece than in Turkey.

Q: And in Greece it was really more because it was an unpopular regime.

ROCKWELL: Yes. However, the Nixon Administration, especially under Henry Kissinger, didn't feel very uncomfortable with the Greek regime.

Q: Just for the record, there was an overthrow of a democratic government in 1967 in Greece led by Colonel Papadopoulos, and that regime lasted until 1974.

The National Security Council was run by Henry Kissinger during part of that time when you were there, from '69 to '70. Did you feel the National Security Council was very interested in the area, or was Vietnam absorbing most of their efforts?

ROCKWELL: What period are you talking about?

Q: You were in from 1965 to '70. You were the deputy assistant secretary for NEA. Nixon came in in 1969. So you would have had 1969 and part of 1970 before you went to Rabat.

ROCKWELL: Yes. I don't recall that the NSC got very much involved.

Q: That really answers the question. There were other things to do done.

ROCKWELL: We used to have to go over there and explain what we wanted to do. Henry Kissinger would sit there and listen, but he didn't intervene. He didn't seem to be particularly concerned about it.

MORRIS DRAPER
Turkey Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1966-1968)

Morris Draper was born in California in 1928. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Washington, DC, Singapore, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey.

Mr. Draper was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 27, 1991.

Q: You left PER in 1966 and were assigned to be the Turkish desk officer. How did that assignment come about?

DRAPER: Although I had never served in Turkey, I was interested in the country. I had studied Turkey while in college and became interested. Originally, I was assigned to be the Iraq desk officer and in fact I served as that for a few weeks. But the Country Director for the area wanted me specifically for the Turkish desk. Essentially, it was the network at work and the Turkey assignment sounded more promising.

So I served on the Turkish desk from 1966 to 1968. Our major problem with Turkey came in 1967 with a new eruption of the Cyprus crisis. The coup in April, 1967 in Athens affected the Cyprus situation. Although I was the Turkey desk officer, I had to keep abreast of all that was going on in NATO and Greece. When the crisis became acute, I chaired the Task Force that was working around the clock in Washington. I got a lot of kudos for that effort.

Turkish policy was directed to prevent *enosis* -- the union of Cyprus and Greece. After the coup in Athens, the Turks became very fearful that the colonels of the new Greek regime would try to take over Cyprus. The Turks, of course, had a lot of good reasons to be suspicious. In the days just prior to the eruption, Makarios (the President of Cyprus) himself had made some moves that aroused Turkish suspicions. So we had a full blown crisis on our hands. The Turks just went out of control. We sent Cyrus Vance who was at the time Under Secretary of the Army as Lyndon Johnson's special emissary. Vance's assignment was to patch something together which would diffuse the crisis. That was the first "shuttle diplomacy" because Vance flew from Ankara to Athens to Nicosia and back again until he had arranged a deal. He had some help from the U.N. and others. It was a very close run thing.

The crisis of course made us very nervous because it involved two NATO allies. We had atomic weapons in Turkey -- not in Greece at the time -- and we were very concerned what might happen to the NATO alliance in addition to our bilateral relationships.

Q: Who participated in the Task Force and how did it work?

DRAPER: It was a model for subsequent task forces. We worked around the clock; I slept in the Department and was on duty all the time. To man the Task Force, we drew on people with some experience in the area. It became a clearing house for decisions. We coordinated the Department's relations with Defense and CIA as well as intra-Departmental relations between NEA, IO and other bureaus. This was the time when Turkey and Greece were still the responsibility of the NEA bureau; a few years later, that was transferred to EUR, which pleased both the Greeks and the Turks.

Our relationship with Turkey was essentially on an even keel. We had a State visit by the Turkish President in early 1967. We had a major military assistance programs in Turkey, substantial economic programs and a very large presence in the country, including "listening" posts, air fields and other facilities.

The Turks were getting nervous about this large American presence and were cutting back on some of our activities, as they did from then on for several years. There was also a budding terrorist movement in Turkey -- a dissident rebellion. Turkey was an important country to us, located on the border of the Soviet Union.

Q: Who was our Ambassador in Ankara while you were serving as desk officer?

DRAPER: Part of the time it was Parker Hart and it was very helpful to have an old friend in Ankara. We understood each other and I knew Pete's personality. He loved Turkey which he found much more fascinating than the Arab countries in which he had served. He wanted the Turkey assignment as the culmination of his career. Both he and his wife became Turkish enthusiasts in all their manifestations. They were great bird watchers; Turkey is a paradise for bird watchers. I found my two years on the desk to be very interesting with some significant developments occurring.

Q: Did you encounter the power of the "Greek" lobby in the U.S.?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. The American Hellenic Educational Foundation (AHEPA) was very strong, while the Turks had very little political power in the U.S. and not a lot of political sense. They didn't know how to make friends or how to cultivate Congress. The Turkish Ambassador for part of the time was skillful in the traditional, classic sense, but he wasn't very good at "rubbing elbows" or drinking with Congressmen. A lot of things happened that were near catastrophes which he didn't handle very well. I found the younger officers at the Turkish Embassy were very savvy; they knew what had to be done. They did a lot of leg-work, talked to journalists, not with the skills of some other Embassies, but they were learning the process and more importantly, they were traveling around the country. For example, the Armenian community in California wanted to set-up a monument to their sufferings, which of course drove the Turks wild. But in the process, the Turks learned something about influencing public opinion and the innate good sense of people. In the final analysis, the city manager and city council of this small city in California, although they were of Armenian descent, decided that the dust they would raise wasn't worth the fuss -- that all it would do was to re-fight and re-argue events that had taken place in 1916. So that their idea for a monument died by itself. There are always these kinds of problems.

The Greek lobby worked very hard on maintaining adequate assistance levels which was based on some formula which kept the Greek program in some consistent relationship to the Turkish one. The Turks were good people to work with; they are reliable and good friends.

So I enjoyed my tour on the Turkish desk. I might just mention that in 1967 there was another Israel-Arab war which took me off the desk and on to a task force to deal with that war. It was over in six days. As I mentioned earlier, all of us so called "Arabists" agreed that the Arabs had gotten themselves into a mess. There was a series of miscalculations on Nasser's part. The Israelis were in great political disarray at the time and Nasser felt he could intimidate them. So he tried to close Israel's access to the Gulf of Aqaba by calling on the U.N. to withdraw from the Sinai. I am not sure that he knew what would happen, but one thing led to another and pretty

soon he had a war on his hands. Both Egypt and Israel had the right to call on the U.N. to withdraw, but U Thant, the then Secretary General of the U.N., pulled the U.N. troop out with "indecent" haste without trying to negotiate, which was his style, but for which he was roundly condemned -- for good reasons. Then the problem became acute. Nasser was basking in the adulation of the Arab world and saw Israel in a terrible domestic political mess. But the Israelis pulled themselves together and formed a government of national unity with Dayan in charge of the war. The Israelis struck one morning at the airfields in Egypt and that was the end of the war. The Egyptian Air Force was destroyed and without air cover, the Egyptians were helpless. The Israelis over-ran them. It was a brilliant military campaign in every respect -- land, sea, air. Other Arabs, including King Hussein of Jordan, made catastrophic miscalculations in part because they were deceived by Nasser into thinking that the Egyptians were winning the war. In the process, Hussein lost Jerusalem and the West Bank; his army was humiliated. All across the board, the Israelis were unbelievably successful even in the very difficult task of taking the Golan Heights, which was really a military feat. The Israelis deserved credit for their military prowess. They devastated the Arabs, comparable to what the United States has done recently to Iraq.

A year later, when I was assigned to Jordan, the humiliation was still present and showed itself in various ways. It took the Jordanians a long time to gain their self-respect.

DRAPER: The Turks controlled most of the Arab world until World War I -- the Ottoman empire. The Turks remembered this period from their parents or the parents of their schoolmates. The memories are not good ones. The Turks by and large detest the Arabs; they consider them uncivilized and refer to them as "flies" -- you can't get them away from one's face. I saw a headline once in an Istanbul newspaper some years earlier which said : "Forty-five thousand dirty Arabs expected to visit Istanbul this season". It is like "Those damn Yankees!". The words "dirty" and "arabs" just go together in the Turkish lexicon. There is also the heritage from the "Young Turk" movement. Ataturk set a foreign policy which essentially did not involve himself or the Turks and stayed out of foreign adventures. There is a phrase in Turkish which calls for peace at home and abroad. That was interpreted to mean that Turks would stay out of foreign affairs unless there was a threat to Turkish independence. So becoming part of NATO was viewed as a self-defense measure, designed to defend Turkey and other European states from potential Soviet encroachment. That philosophy did not extend to other situations.

The Turks had retrieved some of their territory from Syria in the 1930s through negotiations; they did not pursue a possible and potentially respectable claim to North- west Iraq which they had controlled in the Ottoman days. There were complicated reasons for this reluctance including the major Kurd ethnic minority which occupies parts of East Turkey and parts of Iraq and Iran. Essentially, however, the Turks didn't want to get involved in intra-Arab squabbles. The sole exception was the Turkish membership in the Baghdad Pact which came from British wooing. Later, the Turks felt that they had made a serious mistake in joining the Pact.

Q: Were we involved in any of the various Kurdish uprisings?

DRAPER: Yes. I am very familiar with this issue because at a later stage in my career, I was in touch with the exiled Kurds -- Barzani in particular -- when they came to the United States. Kissinger had authorized support for the Kurds when they were rising up against the Iraqis at the

instigation of the Shah of Iran who wanted to cause trouble for the Iraqis. It was a very mistaken policy because the Kurds depended on us for support and were shocked when it was suddenly withdrawn after the Shah and the Iraqis reached an accord on their border disputes. When the Shah reached agreement, he saw no reason to further support the Kurds and therefore we stopped our assistance. The Iraqi, as soon as they could, started getting even with the Kurds forcing the leadership to flee. Many went to Iran where they were treated very badly by the Shah and the establishment. It was a very bad scene. It was one of those episodes of power politics which made many people very uneasy, which left a very bad taste in everybody's mouth. It is lesson in not giving aid and comfort to people unless it is for a long run. It is all too easy to stir up people - there are always dissatisfied people somewhere in the world -- but if you give them support, then you better consider the longer range implications, the reasons for the assistance and what the objectives -- both short and long-term -- are. In our case, we helped the Kurds for almost trivial reasons: to help the Shah because he was a "good" friend.

The Shah was considered one pillar of our "two pillar" policy in the Middle East. He was one of the bulwarks against the Soviets; he was one of the core pivots around which our policy circled. Some people in the U.S. administration then in power felt that the Shah was almost indestructible -- he had survived a number of assassination efforts; he returned to power after being run out of the country by Mossadegh. He was proud and confident.

JAMES ALAN WILLIAMS
Rotation Officer/Staff Aide
Ankara (1966-1968)

Mr. Williams was born in Wisconsin and raised in Virginia. After graduation from Princeton University, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965 and was posted to Ankara, Turkey. During his career Mr. Williams became a specialist in Greek/Turkish/Cyprus affairs and served as Special Coordinator for Cyprus, with the personal rank of Ambassador. His foreign assignments include Ankara, Nicosia, Bonn, Berlin and Athens, and he had several tours at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 2003.

Q: And you had the usual A100 orientation course at the Foreign Service Institute and what happened after that? I see your first assignment was to Ankara, Turkey. Did you have any language training or other specific preparation for that?

WILLIAMS: Not at all. The A100 course was fairly straightforward. We visited various desks in the Department of State, including the German desk. We heard all kinds of lectures, some good, some bad at the old Foreign Service Institute, and we had a fairly useful but short course in consular affairs, and that was the essence of my training. I had gotten off of language probation by passing the test in German since I had majored in German literature. I'd spent a summer in Germany. There was no language training, nor was there any request by me to go to Turkey. I, of course, wanted to go back to Germany and the system wisely decided not to send me there. When the announcements were made, you may recall the old style, for us at least, our class, we

were in a windowless room and somebody like the DG (Director General – head of personnel) would come into the room and call out your last name. You would stand up in a more or less military brace and he would give you your assignment. You would say thank you sir and sit down. My name started with W I was at the end of the line. When he called out Williams I stood up and said, “Yes, sir,” and he said, “Mr. Williams you are going to Izmir,” and I said thank you sir and sat down without having a clue where Izmir was. I asked my wife where is Izmir and she said I don’t know. Somebody behind us thankfully whispered he thought it was old Smyrna and I did know what Smyrna was so I quickly figured out I was going to Turkey. It was a country that I had never particularly studied or shown any interest in or shown any desire to visit, and the system sent me there, for which I am eternally grateful.

Q: And you actually did go to Izmir?

WILLIAMS: No, that’s another story. We were going to Izmir, the assignment was announced so I assume that the director general made it. Normally that was it. So dutifully my wife and I wrote the letters of introduction to the consul general and his wife, it was Lew Schmidt and his wife. We wrote the letter saying how happy we were about our assignment, how much we looked forward to coming to Izmir. I got a fairly quick reply from Lew Schmidt saying that he was very happy to receive my letter, but that it was the first he had known of my assignment to Izmir, and on checking with Ankara he had discovered that the assignment had been changed to Ankara instead of Izmir. So, in fact, we went directly to Ankara as did our household effects and our car, and not to Izmir. Now the reason for that was very interesting. Unbeknownst to us, and certainly Lew Schmidt and his wife never told us this, we discovered later there had been some kind of scandal involving a key club and other things in Izmir. This had involved a number of people in the consulate, not the Schmidts. They were sent there to clean the mess up, but their predecessors and a whole lot of people there had been involved, or some of them had been involved in the Key Club. There were other goings on with the local community including expatriate Americans. The Inspector General had come in there and basically cleaned house, and I think they decided on reflection that this was not the kind of cauldron of temptation into which they wanted to commit a 22 year old junior officer and his bride. For reasons I suspect of prudence as well as personnel management, they aborted the decision to send us to Izmir, moved the position and us to Ankara instead.

Q: What was the position?

WILLIAMS: It was a central complement rotation job. In fact, Ankara is a huge embassy. Ankara had a wonderful set of people in those days. It’s large they said so they can afford the luxury of training you, and they trained me in economic-commercial work, in consular work, in general services work, and so on. So that’s what we did.

Q: So you rotated among those functions and got training and had some experience.

WILLIAMS: Had lots of experience, learned at each of them. The people who trained me were at least 20 years older than I was. Some were older still, but they were very nice to us. They took us in as they took in other junior officers. We were not the only ones in Ankara at the time. It was a very collegial and well-run post. I’ll say it again because it deserves it. A very happy family and

it treated its people well, and trained its junior officers very well. I didn't become an economic commercial officer, but I became much more literate in that field than I had ever been and I was grateful for that. The consular training had helped me a good deal for my rotation tour through the consular section, but as is the case with many junior officers I was largely under the tutelage of the senior locals in the consulate section.

Q: How long were you there? Two years?

WILLIAMS: It was a little over two years. Closer to two and a half years. We got there in early March of '66 as I recall and left sometime in July of '68. I was supposed to rotate through the other sections of the embassy. Political was the one I really wanted to get to. Mutual security affairs, political/military was also a possibility. Either would have been fine. The ambassador's office had a staff aide position. The incumbent got married, that was Sam Peale an old friend, got married and took an extended leave of absence for his honeymoon. They needed a quick fill-in so they yanked me out of I think the general services section where I was working, to become staff aide on fairly short notice. Sam and his wife, did not come back to Ankara. They went on to another assignment, and I wound up staying for the rest of my tour as staff aide to Parker Hart which was a wonderful job working for a great Foreign Service officer.

Q: He was the ambassador the whole time you were in Turkey?

WILLIAMS: He was. He had arrived about I think a year before we got there, succeeding Ray Hare, and he was there when we left. He and Mrs. Hart, Jane Hart, were two professionals who really took their job seriously, showed interest in their people, and tried to make the place a happy one.

Q: And who was the DCM?

WILLIAMS: The DCM was Ed Martin. There were in those days two Ed Martins in the Foreign Service. This was China Ed. Edwin W. Martin I think. He and his wife Emma Rose as I recall were both the children of American missionaries, and I believe both of them had been born in China or one of them had been born in China and one in what was then the Ottoman Empire but then went to China later. They had both had deep experience in China, spoke Chinese and this was I guess an out of area tour for Ed. He was the DCM.

Q: And you were the ambassador's staff aide for the better part of a year then?

WILLIAMS: I was the ambassador's staff aide for about 16 months. Our first three months there we lived in the DCM's residence because the DCM was on home leave and the embassy didn't want the residence vacant. One interesting thing that happened while we were there is that my wife was often at home. She was involved in many activities with the German American Women's Club and playing tennis, but usually she was home doing something and I was at the office. And while at home during the daytime she frequently noticed men coming in and out of the basement stairwell, going down to the basement and coming out. And sometimes when we would play ping pong in the basement in the evening we would hear door shutting in the basement and whispering, but never saw anybody. It was rather strange environment. Well it

turned out after we left our brief sojourn at the DCM residence that the local cook was running a brothel in the basement of the DCM residence. The RSO shop finally did a number on him and rolled the whole thing up, fired the cook, and obviously put an end to the brothel. But for a while there we were living on top of a brothel and perhaps even giving, unwittingly of course, cover to it.

Q: Well I thought there would be some good story on Halloween and that's a good one. Good remembrance. Anything else you want to say about this first tour? Sounds like a very varied and interesting one for you. Anything about U.S.-Turkey relations in that period? '66 to '68.

WILLIAMS: It was in many ways an era of good feeling, even though it was coming to an end. Terrorism began soon after we left Turkey. I mean serious terrorism. When we lived there Turkey was essentially a safe country for tourists and foreign diplomats to travel in. This included the eastern provinces which is a sensitive area for the Turks because that's where the Kurds live. That's one reason the Peace Corps was first moved out of eastern Turkey and then tossed out of the whole country because of great sensitivity to what the Peace Corps volunteers may or may not have been doing with the Kurdish population out there. But essentially in our small VW beetle which was painted bright red, we could travel the length and breadth of the country alone in safety, except at night. You didn't travel at night, not because of terrorism or anything like that, but because shepherds and other native folk had a habit of sleeping on asphalt at night, or parking their flocks there. There were no road signs, reflectors, and you might have an unpleasant surprise rounding the corner and seeing the road ahead of you covered by two-footed or four-footed creatures. So generally it was not a good idea to drive in Turkey at night. On the whole U.S.-Turkish relations were under strain continually because of the Cyprus problem in that period. One of the continual refrains I heard when I was in Turkey traveling around to meet local officials as a consular officer, as a vice consul, was reference to the Lyndon Johnson letter of 1964 which was sent to keep Turkey from invading Cyprus essentially by threatening that Turkey, if it did so, could not invoke the NATO guarantee to protect it against a Russian reaction in defense of Archbishop Makarios' regime. And that letter achieved its purpose but rankled deeply and it was standard fare for every Turkish official who met with an American for years thereafter to make a regretful reference to the Johnson letter of 1964.

We went through the '67 crisis when I was there. That did not seriously impact Turkish-American relations at my level. As far as Ann and I were concerned life went on pretty much as normal. It was still fun to be with the Turks, to travel and meet Turks and so forth. The one thing we were all conscious of in those days and it became worse and worse and was one contributing factor I think to the terrorism that was directed against Americans, was the huge presence that we had, not just at the military and intelligence bases on the Black Sea and at Central Anatolia, but also the wealth of that presence and the gap in the standards of living and income levels between American officials and Turkish officials. That was a very obvious gap; it was a matter of continuing concern to Ambassador Hart and the management of embassy Ankara. We had something like 35,000 official Americans in Turkey in those days. That was mainly Air Force. And the problems arose when these young hot-blooded Americans would come into town to have a good time. We'd often run into difficulty in some of the bars in Izmir, Adana in the south, and in Istanbul. Occasionally soldiers from the sixth fleet would be tossed into the Bosphorus when the fleet would come in for a visit. I think at the end of our tour or soon thereafter, Istanbul

was declared off-limits for sixth fleet visits for a while because of that problem. As the urban terrorism took off in the late '60s we cut back even more on our interface between American military and Turkish officials. But on the whole, in the period we were there, the two and a half years we were there, the relations were good. I think they were managed very ably by Ambassador Hart and his team with a lot of good support from the Washington folks. The Turkish government of Süleyman Demirel was very proactive and actually pro-American. Demirel had been one of the early Eisenhower fellows as I recall. An engineer by training who had studied at least one year in the States. Spoke pretty good English and was open, or at least we thought he was, to the kind of economic reform ideas that the AID economic planners under Loy Jones and Jim Grant and others were pushing. He was open to those ideas. In the end of course, the Turkish economy proved resistant to that type of advice for some time. But Demirel and his team were a very receptive audience in those days. And working with them, even at my lowly level, was a pleasure.

Q: Was the issue of narcotics, poppy cultivation, becoming an irritant in U.S.-Turkish relations, or was that a little bit later.

WILLIAMS: It was becoming an irritant. Of course it became a much larger irritant later on. I think the DEA office was opened a few months before we left. But it had not become a major, major problem. It was becoming one, and everybody knew that. Turkey of course, under the single convention, is one of the few countries entitled to grow poppies legally, and that's part of the difficulty. It's a legal producer or poppies and cultivator of opium. The big problem arises with the diversion of a lot of that production into illicit channels.

Q: Okay. Anything else about the two and a half years in Turkey?

WILLIAMS: Yes. My wife and I had the great fortune of going to language school every day. Virtually every working day we were there. This was an AID run language school. Every morning I would start with an hour, sometimes an hour and a half of Turkish, and my wife would have a lesson later on in the day. There was enough money for this, enough teachers for this, and again because of the generous staffing of embassy Ankara, there was enough redundant manpower in the offices to allow the ones who wanted to learn the language to take the time off to do so. Our teachers were essentially contemporaries. Students, young professionals. Essentially our age, usually married. And many of them became friends. So they made very good friends as Turks tend to, and because we were so close in age and interests and so forth, we had a lot of fun with them. And I think that's one reason that their success in teaching Americans Turkish was very high. The language is not an Indo European one, but that school did very well in teaching Americans basic Turkish which is all it sought to do.

Q: Had you had any language training before leaving Washington, or only part-time while you were in Ankara?

WILLIAMS: No language training at all in Turkish. That was a matter of regret, but as I think I said before it's because I passed German. The system saw no need to train a newly vetted JO (junior officer) in an exotic language like Turkish. So I had to pick it up while I was there, but living in the culture, shopping in the culture, it was fairly easy to pick up enough Turkish to get

by. The Turks are extremely tolerant of foreigners trying to speak their difficult tongue, and very flattered when foreigners make the effort to do so. So by the end of our tour we were speaking pretty good Turkish. Ann's was better than mine because she was more actively involved with school directors and teachers and other recipients of the largesse of the Turkish American Women's Cultural Society. I was involved more with bureaucrats and foreign ministry types and visitors to Ambassador Hart's office. But I tested out at 3+ 3+ when I came back.

CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN
Deputy Assistant Secretary General of Political Section
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
France and Belgium (1966-1968)

Office of Political and Military Affairs
Washington, DC (1968-1971)

Christian A. Chapman was born in France in 1921. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Cyprus, and Washington, DC. Mr. Chapman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in March, 1990.

Q: How did you feel about Greece and Turkey?

CHAPMAN: All of us felt that NATO provided a forum where countries like Greece and Turkey which could not talk to each other directly might find a way of talking with each other privately. In fact over the years, this is what happened. The Greek and Turkish Ambassadors maintained civil relations and were able to meet quietly whenever that was necessary.

You asked about the Greeks and Turks. In the political section, of which I was Deputy Assistant Secretary General, we had about twelve officers at the counselor level, and there was one Greek and one Turk. In that context we all worked amicably and cooperatively. The Secretary-General also headed a Greek/Turkish Task Force to bring together quietly in the confines of NATO, the Greeks and Turks to resolve their mutual issues, and to provide a mechanism to coordinate allied aid to Turkey and Greece. To this day, I believe that NATO has fulfilled an important function in mediating the emotional relationship between these two countries.

Q: You left there in 1968 and came back to the Department. What were you doing?

CHAPMAN: In 1968 I came back to the Office of Political and Military Affairs that was transformed into a Bureau within two or three months of my arrival. I was asked to create a new office in that bureau, the Office of Military Assistance and Arms Sales. Up until then, the State Department had a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs to oversee military assistance and arms sales and indeed military strategy generally. There was an imbalance between State and Defense, with State having a very weak organization to deal with a vast range of subjects while Defense had an entire division ISA (International Security Administration).

Q: Which was their little State Department.

CHAPMAN: Which was their little State Department and they had desk officers for every country and region. It was a very strong organization with very competent people both military and civilian. A few FSOs also served there but the military were very good people. The State Department had no organization to interface with ISA.

So eventually, this imbalance was corrected by the creation of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs in 1969. Phil Farley was its first Director. He asked me to organize this new office to provide a political framework around these arms transfer programs. These were world-wide programs at a time when the sales were running about \$4 billion and grant assistance at nearly \$800 million. These were not small matters.

I spent five years in that job and I like to think organized the office, developed the policies, established it in the bureaucracy, and insured that it functioned effectively. Bureaucratic momentum took over, and the office divided into two offices- one for planning and one for implementation. I had five officers in the beginning, and at the end, after five years, between the two offices, there were about twenty-five. It was a very interesting perspective to see how important the military supply relationship was with many countries. I was amazed how, on the occasion of visits by prime ministers and presidents and foreign and defense ministers and kings etc, the most senior political leaders of most countries, the military supply relationship, military assistance and arms sales, was at the top of their agendas in discussions with the President and Secretary of State.

Q: What was your general impression of the desire on the part of the military to sell arms? ..

CHAPMAN: There had been a directive from MacNamara in the early sixties, to push sales as a way of helping out our trade balance, which was even then a matter of concern. By the end of 1969, many of us were troubled by a policy that had, in certain areas, destabilizing effects. One of the efforts of the Bureau and certainly one I felt strongly about was to dampen down this push for sales, and indeed I also sought to reduce grant military assistance because I thought that in many countries it encouraged the maintenance of defense establishments those countries really could not afford. But overall, as a matter of generality, what this interest in arms revealed was the sense of insecurity felt worldwide. Not just against communism, but world-wide, among neighbors. In Latin America, Brazil, Argentina and Chile, for example. I thought Latin America as a particular egregious place in that it was difficult to conceive scenarios where there was a need for very sophisticated weapons at a time when the economic situation in many countries was not of the best. These were, we thought, misspent resources. So we tried to reduce the level of armaments going to these impoverished countries. Our greatest success was in keeping the F-4 Phantom (the hottest fighter plane around at that time) out of Latin America.

The problem is that you provide one of these weapon systems to Brazil for instance and immediately Chile and Argentina want it. You provide to El Salvador, one of the Central American countries, another fighter plane with less potency, but all the other Central American countries want it.

Q: *Were these weapon systems a way of gaining friendships?*

CHAPMAN: I think it is a caricature of it.

Q: *Were you looking at this as business or policy.*

CHAPMAN: I was looking at it as policy, because I thought in many places it heightened tensions, it diverted resources from more important items, like the building of the economies of underdeveloped countries. It diverted the talents of human resources, and I thought this was a bad allocation of resources in many countries.

I sought very hard to make people think about the consequences of providing major weapons systems. Once I developed a questionnaire to force people to analyze the economic consequences for providing weapons. Because once you have a widget, you have to maintain it. It is expensive. And to show how that would be maintained by the economy of a recipient country.

Q: *Were you a gadfly?*

CHAPMAN: The desks at State and at the Pentagon were pretty well saying, "This is what the country wants, this is what it should get." I was very much of a gadfly, getting people to think about it.

Q: *What about the Pentagon and ISA?*

CHAPMAN: The ones I dealt with didn't question these requests very much. They would just shrug their shoulders. After all, the recommendations on the level of support came from the MAAG's.

Q: *Weren't there two minds to this. On the one hand you don't want to have to fight against your own weaponry if relations go wrong, as in the case of the Persian Gulf, and on the other hand a savings in quantity.*

CHAPMAN: That's exactly right. In fact the military opinion was much more nuance than divided. You had military officers who were very responsible and understood very well the consequences of some of these arms transfers. You had the services, for instance the Air Force, who had a very real interest in selling some of their planes because it meant that the unit cost of the airplane went down as they were sold abroad. This was a very real factor. But in ISA where you had serving officers who were detached from the services, you had a more dispassionate point of view. But the Pentagon as an institution, was interested in maintaining good relationships with foreign military establishments through, among other things, the sale of weapon systems. Moreover, the Pentagon had an economic interest in the sale of major systems because as I said it brought down the prices of their systems but also provided for a long-term relationship through the needs to provide maintenance, including spare parts.

Q: *What was the problem with spare parts?*

CHAPMAN: One of the things I was pushing for was to shift from grant to sales, in order to confront countries like Greece with the question of the cost of these systems. When you give something to someone for free, it's fine and dandy, but there is no appreciation of the impact on the local economy. But when you have to buy something, it is another matter. I made a special effort to shift from grants to sales.

Q: How did we view Greece and Turkey. It was obvious from over there that the Greeks had only one thing in mind. A war with Turkey. The Turks had to think in broader terms. How did we feel about that?

CHAPMAN: We didn't like the automatic formula of providing eight to Turkey and five to Greece. But we were not very successful in breaking that. I think the effort in this area was to maintain both those countries first of all as able allies of NATO, and secondly to dampen down their fears and hatred of each other.

I can't remember the specific about spare parts. But overall the policy we were trying to push was to make countries responsible for their military defense.

Q: Were you there when they just cut off arms to the Turks, in 1974?

CHAPMAN: No I had just left there.

Q: This was the period of Henry Kissinger. Was there a strong hand coming out of the White House?

CHAPMAN: Oh yes. He considered military assistance and arms sales as an important tool of overall diplomacy. But he did not appreciate some of the consequences of some of the decisions. The most dramatic was the decision to provide major help to support the Cambodians when Lol Nol broke away in 1970. Sihanouk was traveling in Moscow and Lol Nol took over the government. The decision was made to support him and to divert a hundred to two hundred million dollars worth of assistance to support him. That had to be gotten from all of the other country programs. So we had to scrub the whole military assistance program worldwide, to come up with the sum. I went to Alex Johnson (the under secretary for political affairs), and said, "This is the decision but these are the consequences. It is going to create a lot of problems with the Philippines and other countries." But that's something that Kissinger considered as a bureaucratic problem and not a political one. Yet it did have political consequences, in terms of our relations with a lot of countries, Korea for instance. Philippines.

Q: Were the desks screaming to you?

CHAPMAN: Oh yes. But I had a pretty good command of these programs and I was able to control all the desks pretty well.

NORMAN W. GETSINGER
Commercial Officer
Ankara (1966-1971)

Norman W. Getsinger was born in Michigan in 1919. He graduated with a BA from Harvard University in 1941, and served in the U.S. Navy overseas from 1941 to 1946 as a lieutenant overseas. His assignments abroad have included Cairo, Rome, Taijung, Taipei, Ankara, Seoul, and Hong Kong. Mr. Getsinger was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

GETSINGER: Well, in 1966, I was in this job. I could determine which foreign assignments for a commercial officer would be a good one to have. So, I chose Turkey. It was an excellent assignment. I really enjoyed it, and the Turks were great people to work with.

Q: *You were in Turkey from 1966 to?*

GETSINGER: 1966 to 1970.

Q: *Where, in Ankara?*

GETSINGER: Ankara, yes. The commercial attaché was in Ankara and there was an assistant commercial attache down in Istanbul. So, I spent a lot of time running back and forth for training. The Turks were just great to work with. The interesting thing is that here is a developing country. A commercial officer or any embassy officer who goes into a developing country is working in a different environment than he is if he goes to embassy Paris. I think the developing countries have special problems, requiring special skills. I would think that someplace, and it may be here, we would train Foreign Service officers that are going to developing countries, into understanding what the experience will be. In almost every case, they will be working with an AID mission. You should understand what an AID mission does, how they get to the point where they do, how they spend their money, and how you take your commercial capability in the embassy and attach it to what AID is trying to do. You both are working in the same direction, but you are bringing the American business community into the AID effort, and making them work together. So, what I had to learn in Turkey was how to work with an AID mission. Since we now have the foreign commercial service, if they are going to be assigned to a country where there is an AID mission, they should spend some time in Washington, learning how to work with an AID program, and how to make the AID program work, alongside the foreign commercial program.

Q: *Let's take Turkey during the 1966 to 1970 period. Where did the connection with AID programs for the commercial service?*

GETSINGER: They had a very large AID program. The country team would get together and the AID representatives would be there with the commercial officer. At first, I didn't quite know how to fit what I was doing into what they were doing. It was kind of a surprise to me. So, then I shifted my operation. I would sit in on the AID staff meetings, before we got to the country team level. That was the way to operate. Of course, the commercial officer, the commercial attache, in

the embassy, had to work hand and glove with the American Chamber of Commerce. That was your identity. That was the way you got things done because you were working for them. You were really their boy, in a very real sense.

Q: What were prospects for trade with Turkey, during this period?

GETSINGER: They were very good and they were coming along at a very good rate. In fact, they had established a new development agency in Turkey, headed by a gentleman by the name of Turgut Ozal. Turgut Ozal was available to the commercial attache at the embassy. So, I could take people like Steve Bechtel over there to meet with Turgut Ozal. Later, Turgut Ozal became the prime minister of Turkey.

Q: What was the political situation as it impinged on the commercial situation in Turkey in the 1966 to 1970-period?

GETSINGER: The political situation was a little difficult because the Turkish government was constantly shifting. It wasn't like it had been in Taiwan, like my experience there, and like my experience would be later in Korea. It was a difficult situation because there were several parties that were competing, more like the situation that I faced in Italy, when I was working on economic affairs. There was a constant change of government. Things were a little disturbed. There were minorities in Turkey who were causing trouble. I remember at the cocktail parties that we would go to, in various embassies around, you would get out on the balcony, because it was warm in Turkey and you would be sitting around with your cocktails and kind of wait for the explosion of the next bomb that would be going off down in Ankara. So, it was an upset.

Q: Was the Turkish economy receptive of American products, business?

GETSINGER: Very much so. I think the sense that we had an economic relationship was doubly reinforced by the fact that we had this military relationship. We had these important bases in Turkey. There was no getting around from the fact that if we were going to fight together, we would trade together. So, Turkey was the key to our whole situation in the Middle East, outside of our direct relationship with Israel.

Q: Did Israel have any impact? I mean, in some parts of the Middle East, you can't do anything without Israel being thrown in your face.

GETSINGER: Yes, and the Turks, who are very wise about their relationships with our countries, did maintain a good relationship with Israel as well as with the other Arab natives. Turkey had so many borders, including one with Russia. The Turks liked the Americans, but they were concerned about our relationship with Cyprus. While I was there, there was another Cyprus crisis. The Turks had gone from taking the American sailors, if they came through the Bosphorus and carrying them around on their shoulders, to them taking the Americans and throwing them into the Bosphorus, because they were upset. We said to the Turks, "Look, we are your friends, and we are friends with the Greeks." The Turks would say, "That's impossible."

Q: Who was the ambassador, or ambassadors?

GETSINGER: I had three. I had Harch, Handley, and Comer. Paca Harch spoke Turkish. Turkish is a difficult language. He was a marvelous ambassador because he spoke Turkish. The Turks respected him. He could discuss their problems with them in Turkish. You can't beat that, if you have to do an ambassadorial job. I think it's so important to have a professional Foreign Service ambassador who is so good to work for in that situation.

Q: Then he was followed by whom?

GETSINGER: He was followed by Bill Handley, who didn't last very long. He had trouble with his wife, or something. That didn't work. Then, it was Bob Comer.

Q: Comer had the reputation of... I have heard him called "the blow torch." He was a very active person. How did he work as an ambassador?

GETSINGER: It's interesting, it doesn't happen very often. I worked for Comer and his wife, as his special assistant. Here he came along to be my ambassador in Turkey. I respected him very much. He was a clear thinker, a hard driver, not a diplomat. I think that is lacking a quality you should have, if you are going to be totally successful at that.

Q: What was the feeling that you were getting from the people at the embassy, about the Soviet threat, the 1966 to 1970 period? Was there much concern?

GETSINGER: I really was not concerned with that very much. My job was so much involved with helping the Turks develop, and bringing American investment in and it was working very well. The Turks were easy to work with, because they respected us, not like other countries. You could never get close to the Italians.

Q: Did you have any contact with Greek diplomats, at all, during this time?

GETSINGER: No, I didn't. Turkey was our favorite post. I think Foreign Service officers have two favorite posts. One is a post where they can work most effectively, and the other is the post where the ambience, the environment, was so perfect for their family life. Turkey was it. It's a beautiful country, and it's full of ruins, and good cooking, and marvelous wines. It's a great place for a Foreign Service family.

Q: Did you find that working out of Ankara with Istanbul, which has always been known as the commercial center, was where the real action was? Or was there much action?

GETSINGER: That is well said. Certainly, most of the economic and commercial action was in Istanbul. With the government in Ankara, they moved the government up into this flat Anatolian plateau, which was about equal distance from all of the oceans and seas that surround Turkey, because they wanted to get it away from the influences of Istanbul. I spent a lot of my time moving back and forth from Ankara to Istanbul. But, the commercial attache and the embassy had to be where the government was. The commercial attache had to be there too. Much of my time was spent, ideally, with the economic development officers.

STANLEY J. DONOVAN
U.S. Representative, CENTO
Ankara (1967-1969)

Stanley J. Donovan was born in Maine in 1910. He graduated from West Point in 1934 and served in the U.S. Air Force. His assignments abroad have included Buenos Aires, Madrid, and Turkey. In 1996 he was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You left there in 1967. Where did you go?

DONOVAN: I went to Turkey, I was the United States representative to the CENTO. I was there from 1967 until I retired.

Q: What was the situation in Turkey during the '67-'69 period?

DONOVAN: Well, the situation there, everything was under control, there were five Lt. Generals, one each from Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, army generals. Air Marshal Sir Tim Piper and I were the two airmen. Each of us had a number of staff officers. They formed the working staff. We made English the staff language. That worked out very well, it was a very good organization, it's out of existence now, it was on a downward spiral while I was there.

Q: How did you view the Soviet threat during this period?

DONOVAN: Well, we were a little concerned about that, because occasionally the Turks would have maneuvers that ran along the Russian border, and one time an Army Major General in our crowd, he was chief of the MAAG there. He had a little two place airplane, and the pilot landed in Russia instead of Iran. All hell broke loose. He adopted the proper attitude, because I heard he complained about the food. And as a result of complaining about the food, he got the imperial treatment and all the caviar and sturgeon he could eat over there. So he made out all right. Landed in the wrong place, there were CENTO maneuvers going on on our side, so they didn't know what to do, but they treated him all right.

Q: What was your impression of the Turkish military at that time?

DONOVAN: Very, very fine outfit, they had discipline, they were really top dogs. The five military deputies were down in Crete where the British have a base, and the Greeks and Turks were fighting all the time it seems. We were there, all of us, and we were on this airfield under British control, I don't know why they had it, but it was in their control. We were heading back to Turkey, well, the Turks had decided they were going to put more forces in Cyprus, the five of us were talking to the Turkish representatives, and we said "You get on that horn, and you're not getting off that damn horn until you get us clearing to get into Turkey. Wouldn't that be great, the five military representatives of CENTO out of the picture while Turkey goes to war when the

whole CENTO should be involved in it? We were.

ARMA JANE KARAER
Consular Officer
Istanbul (1967-1969)

Arma Jane Karaer was born in Minnesota in 1941. She received her bachelor's degree from University of Minnesota and during this time also attended Osmania University in India. During her career she had positions in Australia, Zaire, Turkey, Pakistan, Swaziland, Finland, and ambassadorships to Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Ambassador Karaer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

KARAER: Personnel and consular, right. At that time, the Foreign Service gave all its candidates the same test. We were all supposed to be generalists. You were assigned to wherever they wanted to send you and you did whatever they told you to do. I did have an interview in personnel just before the assignments were made, and the gentleman who interviewed me asked me what I saw myself doing at the end of my career. What was going to be my goal? I said, "Oh, didn't anybody tell you? I'm going to be the ambassador to India." He looked at me and said, "Well, since you've already been to India, maybe we'll send you somewhere else." That was it and they assigned me as a consular officer in Istanbul. A place that I knew absolutely nothing about. There was a couple in my class, former Peace Corps Volunteers, who had served in Turkey. It was from them and whatever reading I could do really fast that I learned what I knew about Turkey before I got to Istanbul. That was just perfect for me. That was a very romantic unknown place to go. That was what I wanted.

Q: You were in Istanbul from '67 was it or '68?

KARAER: From about July '67 until June or July '69.

Q: What was the consulate general like in those days, the staff and the consul general and all?

KARAER: First of all the consulate general itself was in this wonderful old mansion on the eastern side of the Golden Horn. It had been as I recall the mansion of an Italian businessperson who had built it in the previous century. There were wonderful murals of sparsely clad nymphs flying across the ceiling of the second floor that had been the ballroom I guess, which had become the central area for the consul general's office. At one point earlier in the 20th Century some prissy consul general's wife had had them paint over the murals, but they managed to remove the paint without destroying them. The nice rooms on the lower floor were divided up by wallboard partitions to make the consular and commercial sections and a waiting room. My little office had a wonderful marble fireplace, carved marble beauties holding up the mantelpiece. Initially, the consular section was in a separate building across the parking lot, but in 1967 they came up with one of our periodic money saving exercises..

Q: I think it was called BALPA or something like that, balance of payments, exercise. We weren't going to spend much overseas.

KARAER: Well, as a result of BALPA, they moved USIS into that building and they moved us over to those little rooms in the bottom of the now somewhat destroyed Italian villa. Oh, by the way, these two buildings were next to the famous Para Palas Hotel in Istanbul which is the place that Ataturk liked to hang out in before he escaped from Istanbul and went off to inspire the revolution.

Another thing that happened because of BALPA was that some really wonderful FSNs, who by that time were well past the American retirement age, had to retire. One of them was our senior FSN, Abdur Rahman Bey, who was in the style of the Ottoman dragomans. Believe, me of all the diplomats that passed through that place, nobody looked more like an ambassador than he did. He was perfect. He knew everybody, he knew how the system worked and he was wonderfully helpful to young officers that were there. Another person that retired then, that worked in the consular section was a white Russian who had escaped from Russia to Istanbul when she was a young woman. In my time in Istanbul there was a rapidly aging white Russian community. She told wonderful wild stories about her life as a young woman in a wealthy family in Russia. Half of the FSNs in the consulate said she had to be lying. Of course the younger people loved the stories. I decided to choose to believe her. She lived with her cousin. She said he was her cousin, anyway, who had been gassed in the First World War, so she supported him and they lived in a little tenement just down the street from the consulate. She knew many languages and that was one of her fortes. Oh, by the way, I should say that the State Department decided to train me in French before they sent me to Istanbul. It was primarily to get me off of language probation, so I passed their test and I went to Turkey and of course hardly anybody spoke French around there except for the occasional Frenchman. We had Turkish classes that you could take at the Consulate, and I went to them every afternoon. One day, after I'd been there about a year and a half, I decided that in order to help Americans who needed visas for other countries, we really needed to know what the business hours of the other consulates were, since most of them did not stay open as long as the Americans. I wrote a form letter to all of the consulates in Istanbul, in English of course. I certainly didn't write French well enough to do it in that language, and it never even occurred to me to do it in French. I got answers back from all of them, most of them in English. The French wrote back to me in French. That was fine. When that French letter came through it was sent to yet another FSN, an elderly Greek gentleman whose primary task was to translate diplomat correspondence. Well, when that French letter hit his desk, it hadn't even come to me yet, he found out that I had mailed out all of these English letters. He came down and he lectured me that **all** diplomat correspondence was to be done in French. I thought, "Well, I think those times have passed", but I listened to him respectfully. Of course he was protecting his own job, and he too had to retire because of BALPA.

Q: Who was the consul general when you were there?

KARAER: When I first came the consul general was Lansing Collins. He was a direct descendant of Secretary of State Lansing. Mr. Collins was extremely interesting. He was writing a book on the Lausanne Treaty. He was very interested in archeology and liked to collect interesting objects. I didn't have a great deal to do with him, but there is one thing I will never

forget, and this too is connected with BALPA. The embassy had instructed the consulate to follow the Department's instructions about retiring our overage FSNs. Mr. Collins did not want to lose the services of Abdur Rahman Bey, and I don't blame him because it was really hard to replace all of that knowledge. Finally, I don't know if that was the only issue, certainly a junior officer in the consular section didn't know this stuff, but the DCM came from Ankara and it was clear that his job was to get Mr. Collins underway. A lunch was held and it was held at the consulate, not at the consul general's residence. I was asked to attend this lunch. The consul general was at one end of the table. The DCM was in the middle of the table, where there were the eight people seated altogether and I was at the right of the consul general and next to the DCM. A very strange seating arrangement. However, once lunch was underway, I found out what my function was. My function was to be the person to whom the consul general addressed himself when he wanted the DCM to know what was on his mind. It was weird.

Q: They were talking to each other directly.

KARAER: Well, the DCM was willing to address the Consul General directly, but the Consul General wasn't willing to talk to him. I was told, by somebody in the admin section, that the consul general had fought bitterly to keep Abdur Rahman Bey, and the answer that eventually came back from Ankara was that if the consulate general in Istanbul couldn't operate without the services of one FSN, then perhaps we had better close the consulate general. I always remembered, as I went through my career dealing with FSNs and with personnel arrangements, that however indispensable you may think you are or someone else is, you're not.

Q: What was consular work like?

KARAER: Istanbul was an important stop on the hippie trail from the United States and Europe to Nepal and India. Everybody came through Istanbul. There were two things that definitely marked consular work in Istanbul, leaving the visas aside, but as far as Americans were concerned. One, we dealt almost exclusively with very young people. Secondly, they were either arrested for drugs, had "lost their passports" for which there was a big market in Istanbul, or they had snapped psychologically somehow or other.

Q: Kids were playing with a lot of drugs in those days, too.

KARAER: Yes.

Q: I mean, what I mean is on the mental side.

KARAER: Yes, in some cases it may have been drugs, but Istanbul did things to some fragile people. In the spring of 1968, there were big student riots in Paris. Two Life magazine reporters turned up in Istanbul at the end of that. They wanted to do a story on the hippie trail. They came to talk to me and I saw one of my own bon mots in Life magazine, although I was not credited for it. The reporter asked me why I thought that young people broke down mentally when they get there. I said, "Because this is where the world changes." They were hanging on as long as they were in Europe in cultures where they could recognize themselves, but once they stepped across the border everything changed. This is where the church is replaced by mosques. Where

the food is different. Where everything is different from what they're used to, and I think that's what makes them lose it. The fact that they were using drugs certainly didn't help, but we had several spectacular mental health cases. We had a lot of arrests. We had one arrest and death of an American citizen. He was a major drug smuggler in a shoot out at the police station.

I spent a lot of my time visiting jails. Because while I think that Midnight Express, the movie, was a really vicious slander of the Turks and the way they treated people in jail, it is true that Turkish authority is willing to use brute force pretty quickly. There's the rules. You obey the rules. If you don't obey the rules, Bam! Particularly these young kids. Some of them weren't so young, but they were people who thought the rules were for everybody else but them, and that's why they had decided that they were going to get rich by bringing a kilo or two of hashish back to the States or to Europe. I realized that if I didn't show up very frequently at those prisons, and if the people in charge didn't think I was going to show up frequently, that some of the smart mouthed American kids might get slapped around. So my Turkish assistant and I went every couple of weeks to see everybody. I am certain that none of my people were maltreated while I was in Istanbul. I also learned an important thing about the psychology of consular officers while I was there, something that could be applied to policemen or social workers as well. By the time I had spent a year and a half in Istanbul, I had a very low opinion of my fellow citizens, about their common sense, their ability to take care of themselves. It wasn't until later that I realized that, of course, almost all of the ones that I saw were people who couldn't take care of themselves and that there were hundreds if not thousands who passed through who were taking care of themselves just fine and I never laid eyes on them. I remember reading things after I left there about the whole concept of burnout. What this does to people who are in that kind of service job, policeman, social workers, stuff like that and that helped put these experiences into perspective for me. I tried when I was supervising consular sections to make sure that the people who worked for me got some relief from this sort of thing so that they could handle it with more equanimity than I think I was able to do. It bothered me a lot. I wanted to take care of these people, but at the same time my respect for them as individuals got lower and lower all the time.

KARAER: My worst case from the point of view of justice was a kid who had a half a gram of hashish in his pocket, but Turkish law, at least at that time, didn't have room for nuances. If you had it, you had it and then you would be arrested. The police were very good about calling us when they had an American. Somebody from the consulate would go down right away to see them. We would tell them that the next day they would be taken to see the public prosecutor and he would try to determine whether there was cause to hold them for trial. We told them that when they were asked if they knew what the hashish was, they were to say that they thought it was Turkish tobacco. Somebody just gave it to them. In fact in the case of the kid with the half a gram, someone **had** given it to him. The dealers would give samples and then come back later to see if they could sell more. If the arrested person was asked if he had ever used drugs, he was to say never. If they had a small amount on them, that story might get them released. It wasn't worth trying if they had a large amount, and then they would be jailed. We would provide them with the list of attorneys. We had one wonderful attorney who was really good at spinning out sad tales in the courtroom. We would generally get these people released on bail unless they had a very large amount of this stuff when they were caught. Once they were out on bail, of course their passports had been taken from them, we would try to get them out of the country before they had to go back for trial. What we could do with the boys at least, was put them on the train

to Thessaloniki. The train tracks pass through a part of Greece before re-entering Turkey and arriving at the border where passports were checked. The train went very slowly through the little piece of Greece, so the idea was to jump off the train there and then throw themselves on the mercy of the Greek border guards. It was a cinch that the Greeks would never send them back to Turkey. Their story in Greece was, "I lost my passport. I need to get home. Just tell me how to get to the consulate. They would let them go to the consulate in Thessaloniki and they could get a new passport. That worked for a number of them. So I'm not kidding when we said we sent them into your consular district.

Q: Oh, yes, this is the consuls prayer, " oh, Lord, please not in my district."

KARAER: We figured, we had a good share of our own strange ones and could spare some for you. I had a mental health case that was truly sad and is a mystery to this day. I wish I knew the explanation. We were called by the Turkish police saying that they had picked up an American citizen, an African American who had a passport, but no Turkish visa, and who had been wandering around naked in the old part of the city. They had taken him to the state mental hospital on the outside of Istanbul in a suburb called Bakirkoy. No one knew how he got into the country. He did have an airline ticket on him and the ticket was to Adana, in southeastern Turkey. Now, you know Adana is where the Incirlik Air Force Base is.

Q: Yes.

KARAER: So, we thought, maybe he knew somebody there. We quickly found out he was not a G.I. They asked around in Incirlik and nobody knew this person. We then sent the telegrams to the Department. Our practice was to take mental health cases to a private mental hospital which was called the French Hospital in Istanbul, something which had always worked out really well for me. We'd get the person there. They would have very good individual care while we were getting their families notified. The families would come and get them and take them home and pay the bill at the French hospital. So we moved this poor guy there, and then we sent the telegrams in and the Department searched around and got hold of his relatives who said they didn't want to have anything to do with him.. By this time we'd run up something of a bill at the French hospital and you recall there was no money for the government to pay this stuff. I thought, "Oh boy". So we had to have him moved back to the state mental hospital, which was clean and kind, but it was just a holding place. They simply didn't have the resources to help these people much. I then started to try to figure out how to get this guy back to the States.

In the meantime, a very fine elderly lady in Istanbul, who was Turkish, but who had over the years developed a close relationship with the American community, went around and asked businesses for money so we could pay that bill at the French hospital.. The Department then came back and said, "We don't think we should have to pay for his repatriation. After all the airline that brought him there, brought him there without the visa, they should take him back. Unfortunately for us he had gotten to Greece on Pan Am, but for some reason he had taken Olympic Airlines from Athens to Istanbul. Olympic shrugged their shoulders and said, "Not on our dime", Then the Department said, well, the Turks ought to deport him. He didn't have a passport. Now, okay, he didn't have a visa. This was the other thing. It was really hard to get through the airport in Istanbul, to get past all of the checks you had to go through to get into the

country. The Turks were pretty paranoid. This guy somehow had managed to walk around all of the immigration checks and get into the city. I went to see the head of the immigration police about this problem. I sat out in the waiting room of this man's office and he had this secretary, a very attractive young woman who literally was sitting at the desk doing her manicure while I waited. (I should add that female diplomats were a new and interesting thing for the Turks and a lot of the rest of the world. People asked me if it was hard to do my job in a Muslim country. My answer always was, "Heck, no". My male colleagues might have to cool their heels for days before they would get an appointment, but the officials always wanted to see the woman consul). When I got in, I explained what I wanted, and he said, "Well, you know, now" (talk about not in your consular district) "he's at the mental hospital now. It's their problem." Of course he wasn't going to get any money from anywhere to pay for a ticket all the way back to the United States, and he wasn't going to try. Then he said to me, "You know, it was very nice talking to you. Perhaps we could have dinner together sometime." (I was in my late '20s and he must have been at least in his '50s), And I said, "Oh, that's very kind of you. I would love to have dinner with you and your wife sometime." I didn't hear anything more about that.

So, back to the Department and there it sat. What were we going to do? The Turks weren't going to deport him. Olympic Airlines wasn't going to take him, now what? While I'm waiting for the Department to cogitate over this, a Peace Corps volunteer showed up in my office, very irate and self-righteous. He was volunteering his time at the mental hospital and he wanted to make sure that I knew that a citizen was there. I told him yes, I know he's there and we've been trying to get him back home for some time, but nobody wants him. Then he said, "But this is terrible. Don't you know at that hospital they can't do anything for him to help him get well?" He's banging on my desk, and so I went to the filing cabinet and I got out the file on this guy, which by now was six inches thick at least. I slammed it on the desk in front of him and I said, "Well, this is what I'm trying to do about it. Now, if you've got a better idea, you tell me what to do." He then backed up and left my office. I sent yet another telegram and said, "This is getting ridiculous. This is wrong. We can't keep this man in this place."

Oh, in the meantime, I'm going out to visit him. "Of course he doesn't recognize me or anything. At least we know that he's in good physical condition. Finally, the Department comes through and says we've got Pan Am to agree to fly him back from Athens so we're sending you the money to buy the ticket from Istanbul to Athens, but he'll need an escort. My Turkish assistant said, "Hey, we're in luck, there is a doctor who has just gotten a visa to go to study in the United States" to do his post-med something. "Maybe he'd agree, you know we'd pay for his ticket and he gets the free ride. He'll escort this guy." So, the man agreed. The day comes. We collect the patient from the hospital and the escorting doctor. My assistant goes with as far as the immigration check. Goodbye. My assistant is no more back in the office than the doctor is on the line. The patient has wandered away from him and can't be found. I was ready to jump out the window, but they eventually did find him. The Turkish police scooped him up in some corner of the airport and they got him back to the United States. I hope the poor man is well somewhere,

Q: These young people who got arrested and let's say who went through the process, but had more than a minor amount of hashish, did they end up spending quite a bit of time in jail?

KARAER: I think the longest time that anybody spent that I had anything to do with was about

three years. Let me tell you about the kid with the half a gram. When he was arrested, he was arrested with two British subjects, young people also. My assistant got to him right away and told them what to tell the public prosecutor. Well, apparently when they went in there the Brits told the public prosecutor they didn't know what it was, never used it in their lives, and he let them go. The American, who was really a nice kid and must have been taught that honesty is the best policy, said he'd smoked marijuana once in college. I think that was the truth. It probably was all he'd done, but that was it as far as the Turks were concerned. He was convicted. His father came out for the trial. His father was just devastated, of course. They put the boy in a prison on the opposite of the Bosphorus from where we were. I would go over there. These visits would take up almost the entire day, because there were no bridges across the Bosphorus and you had to go over on a ferryboat. The warden in that prison seemed to be a pretty nice man. They brought the prisoner into the warden's office to talk to me, but he would not talk to me. He'd answer the questions I asked him, but he wouldn't say anything else, and then I started to worry. I was reading about stuff that was going on in the Cook County Jail at that time, what happens to young boys when they get thrown in with the criminals. I'm imagining that he's being raped and he won't tell me. I tried to impress on him that I was his only connection with the rest of the world. I told him, "I will do what I can to help you, but I can't do anything for you if you don't tell me. Is anything bad happening to you? You can tell me." "No, I'm all right." Okay. So, after a few months there they transferred him to a prison in Ankara which was a special place for foreigners who were not convicted of violent crimes. Then I got a letter from him. He said, "I wanted to tell you that I'm here and that it's quite nice. They've given me a job, which I learned in five minutes. It's sewing notebooks together. There are other foreigners here, people I can talk to. I want to thank you for everything you did for me. I know you worried about me. Nothing bad happened to me there. I was just so shocked that I had ended up in this situation that I just couldn't speak to anyone." That was a huge relief to me.

Q: Oh, yes.

KARAER: But, I had the one case where everybody in the consulate was concerned about the survival of our citizen. It was around Christmas time. I was having a Christmas party at my apartment. The Marine guard called me and said, "Miss Szczepanski, the consul general wants you to come down to the consulate right away. We've got somebody in trouble." So, goodbye party and down I go in my miniskirt. I remember that because the consul general commented on it later on. I was told that earlier in the afternoon, a young woman had shown up at the consulate and told the Marine guard that her boyfriend had been kidnapped by some thugs down by the waterfront. The Marine guard called the duty officer. The duty officer, who fortunately was a political officer who spoke Turkish, went with her down there. By the time they got down to the waterfront, which was where the cruise ships come in and dock in Istanbul, there was a huge crowd in front of this building. As soon as they arrived, the people in the crowd started pointing at them and saying, "She was with him, she was with him." The police grabbed both of them. The consular officer identified himself and asked what was going on. It turned out that what she hadn't told the consulate was that her boyfriend, whose first name was Gary, was a big time drug smuggler and they had been going across Europe doing his thing. They passed through Istanbul, made some contacts in Istanbul, and then had gone further east, picked up a bunch of drugs and came back to Istanbul. These same contacts had then met them again at a café. She said the contacts took them to a hotel where they proceeded to beat up her boyfriend, whereupon she ran

away and went to the consulate for help.

She believed the contacts were drug dealers.. What really happened was that his contacts were plain clothes narcotics police and the seedy "hotel" that they had taken them to was the narcotics police headquarters. Admittedly, if I were an American in there for the first time, I would have mistaken it for a seedy hotel. It was on the second floor over the arrivals area of the port. I remember going up and down the stairs many times, the orange peels on the stairs and all this kind of thing. At the top there was a desk and a room with a bed in it for their duty officer to sleep in. It didn't look like any hotel you ever saw before, but it sure didn't look like a police station either. Apparently when they brought him into the police station, they neglected to search him well. They got him into this room where the bed was, I guess, and started questioning him and slapping him around, whereupon, and this she knew, but she hadn't told anybody, he pulled out his gun and she ran. Well, when she left, he started shooting, they started shooting and in the end I think three policemen were killed, one of whom was the deputy director of the narcotics police in Istanbul, somebody that we had trained in the United States. In his effort to escape, Gary broke through into the next establishment, which was a very nice restaurant, but where he broke through was like the cloakroom where the waiters changed their clothes. Some poor waiter got in his way, he shot him and he went up onto the roof of the building. I'm still waiting for somebody to make a movie out of this one. By this time our DEA agents from the consulate had been called by the police and they got down there just in time to see Gary fall down into the center courtyard from the roof full of lead and totally dead.

Now, back to our poor duty officer and the girl. The police accepted that he was a diplomat. They let him go, but they took her into custody. The consul general told me to get down there right away. He was afraid that something might happen to her because they, of course, were really angry. They knew me at the police station and they let me in, but they wouldn't let me talk to her. Well, we needed to know who she was. Okay, well, when they could figure it out, they'd let us know. I told them we'd wait and sat down on top of the desk in the middle of the room. A huge number of journalists were there by now. Then I realized that all of the journalists were being let into this room where she was, but not us. In the middle of this, another young woman comes in, American, long hair, long skirt, and they bring her over to me. They want to know if she has something to do with it. She was a tourist who had left some paintings to be sold on consignment with a souvenir shop next to the port. She was on her way out of Istanbul and, because of the shootings, the shop was closed. How could she get her property back? I explained to her what had happened and I said, "These people are just looking for somebody else that they can arrest and, unfortunately, the way you're dressed, you look too much like the person they've just arrested. I said, if I were you, I'd forget the paintings and I'd just get out of here. She said, "Right"! And away she went like a bullet.

Another half-hour passed and one policeman came and dumped on the desk in front of me five, six, seven different I.D.s that they had taken off of this girl and whoa boy. We looked through all of them and there was one American passport that looked quite genuine. I called the consul general with what I had. He said, "Arma Jane, you're right, that's who she is. We just had a call from her father. It's already been on television in California." We waited some more, and finally they started hustling her out of that room and off to jail. I stood up on the desk in my miniskirt and yelled and told her who we were and that we knew she was there and that we would be able

to see her in the jail the next morning. That was the beginning of a long relationship with this young lady who, in spite of the fact that she was in such dreadful trouble, was so smart mouthed, so 'I don't care about anybody or anything,' it was hard to feel sorry for her. Her lawyer tried hard to sell the story that she was simply in this man's thrall and didn't have anything to do with the drug trafficking, was just being dragged along by him, but they convicted her and put her in prison.

Right in the middle of all this her parents, who had mortgaged their house again so that they could pay the legal bill, had talked to some Turkish friends they knew in California and the friends had suggested the name of another lawyer. Now, the lawyer that she had chosen from our list was our good old lawyer who had done all these other drug cases before. The guy her parents chose was not a criminal lawyer, he was a business lawyer, but agreed to take the case. He went to see her and oh, he said his wife wanted to go with me to visit her. They thought it would be more comforting. I thought oh, boy, this is not going to work. I don't know how many upper class Turks you know, but there are the hanım effendis, the wealthy women who are always beautifully, perfectly groomed, and their fingernails are gorgeous because they never have to clean anything. Their maids do it all for them. And here I am with the hanım effendi in the biggest prison in Istanbul, a hanım effendi who is probably about the same age as the mother that the girl had run away from in the first place. And what do you think she says to the girl, right off the bat? "Don't you think you should cut your hair?" Now, this is, of course, a very practical suggestion since the girl was in prison, but it was not the right thing to say to a rebellious girl in 1969.

When I got back to the States I was going to get married and I was going to marry a Turk, so they needed to assign me to Washington so that he would have time to live here and get ready to get naturalized. They assigned me to, what did we call it, CSA? I don't remember what the letters stood for.

Q: Affairs? Anyway, it was basically dealing with people in prisons.

KARAER: No, everything, people who were sick or dead, federal benefits people and all this. They assigned me to a job to handle the arrests on this end of the cases. I picked up where I left off with this gal and talked to her dad frequently. Finally the day comes when she's to be released. I must have been back here about a year by the time this happened. Her father called me. They'd sent her money so that she could come home. She took the money and she disappeared again. The parents were left to pay for their house again. Do you see why I didn't really like these people?

Q: We were seeing the tip of the spear and this was a particularly bad period. This is don't trust anybody over 30 and anybody under 30 had been born without original sin and was completely free to do what they wanted and that was the right thing. You know, it was a peculiar era. Did you try to do anything about warning Americans, I mean going there, saying don't mess with drugs?

KARAER: We contributed suggestions to the Department about it. This was about that time that the Department started putting out flyers that they still put out saying, "Remember when you get

arrested in a foreign country, you're going to stay arrested until you get proven innocent." Of course, these people never came near us until they got into trouble. There were just dozens and dozens.

Q: What was the political situation like in Turkey and in Istanbul from '67 to '69?

KARAER: There was a lot of left, wing nationalistic definitely anti-American stuff. I don't think we had more than one ship visit while I was there and that was a real problem. There had been many ship visits before. I mean these aircraft carriers could go right up in the Bosphorus and anchor right off Dolmabahce Palace. That visit, I remember, they were concerned about anti-American students attacking the sailors. I remember there was an attack on a boat load of sailors with students throwing rocks, and the whole time there was a big contingent of riot police standing right behind the football stadium across the main drag from there not doing a doggone thing about it. It was not nice.

Now, as an individual American there, everybody was as nice as pie to me. I was convinced that the Turkish police were cracking down particularly hard on the American kids there because they looked down on the hippie types, the men with long hair. What Turk would ever think of doing that? They looked down on them and thought this is the way we can show the Americans how strongly we feel about dealing in drugs and so we'll go after these kids with a half a kilo, bust them in these dormitory-style flop houses by the Blue Mosque where people stuck their luggage under their beds. Frequently it was not clear whether the bag of hashish found in a police raid belonged to the guy who was actually sleeping in the bed, or to the much smarter guy in the next bed who shoved it under his neighbor's bed just to be on the safe side.

At that time one of our big issues with the Turkish government was trying to control the trade in opium. This was the time of the French Connection. The opium was grown in Turkey, smuggled to France, turned into heroin in France, and sold in the United States. This was a real political problem for the Turkish government which had laws, very strict laws, about possessing what they called hashhash in Turkish. Hashhash can mean anything from opium, to heroin, to hashish. A drug is a drug is a drug. They were not very good at controlling the production of opium poppies. Farmers who grow opium poppies legally must register the amount of hectares that they plant with the government, and government inspectors are supposed to check on how much they produce. Everything they produce must be sold to the government, not to anybody else. Then the government sells it to the pharmaceutical companies. That wasn't very well controlled. Of course, as we know very well, growing opium is far more lucrative than growing potatoes. We were providing some money to encourage them to grow alternative crops, but that was difficult. Any government in Turkey that tried to enforce this of course was going to lose votes among those farmers and so that was a problem.

These were wild and woolly times not just from the hippies. We had two DEA agents stationed in Istanbul. They had their offices right down the hall from the consular section. My husband, who at that time was the receptionist in the consular section, was used by them a lot as a translator when their snitches would come in. Of course he much preferred translating for the DEA than he did working at the consular section desk.

Q: You mentioned you had federal benefits. Were there problems there because I know in the interior around Antalya, they had a hell of a problem with federal benefits because they had some people there who almost create families in order to keep getting checks and all that. Did you have any particular problems in federal benefits?

KARAER: I don't remember. I know that we had to investigate and actually see people in the flesh before checks could be mailed to them. I'm trying to remember. I think it was during the time that I was in Istanbul and as a result of BALPA that the personal delivery of benefits checks was stopped and then everything was mailed. I mean one of the reasons that I decided that I wanted to marry my husband was how sweet he was with these elderly men who would come in to collect their benefits checks. Usually they had gone as younger men to the United States. They had worked at some manufacturing job, earned their social security benefits, but then had never married, came back when they retired and now were living with their nephew, niece, whoever, who was taking care of them, and they were contributing their check to the family pot. I just remember my husband down on one knee talking to one of these old men, listening to his story, and taking care of him and thinking, "What a nice person he is".

Q: Tell me a bit about the background of your husband's family and all that.

KARAER: Oh boy. Well, he was born on the Black Sea in Kara Deniz Eregli, where there's a big steel mill. His father worked for the post office. He was a lineman for the post office. His father was considerably older than his mother, maybe as much as 14 years older than his mother. His mother was from a family in Istanbul that had been well to do and had owned a lot of land in southeastern Anatolia, but like so many Turkish families during the First World War, they lost their money. In her case, her father died when she was very young. To this day the family has the deeds to several villages in southeastern Anatolia, but nobody who values his life would go in there and try to get those deeds recognized, because the people occupying would shoot anybody who tried. Anyway, she could remember as a little girl being taken to the Dolmabahce Palace to play with the children from the harem. Her grandfather was a pasha. He was some kind of administrative officer, maybe a governor, in the Arab part of the empire in Beirut. She lived in Beirut for a short time, but again as a very young child. Anyway, after the war was over, her father was dead and her mother was married again to a man from the Black Sea so she went up there with them. Then when she was 14 years old she was married off to my husband's father. She had a number of children. Her first two were daughters. They're still very much alive. The boys died as infants or very young. In fact the first one died when he was five years old, I would guess probably from meningitis because what she described was he was perfectly healthy and fine in the morning and by the night he had a high fever and he died. When she told me this story, it must have been 40 years after the date, she still wept and I wept too. Anyway, my husband was born when she was about 40 years old, and he was named Yashar because that's the name you name your children in Turkey if you've lost other children. "Yashmak" is the Turkish word for "to live", so "yashar" means "he lives" or "she lives". By this time my husband's father had retired and he decided to return to his hometown in central Anatolia, Chemishgezek in the province called Elazig.

Q: This is tape three, side one with Arma Jane Karaer. Yes, go ahead, you were talking about.

KARAER: So, they moved to Chemishgezek and lived there for about 11 years. My husband remembers his father had a donkey that was very uncontrollable and kicked him off more often than not, but that was his means of transportation. He remembers going to a primary school where the teacher beat all the boys regularly if they didn't know their lessons. My mother-in-law was a tiny woman, and, when I knew her, always dressed completely in widow's black, who said her prayers five times a day, but she was quite a strong willed person. By the time my husband was 11 years old, she told her husband she was taking her son and going to Istanbul. She'd already sent her daughters off to be educated as nurses and one of her daughters got a job in a village on the Turkish border with Bulgaria. In those days young women who were nurses or were teachers could get assigned to places like that, but they were expected to go with a family member as a chaperone. A family member had to go with the daughter and my mother-in-law said she wasn't staying in the middle of nowhere any longer. She told her husband, "The boy needs to be educated, the girls need to work. I'm going. Are you coming with me or not?" I'm imagining this was the conversation anyway. So, they went back to Istanbul together. They were very poor and my mother-in-law worked cleaning houses for other people. As soon as he could manage it, Yashar did everything like, Do you know simit? Those bagel looking breads that they sell on the street? He sold simit, he sold lemons in the fish market. He did all kinds of jobs like this. After he finished high school he wanted to study at the merchant marine academy..

By this time his mother was a widow. She objected because the life of a merchant officer was dangerous and not good for family life. So he didn't pursue it and enrolled in law school at Istanbul University. During this time he met some American GIs. We had a big army base not too far outside of Istanbul and we had a lot of military services like a big PX and so on in Istanbul itself. There were some navy corpsman assigned to one of these detachments in Istanbul, and they were looking for a place to rent an apartment in my husband's neighborhood. They couldn't speak a word of Turkish and the neighbors wanted to be helpful. Yashar was in the coffeehouse with his friends and the neighbors said, "Yashar, you know some English, you come and see what these men want." The Americans were tipsy and swearing a lot apparently, and he didn't understand the swearing because, of course, they hadn't taught him that in high school. Anyway, he tried to point them in the right direction, but they just left. The next day one of these guys turned up at the coffeehouse again, sober. He found Yashar and apologized and asked him to help them find a place to stay. He did, and then he became their guardian, so to speak. In Istanbul there are seedy bars, called "pavyons" where girls will sit and drink with the customers. Usually, when the bill comes, it's outrageous, and if the customer doesn't pay up, the bouncers beat him up. Well, when these sailors went out drinking, Yashar would wait outside the bars for them until they came out and make sure they got home safely.

After two years of law school he was drafted. In Turkey, every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 40 has to do military service. When Yashar went into the military, the Turkish army said that if a man had a high school diploma, they would assign him as a teacher in a district where they couldn't get civilian teachers to work. After the recruits did basic training, they were sent to be teachers with a month or something of instruction on how you're to be a teacher. They sent Yasar to Manisa Province up in the mountains. All of the teachers found that the villagers were pretty resistant to sending their children to school because the young boys were good for watching the animals and the girls all made carpets. Sending them to school was a waste of time and money in the villagers' opinion. Yashar had to figure out how could he get

them to agree to send the kids to school. Well, right away it was obvious that one of the things these people needed a lot was some kind of medical care. His sisters taught him how to give injections and the American medical corpsmen, totally illegally, gave him some basic stuff, aspirin and antibiotics and stuff like that. So, when somebody in the village had a headache or cut themselves or whatever, Yashar would help them out but he wouldn't accept payment. Just send your kids to school. Well, he never could get them to send the girls, but they did send the boys, and he ended up with quite a class. He should be telling this, because he's had such adventures in his life.

Toward the end of his assignment there, when he had gotten in really well with the villagers, they would invite him to the village room where the men all gathered in the evening to talk and everybody would bring a dish from home, but usually it was rice and beans, beans and rice, because that's what they ate. Yashar would bring the sugar for the tea or he would make a pudding or something that they didn't have at home very often. They liked him a lot. One night he was just going to bed and there's banging on his door. It was the mayor (mukhtar) of the village. "Get up. (Somebody, I don't remember his name, say his name was Mehmet.) Mehmet has been stabbed." Yashar opened the door to find the mayor and other villagers with their guns. "Bring your medicine. Mehmet has been stabbed". Yasar goes with them and finds one of the villagers, an older man, lying on the ground. He'd been stabbed several times. There's blood bubbling up out of his chest from his lungs. Yasar objected, "Mukhtar, this man is really badly hurt. I can't do anything. I'm not a doctor. If I do something and he dies, the people will say I killed him". The Mukhtar said, "Nobody will say anything". My husband said he looked at these guys with their guns and decided that he had better do something for Mehmet, or he might need medical attention. So, he put all kinds of antiseptic cream on this man's wounds.. He bandaged him as tightly as he could, and, in the meantime, some other villagers had ridden off to get the police. The police came and took the man to the hospital. This is an example for all those people who say that life in the villages is morally superior to life in the city. What happened was that the man who was stabbed was married to a woman who was much younger than he was. She was having a love affair with the Imam's son or grandson or somebody like that. Anyway, a close relative of the Imam (local prayer leader). They decided that they were going to kill the husband so that they could be together. When the husband went out in the evening to go to the privy, the wife let her lover into the house and he hid behind the door. When her husband came back in, she threw her charshaf, the veil that the women wrap around themselves, over his head so he couldn't see, and the lover stabbed him several times with a shish, you know, the thing you make shish kabob with? Of course they were caught immediately and went to prison. The tough old husband, thanks to Yashar's bandaging, lived, and came back to the village again.

Q: How did he get involved with the consulate general?

KARAER: When he got back to Istanbul, he got a job at the PX, because he could speak English and his English had gotten better because of his association with those GIs. He ran the drug store in the PX. All of the Americans who used the PX knew him and could see how conscientious and personable he was. Eventually, the admin officer from the Consulate asked him to come work for him. He was working as the receptionist in the consular section when I came to Istanbul.

Q: How did it work, I'm thinking of in a Muslim society and all this of your dating somebody and eventually getting married to somebody from Turkish society?

KARAER: First of all, this is Istanbul and Istanbul is, you know, two-thirds European and one-third not. Our first "date" was a trip to the beach. I was very leery of getting involved. Although I thought Yashar was a very nice person, I was skeptical about getting involved with somebody from such a different culture and a different religion. I had seen the bad side of those relationships when I was in India. I wanted to be really careful. Besides that, I was sort of his boss, so I didn't want to get really deeply involved with him. He was so earnest. I took a Turkish neighbor girl along with us to that thing at the beach. Then one night, I was supposed to go to a party that a secretary at the consulate was giving. I'd been to her flat before, so I thought I would have no problem finding it. But I drove all over that part of town and couldn't find her apartment. Everything looked the same. I asked the doormen who were all sitting outside the apartment buildings along the street. This girl was very noticeable in the neighborhood because she was an African American. Nobody knew who I was talking about. I could not find her place. I went back to the consulate and the Marine Guard didn't have any address. There I was, all dressed up and nowhere to go. I thought well, maybe Yashar and I can do something instead. He had showed me where he lived and it was easy to find. As I knocked on the door, I was thinking "Oh my God, what is his family going to think when I show up here like this?" But it was too late to back out. His mother opened the door, this little tiny lady all in black. I thought she would probably kick me out. But when I asked for Yashar, she just smiled and she took me upstairs. Yashar was just flabbergasted. While he was getting ready, I sat with his mother. At this time, I knew very little Turkish. I could ask for Yashar in Turkish, but I couldn't have a conversation with anybody. His mother was just sitting there beaming at me. Starting from then we went together. I like to tease Yashar that his mother was overjoyed to think that she might get him off her hands!

At the end of my first year in Istanbul, Yashar got an offer to work for the Turkish military attaché in Washington. About the time I arrived in Istanbul, Yashar had had another job offer from a friend to work in Vietnam. The man who had been his immediate supervisor at the PX had gotten a job with a company that had the contract to sell diamond engagement rings in the PXs in Vietnam. He was now in Vietnam and he needed somebody that he could trust to work with him because some of the employees in the Saigon PX were taking the real diamonds out of the rings and putting fake diamonds into them. Yashar was all set to go. Adventure called. His mother said, "Oh my God, if I'm not going to let you go into the merchant marine, I'm certainly not going to let you go to Vietnam. Haven't you heard they're shooting at people there"? Okay, can't go to Vietnam. Then he got this offer to work in Washington. It came through a woman who was the Ambassador's secretary. She had worked for the consulate before she joined the Turkish Foreign Ministry. She knew Yashar, and she knew what a good person he was.

By this time Yashar had talked about marriage with me. I had told him I didn't want to marry anybody else, and that I really liked Turkey, but I that I liked Turkey because I was living there as an American on my own terms. I didn't think that I'd be a very good Turkish daughter-in-law and that I didn't think it was a good idea for people from two different cultures to get married until they had seen one another in each one's country. He said, well, I could live in the United States. I said, you don't know that. Some people really don't like to live in the United States. I can't get married to somebody and then find out that they've changed their mind. Then this job

offer came up, and he went to Washington. After he'd been there about three months, I asked him what he thought of the place? He said, "Let's face it. It's a lot easier to get used to a place where you're more comfortable than it is to get used to a place which is less comfortable than you are used to." After the end of my second year in Istanbul, I returned to the United States and we got married the following month.

Q: We're going to stop about this time, but I thought just to finish this part. What was the situation vis-à-vis the Foreign Service at that time in 1969, if you get married to a foreigner, particularly a woman, things have changed, but.

KARAER: I don't think it made any difference if you were a woman or a man as I understood it, the rules were you had to inform the Department and you had to provide them with information for security clearance for your prospective spouse. I did all that far in advance of my departure from Istanbul, but by the time I got back to Washington, I still hadn't heard from the Department about the clearance. I didn't have any worries about this, I mean after all he'd worked for us already, and I knew he wasn't a security risk. So, a week before we were supposed to leave for Minnesota to get married, I inquired at the Department and learned that they hadn't done anything with my application. The problem was that Yashar currently worked for a foreign government and if I was going to keep my security clearance, he would have to leave that job. Our plan at the time was that Yashar was going to keep his job and then enroll in college here once we got settled. However, in order to get the clearance to get married, he quit his job the same day.

THOMAS D. BOYATT
Director of Cypriot Affairs
Cyprus (1967-1970)

Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt was born in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1933. His Foreign Service career included positions in Chile, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Upper Volta and Colombia.

The following is from Ambassador Boyatt's presentation at FSI Sept. 30, 1992

Introduction by Ambassador Peck

PECK: Ambassador Boyatt will be leading the second part of our presentation today. Ambassador Boyatt was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. After receiving his BA from Princeton University and MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he served in the United States Air Force and reached the rank of First Lieutenant. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959, and has served as vice consul in Antofagasta, Chile from '60 to '62, assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury until '64; second secretary at the American embassy in Luxembourg until '66; and first secretary at the U.S. embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus from 1967 until 1970. He returned to Washington in 1970 as special assistant to Joseph Sisco who was Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East; and he was director of the Cyprus Bureau from 1971 to 1974, and

named a member of the Senior Seminar in foreign policy the following year. In 1975 Mr. Boyatt became Minister-Counselor at the U.S. embassy in Santiago, Chile. Mr. Boyatt was chosen to be ambassador to Upper Volta in 1978, and in 1980 he was nominated and confirmed as the ambassador to Colombia. In 1983 Ambassador Boyatt was promoted to the rank of Career Minister of the Foreign Service.

Ambassador Boyatt has also received many awards in the course of his career. In 1969 he received the State Department meritorious honor award for courageous behavior during the 1969 hijacking of the TWA plane by Palestinian guerrillas. Later he received the William R. Rivkin award for intellectual courage, disciplined dissent in taking bureaucratic and physical risks in the cause of peace on Cyprus from '67 to 1970. In 1979 Ambassador Boyatt was given the Christian A. Herter award for extraordinary contributions to the practice of diplomacy. He has also been decorated by several foreign governments. In 1971 Mr. Boyatt was elected vice president of the American Foreign Service Association, and he was elected president of AFSA in 1973 and served until he was transferred to Santiago.

In 1984 Ambassador Boyatt was elected a member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton University. He serves on the Advisory Boards and Advisory Councils of several other institutions including the Woodrow Wilson School, and the Peru Private Sector Management Project. In 1984 Mr. Boyatt was brought to the Sears World Trade as vice president for Latin America by Frank Carlucci. And currently Mr. Boyatt is a partner in the IRC group, and president of U.S. Defense Systems. Please join me in welcoming Mr. Boyatt.

BOYATT: Thank you very much Tom for that introduction which would have amused my father, and my mother would have believed.

Just as an aside, how many of you know the book, and/or the author from which the quote about "urine etching glass" comes from? All right, listen carefully. Generation of Vipers by Philip Wiley. You're already one up on the cultural affairs officer at any post where you serve.

I've known Ed Peck for 25 years, and during those 25 years we probably spent 15 or 20 of them together...well, more like 15 in Washington, and when we've been in Washington together we see each other every day, and on every one of those days Ed Peck has made me laugh. He is a truly humorous person, and you all have the benefit of that this morning. In addition to that, I've been playing poker with him once a month during those 15 years as well. So he has made a contribution of another sort for the well being of my family. And I want to take this occasion to thank Ambassador Peck for his contributions to Tommy, and Kit, and Jessica, and Alexandria, and Catherine, and to their educations. I mean, how can you not love a guy who donates \$100 a month to your cause?

But having heard Ed you've heard the good cop, and the funny cop. And now you're going to hear from the tough cop, with a story that is not funny at all. What I want to do is to take you through, step by step, a real world, real time, Foreign Service case wherein in 1974, during the Cyprus crisis of that year, the Foreign Service system about which Ambassador Peck was talking, efficiency reports, and grievance systems, and the dissent channel, and hierarchies, and the corridor reputation, and the network, where all of these elements of the system were brought

into play under tremendous pressure. Because the only time you can really find out about a system is when it's under pressure. And it's under pressure when the best interests of the United States are in play, when the reputations of senior officers are at risk, and when you as a more junior person, have a different view as to how the government should be proceeding, than your bosses do. And that's when it really counts because everybody is playing for keeps. And what I intend to do this morning is to give you a quick history of Cyprus, to tell you where the various national and bureaucratic players were in 1974, and then to step by step take you through a situation which I lived, which demonstrates, I think graphically, all of these elements.

First, a capsule history of Cyprus. Cyprus is an island in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. It sits there like an aircraft carrier and dominates both east, west, and north-south movement. Every empire from the Egyptians to the British which has sought to dominate the Middle East has had to control Cyprus, and they all have. The Egyptians did, the Mycenaean Greeks did, the Achaean Greeks did, the Persians did, the Alexandrian Greeks did, the Romans did, the Byzantines did, the Crusaders did, and the Ottoman Turks did, and eventually the British did. Every one of those empires controlled Cyprus for anywhere from 80 years to several centuries. And every one of those empires left an impact on Cyprus.

In the ebb and flow across the island of cultures two stuck. The first, and the majority, is the Greek. The Mycenaean Greeks arrived in Cyprus in 1200 B.C., and there has been a Greek presence there ever since. In modern times the Greek portions of the island constituted about 80%, and that is an 80% majority which speaks Greek, believes in the orthodox form of Christianity, and has essentially a European culture. Unfortunately in the ebb and flow of history with all of its mistakes, the Ottoman Turks, who controlled the island from 1570 until the British came in 1870, for about 300 years, also left on the island a 20% minority spread throughout the island in kind of a measles-like pattern in enclaves, which was and is, Turkish, Muslim, and partaking of what is essentially an eastern or middle eastern culture.

The way Cyprus flowed into the interests of the United States, and of the latter half of this century, was through the decolonization of the island. When it began to become clear that Great Britain was no longer going to be able to control the island as they had from 1870 until the late 1950s, the two groups on the island rose up in various ways in an effort to control what Cyprus was going to be after the Brits left. The Greek Cypriot majority of 80% wanted enosis, which is the Greek word for union. They wanted to unite Cyprus to the Greek motherland just as other chunks of Greece had been united to Greece -- Crete as an example, Macedonia is another example. Historically what had happened after those provinces would win their freedom from the Turks, they would accede and become part of the Greek nation. And the Greeks on Cyprus wanted the same thing to happen with the island.

The Turkish minority, as you might understand, had absolutely no interest in being a minority in a Greek controlled island. So as the Greek Cypriots were fighting for union with Greece against the British in the '50s, the Turk Cypriot minority began to fight and to agitate for taksim, or partition of the island with part of it being Greek Cypriot, and part of it being Turk Cypriot, and an exchange of populations to achieve that.

In '58 and '59 and '60 the British were in their typical decolonization situation between two sides.

They were being shot at by both sides. It was a mess. They were trying to negotiate some kind of a constitutional modus vivendi, and in 1960 they were successful with the establishment of the London-Zurich Treaties and Accords. And under London-Zurich what happened was that instead of Cyprus becoming unified with Greece, or partitioned between Greece and Turkey, it was declared an independent nation wherein there would be a Greek Cypriot majority which would have the presidency and most of the cabinet posts, and a reserved power-sharing majority in the parliament; but where the Turk Cypriots would have the vice president, a certain number of cabinet posts, and total control over the local affairs -- land, water, family, religion, all of that sort of thing. Not unlike the situation that was established in Beirut at about the same time. Great Britain became the guarantor power, along with Mainland Greece, and Mainland Turkey, of this constitutional regime.

They stumbled along from '60 until 1963 in a very uncomfortable, feuding between the two communities, an uncomfortable situation. Eventually Archbishop Makarios, who was elected president of Cyprus in a free election, and who was also head of the Orthodox Christian church of Cyprus, tried to change the constitutional regime to give more power to the central government, which the Greek Cypriots controlled. The Turk Cypriots appealed to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots appealed to Greece. Greece and Turkey both sent troops onto the island, and a crisis ensued.

The British were in that part of the world, as they were in other parts of the world, trying to shift their imperial responsibilities to the United States. Just as in Iraq, and the Gulf, and the Middle East, we found ourselves taking over the great power, third power adjudicator, referee, enforcer role. We found ourselves increasingly thrust into the role in Cyprus. Why? Because the United States could not afford to have its Greek and Turkish allies at each other's throats with armies, armed and trained by us, over Cyprus. So suddenly Cyprus became a major problem for the United States wherein it had in the past, like Palestine, and like Kashmir, and India-Pakistan, like Ireland, been a British problem, it suddenly became an American problem.

The differences were patched over in 1963. There was another crisis in 1967 wherein the parties almost came to war, but didn't. And Cyrus Vance, incidentally, was President Johnson's negotiator in that crisis and managed to avert a war, and indeed he managed to get a mechanism for negotiations established which exists to this day. It must be the longest on-going negotiation in the history of the world, still unsuccessful. In any case, the situation on the island deteriorated, and deteriorated, and deteriorated, and the position of the United States came more and more and more to the forefront, and the British withdrew. And if they could have they would have washed their hands of it. They had a treaty obligation. They couldn't get out of it, but they very clearly weren't going to play a major role, and they very clearly encouraged us to do so. And we, for our own reasons, we felt that imperative, and we played that major mediatory role.

So, that's where we were in 1974. I hope you'll understand this capsulized history. What it did was, it projected two warring ethnic groups, both of whom were connected to metropolises which were our allies in NATO, and whom we could not afford to see in conflict because of what it would do to the NATO alliance, and because of the advantages it would give to the Soviets to fish in these troubled waters.

In 1974 the situation on the island was as follows: the Greek Cypriot community was itself divided between those who supported independence, and those who were disappointed with independence, and in fact wanted to go back to enosis. And this latter group, more radical, the rejectionist front, went into clandestine guerrilla warfare against its own government. And they began robbing banks, the usual pattern. They began robbing banks to collect money, and they began using the money to buy arms. They began raiding the stores of the Greek armies, and the Cypriot armies to get arms, and publishing inflammatory leaflets, and organizing, and doing the sort of guerrilla warfare things, both urban and rural, that one always does when one is in charge of a rejectionist front.

The government of Makarios remained in favor of a solution on the basis of independence. The Turkish Cypriots continued to rearm because they saw trouble coming, and because they increasingly heard the voices in favor of enosis. And both Greece and Turkey, of course, supported their co-religionists on the island.

The situation in Greece was that Greece was run by a military junta, which was under and in charge of a gentleman named Papadopoulos, a colonel, and eventually another gentleman named Ioannidis, who was a general. These Greek military men in effect ran the country. They had a face organization. They had a prime minister, and a defense minister, and a foreign minister, all of whom were appointed. But these people were puppets, and they didn't have any power, and they did what the Greek army generals told them to do.

In Turkey, in 1974, Bulent Ecevit, had been elected the prime minister, and was the first prime minister from the left side of the political spectrum, and the first democratic leader in the country in several years. The country had been run by the army. His situation was fragile, and the Turkish army allowed him varying parameters depending on what the issue was. On economic issues he had a fairly wide borders within which he could operate. On nationalist issues, of which Cyprus was the key, he had a very narrow parameter within which he could operate.

In 1974 the situation in Great Britain was that the discredited Wilson government was on its last legs. Sunny Jim Callaghan was the foreign minister, he wanted to succeed Wilson. He had absolutely no interest in the Cyprus problem. And he had no interest in having to have responsibility for the Cyprus problem because it would draw down his energy, and his resources, alienate the several hundred thousand Greek Cypriots who lived, and still live, in London. And generally the British were in a "wash my hands of it" mode.

In the United States, if you'll remember, the first six months of 1974, we were without a government. Nixon was in the final phase of Watergate, and it was clear that he was without power, virtually without portfolio. But what power he did have left, and what time he had left, was devoted to saving Nixon. So in large measure one could say that the United States was without a government. And into that vacuum stepped Henry the K. Henry Kissinger became in effect president for foreign policy. Both during the final stages of Nixon, because Nixon was without power, and during the Ford administration because Ford really didn't have any capabilities in that area, and simply gave him the power.

But in any case, the point here is that the United States government was not functioning in any

way with any degree of efficiency. The normal channels of government had become clogged.

The concern with Watergate was overwhelming. Washington was a very strange place in the first six months of 1974.

From a bureaucratic perspective there were a couple of wild cards. The first wild card was, that the defense establishment in the United States was very pro the Greek military government. Why? Well, the main reason was because Admiral Zumwalt wanted to home port the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus, the port of Athens, and in order to home port the Sixth Fleet in Athens he had to have the agreement of the Greek government. And since the Greek government was three or four generals and colonels, he had to have their agreement. So nobody in the defense establishment wanted to see any activity involving Greece which would alienate the military government in any way.

To complicate matters further, the CIA had a special relationship with General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos. Why?

Well, the reason is historical. In the '40s and '50s when there was a communist guerrilla movement in Greece, and at a time when, at least in the late '40s, and the early part of that era, we weren't sure whether Greece was going to go communist or not. We poured huge amounts of aid, and bureaucratic attention, into Greece. And among that bureaucratic intention was a huge intelligence establishment. And that intelligence establishment, as it always does in a liaison way, got in touch with the Greek military, and the Greek CIA. And it turns out that 30 years later, 27 or whatever it was, both General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos had been very friendly with the CIA in the '40s and '50s, and the CIA, in fact, had a very close relationship with both of them, particularly with Ioannidis. So, from the CIA's bureaucratic point of view they had a major asset in Athens. They had a relationship with the guy who ran the country, and they didn't want it disturbed. And they certainly didn't want it disturbed by the Cyprus problem.

From the point of view of the U.S. embassy in Ankara they had all sorts of things that they were worried about in terms of the bilateral relationship, and they didn't want to see Cyprus impinge upon those relationships because from the Turkish point of view almost everything the United States did, or could do with respect to Cyprus, was anathema to any Turkish government. And particularly this Turkish government which was being observed very carefully by the Turkish army.

That was the world situation with respect to Cyprus into which one FSO-3 -- you would say O-1 today, I think -- stumbled as director of Cypriot affairs. I was doing my job as the sort of super desk officer for the Cyprus problem, monitoring the situation, when over a period of time in late '73 and early '74 I began to receive increasing evidence that the government of Greece, the Greek CIA, and the Greek military, were backing the radical rejectionist front on Cyprus which wanted to overthrow Makarios and declare Cyprus part of Greece. Now I knew, I'm a Greek language officer, I'd spent a lot of time out there, I knew that were the Greeks, broadly defined, Athens and Nicosia, successful in establishing a government in Nicosia which was responsive to Athens, much less which became part of Greece, that Turkey would invade Cyprus. I knew that. And I knew that if Turkey invaded Cyprus we'd have two NATO armies fighting each other, illegally,

with American supplied weapons and on the basis of American training, and that it would damage our position in the eastern Mediterranean for a generation, and provided -- who knew at the time -- what opportunities for the Soviets.

The situation on the ground kept getting worse and worse and worse and the signals, at least to me, were clearer and clearer and clearer that the bloody Greek government was playing games with these nuts, and they really were nuts. On the right wing of the Greek Cypriot political spectrum the goal being to get rid of Makarios and install a government which wanted it to do.

So what do you do? You're the initially responsible person. I took what I thought was the most responsible action. I drafted an instructional cable to the ambassador in Athens which said, in effect, go in to General Ioannidis not to the prime minister, not to the defense minister, not to the foreign minister, to Ioannidis himself, and tell him in words of one syllable that even he will understand, that the United States being the only government in the developed world which is still on friendly terms with the government of Greece, tell him as a government that is friendly to Greece, that the United States strongly opposes any efforts by any element of the Greek government, overt or clandestine, to mess around in the Cyprus situation. And that we particularly oppose any efforts to overthrow Makarios and install a pro-Athens government. Because if that happens the Turks are going to invade, and that's not good for any of us. And I also drafted backup supporting cables for actions for our ambassador in Nicosia and our ambassador in Ankara to take.

The cable got as far as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the bureau and he called me in, and he said, "We can't do that." And I said, "We have to do that." He said, "Nobody in this town wants to alienate the Greek government." And I said, "You would prefer a war?" Anyway, we argued back and forth, he refused to clear the cable. So I went back and I redrafted it, and I toned it down but with essentially the same message, and I came back with another try. This time he said, "Okay." So we went to the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary said, "We can't do that. Nobody in this town wants to hear this sort of thing." And I said, "We have to do it. As responsible people we just have to." Well, this battle went back and forth, and up and down, and finally along about April -- I had started this in February, so two months had passed -- I finally got in to see the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who was Joe Sisco, my friend and former boss in NEA, had been promoted, and I said, "God damn it, Joe, we have to do something." And he said, "Look, this is very difficult. Nobody in Washington wants to do this, particularly they don't want to hear anything anti-Greek in the White House. Don't ask me why. I don't know why, but I know that's how they feel over there." So we had the same argument again.

Eventually in about June I managed to get a much watered down version of my instructional cable out of Washington with one version to our ambassador in Athens, and backup cables in Ankara and Nicosia. The ambassador in Athens instantly came back with a cable, which is his right, saying, "Those are terrible instructions that you've given me. I can't possibly do that. If I do that it's going to alienate the Greek government, and we won't have any influence with the Greek government. I reject these instructions. You've got to change them." So I had to fight the fight all over again, but with one more enemy. And by this time the CIA and the Defense Department had discovered what I was up to and they were both opposed to doing this for the reasons that I stated before. In the case of one, because of home porting; and the case of the other, because they had a

relationship with Ioannidis.

So I went back for about the eighth time to the drawing board and finally got another instructional cable out to the embassy in Athens. By this time it's July 5th. The ambassador in Athens promptly went on leave. And the DCM, instead of himself carrying out the instruction, gave it to the Political Counselor. And the Political Counselor, instead of going to General Ioannidis as instructed, went to a Greek Orthodox bishop who was reported to have close relations with the military, and gave the message of the United States government to this religious figure. All of this was reported back to Washington about the 12th of July. It became clear that the instructions had been carried out in a half-assed manner at best by the embassy in Athens.

That same day we received a raw intelligence cable from the station in Athens which said, in effect, "We have been in touch with General Ioannidis, and we have been assured by General Ioannidis that the Greek government is not, and will not be involved in any clandestine activity designed to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, and to damage the situation in the eastern Mediterranean." That was a weekend, so all right, we'd had it from the horse's mouth. I went home. And about 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning, I got a call from the Ops Center at the State Department and the person said, "You better get in here. There's fighting in Nicosia, and something is going on and it doesn't look good."

So I went into the State Department, I went up to the Operations Center, and he said, "Here's what we've got." And he put two pieces of paper in front of me. On the left hand side was the Daily Intelligence Summary, which is done by the entire intelligence community for the President and the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the highest officers. And it said, in its lead item, "We have been assured by General Ioannidis that Greece will not move its forces.

We don't know where Archbishop Makarios is. We presume he's dead. A government has been installed in Cyprus, and the new leader is Nikos Sampson." Nikos Sampson happened to be an individual who had...there were those who said he was a pathological killer. In any case, he'd killed a lot of British policemen during the '50s, and he'd killed a lot of Turk Cypriots during the '60s, and for them to make him the president of the new nation of Cyprus, was just unbelievable, and unthinkable. And, of course, instantly the Turkish army mobilized.

Now think about this. There we are, sitting there with the entire intelligence establishment of the United States in all of its majesty, having been conned by a piss-ant Greek Brigadier General, on the one hand; and on the other hand the disaster which I had been trying to avert, and avoid, coming true like your worst nightmare. Well, it was in the fan, clearly. Several emergency meetings were held, and Kissinger decided to send Joe Sisco out on a shuttle diplomacy mission to solve the problem. And I had been around Washington long enough, and had become cynical enough, that I knew that the minute Kissinger sent Sisco, instead of going himself, it meant that he knew that there was no hope, and he didn't want to have a loser identified with himself. So he's sacrificing Under Secretary Sisco, and his staff, of which I was one. I mean it's a clear bureaucratic signal that you're not going to win. And we didn't.

We flew first to Athens where an ashen-faced ambassador received us and said, "We've made

arrangements for you to see the foreign minister." And Sisco said, "I'm not going to see the foreign minister. If I can't see General Ioannidis, I'm leaving." And we had about a morning's go-around over that, but we eventually got to see General Ioannidis, and Joe Sisco went in there and said, "If you don't do something we're going to have a war, and you're going to lose the war. Now give me some elements of compromise that I can take to Ankara that we can work with." Whereupon, General Ioannidis launched into an emotional, weird, surreal, description of Byzantine history, and the struggle against the Osmanli Turks, and Constantinople, not Istanbul. We were clearly in real trouble because this guy had disconnected from the world, and he had all the power. And he didn't give us anything.

We went off to Ankara, and we met with Ecevit. We met with Ecevit just forever it seemed like, eight or ten hours. Talk, talk, talk, and Ecevit was just shaking his head, no, no, no. I'm not going to do anything. And finally our ambassador there, Butts Macomber, who is known to Ed, and Steve, and myself at least, and someone who had been Under Secretary for Management, with whom I had fought seriously as president of AFSA, but for whom I had a great deal of affection and respect, he sort of went like this, time out. And everybody stopped talking, and he turned to Ecevit, and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you're a teacher and a poet. You're not a military man, and there are kids all over the world who are not going to forgive you if you let this happen." A tear rolled down Ecevit's cheek, and he said, "Mr. Ambassador, it's out of my hands."

The next morning the Turks hit the beach. They attacked northern Cyprus, they overwhelmed the Greek Cypriot forces in Kyrenia. They drove straight through to the Turkish sector of Nicosia and established this bridgehead in the sleeve on the island. We went back to Washington with a failed mission, and at that point I was, as you can imagine, self-righteous, and angry, and disappointed because American diplomacy had conducted itself in such a way as to bring damage, death, and destruction. The three Ds. It was, in my mind, unforgivable.

So, I wrote a dissent memorandum. And in that dissent memorandum I covered what I had tried to do, where I had been blocked, what the intelligence community had said and done, what the Defense Department had said and done, what had happened. And, yes, I had to say, "you see, I was right," you know, a little bit of that. But then I said, "But Mr. Secretary, "...these dissent memoranda go straight to the Secretary..."Mr. Secretary, you have to go to the Turks now, and keep them inside that bridgehead because if they break, and drive to both coasts, they will divide Cyprus in half, and Greece and Turkey will have another boundary over which they can fight until the end of time. And what's more, you will have them fighting with American supplied equipment which is contrary to their treaties with us, and our military supply relationships with both countries will have to be stopped...blah, blah, blah."

Clearly, Kissinger...I'm not sure he ever saw my memorandum. There's a requirement that they be answered within 30 days. In fact, my memorandum was not answered by S/P for six months, and I'll get to that in a minute.

Meanwhile, on the island itself the Turkish tanks, two days later, drove out of the sleeve, crashed across the island east and west in both directions, cut Cyprus in half, great slaughter of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish area, great slaughter of Turk Cypriots in the Greek area. A bloody mess. The government of the generals in Athens fell, and a democratic government took over but it was

totally paralyzed. The only good thing was, it was clear that that democratic government was not going to get into a war with Turkey.

In Turkey, the Turkish army simply did whatever it decided to do and Bulent Ecevit had the choice of ratifying it, or disappearing, and he chose, however reluctantly, to ratify it.

On the island of Cyprus itself, everyone blamed the United States for what had happened. There was rioting, and there was a lot of shooting around the American embassy. And one particular morning the shooting was particularly bad, and as everybody ran for the safe room -- a room with steel casings around it -- one of our colleagues (long pause) was hit in the head, and her head was blown off. A Foreign Service national, and as the ambassador reached out to carry her, he took one right here, which tore his heart out, (pause) and he was dead before he hit the ground. A friend of mine, and Ed's and Steve's.

So, there you have it. We had alienated all three parties, the Greeks, and the Turks, and the Cypriots. We had caused severe death and destruction on the island. We had contributed to the death of friends, and in general made a mess of it. As you can see, it is difficult for me to this day. In any case, I got what I deserved. That is to say, I was simply fired. Kissinger said, "You are relieved of your job as director of Cypriot affairs." And I expected that. So I just went home, and stayed there.

The situation on the island went from bad to worse. Indeed, our relationships with Turkey and Greece were severely damaged, and remained damaged until the last four or five years. They stayed damaged for a generation, and we had a lot of problems in achieving our policy goals in that part of the world.

Well, what are the lessons of all this? What does it tell you? In order to make that clear I have to provide a postscript. And the postscript is what happened to me. Well, what happened to me was that, unbelievably for me, the Director General of the era called me up, and said, "I'd like you to go to the Senior Seminar." I said, "Hey, you can't be serious. I'm damaged goods." And he said, "No, no. We want you to do that." And, of course, I did. It's an honor assignment, it's fun. It's a great year. It's the senior most training assignment that one can have, and I have to tell you that I was surprised, as well as delighted. That's what happened.

Half way through that year, I got a call from the intelligence committees on the Hill, the Church committee on the Senate side, and the Pike committee on the House side -- it was the Pike committee that called me -- and they said, "Mr. Boyatt, we have decided in analyzing U.S. policy failures, we're going to do the three Cs, Chile, Cambodia, and Cyprus. And you had a lot to do with Cyprus, and we'd like you to testify." And I said, "You can't come to me directly, you have to go through the chain of command. If you want me to testify I'll have to call my superiors, and ask them." And they said, "That's fine. Do that." And mind you, I'm in a training assignment, all right? So I called Larry Eagleburger, who was the Under Secretary for Management, and who was very close to Henry, and I said, "Larry, the Pike committee wants me to testify." And he said, "You can't." I said, "Okay, I'll tell them that you said that." So he said, "Wait a minute." (Laughter) "Let me talk to the lawyer." So he went and talked to the lawyer, and called me back and he said, "You can't on the basis of executive privilege." I said, "Okay." I called up the Pike

committee, and I said, "I can't testify. Under Secretary Eagleburger has said I can't testify on the basis of executive privilege." And the counsel for the committee said, "That's nonsense. Executive privilege flows from the President only to his immediate advisers, and not down to desk officers at the State Department. I'll call Eagleburger." So a big shamozzle ensued -- with constitutional overtones, by the way. A fight between the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branches, as to whether I could testify or not. And finally Kissinger said, "Okay. You can testify, but you can't say anything that's classified." So I saluted, and I went up to the hearing.

There were three or four Assistant Secretaries in the room, and Pike didn't call any of them. Instead he called me. So I went up, and was sworn, and he asked me a question. The first question he asked me involved a classified response, and I said, "Mr. Chairman, my instructions from the Secretary of State are that I can come, I can testify, but I can't divulge any classified information." "What!" And he went ballistic, and he cleared the room of all of the riffraff Assistant Secretaries, and the press, and everybody else, and the CIA's lawyer. And I'm sitting there all by myself, and they're all up there on this pedestal -- you know how they intimidate you -- and he went into executive session and he said, "Now you can testify." And I said, "Those aren't my..." Anyway, it went back and forth, and back and forth, and halfway through they discovered that there was a Boyatt dissent memorandum, about which I had heard nothing from the Foreign Service specifically. And they subpoenaed the dissent memorandum, and Henry, of course, resisted that mightily. This struggle went on and on and on, and eventually an agreement was reached under the terms of which I was allowed to testify in closed session, and answer questions up to secret but not beyond secret. And the Boyatt memorandum was cut into pieces, and those pieces were interspersed with other drivel made up by S/P designed to disguise what was the Boyatt memorandum because Dr. Kissinger was so concerned for protecting my anonymity. (Laughter) If you believe that, you will also believe anything.

Anyway, a constitutional compromise was reached. At the end of my year in the Senior Seminar I became the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago which is a great job. It's a career making job. I wound up being chargé there, and went on to two embassies, and retired when I was 50, and lived happily ever after.

What are the lessons? Well, there are a lot of lessons here. The first lesson is that you really test the system by how it performs under pressure. That's lesson number one. In my case, the system performed pretty well under pressure. While it is true that in a policy sense I was unsuccessful...maybe that's a fair way of putting it. I was unsuccessful in getting the United States government to do what it should have done, when it should have done it. And if I'd been successful, lives would have been saved and the best interest of this nation would have been much better served. But in the process of trying to do that, I spit in just about everybody's eye that you can spit into. I fought with the CIA at the highest levels, I fought with the Defense Department at the highest levels, I fought with two ambassadors at the highest levels, and I fought with everyone that was above me in the bureaucratic chain of command -- the Deputy Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the Under Secretary, and there was an implied fight the whole time with Kissinger. And he knew it, and I knew it. And yet, I survived. And not only did I survive, I prospered.

Why? How? What were the mechanisms that made this possible? Well, I guess three. One is the

dissent channel. I used it, and I used it in the proper way. I used it in the appropriate way. Two, I fought but I kept my fight within the building. At any point in this struggle, I could have gone to the press, or the Hill, or the Congress, and I could have generated a counter-fire against Henry Kissinger and made him fight out our Cyprus policy in public. In which case he would have had...the case for what I wanted to do was so overwhelming, that had it gotten into the public domain, particularly the press domain, and the Congressional domain, that he would have been forced to do what I wanted him to do, but I did not do that. Now, I stayed within the system and a friend of mine was killed. But I did stay within the system. What did the system do for me?

Much to my surprise the first thing that happened was that I got a great efficiency report from the very Assistant Secretary I had been fighting. The Director General stepped in, and made sure that I got to the Senior Seminar. Somebody else stepped in and made sure I got a good onward assignment. In short, the old boy network, and it's still an old boy network, by the time you guys get up there it will be an old boy and old girl network, but in those days it was an old boy network, closed ranks, and everybody in that system did what they could to take care of me, and they did. And I lived to talk about it.

The questions? There are a lot of them, and the biggest one, of course, is did I do the right thing. Well, I don't know. Judgment is everything. Believe me, I would not have fought this fight over something that was unimportant. I wouldn't have fought this fight over an efficiency report, and I wouldn't have fought it over a travel allowance. But from my perspective the best interests of the United States were in play. So I fought. When your time comes, I hope you fight.

WILLIAM C. BURDETT
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1967-1970)

Ambassador William C. Burdett was born in Tennessee in 1918. He served in New Zealand, Iraq, Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Malawi. Ambassador Burdett was interviewed by Richard Nethercut on December 16, 1988.

BURDETT: Cyprus was one of the most difficult problems in relations with Turkey. A major crisis developed soon after my arrival in Ankara in late 1967. The Turks made obvious preparations for a military invasion with troops boarded on transports. To avert a landing President Johnson assigned Cyrus Vance as Presidential Envoy to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. "Frank" negotiations ensued. Turkish President Sunay postponed the landing to give Vance time to make one more effort with Makarios. Happily Makarios accepted, in effect, the Turkish terms and the invasion was called off. The next time the Turkish troops landed and we're still suffering the consequences. The Turks felt we let them down in failing to oblige Makarios to meet his commitments.

Q: In addition to the relations with Cyprus while you were in Turkey, were there other aspects of particular significance in our policy toward Turkey while you were there?

BURDETT: The bulk of our time on the operational side was taken up with matters involving the large U.S. military presence in Turkey to bolster NATO. There were negotiations on the status of forces requiring special attention to Turkish nationalist sensitivities, and arrangements for visits by the Sixth Fleet. Our A.I.D. program was extensive. We achieved remarkable success in introducing into Turkey a new type of wheat which enabled the farmers greatly to increase their yield. We also had a major Peace Corps program, but with the Peace Corps difficulties developed during the Vietnam period when volunteers sought to protest against U.S. policy toward Vietnam.

Q: That must have been interesting. How did the Turks react to this evident displeasure with U.S. policy by a portion of the Embassy?

BURDETT: These demonstrations did damage to our relations with Turkey. Unfortunately members of the A.I.D. mission and even a few Army officers took part. They culminated in picketing the Embassy. Under Turkish law picketing cannot be conducted without permission. To avoid arrest of the pickets and sensitive to the growing anti-Vietnam movement at home, the Ambassador permitted the demonstrations within the Embassy compound. I think this was a humiliating experience and brought mockery from the Turks who were amazed that such a thing could happen.

Q: During your assignment to Turkey you had three stints as Chargé d'Affaires and so during two of those times you then reverted to the position of Deputy Chief of Mission. Could you describe a bit of the transition process that you went through as two new Ambassadors came in the course of your assignment to Ankara?

BURDETT: Service as Charge is inherently difficult, but lots of fun. The uncertain time element weighs upon you. You are one man short at the top; members of the Country Team are "restless", although in Turkey most cooperative, when your term is short and your authority less clear cut than that of the Ambassador; you lack time for your own policy input and for developing your own tactics to execute policy.

The assignment of Robert Komer, prominently involved in the rural pacification program in Vietnam caused us difficulties. His name had appeared frequently in the Turkish press. At the time there was a growing leftist movement in Turkey and vocal opposition to our Vietnam policy, especially on the part of university students. A large demonstration greeted Komer's arrival, and we were obliged to stop his plane and unload far out on the airfield. It was, of course, a considerable embarrassment and irritating to Komer. A few days later in the official limousine with flags flying, he drove against staff advice to make calls on the university Rector. During this meeting Turkish students seized and burned the limousine. Both incidents made his mission more difficult. A lesson is the need to take into account the global repercussions of U.S. policies even in the assignment process.

Q: I see. Was this also true with respect to Ambassador Komer's replacement?

BURDETT: Ambassador Handley was an experienced career officer knowledgeable about the

Middle East and the transition went smoothly.

Q: In summing up your assignment to Ankara then, were there some principle impressions you gathered that influenced you in your subsequent assignment as Ambassador to Malawi?

BURDETT: There is a great gulf between Turkey and Malawi. Our policies toward each are completely different. To finish with Turkey, I developed a great respect for the Turks. They are strongly anti-Russian, not just anti-Communist, and I believe can be counted upon in terms of Western defense. They are a stubborn, proud people who respect the slogan, "An enemy of my friend, is my enemy." They have been disappointed in the United States because of our perceived bias on the question of Cyprus in favor of Greece. Their enmity with Greece is deep-seated. The Turks have major economic problems and have been grateful for U.S. aid in the economic field. They have made good use of our economic and military aid and contribute in a major way to NATO. Often overlooked is their assistance in the intelligence field.

(Additional explanatory material written by Ambassador Burdett):

I encountered the Cyprus problem in 1964 while serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. EUR was drawn in because of the effects on NATO of the Greek-Turkish controversy and the involvement of British military bases on the island valuable to NATO. Turkey was staunchly anti-Russian, had faith in the US, and espoused the doctrine - the enemy of my friend is my enemy. The Turks, public and government, took for granted our backing in their quarrel with Cyprus and in particular Archbishop Makarios.

Makarios in espousing Enosis was seeking and receiving support from a growing communist movement as well as from Greece. Turkey was threatening military intervention to halt union with Greece and safeguard the Turkish minority. It appealed to the US. President Johnson approved a secret effort strongly endorsed by Under Secretary George Ball to organize an international force including US and non-NATO troops to establish security on the island and curtail Makarios' activities. This would forestall a Greek-Turkish military clash and communist threats to the bases. I was coordinator. Turkey welcomed our plan and other countries including Sweden agreed to provide troops. I received a telephone call from Ambassador Parsons in Stockholm asking if he could assure the Foreign Minister that the Secretary approved. I replied he could say the President approved and subsequently confirmed the answer with Ball.

Plans were completed for deploying troops down to identifying the US units and drawing up the rules of engagement. The British worked closely with us although not contributing troops beyond those already stationed at their bases. Suddenly Ball called a meeting, decided to cancel the project, and immediately obtained President Johnson's concurrence. Joseph Sisco representing IO led the opposition emphasizing the likely ruckus among third world countries at the UN. NEA demurred because of Greek reaction. I urged going ahead. The full reasons for Ball's decision are unclear. The negative factors cited were present all along. Probably developments in the Vietnam war, concern over public opposition to another US troop deployment and unwillingness to face an adverse domestic political reaction from the Greek lobby were significant, but unmentioned, factors.

The incident warrants recording because of the lasting negative effects on Turkish confidence in the US, and as a case of the US tendency to reach hasty decisions swayed by immediate expediencies without adequate evaluation of effects on our long term interests. Turkey felt suddenly deserted by a trusted ally on an issue of major emotional and national security importance. Trust was affected and our diplomacy bore the burden when again coping with Cyprus. Leaders of other countries, some of whom agreed to participate at US urging despite domestic political risk, were let down and bewildered. To what extent are we building a reputation for inconstancy and lack of stamina which will increasingly haunt our diplomacy? We seem especially vulnerable to domestic interest groups with narrow foreign objectives to which they give exclusive importance. Leading examples are the Israel and Greek lobbies.

I was assigned to Embassy Ankara from 1967-70 as Minister-Counselor and during the tour served as Charge for 9 months among 3 Ambassadors. Our Ambassador in 1967, Parker T. Hart, an outstanding Middle East veteran, had built solid personal relations with key Turkish officials which mitigated the new wariness toward the US. That year the Cyprus issue flared. The question again was Enosis and the perceived threat to the Turkish minority from the Greek majority. This time Turkey mobilized and troops boarded transports for invasion of the island. The government appeared obdurate. In a final effort to avert a landing President Johnson despatched a Presidential envoy, Cyrus Vance, to Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. It was a close call. As Hart and Vance were meeting with Turkish President Sunay Embassy Ankara received a "Flash" telegram from Nicosia citing reports invasion was imminent and saying the Embassy was considering an immediate evacuation of American citizens. The Turks had barred all access to the meeting with President Sunay and we judged an order to evacuate American citizens could trigger a Turkish landing even if not already underway. We sent a "Flash" back saying we did not believe a landing would occur that night. To our immense relief the Turks conceded Vance time for another shuttle to Nicosia where Makarios in effect met Turkish conditions.

The time required to convince Makarios he had no choice but to step back or face Turkish troops was bought in good measure with the personal trust built up by Pete Hart, reinforced by the negotiating tact of both Hart and Vance plus Turkish reluctance to break with the US. Unfortunately, the underlying souring of public opinion toward the US grew together with doubts within the military and government about US reliability. During the next round Turkish troops landed and we are still suffering the consequences.

LEON PICON
Cultural Attaché, USIS
Ankara (1968)

Leon Picon was born in Pennsylvania on August 16, 1917. He served as a Foreign Service officer in Japan, Turkey, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed on October 30, 1989 by G. Lewis Schmidt.

PICON: As Cultural Attaché in Ankara, I was in charge of the Fulbright program, so to speak. We had a Turkish director of the Fulbright program, but I oversaw the program itself.

The program in Turkey I regarded as out of balance. About 80 percent of our funds went into sending Turkish students to the United States. Now that isn't altogether bad. To me what seemed to be bad was that the presence of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the Fulbright program -- members of the Fulbright directorate came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education -- they tended to regard the Fulbright program -- wrongly, I believe - as an instrument for building up expertise in the hard sciences and developmental subjects. They put virtually all their weight into sending Turkish students to the United States to study engineering and subjects of that sort.

In terms of our interest in mutual understanding, I'm sure that those things did a bit of good, but they would not match up at all with sending Turkish students to the United States to study American thought, American concepts of democracy, the social sciences in various forms. And that in turn would not make the contribution nearly that sending a Turkish professor in the social science field to an American university would make.

Turkey was certainly a very different situation from what I had experienced in Japan. However, to a satisfactory degree I was able to develop the same kind of dialogue, again, between American scholars who came to Turkey and Turkish scholars. I always regarded that as probably the most important phase of the operation. On the other hand, I became much more deeply involved with the people in the artistic world in Turkey than I had in Japan, though my involvement in Japan was pretty much. It was sort of a shift in emphasis.

In terms of what was going on in Turkey in the field of the arts, the left as it existed had been making inroads into the field of theater. And this was a matter of discussion between my boss the PAO and me. Some progress had been made before I arrived in Turkey, certainly. The State Theater and the State Opera and Ballet were beginning to look toward some of the American things to produce. My predecessor, not a regular Agency employee but someone who had been brought in, was quite accomplished in the field of opera and he worked with the Turkish opera in putting on "Porgy and Bess."

During my stay, we sort of shifted the emphasis a little bit toward Theater, and during my stay we put on American plays, musicals, with the help of CU who provided us with directors and so forth. We put on such things as "Fiddler on the Roof," "Man of LaMancha," "My Fair Lady," and such. The gentlemen on the left in Turkey took exception to "Fiddler on the Roof" and regarded this as a piece of propaganda in that it was anti-Russian and, they said, needlessly so. And they took exception to the State Theater's putting this thing on. The director of the state theater, a man by the name of Cuneyt Gokcer, was interviewed on television about the criticism that he was facing. I was very pleased with his retort when he was asked about this. He said, "You regard me as a propagandist for the United States because of 'Fiddler on the Roof'? You've seen me do 'Julius Caesar.' Was I then a propagandist for Rome? You've seen me do 'Hamlet.' Was I a propagandist then? And if so, for England or for Denmark?"

For these purposes, I can say that the overall impact of "Fiddler on the Roof" in Turkey was one of deepening distrust for Russia. And there was plenty of distrust there before I got there, but it did deepen it further.

The arts. Literature. We never did a book translations program in Turkey. On the other hand, we did help, as we did before in Japan, to expand the availability of American books in Turkey.

Q: Before you go on with your discussion of things Turkish, I think I would say that from my experience in Turkey, the Turks are not great readers. There is a small segment of the population represented by students more so than others, but the broad mass of the population in Turkey I don't think has the same interest in books that America has, nor has it the same interest certainly that the Japanese have. They just are not a nation of readers. And that would tend to inhibit the success of a book program in any event. But you did say that you were doing something about expanding their exposure to American publications.

PICON: Yes. About the time that I arrived in Turkey -- curious that it was very similar to what had happened in Japan -- there was a very leftist book that had just been published that was written by a man by the name of Dogan Avcioglu. Its title was Turkiyenin Duzeni, which means "Turkey's future." And it was straight out the Marxist economic approach to the needs of Turkey. Hard hitting, nearly violent in its statements about what was wrong with what was going on. Of course this was a book that the students seized upon.

That obviously was something that we had to do something about. So to the small degree that we did involve ourselves with book programs, we aimed our sights at neutralizing this single book. I agree with you entirely, they were not great readers in Turkey, but this book by Avcioglu was popular with the students, and we tried to neutralize that by making available books from the American point of view. With some success. But the book program was nothing very much, as was proper, in Turkey.

Q: How about the binational center in Turkey? I know we had one in Izmir, I think we had one in Iskenderun, and I know we had a big one in Ankara and I believe one in Istanbul. What was your impression of that program?

PICON: It was interesting in the contrast between the Turkish binational centers and those in Japan. While there were American directors in Ankara and Istanbul and Izmir, the Board of Governors of these Centers, by Turkish law, had to have a majority of Turks, and the President of the Board of Directors had to be a Turk. So, in effect, the Turkish President of the Board of the Turkish-American Library and Center in Ankara had a certain amount of control over the activities of the American Center Director. And although the Center Director was responsible to me, he was also responsible to the Turkish Board.

Often the American Center Director and I didn't see eye to eye with the President of the Board. And he took quite a bit of exception to some of the things we were doing at times. Even though it was our money, the Turkish members of that Board considered it an important thing to be very active in controlling the activities of the Binational Center. Fortunately, in most cases, the problems were mainly administrative rather than in terms of content.

I was impressed on arrival by the quality of the Librarians, the Turkish nationals who ran the libraries. They certainly were hard working, very well informed, very bright and they kept our

libraries in very good shape. I was impressed that when they made recommendations for me to order books -- I went over their orders -- I was very impressed that they included a lot of hard hitting stuff and they really wanted that in the library. I have seen occasions where librarians did not feel comfortable with having certain hard hitting material in the USIS library. I'm sure you're aware of that problem. But in Turkey it was quite different.

One of the major activities, worth it or not, in the binational centers was the conduct of the English language program. We had an English Language Officer there at all times and she, Barbara Peterson -- now deceased, unfortunately -- got together a staff of people, both Americans and Turks, who were very competent in the teaching of the English language. Those programs attracted many more people than we could actually handle. Everybody wanted to learn English. I think the English language teaching program is a very worthwhile activity of USIA and I think it always has been.

SEYMOUR I. NADLER
Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Ankara (1968-1969)

Seymour I. Nadler was born in New York in 1916. As a Foreign Service Officer, his assignments included Taiwan, Washington, DC, Argentina, and Turkey. Mr. Nadler was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on November 21, 1989.

NADLER: I went to Turkey in the very beginning of 1969.

Q: You went there as PAO?

NADLER: January of 1969, yes, as deputy PAO.

Q: The PAO was --

NADLER: Bob Lincoln was PAO most of the time I was there, actually until the last couple of months.

Q: Anyway, did you have any preparation in language before you went to Turkey?

NADLER: I was always interested, wherever I went, in learning something of the local language. As I mentioned before, I did go to FSI and learned Spanish before I went to Argentina.

I did take the short FSI course in Turkish before going. I learned enough so that with the help of a dictionary I could read headlines of the daily paper and a number of the articles and could communicate when traveling in the country on a very basic level.

Q: I somehow had the idea that Turkish enters this discussion.

NADLER: Yes. I wanted to learn some of the language. The then area director said that it was not really necessary to learn it to go to Turkey for a lot of work we were doing at the time, and also I was too old to study a new language.

After discussion, he said he would make a bargain with me: if I took the standard FSI language proficiency test and passed it he would OK my study of Turkish.

I did take it and I did pass it. I had been told, and most people believed at the time, that the proficiency test given was created for that purpose, with all the rules of grammar and vocabulary, all made up. I recognized nothing in it and assumed I was correct, but later on I found out that a real language was used: Kurdish.

Q: I like that one. In Turkey, Si, I believe there was a kidnapping that drew some attention.

NADLER: Yes.

Q: Can you tell us about that?

NADLER: Three American enlisted men who were working at a highly classified communications establishment commuted daily to and from their work. They were kidnapped by leftist guerrillas.

Q: Was this in Ankara?

NADLER: Just outside Ankara. We didn't know at the time, but as it turned out they were held in an apartment in Cankaya, which was the most exclusive part of Ankara. That we learned after it was all over.

At first there were no real demands made. Then there were some demands calling for release of some of the Turkish terrorists who had been jailed. Two of the kidnapped Americans had wives with them and they pleaded on the TV for release of their husbands.

At that particular time Bob Lincoln was out of the country. In crisis situations, you have to anticipate contingencies, no matter how unpleasant. I spoke with the ambassador about preparing three statements to be used in case of release unharmed of the captives, presentation of demands that could not possibly be met, or, finally, something like delivery of dead bodies -- one by one or all at once.

This went on for a while, and, suddenly, one day these three enlisted men got out of a taxi at the American embassy and walked in. It turned out that they had been held, as I mentioned, in an apartment Cankaya, not badly treated, but nevertheless held, and one day their captors suddenly said, "You are free to go after we do." The captors took off, and the soldiers were left alone. They thought it was a trick and waited a while. Then, they came out, and there they were in the street in one of the main parts of Ankara, completely free. One of them, it turned out later, even bargained with the taxi driver before being driven to the embassy.

It turned out that the police were observed getting closer and closer to this apartment by the

guerrillas who held the three American servicemen captive, and they thought that it was just a matter of time before the police, acting on this or that information, closed in and captured them. They decided that they had just better get the hell out of there -- but it did develop that the police, were, indeed, there and were clearly getting closer. They were, however, working on an entirely unrelated operation and had absolutely no knowledge that the guerrillas were there.

As I mentioned before, this took me back to what I had been told in Singapore, about things sometimes just happening without being planned.

Q: Well, it upsets some of my theories about captives. There was a -- during that period you were in Turkey the opium problem became of increasing importance to the United States. Tell me about that, Si.

NADLER: That represented a lot of difficulties for us because the poppy has a specially place in Turkish culture. It serves many important purposes to the peasants who grow it, none of them relating to its use as a narcotic as such. The plant has a wide spectrum of uses, including one tenuous relation to our drug problem: the peasants have long used the poppy as sort of a home remedy for children who had very bad coughs or related illness.

In any event, their livelihood depended on growing the poppy, which is a very, very painstaking procedure. Opium poppies require almost individual care. They can be harmed by high winds and so forth. They have to be picked carefully. That is one part of it.

When it came to our persuading peasants to give up this crop and growing something else, the Turks tried to explain that this was not as easy as it sounded -- we, are now running into that, of course, in Colombia and other places -- not just because of the economic side of it, but also because of cultural considerations.

As a matter of fact, I remember one case where it was suggested to some visiting American Congressmen by one of the Turks, "You offer to send people over here, experts, to these our peasants how to grow another crop and to give up this one. This is really not our problem. It is your problem. We do not have a drug problem." At that time they didn't, in Turkey.

He added, "We suggest sending some of our experts over to teach your tobacco farmer how to grow something else to substitute for that most harmful crop." This argument did not go over well.

I could see why they felt they had to get this dig in. A New York congressman had just made the headlines, which did not help us any, when he said -- I am paraphrasing, but I am not too far off the actual quote -- that every time a deceased heroin addict in New York City was being taken to the graveyard for burial, the funeral cortege should be made to pass in front of the Turkish consulate in New York.

We kept telling them to help us and take a strong stand when a young American was captured and admitted to smuggling drugs. A Turkish court sent him to Turkish jail. What happened next was that, all of a sudden, sympathy went to him, and Hollywood came out with a money-making

film called "Midnight Express." You can't have it both ways.

This was a continuing problem, not always for the right reasons.

Q: Another problem, I suppose, was the American bases in Turkey. How many did we have, roughly, at that time?

NADLER: I don't know. Major bases numbered perhaps three including two very important air bases in the south at Adana and a base known as Cigli on the Aegean coast at Izmir.

Even more important were some that -- I don't even know how many there were at the time -- very small units of perhaps half a dozen men or less each along the Russian/Turkish border which were primarily electronic listening posts.

You have to bear in mind, this was all done under the NATO aegis, so the Turks had a voice in things.

Q: Si, did that bring into play our responsibility, if we had one, on community relations with the Turks? Did USIS get involved with that?

NADLER: Fortunately, there were not too many problems in that respect. To the extent that there were, yes, we did get involved.

There was always a potential problem that a lot of us kept in the backs of our minds, and that was that in Ankara itself there was a large group called MAAG, the Military Assistance Advisor Group, with military and civilian personnel. There was an area which was more or less off limits to Turks and they accepted the fact. The APO and the AFEX as well as an American school were located there. The buses would pick up American children as they came to school and would take them home.

We didn't talk much about it but I think all of us had this horrible nightmare in the back of our minds: what if guerrillas suddenly kidnapped a bus load of American children?

Q: Sure.

NADLER: On a couple of occasions when there was anti-American feeling there were rocks thrown at the buses, but that was about it. This happened only once or twice while I was there.

That was about the time when the leftists were very strong, not just as guerrillas outside the cities, but in the cities, especially the universities.

Q: Do you want to say more on you experiences in Turkey?

NADLER: Well, I don't know that it has too much relevance, but, as in other places, when you travel outside the capital every now and then (as often as possible in many cases), you find out that, like in Washington where things become different as soon as you get beyond the Beltway, in almost any country when you leave the capital and go to a provincial city or to a small village,

you are almost in another world, not just another country. If you are to succeed as an information officer, somehow you have to expose yourself to this every now and then and bear in mind that things are not always as they were described to you by these very helpful bilingual friends.

Q: Overall, you found that actually a satisfying assignment in Turkey?

NADLER: Oh, yes, but I must say I found all of my assignments satisfying in one way or another.

BRUCE H. MILLEN
Executive Assistant to Secretary General, CENTO
Labor Attaché
Izmir (1968-1970)

Bruce H. Millen was born in Wisconsin. After experience extensive with labor unions, he was sworn in as a Foreign Service Reserve Officer in 1951. His postings abroad have included Norway, Rome, India, and Turkey. Mr. Millen was interviewed in 1993 by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle.

MILLEN: Yes. I went to Turkey and I was initially assigned as Executive Assistant to the Secretary General of CENTO. Given the kind of unfortunate circumstance I had in India, that [assignment] was to get me back in the shadows where I could hide for a while.

Shea: Could you specify what CENTO was?

MILLEN: The Central Treaty Organization, which was the successor organization to the Baghdad Pact, which was the northern tier. CENTO didn't have much substantive value. It may have had a little public relations value with the Turks and the Iranians and the Pakistanis.

That was a strange year. During the summer months the organization had [a work schedule] of 27 and a half -hours a week and we didn't know what to do with 27 hours of it. So when the [Department] created a spot in the Embassy for a Labor Attaché, and I had recommended this myself about seven or eight years earlier, there was a little bit of a "to do" about it. An objection was raised to my being made the Labor Attaché, which, I guess, came out of the AFL-CIO. I never heard much about it. I guess the Department [of State] must have just beaten back the challenge on budgetary impact alone.

That was an interesting assignment. Turkey was one of the few where you had the genesis of American-style unionism abroad. The AFL had spent a lot of time there in the early 1950s, and there was almost a business-type unionism.

Kienzle: Who was your predecessor?

MILLEN: Well, there was none. I was the first Labor Attaché there. Turkey came closer to

business-style unionism than any place I have ever seen in the world. And it was effective. Turkey had a Republican Party which was moderately left of center. The party names have all changed in Turkey, but in the 1960s the Demirel Party was the dominant force, and it showed. Its political alliances were not hidden or anything like that. The two forces got along pretty well inside the trade union movement, and while I was there, we paid all their bills through the AID Mission. We even built their [union headquarters], which was one of the better pieces of architecture in Ankara. Everything was pretty much out in the open. True ideological political unionism did not really start until roughly 1967. Subsequently the entire picture has changed and I have not been able to follow events.

Kienzle: This was Turk-is?

MILLEN: Turk-is was the major federation and it functioned pretty well, but as I said, we financed almost all of its activities. This was well known. There was nothing covert about it. The only criticism I would have made of that operation was that we weren't preparing them for the day when we would cut them loose, and they weren't making any effort to be cut loose either. I'm afraid that I frightened Einer Edwards and his crew over on the AID side of [the Embassy], because I got started looking around at the funding of [the trade union movement] and they thought I was there to wipe [the funding] out. I wasn't. I simply thought that we must make preparations sooner or later, hopefully sooner, to let the [Turks] become self-financing. As the head of the Restaurant Employees and Waiters Union told me, "We haven't paid our dues. We usually wait until right before the convention and then we pay our per capita, so we can get our delegates, but we see no need to pay in as long as you are there." [Laughter]

Kienzle: How many members were there in the trade union movement?

MILLEN: Oh, I can't recall, but it was a strong movement, and they had a piece of [labor] legislation you would not believe. They didn't have an election but a union got bargaining rights by sort of a finger in the wind and a sense of the effort, and they were recognized. When this happened, everybody in that plant except the plant manager was a member of the union. The first contract was always taken up with the plant executives being bargained out of representation in the union, and of course all sorts of little goodies came up like increases in pay or [as for an example] in one factory they had to provide soap or soap powder and so forth, which was expensive in Turkey. If you weren't a member of the union, you paid 1.25 times the union dues. In other words you increased the union dues for the guys who paid an "agency fee." Now I am not sure whether that legislation has all gone down the drain, but it was fascinating that in Turkey, which was regarded as a third world country, they had these concepts. In fact one Ministry of Labor official told me one time, "We're thinking of increasing that [agency fee] to 1.50.

Shea: And there were no direct ties at all with the political parties?

MILLEN: There were no common institutions through which they [interacted]. No, they were just aligned and they used their influence for one party or another. There were no institutional arrangements as there are in Scandinavia and so forth, where the roles are laid out. It's just that some of your influence [as a union leader] comes from being part of the government party and

[the government] throws favors to you which increases your influence with the workers or in the organization or whatever the case might be. While I was there, there was no real conflict between the two major political wings [of the trade union movement]. And then you had a truly radical labor organization-DISC. Whether it was Communist or not I'm not quite sure. I am sure parts of it were. DISC was led by Turkler and the Metal Workers Federation in it, and Turkler's union came as close to being like the U.A.W. as any union in the underdeveloped world. That was an operation the likes of which are hard to find. You would go into their office and you would see that the printing press was always going, and they all had classes; they had indoctrination; they had everything going all the time in that union. I am trying to think what that union was called, but it was the star performer of that left wing group. The metal workers were the core of it. Turkler was later assassinated. I admired Turkler. I never sat down and talked philosophy with him or what his true political thoughts were or anything, but he certainly was far to the left of anything that Turkey is ever developed.

Kienzle: Did Turkey have a cooperative movement to go with the labor movement, say as you would find in Scandinavia?

MILLEN: I can't recall. And then there was another wonderful guy who was a leader, the chief editor of the Republican Party newspaper in Istanbul, Ipekci. He was one of the few people in Turkey with whom I felt comfortable sitting [down] on a veranda and talking. You know, in calm terms. I wasn't up in arms about Vietnam, but I certainly had a lot of questions about it. He was one I could trust when talking [confidentially]. He was later assassinated too.

Kienzle: Were the Turks really interested in the Vietnam issue at that time or was that something that we were trying to push?

MILLEN: It wasn't a big issue with them, not the way it was in India. And, of course, you had that strong military cult in Istanbul, which gave almost automatic support to anything called "Anti-Communism."

I don't remember seeing much in the press, and you certainly didn't see it expressed in trade union affairs.

Kienzle: Would you describe the collective bargaining that went on as free and unfettered?

MILLEN: Well, it was aggressive. There were strikes. Every once in a while a party figure would step in to increase the leverage of one side or the other, because Demirel's party was of course basically a conservative party. So there were these conservative pressures on the trade union movement not to go too far, but it was a rough and ready kind of a situation. You might think of the Western frontier in America, which in many respects it [resembled].

Kienzle: Were the trade unions basically independent of government and free to bargain collectively?

MILLEN: It is hard to say. It was more like ward heeling politics on a local, regional, and national scale. Non-structured give and take, rewards and punishment.

Kienzle: I believe that in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a problem, and the ICFTU looked pretty carefully at the relationship between the government and Turk-is.

MILLEN: Well, in the late 1960s nobody walked in lock step. This isn't to say that they didn't get a message from this minister or that minister saying knock it off and so forth, but it wasn't that obvious and

I thought Turk-is was very aggressive given the framework within which it existed.

I enjoyed myself there but one of the reasons I had the feeling I wanted to get out of the Foreign Service was that I had so much difficulty with the Turkish language. I had too much time when I was in CENTO.

I took double language lessons, but I really didn't make much progress at all.

Kienzle: Well, Turkish is not one of the easier languages to learn.

MILLEN: I know, but I was 45 or so, and it just didn't work out right. I was also going through a divorce and I had just been ranked in the bottom five percent of my class from India. I was looking for a new job. I had a rough time.

Shea: How long were you there, Bruce?

MILLEN: In Turkey just two years. Almost exactly one year in CENTO and one year as Labor Attaché.

Shea: Who was your Ambassador?

MILLEN: First, it was Ray Hare, and then later Pete Hart. He came from a small town banking family.

He was kind of a nice guy.

Shea: How were the employers? Were they neanderthals?

MILLEN: Not all of them. There was a progressive [element]. For example, there was one group that I used to meet occasionally. I made the initial contact through the man who ran the biggest glass factory, which produced fine glasses and art work and so forth. There were some progressive people there but they didn't know much about unionism. I remember the first time that I went there as a visitor. I had lunch with them and I spent maybe three and a half hours in the restaurant just "bullshitting" so to speak. They enjoyed it, but it was hard working through an interpreter. That's what got me down in Turkey. [At the same time Turkey had] some of the most interesting sight-seeing and so forth. That whole Mediterranean area there is just gorgeous! I had only one chance to go out to the east, and I was sick and I couldn't go.

Shea: Isn't it Izmir where they have the old Roman ruins?

MILLEN: Yes, they had Efes near Hadrian's wall out there, half way between Adana and Izmir.

Kienzle: After Turkey you joined the Department of Labor?

MILLEN: Yes, then I went with the Department of Labor.

Kienzle: Do you want to describe the transition and how you got your job there?

MILLEN: Well, of course I had been recruited originally through the Department of Labor and worked with their people in various capacities at the International Labor Organization. I knew a lot of people in

ILAB, guys like Leo Wertz, who was Assistant Secretary for Administration, and Phil Arnow, who at this time was head of the Policy Evaluation Staff. So I had entree. It just took a bit of time. On one occasion I paid my own way back and met with Under Secretary Jim Reynolds. There were two jobs open. One I really didn't think I was qualified for; that was in the equal opportunity field. That job went to Jim Jones, who held it for about two years and then left to be on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin Law School. He was a very bright fellow. The other job was in Labor Relations Management Services, and Bea Burgoon eventually got the job. My entry on the scene forced Reynolds to fill those two jobs that had been vacant for a long time. I didn't get either one of them. I could see that putting Burgoon in a high, super-grade job took care of the women's end, and she was a highly competent woman. And putting Jim, who is black, into that other one satisfied some other needs in the Department. So I had no complaint. I was just amused that those jobs might have remained empty for a long time had I not come back and seen Reynolds.

Kienzle: What job did you finally get at the Department of Labor?

MILLEN: I then went into what we just called the Office of Policy Planning . That office gets a different name with every new president. When I left the Department in 1981 it was the Assistant Secretary for Policy Evaluation and Research (ASPER), but in essence it was the policy planning office. I headed a small unit there on wages and labor relations. I was there for 13 years, from 1967 to 1981. The last year I got out of ASPER and I was the Special Assistant to Dean Clowes, who took over the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB). I had known Dean [earlier]. Dean was out of the Steelworkers. I used to organize with him and his father used to be my boss. Later I had been in Italy with him, where he was part of the Productivity Division.

Shea: Were you able to get back to Italy?

MILLEN: I have only been back two or three times. I used to go back to Norway fairly frequently, but now I haven't been back to Norway since 1978 and I haven't been back to Italy since 1983.

Shea: Back on Turkey, Bruce, it is always regarded as one of the most progressive Moslem countries. Would you care to comment on the status of women there?

MILLEN: Well, first of all, the Turks were always easier to deal with on the Israeli issue. They did not have an embassy when I went there, but they did have a representative and they did a lot

of business with Israel. Israeli contractors worked there and so forth. They kept these low level relationships. So it was not a rough situation, but they didn't want to irritate the Iranians and all the other Arab countries. On a lot of other issues, they didn't want to irritate us, so they frequently were at least understanding of what we wanted to do and went along with us. When I was there you had the first signs of their being a little resentful of our influence. Nothing rough, but we were conscious of the fact, and I can understand that. My God! Around Ankara [we had a] number of our troops and our hospital and our school and all that sort of stuff. Then in Izmir we had a [large contingent] of navy as well as air force. It was inevitable that sooner or later you were going to get some outcries, but basically I didn't think that we were faced with a difficult situation there. I enjoyed those few Turks [I knew but because of my short residence there and because my language limitations I didn't get to know many of them very well.

In Turkey I didn't have much trouble, except once I had a fight with the head of Turk-is at a lunch given by the Ambassador. Afterwards the Ambassador called me over to his office and told me he didn't like it. I said that I was trying to make a point with [the head of Turk-is]. He wasn't going to push me around. Well, there were no further outbreaks of hostility by the Ambassador, and he never held that against me. Generally the Embassy let me go about my work and accepted what I tried to do. I did only small scale things except for reporting and trying to find out what the hell was going on. We had a very fine Deputy Chief of Mission named Martin, who was very easy to work with and very understanding of problems and I came to have some appreciation for him.

Of course the way the Department of State evaluated people doing our type of work is strange. I tried to get close enough to the radical trade union movement to get information and maybe [conduct] a little bit of cross chat, which I could do with Turkler. But attempts to do it [were sometimes problematic]. In Izmir I had a long interview with a fellow, who was secretary or whatever, and he wrote an article attacking me and the Americans. Well, I was, of course, a little ashamed of that, or at least a little disappointed, that I hadn't been able to pull this off quietly. The Deputy Chief of Mission put that in my efficiency report as something that I should be commended for, [i.e.], that I had come under attack by left-wingers. I didn't argue. . . (End of Side B, Tape II)

Kienzle: Okay, we are back on the record.

MILLEN: Well, the Labor Attaché Program has always had to fight for its legitimacy, and from what I hear when we listen to [the current Special Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator International Labor Affairs] Tony Freeman, it hasn't changed one whit, except that you have fewer people. I think that's just part of the fact that the labor function just doesn't have a natural niche in an institution like the Department of State. Now I found [the Labor Attaché Program] much looser, less structured and more liberal-and I am not saying that in a political sense necessarily-and easier to function in during the 1950s than I did in the 1960s. The old [Foreign Service] structure was asserting itself [in the 1960s]. All the new breath that came in with the Second World War was probably crystallizing, so you were getting a more bureaucratic style.

Kienzle: Would you attribute that to the fact that there were more political appointees in the

Labor Attaché Program early on in the 1950s, and that the leadership became more career oriented later on?

MILLEN: That may account for it. It used to always be fun -- I don't know if you ever noticed it -- watching your British colleagues. There was more bizarre and aberrant behavior amongst the British, because they all wore the proper ties. They didn't have to kowtow to the ambassador or his upper group. They had gone to the [same] schools. So you had, I thought, frequently a bunch of freer spirits on the British side of the fence than you did on ours. I don't know if that's a generalization that holds up or not, but that was my feeling from time to time.

During the most intense part of the Cold War period, I think we [in the Labor Attaché Program] were tolerated to one extent or another, as, for example, in Rome when everything was keyed to the anti-Communist image. You had greater tolerance of our activities because we were expected in some way or another to be at the forefront of the anti-Communist struggle. I think that just about the time that Nixon and Kissinger got into détente the labor function fell apart almost instantaneously. I don't know whether that was a coincidence or not, but I had that feeling. Certainly we were moderately useful to some mission chiefs during that period, but I am sure -- and I think you're seeing it now -- that if there are budget cuts and any staff cutting at all, the labor attachés will frequently be the first on the list to go. I just think that this is in the nature of the State Department, which has never found that perfect type of a labor attaché to do a certain specific thing and never will.

Kienzle: Do you see a role for the labor attaché in working with the AFL-CIO institutes in say democracy building?

MILLEN: Well, there always is a conflict. There are different viewpoints as to what is required. A young lady in [the Bureau of] Intelligence and Research commented to me not long ago, "Oh, the AFL-CIO is just making things dreadful in. . . ." I think she was talking about things in Russia or Eastern Europe. She said, "Their viewpoints are so wrong." Well, I didn't want to get into a discussion on it. First of all, I don't know what the AFL-CIO is doing in Eastern Europe, so I was in no position to discuss much. But I think government obviously has a different outlook than the trade unions have on what is to be done. Once you get beyond the simple business of anti-Communism, when you get into the business of building democracy, these disparate viewpoints make themselves even more felt. Certainly that was my experience in Italy and other places, where just being anti-Communist wasn't enough for [Irving] Brown [and company]. You had to be super anti-Communist. So you have that kind of a conflict between labor attachés [and the AFL-CIO representatives] if they are trying to work together, or dovetail their work. You can't work as a team with them, because that would certainly undermine their entire position of independence, and I think quite rightly so. There might be an identity of interests in the long term, but how to get there is always going to be an area of division, and I suppose that this is one reason that the AFL-CIO has paid much less attention to the Labor Attaché Program in recent years. In 1980 we got [then Secretary of State] Muskie to focus in on trying to stimulate [AFL-CIO] interest in the Department and work more closely with George Meany's operation or at least to attract their attention and support, but that, of course, fell apart with the election [of 1980]. Whether anything would have [otherwise] come of it or not, I don't know. Muskie wanted to do it, and the people at the Labor Department were trying to put together some ideas on it, I

know. But the fact of the matter is that even after fifty years the labor function has never been institutionalized, and I don't think you're going to do.

MYLES GREENE
Political Officer
Ankara (1968-1971)

Myles Greene was born in Georgia in 1925. After serving in the US Army from 1943-1946, Mr. Green received his bachelor's degree from Yale University and his master's degree from Johns Hopkins University. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Mexico, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey. Mr. Greene was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2002.

Q: Today is March 15, the ides of March, 2002. We're back to 1968 and you're going to Ankara. You were in Ankara from when to when?

GREENE: From '68 to '71. Three years.

Q: What was your job?

GREENE: I was internal political officer. When I arrived it was a four-person section.

Q: You said in the political section?

GREENE: Political section, yes. Actually there were two people who did internal affairs when I arrived, but the other one was Elaine Smith. She's next to Bob Dillon, the world's most expert Turk. But her job was being abolished. Like everywhere else in the Foreign Service at that time, personnel was being reduced in numbers. Although Elaine was there for most of my first year, most of the time, the remaining time certainly, it was a three man section, the boss, the counselor, me, or internal politics and somebody who was called external, but who basically did the foreign ministry run. Mine was one of the two best jobs I had in the Foreign Service. It was really a great job.

Q: Well, something on this rather than, let me ask the question now, how did you find, I mean for internal affairs, I mean this is something that our station, our CIA should have in any country have a fairly good line on or should, but often there doesn't seem to be much communication with the sort of the political officers. How did you find it at that time in Ankara?

GREENE: I found them friendly. I knew little about what they did. I don't think any of the people I considered my contacts were also their contacts. If they were I didn't know about it. The two main CIA people who did the kind of thing I did, internal affairs, and I would sometimes have lunch. We were friends, there was no doubt about that, but in terms of knowing what they did, I didn't know much about it.

Q: Well, you know, there's a difference between knowing what they do or did and that of being aware of what they're finding out because obviously they're reading your stuff and it's not, sometimes it gets to be a rivalry and you know, one of the things I've picked up sometimes is that the stuff that is in the CIA which can be very good or not, but I mean it goes into the headquarters that goes through a process and maybe comes out in sort of a morphus information where the stuff we send in is fairly raw and much more timely and really both side. The political people should be aware of some of the things they're finding out, not necessarily how they got it, but did you find much information in that context?

GREENE: Not so much as I can recall. My main recollection is this was of course during that Cold War and in Turkey, being next-door to the Soviet Union and next door to Bulgaria and not too far from some other communist countries, they were much more interested in foreign affairs than domestic affairs. During the time I was there Dubcek, who had become the liberal prime minister of Czechoslovakia, was overthrown and, to get rid of him, he was made ambassador to Turkey. The CIA people really pounced on him and his embassy. The CIA had a lot to do with Russian affairs, people moving around the country, this sort of thing, but in terms of what I call internal Turkish politics, I wasn't aware of that, no, not a great deal.

Q: Okay, who was the ambassador when you were there?

GREENE: Pete Hart was just leaving as I arrived. He was coming back, I guess he was going to be assistant secretary. There was a brief period with a charge - Bill Burdett who was looking for his own ambassadorship and was there for most of my first year. Dave Cuthell was the political counselor and very much looking to move up himself. I think he thought being political counselor was beneath him. But we became friends.

Q: How do you spell his name?

GREENE: C-U-T-H-E-L-L. Dave Cuthell.

Q: Is he retired or around?

GREENE: He's dead. He had emphysema and died five or six years ago. Anyway, when Bill Burdett eventually left, what happened was so normal in the Foreign Service, Dave became the DCM, that is the promotion was internal within the embassy. Then Morris Draper came as the political counselor. Perhaps you know him.

Q: Yes.

GREENE: So, during this time one good reason why mine was such a terrific job was that I was really very much on my own. Dave Cuthell knew a lot about Turkey. He'd been in Turkey before, but in Istanbul, not Ankara. When Draper came he didn't know a thing about Turkey and so I was it. It was a great job. The job being keeping up with and knowing members of parliament, the political party leaders, newspaper people, some professors, anybody to do with internal affairs. I spoke Turkish. By that time I had been in Turkey for two years in Izmir, my Turkish was pretty good. We had three terrific, local employees, Foreign Service Nationals, who

had all been there a long time and were well known themselves around town. I was off to a good start with them. I guess there are a lot of things I could say, but the main thing I did was to see a lot of people. One of the ways I started seeing people was through any sort of award that was being given, USIS, AID or whatever, a trip to the U.S. or a trip to NATO headquarters or whatever I got involved as the embassy representative in this selection committee that would pick these people and I was the guy who delivered the letter or the invitation to them saying you are hereby invited to the United States for so and so; then I developed these people as contacts. I would also go around to party headquarters saying, "I'm from the American Embassy. I'd just like to come by for a visit." One of the three local employees was particularly knowledgeable about parliament. I would go sometimes with him to parliament just to listen to what was going on. Of course I kept up with the newspapers through my reading which wasn't that great, and through these three local employees. I did travel some. This was the time of the Justice Party. Prime Minister Demirel, I can't say I got to know him, but I knew a lot of people with him. Pete Hart came back as assistant secretary for a while and there was some parties given for him. Really senior people came and that was helpful. Whenever the ambassador gave a reception which, was fairly often I was the guy who was standing at the door to pull out any political people whom somebody should know.

Q: What was the party system at that point?

GREENE: The party system?

Q: Was there, I mean what was the political system?

GREENE: Well, except for the communist party and any what you might call religious party, things were wide open. There was free vote. So it seemed. Then as time passed, let's see this would be in 1970, Demirel, who had increasingly moved to the right and was flirting with the religious people, was overthrown. One of my really good contacts, whom I had more or less inherited from Bob Dillon, was Nihat Erim. He was a traditional leader from the Republic Peoples Party, then in the opposition. I saw him fairly regularly and he said that he would like to meet the political counselor so one night he had my wife and me and Draper and his wife and somebody else over. It was interesting that Draper's wife claimed she could read fortunes from hands and she read Erim's lines on his hand and said, "Oh, you're soon going to be prime minister." Everybody smiled. But soon he was prime minister, because when the military forced Demirel out, they wanted somebody above day-to-day politics as prime minister. Erim was a long time leader, and the military wanted someone like this, respected, intelligent, willing to play the game according to the way the military wanted and they said okay, you are the new prime minister. Obviously he moved out of my range at that time when he became prime minister, but interestingly enough I still saw him quite a bit because at that time this was the opium problem. But let me go back a minute. We'd had a brief a period of Bob Komer as ambassador.

Q: I was going to ask you about that. Known affectionately as the blowtorch.

GREENE: Yes, that's right. He was nominated in Lyndon Johnson's latter months but never confirmed by the Senate. Senate he assumed that he would be confirmed or redennominated and confirmed under the new president, Richard Nixon. It didn't happen, but he stayed on until the

spring of '69 which was about three or four months into the next administration, never having been confirmed, still wheeling and dealing. His car was burned by the students. He had plans to build a swimming pool in the backyard of the residence and tennis courts and invite all these people over. None of this really happened. He trying to be a Kennedy, developed touch football games in the embassy's backyard. He didn't pay much attention to me and I didn't think much of him, to tell you the truth.

Q: Did you, how did a personality like this fit into the Turkish culture at the diplomatic level, did it work?

GREENE: I think most people knew that he was on the brink of not being there very long and therefore they didn't pay much attention to him. He was terribly aggressive, really. I had, let's go back, when I was on the Turkish desk I had traveled with Lyndon Johnson, then Vice President Lyndon Johnson, for three weeks through that part of the world and Bob Komer was on the plane with us. So, I knew him; people said he was put there by the Kennedys to watch Johnson. Who knows what he was there for? I was delighted when he left Ankara. Bill Handley became the next ambassador. He had NEA experience, but no Turkish experience. USIS background. He was much more likeable, much more down to earth, much less of a buzz saw, although still faced with the same kind of internal problems that had led to Komer's car burning and that kind of thing.

Q: What were the dynamics of the, the students were sort of university Marxist types?

GREENE: That sort of thing. This was really the reason for Demirel's fall. He, on the one hand, had not only moved to the right himself, but had failed to take firm action against this growing group of leftist students. These people were particularly anti-American. They saw us as running the country which was to a degree true. Anything representing Washington they were against, and when the military took over in '70, the main purpose was to have somebody who would crack down on these leftists. A few years later in the early '80s, after much of this had passed and I'd left, Nihat Erim was murdered by some leftists, sitting peacefully at home having been completely out of politics and in his retirement at a farm. Bob Dillon was back then and was our representative to the funeral. I was saying that in 1970-71, I continued to have some contacts with Erim even though he was prime minister and I was a lowly first secretary from the embassy. The reason being that we were in a narcotics war against any country that produced opium or anything resembling that and Turkey was a prime example of the opium poppy grower. Bill Handley made this his personal project and I went to all these meetings with the prime minister and was the note taker and also the fact provider. We had a DEA person who had been added to the embassy staff, but a lot of it still involved internal Turkish politics, so I was very much involved in all of this. In terms of publicity back in Washington poppy growing was probably the biggest thing the Turks were doing at the time.

I continued to maintain at my level contacts with all kinds of people. I took a group of senior parliamentarians on a so-called NATO tour to various places, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, a couple of American bases and obviously that gang was contacts in the future. I did take a few internal trips. I enjoyed that a lot - into eastern Turkey, met the local politicians and wrote up what I had to say about them. Tina and I lived in an area that was within quite easy distance from the embassy and

an area that at one time had been heavily populated by the overthrown Democrat Party leaders who had been in power in the '50s. Some of them were still around, so I even had some contacts with them. Any contacts with anybody way on the left I knew nothing about. There were no communists unless some of these students declared themselves to be communists.

Q: Where did we see these students having ties to the communist party or were they sort of indigenous leftists?

GREENE: I can't recall of any contacts the students had outside of Turkey. They just were strong, young, anti-American, unhappy with the situation, unhappy with what they considered the military's limitations on full freedom on political activity. A lot of it focused on us. We were under, wouldn't seem such tight security these days, but at that time the embassy was much more carefully guarded. I remember Bill Handley whose ambassador's residence was up on the hill where we finally put some marine guards at his door, saying, "Well, that won't do any good. The only good that that will do is that they'll come in the house and shoot the marines and the shot will wake me up upstairs." But we did tighten things up a bit. Nothing like what's being done these days I suppose. I never felt any serious security problem. I know our oldest child was walking the dog one morning and found a pipe bomb down the street from us, not actually in front of our house, but there was an American colonel who lived down the street, and my son pointed this out to him and he took over, but it wasn't the kind of thing that I was nervous about.

Q: Were the Kurds at all a factor during this time?

GREENE: No, not really. We of course had a consulate in Adana, where then consul Dan Newberry would travel a bit in the Kurdish areas, but they had not reached the point of opposition that they have in the last ten years, although you would hear reports about how they wanted to be able to have Kurdish language in schools, to have Kurdish newspapers or radio or whatever, but it wasn't nearly at the level that developed later when they had a more dynamic leadership and when they got support from Syria.

Q: Well, you didn't have external relations with you know there's a point where the internal external coincide. What about, with Syria, Iraq and Iran, I mean, was there much sort of people seeping in from these?

GREENE: Well, of course Iran was a friend at that time. The man who had formerly been Turkish ambassador here whom I knew from his job here was then the secretary general of CENTO headquarters which was in Ankara. I was involved in some social things that he would give and became acquainted with some of the Iranians. I really didn't have that much to do with other embassies. The other embassies would sometimes come to me to say what's going on and talk to me. I gave them broad briefings. I was pretty well known around town as someone who knew about Turkish politics.

Q: How did you find the army? I mean was the army always a presence?

GREENE: The Turkish army or the American military?

Q: Well, let's talk about first the Turkish army. Was there the feeling that they were sort of

keeping an eye on everybody and keeping book on the politicians and all that?

GREENE: Well, yes and no. You would not know about them just being there, but much was going on. I wrote a series of cables in 1970 which in effect predicted that something was going to happen and that the Turkish military were beginning to indicate deep concern that Demirel wasn't taking sufficient action against these students. Certainly at that time we were increasingly aware of the military's political power. I did not have any contacts in the upper level of the military. The ambassador I'm sure knew some and maybe even the military attaches, although my impression was they didn't know much of anybody.

Q: What about the American military?

GREENE: Well, the American military first of all provided us with some very good services. They had a commissary, PX, school, all those things. You could groan about some of it, but it was still very convenient. Our children had schools to go to. I'm not speaking of the top leadership, but the average colonel, lieutenant colonel, major really didn't enjoy being there and did not want to become well acquainted with the Turks. None of them spoke Turkish. They stuck with themselves. They used their commissary privileges constantly. They were not very helpful. There were so-called listening posts around Turkey, which were partially military, and partially NSA.

Q: These are up on the Black Sea?

GREENE: Yes. There were civilians and military at these places. I had the impression that they had good contacts. I took a trip along the Black Sea coast once, an official trip. I stopped to talk to some mayors along the way and they seemed to know, I mean they didn't know the details, the classified details, but they knew the people, they obviously had had some contact with the commanding officer or commanding civilian or whichever at these listening posts. I think these people out from Ankara had much better contacts with the Turks.

Q: Well, I used to be part of that process. I was in Japan and the people, many of these had gone to the language school, and so just by that very nature were much more open and interested in society; otherwise, they wouldn't have spent a year in Russian or something of that nature.

GREENE: I think we had some good people. I have since run into a few of them around town here and they're still interested in Turkey unlike the people in MAG headquarters who really didn't impress me.

Q: Tell me, again, this is outside of your stripped purview, but you were in Turkey, what was the feeling towards Greece at the time you were getting it from Ankara? The colonels were in power.

GREENE: The relationship was as belligerent as you could be, short of war, but there had been a near war while I was in Izmir over Cyprus. There was a Greek ambassador in Ankara and there were contacts, but the Greeks were blamed for just about anything. Particularly the Republican Peoples Party which was not power for part of this time was very vociferous in taking the leadership on being anti-Greek and pro-Turk. But, as I told you I was the internal political guy,

we didn't talk about Greeks too much.

Q: Were there many, were you feeling pressure from Washington on anything? How about the, you know the Armenians in the United States? Were they raising their usual problems?

GREENE: No, having been on the Turkish desk myself I was known to people back in Washington and the main thing I got was very positive comments about what I'd been doing. I think the only sort of internal Turkish problem that came from any pressure from the State Department, and this seems very minor in retrospect, was having to do with fundamentalist Christians wanting to go out into eastern Turkey to Mount Ararat where Noah's Ark was supposedly located. It happened also to be within a stone's throw, almost literally, of the Russian border, the Soviet border and the Turks didn't let people just casually go out in that area. Depending on the degree of influence any one of these religious groups might have in Washington, we would put a little or perhaps a little more pressure on the Turks to let them go out there and look. I know in two cases groups did go right next to the Soviet border.

Q: Well, going back to the students were we concerned that the Turks might come down too heavily on the students? Were we concerned about how heavy a hand the Turks might eventually use on them?

GREENE: No, I would say in one word. No, this was the height of the Cold War. They did damage to us, not only burning the ambassador's car, but in some other minor attacks. We were strongly supportive of the Turkish government, as we kept saying, one of our closest allies. Any group that opposed that government, we were opposed to.

Q: How did the ambassador's car get burned? Was he in it?

GREENE: He went out very foolishly, a typical Komer move, to one of the universities to call on the president or director, the Middle East Technical University on the outskirts of Ankara which was a plus for America in that we had helped set it up, a lot of teaching was in English. An American ambassador should be aware of it, but Komer went out and the driver parked the Cadillac in front of the building and it of course attracted attention. While Komer was inside the building the students attacked and burned the Cadillac. No, he was not in the car. He should have had much more security.

Q: What was sort of the prognosis about Turkey in those days, whither Turkey, I mean was it on the right road and did it seem to be moving along or did we see it as sort of lurching backwards and forwards?

GREENE: That's a hard question. I mean really, seriously it is. On the political side we were not too concerned about the overthrow of Demirel. We liked Erim. We liked somebody trying to crack down the leftist students, which they didn't do a very good job of doing. Economically we were pouring a lot of money in there. We had a big aid mission and I don't think we felt we were getting our money's worth out of that. We were very pro-Turk at that time. I mean Turkey was extremely important to us not only as a member, a fellow member of NATO, but being right next to the Soviet Union, being right next to the Arab world and having the second largest ground

forces in NATO. So anybody such as leftist students who opposed the government, we opposed. Politically we certainly were satisfied with the Turks, but economically they were really not moving ahead very fast. They had these so-called state enterprises, state monopolies, which slowed the economic growth down to around zero, very bureaucratic, very clumsy organizations. They didn't listen to a lot of what we suggested. Maybe we suggested the wrong thing, but they didn't listen much even though we were giving them a lot of money. An American who had been in Turkey four or five years who just loved the country and had been working with the Turks to set up a new civil service system. After his tour was he was somewhere in Africa still came back to Turkey on his vacation; he just loved the place. He came back once and went into see the civil service people with whom he had worked and he said, "How's my plan going that I wrote with you?" They said, "Oh, come on I'll show you." They went down in the basement of this building and there in this waterlogged room was a stack of his printed plans sitting there on the floor, that was it, four or five years of work. So, we gave them money, some of which came back to us through military purchases, but we also gave them economic aid and it was not very well implemented. I think a lot of studies since then have shown that just pouring money in, if a country isn't going to reform itself, doesn't do much good. That's probably the case of Turkey.

Q: While you were there were there any disasters, earthquakes that sort of thing, there always seem to be?

GREENE: I don't remember, no.

Q: Did the Turkish students, I'm not talking about the ones that are trying to burn down the place, but the normal Turkish students who come out, from what I gather, rather were very serious and quite dedicated to it.

GREENE: The Turkish people are quite serious and dedicated and these leftist students were a small minority, very vocal and very active. I think that I mentioned the last time I was here, the Turks are serious balanced people in general and they were proud of having a greatly growing number of universities, a growing number of university graduates, they loved to come to the United States to study. They wanted to speak English if they could. I think the young ones realized the heavy weight that the economy was carrying because of the state enterprise system. Since then some of those earlier students have helped to change that. In other words, we were basically popular, but these leftist students, mostly in Ankara and Istanbul, definitely did not like us.

Q: What about the role of Germany? I mean there had been the World War I alliance. The Germans helped out the Turks at that time. Later so many workers from Turkey went to Germany. What was the German Turkish connection as you saw it at that time?

GREENE: Not nearly as what you just described. That's all ancient history. Turks had been involved with us since the Truman Doctrine. It was America that they wanted to be connected with. The German embassy was large, active, had some good people in it, and sometimes you would find older politicians rather than trying to speak English, knew German. I think that when Dubcek came from Czechoslovakia the Germans were useful in some connections with him. The British, do you want to talk about others?

Q: Yes, I do.

GREENE: The British had good contacts in Turkey. They had some excellent people in their embassy. A lot of them spoke Turkish. The embassy was not as large as ours and of course they didn't have the large military and economic missions that we did there, but what they knew a lot of people. They were very balanced in their understanding of the situation and I got to know several of their people quite well.

Q: Was there at that time, how many language officers did we have?

GREENE: Oh, not nearly enough. When I arrived, as I said, Elaine Smith was still there. She had been trained in Turkish and was one of the most experienced Turkish language officers in the Foreign Service. So, there were the two of us. Elaine left and was not replaced, so I was it. Dave Cuthell who never actually had Turkish training, but had served for four years in Istanbul some years before and so he knew some pretty basic Turkish. He couldn't carry on embassy business in Turkish, but he could chitchat. I'm trying to remember the agency people certainly there were two who had had Turkish training, how many actual agency people there were there I'm not sure, but I know two of them had had Turkish training. Basically it was a weak link and that's one reason why I was really it. I was the guy who knew these people. I was able to go out and talk to them, plus these three local employees, FSNs you call them now, who knew a lot of people and of course spoke Turkish. It was not a good situation, but greatly improved I hope now.

Q: Was there a natural either division or rivalry between Istanbul or Ankara and I'm talking about our consul general and the embassy.

GREENE: Well, historically yes. Of course long ago the embassy was in Istanbul and Istanbul in many ways for a long time considered itself far more important than Ankara. Most of the leading journalists came out of Istanbul; except for the University of Ankara, which was relatively new, the major university centers were in Istanbul. But, at the same time as Foreign Service personal cuts proceeded Istanbul lost internal political connections. Duke Marian who had been Istanbul's internal political officer and left. That was a great loss, and he was never really replaced in terms of somebody knowing what was going on. Before my time, Bob Minor had been consul general in Istanbul. When he arrived and, as is the custom or requirement, went to Ankara to call on the ambassador, but never went back in his four years. In those days, being consul general in Istanbul was considered a step toward ambassadorship. Istanbul had this historic sense of independence and a true sense of being important for a long, long time. They had the waterway to watch. There was an assistant naval attaché assigned to Istanbul at that time and his job was to watch the ships going back and forth. The consulate general had one of the two boats in the Foreign Service, an official State Department boat the Hiawatha, they still have it.

Q: Istanbul was what kind of power center as opposed to Ankara?

GREENE: It was a little bit like Washington and New York in that politics was in Ankara and economic and cultural affairs in Istanbul, but that was shifting. Although I'm sure Ankara has never become the economic power that Istanbul was and still is, but in terms of journalism, for

example, which is very important in Turkey, more and more there were good newspapers in Ankara, but the people you would hear about as commentators, the Walter Lippmans or the Joe Alsops or whatever of Turkey all wrote for newspapers in Istanbul. A later ambassador after my time spent, didn't like Ankara and he got an apartment in Istanbul and used to spend a great deal of his time there, to the horror of the consul general at that time.

Q: Well, you were talking about newspapers. What was the role of the media? I mean, for example, were the papers strictly party papers or where they you know?

GREENE: Well, there were all kinds. There were scandal sheets with girlie pictures in them. There were at least two somewhat leftwing, first rate newspapers. What Milliget and Cumhingat said was important, like the New York Times, and the people who wrote the columns or the editors were influential figures.

Q: What about TV, was that very important during that period

GREENE: No. It was just beginning. It's hard to think of that now, but if there was TV it was not important. I did not know anybody then who had a TV set.

Q: Actually I was the consul general in Athens at the time started there in '70 and TV in Greece which was a little ahead of the thing, wasn't much.

GREENE: It may have been some in Istanbul, but I have no recollection of TV being anything. Radio was government radio, but newspapers were very important.

Q: They were a newspaper reading public, then?

GREENE: Yes, indeed. There were newspapers stands all around the corners of the big cities, you could buy anything. I know in my two years in Izmir, the local paper, which was strictly an Izmir paper, was read all around that part of the Aegean coast. It was a free somewhat right wing paper.

Q: Did it work sort of the way that here in Washington and to some extent in New York, almost everybody who is in the power business, diplomatic or whatever, sits down in the morning and reads the Washington Post and the New York Times and that often sets their agendas. Certainly it can do that in the State Department, too. Did this occur at all in Turkey?

GREENE: To an extent, particularly with the two papers I mentioned, although we also read what I referred to as scandal sheets just to see what their scandals were. I would usually get myself a copy of both leading papers and look through them quickly. We had these three Turkish employees and they came up quite quickly with an English summary of whatever major thing there was, including any editorial. We had a morning political section meeting every day to which the senior local employee came for a while, before which he was excused, and he would summarize today's editorial. Yes, we paid a lot of attention to newspapers.

Q: This is the early years. How about the Nixon Kissinger team, did you get any feel for their

interest or lack of interest in Turkey or was this on their agenda at all?

GREENE: No, I wasn't aware of it. If you asked me about Iran I would have something to say, but on Turkey. It's just the same thing I've already said, about NATO and the location of Turkey and the size of the Turkish armed forces. In terms of something special, I don't know.

Q: Well, then you left Ankara in '71?

GREENE: '71.

Q: Why didn't you extend? I would have thought that such a good job.

GREENE: It was a terrific job, I was saying earlier this was one of the two best jobs I ever had in the Foreign Service. Well, three years in one job and you move on. I had mentioned earlier the negotiations about the opium poppy which Bill Handley, the ambassador there at the time, led. He was really a nice guy, but he loved to pat himself on the back. I had come back to Washington and was briefing the President and the NFC and so forth and somebody said, "Well, how much money would it take to persuade the Turks to back out or to do something about these poppies." From the top of his head, Handley said, "Thirty-five million," which in those days was a lot of money. That became the figure, and eventually we gave him thirty-five million to put some tighter controls on the poppy fields. Anyway, because of all this that was going on, my family left immediately after school was over and I stayed on beyond what was the end of my tour. I was the working level person on this whole subject, so I didn't leave until the fall.

Q: The fall of '71?

GREENE: '71. Yes.

WILLIAM R. CRAWFORD, JR.
Deputy Chief of Mission
Cyprus (1968-1972)

William R. Crawford, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania in 1928. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Cyprus, Yemen, Romania, and Washington, DC. Mr. Crawford was interviewed by William Moss on March 12, 1991.

CRAWFORD: By the time I got there, the second period of maximum tension, almost war, 1967 threat of a Turkish invasion, had passed. We were in an apparent lull as between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. But the fascinating development of the years I was first in Cyprus was the do-or-die tension between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios. It was this Greek-to-Greek thing that needed closest watching at that point.

Q: You are speaking of what is often referred to as the colonels, Papadopoulos and Patakos and Ioannidis in Athens, who had seized power in April 1967, and their opposition to Archbishop

Makarios, who was president at the time.

CRAWFORD: Elected president of Cyprus, as well as being head of the Cyprus church, very much in the ancient Greek tradition. An extremely canny politician and leader. At the time of his death, he was the longest surviving head of government and head of state in the commonwealth. It shows something about his sagacity. There again, it's a very complicated story, which is a subject of a book or several books all in its own right. Suffice it to say that an intense enmity had developed between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios, with the junta fairly blaming Makarios for having aided a young man, a mainland Greek, who subsequently tried to assassinate the prime minister of Greece. Makarios had given him safe haven, the use of the Cyprus diplomatic pouch, and a fake passport to enable him to get back into Greece after a year of clandestine planning in Cyprus, where he subsequently tried to murder the prime minister of Greece.

Q: Threw a bomb on the road to Cape Sunion. His name was Panagoulis.

CRAWFORD: Yes. He was the man who had been given safe haven in Cyprus and subsequently tried to murder the prime minister. Well, in Greek terms, you don't forget that kind of thing, so the Greeks, with their very substantial assets in Cyprus, decided that Makarios had to go. They made several attempts on his life, cut the fuel lines in his helicopter, etc. Put in fictional terms, nobody would believe it, but the die was cast, and the colonels were determined to get rid of him. Watching these attempts build up was an absolutely fascinating detective story. The writing of it made me the 1970 or 1971 runner-up for the director general's reporting award.

Q: What was our role on Cyprus in this ongoing detective story?

CRAWFORD: It was a very complicated picture. Our relations were with the legitimate government of Cyprus and with Archbishop Makarios. Makarios presented himself to the world as a neutralist in the Cold War. At the same time, he depended heavily on substantial political support from the large Communist Party in Cyprus, which on a percentage of population basis is the largest Communist Party in any Western European state. At the same time, he quietly cooperated in many respects with the United States, in an anti-Communist sense. He was well aware that we had certain facilities in the British sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and he did not raise any objections or make a political issue of those. He had countenanced our cooperative, quiet relationship, in an anti-Communist sense, with his Minister of Interior, in various anti-Communist programs.

The issue becomes complicated in that ultimately it was that Minister of Interior, disaffected from Makarios for various reasons, who was the primary instrument that the junta used in its effort to unseat Makarios. So our role got a little fractured at that point. Let me just say that in a general sense, the Central Intelligence Agency felt that the officers of the junta in Greece were proven friends of the United States.

Q: I speak with a certain amount of anguish, because I was consul general on the country team from 1970 to 1974 in Athens, and I know this positive attitude toward a bunch of thugs. (Laughs)

CRAWFORD: Then I'm preaching to the converted.

Q: But we're speaking for the record here.

CRAWFORD: At one point, when I went up to Athens with what I considered proof positive of the way the mainland Greeks were playing around in Cyprus and that they were going to pull the whole house of cards down if they continued their foolishness, I was told by our chief of station in Athens, Jim Potts, that that was just absolutely impossible. He couldn't agree with me: these people were friends with whom we'd worked for 30 years, and they would never conduct anything so foolish, and furthermore, we had absolute assurances that they weren't up to any of the kinds of things we were reporting from Nicosia. Well, this had been totally contradicted by a really dramatic conversation I had had, as chargé with the Greek ambassador, whose name was Panayotakos. He, although a career diplomat, was very close to the junta. About 7:00 or 7:30 one night, Panayotakos telephoned to ask me to come to his office.

I was ushered into his office. He was a fat man and was wearing a dark brown turtleneck jersey. There was no light except a hooded lamp on his desk, one of those things with the metal shade faced down toward the desk and not onto his face or illuminating any of the rest of the room. He said, "Mr. Crawford, I'm calling you in as the representative of a country with which Greece is allied. I want you to know of some important developments." (We were aware pretty well of what was going on, and Panayotakos was, in fact, just confirming information we had from many other sources.) He said, "We have today told Archbishop Makarios that he must leave Cyprus."

I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what if he chooses not to heed your advice?"

He said, "Then the people of Cyprus will know their duty." So I reported this.

Q: When was this, do you remember?

CRAWFORD: This would have been just before I left, probably the spring of 1972. So it was that kind of thing that I took up to our embassy in Athens.

Q: Makarios did not leave.

CRAWFORD: Makarios did not leave. He did not choose to heed their threats. But it was a direct antecedent to the events of two years later.

Q: The CIA station chief, whom I can understand, saw only his particular positive relationship, you might call it, with the intelligence agencies of the Greek. But how about our ambassador, Henry Tasca?

CRAWFORD: I had worked with Tasca in Morocco, and Tasca said, "You've got some pretty convincing information there, but why don't you talk it over with the chief of station who is the man in this embassy really closest to these people? Check it out with him."

The chief of station said, "I hear what you're saying, Mr. Crawford, but it's not plausible,

credible, believable, or a fact. We have known these people for 30 years." I was bringing specific information that a particular colonel, Angelides, had come down to Cyprus to deliver the message to those Greek Cypriots who were regarded as totally subservient to mainland Greek wishes, to pull them together in an anti-Makarios effort. I said this was what Angelides was doing on that trip to Cyprus. He said, "It couldn't be. It's not credible. He's a fine man. I've asked him about this and he tells me there's no truth to it." (Laughs)

Q: I think Greece is probably one of the prime examples of what happens when a foreign intelligence service can almost co-opt ours because of cooperation and all. Israel may well be the other.

CRAWFORD: It was interesting that two years later, of course, when the Greeks made the last of their several unsuccessful efforts to kill Makarios, in July of 1974, once again the evidence in Cyprus was overwhelming that this was just about to happen. It was convincing enough to Washington to cable instructions out to Tasca saying, "Approach the Greeks and tell them this just won't wash. The information has now become conclusive." The agency was concurrently tasked, I believe, to go to a longstanding asset who was very close to General Ioannidis, who by that time had replaced Papadopoulos as prime minister.

Q: There had been a generals' coup over the colonels.

CRAWFORD: Ioannidis was actually in charge. We triggered this asset to try to find out what was up. He came back and said, "No, there's nothing to it, I can assure you." Of course, this was believed, because he, in turn, had worked so long and faithfully for the United States. But nobody ever considered the possibility that he might still be loyal to his boss and reporting to him, Ioannidis, the whole time he was also working for the United States. So Ioannidis succeeded in throwing the U.S. off track in 1974.

Q: What were our relations with the Turks on the island? The time you were there, there was not the division, although they were separate communities. Cyprus was a mixed government and mixed community.

CRAWFORD: Not entirely. Starting in the early 1960's, the island had been, in fact, divided in quite a different way, in a pepper and salt configuration, in which the Turkish Cypriots, feeling exposed and dreadfully insecure in face of sharp hostility by the majority, 80% of the population that is Greek, had pulled into self-defended enclaves. Turks could still move out into Greek areas, but Greeks were not allowed into these tightly defended little Turkish enclaves in the northern sector of Nicosia and these several little secure enclaves dotted the country. The Turkish Cypriot leadership did not venture out of their own enclaves. But we had good personal relations with them and official relations at that point. There was no question of two governments. There was a nominal Turkish Cypriot vice president of Cyprus, but by 1968 he had really faded out of the picture even in the Turkish community. The de facto leader was Rauf Denktash. Over the years, we became very close personal friends, as did, indeed, his closest equivalent on the Greek Cypriot side, Glafcos Clerides.

This is important to subsequent developments, because, yes, we had a Turkish language officer

in the embassy, we had a Greek language officer, but at the top, the ambassador and I had good relations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as with the leaders of the government who were all Greek. This served the U.S. very well after 1974.

Q: What were both the instructions and the official policy of the United States towards Cyprus at the time you were there as DCM?

CRAWFORD: "Do everything possible to try to support the efforts of the United Nations," which had a dual presence in Cyprus -- peacekeeping and peacemaking. Two different organizations. Peacekeeping was under the United Nations forces in Cyprus. The peacemaking presence was a special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. We felt the special representative should be out in front in the efforts to resolve the various constitutional issues between the two communities. So we were supporting his efforts: in Cyprus and as appropriate with Greece and Turkey.

The U.N. seemed to be doing a good job of that, slowly but surely trying to mend the constitutional fences. That was all swept aside, ultimately, by this Greek versus Greek feud which did, indeed, pull the whole house of cards down. So pre-1974 our policy was to stand behind and be as helpful as possible to the U.N. efforts to try to achieve a more stable relationship between the two communities.

Q: Having moved from Israeli affairs to another lobby which has the potential for being almost as difficult, and from time to time it crops up, the Greek American lobby, did you find this much of a problem on Greek affairs?

CRAWFORD: Not the first time I was in Cyprus, not from 1968 to 1972. The American Greek community had not at that point been aroused.

Q: It took the July 1974 Turkish invasion to do it.

CRAWFORD: Yes.

Q: We'll come back to that. During this period, it did not particularly invite your attention?

CRAWFORD: Nor was it trying to exercise much influence on Cyprus events. It was not in evidence as it was intensely later. We'll come to that in 1974 and afterwards.

KENTON W. KEITH
Cultural Attaché, USIA
Istanbul (1968-1972)

Ambassador Keith was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. After graduating from the University of Kansas he served with the US Navy before entering the Foreign Service in 1965. An Arabic speaking Officer, Ambassador

Keith served as Public Affairs Officer and/ or Cultural Affairs in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Syria, France and Brazil before his appointment as US Ambassador to Qatar. His Washington service included several tours in senior positions with USIA. Ambassador Keith was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You were in Istanbul from when to when?

KEITH: From that fall of '68 until late summer of '72.

Q: What was the situation in Turkey in '68?

KEITH: It was very tense. The Turks were still very hurt and resentful of the so-called "Johnson Letter," which was meant to discourage Greeks and Turks, two NATO allies, from going to war over Cyprus but which was read as an insult by both. The Turks were particularly steamed. There was at the same time growing left-right confrontation in Turkish society. The universities were largely in the hands of leftist elements. The beginnings of what was to become an urban revolution were emerging as I arrived in the fall of 1968. There were widespread demonstrations against the United States. There were anti-American slogans all over town. Coming in from the airport you had to drive by the Fine Arts Academy, where there was a big banner that basically said, "Yankee, go home." That was my welcome to Istanbul.

Shortly thereafter, our ambassador's car was attacked. The ambassador, Robert Komer, went to visit one of the universities in Ankara and his car was burned while he was there. Komer was the ambassador at the time. He had been publicly associated by the left with Vietnam.

Q: Well, he was.

KEITH: They took a public posture to oppose his presence in Turkey because of his role in Vietnam.

In the period that I was there, we went from these early demonstrations sometimes verging on violence to a series of violent confrontations between the left and right on university campuses and city streets. The right was often embodied by the police and security organizations, as well as Islamic-oriented toughs. They were aligned against the basically left intellectuals and students, who saw themselves as revolutionary youth. There was a surprising amount of bloodshed through the period '68-'70, with particularly gruesome photographs on the front pages of the newspapers.

On the university campuses, there was an organization or a collection of groups that called themselves the "Idea Clubs." In my role as cultural attaché, I had a lot to do with the universities and I had a lot to do with professors, often of the left, and some of them were allied with the Idea Clubs as faculty advisers in this early period. Over two or three years those Idea Clubs transmogrified into the Turkish People's Liberation Army. In fact, some of the people who were later killed in clashes with the security forces, and one person who later admitted to bombing my car, were Idea Club members whom I would see occasionally in one setting or another. At some

point, a leader of the movement emerged, a man name Deniz Gezmis. On one memorable occasion, I took Daniel Lerner and Ben Wattenberg to a conference for faculty and senior scholars at Istanbul University. In the middle of that conference, Gezmis and a group of his supporters, all dressed in combat fatigues, broke in and announced that the event was over. Gezmis came up to me and said, "I know you. I know who you are. I'm going to take care of you personally." Our Turkish hosts were just as terrified as we were. Then the Gezmis group followed us until they were sure we were off the campus. Well, Gezmis, before he took care of me, the Turkish military took care of him.

Q: What happened to him?

KEITH: Eventually he moved from threats to action, and was involved in a number of things including kidnappings, bank robberies and murder. He was caught after a gun battle with Turkish authorities, tried and very quickly executed. He was hanged. My car was bombed in front of my house on the day he was sentenced. On the next day the U.S. Vice President was arriving on a visit to the country. This was Spiro T. Agnew. He was of Greek descent, and a combative public figure. He wasn't the perfect choice for a visit to Turkey at such a turbulent time.

Q: This must have been about '71.

KEITH: Yes.

Q: I was in Athens when he came. He was told by somebody, "You're going to go to all sorts of Orthodox ceremonies" and he said, "But I'm an Episcopalian." He was told, "You're Orthodox while you're here."

You had come from Saudi Arabia, where nobody went to the cultural center. What about in Istanbul?

KEITH: Things were very different. There was an extremely active cultural life in Istanbul, and American culture was highly respected. I got to know a good many people in the theater and the writers and musicians. Successful Turkish adaptations of American plays were regularly seen. James Baldwin directed Fortune and Men's Eyes in the theater of his friend, Engin Cezzar. There was everything from Hair to Man of La Mancha. Most of these cultural figures were on the left, and they were opposed to our involvement in Vietnam and other American policies and actions, but that didn't prevent me from forging some very close relationships that have endured over the years.

At Istanbul University one of my goals was to help with the development of a political science chair, which at that time was just coming together. I determined to bring distinguished American political scientists (e.g. Lucian Pye and Daniel Lerner) to the campus for lectures, discussion, and consultations. I knew this kind of academic exchange brought both substantive partnership, but also gave the fledgling group at Istanbul some needed self-confidence. I sent most of the chair's young professors to the U.S. either on a Fulbright grant or an International Visitor programs of some kind.

I mentioned earlier the “Yankee go Home” banner stretched across the entrance of the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy that made such an impression on me as I was entering the city in 1968. In fact, I made it a point to be very close to the institution throughout my stay in Turkey. We created a lovely little gallery at the American cultural center, with the policy of alternating exhibits of Turkish and American artists. The new gallery’s very first exhibit was a group show of student work from the Istanbul Fine Arts Academy. The opening was packed and the reviews were wonderful.

And looking back with nostalgia, that was the beginning of an arts program that was fully open to the public with no metal detectors or obvious security. There was always the potential for disaster. After all, there was a real civil war underway. People we knew were arrested because of their political activity and treated harshly. Yet our gallery continued to be a place Turks liked to visit.

Q: They have a real drive and are very serious about their country. That’s what I’ve heard.

KEITH: Turkey is a very nationalistic country. Turkey is almost totally Muslim, and yet the first self-definition of any Turk is likely to be ethnicity rather than religion, even in conservative Anatolia. Kemal Ataturk was clearly the most important figure in modern Turkey. He instilled a sense of Turkishness and a sense of nationhood in the floundering aftermath of the Ottoman Empire. He was the one who crystallized in the minds and souls of the people the fact that they were not Ottomans but Turks.

Q: My wife when she was in Athens had some Turkish girls from high school and found – and I’ve heard this from others – that it was not just getting out in the middle of the street and saying that you were a Turk, but you were going to do something, were going to improve yourself for your country. It was more of a focused nationalism, your duty towards your country as opposed to running around waving flags.

KEITH: That’s right. The motto that Ataturk left with his people is “Be proud and work.” That emphasis on the link between nationality and personal effort is deeply ingrained.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been such a close tie going back historically with Germany that we would find ourselves sort of in second or third place.

KEITH: Historically speaking the German influence was very strong in Turkey. There has always been a lot of respect for Germany in Turkey. By the time I got there in the late ‘60s, early ‘70s, the prevailing sentiment of Turks was, “We’re part of NATO. We’re part of an alliance that is led by the United States.” Then came the mass waves of Turks going to work in Germany, some of them establishing themselves in Germany, many of them learning German, making money in Germany and coming back to Turkey, some with German wives. There was a great deal of contact between the two countries because of this. And naturally there was an enormous economic impact on both countries. Nonetheless, the United States was the dominant foreign power in the consideration of most Turks. After that, I think, although politically the weight of the United States is very strong in Turkey, in almost every other way, the weight of Germany is greater.

Q: In the cultural center, what was your principal focus?

KEITH: Our principal focus was trying to form effective relationships with institutions that had been essentially closed to the U.S. Cultural institutions in the city of Istanbul were very important in forming political attitudes. There was no television in Turkey in the '60s. There was an experimental television station at Istanbul Technical University, but almost no one had a television set in 1970. I know this is a little hard to conceive. On the other hand, there were many theaters. There were nine stages of the Istanbul Municipal Theater alone, and a number of influential private theaters. The theater in Istanbul was a major venue of political debate and activism. A lot of politics were acted out on stage and plays were chosen by directors and theater-owners because of the political message they conveyed. Plays were written by politically engaged Turks. It was my purpose to try to promote as much contact as I could with those institutions and we did a lot. We routinely obtained the rights to translate American works, financed translations, brought in specialists in stagecraft, and even had a major American theater figure, Art Housman, spend a year in Istanbul as a kind of free-floating consultant.

Q: How did you work with the consul general in the embassy?

KEITH: The embassy in Ankara had ultimate control of our budget, but the man who really was in control of the money that I had to spend on my programs was the cultural counselor in Ankara, a man named Leon Picon who turned out to be a mentor and in some ways my professional father. My boss in Istanbul for most of the time I was there was a remarkable man named Marshall Berg, who encouraged all our cultural initiatives. From that perspective, the working environment could not have been better.

The consulate general was an easy place to work. We had a good working relationship with our colleagues. Istanbul was a place where a lot of intrigue went on. It was a natural friction point in the Cold War environment. Because of its location, because of its history, there were intelligence interests on a grander scale than the country would normally warrant. So, there were spies all over the place of all nationalities. It added spice to the stew.

Q: It sounds like something out of Eric Ambler.

KEITH: Eric Ambler described Istanbul both eloquently and accurately, as have Graham Green, Agatha Christie and others. It's definitely a place that inspires writers.

The consulate had other preoccupations. But we could always count on our colleagues when we needed them. Jim Spain and Doug Heck were the consuls general when I was there, both excellent officers, both real pros. Heck knew the city like the back of his hand and the Turks respected him. Jim Spain had a different personality, but he was also a thorough professional with a scholar's knowledge of the region.

Q: You were trying to break in. You were dealing with the theater, the university and getting to that class, which is just a class that is out there throwing rocks at the police. Was this a problem with the government?

KEITH: I didn't have much contact with government officials. I had contact with university officials, but there was really no Ministry of Culture structure I had to deal with in Istanbul. There was a municipality that I dealt with because of the municipal theater and so on. But these were people who were basically not really functionaries. It wasn't the government apparatus I dealt with in other settings. I think one part of your question is, did the government object to my getting in touch with these people? I think probably the government had some concerns. Some of its concerns were expressed not to me directly but to people at the consulate. At a certain point toward the end, after my car was bombed, after the Israeli consul general was assassinated, after a kidnap list was discovered that I was told had my name was on it, the government provided me with a 24 hour bodyguard. They clearly knew who I was but I really didn't have much direct involvement with Turkish government officials at any point.

Q: You mentioned your car being bombed. Were you in it?

KEITH: I was not in it, fortunately. It was parked in front of my house. In fact, I have always thought, perhaps naively, that I wasn't meant to be in it. The operation was carried out, we later learned, by the Turkish People's Liberation Army. If they had wanted to, it would have been far simpler to bomb the house than the car, because the exposure to street lights and the physical orientation of things. In any case, the car was totally destroyed. It was just twisted metal. If I had been in it, I wouldn't have survived. In fact, we were very lucky. We had houseguests that night that, and I might well have been taking them back to their hotel at midnight, when the bomb went off. Instead, we had persuaded them to spend the night at our home, and we were all turning in when the bomb went off. A second bomb was timed to go off simultaneously in the back parking lot of the consulate general. That bomb didn't do much damage. The biggest loss was my 1965 Corvair, a car that as Ralph Nader observed, was unsafe at any speed.

Q: What about the Greek equation? During this time you were there, the Greek colonels were doing their thing. They came in in April of '67 and went out in July of '74. Did that play much of a role? We weren't wild about them. We hadn't taken their side completely, but we were very much involved in bases and everything else in Greece.

KEITH: Yes, it was part of the background of our political presence. We were perceived to be the allies of the colonels. It was the belief of most Turks that our interests were served by the colonels. It was never with the same intensity as Arabs feel about our alliance with Israel, but Turks were uneasy about our relationship with the Greek regime.

Q: Is there anything else we should discuss about this particular time?

KEITH: Turkey was where I really learned to do my job, where I really grew up, where I really found out how potent the kind of work we do can be. I had strong mentors in Turkey, and indispensable Turkish colleagues in the cultural section. My Turkish staff, including Bilge Olçer and Meral Selcuk -- both of whom were figures in Turkish society -- taught me an enormous amount. We used cultural programming and educational exchange as the fundamental building blocks of our activity in Turkey. I sincerely believe that we can prove -- if any proof be needed -- how indispensable this kind of work can be.

DOROTHY A EARDLEY
Secretary to the Ambassador
Ankara (1968-1973)

Mrs. Eardley was born in Wisconsin and raised in Wisconsin and Illinois. She attended Rubican Business School before entering the State Department, where in 1951 she was assigned as Clerk-Stenographer at Djakarta, Indonesia. She subsequently was posted to Berlin, Chengmai, Paris, Libreville, Colombo, Ankara, Ottawa, Jeddah and Kigali. She also had temporary duty assignments in Djibouti, Reunion, and Johannesburg. She retired in 1980. Mrs. Eardley was interviewed by T. Frank Crigler in 2008.

Q: We're going to skip here and talk a little about [Ankara]. You were there a little over five years with ambassadors Handley and Komer?

EARDLEY: A little over five years, with Ambassadors Komer, Handley, and Macomber.

Q: Start from the earlier part, anything you remember.

EARDLEY: All right. Have you ever heard of Robert W. Komer? He was with CIA running the Vietnam War CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support) out there. Well, who was the president? Johnson. He named Komer to leave Vietnam and come there as ambassador. Well Komer was delighted. That was a feather in his hat. But Turkey was not pleased, because of his CIA connection.

Q: Really. They knew that?

EARDLEY: Oh yes. So we had a time getting him off that plane.

Q: Just getting him off the plane?

EARDLEY: Oh yes! The Turks came out to the airport. It was pouring rain. Night time. They weren't going to let him land. The plane was on the ground. We got him off the wing of the plane, got him into the car, and drove off.

Q: You say the Turks came out to the airport. You mean officials or a mob of some sort?

EARDLEY: Mobs.

Q: The authorities didn't keep them away, though?

EARDLEY: No. I was out there. I think I remember it pretty well. Anyway, we finally got him settled in the residence. Then he started doing his official calls. I've forgotten which one he was

calling on. Minister of education, something like that. He called on him. Of course, his chauffeur was no good either. Scared to death. And while he was in there calling on the minister, the Turks set his car on fire, his Cadillac. The poor chauffeur — he was a good chauffeur, but he was scared to death. He evacuated.

Q: Left the ambassador behind at the Ministry?

EARDLEY: Yep.

Q: He wasn't accompanied by any security detail or anything when he went there?

EARDLEY: Oh, I'm sure there was someone in the car. Anyway, we had some tough days.

Q: The ambassador's relations with the government people were pretty good?

EARDLEY: All right, as far as I know.

Q: Well, there was the big issue over whether Cyprus should become part of Greece, and the Turks obviously didn't want that. And it was a difficult question for the United States to handle because we wanted friendship with both sides.

EARDLEY: But, we didn't get into that too much, I don't think.

Q: Weren't we involved in discouraging the Turks from making a military move there?

EARDLEY: I can't recall.

Q: Do you remember his dealings with the Prime Minister, who I guess was Demirel, wasn't it?

EARDLEY: Yeah, he was there part of the time I was there. But there was another one. Foreign minister. What was his name? We were good friends.

Q: You and the minister?

EARDLEY: No, he was well married. But I sometimes think I knew more than the ambassadors did in Turkey, because he talked to me all the time.

Q: The foreign minister did?

EARDLEY: Yes. He trusted me. I've forgotten his name; I think it began with an E.

Q: How did you happen to have so much contact with him?

EARDLEY: He liked me, I think.

Q: I mean, did he come to the embassy, or were you at the foreign ministry, or at receptions?

EARDLEY: I was always with the ambassador. Everywhere. You see, that's where we went through that opium poppy business. We were together a lot. We got the opium ban at one o'clock in the morning after hours and hours of going over this thing.

Q: This was a ban on growing poppies in Turkey? (Yeah.) And when you say "we got it," you mean you had persuaded...

EARDLEY: The ambassador and I. *[laughter]* And the foreign minister. He finally gave up. And it was a shame, because they were not in the opium business. They used the seeds for cooking and oil. The culprits were the French and the Germans with their — what did they call those?

Q: The little factories where they processed the opium?

EARDLEY: Yeah. They had them all over Europe. They would get that opium out of there by devious methods, and that created all this problem for Turkey. So Turkey finally had to stop growing it. Of course Afghanistan didn't.

Q: That must have been some economic shock for Turkey.

EARDLEY: Well it was. It was one of their main things, and they needed it to eat, to cook with. It's too bad that some countries have to pay for the dishonesty of other countries.

Q: Anyway, you and the ambassador wrestled the foreign minister down and finally got the government to agree to impose a ban.

EARDLEY: Right. It was one in the morning.

Q: Where, at the foreign ministry?

EARDLEY: I think we were out in the country someplace. But maybe it was the foreign ministry.

Q: The ambassador was pretty effective at this?

EARDLEY: Oh yes, very good. Ambassador Handley was excellent.

Q: But this was still Komer when you got this agreement

EARDLEY: No, Handley! Komer was recalled. Didn't I tell you about making him sign and then send the message in to Washington? His resignation? He said, "Oh, no," he didn't have to resign; he was a friend of the president. "Yes, everyone has to," I explained to him. I showed him the regulations. I had it all typed up for him.

Q: He must have appreciated that.

EARDLEY: He thought sometimes I knew too much.

Q: He went willingly in the end?

EARDLEY: Well, he said it wouldn't be accepted. It was, immediately. So, Komer had less than one whole tour of duty. I liked him. I even liked his wife. She was kinda forward, but I liked him.

Q: Where did he go from Ankara? Into retirement?

EARDLEY: No, I think to Washington D.C., back to his CIA. He's never had another assignment, to my knowledge. But we got along all right.

Q: Handley came right away after Komer left?

EARDLEY: Yeah, he came May 13 [1969].

Q: Was the DCM in charge in between?

EARDLEY: I don't know.

Q: Must have been. Do you recall who it was?

EARDLEY: Well, Bill Burdette was there. He was the Deputy Chief of Mission when I arrived, I think. And then there were two others: David Cuthell and James Spain, but I don't remember in which order.

Q: Casell or Kafell? I didn't understand his name, the second one.

EARDLEY: David Cuthell? C-U-T-H-E-L-L. His wife's name was Dawn. Very pretty lady. Very nice. James Spain, his wife Edith.

Q: The atmosphere at that point was still rather hostile on the part of the Turkish public, wasn't it? Or had that died down?

EARDLEY: No, that died down.

Q: Despite the ban on opium production? Or rather poppy cultivation.

EARDLEY: I don't remember hearing anything more about it.

Q: So it didn't create a great fuss.

EARDLEY: I don't think so.

Q: Was that a military government at the time? The Turkish government?

EARDLEY: NATO. Huge NATO. It was our southern flank of NATO. We leaned on them very heavily, depended on them, they were our greatest ally at that time, I think. And there were military people all over the place, from every nation. I could go out every night in the week with a different nationality, and I was old.

Q: Well that's what made it awkward for the United States, over Cyprus. We depended heavily on Turkey, didn't we?

EARDLEY: We did indeed, and I'm glad I was part of it.

Q: Who were the important military figures in the embassy?

EARDLEY: Let me see if I can think of his name, I liked him. There was one guy, a Navy guy, I didn't like. I could have slapped him. He hated it that I had to seat the people they invited to their house for official functions. They were going to have their husbands and wives sitting together.

Q: Oh, military style.

EARDLEY: Yep. But what was that nice one's name? He never gave me any trouble. He once got caught in Russia. Lost his hearing aid. Tall thin guy, very bowed legs. He was a Texan and rode horses.

Q: What was his position? Was he an attaché? Head of the military group?

EARDLEY: He was a general and he was head of the military mission in our embassy, the attaché office. So there was this navy guy. Can't think of his name either, he was sort of short — and I could have slapped him!

Q: Were their titles "attaché" do you remember?

EARDLEY: Yep.

Q: Any other figures in the embassy that you could have slapped?

EARDLEY: I don't think so. We got along pretty well. And the ambassador counted on me very heavily. I'm glad I could do it. I got tired of country team meetings though. I had to sit in on every one of them and take notes.

Q: How often did they meet?

EARDLEY: Once a week.

Q: For how long?

EARDLEY: I guess the whole five years I was there.

Q: No, no. How many minutes or hours during the day?

EARDLEY: Quite often over an hour.

Q: The Ambassador ran the meeting?

EARDLEY: Yeah. Sure.

Q: How did it play out? Did he go around the room and ask "What do you have to say, and you, and you?" Or did he give a lecture, or what?

EARDLEY: When they had something on their mind, they would jump in and put it in words. I would take it down in shorthand.

Q: Were they cordial meetings among all these agency chiefs, or was there a lot of argument?

EARDLEY: There was never any problem. Not with Handley. Handley was a great guy. It's too bad he drank himself to death.

Q: Oh, no! That's sad.

EARDLEY: Because he was only about sixty-one.

Q: So it was not at post that he drank himself to death.

EARDLEY: No, it was after he retired. He went up to Laos. They sent him up there to look into something. I can't remember what it was.

Q: All the way to Laos from Turkey?

EARDLEY: Well, he retired. I've forgotten what that junket was.

Q: I'll bet it had something to do with poppy-growing somewhere.

EARDLEY: I think so. Well, also, Laos and northern Thailand where I was stationed — Chengmai. What was it that China had? It was the road from China down to “civilization.” What was it they grew? It wasn't legal.

Q: It wasn't poppies?

EARDLEY: The opium trail, yes! And it went right past my house!

Q: That's right, you told me before.

EARDLEY: And the policeman that lived next door to me? He was part of it.

Q: You think maybe that was why Ambassador Handley was sent up there?

EARDLEY: It could very well be. 'Cause he had gotten that ban in Turkey.

Q: Did you hear from him afterward?

EARDLEY: Whenever I came back to the States, which was every year the last ten years, I visited him at The Citadel, where he was ambassador in residence. I had a house built in Florida for my retirement, so I went to Florida every year when I came back. And in 'seventy-nine, when I knew I was going to retire the next year, I decided there was no way I could ever live in Florida. The house was finished, but I couldn't do it. So that, I think, was the last time I saw him.

Q: Well, he was replaced then by Ambassador Macomber.

EARDLEY: Yes.

Q: Was there a gap, do you recall?

EARDLEY: Not much. We were all surprised by the Macomber assignment.

Q: Why?

EARDLEY: He wasn't too well liked. You know, he was this exercise nut, and he married his secretary, what's her name, Phyllis. I got along all right with him, but I made a real effort.

Q: But you say people were surprised that he was named to Ankara?

EARDLEY: Right.

Q: Why? Was it because they thought he wouldn't get along well with people?

EARDLEY: Well, he was controversial.

Q: Within the embassy or among the Turks?

EARDLEY: I think more outside. I got along all right with him. But she, Phyllis, was a little difficult there.

Q: Do you think Macomber was sent there with a mission, that is, to get Turkish cooperation on something? I mean, Handley had already got them to cooperate on the opium trade.

EARDLEY: Strangely enough, I don't remember very much of that. I barely remember that Macomber came.

Q: You must not have overlapped with him very long.

EARDLEY: There were never overlaps.

Q: Did he bring a secretary of his own when he came?

EARDLEY: No, he used me.

Q: How was he to work for?

EARDLEY: He was all right. He was nice to me.

Q: Serious? I know he was hard-working.

EARDLEY: Yes he was. The problem is, when you've known people that long you have preconceived ideas, and I thought, "Oh, he'll be awful to work with." He wasn't. But Phyllis, the girl he married, she was terribly bossy. I guess you get like that.

Q: What was his style?

EARDLEY: He was sort of a little gruff, a little rough around the edges. But he was a kind man. He knew his business.

Q: What was his "business?" How would you sum up what he mainly did?

EARDLEY: He kept the house in order.

Q: Did he spend a lot of time out of the "house"? In the community? In the country?

EARDLEY: No. He spent a lot of time taking care of himself physically, keeping well, exercising.

Q: And was he in fact generally well?

EARDLEY: He got along all right with just about everyone. I don't think anyone was against him.

Q: What were the topics he was most interested in; dealing with the Turkish government or problems with Turkey?

EARDLEY: I don't even remember what our topics were at that point. We had taken care of opium and NATO.

Q: And issues involving Cyprus didn't come up by then?

EARDLEY: No.

Q: Did he get on with the Russians, the Soviet ambassador, the Soviet embassy people?

EARDLEY: I don't remember the Soviets very much in Turkey. I guess I was getting old.

Q: About how long did you stay after he came?

EARDLEY: I had less than six months with him.

Q: Well, they weren't a very troubled six months then; things were pretty smooth. (Yeah.) Where did you live there?

EARDLEY: On Reza Shah Pahlavi, I think,

Q: In a private house? An apartment?

EARDLEY: An apartment, an upstairs apartment.

Q: Government owned?

EARDLEY: No. The people on the ground floor worked in USIS (U.S. Information Service), and they rented. It was a nice apartment; I loved it.

Q: Do you remember who they were? Their names?

EARDLEY: No.

Q: It wasn't a partying place then?

EARDLEY: No. It was serious. I did most of the partying.

Q: You said Macomber was interested in exercise. Did he get into sports and so forth with other people in the Embassy? Softball teams?

EARDLEY: No. He exercised by himself, every noon. Took his clothes off in his office, threw them on the floor. He was like an untrained kid. Nice guy.

Q: Did he exercise with the Marines?

EARDLEY: No, but he got along fine with the Marines.

Q: I'd have thought they would have taken to that exercise routine.

EARDLEY: No, I think they stayed pretty much to themselves.

Q: Have we figured out who was DCM then?

EARDLEY: Jim Spain? Jim Spain was there a long time. He was a political officer. So was Cuthell. But they both became DCM's.

Q: Cuthell was DCM before Spain, right?

EARDLEY: Yes, I think Cuthell was in the embassy when I arrived. He was in the political section.

Q: He moved up from the political section to be DCM?

EARDLEY: They both did.

Q: You liked Jim Spain?

EARDLEY: Oh, sure. He was tall, good-looking. I was so surprised to find out that, after he retired, he moved to Ceylon and lived in the Golf-ace [*phon.*] Hotel. I couldn't believe it.

Q: Do you think he's still living there?

EARDLEY: I think so. [*NOTE: Ambassador Spain died in Wilmington NC on January 2, 2008.*]

EARDLEY: His wife Edith was in a bad car wreck, if I remember right.

Q: Where was the car wreck?

EARDLEY: Must have been in Washington, I don't know.

Q: Not in Ankara.

EARDLEY: No.

Q: Can you tell me any more about the USIS people? Not necessarily the ones who lived downstairs, but what their program was. We had some bad times with the Turks not many years before that, and I wondered whether you thought USIS was doing a good job.

EARDLEY: I thought they always did a good job.

Q: Your apartment building was near the ambassador's residence. Did that mean you were at his beck and call?

EARDLEY: Yep.

Q: Were you often called there outside of hours?

EARDLEY: Well, I'll tell you, it evolved to the point where, if he wanted to get out, I went out and got him. I left the security people behind. Otherwise he had no freedom whatsoever.

Q: You mean you snuck him out, then?

EARDLEY: Oh, yes. For sure.

Q: Where would you go in that situation?

EARDLEY: To my apartment. What would we do? Drink. I drank a lot. So did he. I was also dating a Turkish admiral at that time.

Q: Tell me about him.

EARDLEY: I can show you pictures of his two daughters. They're over in my other room, downstairs.

Q: Do you remember his name?

EARDLEY: *[No answer.]* If I could pronounce it. It's a long time ago.

Q: Did Ambassador Macomber meet with him there?

EARDLEY: Meet with whom?

Q: Your Turkish boyfriend, the Admiral.

EARDLEY: Oh, no.

Q: I thought perhaps that's why you were sneaking him out of the Residence.

EARDLEY: Oh, no.

Q: Did he meet with others in your apartment?

EARDLEY: Sure, I had lots of parties.

Q: And he would attend them? Enjoy them?

EARDLEY: Yeah. I was a good cook, and I liked to cook.

Q: And Macomber liked to eat?

EARDLEY: I don't know about Macomber. That was later. I don't think he was that friendly. And *[Interruption]*

Q: When you spoke of sneaking the ambassador out of the residence and coming to your apartment, were you referring to Macomber or was that Handley?

EARDLEY: That was Handley.

Q: Ah, okay. We have to keep these guys straight here.

EARDLEY: Oh, yes! Handley was the one who was there the longest and I liked the best. He, and you were my two favorite ambassadors out of twelve.

WILLIAM E. RAU
Political Officer
Izmir (1968-1971)

Consul General
Istanbul (1971-1973)

William E. Rau was born in Michigan in 1929. After receiving a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Montana, he served in the U.S. Army as first lieutenant from 1953 to 1955. His postings abroad have included Thessaloniki, Port Said, Cairo, Pretoria, Izmir, Istanbul, Kabul and Athens. Mr. Rau was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: When you left South Africa in 1967, you went to Turkish language training. How did this come about?

RAU: At this point as I said earlier, I had been in Greece, and I had spoken Greek pretty fluently, enough to pass the exam. An assignment of mine had been changed because they had another officer who was a language officer over there after training. I didn't have the Greek language under the Department's long-term training; I did it more or less on my own. So, they broke my assignment to Cyprus and sent the language officer there in my stead. I thought, well, if I want to get back to that part of the world, I've got to do it the official way. I had a choice of either Turkish or Iranian (Farsi). Fortunately for me, I chose Turkish. I didn't know much about either language but, because I'd shown a facility with difficult languages, they gave me the assignment to Turkish language training.

Q: How long was Turkish language training?

RAU: It's the same as it is now, I think, 44 weeks in Washington.

Q: This was basically from 1967 to 1968.

RAU: That's correct.

Q: One of the off shoots of language training is that you pick up an awful lot from your teachers about the culture and the country, I mean just in interaction.

RAU: Precisely.

Q: What were you getting from the Turks?

RAU: The Turkish teachers you are talking about.

Q: Yes.

RAU: It is interesting that you mentioned that because you always in your lifetime meet some unforgettable characters. One of them that I met at the time was our principal teacher who was head of Turkish language training, a man by the name of Selman Arâgli. Selman had been in the United States for quite a while, still very Turkish in his mannerisms, but he was pretty well acclimated to the United States. He knew a great deal about Turkey, and he was a real raconteur. He told a lot of stories about Turkey and kept us amused. What he was doing was writing the principal textbook, which probably has gone through several emendations since then on Turkish language training. He used our class—there were three of us in our class to begin with—as guinea pigs to try out some of these new ideas he had for this textbook. We in a sense helped him to write that textbook.

Q: When you were going to go up against the Turks as a diplomat, what sort of characteristics were you getting from your Turkish teachers? How would they be different?

RAU: I used to compare them with the Greeks whom I knew fairly well. What I was gleaning at that time and certainly came to understand more clearly after I got there on assignment was that the Turks were much more, shall I say, deliberate people. They were slow to anger, slow to accept something, slow to pick up on something, unlike the Greeks who were very quick and very quick to make an idea, right or wrong, and to go off sometimes in the wrong direction with their idea. Turks are much more deliberate people. But once they were seized with an issue or something, they were like bulldogs. They really got after it. That was and still is part of the problem between Greece and Turkey, the difference in the attitude of these two peoples.

Q: Were you getting anything from your Turkish teachers about the Greek-Cyprus-Turkish problem?

RAU: Yes, we had briefings on that, and one of the officers in our training, Art Giese, was very interested in the Cyprus question as well. In fact, we had to write a study paper while we were there in language training, and I wrote mine on the approach of Greece and Turkey to the Cyprus problem at the United Nations. It was kind of a litmus test, if you will, of the relationship between the two. The Greeks were very good at presenting the Greek case before the United Nations on Cyprus and the Turks, although good, did not understand the importance of world opinion and getting, for example, the Arab nations on their side in this dispute. As a result, most of it went the Greek way in the United Nations.

Q: Now your assignment was to where?

RAU: The first assignment was to Izmir, Turkey.

Q: And you were there from 1968 to when?

RAU: I was there from 1968 to 1971. I was supposed to be assigned for two years to Izmir and then to replace Myles Green who had moved from Izmir to Ankara. I was a political officer at that time, and I was supposed to go to Ankara. I spent a third year in Izmir at the request of the ambassador and the new consul general. We changed consul general while I was there, and they wanted some continuity.

Q: Who was the consul general when you arrived?

RAU: It was Guy Anderson Lee.

Q: And who was the ambassador?

RAU: At that time it was Bill Macomber. He was later replaced by Bob Hanley.

Q: Now, what was the situation in 1968 when you arrived in Izmir? What was the situation you saw in Turkey in the local area but, first, sort of broad?

RAU: Well, I guess about late 1968 - we got there in July - they had an election and Suleiman Demirel, most recently president, was re-elected as the head of the Justice Party and as prime minister of Turkey. At the same time, there was an increasing amount of Leftist influence and street violence, or urban terrorism, as we call it today. It was really beginning back then. We would see all kinds of demonstrations against visits by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, for example, in Turkish ports. We had them then, and we still have the visits, but they were always surrounded by all kinds of attempts to make the visits unsuccessful.

Q: What do we feel was motivating the Leftist groups?

RAU: That's a good question. If you believe the official policy and line at the time, they were all Communist-supporting or Soviet-supporting groups who were intent on getting Turkey out of NATO and making Turkey more independent, meaning making them more dependent on the Soviet Union. I don't think that was necessarily the case. The Turkish educational system was almost bankrupt at the time, and a lot of these revolts were led by students. There weren't jobs available for graduates when they got out of universities, and the university system was honey-combed with all kinds of different people who were students, part-time students, or non-students who were instigating a lot of this trouble. I think a lot of it was domestic oriented rather than foreign oriented.

Q: What were the dynamics of Izmir itself?

RAU: Do you mean as an official community, or as a community per se?

Q: Well, I mean both as an official community and as a community per se. What was going on in

Izmir?

RAU: Izmir, as you probably know under the old name of Smyrna, was one of the first American consulates we had in the whole Middle East. It had always had a Levantine community, a large community of Greeks, Italians, French, and British so-called Levantine because their families had come there years ago. They stayed on but they still carried the passports of their original nations. They made up a large part of the population in Izmir. While we were there, that was changing. We still had the NATO contingent there because there was a sub-NATO headquarters in Izmir. Our principal job, officially, was to keep a liaison as well as possible between the Turkish populace and the American military or NATO military that were there in the community. While we were there, the Greeks had a one-officer consulate, as I recall. The British had an honorary consul there, and most of the others did not have official or career representation. So, we played a major role in trying to keep this whole community in liaison with the military community and the rest of the official American community.

Q: What was your impression of the Turkish bureaucracy in the area?

RAU: Well, it was Ottoman bureaucracy in those days. It still is to a large extent but it was much more so in those days. We had a very dynamic mayor, Osman Kibar, who was what they called in Turkish, a Dönme. Apparently back in his ancestry, he was Jewish, one of the Jews converted to Islam. He was a very popular mayor, and he did a lot for the city. The crowning glory, of course, was the Izmir Trade Fair, which was held every year. The governor was a good career servant, Namik Senturk, who went from there as governor to Istanbul. I met him there again. With the exception there when you got down below the upper levels you really got into a maze of bureaucracy that made our red tape officials look like pikers in comparison.

Q: The 1968 to 1971 period was a time when an awful lot of Arab students around the world and a lot of Americans were taking off. They had discovered the wonders of hashish and that sort of thing. It wasn't what we consider the more deadly drugs but it was rather hashish and some opium. Israel was sitting in the middle of a poppy field, practically, and was also on the route back for people who'd join Afghanistan and all that in those days.

RAU: You're right.

Q: You must have been up to your neck in Americans in drug encounters.

RAU: We were not involved so much as Istanbul, which was much more, but certainly that's when they put a DEA station in Istanbul in about those years.

Q: Do you mean the Drug Enforcement Agency?

RAU: Yes. It was called the BNDD, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. One celebrated case we had was the young man whom the Turkish police picked up who had been boarding a Turkish ferry boat to go on over to Greece. We sent an agent down from Istanbul to interview him and, in effect, take him into custody because he was wanted in the United States for narcotics offenses. I received him in the consulate because I was the political officer at the

time. I remember that he walked into my office - a very handsome young man about my age, I should say, at that time - and the first thing he did was to take out his weapon and slap it down in my out box. He said to me, "Now tell me what you already know about this man." I said, "Well, you know as much about him as I do." The Turkish authorities had picked him up, and he had in his suitcase a big load - I don't think it was hashish - it was processed opium in some form. Anyway that was the beginning of it, and I realized that this was really going to be a great thing. We didn't see a lot of the Turkish police who were working on narcotics because, even though we were responsible for the American side, that was something the Turks kept pretty much to themselves. We did not have an Agency (CIA) presence in Izmir, so there wasn't any liaison directly there.

Q: Well, did you find yourself attending trials, making prison visits, and that sort of thing?

RAU: We had a consular officer there who did attend trials.

Q: Who was the consular officer?

RAU: Originally, it was a woman by the name of Inez Pulver, and Inez is still living here in the District. I see her occasionally. She was a very motherly-like person, and some of these were very young people, young girls or young men who were off on a journey around the world. I remember one in particular who had been an art student out in California that Inez took a liking to. They managed to get her out of jail but she stayed with Inez for a couple of months while her trial was pending. Finally, she spent a limited amount of time in a Turkish prison but then they released her. After every election, the new prime minister could choose to release prisoners of a certain kind, and so she got released from prison. The art student still corresponds with Inez, who turned her life around.

Q: How about dealing with our military? Again, you are dealing with a lot of young kids. You and I have had our time as young kids in the military. It's sort of a time that breeds irresponsibility, you know, raising hell and all that. When they are stuck in the middle of a Turkish society, particularly in a rural, conservative one, I'll bet there are a lot of problems.

RAU: There were problems but I must say that the military had a good set up there. The headquarters, which was the NATO headquarters, was commanded by a three-star American general. The Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force had a two-star American general as commander at that time. We had top brass there, and they had people under them who had the responsibility of making sure that the American contingent, the American community, really toed the line. We did have a Defense Department high school. If any of these kids got out of line, their parents were sent packing right away with the kid. They didn't run afoul of the Turkish system to any degree, and they had a lot of activities for them. They had a big softball program and a big athletic program with playing fields. They had a movie theater and that sort of thing.

Q: You mentioned this demonstration. How did you deal with it?

RAU: Yes, well, we got wind of them as quickly as possible, and we'd notify the American community through our own internal system that this demonstration was coming on. Usually,

when we got wind of them, there were certain places where demonstrations would gather. One was Ataturk Square in the center in Izmir. So we would tell people to stay clear of them even though a lot of them lived very close to there, as we did, near the water front. But just to say, "Don't get involved in any way; this is an internal Turkish situation." The Turkish police were pretty good at keeping them separated and breaking up fights. There were attempts at laying bombs and that sort of thing outside the high school but never against the NATO headquarters. It was pretty well protected.

Q: Speaking of demonstrations and all, this is also the time American students were raising hell in the United States over the Vietnam War. Were there any reflections of this in Turkey?

RAU: Do you mean among the American community?

Q: No, were the Turks pestering you about it?

RAU: Very few Turks that I met or knew were interested in the Vietnam War. They were more seriously interested in their own situation at home. As I say, mostly internal politics were the focus of demonstrations. Even the American kids that I knew, and they went up through high school seniors since most of them were military brats, were not interested in making demonstrations against the Vietnam War.

Q: What were the politics of the Izmir area? What did the Izmir consular district consist of?

RAU: It is a pretty large consular district. It is in the bread basket of Turkey. It has most of the agricultural area including, as you said, the poppy-growing area. Tobacco is a big crop there also. There were some long-time American tobacco people residents who were there as buyers for the major tobacco companies. It was principally an agricultural area. There is little industry in the area to speak of. There are a couple of small plants, and now some of them have grown very large. They are run by Turks, beer making and that sort of thing. Most of the economy was based on agriculture. The consular district was very large. It overlapped in part with Adana where we had a consulate.

Q: What were the politics in that area?

RAU: They were pretty conservative by and large. Demirel comes from Isparta, a Justice Party stronghold. It was a successor to the old Democrat Party and, although business oriented, it was pretty much conservative. It was not like the old Republican Peoples party, which was more to the left and center.

Q: Were you monitoring what was going on in the area?

RAU: Politically, you mean?

Q: Yes.

RAU: I monitored the area politically and economically because we had no economic officer per

se. We did get one young training officer in there and did some economic work for a while. By and large, we had consular and, then, I did the political-economic. The consul general was, in effect, showing the flag, and an administrative officer.

Q: How easy was it to talk to the political types?

RAU: It was pretty easy. The problem was and it's still true, I'm sure, that you can get the "it is" of sitting in the capital city on the sea breeze side and not get out often enough in the other provinces. We tried to get out as often as possible, if not officially, then unofficially. Every place I went, I went to see the mayor, the chief of police and the local governor who took his orders from Ankara. It is a very centralized government. We got to see them. In some cases, we'd call on the chief of police because, if it were a place where there might be Sixth Fleet vessels calling, we'd want to move them through. It was pretty easy to meet the Turkish government officials.

Q: Did you run across examples of fraud? When I was consul general in Athens, we used to send a federal agency officer, Corins, over and we used to have to go up and had all sorts of problems.

RAU: Are you talking about Social Security cases?

Q: Yes, Social Security cases, and there were people who ran Social Security. These were Turks who sort of made sure the checks were collected and got their cut and all that, and there were a lot of dubious checks being issued. Did you get involved with that?

RAU: I didn't because that was the realm of the consular officer, and she usually accompanied the Turkish official when they were out in the district some place. But I know what you said existed.

Q: Were we doing anything about the poppy growth?

RAU: We were essentially doing it through the embassy, which later came to pass much more when Ambassador Hanley came in. He'd been in Vietnam on one of the programs there. This was a major role of his in getting the Turkish government officially to go out of the opium poppy growing business. They were trying to find a substitute crop for the farmer who lived on these crops, not just illicitly, but by selling them to the state factories. They found a way, and they finally got the Turkish government, though a caretaker government, I might say, to go out of the opium poppy growing business. It cost that prime minister his life. He was assassinated.

Q: At that time, were we seeing Turkey trying to exert influence in the Middle East in Syria and Palestine?

RAU: I didn't see it from my vantage point. I am sure there was some of this going on through the embassy in Ankara where they were following this. I might add here that I'm a great supporter and admirer of the Turkish foreign service. I think they get first-rate people in their embassies, and they have good sense in terms of protecting Turkey's interests in which direction they should be going. In that sense, yes, I think they were well represented. There wasn't any

major move because everything was oriented now toward the Soviet Union, toward looking north. I didn't take official interest in the contacts and communication with the lands to the south, all the Arab countries.

Q: Was religious fundamentalism much of a movement at that time?

RAU: No, it was there but it wasn't much of a movement. In fact, the fringe parties had a small contingency. During election, they would vie for seats in parliament but they were very small. They didn't have much influence. That later came to pass, as you know, when communications improved in religions and when Turgut Ozal was elected prime minister. It was really a new American style campaign that he ran. He had television in every village and made talks. No, fundamentalism had not reached the point where it is today.

Q: What crimes against Kurds did you witness?

RAU: There were Kurds, and they were pretty well assimilated in the population. Most of the Kurdish population was unassimilated because they were way out in southeast Turkey. Most of those were in the Adana consular district, and we didn't go in there. Maybe the embassy did, but we didn't. So what we saw were members of the cabinet who were Kurds.

Q: Was there much in the folklore about the Greek Wars in the 1920s and the expulsion from Smyrna and all that?

RAU: I remember one evening. We had a consul general - you probably remember him from Cyprus - named Toby Belcher. Toby Belcher came over on holiday, and I put him together at dinner with the commanding general of the Turkish air force there in Izmir. He was a very articulate man who spoke good English. They had a real discussion on the whole issue of Cyprus while we were there. They both agreed that there had to be some sort of solution short of Greece taking over Cyprus and of Turkey invading northern Cyprus. It was a constant topic of conversation, and this is the source of the famous business the Greeks always refer to, the Turks having an army down there all poised to invade Cyprus. They may have planned it but, if they had an army, nobody knew about it. It wasn't there, not even landing ships or anything.

Q: Well, having served in Greece, I know the Greeks are really preoccupied by the Turks. But, I've understood that it wasn't reciprocated very much. How did you feel?

RAU: That's very true. When I first got there I was trying desperately to learn my Turkish better, but I still had my Greek fairly well. I made friends with some of the Greeks who were there in the community. You might remember that, at this time on the military side, this was during the junta in Greece.

Q: Yes, the junta took over April 22, 1967.

RAU: They had re-installed their contingent in Izmir. They had Greek air force officers there who were with NATO. They would usually fly home every weekend but they were there during the work week. They didn't bring their families to live there except occasionally but they had a

good working relationship with the Turkish military that were part of NATO. It may not have been good in Greece in terms of the bilateral relationship.

Q: What was the situation with the students? You were talking about students getting jobs and all that. Did we have much of a USIS or being able to make much contact with do anything for the Turkish students?

RAU: Yes, we had that small leader grant program, and we had a Turkish-American Association site there. The board was run essentially by Turks but there was the public affairs officer there, a man by the name of Benno Selke, when I first went there. He and his German wife who had a wide circle of Turkish friends. I don't know if they had many friends among the Turkish student community. You must remember, there wasn't a university in Izmir.

Q: Oh, there wasn't?

RAU: No, any student contacts were at a much lower level than they were normally associated with.

Q: Was there any influence from the Turkish writers and of Turks going to Germany and all? Was this a significant way of thinking in Izmir?

RAU: There were quite a few Turks who went to Germany from Izmir, principally to work in the automobile factories. We didn't hear any bad words about it. I was always a little bit surprised that the Germans didn't have more of an official presence in Izmir. They did in Istanbul. USIS ran a full exchange program and Izmir contributed to it because they had a lot of young people who would make good leaders. But the program was run out of Istanbul so we didn't see much of it there.

Q: You left there in 1971.

RAU: As I say, I had been scheduled to go to Ankara, and then I had this third year in Izmir. One day I got a telephone call from Dave Cuthell, who was the DCM in Ankara at the time. He said to me, "Bill, we've had a sudden opening that's happening in Istanbul." The number two man, Bob Dillon, had been called back to establish a new Turkish office in the Department. He said, "There's a vacancy now. How would you feel about filling that, rather than coming to Ankara?" I said, "Which plane do you want me on?" In many ways it may not have been the best for my career, but it was certainly a better place to live. I went up and replaced Bob Dillon instead of going to Ankara.

Q: Robert made quite a name for himself working on, I think it was Izmir, by knowing most of the people of the Justice Party because they were from that area. People in Ankara had sort of dismissed them and they didn't have those contacts.

RAU: I think that's true. In fact, some years ago when Sara and I returned to Washington, Suleiman Demirel was president. I think Bob Dillon was a very good friend of Demirel's and still is, I guess.

Q: I'm not sure. Have we filled in the gap, do you think?

RAU: I think we filled in the gap up to the time of the assignment to Istanbul.

Q: Again, were you looking at the, quote, "Soviet Menace" while you were in Istanbul?

RAU: Yes, it was always there. In fact, the Soviet consulate was a fairly good sized consulate general in Istanbul. And they had the advantage because they had a lot of Turkic speakers whom they could post in that country - you know, native Turkic speakers from the provinces, etc. We got to know them fairly well. They had some very bright consuls general and other officers while we were there. And I remember one of them who - according to what I heard from our Agency people - was really a naval attaché in disguise who was there as vice-consul, and he decided to cultivate me because I lived out in Rumeli Hisar and they were interested in these vantage points where they could watch the ships, etc. So he did it through my dog. He said he had some sort of interest in dogs and he wanted to see Alex, my dog, and he arranged - we had a sort of crazy Scotsman who used to come and stay in our house when we went on home leave, and he was a writer and he wanted to get to the Soviet Union. So this fellow arranged passage for Marcus Brook, this writer, on a Soviet cruise ship which was going up through the Black Sea. And they more or less paid his way, and he went up and was supposed to write articles for the British papers on that trip, so they used that as a pretext, because he had been living in my house, to come up and visit me, take an interest in my dog. Yes, we got to know them. I guess the one time was when Nixon visited Moscow while we were there and the Soviet consul general called Jim Spain, our consul general, and said, "You know, we would like to celebrate the arrival of your president in Moscow by inviting you to a dinner party." And they had, as most of the consulates did (we were one of the exceptions), these big summer places on the Bosphorus where they used to retreat when the weather got hot. The Germans had a huge compound. And the Russians had a fairly good-sized one. So we were invited out there. And Jim selected, I don't know - three or four officers to go and himself. And they had a like number from the Soviet consulate. We had this huge groaning banquet table with a waiter behind each chair and many, many vodka toasts - you know, to your president, and to friendship between our two countries, etc. - and then we went out into this garden, beautiful garden, and they showed a film of the ballerina Plisetskaya.

Q: Oh, yes.

RAU: Jim used to make fun of this, but I'm sure this guy was frightened to death. In the middle of this film, the film broke, and the lights had to come up, and he was back there nervously sweating trying to put this thing back together - and finally did, after a long time. And the lights went down, and they started the film up again. And I looked back and they had another operator. Whoever he was was gone and never seen again. But it was an interesting night, and we didn't get to know them that well but at least we had a chance to rub elbows with them.

Q: How did you find getting to know Turkish politicians and leaders and all? Were these people you were out looking for?

RAU: Yes, when they would come down for the weekend. They were not resident there, most of

them, except for the mayor and the governor. We got to know them, but all the central politicians were in Ankara most of the week. They'd come down on the weekend and we'd talk to them, when they came down to spend the weekend in Istanbul. We got to know the journalists fairly well because they were right there in the community. The best journalists were in Istanbul. Of course, USIA had a very large program for English language training and also for the library and cultural events. They did a lot there. But no, political leaders, with the exception of the governor and the mayor and the Third Army commander, which we got to know pretty well in Istanbul, too.

Q: The Turkish Third Army? Vs. the Greek Third Army?

RAU: Oh, I'm sorry, it's the Turkish First Army.

Q: I was going to say, you got your armies mixed up.

RAU: That's right. It is the Turkish First Army. That's right

Q: Did they seem as much on the alert as the Greek Third Army?

RAU: Yes, except that their alertness was not directed so much against the Greek borders; it was directed more on the northern borders.

Q: Toward Bulgaria?

RAU: Yes, toward Bulgaria and over in eastern Turkey you get to the Soviet Union, of course. And yes, very much so. We had a couple of officers, as they did in Thessaloniki, that went to their Higher Defense College in Istanbul, a couple of American officers.

Q: What about fleet visits? Did you get any fleet visits?

RAU: Yes, they called those off because of the terrorism while I was there. But we did get quite a few, and we had to watch very carefully where these sailors went when they came on shore because they had to be in protected areas. Of course, the Turks always knew when the fleet was coming in. Keeping it classified was a joke. The ladies of the evening would all find out about it a week or more before, through their grapevine, and it would be all over the place when they were coming in. But eventually, because there were a couple of sailors - they weren't hurt badly but they were thrown back into the sea, etc. - so they had to call off these visits for a while.

Q: What about American tourism?

RAU: There wasn't any at that time to speak of. The few people who knew anything about Turkey were those, like I was, that had served in the area before and knew about the possibilities. Real tourism had not really hit in Turkey as it had in Greece.

Q: How was the social life there?

RAU: It was interesting and just about right, because we still had a burgeoning family. I contrasted when I went back years later as consul general and the social life was really incredible. I mean it was six nights a week two or three things just go, go, go. And I realized then that the consul general, if he *can*, will try to get somebody to substitute at some things. But in many things the Turks are not interested in seeing the number two or any replacement. They want to see the consul general. So I didn't have that when I was there with Jim Spain. I went to a lot of things that we had in common, but he had to go much more than I did, of course. When I say "had to," it was just an act of presence - you had to be there, that's all, make an appearance. What was interesting at that time was the beginning of the Istanbul Festival. The head of one of the largest pharmaceutical companies, Nejat Eczacibasi, started the Istanbul Festival, which grew into a world-class music festival, arts festival. And we attended some of the original sessions of it. We got to see *Abduction from the Seraglio* of Mozart in the Seraglio. Incredible. Anyway that was another story later on. But yes, the social life was hectic, but it wasn't frenetic, as it later was.

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
U.S. Permanent Representative
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels (1969-1971)

Ambassador Robert F. Ellsworth, a former Congressman from Kansas who was born in 1926, served as ambassador to NATO and Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was interviewed on June 4, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How did you feel about the troublesome allies, the NATO ones -- I'm talking about Greece and Turkey?

ELLSWORTH: Oh, that was a horrible problem, and always a problem but that goes back 450 years. You can't solve that in 1969 or '70. Later on when I came back into the Defense Department, of course, they actually had a little war against each other with the provocation by the Greek thugs down in Cyprus, and the invasion of Northern Cyprus, and the occupation which continues to this day of Northern Cyprus by Turkey. But that's something that's hundreds of years...

Q: Did you look upon Greece as being a real partner in NATO at the time?

ELLSWORTH: They were -- of course, Greece and Turkey...I remember when Helmut Schmidt became Defense Minister of Germany. He came to his first Defense Ministers meeting, and there was a break around the table in the formal session, and he came around to Laird and me and started bitching at us -- that is the only word -- about why didn't Greece and Turkey contribute to the infrastructure fund of NATO, a big multibillion dollar fund that builds infrastructure for the NATO forces and every nation contributes to it in a percentage that's negotiated. And I said to him, because Laird didn't quite have the answer on the tip of his tongue, I said, "Mr. Minister, Greece and Turkey don't contribute to NATO, they receive from NATO." And they were

receiving a lot of money from us mainly, but also from other wealthier Europeans in terms of military aid. So, of course, they wouldn't contribute to the infrastructure fund because they didn't have the money. Greece and Turkey, you had to deal with them separately.

Q: Separately, but very equally.

ELLSWORTH: Separately, but very equally. Well, it wasn't really equal because they had different sized military, but in all they understood what the balance was, and what the conventions were for 40 to 60, or whatever the balance in a relationship was. And it wasn't easy. I mean, that couldn't be at the center of one's attention at NATO headquarters, although you had to handle it. And the Greeks and the Turks were always good at sending military people, and diplomats, to NATO headquarters who were very sophisticated, and sensible people, and grown-ups, and adults. The real nut cutting, if you will, on the Greek-Turkish conflict, came up down in the southern region and had to be handled by CINCSOUTH who is usually, if not always, an American admiral based in Naples, and it was he who had to work out how to actually have a NATO exercise over the Aegean region without erupting itself into a war.

Q: I know, I was Consul General in Naples when Admiral Crowe was there and he used to shake his head about...I had served four years in Greece so I was familiar with that element of the equation. The historic roots are such that probably it will never be solved. Were there any other major problems that you had to deal with?

DANIEL OLIVER NEWBERRY

Consul

Adana (1969-1971)

Daniel Oliver Newberry was born in Georgia in 1922. He received his bachelor's degree from Emory University in 1944. He then served overseas in the US Army from 1943- 1946. His career included positions in Jerusalem, Turkey, New York, Laos, Iran, Turkey, and Morocco. Mr. Newberry was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.

Q: Absolutely. In 1969 you left the Army War College. Where did you go?

NEWBERRY: I would like to refer back to the personnel assignment process in the State Department. I might add and take advantage of this opportunity to "brag" about myself a bit. Members of the war college faculty told me that my thesis on Defense Department relations with the Pentagon press corps received the highest grade of the various theses prepared by my class. In fact, they said that they had never given such a high grade to a thesis by one of the students. They incorporated my paper in the war college curriculum for the next several years as "required reading" for the ensuing classes. I felt that I came out of my war college year with a great deal of prestige.

However, the State Department paid no attention to this. When it came time to inquire about

my onward assignment, the personnel people gave me two choices: one was to be principal officer in the consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan; the other was to go back to Turkey as the principal officer in Adana, Turkey. I didn't have much trouble making a choice between these two possibilities. I found that in Peshawar, Pakistan, the only place where my children could go to school in English was the Pakistani Air Force School for Dependents. They would be the only non-Pakistani children in the school. So it didn't take me long to decide to go back to Turkey as principal officer at the American consulate in Adana.

Q: So you went to Adana, Turkey. You were there from when to when?

NEWBERRY: From August, 1969, to August, 1971.

Q: You were, what, consul general?

NEWBERRY: I was consul.

Q: What was the situation in Adana? How do you pronounce it?

NEWBERRY: Actually, most people who speak English call it Adana, with the stress on the second "a."

Q: Could you describe the consulate there at that time? That is, its responsibilities and the principal matters that you were dealing with there?

NEWBERRY: I got the clear impression, and I knew this from my previous time on the Turkish desk in the 1950s, that a decision had been made to move the American consulate from Iskenderun [also called "Alexandretta"], where it had been for many years, down near the Syrian border, to Adana. Near Adana was a Turkish Air Force Base, which was to be jointly operated by the Turkish and the U.S. Air Forces. The base was being developed at Incerlik. In fact, the U.S. Air Force "ran" the base, with the participation of the Turkish Air Force. All concerned had decided that the American consulate in that area should be close to Incerlik, since there were very good, relations between the U.S. Air Force and the local, Turkish community.

So the principal function for the American consulate in Adana was to ensure good, community relations between the U.S. Air Force people and the Turkish community. However, of course, we had other, traditional consular responsibilities. The consular district covered 18 provinces in southeastern Turkey. We had relatively meager, personnel resources. We had myself as consul, vice consul Mike Austrian, an American secretary, and four or five Turkish employees [Foreign Service Nationals].

We did a pretty thorough job of getting around a relatively large, consular district but we couldn't do all of that much "in depth" reporting. By that time, although I was reasonably good in conversational Turkish, my vice consul, Mike Austrian, spoke Turkish better than I did. When we made field trips, although we took interpreters with us, I think that we did a reasonably good job of reporting on political and economic matters.

However, we were basically concerned about the Air Base at Incerlik. We tried to ensure that the U.S. Air Force personnel at Incerlik understood what the problems were. One of the biggest of these problems, which Mike Austrian and I had to deal with, involved the trade union situation at the air base, which constituted one of the anomalies in the Turkish political situation. This is still an anomaly, to a certain extent.

The irony is that, back in the 1950s, I was involved in trade union problems during my first tour of duty in Turkey. The American Federation of Labor had a "missionary" out in Turkey. In fact, he was a trade union organizer. He was not particularly welcome in Turkey as he was teaching the Turks how to organize labor unions. So this whole phenomenon of Turkish labor unions and their militancy was something which the American labor movement had introduced into Turkey.

When I got to Adana in 1969, a strike was going on at the air force base at Incerlik. There was a nationwide union in Turkey which organized the military base workers, called the "Defense Workers' Union." The union members were on strike and demonstrating outside Incerlik Air Force Base at this time.

The strike didn't extend to the air base itself, but the union had pickets outside the main gates. There was an astonishing atmosphere inside the base about the attitude toward the Turkish strikers, who were carrying placards and so forth outside the base. It came home to me that an awful lot of American adults had grown up without any understanding of the history of the trade union movement in the United States, as well as the contributions of the trade unions to the life and prosperity of America. The U.S. Air Force people at the base in Incerlik had the attitude that those Turkish workers were like the "Viet Cong" out there, waiting to do "mischief." These Air Force personnel had absolutely no understanding of the rights of labor to organize and to make their grievances heard.

So I found myself, as the American consul, trying gently to persuade my own countrymen in the U.S. Air Force to understand what trade union rights were. It was as basic as that.

Q: How did you go about persuading the U.S. Air Force base commander and his officers to understand the role of trade unions and, particularly, the attitude of the Turkish strikers?

NEWBERRY: Well, we only had partial success because, as at most military installations, and particularly at our base facilities, there is a constant turnover of people. I found during my time at Incerlik that I was constantly having to go over the same ground with newly-arrived colonels, majors, and so forth, coming in from God knows where. I should add that this strike was eventually resolved. However, these Air Force officers really didn't want to deal with the trade unions.

I found that, in general, one of the biggest problems that we had was psychological. One of my colleagues told me that in the U.S. Air Force, when you go from one base to another around the world, everything is provided for you, including the PX, the Commissary, the movie theaters, and so forth. So an air base is an air base is an air base. A lot of the U.S. Air

Force people were really not interested in community relations with the Turks. They could walk down the road, outside the base, to a little, makeshift colony of souvenir stalls and buy anything Turkish that they wanted, without even going into the city of Adana. In fact, many of the U.S. Air Force people didn't go into Adana at all.

We had an uphill struggle. We made some progress and we kept trying. There was a very lively Turkish-American binational association. Some of the more purposeful U.S. Air Force people would come into town and take part in the activities of the binational association. However, they were a small minority out of the couple of thousand U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to the base. There was a very large, American community living inside the base. Some of them were actually quartered in the city of Adana, by choice, especially those who had "unaccompanied tours of duty." Some of them brought their families to Turkey at their own expense and rented quarters in Adana. I don't want to paint an absolutely bleak picture, because there were some purposeful people among the U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to the air base at Incerlik who went out and learned and saw something of Turkey. However, for the most part, U.S. Air Force personnel would just as soon have had nothing to do with the Turks.

In some ways, if there were little or no contact with the Turks, this would facilitate our community relations problem. However, on the other hand, it was a challenge to "juggle" these considerations.

Q: Did you have the problem of automobile accidents, drinking, people going into mosques, and that sort of thing?

NEWBERRY: I think that as far as the issue of Americans going into mosques was concerned, they had pretty good briefings. We never had any problem with that. Automobile accidents were another matter. Since Incerlik air base was in a rural, agricultural community, a lot of really terrible traffic accidents occurred with farm carts which circulated at night or in the late dusk, with no markings or lights on them. We had lots of really serious problems with Air Force drivers who, in spite of briefings, unfortunately had some fatal accidents. The driving habits of Americans and the village folkways of Turks and their tractors and tractor-trailers were a constant problem. This was one of our biggest community difficulties.

Of course, we had the "Status of Forces" agreement, under which the American military could simply declare that, in the event of an accident involving an Air Force vehicle, the Air Force driver was on duty, in which case he could not be touched by a Turkish court. Still, this created a dreadful, community relations problem. This was one which the U.S. Air Force worked on all the time and made a very serious effort to deal with. However, with that many people, many of the airmen had their own cars which were brought out to Turkey or were flown out from the United States, there was lots of driving around. There were beautiful, excursion places for picnics in the mountains around Adana. There was a lot of traffic on the roads, and eventually we had lots of problems on that score.

Q: Well, how did you interrelate with the Turkish authorities in the area?

NEWBERRY: The Governor of the Province and the Mayor of the city of Adana were my principal contacts. I took great pains to stay on good terms with the Turkish military in the VI Corps of the Turkish Army, which was based there. We were very mindful that there were lots of Turkish military in that part of Turkey. We used to say that they were rehearsing for the invasion of Cyprus. It was very obvious to us what they were doing. However, by that time I knew a good bit about the Turkish military. I knew that if I asked too many questions, they would just tell me to mind my own business. So vice consul Mike Austrian and I just took note of these things and recorded them. However, we did not get into any operational discussions with the Turkish military.

As it turned out, preparing for the invasion of Cyprus was exactly what the VI Corps of the Turkish Army was doing, when we were there. There was always a lot of military activity on the roads. I just kept up "correct relations" and very cordial relations with the Turkish military. I've always found the Turkish military to be courteous and polite, even when they had a stern message to deliver.

On one occasion, a Peace Corps alumnus who was employed as the director of the Turkish-American Association Center, had gone out of his way to be hospitable to young, "drifting Americans" who came through the area. On numerous occasions he allowed them to stay in his apartment. Some of these "drifters" were stashing drugs in his apartment. This came to the attention of the Turkish police, and the former Peace Corps volunteer was arrested. By this time Turkey was under martial law. I went down to see the martial law commander, who was responsible for dealing with this matter. I went down to see what I could do to make sure that this young American was not unduly punished for allowing some of these "drifters" to use his house to store drugs.

I'll never forget the very stern but friendly lecture that the commanding officer of the VI Turkish Army Corps, a three-star Turkish general gave to me. He said: "Mr. Consul, the job of being director of the Turkish-American Association is a serious job, and it should have a serious person in that job." That's all he had to say. On the other hand, he did the necessary. He got the message from me. They preferred no charges against the young man. However, the young man had been thoroughly sobered by this experience. He never let anybody else stay in his apartment, "drifters" or otherwise.

I mention this story because it shows the care which the Turkish military exercised in their relations with us. They were firm but courteous and friendly.

Q: Speaking of these American "drifters," during part of this time, from 1970 to 1974, I was consul general in Athens. This was a period when an awful lot of young Americans were going into Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so forth, picking up hashish, and trying to smuggle it out. I'm not talking about "big time" drug dealers. Mostly, it was young people doing this. Did you have a problem with this kind of thing?

NEWBERRY: Not a big problem. Of course, in Istanbul it was a huge problem. Most of the "drifters" got no farther than Istanbul because it was an easy, open scene in those days. There were stories written and even a movie shot about them. However, very few of these "drifters"

strayed as far South and East in Turkey as Adana. So we just got an occasional one.

Q: I think that we may have talked about this before. I am referring to some young, American women who were arrested for having a van full of hashish. Were they still in jail when you were in Adana, or did that happen later?

NEWBERRY: That did not happen when I was in Adana. It happened during the time Bill Hallman was consul in Adana. Actually, when I was principal officer in Adana, we only had one American citizen, a civilian, in jail. Of course, the U.S. military took care of their people. Bill Hallman, my successor, had a different experience.

Q: Part of my responsibility as consul general in Athens during this time was that I had a representative to handle federal benefits in Turkey and other things. We used to send our people out to investigate in Turkey, and they would come back with great stories. I wonder if you could explain what Federal benefits in Turkey were and your impression of what was happening in your consular district.

NEWBERRY: This was a very specialized, localized situation. To explain how this came about, you have to go back to World War I. We used to call this man the "Social Security Attache in Athens." He would come over once a year to inspect the situation. Thanks to the missionaries in that part of Turkey, a lot of their proteges got jobs in war production plants in the United States, especially in Michigan. Many of them stayed on in the United States after World War I was over, long enough to build up eligibility for Social Security pensions. Then they came back to their villages out in eastern Turkey, especially in the province of Elazi_.

Q: Elazi_ was in your...

NEWBERRY: It was in the Adana consular district. Actually, it took about an eight hours' drive to get out there. I'll try to shorten this story, but what happened was that these people came back to their villages and had children, who were entitled to Social Security Survivors' benefits. Even in my time in Adana, in 1969-1971, there was still a substantial number of monthly Social Security checks that had to be disbursed. However, there was an enterprising villager out there in Elazi_ who had contrived to adopt a number of these people legally. He was siphoning off the Social Security checks for himself. This had all happened before my time in Adana.

It was such a scandal that the Social Security Administration had decided that the American consul in Adana had to distribute these survivors' checks personally every month. We had a position in the Consulate which had been funded by the Social Security Administration. One of our local employees went out to Elazi_ Province to distribute these Social Security checks. I went with him a couple of times because I wanted to see the situation in person, and so did vice consul Mike Austrian. The Social Security attache in Athens would come out and inspect this situation once a year because of the extensive "fraud" that had gone on. There were still attempts being made to continue the fraud.

We had set up special accounts in the local bank in Elazi_ for these people, so that "shysters"

couldn't get hold of their money. However, we had to check up constantly to make sure that the people eligible for these checks were still alive. This was a very time-consuming process and, for all I know, it still goes on. I don't know any other place in the world where such an elaborate system has been set up. This was because of the extensive fraud that was perpetrated, years before.

Q: Did you find that the Turkish authorities were helpful in trying to end this fraud?

NEWBERRY: Yes. Once the fraud was discovered, they cooperated completely. They didn't like anybody engaging in such activity. We set up special accounts in a government bank which, I think, is now being "privatized." In those days it was a government bank. We had full cooperation from the bank.

Q: What about the cultivation of opium poppies and that sort of thing? Was this much of a problem in your area?

NEWBERRY: Not in my area. The principal province for the cultivation of opium poppies was in the consular district of the consulate in Izmir. This problem was very much on the agenda during that period. I think that I once remarked that when Bill Handley was our ambassador in Ankara from 1969 to 1972, I don't think that there was a single day during his mission to Turkey that he didn't have to deal with the subject of opium. This was not a problem in my consular district. I was very much aware of the problem because, of course, I read all of the cable traffic that was repeated to me from the embassy in Ankara. I knew how much the U.S. government was concerned about opium.

This was a period when President Nixon had placed great emphasis on stamping out the opium and narcotics traffic. There was a lot of illicit cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey during this time. In the end we obtained the cooperation of the Turkish government, to the point that there was virtually no "illicit" cultivation of opium poppies. There is "licensed" cultivation of opium poppies, because the Turkish government produces its own narcotics for medicinal purposes. This is very much under control, mainly because of our pressure and our willingness to assist the Turkish authorities to find crop replacements and so forth. So this is one of the triumphs of American-Turkish cooperation.

This is not a significant problem any more. However, the illicit traffic in heroin from the Middle East, from Pakistan and farther East, through Turkey and to the Mediterranean, is still a problem on which our Drug Enforcement Agency and the Turkish drug enforcement people work together very closely. However, there no longer is a problem of the illicit cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey.

Q: Obviously, you reported on political developments in your consular district. Were there any particularly interesting political developments taking place in your consular district?

NEWBERRY: Of course, there were reverberations from national political developments. These were developments which we occasionally felt in rather unexpected ways. Most of eastern Turkey includes what we now call freely the "Kurdish areas." Political developments

were very much under the control of what we called the "A_as," who were local leaders. They decided whom their people were going to vote for. There was always a lot of competition between the major political parties to get the support of this or that "A_as" and sway his people's vote this way or the other.

The year that Turkey had a general election when I was consul in Adana, there was a very interesting phenomenon. The "A_as" decided that they didn't like the terms that were being offered by the major political parties. So they supported "independent" candidates. It was the first time that any significant number of independent members of Parliament were elected. This was because the "A_as" were fed up with the two largest political parties in Ankara and put up their own candidates. I don't know that that has ever been repeated in Turkish politics, but it happened that year.

Of course, we felt the repercussions of that, although there was very little terrorism and kidnaping going on in my consular district. However, there was one, very celebrated case in my district, where terrorists captured, I think, four American sergeants. This led to a big drama, which I watched from afar.

I had some rather strong differences of opinion with the embassy on the way it was handling the public relations side of this problem. I remember commenting on a particular telegram from the embassy in Ankara. I said that the way the Embassy was "building up" this terrorist, Deniz Gezmi_, it was turning him into something like "Robin Hood." The embassy's answer was that in these circumstances you have to use television and radio to negotiate with this terrorist. I've never been convinced that that was wise. This terrorist, Deniz Gezmi_, in fact avoided capture and actually "holed up" in my consular district for a time, although we didn't know it then. He was eventually captured and paraded again before the television cameras.

The Turkish Minister of the Interior had a sort of press conference. It was the beginning of what I considered "depraving" the public media by politicians. This terrorist was a villain. He not only had kidnapped the four Sergeants, but he had terrorized a lot of other people. He was eventually executed. However, because of the way that we conducted negotiations with this terrorist, he was built up, as I said, into a great, "Robin Hood" type of figure. He is still referred to in Turkish politics, and it is said that the Turkish state committed a "terrible crime" in executing this "noble, young man." That's just one of my pet peeves.

Let me make one more remark on this subject, which shows one aspect of Turkish personality. We returned to Turkey once again before I retired. While all of this drama was going on, and, of course, the whole nation knew about it, Turkish people would stop me on the streets and apologize for what was happening. They would say: "You know, those kidnapers are not 'real' Turks." This is a standard Turkish comment, that "no real Turk" would do such a thing.

I remember swallowing hard, taking a breath, and saying: "I have to disagree with you. Just as in America there are 'good Americans' and then some 'bad Americans,' you've got some 'bad Turks.' I think that these people are 'real Turks' who have gone 'bad.'" The instinctive reaction of the Turks was to disassociate themselves and say that "these people can't be real

Turks." We'll come to that subject again, in another interview.

Q: Did Israel enter at all in the Palestinian conflict from your perspective? Was there any interest in that in Turkey?

NEWBERRY: We had a very particular interest, because we were monitoring what was going on at the Incerlik Air Force Base. We suspected, and then found out that, in spite of the Turkish government's admonition that Incerlik Air Force Base was not to be used in that crisis in Amman, Jordan, when was it, in 1970 or 1971, when the Palestinians...

Q: This was the "Black September" incident.

NEWBERRY: In spite of all of the admonitions to the contrary, Vice Consul Mike Austrian discovered that the U.S. Air Force, in fact, was using Incerlik Air Force Base for forwarding supplies to Israel. The U.S. Air Force was transporting them down to Israel. One of the most difficult times that I had with the Air Force was when we "blew the whistle" with the embassy and let the embassy know that the Air Force was "breaking the rules." If the Turks had ever found out about it, this could have spoiled all of our privileges at Incerlik forever more.

Q: Dan, you were talking about the involvement of the U.S. Air Force in assisting the Israelis with the movement of supplies during the "Black September" crisis of 1970. What was the U.S. Air Force doing and what did you do as far as informing the embassy was concerned? How was this matter handled?

NEWBERRY: I can't tell you too many of the details. Vice consul Mike Austrian, who was a very observant, alert guy, had a very distinguished career. In fact, he followed my footsteps and was assigned as political counselor at the embassy in Ankara. He had a very important role to play in connection with "Operation Comfort" in Iraq.

Q: Is he still in the Foreign Service?

NEWBERRY: I think that he has just retired. However, his wife, Sheila Austrian, is a senior officer in USIA [United States Information Agency]. We were together in Adana in those days. Mike Austrian discovered this information that the U.S. Air Force was shipping supplies for Israel through the base. I don't think that we ever saw a cargo manifest, but we knew what the destination of this equipment was.

We had to protect the source of the information. The alternatives were to send a communication through the Air Force or to use our "One Time Pad" cipher system. So I sent Mike Austrian up to the embassy in Ankara to report this in person to the embassy, rather than take all the time to use the "One Time Pad." The embassy took up the matter from there. The next thing we heard was a "string of oaths" from the colonel at the U.S. Air Force base for our "snitching" on him. I don't know what the cargo was or what the Air Force had told the colonel to say. However, this misuse of Incerlik stopped. That's as much as I know.

Q: This sounds like one of those political arrangements made in Washington, and the Air Force went along with it.

NEWBERRY: In another respect, this is not too surprising because the U.S. Air Force ran Incerlik as if it were a U.S. installation. They sent planes all over Africa and here, there, and yonder. Some of the U.S. Air Force transports used to go to Israel to buy eggs for the base commissary. So it was a common enough thing for planes to go to Israel. I guess that the Air Force figured that they had a cargo plane available to move these military supplies to Israel. I don't fault anybody on the ground there in the U.S. Air Force detachment at Incerlik. The fault was with whoever in Washington had directed the plane from Incerlik to transport military cargo to Israel. They should have known better. Every time this kind of situation would come up, the Turkish General Staff would remind us that Incerlik was not to be used for this kind of thing. So Washington knew better or should have known better.

Q: Did you find that the U.S. military commanders there at Incerlik were politically "sensitive," or was this something that you had to handle yourself?

NEWBERRY: Some of the U.S. Air Force people were politically sensitive, and some were not. It was a mixed picture. Some of them were excellent and sensitive. Some of them were utterly insensitive. Some of them were downright "hostile" to the State Department.

Q: You left Adana in 1971. Where did you go then?

LARRY COLBERT
Political Officer
Ankara (1970-1973)

Mr. Colbert was born in Ohio in 1940. He attended the Universities of Ohio and Missouri. After a tour in Turkey with the Peace Corps and a year as an assistant on Capital Hill, he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to Viet Nam as Regional Advisor. His subsequent postings, where he served as Consular Officer include: Ankara, Turkey, Oran, Algeria, Dublin, Ireland and Manila, Philippines. At Tijuana, Mexico, Madrid, Spain, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and Paris, France Mr. Colbert served as Consul General. Mr. Colbert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November, 2006.

Q: No, no, no I mean it gives a feel for the system. Where did you go? You went to where? Ankara?

COLBERT: I went to Ankara.

Q: And you were there from when to when?

COLBERT: Let's see, I was there from '70-'73. I spent a year in the political/military section

working for a wonderful man named Howard Ashford who was a civil servant who was Wristonized that is to say he was converted when they merged the civil service part of the State Department with the Foreign Service willy-nilly, I think during the Eisenhower administration.

Q: It was around 1955 is a date that sticks...

COLBERT: So it was Eisenhower.

Q: I know because when I came into the Foreign Service and I remember this was something, which was going on with those of us who came in, as regular FSOs didn't understand what this was all about.

COLBERT: Well he was a fabulous boss, a gentleman, a really fine person to work for. . There was a mid-level officer who was a senior FSO-5 and I was a junior FSO-5 if it sounds what a funny thing to say. He had been an FSO-5 for a while; I had been promoted just after leaving or just the middle of Vietnam. So I was relatively new and this was my first embassy. I did things like arrange diplomatic notes to transfer used destroyers and used submarines to the Turkish military. I arranged for over flights, arranged for military assistance and base rights and issues as SOFA, that is the Status of Forces Agreement. That is the sort of things that I dealt with but I was there on the beginning of a long weekend - the counselor of embassy for political/military affairs Mr. Ashford was out of town and the number two I think had gone somewhere on emergency and I was in charge, that is not to say big deal but I was in charge. But it turned out that's when the Palestinians tried to overthrow King Hussein and we...

Q: That is the beginning of Black September.

COLBERT: Exactly, exactly. We then...I think in fact Hussein had been pushed out of Amman, out of the capital. We didn't have access to Amman airport, and there was an old British field called Browns Field, and we started to shuttle supplies in to help Hussein and his Bedouin native Jordanians take on...

Q: The Arab Legion essentially.

COLBERT: Yeah, but my task then became to work with the Turks to arrange that resupply. Obviously when I say work there was an army major who was an assistant air attaché, and he and I did all the notes and went over to see the Turkish Foreign Ministry, back and forth. We were the gophers. So I went from being the third person in a small section to a key player in a civil war. It was great fun, and I don't think I slept for about four days, and every time the driver would take me home I'd just get to bed and the driver would come and take me back. We would have to go over to the Foreign Ministry at 2:00 AM and then find the DCM to get him to sign the notes because we couldn't sign the notes ourselves, to arrange over flight rights and to tell the Turks what was flying over and so forth. It was good fun. At the time I had to go to the treaties and try to find out what was going on. It was good stuff for a young man and I enjoyed that.

Q: You were there from when to when? Well let's do Ankara first?

COLBERT: Well I was in Ankara from '70-'73 the first year in the political/military section but unbeknownst to me the most junior officer who was a two in the political section was not getting along with his boss so he had arranged to get himself transferred to Izmir and so there was a vacancy in the political section at the FSO-4, I'm talking new terms old terms. I was an FSO-5 and I was the most junior person in the political/military section and so the DCM calls me in and says, "We would like to move you from the political/military section to the political section. You can replace Mr. Siprell." I'm thinking, my God heady news, that's good stuff.

Q: Was that David Siprell?

COLBERT: Dudley.

Q: Dudley, Dudley Siprell.

COLBERT: I barely knew Dudley Siprell and I didn't know that he had arranged with his wife's father who was an ambassador to get transferred out of the political section and into Izmir.

So then I went to work from one of the nicest most competent persons in the Foreign Service Howard Ashford to work for Morris Draper who was perhaps one of the worst people in the Foreign Service, opinionated, arrogant, unfeeling, just generally a nasty person. When he was right, he was right and when he was wrong, he was right. He was not the most pleasant person to work for. He didn't do me any damage. I got good reviews, and he didn't wreck my career. I would, however, go home to my wife and say, "We now have two children," because we'd had had a baby in the meantime, "and this career of mine is going to be in tatters because I am working for this terrible person who can't get anything right." He didn't teach me anything except how not to behave as a human being.

But then as in all cases there was some justice because just as I was leaving at the end of my third year, I was supposed to be there for two years but I liked being in Turkey and I spoke Turkish so we extended. I got permission to do a third year in Turkey on my second tour. That is unusual, usually it was only two years for your second tour then but I got an extension and I was allowed to do three years. Near the end of my third year Macomber became ambassador.

Q: Who had been the ambassador before?

COLBERT: William Handley. He was from USIS, a competent individual, a bit of a womanizer and since the DCM had a drinking problem they made an interesting pair. I had very little interaction with Handley. I had a lot of interaction with the DCM.

Q: Who was the DCM?

COLBERT: David Cuthell, who was a Turkish language officer and had been in a parachute division that landed in the Philippines, he I think was very competent, I liked him a lot. I think he did drink a little bit more than perhaps he should, that's no secret and the man is long dead and I admire him. But he moved me to work for Morris Draper, which I found to be an interesting...

Q: Just to get a feel for this. How did Draper operate within the embassy? I mean how were the relations, I mean, sometimes nasty people to their subordinates are pretty nice...

COLBERT: Oh I think he managed up very well. I think he stomped down and kissed up.

Q: A little "ratfar" as the Germans used to say, "Unterboygen, ober treten".

COLBERT: I think he treated his wife badly. I think he was not really a nice person. Since we are saying it for the record and he is dead I'll say it.

Q: He did make a name for himself working for another not very nice person, Henry Kissinger, he and Kissinger became quite a team in the Middle East.

COLBERT: He was part of a tandem with somebody else that did shuttle diplomacy with respect to Lebanon, but that is a long time later. But in any event Macomber came and he somehow found out that I spoke Turkish, so he just sort of took me out of the political section and said, "I am going to be making all these calls and going to all these...you are going to go everywhere that I go. So you are now working for me exclusively and whatever happens happens between you and me. Do I make myself clear?" "Yes, sir." So on his initial calls I went with him and if the Turkish officials didn't speak English there would usually be an English interpreter there but I was sort of his personal safety valve and checker. So I went everywhere and I would come back and then Morris Draper would want to know what had happened and I wouldn't tell him. He would get furious with me and I would say, "Well, go talk to the ambassador, I'm just following his instructions." But Macomber just chewed through his counselors - we didn't have minister counselor, I think we just had counselors but he just ate them for lunch, so being a junior person who had been chewed on for a couple years I enjoyed watching the more senior people being chewed up.

Q: Well Macomber, there are wonderful stories about him. He married Dulles' secretary.

COLBERT: I didn't know that.

Q: But how did he relate to the Turks would you say?

COLBERT: I think he got along well; I was only overlapping with him for a brief period of time. I thought the man had tremendous energy. There was this one true story where he was going east, he was flying east to visit one of the...there were NATO/American installations in the east and he landed in this small DAO (Department of Defense airplane), It was just a small unmarked airplane. He got off the plane all bundled up because it was cold, and this American colonel came up to him and said, "Get that God dam airplane out of here we are expecting the American ambassador." The American ambassador said, "He's just arrived major." He's the one who was called 'blow torch' and he didn't suffer fools gladly or at all.

Q: You were at a different level obviously what was your impression of first Turkish officialdom and then Turkish military? But let's do the Turkish military.

COLBERT: I had very little to do with the Turkish military. Whenever the ambassador had a big reception one of my jobs was to talk to the wives of the Turkish military, because the wives basically for the most part didn't speak English and they for the most part didn't circulate very much. So if there were some person standing over in the corner who wasn't being spoken to my job since I spoke Turkish was to talk to them and often that was wives who didn't want me talking to them anyway or the odd official standing off by himself.

I thought the Turkish military that I met were very professional and knew their job very well. Turkish military has a tradition of being the protector of the constitution, the protector of westernization so they're western looking - despite current efforts on the part of the EU (European Union) to make them otherwise that is an editorial comment. But as for Turkish officials, Turkish people generally are among the most hospitable and open and friendly as you can find. I had no bad experiences with Turkish officials. The only real Turkish official I ever dealt with were a few members of parliament I got to know and people in the foreign ministry. They were all quite open and quite nice.

Q: What was the attitude of the people you were dealing with to get stuff to help keep Hussein in Jordan? Did they see this Palestinian take over as a bad thing?

COLBERT: I don't know given the press of time I ever had time to discuss with them whether they thought that was a good thing or a bad thing. I know that the cooperation was always forthcoming. They knew what I was doing. I was very open with them and they were very open with me and there was a great urgency about getting the hardware to him so that he could prevail. I don't know that they ever said no to us, certainly they never said no to me and it was always rush, rush, rush, rush.

Q: How did your wife find her taste for the Foreign Service?

COLBERT: Well we are still on Turkey, which is good. I remember once at a cocktail party when the DCM came up to me, he was in his cups as he could be sometimes. He leaned into my face and he said, "You know Larry, I think your greatest diplomatic asset is your wife." I said, "Thank you, I think." But I would say that she was, she was a sophisticated, educated, attractive young woman who people liked who made friends easily and entertained with panache. Years later I was in Madrid and the chief of personnel there one day said to me, "Remember me Larry? I was a junior secretary back when you were a second secretary of the embassy in Ankara? People in the embassy, the staff, died to get invitations to your house, they could eat your wives Chinese cooking and go to your house." We had lots of diplomatic friends, a variety of people and I think part of it was the attraction of my wife. Certainly she was more charming and better looking than I ever was.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Economic/Commercial Officer
Istanbul (1970-1971)

**Director, Office of Turkish Affairs
Washington, DC (1971-1974)**

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Illinois in 1929 and raised in the Chicago area. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Turkey, Italy, Venezuela, Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Lebanon. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 17, 1990.

Q: After the NATO Defense College, you were assigned to Istanbul. What were the dates of that assignment?

DILLON: I was there for one year from July, 1970 to July, 1971. It had been Personnel's intention before I went to the NATO Defense College to assign me to Athens as the Politico-Military Officer after training. That made some sense in light of my experience and the training assignment. I liked the idea, but right in the middle of my time at the Defense College, Henry Tasca, then our Ambassador to Greece, suddenly focused on the fact that his newly assigned Pol-Mil officer had served in Turkey. I am told that Tasca thought that that would be inappropriate; you couldn't have someone who was a Turkish expert dealings with the Greeks. He apparently became very upset by the thought; he concocted a story which made it look like my assignment was the result of a misunderstanding and that in fact the then occupant of the position, George Warren, really wanted to stay on and would not be available for reassignment in the summer of 1970. So all of a sudden, I had no assignment after the College. But about a week later, I received a phone call which told me that the deputy Principal Officer in Istanbul was retiring. Personnel wanted to know whether I would be interested in that assignment. Although I would have preferred to have an assignment outside of Turkey, I agreed and went to Istanbul in July 1970. I think that Henry Tasca was absolutely wrong, but as we said, in those days Ambassadors ruled supreme. I was later told that Warren really didn't want to stay, but it was exclusively Tasca's refusal to accept someone with experience in Turkey.

Q: That was an indication how the "hatreds" permeated our own thinking. The Greeks were realistic enough to accept that if you are an American officer at the American Embassy, you represented the United States and no other country. But the Turkish-Greek tensions tended to interfere with many unrelated decisions by the top echelons in our Embassies.

DILLON: The Turks were the same way. They obviously would have preferred an American officer whom they could have convinced of the righteousness of their position, but they understood that an American was an American and that would be his or her point of view. The idea that you could not assign to Turkey someone who had served in Greece was sheer nonsense and I am sure the reverse was also true. In fact, there may have been some value to the U.S. to make such cross-fertilization assignments.

Q: Who was the Consul General in Istanbul in 1970?

DILLON: It was Jim Spain, who had recently arrived. Jim and I had met briefly once; I certainly remembered him. The assignment had been made before he had become Consul General, but he didn't question it. It became a very happy association. We have remained very good friends over

the years.

Q: What was the major function of our Consul General in Istanbul in 1970?

DILLON: Istanbul was the publishing, industrial and commercial capital of Turkey. It is a larger city than Ankara. It had a large expatriate colony; it was the only city in Turkey which had an important American expatriate presence. A major portion of our commercial relationships were conducted through Istanbul. We had important intelligence connections in Istanbul with a fairly active CIA presence there. It cooperated with the Turks, but was primarily targeted on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They monitored the traffic through the Straits. We had a constant stream of defectors walking into the office. The consular section was quite large because much of the travel to the U.S. originated from Istanbul.

I think however that the publishing and newspaper activities were the most important aspect about Istanbul. It was a great job for the Public Affairs Officer. It was the center of artistic and cultural life of Turkey. Istanbul was a lot of fun; it is very overcrowded, but very lively. Every good citizen of Istanbul still believes that his or her city is still the capital of Turkey, but since I have spent seven years of my life in Ankara, I can assure you that it is Ankara that is the capital of Turkey, at least in political terms. Now that I have retired from the Service I can say that I am not sure that I would have kept any of the other constituent posts open except Istanbul.

Q: I would like to return to your comments on the publishing activities in Istanbul. How easy or difficult was it for the U.S. to get its story told in the Turkish media?

DILLON: You had to work at it. The Turkish press, the editors and reporters, tended not to be pro-American. They were above all Turkish nationalists; to the degree they showed any foreign interest, it was primarily Europe that attracted their attention. The Turkish intelligentsia in Istanbul tended to share European prejudices about American culture and intellectual life. But some of our people were very successful in "selling the U.S. story". They learned to speak Turkish and had a great deal of influence with the media. I don't mean to suggest that the Turks printed "puff" pieces about the U.S., but they did moderate the tone of their analysis of the United States. Also, unlike some of my Foreign Service colleagues, I recognized the value of our cultural programs, which, I must confess, I had not noticed earlier. The visits of American writers, performers, artists of various kinds were effective in Istanbul because, as is true in many other parts of the world, there was a tendency to accept the idea that the United States was a cultural wasteland, a wealthy Philistine country that existed to be manipulated and milked; of course many foreigners have that attitude. The texture of American society that was provided by our artistic and cultural representatives was very important in influencing the Turks. In more recent years, an increasing number of Turks have come to the U.S. and have returned with a different impression of the country. In the 70s, that kind of travel was not so common. Official Turks would come to the U.S., but others had not yet begun to visit the States; they preferred Paris or some other European city. I did notice attitudinal changes in some Turks. America is a complex country, but we are intellectually respectable and creative; just look at our music and theater and even our literature. The fact is that we are way ahead of Europe. I don't tell foreigners that, but it is true. For the Istanbul intellectual community -- academics, media (there were about seven or eight competing newspapers including three enormously successful commercial

enterprises) -- to get a feeling for American culture was very important and I think it has paid off. The last time I was in Turkey, which now has been a few years ago, I was struck by the difference in attitudes towards us.

During many of my years of service in Turkey, the Turks were extremely anti- American. In part that was probably the reaction to the Menderes' years when many Turks felt that their country had become much too involved in the American camp. They tended to see us only in terms of military alliances; that turned off a lot of the Turks. They considered us pro-Greek; they believed that in their various disputes with Greece, the United States always and automatically supported their enemy. The peasants did not have that attitude. In a Turkish village, if you were an American, it did not arouse any hostility, but that was not true among intellectuals, who played a major role in the Turkish body politic. We do not have a similar class here, but I think the standing of intellectuals in Turkey is akin to that existing in Europe, particularly central and eastern Europe. They of course ascribed tremendous importance to themselves. It was easy to laugh at them and frequently that was done. But in some sense, they were quite important because they affected the bureaucracy, which was an important element in society. The intellectuals also affected the military officers to a far greater degree than most understood. University professors and newspaper people were chartered members of the intelligentsia; so it was important to have some influence on them.

Q: Let me ask you about American prisoners in Turkish jails.

DILLON: That problem really came sometime later. You remember that I mentioned that I stayed in Istanbul for only one year because in 1971, the Department needed a country director for Turkey. Jim Spain, who is a very imaginative fellow, saw the value of having on the desk someone with whom he had worked recently. He called the DCM at the Embassy -- Dave Cuthell -- and talked to him and the Ambassador, Bill Handley. He told them that he had a great idea; he had a terrific deputy in Istanbul whom he thought he might be able to talk into returning to Washington to be the country director. I was happy with the thought. I was an FSO-3, the job was classified as FSO-1 and that is always a helpful situation for promotion purposes. Handley bought the proposition and called the Department and insisted that I be appointed. Frank Cash, who was the current country director, accepted the idea and he sold it to the rest of the Department. I was the country director from Summer, 1971 to the Summer of 1974.

It was shortly after my return to Washington that the issue of Americans in Turkish prisons broke. I can remember it very well. I was sitting in my office in January or February 1972, when I got a phone call from a woman, who told me that the last time she had seen her daughter had been on Thanksgiving, 1971. She had come home and then had left to visit a friend somewhere in the South. The woman said that she had never heard from the daughter again and she was very concerned. She called me because she had just heard on the radio that four Americans -- a young man and three women -- had just been arrested trying to cross the border between Syria and Turkey and she was certain that her daughter was one of three Americans. I asked how she knew that. She said that she couldn't explain it, but she was absolutely certain that her daughter was among the group arrested. I asked her if she had heard any names; she hadn't. Had she heard any other information which would lead her to the conclusion? No!

But she turned out to be right. Her daughter had been one of four Americans arrested, Their van had been found filled with hashish. They were apparently on their way to Germany through Greece and were going to take a ferry boat from Turkey. In any case, from then on, I was deeply involved. In fact, later on, when I became the DCM in Ankara, the four were still in jail. I was there when they were finally released in the late 70s.

Q: What were the main issues during your three years as country director?

DILLON: The biggest political issue was the opium problem. The Cyprus issue was quiescent until July, 1974 when it erupted. Turkey was one of the countries which by international agreement was permitted to grow opium. Turkish law required the government to buy all of the production. They had theoretically control of the production, although we maintained that it was inadequate. The Ministry of Agriculture bought all opium grown and then sold it to foreign pharmaceutical companies. The problem was leakage of the legal crop; it was not illegal production. There were no hidden poppy fields, but it was diversions from the legal crop that created the tensions. Inspectors from the Agriculture Ministry would visit the fields and make an estimate of the yield. That told the farmers how much they had to produce. Generally, the fields produce exactly what the estimate had been. Any surplus went into illegal channels. The big smuggling families, Kurds from Gaziantep -- were the same people who were involved in the illegal arms trade, cigarettes, silk stockings, etc. They got involved in opium, which was smuggled in the form of a morphine base. These people were part of an international drug trafficking network. It was often concealed in Turkish lorries to Germany from where it was distributed world wide.

Opium became a major issue between the U.S. and Turkey. There were a lot of different facets. In the end, however it was resolved and became one of the few successes that I can point to that I was personally involved in. We worked out a system that worked. We financed the construction of a poppy straw factory, which was a complicated industrial process. It cost \$25 million to build the factory. The traditional way to harvest opium was for women to go through the field and make a cut in the bulb. Forty-eight hours later, they would return to scrape off the sticky residue and collect it in a large ball. That harvesting methods became illegal. The farmers had to sell the entire poppy plant intact to the government which in turn processed it as "straw" in the factory. If you knew the area well and the growing method, it was impossible to cheat. There was no way in which growth could have been concealed and you could not just cut a few bulbs to make the harvest worth while. Opium growth is very labor intensive; a lot had to be grown and harvested and there was just no way to conceal the growth areas.

As far as I know, the opium growth in Turkey is still thoroughly supervised by the Turkish government.

Q: Who suggested the construction of that factory?

DILLON: I don't remember the fellow's name, but it was an AID officer. In those days, I was not enthusiastic about assistance programs; when I started to work with this program, I changed my opinion. This officer was an agricultural expert who had spent years working on the opium problem. He described to me the manufacturing process; by this time I had been dealing with the

issue long enough -- it was then the late 70s -- that I immediately recognized the validity and attractiveness of the proposal. There were some at the time who were skeptical and concerned by the costs involved. But our AID man had actually seen one of these plants in operation -- I think it may have been in Holland. He knew what he was talking about. Other control attempts had been made, including a Turkish government decree that all growing of opium was illegal. It did that under great pressure from the U.S. government -- I was with Ambassador Handley when he made our views known to the Turks. Our position became a major political issue in Turkey and was never successful and we finally changed our position. In any case, despite some reluctance to construct and finance the processing plant, it was done and it worked. The AID man later went to Pakistan to see whether he could find some ways to control that drug growing problem, but I don't think we ever brought that under control. It was a different problem because in Turkey, the government controlled the growing areas, which was not true in Pakistan. There the poppy fields were in areas that the government could not really control or in some cases had no real jurisdiction at all.

Q: Tell us more about the "jail" issue while you were Office Director.

DILLON: You are referring to the episode that became a book and a movie later called "The Midnight Express". The book was written by Billy Hayes who was caught smuggling hashish and then wrote about his experiences. He was from Long Island, a nice but naive young man. He was caught at the Istanbul airport with a whole pack of stuff on him -- much too much to pretend that it was only for personal use. He was put in jail. We were very concerned from the beginning and tried to get him released, both because we felt the jail sentence was excessive and because we saw what the sentence was doing to Turkey's image in the U.S. We would try to explain that problems to the Turks and they would get very huffy. Senior Turkish officials would say to me: "You are trying to force us to let this criminal out of jail because it makes a bad impression in the United States. That doesn't impress us at all!". I saw Hayes' father at the Department several times; it was very sad. The father spent all of his savings; he mortgaged his house on Long Island; spent all of his money on various schemes to spring his son, even though we advised him not to waste his money. But he was a sucker for any slick character who would come along and promise that for a certain amount of money, he could promise to get his son released. Of course, none of these schemes ever worked. Billy finally escaped from his jail which was down on the Sea of Marmaris. He walked off one day. I suspect that the Turks let him go, although no one has ever told me so. There were reasons to believe that the Turks knew that he would try to escape and that they let it happen. He escaped to Bursa, which was the nearest city, and then on to Istanbul and the Greek border across the river. During the time he was in jail, he was visited frequently by our consular officers from Istanbul. They never reported that he was physically mistreated except for a beating his first night in jail. I think that they would probably have known or noticed if anything more had happened.

When Hayes got back to the U.S., he indicated to someone in my office that he was greatly upset and ashamed at what he had done to his family, who he had more or less bankrupted. He was approached by a free lance writer and offered a way to earn back some of the money that had been wasted on trying to get him released. The writer and the young man collaborated on a book that was named "Midnight Express". I have read it; it is not bad, but Billy Hayes admitted that the book was slightly exaggerated and dramatized. In the book he alleged that when he was first

apprehended, he was beaten. He did not allege other beatings. When the movie was made, it included not only brutal treatment -- there is a particularly savage scene in the movie when the young American bites the lip of a Turkish prison official who was abusing him. I don't think any of those incidents ever occurred. The movie also strongly implied that our own DEA played a major role in fingering Hayes; I don't think that was true either. It was not alleged in the book and I never saw any reports that even hinted at such a possibility. Our Istanbul staff was very sympathetic towards Billy Hayes. Furthermore, DEA was not interested in tracking down individual young American hashish smugglers abroad. It was interested in large operations which would eventually impinge on drug imports into the U.S.

But both the book and the movie were very damaging to U.S.-Turkish relationships. Americans, as with most people, are only too willing to blame foreigners for their problems. The drug problem was already headline material at the time; President Nixon had declared "war" on the drug trade. I really shudder at those words now. In any case, here was an opportunity for us to blame others; we blamed them for producing opium and then we blamed them for the harsh treatment of young Americans caught smuggling. The Turks saw us as hypocrites because on the one hand we beat them over the head and shoulders constantly about drugs, but when Americans were arrested smuggling the stuff we applied massive pressure to release them on the grounds that it was damaging to the relationship with the United States. It was a very troublesome issue. It was one that various Congressmen loved to posture about and we were always caught in between. You were talking to the Turks either about tightening up their drug trafficking surveillance or about releasing Americans who had been caught in the smuggling act. We had a hard time dealing with the problem.

I left the Office Directorship in Summer, 1974, just when the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, took over the government. When that happened, I had just moved to being acting Director for Greek-Turkish-Cypriot Affairs. Not only was this a new job, but it also came at the time when responsibility for these issues was being transferred from NEA, which understood them, to EUR, which had dealt with them only superficially. The organizational shift had been taken primarily to assuage the Greeks who wished to be perceived as Europeans and did not feel that they belonged in the Bureau of Near East Affairs. It was also because Henry Kissinger thought all NATO countries should be in the same bureau. From the day the coup took place -- July 15 -- I was swept up in trying to prevent the Greeks and the Turks from being foolish and in trying to obtain a cease fire. I went out to the area with Joe Sisco in a very unsuccessful trip; we bounced around. We were in Ecevit's (the Turkish Prime Minister) office at 4 o'clock in the morning, pleading with him not to invade Cyprus. He triumphantly announced to us that Turkish troops were landing on Cyprus at that very moment. We returned to the U.S. and then I almost immediately accompanied Bill Buffum to Geneva where we tried to arrange a cease fire between Greece and Turkey.

By the end of that trip, I was totally exhausted. I returned to the States just in time to pack up and leave for Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where I had been assigned as DCM. I left the Cyprus crisis unsolved; it is still unsolved almost twenty years later.

Q: Before we pursue your career in Malaysia, I would like to ask about the Cyprus matter. As the issue developed, how did you find the attitude and reporting from our three involved posts:

Nicosia, Athens and Ankara?

DILLON: Let me go back to tell a story as background. CIA had reported that Brigadier General Ioannidis (head of the Military Police), who had been part of the coup that had overthrown Papadopoulos the previous November, in a conversation he had had with one of CIA's employees, had stood up, knocked a few things off the table and had sworn that he would rid the world of the Communist, Archbishop Makarios, who was ruining Cyprus. The reporter was a Greek-American who had been a long time employee of CIA. The meeting was dutifully reported through CIA channels. I was called by the branch chief at CIA headquarters asking me whether I had seen this report. I had not. So he said he wanted to come to the Department to discuss it with me. That was very unusual in itself. The CIA official added that he was convinced that the Greeks were prepared to overthrow Makarios. I agreed with his analysis.

I had two colleagues at the time: John Day, in charge of the Greek desk -- a very good officer with a lot of Greek experience -- and Tom Boyatt, who had had a lot of Cyprus experience. We immediately huddled. It was John Day who really understood the Greek situation. He pointed out that Ioannidis had sent us a message, giving us a little of time to see whether we would speak out on the coup. We decided to go to our boss and try to convince him that a message had to be sent back immediately putting the Greeks on notice that the U.S. would not countenance or accept the coup in Cyprus. The people in the European bureau, not having much background in this whole matter, showed a lot of skepticism and raised many questions both about the facts and the assumptions. The leadership of the EUR was very strong; Art Hartman, who is one of the best professionals that I ever met, was the Assistant Secretary. The Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of our area was Wells Stabler, who was a superb officer. Both were very uncertain about what to do. They didn't know us and as I said knew little of the background. So they passed the issue to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Joe Sisco. Joe, who had had some experience with Cyprus, came down and we drafted a cable to the Ambassadors. I wanted our message to be sent back through CIA channels to Ioannidis so that there would be no misunderstanding of our position. People objected. They said that the U.S. government doesn't communicate that way with foreign officials and we don't communicate through low level CIA officials. What a pompous position! It was sacrilege that we would even consider communicating with a one star general! Of course, the fact that he was the power behind the throne did not seem to impress the EUR people.

Finally, we sent a very general cable to Athens. All the important direct messages were deleted. All it said was that the U.S. Ambassador was to express to the Greek government our view that we were opposed to violence on Cyprus. What news! Could we have taken any other position? We argued that this was not nearly strong enough and that the Greeks would never "get the message". Joe tried to bolster our position by calling Elizabeth Brown, who was then Political Counselor in Athens. He asked her whether she had gotten our cable. She acknowledged receipt and said that she had carried out the Department's instructions. Joe turned to us indicating that the matter had been taken care of. It was quite clear from the conversation, which we could hear over the speaker phone, that Brown, who was a very good officer, did not have the faintest idea what Joe was talking about. She did not indicate that she had understood that the issue was a very serious one that required special attention and care.

John Day, in particular, was the political officer who had the best understanding of the Greek scene. I thought his insights and tactics were absolutely correct. Nevertheless, after this episode, his career did not prosper. It was a great mistake for us not to handle the matter in the way that John had recommended, namely to use the same CIA channel through which we had gotten Ioannidis' original message. The General had to be told directly that the U.S. had received his message and that we were unalterably opposed to any coup on Cyprus.

Immediately after the coup, we were told that Makarios was dead. Shortly thereafter, we discovered that Makarios was not dead, but that he had escaped and that the British had evacuated him to Malta. Initially, the Turks indicated great concern about the coup and expressed themselves as supporting the legitimate government of the Archbishop. Tom Boyatt said at the time -- and he was absolutely right -- that there was only one solution; namely to return Makarios to Cyprus and reinstall him as the legitimate head of the government. A lot of Americans, and I was one of them, didn't like Makarios; he was a hypocrite, full of humbug, very much anti-West, but Boyatt was right. When I was asked whether the Turks would accept the return of Makarios, I said that I thought that if it were done quickly, they would accede. If time passed, then the Turks might well raise objections.

The issue of what we should do next was pushed up to the secretary, Henry Kissinger, who fancied himself an expert on these matters. He immediately developed some grand scheme. He had never liked Makarios and was happy to see him gone. He liked the situation and could only see us as unimaginative bureaucrats at lower levels who could not seize opportunities. He talked about a Clerides solution. (Clerides was the leader of the moderate Greek faction on Cyprus). Boyatt, who knew Cyprus, said that Clerides was a grand man, but he was not the solution. The saga continued and we did nothing to try to get Makarios back. Gradually, the Turkish position hardened and then it became clear that our job was to try to dissuade the Turks from invading the island. Tom Boyatt and I accompanied Joe Sisco on a trip to the area. I think I must have gone for a whole week without ever going to bed, while we shuttled back and forth between Greece and Turkey trying to persuade both to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. I remember well the night we spent with Ecevit. I was the only one in the American delegation who knew him. I knew what he would do; he loved the opportunity presented him. He couldn't have cared less about the American position; he was going to invade Cyprus.

Bill Macomber was the Ambassador. He, Sisco, Boyatt and I and a couple of others met with Ecevit. It was after midnight. Turkish troops were already on ships. Ecevit, savoring every minute, said to Sisco that the Turks don't make the same mistake twice. In 1967 (the Vance Mission), the Americans had urged the Turks not to invade Cyprus and they hadn't. It had been a mistake and the Turks would not repeat it again. Bill Macomber made an impassioned plea, saying that Ecevit was known as humanitarian and a lot of other stuff. At about 2 a.m., Ecevit said that he would consult with his Cabinet, although he didn't want to raise our hopes and he would then let us know.

We returned to the Ambassador's house and waited there until about 4 a.m. when Ecevit called. He said that as he spoke, the Turkish troops were landing on Cyprus. We pleaded again although it was obviously useless. We then dashed off to the airport and boarded our airplane. Then we started arguing about where to go. It was now dawn. Should we go to Athens to ask the Greeks

to cease and desist? (The Greek government was disintegrating at this point). Should we go to Spain and wait to see what happens next? I didn't have any good ideas except that I was certain that we should leave Ankara. While we were debating back and forth, we got a phone call from Washington, ordering us to Athens. Since we had failed to persuade the Turks not to invade, we were to try to persuade the Greeks not to intervene. Just as we finished the conversation, we were told by the Turkish authorities that we could not take off and that we had to stay put. In a burst of bravado, Joe Sisco turned to the pilot and said: "Take off! We are going to Athens". Even though the Turks had told us that the airport was closed, we ran down the runway and took off. Fortunately, nothing happened and we got to Athens only to find that the Greeks had no government. So we had great difficulties finding anyone to talk to. I don't remember much about the conversations in Athens because, as the Turkish expert in the party, I was kept busy writing up what had happened in Ankara.

Q: It sounds like a serious miscalculation by the Department on Turkish attitudes. Did you ever get a chance to discuss that with Kissinger before the ill fated mission?

DILLON: Yes, once, just before departure. Tom Boyatt, Joe Sisco, myself and some others went to Kissinger's office. Eagleburger, then Kissinger's special assistant, was there. We were there to brief Henry and to discuss what we might do on this special mission. In fact, the meeting consisted of a lecture by Henry Kissinger on history which was totally irrelevant to the issue that we were to address. With a couple of exceptions -- Boyatt and I among them -- most of the other participants kept remarking: "Gee, Mr. Secretary, I never knew the history of the eastern Mediterranean, until I just heard you explain it" and other similar vacuous remarks. That is a slight exaggeration, but that was the tone of the conversation. Then at the end, Kissinger asked whether anyone had any questions. I asked a couple, which went essentially unanswered. I tried to use the questions as a way of showing that what we were about to do was not going to work. I thought that our only chance of getting the Turks' attention would have been to threaten to cut off aid. The Turks were never going to take us seriously unless we threatened to suspend aid immediately. I knew that that was the only language the Turks would understand. I was convinced that the Turks would invade without some very strong U.S. threat or action. Tom Boyatt, having watched my performance and having seen how unsuccessful it had been, just said: "I disagree with you, Mr. Secretary. This isn't going to work!". Kissinger just looked at him and turned away. Nothing further was said and we all got up and left the office, went to the airport and took off.

Q: I might just note here that when I went to the Senior Seminar shortly after the events that you have described, Tom Boyatt was in the same class and the word was that he had been assigned there by Kissinger just to get him out of the way.

DILLON: That doesn't surprise me. It was a bad show. One of the lessons to be drawn from it is that this was one of those cases in which the area experts knew whereof they spoke and their superiors didn't. John Day was never promoted again, in part because I think he had been right about so many things. As for Boyatt and myself, even though I think our careers were probably damaged by this episode, we both recovered and became Ambassadors. While Boyatt and I were running around with Joe Sisco, John Day was the only one left in Washington who knew anything about the area. So he was in constant controversy with senior officials, who knew far

less than he did. I am convinced that it was this that cooked John's career. I thought that everything John said about Greek politics and their reactions and how we should handle them, was absolutely right. When it came to Cyprus, I thought Boyatt was right and I don't think I was totally wrong about my analysis of Turkey and its reactions.

MORRIS DRAPER
Political Officer
Ankara (1970-1974)

Morris Draper was born in California in 1928. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Washington, DC, Singapore, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. Mr. Draper was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 27, 1991.

Q: During the period 1970-74, did our embassy in Ankara see the Kurds as Turkey's weak point?

DRAPER: The Turks referred to Kurds as "mountain Turks". They were very embarrassed by them and gave them very little leeway. Kurdish was not taught in schools nor used as a language. The Turks really cracked down on them. The Kurds were always rebellious and in fact, Ataturk, as President of Turkey in the '30s, at one point had to send troops to get Kurds back under control. They have always been a restless minority, in Turkey or wherever they might be -- Iraq, Turkey or Iran. The Turks always saw an unstable situation in Iraq as threatening because they feared spill over of population and troubles into Turkey. The same thing is true for Iran. There was a common understanding in the area about the Kurds and other ethnic minorities. Under Ozal, the current President of Turkey, some of these perceptions are changing. The Turks are reaching out to bring more Kurds into the political process in a natural way. There have always been Kurds in prominent positions in Turkey; some reached high ranks in the military and the government, but these have been exceptions. Essentially, the Kurds have remained a rural population, out-of-touch and insular, living a difficult life, a feared minority in a part of Turkey that has always been a center of smuggling, among other activities.

Q: How was the Soviet threat seen from Ankara in the early '70s?

DRAPER: Turkey's ability to withstand a Soviet threat was based on its linkage to NATO and its large standing army. There was a belief that if the Soviets broke through for any reason, the Turks would retreat to their mountain passes and be able to hold out there until help would come. In the meantime, it was expected that the Turks would inflict a lot of casualties on the invading Soviet forces.

The US was prepared to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons if Turkey were attacked. There was always some discussion between us and the Turks about the possibility of using atomic mines. This subject was also an issue with the Germans, among others; the decision was finally made that these mines would not be used.

The Turks have historically been very hard on the Russians. They have always been determined

to retain their integrity and independence. While I was in Turkey, there was an incident during which a Soviet citizen hijacked a Russian plane and flew it to Turkey. The Soviets wanted the man and plane returned; the Turks would not let the man go. There have been other incidents here and there of this nature in which the Turks took an independent stance.

Q: Did you feel that the Soviets were ready to invade Turkey during the early '70s?

DRAPER: No, I didn't, but many Turks did. They saw the threat as real. They also felt that if there were an East-West show-down, they would be involved. They were enthusiastic about planning. They also spent a lot of time considering counter-moves in the tank-country in the European part of Turkey. There is a pretty strong anti-Russian xenophobia feeling in Turkey going back to the days of the Mongol invaders. There have been many wars between Russia and Turkey over the years.

Q: Let us discuss Greek-Turkish relations which have bedeviled the US for so many years. How were they viewed from Ankara?

DRAPER: Of course, I had a good deal of experience with this relationship when I was involved with the Cyprus crisis as Turkish desk officer. Both Greece and Turkey behaved in highly predictable ways. There is a racial enmity between the two which is manifested in various ways. For example, if the Greeks decided that they wanted to carry out some seismological expedition in the waters between the Greece and Turkey, you could predict with complete accuracy what the Turkish reaction would be. Both countries took actions to challenge the other. You can blame both for the high tensions.

Nevertheless, there were a few efforts from time to time, encouraged by the US, to bring the two countries together on some understandings, particularly about Cyprus. There was a wide-spread feeling that if we could get the Cyprus problem into a negotiating process, then other pieces would fall into place because neither Turkey or Greece wanted to threaten their NATO ties. The continued enmity between the two countries was a terrific obstacle to the kind of intra-NATO cooperation we were seeking. We were not hesitant in expressing our views to both sides.

Q: From our Athens' Embassy view, it appeared that the Greek ties to NATO were strictly counterweights to the perceived Turkish threat. I gather that Turkey did not see it that way?

DRAPER: No, it didn't. The Turks felt genuinely threatened. The Turks have a great striving for acceptance which the Greeks never had a problem with. The Turks wanted to be accepted as Europeans and not as Anatolian savages. This view is a very important aspect of the relationship, although the issues of defense and security are the principal ones. The Turks would not have maintained such a huge army if they hadn't felt threatened. They also saw an opportunity to progress out of their economic backwardness. The Turks even then were active players in CSCE (Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe). Confidence building measures were being developed which might reduce the tensions between the USSR and the Europe.

The tensions between Turkey and Greece were exacerbated by the nature of the Greek regime -- the Colonels. The Turks were very uncomfortable with a militarily dominated Greek

government; they preferred a Greece ruled by democratic demagogues, if necessary, but not by the military.

Q: While you were in Ankara, Spiro Agnew, then Vice-President, came on a visit. Tell us a little about that.

DRAPER: I was kind of ashamed as an American by what I was seeing. When Agnew traveled, he traveled just like the President -- same entourage, separate airplane to carry limousines, etc. It was a reflection of the Imperial Presidency which extended to the Vice President. It was a great contrast to the visits of other American officials, who were much more modest in their demands. Agnew insisted on knowing in advance his schedule, almost step by step. His advance people worked out with the Turks and others such matters as the length of the red carpet, where he turned, where he would speak. It was all very elaborate.

He moved mechanically after the schedule had been all checked out. It was like a ritualistic dance; there was no informality or change of plans. He did not make a terribly good impression, as I recall. Nixon did not visit Ankara while I was there.

JAMES W. SPAIN
Principal Officer
Istanbul (1970 - 1972)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1972 - 1974)

James W. Spain was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1926. He entered the U.S. Army at the age of 18 and, after spending a year in Japan, returned to the United States to earn a master's degree in 1949. He later received a Ph.D. from Columbia University. In addition to Turkey, Mr. Spain's career in the Foreign Service included service in Sri Lanka. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 31, 1995.

Q: What was the situation in Turkey at that time?

SPAIN: When we got there just before the Fourth of July, 1970, it was the classic Turkey of the previous several years: deteriorating stability but not spectacularly so. In September-October, terrorism suddenly flared up in a very, very big way. Our kids in Istanbul one day were late coming home in the school bus full. They were full of joy and delight because the bus had pulled off the side of the road and sat there for two hours while the police and leftist terrorists fought it out with bullets and hand grenades. Unlike the kind of Tamil terrorism in Sri Lanka which hasn't any interest in foreigners, Americans were the prime targets for the Turkish left. My major interest in Istanbul was the protection of Americans. This was the time of the "hippie problem." At any one time we might have a dozen Americans in jail on drug charges. Billy Hayes, the famous "Midnight Express" character, was arrested three months after I got to Istanbul. Edith

used to visit him bringing books and candy. She said when the book came out, "I always told you Billy wasn't really a bad kid." I asked what she meant. She said, "He didn't even mention us in his book."

The military intervened on March 12, 1971 and the battle with the terrorists ran the rest of that year. It was really acute. They would catch a bunch of them and then their friends would break them out of jail.

Q: How did you deal with the authorities at that time?

SPAIN: There were two security issues. One was a personal one: how to keep our people alive. The Turkish First Army commander came to call on me one day. We had asked earlier for him to give us a rundown of what security measures they were taking and we should take. His beribboned aide carried a suitcase. The aide stood at the door at attention while the general told me they have people doing this and doing that. Then he said, "But we do expect you to do your part too." At his order the aide emptied the suitcase on the table. He'd brought us fifty pistols for distribution to our personnel. Bob Dillon, the deputy, and I carried guns from then on. So did a few others, but, knowing our people, I was afraid to offer them to some -- and others refused to take them.

The other problem centered on U.S. Sixth Fleet port calls. The U.S. Navy liked Istanbul as a leave port. The Turkish Navy liked to have the ships come in. It wasn't about to admit that it couldn't protect the American sailors. Besides, its officers believed that it was good if the ship visits provoked the terrorists to come out where they could smash them. So, the American military and the Turkish Navy were always in favor of a proposed port call. The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish First Army (which was responsible for security in Istanbul) were against them. Sometimes the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and often the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul were against them. So it went for at least two years.

Q: From your observations how were the relations with the Greeks? I was American Consul General in Athens, 1970-74, so I was looking...

SPAIN: Was Henry Tasca there then?

Q: Oh, yes.

SPAIN: Did you know that he used to sneak over to visit Istanbul?

Q: I never paid much attention where he went. I went over there one time.

SPAIN: Later I will tell you some Tasca stories.

Q: Well, tell me some Tasca stories with the machine on.

SPAIN: This is something of a diversion. One of my pals in Istanbul was the Greek Consul General, a wonderful man named Nico Karageorgas. One day he said to me "As you know, Mr.

Slade is coming from Athens on Thursday of next week.” I asked who Mr. Slade was. (Slade is not the actual name; I can't remember it.) Nico said “You mean you don't know? It's your Ambassador Tasca.” I had to admit that I didn't know a thing about it. “Well,” Nico told, “he comes occasionally. It is unofficial, personal, but he always lets me know and I thought I should tell you.” I asked “What the hell is he up to?” The reply was “Well, sort of visiting, sightseeing, rest and recreation.” He paused and then added “You know, he is negotiating with the Patriarchate for a title. You know the Vatican gives papal knighthoods to distinguished laymen. Well, he'd like one from the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate. Of course, he couldn't use it while he's a U.S. official but I understand he's going to retire soon. Don't tell him I told you about this.”

We had the Tascas out to dinner. We were sitting down when a gas barge exploded out in the Bosphorus. We all ducked under the table. When things were back to normal, our Turkish butler came in to pour the wine. Mrs. Tasca looked at him and said to Edith "How do you stand them? Look at him. He would just as soon kill you as talk to you!" It was just as well that they didn't talk. Recep understood English perfectly.

Q: She had problems with Greek members of the household staff. I think in four years they went through over a hundred. She was Roman Italian and had no use for anybody other than Italians.

SPAIN: She had some kind of title, I think.

Q: She may have. The story was that her father was in charge of cleaning up garbage in Rome under Mussolini and for that he picked up some sort of title.

SPAIN: Somebody, an American, it may have been Bill Crawford or Arch Blood, told me she was referred to as the Countess Garbaggio.

We've gotten off the main track...

Q: Well, I was in Greece at the time and very obviously the Greeks, NATO, etc. was very interesting but the real thing was the Turks and the Turkish threat. They were ready to take umbrage at anything that the Turks were doing. What was your impression of the Turks looking at the Greeks at that time?

SPAIN: Their outlook was much the same. They resented the Greeks not taking them as seriously as they thought the Greeks should take them. They were a great power and the Greeks weren't. How dare they think they could go to war with us. There was no terra irridenta sentiment. Ataturk had made a point of that. Anatolia is us and we are Anatolia and that is it. Turkey is truly secular compared to most Muslim countries. By and large the Turks disliked Greeks, not Christians. They had stereotypes about them: lazy, deceitful, untrustworthy.

I was in Ankara during the 1974 Cyprus invasion when the Turks sank their own two ships which they thought were Greek. Bulent Ecevit, normally a pretty cosmopolitan character, was prime minister. He called Ambassador Macomber in. I went with him. He told us the two Greek ships were heading for Cyprus. When they crossed into Cyprus territorial waters, they would be

sunk. That would mean war between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. had to stop them. We got in touch with Embassy Athens -- which insisted that there weren't any Greek ships in the area. Macomber went in and told Ecevit "Look, Mr. Prime Minister, Ambassador Tasca and Assistant Secretary Sisco are in Athens. They have talked to the Greek generals and colonels. There are no Greek warships near Cyprus." I went to Hasan Ishak, the minister of defense, and repeated the message. Later we were able to report that the Greek authorities had told the Embassy "If the Turks can find any Greek warships there, tell them to go ahead and sink them!" This shook Ishak enough that he took me into see Ecevit. The prime minister listened and shook his head. "Well," he said, "you may find this useful after all. You will discover that the Greeks never tell the truth. They can't. You will see this proved when those ships cross into Cypriot waters and we sink them!"

Well, of course, the Turkish Air Force did sink them -- and it turned out that they were their own ships!

Q: To me that story, which is true, of course, is so incredible. It is not a minute to minute decision. It was a long thing...

SPAIN: It went on for 36 hours.

Q: How can you lose your own ships like that?

SPAIN: I don't know. Most ships in both navies were American-made. They looked alike. Then there is a possibility that there was army, navy, air force rivalry and lack of coordination in Turkey. But, still it is incredible.

Q: Now you have left Istanbul to go to Ankara as DCM, is that correct?

SPAIN: Yes.

Q: When?

SPAIN: In 1972.

Q: And you were there until when?

SPAIN: 1974. I was due to leave the day before the Turks invaded Cyprus. In fact, my replacement was Don Burgess, who had shown up a day or so before. My wife had left, although I still had the younger two boys with me. Burgess and I camped out in the house taking turns having somebody in the embassy 24 hours a day. I finally got away perhaps two weeks later.

Q: You were working for Ambassador Macomber?

SPAIN: Initially Ambassador Handley, for the two years in Istanbul and one year in Ankara. Macomber came in for the last year I was in Ankara.

Q: How did you find the operating style of Handley and then Macomber?

SPAIN: About as far different as you can imagine. Handley, who had been ambassador before in Mali, was an easy going, story telling, St. Mary's County Irishman. He had been in Ankara a couple of years by the time I showed up and had done everything there was to do. He was totally relaxed. I was told to do what I wanted.

Macomber was very different. He was vigorous and aggressive -- and, like Handley, very effective. Handley had more or less sweet-talked the Turks out of opium production. Now, in 1973, there was an election coming up. Macomber was convinced the new government would repeal the ban and go back into production. No one else in the Embassy, including me, agreed. The ambassador turned out to be right. Faced with the problem all over again, Macomber set everyone scurrying about to find a way to prevent illegal leakage of the drug. A new German "straw" processing system had just been invented. It reduced the amount of poppy gum in peasant hands to nil. Legitimate production was controlled entirely in strictly supervised factories. Our problem with illegal leakage was over.

I learned a lot from both Handley and Macomber.

Q: Before we get to this Cyprus thing that sort of came like a bolt out of the blue, didn't it, what were some of the issues you were dealing with?

SPAIN: Drugs, the opium war, was probably number one. Force goals were another major issue. These were set by NATO and the Turks thought they should be higher than they were. How much military assistance we "owed" them. Who owned oil in the Aegean Sea. The threat of Greek declaration of a 12 miles limit around all of the islands there. Air control responsibilities for the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The Armenian terrorist campaign against Turkish officials which began in the US in Los Angeles.

And we had some interesting Montreux Convention work. The first Soviet aircraft which was built at Odessa on the Black Sea was assigned to the Baltic fleet. When the time was ready the USSR wanted to take it out and bring it around through the Mediterranean. The Soviet position was that because aircraft carriers were not mentioned in the Montreux convention, they could take it out. Our position was that they couldn't take it out because it was bigger than anything mentioned. Well, they finally took it out as we all knew they were going to. The Turks wanted the thing as far away from them as possible and were not about to stop them.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Russians began flying several planes a day with arms to Syria over eastern Turkey. To my surprise, air passage over eastern Turkey is also covered in the Montreux convention. The Russians were declaring all of these as Aeroflot flights, civilian cargo and food supplies. We had reliable intelligence that they were Soviet air force planes carrying arms. We kept trying to get the Turks to stop them. That part of the Montreux Convention is not very specific. It simply says that civilian planes may fly upon identifying themselves and their cargo. The foreign secretary asked "Well, what do you want us to do, shoot them down?" I took some pleasure in passing the query to Washington. No, the Department didn't want the Turks to start a war with the Soviets.

Q: From your vantage point at the embassy, how did the Turks view the Soviet threat?

SPAIN: Very seriously. Far more seriously than most of our allies, Pakistan for instance, or even some of our Western European allies. One of the first things that most Turks would tell you "If you are an American and your father, grandfather or great grandfather was killed in a war, any number of people might have killed him, Spanish, Mexican, Germans, your own people in the Civil War. But with the one exception of World War I, any Turkish ancestor who died in battle was killed in the 27 wars with the Russians." That was very real to them. They had very much on their mind in living history the 1946 Soviet claims to their Kars and Ardahan provinces and to control of the Straits.

In 1973 when I was chargé, Handley was off somewhere, within six weeks of each other Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson died. We had the usual condolence books. I had left my suit coat home and was wearing a sweater at the office. The consular officer came racing in saying, "There is a line all the way around the block coming to sign the book for Harry Truman." I raced home, got my suit coat, and came back. It was a damn good thing that I did. I had just returned when word came that the president of the republic was coming to sign the book and was walking to show ultimate respect.

I was out glad-handing the line at one point. A classic old Turk with a huge mustache talked to me. Beside him was a big classic clean-shaven young Turk. The old man told me that he was a retired Turkish army sergeant. He had been in Korea. With a tear in his eye he described how in 1946 in Istanbul with his then baby son in his arms he had stood at the edge of the Bosphorus and watched the battleship Missouri sail in to save Turkey from the Russians. He had never forgotten Harry Truman for that. By the time it was over, we had a dozen books crammed with signatures to send off to Bess Truman.

Lyndon Johnson died about six weeks later. The highest official to come was a protocol officer and he didn't walk. Other than the diplomatic corps, we had about 20 Turkish names. The Turks still hated Lyndon Johnson for his 1964 letter telling them that if they invaded Cyprus and the USSR struck at them, we would not come to their help.

Q: I think we had about the same reaction in Athens, too. Truman was remembered. Was there a feeling that the Soviets were messing around with the internal security of Turkey at that time?

SPAIN: Yes. It was nothing like it had been before they took over Eastern Europe, but there was suspicion that they were financing the ultra-leftist terrorist groups. Turkish and American intelligence collaborated in trying to pin this down. We tended to believe that the Turks sometimes overestimated what the Russians were doing. But instinctive fear of the Soviet Union and concern about its machinations was very, very real in Turkey.

Q: Could you talk about the events leading up to the Cyprus situation which was July 14, 1974?

SPAIN: The primary Turk concern about Cyprus was not a desire to take the island over. Their interest was the equivalent of the American/Cuba phenomenon: a hostile power 40 miles off-shore. The real political driving force was all those Turks down there that had been killed. The only real link between the Turks in Cyprus and the Turks on the mainland was that they were Turks and the mainland was not about to see them slaughtered. When the Greek government-supported coup against Makarios came, the Turks assumed that it was the first step towards

“enosis,” union with Greece. With some reason they were convinced that if this happened a lot of the Turks were going to be killed. Turkish public opinion would clearly not permit that. They went ahead as they had in 1964 and 1967 to demonstrate their intentions and determination to prevent this. Right down to a few days before they actually invaded, there was not a unanimous feeling on our part as to whether they were bluffing again. But this time they did go in. In my manuscript...

Q: The manuscript you are referring to is...?

SPAIN: A draft of a book called *In Those Days*. In there is one of the most peculiar little bits of diplomatic history I have ever encountered. Joe Sisco on an airplane loaded with Bob Dillon and others, showed up about three days before the invasion. He came in to talk with Ecevit and left convinced that the Turks were going to invade. By this point we all were. The group went off to Athens with the very sensible intention of trying to prevent a Greek-Turkish war. The next day in comes a letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Ecevit. It is stronger and tougher than the 1964 Johnson letter. You know the context of the Johnson letter.

Q: Regarding Cyprus.

SPAIN: Yes, in 1964 the Turks were going to invade Cyprus. Johnson wrote them a letter saying that if you invade and the Russians jump you because of that, don't think that NATO will protect you. The Turks never forgot or forgave him. But, this Nixon letter was even stronger. I don't recall the exact wording, but it said you mustn't do this and if you do you will be punished. At 12: 30 in the morning Macomber and I set out to deliver the letter. We thought it was a mistake, but was slugged "From the Secretary" and signed by the President. We had to enter the prime minister's office by the back door because a mob in front is screaming for Greek blood. We come up the stairs to the prime minister's office. An aide opened the door and ushered us in. We stopped in the door way because he is on the phone. We started to back out and he said to sit down.

“Well, I'm glad you understand, Henry,” is, I think, the first phrase we hear. It was apparent that Henry Kissinger was on the line. Ecevit was one Kissinger's Harvard seminar types. We heard only half of the conversation but it was pretty clear that Henry was saying “Bulent, old boy, you really shouldn't do this. We will try to help you otherwise, but you shouldn't start this war.”

Ecevit replied “I understand your position, but with God helping us we can do no other. I assure you that we are not trying to conquer Cyprus, just to establish a beach head from which we can negotiate a settlement.” At the end he remarked “Yes, I understand. Of course, I know you must tell us not to Henry, but I am glad you understand our position.”

Here we are carrying this letter signed “Nixon” saying if you do it we will smite you. Macomber looks at me and I look at him. He signals me to keep the letter in my pocket. When Ecevit got off the phone he asked, “What can I do for you gentlemen?” We said nothing in particular. We had just came along to see how things stood. He told us “Well, as I was just telling Henry, we are going tomorrow morning, but you Americans have no reason to worry about it.” We went back to the Embassy.

Bill Macomber got on the phone to Athens to try to get a hold of Sisco. My job was to get the Operations Center in the State Department and let them know that we hadn't delivered it and

weren't going to unless reinstructed. Wells Stabler, an EUR deputy assistant secretary was running the Washington Task Force. He told me "That cable was put in by the Secretary, himself. He even signed it. Are you sure?" I replied that we were sure and would tell why in a classified cable. Understandably, he was mystified. "Okay, now let me get it clear. You are saying that Ambassador Macomber is not delivering the letter unless instructed further to do so." "Yes, that is right." Of course, the next morning the Turks were pouring onto Cyprus.

For three days we never heard a word. Then I came across a routine "official use only" telegram. "Ref Deptel [whatever the number was], Disregard." I have often wondered what a historian who gets into the archives 25 years hence is going to make of this...There was a Nixon letter that was sent to the embassy. The embassy was told to deliver it. It was stronger than the Johnson letter. But there was no blow up in Turkey over it and no one ever heard a word about it.

Q: Were you able to have communication with the embassy in Athens to say that they really mean this and you had better do something with the Greeks? Or did you feel that we were all working in kind of the same way?

SPAIN: I think everyone in Athens -- including the Greeks -- knew that it would be disastrous for them to attack the Turks. Our communications weren't bad: two or three hours for an exchange of classified telegrams; one out of two or three en clair telephone calls getting through. On one call I began "This is Jim Spain in embassy Ankara. May I speak to Ambassador Tasca please?" He comes on and says, "Hello." Then I hear a voice in the background asking "Who is that Henry?" Henry says, "Ankara." The voice says, "God damn it, Henry, give me that phone." "Hello, this is Joe Sisco. Bill?" I say, "No, this is Jim Spain." "Where is Bill. I want to speak to the ambassador." I told him that Bill was busy with something else and he spoke with me. But I remember that "God damn it, Henry, give me that phone."

Q: Did they ever acknowledge anything that you had done afterwards?

SPAIN: The Turks? No, they never admitted they were wrong about the ships.

Q: Then you left about that time, did you?

SPAIN: I left two weeks after.

Q: Were we telling the Turks about the power of the Greek lobby in Congress or at this point did it not matter?

SPAIN: That was part of the dialogue. My own feeling was pleading Congressional necessity isn't a very good diplomatic instrument with the Turks -- or with any other host government I have known. Most feel it is our problem. Ankara's reaction was simply: if you are as strong and noble an ally as we think you are, you shouldn't be bothered by a group of greasy restaurant owners.

Q: You served in Turkey from when to when?

SPAIN: From 1970-72 as consul general in Istanbul; 1972-74 as DCM in Ankara and 1980-81 as ambassador.

RICHARD W. BOEHM
Political/Military Counselor
Ankara (1971-1974)

Richard W. Boehm was born in New York, New York in 1926. He received a bachelor's degree from Adelphi college in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1956. Mr. Boehm served in Japan, Germany, Luxembourg, Turkey, Thailand, Nepal, Cyprus, and Oman. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 27, 1994.

BOEHM: However, I was sidetracked, as I say, by this difficult family medical situation. In 1971 my wife died. The time came for me to go back overseas. I wanted a complete change. I wanted to go someplace that was different.

The job of Political-Military Counselor in Turkey fell vacant, and the Ambassador to Turkey then was Bill Handley, who had started out as a Labor Officer and had done time in USIA [United States Information Agency]. Then he had been a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department bureau which included Turkey, then NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs], not EUR. And then Bill Handley had gone to Turkey as Ambassador. He was back in Washington, looking for a Political-Military Counselor. I was available. I had a place on a river in the backwoods of the western part of the State of Virginia, over in Bath County, near Warm Springs, VA. I was down there. There was no phone. The mailbox was two miles away, across the creek and up the hill. I went up one day to the mailbox, and there was a telegram in it, waiting for me. It was rainsoaked and had been in there a couple of days. It said that the Ambassador to Turkey is back in Washington and would like to interview you. Give us a call. So I went to the nearest phone, said that I had just received the message and that I was interested in the job. I said that I would make a suggestion which might be totally improper: if the Ambassador is a fisherman and has the time and would like it, I would be happy to invite him to come down and spend a couple of days fishing. However, if, for one reason or another, that is not acceptable, I would come up to Washington. They said, "Call us in a couple of hours."

So I drove around, did some shopping, and called them back. They said that the Ambassador would have been absolutely delighted to come down but can't. He has to leave town tomorrow morning for California. So could you come in? Well, I drove right to Washington. Bill Handley and I hit it off very well and he hired me on the spot. So I went to Turkey. That was the beginning of moving in a totally different direction, although while I was in Ankara, Turkey was moved into the European Bureau.

Q: As a matter of fact, it was sort of interesting that you moved into the European Bureau just when the Cyprus crisis hit the fan. I have had accounts of people who dealt with this. They said that the Europeanists didn't like to deal with this grubby business down there. This wasn't their

type of thing. But we'll come to that. What was the situation in Turkey when you arrived there in 1971?

BOEHM: Six months earlier the Turkish military had taken over the country. They had not actually displaced the government, as they did later on. We'll get to that later on. They left the Parliament in place. They got rid of the Prime Minister. They appointed a Prime Minister, so there was some appearance of ordinary, democratic procedures, although in fact the country was being run by the military. They gave various reasons as to why they had taken over. There might have been some element of counter-terrorism involved in the takeover, but there was also a kind of threat to the military. The then Prime Minister was Mr. Demirel, who is now the President of Turkey as we sit here. There were questions about the military budget, and the General Staff was flexing its muscles. The psychology has changed since then, but at that time the General Staff wanted to make sure that everything was to their satisfaction.

There had been some terrorism, which might have given the General Staff some reason to take over, but I wasn't there at the time -- six months earlier. I knew very little about Turkey when I went there. I'd been looking at Turkey as a part of NATO, when I was on the NATO desk, five years earlier. But it wasn't the central preoccupation of anybody on the NATO political side. Turkey was a matter of concern for the American military, because Turkey occupied a strategic position.

However, the situation was that it was a country run by the Turkish military, although it did not have a military government. Democratic procedures ostensibly were left in place, but, in fact, they had been suspended.

Narcotics was a very big issue. Turkish sources had been one of the main suppliers of heroin to the United States. The whole French connection issue involved Turkey, with heroin moving through Marseille. For the Ambassador one of his chief concerns was to get them to suppress the cultivation of opium poppies, of which Turkey had been a major producer.

Always, of course, there were Greek-Turkish squabbles going on. The Cyprus issue came up during my stay there.

Q: You were the Political-Military Counselor, so you were dealing with the Turkish military quite a bit.

BOEHM: Yes, with the Turkish military and with those in the Turkish Foreign Ministry who dealt with those matters. Just as we do, they had a bureau of political-military affairs.

Q: As you had come from Europe, what was your impression of the official Turks that you dealt with?

BOEHM: They were very, very high caliber people.

Q: On the military side as well?

BOEHM: Both sides. They were very nationalistic. You couldn't make any distinction between the Turkish military and the Foreign Office people on that score. They were very Kamalist in the sense that...

Q: We're talking about Kamal Ataturk.

BOEHM: We're talking about Ataturk. They were all dedicated to the principles of Ataturk. They were highly competent. I think that the Turkish Foreign Ministry produces some of the best diplomats in the world. They are hard working, well briefed, and well documented. I found them very tough. A lot of my time in Turkey was spent, negotiating what later came to be called The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. There was this basic agreement and then a whole string of sub-agreements which provided the framework in which the United States carried on various kinds of military and other activities in Turkey. It was an old agreement which was extraordinarily favorable to the United States. Eventually, the Turks wanted to revise it. One of the provisions of the agreement allowed for its eventual renegotiation.

At the time I went there, talks [on renegotiation of the agreement] had been going on for a long time between the Embassy and the Foreign Ministry. Just about the time I got there, the Turks said, "We want to make this a formal negotiation. Let's not have any more of these talks but let's negotiate." They had the right to do that under the agreement, so we had no choice but to agree. I spent the next three years, very heavily occupied in renegotiating the agreements with the Turks.

The original agreement had one key provision: while it provided for renegotiation and revision, it said that until new agreements had been negotiated, the provisions of the old agreements would continue in force. So the Turks were stuck with that. They couldn't simply repudiate the old agreements. They were stuck with continuing to honor the provisions of the old agreements.

Our position was a combination of political and military objectives. The Pentagon was very much involved. The team I led in the negotiations consisted of more military than Embassy people. We had a big military establishment in Ankara. They had a whole section in the military mission devoted to this negotiation process. So I drew very heavily on them for staff and for membership in the delegation.

The delegation would vary according to what the subject was. There were communications people who would sit in when we were talking about the communications agreement. There were all kinds of other people involved. We had engineers and we had real estate people, if we were talking about base construction. So the delegation changed in composition from one week to the next. But it was a long, hard process. An arm of the Pentagon was involved. The State Department was involved. So there was a lot of very heavy military interest.

Q: What were the main sticking points?

BOEHM: I might sum it up this way. There was no one sticking point. They all fell under the same rubric: there was the desire of the Turks that US military operations in Turkey should clearly reflect Turkish sovereignty in Turkey. This was opposed to the US posture of seeking to ensure maximum operational flexibility. You find this attitude expressed by our military not only

in Turkey but elsewhere, because I've been involved in these things in other countries. This means not having to go through too many channels, not having to get too many permits, having the ability to make a decision and do what we want to do on our own base or with our own planes, and flying here, there, or elsewhere. An easy way to sum it up would be this: if you have a military air base in a foreign country, do we have to get permission from the local government to fly someplace, or does a simple notification serve the purpose? If notification is sufficient, do you have to notify three days ahead of time, or can you take off and notify at the same time? That issue, in some ways, epitomizes the problem: who is running this place, anyway? The Turks felt that Turkey was Turkish and that they were running Turkey, and that US operations there had to conform with and illustrate the fact that Turkey was sovereign. Our feeling was, "What's the good of having these military facilities here if we can't run them efficiently? We have to have an agreement that works."

Q: Were you running across a Turkish mind set? Back in the Ottoman Empire, they had this practice of extending concessions under which people had extraterritorial rights. This was a sign of weakness.

BOEHM: Very much so. The Turks would never say that, of course, but there was no question in our mind that the Turks were thinking of the arrangements, called capitulations, which the Ottoman Empire had granted to various foreign powers regarding who ran the banking system, the post office, and everything else. That was undoubtedly in the mind of the Turkish negotiators, who were uncomfortable with our presence and the freedom with which we exercised our presence there. So, yes, that was certainly a fact of life.

Q: You were saying that the Turkish military were tough. At the same time...

BOEHM: Not just the military. The diplomats were very hard and tenacious negotiators.

Q: I would think that the Turkish military would understand the need for operational flexibility to do things.

BOEHM: At times they did. I would say that on certain issues -- I can't think of any specific matter -- the Turkish Foreign Ministry people were much tougher than the Turkish military, because the Turkish military did understand that on certain things you had to have a certain amount of flexibility. But the Foreign Ministry wasn't interested in that. They were interested in asserting Turkish sovereignty. So military flexibility was a matter of indifference to them. You could explain the issue from now to kingdom come, but they wouldn't move from their position.

So during three years of doing this, we didn't negotiate a single agreement. We agreed to drop one or two which had been outdated and no longer counted in the real world.

Q: In talking with other people about base negotiations and so forth in other countries I've understood that they've always had trouble. For the State Department the real problem was the Pentagon lawyers, more than anything else.

BOEHM: They were a pain in the neck.

Q: These people have no idea of local conditions or anything else. Their whole idea is, "Don't give an inch, don't do anything. We've got the agreement and..."

BOEHM: There was an office in the Pentagon -- it's still there. At one time I think it was called the Office of Foreign Base Rights. It had a lawyer's approach that was, in many ways, inappropriate. There were certain points we could have made concessions on, but the Pentagon lawyers would always say, "Well, if we give that to the Turks, we're going to have to give it to the Japanese and others." So they wouldn't make a distinction between one country and another, and you can understand their position. They had a point. If you make a concession to one country, other countries will find out about it and will want the same. A Political-Military most favored nation position, you might say.

Q: What was the attitude of the Embassy and of the various Turks you were dealing with toward the Soviet threat? I keep coming back to this.

BOEHM: The Turks, of course, have their own history with Russia, which goes back hundreds of years. There have been seven, eight, nine wars between Turkey and Russia. The Turks won the first few wars and then they began to lose them. Turkey regarded Russia then -- and, I'm sure, still does -- as a major threat. As recently as the time of World War I, the Russians drove their forces to a point halfway to Ankara. So NATO is very important to Turkey, and Turkey had no doubt that NATO meant the United States.

Q: You were in Ankara at a time when the colonels took over the government in Greece. I was Consul General in Athens at this time. When the Greeks are in doubt, they spend most of their time raising the specter of the Turks, which is very good, domestic policy. It is like waving the bloody shirt. How did the Turks -- both in the Foreign Ministry and in the military -- view the Greeks at this particular time?

BOEHM: To some extent the Greeks have always puzzled me in this context. Not really, since I know where they're coming from. The Turks were kind of mildly annoyed every time that the Greeks would stand up and yap at them. It was kind of like a Great Dane or St. Bernard or Anatolian sheep dog being attacked by a Chihuahua. Any time a Turkish plane would take off and fly anywhere near the Aegean Sea, the Greeks would scream that their airspace had been invaded, because they regarded the Aegean as their sea.

In any case, the Greeks kept it up, but there never was any serious intent which I could discern in Turkey to do anything nasty to Greece. However, the Greeks really don't like the Turks. There's an ancient hostility there. After all, Greece was part of the Ottoman Empire for hundreds of years, and the Greeks fought very hard to free themselves from it. As you mentioned before, the Turks have this almost racial, ethnic memory of the capitulations. For their part the Greeks have a memory of having been absorbed into the Ottoman Empire. So it's understandable. They are very sensitive about Turkey and see threats where there are none.

Q: But the Turkish preoccupation is really elsewhere?

BOEHM: Yes. They were not interested in doing anything to Greece. At the same time the Turks didn't want to be hemmed in by Greece, which would attempt to take the Aegean Sea and say, "You can't come in here," because the Turks would then be unable to get out of Turkey.

Russia -- the Soviet Union -- was the problem for the Turks. That was what the Turks were worried about. After all, you had the Soviet Black Sea Fleet constantly passing through the Turkish Straits. The Russians historically have wanted to dominate the Turkish Straits, and they still had this desire during the time I was in Turkey. It is a major concern of the Turks to maintain complete control of the Turkish Straits.

Q: Did the Turks pay much attention to the Middle East? It is an Islamic country, although secular in outlook. Did they pay much attention to squabbles in the area, like the difficulties involved with Iran and Palestine?

BOEHM: While I was there, they weren't paying much attention to those issues. Later, they did.

Q: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 occurred while you were there, involving Syria, Egypt, and Israel. Did that...

BOEHM: The Turks really didn't want to get involved in that. They weren't interested in it. They didn't regard themselves as part of some Islamic force that had to support their brothers.

Q: What about Iran? At that time we were heavily arming Iran during the Nixon- Kissinger period. One of their policies was to give the Shah of Iran virtually anything that he wanted. Were the Turks at all uncomfortable with all of the arms and equipment we were selling to Iran?

BOEHM: Not in terms of a threat from Iran. The Turks, I think, were uncomfortable about the fact that they weren't getting as much as they felt they needed. They saw us dumping all of this equipment -- huge amounts of aid to Israel and, later on, Egypt. And, at that time, Iran. I think that the Turks felt that their needs were greater and that the justification for supplying Turkey outweighed anybody else.

Q: How about Iraq? Was this a problem?

BOEHM: No, there was very little attention paid to it. One didn't think much about this. An occasional Turk would eye Kirkuk and Mosul and say, "Gee, we really made a mistake about letting all of that oil go." And Turkey was oil short.

Q: What about the Kurds? Was that a problem?

BOEHM: They were always a problem. During the period of the military take-over in Turkey, which was in place throughout most of my first tour in Turkey, the Kurdish situation was relatively quiet, but it was there. I think that, perhaps, the fact that the military were in power helped to keep things quiet. One of the prime ministers appointed by the generals, who had been Defense Minister, a man named Ferit Mulen, was a Kurd. There were Kurds participating in the Turkish government system, although they did not go around proclaiming that they were Kurds. They were ethnically Kurds. But while the Kurdish problem continued to exist -- and I'm sure

that there was a lot going on in terms of keeping the Kurds under control which we never heard about -- it wasn't a major issue.

A much bigger issue -- always -- was the Armenian question. This was a big issue.

Q: Could you talk about it?

BOEHM: Well, that wasn't an issue for the Turks. It was an issue for the Armenians -- especially the Armenian Americans. During my first tour in Turkey, as I recall it, the Armenians launched a very bloody episode in Turkish history. Armenians [in the United States] assassinated the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles and his deputy, after inviting him to address their meeting. The two Turkish officials had gone to address the meeting at the invitation of the Armenians. This was a very nasty matter. Then this kind of thing began to happen elsewhere in the world.

Q: There was a so-called Armenian Liberation Army?

BOEHM: The ASALA, as it was called: the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. There were other Armenian groups as well which were systematically killing Turkish diplomats all over the world.

Q: This has continued. One Turkish diplomat was killed just two days ago.

BOEHM: I've tried to pin that down. My brother-in-law told me yesterday that he'd heard this on the radio. I listened to the news and couldn't find it.

Q: It supposedly happened in Athens, as I recall it.

BOEHM: It might not have been Armenians who did it. It might have been Kurds. The Kurds have been trying, with less success than the Armenians, to kill Turkish diplomats.

Q: It must have been a major problem for you. Did this assassination of the Turkish Consul General [in Los Angeles] happen when you were in Turkey?

BOEHM: Yes. It caused a crisis in Turkish-American relations. We had to decide what to do. With these two assassinations you could say that the Turks understood that this was the first time that it had happened. What they wanted, then, was a follow-up in the form of security measures for Turks in the United States. This exceeded what Washington was willing to do or could do, because of our federal system. We looked for ways that we could deal with this problem. After all, our government does have responsibilities for foreign diplomats and consuls within its territory. We had to do something and so we made a big thing out of sending a special airplane to carry the bodies back to Turkey, accompanied by a senior official. There were all sorts of ways of showing regret and atonement. But we couldn't go as far as they wanted us to in terms of security measures to protect Turks in the United States. They had honorary consuls all over the place, for example. They wanted protection for them. The federal government couldn't do that. An honorary consul in Boston, say, has to go to the authorities in Massachusetts. If they're

willing to assign a cop to their homes, they will. If not, they won't. And the federal government can't do anything about that -- at least this is the position that we were taking.

We were never able completely to satisfy the Turks regarding the measures that we were taking within the United States. But we were able to do enough so that these murders did not cause a serious rift in relations.

Then, of course, the locus of the assassinations began to change -- eventually to Western Europe. That was later on. People you knew, people who had been in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during your tour, were getting killed. It seemed to me, at times, that I was spending one day a week, going down to a funeral in the street outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a Turkish diplomat who had been assassinated. So that situation got rather nasty.

Q: What was your view, from Ankara, of the Armenian-American lobby? Was this a political problem which we couldn't deal with very well?

BOEHM: The Turks couldn't deal with it, and, therefore, we couldn't deal with it. What the Armenians wanted was several things, or at least several things that they said that they wanted, if you could believe that they really wanted them. They wanted the Turks to admit that they had carried out an act of genocide [in 1915] and to compensate them for it. Beyond that there were those Armenians who wanted a return of property, including land, for the re-creation of Armenia in its ancient territory. I had difficulty imagining any Californian of Armenian extraction going to live in eastern Turkey.

Q: In fact I've heard interviews with Armenians saying that we want this and that. These were Armenian-American professors at universities in California. When they were asked, "Do you want to go and live there," they made clear that they wanted to carry on their teaching in the U. S. They felt that it was better to continue to teach in California.

BOEHM: So that coming generations will know that there are Armenians, even though they won't move to Armenia. Anyway, to return to the point. This is something that happened. The Turks were unwilling to admit that they had carried out atrocities and acts of genocide against the Armenians, although, over a period of time, from the 1890's on into the 1920's, bad things had happened to Armenians. But regarding the main event, in 1915 or thereabouts, the Turks denied that they had systematically sought to exterminate or kill off as many Armenians as possible. They argued that the Armenians had brought on themselves the necessity of moving them, because they had been collaborating with Turkey's enemies during World War I. Therefore, the Turks said, they had had to move them out of strategically important territory. The Turks admitted that perhaps in the course of moving them some of them had suffered tragic fates. However, the Turks claimed, there was no policy decision to let them die, even though they were marched hundreds of miles across very forbidding country.

So that was the Turkish position. They said that the Armenians had done some awful things to the Turks. During my second tour there the Turks opened up a museum designed to show the awful things that the Armenians had done to the Turks. So there was very little give in the Turkish position. I also think that in the Turkish mind there was the fear -- they would never

quite admit this, but I think that it was a consideration -- that if they did admit responsibility for what happened to the Armenians, they would have had to pay a staggering amount of money in compensation. So they wouldn't do it.

They decided, however, that they would publish the Turkish records on the Armenian question, and they set to work on it. We said, "Why don't you hurry up and do it quickly and get this question fully ventilated?" The Turk who was in charge of this effort said to me, "You don't understand what these Ottoman archives are like. They consist of shoe boxes with scraps of paper, all over the place. They've been neglected for 60 years. They're mouse-eaten and worm-eaten. They're very hard to deal with. It's not as if they were on a computer and you could just publish them. So it's taking a long time." But the Turks began to publish the Armenian archives. There was alleged to be one key document, which was said to be an instruction sent by telegram, from the Interior Minister in Ankara to the local military commander, which said, in effect, "Kill all the Armenians," though not in so many words.

The Armenians have always claimed that this was an instruction which was actually sent and that it proves their case. The Turks have said, "We've searched all the archives, and there is simply no trace of any such message. We deny that such a message was ever sent." So there was a lot of that going on. There was a total reluctance on the part of the Turks to admit any responsibility or guilt, and there was an insistence on the Armenian side that they...

Q: Were you feeling any political pressure from California Congressmen?

BOEHM: Oh, yes. Absolutely. During my second tour in Turkey one of the issues which we had, talking about the Armenians, was that, when the Holocaust Museum was being planned, here in Washington, the Armenians wanted to have a corner of it for their own genocide. The Turks heard about it and made a big issue out of it. They said, "You can't do this to us. Are we friendly countries or are you going to declare war on us?" We said, "Look, you have to understand that this is not a government project. This is a private activity, and we have no control over it." They said, "Aren't you giving them the land to build this museum?" We would reply, "Well...and..." and so forth.

We would say, "Look, you have relations with Israel. Why don't you get your Israeli contacts to communicate with leading Jews in the United States who are raising the funds and planning this memorial." Up to a point we would let Jewish groups, which were handling this thing, know that there would be a very bad reaction back in Turkey if the Armenians had a part of the Holocaust Museum. There were some people in the Jewish groups which were planning the museum who saw that point and would have liked to back away from it. The matter was still under discussion when I left Turkey. I recently visited the Holocaust Museum but couldn't go to the upstairs part of it. I hadn't made arrangements ahead of time. If you just go there, you can see the part that's always open. But to go to the other part, you have to make arrangements in advance, and I hadn't done that.

However, I think that I've heard that somewhere in the Holocaust Museum there is an Armenian section.

Q: I went through there quickly and I am just not sure.

BOEHM: I could be wrong but I've heard that there is a small Armenian exhibit.

Q: You left Ankara when?

BOEHM: I left there in August, 1974.

Q: Let's talk about July 14 or whenever it was.

BOEHM: You were still in Athens then?

Q: I had left Athens on July 1, 1974. Can you talk about how the Cyprus crisis appeared to you?

BOEHM: Oh, yes. First of all, it hit me in terms of personal plans. I had been planning to leave Ankara on about July 15. By that time we had a new Ambassador.

Q: William Macomber.

BOEHM: Macomber had arrived in Ankara. This was during my first tour in Ankara. Ambassador Macomber had been there for a while. The Cyprus crisis began, and Ambassador Macomber asked me to defer my departure, saying that it was not a good time to leave. The DCM, Jim Spain, was also supposed to be leaving at that time. Jim Spain was also asked to postpone his departure. Of course, we both did.

The situation was a very interesting one and was developing very quickly. Things were happening in Cyprus which had to produce some kind of Turkish reaction.

Q: You're talking about...

BOEHM: We're talking about the colonels who were running Greece at the time. They were trying to implement a policy of enosis, that is, the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. This was unacceptable to the Turks. An obstacle in the path of the Greek leaders was the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. So the Greek leaders overthrew him. They sent some pawns of theirs -- Grivas, I think, was behind this. They attacked the Presidential Palace. Makarios managed to slip out and got away. Then they appointed a well known goon, a bloodthirsty type.

Q: Samson, was it?

BOEHM: Samson.

Q: He was a real thug.

BOEHM: Yes. The colonels installed him in the Cyprus Presidential Palace. That was what touched off the Turks. The Turks said: "You know, we've been following this question very, very closely, and we knew the minute that they installed Samson in Cyprus, we were going to have to

move in. We simply couldn't accept that. This is a bloodthirsty man."

Q: Could you do this a bit more in sequence. Makarios was overthrown but escaped. What was our Embassy in Ankara doing at that time?

BOEHM: You're really testing my memory on this point. I was packing up my effects. [Laughter] We were watching the situation. We didn't want the Greeks and Turks to get into a fight. Of course, we didn't want the Turks to intervene in Cyprus with armed force. Years before, the famous Johnson letter had virtually ordered the Turks to stay out of Cyprus, at a time when Turks were being killed on that island. We had thought that the Turks were ready to move in then. President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu of Turkey and said, "If you move into Cyprus and the Russians then attack you while you are doing that, we don't consider that NATO guarantees apply." And the Turks dropped their preparations. Incidentally, they never forgave us for that. They were still incensed about the Johnson letter and still had bruised feelings throughout the time that I was there. I have no doubt that they still feel hurt about it today.

There wasn't going to be any second Johnson letter, but we didn't want the Turks to go into Cyprus. They didn't say that they would. They were watching the situation very carefully, because they didn't want another slaughter of the Turks, which they anticipated if things developed further, after Samson took over in Cyprus.

Joe Sisco was then the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department. He went out and made a brief visit to Greece and Turkey. When he visited Athens and Ankara, he told everybody to cool off. When Sisco was leaving Turkey -- I think that he was at the airport -- we learned that the Turks had invaded Cyprus. [Laughter]

Q: Someone I was interviewing was saying that they were on a plane on this shuttle visit. They got on the plane -- I think that it was in Ankara -- and learned about the invasion. They wondered where to go next. They had run out of options.

BOEHM: Sisco's mission was a flop. The Turks moved in.

Q: Were the Turks telling you what they were going to do, or not?

BOEHM: No, they didn't. A lot of interesting things were happening. The Turks called us up one day and told us [in Ankara], "We've drawn a line in the water. If the Greek Navy crosses that line on the way to Cyprus, we're going to hit them." Then they called us and said, "There's a Greek warship on the way [to Cyprus]. It's going to cross that line, and we're going to hit it." Our Ambassador got on the phone to Athens and said, "What about this? Tell the Greeks, for God's sake, not to send it." Embassy Athens got back in touch with our Ambassador and said, "The Greeks tell us that there isn't any ship on the way to Cyprus. They haven't got a ship going to Cyprus." So Ambassador Macomber got on the phone to the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, and said, "I'm telling you, there's no Greek ship on the way." So Prime Minister Ecevit said, "That's what you think. There's a Greek ship going to Cyprus, and it's going to cross that line. We're going to let it have it." The Greek ship crossed the line, and the Turks sank it. It turned out to be a Turkish warship. [Laughter] It was a beautiful example of non-communication

between the Turkish Navy and Air Force. The Turkish Air Force sank a Turkish Navy ship.

But the Turks moved into Cyprus, and they took a piece of the northern part of the island. They stopped for a while and then they moved again. They eventually wound up holding about one-third of Cyprus.

Q: *What were you doing?*

BOEHM: First of all, when we recognized the possibility that the Turks might invade Cyprus, we urged them not to do it. But they did. They ignored us. Then we tried to get them to stop their advance. There was a big question about what they were going to do when they got to Nicosia airport. The UN, of course, had had peacekeeping troops in Cyprus for years already. They were lined up at the airport, and the Turks were advancing on the airport. The big message to the Turks was, "Don't attack the UN troops. The UN troops are going to stay there and hold their line." The Turks stopped on the north side of the airport, and they've been there ever since.

Q: *Were all of the lines of communication broken between our Embassy in Ankara and the Turkish military?*

BOEHM: No. We always had contact with them, but, of course, they might be hard to reach at any given moment. They might not want to talk to us at a specific point in time. Once they invaded Cyprus, all we could say, "Gee, we wish you hadn't done this. Please stop as soon as you can. When are you going to get out?" They haven't done this yet.

Q: *What was the Turkish attitude toward the Americans?*

BOEHM: The Turks' attitude was, "You stopped us once before. We should have moved ahead then in Cyprus. We have a right to do so." They cited the London and Paris agreements which created the Republic of Cyprus as giving them the right to move in to protect the constitution. They said that the constitution had been violated, and there was a certain amount of truth to that. So the Turks argued that what they were doing was legal. Of course, Greece has never accepted that notion. We have more or less taken the position that we don't want to get into a discussion of what's legal or not. We said, in effect, let's see if we can get the Turks to cut down the number of their forces or get out. But they have not done so.

Q: *Did you feel at this particular point -- and this will come up later on -- with things happening so fast that the Greek Lobby was not a particular problem? We were doing what we would have done anyway -- or was the Greek Lobby an issue at this particular point?*

BOEHM: What do you mean, "doing what we would have done anyway"?

Q: *We wanted to keep two NATO allies from going at each other. Later, it turned into an almost domestic, political issue [in the US] with the Greek Lobby in action. I take it that, by the time that you were there, things were moving so fast that it probably didn't...*

BOEHM: It was said that the Greek Lobby was playing an important role. Maybe this was

subsequently, in terms of cutting off aid to Turkey, which was done fairly soon after the Turkish move into Cyprus.

Congress itself studied this issue later on. There's a report of a Congressional committee somewhere which you could find, if you're interested, which studied the extent to which the Greek Lobby had any influence on the making of American policy. It concluded that the Greek Lobby hadn't had much of an influence. I don't know what it was that motivated Congress to cut off aid to Turkey, but they did.

Q: But this is after you [left Turkey]. Well, then...

BOEHM: Between my first and second tour in Turkey.

Q: Would this be a good point to cut it off?

BOEHM: Yes, it would be...

DONALD C. BERGUS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1972-1977)

Donald C. Bergus was born in South Bend, Indiana in 1920. His Foreign Service career included positions in Egypt, Turkey, the Sudan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Bergus was interviewed by Lillian P. Mullin on January 24, 1991.

BERGUS: I was in the Department for two years and then the chance to become the DCM in Ankara came along and I was very happy to take it. The main problem that we had had until the middle of 1974 with Turkey, our great concern then was narcotics. Turkey was one of the few countries in the world that had a program whereby farmers raised opium. The government felt that they were controlling it satisfactorily, they could sell the opium only to the government which bought it. The farmers made the raw opium themselves and sold the product to the government. Three or four years before 1974 under very heavy pressure from the United States the Turkish government had forbidden the further growing of opium. As a result they had an awful lot of very discontented farmers. A lot of the land in Turkey is poor and there are few crop substitutes but none that paid off as well as opium did. These people had raised opium for generations -- they did not use it as a rule -- but it was part of their culture. When you take the opium out of a poppy it comes in sort of a round gummy ball and they would hold back three or four and hide them some place and that was to take care of their daughter's dowry once she got married. It was a form of savings.

The system was not foolproof as the Turkish government said it was, there was an awful lot of leakage into illicit channels. So we talked the government into banning the production completely and they were able to enforce it. The Turkish government was generally pretty strong, but they had an awful lot of discontented farmers on their hands. We tried to give them

dairy cattle and other substitute crops, but it did not work. There had been an election in early 1974 and the successful party had campaigned on the fact that they would restore the opium trade.

Q: Did you understand Turkish?

BERGUS: I could, from Arabic, generally get the drift about what they were talking. Turkish is a lovely language. Anyway, when I was preparing to go out to Turkey all my briefings were based around the problem of "you have got to do something about this opium trade." As a matter of fact Bill Macomber was back on consultation just before I was to leave. What happened in Cyprus was that a group of Cypriot nationalists under the care and guidance of the military dictatorship in Greece pulled a coup and overthrew Archbishop Makarios. [July 1974] This got the Turks all upset because they were convinced, and not without reason, that this lot would do their best to harry the Turkish minority out of the land. They had to do something about it. So we arrived back days before the Turks began the invasion of Cyprus. That was a pretty busy summer. The Turks landed and in two waves of military operations they grabbed the northern third of the island, which they still hold -- forty percent of the island. There was a lot of to-do about that. You got into a lot of domestic politics. There is not much of a Turkish vote in this country, but there is a Greek vote and Greek-American legislators. I found this all very interesting because my father was born in Greece. He came to the United States and married my mother, who is of Pennsylvania Dutch stock, and there it was. So as crisis go it was a pretty good crisis that summer. We had the Cyprus problem on our hands and the constant threat from Congress, which they eventually made good, that unless the Turks got out of Cyprus they were going to cut off aid, which in fact they did. Then we still had this opium problem.

The opium problem, oddly enough, we "solved" and I think rather well. Science came to our rescue, in that a farmer could raise the poppies and then instead of the process in which he took the opium from the poppy by bleeding the poppy at a certain stage of its development, he allowed the poppy head to die and sold the dry poppy head to the government at a good price and certain pharmaceutical factories were able to extract a narcotic from those dry poppy heads. One of the things that made it easy to enforce is that to take narcotic from a dry poppy head is a very complex manufacturing process which you can't conceal and there were only two or three factories in the world at that time capable of this process. While converting raw opium to heroin you can do in a garage. All the narcotics traffickers were able to do that very easily. So it was a very effective answer to the problem. The farmer got to raise his poppies, the legitimate narcotic trade had a source of supply and interestingly enough, one of the facts that came out of this, this was just about the time that MEDICARE was about to take hold in the United States and allow a lot of elderly people, who had not been able to afford to go to doctors, to go to doctors. As a result the demand for codeine and other legitimate opium products was going way up. So we were very happy to get this Turkish source of supply.

Anyway the opium problem was, as far as most diplomatic problems were concerned, solved within a matter of some months. But the Cyprus problem remained and it was still flourishing when I left Turkey in 1977.

Q: Didn't Congress offer to cut off aid to Turkey because of the Cyprus situation?

BERGUS: They did indeed. They did not only debate cutting it off, but they cut it off. This was during the Ford administration. Twice Ford vetoed the bills aimed at cutting off aid to Turkey and the second veto was overridden and aid was cut off. Therefore the Turks suspended operations on the network of bases we had had in Turkey, which in those days were very important. Now we only had one base, Incirlik, which we still have, and which by the way we have just received permission to use against Iraq. That was the only operating military base in Turkey, the rest were all listening posts. By listening posts I mean electronic listening posts. These facilities were very important to us because of them we were able to monitor the Soviet missile program.

When we suspended aid to Turkey, the Turks suspended operation of our bases and there was an awful lot of very good military intelligence we lost for a couple of months because of that. Relations got quite tense. There were always our day to day relations with the government and the Foreign Ministry which were very good. The Turks are a mature people. They have a small foreign office but professionally one of the best foreign offices in the world, and extremely capable. So we managed, but we had all sorts of housekeeping problems. They suspended some of the free entry privileges which our military enjoyed in Turkey and all that kind of day to day housekeeping problems. These were not exciting but time consuming and they meant an awful lot to a lot of people.

Q: Let us go back once again to the time of Makarios's ouster in 1974. Did you have a feeling that this was expected or anticipated either in the United States or in Turkey?

BERGUS: No, I don't think so. There certainly had been plenty of tension between the Greeks and Turks over Cyprus, there had been in the early '60s a threat that the Turks were going to take over the island because under Makarios the Turkish minority got more and more hemmed in, freedom of movement was denied them and they had a pretty rough life. The Turkish government just did not want to tolerate this behavior. That crisis was resolved, partially, and then there was the military coup in Greece, April 22, 1967. but this business of knocking off Makarios and trying to declare immediate union with Greece came as a surprise.

Q: Was Makarios against enosis?

BERGUS: He was against it because he was a big frog in a little puddle and he wanted to keep his puddle. The Turks, who detested Makarios, at least knew him. They did not rejoice when Makarios was thrown out of office, they got ready for war because they knew that these people on the mainland were working on *enosis* and they would not, as they said were hemmed in by these islands and their only outlook in the Mediterranean, was to the south, and you make Cyprus part of Greece, then we are really hemmed in. So they felt very strongly about it and they felt very strongly about the humiliation suffered by the Turkish minority on the island.

Q: The press was always talking at the time about our Greek bases and the junta was threatening to call for our withdrawal.

BERGUS: They were both playing it, the Greek bases, they were more interesting from a

military operations and logistics thing, naval facilities in Crete and the airport in Athens while the Turkish bases had become much more interesting from the intelligence viewpoint.

Q: Couldn't we have moved the naval base to Izmir?

BERGUS: I don't think that ever came up. You know that once the military gets a base they will tell you that the whole world depends on it. There was never any question, they wanted those Greek bases, they had put a lot of money in them. As a matter of fact, as I recall, they had had a scheme whereby they were going to "home port" ships in Greece, which meant that you would have permanent military colonies around them, just like our base in the Philippines.

Q: There was a headline from that period in which it was claimed that the US backed Cypriot independence but did not appear to be displeased at the Makarios ouster.

BERGUS: Well I think that was the case because Makarios had been playing footsie with the Russians and he was not a very attractive person -- at least from the point of view of our government. He was intriguing and that sort of thing.

Q: Of course Sampson who came in was...

BERGUS: He was just a thug, a pure thug.

Q: He did not last very long.

BERGUS: One thing in the decade before 1974, Turkey had exported a lot of laborers to Europe, particularly to Germany, and particularly to Berlin. These people, hard working, did a lot of the scut work that the Germans did not want to do, they got well paid and sent it back to Turkey. So you could go to a Turkish village and see two or three houses that had been fixed up and really looked well -- you could say, "Ah, ha, there are German workers in those villages." As a result of this the Turks, probably for the first time in their history, had tremendous reserves of foreign exchange, which they had never had before. All this went along very well until the 1973 Middle East war and the increase in oil prices. This swallowed up the Turkish foreign exchange surpluses very fast and also slowed down the economies of Europe and the Turkish workers started to come home and tried to live off the economy. That was one of the sources of unrest. Then you had the students who, like students everywhere at that time, were against the established order. Remember Vietnam was just drawing to a bloody close, so you had great unrest there, then you had a pan-Islamic movement, which you still see in the Middle East, of conservatives who wanted to undo all the reforms that Ataturk had done -- make Islam the state religion, reveil the women. This had a certain amount of power behind it, and you even had a pan-Turanian movement who wanted to reconstruct the glorious Turkey of history, which probably never existed, which extended through the southern Soviet Union, almost to Mongolia. So you had economic unrest, all these competing forces, you had constant unrest, particularly among the students and they played pretty seriously at it. I was shocked, you had high school demonstrations with high school students shooting at each other with real guns. It was a very frightening thing.

Q: Where did they get the guns?

BERGUS: Well, you can get anything. As this went on the question came, when is the army going to take over again? They won't put up with this for long. The Cyprus thing gave Ecevit a year's lease on life because of his action protecting Turkish interests in Cyprus by making sure that Cyprus did not become a threat to Turkey, was very popular. The Turkish army fulfilled its mission in a way that gratified the Turkish people, but as this began to wear thin all this other unrest developed. So it was a fairly insecure place.

Q: Didn't they have difficulty with their Iraqi border?

BERGUS: Well, they had a Kurdish problem, but in my day they solved the Kurdish problem by saying the Kurds did not exist, that the Kurds were mountain Turks, they were not separate.

Q: Wasn't there a Kurdish refugee problem along with an Armenian one?

BERGUS: Yes. The Armenian situation had pretty well been solved in 1915 when the Armenians were exported or massacred. But they had this Kurdish unrest on the border, so the country was relatively calm, but they had demonstrations and they had difficulties. And they had incredible inflation. I think -- don't hold me to these numbers -- that when I went there something like 700 Turkish lira to the dollar and when I left it was 3000, something incredible, an increase in inflation. So you had all sorts of basis of discontent within the country.

Q: Did Kissinger come over?

BERGUS: He came over twice while I was there. The first time he had some spare time, he was in the Middle East negotiations and there was a hiatus of three or four days while either the Egyptians or the Israelis were preparing answers, so he came to Turkey. He did not perform very brilliantly there and did not get anywhere, and then he came another time for a CENTO meeting. CENTO was the long-since deceased treaty we had -- a defense arrangement between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. That had been started by John Foster Dulles and never really got off the ground and Iraq was part of it but after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, that was really the end of that pact, but it was still there.

Q: Kissinger liked to talk on the telephone a lot. Didn't he call the Turkish government a lot?

BERGUS: Well he called them fairly often, and Kissinger basically was concerned about maintaining our defensive alliance with Turkey to the point where the Greeks thought he had gone completely pro-Turk. They had cartoons of him in the papers in Athens showing him wearing a Turkish fez -- even though the Turks had abolished the fez fifty years before. So he made himself persona non grata with the Greeks but he did not do too well with Turks either, so he did not cover himself with any brilliance with the Cyprus dispute.

Q: He made some remarks about Makarios, that Makarios was dead politically.

BERGUS: That I don't recall.

Q: I saw that in a newspaper article, and Makarios threatened to return.

BERGUS: He did return and died in his bed in office.

Q: Were the Turks upset about his returning?

BERGUS: By that time they had in their hands what they wanted and they were going to keep it.

Q: How did the Turks feel about Demirel?

BERGUS: They elected him while I was there. He beat out Ecevit -- he really didn't beat him out, but he was able to -- by that time the Turkish left had broken into a million pieces so Denktesh was able to put together a coalition of the center right and far rightist parties. He had the Muslim extremists and the pan-Turanian extremists in his government, some of whom were a pretty merry lot I can tell you. Anyway in my last months there we kept saying to each other, "When is the army going to step in?" which they did after I left. I was there into early 1977.

Q: In 1975 the Vietnam war came to a bloody end, did that affect the Department of State's or Government's attention to what was happening on Cyprus?

BERGUS: I think that did. I think pasting together the Middle East after the '73 war did. Greece and Turkey did not get the attention they'd gotten say a decade earlier.

Q: Is that while they were looking for more aid from Libya?

BERGUS: Well, the pan-Islamic people, who were basically anti-western in Turkey, were saying, "We should not mess around with these Americans who treat us so mean and are pro-Greek anyway underneath and if we would just get rid of the Americans, the Libyans, the Saudis and all those would come in and give us all we need if we become a good Moslem state." Which was baloney on its face and most Turks realized that was baloney because although they are Moslems they ruled the Arabs for many centuries.

Q: They are not Arabs?

BERGUS: No, Turkish is a completely different language. The idea of depending on Arabs for assistance was not very attractive for most Turks.

Q: Is there a memory in Turkey of their Ottoman empire?

BERGUS: Oh yes, they still have, for example, the foreign minister under Demirel, was an old Ottoman gentleman. He still wrote his Turkish in Arabic script which had been abolished forty or fifty years before. So you had people who remembered the Ottoman days.

Q: Was there an awareness that they were the last most important part of the Roman empire?

BERGUS: Yes, you have Roman ruins as far inland as Ankara, all over the place, Izmir and that

whole area. They are very proud of their heritage. They have created a pretty impressive school of Turkish archeologists of those periods.

Q: In 1975 student unrest was exploding there, and the exported terrorism, I am thinking of the murder of the two Turkish ambassadors, one in Paris and one in Vienna. How did this effect your work?

BERGUS: That was Armenian irredentism and we worried a great deal about terrorism, Palestinian mostly because Turkey was close enough to the area and Istanbul is a place where people can come and go freely so Palestinians could come in. Shortly after I left Palestinians took over the Egyptian embassy and held it for three or four days until the Turks roused them out in Ankara. So we had enough of it around. And then you add Greek terrorism, our ambassador in Cyprus at the time, Rodger Davies, who was a very close friend of mine, was murdered and we are pretty sure now and when I was there that the evidence was that it was Greek terrorism. So we had enough of it around.

Q: In Davies case they arrested six Greek Cypriot policemen and they got off with some two weeks sentences or something.

BERGUS: If I knew it I had forgotten it.

Q: Terrorism against Turkish diplomats was evident all over the place, I remember the Turkish consulate in Hamburg putting up all kinds of iron gates, it looked like the Israeli consulate.

BERGUS: The Israeli embassy in Ankara was pretty well protected too.

Q: At about this time there was the Lockheed scandal, did you get involved?

BERGUS: Not really, although the Turks did have some Lockheed aircraft. As I recall they were supplied by the US government either as aid or military sales, so I don't believe the Turks were involved in that, not to any great extent anyway. You didn't have Lockheed buying whole governments the way they did elsewhere apparently.

Q: As I recall the Turks allowed the PLO to open its office in Turkey.

BERGUS: That could have been, I just don't remember it. That would have been under the Demirel government and he had some of these pan-Islamic people in his government. That could well have happened, I draw a blank on that one.

Q: Do you recall the problem that was with the Lithuanian hijacking?

BERGUS: Oh boy, do I remember that. I was on the front lines on that one. This was a Lithuanian and his son and they had hijacked an aircraft in the Soviet Union, flown it to Turkey and in the process of it they shot and killed the stewardess of the Soviet aircraft. The Turks were under heavy pressure to turn this man and his son over to the Soviets. That they refused to do. The two of them were tried and convicted. They served prison terms which were so many years,

I can't remember, and then after they had served their prison terms they were put in an internment camp in Turkey.

One morning in the late spring or early summer we were minding our own business and our consul, who was Jane Whitney, came up with her eyes about to pop out said that these two characters had just come in and were about to claim asylum. We were in a heck of a dilemma. They wanted asylum in the United States, the Russians still wanted them, and these were in their way freedom fighters, but they had after all killed a person. It was a fairly messy business. Anyway we gave them asylum in the embassy until we could sort things out. We notified the Turks and we notified Washington. The next twenty-four to forty-eight hours we had some problems on our hands. It so happened, it rarely gets hot in the summer in Ankara, but in that particular period we had a heck of a heat wave and that did not make anybody any happier. We finally worked out a deal whereby we would return the young man and his father to Turkish jurisdiction. They would then, after twenty-four or forty-eight hours, put them on a plane to Rome where a Lithuanian prelate would look after them and send them on to Venezuela which was accepting Lithuanian refugees at that time. They had given assurances that they would accept these two people. So we then had the job of persuading the father and son to go along with this.

The only way we could talk to the father was through the son who had some English. The father has some rudimentary Turkish and of course Lithuanian. We did our best to explain to them what would happen. I went down to explain. The father was adamant, he said, "These promises from the Turks, I won't trust them. They will probably turn me over to the Russians." I explained that, "They did not give these promises to you, they gave them to the United States and I can assure you that when they give promises to the United States that is quite a different thing." We had great trouble. Finally we even brought out a lady, a very attractive middle aged lady of Lithuanian extraction, who was a senior executive in one of the big defense organizations in the United States and who was sort of the head of a Lithuanian organization. Actually by the time she got out there we had finally persuaded the Lithuanians to give themselves to the Turks but she helped push the deal through. In the course of it, to make his point, the father, pulled out a little bitty pen knife and stabbed himself in the stomach with it. There was a fairly superficial wound. We had the US Army doctors there and they patched him up in no time, put a little bandage on it. Finally we completed the deal. It was all like something out of a novel. The Turks took a five lira note, which was worth about a penny, and tore it in half, and gave me half. I was supposed to identify myself when I brought the two to the Turks. All that sort of hocus pocus. They were delivered to the Turks about eleven o'clock at night. They were immediately taken to Istanbul, put in the hospital there for two or three days and then flown to Rome. Then theoretically they were flown to New York where they were to be immediately transferred to a flight to Venezuela. We did not want to have anything to do with them as they had been involved in this murder. Anyway as things so often work, the plane they came in on went to Kennedy airport and the plane to Venezuela took off from Laguardia airport. On the bus between the two places the two people got off and disappeared for a while. When they caught them they were in Boston, I believe, and the young man was married to an American girl of Lithuanian extraction. I don't know how it was ever sorted out after that, but I breathed a sigh of relief once they got out of our consular district, but that was a pretty exciting couple of days.

Q: Was this not about the same time that the Soviet aircraft carrier came through the Bosphorus?

BERGUS: I guess I was still there when that happened. I know there was a great debate, was it an aircraft carrier or was it not? After all it was for the Turks to interpret the straits treaty. They said it was not and they let it through. But that was read by some to show that the Turkish government was going neutralist on us, etc., etc. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing on that one.

Q: Were you there when Makarios died in 1977?

BERGUS: I think it was after I had left.

Q: You were there when Consul General Moffitt's residence was sprayed with gunfire in Izmir?

BERGUS: Yes. We went down there.

Q: Who did that, what was going on there?

BERGUS: I frankly can't remember.

Q: There was a bomb in a garden. There were a lot of bombs.

BERGUS: The hotel in Ankara was a transit one for military people, that had a bomb on the ground floor -- not too far from my house as a matter of fact. There was a lot of that going on. The Communists were then in about two or three factions and I think it was one of those that did it.

As a bystander today following things, the fact that this Turkish government at great expense to itself has lined up with us in the anti-Iraq coalition because one of the few good sources of Turkish foreign exchange is that pipeline that goes from Iraqi oil fields to the Mediterranean. Not only the fact that the Turkish government but the parliament has voted to allow us to use Incirlik airbase for operations with the coalition, I think we have done damn well in Turkey. The Cyprus problem is not solved except that you have in effect a partition although both sides say, "Oh no, sooner or later we will make a federation there". But as far as our objectives are concerned we have not done at all badly in Turkey. Now given what has happened in the Soviet Union, whether all those advanced electronic bases are still that important to us any more, I just do not know.

Q: During your period there, there were several serious earthquakes.

BERGUS: Our response was good in a way. There was one serious one when I was there. We had trouble responding appropriately. We sent out huge hospital groups. One thing that we did not realize, which the old Turkish hands did realize, that in a Turkish earthquake if you are in your house -- remember these are stone houses with heavy roofs on them -- that if an earthquake strikes, you probably are dead, and if you are not in your house you probably are alive -- and there are very few cases in between that require hospitalization. So we responded with a lot of

that. We would dump a lot of stuff on them which they could not use. I know that when the earthquake hit the German ambassador took the line that, "We will give more aid when the aid we sent for the last earthquake is released from Turkish customs". It had been there all that time. It just shows the cultural gap that remained.

I remember the earthquake when I was there that one of the best things we did -- it was out in a remote place with an ordinary airstrip -- we sent out a team with an aircraft controller and because of that they were able to stage aircraft through there at a much faster rate than would have been the case if there had only been primitive windsox and that sort of thing. That made a deep impression on the Turks and on the other donor countries. They could send their stuff down by aircraft and it could actually get to the scene of the devastation very quickly and effectively.

ALAN FLANIGAN
Deputy Principal Officer
Izmir (1973-1975)

Alan Flanigan was born in Indiana in 1938. He graduated from Tufts University in 1960 and served in the U.S. Navy from 1960 to 1966 as a lieutenant. After entering the Foreign Service in 1966, his assignments abroad have included Lima, Izmir, Ankara and Lisbon, with an ambassadorship to El Salvador.

FLANIGAN: I finally got around to changing my area of interest or expanding it a little bit, so I went off to learn the Turkish language.

Q: Had you wanted to particularly learn the Turkish language and serve in Turkey or was that an opportunity that presented itself. How did that happen to come about?

FLANIGAN: I wanted to go to either Turkey or Greece. Greece was much more popular, so it was easier to get into Turkish training; so I happily did that.

Q: That was what a full year language training program?

FLANIGAN: Ten months. It was a long time.

Q: Where were you assigned after that? After learning Turkish?

FLANIGAN: In 1973 I went to Izmir for the first two years of what turned out to be a five year assignment in Turkey. We had a consulate general in Izmir at that time. We'd had consular and commercial relations with that part of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire for a long time, and it became a particular point of interest from a strategic point of view. There were two NATO military headquarters in Izmir, so it was a fairly active consulate general. I was the political officer and the deputy principal officer.

Q: How many besides the consul general and yourself, were there two or three more officers?

FLANIGAN: We had an administrative officer, a junior officer who did economic work. We had an American secretary, and we had a USIS branch officer. We also had two officers from DEA.

Q: The consular district for Izmir was what, western Anatolia?

FLANIGAN: Aegean Turkey basically, and the Mediterranean coast, halfway down the Mediterranean coast and halfway up the Aegean coast until we met the Adana and Istanbul consular districts.

Q: And you went inland until you met the Ankara.

FLANIGAN: That's right. Inland as far as Afyonkarahisar. Afyon is the Turkish word for opium.

Q: Now did we have a political advisor connected with either of the NATO headquarters?

FLANIGAN: No, we didn't. To a certain extent the consul general played that role. It was a limited extent, but he did. Limited because the American commanders were very senior. We had a four star Army general at Land Forces Southeast headquarters. We had a three star Air Force general at Sixth Allied Tactical Air Forces headquarters, and there were at least two other two star military officers at the two command headquarters. As you can see, it was a very high powered American military presence.

Q: And you as deputy principal officer and political officer you were primarily involved in contacts and reporting on Turkish political developments or were you more involved with the NATO, U.S. military?

FLANIGAN: No, I largely was dedicated to domestic political reporting. It was an fascinating time to be in Turkey. The government in power had been elected democratically, but its power had been greatly diminished by what was called "a coup by memorandum." The military had restricted its power, and the military effectively controlled a lot of policy, but it was in the process of giving up that control and elections were held in late '73 or early '74. It must have been late '73. As a result of those elections Bulent Ecevit became prime minister.

Q: Well, the other major development in that period involved Cyprus and relations with Greece. How much of that affected you in the consulate in Izmir, and what role if any did you play in that period?

FLANIGAN: We were observers, but we were close observers. Some of the Turkish forces that participated in what they called the intervention of Cyprus left from the Aegean coast and some from Izmir itself. It was a frightening time in many ways. Looking back on it, of course, there was probably no reason to be frightened; although, there had been reports at the time, and I think have been validated since that in fact the Greek Air Force was ordered to bomb Izmir but did not. I can recall quite vividly that summer. Consul General Glenn Smith was on home leave, so I was in charge. I was concerned about the safety of my family, and I felt responsible for the safety of the staff of the consulate general. We had a Turkish Cypriot who was one of our local

employees, a very competent, very reasonable, interesting person, and I had learned quite a bit about Cyprus just because he was there. When the coup occurred against Makarios, he came to me and talked to me about it. I was, I guess, dumbfounded by his reaction. Like most Americans I had assumed that Turkish Cypriots would be happy with the overthrow of Makarios. But, I was wrong. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots who still had family in Cyprus was that it was a terrible thing. Makarios was someone they knew and understood even if they did not like or trust him. They knew that Makarios had been overthrown by Greek – not Greek Cypriot – military forces, and they feared that Cyprus would be united with Greece by force endangering the lives and livelihood of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. So from the Turkish Cypriot point of view, you could begin to see the problem. I wasn't terribly surprised when Turkish forces invaded a few days later. It all happened very quickly.

Q: I think it was about five days. I think the coup was about July 15, and the intervention on the 20th.

FLANIGAN: It was very fast, and of course the city of Izmir was blacked out. I recall going down to the consulate and doing as all offices had to do, taping paper over the windows. One of the curious things, and I'll never understand it, was that you could drive cars and you could have your lights on, but you had to have blue paper or blue paint over the head lamps.

Q: To shield the lamps?

FLANIGAN: I guess. I wouldn't have thought it would be very effective. There was a major Greek element at Lands Forces Southeast when the invasion occurred. The next day they all returned to Greece. Something in the range of 65 officers and men on the staff, and they all left immediately. There were daily Turkish airline flights between Izmir and Athens in those days. They were suspended. I think they are still suspended.

Q: You mentioned that it was a frightening period for you and your family and the staff at the consulate because of the fear that there would be an attack by the Greek Air Force. What was the feeling generally of the Turks in Izmir toward the United States? We, of course, had dissuaded Turkey from taking action in Cyprus on a previous occasion or two. Did they think we would try to do it again or of course there were other problems that occurred later because of the action that Congress took. At that time was there support or interest or appreciation for the United States or was it a difficult time in that aspect?

FLANIGAN: The attitude toward the United States was in general very positive. I am sure there was some distrust of us because of our efforts to be friends with both Turkey and Greece, but I always felt welcome. It was always acceptable to be an American either in Izmir or in rural Turkey. When I would go around the consular district, I nearly always received a friendly reception. At the extremes of the political spectrum, on the right and on the left, there were always a few elements that were somewhat antagonistic because they considered it to be in their own immediate political interest to be that way, but generally it was a very positive relationship.

Q: Were there other consulates in Izmir at that time of any significance?

FLANIGAN: There were as a matter of fact. None large, but the British, the French, the Greeks, the Germans, the Italians and the Maltese were there. There were also a few active honorary consuls.

Q: Was there a Soviet consulate?

FLANIGAN: No, there wasn't.

Q: Did the Greek consulate close down right away?

FLANIGAN: Yes the Greek consulate closed immediately.

Q: You mentioned narcotics not being an issue in Peru when you were there, how about in Turkey in the Izmir consular area?

FLANIGAN: Narcotics was a major issue in Turkey when Richard Nixon first became president. By the time I arrived, it was still a major issue, but it was a major issue under control. The Turks had, somewhat reluctantly I think, responded to our efforts to get them to control opium production. By the time I arrived in 1973, opium production was controlled. Nobody grew opium poppies without a license; all of the fields were carefully controlled. All of the product was also controlled. Farmers weren't allowed to collect opium gum in the traditional fashion. Instead all of the poppies were grown to full maturity before being harvested and turned into poppy straw. The poppy straw was then processed at a government-owned facility and turned into opium products. As far as we could tell, there was no leakage in Turkey at the time. As you know, it is a very organized society with an authoritarian history; therefore, when they said they were in control, generally speaking they were in control. They knew what they were doing.

Q: How about the general subject of protection of American citizens? Were there a large number of American citizens either resident in the consular district or who visited as tourists or otherwise?

FLANIGAN: Well, not really, tourism hadn't taken off yet. There were the occasional tourist. The drug culture of the sixties had attracted some young people who unfortunately believed they could experiment without consequences. There were a few American citizens still serving prison sentence for drug offenses. The consulate had a responsibility to visit and monitor the welfare of these people. Other Americans included the occasional tourist, archeologists and a few people that were there with tobacco companies. At that time Aegean tobacco time made up about 10% of the tobacco that went into American cigarettes, so all of the major American tobacco companies had resident Americans or other expatriates there. Otherwise, there wasn't a large population, a few pioneers if you will.

Q: You mentioned there were two American generals commanding the two NATO headquarters, and I assume there were other American officers, was there a large U.S. military presence in terms of numbers?

FLANIGAN: Several hundred, all connected with the two headquarters. There was the Air Force

headquarters which was a NATO facility and the Army headquarters which was a NATO facility and then there was a U.S. Air Force support mission which provided administrative and logistical support but in fact was not part of the NATO mission. Effectively there was an American base there as well. It was not a base in the classic sense since it was right in the middle of town.

Q: It was American as opposed to NATO.

FLANIGAN: That's right, among other things there was a Department of Defense school, which my children went to.

Q: If I am not mistaken, the American consulate in Izmir is no more today. I don't know exactly when it was closed.

FLANIGAN: It closed about two years ago I think.

Q: Do you have any feeling based on your two years there whether, how valuable it was? Obviously lots of things have changed. There are no longer American officers commanding those NATO headquarters.

FLANIGAN: Yes there is a limited number of American military personnel there now. They are not in command, so the American official presence is much reduced. There is an historic American presence there. There was the American girls school which was the best women's secondary school in Izmir. It had a history; it had been founded by a Protestant religious group. As far as I know, it is still there and is still a good school, so there are those kinds of presence. Also, I think Aegean Turkey is a unique part of Turkey. I suppose not having a consulate there would be the rough equivalent of a major foreign government not having representation in Los Angeles or perhaps Miami. It may not be essential, but it is useful. We probably miss something now not having any representation in Izmir.

Q: The other historical convention particular to the Izmir area is the many Greek Americans who originated there or their families did, and I assume perhaps during the period you were there some wanted to go back to visit cemeteries or places where they lived, or was that, were you aware of any of that?

FLANIGAN: I wasn't aware of any of that. I suspect it was fairly common when I first arrived, but when I had been there nine months, of course, the invasion of Cyprus occurred. The relationship between Turkey and anything Greek became so tense for the next several years that I doubt that many Greek Americans would have tried to go back. Let me just add that American tourism in that part of Turkey has increased geometrically since I was there. Of course not having the consulate in Izmir is a problem – or at least an inconvenience - for them.

Q: I suppose that area is covered from the consulate in Istanbul now, or the embassy in Ankara.

FLANIGAN: I suppose. I'm not sure how it was divided up. I would guess Ankara.

Q: Well if you think about places like Ephesus and Smyrna, names like that.

FLANIGAN: And of course Troy is up by Canakkale in the Istanbul consular district. There were several civilizations that existed in Aegean Turkey. The Lydians, the Phrygians, the Lycians, the Greeks. It was just fascinating. It was a great place to be with young children. My wife and I look back on those two years as some of the most interesting and pleasant of our foreign service life.

Q: The other question that always comes up when you talk about reporting from constituent posts or consulates is how free were you as the consulate in setting its priorities and reporting schedule, and to what extent did you have to coordinate or clear through the embassy? To what extent could you report more or less directly to the State Department?

FLANIGAN: We reported in parallel fashion; that was the arrangement. As I recall our telegrams were sent "action" to Ankara and "info" to Washington. The effect was simultaneous transmission to both places, but we maintained the niceties of our subordinate relationship. There was no restriction on our reporting. We were free to report, and I think the reporting we did was sometimes very useful. In the run-up to the elections of 1973 we were able to detect in Aegean Turkey the beginning of the surge of Bulent Ecevit and his Republican People's Party which resulted in their surprise victory. Ecevit's strength first emerged in the Aegean area, and we were able to presage his emergence as prime minister. It gave Washington a fair warning that we might not have had otherwise.

Q: Did you travel quite a bit outside of Izmir or did you primarily confine yourself to the city?

FLANIGAN: No, in contrast to what happens in embassies I think, in consulates it seems that you do travel. I regularly would take tours of all of the provinces which we had responsibility for, visit local officials and local party leaders. I really had the best opportunity of my whole career for understanding and reporting on a domestic political situation. It was never duplicated.

Q: You were talking to both the administrative governors and the political party personages.

FLANIGAN: Right, the governors were representatives of the central government, but I always called on the major political party leaders too.

Q: You were the political officer. Was there an economic officer or commercial officer in the consulate?

FLANIGAN: We had a junior officer who acted as the economic and commercial officer.

Q: He would do the Izmir international trade fair and whatever commercial things we were trying to do at that time. Anything else about your time in Izmir? It sounds like it was an enjoyable assignment.

FLANIGAN: It was an enjoyable assignment. I suppose there were two disruptive elements. The first was the invasion of Cyprus. Obviously that was disturbing. Then there was an earthquake. Both Peru and Turkey happened to be earthquake-prone places and it is a fact of daily life for citizens of those countries. I recall we lived on the waterfront in Izmir in a nice apartment

building with a view out over Izmir Bay. Unfortunately it was built on landfill. We experienced a small earthquake, but the epicenter must have been right beneath us because it was really a violent experience. People 10 miles away didn't even know it had happened, but we knew. The Izmir clock tower – the symbol of the city - stopped and didn't run again for years. A couple of people were killed and a lot of buildings along the waterfront were damaged.

Q: Was your building damaged?

FLANIGAN: It was damaged but not so that we couldn't live in it. Walls were cracked and windows were broken, things like that.

Q: Where did you grow up before you went to Tufts?

FLANIGAN: I grew up in Indiana.

Q: So you didn't have a lot of earthquake experience.

FLANIGAN: None!

Q: Did you have a major earthquake in Lima while you were there?

FLANIGAN: They had one just before we arrived so when we moved into the hotel the cracks were apparent on the walls. We had basically two years of rather constant aftershocks from that one, and shortly after I came back to Washington, they had another very major one, very destructive. I recall, Mrs. Nixon went down to Peru in an effort to show our concern.

Q: Let me come back to the effects of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the impact that had on you particularly while you were still at the consulate general in Izmir. In what other ways did that affect you? Did you do some other reporting about how people were interpreting what was going on? Did you ever visit Cyprus from Izmir?

FLANIGAN: No, not from Izmir, no I didn't. We really didn't report on attitudes about Cyprus except as they affected domestic politics.

Q: The U.S. Congress began to react to what Turkey had done in Cyprus; did that happen while you were still in Izmir or later?

FLANIGAN: It began while I was there, but most of it happened while I was in Ankara immediately afterward.

WELLS STABLER
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1973-1975)

Ambassador Wells Stabler was born in Massachusetts in 1919. He served in Palestine, Jordan, Italy, France, Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Spain. Ambassador Stabler was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: Today is July 19, 1991 and this is the continuing interview with Ambassador Wells Stabler. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to start with the situation that blew up in July of 1974 with Cyprus. European Affairs had just absorbed Greece and Turkey in April and all of a sudden you are faced with a major problem with two NATO allies pointing guns at each other. Could you describe how this hit you and some of the personnel in the Washington area when you heard about this Cyprus business?

STABLER: Yes. It was about in April of 1974 that Secretary Kissinger decided that he didn't see why he had to have two Assistant Secretaries traveling with him when he went to NATO conferences -- Greece and Turkey were under the Near Eastern Affairs. So he made a decision to transfer Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of European Affairs. Very few of us at that time in EUR had a great deal of knowledge of what was going on in Greece and Turkey, except as it related to NATO matters. The regional questions were, of course, not dealt with by the Bureau of European Affairs. So this was somewhat of a surprise. Assimilation of the officers handling Greek and Turkish affairs came into EUR and it fell to me as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs who mostly handled Western and Central European Affairs, to take on Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

It was all relatively calm and no one thought a great deal about problems that might come about as a result of this. Although the reasons for the coup had been bubbling up for a number of years there was no particular crisis at the time. At any event, in July, 1974 the Greek military, with the Colonels in charge in Athens, decided that the time had come to carry out the policy of enosis which was uniting Cyprus with Greece. They mounted a coup in Nicosia which was aimed at Archbishop Makarios. He was forced to flee and a major crisis suddenly presented itself. This was putting the heat on as far as Greek and Turkish relations were concerned.

Normally in a situation of this sort the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs would have handled the matter directly with Kissinger who, of course, was much concerned about this as it related to two important NATO allies. But Arthur Hartman had had a long standing engagement to negotiate with a delegation from East Germany on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and East Germany. This delegation had come especially from East Germany for this. Arthur felt that he had to meet this particular engagement. It was not one that I as his principal deputy could have easily taken over because I had not been involved in the earlier discussions leading up to the negotiations.

So he then asked me to go up and deal with Cyprus with Kissinger, whom I hadn't dealt with before. I went up and from that day forward until I left EUR to get ready to go to Spain, I saw Kissinger many times a day, traveled with him as far as India to be with him to deal with the Cyprus question. He, of course, was very troubled by all of this, recognizing that this was going to upset the Turks and that we would soon have a Turkish reaction...which indeed we did. The Turkish army very shortly thereafter invaded the northern part of Cyprus and annexed that part of Cyprus that had predominantly Turkish population...as well as some areas that had a large

Greek population. It was quite clear that this could lead to a very serious confrontation between Greeks and Turks not only on Cyprus but on the mainland as well.

So he set about trying to calm the waters and to restore some semblance of peace in the area. This was not an easy thing to do at all because the animosity between Greeks and Turks was such that it was almost impossible to get any moderation, plus the fact that we had the junta, the Colonels...

Q: Actually I think it was the Generals by that time. The Colonels had been overthrown by their Generals. It was still a pretty inept crew.

STABLER: I guess they were still called the Colonels...

In any event, this was a crisis that started in July and continued with great intensity throughout the summer and into the winter months. A great deal of effort was put in to this business, trying to appeal to the Greeks and then to the Turks to calm the situation down.

Now Secretary Kissinger had, as you remember, taught one time at Harvard and had a seminar for a variety of up and coming political leaders. He felt that this gave him a special bond. Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey had attended his seminar at Cambridge. Thus there was a relatively easy access channel. The Greek situation was really quite different, because it seems to me that sometime in the period from July to the fall, the Generals had been toppled.

Q: Yes, they were. The leader, although he never had the official name, was a man named Ioannidis who was sort of the military policeman -- a very, very difficult character. During the summer, because the coup instigated by the Colonels had brought such a disaster on the Greek cause, the Colonels were put out and Karamanlis came out of exile and formed a government, a democratic government.

STABLER: Yes, I remember that because the access to Ecevit was a very easy one, the access to Karamanlis was not an easy one. He didn't speak English and Kissinger had a predilection for calling these people on the telephone. Ecevit he could talk with but Karamanlis he really couldn't. [Former King Constantine of Greece became a friend of ours when we were in Rome and he was in exile there. When I was in Spain he was the brother-in-law of King Carlos, whose sister was Queen Sophia. I used to see him there from time to time. He always told me that he felt that Karamanlis had betrayed him. He had talked to Karamanlis when he was in exile in Paris and understood that if Karamanlis was ever restored he would bring about the restoration of the monarchy. He had expected a call from Karamanlis when he got back to Athens, which never came.]

Both the Greeks and Turks were very unbending in this whole thing. The situation was compounded later, after the July landing of the Turks, when the Turks felt threatened again and landed additional troops on Cyprus which then really tore things apart because the Greek lobby in Congress was extremely strong. There was no Turkish lobby but a strong Greek lobby with Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and John Brademas of New York and a number of others who were very, very active. They then started a campaign in Congress to cut off military aid to Turkey on

the grounds that US equipment had been used for other than NATO purposes which would require specific consent of the United States government. The Turks felt that Kissinger had misled them and his relations with Congress over this became very intense.

As a result of all this, you may recall, an arms embargo was placed on Turkey -- this being '74 or early '75 -- and wasn't lift until the fall of 1978. This, of course, seriously hampered our relations with Turkey.

In any event, during this period, I was constantly in Kissinger's office. Of course, Art Hartman and others came into it too. There was Bob McCloskey who was special assistant to Kissinger at that time and was there a great deal of the time. Bill Casey, Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, was in and out.

Q: He later became the head of CIA.

STABLER: There were a number of people involved, but I really basically became the coordinator of the Cyprus situation.

Q: In some other interviews that I have done and am doing - I am picking up some of the people who were either the Turkish Desk Officer or the Greek Desk Officer or the Cyprus Desk Officer. One of the minor legends of the Foreign Service is the clash between Tom Boyatt, who was a rather junior but a very outspoken officer who was the Cypriot Desk Officer, and Henry Kissinger. More than just that, I wonder if you could give an idea of Kissinger's reaction to this? Did he see this as an East-West problem that was screwing up the NATO works, or born in Europe did he see this as almost one of those tribal animosities or did he understand... How did he relate to the expertise in the field?

STABLER: I think his main concern at the outset was the fact that it was a clash between two NATO allies, thus disturbing the tranquility of the Eastern Mediterranean at a time when we were still thoroughly engaged in the business of the Soviet Union being our principal enemy. You have the Turks and to a lesser extent the Greeks, looking elsewhere than NATO and this was a concern to him. Basically the context of the East-West relationship became a serious matter. It didn't really have many overtones with respect to his other great interests -- the Middle East. It didn't spill over very much into the Arab-Israel problem. So it really was a question of these people not focusing on their principal responsibility and that was what we had to deal with.

Of course, the British were much involved too because of their own situation in Cyprus. They have a major air base there which was important. Various noises were made by the Greeks of possibly closing that in annoyance over the attitude of the British who were totally opposed to what the Greeks had done.

That is why he spent as much time as he did on it, trying to find a way to bring equilibrium back into the area and get the Greeks and Turks thinking about NATO and their responsibilities rather than fighting each other. This I think was his principal point.

There certainly was a clash with Tom Boyatt, but I honestly can't remember all the details now.

Boyatt was ultimately removed. But there were a lot of people involved in the clash. It got to the point where Kissinger believed that Tasca was nothing more than a spokesman for the junta.

Q: Henry Tasca had been Ambassador there from about 1970-1974. He was sent by Nixon to try to work with the junta. He saw a lot of Papadopoulos, Pattakos, Ioannidis, trying to work with them.

STABLER: But this became really something in which Kissinger believed -- that Tasca was in fact not a great deal more than the spokesman for the junta -- to the extent that there really was no communication between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador in Athens. It was done largely with Monty Stearns. When I was sent out to talk with Ecevit in Ankara and the Foreign Minister or some other official in Athens, I stayed with Monty. I knew Tasca, we had been in Rome together, but I didn't see him at that point. He was up in the Residence and in effect I was sort of advised not to see him as he was on his way out Kissinger being determined to get rid of him as quickly as he possibly could and did. He sent Jack Kubisch there as the Ambassador. So Tasca, also, was one of those who fell in this situation.

Bob Dillon was the Turkish Officer and for whom I have the greatest admiration and liking. I worked very closely with Bob. It seems curious that I can't remember now who the Greek Desk Officer was at the time. But I just don't. I'm a little confused now because there was what they used to call Greek-Turkish Affairs...I don't know if there was an office and then separate desk officers or not. Bob Dillon certainly did Turkish Affairs and there must have been somebody else who did Greek Affairs. Ultimately Bob left and Bill Eagleton came in as the Office Director.

The fact was that I suppose I could say that even though I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, I in effect became the Desk Officers for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus at the time. It was curious. Kissinger had very strong views about all these things. He was apt to decide exactly how he wanted to play something and it often fell to me to put it into words for him, make changes that I thought should be done.

At the very outset, Joe Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was dispatched almost immediately to the area as Kissinger's emissary to see what he could do to patch the thing up. He came back basically empty handed. Then in due course other emissaries were sent, including Art Hartman.

Q: I recall in one interview with Bob Dillon saying they sat in the plane in Ankara and they didn't know where to go. Things were falling apart.

STABLER: Yes, I remember that. They weren't really quite sure what came next. That was put together almost immediately so it wasn't really clear what it was they were expected to do except to try to calm the situation down as quickly as possible.

I know that when Arthur Hartman went over on a mission and reported back what he had done, Kissinger went up in smoke because Hartman had apparently not said exactly what Kissinger had told him to say.

I was sent out and remember going one Sunday afternoon to a house on Nebraska Ave that belonged to Wiley Buchanan, who had been Chief of Protocol. He used to lend Kissinger his house in the summer when the Buchanans went up to their house in Newport. I went over there and we went over exactly what I was to say to Ecevit and to the Greeks. I must say on the plane over I carefully noted down exactly what it was that he wanted me to say, which I did. I reported back practically verbatim what I had said, and of course what had been said to me. This made him happy because he felt his instructions had been carried out to the letter.

All of these things really...it was a constant sort of dialogue but with the attitude in Congress, which was really in favor of the Greek situation, and the Turks clearly having no intention of giving up their military occupation of a certain part of Cyprus, nothing really could be achieved. Certainly the government of Karamanlis was more disposed to reason than the junta, but the Turks were in occupation and by this time Makarios had been restored. Clerides, who was the leader of the Greek community in Cyprus and Denktash, the leader of the Turkish community, would have talks. And there were talks in Geneva. There were talks everywhere. But no one could any solution beyond basically what has now become the status quo. The Turks, of course, declared the independent Turkish Republic of Cyprus, which no one recognizes, except them.

We had great tragedies there because of the Cypriot population's view that we favored the Turks in some way. There would be demonstrations and you remember the tragic killing of Rodger Davies who was our Ambassador there.

Q: He was killed by Cypriot police, I think.

STABLER: I don't remember now exactly how that happened. It was one of those tragic things where the mob stormed the Embassy shooting and he was unfortunately a victim of it. I would guess that today the situation is largely what it was a number of years ago.

Q: A little of the thinking at the time. You had two mixed populations on the island, the Greeks and the Turks, and things weren't going well. They were shooting at each other and it was all mixed up and the fact that there had been essentially an exchange of population and there was a clear demarcation between what was under Turkish control and what was under Greek control. Was anyone saying, "Well, you know this is a bad spot to get over, but in the long run it is going to be a lot better than having these two people living cheek to jowl and really not being very nice to each other." Were you getting any of that?

STABLER: There was a certain feeling of *fait accompli* because with the Turkish army in northern Cyprus, no one believed that it would be possible to get the Turks to withdraw their army. One tried at the time to get the Turks to at least reduce the number of forces, but I don't think anybody really expected the Turks to give the whole thing up. There was some hope that possibly the communal negotiations between Clerides and Denktash might...this was really after Makarios because he wasn't disposed to be reasonable about anything. Their whole effort was to get the Turks off the island and get back to where they were before, which I think no one really felt was a viable possibility. But at that time, less thought was probably given to how this would evolve in the future. Of course it was not possible for the United States to take a position or appear to take a position which in effect accepted the status quo. That was something you

couldn't even think about because with the bad blood between the Greeks and the Turks the effort was to try to find some formula that would in effect reduce the Turkish presence and hopefully through the communal negotiations reach a point where there could be perhaps a restoration of the Republic of Cyprus as before with greater autonomy for the Turkish population.

As you remember prior to the coup there was a Greek President of Cyprus and a Turkish Vice President. The Greeks were clearly in the majority. But there was some hope that somehow through these communal negotiations you could get an improved situation for the Turks and hopefully the Turkish army would go away.

Q: But in your heart of hearts though did you think anything would come of this? Was this something you really had to do but thought.... ?

STABLER: I think probably most of us at the time recognized that in a sense what the Turks had done would probably in the long run ease the situation because you then have a division between these two groups and less possibility in the long run of communal clashes. And that in fact is what has come about. Quite clearly when you are dealing with this sort of a problem you never can take the position...but somehow we have to get fully involved. So, no, I don't think anybody would put down on paper let's let this thing just hang out and take care of itself. The main thrust really of what Kissinger was trying to do was to try to reduce the level of animosity between Greece and Turkey as much as possible and, as I said before, let them get back to their main task. Although this was very complicated because the whole discussion all the time between the Greeks and Turks was about the air control area and what was Greek and what was Turkish, what islands would

Q: And mineral rights which still is going on today.

STABLER: Yes. President Bush is in Greece at the present moment and is facing violent demonstrations because the Greeks think we are more friends with the Turks than we are towards the Greeks.

Q: Another thing on this issue, I may be dwelling too long, but I think this brings so many things together -- how we work. In one interview I did the interviewee spoke with Senator Javits, who was from New York, Jewish and an ardent proponent of Israel, telling him: "You think the Jewish lobby is a problem in the United States, wait until the Greek lobby gets going because the Jewish concentration is in New York, California, and Florida, but there are Greeks spread out throughout the United States and also in positions of considerable political importance. Just wait until this gets aroused." I think this issue sort of proved the value of what had been said prior to this. Did the Greek lobby catch the Department of State by surprise as to how powerful it became? This was the first time it really became organized.

STABLER: I think it was a matter of some surprise to see the lobby as well organized as it was. I had this brought back to me once again when in 1978 after coming back from Spain. I was helping on the Hill in talking to Senators and Congressman about the importance of lifting the arms embargo against Turkey. I went to see the Congressman from Maryland, who died shortly

thereafter, and talked to him about the importance of our relations with Turkey. He said, "I absolutely agree with you. I don't think Congress ought to be nickel and diming the State Department on all these things and getting involved in all the nitty gritty of day to day operations. I think the Turkish arms embargo should be lifted, but I intend to vote against it for the very simple reason that my main fund raiser in the State is a Greek-American and therefore there is no way that I can vote in favor of this matter even though I fully agree that it should be done." So again, that showed the power of the lobby even years after the intensity of the thing had died down. As I said earlier there was absolutely no Turkish lobby whatsoever. Consequently the Greek lobby did get Congress to do pretty much what they thought it should do and there was tremendous pressures on the State Department, the Secretary to take a more pro-Greek line.

I think it is to Kissinger's credit that he...although it caused him a lot of trouble because, as I said earlier, there were Members of Congress who believed that he had outright lied to them on the business of the original question of should we not impose arms embargo because all these US arms are going into Cyprus. I think there were many of us who felt that the Turks had enormously complicated our task. It was at least understandable, the first wave of invasion, because there was aggression in protecting their population in Cyprus. That could be argued, if you will, under rubric of self defense. But then when some weeks later they sent in the second wave there was no real justification for so doing. That enormously complicated our task.

Q: Why did they do that?

STABLER: I think they did it because they wanted to consolidate their gains and to make it absolutely clear that they had no intention of giving up. I think this was actually done after the Colonels had been thrown out. I think they were concerned that the Greeks might try to launch some military operation.

Q: Well, there certainly were some noises about the Greek military talking about fighting there and sending in an expedition.

STABLER: They sent naval vessels and there was the famous episode where in the middle of the night...I was down in the Operations Center and there were all sorts of alarms and excursions about the Greek naval force and then the Turks announced with much pride that they had sunk a Greek destroyer. Then it turned out that they had sunk one of their own.

I think it was also part of the domestic problems in Turkey that was responsible for this. Their economic and political situation was always in turmoil. The Prime Minister of Turkey and the army gained considerable popular support because they were defending the Turkish population in Cyprus.

So I don't think any of us felt that the second invasion was really necessary. They had frankly sent in enough in the first place to defend the population and the second invasion was just a grand stand display which caused us many problems.

In any event, I think from a personal point of view, I found it a fascinating experience being able

to work as closely as I did with Kissinger and seeing what a difficult person he could be on these things. I found that those who permitted themselves to be brow beaten and simply accepted it, soon fell by the wayside. Those who stood up to him, but were not right sometimes in their advice, also fell by the wayside. Those who stood up to him and knew their dossier, fared pretty well.

Q: One of the points about Kissinger that is raised again and again is that he tended to do things by himself with foreign leaders and that those working to support him, such as you, often would find themselves dealing without quite knowing what the game was. Was this a problem in this case?

STABLER: I never felt that. I felt that I knew what he was doing because I often did it for him. I often was in the room and sometimes on the telephone listening in when he was talking to these foreign leaders. I wrote most of the messages, obviously not 100 percent, but most of them that he sent these people. And I went to the White House with him on some of these things. So I felt that on the whole I had fairly good knowledge of what he was doing.

Mind you, there were...Arthur Hartman and I had a very good relationship. For example, when I went on a trip with Kissinger to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, when we got to Rome where he was going to have talks with the Italians, Arthur Hartman came on board and I was finished, because at that point there wasn't room for both of us. But Arthur pretty much kept me abreast of what was going on and as the year wore on...I went over to London a few times to talk to the British about the problem... I never felt that Kissinger was trying to exclude me or that he was not keeping the Bureau of European Affairs through Arthur Hartman and myself, pretty much informed of what he was up to. He believed, I think at times erroneously, that his superior intelligence would easily win over some of these people. They just couldn't resist the force of his logic and therefore they would soon see that he was right and they were not. But, I think, at times we ignored some of the realities of the situation. But in each instance it was worth the try. You couldn't go wrong in putting forward your own point of view to these people.

Q: Sort of the other shoe. While this was going, one of our major concerns was that you didn't want to have two NATO allies fighting each other because NATO was the bulwark and here was the southern flank against the Soviet Union. You must have been monitoring very closely what the Soviet Union was doing. Did you get any feel that the Soviets were going to try to take advantage, or were they taking advantage of this?

STABLER: I don't recall any situation where the Soviets seemed to be a threatening factor in all this. Obviously there were Communists in Greece and some of this carried over into Cyprus I am sure, but I don't know that this was necessarily as a result of any Soviet doing. I can't recall now that this particular aspect entered into the equation in any important way. The real concern, of course, was that...and then there were alarms and excursions throughout this period of reports that the Turks were massing to invade Greece or that Greece was reinforcing their forces along the border and there soon would be problems. There were a lot of rumors in those days. I don't recall that there was any serious information at any time that the Turks and Greeks were about to clash.

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.
Ambassador
Turkey (1973-1977)

Ambassador William B. Macomber, Jr. was born in New York in 1921. In addition to serving in Turkey, his Foreign Service career included positions in Washington, DC, and Jordan. Ambassador Macomber was interviewed by Roger Ernst on September 30, 1989.

MACOMBER: I went to Turkey as ambassador.

Q: *You were there during the Cyprus business?*

MACOMBER: Yes. Two NATO countries, a very sad event. Fortunately the Greeks and Turks never got to fighting each other directly. The Turks fought the Cypriot Greeks. A very sad time. A chilling time, seeing a rational state, and Turkey is a rational state, seeing a war momentum build in that country and reach a point where there was no turning back.

Q: *This is [July] 1974.*

MACOMBER: Yes, 1974, and watching that momentum build I could not help thinking that this is the way that one day the big war will start. I hope not, but as I say, it was a chilling time. I also had the narcotics problem which was fortunately resolved. Turkey handled it very well. It has caused a lot of problems between our two countries, and we were very pleased with the way the problem was resolved. The Cyprus problem, however, developed almost immediately afterwards so we did not have much time to sit around and be happy about one thing before we were hit by another.

Q: *And then from Turkey you came back again to Washington?*

Ambassador Macomber was interviewed by Warren Unna on September 19, 1993

Q: *Let's move to your final posting, Ambassador to Turkey. Something I have always wondered, do the Turks feel they are getting a fair deal from the US for what they are doing for the US and does the US feel its giving more aid to Turkey than it is getting in return for its needs?*

MACOMBER: Yes to both of the questions and it is ever thus. Always each country feels that they are doing more than their partner. The Turks felt they were under appreciated. That the Greek lobby ultimately controlled American actions. The Americans felt the Turks didn't appreciate how much we were doing for them. Originally there was a very different relationship. When I was a young man in the State Department I was told that the greatest and best partnership

that the US was involved in was the one with Turkey. It wasn't England, it wasn't France or Israel. With the Turks each thought the other was great. It was a very simplistic thing, what was important was stopping the communists and we agreed on that. Democracy was important and we agreed on that. Of course, no country agrees with another country on everything. So by the time I got there the relationship was no longer as simplistic. It was actually much more mature. We argued about a lot of things and each side began to become less grateful of what the other side was putting into the equation.

Q: Now when we discussed your first embassy post in Jordan, you said your first assignment was to try to persuade King Hussein not to marry a British wife because that would backfire on him and his own independence. What was your first assignment in presenting your credentials in Turkey?

MACOMBER: There was no current crisis and the relationship was fairly smooth. But I remember saying to Jim Spain, who was later Ambassador to Turkey, when I arrived that there were only two things that could happen to mess things up here, one the Turks start growing poppies again, they had been a main supplier of opium that was shipped out of the country into Europe and used to make heroin for smuggling into the States. The Turks had had a brief military government intervention which had put a stop to that. The democratic government returned and there were pressures from the farmers to make money on this crop. They considered it a legitimate product that was being used illegitimately by other people, not the Turks. So there was a lot of political pressure to start again. The other thing that could cause a crisis in our relationship would be a war in Cyprus. And sure enough both of those things happened during my time there. So it was a difficult time.

Q: If the Greek-Turkish outbreak over Cyprus were to begin today, what lesson did you learn from the origin then should be the role of the United States?

MACOMBER: Well I learned a very scary lesson. It was a terrible thing to see two modern, civilized, sensible states, Greece and Turkey, work themselves into such a lather. In this case the Turks started it. The Greek Cypriots pulled a coup and the Turks were convinced that this put in jeopardy the Turkish community in Cyprus. They were determined to go to Cyprus and take it over to protect the Turkish Cypriots who were living there. It was a thing that I believed, and still believed, could have been settled by negotiation, but the Greeks were under the colonels then, a dictatorship, and unyielding and the Turks grew more and more determined to invade Cyprus. What I watched unfolding under my nose was a civilized state convincing itself that it was totally right and the opposition was totally wrong and that there was nothing honorable or logical for them to do other than go to war. To see a civilized state throw aside negotiating possibilities and work itself up to a point where there is no turning back and go to war was a very scary thing to see. And I remember thinking that's how the big war will start. I remember going home the night it started and dictating a reporting telegram about what had happened, what had been said and what our last effort to head it off was.

Joe Sisco was out there shuttling back and forth. He was Under Secretary of State in those days. He was shuttling back and forth from Athens and working with Ambassador Kubisch and then coming over to Ankara working with me. Joe and I went, with some other staff, for a final appeal

to Ecevit. Joe and Kubisch had not been able to move the Greek colonel. The Turks said they would give us a certain amount of time, which was running out, for the Greeks to soften their position or they were going to go. The Greeks would not soften their position and we were still hoping to head the Turks off. Joe was very eloquent and did a very good job but they were just sitting there ready to go. He asked me what I could add. I said, "Prime Minister Ecevit, look you are a man known for peace. If you give the word to go in a few hours a lot of people will be dead...Greeks, Cypriots and Turks. It is not clear that's necessary to protect your interests. In a week's time there is no way the Greeks can reinforce their position. You don't lose any option you don't have today and maybe we can pull something off in a way of a more peaceful solution. Give us a chance to try.

And he said to us, he was a humanitarian, I don't think he wanted to be remembered as a man who gave the go sign to a war, "There is a momentum in these things which when it reaches up to a particular level has reached a point of no return and there is no turning back."

While we were in Ecevit's office talking to him, in the room next door were the joint chiefs of staff of the Turkish forces and after we left he gave them the word to go.

I sent in a reporting telegram telling the Department in detail what had happened and I think we were also on the phone telling them it was going to happen. It must have been about 4:00 in the morning I went home and was sitting on the front porch by myself and thinking it over. I thought, "I have seen tonight how the next big war will start where a rational state will be convinced that it is totally right and the enemy is totally wrong and they have no choice but to go to war." There is no logic anymore. That was very scary. That could happen with not just another Turkey but with the great powers and result in another world war. It is a scary thing to see something like that.

Q: From what you said there really is no afterthought of how the US could have acted differently to prevent this. Could NATO have been evoked to go to Turkey and Greece to impose peer pressure or was that already done?

MACOMBER: I think they tried to put all the pressure they could on, but the Americans were the ones who had the great influence in both camps. They were major players in both capitals. I can't think of anyone else who had as much influence as the Americans.

Q: Something that has always intrigued me, every diplomat I have known associated with Turkey, whether in the State Department or the AID program, has put in a lasting affection, more so I would think than many countries I know to which diplomats have been sent. Now you and your wife have been active in Turkish/American groups ever since. You obviously are one of those who has been smitten by the country. Could you explain this affection?

MACOMBER: I have the same affection for the Jordanians. They also are interesting, appealing people. Specifically why we like the Turks we thought they were honorable, decent people who were hard to get to know but once you got to know them and they became your friend it was a live long friendship. They believed in democracy. They believed in the Western tradition and that that was the way of real progress for Turkey. I think the most appealing thing to us was that you

can't imagine the bitterness that came out of our opposition of their going to war and our cutting off of aid and the embargo that was put on Turkey and not on Greece. Congress was very sympathetic with the Greek side. There was much more domestic Greek pressure on Congress than Turkish because there are fewer Turkish Americans than Greek Americans. Understandably the Greek-Americans wanted to go to the aid of their motherland. So the Turks were very, very bitter about that. They felt they were the sinned against party. They hadn't pulled off a coup in Cyprus. That had been started by Greek-Cypriots, not by a Turk. Of course, when the Turks first went there was a lot of sympathy for the Turks because people thought they were the main ones sinned against and democracy at that point in Greece was a dictatorship. Later the Greeks kicked out their dictator and put in a democratic government and became much more sympathetic figures than they were in the beginning. But the Turks who started it had the feeling that privately they were being applauded for making a move. At least people understood why they were doing it. And then they felt their great friend lined up on the side of the Greeks in a situation where objectivity, which some of them still retained, would be that at least America would be neutral. Most of them thought they should be on the side of the Turks because the Greeks had started it, but at least neutral. And when they weren't and Congress forced an embargo on the executive branch...the executive branch was fighting against the embargo, the Congress was for the embargo. The executive branch was villains in Athens and the Congress were heroes. It was a little reversed in Ankara where Ford and Kissinger were because they were fighting against the embargo. Put the point was that they were very, very bitter about the way they were being treated and I have to say with some justification. My own view is that if you are going to shut off aid you should shut it off on both sides, not one side or the other.

Anyhow, during that period, our Turkish friends never turned on us and their personal friendship continued. It was difficult at times when they had every right to be angry at the United States. So that is another reason why we like them a lot.

Q: A final area. I believe while you were still in Turkey you decided to write a book on diplomacy, "Angels Game" and I think you did it in the early morning hours of your tour in Turkey and in airports commuting back and forth to the US. What motivated you? Why did you want to write a book on diplomacy?

MACOMBER: Because when I was in the job of Under Secretary for Management one of my pleasant duties was to swear in the entering class of Foreign Service officers. When I first started doing this I wanted to recommend a book they should read which would give them real insight into the profession they had entered and I looked around and there wasn't any real book that satisfied the need I thought was there. There was a wonderful book by Sir Harold Nicholson that we all read when we were young and is still an outstanding book on diplomacy but was written in 1938 before there was a USIA, before there was an AID, before there was a CIA, before all the other branches of government got interested in what was going on abroad. The whole thing got much more complicated. Nobody had written about the crafts of diplomacy as it emerged after World War II. I did recommend Nicholson but an awful lot had happened in the profession since he had written it. The other great writer was DeCallieres in the 1700s. He was a terrific writer too. Nicholson learned a lot from DeCallieres Charlie Sayre also wrote a very good book on diplomacy. He like Nicholson had been a diplomat when he was young and left it to become a writer. Anyhow they all wrote before the revolution and change in the diplomatic profession. So

I felt that what we needed was a book that said what of the old things that DeCallieres and Nicholson talked about are still important and explain them and tell why they are important. But also talk about the added dimensions that had come to the profession since they had written. That is why I wrote the book.

GEORGE A. MCFARLAND, JR.
Political Counselor
Ankara (1973-1977)

Mr. McFarland was born and raised in Texas and educated at Southern Methodist University and the Universities of Texas and Princeton. After a brief journalist career, he joined the Foreign Service and was assigned to the Passport office in Washington. His subsequent overseas assignments, primarily as Political Officer, were in San Jose, Nicosia, Istanbul, Lima, Ankara, Brasilia and Antigua, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires. He also served as Cyprus Desk Officer in Washington. Mr. McFarland was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 1999.

MCFARLAND: Well, I was invited to go back to Turkey in '73, to the Political Section. I of course had not been promoted. I had to go out as number two in the political section. I'd been number two in Lima, not advancing. By that time I should have been political counselor. And there I was. I accepted and went back, arrived there in 1973, and I was married the following June. Rosario came over with her sister and stayed there a few months working as secretaries in Latin American embassies and when the divorce came through we got married. I had to take over as acting political counselor in April, just after my divorce. My predecessor left me with zero political contacts. He had only a few of his own, and he didn't turn them over to me. He was not a Turkish speaker, number one. I had to set about rebuilding political contacts, and in fact, I was approached to report him. The ship was dead in the water. Furthermore, I had a useless officer, graduated from Harvard - I don't know how - but he was absolutely useless.

Q: You were on your own, really.

MCFARLAND: Yes, and I was bearing down -

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MCFARLAND: The ambassador was Bill Macomber, William B. Macomber -

Q: Yes, I remember him.

MCFARLAND: - who had been deputy assistant secretary for management, and he started us on the Cyprus force over on the side of management and administration. At the time he came out with this I had written memos to him taking issue with the view that managers and administrators are a dime a dozen in the United States, and people who can interpret overseas political events

are in extremely short supply, and our essential role is interpreting what's happening overseas, not in administering. But he had his marching orders from Lyndon Johnson, as he told me later, which was for a State Department that could manage in doing a good job over there in Vietnam. We were never, ever predictably going to have another Vietnam situation with all those people. And the need for greater ability to manage, which is altogether under-emphasized in the Foreign Service compared to the military, but still, we didn't need to go overboard, as we did, which added to the length of my time in grade, because they started promoting administrative officers and consular officers and making up their quotas. But I got along well with Macomber after the first year or so. I was acting political counselor for several small crises - an Aegean crisis between Greece and Turkey, then a crisis over Turkey's opium production. This was in late June of '73. Macomber was pulled back to Washington in protest of the Turkish Government's attitude. And then for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, for which Macomber was returned very quickly. He was very under-confident of his ability to handle political issues, and overcompensated by browbeating, by keeping us all awake. At the start of any mini-crisis he would call everybody together at the residence, but nevertheless, he and I became friends when he began to see that I had ability that he could count on and ability that perhaps he didn't have. But we went through a rough time. He initially began addressing me simply as "Goddammit," and it got around the embassy that this was my other name, Goddammit. And then as his exasperation rose in step with the increasing tensions over Cyprus and the invasion and so on, I reached my highest point. I became "Jesus George," as in "*Jee - zus*, George, do I have to do all the thinking around here?" After that he decided I passed the test, and we were friends, and we still are friends.

Q: Did they bring in another political counselor over you?

MCFARLAND: Yes, yes. I was acting until about August, when they brought in another one. Nobody wanted to work for Macomber; he had such a bad reputation. And the job, after all, was an FSO-1 job, not an FSO-4, and now the minister counselor. And they found an FSO-3 who had some connection with Turkey and was willing to try it, and he lasted I think just under three months, and the alcoholism that he had under control before took hold again, my second time to be involved with an alcoholic. He fooled me. Other people knew. The secretary knew and so on. I didn't until one day he arrived late, and the Marine guard found him holding onto the rail of the stairway unable to climb, and he was evacuated. And I was again acting political counselor. And then Macomber decided to think big. "That's where you should be anyhow. You're the political counselor, and you're entitled to the political counselor's quarters, a beautiful place, the top apartment.

Q: So you got the job.

MCFARLAND: I got the job.

Q: That's something.

MCFARLAND: A three-grade stretch.

Q: Well, that promoted you then.

MCFARLAND: No, no, no, no.

Q: I don't understand.

MCFARLAND: But that summer while I was still acting, I had gone through all these crises, but that year they were promoting on the basis of cones. There were only about, I think, five political officers promoted, of whom three were from Kissinger's own staff, who he saw to it. So the other two. . . . I missed. There was an economic officer in Istanbul who had done nothing. He got promoted, and I didn't. An inspector came through after I was political counselor and recommended me for a double promotion. Well, they didn't do it. But at least I finally did get promoted after demonstrating over and over again that I could do the job three grades higher and under pressure and conflict and a big embassy. We had people there from just about every agency, and they liked me. I enjoyed it, good time there. And the other embassies had good people there too.

I knew a couple of people in the Russian embassy, not that I was on good terms with them. I set up a carefully planned reporting program, and by the time I left, visitors told me that we had become one of the outstanding reporting posts in Europe. Of course, by that time Turkey had been transferred over to the EUR, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. And as the EUR hands complained, we brought them their first war in 30 years - not counting the Greek Civil War, I guess. At any rate, we had a good time there, traveled a lot on weekends and so on, whenever we could. I had to work long, long hours.

Q: It was your honeymoon?

MCFARLAND: Yes, I got three days, and Kissinger got five. But from there, of course, I was overdue for a Washington assignment or for a DCM-ship. What I really wanted was a DCM-ship. I wanted to catch up, make up for lost time, and as an O-3 I was eligible. But I was offered DCM-ship in Cyprus. Think again. There's a Greek lobby in your town, isn't there? And do you imagine what they would say, and can you imagine what the Greek Cypriot Government would say to having a Turk - in their eyes - as a number two in the American embassy? And they called me back the next day and said, "You're right." They also offered me deputy office director for Turkey, Greece, Cyprus. I mean, they had reinstated by this time the offices, and I made the same point. With the Greek lobby it would never wash, and it didn't. And eventually all they could offer me was Turkish Desk officer - well, good Lord! I was going down from two stars to O-3? I couldn't take it. What was the stretch all about? So I instead opted for senior training, and I was offered a year at Princeton, at that wonderful Woodrow Wilson School. It was a great year.

Q: Well, that's great.

MCFARLAND: And we got into New York frequently, and I renewed my acquaintances there.

Q: What, did you write a paper?

MCFARLAND: No, I went to seminars. I wanted to get out of Turkish things and into a more general preparation. I wrote some little papers, but nothing big. And I'm rather sorry now that I didn't specialize more on Turkish matters, but I was up to my ears at this point in being with the Turks. I could have taught a course, I guess.

Q: Yes, but Princeton was pleasant. It's a nice -

MCFARLAND: Oh, yes.

Q: There were no midnight cables no Niact's. You know what I mean.

MCFARLAND: They let us live in junior faculty housing. By this time we had a daughter, the first of the second generation. She was born in Turkey. What a great gift. And the first flowers that arrived in the room were from Bulent Ecevit, who is now the prime minister, who was then the recently ousted prime minister, a great political figure.

Q: That's great.

MCFARLAND: Maybe now's the time to bring it in. I should have gone back to Turkey.

Q: All right, go ahead

MCFARLAND: As DCM, seven years later. I was EUR's candidate. I was the person indicated. I had far more qualifications than anybody else. By this time I had become a senior officer, FE/OC in current terms, and the then ambassador was a political appointee, Strausz-Hupé. He was an Austrian financier who had emigrated to the States just before World War II and had gone into academia and become one of the founders of the Institute for International Relations. And during the Nixon Administration, he had been appointed ambassador to several places - Sri Lanka, or Ceylon, as it was then, and married a Sri Lankan, and Sweden, I think, and then USNATO. Anyway, when the DCM he inherited had to leave, whom I knew, he had the problem of replacing him. I was number one on the list, and he preferred somebody he had known in USNATO who had no Turkish, no Turkish experience. He knew that he wasn't a threat. And somebody who counseled him or had the basis for sending him up said, "There is no way that he would have brought in a Turkish language officer as his number two." He was afraid I would show him up. Of course, I wouldn't have.

Q: No, of course not.

MCFARLAND: I know what it is to be loyal to your chief. I would have helped him. I had great respect for him.

Q: But he didn't know you. He knew the other guy, yes.

MCFARLAND: He knew the other guy, and this was the reason for my retirement - I'm advancing considerably in my story. This was probably the principal reason for my disillusionment.

Q: Or at least consul general in Istanbul or Ismir - would that have been satisfactory?

MCFARLAND: No, I wanted a DCM-ship. I wanted real policy.

Q: Okay.

MCFARLAND: And I just lived there with the idea to bring my knowledge of Turkey and Cyprus to bear on US relations, and I think I could have made a contribution, and it was never made.

Q: So you

MCFARLAND: They did fill it.

Q: Beg pardon.

MCFARLAND: Well, I stayed in Ankara a total of five years, summing up, a total of seven years in Turkey plus two years in Cyprus plus two years on the Cyprus Desk plus a year studying Turkish. It was a considerable investment. That was my real specialty. And that was the reason why, I think, EUR and the State Department plumped for me as the DCM. Ron Spiers, who succeeded Macomber as ambassador and made me - I thought he made me - a protégé at least, told me after I had retired, when he was undersecretary for management, that my case had been among several that motivated a change in the DCM-ship selection procedures, where ambassadors were no longer allowed a completely free hand.

MYLES GREENE
Political Counselor
Ankara (1974-1975)

Myles Greene was born in Georgia in 1925. After serving in the US Army from 1943-1946, Mr. Green received his bachelor's degree from Yale University and his master's degree from Johns Hopkins University. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Mexico, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey. Mr. Greene was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 2002.

Q: Going back to Turkey, you were there, well, we're talking about what '73 or '74 or something?

GREENE: '74 and '75.

Q: How was Ambassador McCumber to work for?

GREENE: Oh, you want to know?

Q: Yes.

GREENE: Ambassador McCumber was an SOB. Is he still alive?

Q: Yes, up in Martha's Vineyard somewhere.

GREENE: That's right, somebody told me he had some serious disease.

Q: Yes, I think Parkinson's or something.

GREENE: Yes. I didn't like him much. I don't think he liked me much. At least that seemed to be the case. He respected my knowledge of Turkey. He was a showoff. He would go out and jog everyday at lunch and come roaring around, not change his clothes again, but stay in his shorts and sweated shirt and walk around the embassy telling everybody what to do. He was a showoff. He had these marvelous connections back in Washington. He was a friend of former Secretary Dulles, his wife had been Dulles' secretary. She was a charming woman, by the way. He wasn't as bad as Bob Komer, but he was headed that way.

Q: Had things changed at all in Turkey when you got there? Could you see a different balance?

GREENE: Yes. Definitely. The overthrow of the Demirel government in '70 and then Nihat Erim for a while. There had been a serious crackdown on leftist students in the meantime. As I said, pretty soon Erim just retired and moved out to his farm where he was eventually murdered. But there was very definite change. I think Cumhuriyet, which at that time was the closest thing to be a leftist newspaper, was more moderate. This was a sign of the times.

Q: Did you feel that the sign of the times, was this reflecting just the government or did you feel that the population as a whole had had it with the students?

GREENE: I don't think the population as a whole ever really supported them, but nobody had guts enough to do much about the students and so once again, as this happened several times in Turkish history, the military forced the situation. The Turks are happy with the military. I keep reading even today I'm sure you do, too of people saying, "Well, Turkey is never going to become fully democratic unless they do something about this military involvement in day-to-day politics." Well, they are not involved in daily politics, but they are certainly the ultimate power and the Turks don't object. The Turks, at least this was the case when I was there, mostly say fine.

Q: Was there a problem in the embassy with Macomber, I mean?

GREENE: People laughed about him. He was gung ho. He had been a marine at one time and he liked to think he still was a marine I think. He was a very intelligent man, no doubt about that. Whether Komer was intelligent I don't really know, but Macomber was. He had vast experience and wide connections in Washington. He had been assistant secretary for congressional affairs among other things. He could pull strings easily from Ankara and in that way he was a really

good ambassador.

Q: I'm told that he had quite a temper. Did you ever see it?

GREENE: He did. He did. Quite a change from people like Bill Handley. I never felt the real anger, but he let me know if he wasn't satisfied. He also would let you know the opposite. Once a contact of mine when I was there before had, in the meantime, become Minister of Education and I went around and called on him in his new capacity, got some information out of him and sent a cable about it. The ambassador came in my room and said, "This is what I like to see you do." So, he liked action and getting out there and seeing these people.

Q: How did you find, sitting there as political counselor, how did you feel the reporting was, did you feel you got a good picture considering your officers in Adana, Izmir and Istanbul, how did you feel, were you getting good reports?

GREENE: Well, Adana never did much reporting.

Q: That was keeping the air base happy or?

GREENE: It was basically to keep the air base happy, to handle, as you mentioned here last time, the vast social security fraud and to travel around a bit in Kurdish areas. Izmir was slowly being cut in staff. I can't remember how many people there were by that time, but it didn't do much good. Istanbul still did. Istanbul still had very good contacts with journalists and cultural leaders of various sorts. I don't remember who it is who was doing the writing, but I remember I went to Istanbul for the consul general decided he would have a gathering of political officers from the whole country, there rather than in Ankara which is another example of Istanbul's importance, so I went there to represent the embassy. They were good. They knew a lot of what was going on.

Q: In your position as political counselor, I'll go back to one of my original questions, did you find you were getting much input from the station?

GREENE: More than when I was the internal political guy in the previous job. The chief of station and his deputy and I saw each other from time to time. I really still didn't know that much. I think insofar as anybody below the ambassador knew, the DCM, but they were pretty close-mouthed.

Q: Any presidential visits or big visits?

GREENE: No, no. We always were having CODELS. That was sort of a routine thing. Senators particularly seemed to like to come to Turkey. I remember straining my Turkish once to try to describe some details of a haircut that a senator wanted in a barbershop. I had to think of the right words for sideburns and all these things. The senator said, "Tell him to do it this way." We had a lot of CODELS, lots.

Q: During this time was there concern about the "Soviet menace" or was the feeling that things were pretty static?

GREENE: It was still very much the same. I think by then let's see in the mid-'70s who was the head of the Soviet Union then?

Q: I guess Brezhnev. He was getting older.

GREENE: Brezhnev, yes. The Soviet Union was stultified I think and therefore, although the agency people in the embassy certainly followed in detail everything that happened to the Russians, to the Soviets, it didn't seem as important.

Q: Did Turkey feel any obligation to mess around in Syria or in Palestine, Israel?

GREENE: No, all that's more recent. Although there was a friendship at that time between Turkey and Israel, it was not what has happened in more recent years where they are practically allies, not quite, but close. The Turks used Israel for certain kinds of technical training and I believe our MAG sent some Turkish officers to Israel for I don't know what, some kind of training. They were friendly. The senior Israeli in Ankara wasn't called an ambassador, but he in fact was an ambassador.

Q: How about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, how were things while you were there?

GREENE: Well, this was the ambassador's main concern, this was perhaps the hottest time in the Cyprus issue. Bulent Ecevit was, Prime Minister and had recognized the Turkish slab of land across the north of Cyprus and had sent in quite a number of Turkish troops to assist there. We were deeply concerned about this and so the ambassador was personally involved in a great deal of this himself. I was often the notetaker when the ambassador or the foreign minister talked about Cyprus.

Q: Did we see any, well this is the Turks under provocation had taken over a sizeable hunk of Cyprus in July of '74?

GREENE: Yes, that's what I'm saying, it was '74 and '75.

Q: You were there?

GREENE: Yes.

Q: What happened, were you there in July?

GREENE: I arrived in late July, early August and I remember the new head of the consular section and I both arrived on a plane in Istanbul and were told that there were no planes flying to Ankara anymore. The Turkish air space had been closed because of possible war and that if we wanted to get to Ankara we would have to figure out some other way so we took a bus, a very public bus and that was my first awareness of the tight restrictions being developed

Q: How was this playing in, you know from the newspapers or your Turkish contacts?

GREENE: The Turks are proud of their military background, their military strength, they were quite gung ho. Ecevit of course, was aggressive in terms of recognizing Turkish-Cypriot independence. He was very popular. He doesn't seem like that kind of man today, relatively young, assertive, intelligent, spoke English which helped.

Q: Were we, I mean at your level were you going around and telling the Turks to cool it and all that or?

GREENE: No. The ambassador's very proud of having this as his baby and, as I say, he mostly saw the foreign minister, two times I saw the foreign minister with him and the prime minister. He probably saw some of the military, too, I don't know.

Q: Were you at that time feeling the brunt of the Greek lobby acting on congress on arms embargo?

GREENE: Having been Turkish desk officer before, I felt it much more here in Washington than there. We were certainly aware of them, but in Ankara the importance of Turkey to us was most important.

Q: I mean were you though getting any feedback from your Turkish contacts saying, "How could you put this embargo on us?" If you were there, I can't remember when the embargo went on, but "how could you do this to us because we were responding to Greek aggression? Which I think is quite true.

GREENE: Quite true, yes. I'm sure there were people who thought that.

Q: But anyway, you didn't feel that you were in a hostile situations? I left Greece the first of July 1974, but?

GREENE: It was about a month later than I arrived in Ankara.

Q: But, obviously the Greeks were pounding the drums and talking about Turkish aggression which of course had nothing, they made no reference to the fact that the Turks came in in response to a coup on the part of the Greeks there to take over the whole island and they got caught with their hand in the cookie jar and it got chopped off.

GREENE: That's right. I honestly don't remember that much about that subject, since the ambassador was really doing the whole Cyprus thing himself. I remember he would go see somebody, often the prime minister, and then in the middle of the night he would say he wanted to write a cable about this. This caused a flap at the embassy in that he would have his secretary available, and he would want to have me present at the same time, so we'd go to the residence at midnight, somewhat groggy to say the least, but this was the way he operated. He was a late night man.

FREDERICK Z. BROWN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Nicosia, Cyprus (1974-1976)

Frederick Z. Brown was born in Pennsylvania on August 2, 1928. His Foreign Service career included positions in Cyprus, France, Thailand, Russia, Vietnam, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 2, 1990.

Q: You were on Cyprus from '74 to '76.

BROWN: I arrived in early September 1974 and I left in March of 1976.

Q: You were Deputy Chief of Mission. What were your main concerns?

BROWN: Initially my main concern was helping the ambassador who had just arrived there himself, to reconstruct the embassy personnel system which had been hurt, and morale, which had been pretty badly damaged by the events of the summer which included the coup that had deposed Archbishop and president Makarios; the attacks against the embassy; the invasion by Turkey of northern Cyprus; the splitting of the island in two, the murder of our ambassador plus one local employee, numerous menaces against American personnel. Our embassy was in a vulnerable position. You recall we had a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) unit in the part of Cyprus ultimately controlled by Turkey. We also had a naval communications listening post there. There were a number of consequences there and a splitting of the island in two that required a reorganization of the mission, and a realignment of personnel, lots of readjustments. Our local personnel were thoroughly shattered. Many of them had lived in the northern part of Cyprus which was now occupied by Turkey. All of them were loyal to the United States, but many of them were critical of our role. We had a very difficult foreign service organizational problem after that cataclysmic event.

Q: I want to ask a real nuts and bolts question. You say you went in to restore morale. How did you see you were going to do it and how did it work out?

BROWN: The first thing is personnel. I think I mentioned that Bill Crawford chose me in part because I did not have a deep Cyprus, Greece or Turkey background. The Deputy Chief of Mission that Rodger Davies had chosen to go out and join him was a Greek language officer. Bill Crawford felt that that was not appropriate in the new circumstances.

So the first thing we had to do was reorganize the personnel in the embassy. This meant moving out several of the employees who had been rather profoundly shaken by events. Seeing their ambassador with his head blown off, in effect. We changed a number of our political and economic officers. There was a change in the other agencies attached to the embassy. This took place over three to six months.

Second, we had to somehow regroup the local personnel. Assure them that we were going to stay

on the island. That we were not going to leave. We had to spend a lot of time simply working with our employees.

Thirdly, we had to physically upgrade the embassy. To protect it against further attacks. And indeed there was another attack against the embassy in January of 1975. In which the first floor was invaded. One wing was set afire. Ten cars were burned in our courtyard. And our American personnel were retreating upstairs to the roof, to the vault. For either the last stand. Or for protection. Or evacuation by the U.N. peacekeeping contingent, when the Greek Cypriot mob broke into the building and almost killed us. We were eventually saved by the Canadian contingent of the UNFICYP military detachment on Cyprus.

This is by way of saying we had to do a lot in terms of physical protection of the embassy. We did not do enough initially. It was only six months later that the second threat became apparent.

So there was a lot of basic messing about just to straighten the mission out. There was also the addition of an AID component.

Of course Cyprus, prior to 1974 had been one of the most prosperous countries in Europe. The invasion of Turkey and the coup against Makarios, changed all that. There were three or four hundred thousand refugees created. So we had to add a AID component, disaster relief to the mission. I spent a lot of time working on that.

I guess the most important political activity that we engaged in was the attempt somehow, while Makarios was in exile, to bring the temporary government under Glafcos Clerides, who had taken over as president after the failure of the rightist coup, taken over as president of the Republic of Cyprus, trying to find some way to bring about rapprochement between Greek Cyprus and Turkish Cyprus. I spent, and Ambassador Crawford, spent the majority of our time talking to the leaders of the legitimate government of Cyprus, Clerides, and the Turkish minority who were, ninety percent, across the green line in the northern part of Cyprus. The big activity then was, if you want, "peace making," rapprochement, political reconciliation -- it is very very difficult. It hasn't been done to this day. Look where we are today, sixteen years later. Cyprus is still divided. At the embassy we had to try to do all these things simultaneously.

Q: In your heart of hearts, did you think there was an answer?

BROWN: There was a window that was open, briefly, roughly between September 1974 through January 1975, when Makarios was out of the country and in exile. Clerides who was a more moderate man, was president, pro tem of the country. I think there was an opportunity if the Turks had shown more flexibility on certain key elements on a settlement on Cyprus. Having to do with the status of Famagusta and Varosha, the new town of Famagusta, where much of the Greek investment on the island was located in the form of luxury hotels, restaurants and fancy apartment buildings. In terms of what would happen to certain areas to the north of Nicosia. I'm trying to pull the names of these places out. The very rich citrus growing areas -- Morphou. And also the status of unaccounted for Greek Cypriots in the north who were assumed to have been murdered by the incoming Turkish army. We had a list of eight or ten very important political elements. Also the size of the international airport of Nicosia. Which is still closed, by the way.

There was a list of items on which I think progress could have been made. Which would have built confidence between the two sides that might have ended up in producing a federation of the Turkish area and the Greek area. Which would have been much better than what you have now, which is an island, totally split, with a defacto Turkish government comprising 20% of the population in the north, and the legitimate U.N.-recognized, U.S.-recognized Republic of Cyprus in the south, in the capital of Nicosia.

So there was a time, about three or four months, where we worked night and day, the U.N. Secretary General special representative, who soon became Perez De Cuellar, the current secretary general. At that time it was Weekman-Mumoz. I think there was a possibility as long as Makarios was out of the country.

Makarios came back and solidified Greek Cyprus, totally, as he had before, until the attempt to overthrow him. Solidified Greek Cyprus in a much more rigid fashion. Makarios was basically overthrown in July of 1974 because it appeared to the EOKA elements and the Greek colonels that Makarios was adopting a more tolerant line toward the Turk Cypriots. Ironically. So that was the reason for overthrowing him. That and the residual unification of Cyprus with the homeland of Greece. Basically abrogating the basic independence of Cyprus. But when Makarios came back he played a rigid rightest wicket which was adamantly opposed to any kind of concessions to the Turks.

Q: How was it to deal with the Turks?

BROWN: Yes, I used to see the Turks. We had to have a rather formal relationship with the Turkish embassy. We had two kinds of contacts. One with the embassy in Nicosia which was beefed up with very high powered diplomats after the invasion. That was our formal meeting place to discuss political matters. The actual discussions of the Cyprus issue really took place in Ankara, in Washington, and at the U.N. and in London and in Geneva. So what we did was at a relatively low level.

Q: It was not going to be decided on Cyprus at this point.

BROWN: What we did was of a rather local formal nature. Our second source of contacts was with the provisional government of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. There we had to walk a very fine line because obviously the legitimate government of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, did not like the American embassy talking to Denktash. Getting across the green line into the Turkish area was a difficult matter. You had to go through phalanxes of armed men a la Beirut.

We also had contacts with the Turkish military, about thirty to forty thousand, in the north of Cyprus, who kept a rigid iron grip on that area. We used to go up there in order to show the American flag up there, to show that we were still interested in northern Cyprus. And to get access to American citizens -- Greek Cypriots American citizens. So we had a lot of contact with the Turkish side.

Q: What was the Turkish attitude towards the Americans?

BROWN: The Turks were using American tanks, they were wearing American boots, they were flying American airplanes. Of course you had at that time Congress cutting off military supply to Turkey as a result of the use of American military equipment that had been supplied under our FMS program for defense purposes.

I found the Turks very hard. Very unbending. And not in the mood to negotiate. We had to fight for every inch of ground. On consular access. On protection of American property. Not to mention the more political matters. The Turks were very very tough.

Q: Maybe splitting up is a lot better than trying to intermingle.

BROWN: That is a difficult question. There was a period in the Republic of Cyprus' history and it probably goes from 1970 to 1973, known as the golden age, in which the religious and ethnic tensions were at a low point. The way the Cypriots worked it out among themselves was that in the north and in the south there were both Greek minorities and Turkish minorities in the villages. And for the most part, in the villages, the Greeks and the Turks got along in that period. Even though there had been terrible pogroms in the 1960s. The British colonial government had used the Turks as the police against the Greek majority. This had left a bad taste. It goes back a long way.

In answer to your question, the attack against the American Embassy in January of 1975 was precipitated by the United Nations convoying of the remaining Turks on the southern part of the island to the north. After that was completed, 99.9% of all Turks were in the north and 99.9% of all Greeks were in the south. The island was almost totally divided. With approximately 30% of the territory in the north belonging to the Turkish Cypriots and the remainder to the Greek Cypriots, with 3% of the island under the British sovereign bases.

Whether or not that is a better arrangement, only time will tell. My feeling is that Cyprus lost a priceless opportunity to have a binational society perhaps on the order of Canada. Of course Canada is not without its problems. But there is too much history on the island. Too much history. What you are seeing now is just a settling into the island which may last another ten or twenty years or three centuries. I don't know.

Q: How well did you feel you were supported from Washington?

BROWN: I have to say I had superb support. Isn't that terrible to say, that the Department supported us! I think we had excellent desk officers and an excellent executive director in Joan Clark, who was EUREX and who responded overnight to our requests. I made one egregious error administratively in not getting authorization to put up steel shutters. Almost overnight, after we had been attacked by this mob, almost killed, I just went out and ordered our administrative officer to do what was necessary with a local contractor overnight to put up metal shutters that would stop AK47 bullets. That meant an expensive operation and for one reason or another, I did not get the correct direct authorization from the Department to do that. I was covered. Nobody said, "Well Fred, you goofed. Come out." I could have blamed it on my admin officer but I was charge at the time and I didn't. It was my decision. So I had superb support. All the way along. In

personnel. In logistics. In communications. They sent us TDY communicators from Europe. I really can't complain.

Q: In a crisis, it works often.

BROWN: But it depends on people. On Joan Clark and people like her. We could have had a hard-ass executive director who simply didn't see it.

When the embassy was attacked in January of 1975 again, I received a communication, a personal letter from the secretary, for the then president Clerides. I don't think Makarios was back then. It was a simple message.

"I have instructed Mr. Brown to tell you that if there is any further attack on the American embassy, if an American citizen or any Greek Cypriot employee of the American embassy, is harmed in any way, the United States will cease all activities having to do with Cyprus, will cut off negotiations and will have nothing further to do with the attempt to find a solution on Cyprus. Yours truly, Henry Kissinger."

So I went over in the clothing I was wearing. Full of stink and tear gas and a little bit of blood. I went over and called on the Foreign Minister and delivered this note. Just put it on the table and said, "This is what we have to say to you." That took care of it.

The message came when I needed it. It was given to me in a matter of hours.

Q: Was there the feeling that the Greek Cypriot government was tacitly behind this?

BROWN: Yes. My feeling is that they would not have permitted us to be killed. I do know that I was retreating up the stairway up to the vault area, with my two Greek Cypriot guards, my chief marine gunny who had a couple of shotguns, and our security officers. We had decided that if the mob came around the corner and up the stairways, we would fire. We had used all of our teargas.

The marines had not used their weapons. And don't forget. This is fairly early on in the era of attacks on American embassies. Cleo Noel had been killed in the Sudan and one or two other people. But basically this was early on in the era of attacks around the world. So we didn't have a lot of experience in how to handle it.

But the marines. I must compliment the marines. We had supreme marines all during my time there. Unlike the horror stories out of Moscow.

Q: Do you think they were particularly selected?

BROWN: We had well trained and well selected marines. I never had any problem with the marines. They were pretty much under my close supervision. We always had superb marines and very good security officers. The incipient problem that was brought to my attention before I went out there, with regard to the Central Intelligence Agency. I never had any problem with that. I was always given straight answers. I asked as to sources, methods, not to mention information. I

didn't have any problems.

Q: Speaking of this. Our embassies at Ankara and Athens were also important. How did you feel being in the middle and the work of our embassies there?

BROWN: You realize that the Cyprus crisis was the cause of the overthrow of the Ioannidis, Papadopoulos' regime in Athens. The coups against Makarios was the cause for the downfall of Ioannidis regime, which had been in power seven years. Which was considered to be a plaything of the Nixon Administration and Johnson Administration before that.

So in Athens, you had a whole new ball game with the new president and a far more leftist regime which replaced Ioannidis. I felt that my relationship in Nicosia with Athens was fairly good and fairly easy. It was not so with Ankara.

In Ankara we had William Macomber as ambassador, who took a very protective attitude towards the Turkish government. Much of the disagreement which Embassy Nicosia had, was with Embassy Ankara, on what the Turks should do quickly with regard to cooling the situation. We were very much concerned that the Turkish forces were going to continue on to occupy the rest of Cyprus. There was a real fear about that. The whole thrust of diplomatic activity in July and August and into September, was to make sure that Turkey didn't occupy the whole damn island. Then we really would have had a mess. So in answer to your question we did have very different points of view with Bill Macomber in Ankara.

PAUL F. GARDNER
Mutual Security Affairs Counselor
Turkey (1974-1976)

Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas on October 31, 1930. His Foreign Service career included positions in Madagascar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Turkey, New Guinea, and Washington DC. Mr. Gardner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November 1991.

GARDNER: I went to Turkey as mutual security affairs counselor at the Embassy.

Q: This was from 1974-76. Was it a direct transfer?

GARDNER: No, I went on home leave and got caught by the Cyprus war.

Q: I was going to say...I had just left Athens the first of July of 1974. So what happened?

GARDNER: I was on my way to the post and was caught in Rome, which wasn't a bad place. There were no flights available because of the Cyprus war so I was stuck in Rome for several days. When I got to Turkey the situation was quite different than when my assignment was made. Obviously we had a problem over Cyprus and a problem with Congress and their decision

to take some actions against the Turks. The Turks then renounced our mutual security agreement.

Well this gave me a lot of work to do because we had a large number of installations in Turkey and a large number of military personnel scattered all over Turkey and suddenly there they were without an agreement to cover them. The Turks claimed that Congress had broken the agreement. So my job was quite simply to negotiate an agreement with the Turks at a time when they were very angry with us. No Turks showed up to our Fourth of July party.

I also had to worry about what they might be doing to our installations. Theoretically they were closed down, but they let our personnel stay on, but theoretically they couldn't do any work. There were all sorts of little problems that would arise. Some people would take action against our posts, etc.

So between negotiating and trying to keep the status of the military and their safety in the country I was busy. It took me virtually the full two years. We did reach an agreement about six months before I left. I was scheduled to stay there another year but they called me up and asked me if I would come to Indonesia because they needed a political counselor there, so I left and went back to Indonesia.

Q: On this, did all of you in the Embassy feel that you were really negotiating on two sides...one with the Turks and the other with Congress?

GARDNER: Well, when you get into a negotiating condition like that you have many more sides than that. Obviously we had to negotiate an agreement...I was the head of the working group that was composed of a number of military, some people from Washington. I was the chairman of the working group which did most of the actual negotiating. We just left the toughest things -- the bracketed language including how much aid we were going to give them -- to be decided by a higher negotiating group. But I led the American side and there was a Department of Foreign Affairs person that led the Turkish group, which was also composed like my group of a lot of colonels. We had trouble with Defense, the Department and the White House, all three, and Congress. So you had to look four different ways.

There were some things that the Department and Defense disagreed on. Was it really necessary to fly our flag over the base? Couldn't we call it a Turkish base as long as it did the same thing? Things like this, because this would set precedents for other military negotiations. We knew this was going to set a tremendous precedent for all of our NATO agreements and our non-NATO agreements to boot. So we had a lot of people looking over our shoulders.

At the same time we had some very tough negotiators. Those Turks are very tough negotiators. I really respected them quite a bit. They really did their homework. They argued very cogently and stubbornly. Some of the stubbornest people you will ever meet. But very, very intelligent. They are really very, very good allies and we wanted to keep them as allies. This was our hope. There were times that we just didn't know whether they really wanted an agreement or not. The Turks were very good at keeping us guessing as to whether they really wanted an agreement or not.

Q: But they knew that you wanted an agreement?

GARDNER: They knew we wanted an agreement. They knew what was up with us. They knew that Greece was over on the other side. We had a strong feeling that they wanted us there. But we weren't absolutely sure because they were so angry. The Turks are highly nationalistic. We were not sure they wouldn't carry it to the point of actually getting rid of the base agreement.

Q: When you are saying this...okay they are very good negotiators, they knew their subject, etc., in some ways what difference does this make. I mean if you have two nations no matter how good negotiators you are...usually there are concerns, after all there is the Soviet Union, there is Greece...Do things fall into place no matter how good the negotiations are or not?

GARDNER: I think the Turks wanted to see if they could find something they could live with and we just wondered if we could produce something they could live with under these circumstances. Obviously they weren't going to give up the relationship as a whole. There was no talk about them getting out of NATO, not with the Soviet Union next door. But what worried us was that we had an awful lot of intelligence gathering bases there. Also we had an Air Force base there which just figured recently in the Iraq crises, Incirlik Air Force Base. We could have lost use of those things. We had far more in Turkey than we had in Greece, for example. And Turkey was geographically more important to us because of its borders along the Black Sea. Some of our installations were duplicated in Iran at that time, but you know what happened to Iran.

We tried to pretend that the facilities were not that valuable to us...satellites were taking over on this type of thing, etc, not fully meaning it, however, because they really were of some value still. The military was very dyed-in-the-wool about regulations and they had certain things about US bases. It was very hard to get Defense to change its attitude about these things.

Q: I have talked to people who have been involved in Portugal on the Azores negotiations, and particularly when you get back to the lawyers at the Department of Defense, they are very difficult.

GARDNER: Yes, it is very difficult. So a lot of our problems were with Defense, although we did work them out. Defense did give in many ways in the crucial areas like flags, etc. that I felt really didn't matter. We did finally get an agreement. The price tag on that agreement, was something the colonels and I (I was an FSO-2 career counselor at the time) couldn't decide. There were a few other things that could only be taken care of at the Cabinet level. So the negotiations moved up to the Ambassador with the Foreign Minister for the last part. I was aide to the Ambassador and that was a pure State Department thing because at that time there was only the Ambassador and me on our side...

Q: That Ambassador at that time was?

GARDNER: Macomber. Bill Macomber and me on one side and their Foreign Minister and my counterpart on the other side. So there were only four of us in this room. We felt it was necessary to take it down to that level for the last key points. I think we agreed virtually on everything except the amount, which was left open for the last stage of meetings with Kissinger in

Washington. By that time it was clear, however, that there would be an agreement. We were quite comfortable that we had reached an agreement. Kissinger and his counterpart, in a few days here in Washington, arrived at the money amounts and negotiated the last clauses.

The agreement was not accepted by Congress, but that is another story and I was out of the picture by that time. It had to be renegotiated. I think Congress balked at the price. But by that time the government in Turkey had changed and we had a government in Turkey that was amenable and this reduced the pressure to a large degree. So when Congress did refuse to accept the agreement...As I recall it was never actually sent to Congress because there were clear messages from Congress that they wouldn't sign it. I may be wrong because by that time I was out of country. One way or the other it was learned that it wouldn't float with the Senate.

But by that time the regime had changed in Turkey and another negotiator did what changes were required and the Turks accepted them to get the large aid that was being offered.

Q: Well you left in 1976. By that time did you get the feeling that the situation in Cyprus was going to be there for some time and they were going to have to live with it?

GARDNER: I think the Turks made it pretty clear that they weren't going to leave the Turks on Cyprus to the Greeks. They made that quite clear. I personally never felt that there was an easy solution to this, unless they came to an agreement that would give the Turks a really large role in the governing of Cyprus. I wasn't involved in that side of things because I was completely tied up on the base negotiations.

One point I would like to make that really bothered me about working on things like this is the degree that lawyers do get involved in treaties. Of course this is very important from our point of view, because we are such a law abiding, "observe the letter of the law" society. The Lawyers wanted language to safeguard every possible situation in the future. One of these horrible contracts that our government tries to force on people from time to time. It makes you guarantee things for all sorts of contingencies which were not there and which I found quite stupid because no one pays attention to this kind of language.

So I did an airgram which the Department of State applauded, but which I am sure Defense did not applaud at all, in which I pointed out what the Turks had done under our other agreement. I said that everything that many of their acts you could consider violations. Then I pointed out why they had made these violations -- they were to be expected. Then I said, "You must take into consideration what they are going to do whether or not you have this language or not; you are stupid to try to put this language in to protect yourself. In many cases they are not going to accept it because it looks as if we are tying them up in knots." We tend to do this with every country, by the way. Our lawyers are really...

Q: I know. I have heard this in dealing with Morocco, etc.

GARDNER: But if you looked at our last agreement you could see that they had violated it all over the place, so why have language that you know is going to be violated from the beginning. That doesn't make any sense just to protect yourself. Of course you have to worry about

Congress and other things.

Eventually we got the kind of agreement that was necessary and I was in charge of the first stage, the first document which later had to be changed.

Q: What was your impression of the Embassy when you arrived just after this catastrophe for American-Turkish relations? The invasion of Cyprus, which I considered well justified considering what the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots had done. How was the Embassy responding to this diplomatic disaster?

GARDNER: Oh, well, we had a very forceful Ambassador and they responded the way he wanted them to do. I think he was quite effective. We had a very large military presence in there that I worked with and many of them were quite good. I was really impressed with some of the military that I did work with. Especially at the colonel level. The ones on my team really did a good job. I found the general, as well, easy to work with. We had some good generals there. There were some exceptions, but that always occurs.

The hatches were battened down, obviously, because suddenly a friendly atmosphere turned unfriendly as far as the government was concerned. We had to host a Fourth of July party to which very few Turks came, but I had done that before. Otherwise it was fine.

Q: Before we leave this could you describe the operating style and impressions of William Macomber as ambassador? He was a major figure in the foreign policy annuals.

GARDNER: He was very effective with the Turks. They really liked him and respected him. He can be a very gracious person as an American host for Turks. He is a very stern taskmaster of an Embassy and he did not always have control of his temper.

Q: I just finished doing an interview with some one who had served with him at an early time. His temper is one of the traditions of the State Department.

MIKE METRINKO
Political Officer/Staff aide
Ankara (1974-1976)

Michael John Metrinko was born in Pennsylvania in 1946. He graduated from Georgetown University in 1968. After entering the Foreign Service in 1974, his postings have included Ankara, Damascus, Tehran, Tabriz, Krakow, Kabul, Tel Aviv and special assignments in Yemen and Afghanistan. Mr. Metrinko was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: You went into the Peace Corps in '68?

METRINKO: In 1968.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about your indoctrination training, and all.

METRINKO: Indoctrination training was actually rather funny. I was told to report to Eagle Rock, Los Angeles, California. Eagle Rock has a very good small school called Occidental College.

Q: It's sort of between Pasadena and Beverly Hills and that area.

METRINKO: Right. It's a very, very beautiful little school, a little gem of school out there, and they had a contract for running the Peace Corps training for the summers. So I went off to Eagle Rock and showed up in Los Angeles for what was supposed to be two months of Turkish training. I had a great time. I immediately liked the Turkish teachers. I had another cousin who had also been through Georgetown, living in Los Angeles at the time, who was delighted that I was out there and used to show up and pick me up in her convertible and whisk me away from classes at the school and off to things on weekends. The summer school was in session, and it consisted mostly of girls who were living in the sorority houses there. I had a great time with them. I spent a lot of my time fooling around during training, going out to the beaches, touring around, spending time with my cousin. I had a private dinner one day with Tiny Tim. My cousin introduced us. You know, this sort of thing. It was great fun. I went off to Palm Springs. I got to Las Vegas. All the sorts of things that you do in about 10 weeks of frenetic activity. I disappeared one day with one of the Turkish teachers, who suggested that we cut class. He was a Turkish university student there who was teaching us Turkish, and he wanted to go off and do something, so I went off with him and spent the whole day with Turks, came back and discovered that we had had a surprise inspection from Washington, and I was being summoned - they had left notes all over for me - because they were worried about my ability to adjust to foreign countries, and the people from Washington had wanted to talk to me. I was not a group player. The Peace Corps head of our program at Eagle Rock was a professional psychologist. He used to sit around with a notepad taking notes all the time as we talked or interacted or did things. And he had realized he rarely saw me in groups. I was always off doing something, so he had decided I was not going to make it in Turkey. Well, they literally told me that I should drop out of the program in Eagle Rock because obviously I was not cut out for the Peace Corps, and I reminded them that they had said that everybody in training in Eagle Rock would go to Turkey, and the final cut would not be made until after our month in Turkey. They had said this; they could not tell me to leave if they were telling the truth then. And they got annoyed, but they said it would depend on my Turkish examination. And I went into the Turkish examination, and the teacher, the examiner, was from FSI. He had come out from Washington. And one of the first questions he asked me, in Turkish, was my name and where I had gone to university. And I told him, and he immediately said, "Oh, Georgetown" - in English - that he also had had some affiliation with Georgetown, and the next thing I knew we knew all sorts of people in common, because I knew people at FSI, courtesy of their children whom I had gone to school with, and he spent the next 20 minutes laughing and talking in English about Washington, DC, and this place and all the people we knew in common, etc., etc., etc. He forgot, literally, he was giving me a Turkish examination. And when they announced the scores, I came out as the highest score of the entire group, which nobody could understand. And he was gone. But he had conducted the whole examination in English. It was great, you know.

Anyway, I went off to Turkey and arrived in Turkey and got off the plane and immediately loved it.

Q: You were there from, what, '68 to '70?

METRINKO: '68 to '70 - but got off the plane, saw people standing at the awful Dogpatch airport - the airport in Ankara back in 1968 was like something left over from World War I. A dust storm was blowing, and there were women standing there veiled. And I thought, This is where I want to be. And by the next day I had made Turkish friends.

Q: Where were you sent?

METRINKO: Well, they were so sure I was not going to make it in Turkey that they assigned me as a problem case to Ankara, and I spent two years teaching at Hacettepe University, which was great.

Q: What was Ankara like in those days?

METRINKO: Ankara in those days, 1968 to '70, still had wide boulevards. Atatürk Boulevard, which is the street the embassy is on, was lined with big old houses and with buildings set half a block in from the sidewalks, with huge gardens with trees in front of them. Restaurants typically had huge, huge gardens. It was a city of gardens, pleasant villas, small apartment buildings, only one hotel that you would even think of as being a decent hotel. There was one traffic light in the entire city. As we used to say, "Let's meet at the light," and everyone knew what it was. And that was way, way, way down away from us. The university that I was teaching at was a great place. The students were all my age. I made lots of friends there, had a good time for two years.

Q: How did you find the state of Turkish education when you were there?

METRINKO: I thought the university was quite good. It was highly selective, of course. You don't get into a university easily in Turkey. You had to pass very rigorous exams. They took a small percentage of the graduating class of every high school. My students tended to be bright, spoke or learned to speak quite good English, well educated, well brought up, nice people. I had Turkish roommates who were well educated or in the process of becoming well educated, bright decent people.

Q: How dedicated did you find them?

METRINKO: The students were hard-working. To stay on in the universities they had to work, and they did. It was not a free ride. At the same time, the universities were rife with problems, basically political problems. This was when socialism was rearing its head. There was lots of anti-American stuff going on because of Vietnam. Political troubles in Turkey itself - the problems were having a resurgence then, so there were also political problems there in the universities at the time. The universities went off on strike several times when I was there.

Q: Well, did the university end up, as so many universities around the world do, except in the United States and maybe England, with the students being practically expected to be quite radicalized and demonstrate practically extreme socialist, Communist or stuff? Then when they graduate they go out into the world and they do a complete turnaround.

METRINKO: Yes, that's fairly descriptive of Turkish universities except for the Kurdish ethnic problem. But at the time it was less Kurdish and more socialist versus far right. The *solcu* and the *saci*, the right and left. And there were students with beards and students without beards. If you had a beard, you were a socialist hippie. Everybody had a moustache, but you either had a beard or you did not have a beard.

Q: What about Islam at that time?

METRINKO: In the universities, almost no mention of it. The university that I was at, one of my classrooms where I taught probably five days a week in the afternoon, that particular classroom had been built... it was a brand new university. In fact it was still under construction. And our particular building had been built right next to the minaret of a mosque, a very old minaret of what was then still a village mosque, because we were on one of the outskirts of the city. The muezzin, the guy who did the call to prayer, would climb the minaret and do the call to prayer in person. I could see him standing about 70 or 80 feet from me, and the top of the minaret was on a level with my classroom, so we had a beautiful view of him. I would always stop the class when he was doing the call to prayer, and the students would laugh at me for even paying attention to it. He had a beautiful voice. But the students themselves, not religious, at least not on the surface religious at all.

Q: Women students with head scarves?

METRINKO: No scarves at all in the universities then or now. Scarves weren't allowed, and this was the time of the miniskirt, so a typical Turkish girl, if she were middle class there, would be wearing a miniskirt and high boots, and long, long hair, you know, sort of flowing freely. It was a wonderful time to be in Turkey. The girl students were absolutely beautiful.

Q: Where did your university sort of rank in the pecking order?

METRINKO: It was a new university, a medical university attached to Hacettepe hospital in Ankara. It was very, very new. The first building was still under construction, the first several buildings. It was surrounded by mud fields and construction fields. It was part of the hospital complex. When you were sitting in the school cafeteria, for several months of one year, the operating theater was on the other side of the cafeteria, and the connection was through the cafeteria. So bodies were being wheeled through the cafeteria on stretchers to have operations and medical treatment. It was that new. They still hadn't gotten the complex put together. The pecking order wasn't applicable yet. If you wanted, the old established university in Ankara was Ankara University, which had a law faculty and the political science faculties attached to it. The other one in Ankara was the Middle East Technical University, METU, which taught all courses in English - engineering, hard sciences. Ours was social work, pre-med, things like that.

Q: How did you find your language training was going?

METRINKO: I think as with all language training, you learned the theory of it in FSI, although I never had any FSI training in Turkish. You learn the theory of it in language class and you learn the practicality of it when you meet friends and start going out. And that's how I learned Turkish.

Q: But how about your teaching English?

METRINKO: Oh, that was fine. The students were interested. They knew they had to study it. They knew that to get ahead in Turkey you had to have English at that point. They were serious about it.

Q: What about the view of America, because we are talking about the Vietnam time and all this?

METRINKO: The view of America versus the view of Americans. Students were basically anti-America. Our government was doing some awful things. They were seeing it all in the news in Turkey, so they were becoming more and more anti-American government, anti-American Army. We had a lot of military bases in Turkey at the time, US military bases, including one in Ankara. These became the focus of attention, too. Towards myself, never anything personal. My friends were Turkish, and some of the most radical in my class were friends of mine. We'd go out drinking together. We would argue about Vietnam, but I wasn't a supporter of Vietnam either. In fact, the years that I was there, a lot of Peace Corps - not me, but a lot of them - took part in an anti-Vietnam demonstration in Turkey, caused a lot of trouble, actually for the Peace Corps there.

Q: How did the writ of the Peace Corps work with you while you were there?

METRINKO: The Peace Corps is a funny organization. It didn't at the time exert any real discipline over us, so that I would go to the Peace Corps office occasionally to get mail, to look at other things, but not really hang around at all - there was no reason to. I knew people on the staff, of course. I knew other people who would drop in to get a newspaper or to pick something up or drop something off, but we didn't really have a close, close connection to it. It was there; my apartment was half a mile away from it. I would usually have breakfast at a place that was only a block or so away from it, but by no means did I go in on a daily basis.

Q: Well, were they monitoring you, or how did that work?

METRINKO: In theory I guess they were, but I don't really remember anyone from the Peace Corps office coming down to the university. And there were seven or eight of us assigned to the university. They had yearly Peace Corps assemblies when we would all go off to a hotel somewhere off in the outskirts or one of the provinces and get together and talk about the Peace Corps, talk about what we were doing. They did that twice when I was there and were sorry for having done it each time. The first year when I was there we took a vote, and the vote came out almost unanimous from the volunteers that the Peace Corps should not be in Turkey, that Turkey did not need Peace Corps. And the Peace Corps staff got very upset.

Q: It was really designed for a different country, anyway. What did you and your group feel was the rationale for keeping the Peace Corps there?

METRINKO: Political reasons. Part of the Turkish government wanted to look as if they were very receptive to the United States. And I don't think that the Peace Corps at the time ever looked at pulling out of places; they just wanted to get into more places. There was an unlimited supply of volunteers; there was lots of money in the budget - Kennedy and Johnson both supported it - and it was, you know, it was a good idea, it seemed, at the time.

Q: Did you have any contact, feel, knowledge of the American diplomatic establishment in Ankara?

METRINKO: Very limited contact. I knew one of the Marine guards at the embassy because he was dating one of the girls in my Peace Corps group. Other than that, I think I may have been to the embassy cafeteria occasionally, and that was it. We could also cash checks, if I remember correctly, in the embassy Budget and Fiscal Office, and it was a way to get American dollars if we were going on a vacation or a trip somewhere, because they were not easy to get if you got a check and you wanted to cash it. You would go to a Turkish bank and wait forever.

Q: What was student life like there while you were there?

METRINKO: Guys and girls studied together at the university. Because it was a university in the capital city, and I guess considered one of the up-and-coming universities once it got off the ground, we had a fairly middle-class group of students there, middle-class and slightly upper-class. Life was easy. I mean I would go out on weekends all the time with the students - with the guys, basically - to go drinking for a night - not every weekend, but it happened a lot. There was some traveling. I'd go off on trips sometimes with students, things of that sort. It was rather free and easy in class. This was 1968. I was 22, so I was almost the same age as a lot of my students.

Q: How about the Kurdish problem? Did that intrude?

METRINKO: It didn't exist. Officially there were no Kurds in Turkey.

Q: They were "Mountain Turks"?

METRINKO: Mountain Turks. I had Kurdish friends. Two of us - myself as one volunteer with a Turkish roommate and the people who lived in the next apartment building over, two volunteers from a different group, had both taken in Turkish high school students who wanted to come to the capital city to complete their high school education. It was quite often done in Turkey if you were from a provincial town. The parents would send their son to the capital city to get into what they thought was a better high school to improve his chances of getting into a college. I had one of the students living with me, and in the next apartment over was one of his closest friends. And the next apartment with the other Peace Corps Volunteers was the next building over. It was maybe 100 meters from our place. They had a Kurdish high school student, and my student and that student were very close friends. They were always together. So I got to know the Kurdish student very well, went back to his village with him a couple of times, in Eastern Turkey. I also

had some Kurdish students of my own. They were very circumspect, very guarded, but could be very vocal in private, when you got them out of the Turkish environment. And I certainly saw some good examples of what was happening to the Kurds when I went out with these students.

Q: What was happening?

METRINKO: Well, if your village had a Kurdish name, the name had been changed to a Turkish name and you had to use the Turkish name. You could not give your children Kurdish first names; they had to be given Turkish first names. You weren't allowed to register with Kurdish names. You were not allowed to speak Kurdish in public. It was considered an illegal language on the streets; therefore, they weren't going to teach anyone Kurdish. They could speak it inside their own homes, with their families.

You'd hear quite a bit about Kurds - the Kurds this and the Kurds that. Of course their existence was being denied in the public press and regular history books. As far as I know the US Government went along with this lock, stock, and barrel - which it does today too, for that matter.

Q: Were there radical leftist Marxist-Leninist organizations in the university?

METRINKO: In the Peace Corps? Sorry.

Q: I was just thinking about the university and -

METRINKO: If there were, and there were, members would never have introduced themselves to me as a member of a Marxist-Leninist, whatever, group. Did the guys I went out drinking with have tendencies in that direction? Yes, probably. We had a lot of discussions about politics. A lot of them were not happy. My students also went off on strike routinely, especially in 1970. There were a series of strikes, against the university, against the government. But as to their particular affiliation with this or that group, I can't answer. They would never have talked to me about that.

Q: Well, then, what were you thinking about? You had a two-year term. What were you thinking about doing?

METRINKO: What I wanted to do was to spend a third year in Turkey. I had put off making a decision. I wanted to spend a third year there. My uncle was on the draft board in Pennsylvania, and I talked to him about what would happen if I came back to the United States. I wanted to go into graduate school, study Middle Eastern studies, get a master's degree; and it was something I had never thought about before going to Turkey, of course. I just fell in love with the area, the language, the people, everything else. I talked to my uncle, and he said that as long as I stayed in the Peace Corps I would be considered draft-exempt by our draft board because they were exempting all teachers and Peace Corps volunteers. I came from an area that was oversubscribed for the military. They had enough volunteers; they didn't have to draft people. He said if you came back here and you simply start going to school again, with your lottery number you'll go into the army almost immediately. So I decided to spend a third year in Turkey. I was signed up for it, everything was approved, I was going to spend a third year not teaching but working for

the Ministry of Tourism, which would have been great. By this time I spoke Turkish well, I knew the country, I had English, etc. I had traveled all over Turkey. Everything was set, and then all the universities in the country went off on a massive strike in the spring of 1970. The strike went from week to week to week and ended up with a whole series of demands being made by the strikers. One of them was that all Americans had to leave Turkey. Well, the government decided, and I guess the embassy decided, they certainly weren't going to sacrifice the U.S. bases, and the American soldiers there, but to at least give a sop to the demonstrators, they might as well let the Peace Corps go. We were the ones who were visible, anyway. And we were the ones who looked suspicious, because nobody really knew what we were doing. We were teachers - what does that mean? What does Peace Corps mean? At that time, we were waging a major war. So the Peace Corps in Ankara disbanded. That's fine. At the time that it was disbanding, I kept hoping that we'd be able to stay on or I'd be able to stay on, not as a teacher, but at the Ministry of Tourism. I walked into the Peace Corps office one day to discuss this. It must have been in the early spring of 1970, and there was a notice on the bulletin board there that an American archeologist was looking for an assistant and an interpreter. I took the notice off, called and got in touch with the person. We hit it off. He had just been given a license by the Department of Archeology, the first foreign archeologist in years and years, to go up all along the Black Sea coast and do a survey of potential excavation sites. He offered me the job of going with him. The Peace Corps agreed to let me go and continue as part of my Peace Corps service, pending what might happen at the Ministry of Tourism, since this fit exactly into tourism anyway. So I went off with him for several weeks and toured the entire Black Sea area - not toured it, you know, staying in some pretty awful places - but got to see archeological sites from Sinop to Trabzon.

Q: We'll pick this up in 1970, after you've finished this time with an archeologist.

Today is May 18, 2000. Mike, you're at 1970, and you've just finished going around looking at archeological sites on the Black Sea, was it?

METRINKO: The Black Sea.

Q: Okay, so what did you do after you came back and went to work?

METRINKO: That period, more to the end of the Peace Corps presence in Turkey, I was one of the very last of the volunteers, probably the second or third last, to leave the country. The Peace Corps presence left there because of the growing anti-American feeling that was rising in the student body in Turkey, the leftist press, etc. Turkey was going through a period of extreme civil problems, civil unrest, if you will, and the Peace Corps was seen as too much of a presence, too obvious a presence. We were at all the Turkish universities, throughout Turkish schools. They got rid of us. That was fine with me. Because the program was ending so abruptly and so early, and because I had expected to spend a third year in Turkey - I had made all my plans to do this. I had already been assigned to a new position in Turkey in the Peace Corps - and suddenly found myself without an assignment; and the Peace Corps in Washington offered several of us Peace Corps assignments in other countries. On the list of countries was Iran. Because I had been to Iran on a vacation and had really liked it and had wanted to go back, I decided to go to Iran. I

originally thought I would go there for one year. That was my plan, to leave the Peace Corps after three years in the Peace Corps. Instead, I went Iran and ended up liking it so much that I spent three years more in Iran.

Q: Okay, so I wonder, this was 1970 to '73 you were in Iran in the Peace Corps. Well, let's talk about what you were doing, where you were, and the state of things there at that time.

METRINKO: Peace Corps training in Iran took place - it was all in Iran, unlike my Peace Corps studies for Turkey, where I'd been trained in the United States partially. All Peace Corps training for Iran was actually conducted in the country of Iran. And I spent two to three months in the city of Hamadan in western Iran. And my first assignment would be in the town of Sonqor (or Songhor). Sonqor was a Turkic town surrounded by Kurds in Khorramshahr Province, which is in western Iran. It was not very far from the border of Iraq, and the town of Sonqor, according to local legend, had been founded by Bay Sonqor, the grandson of Genghis Khan, who was allegedly in the area on a hunting trip and had a hunting accident and broke his leg and had to camp there for several months until he was recovered enough to leave. He liked the place, established a tribal presence there, and the Turkish town of Sonqor came into being. Sonqor has a Turkish name. The Turkish which is spoken there, according to linguists, is closer to the Turkish of Central Asia, rather than the Turkish of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Also, I noticed later that the carpet patterns, the ones that were native to the people of Sonqor, I saw the exact pattern in carpets that came straight out of Central Asia. In fact, I've made mistakes in thinking one carpet was from Sonqor and it turned out to be directly from Bokhara. You see the Bokhara city pattern as well. These patterns are only found in these two cities as far as I know.

I spent one year teaching in the local high school. I was responsible for all of the first-year English classes in the two boys' schools. We had more than 200 students, and all the students had three English classes a week. It ended up being a pretty full-time week. The students there were very different from the university students in Turkey. Number one, they were all guys. First-year high school, which meant an average in age of anything from 11 or 12 up to 18 or 19. The first year high school was the year traditionally in Iran when students came in from the villages to the nearest city or the nearest town to continue their high school education. Most Iranian villages had up to the sixth grade or seventh grade, but not much beyond that. This was the time when village students were showing up. This meant that I had a very heavy contingent of Kurdish students who had a lot of trouble speaking Persian, along with the town students from Sonqor itself, who were basically Turks. So it was mixing Kurds and Turks, almost no Persian presence at all. Persian was the state language, the official language. Everyone in the town was trilingual. They all spoke Kurdish, Turkish, and Persian, and I spoke Turkish and Persian, so that made me at least good in two of the languages, and I learned to get along in Kurdish.

Q: What was the Shah's government doing at this particular time that you were seeing evidence of in Sonqor?

METRINKO: Well, he was sending Peace Corps teachers, for example. The Shah's government was trying to open up the education system, trying to spread literacy in a country that had been historically illiterate. The closest friends I had there were Iranian guys from the town, several of whom were village schoolteachers. I met a group of guys my age very quickly after I got there.

They all had high school diplomas and they had been sent out to teach in various of the villages around Sonqor, within one, two, three hours' walk. And they became my friends, and I spent a lot of time, because of that, out in the villages. That was one indication of what the Shah's government was doing, making sure that at least basic literacy was getting to every nook and cranny of the country.

Other than that, there was a good clinic in the town - a couple of good clinics, as a matter of fact. The town was small, by the way. It had 9,000 people. Electricity had been brought in that year. It was the first time people had had electricity. This meant, of course, very basic electricity, usually a light bulb hanging from the ceiling, and that was it. And when I say light bulb, I mean exactly that - a light bulb hanging from a wire. There were no televisions in the town. There was no television reception in the town. I had a short-wave radio, so I could pick up short-wave broadcasts. Other than that electricity was not used for anything at all - maybe an occasional tape recorder, but not much else. No televisions at all. The town was a strange and somehow very attractive place as far as people were concerned. It was on a plateau, a large plateau surrounded by mountains, and you had to pass through some pretty heavy mountains to get to the town proper. I think that's why it retained its Turkic identity. Nobody had gotten into that place or out of that place in so long.

The town of Sonqor, if you tried to go there up until World War II, the nearest city was Khorramshahr, which was about four hours' drive away when I was there. If you tried to go through Khorramshahr to Sonqor up through World War II, the trip would have taken approximately one week by horseback, donkeyback, or camelback. The path over the mountains is a rough one. There are a lot of mountains in between. It's just a long, dry haul to get to the city. By the end of World War II, my understanding is that the British Army and the American Army had pushed through and at least leveled off somewhat a road you could drive a jeep over, and the trip had gone from a week to the longer part of a day. The road had improved considerably by the time I was there. We were serviced by a bus and you could get there in approximately four hours from the city. The town was certainly one of the most conservative towns anybody had ever seen in Iran. Every woman in the town, with the exception of a single woman only - I can tell you who she was - wore a full dark *chador*, a full black heavy veil that Muslim women in Iran... that has become famous since the revolution. In the time I was there, I rarely saw a woman's face. The society that I was in was totally male. I had a landlady, of course, in the house that I shared with an Iranian family, but I rarely saw her face. She would normally, as soon as I walked in from the courtyard, cover herself up and then talk to me through her veil. Once in a while, if things relaxed in the course of a day, I saw her face, but not very often. Other than that, my best friends - and I found very good friends - and I would only see the older women, for example their mothers or their grandmothers occasionally - they'd be allowed to come out and talk to me. Other than that, I never saw the women in any of the houses I went into. If I did see one, it would be someone totally veiled who would simply say "Welcome," or "Welcome to the house," and then would disappear. From then on I would only see a hand from behind a wall holding trays of different foods. If you had been dropped in from outer space you would have assumed that only men existed in the city except for lumps of black walking around the streets in heavy black veils. There was no cinema in the town. Someone had tried to build a cinema there. He was warned by the local clergy that this was a sin because films and the cinema industry were anathema to Islam. He persisted, and he died. And the clergy then collected money in the mosque to help pay his wife through gifts so that she would not starve. He was killed for trying

to build a cinema. Other than that, it was a very pleasant time. I had no problems there. I had a lot of friendships there. I still get telephone calls from people in the town on holidays, Christmas, etc.

Q: Well, now, what was the situation that you were seeing in Iran? How was the Shah perceived at this particular time?

METRINKO: 1970. The Shah was very much disliked in the town that I was in. The town had, for *pro forma* reasons, requested permission to put up a statue of the Shah and was turned down by the palace, which refused to give them permission to put up a statue. The town was known in the area of Khorramshahr, in joking, as "Stalingrad." It was a town that had been heavily influenced by the Tudeh Party, the old pro-Communist party. It was a town of separatists. A lot of people in the town had died fighting the Shah's armies. The people were not pro-Shah at all. There were *pro-forma* celebrations on the Shah's birthday and at other times, but in general the feeling was rather anti-Shah. One example I can give, I have a photograph of myself that was taken by someone else in Songhor at the time of the Shah's birthday in November, 1970. It was a little celebration with the normal folkloric dances and people like that in the central square of the town, and I was standing with a friend who was one of the local bank presidents. We were standing at the edge of the *maidan*. Somebody was giving a speech, and approximately every 20 or 30 seconds he would call out, "*Shahanshah aryah mehr!*" And everybody would clap. My friend would clap, too. This means, "Shah of shahs, the light of the Aryans." It was a title used by the Shah. I turned to my friend the banker, and I said, "Why are you clapping? You can't hear anything he's saying? I can't." And he looked at me and said, in a whisper, "If I don't clap now, I'll be in jail tonight." So I started to clap, too, whenever they'd say "*Shahanshah aryah mehr!*" That man, by the way, later on, after the revolution, became one of the heads of the regional Islamic banking system. He was put in charge of a big chunk of the country to turn the banking system Islamic.

Q: You were from America. Did they kind of know what America was, have any feeling for it? Or were you just a helping hand?

METRINKO: No, the Iranians never accept the idea of somebody helping them. They are the most suspicious people in the world and accept nothing at face value. There was a basic assumption that I was a spy of some sort or there for some nefarious purpose. That did not stop the friendships because Iranians accept nefarious purposes as part of their culture. They never quite knew whether I was working for their own government or another government. Most of the people in the town would not have known where America was, no. For example, I was invited once to dinner to the home of one of the other teachers, and his wife was present at the dinner. That was a bit unusual. This was an educated family, by the way. And after the dinner was over, the wife looked at me and, addressing me directly, said, "You're probably wondering why we invited you for dinner tonight." Well, I had been wondering. And she said, "The reason is that I have a brother who's living in your country, and I thought that if we became friendly with you, you might have your family invite my brother to dinner at your place." I said, "That's great." I said, "What's his address?" And she went and got a piece of paper and handed me his address, and he was living in Frankfurt, Germany. I looked at it and said, "But I live in the United States of America." And, "Yes." She assumed they were the same place. If you were from America,

you were just from out there. Now that changed absolutely 100 percent in a few years.

Q: Now we're sticking to this '70 to '73 period. What were you picking up? Because this is always a very... this area, I would assume, had been one in which there were unpleasant neighbors around, not only Iranian, but you had Iraqis and Turks. In typical way, how were relations there?

METRINKO: Relations with Iraq... the Iranians and the Iraqis had had relations for 3000 years. It's been hot and cold throughout the length of that 3000 years. They've been fighting with each other and visiting each other and trading with each other constantly through that whole period. The Persian Empire wiped out the Babylonian Empire. That was only the beginning, and it's gone back and forth, back and forth, back and forth all along. When in I was in Iran in the early '70s, the business of border security had been turned over in large part to the Kurdish tribes who lived on the border. The Kurdish tribes went back and forth; each came into the other's country all the time. People visited, they did trading, they did black market smuggling all the time. Also, despite flare-ups and the Shah supporting Kurds in Iraq, for example, in Iraq in this period lived some of the major Iranian Shiite religious leaders. They lived in the shrine city of Najaf. There was a huge Shiite presence in Iraq - still is, the Shiite religion of Iran - and a lot of religious leaders went back and forth constantly. Khomeini lived in Iraq at that point. There were Iranian religious families living around the shrines of Iraq who had been there for hundreds of years but still considered themselves Iranian, and they had Iranian passports. Was there a problem? Well, for one part of that period, you couldn't visit Iraq. In fact, Iran accepted a lot of Kurdish refugees from Iraq who had fled across the border. For other periods of time, it was fine. One could go easily - not Americans, particularly - but people could go easily, and Iranian pilgrims always visited Iraq. So was it a friendly border? No, but it was a much-traveled border, and people did go back and forth, and there were treaties between the two countries.

Q: Did you get any repercussions of that, or was that farther away?

METRINKO: It didn't touch me at all. To the best of my knowledge, none of the refugee Kurds came into the Sonqor area. I only saw them later, up in the Caspian.

Q: What about the relations between the Turkic and Kurdish speakers?

METRINKO: In Sonqor it was absolutely fine. They all spoke each other's languages, and in fact most of them were intermarried. I don't think there were any pure Turkic peoples or pure Kurdish peoples there. The language you spoke... people would routinely, for social reasons, use all three languages. So even illiterate villagers or illiterate townspeople, who had had no formal education at all, spoke all three.

METRINKO: No, actually, when I left Iran, I took a slow trip back. It took about six weeks. I hitchhiked out of Iran. I hitchhiked in and out of Iran many times in the course of those years. I hitchhiked out of Iran, across the border, hitchhiked around eastern Turkey, traveled with a Turkish friend hitchhiking around southern Turkey for a couple of weeks, and really said goodbye to Turkey and Iran. I wanted to go into the Foreign Service to see other parts of the world. Then as they started to talk about personnel assignments, the guy who was our personnel

counselor at the time went on and on about how it's the new Foreign Service, with the open assignments process, and you can go anywhere in the world that you'd like to go, and these are the possibilities, and you're lucky because you're in a rank where you can really do anything at all, and this is the start of a whole new life. And I looked at the list, and there were really some great places on there. And when it came my turn to have my career counseling session, the onward assignment counseling session, he looked at me and said, "Where have you been thinking?" I said, well, this one, this one, this one all sound great. He said, "What about Turkey?" And I said, "No, thanks, I've just been there." Again he said, "Well, what about Turkey?" I said, "No, I just got out of Turkey. I just was there a matter of weeks ago." And then I got suspicious and said, "You've told us that we can ask for anything in the world that's on the list. There are lots of places here" - Southeast Asia, the Pacific, etc. He said, "Yes, well, you know there's a job that we might be able to get for you in Addis Ababa." I said, "There's a civil war going on there now. Isn't the embassy closed or closing?" He said, "Well, yes, but what about Ankara? Have you thought about that?" Well, the upshot was that I found myself back in Ankara. They needed somebody who spoke Turkish.

Q: So you were in Ankara from '74 to when?

METRINKO: '74 to '76. I had just left Ankara.

Q: Yes, that takes all the fun out of it.

METRINKO: I spent my vacation money in Ankara saying goodbye to Ankara.

Q: When you were in Ankara, when you went there, what was your job?

METRINKO: When I went there I was so new to the Foreign Service, I had missed the part of the orientation because I was Cyprus task force, about informing the embassy that I was arriving. So I simply went, picked up the ticket, left, and went to Ankara. It was possible to do this. I got to Ankara, spent a couple of days with friends, went up to the embassy one morning and said, "Here I am." And it was quite a surprise to Ankara that I was there already. They had assumed somehow that I'd be in language training for a couple of months.

Well, my first job, I was, according to what the personnel system had told me, I was going to be 90 percent consular officer and occasionally fill in when somebody was absent from the political section. I got to Ankara and discovered the embassy had a different version of that, and it was 90 percent political officer, occasionally filling in- (end of tape)

Q: It was '74-'76. Who was the ambassador when you got there, the DCM, and a little about your impression of the embassy.

METRINKO: The ambassador was William Butts Macomber, who was a political appointee, who had been a political appointee with the State Department for, I think it was, about 20 years. He had been head of administration; he had been staff aide to John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson. The DCM the whole time I was there was Donald Burgess, who was a straight career employee, an old Middle East hand, who went on from there to become our ambassador in Khartoum.

Macomber went on from there to become the president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Both professional, both good in their own way. I'm trying to think of some of the other people at the embassy. I can go through naming lots of people's names, personalities.

Q: We don't need that, but what was your impression? Was it a happy embassy? How did it run?

METRINKO: Was it a happy embassy? No. I'd say there was a fair amount of tension in the embassy. Individuals there were happy, depending on whether or not they were acclimated to Turkey. I went there having Turkish friends all over Ankara, all over Turkey, speaking the language, so it was different for me. I was just coming back home again. But for a lot of people there it was a foreign experience they did not like.

What can I say? My job there was supposed to be, as I said, consular, part-time political. Instead just a few days after my arrival, the staff aide's father got seriously ill, and the staff aide had to leave for two weeks. I was told to report to the ambassador's office, being the youngest piece of meat, I guess, in the political section, and found myself a staff aide for the next two weeks, hated every second of it because the ambassador, while he definitely had gifts, was also a workaholic who had no life outside the embassy and expected his staff to be there the whole time, too. I spent two weeks hating it, just waiting for the staff aide to get back. The staff aide returned. The ambassador called us into his office and announced that he had decided that the staff aide needed some broadening experience and would go to the Political Section and I would be the new staff aide. I was the ambassador's staff aide for a full year. It was a definite learning experience.

Q: I'm told Macomber had a well-deserved reputation for his anger. I mean he would blow up, but it didn't last long.

METRINKO: Macomber went up and down, hot and cold, from frigid to volcanic, approximately 15 times an hour. You never knew, when you were walking in with him or talking with him, whether he was going to explode or love you. You never knew. It was very, very difficult to deal with him. He was extremely sharp. An intelligent person, he liked Turkey, the Turks liked him. At least, the Turks like him for what they saw, the good side of him. I remember once a Turkish friend of mine from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a woman, was at one of his receptions, and she and I were talking, and someone made a comment about how pleasant the ambassador was, and she looked at me and she said, "You know, he's so nice to me now because I come and see him from the minister" - she was one of the minister's secretaries, minister of foreign affairs - "he's always so pleasant and so charming when he's seeing me, but he doesn't know that I used to be an operator at the military base here, and I would have to deal with him late at night when he was trying to get calls through to the United States, and he would curse at me." He always forgot that. He never remembered that the person he needed right now was the one he had just cursed at and insulted a minute back. He was definitely sharp and knew the Washington world. He was extremely hospitable, and some of the things he did in the embassy I've tried to use through my whole career because I thought they were great. He was the most democratic person I've ever seen, and he really did believe that everyone in the embassy should use the ambassador's residence all the time - whether or not they wanted to. This meant that if he was having a dinner for a Rockefeller and it was going to be a sit-down dinner for six people, one of the six might be a GSO FSN or a driver, and another one was going to be Princess

So-and-so who was passing through the city, and the other was going to be a junior officer. He had a standing rule about including everybody in everything, and his hospitality was extraordinarily good and effective. He could meet anybody whenever he wanted to, and he made it very clear to everyone in the embassy, from the Marine guards to the FSNs to this to that, that he wanted us at the residence to share things, and we were all considered equals. I was at so many events there because of that, unlike any other ambassador. I know, I've met, many ambassadors who had no idea that they had junior officers in the embassy, but only knew their political counselor and DCM and that was that. Macomber was exactly the opposite, very effective and got himself into some very amusing and unusual situations because of this focus.

Q: Do any come to mind?

METRINKO: Oh, yes, sure. One came to mind. His standard thing, when he was inviting FSNs or embassy staff to the house, was please bring a Turkish friend. This was partly to make the events representational, and he had to have more than 50 per cent [non-] American presence or embassy presence. And one day he decided to invite all the Marines for some event or other. All the Marine guards were supposed to come. You always got fed well at his place. So he invited the Marine detachment, as many of them as could be off duty. And they thought this was great. Now we had a funny Marine detachment there. It may have been the most unusual one in the world at the time. The gunny rarely spent time at the embassy. One of the USMC sergeants - I've forgotten his title now - was working part-time and living at a house of prostitution. He was the bouncer at the house. I only found this out because I was talking to him once very, very late at night when I'd been called in for some duty and asked him if he spoke Turkish, and he started to speak to me in Turkish that was absolutely fluent and beautiful except it was gutter Turkish of the worst, vile type. I asked him where he had learnt it, and he told me that his girlfriend was the madam of the local house of prostitution and he stayed there with her as the bouncer. Because all the Marines wanted to bring girls to this reception, the whorehouse closed down for the evening, and they escorted prostitutes. It was one of the better receptions ever held at the residence, and the ambassador kept saying, "Gee, it's so nice that the Marines know such lovely young Turkish girls." But everybody had a great time, and the ambassador, I don't think, ever found out.

Q: What about Mrs. Macomber? She had been John Foster Dulles's secretary.

METRINKO: Very, very professional, lovely person.

Q: I've heard very fine things about her, and as a staff aide you would have had to work with you, didn't you?

METRINKO: Dealings with her, she was always pleasant. She was very professional and sometimes acted a bit like the dragon secretary that she had been, protective of the Secretary. But she was fine. She had a good sense of humor, also -

Q: Phyllis.

METRINKO: Phyllis Macomber. Also very hospitable. I liked her. I mean, I still do. She was always pleasant, and very old-school. This was still back in the days when... I think the year

before or two years before they had stopped rating spouses. It had been a very recent change.

Q: *It was just about that time.*

METRINKO: And she was definitely old-school, as was the DCM's wife.

Q: *The DCM was?*

METRINKO: The DCM Don Burgess's wife, again, very professional, very old-school, white gloves, the whole bit.

Q: *Well, now, you arrived there in 1974, and of course you had already talked about the Cyprus thing, and '74-76 was not a very good period in Turkish-American relations, mainly due to the Greek lobby and particularly Greek congressmen.*

METRINKO: We had the Greek lobby, we had an arms embargo against Turkey, so that no armaments could come there, which made the military relationship a bit delicate. But we also had Turkey in CENTO. CENTO headquarters was in Ankara, and so there were American diplomats assigned to CENTO headquarters, and we had a lot of visits because of CENTO. Turkey was in NATO, so we had Alexander Haig showing up frequently there. We had Kissinger there several times. The combination of Kissinger, Haig, other visitors - there was just a steady stream of very high-ranking American visitors there all the time. So I got to meet Kissinger, I got to meet Haig, etc., any number of senators. Congressmen and senators were always there.

Q: *As so often happens in the American body politic, you have the executive - the President, the Secretary of State, and all of that - and we have a very solid relationship with Turkey, and it makes very good sense; and then you have on the Congressional side, next to the Jewish lobby, the Greek lobby is probably as strong as any ethnic lobby in the United States.*

METRINKO: And the Cuban-Americans.

Q: *Yes, the Cuban-Americans probably even smaller, but the Greek lobby is all over the place, even more than the Jewish lobby, and a big number of Greek-American congressmen. And my time in Greece was... I mean, I've never seen anything so infectious within the Greeks and the Greek-Americans as this hatred of the Turks. It's unreasonable.*

METRINKO: And the Turks have, or had, no concept of lobbying. They also had very little, they still have very little concept of discussion. Turks don't talk about things; they want it their way or not at all. They're not good at bargaining or at discussing things. I had a Turkish roommate. They're great at some things, but discussion, being open minded, thinking of other people's position, or acknowledging problems in their country's history are not strong points.

Q: *I'm still interviewing David Jones, who was involved in a series of things dealing with both, and he said although the Greeks seem to be giving us a rougher time, you can usually eventually get something from the Greeks, but the Turks sort of have a position and it stays that way.*

METRINKO: It stays that way, and you cannot talk them out of it, and eventually it becomes solidified, and they make a law saying you cannot talk about it. I remember when I was in Turkey you had the Lebanese civil war sort of raging on and on and on. And at the time, a lot of the major banks and financial institutions that were based in Beirut talked about coming to Istanbul or Ankara as their base of operations. They wanted a country that was Muslim because they wanted to continue handling the Arab money. They were interested in Turkey for lots and lots of reasons. They thought of Istanbul as being cosmopolitan. And they started making all sorts of approaches, not only to us but through us and to the various Turkish ministries. They were met with a total stone wall. The Turks would not allow them to open up hard currency exchange accounts; they wouldn't allow them telephone lines. They basically were totally uninterested and, more than uninterested, made them feel unwelcome. And these were major banking concerns, major financial institutions. I remember talking once to somebody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this and saying, "Hey, if you allow these people to come in, you will become the financial center of the Middle East. You will also get a lot of spin-off development money for things in Turkey because when they come here and have the money for development and investment, they're going to look at projects in the area, right around their eyes." And the answer was, "We don't want foreign investment or foreign goods like that in Turkey." Period. Click. And they never got them; they went to Greece. But they wanted to go to Turkey first.

Q: How did you find the Turkish-American relationship? In a way, you were kind of a fly on the wall, being the ambassador's assistant.

METRINKO: The ambassador was quite popular there. We had a number of incidents there that were unpopular. Well, the Turks liked, number one, the fact that Kissinger was there several times, that Haig seemed to be living there at certain times - I mean he was there so often. There was a very active, in Ankara, Turkish-American friendship sort of society going, and it involved a lot of husbands, wives, etc., very active, very pleasant. There was nothing anti-American as such. The Turks never blamed the embassy for the problems. They never really blamed individual Americans in Turkey for the problem. In fact, it was always a bit strange to me that when the Greeks reacted by burning down our embassy in Cyprus and assassinating our ambassador and his secretary the answer was more anti-Turkish tirades in Congress and almost nothing against the Greeks. The Turks couldn't understand that either. We never had a problem at the embassy. There were no demonstrations, no anti-American protests, no marches against the building, nothing like that. To me at least, there was almost no effect at all. I certainly had lots of Turkish friends, including a lot of official friends, Turkish diplomats, Turkish military friends. The social life just kept on; it never changed. There was no policy of freezing us out or anything else.

Q: Well, now, there have been periods - the '74 to '76 period - where there have been extreme leftist groups, "Gray Wolves" or other things, but essentially terrorist groups which were anti-foreign, particularly anti-American. Were they around at this time?

METRINKO: I'm trying to think if we had anything at all at the embassy. I don't recall anything. There was some stuff, I think a couple of bombs were probably thrown at the Merhaba Palas,

which was the military temporary housing in Ankara. Bombs would go off occasionally against Turkish targets, too. Other than that, probably if you talked to somebody who was in the military there at the time, they might give you a different story about Turkish feelings. I didn't see it myself.

Q: What were you getting from your Turkish friends about Turkish-American relations and also whither Turkey at that time?

METRINKO: Turkish-American friends - nothing at all. A lot of my Turkish friends were married to Brits or Americans. Other friends were just straight Turkish, with very Turkish lives but nothing at all that was anti-American that I can recall. It never affected my travels in the country, going to people's homes, doing this, doing that. There was no real... I'm starting to speak in Turkish now. The words are coming out in Turkish in my mind. I'm translating back into English. There was no real impact on me, anyway. Whether other people felt there was on their lives I don't know. On my life there wasn't.

Q: Was there a discontent with the government?

METRINKO: Not particularly. I knew people in both the pro-demo... You know, the top level in the Turkish Government has been the same since I was in the Peace Corps there. In the year 1968, I used to sit at little outdoor café where they sold biscuits and pastry in the morning, where you could have tea. I used to go there every morning for breakfast, and I would see the prime minister pass by because his house was near there. He'd be walking down to his office, and every morning for about two years he would pass me by and say good morning in English to me because he knew I was an American, and I would say "Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister." I would continue drinking my tea, and he would pass by. That was Demirel, who was prime minister *forever*, and then president. He's still a major force in Turkish politics in the year 2000, and I'm talking 1968! His successor was Ecevit, and it was Demirel-Ecevit-Demirel-Ecevit-Demirel-Ecevit - I really don't see much difference between the two. I think probably when they were a lot younger there was, but is there much of a difference? Probably not really. There aren't that many names in Turkish politics. It's not like there is a clear-cut choice. There have been times when the government has got more conservative, but were people dissatisfied with the government? Well, I had a lot of Kurdish friends - they sure were. They weren't dissatisfied with the government so much as they were dissatisfied with Turkish Turks. But even they were often intermarried. Open dissatisfaction? No. Hatred of the government? No. Was there in Turkey such a thing? Yes, absolutely, and a lot of people went to jail or got killed fighting for a different type of government there. Did I know them? No. The embassy in Ankara has been traditionally or was traditionally even less professional about dealing with the opposition than the one in Teheran was.

Q: Why was that, do you think?

METRINKO: I'm not sure, but I think that traditionally our embassy in Ankara has basically just toed whatever line the Turkish Government has wanted it to as far as internal developments go. If the Turkish Government said that so-and-so was a terrorist, the embassy parrots it back. The embassy has been so silent on the subject of the Kurdish genocide there that it's extremely

dishonest, I would say. It's been extraordinarily unprofessional through a succession of ambassadors. It's sad.

Q: Was this an issue among the junior officers at all at the time?

METRINKO: Kurds didn't exist. They did not exist because the Turkish Government told us they didn't exist.

Q: They were "Mountain Turks," were they?

METRINKO: Mountain Turks, yes.

Q: Just like in Israel, Golda Meir used to say there's no such thing as the Palestinian. We get caught on these things. Well, you were with the ambassador through his moods for a year.

METRINKO: It was more than a year. I saw him do things that would not even have been believable in the best of comedy fiction.

This ambassador is the only one, I think, who's ever had the balls to tell Kissinger that somebody who was coming in Kissinger's party was not welcome in Turkey. And he did this. He refused to let one of Kissinger's guards in because he didn't like the guy. And Kissinger accepted this. I saw him do this telegram.

Other stories about him. Well, the ambassador was... he liked dogs. Saying he liked dogs is not enough. He had a fetish about dogs. He loved dogs. He loved street dogs, and whenever he saw a dog on the street in Ankara he would stop and pick it up and then he would carry it home. He turned the entire garage there - it was a three- or four-bay garage - into a kennel, blocked it off, and had only dogs in there. At one point he was up to 26, I think. I tried to count them. These were street dogs. Well, one of his best tricks was he'd show movies on Saturdays. He had a little theater in the residence. And new people who arrived in Ankara were always invited. Any of the American families, especially the military families, would come up to the ambassador's residence and see these old reel-to-reel movies. And what he would do would be to disappear from the movie while everybody was engrossed in it with little Timmy and little Jimmy and little Jamie or little Mary Ann, and at the end of the movie, the kids would come back and say, "Mommy, Mommy, look what the ambassador gave me - a puppy.!" That's how he'd get rid of the puppies. Everybody knew about this, and nobody would tell the newcomers because everybody else had gotten screwed.

He had two dogs himself. One of them was Benjamin, and the other was called Tripod by everybody because he only had three legs and would do a sort of peg-leg routine across the floor.

Q: Of course, in a Muslim country dogs are not -

METRINKO: They are considered unclean.

Q: Yes.

METRINKO: They were considered very unclean in Turkey. Two more stories about dogs. The July 4th reception at the ambassador's residence, my last one there, I had been in the back sort of dealing with people down in the back garden, and a Turkish general saw me and walked over. He had just come out of the residence, and he walked up to me and said, "Michael, you must tell your ambassador something. I have just been introduced to his dog, and he made me shake its paw." He said, "He is making all of the Turkish guests shake his dog's paw. Please go and tell him that we do not think dogs are clean animals."

Well, that was one. The other one was my first winter as staff aide. We had just gotten him off to the United States. Because of his CENTO responsibilities, his NATO responsibility, the Cyprus War and other things, the arms problems, he was in the United States quite frequently. We had gotten him off, and the phone rang. The phone rang in his office, and it was for me. The office configuration was such that the three secretaries, the DCM's and the ambassador's two secretaries sat in one room. To the right was the DCM's office; to the left was a waiting room for the ambassador's office, and then the ambassador's suite. If you stood in the waiting room, you had a line of sight for all three offices. They had big doors opening from one to the other. The phone rang, someone said, "Michael, it's the ambassador, he wants to talk to you." I picked up the phone from one of the secretary's desks. The DCM's secretary and the ambassador's two secretaries also picked up phones, and I could see the DCM pick up the phone, too. We were all protecting each other. The ambassador said, "Michael, I forgot to tell you something when you dropped me off at the airport yesterday." He said, "There's a dog, a big black bitch up at the officer's club, and it's going to have a litter of puppies." I said, "Yes." He said, "I want you to take her and take her back to the residence and tell Phyllis I said it was okay, because I don't want her to have her puppies in the cold weather. I want her to have her babies in the residence." I said, "Okay." And he said, "Oh, and by the way," he said, "take the father, too." And I said, "The father?" And he said, "Yes, the father." I said, "How will I know the father, Mr. Ambassador?" He said, "Oh, it's a really big dog; it's one that walks with a limp and it has this big brown thing on its nose." I said, "Okay, I'll take it up." Fine, fine. Well, when he said, "take the father," I had taken the phone away, and I was staring at it in my hand, thinking I hadn't heard him correctly. I looked up. All three secretaries and the DCM had their phones away from their faces and were staring at the phones. It was like the only reaction. We put the phones down, and the DCM walked over and he said, "I wonder how he knows it was the father. Do you think he stood there and watched them do it?" But I'm not going to go and get pregnant dogs and stray street dogs myself. What do I know about dogs? I got the local army vet from the army base, and he and I and his helpers went out in a military vehicle with a big dog box and got the dogs, took them back to the residence. And his wife's face, when I told her that the ambassador had said that he wanted her to have the puppies right there with the father watching - it was... an interesting experience.

Q: We're talking about a very interesting time. Did you get any feel for how Macomber dealt with the president, the prime minister and all? Were relationships strained?

METRINKO: No, the relationship was not strained at all. The relationship, in fact, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy was extraordinarily good. The minister's special assistant and his two secretaries were three of my closest friends there. I'm still in touch with

them even after all these years. We did everything together. We were good friends. The minister's special assistant and I lived less than a block apart. We were together a lot and became good friends. But the ambassador was so energetic, and he had such an open, engaging personality when dealing face to face with officials or face to face with anyone who didn't work for him, that he was excellent at that, and they liked him and he had a good reputation. It's only when you worked for him that he would blow hot and cold, hot and cold, hot and cold. Turks liked him in general. They thought he was extremely strange, but he appealed to them somehow. I think he was quite effective. He would call them up at one o'clock in the morning. He was on top of everything to do with the political relationship and very actively on top of it all the time.

Q: I would have thought that we had a real bone to pick with Congress at this particular time.

METRINKO: The ambassador, I think, was supportive of Congress. He loved visitors. He would encourage people to visit him, and every time a congressman came through, the congressman was treated like visiting princes. I've seen embassies where congressional visits are handled, but just handled and that's all. Macomber went out of his way to handle them well - full-court press. I think that as much as anything helped Turkey. It would also encourage the Turks to do something. And the Turks understood this, probably. They had a story to tell. They wanted us to accept their version as the only possible version, but they would still deal hospitably with visiting congressmen. And they understood that.

Q: Well, then, in '75, you got out of that hot spot, and where did you go?

METRINKO: I started to hate the job because I never had any time off, and I mean literally no time off - no Sundays, no Saturdays. I was there every evening. And my social life was more and more just going to his receptions and going to his dinners, working through them. And I was getting only a couple of hours of sleep a night.

Q: Had other staff aides been married? Because I would think that this would -

METRINKO: I don't know. My predecessor had not been. But I'd only wanted it for two weeks, and I was the only staff aide that I knew. And the ambassador seemed to be quite content with me. I talked to the DCM about the possibility of changing because it was slowly driving me crazy, and he said, "If you want to change, you're going to have to get out of it yourself, but you don't want to just quit and, you know, leave the job." He said, "You have to find a way to get somebody else into it and get yourself out of it." But I did. I did a campaign - it took me about two months - and part of the campaign was letting my hair grow very long. It was that time in the Foreign Service when it was becoming unclear what you could or could not say about hair. I let my hair grow right to my shoulders. I started smoking. I hadn't been smoking in a number of years. I decided it was worth it. I knew the ambassador hated smoking, disliked people who smoked around him, but also knew that he'd never say anything about this because in 1975 you could not say anything about people smoking. He had a box of cigarettes that he kept on his coffee table for Turkish guests and other guests. I started taking cigarettes from the box and smoking them in front of them, if he had guests that I was taking notes for, something like that. He would look at me, but he never said anything. I then started really building up another junior officer at the post who I decided was my best possibility of a replacement. I was sort of

Byzantine in my approach. I kept dropping things about what a great social life it was, the ambassador's receptions and dinner and this and that and Princess that and the Hohenzollerns coming through, you know, and Rockefellers and others. This guy was a GSO. He was a great officer, but he was a GSO, so he never went anywhere. No one ever invites the GSO to anything, and his wife was starting to feel this, and I would just keep talking about the wonderful social life you have as a staff aide, always with the ambassador and the generals and the this and the that. I wanted his wife to push him for it. And then anything... because I had control of what the ambassador read, I made sure that for about a month anything at all that had been done by this guy the GSO I would underline with comments like "He did a great job on this. He really pulled the chestnuts out of the fire on this one. So-and-so's really good."

Q: This is the most disgusting story I've ever heard.

METRINKO: Sorry, but I was desperate to get out of the job. I had no life. I had no life at all. I worked on the guy's wife, I worked on the guy. I did everything I could. I kept building up... I built up his reputation to a fever pitch in the office, and then, thank God, a telegram came through. It was Martin Hertz talking about staff aides. Martin Hertz - God rest his soul - used to love to pontificate about the Foreign Service and the philosophy of it.

Q: Oh, yes.

METRINKO: I was his control officer when he came to Turkey on a visit.

Q: I knew him in Saigon.

METRINKO: Nice guy.

Q: Very.

METRINKO: Really liked to pontificate. And he had written a telegram about the care and feeding of staff aides, and the best length of time to have a staff aide and what their duties should be, etc. Well, this was not normally something I'd waste the ambassador's time with, but I carefully and judiciously underlined it and had it in the ambassador's traffic one particular day; and very late one night, as the DCM, the ambassador, and I were sitting there going through the day's events and the traffic and everything else, the ambassador pulled it out and asked the DCM if he had seen it, and my ears, of course, were right up to the ceiling at this point. And the ambassador said, "It says here that no one should be a staff aide longer than four or five months. I've never had one for that long. The maximum is about three months you should have one for." And the DCM looked at me and said, "Michael, how long have you been staff aide now?" And I said, "It's going on 13 months." I said, "We passed the year a couple of weeks ago." The ambassador said, "Has it been that long? You've been here more than three months?" And the next day, it worked. I was GSO.

Q: Oh, how wonderful!

METRINKO: And thank God. My blood pressure came down, my weight dropped, I stopped

smoking.

Q: Did you get a haircut?

METRINKO: I cut my hair. Everything was wonderful then. And I was able to start using Turkish again. Sitting in an office surrounded by Turkish FSNs, it was great - because I never used it in the ambassador's office. No one ever used it. We had to deal in English all the time.

Q: Why don't we talk a bit about what does a GSO do?

METRINKO: GSO.

Q: It means General Services Officer.

METRINKO: My specific job was I was the customs and transportation officer. I was responsible for immediate supervision of the motor pool, dispatcher, other drivers, the cars; and as customs officer I was responsible for the pouches and shipments of household effects, all official shipments that came in and out of the embassy. And this also involved AID and also involved in a general way military shipments that came in for people assigned to the base. I had to supervise the staff of guys and the work and also the travel office too. We arranged for shipments of the non-classified diplomatic pouches and also of all personal effects and all air freight. I found it very interesting. I was still, by the way, this whole time, a vice-consul, so I was also doing consular work for the consular officer whenever she was away. As GSO I supervised the travel arrangements. We had a travel girl, an FSN, who made all travel arrangements, private and official, for people assigned to the embassy. She worked for me. The 16, I think it was, drivers worked for me. Also, I was responsible for the maintenance of the motor vehicle pool. Now I didn't even own a car. I had never owned one at that point. And suddenly I'm responsible for a whole fleet of clunkers, including the ambassador's extraordinarily heavy, uncomfortably falling apart stretch limo with full armor.

Q: This was the period when we had this big limos underpowered - I mean, our limousines were far underpowered all over the world, weren't they?

METRINKO: All over the world they were heavily armored and they hadn't been built to take an extra thousand or so pounds of iron. These were the ones where the windows could not be opened or closed because they had Plexiglas on the outsides or they had Plexiglas-Mylar, I think it was called, on the front windshield so that if you were a driver and had to drive this for more than 10 minutes you started to get headaches because of the refracted light. They were uncomfortable, and basically if they had ever been attacked or gotten into an accident, they would have been real sweat boxes in which you would have died. And the tires on them, the extra-heavy tires, if you went over a certain number of miles per hour, they would bust. They were impossible, and yet they were required. We had one of those real clunkers that was breaking down all the time. The fact that the ambassador liked to tool around at high speeds did not lend itself to keeping the vehicles in good condition.

Q: As the GSO often you can end up by being in the unenviable position of being responsible for

who gets what.

METRINKO: I didn't do furniture, and I didn't do housing.

Q: Okay, that's like that saying, "I don't do windows," because that's where the GSO becomes the most unpopular person in the embassy, by -

METRINKO: - holding back or giving forth to the wrong people.

Q: Yes.

METRINKO: Well, what I did - my life with the motor vehicles didn't really affect people. It was to get people efficiently from one place to another. We had a very good dispatcher, who normally handled things quite well. He only came to me when it was a big problem or when he needed something or had to go over resources. The drivers, I knew every one of the drivers, spoke Turkish to them all the time, so I had no problem with them. The household effects were a problem because household effects were always delayed. Air freight was always delayed. It was a country that was always full of red tape, especially for the shipment and movement of property. Problems in the office... Well, three men who worked with me, three local employees, were under indictment for smuggling through the diplomatic pouch, and once a month had to go down to the local court and have their hearing postponed for another month. They'd been accused of smuggling watch parts from Germany into Turkey using the American diplomatic pouch. Because they had not yet been found guilty, they were still all at work. As it turned out, the charges were dropped about a year after they had started this process, but once a month they would stand up and say, "Well, Mr. Michael, it is time for us to go to court again." And that was happening. I got to see the bad side of a lot of American employees, the things that they would try to smuggle into Turkey or take out of Turkey that were forbidden or breaking Turkish laws - people who would look at you and say, "No, I have no weapons. I have never owned a weapon." And you would discover they had a collection of high-powered hunting rifles they were bringing into Turkey, probably to sell. Things like that happened far more than once. I was responsible for motor vehicle sales, and at the time there was a regulation- (end of tape)

If you sold your privately owned vehicle for a profit, more than you had paid for it, you were required to either turn the profit over to a local charity approved by the embassy or to return it to the federal government. In the course of my one year as GSO seeing 30 or 40 car sales, I only saw one person who admitted to getting a profit on his car, and when he came in it had been so long in the history of the office since anyone had declared a profit that no one knew what to do. It was literally that long. For years and years everyone had said, No, I did not make a profit, no, I did not make a profit. It was an interesting time because the admin counselor at the time was a very nice man. He came to me shortly after I became GSO and said, "Michael, you have a lot of Turkish friends. I know that you have Turkish friends over at your house. We have a huge representational budget for the admin section. My wife and I prefer not to have any Turks in our house." He said, "You know, [So-and-So] the GSO doesn't really want to have any Turks in his house, either. [So-and-So] isn't really interested in entertaining. On the other hand, we have to entertain, because you know what the ambassador is like. He wants us to spend all of this money." He said, "Why don't you use all of the representational budget. Just send me the list of

your guests. Try and make it look like they're good for the section, and you can use the whole representational budget for the year." So I did.

Q: I would think this would give you plenty of license to go after customs people and -

METRINKO: Everything. And I had Turkish friends, luckily, who were, many of them, officials. It was great. So in my second year as a junior officer I had representation, a major post's entire section. I had lots of good parties.

Q: Well, after sort of getting out of that - you didn't have to deal with dogs any more?

METRINKO: No dogs any more, thank God. That was the staff aide's job - the dog aide's job.

Q: They used to call the staff aides "dogsbodies," which was really -

METRINKO: There was probably a reason for that. No more dogs. Basically, I was able to have a social life. I was able to go to dinners. I could show up at the time I said I'd be coming. I had a very pleasant second year in the embassy. And the ambassador would even occasionally remember my name when he saw me. It was fine.

JACK B. KUBISCH
Ambassador
Greece (1974-1977)

*Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch was born in Missouri in 1920. In addition to being ambassador to Greece, he served in France, Mexico, and Washington, DC.
Ambassador Kubisch was interviewed by Henry Mattox in 1989.*

Q: Was that the Turkish question?

KUBISCH: Yes. It was a crisis between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. I'd be glad to say a few words about this, if you wish, because I think it shows a role an ambassador can play in helping to avert a serious conflict and particularly this one, much of which has never been published. I can give you an insight into what really happened.

The fact is that there was a widespread movement in the United States to establish a Greek lobby in order to influence the American Government on policy toward Greece. The Greek Government itself was, of course, deeply involved with the Cyprus crisis, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and between Greece and Turkey. Perhaps even more serious, in the view of the Greek Government, were the problems in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey because very basic strategic, economic, military and political interests of the Greek people and the Greek Government were at stake there.

It was, as I recall, in the summer of 1976 that the Turkish Government began a program that the

Greek Government and the Greek people thought threatened their vital interests. This almost led to a war between the two countries. The first time had been over Cyprus in '74. This was the second time, the summer of '76.

The issue was basically that the Turkish Government was going to send out a scientific exploration ship to study the bottom of the Aegean Sea for mineral and oil deposits because oil had been discovered in the northern Aegean Sea bed. The Greek people and the Greek Government said they would not allow this to happen. It went to a basic dispute between the two countries over who had the rights to resources in the sea bed in the Aegean.

The Turkish Government took the position that Asia Minor had a continental shelf that went out from Turkey under the Aegean and that the mineral and sea bed rights belonged to Turkey because it was on their continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that Greece and its 3,000 islands, many of which are in the Aegean, had their own continental shelves, that Greece was an archipelagic state. As a matter of fact, the word archipelago has its origin in the Greek words "above the sea," "islands above the sea."

The Turkish Government said the islands were mere protuberances on the Turkish continental shelf. The Greek Government took the position that the islands had their own continental shelves around them and that if the Turkish Government sent this ship out, it was called the "Seismik", Greek naval vessels would intercept and take it under control and bring it back to a Greek port. The Turkish Government said if the Greek Government did that, they would be fired on and the Turkish Government would send ships out to protect the research vessel.

Over a period of some weeks, the issue got hotter and hotter, and tensions and emotions rose on both sides of the Aegean. When I would ask for instructions from Washington as to what we could do about this, the U.S. position was, well, we call on both parties to restrain their passions, to calm down and let the crisis pass and negotiate a solution -- basically, a hands-off posture. We didn't want to get involved in such a serious dispute between two prized and valued allies.

Q: Two NATO partners.

KUBISCH: Two NATO partners. It was becoming increasingly clear to me that if we didn't do anything, that if somebody didn't do something, the Greek Government had no choice but to send naval vessels to intercept the Turkish Seismik and that there could be gun fire and a conflict between the two countries.

In the meantime, I learned that Prime Minister Karamanlis was getting advice and recommendations from his own subordinates in his foreign ministry and his legal department that Greece's position was a sound, legal position based on the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention which Greece had signed but which Turkey had not.

In looking into it I disagreed. I thought he was getting bad advice, and I told him so. I told him that if he sent Greek naval vessels out to intercept the Seismik, the Turkish ship, that he would not have the support of the world community and Greece would be isolated. I told him that, in my opinion, he was getting bad advice. I did this without instructions and without authority.

Q: Under what circumstances? Did you call on him?

KUBISCH: I was seeing him on other matters during this period and told him then. To my surprise, one Friday afternoon about 4:00, he called me on the telephone and said, "Ambassador, I've arranged for a small boat to take me out for a little recreation this weekend. I'm leaving tomorrow morning at 11:00, Saturday morning, and I wonder if you and Mrs. Kubisch would care to join me. It will just be us and no one else there to speak of, no other foreign officials and no other government officials. I would like to talk to you." So I said, "Yes."

I went out with him at 11:00 on Saturday morning and we stayed out until late Sunday afternoon. During that time I talked to him at length about why I thought he was getting bad advice. It had to do with whether or not this research vessel would actually "penetrate" the sea bed and drill, or whether it would merely drag a cable and take some "soundings" of the sea bed, which it would be legally all right for it to do from the standpoint of scientific explorations.

As a result of this weekend with him privately, and without the authority of my own government in Washington, I think I changed his mind. I could be wrong. But, in any case, he went back and authorized a press campaign to tell the Greek people that Greece was wrong, that their position was not a sound position legally, and that they would lose the support of the world community if they attacked the Turkish vessel. As long as the Turkish vessel didn't touch the bottom but merely took sonar soundings and so on, this was perfectly all right. And the whole crisis subsided.

Q: During that period the Department distributed to posts abroad a great deal of information on Law of the Sea which, of course, had been hanging around for years, the negotiations. Is that how you managed to inform yourself so closely on this issue?

KUBISCH: Yes, exactly. Just from materials that were available in the embassy, although I may also have requested materials from Washington, copies of documents or interpretations, and so on. I don't remember at the moment.

Q: Did you inform the Department of what you had done?

KUBISCH: Subsequently. And, as I recall, I got a well-done message back from them.

Q: When was that exactly?

KUBISCH: As I recall, it was in about August of 1976.

Q: Well, that was an issue between two allies, valued allies, as you put it. At this time, '76, about a year before you were to leave, was the bases question still the outstanding issue in the U.S., American relations at that time?

KUBISCH: It was one of the major problems. I'll just say one word more before we leave this problem between Greece and Turkey, and Cyprus, which is this. You may recall during this

period, Henry, that the Congress had passed a law placing an embargo on arms shipments from the United States to Turkey until Turkey withdrew its military forces from Cyprus and changed its policy toward Cyprus. The Executive Branch of our Government under President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were, on the other hand, strongly in favor of shipping arms to Turkey. So the two policies were diametrically opposed. The Executive Branch of our Government felt that if we shipped arms to Turkey, we could maintain a cordial relationship with the Turks and could influence them more to moderate their policies on Cyprus.

The Congress, under great pressure from the Greek-American community and the so-called "Greek Lobby" in the United States, legislated the embargo and said that we weren't going to let Turkey have any arms or spare parts until they left Cyprus.

What became apparent to me then was the price we pay at times in our system of government with the separation of powers, which has so many benefits for us as a nation. In this case, for example, the policy being followed and advocated by the Executive Branch might have worked, the cooperation with Turkey and the supplying of arms, if it had gone forward. The policy of the Congress of withholding arms, embargoing arms and putting pressure on Turkey, might also have worked if that policy had been followed. But what was perfectly clear was that both policies could not work simultaneously. As a result, they tended to cancel out each other. They had the effect of paralyzing U.S. influence in the area; and we could not play, as a result, the role that the United States Government could have and should have played in bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

Q: Well, without the benefit of hindsight particularly, what would have been your prescription then when you were there close to the scene and pretty well seized with the problem? What would you have suggested would have been the most useful way to work through the crisis at that time?

KUBISCH: The most useful way to work through the crisis would have been, in my view, to do what the Executive Branch generally wanted to do, to cooperate with the Turks -- they, after all, had 600,000 men under arms and had the longest border with the Soviet Union and were a staunch ally -- to work with them and cooperate with them in trying to bring about a more moderate and compromising position on their part to deal with the Greeks.

I think that could have been done, and most of the people I knew who were well informed of the situation at the time felt the same way. But to threaten the Turks the way we did and to publicly pressure them the way we did with Congressional legislation, although it satisfied some emotional concerns of many people, actually helped to thwart the accomplishment of our objectives in the region.

L. BRUCE LAINGEN
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1974-1977)

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen was born in 1922. His Foreign Service career included positions in Iran and Washington DC, as well as an ambassadorship to Malta. Ambassador Laingen was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

Q: Did you get involved in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?

LAINGEN: The Cyprus issue was still there at the time. Exactly where was Cyprus at that point...?

Q: The invasion had taken place in July, 1974. Did you get involved in arms embargo in Turkey at all?

LAINGEN: Oh, yes, I remember the arms embargo in Turkey. With respect to Turkey I remember Sarbanes and John Brademas...

Q: These were two Greek Americans...

LAINGEN: Two Greek Americans, one in the Senate and one in the House, both of whom had had obvious concerns given their Greek constituencies and their Greek-American background over what was happening in Cyprus. And feeling very strongly about the Turkish invasion and carrying their anger and irritation and their legitimate concerns to the point of pushing the arms embargo against Turkey so strongly as to run into very frequent confrontations with the Department of State, and with the administration which felt, of course, that the Turkish arms embargo was prejudicial in terms of larger American interests affecting NATO.

That issue still prevails to this day in the sense that the Turks are still there. I can recall how frustrated I was then and have always been about the way in which the Turks have carried their presence in Cyprus to the point of having 24,000, as I recall the figure, troops in their part of Cyprus and never removing them. This is far more in terms of numbers and presence than conceivably would be required in any strategic sense, but in political terms determined to keep them there as evidence of their determination to keep the Greek Cypriots in their place.

I recall traveling in Cyprus at the time. This was...Ambassador Rodger Davies was murdered at the time in Cyprus. The exact date of that I don't recall. I had known another American Ambassador there in an earlier period when I was Greek and Cyprus Desk Officer...it was Toby Belcher, who has since died.

Q: Rodger Davies was assassinated on August 19, 1974 and William R. Crawford, Jr. replaced him and was there until 1978.

LAINGEN: I remember the terrible tragedy of the killing...it was not an assassination of Rodger Davies except that he fell victim to gunfire in the turmoil of the place at that time.

I saw a lot of the diplomats of the two countries, Greece and Turkey at that time, and in Cyprus. I always thought, myself, that one of the tragedies of peoples on the surface of the globe is that some of them are destined to live side by side, destined to forever have problems with each

other, and the Greeks and the Turks are among them and the Pakistanis and the Indians are another pair. It seems impossible for them ever to come to any kind of accord that does not shortly fall apart. A small island like Cyprus, a terribly small place, but nonetheless has loomed so large because of the way in which peoples of two other countries look on it as an important place where emotions are greatly caught up. A lot like Kashmir between the Indians and the Pakistanis.

The Greeks and the Turks wisely concluded in 1960 with the Zurich Accord that perhaps the only solution was for them to both agree on some kind of independent status for the place. That worked for a time and still works in the sense that there are now two independent portions of the same formerly independent republic.

Kashmir having never reached that point and in my view today, 1992, the only solution for that tragedy...and it was very tragic in terms of the impact on the people of the place...the only solution for that is independence. Regrettably neither the Pakistanis nor the Indians as governments are prepared to see that happen, although increasingly, I think, there is evidence that peoples in both countries are prepared to move towards some kind of independent state themselves.

This is getting outside of where we have been, perhaps, but the Kashmir issue cannot help but be affected by the way in which self determination as a sentiment is today contributing to all kinds of political change. This is evident particularly in the former Soviet Union and also in Yugoslavia.

Q: Outside of Congressional pressure, how did we deal with Greece and Turkey? Did we have to watch the balance very carefully?

LAINGEN: Well, we had to watch it very carefully. Not least because of what you just indicated that there was an American domestic political interest involved, given the substantial Greek minority in this country. I have always said that one of the problems the Turks have in this country is that there aren't many Turkish restaurants, but there are a lot of Greek restaurants. And the sentiment among them is very strong and there is a natural American inclination to be supportive of the Greeks, not least, I guess, because they are Christians and how that affects public attitudes.

But I don't recall that there ever was a massive American public interest in the problems between the Greeks and the Turks, except to the degree to which the Greek-American community has been able to fuel that. Fuel is probably the wrong term. It is not meant to be critical, it is a natural consequence. I think for that reason there is also that feeling that the Greeks in that situation were a kind of minority, dealing with a larger country like Turkey. That the Greeks were the ones that we should be generally supporting.

For that matter I felt that way myself, believing and seeing how the Turks had so ruthlessly, forcibly involved themselves to protect a relatively small minority of people on the island. I guess I was instinctively naturally affected as well by what I hope is a majority feeling among most Americans that ethnic considerations should not affect American foreign policy...that the

Greek-American minority should not have the degree of influence simply because they are Greek-American that it had in this particular case. It makes it difficult for people working on an issue in the Department of State to hold on to their objectivity, if you will, or their impartiality. There is this American domestic political influence or impact that one has to keep one's eye on over one's shoulder if nothing else. Of course the major one in American experience is the Jewish-American community.

Q: As regards Israel.

LAINGEN: Yes. The Greek-American community has never been as effective a force as has the Jewish-American community through PACs such as AIPAC, but given their relatively small numbers, the Greek-Americans have been remarkably successful in influencing American policy towards Greece, the Greek-Turkish issues and particularly the Cyprus issue.

Q: Did you get many delegations of Greek-Americans coming to see you?

LAINGEN: Oh yes, we saw them all the time including the Primate of the Orthodox Church in the United States, the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of North and South America, who I think at the time was Iakovos in New York City, and still is. Iakovos is the Archbishop of that Church and I believe was in the seat at that point.

I don't recall being hailed down to meet personally with Sarbanes and Brademas, but the fact of their strong interest in anything we did affecting Cyprus was very much in our minds all the time.

Q: It was a very interesting province or dioceses of your day because you had the Spain and Portugal emergencies, and the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus problem, and with Italy and one wondering about the various elections and how the Communists would come out.

LAINGEN: The Communist threat never rose to the point where they could command government.

Q: They had a little less than a third, I think.

LAINGEN: Yes.

Q: But on that subject, were people dealing with Italy at that time saying, "These are Communists, but different Communists and in a way they don't pose in or out of power quite the same threat as, say, the French Communists or some others."?

LAINGEN: Yes, we heard that all the time. I don't think that had any particular impact in terms of lessening our American concern. We were aware of that, people talked about it. Tagliati was still in command, as I recall. The European face or Italian face on Communism, I forget the term we used, was supposed to lessen the danger in the view of a good many editorial writers, and so on. But I don't think that ever affected American policy. There remained that strong concern that we must do everything we can because of that threat to insure that the Christian Democrats, or at

worse, the Socialists, in Italy maintained control over the Italian government.

Q: Did you ever feel in dealing with Southern Europe that when EUR got together that you were the younger brother or something, the big boys being France, Germany and England?

LAINGEN: No, never had that impression. The issues were so large affecting Southern Europe at that time, particularly Spain and Portugal, that I certainly never had the feeling that we were of less interest, of less consequence, of less importance to American policy. Those were very consequential issues and times affecting that corner of Europe.

Q: In fact much more because the Northern tier was relatively tranquil.

LAINGEN: Yes, it was.

Q: They were in place.

LAINGEN: That is correct.

Q: Before you went there did Malta play any role at all? It was part of your bailiwick wasn't it?

LAINGEN: Yes, Malta was part of my bailiwick but it never entered my consciousness in any significant way. I had not been there and had no reason to go there. The Ambassador at the time was Bob Smith and I don't recall that he raised any particular issue of consequence to us. Mintoff was in power and sort of a known nuisance in the background. But we had gotten beyond the point where the Sixth Fleet had been banned from entrance into Maltese harbors, so that was something we had accepted and had to live with. I can not recall a single Maltese issue that occupied my time as Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Q: How did you view the Sixth Fleet which is our Mediterranean military presence? Was this a tool while you were there or was it just doing its thing?

LAINGEN: I think largely it was doing its thing in the sense that it had been there for so long and was a presence that we assumed would always be there. I suppose I was prejudiced in my own instance simply because of the fact that I had served in the Navy and tend to regard most things Navy a good thing, which may not be a very objective point of view. The movement of the Sixth Fleet, the availability of carrier units to make a statement, to be present, was something that was there and we accepted it and used it.

NELSON C. LEDSKY
Deputy Director of the Office of Southern Europe (SE)
Washington, DC (1974-1977)

Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US

Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department's Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

Q: Before we move to your next assignment, let me ask what your views were about Kissinger's GLOP program? Was it a mistake to move people from region to region just for the sake of "expanding their horizons?" Would the Foreign Service have been better served by continuing its program of specialization?

LEDSKY: I did see some value in expanding horizons and making Foreign Service officers knowledgeable in a variety of regions and functional specialties. I also recognized that with some people, a deep specialization was to the Department's benefit. But in general, I had no objections to the notion that an officer should master two or more regional and/or functional subjects. I understand that the issue of specialization versus wider experience is a real management dilemma. It is difficult to ask an officer to learn a language that might be used only in one or two countries and then ask him or her to work in a region far removed from that country. The Department must have highly specialized personnel. On the other hand, it is not necessarily helpful for either the individual or the system, to keep the officer working his or whole career on one specific country, or even region. Variety in assignments can improve an officer's contribution to the work of the Department, but so can concentration on one country, particularly one with a unique language. So it is a dilemma.

As I said, in my case, I didn't think that my work on Germany for about ten years had limited my value to the Department, because German issues were in such a state of flux that although the general topic might seem the same, the underlying conditions changed so often and so rapidly that the policy challenges were never the same. On paper, I appeared to have worked on Berlin for ten years; in fact, every year the issues were different, so that there was very little relationship between what I was working on in 1964 from that which I worked on in 1974. I think an officer should be able to develop different sets of skills during his or her career, but that can be done either working on one geographic location or functional area or in several. There may be limits if one is assigned to a relatively static area or function, but that was certainly not true for Berlin or Germany. In the latter case, the issues changed so often that it was almost impossible to go "stale." The wider the experience one has, the better the contribution one can make. However, a geographic or functional change is not necessary in all cases to gain that wider experience.

It does, however, extract some personal sacrifice. I was annoyed that the system had so much trouble with this new concept, particularly since I viewed the EC assignment as something entirely different what I had been working on in prior assignments. In the first place, the job focused on many, many other issues besides Germany. Furthermore, although it was designated as "political officer," it would have had an economic content. It would have required the knowledge of French, which I did not have. So I saw the EC assignment as meeting the

objectives of GLOP: expanding my knowledge far beyond Germany and political issues. So I had no problem with the concept; only with its administration. As it turned out, I ended up in the same regional bureau, although my work was entirely different from what I had done previously. I think the SE assignment was consistent with the GLOP concept, but it certainly did not fit the criteria that Personnel had established, which blocked my Brussels assignment. Ironically, the SE assignment did fit the GLOP concept because I would be covering Turkey, which had been in a different bureau (NEA), but had recently been moved to EUR because the Seventh Floor had decided that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus should be handled by the same assistant secretary who was responsible for NATO. Had Turkey remained in NEA and had I been assigned to work on it, then my assignment would have met the GLOP criteria – out of region. But, because it had just been moved to EUR, one could have said that my assignment to SE was in violation of GLOP, as had been determined that the Brussels assignment was. So, the administration of GLOP became much too mechanical; it looked at surface appearances, such as geographic location, rather than substance. So, I didn't really think very highly of the program's management. I would have much preferred to go to Brussels, particularly compared with what I considered to be a lateral move within the same geographic bureau. But I had no choice and it did extend our Washington tour, which made the family happy.

It should be noted that one of the reasons my assignment to GTI (Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs) went through was because in 1974 Kissinger left his dual-hatted role, NSC and Department, and became full time Secretary of State. One of his management objectives was to start fresh with a new staff in GTI because of events that took place in the summer 1974, which revolved essentially around Cyprus. Those events led to the collapse of the military dictatorship in Greece and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; the whole area was in an uproar. The timing was particularly unfortunate because this was the period during which Kissinger devoted much attention to the Israel-Palestine conflict and its resolution, as well as to other hot issues.

In retrospect, of course, the SE assignment was a very good one, which started me in some new directions. At the time, however, I thought that the Department was woefully inadequate when it came to managing personnel matters.

Q: Let's talk a little about your SE assignment. What did EUR know about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus?

LEDSKY: Exactly. These were not issues that the EUR assistant secretary had dealt with previously. He got stuck with a hornets' nest – as if he didn't already have a full plate. So, both Hartman and his chief deputy, Wells Stabler, were really presented with a challenge. When I joined SE in August, 1974, there was a complete change of personnel. The new office director was Bill Eagleton, who had worked in the Near East. I was the deputy office director, whose knowledge of the three countries went way back when I started in INR – a long, long time during which many changes had taken place. Our predecessors had had Near East experience and they were reassigned to that area. Tom Boyatt, who had been the Cyprus desk officer was also reassigned because he had tried to bring the Cyprus issue to the attention of the secretary; he predicted an outbreak of hostilities unless the U.S. applied heavy pressure to all sides. He was ignored and was replaced by a new officer.

As I said, 1974 was the year during which Kissinger left the NSC and became full time secretary. Regardless of his physical whereabouts, I think he did try to become the desk officer for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. He would not pay any attention, not only not to Boyatt, but also not to others in that GTI office. All were predicting dire consequences to the drift that was taking place. As a result, so they were dispatched to other assignments.

Q: So you found yourself in a new office, which had just been transferred to the jurisdiction of a new assistant secretary, and the staff had almost all just arrived. And you had to face issues of war and peace. Was that unusual?

LEDSKY: It was very strange. To make matters even worst, I hardly had time to find my desk, given the continual bombardment of crises to which we were subjected. As I said, my background in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus matters was woefully inadequate and out of date. On the other hand, I was intrigued by the job; it was highly operational with lots of new challenges daily. Despite the predicted crises, neither the EUR front office nor the Seventh Floor paid much attention to what was going on in the area. Even as issues jelled, we were pretty much on our own. Bill Eagleton was very nice to work for and knew a lot about the general area, although he too was on a crash course to learn about Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I must admit that for several months, I felt like a fish out of water.

As the crises mounted, Art Hartman had to devote an increasing amount of time on our issues, as did Wells Stabler. Kissinger also became much more involved, as did the undersecretary for political affairs, Joe Sisco. Phil Habib also spent much of his time on these issues. So, eventually, we were not lacking high level attention. The problems in the area started while Kissinger was still the NSC advisor. I remember going to the White House on a couple of occasions with Hartman. I started going to the Seventh Floor almost daily. This exposure was brand new to me, and it continued as the Greek Junta government fell and was replaced by Karamanlis and his democratic government. As 1974 went on, the war on Cyprus was winding down with the Turkish army in control of half of the island. That created a major refugee problem. Then our ambassador in Cyprus, Rodger Davies, was assassinated. Bill Crawford, our ambassador in Lebanon, was sent to Nicosia to take over the embassy. It was just one crisis after another.

I had never been to any of the countries I was asked to cover. I had some historical background stemming from my days in the GTI section of INR s I was not an entire neophyte in the area, although I had a lot of catching up to do.

Q: Let's talk about the situation in the area at the time you arrived in SE. You have already mentioned the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the overthrow of the Junta in Athens. What was happening on Cyprus itself?

LEDSKY: I arrived in SE during the last week or so of the war. We were working on trying to implement a cease-fire to stabilize the situation on the island.

A number of actions had taken or were taking place. Our ambassador, Rodger Davies, and an embassy staff members were shot by a local policeman. He was subsequently arrested and given

a very short prison sentence. It took three or four years before the Cypriot government finally even made an arrest and then I think it was only our pressure that forced them to do that. The Cypriots stalled and stalled, I think they knew from the beginning who the perpetrator was. Eventually, we succeed in getting the killer arrested. There was considerable speculation that the government itself may have been involved in the murder, but I have never seen any firm evidence to support that theory. There may have been elements of the ORKA, the Greek resistance force, that was involved; the policeman who shot Davies was a member of that organization. My own guess was that the shooting was an accident; I don't think murder was the intention as it didn't gain them anything and in fact lost them a lot of support. The policemen was shooting into the embassy, perhaps as a warning, but in doing so one of them killed two people.

Archbishop Makarios, the president of Cyprus, was subjected to an assassination attempt during the Turkish invasion. He had managed to escape and fled first to New York and then to Washington. He became one of the first issues in August-September that we had to deal with. Then, we had to deal with the issue of population exchange, a proposal that both sides in Cyprus were discussing.

Many Turks were stuck in the southern part of the island near the British air force base. It was agreed that they could move north in exchange for Greeks who had been caught in the north and who would be permitted to migrate south. A "Green" line was drawn across the island in August, 1974 which still exists today.

There was an effort made at this time to convince the Turkish government to withdraw its troops from the island. In the fall of 1974, there were discussions in the UN aimed at eliminating the division on the islands – talks that continue still, 30 years later. I was involved in each of these crises and negotiations. In addition, I worried about the security of our embassy and its staff, the status and well-being of the refugees. All of these events were occurring in roughly the same time period, making for a lively time. At this time, or perhaps soon thereafter, the Seventh Floor became fully engaged, often on a daily basis. Kissinger was personally involved, as were Sisco and Habib. As I mentioned, Sisco had been involved for several months even before the outbreak of hostilities. In the Spring of 1974, he took a trip to the region trying to contain the situation. He tried to convince the Turks not to invade and the Greeks not to try to impose "enosis," (union) the Greek desire to unite Cyprus with the mainland. This happened after the transfer of responsibilities for Greek, Cypriot and Turkish affairs to EUR, but before I reported to the SE office.

Sisco was sent to the area to see what could be done to lower the tensions. Hartman was in New York with the secretary. Our office drafted papers and talking points. We also tried mightily to get our embassy in Nicosia to function effectively again. We also pressed the Cypriot government to find the ambassador's killers and to deal with them. There was some speculation that the Cypriot police or some of their officers had participated in this heinous crime. We kept pushing the government to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Our major interest in the area was to prevent the Greeks and Turks from starting armed conflict, which in addition to bringing tensions and unforeseeable consequences to NATO, might well

have destroyed the island of Cyprus. We also wanted to support the re-establishment of a civilian government in Greece. We were interested in reaching an understanding with Turkey about the future of the island so that it would not interfere with good U.S.-Turkish relationships.

Q: You describe your work as careening from crisis to crisis. Was there an overall U.S. strategy?

LEDSKY: Our job was basically to “put out fires.” That job fell to us because the British stepped aside and were not prepared to take an active role. After the war, the U.S. was forced to take all the steps necessary to stabilize the situation. Much of our policy was driven by the political pressure brought to bear on our government by the domestic Greek lobby. When Makarios landed in New York, the American-Greek community was really mobilized to lobby the American government to do something to reverse the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and to restore order on the island.

Q: Did the Greek-American community show much interest in events in Athens?

LEDSKY: That situation quickly resolved itself so that the political pressure really had to do with Cyprus. I think the Cyprus crisis of 1974 mobilized the Greek-American community in a way that it had never been before. In that year and thereafter, it became a major lobbying group, which put considerable pressure on U.S. administrations – particularly on foreign affairs. This was a new development, which continues to this day. Cyprus was the catalyst that drove the political activities of the Greek community in 1974 and for many years thereafter, although in more recent years, it has broadened its focus. There has always been a tinge of anti-Turkism to its positions.

Q: It was in 1974 that you began your work on Cyprus. Did you begin to develop a framework that you found useful in later years?

LEDSKY: Not really. For those who have never been involved in Cypriot affairs, the island is a mystery. It certainly was to me when I started to work on it in 1974. As time passed, it became clearer to me what the dimensions of the problem were. I made my first trip to Cyprus towards the end of 1974. I was then able to personally observe the complexity and the absurdness of the situation.

First of all, I could only get to Cyprus by British military transport. There was no commercial air service to Cyprus at the end of 1974. I had to go London, hop on a British military aircraft which took me to a British base, which was English sovereign territory. When Cyprus became independent, the British had demanded and got two parts of Cyprus over which they retained sovereignty. One of these sections was used as a major military base, including an airport. I was met by the American chargé and was then driven to Nicosia, 60 or 70 miles away. When we arrived in Nicosia, I saw the “Green” line – the dividing line between the Greek and Turkish parts of the island. I must say that the “line” reminded me quite strongly of the Berlin Wall. The “line” was a crude barbed wire fence with buildings on both sides occupied by armed forces. Nicosia was a divided city, much like Berlin. It is hard to describe the division; one really has to see it to fully comprehend the nature of the Greek-Turkish divide. The “line” stretching out from

Nicosia was more an imagined divide; there was no major physical barrier, but a set of watch posts in fields and towns.

The division in 1974 was hard to understand because before the 1974 war, the Turkish minority – less than 20% – lived essentially in enclaves in the larger cities and towns. They had no discernible geographic areas which might be called “Turkish.” There were some Turkish villages in addition to the enclaves, but no large areas were seen as “Turkish.” Before 1974, it would have been accurate to describe Cyprus as a unified island populated by a majority Greek population with a Turkish minority spread out in pockets, and living adjacent to their Greek neighbors.

In 1974, the Turks invaded the island, landing in the north and moving south. As they moved in that direction, the Greek population fled before them, becoming refugees in their own country. The Turks occupied about one-third of the island; when a cease fire was agreed to in the summer of 1974, a line was drawn between the Greek and Turkish parts of the island; that became known as the “Green” line. In most of the country, this line was drawn arbitrarily, forcing troops to retreat behind it. In fact, in Nicosia, the line was just re-established; it had existed there for sometime as the line between the Greek and Turkish sectors of the city. It was a new dividing line for the rest of the country. I think it was very hard, if not nearly impossible, to understand the nature of this fundamental change in 1974 without seeing it with your own eyes. The island was filled with refugees: Turks fleeing the enclaves of the cities and towns going north and the Greeks fleeing their lands in the northern part of the island and going south. An agreement was reached in early fall of 1974 on a population exchange.

The geographic division of 1974 was a new phenomenon for the Cypriots. It had an overwhelming impact on the island and its people, which lasts to this day. It is very hard to imagine re-establishing a society which was destroyed in 1974. It is particularly difficult to imagine a solution if one saw what was happening in 1974.

Q: When you visited Cyprus in late 1974, were there any signs of an eventual settlement?

LEDSKY: There were some ideas being floated in Cyprus, which might have led to a settlement. For example, the Greek Cypriots, quite wisely in retrospect, had brought their refugees south and tried to resettle them in existing Greek communities. They were not placed in refugee camps, as is so often done, e.g., the Palestinians. These refugees from the north were actually resettled.

They were able to retain their voting rights in their former communities, now occupied by the Turks. That allowed the Cypriot parliament to include people who had lived in the north until the 1974 war. Thus, the refugee population were represented in parliament. In this way, the Greek Cypriot government in a sense was preparing the refugees to return home. This move suggests that the Greek Cypriot leadership was looking forward to a return of the pre-1974 situation on the island. That was a plus. On the minus side, the actions taken by the Greek Cypriot government created a certain amount of irredentism among the refugees, even while they were being resettled.

There were other signs that might have led one to believe that one country would be

reconstituted and reconstructed. For example, the electricity system on the island was a single system. Even though the generating station was in the south, the north continued to receive its share to meet its demands, all on a *gratis* basis, a situation that is in existence today. The same was true about the water distribution system. The Greeks continued to share these utilities with the north, based on the assumption, I would guess, that unification would come sooner than later. Therefore, from the beginning, it was apparent that both sides recognized that division could not be eternal and that reunification was bound to come.

The U.S. and the international community also viewed the split on the island as a temporary development, which could be quickly resolved. September, 1974 talks between the Greek, Turkish and the Cypriot sides were initiated in New York. The focus was on the reconstitution of a single nation on Cyprus. Those discussions covered most, if not all, of the contentious issues that led to separation in the first place. The assumption of the negotiators was that the reestablishment of a single nation was achievable in a short time. The Greek-American lobby supported the reunification very strongly, as did Archbishop Makarios and the government in Athens. They all supported the rebuilding of the country, the departure of the Turkish troops, and the restoration of a sovereign and unified Cyprus.

For the first six or seven years after the split, the Turkish government also viewed the division as temporary. It also felt that negotiations could lead to a unified Cyprus – to something like the pre-1974 situation. The Turkish Cypriots were reluctant to return to a country unified under the 1960 Constitution, which they thought Makarios had violated in 1963 when the first crisis arose and the UN had to intervene militarily. I think they were right in that view.

Until about the end of the 1970s, there were continual negotiations about restoration of a single country on Cyprus. I think – and this is controversial – the reasons that negotiations did not succeed was due to the premature death of Makarios in 1977. That terminated the possibility of the Greek Cypriots reaching an understanding with the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios had been a central figure in the negotiations. He came to New York and Washington in 1974, before returning to Cyprus the following year. He was central to the negotiations; he in fact represented the Greek Cypriot community. Glafkos Clerides, who was the acting president in the Archbishop's absence, was not allowed to speak for that community unless his words had been blessed by Makarios. Clerides did not have a free hand in the negotiations. Clerides and Denktash did reach an understanding in the late 1970s, which could have been a basis for further and perhaps even final negotiations had Makarios allowed it.

In 1977, Clark Clifford was sent by President Carter to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara. I was part of his delegation. When we saw Makarios, he agreed to a bizonal and bicomunal settlement of Cyprus. This was a major break-through because for the first time, the Greek Cypriots agreed that the Turkish Cypriot could have an area of their own, which would be autonomous and run by them. It is true that the territory that Makarios agreed could be turned over to the Turkish Cypriots was small – 20% of the island; nevertheless this was a major departure from previous Greek Cypriot positions. For the first time, there was a Greek Cypriot agreement to have a Turkish Cypriot zone, which they could manage on their own.

We believed, and I think rightly so, that this Makarios shift could have been the basis for of a

settlement. When Makarios prematurely died of a heart attack in 1977, the government fell, nominally at least, under the control of Clerides. A presidential election was held soon after the Archbishop's death, which was won by Spyros Kyprianou, a hard-liner. That basically ended any chances for a settlement, at least for the rest of the decade.

There were other contributing factors which barred reaching a settlement in the 1970s. For one, the Turkish government was in constant flux, changing leadership several times. Ecevit, who was the prime minister when Turkey invaded Cyprus, was defeated followed by a conservative government headed by Suleyman Demirel. He lasted for a few years, but was beset with domestic issues which detracted their attention from the Cyprus issue. Then in 1980 the military took over the government. That stopped any serious, sustained discussions with the Turks.

There were other factors which really militated against the conclusion of any agreement. I think that, essentially, there should have been a settlement by the late 1970s. A study of the period will clearly show a series of missed opportunities. There was a clash of personalities but I don't think that was an over-riding factor. Makarios was extremely stubborn and hard-headed. Denktash was the same. On the Turkish side, the foreign minister lacked imagination.

I think the key ingredient was the different vision of the future. The Greeks insisted on seeing Cyprus as a single country, unified in all aspects as it used to be. Only Makarios, after a prolonged period, finally came to acknowledge that perhaps a bizonal, bicommunal arrangement would be acceptable. The Turks insisted on a separation of the Turkish population on Cyprus from the Greek one and that the possibility of living side-by-side with the Greeks was just impossible. The Turks had to have their own autonomous area. They had suffered too long as a minority; they had been oppressed for too long and needed their own space. These two conflicting visions were so far apart that no bridge could be built.

I do admit that there were a lot of practical issues that had to be resolved, e.g., the rights of refugees, property rights, and missing persons. None of these were minor; they all would have been difficult to resolve, but without an agreed upon an over-all framework, it was just impossible to reach compromises. The Greeks maintained that the Turks had invaded the island and that the invaders had to leave before any settlement could be reached. The Turks saw themselves as liberators of their ethnic "brothers and sisters" and would only really deal with the Greeks if they perceived some new level of equality between the two communities. These two perceptions of the situation were too high a barrier to overcome.

Q: What was our role? Did we offer any inducements to the two sides?

LEDSKY: We did. As I suggested, the Cyprus negotiations were confused and complex. The UN was the central operational fulcrum. It was UN troops that patrolled the "Green" line. It was the UN which was responsible for convening meetings between the two sides. Only the UN had the moral authority to play this role. As I said, the Turks insisted on scenarios that clearly showed equality between the two Cypriot communities, so they would not accept discussions between the Cypriot government and the Turkish community. The discussions had to be between the two communities.

We played a catalytic role; we offered a number of “carrots” which we hoped would bring the two sides to reach some agreement. For example, Congress appropriated \$250 million to be used by the two sides as part of a settlement. Congress appropriated an annual grant of \$15 million to be used for communal development projects, an appropriation which continues to be made even today.

We also developed a number of proposals over the years, which were usually tabled through the UN. These ideas were directed to the solution of specific issues. For example, Bill Crawford had a number of ideas which might have led to a step-by-step resolution, e.g., reopening the Nicosia airport, and resettling refugees who were in occupied parts of the island. The U.S. ideas were aimed at facilitating the negotiations one issue at a time. Sometimes, the ideas were accepted by both sides; sometimes they were just UN proposals.

Q: In retrospect, the U.S. invested a lot of time and resources trying to solve the Cyprus puzzle. Was it worth it?

LEDSKY: First of all, I don’t accept the basic premise. I don’t think that as a government we invested that much time or that many resources. We in fact viewed it as a minor irritant and leadership gave it attention when it had time – or had to. We were much more focused on other world issues. I don’t think Cyprus attracted much U.S. government attention or emphasis. There was a moment, in 1974, when Cyprus did get a lot of attention, but that was a brief period, which was not repeated. I don’t want to suggest that Cyprus was ever forgotten by the Department’s Seventh Floor. However, I think it is wrong to suggest that it attracted continued and persistent attention. Most of the time, the U.S. government, when it did become engaged, was responding to Congressional pressure. It was not because someone high in the Department clamored for more action on Cyprus; what we did was react to pressure from the outside and took actions not necessarily to reach a solution, but rather just to show that we were doing something – anything. I suggest that this was the pattern of our involvement in Cyprus throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In the Department, Cyprus was the last issue that anyone wanted to hear about; they all wished it would somehow go away. I am sure there were many who hoped that by ignoring it, the Cyprus problem *would* go away.

It was Congress that was the action-forcing mechanism. It would periodically say to the administration: “Do something! Show some action and progress, if possible.” The Department, in its great wisdom, would then respond by doing something – never much, but just enough to keep the critics off its back. For example, Congress required that there be a quarterly report on Cyprus on the progress of negotiations. So the Department – people like me – dutifully filled a few pages of verbiage, signifying nothing, but enough to keep Congress at bay. The reports had the aura of high level input, suggesting that the Seventh Floor was fully engaged; it was not and would most likely never be. Another example: the Department appointed a special coordinator for Cyprus; it was not a meaningful gesture, but kept Congress at bay for a while longer. The coordinator was seen as working on this issue, reporting directly to the principals; it was all show and no substance.

Q: If you had been in charge of the Department, would you have given Cyprus a higher priority?

LEDSKY: Probably, although I was not aware of all of the other problems that the Seventh Floor had to face. What went on on the island was not that important; what was important was that the continuation of the Cyprus dispute has poisoned the relationship between Greece and Turkey, which had always been somewhat tense; it didn't need this additional fuel. Cyprus kept the antagonism alive – an antagonism between two NATO members that in the Cold War period was dangerous and should have been resolved expeditiously. Today, even though the Cold War has ended, the Greek-Turkish antagonism needs to be resolved because it has been festering for so long and could easily lead to another confrontation. There are enough other issues between the Greeks and the Turks that need resolution; they don't need Cyprus in addition. So, Cyprus may not be as important as some other international issues, but it deserved more attention than it has received – particularly in the 1980s and 1990s and currently. It is an issue that should be resolved expeditiously, even if the U.S. has to be actively and constantly involved.

We have now essentially turned the issue over to the Europeans. We have decided that Cyprus admittance to the European Union will resolve the problem or will be the basis for a solution. We still have a Cyprus coordinator, who is still looking for solutions, but essentially, we have left the problem to the Europeans and the UN.

Q: Do you still see Cyprus as a potential source of armed conflict?

LEDSKY: Not as much as it was ten or twenty years ago, but it still has the potential and the issues have to be resolved.

Q: In retrospect and for the benefit of historians, what went wrong with our efforts to resolve the Cyprus issues, particularly after Makarios' death?

LEDSKY: I would have to say that too little attention was paid to the problem by the international community. The intransigents on both sides of the "Green line" and in Greece and Turkey were given a free hand to ventilate their prejudices. Cyprus was a domestic political issue in both Greece and Turkey, less now in Athens than in Ankara and less in Ankara than it used to be. However, it is still a domestic political issue. I blame the Cypriot leaders, both Turkish and Greek, for failing to reach a solution, one which should have been reached decades ago and is still within reach. It probably will be reached sometime in the future. We, the U.S., could have done more and could still do more. For example, we never have made it clear enough to the Turkish government that the resolution of the Cyprus problem is important and that it must be resolved *pronto*. It has been too far down on our priority list in our agenda with the Turks. Cyprus has also been too far down our priority list in dealing with the Cypriots. Therefore, it is not too surprising that the issues are unresolved.

Q: Was there an improvement in our relations in the mid-late 1970s?

LEDSKY: There was. Relations improved, but there was never a close relationship in that time. All negotiations with the Greeks, regardless of issue, were difficult. I was in Athens in 1976, negotiating for another base agreement. That lasted three or four months. It was a difficult negotiation because the Greeks essentially wanted the U.S. military to leave their country. The question of nuclear weapons storage became a major impediment to good relations. The issue of

Greek relations to NATO's military commands in Italy and Turkey was also a major subject.

All these issues were very difficult to negotiate with the Greeks because they were very suspicious of us and NATO. They saw membership in NATO to be of minor importance to them, if not an outright negative. They did not perceive any threat from the USSR except for the presence of our bases. They felt they were being used by the U.S. and NATO in an alliance that had no significance for them. Slowly, each of these issues was resolved and we came to a new understanding with the Greeks in every conceivable matter so that by the end of the 1970s, relations were back to normal.

The Greeks were concerned by a perceived potential of an attack from Turkey. There were a number of issues between the two countries that arose in the late 1970s. There was a question of the control of the Aegean Sea and the airspace above it. There was the unresolved issue of the future of Cyprus. On each of these issues, the Greeks saw the Turks as the instigators of the troubled waters, supported by the United States and NATO. The Greeks did not think they had many friends in Europe, only the French and the Italians, perhaps. But in general, they perceived NATO as being anti-Greek and pro-Turkish on all the Greek-Turkish issues.

There were a number of incidents between Greece and Turkey during this period, which were mostly in the Aegean Sea and related to oil exploration. There were some tensions in Thrace, where the Turkish minority was somewhat restless. But the major issue was always Cyprus. The Greeks always viewed us as being intrinsically pro-Turkish on the Cyprus questions. They felt that our relationship to Turkey was more important to us than our relationship to Greece. One always felt, even when it was not expressed outrightly, the constant resentment towards the U.S.

Q: The Aegean question remains unresolved. What is the basic issue?

LEDSKY: The problem is that some islands governed by Greece lie very closely to the Turkish shoreline. They are so close that normal international rules about maritime boundaries are almost impossible to enforce. The Turks view the islands as being part of the mainland; the Greeks see them as part of Greece with their boundaries lying somewhere between the islands and the mainland. The Greeks assert jurisdiction over the islands and a 12 miles of water surrounding the islands. The Turks refuse to accept that determination, in part because the 12 miles, in some cases, would hit their mainland. The Greeks also maintain complete sovereignty of the airspace over their islands in the Aegean Sea; the Turks will not accept that.

The issue becomes more than just a hypothetical one because many feel that there are recoverable oil deposits in the Aegean Sea close to the islands. As a result, drilling questions continue to arise, even if the little drilling that has been done has failed to find any major deposits. Despite the poor drilling record, oil may still lurk in the background as one of the aggravating factors. Originally, the assumption had been that there were major oil reserves under the Aegean Sea, as there are in the Caspian. Both sides were anxious to lay claim to these "unrecovered" deposits. Rationality might have suggested a division of the reserves or a sharing of the finds, but that is too much to hope for in that situation. So, the argument about the Aegean goes on and on, even though no large oil deposits have been found.

The location of the islands is the basic problem. Both sides can make a case for jurisdiction under international law. The history of the islands themselves add complexities. They have been part of Greece for only several decades. Some used to be controlled by the British, some by the Italians. They were turned over to Greece after WWI and WWII. Many were populated by Turks, but they were forced to leave after the Greeks took over. That didn't go over well in Turkey.

Greece, on the other hand, consists of many islands. They therefore see nothing unusual about having jurisdiction over some more even if they are separated widely from the homeland. The Greeks feel that they have the right to fortify them and have a military presence on them. The Turks feel threatened since the islands are so close to their mainland. The Turks have stationed armed forces on their shores opposite these islands, which then became an excuse for the Greeks to further reinforce their forces. The islands have very little strategic value; therefore, the debate about their status is sometimes absurd. It has been suggested that the question of ownership of the islands be referred to the International Court of Justice. The Greeks have periodically shown willingness to do that because they feel that international law is on their side. The Turks are reluctant because they feel that they would be out-voted, as they are in all international courts. They feel beleaguered, not only on these Aegean issues, but in general. They have a complex that the West is against them. Occasionally, we have convinced the Turks to take one issue or another to the Court; sometimes they win, sometimes they lose. However, never have they agreed to be bound by a Court's decision. So, the Greek-Turkish issues continue to fester.

Q: Let me ask you about the Greek-Turkish relationship in this three-year period of 1974-77. Was it tense all the time?

LEDSKY: Yes, indeed. It was tense and intense all the time. We spent a lot of time trying to calm down the ardor on both sides.

Q: Let's talk about what was going on in Turkey during this period. What do you recollect about that situation?

LEDSKY: There are always several elements of our relationship with Turkey. Generally, our military-to-military relationship was good. The issue of Cyprus was a real stumbling block to smooth diplomatic relations. To add to the strain, Congress took some actions which further exacerbated the relationship. For example, an arms embargo was imposed on Turkey in the 1974-75 period because of Congressional perception of Turkish intransigence on the Cyprus issue; no American arms could be sold to them. By 1978, we managed to convince Congress to lift that as being counterproductive. I spent a lot of time in Congressional offices, first opposing the embargo and then working on lifting it. I went to Turkey with Clark Clifford to discuss the arms embargo because there was a direct linkage between Cyprus and the arms embargo. The arms embargo was lifted when we were able to convince Congress – or at least those members who felt passionately about the Cyprus issue – that progress was being made on resolving the Cyprus dispute and that our military relationship with Turkey was so important to NATO and our own Cold War efforts that the embargo was really detrimental to our security. Once the embargo was lifted, Turkey was able to purchase advanced aircraft.

Clark Clifford's principal objective in his discussions with the Turks was to get them to agree to

a trade off: an easing of the Turkish position on the Cyprus issue in exchange for a lifting of the U.S. arms embargo. Most of the discussions in the 1974-78 period revolved around our aim to keep the close military and diplomatic relationship going despite disagreements about Cyprus. In addition to the Turkish policy impediments, we found our negotiations with the Turks very difficult because of the weaknesses of succeeding, and ever-changing Turkish governments. First came the Ecevit government, followed by a caretaker regime, then came a Demirel government, which was followed by a military government in 1980. Some civilian members of the previous governments were included in the military one; for example, the foreign minister was Melih Esenbel, who had been the Turkish ambassador in Washington and was therefore a familiar personage to us.

I should note that during the period we are discussing and even subsequently, the role of the military in developing Turkish policies has always been a subject of speculation. There are those who maintained that regardless of who headed the government, policies were established by the military through its role on the Turkish national security council. There are those who have questioned the influence of the military. This debate went on then and goes on today. My view is that in the mid-to-late 1970s, the military was very influential, although I can't be more precise than just that. The Ecevit government, a social-democratic regime, was quite strong. I do believe, however, that the invasion of Cyprus was mandated by the military with Ecevit playing the role of a willing accomplice. He may even have encouraged the military in making their demands. Demirel, on the other hand, was a very stubborn man, a conservative whom the military did not like. During his stewardship, the civilians were in charge and the military influence was minimal, particularly in the foreign affairs field. The foreign minister was a well known Turkish politician and very influential in the Demirel government.

In 1980, the Turkish military overthrew Demirel. From that point on, the military obviously had the major voice in determining Turkish policies. It was then that the negotiations on Cyprus completely collapsed. On the other hand, U.S.-Turkish relationships were always better when a military regime was in power in Ankara, although I think during the mid-to-late 1970s, the relationship was generally good, if not warm, except for the Cyprus issue.

Q: Were the Kurds a problem in the late 1970s?

LEDSKY: Yes; they have been a problem for a long time. However, during this period, their clamor for independence, or at least more self-rule, was overshadowed by the challenges from the Greek and Armenian minorities in Istanbul, as well as from the Greek Orthodox Church. Much of it was connected with Cyprus and, therefore, was part of a much larger package. So, the status of the minorities was a problem, but it was overshadowed by the issue of Cyprus.

Q: You mentioned that you had taken several trips during your assignment to SE. Where did you go?

LEDSKY: For some reason, I was very much in motion during my tour on the desk. I've already mentioned my first trip to Cyprus, on a British military aircraft. I did that a couple of times using British facilities because they maintained a military presence on Cyprus. In 1977, I made several trips to Cyprus, starting with a Carter presidential decision to take all necessary steps to remove

the Turkish arms embargo. He appointed Clark Clifford the Cyprus coordinator. Clifford, Counselor Matt Nimetz and I made several trips. Nimetz's appointment was to emphasize the importance of lifting the arms embargo.

Our first trip was to Greece, Turkey and then to Cyprus where we met with Makarios. We saw the Greek foreign minister and Karamanlis. We then took a trip to Vienna, where we met with Kurt Waldheim, who was then UN Secretary General and who had assumed charge of resolving the Cyprus crisis. He had met the Turkish and Greek Cypriots first in New York and then in Vienna. We were to spend a couple of weeks in Vienna working with these groups. In fact, the first "high level agreements" – as they were called – were reached during our visit in 1977. This was the first understanding between the two Cypriot factions. We then went to Cyprus to see Makarios and obtained his approval. Later that year, Makarios died and I went to the funeral as part of the U.S. delegation, which was headed by a member of the Carter family. After that, I took another tour of the area for a couple of weeks.

I went to NATO meetings in Brussels a couple of times. I accompanied President Carter to his first NATO meeting in London. I went because the major issue for that NATO meeting was Cyprus. We met with the Turkish, Greek and Cypriot leadership. I think it was Clifford and Nimetz who kept Cyprus at the head of the Carter foreign policy agenda. Vance was more interested in a settlement than Kissinger had been. Furthermore, by 1977, it had become clear that our relations with Turkey were faring badly and deteriorating. They wouldn't deal with us – they barely spoke to us – because of the embargo. We had to find some resolution to the Cyprus problem if we were to re-establish friendly ties with the Turks. So, between early 1977 and mid 1978, a lot of top level attention was being devoted to the Cyprus issue.

Clifford knew a lot about many issues. He claimed that he was instrumental in getting Greece and Turkey into NATO in the 1950s I have no reason not to believe that claim; I know that he knew a lot about Greece and Turkey in 1977. He told us a lot about his activities of the 1950s when he was in the White House working for Truman. There had been a Dean Acheson trip to Cyprus in the 1950s and a trip by George Ball. So the U.S. government had a long history of involvement in Cyprus and Clifford knew it all.

We did have to bring him up to speed on events since 1974 because from then to 1977, he had not been involved in governmental affairs. Nimetz and I used to visit him in his Connecticut Avenue law offices. We spent many hours bringing him up to date on the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus imbroglio. Clifford was a fast study; he was very sharp, even though along in years. He had decided that he was going to solve the Cyprus disputes and he went at it in a serious and persistent manner.

He was a great negotiator, able to pick up the slightest nuance which he could use to move the ball toward his goal. He knew where he was going; he was very good with people. I remember when we were in Nicosia, he decided to talk to some people alone. He asked Matt and me to step out of the room. He was a masterful tactician and developed excellent rapport with people of all sorts and stripes.

Clifford was the nicest and most competent person I ever worked with. He carried the Cyprus

burden until the end of the Carter administration. I left him a few months earlier to work on the Olympic games. However, I was also involved with Clark Clifford when I worked in Congressional Relations (H). I traveled with him to NATO meetings and to London during this period because, even though I was organizationally far removed from a geographic bureau, the Cyprus issue remained in my portfolio.

By 1980, Cyprus had taken a back seat in light of the Iran hostage crisis and other hotter events. I must say that the Cyprus experience was somewhat frustrating. As I said earlier, hopes for a settlement were really dashed with the death of Makarios. Until then, we thought that we were possibly on the way to a resolution, which however needed Makarios's approval and active participation. His death dashed all our hopes. After that we did manage to get the embargo lifted by one or two votes; that took a lot of time here in Washington. With Makarios' death, our chance to find common ground between the Cypriots and the Turks was almost completely lost.

Q: Am I right in assuming that U.S. government interest in Cyprus was driven primarily by the arms embargo imposed on Turkey?

LEDSKY: I would phrase it a little differently. The main issue was how to keep good relationships with the Turks. If they had ignored the embargo, we still would have had to work on other issues which stood in the way of close relationships. However, the embargo became the issue for the Turks and therefore for us. Lifting the embargo was a means to an end; it was not a goal in itself. The resolution of the Cyprus issue was a means to an end as well. That is the way Clark Clifford saw it. He was very good with the Greek-American lobby and with Congress. He understood the problem and he must be credited for keeping the issue high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. I don't think the president or anyone else in the White House really cared that much about Cyprus; it was just Clifford who made sure it got the attention he believed it deserved.

Q: Tell us a little about your relations with Bill Macomber, who was then our ambassador in Turkey?

LEDSKY: He had great interest in what Congress was up to because he had been the assistant secretary for congressional relations. He was very much opposed to the arms embargo and wanted it lifted ASAP (as soon as possible). He also had an interest in and knowledge about the Cyprus issue from his previous jobs. Every time I visited Ankara, which was about three times, I stayed at the residence; he was very nice to me, as was his wife, Phyllis. He introduced me to many Turkish politicians in a very smooth way. He was very good with the Turks and had a wide circle of acquaintances. He was very smart and a good negotiator. He was close to the Turkish military and very good at handling politico-military affairs. I found him very helpful on Cyprus, although I don't think he ever fully understood what drove the Greeks on this issue, just as Kubisch, our ambassador to Greece, failed to understand the Turkish position. That is not unusual; many of our ambassadors fail to understand or much less appreciate the position of another country – one to which they are not posted.

I thought he was an excellent ambassador and never saw those parts of his personality which put others off. He was an avid collector of "street" dogs; he would pick these strays up and give

them shelter in the residence. He had one three legged dog, who was given a wooden fourth leg. That trait and some others perhaps, made him seem a little odd, but I liked him and thought very highly of his professional efforts.

Q: Did you have any contact with the White House?

LEDSKY: Doug handled that phase of the work. This was time when Madeleine Albright was working for Brzezinski as the national security advisor's Congressional liaison. She used to come to H almost on a daily basis to be briefed. Occasionally, we were invited to attend NSC meetings; that was done by Doug. I had no personal contact with her or any White House staff member.

I personally spent a lot of time on the issue of the arms embargo on Turkey. In 1978, it became my major burden. I was also heavily involved in the Rhodesia embargo issue and the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty negotiations. Those were the three issues that kept me the busiest.

I knew the arms embargo issue pretty well, having worked on it for a couple of years. We finally succeeded in getting the embargo lifted after an enormous effort. I think we discussed the issue with practically every Senator and Congressman. We arranged for some of the key Members to have breakfast with the secretary; that went on for months. We mounted an enormous lobbying effort; Clark Clifford spent much of his time testifying before one Congressional committee or another. I participated in those hearings as well. The administration really went full throttle to get the embargo lifted. It was finally lifted, winning by one or two votes in the House. I think, in the final analysis, it was the full weight of the administration's lobbying effort, particularly with democratic members, that finally brought "victory." Many Democrats were supporters of the embargo – some very enthusiastic.

The administration applied pressure to have the embargo lifted because, as I said before, our relationship with Turkey was being badly frayed by it. Turkey was an important ally in a geographic area of great interest to us in our Cold War rivalries. I and many others were convinced that the embargo was jeopardizing our national security. I don't know that we convinced a large bloc of Democrats; we just got the votes from a few, but they were enough to get the embargo lifted. The embargo was supported by the Greek lobby and its representatives in Congress. To some extent, the Jewish lobby also supported the embargo, although in the final analysis, it was Congressional friends of the Jewish lobby who switched votes and put us over the top. As I recall AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) helped us out when it came to a vote in 1978. In looking back, I don't think there was one issue that swung the votes; I think it was just plain hard work on the part of the administration, hammering its position day in and day out to any Congressman who was willing to listen. Clifford was certainly a great help, as was the White House.

For me, it was an education. I visited Congressional offices, which under normal circumstances, I would not have. One of the things I was able to do was to get the Turkish ambassador into

some of these offices; he might have had some influence. As I said, our lobbying effort was intense and continuous and many people participated. This lasted until the embargo was finally lifted. It was sometimes very hard to see the Congressmen themselves. We would consider ourselves very lucky if we saw one or two in a day. Fortunately, we had Clark Clifford, the Turkish ambassador, the White House and the NSC with and behind us; that opened a lot of doors that might otherwise been closed to us. I think the administration's effort to get the Turkish arms embargo lifted was well organized.

WILLIAM R. CRAWFORD, JR.
Ambassador
Cyprus (1974-1978)

Ambassador William R. Crawford, Jr. was born in Pennsylvania in 1928. As a Foreign Service officer, he served in Cyprus, Yemen, Romania, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Crawford was interviewed by William Moss on March 12, 1991.

Q: Now we come to the events that caused your sudden assignment as ambassador to Cyprus. For somebody who is not too conversant with this, you might just give somewhat of a summary of what brought about the assignment.

CRAWFORD: I touched on this earlier. I think two things. First of all, there had been the cataclysmic events in the summer of 1974 in Cyprus, in which the junta had made its final desperate effort to unseat Makarios, had very nearly killed him, but he escaped with his life. I remember I was in the Department, having just talked to Secretary Kissinger about going to Syria. He said, "Particularly at the wish of NEA, your own bureau, you will be going back to Yemen. You're free to go on your summer vacation."

The day I was leaving the Department happened to be the day that the Greeks moved against Makarios. A couple of senior U.S. officials remembered my Cyprus experience and called to ask my thoughts on the Makarios course of events.

The then-Assistant Secretary for IO [International Organization Affairs] was one call, and the other was from the National Security Council. My first response was to ask if Makarios had escaped alive. They told me the newest reports indicated he might have.

I said, "He's a cat with nine lives, and if he has escaped he will be back, because he's beloved by the Greeks and a master politician. Who have the Greeks put in his place?"

"Somebody called Nicos Sampson."

I said, "You mean that paranoid killer?" If anything more were needed, that would discredit the Greek effort, and I explained that he was a discredited paranoid killer.

Q: Could you give some background? It's an important factor that they put this man in there.

CRAWFORD: The junta had, I believe, gone to a couple of other "respectable" Cypriot political leaders, who had turned them down and said, "We're all loyal Greeks, but we don't approve of your apparently impending action against our president, and we're not going to be a party to this."

Nicos Sampson had been a newspaper photographer and later newspaper editor/owner in the 1960's, just a plain despicable man whose claim to fame in history was that he carried in his newspaper during the period of the fight against the British pictures of a British woman and child blown up or shot in the back, lying bleeding to death on a Nicosia street. The common story was that it was Sampson who had shot them in the back and then stepped up to photograph them and give it more publicity. This was the view that the Cypriots had of him -- cheap, unintelligent, ambitious, a killer, a thug. Most sensible Cypriots and foreigners refused, even before this, to have anything to do with him. In Cyprus, as deputy chief of mission from the 1968 to 1972 period, I had refused his invitation to come to his house, he was such a despicable person. The British obviously felt that way and so did many Greek Cypriots. I pointed out to my interlocutors on the telephone that the fact that Sampson was the only man the junta had found to play their game means their effort was discredited from the start and I doubted Sampson would last.

They said, "Who will take his place?"

I said, "In the absence of the Archbishop, probably Glafcos Clerides, the Speaker of the House, a fine man who is in the constitutional position to step in as acting president. The next thing that's going to happen is that Turkey is going to invade, and nothing that we do will stop them. We stopped them twice before, and this time they're going to view this as such a serious disruption of the status quo, that under their treaty rights they will almost certainly invade Cyprus. We won't be able to stop them."

Question: "How much of Cyprus do they want to take? All of Cyprus?"

I said, "No. They'll go for the northern third, which is enough to establish strategic control over the island. Finally, one gratuitous comment, and that is look for the early fall of the junta, because Greeks cannot, in their pride, stomach a government which has so seriously misbehaved and jeopardized Greece's reputation around the world. So look for the early fall of the government in Athens. Is there anything that I could usefully do in this evolving situation?"

"We'll check with the Secretary." The answer came back the following day, as a matter of fact, "Thank you very much. We've got it under control. The Secretary thanks you, but you're free to go on your vacation."

I did. I went off to hike in Norway sometime in August, and had hardly started when the Norwegian police found me on top of a fiord and flew me back into the capital, where I was told by our ambassador that I was to return to Washington instantly at the Secretary's request. Our ambassador told me of Ambassador Davies' assassination in Nicosia and speculated that this was the reason for the preemptory summons. On my wilderness hike, of course, I had heard nothing of what had happened in Cyprus after checking out of the Department.

Q: This is Rodger Davies, who was shot on August 19, 1974.

CRAWFORD: And it was August 19 that the Norwegian police tracked me down. I flew back. I think the fact that Kissinger had seen me just a few weeks before in relation to Syria was relevant, as well as my four years previous experience in Cyprus.

Q: It was such a fast-breaking situation, I assume, that the idea was to get somebody in place right away.

CRAWFORD: Yes. President Ford and the Secretary prevailed on Congress to treat Senate confirmation as an emergency. From start to finish, from notification to the Senate to confirmation, took about two hours. I was sworn in, and I was off in just a few days, arriving in Cyprus as I recall on August 27. By that time the civilian airports in Cyprus were closed off because of the fighting. The only way to get into Cyprus was to fly into the British sovereign base area. So I flew to England, and the RAF took me into the British sovereign bases. I came, so to speak, by the back door.

Dean Brown had been out there for a few days holding the fort after Rodger's death. I believe I arrived exactly ten days after Rodger was killed.

Q: What was the situation when you were there? What did you find that you had to do -- instructions from Washington? What was the situation you had to deal with?

CRAWFORD: It's curious that there really were not any instructions from Washington. In the case of my assignment in Yemen, you could say there were. Secretary of State Rogers had said, "I want to help these people and establish an effective American presence." I certainly never received any instructions from Dr. Kissinger, except to go out there and get there in a hurry. So I think it really was more than anything how I came to conceive of what I should be doing. Nobody ever told me. I suspect that's true more often than not.

Q: In the interviews I've been doing, in a fast-breaking situation, the person in the field essentially writes his or her own instructions, unless there's some doubt about their competence. So with all the modern communication and technology, when the chips are down, the reliance is in the person in the field.

CRAWFORD: On the plane crossing the Atlantic, I decided that the first thing I had to do was get back into effective communication with the leaders on both sides.

Q: You are speaking about Turkish and Greek leaders, or were there more leaders than that? What about Makarios?

CRAWFORD: Makarios was in London, and the acting president of Cyprus was Clerides. In a sense, the first policy thing I did, although I in no way thought of it as making policy, which produced immediate grumbles from Dr. Kissinger, was in my brief remarks on being sworn in by the Deputy Secretary. I spoke of an island whose very independence and unity were threatened

unless remedial measures were taken soon to prevent a permanent division of the island, to get the communities back into negotiation, to terminate the foreign military presence, etc. Word came down through Arthur Hartman, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, that the Secretary had rather blown up about his new ambassador in Cyprus making policy before he even arrived on the island. I said, "It's simply a statement of fact. The island is now divided, and unless somebody does something, it's going to stay divided. I wasn't trying to make policy, Arthur."

He said, "Well, the Secretary is angry."

So I said, "By the way, Arthur, I'm going to stop and call on Makarios in London." Arthur looked troubled. I guess he realized more than I did at that point the extent to which the Secretary -- this does not give credence to those who think the United States was involved in the effort to overthrow Makarios; we absolutely were not -- but it was perfectly true that the Secretary of State did not like Archbishop Makarios, and vice versa.

Q: This is almost endemic. There would be a long line of those. I'm told he was a very difficult man.

CRAWFORD: The Secretary of State or the Archbishop?

Q: (Laughs) I think both, but particularly Makarios.

CRAWFORD: I actually rather liked him. He was very cagey. There was no pious virtue about him despite his chosen profession. He had tremendous sagacity as a politician: very wily and very tough. But you had to admire that. He was shrewd. As Dr. Kissinger once venomously said to him in my presence, "Your Beatitude, we don't have any problem with you, except you're too big for your island." (Laughs)

So when I repeated that I intended to call on the Archbishop, he said, "The Secretary would not like that."

I said, "I'm sorry, I've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that I stop in on my way out. Although he is not currently the president of Cyprus, he will again be. Clerides is only the acting president. I really have no choice." So I did call on Makarios. I'm very glad I did, because it helped pull back on the suspicion, which Makarios really had, that the United States had not only supported the junta, but also its effort to remove him. So it helped to get me off on a better foot. At least I didn't have Makarios and his supporters against me.

Q: The Secretary of State, again through an intermediary, basically says, "Don't see him," and you say, "I have to see him."

CRAWFORD: Because I knew the situation on Cyprus, that Makarios would return.

Q: But I'm really talking about here in the Department of State. When you were told it wouldn't be a good idea, you said, "It really is a good idea," and then there was no further opposition? Or

did you go directly against instructions?

CRAWFORD: It was not a direct instruction. Arthur shrugged and said, "I'll tell the Secretary that the horse is out of the barn door, you've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that you call. It would then be a clear insult not to do so." I emphasized that from my point of view, not to mention my safety, it really had to be done. And I'm glad I did, because that was a calculation.

We had just had an ambassador who got killed by ultra-Greek nationalists and who were still very, very angry over the failure of the attempted coup. Makarios already felt that we were responsible for what had happened. When I got to Cyprus, it was the ultra-nationalists, the EOKA types advocating union between Cyprus and mainland Greece, and EOKA-B, the second EOKA movement (the first having been back in the 1960's under General Grivas) who were certain to be implacably hostile. It was they who had killed Davies. If in addition to this group, other Makarios' supporters, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots and truly adored him as a leader -- if they were against me, I would just be zero in effectiveness. Not only a question of physical survival. I wanted to make sure that the word got sent back from Makarios in London to his supporters on the island that I was okay and fair and could perhaps be helpful.

Then arriving in Cyprus, fortunately I had a very close, friendly relationship with the acting president, Glafcos Clerides from previous service. Fortunately also, the same was true in his own-by-then sector of Cyprus, of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. The first thing I did was to insist on and gradually gain freedom of movement. Remember by then, Northern Cyprus, one-third, or a little less, was controlled by the Turkish mainland Army. They gave lip service to the idea that Rauf Denktash was the leader of Turkish Cyprus, but in fact, he was entirely dependent on the mainland Turks and very much restricted in his own movements by them. The Turkish military who wanted none of the messiness that might have gone with an independent local leader.

So I went to the Turkish ambassador. There were two or three telephone lines across the line. The first full afternoon I was there, within 18 hours of my arrival, I got on one of those lines. Ambassador Asaf Inhan had been the Turkish ambassador when I left two years before. After greetings, I told him that within 48 hours I proposed to come across the line.

He said, "Bill, I'm glad you're back, but I think that would be most inconvenient and probably not possible."

I said, "First of all, in conducting its military operation, Turkey has announced that it is not trying to destroy the unity of Cyprus, nor the independence of Cyprus. As far as I'm concerned, I am the American ambassador to Cyprus in all of its parts, and I must have freedom of movement. There's an additional reason beyond policy. I have a lot of American citizens in the north whose welfare, under American law, is my responsibility. They have just been through a war and many of them are in trouble. I must be free to visit them." So he sighed.

I called him later again to say that we would be arriving at the checkpoint two days hence at 4:00

in the afternoon. I knew he had to check it out with the controlling Turkish mainland military.

The next message from the Turkish ambassador was that I had to have a visa.

I said, "A visa to go to all parts of a single country to which I am accredited?" So I got them to drop that.

When we got to the checkpoint as we had said we would two days later, there was an escort. I said, "I don't have to be escorted. I know my way."

The Turkish military said, "Call it an interpreter." So I had a jeep full of "interpreters" with machine guns at 16 checkpoints from there out to the northern coast. The Turks were still very much on a wartime footing, shoved guns in your face and so on.

I did establish the principle of freedom of movement, albeit very limited at first. I was able to drive out to the northern coastal city of Kyrenia, called on my American citizens there, which is where most of them happened to be, and bit by bit to extend that every weekend, to expand the area along the coast the military would allow me to visit.

I was able to convince the leadership on both sides that my freedom of movement was in their interest. To the Greek Cypriot government, which is the only one we recognized, and is still, I was able to say, "Surely, for the sake of the ultimate reunification of the island, it is useful for you to have me insist on this principle of freedom of movement in all parts of the island. Furthermore, I can perhaps see things going on of which you're unaware that may be of interest." Remembering that we were accused by Greeks of having caused the attempt on Makarios and subsequent Turkish invasion, they swallowed and said, "All right, we trust you. We understand why you're doing it, and we'll try to explain to people why you're going to cross that line. We'll try to explain so you don't get shot when you come back."

To the Turkish Cypriots, I offered the chance, and ultimately gave them, some voice to the outside world other than the Turkish mainland military with which Rauf Denktash was very restive. He had very early in his career been in exile from Cyprus in Turkey, where he was kept pretty well under lock and key and had written a book against mainland Turkish policies over the years in northern Cyprus. So while there was a semblance of Turkish unity, the reality was that Denktash welcomed contact with the outside world and the American ambassador, because it gave him a little more elbow room. At first, after the invasion, he had no freedom of movement outside his own "capital" of Nicosia. When I insisted on it, as happened on a couple of occasions, he was able to say, "Your insistence has enabled me to say that, of course, I must escort you." So it got him and the community moving in areas that the Turkish mainland military had not allowed him.

Then the rest of the diplomatic corps, the British, French, and Germans in Nicosia, who had in truth been cowering on the Greek side for fear of incurring the government's anger, not knowing how to deal with the situation, followed suit. It became the established way for all missions to deal with the confused situation in which there were two declared administrations, only one of which was recognized.

It was not very pleasant living. There were no dependents. Early on, we had to make changes in the embassy staff, because people were pretty demoralized. They'd seen their ambassador killed, gone through a war, and had a very rough time. We removed some, brought back others who had previous Cyprus experience.

Q: Who was your DCM?

CRAWFORD: Frederick Z. Brown, who had been with consul general in Danang. He was wonderful, not familiar with Cyprus, but it didn't matter. I had that familiarity and we had a Turkish language officer who knew Cyprus, and a couple of others whose experience went way back. We had no dependents, and I flew in with two American bodyguards who stayed with me the whole first year. They lived in the Residence. Because Rodger Davies had been killed by shooting through a window, I was never allowed near an open window. The windows were blocked off with sheets of steel, so it was very hard to tell when it was daytime or nighttime. I got out very little. When I did, it was always accompanied by two extra cars of Cypriot police, all armed fore and aft. In the car there was so much bulletproofing, I couldn't see out of my own window. And a great deal of hostility. The Greek Cypriots, by and large, people I had known socially in the earlier period, few of them came forward to offer anything. Those who did knew they were risking their lives or, at minimum, violent criticism. I was enormously grateful to the brave few who did.

Q: What did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: That we had caused the whole thing that had happened to them, the loss of their island, the Turkish invasion, the near-killing of their beloved president. They felt, to a large extent, that Dr. Kissinger personally was the cause of it, because he was the personification to them of the maligned U.S. influence. They felt that in his previous position in the National Security Council, he had unique authority to control the actions of CIA as well as the overt side of the U.S. foreign policy. They were convinced that we regarded Makarios as a dangerous Communist, and therefore supported the junta against democracy in Greece and against Makarios.

Q: How about the ones that supported the junta in Cyprus? How did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: They had killed Rodger Davies because they felt they had been betrayed. They had been assured by the junta representatives from mainland Greece that this whole thing had been approved by the United States, and they felt that it couldn't be motherland Greece that had made this ghastly mistake; it must have been the manipulations of the United States which had caused the whole thing to go awry, and had intentionally created a situation which would permit Turkey to invade.

Q: It's interesting. I had just left Greece, but before that, everything that happened in Greece, whether inclement weather to anything that was detrimental to the Greeks, was considered to be a machination on the part of the United States. There was this wonderful self-delusion that "We

never do anything wrong; it's always somebody else." I suppose 50 years before, it was the British. Now it was the United States.

CRAWFORD: Absolutely.

Q: It's the exact play in Greece with the Greeks.

CRAWFORD: It was not the Greek ambassador that was killed; it was the American ambassador.

Q: Yes. I always found this incredible. In many ways, I've often felt that as we divide the world up, Greece should be put in the Middle East, where at least the thought processes are more, you might say, Middle Eastern than European.

Did you have any dealings with Sampson? Was he still running things?

CRAWFORD: Sampson had indeed gotten discredited in just a few days and had been run out of town. He wasn't even in Cyprus at that point. I had no dealings with him whatsoever. Clerides was acting president by the time I got there, an old and good friend.

Q: Did he remain a good friend? Were you able to deal with him?

CRAWFORD: Oh, yes, very close.

Q: What did the Greeks want from you?

CRAWFORD: Massive amounts of American aid, pressure to remove Turkish troops from their island, get Turkey to pull out. In short, an instant solution; our insistence with Turkey that all the Greek Cypriot refugees, of whom there were about 100,000 or one in every five Greek Cypriots who had been displaced from their home, that they return to their homes in the Turkish-occupied area, the Turkish troops removed, and the status quo be resumed, which was clearly impossible.

I sound throughout this as if I blame the junta. In a specific sense, yes. But in fact, there was a very long history of Greek Cypriot maltreatment of the Turks, so this has antecedents going way, way back.

After arrival, I set about trying to help the whole process of U.N.-sponsored negotiations between the two, to help the special representative of the United Nations, who is now, by the way, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar. In reality, the United States had more authority than the Secretary General's special representative, because we had more influence with Greek and Turkey and with the two communities in Cyprus.

Over the four years that I was there, we tried in countless different ways to nibble away at the intractable situation, intractable because Turkey had achieved, in 1974, what it had long wanted, and that was to move Cyprus out of a waffley area of Greek-Turkish influence and irrevocably into a zone of Turkish military hegemony. They just never liked the idea that this island thirty

miles off their shores might suddenly become hostile and cut them off to the south. The Turkish ambassador expressed it to me in just those terms. He said, "Turkey is an imperial power and a continental power. That we are unnaturally prevented from breathing to the north and the east by the presence of the Soviet Union makes it all the more important that we be able to breathe to the south and to the west. 1974 solved the southern dimension. It remains to solve the western dimension."

Q: This is an unclassified interview. How effective did you find the CIA when you were there this second time? Were they helpful?

CRAWFORD: By that time (fall 1974) I think they were a bit embarrassed. They had been closely identified with the junta and therefore with its mistakes, even though, as I used to try to persuade my Cypriot friends, American errors were errors of omission, not commission. They had been too prone to believe the colonels when they told them that nothing was going to happen. So by the time I was ambassador there, I got nothing but absolute collaboration, cooperation, and support from Agency representatives. In fact, I was in a position to pretty well insist on the kind of representation I wanted and, in fact, on the officers who would represent the Agency at that time, and did so insist.

Q: How about the desk? Maybe it was slightly before your time, but Henry Kissinger had forced out the desk officer, Tom Boyatt. Was that during your time?

CRAWFORD: No, that was when I was in Yemen. Partly because, I gather, Boyatt had been calling signals about what Greece was up to and presenting the arguments very forcefully. I don't know whether Kissinger forced him out or not, because he certainly went on to have a successful career.

Q: He was moved, all of a sudden, rather rapidly over to the Senior Seminar. I joined him. Did you find, as time went on, that you were getting good, solid support from the Department of State?

CRAWFORD: Absolutely, all the way up to Secretary Kissinger, about whom Cyprus stories are legion. I'd like to think that I got along with him quite well. I could deal with him, with humor, and he seriously wanted a Cyprus solution, no question about that. He felt the whole Cyprus thing threatened to be a real blot on his reputation in history, and he really did want it resolved if it possibly could be in his time as Secretary. So he gave me every possible support.

The enmity between Makarios and Kissinger was very real. Though Makarios dealt fairly with me, he kept letting his newspapers blame and continue to blame Kissinger for everything that happened. I reported all this. Kissinger finally, quite rightly, could accept this no longer, saying, on the one hand, to the Archbishop/president of Cyprus, who had by that time returned, "You ask for our help in solving this. You ask for aid. On the other hand, you are against us in every one of your controlled newspapers. You can't have it both ways." So after the worst of these, I was recalled. This was maybe in the middle of 1975, 1976, really at my own suggestion. It was the only way we could show Makarios we were serious about not accepting continued insults. So I was recalled very quickly and sat in Washington for two or three weeks.

Then I said, "We've made the point. I think we should find some way of getting me back to Cyprus." The then Under Secretary, Philip Habib, asked if I had any ideas.

I suggested that I draft a strong letter from the Secretary to the Archbishop, and that to the letter be added an oral message from the Secretary that I would be charged with carrying back, to say, "You can't have it both ways. If there's any more of this violence and insults to the United States and criticism of the American role, we will terminate that role and let the Cyprus situation stew in its own juices." I went back; the dual messages worked, the inspired insults stopped; and I picked up my job again.

Q: What were we doing outside of showing our good intentions?

CRAWFORD: By that time, we had established full freedom of movement. For another, we had a massive aid program. This, of course, gets into the whole business of the friends of Greece in Congress and out of Congress.

Here I digress a bit. The day I was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I went down with Secretary Kissinger, who was giving classified testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This would have been sometime before I left, the 26th or something like that, of August 1974. I went with Secretary Kissinger, who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how we saw the situation, what he intended to do, and he introduced me and asked for the committee's earliest possible approval.

After the Secretary had spoken, Senator [Jacob] Javits of New York spoke. A truly remarkable man, I might say. I am paraphrasing somewhat, but he said something like this: "Mr. Secretary, everything that you've said to us this morning sounds appropriate to the circumstances and we think you're on the right course. We support you. But just a word of advice. Rightly or wrongly, I am regarded by some as the leader of what is known as the Jewish lobby in Congress with which you have occasionally taken issue over policy. Whether that is or is not correct, let me just talk to you for a minute about some realities of American politics. Jewish influence in the United States is concentrated in a few key cities -- New York, Los Angeles, Chicago. Greek influence in this country is everywhere. There isn't a sheriff, a small town mayor, a state governor, highway commissioner, who hasn't to some extent become indebted to Greek American support, financial support and votes, whether Republican or Democratic. Greeks in the United States have an organization which links them, called AHEPA, the society for the preservation of Hellenic culture. It has never been a political organization; it's essentially cultural to preserve the sense of Hellenism and so on. Greek Americans have never exercised national political influence. Their interest is in the liquor licenses, the highway contracts, restaurant licenses, and so on, to protect their own local position. They've never before exercised this essentially tremendous weight on a national level."

"But the Cyprus issue has galvanized them as they have never been galvanized before, and they have a structure through which to bring political influence to bear on the national level. If from time to time, Dr. Kissinger, you have had reason in your mind to take issue with the Jewish lobby, just wait til the Greek lobby hits you." (Laughs)

Indeed, it hit him. When the Greeks got behind Carter's campaign, as an alternative to Ford-Kissinger, as you recall, leaders of the Greek community in this country passed the word to the leaders of Greek Cyprus that, "When our man Carter gets in, we will make sure that anybody who has had anything to do with Cyprus during this disastrous period is eliminated." They specifically said there would be a clean sweep of our ambassadors in Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus. The Secretary of State, of course, would be changed. They said that first. And the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman. "We will promise you there will be a complete change of characters." Indeed, within weeks of Carter coming in, they got the change in Athens, got the change in Ankara. Arthur Hartman went off with dignity to be ambassador to France, but they got him out. They did fulfill their promise on that. A couple of other semi-subordinate officials, the Director for Southern European Affairs and so on, were moved. I was, in effect, told by my Greek Cypriot friends that the "Greek lobby" had assured the Cypriot leadership: "Crawford's next."

Then an interesting, wonderful thing happened, which was reported back to me by the Greek Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriot foreign minister, an old friend. He reported these conversations with the constant flow of American Greek principals to the island. So the foreign minister said, "Bill, they've told us that they're going to get rid of you. What would you like to do?" I replied that, "If there's something useful I can do here, I'd like to do it, to help put this island back together again."

So the Greek Cypriots went back to their Greek American friends and said, "If you insist on this, as condition for aid to Cyprus, if you think it's got to be done, fine. But we think that Crawford knows the island, is fair, and we'd just as soon have him stay," including, by the way, Archbishop Makarios.

When I got back, for instance, with that angry message from Kissinger, that was just before Carter came in, Makarios spoke to me. He had this benign, lovely look, with his big tall hat. He said, "Mr. Ambassador, isn't it true that under your system, ambassadors submit their resignations when a new President comes in?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude, it is."

He said, "Wouldn't that be in your case, also, as a career officer, that you would submit your resignation?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude."

He said, "What are your wishes?" Meaning he was angry at Kissinger, furious, too, at my bearing this angry message: seething.

I said, "Your Beatitude, if the time has come when I can no longer serve the cause of peace in Cyprus, I'll be happy to go. If there's still something to be of use based on my knowledge of the island and experience here, I would prefer to stay." He just smiled very faintly, having made the point that he could remove Kissinger's envoy at will. And I stayed for another three years.

Q: You are using the term "beatitude" reminds me again of another one of the interviews. It may have been Douglas Dillon or George Ball. He found himself pushed to the corner by Makarios, found himself saying, "Jesus Christ, your Beatitude, you can't do that," or something.

CRAWFORD: That was probably George Ball. He undertook a mediatory mission to Cyprus in the 1960's. There's a resonance to that later on, too, on one of Makarios' visits to Washington after all of these events. I think he was coming in from London. I was called to be back for the visit. I went up to talk to the Secretary before Makarios' arrival, and Dr. Kissinger said, "Bill, what do I call him?"

I said, "Your Beatitude."

So we went downstairs to the front entrance. Dripping with cynicism and dislike, Dr. Kissinger greeted the Archbishop when the limousine pulled up at the door. "Your Beatitude, I'm so glad to welcome you to Washington, your Beatitude." We went upstairs, and Makarios was sitting there resting his hands on his scepter symbol of office and his lovely hat and all the rest, and that's when Kissinger just started right off saying, "Your Beatitude, I want you to know that we have great respect for you, your Beatitude. It is only, your Beatitude, that we feel you're too big for your island. Of course, if you chose, you could, I suppose, be president or prime minister of Greece whenever it suited you. I suppose the one thing that would unify all those Greek politicians, your Beatitude, would be the prospect that you would come in to be president of Greece or prime minister. Now, on the other hand, if, your Beatitude, you were General Secretary of the Soviet Union, that would give us real problems to have such an adversary, your Beatitude." The meeting got nowhere, obviously.

Then as we were going down the elevator, all crushed in there with the Archbishop and his bodyguard, Secretary Kissinger and his bodyguard, me, into an elevator that ordinarily holds five, the Secretary said to the Archbishop, "Your Beatitude, when I'm with you, I really quite feel that I like you."

The Archbishop looked at him benignly and said, "Dr. Kissinger, it lasts for just about five minutes after we've parted, doesn't it?"

Q: Makarios died rather shortly thereafter, in 1977.

CRAWFORD: Yes. Then you get to other things. The Carter Administration did come in. Carter, in fulfillment of his campaign promises, appointed Clark Clifford as special emissary. We had been chipping away at various aspects of the aid problem. Aid was not a problem. In fact, it was a problem unusually in the reverse; we had more aid money voted by the Greek lobby in Congress than we could ethically utilize. I did not endear myself to the leaders of the Greek lobby, John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes, by reporting exactly that, that this was unconscionable, when there was so much poverty in the world, to be spending this amount of money in Cyprus. But they had that kind of political authority and it went through. Despite the best efforts of Kissinger and my own efforts, we really hadn't gotten anywhere against the intransigent realities on the ground, and still haven't, by the way.

President Carter appointed Clark Clifford to be his special emissary to try to resolve it. Clifford is a brilliant negotiator, a very wise man. I think, as the result of the first major mission to Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus, he was really starting to make a dent, basically saying to Makarios, "You can never get everything back. You've got to do some giving in constitutional terms, not ceding land to Turkey or anything like that, but you've got to be more flexible in negotiations than you ever have been in the past, and realize that Turkish Cypriots, for example, are going to have to have a zone which they can call their own. With our help, perhaps, you can get a federal umbrella over the whole thing so eventually you can reunite it. You can probably get the percentage area of Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriots control down from the present 38 to something under 30, but you're going to have to give. Otherwise, we can't be helpful." That's not by any means exact, but that's roughly the kind of realism that he was advocating to Makarios.

It was tough negotiating between two strong men, but we all felt that Clifford was starting to get somewhere and that Makarios was starting to move. Then he had first one, then a second heart attack, and died. He was followed by a leader, Kyprianou, without anything like the stature to carry off that kind of thing. It takes a strong man to be able to cut his losses, and Kyprianou was not that.

Q: On April 12, 1976, I notice that 2,000 to 3,000 Cypriots tried to storm the embassy. What was behind this?

CRAWFORD: They did several times. There were two main attacks. One was when I was back on consultation, and Fred Brown was chargé. Another was when I was there, and I have forgotten the date. They were still very, very angry with the United States. After all, there were 100,000 refugees in and around Nicosia, who fled from the Turkish zone of occupation. They were dislocated, homeless people, though we were rapidly housing them with this most generous per capita aid program anywhere in the world, including Israel at that point. They were a lot of bitter, desperately angry people. Students could be very easily whipped up, and that's what happened. They were students whipped up by professional agitators. They had already burned down a chunk of the American embassy at the time that they killed Rodger Davies. They burned down a little bit more when Fred Brown was in charge. They tried a third time, and that was the last.

By then, we were better organized with tear gas in place, more levels of local defense. Kissinger at that point had given his warning to Makarios, "If anything more happens to our embassy, we're going to pull out." The previous violence had certainly been condoned, indeed if not instigated, by Makarios. So the warnings had taken some hold. The students were still agitated and tried again to burn the embassy, but by that time, we not only had a great deal of cooperation from the U.N. forces, with the Canadian chief of staff for the U.N. forces in quietly positioned -- not quite in U.N. terms "legal," but de facto active Canadian-American friendship -- had stationed his troops in side streets, ready to move a couple of personnel carriers, ready to move in if something really got out of hand. Furthermore, the mainland Greeks by then had seen that it was not in their interest. They controlled the Greek Cypriot Army and national guard, and it was not in their interest to let things out of control.

Q: By this time, of course, the colonels were long gone.

CRAWFORD: It was a totally different situation.

Q: There was Karamanlis and a democratic Greek government.

CRAWFORD: Our ambassador in Athens went to Karamanlis and said, "We have disturbing reports about what might happen tonight." I believe I'm right in this. Jack Kubisch had talked to the Greek government, and they had sent instructions to the Greek general commanding the Cyprus forces, "Don't let anything get out of hand." So there were pretty nervous-making waves of student attacks on the embassy to try to burn it down, but it was controlled, and they ran out of zip before we ran out of tear gas.

Q: Looking back on this, what would you say was the effect of your time as chief of mission at a very difficult time? What would you call your accomplishments?

CRAWFORD: First of all, we were able to establish freedom of movement in a situation in which the U.S. was excluded from dealing with one-third of the island and its leadership. The aid money, though it was excessive, was spent as wisely as could possibly have been the case. A lot was done for displaced persons, but, at our insistence, for basic economic development and improvement on both sides of the line. We got Greek Cypriot approval, believe it or not, for spending money on depressed Turkish communities, as well, because Turkish Cypriots had been displaced in the whole process of population transfer. So we spent money in proportion to the population ratio, 80-20, on the Turkish side, with Greek Cypriot approval. The aid money was spent fairly and effectively on doing a lot of good things that needed doing, more than probably needed doing in some cases.

We established a role for the United States as the effective communicator and purveyor of ideas which might lead toward a solution of the problem, any aspect of the problem or its entirety. We made it clear that our role would be more behind the scenes, that it was our preference and certainly in the interest of the parties to keep the U.N. peacemaking presence out in front. Everybody came to see that that was a logical way of approaching it, because we were so neurotically identified in different ways by our two allies, that we couldn't play the neutral role. Witness the Greek influence in the American political process by that time.

We were able, on arrival, to establish effective working relationships with leaders on both sides, despite grievances and hatreds and all the rest, largely buffered by the friendships that we'd carried over from previous experience. Over time, the extent of animosity began to ebb, and more and more of a genuine friendship began to be restored to replace this real hatred which had existed certainly from 1974. It was palpable. Several attempts were reported to have been made on my life, and there was no question about it, it was a very unpleasant atmosphere. We were regarded as the betrayer of Greek Cyprus. By 1978, that was no longer true. We were looked to as the power de facto, and the only power that could really do anything in a final sense to develop a solution. So it was a very different atmosphere when I left.

Q: This may be more in an editorial note than a question, but sometimes it's said by those who

don't understand the trade of diplomacy that with modern communications, you really don't need someone in the field; you can practically do everything by telegram, it's just a matter of communication. I would think that what you've just said here shows the idiocy of doing away with someone who is there and who is intimately concerned.

CRAWFORD: Yes, I think that's absolutely true. Immodestly or modestly, whichever, I think I was the right choice to go back in, because I had a documented record of friendship with both communities, an impartiality, and was able to build on that. I had had four years of recent experience on the island, and many friendships, and built on those. If it had been somebody else who didn't have that kind of relationship, it would have been a far harder task.

Q: *You could hit the ground running.*

CRAWFORD: Talking to our military attaché about a month after I arrived, he said, "If you don't mind my saying so, Mr. Ambassador, I thought you were out of your mind when, within 24 hours after arrival, you started wanting to cross the line, wanting to talk to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. I just couldn't understand what you were up to, but now I see it. It worked. You established working relationships within a few days at all levels, on both sides."

HERMAN REBHAN
General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation
Washington, DC (1974-1989)

Herman Rebham was born in Poland and raised in Germany. He came with his family to the United States in 1938 and settled in Cleveland, Ohio. After working in auto manufacturing plants in the Midwest, he became Administrative Assistant to United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, and dealt with domestic and international labor matters throughout his career. In 1972 he became the United Auto Workers Director of International Affairs in Washington, DC. Mr. Rebham died in 2006. Mr. Rebham was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle in 1995.

Shea: *What role did the Turkish workers play in the union or did they play any?*

REBHAN: A very good question. There was an enormous number Turks working at Ford, especially in Cologne. If I remember, 3,000 in Cologne alone.

Shea: *And also at Mercedes in Stuttgart.*

REBHAN: Yes, in Stuttgart, too. The Turks played a very important role politically in the union. Everybody in the union catered to them politically. We had a Turk who was a member of the Aufsichtsrat who was a member of the bargaining committee. In some plants they have separate meetings for Turkish workers, because of the [need for language] interpretation. But in the Turkish group there were a lot of guys who had an outside ax to grind. On the Board of I. G.

Metall there is a Turkish worker. I used to kid him. They used to say Chrysler gave the union some representation on the board which they took away afterwards. The guys at Ford asked me, "How many [workers] do you have on the board?" I said, "One." They laughed at me. Then I asked, "How many Turks do you have on your Executive Board?" [Laughter].

Kienzle: What kind of extraneous issues did the Turks try to interject at the local level?

REBHAN: The Turks had political parties. They didn't interject, but they recruited people [for] the political parties. Then Turks voted for Turks, just like blacks in our union vote for blacks.

Kienzle: There was a lot of concern at one time about the perks that might be offered to members of the board.

REBHAN: Oh, that's a good question and that's very interesting. First of all, Ford was smart. They paid very little. I originally got 6,000 marks, but because I was a vice chairman, I got 8,000 marks a year and a car. That was good, because that kept down graft. That was Ford's idea, and the union people agreed with that. Mercedes paid 40,000 or 50,000 marks but in the I. G. Metall you had to return everything to a the Mitbestimmungsstiftung (The Co-determination Foundation), and you actually kept very little. How did they enforce it? Every year they published [a list of] those that paid and those that didn't pay, and those that didn't pay, didn't get elected again. That made me feel good. At a certain time of the year I sent them a few thousand marks and forgot about it. There was no double income. They also had bankers and people like that on the board. But that [I. G. Metall policy] was very good. The union did that immediately. I know one fellow at Klockner-Deutz in Cologne, who was one of those smart alecks, who thought he would not give any money [to the Co-determination Foundation]; he didn't get reelected. And once a year they published a full page in the I. G. Metall paper of all the names [listed] alphabetically.

ALAN FLANIGAN
Political Officer
Ankara (1975-1978)

Alan Flanigan was born in Indiana in 1938. He graduated from Tufts University in 1960 and served in the U.S. Navy from 1960 to 1966 as a lieutenant. After entering the Foreign Service in 1966, his assignments abroad have included Lima, Izmir, Ankara and Lisbon, with an ambassadorship to El Salvador.

Q: The U.S. Congress began to react to what Turkey had done in Cyprus; did that happen while you were still in Izmir or later?

FLANIGAN: It began while I was there, but most of it happened while I was in Ankara immediately afterward.

Q: Because you went from Izmir to Ankara. What was your job?

FLANIGAN: I was the second officer in the political section, so I continued to follow domestic politics. I also handled a lot of the bilateral issues at the Foreign Ministry. U.S.-Turkish relations.

Q: Who was the political counselor at the time?

FLANIGAN: George McFarland had taken over just before I arrived.

Q: So you knew him.

FLANIGAN : I knew he had been the deputy to the political counselor. Maury Draper had been political counselor when I arrived in Izmir. He had been replaced briefly by Myles Green, and by the time I arrived in Ankara, George McFarland had moved up to be the counselor.

Q: Did you, when you were in Izmir, regularly visit the Embassy in Ankara?

FLANIGAN: Yes, several times.

Q: And the ambassador was?

FLANIGAN: William Macomber.

Q: The whole time you were there?

FLANIGAN: The whole time I was in Izmir and the first two years I was in Ankara. He was replaced by Ronald Spiers.

Q: What were some of the major issues while you were in Ankara in the political section that you were reporting on? You said it was primarily domestic political and bilateral.

FLANIGAN: Well, the Cyprus situation had become the major preoccupation by the time I arrived. It tended to dominate the relationship. There was another national election while I was in Ankara, and we followed that very closely. But the overriding concern was the Cyprus problem and the effect on the bilateral relationship – which was corrosive. Even though we had a political-military section as well as a political section, there was to a certain extent an overlap in our dealings on the subjects. The political-military section attended to the bilateral military relationship and to the negotiation and implementation of the military base agreements.

Q: The nuts and bolts of the military presence in Turkey.

FLANIGAN: Exactly, because we had a major presence in Turkey.

Q: Why don't you remind us about what had happened? On the overall bilateral level you mentioned a deterioration that had taken place. That had run its course when you got to Ankara in 1975 or was it still happening?

FLANIGAN: This is impressionistic because I can't remember the precise times, but what had

happened was that Congress in reaction to the invasion of Cyprus had imposed an embargo on the sale of arms to Turkey. At the same time it had frozen assistance programs. The regular AID program had already been phased out. It was closing down by the time I arrived in Ankara. Turkey graduated in this case. It had nothing to do with Cyprus. But, the military relationship was still very important; there was military assistance both in terms of funding and all sorts of interactive relationships, and those had been frozen. In reaction to that, the Turks suspended the activities we had been conducting at the bases we had in Turkey. Those included intelligence collection obviously, which is one of the major things that we did there. Since they were directed against the Soviet Union, it was of some consequence to us. Trying to sort out this, overcome this problem and get Turkey to agree to the resumption of our activities or to get the Congress to lift the embargo or some median resolution was what we...

Q: The embargo was essentially on sales of military items, not normal trade.

FLANIGAN: Correct, it was on the sale of military items.

Q: One of the objections of the Congress, of course, was not necessarily that Turkey had felt threatened or felt compelled to act by the coup against Makarios, but rather that they invaded Cyprus and taken control of a very large portion of the island and was not willing to leave. Some of the Turks didn't agree with that. You had mentioned your relationship in Izmir with the Foreign Service national Turkish Cypriot background and how he immediately knew there was a problem when Makarios was overthrown. How do you recall your Turkish contacts looking at all of this and justifying what they had done particularly the second action they took?

FLANIGAN: Just to supply a little background on why we were upset. Turkish forces used military equipment which we had given or sold them. We considered such use to be contrary to the conditions of grant or sale. Turkey had agreed not to use this equipment for anything except their defense. We did not interpret this as being the defense of Turkey. The Turkish justification for the second operation was simply that they had a toehold which they couldn't defend. I don't think that would withstand careful scrutiny. What happens in a situation like that is a military commander says I can't put myself or my troops in a position of having to defend this little piece of territory here; I've got to expand the perimeter, and that puts political authorities in a difficult position unless they say yes. Especially if subsequently something happens. So, I think that under those circumstances the Turkish government was a pushover for the local military commander who decided to move forward.

Q: How do you recall generally the relationship between the elected government and the military? You said the government had been elected following a period where the military was very much looking over the shoulders of the previous government? Did Ecevit government have very much leeway vis a vis the military during this time you were in Ankara?

FLANIGAN: Well, yes and no. Ecevit had become a very popular leader, in part because he had authorized the Cyprus invasion. On the other hand he represented a party that some the military considered dangerous. Although it was just mildly left of center, it was left of center, and therefore he was constrained in what he could do without antagonizing the military which was very conservative. He was very effective internationally because he spoke very good English. He

was urbane and intellectual. I think most foreign observers were surprised that he became a strong partisan of the invasion. In retrospect it is not surprising. Turks, to the extent that you can generalize, are nationalistic, and when the government takes an action that purports to be in the defense of other Turks, then the population supports it.

Q: In terms of the relationship with the United States as you said, it was the Congress that enacted embargo legislation. How did Turkey look upon the Congress but also on the executive branch in the period you were there? Obviously there were executive branch members who came, but there were also members of Congress who came to Turkey. What sort of recollection do you have of that?

FLANIGAN: The Turks were totally convinced that Congress was under the control of the Greek lobby, so they took it upon themselves to try and establish a counter force in the United States. They were very proud and consequently uncomfortable with the idea of explaining themselves to others. It somehow seemed demeaning, and they claimed not to be very adept at it. But in fact, they put together a fairly good public relations effort over the next several years. It took them several years to make it effective. That is one of the results of all of this is that Turkey became much more adept at presenting its positions on the world stage and particularly in the United States.

Q: They weren't able to appeal to much in the way of an ethnic group in the United States. There are Turkish Americans but certainly not very many compared to the Greek Americans. Who were they appealing to and what was their theme, the argument they used?

FLANIGAN: The appeal was security-based. They pointed out that Turkey occupies a strategic piece of real estate especially in the context of the cold war. They also spent a lot of time as they now do talking about being a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. So, they tried to enhance the strategic importance of Turkey and were fairly effective in doing that. In fact, I do recall some Congressional visits to Ankara while I was there. Most of the Congressmen who came turned out to be fairly sympathetic in the end. Some of them were not when they arrived. I remember Steve Solarz made his first trip to Ankara while I was there. He came largely as a skeptic, but left fairly strongly convinced that Turkey was important to the United States. Not that Turkey was right, but that it was a country that had to be dealt with, and we needed to find a way of getting it back in the fold if you will. Subsequently he was quite effective as a young Congressman in the effort to get the embargo lifted.

Q: As I recall he was elected for the first time in 1974 just after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, and I believe during his campaign he made certain promises or statements and got a lot of votes from Greek voters, constituents in his district in New York.

FLANIGAN: I think this was his first trip overseas. In fact, he came, he was brought by another New York Congressman, Ben Rosenthal, who was a strong supporter of Greece and a critic of Turkey.

Q: Not talking specifically about Solarz, who was the most effective with people like that who visited in that period? Was it Ambassador Macomber who I am sure spent long periods of time

with them or Prime Minister Ecevit or was it sort of a combination of the two of them and others as well?

FLANIGAN: It was a combination. Macomber did spend a lot of time working with Congress. He had been Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and had an appreciation of the importance of the Congress in the conduct of foreign policy. So, when Congressmen or Senators came, he went all out to see that they got a good appreciation of his views, that is the administration's views, and so I think he was quite effective. He was considered to be difficult to work for, but that is a different issue. The Turks themselves were sometimes not as effective as they could and should be. Ecevit was an exception because he had gone to school in England. He spoke excellent English. He had a better feel for dealing with the United States and Western Europe than most other Turkish leaders did. Most Turks were somewhat introspective at that time. Xenophobia is an overstatement, but they had an appreciation of the importance of Turkey that if not exaggerated, at least it was exaggerated relative to its importance in other worlds.

Q: It was hard to convey or communicate, and they didn't always do it effectively. Let's talk a little bit more about Ecevit. He also went to Robert College in Istanbul. He also at some point was in a seminar that Henry Kissinger conducted at Harvard University. Let me ask you a little bit about him in terms of your experience, but also more generally another dimension of the Cyprus crisis for Turkey in the United States was as we've said it was Congress, the legislative branch that took action because to a certain extent the executive branch, the president had not done anything or very little in reaction to what had been done. How do you sort of remember the Turks looking upon that? Did they see President Nixon and then President Ford as kind of their ally and friend and particularly Henry Kissinger who was National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State? How do you remember that part of it?

FLANIGAN: No, I think in fact they had a perception that we were playing a double game with them. They didn't really have a good appreciation of how our system worked, and they began to get one because they had to deal with it. I think they felt that any President if he wanted to could have his way, and they were just not convinced that Congress by itself could do what it had done. I think you are right. I think the record will show that the administration did try to restrain the Turks, especially after the first invasion. They tried to restrain them from the beginning, weren't successful, but not being successful were not prepared to expend as much leverage as the Congress was prepared to use to get them back off of Cyprus.

Q: Let's talk a little bit more about some of the other dimensions of your job in the political section. You said you did primarily domestic political affairs. You had a lot of contact with the Parliament primarily or the Foreign Ministry?

FLANIGAN: The Foreign Ministry more. I dealt with the parties, and I went to the Parliament from time to time, but it wasn't that common. I spent a lot of time at the Foreign Ministry because of the crisis in the relationship trying to convey this message or that message. Because I was a Turkish language officer I often accompanied the Ambassador, both Macomber and Spiers, when they went to see the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry or the Foreign Minister.

Q: Not to act as an interpreter but to be aware of what was said in Turkish.

FLANIGAN: To be a note taker and to be aware. My Turkish was adequate, but I wasn't up to interpreting. In fact, some of these conversations, depending on the Foreign Minister or who was involved, were conducted in English, but generally they were conducted in Turkish and English with a Turkish foreign service officer acting as interpreter.

Q: Maybe we could just step ahead a little bit. While you were there of course, there was an election in the United States, and Jimmy Carter was elected President. What do you remember about Turkish analysis of that election and expectations when the Democrats came into the White House?

FLANIGAN: First of all, I think they were astounded. They just couldn't believe it. I recall having a group of Turkish politicians over during the campaign and showing a small movie about Jimmy Carter.

Q: Campaigning or debating or something.

FLANIGAN: Exactly. I can't remember what it was. It was one that his supporters had made, and it presented him in a sympathetic light. But it also highlighted his religious beliefs. The Turks were dogmatically secular and they just couldn't believe that this man was a serious candidate. He was so different from anything they had dealt with in the United States, so I think they were astounded and probably somewhat concerned about what it might mean. They had become convinced that the Republicans were as close as they were going to get to friends in the United States, and were concerned that Carter would be much more responsive to their bugaboo, the Greek lobby.

Q: It is said that church bells were rung in Greek Cyprus when Carter was elected.

FLANIGAN: That did not happen in Turkey, but once again there is a difference between the way the Turks respond to things and the way Greeks respond to things. Generalizations are always dangerous, but I think it is fairly safe to say that Greeks are much more inclined to show their emotions than are Turks.

Q: One of the first things President Carter did as far as relations with Turkey were concerned was to dispatch Clark Clifford as a special emissary. Were you involved in his visit?

FLANIGAN: Yes, I was involved in his visit. It was a fascinating experience in bilateral diplomacy to watch and see these things happen. Ambassador Macomber had a penchant for gathering groups around him to deal with issues. So any officer who was interested and willing to spend the time, could be involved. Since I lived about 100 yards from the residence, whenever he would invite people to come up and talk about so and so, I would go. I was involved in a lot of these things. As you know the Clifford mission was then followed by the Christopher mission. It was a continuation of that same effort which ultimately was unsuccessful I suppose, but it did improve the relationship and it did lead to a better understanding on the part of Turkey of what our concerns were and how we operated which was essential. They needed to know how to deal with us; they didn't really know at that point.

Q: I guess you were still in Ankara when President Carter decided to go to the Congress and ask for basically a lifting of the embargo restrictions or at least to put the relationship on a different basis than it had been since '74.

FLANIGAN: Yes I was. Once again, the Turks in response to that were pleased, but they were so displeased that it had ever been imposed that the extent of expression of pleasure was quite limited.

Q: They probably anticipated there would be some kind of conditions or understanding or something that would not be quite the same as before this episode began.

FLANIGAN: And they already knew that we were going to close some installations permanently, that we had decided after they had been closed for some time that bringing them back up to speed was not worth the effort.

Q: We could get along without some of them. Was Ecevit, he was not prime minister throughout the entire period you were there?

FLANIGAN: No, in fact when elections were held, I think it must have been '77, the government that emerged was a coalition government between the parties of two conservative parties, the Justice Party of Suleyman Demirel and the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan. No it was earlier than that. I'm not sure; I'd have to go back and look at the record but I recall that shortly after I arrived in Ankara in 1975, I went to a political rally and to listen to a speech given by Demirel, which meant that they were campaigning already, so elections must have been held in the fall of '75 only two years after the previous elections. In any event, these elections marked the emergence of an openly Muslim party, the National Salvation Party.

Q: Demirel is now in 1997 President and Erbakan is at least until last week, prime minister. Maybe there has even been a change today. There was a lot of terrorism some aimed at Americans in Turkey in the late 70's. Did that go on when you were in Ankara?

FLANIGAN: It had and it hadn't. We were concerned. There was a lot of terrorism that was sort of Turk against Turk. It was predominately right against left and left against right. We were sometimes accidental victims. There were occasions shortly after I left, a couple of incidents where the United States military were targeted specifically and people were killed. I recall I was back in Washington serving as desk officer for Turkey. While we were in Ankara we were concerned. I recall hardly a night would go by when we wouldn't hear an explosion somewhere.

Q: An explosion rather than a shot.

FLANIGAN: An explosion. That was very typical, car bombs or some kind of bombing. Normally not doing a lot of damage, but sometimes yes.

Q: What about the Kurdish dimension? Was that a subject while you were in Turkey?

FLANIGAN: No, it wasn't. The Kurds were still restrained in the expression of their Kurdishness. Everybody knew that there was a Kurdish community, and they knew there were Kurdish villages. I remember there was one just outside of Ankara that we would visit from time to time because it was distinctly different, the way the people dressed and I gather the way they spoke. I can't attest to that because they all spoke Turkish around me. There were Kurdish members of Parliament, quite active, but I suppose they were by all Kurdish national standards co-opted because they were acting as Turks. Kurdish nationalism per se was just beginning to develop and mainly in Germany among the workers, many of whom were Kurds. Subsequently it developed as a major issue in Turkey.

Q: How about there was certainly a period where Turkish diplomats were under threat from Armenian groups, one group in particular whose name I don't remember right now. Had that occurred while you were there?

FLANIGAN: It was at that time while I was in Izmir and while I was in Ankara. I can recall, in fact, one of the first things I can recall having arrived in Ankara was attending, going with the chargé to a funeral for the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican who had been assassinated. Of course, there had been incidents in Los Angeles where the one of the Turkish consuls or maybe two had been killed. I can't remember. The Turkish Foreign Service really felt under siege. Over the course of about five years they lost a substantial number of people. It colored their view of the world more than the relationship with Greece I think. My own experience is the Greeks were much more obsessed if that's the right word, with Turkey than the Turks were with Greece. It was an issue that many Turks were not even aware of and certainly if they were, it was not something they dealt with on a daily basis, whereas most Greeks did deal with what they called the Turkish threat on a daily basis. It was a constant issue. I think most Turks were amazed by the emergence of Armenian terrorism. They were largely ignorant of the massacres of Armenian that had occurred in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. And to the extent they knew about them they had no sense that they as Turks were responsible for what had happened. They were astounded to find they had these mortal enemies.

Q: The Turkish Republic was very secular and kind of dated back to the 1920's.

FLANIGAN: Not into the early 20's. The large forced movement of Armenians occurred earlier still, maybe 1907 to 1912. I can't remember precisely, but it was before the founding of the Turkish Republic.

Q: Whereas a lot of Greeks living in Anatolia left in the early 20's. What about Turkish relations in that period with other countries in the Middle East, Syria, Israel, Iraq, Iran?

FLANIGAN: When I was in Ankara, CENTO still existed. It died while I was there, but Turkey still had a fairly good relationship with Iran. It had a fairly good relationship with Israel. It is interesting how short our perspective is because I keep hearing on NPR and other places speak of this "new" phenomenon of Turkish-Israeli cooperation on the international stage, but in fact, in those days the Turkish, Iranian, and Israeli intelligence services exchanged information on a routine basis.

Q: The relationship with Syria and Iraq?

FLANIGAN: The relationship with Syria was always a difficult one because in the late '30s, Turkey had seized Alexandretta, a part of Syria. The relationship with Iraq was traditionally a good one. That still is by and large the feeling. Even though the relationship with Saddam Hussein is not good, I think that most Turks would think that the relationship with Iraq is not bad.

Q: How about with the Soviet Union in this period?

FLANIGAN: It was a difficult relationship. Turkey was of course, a member of NATO and an ally of the United States, and yet Turkey felt very vulnerable since it had a long common border with the Soviet Union. They tried to maintain a decent relationship. It was not easy balancing those roles.

Q: You mentioned that you visited Cyprus but not while you were in Izmir. Did you visit Cyprus from Ankara?

FLANIGAN: Yes I did. I went once. Of course, by then you had to go either through, as I did, Tel Aviv or through Athens. And since getting to Athens was more complicated than getting to Tel Aviv, I chose to go to Tel Aviv and spend the night there and fly on to Cyprus.

Q: And you had a chance to go to the Turkish side of Cyprus as well as the Greek side.

FLANIGAN: I was there only a couple of days, but I called on both communities and went to the north side as well.

Q: What else should we talk about in regard to this period? Again in Ankara it was '75-'78. I think we have pretty well covered the Turkish bilateral relationship and Turkish internal politics. When you left in '78, U.S. military activities in Turkey were still essentially suspended.

FLANIGAN: Yes, but we were on the verge of resuming activities. That did occur later; it was after I was back in Washington.

S. DOUGLAS MARTIN
Deputy Secretary General, Economic Affairs, CENTO
Ankara (1976-1978)

S. Douglas Martin was born in New York in 1926. During 1945-1945 he served overseas in the US Army, upon returning he received his bachelor's from St John's University in 1949 and later received his law degree from Columbia University in 1952. His career included positions in Germany, Washington D. C., Yugoslavia, Poland, Laos, Austria, Turkey, Nigeria, and Cameroon. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in January 1999.

Q: Today is the 12th of April of 1999. Doug, it's 1976; you're off to Ankara. You were in Ankara from when to when?

MARTIN: I was there from 1976 to 1978.

Q: What was your job?

MARTIN: I was the deputy secretary general for economic affairs in CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization.

Q: Let's talk about CENTO in '76. What was the status of CENTO, and then the importance, and what you were doing?

MARTIN: You can't talk about CENTO in '76 without going back to its establishment as part of the Baghdad Pact. In the mind of Secretary Dulles, the Baghdad Pact was going to be part of the ring around the Soviet Union for the security of the United States. But the Baghdad Pact presented problems in several ways. First, the Arab countries perceived it as a reestablishment of the old Turkish Empire, so they were suspicious of it. It died because before Iraq tried to join, there was a coup and the king of Iraq was assassinated.

Q: July 14, 1958.

MARTIN: So the participation of Arab countries in the Baghdad Pact never took place. Another factor was Israel. The United States understood that if we established an alliance with some Arab countries, then the Israelis would want something countervailing. They would want us to be in some sort of alliance with them. That wasn't going to work out. But there was a need for something in that area of the world, because on one end you had Turkey, which was a part of NATO, and at the other end was going to be Pakistan, which was a part, I believe, of SEATO. That was to be the connection from SEATO to CENTO to NATO, so you had a security ring of alliances around the Soviet Union.

Because of these various objections, we never actually were members of CENTO. However, through some complicated legal arrangement, that Secretary Dulles was able to work out, we were members of every committee of CENTO. We were members of the Economic Committee, and I was the deputy secretary general for economic affairs. We were members of the Military Committee, and the Military Committee was ruled by a council, which consisted of five three-star generals, and the military implementation of CENTO was under the leadership of an American major general. Both these jobs rotated between air force and army. My colleague was Major General Healy, who had been in charge of special forces in Vietnam, a wonderful person.

In a sense, CENTO almost died a-borning, and though it did survive, and many thought of it as moribund. By the time I got there, there had been a war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, being a member of CENTO, expected the other CENTO countries to come to their aid, but this wasn't going to happen and didn't happen. Instead we said, "Work that out among yourselves; work it out with the Indians." The Pakistanis were unhappy with CENTO from then on, and the

organization was tied up in a situation where they could not agree on the political guidance. The Pakistanis wanted to have an agreement on a policy that would require the other countries to come to Pakistan's aid. Even though we tilted against India, we did not come to their aid with troops or arms or any other supplies. And they were unhappy with that. So the political guidance couldn't be agreed on, and the alliance just kept going along.

I was one of the only people, and the military too who were engaged in something called "region building." We were trying to connect up the three countries: Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and then the U.S. and the British. We were trying to connect up their communications, transportation, and through any projects that would enable them to cooperate with each other.

For example, in the field of air transportation, we used to run an air traffic control program every year and send people from the three countries to London to the Air Traffic Control School. I went there myself. We had a conference on air traffic control and the problems of air traffic control in that area. We also did a lot of road building. There was transportation coming down from Europe through Turkey to Iran, because at that time there was a lot of economic activity between the US and Iran and Europe and Iran. The Turks were not interested in helping Iranian trade with Western Europe, so they just neglected the roads. As the roads got closer and closer to Iran, going through Turkey, they got worse and worse. We were doing some road building, trying to improve the road connections. We were trying to improve the ferry traffic connection across Lake Van. We also had a project to improve the communications microwave link across Turkey to Iran and Pakistan.

The military people had exercises every year. They'd have a small-infantry-unit cooperative exercise where the five countries would send units and compete with each other. There was a naval exercise every year. The Pakistanis had a submarine, and they would try to chase after some of the Iranian ships during this naval exercise, testing their anti-submarine capabilities and the abilities of the submarine to evade and attack.

We had a science program going, and that was headed by a British scientist who was in Teheran. We were funding a program in dental health, trying to study the effects of fluorine on people's teeth because for some strange reason, the highest concentration of fluoride in the world in water is found in the Aras River, right at the eastern end of Turkey, and the river runs into Iran. So we had some Turkish scientists and some Iranian scientists taking samples from the river and seeing what the effect was on the animals, the cows and cattle, that drank from river. It was being done by an American scientist from the University of Rochester Dental School. They were doing a double-blind study. The Turks didn't have the equipment, didn't have the funds, and the Iranians had everything. Yet the Turkish results seemed to be better and stood up better than the Iranian results.

Another important part of the job was conferences and meetings, in the three countries. I got a great chance to travel throughout the region and also to London, when the committees had their annual meetings. I got a chance to go to Shiraz. I traveled all around Iran. We had a meeting of the secretary general, a top meeting, in Iran one year, and we went to a state dinner given by the Shah of Iran, although he didn't appear at the state dinner; so we didn't actually meet him. We traveled down to Persepolis, which was where Iran the previous year had had a celebration of its

5,000th year. It was unbelievable to see this tent city that had been built, air conditioned tents, but also Persepolis is a marvelous place, celebrating the victory of the Persians 5,000 years ago. Darius defeated somebody.

I traveled throughout the region and also to London, but never got to the United States, because one year when the meeting was going to be held in the United States, it conflicted with a NATO meeting that was taking place.

I traveled all over Pakistan, and became quite familiar with the place. They were very interested in getting a \$500,000 microwave link from us. We wanted it to happen, but it never did. Turkey was a fascinating country for anybody who has even the slightest sense of history. It's where it all started. Everybody in Europe came across the steppes of Russia and either went north around the Black Sea or through Turkey. Yet people didn't know much about it because there's nothing about Turkey in the Bible. They talk about Asia Minor, and a lot happened there, not just the Christian religion but also earlier than that, the Hittites were in Turkey. The first library in the world is found in Turkey among the Hittites. They call it the earliest known formal library. Croesus, the Greeks, it all happened there. So it was a great country to be in and to visit.

Q: What were you getting from CENTO, what was the American military and other civilian impression of, one, the Soviet threat at that time ('76-78) and, two, the capabilities as far as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are concerned?

MARTIN: Traditionally this was always a key strategic area because the Russians always had their eye on the south and a warm-water port, going through Iran or through Turkey, and they had invaded. They had occupied part of Turkey, Kars, after World War I. After World War II there was Azerbaijan, where we almost went to war with the Russians before they pulled back. General Michael D. Healy when he gave a briefing, used to say, "We have so many Soviet divisions pinned down here, with our troops, the Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani armies." But somehow it didn't seem real to me that we were "pinning down" any Russian troops there, as I think their main focus was directed to the west, not to the south. Still, the Soviets, did not like CENTO at all. I remember once meeting a couple of Russians at a reception. Somebody said, "This is Mr. Martin from CENTO," and the Soviet guy went "Ugh! Ugh!" You know, showing disgust toward CENTO. We didn't have any conversation at all. They didn't like it and they were watching what we were doing.

The main thing at that time was that we had an embargo on resupply of weapons to the Turks, because they had invaded Cyprus.

Q: In 1974.

MARTIN: Yes, and there was tension between the Greeks and the Turks. That was the background of our relationship with Turkey at that time. The embargo at first didn't have much effect. It takes time. But by the time I got there in 1976, there was a feeling that maybe shortages of ammunition and spare parts were beginning to hurt the Turks. Still it didn't stop them. I had people from all of the nationalities represented in CENTO and it was my first close contact with

Muslims. I had Pakistani Muslims working for me on the clerical staff. I remember going by somebody's office one day, and he was up on his desk going through his morning prayers.

A big thing there was the *Hajj*. Every Muslim during his life, if he possibly can do it, even at some sacrifice, tries to make the *Hajj*. These clerical employees of CENTO were horribly low-paid people, but they all wanted to make the *Hajj*, and if they wanted to go, they could get leave and go. We tried to help them go, and they really appreciated that a lot. The more sophisticated of the Pakistanis - my deputy was a Pakistani - and his wife was quite religious, and she wanted to make the *Hajj*. So off they went. This fellow used to like to drink, and he got stopped at the border of Saudi Arabia because he had a case of scotch in the back of his car. He didn't want to give it up. He turned around and went back. He didn't make the *Hajj*. I think his wife continued on with a friend. But he liked to have a supply of scotch wherever he went.

Q: Was there the feeling in CENTO at that time that the Soviets were poised to invade?

MARTIN: There was never a feeling of crisis, never a feeling of tension. We went through our exercises. We had been doing it for years before I got there, and we continued. We would have continued after I left except this crisis with the political guidance eventually led to a stalemate among the political people. Then when the crisis came in Iran, CENTO didn't formally dissolve, but it just vanished. There was no more CENTO because Iran was gone. It didn't make any sense to keep it going, so my job there at the end, when we were getting smaller, was trying to get jobs for my people, get them jobs at the embassy or find someplace for them, so that was my main activity.

Q: You were there when the Shah left, were you?

MARTIN: No, that happened afterwards, but we were already reorganizing CENTO and were trying to find people jobs. For example, we used to give funds to CENTO as a whole, and then there was an American grant that was over and above our general grant to CENTO. I had an American employee. But the secretary general who succeeded the one who was there when I first arrived didn't like that, and neither did the Pakistani deputy secretary general, and so they said they would only accept the grant if they were in charge. We agreed. But once that happened, we were reorganizing, and we were cutting down on American employees there.

There was a lot of tension in Iran, and I remember speaking with one of my Turkish subordinates who had attended a briefing given to all Turkish diplomats. He was telling me that the difference from the way Turkey was then was Turkey had gone through its revolution when Kemal Atatürk came in. Atatürk stomped on the mullahs and got control over the mullahs so you couldn't have this fundamentalist Islamic point of view running a country. He said people laughed at Turks around the world because they wore fezzes. He said you could not wear a fez; it became illegal. You had to wear a cap, and the cap had a peak on it so that you couldn't bend down to the ground and have your forehead touch the ground in prayer. Basically, he secularized the country. By the time I got there, this hurt the Christian and other religions, but it hadn't killed Islam altogether, and Islam was coming back. From what I read in the newspapers, the fundamentalist Islamic party is pretty powerful and there's a real fight going on with the military.

So I would say, at that time, the main background to everything was the American embargo, which tainted our relationship with Turkey.

Q: Was this a subject that came up all the time with the Turks with you?

MARTIN: No, it never came up with me. It was an issue for the embassy. Where we were we had a very happy group. There was a secretary general that rotated -

Q: Who was the secretary general?

MARTIN: Halop Bailokan. He had been a minister in the Turkish Government, and later he was minister of defense, and he was an important ambassador. He was succeeded by Ambassador Gurun, who had been the ambassador to Greece at the time they broke relations with the Turks. He had at that time been on leave somewhere. They couldn't locate him. He was, I would say, a bit in eclipse at the time, but he was very smart, and the Turks were very interested in keeping CENTO going.

There were five of us at the deputy secretary general level. My British colleague was the counselor to the secretary general, and the administrator was Pakistani, the military man. I was the economic man. And the Turkish person was in charge of all files and things like that, all the documentation. That was mainly Turkish. There was an Iranian too. The Iranian was in charge of health programs. But everybody got along very well, and then within each section there were always five employees, from the five different nationalities. My deputy was a Pakistani, a very nice person. He was the fellow that couldn't make the *Hajj* because he couldn't give up his case of scotch.

One of the American there had done a study showing no one who went to CENTO ever got promoted. It was definitely low on the totem pole in Washington, and the reason for that was that Ankara was part of the European Bureau in Washington, but CENTO was part of the NEA Bureau. It just didn't get much attention back in Washington. That's just the way it was. When I left, the efficiency report had to be written by somebody in the embassy who was in the political-military section, a counselor for political-military affairs. He said I didn't know many Americans there, which was true - because my universe of people and contacts was in the international community -- but somehow he thought I should have been known as an embassy employee. But I enjoyed it very much, and can recommend working in any international organization to anybody in the Foreign Service.

Q: While you were there, did the problem of the Kurds come up in CENTO?

MARTIN: Yes. I mentioned this study of fluorine in the water. There were about five villages in eastern Turkey where we visited when we were doing the fluorine study of a river that flowed into Iran. Even though it had a high concentration to the point where it was killing some of the cattle - the sheep would drink this water and after a while they couldn't eat because their mouths became very sensitive and their gums receded from their teeth - the Turks didn't seem to care. They were combining these villages into one watershed, and the water was bad. It was true they were going to have more water, and it seemed all right when you drank it, but you couldn't drink

it for long. If you drank it for a couple of years, it would affect you very adversely. I remember when we went to this village, we went into a home of a family - it was just almost a hovel, little more than a tent - but what struck me was the ground was covered with these beautiful carpets. Somebody told me later they were Kurds. The Turks would never tell you you were in a Kurdish village, but the Kurds were there.

Q: At one point during the Kissinger period, we had been supporting the Kurds in Iraq, and then we cut them off. Did our support for the Kurds play any role at all?

MARTIN: Not that I knew of. The Turks would never mention the Kurds. They would never say "Kurds." Somebody said they call them "Mountain Turks." But I never heard them called Mountain Turks either.

There was an air station in Ankara. My kids went to school there; we used to go out to the chapel there and the PX. My kids used to ride horses out there. We owned a couple of horses, which everybody did. If you had teenage girls especially, you'd have horses. The horses were on the edge adjoining the Balgat Air Station. They called it an air station, although there were no planes there, because it was headed by a colonel in the air force. On this adjoining area where the horses were, all the people working there were Kurds. It was a village, and they were all Kurds.

ALPHONSE F. LA PORTA
Political-Military Officer
Ankara (1976-1978)

Ambassador La Porta was born and raised in New York and educated at Georgetown and New York Universities. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965. During his career the ambassador had several assignments in Washington in the personnel and administrative field. His foreign assignments include Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, New Zealand, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and Naples, Italy. In 1997 he was named Ambassador to Mongolia, where he served until 2000. Ambassador La Porta was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: When you got there in the summer of '76, what was the situation in Turkey, sort of domestically and then vis-à-vis the United States?

LA PORTA: In '76 it was a relatively settled period. Suleyman Demirel was Prime Minister. He was later a little less than a year later replaced by Bulent Ecevit. You had a relatively stable period in Turkish politics where you had the two ruling parties, the Justice Party and the Social Democrat Party who were relatively equal in strength. The jokers in the pile were terrorist elements or the extreme leftist parties who were outside the legitimate political realm. You had the Motherland Party, which was a Nazi party of the extreme right, and you had the National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan who later became prime minister representing the Muslim interests.

Basically the political field was dominated by the two mainstream parties and if they couldn't do it individually they always found some way to along bring allies with them. The challenge to Turkey at that time was whether Turkey was going to modernize or improve its competitive position sufficiently in order to break the stranglehold of the old statist system, mainly huge publicly owned companies and inefficient banks. But the statist system in Turkey, which kind of was a product of World War II and socialism in the 1950s, left an economic system that, while it functioned on a certain level in order to keep daily livelihood turning over, it was not creating any wealth and was not investing in needed areas such as more modern education and the infrastructure including the power system. By mid-1977, a year after I had arrived in Turkey, incredible economic strains and hardships begin to emerge and that led to the economic collapse of 1979-1980, then the reintervention of the military into Turkish politics. I guess it is a somewhat bizarre footnote of history to come back to looking at Turkish affairs in close quarters when I was stationed in Naples during the preceding couple of years to find that the same old forces were still there. Demirel was president and Ecevit was still running his party until he was forced to retire for medical reasons. These guys had incredible staying power.

Q: Just like Cyprus.

LA PORTA: That was a point I was going to mention next. Rauf Denktash is now building his own dynasty with his son in Northern Cyprus, the so-called Turkish Federation of Northern Cyprus. The Cyprus issue was the single biggest overhang in not only the U.S. relationship, but in Turkey's relationship with the outside world. Like so many disputes that are territorial and ethno-religious in nature, they're never completely enough understood in terms of the ebb and flow of international politics. Basically neither the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus nor the Turkish regime in the north has covered itself with any glory through the long span of years.

Consequently you have groups of people behaving badly whether they're in Athens, Nicosia or in Northern Cyprus or wherever. You have gotten locked into a kind of a Pavlovian situation where you have a challenge and response. If X happens, then there has to be a Y response. If A happens, there has to be a B response because everybody's locked into a situation in which there's little or no movement. When I went to Turkey, fortunately the political section had to deal with the Cyprus problem, not the political-military section.

Q: So, you were in a POL/MIL section? Could you give us a brief description of the Embassy when you arrived. The main people in your reporting chain?

LA PORTA: The Ambassador was William Butts Macomber, a former Under Secretary for Management who, despite his one contribution of publishing and promoting Diplomacy for the 80's, was a notoriously difficult person. The DCM during my first year was Donald Bergus, a Middle East-Africanist who was not well regarded and was scorned by Macomber; the second DCM was Bob Dillon, of Kuala Lumpur fame, by then a good friend. At the end of my tour Ron Spiers, later Under Secretary for Management in the mid-80's, replaced Macomber to everyone's relief. The Spiers-Dillon team was superb – two enormously talented, honest, reasonable and personable officers – the finest of the Foreign Service.

I was a POL/MIL officer. We had three officers and one secretary at the time in the pol-mil section. Our political military counselor was Albert Francis. The first officer who served with me was John Yates; he was later replaced by Richard A. Smith, Ras Smith. My portfolio was NATO and the other portfolio was basing arrangements. We were negotiating perpetually negotiating, eternally negotiating new base agreements with the Turks. So, my colleague, at first John Yates and then Ras Smith, were really bogged down in all of the minutiae of that, whereas I did the more fun stuff I think in terms of doing NATO relations and security assistance.

Q: You were doing this from when to when?

LA PORTA: From the summer of 1976 to the summer of 1978. It was a two year tour.

Q: How did the Turks look at NATO because a little before this I was in Athens for four years and no matter who was in power, the Greeks essentially looked at NATO as a way of getting stuff so they could stick it to the Turks. I was wondering how the Turks looked at NATO.

LA PORTA: I think the Turks, basically then as now, look at NATO as part of their defenses against Greek interests or encroachments or whatever and again, whether you're talking about air patrolling over the Aegean or any number of other kind of intra-alliance issues. You're locked into this very unfulfilling dynamic of challenge and response; no matter who is the challenger, there is always the predictable response from the other side.

Q: Well, we're still talking about a time when one, there was a Soviet Union and two, the Soviet Union militarily was very powerful. What was sort of the feeling about the Soviet menace on the military side?

LA PORTA: There is no question that the feeling in NATO, as well as in Washington and in Turkey itself, that NATO was the first line of defense against the Soviet Union. There was a qualitative difference because in 1974 the United States basically gave up the nuclear option. In other words, nuclear weapons were pulled out of Turkey and the Titan missiles and the other weapon systems that we had as a deterrent were gone. Consequently there was a qualitative difference in the way the Soviet threat was being viewed.

The Turks did not like our arbitrary removal of the nuclear weapons because they considered those systems as being essential to their defense. When we gave these up in terms of the Salt I agreement, I believe, they viewed this unilateral decision by the United States as leaving them vulnerable to intimidation by the Soviet Union. The reality was in fact quite different because Russian encroachments against Eastern Turkey, or even in the Bosphorus, did not increase. Russian ground military activity and naval activity in the Bosphorus did not increase. There was no significant rise in air encroachments or other kinds of incidents. This situation during the period I was there was very stable insofar as dealing with the Russians was concerned. Likewise the Caucasus was pretty quiet at that time. The kind of internal rebellions and dissidence that we see today was not in evidence significantly, although there were Turkish and Turkic minorities and the Armenians, Georgians and others certainly have had a long history of low level nationalism. From the alliance standpoint and certainly Washington's standpoint, we considered as being of equal importance Turkey's being on the front line against bad behavior in the South

and East against vis-à-vis Syria, Iraq and later of course in 1978, when the real turmoil started in Iran, against extremism of the Ayatollah's regime. In Washington's view, the traditional NATO interest shifted away from the Soviet "menace" toward the containment of other forces that were considered to be undesirable.

Q: How did our military view Turkey on either the Bulgarian front or the Caucasian front as standing up to the Soviets if something were to happen?

LA PORTA: During that period and I think it's probably true from certainly the Salt I on, much, much less attention was paid to the Trans-Caucasus and European Turkey. My family and I drove from Ankara through Turkish, Greek and Bulgarian Thrace to Athens; and we also took the other route through Southern Turkey and then cross the Dardanelles from Gallipoli. The region was very benign, lots of trucks, lots of civilian activity, but certainly no hostility. There was one rather fun incident as we were driving from Canakkale, which is a ferry terminus, we drove pretty much of a full day into Kavala in Northern Greece which is in the Thessaloniki consular district. Kavala is a lovely seaport and there was and I think may still be USIA radio station sitting up on top of a mountain, which is the only thing Kavala was noted for except for its very attractive harbor. We drove into town and we finally found our hotel. It was down in the port area and we parked our car, with its Turkish license plates, out in front. The hotel manager said, "I noticed you have Turkish plates on your car, do you come from Turkey?" I said, Yes we do." He said, "Is that your car? Has it ever been stolen?" I said, "Why do you ask?" He said, "Well everybody knows Turks are thieves." I assured him that that was not the case, but on the very basic level Greek perceptions of the Turks were not exactly charitable. On the other hand, I found it remarkably open and free from anti-Turkish hostility. I would dare say that some of our colleagues in the embassy in Athens, who had either served in Turkey or on the Turkish desk in Washington, were dealt with a lot less charitably than we were in Ankara. I remember one colleague saying that even the ambassador to Greece at that time, Monty Stearns, wouldn't allow him to attend staff meetings. He was a Turkish language officer as well as a Greek language officer, said he was regarded a Turkish "spy".

Q: It really passes understanding. In my experience in Athens was that you couldn't overestimate the reactions of the normal Greeks to anything where they thought that the Turks were doing something to them.

LA PORTA: Absolutely.

Q: I've heard it's not quite the other way around. The Turks have got other problems in a way.

LA PORTA: I think that's exactly right. The other problems of the Turks, and certainly as time has gone on, concern the rise of Islamic fundamentalists and the big influx of ethnic Kurds. There are also a lot of concerns over education, the secular nature of government, encroaching ethnicity and so forth. The Turks have at least 50% had their mind on a lot of other issues than just simply going toe-to-toe with the Greeks. Probably in the Greek mind it was 80% preoccupation with going toe-to-toe with the Turks.

I visited Cyprus with my family. I was able to get a pass to go across the Green Line to visit our

embassy in Nicosia. I was interested from the POL/MIL standpoint just in terms of what the Turks really did have in Northern Cyprus and it was far from a grizzling military camp. There were mostly under trained territorial soldiers with second class weapons. These were not the crack troops the Turks had out on the Eastern border. They certainly had no greater level of armament other than they would probably need for defending themselves. There were no panzer divisions pointed at Greek Cyprus, although certainly they did have the air power on their side and had they wanted to do something by sea they had a capability of doing it. But Turkish Cyprus was by no means an armed camp. In fact it was remarkably open although because the small population, most of the towns and even the resorts along the coast were vastly underpopulated. You didn't see too many people on the streets. The smaller restaurants had people in them, but they were by no means crowded. By the middle of 1977, there was no significant tourist traffic.

On the other hand, we were able to appreciate some of the true Christian and Muslim historical treasures there. The mosaics, the churches, and the monasteries. The Turks were, with a few exceptions, very scrupulous in keeping the Christian sites in good shape. There's a lot of archeology that's gone in Cyprus, both Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus, by foreigners. There's been I think a good record of not only protecting what is there in terms of cultural and archeological significance, but a lot of that has expanded in terms of new research.

Q: Well, tell me what was your reading on how from your NATO colleagues about how the Turkish military fit into NATO at that time.

LA PORTA: The Turkish armed forces then and now I think have had the well deserved reputation for being one of the best trained if not well equipped forces around. Then as now, we look at the Turkish soldier as being well motivated, underpaid, but having skill and trainability. The Turkish armed forces historically, even from Ataturk's time, were probably far too large in proportion to the national need. That said, they were valued in the NATO context for being able to surge divisions against the hypothetical Soviet threat. We're always eager for them to play a role in NATO exercises. Capabilities-wise it was evident at that time that the Turkish armed forces were desperately in need of military modernization and equipment. Beginning in the late '70s a number of co-production agreements emerged with NATO and with individual weapons manufacturers, many of them aided and abetted by the United States to establish production facilities in Turkey, to produce ammunition of NATO standard and to produce light weapons. NATO also changed its personal weapons standards at that time, so the Turks now produce extremely good equipment.

They also needed a big overhaul of their communications and command and control systems. This was a fairly large NATO and U.S. concern during that period. We had the NATO headquarters in Izmir; the remnant of that headquarters is still there. In fact under the Transformation plans of both the United States and NATO, the allied air force command is being restored to Izmir, so it's *deja vu* all over again.

In Turkey there are two NATO air command elements, air commands. There is an air traffic control center and then there's the NATO forward command presence for aerial defense. In the mid '70s there were nodules of American forces stationed all over the country. We hadn't even

drawn down completely our army elements, for example, that were responsible for operating the missile facilities. They were being closed out but fairly slowly. We also had the infamous “listening posts” along the Black Sea run by the National Security Agency. We had Detachment 120, the headquarters of the National Security Agency operation in Ankara. We had the big U.S. air bases at Incirlik and Erzurum still in operation at that point. It was a very dominant, evident and obvious presence there. In contrast, the Turks focused on “garden variety” missions where you needed large numbers of troops to secure a territory, to establish law and order, or to conduct pacification operations. Where the Turks are less capable is in special operations. There is an insufficiency of light reconnaissance units. They’re not a light army. They move very heavily. Today Turkey has committed one army division to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Force. I think the big question is how to move the division because it is a large force and it is not very well equipped to move, lacking a lot of the transportable infrastructure.

Q: What about...did you get any feel for the workings within NATO headquarters in Brussels about your POLAD counterparts, how the Turks were operating then?

LA PORTA: We did. I think first of all it was a matter of almost daily engagement with the foreign ministry and to a lesser extent the Turkish general staff on NATO issues. They were very active. My opinion at the time was that they had probably the best single group of diplomats of any country in Brussels. They worked a very tight regime between Brussels and Ankara and the people doing NATO affairs and political affairs on the upper levels in the foreign ministry were absolutely first rate. These were first class people, extremely well trained, well educated, superb linguists, didn’t miss a thing and it was very clear that the Turks invested in the NATO relationship almost like no other country did in terms of the number and the quality of the people they had doing it. We had a very good, though not necessarily easy, working relationship with the Turks. We prosecuted the alliance issues, whatever they were, very actively with the foreign ministry.

Q: The Greek attempted coup in Cyprus took place in July I think 14th, 1974.

LA PORTA: Right.

Q: So, you were not that much farther away and responding in a completely bipartisan way when the Greek lobby in congress really did a number on the Turks. How stood the situation on that issue at that time?

LA PORTA: Well, the embargo on Turkey was still in force to a great extent except for those things that we could justify in terms of alliance requirements. So, we had some latitude there and there were some loopholes. There was no question whenever sanctions are applied, whether it’s Turkey or virtually any other country, there is bound to be enormous political grief. We spent a lot of time, and certainly the ambassador did, in terms of explaining why these sanctions were imposed. We worked very hard with Turkish organizations and people here in the United States to try to get some understanding of the situation both in the administration and on the Hill. There was also, I think, a profound inclination of the Carter administration not to do very much about the relationship with Turkey. And it was a constant matter of top-level concern, as Ambassadors are probably more important than they are today of pushing the Hill to get changes. Both

Macomber and Spiers were energetic, but probably Spiers was more skillful in prosecuting Turkey's case with the Congress.

Q: When you're trying to explain is really two explanations. One's the real explanation and the other is how politically important the Greek votes are in the United States. The Greek community in the United States is well organized and there ain't no Turkish organization in the United States and that's the real reason. I assume we had another reason, I'm not quite sure.

LA PORTA: Armenian genocide.

Q: Oh, yes, Armenian genocide.

LA PORTA: There were several layers to the problem as there always are. One of them was to prevent damage being done in the programs of the World Bank and the IMF and what Turkey was having to address in terms of financial adjustments (and not very successfully doing that). At the same time, we did have a couple of organizations that were maybe not significant as they are today, but by the late '80s the American Turkish Association and a few other organizations began to be quite powerful. A subsequent U.S. ambassador, Strausz-Hupe, a political appointee, used those organizations quite successfully in kind of mobilizing them to press the case in Washington at the political level. The thing that has always saved Turkey was the importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the NATO interests in containing the Soviet Union and generally containing other influences from the South and East. That bunch of bad actors was very important. We also had Israel and Palestine in the '70s, our concern over the Suez Canal, upheavals in Egypt, and other things in that area. Turkey, we considered, was always a nice "air craft carrier." If you look at Turkey, its footprint is like a large extremity extending itself into the heart of the Middle East. Thus it was a solid platform for not only the United States, but Western interests in general. Even then, though, a lot of the suspicions and anti-Turkish sentiment in the EU and from liberal elements in Europe was beginning to come out.

Q: Was there an anti-Muslim strain to that do you think?

LA PORTA: Absolutely. It is racial. It is religious. Depending upon the country, I think there is very little tolerance of that kind of diversity. For example, the French are simply viscerally anti-Muslim, anti-Turkish. It's just something that they simply don't want to deal with.

Q: Did you sense this is in the NATO context? France was not, sort of in NATO, but not in NATO. I mean, were you picking up these strains as you worked with the NATO relationship?

LA PORTA: I think they were certainly underlying, but they certainly weren't things that were being acted out over the table, unlike the current situation where they are now. Even at that point the EEC was making demands on Turkey in terms of human rights behavior, the role of its armed forces and so forth. In the intervening period all of that has really snowballed.

Q: What about relations of those two other almost hostile powers. The American Embassy in Athens and the American Embassy in Nicosia. Did you pick up, I mean, were we all on a team or not?

LA PORTA: We were certainly not. There was no question that the American Embassy in Nicosia was just seen as the tool of the Greeks and we assessed its importance accordingly. In other words you knew that their behavior would be predictable. The embassy in Athens was a little bit more complex. As I indicated earlier there was very strong clientitis in Athens. We had a couple of ambassadors and members of the country team who certainly I thought were excessive in their partisanship for the Greek side, right or wrong or indifferent. One of my friends at that time was serving in Thessaloniki when the consul general was John Negroponte. John Negroponte's ancestors came from Corfu. I daresay he's probably the only American diplomat of Corfu origin ever. John was in Greek language training while I was in Turkish language training and we got to know each other quite well. On one of our trips we visited him in Thessaloniki. I think John had a bit different view than his own embassy in Athens because he was halfway to Turkey. From Thessaloniki you looked at the complexities of the region, relations with Turkey and others with more of a dispassionate eye.

Q: How stood the relationship with Syria and Israel in those days?

LA PORTA: Syria always has been a complicating factor, usually negative, for Turkey having been an Ottoman dependency. There weren't any Syrians who had any love for any Turk. On the other hand the Turks had several significant interests that were vis-à-vis Syria. One was to keep the door open on the oil pipeline that ran through Syria near to the Turkish border. Although it was a narrow gauge pipeline it was nevertheless very important for petroleum supply in Southern and Eastern Turkey. The second thing the Turks wanted to have what they considered orderly commercial relations with Syria. Syria was not important in the modern economic sense, but it was important for cross-border trading and the markets in Aleppo supplied a lot of goods into Southern and Eastern Turkey. Indeed the U.S. military had a port handling unit down very close to the Turkish border. Basically they'd expedite goods coming North into Incirlik air base by truck. The third Turkish interest was to keep Syria as politically friendly as possible because they did not want a hostile or extremist regime on their borders. But let me make it clear they had no love for the Baathist regime of Assad Hussein at all.

Q: This was Assad and...?

LA PORTA: Assad and his military gang. Relations on the top government level were very chilly. There were no Turks going to Damascus to kiss Assad on the cheek and no big Syrians came into Turkey to kiss any Turk on the cheek. That was out of bounds. The old colonial relationships didn't allow for that. The Turks had a very pragmatic outlook toward Syria pretty much as they do today. In other words, they don't like Syria. They have to deal with them. They need Syria for certain economic purposes; they don't want to pick fights for stability reasons. We were aware that Turkish intelligence in the Turkish general staff were talking to the Mossad.

Q: The Israeli Secret Service?

LA PORTA: The Israeli Secret Service and I will have to say that officially everybody says uh huh, okay, that's nice, but as long as it doesn't get out of hand or result in disruptions either to our relationship with Israel or doesn't result in kind of inflaming Turkish relations with the Arab

world, keep it at kind of a manageable level. I do not know, nor do I have any reason to suspect, that the United States or any of our agencies aided or abetted that relationship. It was known in certain circles at that time and it was something that nobody objected to and everybody hoped would be kept in a manageable proportion. In the mid '80s the Turks signed a defense agreement with Israel and the relationship has grown. They now conduct bilateral exercises together.

Q: How about the Iran-Iraq relationship at your time?

LA PORTA: Probably Iraq was more easily disposed of in Turkish views by being ignored. Again it's one of these Baghdad-Istanbul problems; no Iraqi had any use for any Turk and vice versa. Baghdad is the caliphate that challenged Istanbul; the Ottoman supremacy was not well regarded in Iraq or Iran. More important was Iran because Iran and Turkey were joined in CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization.

Q: I had thought that had demised after 1956.

LA PORTA: No. CENTO was alive. It did not demise until the end of the Shah's reign.

Q: 1958 I mean.

LA PORTA: The Shah's reign, the Shah was overthrown. We had a ministerial meeting of CENTO in Tehran in the spring of 1978. I went because CENTO was part of my little pol-mil bag, so I backstopped the ambassador and U.S. delegation. I was the Turkish expert in the party. On the official level, Turkish-Iranian relations were very correct although the underlying sentiment was of Persian-Ottoman competition. Like the relationship with Baghdad, and the relationship with Egypt, was very largely conditioned by the events and history of the Ottoman Empire. The Persians of course always paraded themselves as saying they were never subjected to Ottoman domination. Well, that's only partly true. It depended on which dynasty you were talking about and which piece of territory you were talking about. There was an ebb and flow in Ottoman control over parts of Iran and it depended largely on who was up and who was down on the Persian side. The Turks generally regarded the Shah of Iran as kind of an upstart, a big ego, and they snickered and questioned his legitimacy as Shah which, after all, was probably a fair question.

Q: He only went back one generation. His father was a Cossack essentially.

LA PORTA: The interesting part of it of course is that a lot of the most brilliant art in Istanbul in the Topkapi Museum for example is Persian, it's not Turkic or Ottoman in the later period.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the Turkish military judged the Iranian military?

LA PORTA: On the military-to-military level things were not bad because I think that they all behaved quite respectfully in the terms of a context of an alliance relationship. Iran had a friendly relationship with NATO as a non-NATO member, but friendly NATO state. That's the same way in which they were regarded in Washington; of course we had very large assistance programs. A lot of that assistance came through or from U.S. forces in Turkey. There were lively

goings-on back and forth, and the Turks and the Iranians played reasonably well in CENTO. Now CENTO didn't ever involve a lot of ground forces or combined military operations. What CENTO did reasonably well were air control, air surveillance and air patrolling. Watching the borders with the Soviet Union, over flying Iraq and other places that you wanted to keep an eye on, the Turkish-Iranian relationship during the Shah's time worked reasonably well. The CENTO secretariat was resident in Ankara at that time. The military head of CENTO was a U.S. Air Force general and the other CENTO nations seconded officers to that secretariat and usually one diplomat. It was a mini-alliance working in downtown Ankara, part of my job in the embassy was to be the CENTO liaison officer.

Q: While you were there what about the Kurdish problem?

LA PORTA: Kurds were becoming a problem, but then as now Kurdish migration was set in the larger context of either political-religious activism or extreme leftist terrorism. The conservatively religious Kurds were always fair game for recruitment into the National Salvation Party with its thuggish youth wing. You also had the extreme left and labor unions that were predominant in Istanbul, but recruited Kurdish activists who joined with underground Turkish Kurdish nationalists, incorporating them into terrorist activities against the government. Even today this low-level violence is perpetrated by the Turkish extreme left with a lot of Kurdish activism and participation.

We had serious security problems not only in Ankara but in other places. In an incident involving an American military school bus, our kids were ambushed and shot at. Thank goodness nobody was killed. We had incidents against our smaller bases around Istanbul as well as against our consulate there. There were also intermittent anti-U.S. demonstrations against our embassy in Ankara. It was basically low level activity but very troubling. We gave our families protective training to hit the deck if they heard a loud noise and to look out for suspicious packages. This was in the mid '70s. As I recounted to you earlier I came fairly fresh from the seizure of our embassy in Kuala Lumpur, so on a personal level we were very much sensitized to dangers like this.

Q: What about the students, the university students? Were they a factor at all?

LA PORTA: Mostly no, but some yes. The mainline universities were pretty well controlled. The Turkish Secret Service and police had infiltrated virtually any student organization in the major state universities, and by and large the student populations were fairly docile. They became very active later in protesting the military takeover by General Kenan Evren in 1980.

Q: That was after you'd left?

LA PORTA: After we had left. The students were mobilized against that military takeover. We had friends in the universities and we still have friends teaching in a couple of the larger universities in Ankara. By and large the student population was pretty inert; there was generally not a great or unanimous inclination toward activism. Where it was difficult was in some of the polytechnics and Islamic schools. These were what I would call the outliers of the state education system. The populations in those schools were less middle class and more working

class, more susceptible to infiltration by extreme leftists or extreme rightists, and less sophisticated in their political viewpoints. That's where the extreme organizations of the right and the left found their great gain. So you had the fascists recruiting in these polytechnics and trade schools and so forth.

Q: By the time you left Turkey, what did you see or was this a country that was coming along or had almost possible problems or you know, I mean, entering the world?

LA PORTA: Well, it was certainly looking that way. I jokingly measured the situation by whether we were having more positive days or more negative days. We used to joke among ourselves, well, is this a positive day or is this a negative day? By the time that we left in late summer of 1978 that we were certainly having more negative days than we were having positive ones for a number of reasons. First of all the economy was deteriorating badly. There were shortages of petrol, shortages of cooking gas. We in the embassy had to go and stand on long queues in order to get gasoline. My wife had to line up to get bottles of cooking gas. The embassy didn't provide those things. The military provided it for their folks, but not to us. We also saw a rising number of incidents of low-level violence such as threats against people in the embassy. Our PAO (Public Affairs Officer) was threatened by name at that time. If I remember correctly there were threats against the ambassador. There was vastly increased security at our logistical support base run by the air force in Ankara. We had a bombing at a little branch PX, a little convenience store located at the military transient apartments not far from our apartment.

Ankara was a not bad place to live except for the smog caused by burning soft brown coal for heating in the winter. There were all conveniences, shopping, good restaurants, the opera, symphony, etc. But the main problem was environmental. The big downside of serving in the embassy, however, was the low level of logistical support especially as compared to the military. Our housing allowances were too low and we were out of pocket several hundred dollars a month for rent alone, not to mention utilities and other living expenses. State was very niggardly with allowances and benefits for those of us in Ankara.

There was a great deal of unsettlement in Turkey at the time and it was not a situation where we felt we wanted to stay. I personally I was asked to stay. It was very late in the assignment game and Ambassador Ron Spiers asked me to replace a colleague in the political section. My colleague in the political section wasn't sure whether he wanted to stay another year or not and I said, look, if you can't make up your mind, I'm out of here. My wife and I decided at that point that, with two small children, the low level of our embassy services and going out of pocket on housing were not worth it. We saw the economy going down, we said, well, do we really want to continue on?

In the upshot what happened is that, as often happens in our business, I got a phone call in the middle of the night from a colleague in Washington in the East Asia bureau who asked would I like to break my assignment to Australia. I was destined to go to Canberra as political military officer and would I consider breaking my assignment to Canberra and going to Medan in Sumatra as principal officer. We had one question and we said, what is the school situation, but we said, yes, we will go to Sumatra. It was no contest.

The point remains, and I guess in a summary fashion, I will have to say that both my wife and I valued all of our time in Turkey. We certainly had wonderful Turkish relationships and a good professional working environment. As I indicated earlier, they were some of the best people in the world. We had excellent relationships and I certainly had high regard for everything we and the Turks were trying to do together. Tough people, hard negotiators, but that's fair.

I always used to say, there wasn't a Turk that we didn't like except for our landlord. That's probably true. We were always treated well. We traveled widely in Turkey on a personal basis. We'd just get in our car and go. As I mentioned earlier we went to Greece and we were always well treated. You could see the country going downhill; a year from the time we left there were severe shortages of coal to the point that during the winter of '79 and '80, apartment houses didn't have any coal to put in their boilers to heat their apartments. There was no cooking gas that you could buy, no gasoline either. It was scarce when we were there, but over a year later there was none available. Severe shortages of basic commodities and the commercial economy started to stop functioning. Severe dislocations in the transportation system, stoppages of trains and other consequences largely due to the failure of the Turkish economy to modernize and also, inflated budgets, government rip offs by state corporations, parastatals supporting uneconomic systems, a profligate banking system and all the things that the IMF loves to hate. All of those ills were accumulating.

On the other hand, we do retain enormous regard for our Turkish relationships. We were fortunate to be able to go back to Turkey a couple of times in my last job in NATO. Today the Turks deserve an awful lot of respect for the way they're trying to fashion their own democracy in dealing with problems of religious extremism and migration, the Kurdish problem, the lack of assimilation and other issues.

Q: I wonder if you'd mention your personal experiences with the temper of William Macomber, ambassador. I have some stories and I was wondering whether you have some.

LA PORTA: I guess they can be summed up in a couple of ways. Number one, of course, he was a person that was so mercurial, whenever anybody was called into the office they would come out quaking totally from the first class reaming out or the second class reaming out. How bad was that thing? I will have to say that his DCM during the initial part of my time there Don Bergus didn't help terribly much in being a cushion between Macomber and everybody else. Macomber was an equal opportunity abuser. On the professional level he was he could have his good moments. He was very funny and I remember one time we were having a difficult NATO issue. I was the action officer and we had to go early in the evening to see the foreign minister who was a wonderful man. Caglayangil was his name and Macomber used to call him Charlie. He'd come into the room and say, "Hey, Charlie how are you?" Poor old Caglayangil didn't have a clue as to what Macomber was talking about.

We were in the car driving to the foreign ministry sitting beside him. I had a modest size pad, not a big steno pad. I hated to have large pads of paper when I'm in a meeting. He said, "You have paper there? Do you have a spare pen so you can take notes?" I assured him that I was well equipped for the meeting that he was going to have. I'd been through this innumerable times, but he again went through his drill on how he wanted the note taking to proceed. Then we got to the

meeting and after it was concluded, we were in the car going back to the embassy and he said, "You're going to write the message. We'll give this to Washington tonight and we'll get it out, but I noticed you weren't taking very many notes." I said, "I can assure you, Mr. Ambassador, I can faithfully record everything that transpired." He said, "But how can you do that? You didn't take very many notes." Being blessed with pretty good recall, I'd take enough notes, everybody takes notes in their own way, but he just wouldn't let it go.

Macomber liked dogs more than he did children and he used to collect all the stray dogs and he had them living with him. They were either in the embassy compound or at the residence. He had three legged dogs and two legged dogs, all kinds of strays. Because they knew he was a sucker for animals, people would drop off stray animals at the gate and say give this to the ambassador. On the other hand he and his wife Phyllis were very generous in personal ways. He did things that are classically good. For example, he made sure that junior officers, secretaries and admin people were invited to the residence. He always had places at the dinner table for other people other than the top ranks. Phyllis was charming. She was lovely and, having been a former Foreign Service Secretary herself, she knew how to treat people. They invited people with children to bring their kids to the house to play, usually on the afternoons and on weekends when they weren't having functions because they knew that there weren't many playgrounds in Ankara. A lot of people who were in apartments didn't have safe places for the kids to run, ride bikes or play in a sandbox. We were over there a lot. We could walk to his residence from our apartment.

He was also very generous, very democratic, in the small "d" sense in allowing people to use the embassy apartment in Istanbul. A beautiful apartment overlooking the Bosphorus, not lavish, but, what a view, and with a veranda that was absolutely superb. Many times my wife and I took the kids and we got on the night train, went down to Istanbul, spend a long weekend, stayed in the apartment and then come back to Ankara. The Macomers were very generous in that way. It was just his work habits. No one could leave the embassy until he did. I mean because he would always be looking for the political section or my section or the Econ section, so you were always stuck. The other negative is, having been a former Undersecretary for Management, he didn't give a fig for the management of the embassy. It was amazing. So much for diplomacy of the '80s.

RONALD D. GODARD
Political Officer
Istanbul (1976-1979)

Ambassador Ronal Godard was born in Oklahoma and raised in Oklahoma and Texas. He was educated at Odessa College and the University of Texas. After a tour with the Peace Corps in Ecuador, he joined the State Department in 1967 and was posted to Panama, the first of his assignments in Central and South America. These include Costa Rica, Chile, Nicaragua, Argentina and Guyana, where he served as Ambassador from 2000 to 2003. His Washington assignments also concerned Latin American Affairs. During his career the Ambassador served

with the Organization of American States, was diplomat in residence at the University of Illinois in Chicago and was Political Officer in Istanbul. Ambassador Godard was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: You went to Istanbul, you were there from what, '76?

GODARD: I was there from '76 to '79, three years.

Q: What was your job in Istanbul?

GODARD: I was the political officer in Istanbul. It was a fascinating job. I was also the human rights officer. There were a number of minority groups in Istanbul that we were particularly interested in. The Greeks and the Jewish community, and the Armenian community there, all of which had important, huge domestic American constituencies. So there was quite a market for reporting on their status and quite a need for me to be in frequent contact with them. So I got to know those communities pretty well. Had a visit during that time from Allard Lowenstein, remember he was a UN Commissioner.

Q: He was sort of a political firebrand.

GODARD: He came out to Istanbul and wanted to go see the Grand Rabbino, the grand rabbi in the Jewish community here. Took him out to see them. His lime green suit jacket he wore to see the Grand Rabbino. Pretty cool guy. And then I also did the blood and guts airgrams that we were doing in those days. It was a sad time in Turkish history where there was right wing and left wing violence that you couldn't believe, terrorist actions. They were killing each other, the right and the left, and taking over universities, assassinating people in the streets. They turned against us as well. We were losing some people who were shot, NATO personnel in Turkey. It was something like 15 people a week were being killed in Turkey.

Q: This is tape three side one of Ron Godard. You were saying?

GODARD: Well I was also the labor officer and this number was the headquarters of DISC which was sort of the leftist labor confederation there. I stayed in touch with them, and as many political leaders as I could in Istanbul, building on what I'd learned in Managua. Tough to do with the language, but that got a little better with time. The fun thing in Turkey was going out to these different provinces and visiting with local political leaders and the local governors and so forth. I'd try to find out what was going on outside of Istanbul. My great coup while I was there was anticipating the call for elections in Turkish politics where it just, from my vantage point in Istanbul, it looked like the governing party was moving closer and closer to calling elections. I heard that all the time and just from what I was seeing, that's what I predicted. The embassy wasn't quite ready for that message and I was sort of pulled up short a little bit for getting out of step with reporting. But I was right. And Prime Minister Demirel did call early elections and of course he lost them and that's when they had a change in government. Bulent Ecevit became the prime minister again.

Q: What did the Istanbul cover, Thrace and what else?

GODARD: All of Thrace. Izmir had a consul general of its own, but there were several provinces on the Asian side going back toward Ankara as well.

Q: Your consular district, Thrace and the other parts, did they have a different political thrust or status basically than in other parts of Turkey?

GODARD: Well, this was a period when there was, as it is now, concern about the fundamentalist Muslim parties coming to power and becoming much more influential. That was part of my job, reaching out to those groups, trying to establish some contact. Very tough work to do because they were very suspicious and not very receptive. But I tried to keep up with that. But for the most part, Istanbul and environs were the more westernized part of the country. It was pretty much a stronghold of the party of Bulent Ecevit which is a social democratic, almost western ideology, party. As opposed to the Justice Party which was much more conservative and as opposed to the conservative party, the Islamic party which had some following in Istanbul area, but very limited. They had more of a hinterland following.

Q: How were the minorities being treated? The Greeks, the Jews and Armenians.

GODARD: Government policy was to protect them and they certainly didn't want it to become an issue. But that said, they weren't doing a very good job of it and they were under pressure from particularly the right wing of these groups that were killing each other with the left wing. Those were hyper-nationalist types and they viewed the minorities as a Trojan horse in the society, it was evidence of their world view. There were little incidents of trashing of churches and roughing up priests and small bombs, not to do major destruction, just sort of blacken the sidewalk kind of thing going off. I've seen them, I've seen the evidence of them. I checked that sort of thing out when they happened. So people were living under a good deal of tension. Not oppression I wouldn't say, but it's just a hostile kind of environment where things could happen that you wouldn't hope to have happen, where you're trying to raise your family. And they hung on because of faith in the historic mission of those communities, because they went back for so many centuries and really believed that they needed to be in Istanbul. So they held on. But it was kind of a tenuous existence, and so they were all going down and I think they have continued to go down. When I was there, I think the Armenians were said to be around 50,000 and I think they're much less now. Jewish community same, and Greek Orthodox community's dwindled down. The guy who is now the patriarch was one of my contacts in the Greek Orthodox church. Bartholomew. He was a young metropolitan at that time, and I actually got him out to the house a couple of times.

Q: Well, you know, I was in Athens from '70 to '74. I was consul general and the Greeks were always looking at the Turks, what are they going to do, and the Turks were the big thing. Did you find the Turks paid much attention to the Greeks?

GODARD: Oh yeah, they were ready. The border crossing there between Turkey and Greece while I was there was not used that much at all. They had these periods of confrontation over those little islands where they had conflicting claims for oil explorations and so forth. That was always bubbling up as an issue. Of course, when I was there we had imposed an arms embargo

after Cyprus, so our relationship was not as cozy as it had been in the past. Very resentful of that, but the Greeks, they were quite suspicious of. Particularly with the Cyprus situation still sort of boiling over there.

Q: What about Istanbul's society? Was there sort of a western sophisticated society that was sort of the core of the business community?

GODARD: Very sophisticated, their own sort of pop music culture and western dress everywhere. Very stylish women in Istanbul. Traveled to Paris frequently and whatever. A lot of hotels even then attracted quite a lot of tourism from the West. Germany in particular. There was a huge German mission there and a very good size Russian mission too of course.

Q: It was a Soviet mission in those days.

GODARD: Yeah, Soviet mission. And you could see why. Going through the Bosphorus every day were these huge ships in the fleet in the Black Sea. One of the fun parts of my job was the contact with the Russian diplomats and some of the others there. Interesting times, because they're housed in these czarist houses that are dating from the Ottoman days. They've held onto those properties. Brits have a huge compound there too. We had sort of an Italian villa that we'd picked up that's a pretty good size. But they have historic buildings that are really gems.

Q: What about these groups who were fighting each other. Did we have any contact with them? How did we get information about the right and the left?

GODARD: That was mostly intelligence that we would pick up. Because there was a right wing party that they were sort of associated with, they had contact with them in Ankara. I didn't have contacts that I recall from that particular party in Istanbul. I don't think they were much of a force. And the left wing were underground terrorist groups, so we didn't have any contact with them.

Q: Were the Kurds a factor or were they all somewhere else?

GODARD: They didn't exist. They were called mountain Turks, and there was no recognition of this Kurdish presence. They were all around you of course. People didn't wear badges that said "Kurds", but they were all over the place. Huge community in Istanbul. But they weren't recognized. Nowadays I understand they're getting their own radio stations and whatever, but you never heard the Kurdish language.

Q: Were they enough of a unified force to have contact with, or were they a voting group?

GODARD: Never surfaced. In Istanbul they did not. Of course, you go toward the east, that's all there is in many of those provinces. I bet it's infrequently. The Turks for one thing were extremely careful about controlling diplomatic travel in that area. I know our embassy tried to get out as often as it could, but our access was limited to those areas.

Q: Who was our consul general in Istanbul?

GODARD: There were two while I was there. One was Elaine Basham.

Q: I knew her when she was deputy principal officer in Zagreb way back.

GODARD: I really respected her. Robert Houghton was her replacement later on. And in the interim, Jeff Ogden was the deputy principal officer. He'd served in Greece before I think.

Q: Did you feel the hand of Ankara very much?

GODARD: Not really. Other than this little business about the report they were unhappy about that election business, but I got guidance. They were real professionals.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

GODARD: Macomber, William Macomber, Bill Macomber. And later on Ron Spiers was the ambassador. Macomber came down and swam the Bosphorus. He was trying to swim the length of it, I think. I don't think he made it all the way. He was a very Outward Bound type. But no, we were left pretty much, they were down frequently because everybody in Ankara wanted to come down to Istanbul and we had an apartment there that the ambassador maintained where he came down on official business. And others in the embassy were allowed to use it so we had a lot of traffic. And we also had a wonderful asset there, the Hiawatha, this day cruiser that we had for tooling around on the Bosphorus. Later on I understand that was bombed at one point, but they managed to salvage it and it's still around.

Q: Did you get at all involved in the drug business, the arrests and all? This is sort of the era of the movie Midnight Express and all. So many of our kids were coming through there and picking up hashish then trying to get it to the States.

GODARD: Only peripherally. We had a sizeable DEA office there in Istanbul and a slightly bigger one up in Ankara. I remember when the movie came out, of course they didn't show it in Turkey. I went to see Midnight Express when I was in London and thought it was overdrawn a little bit, but probably generally accurate.

Q: How did you find the political types in the Istanbul area?

GODARD: Mixed bag. The mayor, I think, had a labor background. He came from the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi which was the social democratic party I was talking about. They were very much into the labor, depending regularly on the modern labor movement that they had for their support. Sophisticated guy. Reflective generally of the elite in Istanbul. Very western ideas. What you saw when you got out of the province was a different animal. Much more conservative, but still imbued with those Atatürkian ideals about need for modernity and reform in Turkish society.

Q: What about Islamism? What was happening during the time you were there?

GODARD: It was kind of a new phenomenon. Religion was by law not supposed to be a factor in politics in Turkey. But there was this conservative party that was the third party and later became even stronger, and I think now a variation of it has become secular, or maybe the party in power now. But back in those days they weren't much of a force in Istanbul. But they were there, and they were working hard to build up their force. That's been since the revolution in Turkey. It's been a cycle of growing influence by a more, not outwardly religious party, but in a party that was more conservative and appealed to Islamic sentiment in the country. But they were not that big a factor in Istanbul.

Q: Did we have military attachés at our consulate general? I was just wondering because military was such a powerful force...

GODARD: I think there were noncommissioned officers attached to the consulate, and there was some kind of NATO office there. I saw a lot of military, because of course we had bases around there and the guys came into town all the time, to Istanbul. There was a military attaché there who was a major.

Q: Did somebody from the consulate watch Soviet ships going back and forth or was that taken care of?

GODARD: Sure. That was natural for us. We had some pretty sexy equipment that came through there. I remember when the Kiev came through the first time.

Q: A helicopter carrier.

GODARD: A very sophisticated piece of equipment. We all watched that one come in. The cameras were pretty intensely on that baby as it came through. But they all came through the Navy and there were people watching it.

Q: How about your wife? This was supposed to be her tour. How'd she like it?

GODARD: Well she loved it. Leslie made herself a expert on the bazaar and walked all of the walls, the old Byzantine walls, visited all of the old Byzantine churches. She also finally had an opportunity to go back to work while we were there, so she started teaching in a Turkish school, teaching English. Our kids had finally started school so she could do that. But she was a real asset in terms of showing people around because she knew the city better than anybody in the consulate. She really traveled all over the place. Whenever we had a CODEL (Congressional Delegation) or anything we'd put her to work showing if not the spouses than the congressmen themselves. We had quite a few congressional delegations back in those days.

Q: Did you have any contact with our consulate general in Thessaloniki or not?

GODARD: No. Not at all.

Q: In other words, you weren't really being apprised of the temperature over in the other side of the Greek side.

GODARD: I'm sure that we infoed each other on cables and that sort of thing but I don't remember any traffic from Thessaloniki.

Q: It has to be seen or felt to be believed to understand how the Greeks feel about the Turks. You can say it, but... it's not rational, but it's a major factor.

GODARD: The Turks to a certain extent reciprocate that, but I don't think they're quite as hysterical.

Q: Ok, well this is probably a good place to stop. Let's see, you left in '79, is that right?

GODARD: That's right.

RAYMOND C. EWING
Deputy Director, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1976)

Director, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1977-1979)

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1980-1981)

Ambassador
Cyprus (1981-1984)

Ambassador Raymond C. Ewing was born in Ohio in 1936. In addition to being ambassador to Cyprus, his Foreign Service career included positions in Washington, DC, Japan, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. Ambassador Ewing was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1993.

EWING: I took over as Deputy Director in September, 1976. Then, as Director, in December, 1977. At the beginning of the Carter administration, I was Deputy Director. In the State Department Southern European Affairs concern Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, three countries that came to the European Bureau from the Near Eastern Bureau in 1974. It's one office. At that time we had two desk officers for Turkey, two for Greece, and one for Cyprus. We had a junior officer who handled special projects on issues which cut across the region.

Q: This was your first, professional exposure to this intractable problem of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. What was your impression when you came to the office? How did you see the situation?

EWING: I really had the chance to watch the area closely for a year before I came into the office, when I was working for Assistant Secretary Hartman. I think that roughly one-third of his time

that year [1975-76] was probably devoted to those three countries. So I was aware of all of the developments during that year. I didn't know that I was going to go into that office until shortly before the time when I actually [assumed those duties]. I never felt particularly defensive about my lack of prior, professional experience. I thought that if I had served, say, in Turkey, and then tried to come into that job, I would have been perceived within the State Department and probably by the Embassies concerned as more comfortable, more familiar, and perhaps even biased for or against the Turkish position. By coming in fresh I didn't have that problem. I felt that having some background in economic affairs was probably useful, because economic issues -- especially with regard to Turkey -- became very important in that period. Primarily, it was a problem of diplomacy -- trying to encourage a dialogue, problem-solving, and conflict resolution -- rather than necessarily knowing everything about the history of Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus.

Q: How did you find dealing with the various Embassies of these countries? Was this a problem? Were they always looking at you as if to say, "You're either with us or against us."

EWING: I think that the Embassies in Washington were always trying to influence us or to get us on their side. But I think that they recognized -- and this was an advantage of having all three countries in one office -- that they really couldn't do that. That really couldn't be expected from us. Their objective, I think, was primarily to make sure that we understood their position -- not necessarily agreeing with it or buying it, hook, line, and sinker. We had good relations with all three of the Embassies concerned. Lines of communication were fairly open, and relations with the three Embassies in Washington were fairly good.

Q: What were the main issues that you were dealing with at this time?

EWING: Really, there were three issues: first, the Cyprus problem, primarily left over from 1974; secondly, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey...

Q: You mean our bilateral relations?

EWING: Our bilateral relations with Greece and Turkey, primarily related to our forces, our bases in both countries, assistance levels, and the relationship of assistance levels [between the two countries]; and, thirdly, the problems between them, relating to the Aegean Sea and other issues they had between them -- including the minorities in both countries.

Q: Taking the last point first, regarding the Aegean Sea, this involves the definition of territorial waters and all that. If the Greeks get their way, they basically blocked off the Aegean to anyone else -- particularly the Turks. Did we see any way out of this problem or was this so emotional that there wasn't much that you could do?

EWING: We certainly didn't have our own plan or our own solution to those issues, because they were so emotional and complex. The main thing that we tried to do was to encourage the process of addressing the issues, either through negotiations or through some judicial approach, the International Court of Justice or otherwise. But there it was more of a matter of watching them, because we really saw that they had the potential for major conflict between two NATO allies. We studied these problems, we analyzed them, and Clark Clifford looked at them when he

undertook his mission to the area. However, we never really took the initiative to put forward a plan, or anything like that.

Q: What was the Clark Clifford mission, and how did it work out?

EWING: I mentioned before our hope that he would take a fresh look at this whole complex of issues. To some extent this mission came out of the presidential campaign of 1976, when Jimmy Carter had made some promises and commitments, particularly to Greek-American voters, which, he thought, ought to be given priority attention when he entered office. One of his early actions was to ask Clark Clifford to undertake a mission to look into these serious problems. He didn't have to wait for Senate confirmation. He went a matter of weeks after the inauguration in 1977 to pay a visit to all three countries.

Q: Did you brief him before he went?

EWING: As I said, I was Deputy Director of the office at the time. The Director of the office was Nelson Ledsky, who accompanied Clark Clifford on the trip, along with Matthew Nimetz, who was Counselor of the Department, a close associate of Cyrus Vance who was quickly given responsibility on the Seventh Floor of the State Department for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus matters. We were involved in a number of briefing sessions with Clifford, both before he went and when he came back. He continued to have this role as a kind of special envoy for the region for a couple of years. I continued periodically to meet with him, usually over at his law office, to keep him informed and abreast of developments, although he certainly pulled back and did not continue to play a really active role after 1977-78.

Q: On his initial trip, was he able to break any ground?

EWING: I think that he broke some ground in terms of U. S. policy and the Carter administration posture by a couple of things. One, he recognized that a restoration of the relationship with Turkey was very important. If we couldn't really solve the Cyprus problem or really improve relations greatly with Greece -- the arms embargo with Turkey was in effect...

Q: This was imposed by Congress, due mainly to domestic Greek-American pressure.

EWING: Well, there was a strong feeling on the part of many people in Congress that Turkey had invaded Cyprus in 1974, had misbehaved, and the United States shouldn't continue as a major arms supplier. Therefore, they felt, we should cut off this relationship and so Congress enacted the arms embargo in 1975 over strong opposition from the Ford Administration. Clark Clifford felt, after he went there, that we needed to restore that relationship with Turkey in order to deal with the other issues of the region. I think that that was an important development. Now, initially, we put the emphasis on approving a defense cooperation agreement, which was negotiated when Secretary Kissinger was in office and which called for, I think, \$1.0 billion in security assistance over four years, as a means of restoring that relationship. Later on, in the following year (1978), the administration decided that the way to proceed was to get the embargo lifted and then go ahead separately with an assistance relationship, rather than using the approval of the defense cooperation agreement and its \$1.0 billion of assistance to break the embargo.

Q: How did you view the communications between [our Embassies] in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia as far as local bias was concerned?

EWING: I think that our Embassies in all three countries did tend, at times, to take on some of the color of their respective places of assignment. However, I don't think that "localitis" or "clientitis" was anywhere near some other situations which I've been aware of over the years. In 1976-77 our Embassies [in Turkey and Greece] had very strong Ambassadors -- Bill Macomber and Jack Kubisch, respectively. They recognized that, whatever the solution to the problems of the region at that particular time, there was no way we could ignore the legitimate interests and objectives of the other countries. You couldn't solve the problems of Greece alone or Turkey alone. You had to take the whole region into account. I think that one of the things I remember is that some of the harshest criticism of positions taken by the Greek Government came out of our Embassy in Athens. To some extent that was true in Ankara as well.

Q: Did you ever run afoul of Bill Macomber's temper?

EWING: Bill Macomber tended to raise his voice so that one wondered sometimes if it were really necessary to use the telephone to talk to you in Washington. He had some strong views and certainly expressed them vividly. But I liked him, and we got along well. He was in Turkey and had a very difficult time shortly after the embargo and the events of 1974. This was a time of frustration and concern, but I think he, of all people, recognized that it was very important to communicate effectively with the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs and try to get us on his side. He understood that yelling at us or blowing up wasn't the way to do that.

Q: Who was our Ambassador to Cyprus during most of this time?

EWING: Bill Crawford was Ambassador to Cyprus. He had a very strong background in Cyprus. He had served previously as DCM there. So he really knew his way around, knew all of the parties, and knew the fine points of the issues.

Q: That was also a dangerous time there, wasn't it?

EWING: Well, Ambassador Rodger Davies was assassinated there. "Killed" is probably a better word than "assassinated," in view of the way it happened in 1974. So Bill Crawford had a security detail of Cypriot policemen who went with him everywhere. It was a very difficult time for his wife and his daughter, who were also with him at the post. I think that virtually all Greek Cypriots were mortified at what had happened to Ambassador Davies. Certainly, the Cypriot Government was determined that there wouldn't be any such threat again to the American Ambassador, from anybody in Cyprus. So this may have been a safer period of time than it seemed at the time because the Cypriot political situation quieted down fairly quickly, with the division of the country and with the fact that the Right Wing in Cyprus, if you will, was at fault in staging the coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. So, in a sense, things were calmer during this period than they had been in an earlier period.

Q: I don't think that we're repeating at this point, because we had a little trouble with the tape

before, but could you talk about dealing with Congress and the "Greek lobby"?

EWING: Yes. Obviously, Congress had an enormous interest in the Cyprus issue but also in relations between Greece and Turkey because in 1975 it had enacted the arms embargo on Turkey. The group primarily interested in this was, of course, the "Greek lobby." This included people like Senator Paul Sarbanes, who had been a member of the House of Representatives in 1975, John Brademas, and some others. But there were still others in the Congress who were very active, informed, and interested, particularly as the Carter administration took a clear stand in 1978 and sought a lifting of the embargo. Some were Democrats but some were Republicans who were concerned about the cohesion of NATO and the role of Turkey and Greece in the alliance. These included people like Senator Tower, Senator McGovern, Congressman Solarz, and Congressman Lee Hamilton. They ranged across the political spectrum. They took a less emotional or intense initial interest than some of the members of the so-called "Greek lobby" but came to be very well informed and were eventually among the supporters of the Carter administration [in its efforts] to lift the embargo on Turkey.

Q: Were human rights a particular problem for you? I was thinking particularly of Turkey but probably, to a certain extent, of Cyprus.

EWING: In the Carter administration human rights, of course, became a much more significant foreign policy priority than they had been previously. There were issues relating to human rights in Turkey, in terms of how prisoners were treated, problems with the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul, Armenian issues -- that certainly was something that we spent a lot of time and energy on. In Cyprus there was the missing persons issue, going back to 1974 and previously. This was something that we were interested in, together with other countries and the United Nations. That was the primary issue in...

Q: What was the missing persons issue?

EWING: As far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, a number of them were missing, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. They were civilians. They either had been killed, taken to Turkey, or moved to northern Cyprus. Nothing had been heard from them, and nobody knew where they were. There were a few American citizens who were Greek Cypriots by origin, who also were on the list of the missing. As far as the Turkish Cypriots were concerned, they also had a list -- not quite as long but still a substantial list. These were Turkish Cypriots who had disappeared during the earlier period, particularly from 1963 to 1974 when there were inter-communal difficulties. According to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, these people had not been heard from and had never been accounted for. So they both had lists, and that issue has never been fully resolved.

Q: So the assumption is that these people are dead?

EWING: The assumption is that they are dead, for the most part.

Q: A final note on this question, and I think we might stop at that point. What was their view of the Soviet threat, and how did this influence our policy in that area?

EWING: As far as Greece and Turkey were concerned, we saw them as important members of NATO, the key to the NATO southern flank, providing protection, if you will, for the eastern Mediterranean, where we had a major fleet. We considered that Turkey had an important role to play in bottling up the Soviet Navy and controlling the [Turkish] straits -- the Dardanelles -- to prevent the Soviet fleet from breaking out [into the Mediterranean]. As far as Greece was concerned, they were also neighbors of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Both countries [Greece and Turkey] played an important role with respect to U. S. bases. They provided a means of supplying the U. S. fleet. We had important installations in both countries that were aimed at the Soviet Union, both from an intelligence and defense point of view.

Q: Were we considering at that time with the Pentagon the problem of a diminution of our presence in Greece, because it was such a political issue?

EWING: At that time we really weren't. Our military presence wasn't that large. As I recall, we sought to ensure that everything there was useful or essential to us, but this presence became an issue later on, during the Papandreou Government. At that time...

Q: Karamanlis was the Prime Minister [of Greece], wasn't he?

EWING: It was Karamanlis. You know, the Greeks had mixed feelings about the United States and the role we played with regard to Cyprus. They had negative feelings in this respect. However, they also recognized that if they were to ask that the U. S. presence be eliminated or even reduced, that would make Turkey even more important to us and our presence in Turkey [would become] even more valuable than it already was. So that was certainly something on their minds.

Q: OK, well, why don't we stop at this point? I'd like to put something on the tape so that I'll know where to pick up. We'll ask how you were appointed Ambassador to Cyprus and go on from there afterwards.

BREAK

Q: Today is December 3, 1993. Ray, we got you out of Southern Europe and European affairs. How did you get your next assignment? How did that come about?

EWING: After I left the Office of Southern European Affairs in the summer of 1979, I went into the Senior Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute and was very much looking forward to that opportunity to look at a number of U. S. domestic as well as international issues and to have time to reflect on them. I very much enjoyed this stimulating experience. I was on a trip with other members of the seminar to Florida and Puerto Rico when I received a phone call in Miami from George Vest, who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He asked me to come back and be a Deputy Assistant Secretary, which I did. As it turned out, I served in this capacity from April, 1980, to June, 1981. Early in 1981, after the elections, when the Reagan administration came in, Lawrence Eagleburger was appointed Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. He decided early on, before he got to know any of us, that he would keep only the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Allen Holmes. He indicated that he would try to be helpful to the rest of us

in obtaining an onward assignment. I really give him credit for pushing my nomination as Ambassador to Cyprus. As it turned out, that worked out, and I was nominated, confirmed, and went to Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: So you were in Cyprus from 1981 to 1984? I think I mentioned this before, but with Larry Eagleburger in EUR, I take it that things went fairly smoothly as far as the Reagan administration was concerned. In ARA, I understand, there was "blood in the corridors." The change of administration did not involve a friendly takeover [in this area]. However, I take it that in the area of European affairs there wasn't much of a problem.

EWING: I think that, on the whole, that's right. There was perhaps some tension [in the bureau] because the new administration was regarded as following a very "hard line" toward the Soviet Union. During the transition period there were some people who came to the State Department to ask some very sharp, harsh, and challenging questions. However, in the area that I was responsible for at the time, which was Central Europe, including Germany; Southern Europe, including Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; and Canada, there really wasn't much tension and controversy. Larry Eagleburger, of course, was a professional who was well known in the Department. He did not stay long in EUR before moving up to be Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I was succeeded as Deputy Assistant Secretary by Tom Niles, who had been Director of Central European Affairs, so he had worked directly with me. It was really a very smooth transition as far as EUR was concerned. It was nothing like ARA at that time.

Q: How did you prepare yourself for the confirmation process?

EWING: Of course, I'd been working on Cyprus, essentially since 1976, with a few interruptions. I'd been to the island three times, first in 1976, then in 1977, and again in 1978. I had worked on a Cyprus plan which the Department developed in 1978. I had met, really, with all of the key figures, either in Cyprus itself or in New York or Washington: President Kyprianou; Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriots; the Foreign Minister; the communal negotiators; and so on. So in a sense it didn't take a lot of homework or detailed preparations to get ready. However, I did some specific things. Of course, I spent a lot of time on the Hill, meeting not only with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but also some other Senators who, I knew, were interested in Cyprus, plus some people in the House of Representatives. I tried to see and talk with all of the former Ambassadors who were still living and was able to see all but one or two of them. I did some reading which I had never had time to do before. Since I had left EUR around July 1, [1981], and my confirmation hearing was not held until, I think, August, [1981], I really had a little bit of time that summer to try and get ready and be prepared. Of course, I went around and talked to people in other Washington agencies.

Q: Given the efforts of the "Greek lobby" in the United States, was Cyprus as much of an issue then, as it had been previously, or was it less sensitive then, in 1981?

EWING: I would say that it was less sensitive. The "Greek lobby," and the Greek-American community generally, I think, at that particular point, was somewhat disillusioned with the role of the United States Government. They had had very high hopes and expectations when the Carter administration came in. President Carter made some promises during the campaign. I

would say that a fairly strong, diplomatic effort was made by the United States during the Carter administration, which essentially had produced very little, as far as Cyprus was concerned. I think that, as the Reagan administration came in, the Greek-American community did not expect very much. They were somewhat angry and frustrated about that but they didn't try to extract promises or commitments from either candidate which they [the candidates] couldn't carry through on. I think that the interest and concern about Cyprus was as great as ever, but the expectation that something was going to be achieved -- or that the United States could do something -- was somewhat less at that point.

Q: Were there any Senators who felt very strongly and who, you thought, were going to "keep an eye on you" and what was happening?

EWING: Senator Paul Sarbanes had been very much involved [in the Cyprus issue], initially as a member of the House of Representatives, and then as a Senator, throughout the last part of the 1970's. He continued to be very interested. I always made a point, when I came back from Cyprus, of going and talking with him. He was well informed, thoughtful, and considerate, as far as I was concerned. Sometimes he would say some things publicly that were a little different from what he would say privately, but he was probably the most vocal and active member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Paul Tsongas was also a member [of the Committee] at that time and was present during my confirmation hearing. I don't think that Senator Paul Sarbanes was even there. Senator Tsongas asked me a question about whether I knew how to speak Greek. I said that I didn't, and I didn't know Turkish, either, but I intended to study both while I was in Cyprus. Of course, I pointed out that in Cyprus, a former British colony where English was the official language, English was very widely known -- in Cyprus even more so than in Greece. Those were the two Senators who were the most interested and active. Some of the others, including Senator Pell; Senator Lugar, then the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee...

Q: Yes, it was a Republican controlled Senate at that time.

EWING: Senator Lugar was interested. There was a university in Indiana -- actually the university with which he had been affiliated between the time he was Mayor of Indianapolis and was elected to the Senate -- which had a program in Cyprus. I talked to him about that, and we kept in touch during the time that I was there.

Q: You arrived in Cyprus in...

EWING: I arrived in Cyprus in October, 1981.

Q: What was the situation on the ground when you arrived there, in political and economic terms?

EWING: The geographic situation was as it had been since 1974 -- and as it is today, in 1993. That is, the Government of Cyprus, which was controlled by Greek Cypriots, controlled the southern part of the island up to a demilitarized zone, which was essentially controlled by the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a peacekeeping unit. The Turkish Cypriots

controlled the northern part of the island. In 1981 the Turks referred to themselves as "The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." Their view, as they expressed it, was that, eventually, there would be a "Greek Federated State of Cyprus," and the two could have some kind of federation arrangement with each other. The Turks had therefore gone ahead and organized themselves in that way.

Economically, Greek Cyprus, the southern part of the island, had already begun to recover pretty well from the extreme disruption and other dislocations which occurred in 1974, when perhaps as many as 200,000 refugees moved within the island. Hotels were being built on the coast in places like Aya Napa, Larnaca, Limassol, and Paphos. But in many ways what had really stimulated the economic recovery was the civil war in Lebanon, which is only about 100 miles or so away. Beirut is that close. Many Lebanese, as the civil war began in the late 1970's, moved to Cyprus, perhaps to have a safe place for members of their families. They bought apartments, invested in real estate, and then, in some cases, moved some of their business activities there, as did some international companies. The troubles and travails of Lebanon -- and Beirut in particular -- were certainly to the benefit of Cyprus at that juncture.

Turkish Cyprus -- the northern part of the island -- was fairly stagnant economically. There was agriculture but very little in the way of industrial activity. None of the positive, "spill over" effect of the Lebanese civil war had come to northern Cyprus. It [Turkish Cyprus] was very dependent economically on Turkey and on the support it received from Turkey, both in terms of the Turkish troop presence but, more importantly, in many ways, the government budget support that it received. People from the outside often said that the economic disparity was so great that it would be an incentive to a settlement. I think that the problem was that Turkish Cyprus was doing as well at that juncture as mainland Turkey. But the Turkish Cypriots tended to compare themselves with the Greek Cypriots, with whom they had very little interaction economically, rather than with the peasants of Anatolia. They could see buildings going up in the Greek side of Nicosia, but it didn't really have any particular impact on them or their standard of living.

Q: One is always enjoined not to make comparisons between populations or people, but the point is that any rational being will see that one group of people makes much more of a success with its situation than another group. Did you see any dynamics of change within the Greek Cypriot side, as opposed to the Turkish Cypriot side while this was happening?

EWING: It's hard to be categorical about that, because there are certainly some very able Turkish Cypriot businessmen, lawyers, and so on. But I think, in general, that they did not have the same base to begin with, in the sense of educated people or people with entrepreneurial skill and talent. And I suppose that they didn't have as many advantages from outside the island. Turkey, at that particular time, was not a great success, either. I might just go back, for a minute, to my time in Washington. The Turkish economy was a matter of great concern to us at the State Department in the late 1970's. There was a lot of violence in the country, but there was also rather sluggish economic growth. The Turkish workers in Germany were one of the main sources of foreign exchange. There was not a lot happening in Turkey itself in terms of exports or economic growth. One of the good things that happened late in the 1970's was the appointment, initially as Minister for Planning, of Turgut Ozal. Later, he became Prime Minister and then, eventually, President. When the Turkish military took over the government in September, 1980, one of the very good things that they did was to keep Ozal in a position where he was responsible for the

economic recovery. And then, slowly during the 1980's, that program began to take hold and have an impact. But in 1981 Turkey wasn't doing very well, and Turkish Cyprus wasn't, either.

Q: One of the most vicious groups promoting civil unrest -- ranking up with the IRA [Irish Republican Army] -- was the "EOKA A", or whatever it was. There seemed to be offshoots of this group engaging in terrorism. I recall that in 1972 a Greek Cypriot set off a bomb near our Embassy when I was there. Luckily, it killed him and not us. Were there bombing and small scale raids going back and forth between the two sides in Cyprus?

EWING: No, there was really none of that going on during the time that I was there. Really, there has been very little of that since 1974. At that time Samson and some of the other EOKA B elements were involved in an attempted coup d'etat against Archbishop Makarios. Essentially, they were completely discredited, and the whole notion of Enosis, or union with Greece, was really not something that people thought about or talked about. The last gasp of Enosis, as far as I could see, was in 1974. It failed. Whatever you want to say about the Turkish intervention in or invasion of Cyprus, even some of the sharpest critics of that action will acknowledge that Turkey was provoked by the threats that Samson represented against Makarios and against the Turkish Cypriot community. So during the time that I was there, there was almost no threat or tension or interaction between the two communities -- and certainly no terrorism. There were a couple of border incidents or incidents in the demilitarized zone. Somebody would stray across [the line], somebody would be cleaning a rifle which would go off, or someone would get bored and take a shot [at somebody]. But it was almost more of a matter of sloppiness or laziness than anything more definite than that.

As far as the Greek [Cypriot] side was concerned, they certainly perceived a threat from the Turkish [Cypriot] side. At one point when I was there, there was a fair amount of tension when threats and actions against Turkish diplomats around the world were made by a group of Armenian extremists. The Armenian community in Cyprus -- and the Greek community as well - were afraid that Turkey might think that there was a soft, easy target in the Armenian community in Cyprus and would come across the line with the idea of retaliating or getting even. But that didn't happen, either. So, in general, the island itself and the line [of separation] were very calm, peaceful, and free of tension.

Q: This is very interesting because, when you consider how much Enosis, and all of the terrorist activity it generated at one time, [caused], here was the greatest provocation you could have, with the Greeks losing their predominance throughout Cyprus...

EWING: In a sense both sides feared each other. The Greek side feared that Turkey would try to take over the whole island. Cyprus was close to the Turkish mainland. Greece was preoccupied at that time with its own problems and could not be expected to come and help. And the Turkish side, which was a minority on the island itself, knew that the Greek Cypriots were economically thriving, doing well, and purchasing arms. They used to fear that the Greek Cypriots would try to take over the whole island. But at the real and practical level, very little of that was happening on a day to day basis.

As I said before, I think that Enosis was really dead at that time. On the other hand there is no

question that the influence of the Greek Government and Greece in general was very great in Cyprus. That is certainly where the Greek Cypriots looked for the only support they could count on, both in the United Nations and in the world, generally. There were lots of investments and connections in both directions. The Greek Ambassador in Cyprus certainly had an influence that was far greater than that of any of the other ambassadors. Whenever the time came for a major decision or a meeting was coming up, the President of Cyprus would go to Athens, and, often, other [Greek Cypriot] political leaders would touch base with their friends and associates there [in Greece] as well. Prime Minister Papandreou came to Cyprus while I was there, and that was seen as a major step, because that hadn't happened before. Usually, it had been the other way around. There is no question that the Nicosia-Athens axis is very important. But in terms of Enosis or union [with Greece] most Greek Cypriots that I talked to valued their independence. They recognized that if they were part of Greece, they would be more or less forgotten, as a small element away out to the East. They wouldn't have accepted unification with Greece at that time, even though it was an important issue in the 1950's, 1960's, and early 1970's.

Q: During the time you were in Cyprus, what were American interests there?

EWING: American interests primarily related to a resolution or settlement of the Cyprus problem, for several reasons. One, because of the impact that issue had on our relations with two important NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. But also because of our concern for the people of Cyprus. We certainly didn't want to see another event like 1974, when a number of people were killed or dislocated, and the whole situation was put in jeopardy. We worked, as best we could, to encourage the two communities to resolve the Cyprus problem. Our policy during that period, as well as before and after, was primarily to rely on the communities and to encourage the United Nations, the Secretary General, and his Special Representative in Cyprus to take initiatives and to look for opportunities and openings to move ahead.

We did have some other interests, of course in Cyprus. It is a very important, geographic area, very close to the Middle East and to Turkey. It was [also] close to the Soviet Union. One of the things that happened while I was in Cyprus, which I had not fully anticipated, occurred after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. During the summer of 1982 we were involved on the periphery of it. We helped to arrange for ferry boats for the evacuation of the PLO forces from Beirut. I remember getting phone calls on a Sunday when, contrary to the understanding and agreement, the PLO had put, I think, 20 Land Rovers on one of the ferry boats. It was understood that they wouldn't take their heavy weapons or their vehicles out of Beirut. By the time anyone realized what was happening, they were already on the boat, and [the PLO] wouldn't take them off. This got high level people involved on a Sunday, including the [U. S.] Secretary of Defense and senior officials of the Israeli Government. I think that Secretary Weinberger was on a "talk show," and there was a minor flap. It was finally agreed that the ferry boat -- it was a Cypriot registered boat, as I recall -- would come to Limassol and offload the 20 vehicles. We had to arrange to put them into storage. Then everybody conveniently forgot about them. Later on, the question came up about what to do with them. The Israelis still didn't want the PLO to have them, and the PLO still considered them their property. In fact, they were old and beat up. I think that one or two of them even had to be pushed off the ferry boat. By then they'd been sitting in a locked, parking lot in Limassol for a year, open to the sun, dust, and everything. They were worthless. I don't know whatever exactly happened to them.

That was a minor aspect of the Lebanon situation. But a more significant matter, perhaps, was that for the better part of the next year and a half or so the only way, or the best way, for Americans to get to Beirut was by helicopter from Larnaca [Cyprus]. This connection came up in an odd way. Early in the fall of 1982 I received a message from the [U. S.] Navy Headquarters in Naples, saying that during the early period the [U. S.] Marines were in Beirut one problem was that they couldn't get any mail. This was a morale problem during those first few months. You may remember that the Marines were pulled out of Beirut after the PLO left Lebanon and then were reintroduced right after the massacres at the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps. It was after that second deployment [of the Marines to Beirut] that I was asked whether I thought that there was any way for Cyprus to be used [to base] a helicopter to take mail into Beirut. I thought, "Well, that sounds like a great idea. Why not?" Since Cyprus is a place where you could get things decided very quickly, I made an appointment and went over and saw the Foreign Minister that morning. I said, "This question has come up, and you're interested in peace in Lebanon. You know why our forces are there -- to try and stabilize the situation. We're not asking you to send forces yourselves or do anything more difficult, but what would you think about having a couple of helicopters and a few people at the civilian airport in Larnaca which could take U. S. mail to the Marines there?" The Foreign Minister said, "Well, that sounds like a good idea. Let me talk to the President, and I'll get back to you." Within an hour, after I had returned to the Embassy, I received a phone call and was told that this arrangement would be fine. I communicated that to Naples, and they were delighted. It was only later that the State Department heard about this.

It later turned into quite an operation and continued for years and years after I left Cyprus. At the time we were using this service not only to support the Marines in Beirut but also the U. S. Fleet that was offshore Cyprus for months at a time. I remember once standing there [at the airport in Larnaca] with the Soviet Ambassador, waiting for the arrival or departure of some head of state. A U.S. C-5, an enormous aircraft, landed at Larnaca. He just looked at it, because Cyprus took pride at being a neutral country. Here was a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement...

Q: A C-5 is as big as they come.

EWING: Can't get any bigger. Anyway, it was an important arrangement. Various officials came to Cyprus that way. Secretary of Defense Weinberger came, Vice President Bush was there at one point, as were many members of Congress. It gave us a few headaches in terms of logistical support but also an opportunity for them to see at least a tiny bit of Cyprus. Sometimes a senior Cypriot Government official would come down to Larnaca to receive a high level visitor.

Q: I might mention as an aside that I've just finished an interview with Terry McNamara, our Deputy Chief of Mission in Beirut, a little later in this period. He said that during the nastiest times in Beirut this was the way we got our people out and in during the terrorist gang fighting that was going on in Beirut.

EWING: Yes, it was really essential. It allowed us to keep our Embassy open [in Beirut]. I think that you can argue whether that was a good idea or not. But the helicopters were vital to assure access to the Embassy in Beirut. And even in the periods that were sort of calm -- the interludes between the fighting and tension, and there were some brief periods -- we continued to think that

the helicopter flights were the most secure. It was much better to use them than to use the ferry boats, which also operated from Larnaca to both East and West Beirut.

In the late fall of 1982 I was invited out to visit one of the U. S. Navy ships -- I think it was the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.

Q: An aircraft carrier.

EWING: Yes. This was for briefings and to see what we were helping and supporting. I took along the Minister of Defense of Cyprus, on another occasion, it was a fairly quiet time, so they flew me to another ship just off the [Lebanese] coast from Beirut and then into the [Beirut] airport. I was taken around to see what the Marines were doing and then to the Embassy, where I met with Ambassador Bob Dillon and had lunch at his residence. They took me back to the airport and flew me, by fixed wing aircraft, back to Cyprus. It gave me at least a chance to see Beirut.

Q: After all is said and done about how we wanted to see everything get back to normal, I take it that our relations were preponderantly with the Greeks. Our Embassy was located in Greek [Cypriot] territory, this was where decisions were made, and all that. Is it fair to say that or not?

EWING: Yes. The United States had its diplomatic relationship with the Government of Cyprus, which was the government representing the Republic of Cyprus abroad. I was accredited as United States Ambassador to that government, and our Embassy certainly had relationships with all of that government's departments.

Q: And all of which were essentially in Greek [Cypriot] territory, staffed by Greek Cypriots?

EWING: Yes. That was in Nicosia, in Greek Nicosia. However, we also recognized that the Turkish Cypriots needed to be a party to any settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots were there in Cyprus to stay. They were obviously very close to an important ally, a friend of the United States -- Turkey. Therefore, as United States Ambassador, I felt that it was appropriate that I should have contact with some key Turkish Cypriots. So I would regularly see Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. I would also see the negotiator in the inter-communal talks for the Turkish Cypriot community. And I would meet regularly with the representative of Turkey -- the Turkish Ambassador, who was not accredited to the Republic of Cyprus. He never came across to the Greek side and stayed on the Turkish side. I would go and meet with him, frequently. I would also see other Turkish Cypriots, including ministers and officials of their so-called "Government" on a social basis, including at a residence that the U. S. Embassy [in Ankara] rented for us, just outside of Kyrenia.

Q: This was essentially the "capital" [of Turkish Cyprus]?

EWING: No, their "capital," and you have to put it in quotation marks, was on the Turkish side of Nicosia. Kyrenia is a port. It was the seaport for hydrofoils and ferry boats -- to Turkey. It is one of the more famous resorts in the northern part of Cyprus, Famagusta being the other one, in the eastern part of the island [also in Turkish Cyprus]. We had a house in Kyrenia. We would go

there on weekends. It was delightful to be in a very quiet and beautiful place, but it was also a place where we could invite Turkish Cypriots to come for receptions, to see a movie, or whatever. Congressman Solarz once was there. He and Denktash had a meeting on the porch of our residence there. So those were the contacts which we had with the Turkish Cypriots. Now, other officers of the Embassy also had some contacts below the ministerial level. We had a political officer in our Embassy who spoke Turkish. He had a number of contacts with political party figures and others. We also had a small office in the Turkish part of Nicosia, staffed by Foreign Service Nationals who had been with the Embassy for a long time. There was a total of three of them. They would arrange appointments for us with Turkish Cypriot officials. Whatever we had to do with them, they would arrange it. I think that one of them was a part-time librarian and we kept a small collection of books and university catalogues at the office. But we also had some other programs for Cyprus which were of benefit to the Turkish Cypriots, as well as to the Greek Cypriots. We had an assistance program. A share of that program was administered through the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees for the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots. While I was there, we also started, with the strong support of Congress, "The Cyprus-American Scholarship Program" for college and university study in the United States. Some of those scholarships went to Turkish Cypriots as well. They also had an opportunity to compete for Fulbright Scholarships.

Q: As happens in other, divided countries, did you have a problem with people watching you closely to ensure that you didn't do this or that? This isn't exactly like Israel dealing with the Palestinians, but did you have to be very careful about the balance between scholarship awards to the two Cypriot communities? Or were people more relaxed?

EWING: No, I think that people were watching us constantly, all the time. Anything that appeared in the newspapers was read intently by the other side. So we had to exercise a certain discretion. If I'd spent all of my time on the Greek side and never gone to the Turkish side, I think that the Turks would have regarded me as totally one-sided in my activities. Or, if I'd neglected the Greek side and gone around and done things on the Turkish side, beyond what I said before were our policy contacts, that would have created a problem as well. In 1983 Denktash [the Turkish Cypriot leader] declared the independence of his state. He called it "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This was somewhat of a surprise, although we had thought of it as a possibility. We weren't sure that Turkey would allow him to do it. Fairly soon after that, after some argument and discussion with Washington, we essentially took the posture that this action didn't mean a thing and that we weren't going to recognize it. In fact, no other countries in the world recognized this new status, other than Turkey, of course. I would continue to meet with Denktash as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community but not as the president of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." In fact, I went to see him fairly soon after their declaration. There were some people who thought it was too soon. But it seemed fairly important to me to do this quickly to get across the idea that nothing had changed and that he was still the leader of [the Turkish Cypriot] community. However, we were not going to accept that this new step had any particular political significance. We were essentially going to ignore it. I think that this was the right thing to do. But, as I say, some people on the Greek Cypriot side and some people in Washington felt that it was, perhaps, premature to do that.

Q: Did Denktash get into a position of saying that unless you see me as the president of my

republic, I won't see you or anything like that? You can get into such a situation.

EWING: Oh, yes, he could certainly have made it difficult for himself. On the other hand, I think that he realized that there was value in contact, that if the American Ambassador was willing to come and listen to him -- even though without acknowledging the title and status that he'd like to have -- there were advantages in that. He knew that we would report and seriously take into account his point of view. Of course, the other thing was that the United States was giving far more help and assistance to the Turkish Cypriots than anybody else in the world (other than Turkey), and it was to his advantage not to be 100% dependent on

Turkey, but to be able to say to Turkey, "Well, others are taking me seriously, paying attention to me and giving our area help." It was obviously to his advantage, as well, with other diplomats and with the United Nations. When I saw him the first time, I told him, "I am going to have to make clear that I am not calling on you as president of 'The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'" He replied, "Well, you do what you want." He didn't argue with me about that or say that he never could see me again.

Q: Did you make clear to the other side, the Greek Cypriots, that this was what you were doing?

EWING: I did. They weren't too happy with it, because they thought that it was too soon. But we made it clear to them that this was the basis on which it had been done.

Q: What is your impression of Denktash and Kyprianou?

EWING: Well, neither one liked each other at all or had much respect for each other. I always thought that there were two Greek Cypriots whom Denktash knew, respected, and could, perhaps, have worked with. One was Archbishop Makarios, and the other was, of course, Clerides. In fact, one of the agreements going back to 1977 was between Makarios and Denktash. I don't think that Denktash particularly liked or admired Makarios, but he did respect his position, political background, and so on. As far as Clerides was concerned, he and Denktash had similar backgrounds. They were roughly the same age and were both lawyers. They had known each other and negotiated together for a long time. I think that Denktash saw Clerides as a practical person who was more interested in trying to solve an issue than to make points, and so on. But I don't think that Denktash had much respect for Kyprianou [He didn't respect him], and, certainly, Kyprianou didn't think much of Denktash. By that time they had had one or two meetings together, but most people didn't see much point in trying to work out a high level meeting. That probably wasn't going to get very far.

Q: How about your impression of these two? Did you have problems with either of them?

EWING: Well, I had problems with both of them, I guess, to some extent. I always thought that Denktash could posture and parade with the best of them, especially in a larger group. When I met him, one on one, over a cup of coffee, I thought that he was a different person from what he was in public. I think that he believed that he had accomplished a lot. He had more or less what he wanted -- control of his area. His people and he had a certain position and stature. Maybe the rest of the world didn't pay much attention to it, but they felt secure and able to run things

themselves. I think that they thought that in any kind of settlement or arrangement with the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots would probably come out ahead, because they were clever, capable, and effective. [He felt that] they weren't to be trusted. On the other hand Kyprianou sort of spoke the same way. He had the high ground, in terms of international support, recognition, and prestige. And to give up on the idea of a unified Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriots in charge, clearly, would have been a loss, even though the [Greek Cypriots] would have gained in getting some additional territory, perhaps allowing refugees to go back, and getting an opportunity to do business throughout the whole island. Just that idea of giving up their goal, their ideal, was something that gave them very little incentive really to negotiate.

Q: Were there any particular developments between them during the time you were there?

EWING: There was very little, really. The establishment of "The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was a setback. We spent a lot of our time with the UN Special Representative. During most of the time that I was there he was Hugo Gobbi, from Argentina. We [tried] to find a formula to get talks going, or to resume the talks that had taken place intermittently in the past. There were a few, occasional meetings, but really there wasn't a lot of progress or development.

There was some effort made to find "confidence building measures" or efforts to bridge some of the difficulties. The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] tried to do a few things with both communities in Nicosia in particular, relating, for example, to sewer and water supply systems. As far as the United States was concerned, we talked a little bit before about the Reagan administration wanting to make some kind of an effort -- although maybe not having the same priority, as far as Cyprus was concerned. Secretary of State Haig recognized that during the Carter administration a lot of the things that the State Department had done, such as [assigning] primary responsibility for Cyprus to a high level officer, (Counselor Nimetz) gave a certain visibility to our efforts. This made it possible for the Secretary of State to avoid spending a lot of time on Cyprus. As much as anybody, Secretary Haig arranged to have a special Cyprus coordinator appointed. That was done before I went to Cyprus. The first person to fill this position was Reginald Bartholomew. He was connected to the Office of Southern European Affairs but could also deal at higher levels as well. Bartholomew recognized that not very much was likely to happen and that, if he were to come to Cyprus, that would give the impression that we were preparing to take an initiative or involve ourselves to an extent that we really did not want to do. So he never came to Cyprus as Special Cyprus Coordinator during the time I was there. The first time I saw him in Cyprus -- although we had known each other before, and I actually met with him in Greece on one occasion just after he gave up this position and became a negotiator on our bases in Greece. He visited Cyprus when he was Ambassador to Lebanon to attend a meeting at my residence with Don Rumsfeld, who had just taken up the position of Middle East negotiator and wanted to meet quietly with Bartholomew and our Ambassador to Israel and Syria.

Later on, other Cyprus special coordinators did visit Cyprus. I don't think that the problem of a perception that we were prepared to launch major Cyprus initiatives was, in fact, a real difficulty.

Q: While you were there, did you find that your part of Cyprus was a hotbed of Israeli- PLO "games"? Was this a problem for you? I'm talking about a few assassinations and things like

that?

EWING: Let me answer that but first take issue with your saying, "My" part of Cyprus. I considered that all of Cyprus was part of my responsibilities.

Q: All right. Point taken.

EWING: That was the basis on which we traveled in northern Cyprus, because we considered all of Cyprus was our area of responsibility, even though the government's control only extended to a part of Cyprus. All of Cyprus was part of the Republic of Cyprus except for the British Sovereign Base Areas. We could travel there as well.

However, as to your question about Israeli and Palestinian activities, this only pertained to Greek Cyprus, because I don't think that either Israelis or Palestinians were ever very active in northern Cyprus, to my knowledge. Because of Cyprus' geographic location and the ease of travel to all parts of the Middle East and North Africa, it was certainly a place where Israelis, Palestinians, Libyans, and Arabs of all kinds were present and active, engaging in business, [holding] meetings, and doing various things. In terms of activities directed against diplomatic offices, I don't remember very much happening. I know that the Israeli Embassy was attacked with a bomb not long after I left. One of the things, I think, worth keeping in mind is the fact that Israel had an Ambassador to Cyprus. Israel had diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, which was not the case with either Greece or Turkey at the time. Israel was [represented] there. Cyprus Airways flew three flights a week to Tel Aviv, as well as to Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo. The Libyans were active there. Their airline office was bombed. It was just a few blocks down from our chancery, which was also our residence. So we were always very aware [of the situation].

We talked before about tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In terms of security for the Embassy and security in general there was certainly a greater threat from outside the island than from activity within the island. Since the killing of Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974 the Cypriot Government had provided a full-time security detail to United States Ambassadors. When I arrived in 1981, I was met by a seven-member detail of Greek Cypriot policemen who went with me everywhere I went outside of the Embassy in Greek Cyprus. When I went across to Turkish Cyprus, they would accompany me to the United Nations checkpoint, and we would go beyond that point on our own. In my view at the time the only real reason for continuing with this arrangement was the history of the problem but, more importantly, the possibility of something happening from outside Cyprus. Eventually, after I'd been there a year or so, I realized that this protection was really a bit much and that, if I did something purely spontaneously, like taking my daughter to school or to the Marine House to see a movie or to do a baby sitting job -- or even, say, on Sunday morning, to go to the North -- it probably wasn't necessary to have a security detail with me. I eased up a bit. I felt much more comfortable and I tell you that my children really felt much better. It had been a bit intimidating for them, especially with all of the weapons around.

Q: How did you find the Embassy staff while you were there?

EWING: It was a fairly small staff. I suppose, by [the usual] American Embassy standards, it

would have been called a medium sized Embassy. We had about 40 Americans, including our Marine Security Guard detail. There were people there with the FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, who were monitoring primarily [regional] radio stations in the Middle East region. We had a few people there with the United States Information Service; a couple of political officers, one speaking Greek and the other speaking Turkish; an economic/commercial officer who, in many ways, was one of the busiest in the Embassy because, not only did he do economic reporting and assist the increasingly active U.S. business community and support the possibility of promoting the export of U. S. goods and services, he also was the only point of contact with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees concerning our aid program which, oddly enough, was running at about \$15 million per year -- without AID [Agency for International Development] actually being present on the island. We had, of course, a security officer. It was a highly competent staff with great ability and dedication. I think that they enjoyed Cyprus. The local people were very nice, and I think that most of us found friends both on the Greek Cypriot as well as the Turkish Cypriot side. We enjoyed the archeological activity. There was something there called "The Cyprus-American Archeological Research Institute" which supported various "digs" on the Greek Cypriot side. We had a chance to visit most of those during the time that I was there.

The other thing that was happening, as I think I said before, was the economic burgeoning of Greek Cyprus, which was all to the good, because it was raising income levels. It was also overwhelming, as hotels were built along this beautiful coastline, not always with full regard for the environmental impact.

Q: You left Cyprus in 1984 and came back to Washington. Could you talk about your next job, how you got it, and what you were doing?

EWING: There was kind of an interval there. I didn't have an onward assignment when I came back from Cyprus, except on a short-term basis. I was asked to head the United States Delegation to the meeting of the Group on Mediterranean Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- CSCE. This meeting took place in Venice in late October, 1984. In preparing for that conference I paid visits to Brussels (NATO Headquarters), London, Tel Aviv, and Rome. That pretty well took me through the fall. Then I was asked to be a negotiator on a new Status of Forces agreement in Greece. I spent some time preparing for that negotiation in Washington, with the Defense Department and other interested agencies. It fairly quickly became apparent that the Greek Government under Prime Minister Papandreou really wasn't ready for any such negotiation and that the negotiations were very unlikely to take place. I think that, with some reluctance, the American Embassy in Athens agreed with that assessment. They wanted to have a negotiator ready, but the Greeks turned the idea down. It was clear that nothing really was going to happen.

I asked the European Bureau if they would be willing to keep me on "stand by" in case the Greek negotiations got under way and let me go over and study French at the Foreign Service Institute. They were agreeable, so I studied French for about 16 weeks. Near the end of that time Stephen Low, who was the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, came down to the French class one day and asked if I'd be interested in being the Dean of the School of Language Studies at the FSI. Not having a better offer at the time and thinking that it would be kind of interesting and a

chance to manage a fairly active program, I agreed to do that. I started that in the summer of 1985. Between my French studies and the FSI assignment, the Under Secretary for Management asked me to head up a committee studying all mid-level training in the State Department. There had been a course for mid-level officers, six months in duration, that was wildly unpopular. They asked us to take a look at that and mid-level training in general. We made a series of recommendations, including dropping that course immediately. We came up with a concept of what we called a "Continuum of Mid-Level Training," under which we would have a series of shorter, more focused assignment or job specific training to substitute for the mid-career course, and that was generally accepted.

GEORGE S. VEST
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1977-1978)

Ambassador George S. Vest was born in Virginia in 1918. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Bermuda, Ecuador, Canada, Belgium, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Vest was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: During that period, was there any other particular moments or areas of major concern?

VEST: In the earlier stages, we had Greece, Turkey. We had to resume -- this was almost more politics in our country than over there -- we had to resume the sale and delivery of arms to Turkey. We had stopped it because of the Cyprus situation.

Q: That was the Cyprus situation in July of '74?

VEST: Yeah. And we went to the Senate. It was approved. I met sort of steadily with Sarbanes and Brademas and the other Greek-American people on the Hill.

Q: It's interesting how powerful the Greek lobby is. I mean, one always thinks of the Israeli and Jewish lobby, but the Greek is probably, well, second.

VEST: It's second. I mean, I've had a lot of personal experience with each.

Q: Each being the congressional...

VEST: The Jewish-American lobbies -- and without any question, the most powerful lobby in political terms inside our country -- but I think equally there's no question the Greek-American lobby, much, much smaller, much more pointed in its concerns, is the next most effective. They are absolutely fantastically well organized and able.

Q: Why did we want to resume arms shipments to Turkey?

VEST: You had the case of a NATO ally who, really, whose armaments were frankly beginning to be out of date, limited. You know, the armed forces were getting to be genuinely in a bad way. And as a NATO ally, you had two things. You were, one, having an increasingly, poorly armed ally; and second, you were creating increasing strains inside a society, which is a rather shallow, western-oriented society where the military represented a major component factor. And so, in NATO terms, there was a very, very strong desire to help, go ahead and modernize the Turkish military.

Q: Looking at it from both the NATO and the European...

VEST: It wasn't having any affect on the Cyprus situation.

Q: Looking at the Greek-Turkish business from the point of view of European affairs -- American view of European affairs -- and NATO, how important did we find Greece in this? Greece, in a way, seems to spend most of its time pointed towards Turkey rather than Bulgaria or something like that. Was Greece something we almost would discount and were more concerned about Turkey from a military support of NATO point of view?

VEST: You can never discount either one of them. Geographically, they are both in extraordinary...

Q: You were saying that Greece points at Turkey, and Turkey points at Greece, too.

VEST: And both are absolutely delicate pieces of real estate in relation to the eastern Mediterranean and the Soviet world, so you constantly have to try to have them do something that is constructive and to have them point less at each other. And that has been the role of these two countries inside NATO ever since they joined. There's never been any major difference in this kind of approach on their part. And it still is.

Q: How did you deal with this? Was this something that you spent a lot of time on?

VEST: The only thing I can say is I dealt with it by virtue of the fact that I was good friends with the diplomatic people on both sides. And we were constantly negotiating on Cyprus, trying to get the sides to come together in Cyprus and to get the Turks, which were part of it, to work with us, and there never was that opportune moment where the parties involved, all of them, really were ready, because the Greek Cypriots never really wanted to settle, as far as from my point of view.

I had the good fortune that key people in the Greek foreign office were people I had known, and the equivalent of assistant secretary for political military affairs in the Turkish foreign office, one of the most powerful at that time because he was the one the military trusted, he was someone I had known as a junior officer when I started in NATO. He was their most recent ambassador here, Ambassador Elekdag. He and I had known each other since we were very junior officers, so I could always really speak very, very candidly and openly and work with them.

You did your best to soft-pedal the differences, to restrain them, and to remind them that they had this other concern they needed to watch, as well. There are only moments when Greeks and

Turks are really ready to do things together, and you have to capitalize on those moments. Now none of those moments honestly came in the four years that I was assistant secretary for European affairs. A little later, when Ozal more recently was made head of the Turkish Government, you hit one of those moments and they've had a much better rapport. Not a rapport, but a relationship, in more recent years. Otherwise, it's very difficult always.

PATRICK E. NIEBURG
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Istanbul (1977-1978)

Patrick E. Nieburg was born in Latvia on November 21, 1931. He joined USIS in 1962 and served in Brazil, Vietnam, Germany, Bolivia, Sweden, Turkey, and Washington DC. He was interviewed by Allen Hansen on February 4, 1988.

NIEBURG: I went to Istanbul as PAO. And that may sound funny because I say PAO rather than Branch PAO. Because while the PAO sits in Ankara, the capital, all the action except for the government is de facto in Istanbul. That is where the headquarters of the press is. This is where the universities are. And it turned out to be an absolutely fascinating assignment. And for a man who had come dominantly out of the information field, I frankly found myself going in a different direction in Istanbul, without necessarily neglecting the information aspect of the job. I found that the most important job there was to build institutional bridges between Turkish and American institutions. I think if I look back over this particular job the greatest pride that I take, if it is an accomplishment, was a mutual university affiliation in ..bringing about a greater exchange of Turkish literature translations into English or English literature being translated into Turkish. Bringing about these bridges which really last way beyond a tour of duty, is ultimately more fruitful.

I was there during a very difficult period where political murders occurred at the rate of six a day, where our own USIA van was sprayed with automatic rifle fire, where my family and I were held up in our own apartment at gunpoint for four hours.

Q: For political reasons.

NIEBURG: Well, we did not know. We did not know this at first. It turned out to be non-political. But with the political crime at a peak crime in general also increased. It got so bad that you couldn't have any function or entertain at night because people would not dare to come out at night in the streets, even if they were in a car.

Q: What year are we in now?

NIEBURG: We're in the year 1977, '78. Very difficult years for the Turks. But I need to point something out here which is terribly important. I found the Turks to have a political culture which is absolutely superior. Let me explain what I mean by this. In the press there were quite a number of newsmen, as there are in the press ..

I think all over the world, who are very liberal, often left leaning reporters, editorial writers. There were some with whom, as you might imagine, I disagreed diametrically. We had acrimonious shouting matches. We had arguments. And yet, after each one of them the conversation was, "hey, let's get together; have dinner together with our families; go out together on the town." What I am saying is that in many places where I have served if there was political animosity or disagreement this was carried over into personal life. I found that in Turkey you could have serious political differences and still maintain a personal relationship which was warm and friendly. And I really enjoyed that very, very much. I can say to this day that many of the people with whom I also disagreed have remained personal friends who come and visit and I hear from them.

Turkey was also tough because of communications. I remember one occasion only too well, and, of course, this is all part of the Foreign Service. I don't remember whether you recall the headlines because they were not even reported in the United States since it occurred in Turkey -- Turkey's worst train accident in which 128 people were killed. It so happened that I was on that train. I had been in Ankara for a consultation. Strangely enough somebody in the embassy had even asked me to carry a pouch and I had refused to. And I was glad I had, in retrospect. Two trains collided head on.

It was during that moment of people being mangled, being seriously injured, that I developed a respect for Turkey that goes beyond words. People suffering -- with tremendous amount of pain. And I have never seen people be so contained, to have so much dignity in adversity as during that particular moment. I have nothing but the utmost respect for the Turkish people and for those people on the train. I don't know how I got away. I got away with barely a scratch, luckily. But it is something that I will long remember. So, Turkey to me has had personal experiences that are not easy to forget.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1977-1980)

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in 1929 and raised in Illinois. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Turkey, Italy, Venezuela, and Washington DC, and an ambassadorship to Lebanon. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 17, 1990.

DILLON: Then I got a phone call from the Department, telling me that Ron Spiers had been named Ambassador to Turkey and had asked that I be assigned as his DCM. I agreed. Having said "Yes", then came the rest of the story, about which I had not asked. I would have to go to Ankara on direct transfer and immediately because Spiers could not get to Ankara for several months and Ambassador Macomber had to leave immediately. Don Bergus, who was then the DCM, had been nominated as Ambassador to The Sudan and would have to leave very soon. So the negotiations started because I wanted to return to the U.S. for personal reasons. It was

pointed out to me that I had just been in the States for my father's funeral; what more time did I need? So in June, Sue and I and the two children who were still with us packed up, got on an airplane and flew directly to Tehran where we had to change planes. We spent a night and a morning in Tehran. This was June, 1977. Jack Miklos, the DCM, was kind enough to invite us to stay a few hours with him. That gave us the opportunity to see the famous American Embassy compound in Tehran. Bill Sullivan had just arrived as Ambassador and I had the opportunity to chat with him a little, mainly about Southeast Asia from where he had also just come (he had been our Ambassador in the Philippines). Then we went on to Ankara.

When we reached Ankara, we found Ambassador Macomber dying to leave. I spent 72 hours with him; he never stopped talking during that whole period. A lot of what he had to say was interesting and important, but it was exhausting. Bill is very hyper; I felt well briefed by the time he got finished. Bill left and I became Charge' for two-three months until Ron Spiers arrived. Spiers was new to the area. He was a politico-military expert. He had been Ambassador in the Bahamas and the DCM in London; so he had some overseas experience. He was essentially a Departmental type, but a very bright and very nice man. I liked him a lot. We had a comfortable relationship. It was different from Malaysia where as I have already mentioned, I did not get involved in substance very much because I was not the area expert that the Ambassador and the Chief of the Political Sections were. They really knew the country and I didn't. But in Ankara it was different; I was the country expert. So my role was somewhat different. While I functioned as the executive Officer -- the standard DCM role -- I was much more involved in politics.

Q: But isn't that a dangerous position to be in? That is to say, to be the Number 2 and yet have more knowledge and connections than the Ambassador?

DILLON: Yes, it is. The normal DCM position is the better one to be in, as was true in Kuala Lumpur. There we had an Ambassador who knew the country and the issues well, who had great charm and was well liked by the Malaysians. I did the "inside" work. That is the better situation. In Ankara, it didn't work that way; on the other hand, Spiers was such a good professional and a good manager (despite some of the criticisms that were made of his stewardship as Under Secretary for Management later on, especially some of his personnel policies) that we turned out to be happy combination. I did get involved in many substantive issues. I did try to exploit my contacts which were still numerous. After all, I had already served in Turkey for seven years. Ron himself was so secure as a person that he was not bothered at all that I knew Turkey so well. I could well imagine working for an Ambassador who would be upset by a situation in which the DCM was a well known figure in the country, but Ron was not at all. Furthermore, the Turks have a very strict sense of hierarchy. Whereas Americans might handle a situation as we had in Ankara badly, the Turks never would. They knew who the boss was and they behaved that way, even though I knew many of the senior officials personally. I did exploit that personal relationship to a correct degree; it was essentially for information gathering purposes. I do not believe that Ron ever felt that I was trying to up-stage him; I certainly didn't and I think he recognized that. But as a general management principle, I would side with an Embassy organization which had an Ambassador who was the area expert and the DCM who was the manager. The Malaysian model was the correct one because it also had the Chief of the Political Section as another country expert. You need a couple of Section Chiefs who know the territory.

Q: During the 1977-1980, what were the major issues the Embassy had to deal with?

DILLON: First of all there was the opium poppy problem. Turkey was a major supplier of these narcotics. One other major problem concerned the embargo that the U.S. Congress had placed on assistance to Turkey as the result of the 1974 Cyprus invasion. Another issue that created tension between the two governments related to the Americans still in jail. Although that issue may not have been as important in terms of our national interests as the Cyprus one, nevertheless these imprisonments were very sensitive because many Congressmen became involved as the relatives put pressure on their representatives and senators to take some action. Every American prisoner had two Senators and one Representative; their relatives had other representation. I was always amazed by the number of requests for information and action we used to receive from Congress.

Ron Spiers felt very strongly that the embargo had to be lifted. He felt that the U.S. could not pursue its other interests in Turkey without that action. After he had been in Ankara for six-eight months, he decided to return to Washington to see what he could do about changing Congressional views. He did not have confidence that the people in the Department, who were responsible for Congressional relations, were putting enough effort into the lifting of the embargo. Ron was superb in handling Congress. He had a nice direct, no nonsense style; he didn't pester or hector -- no histrionics or flamboyance. He was very credible. He told me later that he had personally talked to two hundred Congressmen and Senators -- an extraordinary number. So I had extended periods of being Charge' in Turkey while my Ambassador was in Washington lobbying. I thoroughly enjoyed being Charge'. It is a pretty good situation; if you want to, you can duck a situation -- "The Ambassador is not here and this has to wait until he returns". On the other hand, if you want to make a difference on a certain issue, you can insert yourself. It is not a bad situation to find oneself in. So I had long periods of being Charge' and it helped me to learn a lot about being the senior official at an Embassy.

On the question of the embargo, I was the lead officer at the Embassy while Ron was in Washington. The lifting of the sanctions required some actions on the part of the Turks and I was responsible for conducting negotiations with them on this issue. They were not easy to deal with. While Macomber was still Ambassador, the Administration had been defeated in Congress on the issue, despite making a major effort. I am convinced that what finally got the embargo lifted was the result of Ron's efforts -- and those of some others -- another vote had been scheduled in Congress. Key members had been convinced to vote for the lifting of the embargo, but there was still strong opposition from some powerful members such as Sarbanes and Brademas. It was strange because on other issues, Sarbanes and his group tended to vote in favor of our positions. I am a great admirer of Sarbanes, except on issues that related to the Greek-Turkey conflict where I think he was inflexible. A conversation with Sarbanes on a Greek-Turkey issue is more like a grilling; I had had several of those inquisitions. Ron was more successful in handling Sarbanes.

In any case, as Congress was heading for another vote, the Greek and Cyprus governments became very concerned about the potential Congressional decision. They wanted to insure that the embargo remained in effect. Kyprianou, then the President of Cyprus, announced that he would fly to Washington to personally oppose the lifting of the embargo. He had been encouraged to do so by some of his Greek-American friends. Spiers immediately recognized that this would work in our favor; I also recognized that in the first place, it is a high risk game for

foreigners to go to Washington to lobby on their own behalf (The Israelis seem to do it and get away with it, but not many others find it a successful strategy) and in the second place, Kyprianou was an obnoxious bore. He was totally lacking in charm; when charm was passed out, most Greeks got a lot of it; Kyprianou none. I am not sure whose idea it was to encourage Kyprianou to go to Washington, but it was certainly welcomed by Ron and those of us who wanted to have the embargo lifted. We were delighted by the prospect of Kyprianou's visit. We wanted his allies to encourage him to go; we felt he could do more for us than we could do for ourselves. I am absolutely convinced that he turned all the "fence sitters" in our favor. It became very clear to the Congressmen that he was unreasonable, emotional and irrational. Many of them suddenly became aware that the Turks who lived on Cyprus might have had a reasonable case and may have had a legitimate reason to separate themselves from the Greek-Cypriot government. So in a very close vote, the embargo was lifted. Ron returned to Ankara where by this time he had been Ambassador for about eighteen months.

He then went to work on some other issues, including negotiations on a treaty for prisoners' exchanges. I participated in that, although the real negotiators were teams of Washington staffers. That treaty allowed prisoners in the respective countries to complete their term back in their home country. It was essentially a fig-leaf which permitted the Turks to release the American prisoners they held which had become such a great international political liability to them. By this time, the whole issue had become a Turkish domestic issue. Every true Turkish patriot was primed to stand up and scream about Turkish sovereignty and about favoritism for American prisoners. The anti-American stand was supported strongly by those who resented the pressure we were placing on the Turkish government on the poppy growing issue. The two issues became somehow engaged in people's minds and in many cases, one became an excuse for inaction on the other.

In any case, all the Americans were let out of jail. I remember going down to the Adana jail where there were just three left. These were kids who had been foolish, stupid, had behaved arrogantly -- had done all the wrong things. They had matured in prison. The Adana jail is a terrible prison, perhaps no worse than some American jails, but it is not a place where you or anyone close to you would want to spend any time. It was divided politically between left and right. There were a lot of local terrorists in this jail. Many of the prisoners belonged either to a right wing or a left wing group and had to be kept separated. The three Americans had to occupy neutral territory. I went into the jail and talked to them. They were brave and dignified. I hadn't realized how sentimental a person I really was. When it came time for me to leave, they were very composed and amazingly cheerful and wanted me to understand that they appreciated the efforts of the U.S. government. When I heard that, I started to cry. I stood in that miserable prison, tears streaming down my cheeks. Eventually, the three were released and I think they have had productive lives. Although this issue of the prisoners didn't sound like a big deal, as a matter of fact, it was.

Q: It was a big deal. In fact, in some ways, that is what we Americans are all about. American interests aren't always about that we have enough oil, but we do care about protecting our fellow Americans, even if they have behaved stupidly.

DILLON: These kids obviously had "sinned" but they had paid. I think, interestingly enough,

they were also rehabilitated. When I saw them they were probably in their late twenties, having been in jail for a few years; they were no longer the silly, "hippy" types that they were when they were originally apprehended.

Q: Let me ask you to discuss the Kurdish problem during this period. Was the phrase "Mountain Turk" used to describe the Kurds?

DILLON: I never heard it used in Turkey although some Turks claimed it was the government's official term. I think some American journalists described the Kurds that way in sort of a sardonic fashion. But I never heard the phrase in Turkey. The Kurds were discussed in Turkish circles, even though some found it difficult to mention the subject. Interestingly enough, politicians had no reservations at all about telling you what they thought of the Kurds. Turkish politicians have one thing in common with Americans: a tremendous sensitivity to ethnic politics and the need to balance electoral lists representative of all ethnic groups. So every politician was keenly aware of the ethnic break-down of his own province. Starting from the early '60s, I never found any inhibition -- with the exception of the Foreign Ministry perhaps -- in discussing the ethnic issues -- Kurds and other minorities. You quickly found yourself talking about Cherkez, to a much lesser degree, Azeris, Alawites. The word "minority" had a special meaning and was used in connection with the Lausanne Treaty when Christian -- Greek and Armenian -- minorities were specifically listed in the Treaty. So to a Turkish government official particularly, the word "minority" didn't have the generalized meaning that it has to us. It meant those specific groups listed in the Treaty to whom the government owed certain obligations. But this issue was not very important in Turkey and the role of the small Christian minorities was seldomly raised. Perhaps one heard the role of a "minority" discussed in Istanbul because they were interwoven with the history of the city, but in Ankara, weeks would go by without a mention of these minorities because people just didn't think about them.

But the Kurds were different. There are two levels at which discussions of Kurds took place: 1) the problems in Eastern Turkey with tribal Kurds; 2) politicians especially would also talk about the hundreds of thousands of integrated Kurds in Turkish cities -- Istanbul and Ankara being the main locations. So if you talked to politicians or, on rare occasion to policemen, they would tell you which neighborhoods were Kurdish. Most outsiders would not have known because the Kurds in these neighborhoods spoke Turkish, were Sunni Muslims and were not subjected to any obvious discrimination. Indeed all government organizations had Kurds in them. Now it is generally acknowledged that at least 20% of the Turkish population is Kurdish. When I was in Turkey, 10% was the figure being used, even though there were people in the American Embassy who felt that the number was far larger than 10%. You have to remember that the period of the late '70s was politically very violent culminating in September 1980 with a military crack-down. For the few years preceding that, there was a lot of political violence, terrorism -- a lot of left-right combat. That was very disturbing to the Turks who are rather conservative and law and order oriented. It is interesting to note that the only widespread violence was political in origin; there were some other kinds of violence, but none with the fervor and extent of political one.

The violence was always explained in ideological terms. There were people who called themselves Maoists. Plain ordinary communists were considered almost conservative. During

this period, any idea that some Turks were inspired in any way by the Soviet example is nonsense. Whatever revolutionary appeal Soviet communism may have had in the '60s, was gone by the late '70s. By this time, no one was interested in the Soviet experiment; it was clearly irrelevant. These were Turkish revolutionaries, although people were misled by the use they made of Marxist vocabulary and symbolism. I am not trying to denigrate "Marxism", but its use in Turkey in the late '70s was just plain misleading. They had to talk about "revolution", but it did not have the same significance of years earlier.

But back to the Kurds. There were a large number of Kurds in Turkey's leftist groups. I suppose the motivation was nationalistic as well as ideological. I can remember some of the famous and bloody incidents, in Istanbul in particular, although not exclusively. There were some gangs of younger men that police were looking for. It was noticeable that, although the papers never referred to them as Kurds, their nicknames were such as "Kochero" -- meaning "eagle" in Kurdish. Many of the nicknames ended in "o" which suggested Kurdish origin. There was also an incident in an Istanbul suburb when the police surrounded an apartment building in which some of these young men were holed up. The police commented that the young people were talking a "foreign" language, which was actually Kurdish. But in general, the Turks were correct and smart in not generalizing about revolution and Kurdishness, even though, as I said, a lot of the young men belonging to revolutionary groups were Kurdish.

Q: That sounds somewhat akin to the United States where much of the leftist and Marxist leadership came from Jewish ranks, but it is not mentioned because we don't want something going. Is that a parallel analogy?

DILLON: Maybe. The interesting aspect is that it was certainly widely understood because it was not as if someone had to go around telling everybody that it was dangerous to mix ethnic issues and ideology. An awful lot of Turks seemed to understand it. There was no direct censorship on the issue but in newspaper accounts, there almost never was any identification of national origin of leftists. It was clearly very dangerous to link Kurds and leftists. It was especially true that no one wanted to call attention to the fact that among the integrated Kurds, who were, for the lack of a better phrase, "loyal Turkish citizens", were some leftist revolutionaries. No one wanted to raise that specter. The Turkish policy for a long time had been one of assimilation, which as I get older, I don't find a bad policy. In Turkish life, I believe, there is absolutely no barrier to Kurds who speak Turkish and who are Sunni Muslims. If you don't speak Turkish or if you speak it with such a thick eastern accent that no one can understand or if for some reason you are a member of a religious minority -- i.e. non Sunni Muslims -- then there were barriers to moving up in society. They were not written, but they existed. But the integrated Kurds didn't have those problems and I don't believe that most Turks viewed Kurds in western Turkey as subversive or enemies.

Q: Did the terrorism stem from the University or did it have its source elsewhere?

DILLON: I thought that it might have started around the Universities. To say that it came out of the Universities would not be accurate, but around the Universities there were a lot of poor young men living in miserable conditions. Turkish Universities are like European Universities; they are nothing like American Universities. They were large, urban, impersonal institutions with

little or no campus life. In the cities, there were large dormitories which are not connected with the Universities. So you get a large concentration of students, particularly young activist males, who live in these dormitories. The dormitories became factional headquarters; they became segregated and battle grounds between the leftists and the rightists. The rightists were almost 99% pure Turks; the leftists were more mixed, but a lot of them were Kurds. Then there was a large middle group of students who were trying to avoid the factional fighting altogether. The parents of course were very worried and encouraged their children not to live in these dormitories. Within the Universities, there were radical professors who promoted their ideology. I don't think one can clearly paint the professors as espousing violence, but Maoist philosophy had a radical chic in those days. They were influenced by Europeans as always. If you want to know what is going on in Turkey's ideological spectrum, go to Paris and you will see Turkey a few years hence. A few years before my period in Turkey, there was a well advertised Paris student scene. The Turkish professors had an exposure to that leftist student drive and over a period of time, brought it to Turkey. It was chic in Europe for many years to be anti-American; that also spread to Turkey. That period has fortunately passed and we are no longer the issue we used to be. Our overwhelming presence, at least in the eyes of many young Turks, contributed to this. So the leftist movement became enmeshed with anti-Americanism. In 1979 and 1980, Americans became direct targets. During my last year in Turkey, something like eight Americans were killed. They were either G.I.s or civilians who worked for the military. There were murders in both Istanbul and Ankara; that was very disturbing to all of us.

Q: Did you feel that the Turkish government had some control over the situation or did you feel somewhat isolated?

DILLON: I didn't really feel either of those. It was clear that the Turkish government did not have control of the situation. The government was alternating between Demirel and Ecevit. They detested each other; could never cooperate. So in effect Turkey had weak governments with Ecevit heading leftist governments and Demirel heading up rightist ones. Neither man was an extremist, particularly Demirel was essentially a centrist. Ecevit is not an extreme leftist, but somewhat of a romantic and very much influenced by what he saw as a European social-democratic movement.

The government was paralyzed. Police and security forces were "rightists", if one can use such term. That was a point that the left made over and over again. It was a pattern that happened in other places. You don't tend to find leftist police forces in most countries. In Istanbul particular, you could claim that the Laz dominated the police force. The Laz also dominated the criminal class. They were all rightists. The government, as I said, was paralyzed. There was no good way to deal with terrorism. What you had were young men, who were not from traditionally lower-classes -- some of very humble origins, some not -- and therefore very difficult to pin point. We had some of the same syndrome in Turkey as we have in the United States. Huge waves of protests when the police beat up the children of middle class citizens. We had Turkish families genuinely very upset and concerned about violence. They were concerned about safety, but on the other hand were also very critical of the security forces. The government was not very effective in handling this situation. There may have been people in Washington who thought that the Turkish leftist movement was inspired and supported from outside the borders. That was nonsense. None of us in the country believed that at all. We were convinced that these

movements were very much home grown. There was no scintilla of evidence that the Iranians, the Arabs or anyone else were involved. It was the Turks and the Kurds. The government, as I said, handled the situation badly. A lot of traditional police methods do not work. The police would be given a name, would apprehend the individual immediately and beat him badly. Then they would get other names and follow the same procedure. That would generate other names and so went the process. In a few days, they would have a large number of young men locked up. They had no time for careful investigation to separate the wheat from the chaff.

The Turks, by this time, had gotten the idea that the Jews were important politically in the United States and undoubtedly exaggerated that perception, but they always made a point about the very special position that the Sephardic Jews had in Turkey. I am not sure that at the popular level, people cared much one way or another. There was not much anti-Semitism in Turkey; it was not like Europe where you have that traditional, Christian-based anti-Jewishness. In Turkey, the only symptoms I observed were Turks pandering to what they believed to be a foreigner's view. You can say that of the Arab world as well. You occasionally get people who assume that because you are an American Protestant, that you must to some degree be anti-Jewish, which is nonsense. It was a kind of pandering statement. But I don't think anti-Jewishness is deeply rooted in the Turkish culture.

At another level, the Turks -- and we are seeing that today as the newspapers celebrate the 500th anniversary of the large Sephardic migration from Spain and Portugal to Turkey -- make a big thing about the Jews among them. That, of course, is for western consumption, but I don't think I ever witnessed anything that suggested that the Sephardic Jews were suffering from discrimination.

I am sorry to say that if any minority suffered from discrimination, it was the Greeks. I have been very annoyed over the years by the constant Greek obsession with the Turks. Whenever I would go to Greece, people would ask me how I could live in that "savage country". I didn't like that. On the other hand Istanbul Greeks did suffer from discrimination.

The honeymoon between the Turks and the Americans ended in the late 50s. From then on, Americans were scape-goated and blamed for all kinds of things. The Turks became very suspicious of Americans. The Cyprus affair really galvanized this feeling. There was a tremendous animus against Greeks whenever something was going on Cyprus. There is a free, popular press in Turkey and even though there were some taboos -- e.g. discussing Kurds, critical treatment of Ataturk -- and therefore some self-censorship, there was no inhibition on the discussion of Greeks. Huryet, a major newspaper with a circulation of over a million readers by the time I left Turkey, which was commercially very successful with offset presses and color picture, would beat the Cyprus-Greece problem to death. Even the more intellectual newspapers, like the Cumhuriyet and Milliyet would take the same approach. They would also treat the Cyprus issue in very xenophobic terms. The composition of the staff on those papers were important elements in Turkish political life. Sami Kohen, who is still the foreign writer of Milliyet, and a stringer for major American newspapers -- in fact, I see his byline a lot in the *Christian Science Monitor*, but he writes for others as well, goes often by the name of Sam Cohen and he is a Sephardic Jew. Abdi Ipekci, who was murdered by a Turkish rightist, was the premier Turkish newsman of his time, was a donme and a very Turkish nationalist in addition.

The minority picture in Turkey is complex and multi-level.

The Turks should have done years ago the things for the Kurds that they say they are willing to do now in cultural and economic matters. It may be too late, but if they had done them thirty years ago, they might have been successful. Now they are willing to let people speak Kurdish and are discussing letting Kurds have some cultural identity, but it may be too late.

The other minorities are interesting, but politically insignificant; the Turkish record is not bad on minority treatment. When one says that, one is immediately tagged as an "apologist", but in fact their record is not bad. They used the old "Millet" system which worked for many years, although towards the end it was far from perfect. In effect, the Turks left people in the hands of their own religious authorities. That was one of the reasons why in the early days, the Turks were welcomed as liberators and why many, many people converted to Islam. It was not because the Turks were holding knives to their throats, but because they wanted to get away from their own authorities. Surely there a large number of people in modern Turkey who, although Sunni Muslims, are the descendants of Greek and Armenian ancestors, who voluntarily converted to Islam. Christians sometimes like to believe that the conversions were forced, but in fact they weren't; it may have happened occasionally, but not as a rule. The Arabs converted people forcefully sometimes, but that was not the Turkish style.

Q: There were two outside events that occurred while you were in Turkey. One was the convulsion in Iran (the take over of our Embassy in Tehran) and the invasion of Afghanistan. How were these viewed by our Embassy in Ankara?

DILLON: The Iran situation was viewed with mounting horror, to say the least. The Turks were greatly concerned. There is a sense that Iran is an awfully long way away from Turkey, even though the two countries have a contiguous border. But the heart of Turkey, which is Western Turkey, where most of the population dwells, is separated from Iran by eastern Turkey, which was largely Kurdish and then across the border, in Iran, is the province of Azerbaijan which is populated by people of Turkish descent and more Kurds. The heartland of Turkey and the heartland of Iran are a long way apart. These two countries never really felt like neighbors.

The Turks of course had modernized much more quickly than the Iranians. They were concerned by a reactionary movement which was religiously driven and led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. That was horrifying to them. The Turkish press and popular opinion in general was very anti-Khomeini. Undoubtedly, there were individuals who supported the revolution, but on the whole the prospect was not pleasing to the Turks. There was no great upsurge of religious fervor. There had been for sometime a lot of pandering in the political parties to Islam. Pandering to Islam by secular politicians is a hell of a lot different than having religious leaders who emerge as political leaders. In Turkey, there was a party called the Salvation Party, headed by Erbakan, which was outrageous in its pandering to Islam. They ended up at one point with 12% or 13% of the vote, but this was nothing like Iran. Erbakan and his deputy, Korkut Ozal, who was a brother of Turgut Ozal, who later became Prime Minister, were essentially secular leaders. But Erbakan is still in political life in Turkey today. He is an absolute fraud. If he were in the United States, he would be a TV evangelist with a scandal surrounding him, but with a pocket full of money. Many Turks were worried not only because of the nature of Iran's revolution, but wondered whether the

Soviets would take advantage of it or what other events might be triggered by Khomeini's assumption of power. There was a good deal of sympathy among the Turks for the refugees from Iran. It is worth recording that they were well treated. The official Turkish position was to close the border to people without entry permits; on the other hand, if one managed to cross the border, the refugees were taken care of. The Turks were very helpful to fleeing Americans. There were a number of cases of Americans who got close to the border and made a run for it and as soon as they had reached Turkish territory, they were protected and assisted.

I should mention that we monitored communication channels. One of those was the Iranian Embassy in Ankara. After the revolution, the Iranian Ambassador fled. The Embassy was taken over by what was called the "students committee", although the diplomatic staff remained in place. Reading the Iranian communications was appalling because they were so clearly pandering to the religious nuts back in Tehran. If Tehran formed its world views based on the information from its Embassies, it was totally misled because the reports from Ankara, for example, suggested that Turkey was on the edge of a major religious upheaval. It simply wasn't true. There were all sorts of misleading reports from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara. I found it difficult to believe that the reporting officers believed the misinformation they were filing; on the other hand, people often find what they are looking for and they may have found some evidence to support their arguments. The Iranians were not very sophisticated about their communications, so that we routinely read probably everything they sent home that was allegedly political reporting and commentary. On one level it was funny; on another it was frightening. I sat there thinking that if these messages reflected their views of Turkey, how misled were the Iranians about other countries?

I left in August, 1980. At that time, the Turks were still trying to digest what was happening in Tehran. Our people had not been released from their "quarters" in Tehran. The Turks were very helpful to us since they had still a functioning Embassy in Tehran. Also, particularly through Azerbaijanis, the Turks had pretty good reporting. They were very sensitive that the Iranians not see them as reporting to the Americans; on the other hand, they would brief us very carefully and seriously on what they were being told. They would report to us information about the hostages. At one time, there were some hopes that the Turks might be helpful in resolving the hostage crisis. Publicly, the Turks said very little about Iran. They were smart enough not to get caught up in a public debate. I remember meeting with the Turkish Ambassador to Iran when he returned from Tehran. He didn't want to make a big thing about meeting with me; in fact, I think I had to go to Istanbul to see him. We spent some hours together talking about the Tehran scene and his views. The Turkish Foreign Ministry is quite good. This Ambassador was very good in his analysis. His views were well documented and balanced. He had obviously kept up his contacts and was quite familiar with what was going on. I took notes and wrote up a lengthy report.

The Turks would also on occasion share with me information they received from their border post at Maku. That covered events in such places as Tabriz. There was nothing secret about it, but it was good reporting. It became clear to me in the course of these debriefings that the Turks had a pretty good network of informants among ethnic groups in Iran. I don't know how things developed in the 80s. I assume that the Turks continued their attempts to maintain decent relations with Iran; that would be absolutely characteristic of the way they would operate. What

they thought privately was irrelevant; they would make an effort to maintain good and normal relationships. The Turks are *status quo* minded; they don't want any questions about borders; they want good relations with their neighbors. They don't want to feel threatened.

As far as Afghanistan was concerned, the Turks always had a thing about that country. After Ataturk became President, one of the few places outside of Turkey that he became involved in was Afghanistan. Until the late '60s, there were Turkish military instructors in Kabul. I remember meeting the Afghan Ambassador who had defected to Turkey in the '70s. He had been a former Afghan military officer who had gone to Yildiz, the large Turkish military staff college in Istanbul. So the relationship between the Turks and the Afghan had been close for many years. The Turks became a little sentimental about the Afghans perhaps because they were so far away that they didn't create any threat whatsoever. The Turks had attachments to strange little places. Albania was another one partly for historical and cultural reasons. They had a similar attachment to the Afghans. They viewed these little countries as friendly and as culturally related. So the Turks reacted very negatively to the communist revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even among the intellectuals, Russian communism was *passee* and the events in Kabul did not find much appeal in Turkey.

At the popular level, the fear of the Russians still existed. The Afghan events reinforced the views of those who believed that the Soviet Union offered a threat. The Soviet invasion may have discredited the left to a small extent. It strengthened the right, particularly a man like Turkesh, who was viewed as the chief secular rightist as opposed to the religious rightists. He could cite Afghanistan as evidence that he had been right all along. Incidentally, Turkesh now cites the emergence of the Turkish republics in Central Asia as proof that his earlier views were right. There is a lot of racism involved in the views of these rightists. They are a minority. I doubt whether they make up more than five percent of the political active Turks. They are a strange little minority with strange racist views, even though the Turks, of all people, are immensely mixed. Racism doesn't make sense in any context, but it certainly makes even less sense in a country as mixed as Turkey.

Q: How did our policy of negativism of the Afghan invasion play in Turkey? How did they view our cancellation of participation in the Olympics, for example?

DILLON: I can't remember how the Turks responded. The Turks are never enthusiastic about that kind of gesture. But it would be dangerous for me to say that they didn't respond. The Turks were pretty good at keeping things like Olympics out of politics. They are not a big Olympic power; there are only a few events, like wrestling and weight-lifting -- traditional Turkish sports -- that really interested them. They were good at keeping sports and politics separate. A lot would have depended on whether they wanted to please us, but I don't really recall their reaction.

The big issue between the Turks and us at the time was the opium traffic -- its cultivation and smuggling -- and our exaggerated view that the Turks were responsible for heroin coming into the United States. So the Turkish reaction to Afghan events was undoubtedly guided by their views of what would play better with our Congress. This period was also one during which we had just gotten the military assistance embargo lifted -- the one that was invoked after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

Q: You were in Turkey essentially for the whole Carter administration. That regime emphasized "human rights". You have already discussed that situation in Turkey as you saw it from Ankara. How were the Embassy's relationships with the Bureau for Human rights in the State Department?

DILLON: The Bureau of Human Rights was just getting under way when I left for Turkey. I remember better what the Embassy-Bureau relationships were when I was in Cairo because by that time that Bureau had become a power-house. I do remember reporting on the human right issue from Turkey. We were mainly preoccupied by the issue of police brutality. The Turkish police were brutal. I am not rising to their defense by saying that they are probably no more brutal than the French, who are awful; the Greeks were pretty bad. The Turkish police was essentially the same as others. They are poorly educated, poorly trained, poorly paid; they come primarily from lower classes. I have earlier described their investigating technique. There were allegations of abuse of some of the women that were arrested. I obviously don't know the truth of those allegations, but I don't have reasons to disbelieve the allegations.

Political freedom was pretty well established in Turkey by the late '70s. The Army assumed power again in 1980 and was repressive for several years. A lot of the "Amnesty International" allegations about Turkey stemmed from the period following the Army coup, starting particularly in the Fall of 1980 and for the following three years. The Army was fairly brutal in its repression. The left was crushed and it was from that process that many allegations of human right violations stemmed. While I was there, there wasn't very much of that. For example, it was very difficult for people in the United States to believe that the American prisoners in Turkish jails were not mistreated; in fact, they were not.

The Hayes case is interesting. I have already described it. It was a tricky matter. There were Turks who understood that Billy Hayes was a political embarrassment and that Turkey would be better off if he were released. On the other hand, so much ado had been made about the whole narcotics issue that a number of Turks felt that it would be very unpopular for the government to do anything for Hayes. The sad thing that happened -- and I think this is what got Americans upset -- was that there was an appeal filed. In our system, in an appeal process, you can't be punished more than the original sentence; you may get relief, but you can not be punished further. The Turks use the European system which permits a complete re-evaluation of the case if an appeal is made. So, in Hayes' case, the appeal process resulted in a doubling of the original sentence. That really evoked outrage in the United States in part because of the lack of understanding of the differences between the two systems. In Turkey, cases and appeals are heard by a panel of judges (no juries), who are employees of the state (the Ministry of Justice). They are supposed to be graduates of the law schools. The system is copied essentially after the Italian model. The criminal justice system was a copy of the Italian system; the commercial law was modeled after the Swiss. In any case, the Turkish legal process came under American scrutiny and many Americans became very upset by it.

I remember reading a good article in the NEW YORKER magazine which pointed out how dishonest the movie about Billy Hayes' Midnight Express was. In an interview the director, Oliver Stone said that the movie was not about Turkey, but rather about "violence". It was simple sophistry. It was a movie about Turkey and was seen as such. At the end of the movie, there was

an attempt made to portray it as factual by adding a statement that as result of the Hayes incident, the Turks and the Americans had signed a treaty for exchange of prisoners. It is true that such a treaty was signed; I helped to negotiate it. But that was the result of neither the book, nor the movie, not the Hayes case itself; the idea had been under discussion for a long time. It had a lot to do with some prisoners in the Adana jail. In any case, I hope Billy made a lot of money and repaid his parents.

The filming of the Midnight Express was done in two different ways. Some was done in a Turkish bazaar with a hand held camera. The rest was filmed in Malta, around buildings that looked vaguely like Istanbul. The extras were Turkish speaking people, but if you listened carefully, you could detect a thick Greek accent on most of them. You could imagine the Turkish reaction! They saw a movie which denigrates them and their country. The movie painted a very dismal picture of Turks; then to have the actors speak with a Greek accent, really outraged them. They felt victimized. But a movie that pretends to be factual should be just that; it wasn't.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Ambassador
Turkey (1977-1980)

Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. In addition to being ambassador to Turkey, he served in the United Kingdom (England), Turkey, the Bahamas, Pakistan, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Spiers was interviewed by Thomas Stern on June 3, 1992.

Q: Auten set the standard for service to U.S. Congressmen throughout Europe. She was known to all American Embassies on the Continent. In 1977, you were appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. How did that come about?

SPIERS: One day while serving in London, I was called by Bill Galloway, who was a special assistant to Dick Moose, who had been a neighbor of ours in Hollin Hills (Fairfax County, VA). We had been living, before going to London, on a short cul-de-sac in Hollin Hills; Tom Pickering lived right across the street from us and Moose was next to him. I had known Dick from his earlier stint in the State Department; in 1977 he was the Deputy Under Secretary for Management in the Carter administration. I didn't ask to be reassigned; I was quite happy in London. I had been in London almost three years and it was time to think of another assignment. In any case, Galloway called and asked what I wanted to do next. He thought I could have my pick of posts. I mentioned a few; Turkey was not in that list -- Greece may have been.

The next Washington call came from Phil Habib, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who said that the White House had approved my assignment to Turkey. I know that that call came before the Carter visit because during the visit, Carter asked me what I was going to do next and I had to tell him that he had recently nominated me to go to Turkey as his "personal representative" i.e. Ambassador. Carter said: "Oh, yes, that is right. I remember that!".

I didn't know much about Turkey and I guess I was somewhat disappointed. As I said, I would have liked to go to Greece or something similar. But as it turned out, my Turkey assignment was the high point of my career in many respects. I think that originally I was supposed to go to Iran. David Aaron had mentioned that possibility when he came to London with Mondale. I told him that I would prefer not to go there. I didn't have any sympathy for the Shah and in any case, I was a NATO expert and thought that I should be assigned to a country that was part of that coalition. I suspect, although I never had any confirmation, that David, upon his return to Washington, mentioned my concerns and had my prospective assignment changed to Turkey. In retrospect, I am more than delighted with that change. I would have been in Iran during the Shah's fall, as Bill Sullivan was.

We returned to the States with my family remaining in Vermont, while I went to Washington for a week or ten days of briefings. We didn't have much time because there was still no Ambassador in London and the post couldn't be left open for too long. Then we returned to London, stayed there to break in the new Ambassador -- the new DCM, Ed Streater, had not yet arrived -- and went through the usual farewell routines and then on to Ankara. My main background in Turkish matters came from my EUR/RPM and PM days. That was very little.

Q: What did you expect to find in Ankara and how were those expectations met?

SPIERS: I didn't know what to expect because I knew so little. I had worked with Turkish officials. The senior official in the Foreign Ministry when I arrived in Ankara was an old friend - - Sukru Elekdag -- who later became the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. I knew him when he had been head of NATO affairs for the Turkish Foreign Office in the mid 60s. I got to know him well as I did many of the officials in charge of NATO affairs in the various Foreign Ministries of NATO countries.

So I had some friends, but I didn't really know what to expect. I didn't speak Turkish; I had only visited there once as Director of PM; I didn't know anything about the country beyond the NATO relationships, e..g the internal political situation, the economic conditions, etc.

I found an absolutely fascinating country filled with great people. I loved the Turks. It is a country that has had about twelve civilizations moving across its surface, with each leaving its mark. Turkey was the location of a lot of places that I thought were in fact in Greece.

When I arrived the U.S.-Turkish relations were in very bad shape because of the arms embargo which Congress had imposed after the Cyprus invasion. I believe that in fact many in Congress were motivated by the desire to embarrass Kissinger rather than just to punish Turkey. Kissinger had had a close relationship with the Turks; he liked them very much. Before going to Ankara, I went to see Henry and he told me that I was going to one of the most important places in the world. He thought that the administration had made a great assignment and that I was very lucky. I asked him a lot of questions about various Turkish personalities whom he knew well.

Al Haig, whom I had known from EUR/RPM and PM days was then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He also regarded Turkey as one of the most vital links in Western defense. Turkey was the eastern flank of NATO, bordering on the Soviet Union. We

had a lot of important listening posts -- intelligence facilities -- there. From Turkey, we monitored Soviet nuclear tests. The whole southern part of the Soviet Union was covered by devices located in Sinop, Karamursel and Diyarbakir. All of these were very important military facilities. We had an important air base at Incirlik. The commander of the NATO south east flank was stationed in Izmir where the U.S. had a substantial military contingent. My challenge was to get relationships back to a more friendly basis. The relations, despite all of our military presence and the importance of Turkey, were at a stand still. The Turks, in retaliation for the embargo, had closed all the PXs. Our military stayed, but it was not a pleasant situation. Demirel was the Prime Minister then; he recently became that again. I just saw him in New York a few weeks ago. The internal politics were on a see-saw. Ecevit and Demirel would trade-off the Prime Ministership. They disliked each other personally. What ever one of them did when in office, the other would undo when he succeeded. It was a very unstable political situation with the political extremes -- both right and left -- at war with each other. It was very difficult security situation; eight Americans were killed during my tour by Turkish terrorism, mostly left wingers from the revolutionary group Devsol, which was quite anti-American. About five thousand Turks were being killed every year in political shoot outs. A right wing group would drive by a left wing coffee house and throw some fire power into it, killing some and the next day the left would retaliate in similar fashion. These outbreaks of political violence lasted throughout my tour.

Our relationship with Ecevit was interesting. He was the Prime Minister for most of my tour. He had been a journalist, an intellectual. We got along pretty well primarily because he was a devotee of T.S. Eliot -- he had translated a lot of Eliot's works into Turkish -- and I happen to know by heart a considerable amount of Eliot's poetry. So that built a good base for a relationship. In general, Ecevit was very suspicious of the American government. This stemmed from a leftist, socialist ideological background. He was also anti-military. He spoke excellent English, having lived in the U.S. as a student and journalist. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Turkish relationships had tensions.

The Congress was a major problem. We used to have a number of Congressional delegations visit; I used to believe they left with a better understanding of the situation. But there were two Greek-American members of Congress that were a real stumbling block: Paul Sarbanes and John Brademas. I had only seen Pat Leahy and Bob Stafford, the two Senators from Vermont before I left for Turkey. As I mentioned earlier, I wasn't in Washington very long between London and Ankara. During my briefings in Washington the Greek "lobby" may have been described to me, but at that time I didn't really have an appreciation for its political heft; that I didn't find out about that until I had been in Turkey for a while.

I had known both Sarbanes and Brademas before. Both had been Rhodes scholars; both visited London relatively frequently. Whenever they came to London, they would have dinner with me. I introduced them to a number of important Britishers; that I think helped them look at me favorably. But once I became engaged in Turkish affairs, we were on opposite sides of the fence. I considered the embargo as pure impediment to good US-Turkey relations without having a scintilla of effect on Turkey's Cyprus policy. It just hardened the Turkish position and I said so. They were unhappy. They called me on the carpet. I had to return to Washington and they, in effect, threatened to have me fired. It is interesting to note that after I left Turkish matters, we all

became friends again. I saw Sarbanes often when I was Under Secretary for Management and when I was Director for Intelligence and Research. I saw Brademas often when he became President of NYU and I was at the UN.

It has been suggested that they were motivated by anti-Kissinger feelings, but I think they were just spokesmen for the American-Greek community. That made them strong opponents of Turkey. Of course, in some ways, the Turks are their own worst enemies. They are not very adept at handling Congressional relations. They are not very nimble politically; they are not very subtle; they are heavy-footed, deliberate and lumbering. They have very little understanding of the American system. I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully.

Q: Let me pursue that effort a little because I think it is somewhat unusual in the Foreign Service. What led you to cultivate a foreign military establishment?

SPIERS: I did that in Turkey, Great Britain and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff -- Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie -- gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect. It was very amusing.

Q: Lets' talk a little about Cyprus. What was that situation in the 1977-80 period?

SPIERS: The Turks are not very flexible, but they were helped at the time by the fact that Cyprus was also governed by an inflexible leader, Kyprianou, who was probably the greatest obstacle to conciliation. That protected the Turks from themselves; they didn't need to overcome their own inflexibility. At the beginning of the crisis the Turks probably had a very defensible position. There had been a coup in Cyprus which overthrew Makarios; that was engineered by the Greek military who undoubtedly wanted to incorporate the island with Greece. In some respects, Cyprus is much like North Ireland -- very difficult to solve; the problems are confessional and cultural. The Turks are a minority on an island forty miles off their own coast. The Greeks are a majority, but separated widely from the metropole. The Turks are the poor; they have been badly treated for a long time by the majority. That situation rankled. The Turkish Cypriots are much like the North Ireland Catholics -- the dispossessed, the poor, the despised minority. But the Turks, in their usual way, are not very agile in dealing with the issue.

We urged genuine negotiations, but most people realized that the obstacle at the time was Kyprianou, the Cypriot President. So the Turks couldn't be solely or even primarily responsible for the deadlock, but I did what I could to urge that reasonable negotiations be undertaken. For

the Turks, the "Law of the Sea" negotiation was a much more important issue at the time in their relationships with Greece. I didn't constantly raise the Cyprus issue; Washington didn't expect that and it would have been counter-productive. Cyprus was a major issue and I followed it closely in Ankara; when I had an opportunity, I would urge negotiations, but never in a heavy handed manner. I tried to explain to the Turks the American political system in which they were at a disadvantage because there was little Turkish influence in Congress, nor was there a very vocal American-Turkish lobby. There had been a large number of Turkish immigrants, but most had been assimilated and had lost that fervor for their former homeland that Greek-Americans tend to display. I tried to point out these realities, but the situation was just not ripe for negotiations.

Today, the obstacle to a solution is Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot, much more than the Greeks. Nevertheless, I think today's situation is ripe for negotiations. But the Turks are very heavy handed, stubborn, suspicious of the Greeks. On the other hand, they are much more straight forward than the Greeks, more loyal and reliable. The Greeks can run circles around them in the public relations arena; they are faster, quicker, they appear much more flexible. The Turks sense this difference and that makes it much harder to deal with them on the Cyprus question.

The issue loomed large when I was in Turkey. The Turks hated the Greeks; they had a love-hate relationship with us. In 1974, Johnson had sent a letter to Ecevit which the Turks read as a threat. They read it to say that if the Soviets attacked, the NATO accords would not be called into effect because the crisis was related to Cyprus and not to an East- West issue. It was a mistake to send that letter, given the existing political situation and the cultural chasm. It generated a very bad relationship between the U.S. and Turkey which was still very much in evidence when I got to Ankara three years later.

As I mentioned earlier, fortunately I knew a few people in the Foreign Office. It was lucky that I knew something about T.S. Eliot. It was lucky that I had an affinity for the military, which very soon came to accept me as an active opponent of the embargo. When I came home on leave, I spent almost every day for two months working the Hill. I must have talked to about 250 Congressmen. I know I changed fifty votes and eventually the embargo was lifted by a very, very close vote. The Turks appreciated my efforts.

Sarbanes and his colleagues represent a strong ethnic nationalist affinity. Their position was not entirely unreasonable. Even Sarbanes will admit that the original Turkish invasion in 1974 was probably justified, but then a truce was declared, which the Turks broke by occupying additional territory to consolidate their position. That Sarbanes finds unreasonable and I must say, even without the pro-Greek bias that Sarbanes has, that his position has merit. Strangely enough, one of my best friends in Ankara happened to be the Greek Ambassador -- George Papoulias -- who later became the acting Foreign Minister for the Greek government. I think that the Greek Ambassador in Ankara reported to Athens which reported to Washington, including Congress, that I was not anti-Greek.

Q: Do you see an eventual settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute?

SPIERS: It has to come sometimes. The tensions are deep rooted in history. Greece was part of the Ottoman empire and then revolted against it in 1822 after a costly war. Greece and Turkey were on opposite sides during World War I, and Greece invaded Anatolia after the Axis' defeat. Greece took a lot of islands in the Dodecanese which were very close to Turkish shores. They were taken over by the Italians during World War II, but after the end of that war, reverted to Greek control. The "Law of the Sea" is a major issue because the Turks feel their access to the Aegean Sea is unacceptably restricted because the Greeks have declared unilaterally a ten-mile zone around all of their islands, which effectively hampers Turkish access to both the sea and some of their ports. Then there are the cultural differences to which I alluded earlier. The Turks have something of an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Greeks. So we are facing a set of difficult and complex issues, many of which have long historical roots. But there is no reason why they can't be resolved.

The real tragedy is that after World War I, Ataturk and Venizelos met and arranged for a transfer of populations. But that arrangement did not apply to Cyprus because at that time Cyprus was a British protectorate and therefore could not be part of any Turkish-Greek deal. The Cyprus problem is a real one; as I said, it is much like Northern Ireland and much like the present problems in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia lies across the fault line between the former Ottoman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, which creates all sorts of cultural and religious divisions. Cyprus has a Muslim North and a Christian South, with the latter being richer than the former. The Greeks have emphasized business in their history; the Turks have leaned toward the military. That explains to a considerable extent the economic gap between the two. But the issues between them are not unresolvable.

Q: Did you while in Ankara keep in constant communication with the U.S. Ambassador in Athens? Did you try to coordinate strategy?

SPIERS: We were always in touch with our Athens Embassy. We kept each other informed. Unfortunately, we couldn't visit each other; we probably would have had to go to Frankfurt in order to get to either capital. I didn't have even a chance to go to Cyprus until after I left Turkey. Galen Stone was our Ambassador in Nicosia and we tried to keep in touch with him. There had been a history of antagonism between the two American Embassies and I would have none of that while I was in Ankara.

Q: The embargo was lifted in 1978. How did that change your role?

SPIERS: It immediately made it easier for the Americans in Turkey. The PXs and the Commissaries opened giving us all access to a new supply line. The relationships between the Turkish and U.S. military reopened. The Turks became eligible again for military assistance. This was very helpful because the Turks had always felt that they had gotten the short end of the stick from NATO in terms of military hardware especially since they were the nation with the longest common border with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they felt, and appropriately so, that they did more for NATO than any other country by hosting so many military and intelligence facilities. They were very loyal to NATO, but felt unappreciated. The Turks have been given short shrift by the European Community; they have gotten a very cold shoulder. The Turks feel this discrimination very keenly.

Our embargo certainly had an impact on Turkish military preparedness. When the embargo was lifted, we had to face the question of the level of assistance. I had spent a lot of time with the military, as I have mentioned, both Turkish and American. We had a large military assistance office. I worked very closely with our military planners who had office in the Turkish General Staff headquarters. The Turkish requirements were so great that we couldn't possibly have met them. In addition to all the other issues, we were also stuck with the McNaughton commitments that I described earlier. As I said, I think his promises were made without reference to Washington; he may have added that "the administration would make its his best efforts", but those footnotes are seldom heard by the other side. The "McNaughton commitment" made our job very difficult because the Turks always said that we were not doing enough for them; we would point out to the high level of our assistance, but in fact, their needs were so high that even a doubling or tripling of our assistance would probably not have met the requirements that NATO's planners had established. The Germans also provide assistance. I used to meet with their Ambassador; he had been previously the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union and earlier to NATO.

The perceived "shortfalls" were a constant source of tensions. Intellectually, the Turks may have understood the mechanics of the U.S. government, but not emotionally; that is true for many countries. They feel that if the President of the United States really wanted something done, he could ensure it is done. They can not accept the concept of divided powers, of checks and balances. Even the British have a hard time understanding a Presidential system. So when an American President is not able to obtain Congressional support, he is perceived as not really having wanted to do so; the failure is due to the lack of personal commitment and not a systemic problem as it is often.

Q: Did you have to face the issue of the relationship of the Greek assistance program to the Turkish one?

SPIERS: That was not as much of a problem in the late 70's as it is today. In those days, the issue was a Congressional matter; the administration opposed the 7:10 ratio, so that that ratio was a sense of Congress and not law. It was a relationship that the administration had not accepted; later the Executive Branch may have gotten used to it because it is certainly in effect now. Of course, the Turks also opposed the concept.

Military assistance was the major aid effort still in being when I was Ambassador. The old aid program had been phased out; the only economic assistance still left was what was called "security assistance" which was essentially a budget support program. It was useful to us because any assistance program is useful to achieve political objectives. I spent a lot of time on Turkish economic issue, particularly in the Ecevit period. He was essentially a socialist. The Turks are well-organized and hard-working, but were hampered by statist economic ideas. As a matter of fact, Turkey is a fertile soil for foreign investment because the returns will be good. But they did have a lot of quasi-socialist rhetoric and formulas. Some Turks were convinced that our embargo was really an economic one, promoted by the Greek lobby to strangle them. I used to tell them that they couldn't blame the U.S. for their crazy economic policies. One of the pillars of Ataturkism was "statism" -- state owned industries. Such policy may have been defensible in

Ataturk's time, but by the end of the 70s, the Turks had pushed the concept so far that many of their industries were totally non-competitive. Their products were not marketable overseas. They had an import substitution policy which could not be justified on economic grounds. I cooperated with the IMF and the World Bank to try to get those institutions to push the Turks towards more sensible economic policies, which they finally accepted under Demirel. I used to talk to the military about their country's economic policies. When the military executed their coup in September, 1980 -- shortly after my departure -- Evren became the head of government and he instituted a more sensible economic policy with a much greater emphasis on the free market, which is what Turkey needed.

Security assistance was not very useful in changing the government's economic policies. It was helpful in our relationships with the military. What would have been more helpful than anything else would have been the removal of U.S. tariffs on Turkish textiles and the abandonment of the multi-fiber agreements. Those are actions that are often much more economically useful than aid. Some Turks complain about our protectionist policies and we didn't have a very good answer to their charges. They would point out that they had proceeded with economic reforms of the kind that we had urged on them and which made them competitive and then we raised the tariff barriers so that they had difficulties selling their wares in the U.S. market. What made the matter even more egregious was that the Turkish exports were really minuscule in the total textile picture.

Q: You earlier mentioned the physical security problems in Turkey. Was the left-right conflict also a barrier to economic development?

SPIERS: Of course. It had to interfere with development. It was destabilizing; it was a barrier to foreign investment. Fortunately, most of the conflict had abated although periodically there was some resurgence. There are some sympathies for Muslim fundamentalism. You have to understand that Turkey is stratified. The older generation spoke German; the middle generation spoke French; and the youngest generation spoke English. So German is now disappearing, but at the time of Ataturk, the German relationship through World War I was very strong. In addition to this generational gap, there were strong ideological differences, with a pure revolutionary sentiment being felt by part of the population. That in part caused the domestic violence. Turkey has some elements of a tribal society. Vengeance is a very Turkish sentiment. If someone kills a member of your family, you are duty bound to kill some one in the family of the aggressor. Tensions spiral upwards.

Q: What was the Kurdish situation in the late 70s?

SPIERS: The Turks denied that there was a Kurdish situation. Now they have accepted the facts of life. They believed that all people living within Turkish borders were Turks first. They called the Kurds "mountain Turks". There was some evidence of Turkish cultural imperialism. They refused to let the Kurds use their language. It was a question whether everybody had to speak the same language or whether diversity and separate nationalism would be acceptable. But there was no overt insurgency while I was in Turkey. There were Cabinet officers who were of Kurdish origin.

I had great concern for these internal instabilities but there wasn't much we could do about it. I was personally exposed to terrorism on two occasions. The first one occurred shortly after we arrived while we were visiting Istanbul. The U.S. government had an apartment there for the Ambassador because Ambassadors spent considerable amount of time in that city. About 3 a.m. one morning there was a loud pounding on the apartment's door. I was there with my wife and one of our daughters and Dick Moose's daughter who was visiting us at the time. I roused myself from bed and went to the door and looked through the peephole. There, in the hallway, were three seedy-looking bearded guys carrying machine guns. I was quite concerned, particularly since they were yelling at me in Turkish and I didn't understand a word they said. My wife looked out of the window into a narrow alley and told me that a police car was parked there. At about this time, the phone rang; it was the Consulate General's Marine Guard who said that a detachment was on its way over to the apartment and asked that I wait for them. When they arrived, we let every one in. Apparently, CIA had intercepted a message between Japanese Red Army operatives reporting that they had plans to attack the American Ambassador or the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul. The intelligence people didn't pay much attention to it because they assumed that the Japanese Red Army had Ankara and Istanbul confused. But when someone found out that I was in fact in Istanbul, it dawned on them that precautions might be in order. I found out all of this later. So the police and the Marines had come to the apartment to intercept any attack that the Red Army might have contemplated.

The other terrorist threat occurred in Ankara itself. A team of Palestinian-Syrian terrorists occupied the Egyptian Embassy, which was about 500 yards from our Embassy on Ataturk Boulevard. That team killed several people; they captured the Egyptian Ambassador. They let him make only one phone call which he made to me; he wanted my help to intercede on his behalf. The siege was ended when the Turks stormed the Embassy and captured or killed the Palestinians, although a few more innocent bystanders were killed in the process. It turned out later that the terrorists' principal target had been the American Embassy, but they shied away from an attack because our facilities looked too well protected. So they went to the next Chancery up the street. That was a real plus for our security program. It is a lesson that I didn't forget when I became responsible for security as Under Secretary for Management.

Q: What do you believe the future holds for countries that have tribal rivalries, e.g., Northern Ireland, Turkey, etc?

SPIERS: I don't know. There may not be a solution. Yugoslavia will be an interesting test case. One of our friends is the former Yugoslavian Ambassador to the U.N. He was fired because he is a Croatian; his wife is a Serb. These internecine wars create a lot of personal hardships. Ethnic conflicts are deeply rooted and very hard to resolve. It is hard for an American used to a multi-ethnic society to comprehend how ethnicity can be such a potent force. We may have ethnic "lobbies" but we don't have open conflict between ethnic groups.

Our influence in situations of this kind is minimal. It may be that the U.N. can help. There are so many of them: the former Soviet Union republics, Northern Ireland, which is a confessional problem stemming in part from the implantation of British Protestants into Northern Ireland in the 1700s, Yugoslavia, where a solution is hard to imagine, Africa where there are many conflicts.

Q: Anything else that should be mentioned about your tour in Turkey?

SPIERS: It finished with a flourish; I signed a base agreement on my way to the airport for my trip home. I had been ordered back, again to my great unhappiness, to become the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

Q: So you were dragged out of Ankara. Why?

SPIERS: I never knew why. One day, a cable showed up on my desk in Ankara. It was sent by Harry Barnes, the Director General, telling me that Vance wanted me return to head INR. Bill Bowdler, who had been in the job, had been moved to Assistant Secretary for Latin America. Harry told me later that if I had called and told him that I wasn't interested, he would have looked for someone else. But I didn't have enough sense to do that; I accepted the assignment as an order from the Secretary. I really had enjoyed Turkey. We had traveled through the country to a great extent. It is probably the world's most fascinating country to travel through. I felt that as far as relationships were concerned, we and the Turks were beginning to travel a good road together. Demirel had just returned to power as Prime Minister and that I expected to be a big plus. Unfortunately, it didn't turn out that way because before too long the military once more interjected itself into the political life. I used to joke with Vance about the assignment. I told him that I had understood that he was looking for some one with "little intelligence" and that was me; I had as "little intelligence" as anybody. I suspect that the system had a vacancy to fill and since I was nearing the end of my three years, the dart fell on my name. I would have been glad to stay in Turkey.

ALAN FLANIGAN
Turkish Desk Officer
Washington, D.C. (1978-1980)

Alan Flanigan was born in Indiana in 1938. He graduated from Tufts University in 1960 and served in the U.S. Navy from 1960 to 1966 as a lieutenant. After entering the Foreign Service in 1966, his assignments abroad have included Lima, Izmir, Ankara and Lisbon, with an ambassadorship to El Salvador.

Q: When you left in '78 you came back to the State Department to be the Turkish desk officer.

FLANIGAN: And to work for Ray Ewing.

Q: You arrived in Washington at a time when things were very busy. The Congress was just on the verge of taking the action that President Carter had recommended.

FLANIGAN: That's right. In fact, I think it even happened before I got to the desk because I don't remember being engaged in the effort and the constant communication with Congress. I think it was afterward that I came to the desk.

Q: It was, I don't remember the exact date. It was during the summer of 1978.

FLANIGAN: Yes and I probably didn't get to the desk until August or September.

Q: In any event it was very close to it. You were on the desk trying primarily to build on and overcome a very difficult period. You went back to Turkey sometimes?

FLANIGAN: I went back to Turkey a couple or three times. I can't remember exactly. The Turks themselves I think, became determined to do better in getting the United States to understand their own perspectives. As I say, they began to develop some expertise in public relations. They sent a new ambassador over who was more modern, I suppose one would say, in his outlook and approach, Elekdag.

Q: Had been the secretary general before in the Foreign Ministry and so had been accustomed to dealing at a very high level with the United States and other countries.

FLANIGAN: That's right. I think by and large he was quite successful here. Obviously it did not overcome all of the problems Turkey has had over the years in making people understand what they are all about, but it began the process. From my perspective, what we were trying to do was to reestablish a relationship to the extent that we could that had been damaged by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, by our suspension of military sales, by their closure of the bases. So there was re-negotiation of the military basing agreement. There was constant effort to get some movement on the Cyprus issue. We thought we made incremental progress. History suggests we fooled ourselves.

Q: There was certainly a big issue about the level of assistance of military sales that should be permitted. The Turks wanted to recover lost ground as quickly as possible.

FLANIGAN: And in fact, we did expand rather substantially the assistance we gave to Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the lifting of the embargo. But, because of the pressures of the Congress, we also expanded the assistance that we gave to Greece in a 7-10 ratio as it were. It always took some of the edge off the satisfaction that Turkey received in whatever assistance we provided because they knew that Greece would be getting seventy percent of that amount. They didn't see themselves as a threat to Greece, whereas Greece saw Turkey as a constant threat. They saw Greece as an irritant, something that complicated relations with the United States and acted as a barrier to closer cooperation with Europe, not a military threat.

Q: And a much smaller country with much smaller armed forces.

FLANIGAN: That's right. The ability to do some damage perhaps but certainly not the ability to threaten Turkish sovereignty or Turkish nationality. In contrast, Greece was a small nation and knew that Turkey probably had the power to do exactly what the Ottoman Empire had once done.

Q: Alan, let me pose a question slightly differently than I started to before. Who were some of the main actors in U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey in the period you were the desk officer for

Turkish affairs?

FLANIGAN: Well, it was in the State Department. The counselor of the Department at that time was Matthew Nimetz, and he had been given principal responsibility for dealing with that part of the world. Even though Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were the responsibility of the European Bureau, Nimetz took the lead on this issue. George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, was kept informed but concentrated on other parts of the Bureau. There was also the active oversight and more than occasional participation by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher.

Q: And I guess the secretary was involved to some extent.

FLANIGAN: The secretary was involved to some extent. He was interested in the issue and from time to time did get involved personally.

Q: But as you say it was maybe one of the first major foreign policy issues that was given to Christopher and Nimetz to take primary responsibility for. How about members of Congress and their staffs? Was there a lot of interest in Turkey while you were the desk officer?

FLANIGAN: I think it was a down period in a sense. After all of the effort of the previous couple of years, the Congress took a breather. Of course assistance – how much and what kind – was a constant issue. There were people who were very interested. Senator Sarbanes, of course, a formidable member of the so-called Greek lobby was very supportive of the Greek community and was very effective in making sure that whatever we did to support Turkey did not jeopardize Greece or didn't appear to jeopardize Greece. He was very interested and very effective.

Q: Were there particular members who were special friends of Turkey? You had mentioned some before from a security point of view.

FLANIGAN: Yes, Steve Solarz had become identified as being a strong supporter of Turkey. Senator Tower and Senator Byrd became very strong and powerful supporters of the assistance program to Turkey over the years.

Q: How about in terms of supporting the embassy and U.S. citizen interests in Turkey, were there particular issues? The terrorism question that we mentioned before continued.

FLANIGAN: It continued and it grew because there were some American victims. Life for Americans in Turkey became more difficult in the two years after I left there. I think people began to be seriously concerned about their safety. When I was there, that generally was not the case even though occasionally there would be problems. My family and I traveled all over the country in our car, drove 55,000 miles in our car while we were there. The only great hazard was the traffic which was quite serious - and running out of gasoline which was sometimes serious out in rural Turkey too. Overall, it was a fairly safe place to be during the five years we were there. But it became increasingly unsafe while I was on the desk.

Q: The military did take action to overthrow or take over the civilian government. I think that

happened after you left the desk. That was kind of a political turmoil within Turkey as opposed to a safety level.

FLANIGAN: That's right. As I said, most of the violence in Turkey was left against right and right against left. It was political violence and we were occasional, sometimes accidental targets. The violence grew enormously in '79 and '80, and it was ultimately destabilizing. Unfortunately the elected government could not control the violence. The military stepped in. As you say, I had already left the desk.

Q: There were certainly warning signals.

FLANIGAN: I wouldn't say I wasn't surprised because you are always surprised when a democratic government is overthrown. In a sense you have been there at the beginning; you have observed the election; you have seen how it worked, and then suddenly it is all over. When you are an advocate for democracy, it is always disturbing to see it fail.

Q: How about the economic dimension of Turkey and U.S. relations with Turkey on that score? Was that something of particular interest to you as desk officer? Was much going on there?

FLANIGAN: There wasn't a lot going on yet. I mean Turkey was just beginning to seek and receive a lot of U.S. investment attention. I don't remember any particular issues or crises offhand.

Q: I think there was sort of an effort to stabilize the economy in the old International Monetary Fund. I think that happened near the end of your time maybe.

FLANIGAN: That's right. That was the second Demirel government.

Q: Then the military kept him on. That was after you left. They continued to have programs.

FLANIGAN: That is when they really did stabilize. That was the other element of course. Not only was security a problem, the economy was imploding in a sense. It had gotten out of hand.

Q: You had been desk officer in charge of Peruvian affairs and now Turkish affairs, with ten years in between. How different were your roles? Turkey was perhaps a much more important ally and country with very difficult problems. Was that the main difference or were there other differences in that decade or so in between?

FLANIGAN: It was the principal difference. It is hard to make judgments this far removed, but obviously there was a lot more interest in Turkey and what was going on. It was a much larger country as you say. It had some strategic importance for us that Peru did not have, and it was in the cold war context, so it was in that sense more important. As far as how we functioned, I think because of the interest in it and because of the fact that the counselor had been assigned specific responsibility and the deputy secretary had developed a personal interest and had responsibility, I had a lot more contact with the seventh floor and a lot more contact with policy makers. I can recall that Warren Christopher from time to time would call me to ask about developments in

Turkey. That was very different. It didn't happen on Peru.

Q: I suppose another difference was that other agencies, particularly the Defense Department but other agencies as well were very engaged and involved with Turkey in a way that I think you said before, you really didn't do much with other agencies with regard to Peru.

FLANIGAN: That's right, with the exception of the Defense Department which was interested. Once again I think the State Department was the primary protagonist in the relationship with Turkey, but that was already changing. There had been the beginning of a revolution in the way the U.S. Government deals with countries. I recall we were negotiating a prisoner exchange treaty. That was being done with the Justice Department. We dealt with Treasury from time to time on specific issues which hadn't happened in my earlier incarnation as a desk officer.

Q: You were involved with Turkey for about eight straight years which is pretty long for a Foreign Service career. Was that too much for you?

FLANIGAN: Well, it was too much at the time. I really felt that I needed to get away from it. By that time I had spent well over half of my career working on Turkey. It was a fascinating country. I always hoped that I would go back again, but I never got that opportunity.

DENNIS KUX
Political Counselor
Ankara (1978-1980)

Ambassador Dennis Kux was born in England in 1931 and emigrated to New York, New York in 1933. He graduated from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1952 with a degree in History. Ambassador Kux entered the U.S. Army in 1952, where he worked with intelligence as a prisoner of war interrogator in Korea. Ambassador Kux's career in the Foreign Service included positions in Pakistan, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on January 13.

Q: In 1978, you were assigned as Political Counselor to our Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. What were your considerations for accepting this assignment?

KUX: At first I thought that I wouldn't end up assigned there for personal reasons, because my wife couldn't get a job. In the end she decided to stay at home and continue working in the U. S. I remember drawing a circle of places which wouldn't be too far to get back home from time to time. Turkey was about as far as you could go and get back in a day.

One other consideration was that the Ambassador was very good -- Ron Spiers. He was somebody I had not known before. But he had an excellent reputation. I wanted to work for somebody who was a real "star." I hadn't really thought that much about Turkey. But when the job was offered, I said to myself, "Why not?" Everybody thought very highly of Ron Spiers.

Knowing that I was going to Turkey, I decided to study the thorny problem of Turkey, Cyprus and the Greeks. It was an opportunity to look at it in some depth, and my senior training assignment was an occasion to see how this policy had been put together. I focused in particular on the Greek lobby. I interviewed the leaders of the Greek community and traced how they operated in the American political world. In the Congress, I met two Greek-American Senators -- Sarbanes and Tsongas -- and a couple of Congressmen as well. I went to New York, Boston, and Chicago to see Greek community leaders. I concluded that it was very simple to put together a "Lobby." The Greek-Americans had a basic structure, the Greek Orthodox Church, which could readily mobilize people. They didn't have faxes then, but they had telexes. The Greek-American "lobby" had a small office in Washington, which kept track of what was going on. It fed information into a larger organization, called the "AHEPA.(American Hellenic Education Progressive Association)". AHEPA was an overall Greek ethnic organization, which went back to the 1920s.

I enjoyed working for Ron Spiers. He was very good -- an unusual manager, I think. He was intellectually very active, but he wasn't hyperactive in the embassy. He didn't go in for unnecessary work. He always left the Embassy on time and didn't come in on Saturdays -- unless something had to be done. He let his staff carry out their functions without interference. He was most unusual in that he really delegated responsibility. When he wanted to get into something, then he did get into it. Otherwise, he was rather laid back as was Bob Dillon, the DCM. The Counselors functioned as they saw fit. In Bob's case, he was surprisingly restrained because he was an experienced Political Officer and knew more about Turkey than anybody else in the Foreign Service. But he let me do my job and wasn't looking over your shoulder. It was a pleasure to work for both Ron and Bob.

The Political Section had seven officers and focused on three main issues. One related to presence of U. S. troops and the base negotiations. This had been handled separately, outside the Political Section, but Ron Spiers put responsibility for it back in the Political Section. We had a Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, Don Gelber, who, in effect, was the deputy chief of the Political Section. He more or less reported to me. He was a friend of Ron's. I think that Ron really hadn't gotten the boundaries quite straight between the Political and Political-Military Affairs sections, reflecting I suspect his previous assignment as Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department. But it worked out all right. Gelber and I shared a house and got along personally.

The major bilateral issue was trying to work out a satisfactory base relationship between us and the Turks. This issue was very difficult because the Turks were super-sensitive about sovereignty issues and were very tough negotiators. The U. S. forces are prone to setting up "Little Americas" overseas and didn't like the idea of local jurisdiction. Negotiations on this subject went on the whole time I was there. An agreement was finally agreed upon the night that Ron Spiers left Turkey in 1980. When I went to Turkey, there was no "Status of Forces" agreement as such; there were ad hoc arrangements which had been carried forward over the years. The Turks were unhappy about this because we had cut off military aid after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Aid had been restored just prior to my arrival thanks to a major push by the administration.

Handling military aid was another major task for Don Gelber. The other aspect of his work was dealing with American military units in Turkey. We had a couple of "listening posts," and the Air Force had a base at Adana. We had shrinking numbers of troops, but we had about three or four generals there. There was a NATO headquarters in Izmir. So there was a considerable U. S. military presence in Turkey, which was primarily Don Gelber's bailiwick. He did it very well.

The second major issue was Cyprus. Despite much effort, the US hadn't been able to make much progress on that. While I was in Turkey, things had pretty well reached a stand off. The Turks had their part of Cyprus, and the Greeks had their's. During the two years that I was in Turkey there wasn't any real movement on this issue. There were occasional "up's" and "down's," but I don't think that much happened. There was some interest from Washington in doing something about the Cyprus problem, but no pressure because there wasn't much that we could do. The UN in those days was very active on this issue, but it also could not work out an agreement to do anything. We weren't satisfied with the *status quo* because we always saw this issue as a potential flash point. Here were two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, more or less at each other's throats. We were always concerned that something would go wrong. We had good relations and periodic visits from and to our colleagues in Athens. We had different vantage points, but that never degenerated into bitterness or feuding.

There was a lot of physical insecurity in Turkey during those two years [1978-1980]. It was called the "anarchie", "the period of anarchy." First, Turkey had a weak Center-Left government and then a weak Center-Right government. There were Left wing anarchists periodically shooting up the towns and on the Right, there were some quasi-fascists, led by a Mr. Turkesh, making trouble, shooting leftists. A number of prominent people were killed, including the editor of the major newspaper, who was assassinated in Istanbul. Some Americans were targeted. There were nine Americans killed while I was in Turkey, all military people. So security was a real problem. One evening, around 6 or 7 p.m. somebody threw a bomb at my house while I was taking a nap and blew out all the windows in the living room. Our houses were not especially guarded. There may have been some soldiers around, but there was no special security. There was a terrorist attack just down the street at the Egyptian Embassy. A couple of people were killed. So there was a fair amount of insecurity in Turkey at the time.

A threat was made against Ambassador Spiers one time when he was visiting Istanbul. There was one other situation concerning a Political Officer, Bob Peck, later Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs. I had known him earlier when he worked on South Asian Affairs. He spoke good Turkish, traveled a lot and may have asked the Turks too many questions about what was going on locally. His name began to appear in the Turkish press. He was described as a "CIA agent." He wasn't. There was concern in the Embassy that he might become a target because he had become sufficiently prominent. He was also a victim of pro-Communist disinformation. The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, in a Left wing government -- he was a "Left winger" himself -- tended to take these allegations of CIA involvement seriously. He wouldn't accept our assurances, and suggested that the allegations were true. Then when we asked what he wanted us to do about these charges, he said: "Why don't you withdraw Peck?" In the end we didn't withdraw him, but Peck decided to leave early. So he left Turkey about a year early. Ambassador Spiers left this decision entirely up to Bob Peck. This was a technique which Ron used.

We felt the insecurity the most in 1979 after the trouble in Mecca [Saudi Arabia]. Muslim extremists had seized the Islamic Holy Places in Mecca and held them for a short time before being expelled. A rumor circulated in the Muslim world that the U. S. was somehow responsible for this incident.

Because of the burning of our Embassy in Islamabad, the Department started evacuating people throughout the Muslim world. I was Chargé d'Affaires that week as the Ambassador and DCM Bob Dillon were both away. Dave Newsom, then Under secretary for Political Affairs in the Department, called up on the telephone and asked: "Do you want to evacuate our people in Turkey?" He came right to the point. I said, "No." I think that this was the right decision.

We did have some trouble in Izmir. A mob surrounded the Consulate General but no one was hurt. One thing as a result of the incident -- and the experience in Tehran when the militants found all sorts of classified documents in the Embassy -- was to cut way down on the classified documents. The Department's instructions were to destroy everything, leaving only a small amount of material which could be burned quickly in case the Embassy was attacked. In the case of Ankara that meant going down from 132 file cabinets to four. I don't think that we ever missed the material that was destroyed.

We did not consider the internal problems of Turkey to be our affair, but we did have one issue outstanding with the Turks. This came up in the early part of my tour in Ankara, and it was happily resolved. After some Americans arrested in Turkey on drug charges, the Turks were pretty tough on them. This led to an outcry in the U. S. We tried to get these people out of Turkish jails. The Turks wouldn't let them out. They insisted on having an extradition treaty, and an agreement on judicial cooperation. I was the negotiator and the work took up a fair amount of my time during the first six months that I was in Turkey. As I've said before, the Turks were tough negotiators. In the end, the agreement was settled only when Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher came out and raised this matter with the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit.

We did have a somewhat different relationship with the "Right" than we had with the "Left". A number of the people in the "Left" government tended to favor a more neutral approach in Turkish foreign policy. But that did not interfere with our personal relationships. We had pretty good contacts with the "Left". I knew some Turkish, though I wasn't very good at it, but enough to deal with people who did not speak English. On the political side, I could always call on appropriate people to find out what was going on. The doors were always open for get-togethers regardless of party in power.

Turkish foreign policy and Turkish attitudes toward the United States altered with the change in governments. The Ecevit government was more suspicious of the United States. One of the reasons was a CIA "scandal" shortly before I arrived in Turkey. The CIA Chief of Station was caught meeting clandestinely with the deputy head of Turkish Intelligence, who had been working for us. It did not exactly improve our standing with Mr. Ecevit. However, this affair was buried; it never became a public matter, but it certainly did not inspire a lot of confidence on Ecevit's part. When he came in as Prime Minister, there were great hopes that Ecevit would be a Turkish "Kennedy." He turned out to be indecisive and incapable of delegating authority very

well. He tried to do everything himself.

After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, we wanted to make greater use of Turkey. The issue was verification procedures of the SALT II agreement with the Soviets. We wanted the right to base "spy" planes in Turkey and overfly Turkish soil. The Turks refused. They didn't want to run the risk of upsetting the Soviet Union. The issue finally died. Ecevit was also not very helpful regarding Iran both before and after the Shah's fall. When the Turkish government changed, Demirel, the incoming Prime Minister, was much more pro-American.

The Shah's fall raised questions in Ankara. One of the things that happened was that CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] disintegrated. I got involved as the U. S. representative on what was called "The Liquidation Committee." Part of my job as Political Counselor was to deal with CENTO as the U. S. representative. We were technically "observers" but de facto members. By then CENTO had become pretty much moribund. The "Liquidation Committee" was necessary to dispose of CENTO assets, the building, furniture, and things like that.

Another matter that I was involved in during my tour in Ankara was the effort to tie Turkey more closely to Europe and NATO. If the Turks felt excluded, there was a risk of driving them away from Europe and NATO. The Turks were always uneasy and worried that Europe would reject because they were Muslims. They wanted to be part of Europe. There were numerous Turkish workers in Germany and elsewhere. However, people in the Turkish government tended to be from the "elite." They were very nationalistic, very proud of being Turks, but still wanted to be seen as part of Europe. We were always pushing for the Turks to be more closely identified with Europe. We felt that Turkey was important, and there was a risk, as I said, of alienating her if she were not brought more closely into Europe. Therefore, we felt that it would be better to have close ties to Europe.

Ecevit and Demirel did not get along personally. Turks are not compromisers by nature. Actually, it is most surprising that the Turks have stayed with democracy. There was nothing democratic in their history. The rivalry between the two men had an impact on Turkish politics. The two major parties, the "People's Party" and Demirel's party -- the "True Path" party -- couldn't get together on anything. There was a lot of personal ill will, quite apart from ideological differences, which were not major.

Future historians may trace political instability in Turkey to the population explosion. The growth in population since World War II outstripped the economic development; the cities were just bursting at the seams. It was a very poor country to start with. Turkey had a lot of economic development, and what they had done was impressive. However, population growth outstripped it.

Our aid program amounted to \$200 million a year, and delivery of it was by means of a check. We no longer had any programs, just money. The assistance checks that we wrote were what was called "Supporting Assistance." In fact, it was budgetary support.

Actually, I was interested in doing something in the field of environmental affairs. My wife worked in this area for AID. There was one AID officer who instead of being in the Economic

Section was attached to the Political Section, which is a little unusual. In the end, we got an environmental program going. In the whole Middle East, Turkey was the only country where there was non-governmental activity going on in the environmental field. This was led by a Turkish lawyer who did legal work occasionally for the Embassy. In fact he was the Turkish environmental movement. He operated out of his home, working for environmental legislation and so forth. We were able to arrange for some AID assistance for him -- to fund his operation for four or five years and to set up a little program for him. When I was in Washington, I met with Joe Wheeler, the Deputy Director of the Agency for International Development, whom I came to know when he was the Director of the AID Mission in Pakistan and sold him on the idea of helping the one-man Turkish environmental lobby. Ten or 15 years later AID was still working with this person!

While I was in Turkey, we heard rumblings of dissatisfaction as the violence got worse. Finally just after I left, the Turkish military took over. This was not a surprise. The Turkish military had done this before. But, as before, they only stayed in power a short while and then went back to the barracks -- not like in Pakistan.

I thought that Turkey was a fascinating country -- half way between Europe and Asia, both literally and figuratively. I traveled widely around the country. I never worried about personal security although people in our Embassy were worried about "the Turks," the Kurds, and the military. I remember once that I got on an airplane and went way out to Eastern Turkey to Van [on Lake Van Golu]. Then I went to Diyarbakir in the heart of the Kurdish area by bus. The security situation was not worse there than in Ankara. You had the same problem -- insecurity existed everywhere. Reporting on Turkey really wasn't a problem. We had a pretty good feel for what was going on in the country that was of interest to Uncle Sam. I was not a country expert, although I learned a lot while I was there. Unlike South Asia, I didn't feel that we were missing any important information.

We worked pretty hard, as did Ambassador Spiers, on trying to organize the reporting. This was a challenge. The issue was not a report, but rather the lack of a reporting system. Ambassador Spiers wrote to Washington] and got a nasty reply. He then had an argument with Frank Carlucci [Deputy Director of CIA] about it. Ambassador Spiers and I felt that the Department of State's reporting system was badly organized. There was no guidance and you never got any feedback from Washington. I worked out a reporting plan for the Embassy and pressed Washington for some reaction. We eventually got something back, but only after a lot of hammering.

Ambassador Spiers left Turkey toward the end of my tour to become the Director of INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research]. That was amusing. I happened to be in his office when he got the message calling him back for a Washington assignment as head of INR. He was not thrilled, but asked that if he didn't go back to take the assignment, even though he didn't think he would care for it, how could the Department expect some junior officer to go off to Ouagadougou?. Ambassador Spiers was replaced by Ambassador Jim Spain. I had known Jim Spain from the time when I was in South Asia. He was very, very different from Ron Spiers. He was capable but had a bigger ego and was much more insistent on ambassadorial prerogatives than Spiers.

GALEN L. STONE
Ambassador
Cyprus (1978-1981)

Ambassador Galen L. Stone was born in 1921 and grew up in Massachusetts. After attending Harvard University and serving in the U.S. Army, he joined the Foreign Service. In addition to being ambassador to Cyprus, he served in Germany, France, India, Vietnam, Laos, Austria, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Stone was interviewed on April 15, 1988 by Malcolm Thompson.

Q: When did you become Ambassador to Cyprus in Nicosia? Was that your next assignment?

STONE: Yes, that was my next and last assignment. I recall being asked to come to London. This was during the Carter Administration in late 1977. The new czar on non-proliferation was Gerald Smith. I go knowing that I should come to London and meet him at the American Embassy there. Kingman Brewster was the Ambassador in London at the time, and very kindly invited me to stay at his residence. I walked around Regents park at least twenty times with Gerald Smith while he tried to persuade me that I should remain on in Vienna. He did tell me that I was under consideration for another Ambassadorial post, but I had no idea whatsoever what that post might be. I really felt that by that time that there really wasn't too much more that I could do at the International Atomic Energy Agency. The dealings with such a host of other countries made progress terribly difficult and frustrating and the upshot was that I eventually was appointed as Ambassador to Cyprus

We arrived in Cyprus in late March of 1978 almost on the day that President Carter announced the lifting of the arms embargo against Turkey. This announcement was greeted with a series of protest rallies and demonstrations against the U.S. Embassy. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks did not wish the United States to resume arms deliveries to Turkey, and at one point armored cars from the Cyprus National Guard were deployed around the Embassy building for our protection. It so happened that in Cyprus the Chancery building and the Ambassador's residence were one and the same and we live on the third and fourth floors and the Chancery was on the first and second floors. It was like being the skipper of a ship, we entertained on the top decks and then went down to the boiler room to do the work. I was somewhat concerned on arrival that President Kyprianou might delay receiving my letters on credence, but he didn't. I did have to stand and listen to some-what of a tongue lashing, which I didn't appreciate at all. However, having begun my tour when our relations were at an absolute nadir, I had the satisfaction of feeling we had almost nowhere to go but up. My assignment in Cyprus was certainly a fascinating one, because even though our government and all the other governments of the world, with the exception of Turkey, recognized the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of the Republic of Cyprus, I was expected to deal with the Turkish Cypriot, "so-called government" as well. I did this by dealing on a personal basis with the head of that government, Mr. Rauf Denktash who called himself "President of the Turkish State of North Cyprus." His government was recognized only by the government of Turkey. What one said on one side of the so-called "green line," which divided Greek and Turkish Cyprus had a one hundred and eighty degree different effect than it did on the other. So it was very important to

watch every word I uttered that might be reflected in any kind of public media, because of course the Turks were reading the Greek language papers and vice versa. The Ambassadors on the islands were being watched like hawks by both sides to try and determine where their sympathies really lay. Having started at a very low ebb, I found the assignment there extremely satisfying. This was partly because I was in the relatively unique position of having a very clear idea of what my government wanted in Cyprus. What we least wanted was to have a further flare-up between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, or between Greece and Turkey both of whom are our allies within NATO.

I was able to take steps on my own, which in other times and places would have required be to go back to Washington and ask for instructions before doing what I wanted. For example, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which was totally officered by career Greek army officers from Greece, go the bee in their bonnet to harden all the out posts facing the Turkish forces. They started pouring concrete and reinforcing all of their military outposts which was very offensive to the Turkish army which was deployed where they could see what was going on. In order to keep things on an even keel, (and I must say that I worked quite closely with the U.N. in this regard,) I passed the word to the Minister of Justice, with the understanding that the word would be further passed onto the President, that if any further hostilities broke out as a result of this Greek Cypriot action, I would have to report to Washington that it had been brought on by the Greek Cypriots themselves. Within twenty four hours the efforts at hardening their outposts ceased!

Q: At this time the Turks had already invaded the northern part of Cyprus and occupied a considerable amount up to the so-called green line?

STONE: That's right. That particular event had taken place in the summer of 1974 and that was when my predecessor once removed, Rodger Davies had been assassinated by a bullet fired by a Greek Cypriot right into the embassy premises and down a corridor to where he was standing. This made life for the Ambassador in Cyprus somewhat different from what it had habitually been, in that I lived with a seven man personal body guard every where I went. Of course that unfortunately has become all too common now-a-days, with the amount of terrorism that we are experiencing.

Q: Were you able to travel for example, to the coastal area facing Turkey? As you know I spent many years in Turkey and was a Turkish language officer. I also visited Cyprus during the time in the early sixties when Toby Belcher was Consul General and he had a lovely house at Kyrenia, I believe, overlooking the water. I wondered whether that part of the island was available to you at all?

STONE: Yes it was. Because of the fact that I was expected to deal with the Turkish Cypriots as well as with the Greek Cypriots, I had to have a way of doing that. The government did rent a house, and I think that it was the same house that Toby had lived in, and they were able to continue renting it because it had been Turkish owned. We could not have used a house that was owned by a Greek Cypriot and occupied by the Turks. This house was put at my disposal and this house become my weekend escape. We would regularly go up there because we could wave good bye to our Greek Cypriot body guards at the green line, go through the U.N. lines and then proceed on our own and do our own thing so to speak in the north.

We got a lot of business done with Turkish Cypriots at relatively small social affairs. I used to climb Mount Kornos with the so-called Foreign Minister Kenan Atakol, who is today called the Foreign Minister of the Turkish State of North Cyprus. Both he and his wife were graduates of Penn State University and extremely personable people, and we had a very easy business and social relationship with them.

Q: I am very familiar with the Turkish position and if you were to discuss this with the Turks, they would go back to the London Agreements of 1960 which gave independence to Cyprus and which very clearly delineated the authority that the Turks would have, which amounted to a veto authority. The Turks would tell you that Makarios violated this agreement in many respects. Makarios would have probably answered that the agreement was impossible and that you couldn't have a government where a minority had a right of veto. Legalistically, the Turks would always hang to that agreement as a justification for their later actions. How would you comment on that agreement?

STONE: Well I think that the Turks have a good legal case. They are a guarantor power of the original 1960 agreements, and it was on that basis that they moved into Cyprus in the early summer off 1974. At the time as you recall the Colonels were ruling Greece and they got the bee in their bonnet to get rid of Makarios, because by that time Makarios had become convinced that Cyprus' future lay in being an independent entity and not as a part of Greece. Makarios had initially been a supporter of Enosis but he later came to feel that Cyprus should not be a part of Greece, that it should be an independent entity. The Colonels plotted to get rid of him and of course you know that Makarios had to flee for his life and they installed a man named Nicos Sampson as a puppet. The Turks, after consulting with the British, and learning that the British were not going to intervene, then decided to move on their own.

I think that it's hard to fault the Turks for that action. Where they perhaps can be faulted, is in the steps that they later took. Of course as a result of the initial Turkish invasion which resulted in, let's say some twenty percent of the North of the island being occupied by regular forces from Turkey; the U.N. immediately called for a cease-fire and negotiations began in Lausanne. Well, those negotiations had been going for about three weeks or so when the Turks suddenly without warning moved out and took over considerably more terrain, so that today they in fact control roughly thirty six percent of the surface of the island. Four percent of the island is now under U.N. control with a U.N. military force that has been there since 1964 and, I must say doing a very commendable job of keeping the peace between the two protagonists.

Q: The Turkish rebuttal; and I am being sort of the Devil's advocate here, would be that as far as partition goes the island being eighty percent more or less Greek Cypriot to twenty percent Turkish Cypriot - the Greeks of course would say if they were to agree to any kind of a partition, that the Turks should have twenty percent of the land area. The Turks on the other say that it should be according to land ownership. Since most of the Turkish population are peasants and have land and fields, whereas the Greeks are congregated in the cities like Nicosia and the villages. On the land ownership issue, it comes out much nearer one-third Turkish and two-thirds Greek! So that's another Gordian knot where it all depends on how you look at it.

STONE: Well, of course, before these events of 1974, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots were scattered all over the island and they were living cheek by jowl. After the 1963 events when Makarios over-ruled the Turks and the Turkish representatives withdrew from the Parliament, the Turks were more or less forced into enclaves in their own particular areas because the Greek Cypriots who controlled the surrounding area required permits for them to move from one place to another. So they were really economically deprived in many ways, and were in many cases given jobs as laborers, as the Greek Cypriots, who tend to be natural entrepreneurs anyway, had obtained more of the higher paying jobs.

After this, as you recall in 1975 there was an agreement reached for an exchange of population. At that point all of the Turks within the Greek Cypriot area were moved to the North and vice versa. In fact, whole villages, whole Turkish villages were moved into what had been Greek villages in the North, and they kept the entire population together so as to give them some sense of stability when they moved with their friends and associates and people that they knew. By and large this worked rather effectively in terms of the town administration, because the history in Cyprus, as you probably know, is one of a tremendous importance being attached to the town from which one comes.

Cyprus in the pre World War Two era was considered to be one of the most crime-free areas on the face of the earth. This was because an individual who committed a crime not only dishonored himself and his family, but he dishonored his village as well. The attitude of hospitality amongst the Cypriots was also something we found very remarkable. The common greeting is "kopiaste," which means "come and share my meal," and this was literally what they meant, and still do today in some of the outlying villages. Of course this has now disappeared almost entirely in the cities and the populated areas.

Q: I note from the newspapers recently that the Turks and Greeks are talking about this, Ankara and Athens, and relations seem to be a bit better. Do you see this sort of a partition as being permanent as you look ahead?

STONE: No, I don't see it as being a permanent partition in the sense of two separate and independent political entities, because I just think that there are too many mini-states in this world. The groundwork has been pretty well plowed, in fact it's been gone over time and time again, to reestablish Cyprus as a federated state. I think there will be two parts to the federation, there will be a Turkish part and there will be a Greek part. There will be a considerable amount of autonomy left to each part. Each part will have it's own police force and it's own educational system. In the north it will be predominantly Muslim, the south Greek Orthodox.

I think that there can be a loose federation which would have at the center, common currency, common foreign policy, some shared defense arrangement which could run the island. This area has been gone over and over, under the auspices of the United Nations Special Representative who has served on Cyprus ever since 1964 -a civilian representative of the United Nations Secretary General. The present United Nations Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar served on Cyprus himself for two and a half to three years and thought when he became the Secretary General that this would be a relatively easy problem for him to resolve. He brought Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash to New York and thought that he was going to have them sign an

agreement which would resolve this issue, or at least be a step in that direction, but Mr. Kyprianou refused to sign it.

I have never seen the document which he asked them to sign, but I am under the impression that the U.N. had tried to be even-handed. I must say my Greek Cypriot friends, whose judgement I respect, do feel that the Secretary General did present a document that tended to be more favorable to the Turkish Cypriot cause and they rather supported the fact that Mr. Kyprianou did not sign it. I felt all along that as long as my Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash were the principle in charge of their respective communities, that there would not be a solution, because both of these men have personally lived through all of the tragedy that has gone on, and know of all the evil deeds which one side has done to the other. So there is a tremendous tendency on their part to look backward rather than to look forward.

With the recent election of a new President in the Greek part of Cyprus, George Vassiliou who is very intelligent and has a very agile mind, I believe that the chances of some agreement are considerably enhanced. You have to realize that he has to bring along his Greek Cypriot population in whatever he does. Therefore, I am not surprised that the initial reports make it sound as though there is hardly any change whatsoever in the Greek Cypriot position.

Q: I would agree, and also I would say that if the influence of Ankara and Athens can be minimized, it would all be in the interest of a permanent settlement. In other words, if the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots can be more or less left alone to settle their own problems, then I think they are more likely to work out a solution. This is because I feel that Ankara and Athens have never played a very constructive role on either side. What do you think?

STONE: They haven't up until now, but I think it is encouraging that Mr. Ozl and Mr. Papandreou seem to be making some progress in terms of their own problems between Greece and Turkey directly. I believe that to bring about a solution in Cyprus there has got to be a willingness on their part to support whatever can be done, and perhaps to nudge their respective sides into an agreement. I wouldn't rule out that it may be important to involve them in supporting a solution to the problem.

Q: Well of course they have to agree. Would you have any comments on U.S. policy towards Cyprus? Do you think there is anything else that we should have done, could have done, or should not have done?

STONE: I don't really have any comments on policy during the time that I was there. One could argue a lot about U.S. policy during the period that Turkey invaded North Cyprus in 1974. In all fairness, we have to remember what was happening in the U.S. at that time, as that was the very summer that we were going through Watergate, which was preoccupying the attention of the senior officials of the U.S. government. The U.S. had been instrumental on two previous occasions in dissuading the Turks from invading Cyprus. Once Cyrus Vance was directly involved in that and there could well have been a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, - but were successful in dissuading Turkey from moving. Because of our success that time, we were blamed by the Greek Cypriots for not having prevented Turkey from invading in 1974. We were accused by the Greek Cypriots of being more or less responsible for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

However, in reality they should have looked toward their motherland, (if you want to call it that), Greece, as being the cause of the problem. Naturally they didn't want to place the blame on Greece as they found it far easier to place the blame on the United States. This is so often the case in foreign countries.

The thing that has always struck me in my service around the world is how much people look at the world through their own particular perspective and see their own country as being the cockpit of world politics. This was just as true of the Cypriots as it was of the Indians. The Cypriots felt that the most important problem that the world faced, was the Cyprus problem!

BEAUVEAU B. NALLE
Consul General
Izmir (1979-1982)

Beauveau B. Nalle entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Washington, DC, Turkey, Uganda, Liberia, and Belize. Mr. Nalle was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on April 19, 1994.

NALLE: No, I left. I was ready to get out, I was tired and it was a hard post. The old Governor had left and a new guy came in. And he was not helpful. The old Governor had tried to get the Independence taken care of through persuasion. Also the British had a great deal of trouble in working out with Belize just what the terms of independence would be. This went back and forth.

So I was very happy to get out. I had a phone call from PER and they said that -- How would you like to go as Consul General to Izmir? I said, I don't even have to talk to my wife about that, well, I'm ready. I made up my mind in 2 seconds. Sheila was tired, housing was just excruciatingly bad, just awful.

Q: *In Belize.*

NALLE: Yeah, in Belize, just unbelievable. Living was difficult. Next to Iskenderun, it was the hardest post we were ever stationed in. Sheila had liked it at first but she got tired.

Q: *Did you not have a Principal Officer's residence there?*

NALLE: An apartment over the office building. We couldn't stand this. She was sitting at the place one time, kept scratching her head, couldn't figure it out. It was a termite, it was eating away at the wood and the sawdust was falling on her hair. We had a hurricane that nearly blew away the whole city at one time. The Department sent down a fire expert, he got one look at the building, turned to me and said, "Twenty minutes." I said, what do you mean? He said it'll take this place 20 minutes to burn to the ground.

It was hard duty. Fortunately we did have the boat and it was cheap to go to Miami. Get a round

trip ticket to go to Miami from Belize Air for \$200.00. It wasn't very safe but it got you there. And so Sheila would spend a lot of her time up in Washington. It was awful hard. Again, I was probably drinking more than was good for me.

I didn't get along with the new Governor at all. He's one of these matey Brits who slap me on the back and started calling me Beau from the first time we met. I don't think that's an appropriate way to behave. I was a little reluctant, I never called his predecessor anything other than "Governor." It just seemed appropriate.

Q: No wonder then you were pleased with the prospect of going back to Turkey.

NALLE: In Izmir we had a very nice, well organized office. We had a gorgeous official residence to live in, beautiful house. You know Ken Burns? Did you ever meet Ken Burns?

Q: No. I've heard the name but I never met him.

NALLE: Ken was responsible for building this house in late 1950s. He'd come up to Ankara from time to time when I was with the Embassy there, and I'd meet him in social affairs. He'd talk about the house he was building.

A beautiful place, wonderful FSNs, and this time we really went first class. We had a boat from Hong Kong, a 30 foot diesel trawler. We'd go to sea and be out for 10 days without touching land, except maybe stock up on fresh vegetables and drinking water, that kind of stuff.

Q: Beautiful islands near there too.

NALLE: The Turkish coast is the last unspoiled part of the Mediterranean Sea. It is so beautiful. You can drop anchor there and there won't be another boat within 5 miles of you. It's not that way anymore, the 15, 10 years we've been away. It's turned into a very popular cruising area. When we were there it was just deserted. And the work was fascinating.

Q: What were your principal functions?

NALLE: We had 2 major NATO offices, Allied Forces Land South East, with a Turkish 4-star commanding and a U.S. 2-star as his Deputy. In the old days that had been an American 4-star slot but we changed it around, it's a Turk job now. The Deputy was an American. We had a tactical air force with a Turkish 3-star and an American 2-star as his Deputy.

I mentioned at lunch that I was delighted and thrilled at the way the American military personnel were behaving in Turkey. We had very few problems, town and gown problems, very few. We had a lot of Americans who had volunteered for Turkey. Some of them in 2nd tours of duty. They obviously liked it. There were a few bad apples, for the most part they behaved well. We had quite a number of ship visits, U.S. ship visits. We had growing U.S. investment. We had the Aegean Sea dispute.

NALLE: So as I was saying, we had increasing American investment. We were trying to attract

more. We had the annual Izmir Trade Fair. It was always kind of a cliff hanger, whether or not we were going to participate. It was a joint USIS-State Department-Department of Commerce operation. I think it was very successful. The U.S. pavilion always, after Perils of Pauline kind of adventures, always ended up as one of the most attractive and heavily visited at the fair.

That was a lot of fun. I used to go down there every night. Spend time at the Pavilion, talking to people, sit around and drink coffee or go to look at the other pavilions and stuff. It was summer and the weather was pleasant. It was just good fun. We had a few individual business companies coming in.

We had some consular problems but not many. The case that hangs in my mind is the case of Mrs. Jean Lapere. Who is the daughter of the guy who gave that big statue gallery down here on the Smithsonian. You know that round one? Anyway, Mrs. Lapere is the daughter of that man. He's a billionaire, American, who gave his collection of modern sculpture. He built the whole gallery himself, right next to the Air and Space Museum.

Q: Not the Hirshorn?

NALLE: Yeah, the Hirshorn. She was Hirshorn's daughter. Well, she got arrested for trying to take antiquities out of Turkey. She claims she didn't know there was such a law. I contended at that time, the daughter of Hirshorn must have goddamn well known something about the business in antiquities, in statues. Particularly in view of her father's record in that matter.

Well anyway, she was caught and thrown in jail. And such a deluge of congressional attention, I'd never seen in my life. Some of it was sickening. I got a message from Senator Percy saying he didn't know Mrs. Lapere himself, but his children did and therefore she was all right. Therefore, she should be let loose from jail immediately. Pat Schroeder's husband, Jim, came out in person to help Mrs. Lapere get out of jail. Jim Schroeder turned out to be a very nice guy who very quickly realized that there was very little, or nothing, that he could do and went home. He couldn't have been nicer. I spent a lot of time with Jim Schroeder, I've seen him since. And he knew what was up.

The work we did was unbelievable on behalf of that woman. She got back to the States and wrote a book that's sort of wishy washy. I don't think it acknowledges everything that was done for her, not just by the Post but the whole US government. Jane Lapere left an extraordinarily bitter taste in my mouth. We put it on the line for her and never a word of thanks.

At the same time we had a young Air Force kid in jail, nobody gave a damn about him. No letters coming in for a black air force sergeant who was in jail. No letters coming in from Senator Percy for him. No letters from the Department. The Department also was pretty craven on this thing. They said -- we'll back you up -- but they never said, we'll get out in front of you. I felt awfully bitter about the Department's response. No effort what so ever, to take any monkeys off my back.

I had a superb young officer who did the econ/consular job there. A genius, he's going to be an ambassador to Japan one day. His mother was Japanese, his father was a retired American army

officer. He and his wife were both FSOs and they are some of the nicest and brightest young people I've ever worked with in my life. He's studying Chinese now, he's a language freak. He just soaks it up. He did just unbelievable heroic work for Jean Lapere, never a word of thanks. The same for our wonderful FSN staff.

So we had a little consular work. A great deal of sort of semi-representational work. I've always felt that one of my absolutely essential jobs is traveling around the consular district. Izmir was about the only post in Turkey that did any traveling. Dan Newberry, bless his heart, I'm not ashamed to say this, I used to tell it to him in his face, never left the town limits of Istanbul. Nobody at the embassy in Ankara ever left the embassy for fear that there would be somebody sitting in his desk when he got back. The people down in Adana were too busy to do much traveling. We were the people who had a real travel program.

I think the only time that anything I ever wrote got over to the White House, came when I was in Izmir. I had been on a long trip, just at the time of the infamous Armenian resolution. Part of my trip was to assess the damage that the Armenian resolution would do to us if it were passed. It was a brutal experience. I made it a point to visit the provincial headquarters of all the political parties. And the anger was palpable. I'd never seen anything like it. One place we got into a real shouting, name-calling, I was using fairly bad language talking to these Turkish politicians about what they were saying about the United States. It was unpleasant, it was not a friendly discourse, it was nasty bitter argumentative disagreeable anger. Bile was being let loose.

At one point I stopped in to buy gas out in the middle of the Anatolin plateau, along the road. And the old fellow who was pumping gas, started beating my ears about the Armenian resolution. And I put that in as almost an afterthought on what I thought was my more meaty report on the political reaction.

I got a letter from a friend who said my little thing on the gas station had so caught the eye of the people at the Operations Center that do the briefing books, that they had put it in the Secretary's briefing book. And they were given to understand that it had eventually been sent over to President Reagan for him to see as being on the level of something he could understand it. All this talk of the political parties didn't interest him very much, but this old guy pumping gas, white-bearded old Hajji Bektash kind of fellow pumping gas, was the sort of thing that would grab Reagan's eye. So that I think that is the only time I'd gotten out of the State Department.

Q: Sentiments ran high in that question.

NALLE: We had very major security plans growing up in the event that the resolution might be passed. It was not passed. The Turks just don't understand the American political process. A congressman can introduce something like this, it was Tony Coelho from California of Portuguese background not Armenian himself. And now I believe under strict investigation for corruption in office. He was the one who introduced it because his district is heavily Armenian. And this was done simply to make the Armenians happy and to get him votes.

The Turks would take the high moral ground and say, this is no way to treat a faithful and loyal ally. By any terms, other than American terms, it is no way to treat a loyal and faithful ally. But

Coelho doesn't give a rat's ass about what the Turks think. Coelho wants to get reelected. It's kind of disgusting but you have to put up with it.

And then we left Izmir, sold my boat and went to Switzerland.

Q: Yes, now you're in Europe.

NALLE: Now I'm in Europe, after 30 years in the Foreign Service, in a developed country, and bored to death.

G. CLAY NETTLES
Economic Counselor
Ankara (1979-1982)

George Clay Nettles was born in 1932 in Alabama. He attended the University of Alabama for both a bachelors and a law degree after serving in the US Army. Nettles joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served overseas in Japan, Vietnam, Venezuela, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zaire, Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as attending the NATO Defense College. Mr. Nettles was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1997.

Q: Yes, and as I recall, assignments to the NATO Defense College are usually linked or connected to onward assignments to one of the NATO capitals.

NETTLES: That's correct. Now that's a requirement. When I was there it was not a requirement, but I was fortunate that my next assignment was to a NATO country, Turkey and I found the course good preparation for it.

Q: So you went to Ankara immediately from Rome or did you have some Turkish language study at some point?

NETTLES: I took home leave after the course and also had about six weeks of Turkish language training. As you are familiar with our language policy, I'll just review it briefly, normally Turkish requires ten months of training to receive a useful or working level. As you know, when a course takes 10 months or more, they make an assessment as to whether the job is language designated or not. My position as economic counselor was not language designated. I think that was correct in terms of almost all people with whom I dealt in Turkey on a professional basis almost invariably were proficient in English or French. I found the six weeks of basic Turkish quite useful as it helped me to get around because the average person on the street doesn't speak any English or any other foreign language.

Q: So you had a six-weeks' short course to familiarize you with the Turkish language.

NETTLES: I traveled extensively in Turkey and that was really quite [adequate] for that purpose.

Q: So you actually took up your assignment in Ankara in the summer of 1979? And you were there three years? Tell me a little bit about what conditions were like when you arrived. And, you were the economic counselor so particularly on the economic side.

NETTLES: Correct. Turkey was in a desperate situation. They had had weak coalition governments and weak coalition governments were unable to take fundamental reforms which they badly needed. They had turned to us and other OECD countries - Turkey was a member of the OECD - and asked for assistance. We and other OECD countries said, "No. We will help you with a program, but we are not going to give you assistance until you have a program." Finally, when the situation became truly desperate, they did sign an agreement with the IMF for fundamental reforms.

I had left my car in Rome and I took the ferry from Ancona to Dubrovnik and then drove through southern Yugoslavia and Greece and on to Istanbul. There was little gasoline in Turkey as ships anchored offshore waiting to be paid before they unloaded petroleum. I had filled up at the Greek border which got me to our consulate in Istanbul. I filled up there and that got me into Ankara. The whole economy was hardly functioning because of lack of basic supplies. You saw trucks lined up for miles waiting for fuel that might come in. That winter was one of the coldest on record. My colleague from the Austrian embassy said it was like Vienna in '45 except there was plenty of food. Many of my European colleagues sent their families home. It was pretty grim, however, from an economist's point of view, it was fantastic because you could see results from the reform which had been made. Turkey went from being an extremely centralized economy to being a very open economy. Almost immediately you could see results. Of course, we and other OECD members were supplying significant amounts of assistance. The combination of our assistance produced results better and quicker than we had dared to hope.

Q: What would you say was the key ingredient that got the Turks to adopt a meaningful reform program that was accepted by the IMF? Was it the pressure from the United States and their Western European allies or was it a decision that they came to themselves? If so, with these weak coalition governments, how did they manage to make that decision?

NETTLES: Sure, there was pressure from the U.S. and the OECD allies if you define it in the sense of pressure that we refused to help them until they did come up with a program. That was pressure, but I think appropriate pressure. The Turks were in desperate straits and they realized that the existing situation was not working so they felt that they really had no alternative.

Q: Let me ask you to comment on Turgut Ozal. He is often given a lot of credit for implementing the economic reform program, to getting it accepted, to seeing it through. You knew him, I think, well? I don't remember some aspects of the timing, but I'd be interested in your comments on him and his role.

NETTLES: That's right. I did know him well, because he was the head of the State Planning Organization and the State Planning Organization was the group within the Turkish government which was given the responsibility for implementing these basic reforms. I worked with him and I got to know him well. Now as I am sure you know, a military coup occurred in Turkey

approximately six months after I arrived. The coup did not occur because of economic conditions as reforms were working. It occurred because of the political situation. The military has a role in Turkey which is perhaps unique. They consider themselves the guardian of the Ataturk legacy. Of course, as you know, Ataturk was the founder of modern Turkey. His fundamental objectives were that Turkey would be part of the West and would be a secular society. The military is considered the guardian of his legacy and has intervened and taken over the government on three different occasions. But each time, once they stabilized the situation, they returned the government to civilian control. That was the way the military was perceived in Turkey and they waited until the situation was again quite extreme before they intervened. One of the very first things that the military government did after they staged the coup was to say that the economic reform program would continue and be under Turgut Ozal, who was promoted.

Q: I believe that the military intervention was in September of 1980, as you say, not long after you arrived and was primarily because of the political situation but also because of terrorism and the violence that was occurring within the country.

NETTLES: Between both the left and right, assassinations had become common, but the violence and the terrorism largely didn't affect foreigners. When I had a cocktail party or a dinner when Turkish guests arrived, they would often call home to say that they had gotten to my place safely and then when they returned, they would call back to say they'd gotten home. The situation was desperate for many Turks, particularly if they were journalists or professors.

Q: You as part of the embassy did not take particular security precautions? I'm sure you took precautions, but nothing unusual? You were not a target or vulnerable yourself?

NETTLES: Not really. We did have guards at our houses and there were a few exceptions of terrorism, but nothing comparable at all to the terrorism which was affecting the Turks.

Q: By the time the military took over and, you said, they continued the economic reform program, elevated Turgut Ozal and gave him more stature and continuing position within the government, we were supporting the economic program. We encouraged them to move in that direction giving some support. Did they appreciate the fact that we were not only giving that support, but were prepared to continue it even after the military took over?

NETTLES: Yes, the military intervention was supported by 95 per cent of the people and they returned control to civilian authority before they became discredited.

Q: At various times when a military intervenes and overthrows a democratically-elected government, even if it is a weak or vulnerable government, we have taken a very critical position feeling that this is hurting human rights or democratization or whatever. That wasn't the case in Turkey at all. We understood the situation and the fact that they were prepared, at some point, to turn it back to the civilians and also continue their policies.

NETTLES: That's correct, Ray. That was our perception and it turned out to be correct. More importantly or at least as importantly, that was the perception of the vast bulk of the Turkish population. I'm sure there were a few individuals who were against it, but not the average

person.

Q: How quickly, for the average person, did they see the results of the economic recovery program? Did it happen rather quickly? You said that you could see the affect rather dramatically. Was it also quick?

NETTLES: Very quickly. For example, I told you of the shortage of petroleum. Well, that shortage was overcome in a few months. The winter that I arrived was terrible, but by the next summer, there was no shortage of fuel or basic commodities. Even a few luxury products such as coffee again appeared on the market. Coffee was not available when I first arrived, and, of course, Turkish coffee is famous and very popular with the Turks.

Q: During that first winter that was so difficult for Turks, was it also difficult for you in the embassy or were you able to have heating and meet your requirements?

NETTLES: It depended upon where you lived. I happened to live in an apartment building where there were only Americans and it was small and the embassy could get fuel oil and supplies. However, one of my colleagues lived in a much larger building and was one of the few Americans living there. He had two small children. The only heat they had for about six weeks was from the electric stove and the electricity was only on 12 hours a day. As the result of that, the U.S. government decided to find small apartment buildings for its people in order to be able to supply fuel and, occasionally, water, as there were water shortages from time to time. Within the next two years, all embassy staff were living in buildings in which they were the only ones. Some people were not happy about this, because they said they did not want to live in an American ghetto. Then again, they had to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages. When you didn't have any fuel and when it was 10 above zero, that was something to consider.

Q: I know one of the other winter problems in Ankara, particularly during this period, was smog. The air quality because of the burning of soft coal, it has another name, too.

NETTLES: Lignite, which is a form of soft coal.

Q: Was that a major problem for you in Ankara the whole time you were there or especially the first winter?

NETTLES: It was always a problem in the winter during my first tour. However, while I was there, the Turkish government contracted with the Soviet Union to import natural gas. The United States was not happy about that, but Turkey insisted that they would not become overly dependent upon the Soviet Union as the source of its fuel. In fact, they pointed out that their energy imports from the Soviet Union would be a smaller percentage of its total energy imports than that of Italy. They did sign this contract with the Soviet Union, built the pipeline and a distribution system so that today Ankara does not have a serious smog problem.

Q: When you first arrived in Ankara in 1979, Ambassador Jim Spain was the ambassador?

NETTLES: No, Ron Spiers was the ambassador. I served under him for about a year and then

Jim Spain arrived and he was there for about 18 months. He was replaced by Ambassador Strausz-Hupé.

Q: You were the economic counselor under these three ambassadors. Was there a significance difference between them in terms of their interest and support for the work of your section?

NETTLES: No, not at all. They all had different personalities, but they were all very supportive. I enjoyed working with all three of them.

Q: Turkey, of course, has a big economy and lots of problems. We touched on those and the program that was introduced to deal with those problems. Let me talk a little bit more about the external aspect. I assume that as the reform program got going, not only were there more imported goods on the market, but Turkish exports began to pick up?

NETTLES: Let me go into that in a little more detail. The Turkish economy which developed after World War I was based upon self-sufficiency and the only significant exports were agricultural. On the other hand, almost everything that could be made in Turkey was made in Turkey and a lot of things were made that really shouldn't have been made. Any virtue carried to the extreme can become a vice and that happened in Turkey. Protection was given for anything that could be made in Turkey regardless of the cost. Once they decided to open the economy, many of these businesses, which were basically import substitutions, were no longer viable. They had to rationalize that if they were going to survive and if they couldn't survive, they went out of business. The way to survive was not only to supply the local market, but to be exporters. This is what Economics 101 teaches. Many Turkish businesses had been grossly inefficient. They didn't have to be efficient as long as they only supplied the captive local market. But they had to become efficient when imports were permitted. Turkish traditional agricultural exports continued, but they did not increase significantly, but very, very quickly manufactured exports became important.

Q: Was the United States' market important in that early period as they began to look for markets abroad for their industrial products - particularly, say, textiles and so on?

NETTLES: Yes, textiles were important for that, but many of the manufactured products other than textiles were, frankly, not up to U.S. standards. This changed very quickly. Packaging is very important when you go into a sophisticated market like the U.S. You have to manufacture to a certain standard, you have to package it. The textile industry was the first to take advantage of the U.S. market, but others followed. You name it, there was a broad category of exports. Turkey also became and still is a significant market for U.S. exports.

Q: And that happened as the reform movement took hold, and they reduced some of the protection they had been supplying to the import substituting industries? What kind of products was the U.S. interested in that earlier period selling to Turkey?

NETTLES: We sold quite a bit of fertilizer, for example, and, of course, we had a military assistance program and supplied a lot of military equipment to Turkey. Basically, we supplied bulk raw material. We didn't supply many manufactured products, but the industrial raw

materials we supplied to Turkey were significant.

Q: How about tourism? Did you begin to see that developing as a result of the eased political situation, as the improved economy or did that happen later?

NETTLES: It began to happen during my first tour. I wouldn't say that the economic reforms had much to do with that. It was more the result of the improved political situation. I think the tourism industry really developed on its own without significant government assistance.

Q: What about Turkey and the European Common Market or European Community at that time? Turkey is still not a member as a customs member with the European Community. It's a significant political issue in Turkey and Europe. How was it especially in the early period when you were there?

NETTLES: Throughout my entire association with Turkey, the European connection has been extremely important. Remember, I said that the two fundamental principles of Ataturk's philosophy were that Turkey was a part of Europe and was a secular state. Thus, association with Europe in the form of the European Community or whatever had as much psychological importance as economic importance. The Europeans had given the Turks almost all the economic benefits of membership, but they said, "Well, that's enough, you're not really ready to enter into the European Community." The Turks wouldn't buy that because of the psychological implications. And, I would say that that continues to be the situation. The Turks believe that it is not only an economic problem, but a political problem.

Q: And with a strong psychological aspect as well?

NETTLES: I would say psychological not political.

Q: Well, it's probably political, too. How about thinking partly in terms of the economic dimension? How about relations with Greece while you were there? It wasn't very long after a lot of trouble?

NETTLES: That's correct. The Turkish national holiday is when they defeated the Greeks on the outskirts of Ankara. Many Americans are not aware of that, but in 1922, Greece invaded Turkey and almost conquered the heart of Turkey. They were defeated and were driven into the sea. There was a division of the population. The Greeks, of course, have never forgotten that. In 1922, the Turkish population was roughly eight million and there were about five million Greeks. That wasn't that much difference between the two countries. Today, Turkey has roughly 65 million and Greece about eight million. I could be off a million or two. But changed ratio is important. The Turks are not obsessed with Greece the way the Greeks are with Turkey. If you see a country as your enemy and all of the sudden it has eight times as many people, then you are concerned. The Turks certainly are aware of Greece, but they are always shocked that the Greeks consider them a threat. They don't think of Greece as being a threat and they don't really think they are a threat to the Greeks.

Q: I think you're right, the perceptions in Athens and Ankara have always been different and

that is certainly still the case. And, the great national holiday in March is when they got independence from Ottoman Turkey in the 19th century. How about Cyprus? Did you pay much attention to that on the economic view?

NETTLES: Not a great deal, because there were very few economic considerations involved in the Cypriot situation when I arrived. The embargo had been lifted.

Q: Turkey also has a very important situation vis a vis the Middle East - Syria, Iraq, Iran are all neighbors. Was that something you took much interest in and also related to that, were you able to travel in eastern Turkey or southeastern Turkey?

NETTLES: First question first, when the Turks started seeking export markets, they quickly found that some of their neighbors and particularly the ones in the Middle East were natural markets. The exports to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia increased dramatically. And, Libya was important. The Turkish construction firms became quite efficient and often obtained big contracts in these countries. The Turks also tried to present themselves as an intermediary. For example, they would urge American firms who wanted to build a dam in Iraq to take them on as partners. There were several instances, I know of, where it worked very well. Yes, the Turks were very conscience of their opportunities in the Middle East and took advantage of them.

This is August 23, 1997 and this is an oral history interview with G. Clay Nettles and I'm Ray Ewing. Clay, we were just talking about Iran, I think. Why don't you finish your thought about how that was seen in Ankara, particularly in the Economics Section?

NETTLES: Well, it didn't affect us immediately at all, but at that time Turkey was the only country in the area that didn't require visas for Iranians citizens, so there were literally hundreds of thousands of Iranians passing through or in Turkey at any one time. The Iranians were desperate and the lines were a mile long at the American consulates in Istanbul and in Ankara. However, we really didn't become, certainly not in the Economic Section, directly involved.

JAMES ALAN WILLIAMS
Turkey Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1979-1982)

Mr. Williams was born in Wisconsin and raised in Virginia. After graduation from Princeton University, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965 and was posted to Ankara, Turkey. During his career Mr. Williams became a specialist in Greek/Turkish/Cyprus affairs and served as Special Coordinator for Cyprus, with the personal rank of Ambassador. His foreign assignments include Ankara, Nicosia, Bonn, Berlin and Athens, and he had several tours at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Ray Ewing in 2003.

Q: Ok, you left Bonn in '79, where did you go then?

WILLIAMS: Left in '79, at this point I'd been abroad since '76; I'd been out of real work in Washington since '72 when I started Greek language training. I had a chance to go to Prague as DCM. I hope I'm not being indiscrete in revealing that Frank Meehan who had been designated the ambassador in Prague wanted me to do that, or was kind enough to ask me to do that. Frank may have appreciated much better than I did the difficulties that would cause, because as I said I had no real sub-seventh floor experience in the department at that point and even worse I was one grade junior for the job, so it was a stretch. The system said no despite Frank's best efforts. I felt wonderful, flattered by being asked by that fellow because he was such a phenomenal person as well as a representative of our country, but it didn't work out that we went to Prague. It was probably for the best I have to say, although at the time I was a bit sore that Washington didn't see the wisdom of Ambassador Meehan's choice. He got a very fine DCM as it turned out, Byron Morton, who was of grade, and actually I think had served in Eastern Europe before. So we came back to Washington and I was assigned to EUR/SE.

I was assigned to be the Cyprus desk officer in EUR/SE, the Office of Southern European Affairs. Ed Dillery was in charge of it and Bob Pugh, later Geoff Ogden was the deputy. There were two Turkish desk officers, two Greek desk officers, and one Cyprus desk officer, two people in the front office of SC and then several secretaries. This was my first real experience working in the Department of State below the seventh floor. Up on the seventh floor I'd done essentially staff work, asking others for something, telling others what to do, but I'd never really done what I would call serious work at the country officer level. And as I had served in Cyprus I knew quite a bit about it at that time and it was not hard to pick up the portfolio for Cyprus and EUR/SE. One of the first issues we had to deal with was whether to allow into the United States for medical treatment Nicos Sampson who had been installed by the junta as the president of Cyprus when Makarios had escaped by the skin of his teeth and with his life in 1974. Sampson at the time the request was pending was suffering from a horribly debilitating disease which is caused by parasites that get into your system and cause enormous benign tumors in all parts of the body including the vital organs, the heart and so forth. It was not so much disfiguring as disabling and very painful, and it does sooner or later lead to death. So we apparently had some treatment or treatment centers in America that could handle this disease and his other ailments. And as I recall, Kyprianou the president of Cyprus, asked us to let him in. I wrote a memo to George Vest, this was the first thing I ever wrote I think for SE. Basically saying that we don't owe anybody this favor, that Sampson could get treatment in France where he was staying or somewhere else. He was kind of a Flying Dutchman at that point. He hadn't yet been allowed to go back to Cyprus, he was clearly sick, but just as clearly there were other treatment centers available, so my recommendation was no. Ed signed it off, it went up. I don't recall what the final decision was, but this experience on the desk brought me into very close contact with members of the Cyprus embassy. Some of them I saw later when they were in Bonn, Andreas Nicolaides was briefly in the embassy in Washington but went later to Bonn as ambassador.

Q: He was in Washington quite a while.

WILLIAMS: Came back as ambassador to Washington, then he was ambassador in Bonn, and I saw him in Bonn when I was passing through once or twice as coordinator. I enjoy working with the Cyprus embassy folk. To some extent I dealt with the Greek and Turkish embassy although not quite so much for obvious reasons, but just learning how the bureaucracy works in terms of

the budget cycle, in terms of the aid requests, in terms of the importance and the power of the domestic groups that are concerned with Cyprus and Greece. Everything from AHEPA to the Pan-Cypriot Federation and the other groups that were around at the time. We saw them all and quite a bit of some of them. I think I only spent about five months on the Cyprus desk. It was a busy time. The Kyprianou/Sampson issue sticks out in my mind as the main thing. There were probably some others. But the Turkish desk had a sudden vacancy. Having also served in Turkey and realizing that that was a bigger job because it had a secretary and a deputy, I applied for it and I moved over. And for the next two and a half years I was the senior Turkish desk officer in SE. It was a very busy time for reasons of military aid, economic aid, the effort to stabilize the economy of Turkey, periodic rumblings about the military. There was a coup in 1980 and there was terrorism. The first thing I had to deal with when I moved over, and it was December of '79, it was the immediate aftermath of the assassination of four American contractors in Istanbul by Dev Sol or one of the leftist Turkish terrorist groups. These people were somewhat similar to Baader Meinhof, left wing in orientation, highly organized, compartmentalized, very ideological, and they had enough bench strength so that even when the Turkish police rolled up some of their cells, there were others to do the work. So the quick issue I had to deal with was the assassination of these four contractors and what that meant or didn't mean for the bilateral relationship.

Q: One issue that I'd like to hear what you have to say on, and I don't want to take things out of sequence, but at the time of the military takeover in 1980 and there had been terrorism, there was lots of concern about the situation in Turkey, do you want to say what you remember about that event and the U.S. reaction to it. It was late in the Carter administration. Were we terribly upset that the military demolished the democratic process in Turkey and so on? Maybe talk a little bit about the period before it too.

WILLIAMS: There was a steady worsening of the domestic situation in Turkey starting in the late '70s when Süleyman Demirel came back to power. It wasn't because it was Demirel but it was just because these left wing terrorist groups were getting out of hand in the sense they were killing more and more people and creating more and more sense of panic and disorder in Turkey. This unease of course was noticed by the Turkish military which historically has viewed itself and been viewed by the Turkish people as the guardian of the Atatürk legacy. The situation affected schools, it affected universities, it affected economic areas. There was hardly an area of Turkish life that was not to some extent compromised by this terrorism. Just one personal comment: our language teachers from Ankara who had taught Ann and me Turkish in the late '60s left Turkey at that time in '79 and came to the States. They left essentially because they were worried about their children. It was so unsafe. Even their young child who was in primary school, the primary schools were not entirely safe from the random violence or the targeted violence of the terrorist groups. It was a time of tremendous unease and danger for many people. Turks in the cities especially. Much less so in the countryside. I don't recall if martial law was used in that period, though in some provinces for much of the '80s and '90s martial law was in effect. There was no Kurdish issue at this time. This was not an issue of Kurdish separatism or Kurdish unrest at all. This was an issue of left wing anarchistic terror against the state and against the Turkish people. Against that background I, by sheer dumb luck, happened to be in Ankara on consultations September 11 or 12, whatever day it was 1980 when the coup happened. I was staying at the residence and Ambassador Spain knocked on my door early that morning

and said I could sleep in and take my time because we wouldn't be going down to the embassy for a while, there had been a coup. But when we did go down the hill from Çankaya where the residence is located, to the embassy, there were no cars in the streets, there was a tank here or there, but there were a lot of people walking around and they looked quite happy and relaxed. This is Ankara now, I'm not going to generalize beyond that, but it was a pretty big hunk of people, looked quite pleased that the military, thank God, had arrived to put things right. Relieved and happy. We didn't interview them, this is a very impressionistic statement, and could be challenged by people who looked at it more scientifically, but the sense was, and this was also the sense that other people on the country team had, of relief that at last the Turkish military had acted and stepped in and would impose order and bring the terrorists under control. As I recall, that's pretty much what happened. They did use martial law; they did bring the terrorism under control. They did set in motion, largely prodded by us, a process to restore democracy, but with a constitution that gave the military tremendously central importance in national security and main affairs of state. Our reaction in Washington was certainly not one of condemnation. I think there was a lot of understanding and sympathy for what the Turks had been going through, and given the fact that the military had already overrun the government several times before, and had restored democracy, there was a reasonable expectation that it would do so again. I remember Larry Eagleburger was the assistant secretary for EUR soon after this happened.

Q: Not until 1981. He was ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time. George Vest was assistant secretary during this period.

WILLIAMS: I distinctly remember meeting with Eagleburger. I'm confusing my dates perhaps, but essentially Ambassador Elekdag who was the Turkish ambassador for many years in Washington came in with his talking cards. He always had his points on three by five or four by seven cards and started making excuses, explaining how democracy would soon be restored. And it was either Eagleburger or Secretary Haig or both who in effect said don't worry about that, we understand what you did and we understand that you have a plan to in effect restore democracy when conditions are right. So there was no real pressure from Washington as far as I can recall, despite the official tut-tutting about what happened to democracy. But there was a deep understanding for the reasons it had happened and as I said a reasonable expectation that the Turkish military would restore both order and democracy in due course.

Q: What you just said is basically my recollection as well. I happened to be in Bonn at the time on September 12th I think it was of 1980 and had arrived I think from Berlin the night before and was staying at the DCM's residence and was quite surprised at breakfast to find out what had happened in Turkey, and then Jack Seymour came to pick me up and we went over to the foreign ministry. Of course, with the time difference with Washington it was a little hard to consult with people, but the German foreign ministry was very interested in what our reaction would probably be, and I think as I recall describing it more or less along the lines of what you just said. That yes, we always preferred democracy, but we were confident and things had gotten very bad in Turkey and this was not a big surprise and we would probably be somewhat understanding of it.

WILLIAMS: I recall now the specific issue with Secretary Haig. I had conflated two meetings.

When Haig became Secretary of State early in '81, this would have been the end of January, early February. Early in his tenure, Elekdag came up for a meeting and in that meeting, his first with the new Secretary of State of the new administration, Elekdag started to explain how the Turkish military planned to restore democracy, anticipating that this is what his audience would want to hear. My deputy was in that meeting, Larry Benedict I think it was. Larry said it was quite striking. Before Elekdag could get through one card, and he had quite a few of them, Haig essentially cut him off and said don't worry about it, we trust you. And Elekdag was very surprised because he'd been expecting to get a little more effusive encouragement to go back to democracy. Haig, having dealt with the Turkish military as NATO Commander and intimately involved in some of their dealings with the Greeks and the effort to bring Greece back into the military wing of NATO, Haig knew these folks, General Ebrin and the others, and had full confidence in them. He wanted to assure Elekdag he didn't need to go through the motions of talking about restoration of democracy. So he didn't. Elekdag talked about something else.

Q: What were some of the other issues that you dealt with as country director for Turkey in this period?

WILLIAMS: Turkish aid levels were a hardy perennial. I never did learn our own budget cycle very well. I remember that Eric Grayfelt who coordinated these things for the various desks in EUR would come by; it seemed earlier and earlier each year, with a request to start jetting up papers for presentation. How much money for economic assistance, how much for military assistance. The Turkish debt issue was a constant problem. My deputy tended to cover this more than I did, but as I recall there were several efforts by the Paris club to reschedule Turkish debt which had been done before. We crossed a new threshold however when we rescheduled already once before rescheduled debt from previously rescheduled debt. So PRD, previously rescheduled debt, rescheduling became the watch word and we had a lot of meetings with Elekdag on doing that. I think at the end of the day we did it. I don't remember the numbers, but because of Turkey's central importance to us, to the alliance, to that part of the Mediterranean, those strategic considerations overrode shall we say financial orthodoxy and I think the trade treaty went along finally.

Q: As I recall, one of the reasons why we were as confident of Turkey and what the military would do was that they retained Turgut Ozal as kind of the chief economic officer as he had been in previous government. And I know I had some meetings with him in Paris and in Washington. Do you remember anything about that?

WILLIAMS: Just that he was retained and that was an important element of continuity and as you say confidence. Demirel had installed him as an economic advisor with some power. I think those powers in his portfolio were enhanced significantly when the military came in, but I had no particular dealings with him, unfortunately.

Q: U.S. military facilities in Turkey had presumably gone back into operation, back to normal, after the congressional Turkish arms embargo was lifted in '78. Were you involved in status of forces negotiations or any kind of base negotiations with Turkey?

WILLIAMS: Not really. Don Gelber as I recall was our main negotiator for the Defense and

Economic Cooperation Agreement, the DECA.

Q: And he was in the embassy at Ankara at the time.

WILLIAMS: Was in the embassy at the time and came back regularly which is where I'm at, to debrief essentially. But that was handled on a different level. I'm sure Ed and probably Bob Pugh and Geoff Ogden were much more involved than I was. But I did not do base negotiations directly. I do remember the debriefs which were extensive and I seem to recall that that DECA was used as the model for the Greek DECA. There were two DECAs were there not in that period?

Q: There were, in parallel more or less. Any other issues with Turkey that you were...

WILLIAMS: Economic assistance I mentioned, military assistance. The Turks had a charming way through Ambassador Elekdag in particular, voicing their expectation that you would give them certain amounts, and it was put in the declarative sense which did not go down well initially with those that did not know the Turks. But in fact they got substantial assistance from us in those years. One year we actually gave them more than they had asked for. I don't remember why. And they never made that mistake again. They constantly upped the ante so we are always under their expectations and therefore we were in the position of owing them something by their lights. It sounds like I'm making fun of them, and I am to a certain degree, but I thoroughly enjoyed working with the Turkish embassy. It was a very professional group. Elekdag was one of the best ambassadors I've ever seen in any country. I think his tenure here was very successful. There was one issue too which I should mention, which sounds like I'm echoing my Bonn comments, but it's true, that is terrorism which I started to mention before. Terrorism was of course a concern in Turkey. Unfortunately on my watch it became a concern in the United States with respect to Turkish diplomats. I think in the early '70s a deranged elderly Armenian in California had murdered two Turkish consuls in their office and he was I believe a survivor of the Armenian genocide or the son of somebody who had survived it, but had very direct memories of that experience. And this had never happened before, and we were shocked and the Turks were shocked. As I recall that old man was sent to jail for the rest of his life. For whatever reason, at this point I can't remember what the reason was, the Armenian community in the third generation in the States, members of it was radicalized in the late '70s and there was a group called ASALA, the secret army for the liberation of Armenia. There were two essentially Armenian groups with terrorist wings in the United States. One of them assassinated a Turkish consul general and his driver I believe in Los Angeles when I was a desk officer, and this fellow was caught, his name was Sosoonian. He was caught rather quickly; he was prosecuted and sent to life in prison. I think he's still there. That search, that prosecution, that trial, that conviction, were very closely watched by the Turks as an indication of how seriously we took the problem of terrorism that affected them. We worked out a system that was followed so closely, this was before e-mail. Our embassy had to have almost day to day real time input to keep up with the Turks who were getting it from their people in Washington and out in California about what was going on with the trial. I forget how we did it exactly, but somehow we got daily reports from the courtroom or from lawyers following the case for us. We didn't have Greta Van Susteren but we had somebody talking to us who was a lawyer who could give us a sense of things. Maybe somebody in the Justice Department. And I would then send an official and formal night note to

Dick Bone the DCM in Ankara to give him the latest up to date. There was no CNN; there was no broadcast coverage that would compete with that. So he had by the next morning more information than anybody else in the embassy probably and certainly enough to deal with the Turks in the foreign ministry who were hammering on us daily about what are you going to do about Sosoonian, what are you going to do about Sosoonian. That we hoped would be the end of it. Unfortunately, about a year later, another Turk was killed in Boston. This was the honorary consul. I forget the name. But he was killed by an Armenian, third generation from the genocide. I don't know the name this time. But that person too was caught and convicted and sent to jail. Once again demarches by the Turkish ambassador had to be dealt with, demarches in Ankara had to be dealt with, and real time information on the status of the trial. So that took a lot of time. And there was another component to it because the Turks quite rightly said and our own people in DS (Diplomatic security) concluded that the Turks had other enemies too. A Cypriot once tried something just after the Cyprus disaster of '74. So there were various groups of people in this country and elsewhere who would try to get them. There was also a serious case of Armenian terrorism against Turks in Europe. In Vienna, in Paris and elsewhere they were successful in assassinating Turkish ambassadors and other officials. So the Turks were in a sort of understandable paranoia about what this meant and they were demanding all kinds of protection. And we as a matter of prudence thought it necessary to give them some extra protection. And that came down to the issue which is where I was so heavily involved with DS and the treasury, of installing fixed posts at the Turkish embassy and to some extent to Turkish consular positions in the United States. The Treasury ran the uniformed division of the Secret Service and that was the body in Washington tasked with providing fixed posts. It's something that no security service likes to do because it's very manpower intensive. It's 24 hours a day, just chews up people. It's seven days a week. And the initial reaction was no, no, no, but we kept going back to them and then we finally overruled the Secret Service. I think it required the Deputy Secretary of State talking to his colleague in Treasury before it was finally done. When the dam was broken we got the fixed post at the Turkish embassy and I think it's still there. I think DS might have had to do this at their consulates elsewhere in the United States, so that was visible, tangible proof of our seriousness about terrorism and our determination to give the Turks some extra protection. A lot of people said at the time, and this may be true, that's not the most efficient use of manpower in terms of combating terrorism. On the other hand, it's a very basic part of reassuring the protectee that you're serious and that he can do his work normally. So getting that done I think was probably the largest single issue I had on my last year on the desk there.

Q: Besides the tragic incidents of Turkish diplomats being killed by terrorists there certainly over the years has been pressure by the Armenian American community and Armenians elsewhere to encourage Turkey to accept responsibility for what happened in 1915. Congressional resolutions, something at the Holocaust Museum. Did that sort of thing come up while you were on the desk, or was that later?

WILLIAMS: It was always there. It was part of the discussion because as soon as you start talking about Armenian terrorism the reasons for it come up and the past is dredged out, and the obstinate refusal of the Turkish governments to open the archives or to even express regret let alone apologize was always, always there. But I would say that the political discussion on this subject was virulent at the time because of the murders. I mean that made it difficult to have a

dispassionate discussion with the Turks, or even with some of the Armenian American leadership about what was involved in the Turkish relationship. I remember, and there was a lot of pressure against Turkey, and justifiable pressure, for its refusal to come clean or to open the archives or to allow a dispassionate examination of the record. The Republic of Turkey was the legal successor to the Ottoman government and the government in power in World War I, and it certainly was not responsible for what had been done. But it seemed to take the position, and I think this is the case of many Turkish governments and maybe to this day, that if you accept responsibility by saying you're sorry, you open yourself up to potential claims for reparations either monetary or territory or both and they just didn't want to go down that road because that would be domestically difficult in Turkey. I had several experiences with this and I lost a few feathers in both. One of our efforts to promote the bilateral relationship, which I saw as one of my duties on the Turkish desk, was to host or to have the Turkish folkloric ballet perform in the United States. This was something that USIS (United States Information Service) had scheduled, it was cultural exchange. This was the national folkloric ballet of Turkey doing essentially folk dances which are not unlike those you see in Greece and other parts of the Middle East, Cyprus. But they were Turks and they were doing Turkish dances, and their name was Turkish Folkloric Ballet. The impresario initially scheduled them to do four appearances in California, I think a couple in Chicago, New York, Boston, and finally in the Kennedy Center at Washington. The pressure from the Armenian American community and other communities against those appearances was so great that one by one the insurers started threatening to cancel their policies and the owners of the theaters and the other establishments started backing out. We couldn't obviously tell any of these folks what to do as the Department of State, but we thought it important to appeal to the political leadership in California at least to try to let this performance go forward on the grounds of cultural exchange and not to give into terrorism as we would do. This type of political pressure as we put it, we didn't call it terrorism outright. So I, as full of my enthusiasm as I always was, drafted a set of I thought very persuasive talking points for the deputy secretary. The secretary was not available and Larry Eagleburger didn't want to bother him, but for Judge Clark, Deputy Secretary, to use with the Governor of California who as luck would have it was named Deukmejian.

Q: And Clark had a very strong California connection.

WILLIAMS: Clark was a Californian and knew his way around politics there. He might not know much about foreign policy but his mother had raised no fool when it came to domestic policy and politics. He understood that very well. In any case, we did the talking points. This was an important issue because the Turkish ambassador had been demarching all over town about it. The Turks had been raised with our embassy in Ankara, and as a matter of principle we really felt the Turkish Folkloric Ballet should be allowed to perform. But both the cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco and the local backers had said no. The proposal was that Judge Clark call George Deukmejian, Governor Deukmejian and make the case on political grounds. To use suasion with his community, with his people in California, all Californians, to let these performances go ahead. I was asked to join Larry Eagleburger in Judge Clark's office. Never met Judge Clark before though I'd heard a lot about him. So Larry gave him the memo. I don't think the judge had read it. He told the judge in several senses what it was about and gave him the memo, and Clark had the call put through to Governor Deukmejian. I was sitting there taking notes because I thought that was my responsibility. Judge Clark picks up the phone, talks to the

governor, had a little small talk, and then he says to the governor, there's one of my people here who wants to raise an issue with you, at which point he hands the phone to me. So I get on the phone. There was no warning on this. I was coming into the conversation cold, and Deukmejian, I don't know if he knew what the subject was or not because Clark had certainly given him no indication of what it was. So I start reading my own talking points to the governor of California and there was silence. I don't know how he looked or what he was doing or who else was on the line, but I went through all my talking points and asked for his cooperation as I thought Judge Clark was going to do. And as I recall, Deukmejian was courteous but he basically said he resented this effort to tell the people of California how to think about Turkey and what to do about the ballet, and that he just didn't think he could do anything about it or words to that effect. So that was the bottom line. So I felt like a stupid fool because I thought I'd wasted my time and his and Judge Clark's. But it was a lesson to me also in how things worked and how Murphy's Law can occur. So at the end of the day the appearances were all canceled except for the Kennedy Center, which did go on. That was the only one. Every other one the impresario backed out because the insurance wouldn't cover it, or the owners of the theater didn't want to put their facilities at risk for riot or bombing or incident or unfavorable publicity. There was just too much downside potential to the entrepreneurs and private sector and public sector folk. After this fiasco with Governor Deukmejian, I called in my capacity as senior Turkish desk officer in the Department of State, then Mayor Diane Feinstein of San Francisco, and asked her to be helpful, figuring that with a name like that she would perhaps be more inclined to be helpful. I would say she engaged more on the issue and professed sympathy, but also told me very clearly there was nothing she could do to overrule that decision or to resist the pressures for the decision to cancel the Turkish Folkloric Ballet. So even I struck out. But the performance in the Kennedy Center, perhaps for all these reasons, was well-attended. The concert hall was full. It was an enthusiastic audience; it was a stellar performance of folkloric dance. This was really impressive, the costuming, the agility, the grace of these dancers. And as it was their only appearance in a program that initially called for eight or 10 performances across the whole country, we wanted to make it special and they did too. And it was a very magical evening. But I'll never cease regretting that we couldn't do better on that cultural field, but again it was a lesson on how things work. You can't treat culture or politics or anything in isolation. It all is ultimately subject to other concerns.

Q: I'd like to come back for just a second to the aid levels for Turkey. One of the things I don't think you mentioned and maybe we should say just a word about is this whole question of the ten to seven ratio that Turkey would receive ten dollars and Greece would receive seven. No matter what the Turkish level was, that also set the Greek level. That might have been the case in the time that they got more than the Turks had asked for, that really Greece wanted more and therefore we wound up giving more to Turkey than they had asked for. Do you remember much about the ratio and how that came to be and how important that was at the time you were on the desk?

WILLIAMS: Well it was important because the Turks resented the hell out of it and they were very up front in telling us that. They essentially saw the ten to seven ratio, which was an undertaking reached in the negotiation of the Greek version of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, as a brake on their ability to milk us for resources. The Greeks were not trying to push their levels up because they understood correctly that their lower level could push

the Turkish levels down. The Turks argued that their needs, which were so far greater than those of the Greeks, were not being met adequately by us because of the braking effect of ten to seven. So it was a constant element of resentment in the discussion. That's the main thing I remember about it.

Q: You've talked about the Turkish embassy in Washington, Ambassador Elekdag, why don't you talk a little bit about your relations, how you handled Ambassador Jim Spain and then Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe who I think became ambassador while you were on the desk.

WILLIAMS: Jim Spain was my first ambassador. Ron Spiers had just left. Dennis Kux was the chargé for a while. We were involved in getting Jim Spain confirmed and sent out to Ankara. As it turned out he was virtually a lame duck because when the Republicans won, Strausz-Hupe was tapped to be the next ambassador to Turkey. And I don't recall how long Jim Spain's tour was. But the issue with Spain in which I was only slightly involved was his confirmation. He had had an earlier career as an analyst for the CIA and there was some concern in Washington that if the Turks found out about this it might prejudice his success as chief of mission in Ankara. It might even lead them to deny his appointment. So there was a lot of discussion about it. Spain mentions in his memoir even, I think it was finally resolved when Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, was persuaded to call Ambassador Elekdag and over the phone discuss Ambassador Spain's biography to see if any neuralgic reaction occurred. At the end of the day the Turks said fine, come ahead as I recall. It was not a problem. But for a while in Washington we thought it would be.

Q: He had served in Turkey before hadn't he?

WILLIAMS: He'd been DCM. But that had not come up. This was in context of his confirmation and that was the concern. No, he'd had a very successful tour as DCM and knew Turkey well. So that was the main thing. I stayed with him once when I was there on consultations. That was during the coup of the fall of 1980. He was heavily involved in pushing the idea of a... the question was how could America best commemorate the centennial of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's birth which was a very big issue in Turkey, but understandably not in many other countries and certainly not in the United States of America. And we discussed a lot of things, from a postage stamp to this, that or the other. I think in the end it was a very modest commemoration and I don't recall what it was, but Jim had a lot of ideas on that as he did on many things. And we tried all of them including the stamp, but discovered that the lead time for stamps is pretty long unless you're a former President of the United States. Again the politics of it was such it was clear we could not get a stamp through the Citizen's Advisory Committee even with enough lead time. There was some work with Jim as I recall, but I don't remember much more than that. Then when Ambassador Strausz-Hupe came he was in no great hurry to get out which surprised me a bit. He spent a fair amount of time consulting to Washington. As with Jim Spain I had a good relationship with Ambassador Strausz-Hupe. We made heavy use of the OI channel and less of the phone to keep each other informed officially in the formal channel. The only difficulty I had with him sometimes was that he had a habit of going out in a rather proconsul-like fashion giving press conferences. This was under the military government, giving press conferences on issues for which we had not had a chance to prepare him. Sometimes he would put his foot in it because he was uninformed so we had to help him walk that particular cat back. But that was the main

issue I had with him.

Q: Okay we're continuing the foreign affairs Oral History interview with James A. Williams. It's the 4th of November 2004. And Jim, I think we're just about finished with your period at the Turkish desk, which ended about 1982. Was there any sort of last words you'd like to make about that period?

WILLIAMS: Well that was my three year tour on the desk. I'd been the desk officer for Cyprus and then most of the time for Turkey. I think it was a wonderful introduction to how the bureaucracy works, the budget process in terms of the military, and the economic assistance request clearance issues and so forth. And that was a very useful lesson for me, a very intense one, but I enjoyed it enormously.

JAMES W. SPAIN
Ambassador
Turkey (1980 - 1981)

Ambassador James W. Spain was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1926. He entered the U.S. Army at the age of 18 and, after spending a year in Japan, returned to the United States to earn a master's degree in 1949. He later received a Ph.D. from Columbia University. In addition to Turkey, Ambassador Spain's career in the Foreign Service included service in Sri Lanka. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 31, 1995.

Q: What was the situation in 1980 when you went out to Turkey?

SPAIN: Security had been deteriorating again almost from the time I left in 1974. Right and left extremists were back to battling in the streets. Military aid had been cut off for several years and was restored just before I came back. My first task was to complete and sign a defense and economic cooperation agreement that put the U.S.-Turkey alliance back together. My predecessor, Ron Spiers, had done most of the work on that. Demirel was back as prime minister. Violence was growing; the politicians were squabbling; and the military was obviously growing more and more restless. I had nine or ten months with Demirel. Things were bad. We sat in the second floor sitting room in the residence in Ankara and listened to gun battles going on all over the city. Americans were prime targets of the left. Between June 1979 and September 1980 eleven Americans were killed. Then on September 12, 1980 the military took over the government. In two days they had the graffiti scrubbed off the walls and all the agitators (as well as some innocents) locked away in jail. We were back to peace and quiet, if not democracy.

Q: This has been the pattern in Turkey hasn't it?

SPAIN: That was the third time.

Q: And the military does let go after a while. Unlike other places, here you are hearing the gun

fire and watching the situation going down, you must have been thinking, "We know the military is going to take over. As a policy we are opposed to this, but in your heart of hearts you must have felt soon rather than later they have to do it." How did you handle this in your reports to Washington?

SPAIN: You describe the pattern correctly. We tried to keep Washington up to date on events from day to day. There were complaints about military behavior from the human rights people, but these existed even before the military took over. It has always been true that the Turkish police and military take more than a legitimate amount of glee in banging students and other agitators over the head. But I don't recall that between January 1980 when I came and September 1981 when the military intervened that I ever had any instructions to tell them to do it. I think most people in Washington recognized the situation for what it was. They didn't approve of military takeovers but, if there ever was a case where one was justified, this was it. There was also less reason to be concerned about a military takeover in Turkey than in most other places because the Turkish military had a good record of intervening and getting out in a finite time.

Each intervention took longer. If I remember correctly, the 1961 intervention when they hung prime minister Menderes lasted something like 18 months. The 1971 takeover, which happened when I was in Istanbul, ran 20 plus months. The 1980 takeover stretched to three years or so. This kind of thing is accepted by most Turks. There is a tradition dating to Ataturk, if not an actual constitutional provision, for it. In 1961 they jumped a little fast -- Menderes was juggling the army promotion lists, not exactly a crime deserving the noose. But in 1971 and 1980 they waited until well after law and order had broken down under the elected governments.

Q: At the time of this unrest were we seeing anybody else's hand in it outside of Turkey? Or was this a Turkish problem?

SPAIN: There were all sorts of reports about Soviet inspiration and support, but in fact, I think the opposition to the government came primarily from Turks of both the extreme left and extreme right. It was not a Soviet inspired or led attempt at revolution. The USSR likely provides some money and arms to the leftists but it wasn't decisive.

Q: Did the Kurds play much of a role at this time?

SPAIN: No. The Kurd problem is endemic in Turkey. It's always there. Some individual Kurds probably supported the leftists but the mass of the Kurdish people simply weren't involved. Demirel's position was undermined by a certain amount of Kurdish agitation in the East and the military probably feared that too would grow. But the fight was between Turks of different political views.

Q: What about Cyprus at this time. In 1974 the Turks took over a significant portion of Cyprus and we violently protested and the Greeks did it, but I take it by this time Cyprus, as far as the Turks were concerned, was no longer a problem, or was it?

SPAIN: As far as the Turks were concerned the Cyprus issue was frozen. Nevertheless, there had been a number of international efforts at a solution in the years since the Turkish invasion. We

supported UN efforts and bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey. In the summer of 1981 the NATO Ministerial Meeting was in Ankara. The Greek foreign minister was there. So, of course, was the Turk. Ed Muskie, our Secretary of State for only a couple of weeks, came. So did the eternal Peter Carrington for the UK.

We had some conversations on Cyprus in our house hosted by Muskie with all of them. At one point we seemed close to a mutually acceptable concept. We thought we had at least established a platform on which the Greeks and Turks could sit down and reach agreement. But at the very end the Greek Foreign Minister announced (having checked with Athens, I suppose) that there wasn't time to try to implement things. In October there would be elections in Greece. The leader of the opposition, the infamous Andreas Papandreou, was already charging the Karamanlis government with being soft on Cyprus. Nothing could be done until after the election. Well, Andreas won the election and nothing ever happened.

Q: Did you find the Turks sort of felt what is the Cyprus problem now? We have our people on one side and the Greeks on the other.

SPAIN: The Federation of Northern Cyprus has taken on a life of its own. A Turkish military withdrawal would be more difficult now. But as late as 1981, the Turkish position was still that they didn't want any land on Cyprus. What they wanted was a guarantee that the Turkish Cypriots could live in safety and equality. Did they mean this? I think they did. If a way could have been found to achieve this, I think they would have withdrawn. The establishment of a separate state for the Cypriot Turks has changed all this.

Q: Could you go there?

SPAIN: When I was ambassador? The Turks would have been delighted, but I carefully never did. The Greeks could have interpreted it, not without reason, as showing some kind of acceptance of the Turkish presence -- which was not U.S. policy. A lot of our embassy people wanted to go on leave because it was very cheap, convenient, and interesting. I made myself rather unpopular by refusing to let them do so.

Q: I can see why not. The Greeks would have taken this to the halls of our congress. In an earlier era you had gone through an estimate of what our listening posts were doing on the Black Sea. Did you have a chance to take a look at our military establishment there and possibly think it should be reduced?

SPAIN: I did a lot of touring of U.S. military installations -- more, I think, than our resident American generals really liked. If my figures are correct, there were something like 24,000 uniformed Americans in Turkey in the 1960's. 16,000 or so in the 1970's, and only 5,000-7,000 when I got there in 1980. Let me add that I am far from sure about the accuracy of those figures. At all times military personnel were an important part of my constituency. Unlike in Western European countries, where they were directly under military theater commanders, the people in Turkey were responsible to the embassy.

Q: So there had been a significant reduction.

SPAIN: A number of the intercept facilities had been closed. I gather they have all been closed now. When I was last in Turkey there were two left, one at Sinop on the Black Sea and one near Diyarbakir in the east. The latter was actually over the horizon radar. There was a NATO US Air Force establishment at Incirlik near Adana a few small nuclear weapons custodial units at two or three other places in Turkey.

Q: Well, anything else we might cover about Turkey?

SPAIN: I was in Turkey for much of the time the Embassy Tehran hostages were held in Iran. We and the Turks talked a lot about them. Turkey was the only NATO country not to withdraw its ambassador. They argued that his remaining would help and they certainly passed on to us everything he learned about the hostages. The hostage crisis also provoked a certain amount of tom-foolery by U.S. agencies. One of them recalled to active duty an ageing young reserve officer once stationed in Izmir who insisted he could raise a Kurd levy to go into Iran and rescue the hostages. He was apparently authorized to come to Turkey to get the process started and actually got the American general at NATO Land Southeast in Izmir to lend him his airplane. Don't think so. Then he showed up at the CIA station in Istanbul claiming the Authority of the President himself and demanding to use their communications. The Agency was as aghast as I was. We kicked him out.

To recap my experiences in my brief year-and-a-half as ambassador in Turkey: we got the U.S.-Turkish alliance patched up; we made a little mileage toward a Cyprus settlement but it went down the drain with the elections in Greece; we worked out a way with the Turkish Government to handle the growing number of Soviet defectors who jumped ship or plane in Turkey; we kept a good flow of economic assistance going after the USAID program had ended; we probably contributed to containing bristling Turkish-Greek hostility.

MICHAEL W. COTTER
Political/Military Officer
Ankara (1980-1982)

Ambassador Michael W. Cotter was born in Wisconsin in 1943. He graduated from Georgetown University in 1965 and received a JD from the University of Michigan in 1968. Postings throughout his career have included Saigon, La Paz, Can Tho, Quito, Ankara, Kinshasa, Santiago, and an ambassadorship to Turkmenistan. Ambassador Cotter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: I found slightly earlier, in 1970-1974, when I was in Greece, that the Greeks made the United States responsible for whatever had happened. Not just the United States, but the CIA.

COTTER: I remember, it was later I guess, an Argentine, who had been one of our exchange students back in Wisconsin. We got into a discussion after the Argentine junta had left. A new

government had come in, and there had been this banking crisis. This was the crash in the 1980s when the American banks lost an incredible amount of money because they had loaned too much to the Third World countries. This guy was an engineer, and his view was that this was our fault because we forced money on the military junta. It really wasn't the Argentines' fault because the junta wasn't an Argentine government. It was the junta. If we hadn't forced all this money on the junta, all these problems would not have occurred. I said, "Carlos, get a grip. It was your government. You may not like it, but it was your government, and they took the money. I can feel sorry for banks that may have gone bust, but I can't accept that it is my responsibility or my government's responsibility that you guys over-borrowed." We decided that for our mental health we didn't want to continue the trend descending posts by altitude, and we had to get out. For a long time I had been interested, as all of us are at one time or another, in serving in Europe. Well, of course, Europe is a very difficult bureau to get into if you are not in it already. It always has been and always will be, although it is less so as the definition of Europe expands to include places that some of the European bureau (EUR) people weren't so interested in going to. Nonetheless, I was interested in going to Europe. Coming from ARA (Bureau for American Republic Affairs), you can forget it. I had no contacts, and I had been overseas for most of the previous three years. I ended up talking to my career counselor and came up with two possibilities. The only way I could get into Europe was to take a hard language. If you had Spanish and wanted to go to Spain, you can forget it. If you wanted to study French or German, forget about it, but you could take a hard language. So, there were two possibilities open for me: one was taking Serbo-Croatian and serving in Zagreb, and the other was taking Turkish, and serving in Ankara. Very much about our careers is luck because you just don't have that much control over things. You are faced with decisions, but that, frankly, was for me a very lucky decision. I had wanted to go to Zagreb, but I got a call one day saying that they were paneling the Ankara job and wondered whether I wanted it. I said, "Well, where does the Zagreb job stand?" They said, "Well, we are not paneling that yet." "Well, when are you going to panel it?" "Well sometime." "Well, what are my chances on that?" "Well, we can't say." I decided to take the Ankara job and go to Turkey, and go on to Turkish training, which is a 10 month language program. I got back to Washington and discovered that Turkey was in the thralls of incredible terrorism and had no money for heating oil. Not only did you have terrorists around town shooting up restaurants, but people in the previous winter had had no heat, and in some cases literally had to break the ice in their commode to go to the bathroom, which answers the question why the system was willing to have someone from ARA go to Ankara. Anyhow, my wife and I both took the full Turkish language course, something the Department also moved away from when money was tight. We treat our spouses so badly in general and provide so little to them. Obviously, we don't compensate them because they are not real people, even though they are expected to endure a significant amount of work. But, also, when we don't provide language training to such people, we don't provide them with the tools they need to function adequately in various countries. I think we are back to doing more language training. It is really important, and it really made a difference. We were also in the same class which was interesting. They tend not to like spouses in the same class. Joanne and I managed to do quite well. So, we had 10 months of language training.

Q: This would be from 1979 to 1980?

COTTER: That's right, from summer 1979 through summer 1980. I like FSI very much. I like

their language training. I had been through it, of course, taking Vietnamese, in somewhat odd circumstances, but nonetheless a full language course. It's interesting. You have lots of conflicts in these courses. I think there were 12 of us taking Turkish. We had three classes. One of the early conflicts you get into within all these language classes is between people who like grammar and people who don't. There are some people who, when you start talking about noun cases, are really turned off and would rather absorb the language by osmosis. Other people like to know the grammar, and almost inevitably, it ends up in a conflict. Finally, the linguist has to resolve this. But we had a very good group who took Turkish, most of whom we are still in close touch with. I can't think of any events, in particular, that occurred that year, other than we spent a lot of time studying.

Q: *Where did you go, to Ankara?*

COTTER: Summer of 1980, I went to Ankara.

Q: *You were there from 1980 to 1982?*

COTTER: Yes. I was in the political military section, called Mutual Security Affairs. We arrived in August, and three weeks after we arrived there was a military coup in Turkey, which overthrew the government that had been there, and put an end to serious terrorism. I have now served in Vietnam, which obviously was a military government; I have served in Bolivia, which had a military coup six weeks after I got there; I served in Ecuador, which had a military coup three months before I got there; and I was now serving in Turkey, where a military government took over three weeks after I got there. I suppose the KGB's file on me probably ties me somehow together with military takeovers in various places. I guess one's personal experience colors very much how one looks at these things. My view of military governments is that, in some cases, they are necessary, where there is simply a breakdown of civilian institution. The difficulty in most cases is that they simply compound the problems that occurred in the civilian government. I was talking to somebody about this the other day. In a lot of countries where these things occur, the problem is that you don't have institutions that are strong enough, or good enough, to run the country. So you have a civilian government which simply doesn't perform. In almost all the cases where I have served with military governments, those governments were welcomed by the vast majority of the people, simply because of the chaos and non-performance of civilian government. People accepted that it was time for change. The problem, in a place like Ecuador, was that nothing changed under the military government. You had a lot of potential there for reforming, but the reforms don't occur. The military doesn't do anything to develop civilian institutions, and inevitably, they become corrupted by the same powers around the country that have corrupted whatever civilian people were there before them. They take money, and they take benefits from civilians. After a while, they leave power simply because they no longer enjoy popular support. Once again, a group of civilians takes over with the prospect of not much changing because nothing has been done to change the underlying conditions in the country. This was certainly the case in Ecuador, and it was, to a large extent, the case in Bolivia, where not much change was carried out. The Turkish military, to their credit, was much more disciplined and had done this before.

Q: *And returned it.*

COTTER: They returned it to civilians, trying to change the system every time. They did change the system significantly between 1980 and 1983, when they left, although again, they were not able to resolve some of the underlying conflicts within the Turkish body politic. Today, we find that Turkey hasn't had a government for six weeks, and it is some of the same old people who are in charge. The guy the military kicked out of office in 1980 was Suleyman Demirel, who is now the president of the country, and the prime minister before him, Bulent Ecevit, is now in the parliament and is trying to form a government. Nonetheless, when we arrived in Turkey, in Ankara people wouldn't go out at night because of two big dangers. One was banner bombs. There would be a banner strung across a main street with an inflammatory political slogan, and when the police came to take the banner down, it exploded. The other danger was drive-by shootings. It could be at a restaurant or a shop. Patrons would be in a restaurant at night, and along would come a carload of people with submachine guns and grenades.

Q: What were they trying to do?

COTTER: You would discover that the owner of the restaurant was a rightist or a leftist and was being targeted by people on the other side of the political spectrum. The precise goals were never clearly defined. I mean, right and left had been clearly defined, tending toward socialist on one end, and tending toward conservatives on the other side. This reflected much of the same societal conflict that was affecting a lot of countries during the 1960s and 1970s. One of the interesting things about studying Turkish at that time was the degree to which this conflict pervaded even the language. We ended up having to learn two vocabulary words for lots of things because language had become politicized. You had Turkish vocabulary that came from Ottoman Turkish and that had lots of Arabic and Persian words. Then, you had what the Turks called "Oz Turkey" time Turkish, which was an effort to go back to the roots of the Turkish language and get rid of the rest. Well, if you were a rightist, you used "Oz Turkey," if you were a leftist, you used the more modern, or older Ottoman, Turkish that was popular in the cities. So, we ended up having to learn two words for many things. That has mostly gone away by now. Turkey has gone beyond that. If you talk to the Turks today, they use only one word for things. They will all know both words, but it is no longer politicized. Anyhow, the tension was incredibly high in 1980. It was not only that these attacks would happen in parts of town where foreigners were, but even in poorer neighborhoods. If you were a leftist, and lived in an area where there were mostly rightists, your life would be in danger. So, people would move into another neighborhood. At that point, you would have entire neighborhoods that were all leftists and all rightists. Then you would have carloads late at night from one neighborhood going to the other and shooting up the neighborhood. Oh, the other thing in Turkey was a significant element of this from the far left, aimed at America. In the late 1970s, there had been a number of terrorist incidents directed at us: attacks on bus stops, military buses. I don't remember whether there were any attacks on embassy people, per se. I think most of them had been targeted at our military presence, rather than at the embassy.

The military government came to power around September 1980 and stayed in power until 1983. I was assigned to what was called Mutual Security Affairs, the embassy's name for the political-military section. In Ankara, we had then, and we still do today as we do in many of the NATO countries, in addition to a political section, have a political-military section that deals with lots of the issues stemming from NATO. Examples of these issues are status of forces issues and NATO

political issues. In Turkey, what made the job particularly interesting at that time was that in the wake of the Turkish action on Cyprus in 1974 we had cut off military assistance to the Turks and had cut off most of our cooperation. This created difficulties for our military, which had a number of facilities in Turkey. We had a large air base down near Adana, in southern Turkey, called Incirlik. Americans also manned a number of NATO communication and weapons facilities in the country. Our cutting off military assistance caused the Turks to put all of that in the deep freeze. While we still manned those facilities, we weren't allowed to do anything to them or at them. Well, this went on for about four years. Finally, the costs to our defense posture and NATO's defense policy became quite clear. In 1979, we began negotiations with the Turks, and in early 1980 we completed them on terms for renewing military assistance. This was particularly difficult in the United States because of the influence of two very strong ethnic lobbying groups: the Armenians and the Greeks. This was my first experience in the Foreign Service dealing with ethnic lobbying in the United States, primarily the Greek lobby, and to a lesser extent the Armenian lobby. Renewing military assistance with the "barbarian" Turks was fought very strongly by the Greek lobby in the U.S. Congress. But, it was finally done. In early 1980, we signed the first Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the Turks, which was a really seminal document. It ended up being the model for agreements we have done with a number of other countries around the world since. It changed very basic relationships. What essentially had been our bases became Turkish facilities. We were required to cooperate with the Turks and share information with them. Among other things, we had intelligence collection facilities, two of them, in addition to the air base at Incirlik. I say this was a seminal document because it was really the first time that we had accepted, as we have subsequently in other places, that we are in these countries as guests, and that the places we are based we will share, and will be under at least notional command of local commanders. I arrived in the summer of 1980, just about the time we began to implement the DECA. It was absolutely new territory, where we had never been before. The Turks would send in a commander to one of these bases, with three guys on his staff, and very vague orders about what his role on the base was to be, who then had to take over from an American commander who had always commanded the base and who has now been told, "You have to work with this guy whose base this is." Of course, you got a lot of personalities involved. There are some people who want to play hard ball and others who didn't. We, in our section, and the foreign ministry, essentially had to sort all of this out. It also opened the possibility, for the first time in six or seven years, of our doing maintenance and upgrades at some of these bases. Nothing had been done at any of these places since 1975. At Incirlik, for instance, NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) were living in trailers that were from World War II. They were in Libya for the Africa campaign for World War II and had stayed at Wheelus Air Force Base until we closed Wheelus in 1967 or 1972 and then had been moved to Incirlik. They were still being used 35 years later. You can't imagine what these places looked like.

We did all sorts of interesting things. One of the things we did at Incirlik, for instance, was allow Turkish firms to bid on constructing new base housing. The Air Force in Germany, which managed contracting, was getting ready to hand off contracts to one of its German firms. The Turks said, "Wait a minute, under the DECA you have to open this for bidding by Turkish firms." The Air Force didn't have any Turkish firms on its contractor list, but the Turks insisted they add some. Well, in fact, by that time there were Turkish construction firms working around the world that were very good. In the end, it was a Turkish firm that won that contract and did it

a lot cheaper than it would have cost to bring in Germans. Again, the U.S. Air Force had to adjust its mind set. They had simply never done this kind of a thing in Turkey. Putting in new equipment out at the radar site in Diyarbakir, which had 60 tons of old copper piping, also had to be offered to the Turks. We worked out a regular set of inspections with the Turkish foreign ministry and someone from Embassy, the counselor or I, would go around and inspect all of the bases. There were lots of status of forces issues. It was a fascinating two years. It was really very good.

Q: I would like to go back. The coup came when?

COTTER: Three weeks after I arrived.

Q: You are the new boy on the block, and all. Looking at the embassy, was everybody waiting for this particular event to happen? If so, or if not, how was the coup received when it did occur?

COTTER: Well, it was received quite well by most people, simply because we had lived in such concern over our personal safety, as did most Turks. You could almost hear a sigh of relief, I think, from most people. Over night, restaurants opened up and people were out on the street who hadn't been out on the street. The military in Turkey had an extraordinarily high reputation, which I must say, in this case, they lived up to, in terms of the probity with which they ran the government and met their commitments to turn it back to civilians. The fact that people were no longer subjected to being gunned down in a restaurant or being gunned down in their neighborhood was received with a great sigh of relief. Of course, by 1980 we couldn't accept the coup because of the human rights implications, and we leaned very heavily on the military government for a commitment to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. They said that they were only there temporarily and had taken similar action before and returned power to civilians. We insisted on receiving from them a time commitment.

We did not have much notice on the coup. Actually, the day of the coup, out on the edge of Ankara, near where our small military compound was, one of our military attachés had noticed a line of tanks and asked his contacts what they were for. He was told they were for an exercise. Indeed, the exercise was the coup. So we had no forewarning of it. There had been a lot of speculation that something was going to have to happen, but the timing of it came as a surprise.

Turkey was interesting to me for a number of reasons, after Latin America. One, the place was an order of magnitude in terms of sophistication beyond places like Ecuador and Bolivia. They have an incredibly professional and efficient, well-trained civil service and the foreign ministry people in Turkey were really outstanding. In Latin America we had very large military assistance groups that were all over the country and worked very closely with all of the military and had very clear access to all of the military. In Turkey, it was considerably different. We had a large military assistance team, but they were not out with Turkish units. When we did things socially and professionally, it was with a limited number of Turkish officers. Our access to Turkish officers outside of that circle was really quite limited. The Turks have always maintained a certain distance in terms of a fullness of sharing with us. There were, in those days, those officers on the Turkish General Staff and elsewhere who were clearly designated to work with foreigners. If you met an officer outside the circle and invited that officer to a social event, generally the

officer was unable to go. Certainly a lot of that occurred during the embargo period, from 1975 to 1979. There was a lot of speculation, and I don't know whether it is true or not, but as we began our assistance programs again, there was a lot of concern expressed about the generation of military leaders in Turkey who reached field grade during that period and didn't have access to U.S. training and U.S. schools. A lot was made of the fact that when I was there, most of the senior Turkish General Staff people had served in Korea. The Turks had a very big contingent in the Korean War, so the Turkish General Staff in those days felt very close to us. I don't know whether by now the group in the general staff who were at their formative point in their military careers when we cut Turkey off from military assistance are in positions of authority.

The embassy, generally, welcomed the coup. The other thing the coup did was to restore fiscal discipline. Part of the problem with the civilian governments was their financial irresponsibility. Turkey has very cold winters, and in 1978 and 1979 the country did not have the money to buy heating oil. At that point, it depended largely on coal and on oil for heating. That changed with the military government. So, there was, in the two winters we were there, sufficient heat, although by that time the embassy had put generators in most of our quarters. Embassy staff had lived scattered around town. In the difficult years, as leases came up, the Embassy tended to put us together in apartment buildings. So we were in a building that was occupied primarily by Americans, which allowed us to make sure that the heating plant had fuel oil, and we had a power generator. We lived in a six-story apartment building that was all U.S. embassy people. I remember the rules were that if there was a big power outage, we could only use the emergency generator to keep our refrigerator and freezer going. We weren't supposed to have any lights because they thought from a security point of view it would look strange if the whole neighborhood was black, except for the one building. Terrorists or whoever would be able to identify that as the American building. When I recounted this to Turkish friends, they would say, "There is something wrong with you, you must be nuts. You mean, you have a generator, you have the ability to have lights, and you don't have them because you are worried about it. Anybody who wants to know a building occupied by Americans, it is easy enough to find out." But, nonetheless, we maintained that charade the whole time I was there.

Q: Speaking on the military side, was the Soviet Union the threat? Is this what you all were looking at?

COTTER: Yes. Turkey, of course, is a member of NATO. It was and is the easternmost member of NATO. It faced the "soft southern flank" of the Soviet Union. The Iranian revolution had occurred in 1979. Let me go back a minute. I commented earlier that as I was studying Turkish nothing notable happened. But one of the difficult things, if I can digress, about language study is that early on the teachers try and force students to communicate in the language. So while you are in the first several months, they will do dialogues and try to get discussions going, which, under the best of circumstances, is very difficult because you simply don't have the vocabulary to express yourself. I forget when in 1979 the takeover of the embassy in Tehran was. September maybe?

Q: I think it was November 1979.

COTTER: Okay. So, we would have been in Turkish training three months when it occurred.

What the language teachers do is to try and find topics of current interest to talk about. And our Turkish teachers kept wanting to talk about the embassy takeover. For most of us, what compounded the fact that we didn't have the vocabulary to talk about it, was the fact that it was very difficult even in English for most of us to articulate our feelings about this. I still remember the people I knew and how absolutely devastating that year was. It was such a traumatic thing to have so many of our colleagues taken hostage and have no idea, for months, what was going to happen to them. Talking about this in Turkish was absolutely impossible. Finally, we said to the teachers, "We don't want to talk about this. Let's talk about other subjects," because we had such strong feelings pent up and didn't have the vocabulary to express them.

Anyhow, Iran also borders Turkey and clearly we weren't friendly with them. We wanted to get our hostages out, but that was not a major concern of the Turks. Then there are the Kurds, who live in southern Turkey, western Iran, and northern Iraq. Traditionally, two of the three cooperated to push the Kurdish problem into the other country.

This was 1980, 1982, and we were in the depths of the Cold War. Greece has always been an ancillary concern of the Turks. That relationship may be more central now than it was then or at earlier times. It happens in many bilateral disputes that the dispute is much more important to one side than the other. Certainly this was the case with the Ecuador-Peru border dispute, where it obsessed the Ecuadorians much more than the Peruvians. Peru was involved in lots of other things (including the land they had lost to Chile in the 1880s), and only worried about the border with Ecuador when the Ecuadorians made something happen. But, the Ecuadorians were absolutely obsessed by it. I found very much the same in the relationship with the Turks and the Greeks; the Greeks are absolutely obsessed by Turkey. I think even during the height of the Cold War, probably they considered Turkey their major enemy.

Q: I was in Athens from 1970 to 1974. The Soviets were all over the horizon, but the Turks...

COTTER: For the Turks, the Greek issue is a sideshow. The enemy of the Turks for hundreds of years had been the Russians. The Russians have several complaints about the Turks. First, the Russians' great historical enemy are the hordes from the east, the Mongols, and ethnic Slavs still talk about the horrors 600 years ago when the Mongols came through. Second, the Russian Orthodox Church had always looked to Constantinople for its spiritual guidance. Third, the Turks controlled access to the Mediterranean Sea. So, the Turks and Russians have been traditional enemies for years. The Cold War for the Turks was simply a continuation of a long dispute, which they believed would continue after the Cold War was over. Again, one of the things you realize working on Turkish and Greek affairs, as well as in other parts of the world, is how superficial our view of things often is. We have a very short history ourselves, and we tend to be forward-looking and to believe that history has little impact on what people do. So for us, everything is a current problem which should be solvable using common sense. If people don't like each other in Bosnia, we say, "Let's sit down and talk about this because we can work something out." Well, maybe you can't work anything out. We tell the Greeks and Turks, "You are both members of NATO. Let's sit down guys and work this thing out because you are causing lots of problems." We tell this to a Greek, and he says, "These bastards took Constantinople 600 years ago, and we are going to get Constantinople back." We say, "Wait a minute, that was 600 years ago. You are not going to get Constantinople back." But we can't tell

them that. It is the same with the Turks, regarding the Russians. They say, "Okay, it is now Soviet government, but hey, Soviet government or imperial government or democratic government, we have to deal with the Russians. This has gone on for a long time, and it will go on for a long time in the future, and we have to sort our relationship out in a much longer term sense than you Americans are interested in working on." The same thing occurs all over the Middle East. Again, there are blood and other feuds that go back 1,000 years, and somehow we think we can come in and say, "Let us sit down and work this out as reasonable men." I have been away from Turkey, and I don't know how much has happened in recent years. From my contact with Turks when I was in Turkmenistan, and from visiting Turkey, the potential problems with Greece remain a sideline and really are not central to Turkish thinking. It is a handy issue and where you see it exploited on both sides, is when a politician is in difficulties. One way to alleviate that difficulty is to play the Turkish card on one hand or to play the Greek card on the other hand and distract people's attention from the political failures. Having tracked, to some extent, efforts to settle this dispute over the years, it is like lots of other disputes. The party that is losing tends to want to sit down and talk while the party that is "on top" has no interest in doing so. Then the table turns and so does the relative willingness to negotiate a solution.

Q: You were saying, a year later...

COTTER: A year later, the tables have turned and the other side is strong, and the first side is now the weak one. To solve something like the differences between Turkey and Greece, even without the complications of Cyprus, you would need to get a strong, confident government in Turkey in a positive economic climate; and a strong, confident government in Greece in a positive economic climate. Such governments would probably be able to take that step. The chances of having that happen at the same time, basically, are not very good. It makes it much worse that the Cyprus issue is in there, because then you have two client states, either of which may or may not have a desire to have some progress made on this. In theory, we can say to the Turks about the Turkish government in northern Cyprus, "You guys control them, tell them what to do." It is not that easy. All the time, we are having people tell us the same thing: "Tell the Turks what you want done, and they will do it." Well, we found out that doesn't always work.

Q: I want to take you back to the 1980 to 1982 period. On Cyprus, and Greece in general, did this raise its head, what you were doing, in the political-military area?

COTTER: Only in a limited way. The one area that it did was with the NATO commands that the Turks had put on hold after the Cyprus action. There is a southeastern command that is a naval command, I believe, headquartered in Greece. Then, there is a NATO southeastern land command that is based in Izmir, Turkey. We encountered difficulties with those commands. The Greeks opposed reinvigorating the land command, but NATO went ahead. But with the sea command in Greece there has always been difficulties. Difficulties would also emerge in air space use over the Aegean and control of that. In theory, Aegean air space is managed from Greece, not from Turkey. The Greeks would tend not to accept it when the Turks would announce that they were going to have air exercises over the Aegean and designate an area that commercial aircraft shouldn't go through. If the Turks would be able to get us or other NATO allies to participate in these air exercises, then the Greeks would get upset.

When I left Turkey in 1982, I returned to the State Department as a Turkish desk officer. At that point, significant differences had begun to emerge over the Aegean islands and the question of territorial water extension. This was about the same time the international Law of the Sea was being finalized. The Greeks wanted to apply Law of the Sea standards to territorial waters of the islands they possess just off the Turkish coast. If the Greeks were able to claim a 12 mile territorial sea, there were enough of these islands that it could, in theory, block Turkey from access to the Aegean. So the Turks, even in the early 1980s, had said that any attempt by Greece to apply those kinds of territorial seas to the Aegean islands would be a *casus belli*. That conflict still goes on. We would have loved to have spent at least another year in Turkey. But, at that time, Turkey was a 20% post I guess it was.

Q: *Twenty percent post means?*

COTTER: At that time Turkey was a 20% hardship differential post. Therefore, it was a two-year assignment. Because language was one year long, and because we assign people to language generally nine months before that, what happens in a place like Turkey is that your job appears on the bid list the same time that you arrive. They are going to recruit someone that fall who would start language the next August, who would come out the year following and replace you. As a result, literally within two months of having arrived, you had to make a decision whether or not to extend for a third year. Of course, we arrived in Turkey in a climate of terrorism, and two months later we had no idea whether we were going to like it and were not prepared to extend our tour. That opportunity passes and someone is assigned to follow you, then the opportunity to extend goes away. This is a real problem in every hard language, hardship country in the world, although the situation is better now than then. Now, my understanding is that you can extend up to the time the Department actually assigns someone. Oftentimes, because they have a hard time filling some of these positions, that process may extend into the spring. In Turkmenistan, we ran into the same thing. In any event, as a result, we did only two years in Turkey. But, I came back to be the Turkish desk officer.

Q: *This was 1982?*

COTTER: 1982, which worked out very well. It worked out well for the post, because somebody was coming back with good knowledge of Turkey. Again, in the State Department it is interesting that if you look around at desk officers, I would guess that at any one time, we are lucky if a third of them have ever served in the country they are the desk officer for. If you are looking at posts where people became a desk officer for that country, immediately after assignment to the country, I bet it is not a quarter of the time when that happens. Well, there are in fact countries in the world where this kind of continuity in the country experience makes a difference. I would suggest in the case of Ecuador or Bolivia or most of Central America, it doesn't make much of a difference. In a case like Turkey, I think that it makes a real difference. There is very little understanding in Washington of the issues involving the countries of southern Europe. Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus have always been sort of the stepchildren of the European Bureau. They don't look like us, they don't talk like us. They are not real countries. The bureau has never figured out how to deal with them. EUR has an even greater problem now. It has had a whole bunch of other countries dumped on it that don't look like us or talk like us either. When I

came to the Turkish desk in 1982, southern Europe was really seen as peripheral issues. EUR management and the Department focused on Germany, France, and the significant NATO issues, and not on Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus. This lack of attention has advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages to that is that it pushes some decision making down at a lower level than it would otherwise come, which is nice if you are on a desk. But, it also imposes a great burden on desk officers to be able knowledgeably to brief their superiors on what the hell is going on in the country because there is no hope that their superiors are going to have any idea of what is going on. So, it made a lot of sense for me to take over the desk. Actually, the Department has generally filled those desks well. I am not certain with officers directly coming back, but certainly, as I track these things, the percentage of people in the Southern Europe directorate who have country experiences is really quite high. The current director, Mort Dworkin, served in both Turkey and Greece, I think. The deputy director, when I was there, had served in both countries. We have done pretty well by those countries, which is necessary.

What is certainly true about Turkey, and I believe Greece as well, is that the Turks have never thrown away a piece of paper. They have such professional capabilities in their foreign ministry, that if we don't maintain some kind of continuity in ours, we really are at a great disadvantage. I remember one case where we actually had a reverse status of forces case. This involved a Turkish officer who had been assigned to Newport News and had injured an American in a car accident. Of course, under status of forces agreements, the Turkish officer was not liable. The American spent the next 15 years trying to get some compensation. It was understood that he had no right to compensation, but our tradition is to do an *ex gratia* payment. This person had been after such a payment from the Turks for years. While I was in Ankara, we received a cable from the Department saying that so and so had contacted them about this case and what was going to be done about it. One of the other things I should mention is, in 1979 not only did hostages get taken in Iran, but our embassy in Pakistan was burned down. It must have had to do with the Middle East situation?

Q: I think it was almost a spontaneous thing, but it had to do with the Iranian takeover and the general excitement within the Islamic region.

COTTER: One of the impacts of that was that orders came around to all posts to reduce paper records and to send them back into storage. I think they were sent first to Frankfurt. So, when I got to Ankara, we were carrying something like six months of files. Thus we had no historical memory at post. Not only don't you have any there, but the records are not readily accessible because we still don't have any effective way of accessing those records. If when the embassy retired them, it actually marked what was in each box, and the box was numbered, and then the embassy kept a list of what was in that box, in theory you could find it. But, of course, as we both know, no one ever marks what is in the boxes. No one ever marks the boxes, so you don't have any idea. Well, up came this case. I got this letter and went over to the foreign ministry, and said, "I don't know anything about this, but I have this request, asking for *ex gratia* payment." The Turkish official rolled his eyes, and said, "I know about this case, give me a minute." He came back with two of these European style binders, full of papers. The Turks had all the papers on it. It turned out that, indeed, at several points, the Turks were in agreement to make an *ex gratia* payment, but every time the recommendation went to the Turkish treasury, the treasury said, "We don't have any money. This is not a legal obligation, so we are not going to pay it."

But, I was so impressed by the fact that they had such a complete file and were willing to share it with us. We literally had to get copies from the Turks of our notes to them and their notes to us on this to recreate our files on this case. The guy ultimately got paid, in about 1985 or 1986. He received a \$100,000 payment. So, we don't have very good collective memory on these sorts of things. We really depend a lot on the knowledge of officers who have served in the region and have some experience.

Q: Well, you were the desk officer back in the Department from 1982 to 1984. What were the issues?

COTTER: Well, the major issue was the Armenian situation and Greece, to a lesser extent. But there were a number of issues about the Armenian situation. I don't know if this was the first time, but the Armenians were pushing to have the expulsion and murder of Armenians in eastern Turkey in 1915 and 1917 declared a genocide. There was also a very active Armenian terrorist organization called ASALA, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, based in either Lebanon or Syria, engaged around the world in assassinations of Turkish diplomats. In fact, they assassinated the Turkish consul in Los Angeles in 1977 or 1978.

Q: Consul General, yes.

COTTER: It may have been while I was in Turkey, but it was before I was on the desk.

Q: I think it was in the early to mid-1970s.

COTTER: It was toward the end, because it was still very fresh. Anyhow, there was a lot of activity on our side, in trying to track down the ties of ASALA and others in the Armenian-American community. Of course, this is one area where we were sensitive because it placed Turkish diplomats really on the forefront of being targets of terrorists around the world. But dealing with the question of how to deal with the events of 1915 was difficult because the Turks made it very clear that any declaration by the U.S. Government that this was genocide would seriously harm the relations. That probably was the most difficult issue over the two years, and one that came up continually. Again, because nobody in the U.S. Government is familiar with or cares about the issues, we were forever briefing congressmen and staffers. Every congressman has at least one Armenian in his district who is writing a letter to him urging action. If you are lucky, you get a call from the congressman's office and a staffer saying, "Can you give me some background on this?" If you are not lucky, the congressman writes a letter to the Secretary, and then the desk officer has to deal with a congressional letter. It was usually much better to be able to brief a staffer orally and say, "Look, here are the implications, and here is the situation. We aren't going to do anything about this." That issue took up a lot of time.

Military assistance issues and military relations issues, even on the desk, took up a certain amount of time. We had two desk officers, I should note, for Turkey. I did the political portfolio, and the other officer did the economic portfolio. There was a lot of economic work because in 1983, as promised, the military government turned power back to civilians, to a great reformist, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who really opened up Turkey to greater competition. When I was there, Turkey was a very autarchic place. The republic had developed along a very self-

contained, import substitution model, corporatist not in the pejorative political sense, but in the way that Germany, Italy, Spain, and other countries were organized at the same period in the 1920s and 1930s. It really wasn't until the 1980s that Turgut Ozal opened the Turkish economy to competition.

On the political side, there was a lot of work on military assistance issues. At that time, the Turks had been negotiating for sometime to buy new fighter aircraft. There was intense competition amongst, on the American side, the F-16, the F-18, and F-5 Freedom Fighter, which by that time was called the F-20. While I was in Ankara, this competition had begun. When I was back in Washington, I was managing that competition from a policy side of the State Department and ensuring openness and assuring that we stayed neutral. I also ensured we maintained an even playing field amongst the competing American companies. So that took up a significant amount of time. Working on and defending our assistance programs to Turkey took up a significant amount of time because the Greek lobby, rather than the Armenian lobby, fought hard against our military assistance to Turkey. Although it wasn't written in regulation or in law, pressure from the lobby caused Congress to impose a seven-to-ten ratio, where for every \$10.00 of military assistance to Turkey, Greece was assured of \$7.00. It was a terrible policy. At various times, we had more money available for Greece in military assistance than Greece had any capability of absorbing. But, of course, no government was going to turn it down. This was something that the Turks worked very hard to keep from being written into law. The Greek lobby kept wanting to write it into law, but succeeding administrations kept it out. The Turkish view was that our military assistance of countries ought to be based upon need, not upon some kind of an artificial ratio. The Greeks would laugh at that and say, "I guess that is true, but..."

Q: At this time, was Andreas Papandreou the prime minister in Greece?

COTTER: He may have come in just about then.

Q: Because he was making provocatively anti-American, get out of NATO, get out of the European Union, get the bases out statements, none of which he acted on, but I was wondering whether this was thrown into the mix at the time?

COTTER: Well, not so much on the bilateral relationship with Turkey. The Turks would throw this up at us and say, "The problem is because the Greek-American lobby is so strong and so supportive of things Greek." In general, no matter what outrageous statements the government in Greece makes, it doesn't make any difference when it comes down to an issue of Turkey versus Greece. It may make an issue in NATO councils, of what we think about the Greeks, and how close should we work with them, but when it comes down to things like U.S. assistance for or cooperation with Turkey, it doesn't make much difference. That policy, or our relationship with Turkey, isn't driven by, but it certainly has to take into account, the strength of the Greek lobby. This was my first real exposure to the ethnic lobbies in the U.S. One interesting thing was that at that time, Edward Derwinski, former congressman from Chicago, became counselor of the Department, and made a big point of stating that he saw himself as the desk officer for Americans. The State Department had desks for every country in the world, according to Derwinski, but there was nobody in the State Department who was worried about American interests. Of course, in this context American interests mean whatever a given hyphen-American

group wants. Derwinski, who came out of Chicago, where there were many Greeks and a very large Armenian community, was the person in the Department to whom these communities would go looking for assistance. We concluded that Derwinski was a very nice fellow, but not one of the brightest stars that ever descended upon the Department. Then, as today, the counselor was a seventh floor undersecretary-equivalent, for whom desk officers had to go through all the hoops. Once the counselor said, "I have a question about this," everything had to be dropped, so we could answer his question no matter how silly it might be.

This was an interesting time on the desk. There was also tension between the State Department and the Department of Defense (DoD) over control of our Turkish policy. I think the Pentagon had been unhappy with the arms embargo from the get-go. They saw this as State Department or Administration pandering to a domestic constituency and losing sight of the greater defense needs. So the Pentagon had chafed under this for some time. Indeed, DoD has a close relationship with the Turks. It carried on a whole series of activities with the Turks that State, more or less, kept an eye on. Well, when Reagan came in Richard Burt was assistant secretary in the political-military bureau. Well, Burt had enemies on the Hill. He had been a reporter who took over what I used to call the "Les Gelb Memorial Chair" because Gelb, also a New York Times reporter, had also been Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs. In came Reagan, and they replaced Gelb with their reporter, Burt. In 1982, Burt moved from the political military bureau to the European bureau, but he had a problem getting confirmed by the Senate. It took six or nine months for him to get confirmed. In the meantime, of course, the EUR bureau was somewhat leaderless. Burt was there but not confirmed. In the Pentagon, meanwhile, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs or Policy was "The Prince of Darkness."

Q: Richard Perle

COTTER: Richard Perle. He was a very astute, very tough bureaucratic player, who took advantage of this hiatus to hijack Turkish policy. It was fairly easy, because Burt wasn't very interested in Turkish policy. This was down in southern Europe where he wasn't very interested. Burt's deputy for southern Europe was Richard Haass, who is a foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush. Haass was not a deputy assistant secretary (DAS). I think it probably was because EUR had already filled its allotted DAS positions, and Burt couldn't get permission to create a new DAS for Haass. Haass was called the deputy for policy and had DAS authority. Haass' area of responsibility was southern Europe, which is interesting because it meant that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus issues were not under one of the deputy assistant secretaries, it was under someone who was not a deputy assistant secretary. On the other hand, the advantage of it was that Haass had Burt's full confidence, where some of the career DASs didn't. So at least when you dealt on something with Richard Haass, and Haass said, "Yes, or no," you could be fairly confident that it reflected Burt's view. Haass is a very bright guy and very good. He was actually very good to work for, but bureaucratically, he was a little strange. In any event, as you might expect from two high-power personalities, Burt and Perle didn't get along, so there was internal bureaucratic back-biting all the time. I remember at one point, we had (and still have, actually) a high-level defense group, that carries on talks with the Turks once a year. One year it met here, and then the next year, it met in Turkey. We always create these mechanisms and I've come to hate them because they start with great fanfare and the deputy secretary shows up for the first meeting and

that is the last time. Then, responsibility flows down to the desk. Meanwhile, the other country is sending a prime minister to the sessions, and they don't understand why they were getting an assistant secretary of state. Well, the same thing happened here, of course. At one point, it had no doubt been the Secretary of State or conceivably the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, but while I was there, it had drifted down to assistant secretary level. This is the kind of thing Richard Perle was going to take the ball and run with. Burt wasn't yet confirmed. So, the first year I was on the desk, I got called to the front office and they said, "None of us can go, and you are going to represent the State Department. Your job is to keep Richard Perle on the reservation." There I was, a mid-level desk officer, and I said, "Yes sir, of course, I will keep Richard Perle on the reservation."

I should go back, while we have a break. I had talked earlier about dealing between defense attachés and military assistant group commanders and the difficulties this caused, and the advantages it sometimes gave embassies. Well, in Turkey, in addition to dealing with the Turks on the NATO issues, in the mutual security affairs section, one of the main things we had to do was deal with our own military establishment. Frankly, this was usually more difficult than dealing with the Turkish military establishment. In most countries, you have a defense attaché, who is a colonel, and a military group commander, who is a colonel. In Turkey, we had a military group commander who was a U.S. Army major general, and a major general who ran the logistics command for our various bases, all of which came under the logistics control of the Air Force. Then there was a two-star American major general wearing a NATO hat in Izmir, plus a colonel defense attaché. Well, of course, in Turkey, the defense attaché was completely out of it because he was a colonel and everybody else was a major general. But, the amount of time spent in fighting and deciding who indeed was in charge between the military group commander and the Air Force logistics commander was brutal. The guy from NATO was not so bad because he had a NATO hat, but, of course, he was a major general, expecting to be treated like a major general whenever he came to Ankara. The lack of coordination and coherence between the military group commander who came under the European Command (EUCOM) and the Air Force guy, who came under U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), both of whom, in theory, came under our overall commander in Europe, but who, in fact, were different services and didn't talk with each other, was just incredible.

It must have been then, for the first time, there emerged, in my recollection and my experience, the whole issue of "stovepipe organizations," which later on became a very important issue when we got into security and determining who was responsible for security. This is an issue which just in the last couple years...

Q: Let's keep to the time.

COTTER: Okay, I'll stay to the time. You'll remind me to come back to that, right?

Q: Only if it pertains to when you were dealing with it.

COTTER: Well, part of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was defining the cooperation that we would provide and the activities that we were going to carry on there. So, you have the European Command which is in charge of various things. But, it is not, as

it turns out, in charge of everything. In many of our bases, we had activities being carried out by military organizations which were independent of EUCOM. Their housekeeping was being taken care of by EUCOM, but their policy direction came from someone in the U.S. This caused real problems because you would go to get a policy decision at EUCOM and they would say, "I'm sorry, we don't manage this." Then, we would have to come back to some strange organization in the Pentagon that knows nothing about Turkey except they know they have some people out there. Where this was an issue was in sharing of intelligence information, and where we collected information. There were two places basically. One was on the Black Sea coast and was a listening post. That worked out pretty well because our people who did that actually had been working with their Turkish counterparts in other areas, and it was fairly seamless, having Turkish operators next to our folks and sharing information. The other one was out at Diyarbakir. It was a radar collection site. It had an enormous radar that monitored Soviet missile launches. So, the DECA got signed which required us to provide the Turks with the data from that site. Well, it took months to figure out who ran this. It turned out, of course, it had nothing to do with EUCOM or anyone else in Europe. It was an Air Force organization back here. We said, "Okay, you have to provide the data." They said, "In a pig's eye, we will provide this to the Turks." We said, "Well, if you don't, the site won't operate." That issue ended up going all the way up to the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to get someone to explain to that command that they had to provide the data. Then, they would say, "The data is useless. It has to be integrated." And that created problems of other third country information that couldn't be shared. In the meantime, the Turks are saying, "We are going to shut this thing down if we don't start getting data." It took about six months to get the command's attention. Finally, it agreed to develop data that made some sense and could be provided to the Turks. It took about a year to work this out. We had a number of similar issues at other stovepipe organizations.

Q: Stovepipe means what?

COTTER: Stovepipe meant that it had a direct command line back to a command in the U.S., from whence its policy came. The Pentagon divides the world up into its regional commands. You have SOUTHCOM, Southern Command, for Latin America; CENTCOM, Central Command, for the Middle East and part of South Asia; EUCOM, European Command, for Europe and Africa; and PACOM, the Pacific Command, for East Asia and part of South Asia. Those are the regional CINCS - commanders in chief. They, in theory, are quite independent. They come directly under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have operational responsibility for those parts of the world. But, like everything else in the Pentagon, there are other commands and organizations which simply aren't subordinate, although they assign people to the region. For instance, the Military Transport Command is a separate command, which services the regional commands, but doesn't work for them. Defense intelligence agencies don't work for them. The same for a number of other organizations, which have activities overseas, and when they are housed overseas, they come under the housekeeping control of the CINCs, but they don't come under their command. They are considered to be "stovepiped," back to their headquarters in Washington. It causes enormous difficulties.

But our main problem in the embassy was managing major generals, who didn't have enough work to keep a major general busy. I don't know what in the military a major general usually commands, whether it is a corps or a division, but in the military group in Turkey, a major

general commands 75 people. Well, obviously, you don't get to be a major general without being an A-type personality.

Q: A-type personality meaning active, not passive?

COTTER: That's right. There are brigadier generals in the military that I have met who are stretching the Peter Principle, but when people get to major general, they tend to be quite good.

Q: I have to say that according to the Peter Principle, you rise to your level of incompetence.

COTTER: Something, of course, in the Foreign Service that we don't know anything about. But, anyhow, you end up with senior officers who have a lot of energy and not enough work to occupy them. It caused a lot of difficulties. Anyhow, we've digressed from when I was in the Department working on the Turkish desk and doing a lot of work on political-military issues. I worked a lot with the political-military Bureau. It was at that time, I think, either in Turkey or when I came back, I added to my specialization as a political officer. We have a sub-specialty for political-military officers, which I added formally to my expertise.

Q: In fact, at one of these joint meetings between the Turks and the Americans, you said you were supposed to keep Richard Perle under control. He was essentially not interested in the Greek/Turkish thing, but in Turkey, or was he involved in the Greek/Turkish side of things?

COTTER: Well, yes, it inevitably came up in these kinds of things. To say Richard Perle was sort of hijacking policy is not fair because policy in this case tended to be made a lot higher. Whoever was going out to these meetings would go out with a mandate, one of which was to tell the Turks, "Look, if you don't settle Cyprus, we have a lot of difficulties." They were also to explain to the Turks why the American domestic political situation made it difficult for us to do all the things they wanted us to do. Certainly, Perle would go out and carry that message. Perle was quite effective at that. If you looked at it from anything other than a narrow European bureau of the State Department perspective, having Richard Perle in charge of the delegation was not bad because he is very articulate. The Turks knew him and liked him and thought him a friend of Turkey. He could tell them difficult things that would be harder for a Rick Burt to come and tell them. Actually, those delegations went pretty well.

I should say something else. I spent 10 months studying Turkish, and then while in Turkey used Turkish only twice professionally in two years. The foreign ministry people with whom we worked and the Turkish military people with whom we worked all spoke English. One time I used it was when I ended up having to do a demarche on the Law of the Sea. I found the officer in the foreign ministry's Law of the Sea office, who didn't speak English. He was a French speaker. In those days, unfortunately, I didn't speak French, which I later corrected. I had to struggle through that demarche in Turkish. The other time I used Turkish was very interesting and very useful. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time, an Air Force general as I recall, was in Ankara at one point to meet with the head of the military junta. The Chairman had come out with a number of things, the Greece/Turkey relationship being one, return to civilian government another. I sat in on this meeting for the embassy. The interpretation was provided by the Turks. I was the embassy note taker. The interesting thing was that the interpreter wasn't

interpreting everything, in either direction, but particularly some of the points that General Jones was making were not being translated to the Turks. Sitting there with my knowledge of Turkish, I could track that. I could see how the conversation developed, and things that came out and things that didn't come out. I did what I thought was a very good report afterward, reporting on this and reporting where the conversation had gone and the areas where it would have covered if the interpretation had been correct. I never regretted taking Turkish. It is a great language, and we have gone back to Turkey a lot.

Q: When you were the desk officer, 1982 to 1984, obviously, as you have mentioned, Cyprus came up again and again. What was the general feeling that you were getting on Cyprus? For somebody who was, by this time, pretty well out of the business, I have to state my prejudice today. It looks to me like Cyprus oneness is essentially settled. The Greeks aren't going to get back what they took. When you look at the origins of what happened in Cyprus, they don't really deserve to get it back. But we keep making these noises about trying to redo it, mainly because of the Greek lobby. As you look at this, essentially for the first time, and the people on the desk, in dealing with it, was this just noise we were making about doing something about Cyprus, or did we feel that maybe something could be done to reintegrate these two communities, at that time?

COTTER: I think Cyprus is a case not atypical in our foreign policy management, where you can't say that we have 25 years of experience with the crisis. Rather, we have two years of experience, 12 times over. I think how we deal with the issue, and dealt with it in 1982 to 1984, are probably the same because every time a new cast of characters comes in, we deal with it anew.

Q: When you talk about a new cast of characters, you mean on the American side?

COTTER: On the American side. We change administrations, and a whole new group come in. We are unfettered optimists. The new people look at the issue and say, "Look, there are very key issues at stake here. We have a very critical part of the NATO alliance. We have two countries to which we are very close. They have this bone of contention between them. They obviously have to get rid of the bone of contention. Every problem has its solution." People who have been dealing with this for 10 or 15 years may say, "Well, it may not be that easy." Well, we don't have that luxury. We have every four years, probably, and sometimes more often, when new people come into an administration, a new group of people who come in, they know nothing about this. Six weeks or two months later, up comes an issue on their desk. They say, "But, I don't understand, why am I dealing with this? There has to be a way around it." The Clinton administration deals with this problem by naming special negotiators for everything. Actually, the first special Cyprus negotiator was named when I was on the desk, Chris Chapman. He had been DCM in Paris. They were looking around for an embassy for him and parked him in this position. Later on, it was Reg Bartholomew. Nobody has ever stayed in that job for more than two years. When they leave, someone new comes in and looks at it again.

The thing about the Cyprus issue is that it comes and it goes. When it comes to a head, we tend to look at it and say, "But this is an annoyance we don't need. It complicates our relationship with these two countries, and we would like it to go away. So, we will go and talk to the two countries." As I said before, you may find a conjunction in time when both of those countries are

really interested in a solution and would really welcome our input, and if we at that point had people in Washington who were knowledgeable about it and wanted to do something, we might be able to find a solution. But, the chances of having the four players on the ground all together on it, and us having an administration which, at that point in time, was willing to focus on it, is practically nil.

Q: The four players being the two parties, the Greeks and the Turks on Cyprus?

COTTER: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and then Turkey and Greece. Each of those client groups is very good at playing off its own patron. One looks at a patron-client relationship and says, "Well, the patron tells the client what to do." But, in fact, in most places in the world, that is not true. The patron certainly has advantages, but the client has great advantages as well. The patron can't dictate that easily. One interesting issue when I was still in Turkey, and which has been a recurring issue, is the question of whether or not Americans should go to northern Cyprus. Now, the Turks have offered great, very cheap fares to go from Turkey to Cyprus for vacation. Of course, there are a number of resorts in northern Cyprus that the Turks have kept open. This finally came to a head while I was still at Ankara. We discovered that airmen assigned to Incirlik were going to northern Cyprus for vacations. Incirlik is down at Adana, which is in southeastern Turkey. There were two ways to get to northern Cyprus: you could fly to northern Cyprus, or you could take a ferry from Mersin, a coastal town. I don't know what the prices were, but let's say, for \$200 for a week, an airman could go to Cyprus. Well, the issue came up, "Do we allow this?" We went back and forth on it. Some felt when these guys were on their own time, the U.S. government really couldn't dictate to them what they could do and what they couldn't do. So, we finally decided that as a matter of policy, we didn't want people going on vacation over to Cyprus, but as a practical matter, we weren't in a position to, or going to try to, prevent them from doing so.

Another interesting thing that came to a head while I was there was another issue that looked simple until we looked into it and it turned out to be very complicated. Every so often we would get intelligence that the radical groups in Turkey were going to target American military again. So, at one point while I was still in Ankara, the ambassador, having gotten one of these, called everybody in and said, "Well, I am making a decision that all military personnel will wear civilian clothes." The military assistance group commander said, "You can't do that." The ambassador said, "Yes I can." The commander then said, "The problem is that we issue uniforms to enlisted people. If we tell our enlisted personnel that they may not wear uniforms, we have to give them a clothing allowance. They are entitled to a clothing allowance to go out and buy suitable civilian clothing. I don't have the money to do that. I can't do that. I have to go back to the Pentagon and get authorization to do that. That authorization is going to take time. You can't do this." Well, the ambassador, of course, in the end made it stick, and they finally found a way to do it, but it was an interesting example of some of the complicated bureaucratic issues. You have young soldiers who don't own coats and ties, perhaps, who are being told they have to wear them. Having to come to terms with what that means to the military, in terms of cost.

Q: Well, maybe this is a good place to stop. I would like to put at the end that you left the Turkish desk in 1984?

COTTER: Yes, in 1984. My wife, Joanne, entered the Foreign Service in late 1983. I think I mentioned earlier she had taken the examination at an earlier time, and one of the questions was, "Do you want to join because your husband is in it?" Well, she took it again at a later time when they couldn't ask those kinds of questions, and certainly on her own very good merit, passed the exam. She came in as a USIA [U.S. Information Agency] officer. The way things often work in the State Department is that officers serving overseas often come back to Washington for four years - for two, two-year tours - and then you go overseas again. That is what most people do unless they stay in Washington for six or eight years. I had been looking at doing two years on the Turkish desk, and then perhaps doing two years in the regional political military affairs office in EUR, or on another desk in EUR, and then go off to another European post. Well, Joanne, bless her soul, entered the Foreign Service, and happily she did this at a time when we were both mature and had been overseas and knew what we were getting into. We had a long discussion about it, as you really have to. Being a couple in the Foreign Service is not easy. It has very clear implications for careers. Now, if they are both junior officers in the same entering class, that is not very apparent. It becomes apparent as soon as one gets promoted, or soon it becomes clear that one is better than the other and then the other person has a very difficult personal decision to make. But, in our case, I was, by this time, an FSO-2, senior 2, looking for promotion to 1. Joanne was entering as a junior officer. We had talked about this a lot. We don't have children and the relationship between us is very important to both of us. One of the things that we decided early on was that we would not accept posts in separate places. We didn't want to live apart. I have known other couples who have done that, some successfully, but very often not. It is very hard for the marriage to survive. That decision had implications for my career because it meant that we would go to a place where we could both get assignments, not necessarily a place that otherwise I might have chosen to go. The other thing about tandems (as the State Department calls professional couples) is there are two places where they tend to go on assignment. One is to very large embassies, which have enough jobs for both people, and the other is to places where no one wants to go. Although non-tandem people in the Foreign Service tend to think that tandem couples get preference for cushy, large posts, in our experience and that of other tandems we know, many more tandem couples end up in places where no one wants to go. Joanne was coming in as a junior officer and so she had a limited list of USIA junior officer training positions in places where she could go. Then, we had to look for a job for me. There were really only two places that would work. One was Lagos, Nigeria, and the other was Kinshasa, Zaire. The job possibility for me in Lagos was an excursion tour as the USIA information officer. Another experiment that was tried between USIA and State back at this time was to have some cross-fertilization between the two agencies. So, they came to an agreement that each agency would put up a number of comparable positions to be taken by officers in the other agency. This information officer position in Lagos was one. I bid on that. It turned out that that job disappeared before it ever got started because USIA looked at it and complained that the jobs State put up for the exchange were not comparable jobs...that the State Department was dumping the dregs on them. In fact, the whole experiment disappeared. The other option was Kinshasa. That was a "gimme" [give me] for me, because the position I would be going out to was an 02 political officer position on which I was the only 02 officer bidding. Many hardship posts, in the 1980s in particular, filled positions through what we called "stretch assignments," where people bid on jobs above their grade. I think it is still the case, but it certainly was then. As the only 02 bidder on the 02 job, I was fairly sure of getting Kinshasa. Indeed, that is what happened. Joanne was assigned as the assistant cultural affairs officer, and I was assigned to the political section.

She went out in May 1984 after six months of French. I, for the last three months I was on the Turkish desk, took early morning French at FSI from 7:30 until 9:00. Then, when I got out of the desk job around Memorial Day in 1984, I went into full time French until September, when I arrived at post. So, Joanne was at post about three months before I was.

RICHARD W. BOEHM
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1980-1983)

Richard W. Boehm was born in New York, New York in 1926. He received a bachelor's degree from Adelphi college in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1956. Mr. Boehm served in Japan, Germany, Luxembourg, Turkey, Thailand, Nepal, Cyprus, and Oman. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 27, 1994.

Q: *You left Nepal in 1980.*

BOEHM: I had said that I would spend a three year tour in Nepal. I stayed there for two years. A couple of things happened at roughly the same time. Ambassador Doug Heck's tour came to an end. He was to be succeeded by a political appointee at that point. My former boss in Ankara, Jim Spain, who had been DCM there when I was Political-Military Counselor, was made Ambassador to Turkey. He was looking for a DCM. Jim offered me that job. I was perfectly happy in Nepal and was utterly absorbed by that fascinating place. The culture is a remarkable one -- the most exotic that you can imagine. The country is picturesque. I would happily have stayed for the third year, but the DCM job in Ankara was a good one. It kind of reversed my own fortunes which, as you have seen, had been sort of declining. [Laughter] So I accepted that job and was ready to go there when suddenly a new Ambassador to Nepal, a political appointee...

Q: *Who was that?*

BOEHM: A lawyer who had been, at one point, in the Legal Adviser's Office in the State Department. He was a Democrat and had gone to New York when Ed Koch was elected Mayor. He was one of the deputy or assistant mayors. I guess that Koch got him the job of Ambassador to Nepal. He wanted that job because he was a mountain climber. [Laughter]

He made no secret of the fact that that was why he wanted to go there, which, I thought, was something less than totally tactful on his part. This was in the interviews in the Washington newspapers, which were played right back to Kathmandu. I was due to leave a month or two after he arrived. Shortly before the time of my planned departure came, he said, "Well, I don't want you to leave. I'd like you to stay on." I replied, "Well, I'm already scheduled and paneled [before the personnel boards] and due to leave." He said, "What can I do?" As a dedicated, professional diplomat, I had to tell him that he could send a telegram to the State Department, telling them that he wanted me to stay in Kathmandu.

He went back to his office and an hour later he came into my office with a draft telegram and said, "What do you think of this?" I read it and could see at a glance that it wasn't going to do the job. Well, how much are you really required to do as a dedicated, professional diplomat? I'd done all that I was really required to do. I didn't have to say, "Look, if you'll let me rewrite it, it'll do the job." [Laughter] So I said, "If you want to send it, go ahead and send it." He sent it, and by return telegram, of course, he was turned down [by the Department].

Q: It's enough that you supply the rope, but you don't have to tie the knot.

BOEHM: You don't have to tie the knot around your own neck. So I left. And he left Kathmandu not long afterwards, because the Democrats lost the election after that. By early in the following year, after a six or eight month tour, he was gone. But I was also gone. I went back to Turkey.

Q: Well, you were in Ankara from 1980 to 1983 as DCM?

BOEHM: For three years, yes.

Q: What was the political situation in Turkey at that time?

BOEHM: The political situation was this. Let me go back to my first tour [in Ankara]. I went there in 1971. I arrived about six months after there had been a military takeover, which had ousted then Prime Minister Demirel. Eventually, of course, the Parliament and democracy were restored. When I arrived back in Turkey in 1980, the country had a democratic system. The Prime Minister was none other than the same Demirel. [Laughter] It was a functioning, parliamentary democracy.

Within a few weeks of my arrival Demirel was once again thrown out by the military. There had been a lot of terrorism, which was a very serious problem, indeed -- bombs going off and assassinations, right in the heart of downtown Ankara. The explosions were called banner bombs, bombs installed in a banner. If you put a banner along a fence, it would blow up. The situation was getting very nasty, and the government wasn't controlling it. So in accordance with what you might call tradition in Turkey the military, who regarded themselves as the guardians of democracy, thought that the threat required them to move in. Once again, Demirel was out. The military were in power, then, throughout the rest of my stay there.

Q: A couple of things about this military takeover. One of the prime functions of political reporting at any Embassy is anticipating when the coup d'etat is going to happen, and all of that. Watching terrorism and knowing the military tradition in Turkey, how did the Embassy view the situation? You were newly arrived, but you were an old Turkish hand. How did you go about figuring if and when this was going to happen?

BOEHM: Well, you use all the normal means. You get to know as many people as you can who might be able to help you out on the subject. You keep in touch with them -- especially military people. You find out what they're thinking. You analyze the causes which might lead to a takeover and see how that's going. In this case terrorism was a serious consideration. The military were grumbling a bit. Then you have intelligence sources as well. You have the military

attachés, and our attachés always had very good connections with the Turkish military. The attachés would be prepared to find out from their best contacts what the thinking in the Turkish military was. You had CIA reports. You check all of these various intelligence sources and try to analyze the situation as best you can.

Now, in the case of the 1980 takeover which, as I recall, was in September or October -- September, I think -- one of the Army attachés [gave us an indication]. We were examining this situation every day as to whether it was or was not going to happen -- is this the time, or when? One of our more junior military attachés spotted a column of tanks lined up along a road near downtown Ankara. He checked around and concluded, on the basis of what he saw and could find out, that the military were just about to take over. We looked at this report and checked with a few Turks as to what those tanks were doing. We were told that there was nothing unusual about that. The police had asked for assistance. They were expecting another terrorist attack, and the tanks were to assist the police. That very night those tanks moved in, and the military took over. It was a coup.

I would not say that we had rejected the report but I would say that we had not reached the same conclusion as our young military attaché had reached. But he was absolutely right. He said, "This is it," and it was.

Q: In Turkey at that time, the military were obviously very important. They were in and out of power all the time. Did our Army, Navy, and Air Force make a special effort to have really good officers assigned to Ankara as our attachés? In some countries our military attachés [are not always top notch people]. The attaché service is often regarded as a retirement posting. The attachés are all right, but they really don't add an awful lot. Did you find that the attaché service was sensitive enough?

BOEHM: Yes and no. We had both kinds of attachés. We had some very able Army, Navy, and Air Force attachés. We had others who were less effective. Part of the problem there [in Ankara] was that we had a large military assistance program, which was headed by a major general, with three service sections -- Army, Navy, and Air Force -- each headed by a brigadier general [or equivalent]. We had general officers all over the place. The senior Turkish military basically ignored our military attachés. They wanted to deal only with the military assistance people for obvious reasons. So, to the extent that you had military to military contact, it tended to be more with the military assistance advisory group -- JUSMAT, or Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Turkey. The attachés really had to fight for what they could get. Some of the attachés were effective and successful, but they were heavily overshadowed by the military aid mission, which traditionally always wanted to stay out of the intelligence field. So not only did our attachés have difficulty talking to the Turks but they sometimes found it impossible to talk to the U.S. military assistance people. [Laughter] The military assistance people wouldn't tell the attachés anything because they wanted to stay out of the intelligence field altogether.

Q: From your perspective, what were the Turkish terrorists after? They were setting off bombs. You had a democratic Turkish government. It was no secret that if you set off enough bombs, the Turkish military would take over. Was this the goal of the terrorists?

BOEHM: I think that the goal was to create as much chaos as possible, in the hope of exploiting the situation that developed or exploiting a military takeover. It didn't work. Most of the Turkish people, I think, were not interested in revolution and basically approved of the military taking over for a specific purpose -- that is, to calm things down and move the terrorists out of the way. The Turkish people want democracy. They have shown that in elections and, in fact, the military recognize this. They moved out. They always have. They seize power, deal with whatever the crucial problem is that caused the coup, and then they move out.

In the case of the 1980 coup, of course, they rewrote the constitution to eliminate some of the constitutional problems that had made it difficult for the Parliament to function.

I still recall that, during my first tour [in Ankara], the Parliament had not been set aside at that time. It was allowed to continue functioning. A Prime Minister was appointed. This was in the 1970-1971 period. When it came time to elect the President -- Parliament elects the President -- the tradition had been that only a member of Parliament can be elected President. The Chief of the Turkish General Staff, a man by the name of Gurler, resigned from the Army and was appointed to the Senate, thus becoming eligible to be elected President. But then the Parliament refused to elect Gurler. The military tried to threaten them. The Air Force flew its planes over the Parliament building, wagging their wings and thereby suggesting, "Elect Gurler." [Laughter] But Parliament wouldn't do it. Eventually, they elected a retired admiral, Koroturk.

The point is that the parliamentary system was almost unworkable and very, very awkward and cumbersome. It was hard to get a majority on anything. The 1980 coup d'etat set about restructuring the political system. The military wrote a new constitution. Eventually, elections were held, and the military moved out of power. Turkey is once again a democracy, and Demirel is President.

Q: Some time had gone by since the Cyprus flare-up in 1974. How was this Greek and Turkish Cyprus situation in this 1980-1983 period?

BOEHM: Still dicey. Always dicey. Cyprus was a political issue at that point. There was really no military issue, because the Turks had a lot of troops in northern Cyprus, and the situation had basically stabilized. You had UN forces there which had been in place even before 1974, with contingents from a number of UN countries. Sweden, the British, the Austrians, the Canadians, and others were there.

So the situation in Cyprus, in that sense, was militarily stable. But politically, it wasn't. The Greeks always made an issue of the Cyprus problem. Athens did, and, of course, so did Nicosia. The Government of Cyprus, which controlled only the southern two-thirds of the island, was Greek. It was the only government we recognized. Of course, they also wanted to keep the issue alive. The UN was the main focal point for that -- and Washington, during U.S. election years.

When Jimmy Carter was elected President, he had the support of the Greek- American community, partly because he had made commitments about Cyprus.

We had cut off military assistance to Turkey in 1974 or the following year, 1975, when the Turks

moved troops into Cyprus. Carter saw the reason -- for NATO considerations -- to restore military assistance to Turkey. So he made a deal with Congress, saying that if we restored military assistance to Turkey, this assistance could be used to get the Turks to get out or back off on Cyprus. But the Turks didn't. The Greek Lobby in Washington, in the United States, was always working on this issue. They worked on Carter as they worked on every presidential candidate, extracting commitments, none of which could be fulfilled.

So at that point, as I said, Cyprus was an issue, but not a military issue. The big Greek-Turkish issue in the 1980-1983 period, during my second tour there [in Ankara] was the Aegean Sea -- the question of air space and the continental shelf [off Turkey]. Every time a Turkish military aircraft flew anywhere near one of the Greek islands which dot the Turkish coast, the Greeks would charge a violation of their air space. There was always a big argument going on, with basically minor incidents taking place. But the Greeks continued to keep things agitated.

Q: This was still a time when there were major concerns about the Soviets. The Soviets had moved just a little earlier into Afghanistan. We were very concerned about a Soviet thrust through Iran, or something like that. How did Aegean Sea issues fit into all of this, with the continental shelf and so forth. Is there a solution, or is it just one of those things that will never go away? How did we see it?

BOEHM: First, you asked about the Soviet threat. Yes, the Soviet threat was the dominant consideration as we viewed Greek-Turkish relations. In Turkey itself this meant that the impact of Greek-Turkish disagreement on NATO was our big concern. For that reason, for example, we gave military assistance to Greece as well as Turkey in a proportion of 10 for Turkey to 7 for Greece. Although there was no legal requirement for this, there were those in Congress who felt that there was. In any case, they wanted it that way. So whatever we did for Turkey, we did 7/10 of that for Greece to try to keep things in balance and quiet. We tried to moderate relations between Greece and Turkey, but without great success. Relations kept flaring up. But the Soviet threat and NATO were the main considerations.

Then, of course, you had the whole question of the Bosphorus and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which moved in and out, through the Turkish Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet was very active at that time. It was frequently in the Mediterranean. This was something that we watched very closely. I think that it was never a match for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. There was no question of that, but the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was something that was there. You worried about it. You wondered where it would go. Neither the Sixth Fleet nor the Soviet Black Sea Fleet could make port visits to Cyprus. The Cypriots had decided that they didn't want either the Sixth Fleet or the Soviet Black Sea Fleet coming into port.

When I was later on my way out there to Cyprus as Ambassador, I stopped in London to call on the U.S. admiral who commanded U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and the Mediterranean. I had known him before. His staff briefed me, and they said that they would like to make port visits to Cyprus. They said that they would like me to arrange this. Washington had been waffling on this subject. I said, "Well, OK, but let me put this question to you before we reach any conclusion on this. If the Cypriots agree to allow U.S. Navy visits to Cyprus, with the proviso that they would

also allow Soviet Black Sea Fleet visits to Cyprus, would you consider that we came out ahead or behind on that? Is that a price that you, as U.S. Navy officers, would be willing to pay? I'd like you to study that question and let me have an answer to it."

At the end of the briefing I called on my old friend, the commander, a four-star admiral. I told him about the question I asked. I said that his people were urging me to arrange for port visits to Cyprus. I had put this question to them. He said, "You know, I'm not really interested in these port visits at all." [Laughter] I wondered what the hell his staff was talking about. That was the end of that. I never heard another word about it. I never got the report I asked for. It just dropped out of sight. This tells you something about how these staff questions are raised.

Q: Yes. It's on their agenda, and they want to rush it to death. Had our policy on Cyprus of withholding arms had much of an effect on Turkish military readiness?

BOEHM: Yes, it had. There certainly was serious degradation in readiness. Turkish armed forces depended very heavily on U. S. assistance. Most of their equipment was surplus or old stock that we gave them under the military assistance program. We gave them a lot of money under the program. We gave them a lot of economic assistance under the rubric of ESF, or Economic Support Funds, which are basically a budgetary grant, with no strings attached. So, yes, they did depend heavily on us. During the period when the aid was cut off, the readiness of Turkish forces underwent considerable degradation. Of course, by the time I got back there in 1980, President Carter had persuaded Congress to restore military assistance, which was beginning to come in again.

Q: Did we feel that the Soviets might try to do something at that time? Were we concerned about their doing anything with Greece or Turkey?

BOEHM: Well, in Turkey we were always concerned about the military situation, although it wasn't given the same degree of priority as the so-called Central Front in NATO. The Southern Element of NATO was its right flank. But people were beginning to think at that time that what had been thought of as NATO's flank needed more attention. There had been trouble in Iran, and so it was receiving more attention, in strategic terms.

There was concern. The Soviets were very active. The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet was constantly moving in and out through the Turkish Straits. Turkey didn't want to stir up trouble with the Soviets. There was a long history of wars between Turkey and Russia -- something like eight or nine of them. The Turks won the first half of them and lost the second half. The Crimean War was the last one that they came out ahead on. So there was a long history in this relationship and Turkish fear and concern about Russia. Turkey's main motive in joining NATO was this ancient, atavistic fear of Russia, which is well founded. So there was considerable Turkish concern. The deterioration of the Turkish armed forces was also a concern.

Q: At the time we are talking about here, there was a very hot and heavy war between Iran and Iraq, which were neighbors of Turkey. What was our view of this and did this have any political consequences?

BOEHM: Well, Turkey's view was that it wanted to stay out of the Iran-Iraq War. The Turks didn't want to throw their weight in on either side. Turkey has pretty extensive borders with both Iran and Iraq.

There was the problem of Iraq-based Kurds, who were part of a contiguous Kurdistan -- a term which you could never use in Turkey, by the way. At the same time that the Turks sought to maintain close relations with the government in Baghdad, it sought to prevent Kurdish activity across the border. Also, the Turks wanted to be able to send troops to pursue Kurdish terrorists into northern Iraq, into Iraqi Kurdistan. They did that a few times. They said that they had the permission of the Iraqis, although it wasn't always clear that this was so. The Turks had the Kurdish problem, which conditioned their relations with Iraq and impelled them to want to maintain good terms with Iraq.

There was a lot of Turkish trade with Iran and still is. The Turks were concerned there about some of the activities of the Islamic extremists, which they feared might be reflected in Turkey. So they wanted to try to avoid that and remain on good terms with Tehran. In a word, they tried to remain on good terms with everybody and stay out of the Iran-Iraq War. They were successful in this respect.

Q: How did the U. S. feel about the Iran-Iraq War?

BOEHM: Well, as you recall, we were still living in the wake of the hostage crisis in Tehran. I think that there was probably a lot more pro-Iraq sentiment in the United States and in Washington than there was in Turkey. The Turks wanted to maintain a hands-off attitude. We certainly never had much sympathy for Iran at that point.

Again, I think that our main concern was to see the Iran-Iraq War stopped. The United States usually wants wars to stop. It supports UN efforts to arrange solutions, and that, of course, was what eventually happened there.

Q: You were in Turkey when the administration changed from the Democrats to a Republican in 1981. You arrived in Ankara in 1980. Let's look at the time when President Carter was still in office. Were we doing anything on the human rights side with the Kurds?

BOEHM: Yes. We did not focus so much on the Kurds as on allegations of torture in Turkish prisons. This allegedly still goes on today. The human rights community is still interested, including Amnesty International and others, as well as the State Department, although I haven't read the last couple of human rights reports on Turkey. Evidence is still allegedly found of torture in Turkey. The main focus of our human rights activity in Turkey was this question of torture.

Q: Did we get anywhere?

BOEHM: Yes. The Turks would listen to us and would claim to be taking steps. Torture was illegal in Turkey, of course, but that didn't mean that it stopped. The Turks would go from denial that torture was taking place to claims that they were taking effective steps, including the arrest

of police accused of torturing someone. Sometimes the Turks would convict somebody. They were very sensitive on this issue and they had to be, because the whole Turkish relationship with Western Europe and the United States was related to this issue. The Turks were constantly being pilloried in the Council of Europe, usually on the initiative of the Greeks. The Council would pass resolutions denouncing Turkey for its human rights practices.

Turkey wanted to join -- and still wants to join -- the European Community, now the European Union. This issue of torture was an obstacle for them. When Greece succeeded in joining the European Union -- and now I see that Cyprus is seeking to join -- this somewhat diminished Turkey's hopes of joining, because the European Union operates on a basis of unanimity. The Greeks can fend off Turkey.

Turkey had all kinds of reasons for wanting to put up a show of concern about human rights. I think that they tried, but, after all, torture, you might say, is a long, long tradition. It's almost part of Turkish culture, and you can't change that overnight. I think that they're making a good faith effort to work on it. They probably haven't succeeded all that well.

Then the Kurdish issue, of course, has become a more prominent human rights question in recent years than it was in the early 1980's, although it was there at the time. In human rights terms, the Turks have tried to take steps to satisfy concerns about the treatment of Kurds by allowing them to use their own language, which was illegal in the early 1980's and before.

Look, there still are Kurdish terrorists attacking Turkish villages and military units and setting off bombs in Istanbul. Like almost anybody else, the Turks lash out pretty heavily in response. When they retaliate against a Kurdish village for harboring terrorists who have just committed a terrorist act against Turks, it gets into the newspapers. There was a lot of that. They get a lot of bad publicity. They know this, and at times they feel sorry for themselves -- perhaps a little too much so.

Q: How about the problem of drugs and narcotics?

BOEHM: I can't give you a current status report on that.

Q: I'm talking about the time when you were in Turkey.

BOEHM: That was a major issue. When I first arrived in Turkey in 1971, the United States had just persuaded Turkey to ban the cultivation of opium poppies. Turkey, in fact, did that, despite very heavy domestic political opposition. It's like any agricultural issue in the United States. You're going to see this now with tobacco in the United States. There is a concentrated, political group that is deprived of its living by this type of thing.

The same was true of opium poppy cultivation in Turkey. Those who grow the poppies are not addicts. They crush the seeds for poppy seed oil, which is not a narcotic and which they use as the basis for their cooking, and also sell. So a lot of the income of the farmers in one significant part of Turkey is derived from poppy cultivation. These farmers were put out of business, and they raised hell. Eventually, as the democratic process proceeded, Turkey decided that it would

have to allow them to start cultivating poppies, but this time under very tightly controlled conditions, so that it couldn't leak out and become opium gum, morphine base, and heroin. The Turks established a system which was able to maintain very tight control of the poppy fields. They opened their own plant to process opium poppies into morphine for medicinal purposes and for export. That plant was at a place called Bolvadin. The plant was built by the Germans, but we probably paid for it, because we were making every effort to assist Turkey to stay out of the illegal opium business.

Q: Did you find at the time you were there in 1980-1983...

BOEHM: At that time the Turks were out of the business. There was some transit [of opium derivatives] from Iran and Afghanistan through Turkey toward Europe. There was some talk that there was some processing in Turkey of [opium derivatives] coming from countries farther East, which was then shipped to the West. There probably were some examples of that but, by and large, I had the impression at the time that the Turks were doing an effective job of enforcing the rules. Turkey was no longer a major player on the illegal international narcotics scene.

Q: A perpetual burr under our saddle for some years was Americans who got caught in Turkish jails for narcotics smuggling. What was the situation and how did you deal with it during this period?

BOEHM: It was both a consular and a political problem. I have to talk about both of these things. During my earlier tour in Turkey we had, for example, the famous "midnight express" case, involving Billy whatever his name was -- a clean cut, good looking American boy who seems to have tried to smuggle illegal substances out of Turkey and got caught at the airport. He was in jail. That was basically a consular case. You want to make sure that he is decently treated and maybe gets even better treatment than Turkish citizens get, because the treatment of Turkish nationals [in Turkish jails] is not that great. We tried to ensure that U.S. prisoners were treated in accordance with civilized standards. And the Turks were not inhumane. I visited some pretty rudimentary Turkish jails, but the treatment of the prisoners was not inhumane, as far as I could tell.

We had this kid there -- a famous case. It became a big deal, with international coverage and, eventually, a movie. There was a lot of flim-flam involved in that. The guy was in a jail in Istanbul. He kept wanting to be transferred. The Turks had a separate jail for foreign prisoners. He kept asking to be put in that jail. We finally arranged for him to be transferred there, but he wouldn't go. He said, "No, I've decided that I'd rather stay here. I've got a lot of friends here among the Turkish prisoners." When you had an American in jail with Turkish prisoners, the Turkish prisoners tended to help him out. They don't get fed -- they cook their own food and all of that. They do a lot for themselves which prisoners in American jails don't do. A lot of Americans are incapable of doing for themselves, even their own laundry. So the Turkish prisoners would take the foreigners in hand and help them out -- feed them and keep them alive. As prisons go, they were by no means the worst that you can imagine.

But this was an international case. There was a lot of pressure back in the U.S. to get the kid out. Eventually, he did get out. That was at the early stage. There was always a problem, especially if

the person arrested was in the U.S. forces stationed in Turkey. They really were a big problem. You just dealt with these things as best you could.

The United States was in a very ambiguous position, because on the one hand -- during the early period -- we were urging the Turks to take very strict measures against narcotics. Then, on the other hand, every time an American was arrested on a narcotics charge, we were in there trying to get him out. The Turks said, "Look, how do you want this? You can't have it both ways. If you want strong measures, we're taking strong measures. Get off our backs." But you know how things work. We have both objectives. We try to pursue them at the same time and do the best we can.

During my second tour in Turkey during the early 1980's we had begun to negotiate -- and Turkey was one of the first -- what were known in the vernacular as Prisoner Exchange Treaties. For example, if an American is convicted and sent to jail in Country X -- or somebody from Country X goes to jail in the U.S. -- there is a process by which they can be repatriated to their own country to serve out whatever sentence they got in the country where they were tried. We signed one of those agreements with Turkey.

Q: When was this?

BOEHM: This was in 1982. We negotiated that agreement with the Turkish Foreign Ministry and brought it to a successful conclusion. We did actually get some Americans who were in jail in Turkey on narcotics charges sent back to the U.S., where they were instantly released on parole. [Laughter] So it amounted to a kind of fraud. But it was a way for the Turks to get rid of these people without appearing to yield to pressure. They could say, "The same applies to our people over in American jails. We can get them out."

Q: When you were there, the elections of 1980 took place, Reagan was elected, and you got a new Ambassador, Robert Strausz-Hupé.

BOEHM: The appointment of Mr. Strausz-Hupé was the principal result of the elections of 1980, as far as I was concerned. My boss, Ambassador Jim Spain, who had brought me there as DCM, left. He'd been there for only about a year when this happened. I had been in Turkey for only about four or five months when the elections took place -- a few months before the change in ambassador. Obviously, it was unsettling, and I wasn't sure what was going to happen. Ambassador Strausz-Hupé wanted me to stay on. I did until we had a disagreement and I suggested that maybe I should leave. Although he didn't want me to leave, he said, "I think that you're probably right. Two people with strong wills probably shouldn't be yoked together." He agreed that I could leave.

I informed the Department that I wanted a transfer. They didn't make any serious effort that I could discern to find me another job. So I was there for another year, for a total of two years as DCM to Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé. I had been there a year with Jim Spain.

Q: I'm interested in how these things work. Here were two people. Strausz-Hupé had been a political appointee. He went around collecting ambassadorships. He'd been Ambassador in three or four other places.

BOEHM: Yes, he had.

Q: *I think that he came out of the academic world.*

BOEHM: He did. He was, in fact, a very distinguished academic who had founded the Foreign Policy Institute, or whatever it's called, at the University of Pennsylvania. He had written a number of books. He's a very distinguished historian and student of international affairs. He was fairly old by the time he went to Turkey, but still had a first rate mind. He would analyze things in a very broad way, in historical dimensions. He was a very interesting man to be exposed to.

As I said, we had a disagreement. Everybody agreed that I could leave, but...

Q: *Well, how did this work out? Did you...*

BOEHM: It didn't work out too well, from my point of view. After I'd said, "Well, I think I should leave," he said, "Wait a minute, think about it." I thought about it and said, "I still think I ought to leave." So he said, "OK." Then relations became more harmonious. We didn't have any further disagreements of that kind. However, as I said, I had been there for almost a year with him at that time, and it was another year before I left. So I served him as DCM for almost two years.

The job as DCM at Ankara normally led on to an ambassadorship. In my case that didn't happen right away. When I left Ankara in 1983, I was unassigned.

LUCIAN HEICHLER
Politico-Military Affairs
Ankara (1980-1983)

Lucian Heichler was born in Austria in 1925. He received a BA from New York University in 1947 and an MA in 1951. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1944 to 1946. His postings abroad have included Berlin, Yaoundé, Kinshasa, Rome, Bern, Brussels and Ankara. Mr. Heichler was interviewed by Susan Klingaman in 2000.

Q: *Okay, and then you went to Ankara?*

HEICHLER: Yes.

Q: *And you mentioned that in that job you were called counselor for mutual security affairs?*

HEICHLER: Yes.

Q: *And what was that?*

HEICHLER: It was just another name for politico-military affairs. When I got to Ankara, my predecessor, Don Gelber, was still there, stayed a few more days, and gave me an extremely intensive briefing on what was then a prime issue, the conclusion of a new defense and economic cooperation agreement between Turkey and the United States, known by its initials as the DECA. Gelber had worked tremendously hard on this agreement; it had been his main preoccupation during his two or three years at the embassy, and he congratulated me on the fact that since the agreement was now signed, sealed, and delivered, I wouldn't have to worry about it for a few more years.

Q: That sounds like famous last words.

HEICHLER: Well, actually he was right, for the most part. The agreement was kept and it worked. Naturally, I was responsible for making sure that the agreement was implemented properly. That meant a lot of detailed work. Mine was an important job because we had a major military presence in Turkey - and we still do. We had some 5,000 or 6,000 largely Air Force troops, mainly in communications and flying operations, in so-called co-located bases with the Turks all over the country, some 30 or 40 of them, the largest and most important being the airfield at Incirlik near the town of Adana in the southeastern Cukorova Region of Turkey. It was from this air base that many of the strikes against Iraq, for example, were and still are being carried out. This is also the airfield from which Gary Powers took off in his famous U-2 flight across the Soviet Union.

Q: Which indicates the sensitivity of these bases.

HEICHLER: Yes. There were other issues so sensitive that I don't think I should go into them -- nuclear arms questions and the like. We had several major military commands -- the very large Joint U.S. Military Assistance Mission to Turkey (JUSMAT), headed by an army major general. There was another command headed by a two-star Air Force general to provide logistical support to all these bases, all these American troops scattered all over Turkey. I did not have quite as much to do with that headquarters, but I had daily contact with the commanding general of JUSMAT.

Q: Okay.

HEICHLER: Because his mission, his people, constituted a sort of interface between my office - which consisted of only three officers, myself included, and all the American bases which they were supposed to oversee. And I had a great deal of contact with Washington through the ambassador concerning the level of our military assistance. Our assistance to Turkey primarily took the form of Foreign Military Sales through loans, with delivery of American military equipment on credit or by offset. We had a major program to modernize the Turkish armor fleet, which consisted of several thousand over- aged tanks, and the same with aircraft. The Turks had F-4's and F-104's, and during much of my time in Turkey there were heated discussions concerning a new fighter and heated competition among American aircraft manufacturers for a contract with the Turks to buy either the F-18 or the F-16. In the end General Dynamics won a contract to co- produce the F-16 fighter in Turkey.

So there was a great deal to do, constantly, every day. I had two or three truly excellent officers working with me. Here again, as I said earlier, I had the slightly uncomfortable feeling of floating on top of a mass of detail with which I was not as familiar as I might have been. I could fully rely on my staff always to be completely on top of things; they were very, very thorough officers. Also, I found that, since I was constantly being called to the front office and getting involved in this, that or the other thing, if I tried to take on one of the more complex issues concerning our Status-of-Forces Agreement or the status of one of our bases - whether we were going to keep it open, whether we were going to close it, or whether it had been closed and what we still owed the Turks or what the Turks owed us - I couldn't really afford to immerse myself in all that detail because I had to keep myself free to be at the beck and call of the ambassador, who might suddenly want me to draft an instant cable on some completely unrelated issue.

My first ambassador when I got to Turkey was Jim Spain, a career officer, a wonderful man whom I liked and respected greatly and with whom I worked very well. I ranked as the third most senior officer at the embassy -

Q: After the DCM.

HEICHLER: -after the DCM. It wasn't supposed to work that way. The political counselor was supposed to be the number three, but about one month after I arrived in Turkey, I found myself promoted from FSO-2 to FSO-1, under the old system, and that automatically put me ahead of the political counselor, who was and remained an O-2. The poor man resented this rather bitterly, but we worked well together anyway. We were also neighbors, sharing a marvelous villa owned by the American government, the first piece of property the American government had ever bought in Ankara after Kemal Atatürk moved the capital of Turkey from Istanbul to Ankara. And this house, with a magnificent, huge garden, had served initially as chancery offices and ambassadorial residence. Later, when an ambassador's residence was built up in the hills of Çankaya and a large chancery was acquired, our house was divided into two huge apartments, one upstairs and one downstairs. The political counselor lived upstairs and I lived downstairs. Each of these apartments had about 12 rooms, and I've never lived better.

Q: Sounds nice.

HEICHLER: Yes, and we got along very well, personally and with our respective families. I also liked, respected, and got along extremely well with the Turks, the people at the Foreign Ministry, the NATO Desk, who were my principal contacts, and to some extent with the leading officers on the Turkish General Staff. One fascinating aspect of my tour of duty in Turkey was that exactly two weeks after I got there, the Turkish Army took over. It was their third coup d'état since the Turkish Republic was founded. I was awakened at three o'clock in the morning, told to rush down to the embassy, and found soldiers all over the streets, tanks deployed in front of the embassy. Overnight the Army had taken over the government, closed down Parliament, arrested the political party leaders - the same ones who are still running political life in Turkey today - Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit. Demirel today is president of Turkey [retired] and Ecevit is prime minister. But they were both put in jail on an island out in the Aegean Sea that night. We worked under a strict curfew for quite a while, which everybody liked because it gave us an

excuse to go home early from dinner parties, and we got enough sleep for a change.

Q: *Yes.*

HEICHLER: We had to be home by 11 o'clock, so everything broke up. Only a very few people had special passes that allowed them to be on the streets after 11 o'clock at night.

There was a funny little incident connected with the coup. My wife came two weeks after me and was supposed to arrive in Turkey the day of the *Putsch*, and since Ankara's Esenboğa Airport was occupied by the army, I did my level best, in addition to firing off substantive cables to Washington, to track her down en route and keep her out of Turkey that day. I sent telegrams to the embassy in London and the consulate general in Frankfurt to try and catch her at the airport, or wherever she was, and keep her from traveling to Turkey until we knew she could arrive there without being arrested -

Q: *I see.*

HEICHLER: --or kept out -

Q: *Right.*

HEICHLER: -of the country. I managed to do this, and she spent a couple of days in one of the guest apartments that the consulate general maintains in Frankfurt, then joined me in Ankara.

Q: *So what was it like then dealing with the Turkish government after the coup?*

HEICHLER: Well, it was pretty simple.

Q: *Simple in the sense that you knew what you got was what you had, more or less?*

HEICHLER: Yes -

Q: *I mean, you didn't have to go through as many layers as you might have before?*

HEICHLER: No, the Turkish General Staff ran the country, and the chief of the General Staff, under the constitution that was then adopted, became president of Turkey. This was General Kenan Evren, whom I had met with Secretary General Luns a year or two earlier, because Evren had invited us to a dinner party at his military headquarters. Later, I took distinguished American visitors in to meet him and sat in and took notes, like Senator Tower, who came once. Evren was quite popular with the Turks who called him "Papa Evren."

Q: *Tower, yes.*

HEICHLER: People like that. And I had, well, I suppose the same amount of contact with the Foreign Ministry people as I would have had under any government. A lot of social contact with Turks, both civilian and military, and I grew to like the Turks very, very much. For me Turkey

was one of the happiest posts I had. I would rank it right after Berlin, in terms of being enjoyable and interesting.

Q: *As a country?*

HEICHLER: As a country.

Q: *And as a place for your family to live also?*

HEICHLER: Yes, we lived comfortably. We had some problems to put up with, especially early on, when the Turkish economy was in such sad straits that we had daily blackouts, periods when there was no electricity for four or five hours a day, usually announced in advance so that we could prepare for it, and shortages of just about everything - no coffee, no this, no that - but we did have a commissary at Balgat, the American military base outside of Ankara, so we were not affected all that much, and things gradually got better over the years. The economy revived somewhat. I think the main reason for the continuing economic problems was rampant inflation which continues to plague Turkey today, more than ever. Now the Turks have profited greatly from tourism and are not nearly as badly off as they were then.

During the winter months Ankara suffered from a terrible pollution problem. The city lies in a depression surrounded by hills. Most of the population burns soft coal, creating a terrible layer of smelly brown smog lying over the city. Some days you can't see 10 feet in front of you. If you can get up into the hills, where the higher-ups lived (like our ambassador), you could look down on this cloud covering the city, like looking down on clouds from an air plane. We didn't live above the smog; we lived right down in the smog, about two blocks from the embassy, which was right downtown. But it didn't bother us all that much.

We had a very agreeable social life and very close Turkish friends, which was a new experience after Belgium, where we hadn't succeeded in making any friends among the host country nationals at all. And we got to travel a bit.

Q: *In Turkey?*

HEICHLER: Yes, and Turkey is absolutely fascinating for anyone interested in ancient civilizations and ancient art. One of Ankara's main attractions is one of the great museums in the world, the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations, normally called the Hittite Museum, which features artifacts from the Hittite period, the Lydian period, the Greeks, the Islamic time and what have you. It's amazing how many civilizations have marched across Asia Minor in the course of several thousand years, and we visited a great many wonderful sites, especially in western Turkey, along the Aegean coast -- Ephesus, Izmir, lovely old port cities like Bodrum (ancient Halicarnassos) and Marmaris, all of which had been Greek colonies in ancient times. We got up to the Black Sea once and visited fabled Trebizond, which the Turks call Trabzon, a city which split off from the Byzantine Empire and was its own isolated little empire for several hundred years. There was a sensitive American listening post up on the Black Sea at Sinop, which served to monitor Soviet missile launches and other traffic.

Q: *I see.*

HEICHLER: Sinop is a peninsula that sticks up a little ways into the Black Sea, right in the center of the Turkish coastline, and the NSA had a major installation there. Everybody knew about it. I remember taking Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont to visit Sinop; he was then a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. So I got around quite a bit.

Q: *Well, that's good.*

HEICHLER: I never had a boring day.

Q: *Did you get involved in any way in Greek-Turkish issues?*

HEICHLER: Not very much, no.

Q: *Okay.*

HEICHLER: I maintained close contact with my opposite number in Athens, social as well as professional. He was serving much the same function vis-à-vis the Greeks, less extensive - we only had four bases in Greece compared to the 30 and more we maintained in Turkey - but I think he had a much harder time than I did because he had to deal with a rather hostile, anti-American administration under Andreas Papandreou. Sometimes it's a wonder to me that Greece has managed to stay in NATO.

Q: *Why is that?*

HEICHLER: Well, because so many of its positions and policies have been anti- Western, all the way down to what to do about Kosovo.

Q: *Why do you think that is? I know that may be not exactly your specialty.*

HEICHLER: I really don't know. It's partly because-

Q: *I mean, is it a function of the Greek-Turkish issue somewhat?*

HEICHLER: It is partly that. The Greeks resent our assistance to Turkey. They fear Turkey because Turkey is so much bigger and more powerful. And then the issues between the two countries are just terribly intractable. It is not just Cyprus - of course a very sore tooth - but there are other problems: Control of the Aegean Sea. The Greeks talk about extending their territorial waters to 12 miles. The Turks will then show you a map with all the Greek Islands scattered around the Aegean surrounded by a 12-mile Greek territorial limit. In such a situation, Turkish shipping would be imprisoned in Turkish ports - they wouldn't be able to get out into the open sea at all. Obviously they can't live with that. That's just one example. There is also exploitation of the mineral riches on the sea bottom; fishing rights - you name it. It's terribly complicated. I didn't really want to be involved in all this, and I didn't have to be.

Q: And did you have any particular relationship with the Turkish Desk in the Department in the context of your job, or was the relationship with the Department more with politico-military affairs?

HEICHLER: No, it was much more with the Turkish Desk. I talked to the Desk officer on the phone occasionally, and he came out for the occasional visit. I really didn't have much to do with PM. There were some high-level visits by people like Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who took a strong interest in Turkish affairs. And I was also responsible (control officer) for one visit by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. And there was a visit by Alexander Haig while I was in Turkey.

Q: Haig was then Secretary of State.

HEICHLER: Secretary of State, yes. So we had our share of high-level visits to worry about, but they all went off without a hitch.

Q: Anything else on Turkey? It sounds like a great assignment.

HEICHLER: It was a great assignment.

Q: Do you want to go on for your next or... It's up to you.

HEICHLER: Why don't we let it go for next time.

Q: Okay, the next time we would be talking about your period in INR, and I think that was your last assignment.

HEICHLER: It was.

Q: So then perhaps you could give us some reflections on your overall career in the Foreign Service and so on.

HEICHLER: Right, I'd be glad to do that.

Q: That sounds great.

Today is Wednesday, March 22, 2000. Lucian, I believe you have a few other comments about Turkey.

HEICHLER: As I think I said before, my job at the embassy in Ankara was one of the most interesting I'd ever had. It involved an interesting balancing act, among other things. My responsibilities included supervising the implementation of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, working with the ambassador and with the commanders of the military assistance mission and others in our efforts to raise levels of military assistance to Turkey, at which we were quite successful. In addition to working with the ambassador and the DCM at the

embassy, I had to maintain good, close relations with two major generals whom, according to the army system of equivalent ranks, I actually outranked slightly, but they didn't know that, and of course I lacked their perks - such as my own airplane, my own chauffeur-driven car, and all the rest of it. I met at least once a week with the commanding general of JUSMAT, the military assistance mission chief, and occasionally with the commander of the logistical support command, TUSLOG, which supported all our 30-odd bases in Turkey, where we had a total of over 5,000 men, mostly airmen and a few sailors. I enjoyed very good relations with the NATO department of the Foreign Ministry, my principal Turkish contacts. I made good friends there and generally found it an enormously satisfying, interesting, and sometimes difficult assignment, the kind of challenging assignment which always made me wonder, am I really on top of things or not? But I had an excellent staff with a penchant for extreme thoroughness and competence, and so I felt very good.

Q: You're referring to your Foreign Service staff?

HEICHLER: My Foreign Service staff of two officers plus a secretary.

Q: How did you find working with the U.S. military? I'm thinking in terms of what we hear about the military mind and all of that. Did they have a notably different mind set than Foreign Service officers?

HEICHLER: They most certainly did. For one thing, they rather distrusted and resented civilians like me. For another, they spoke their own special lingo, their own technical language, which was sometimes a little difficult to follow, and they had a tendency to try to put things over on me. The general with whom I worked longest and most closely was a great talker, and to keep him on the straight and narrow was sometimes a little difficult. But my biggest challenge, as well as, I think, to just about every other career officer in the embassy, was our own ambassador.

Q: Who was that again?

HEICHLER: Robert Strausz-Hupé.

Q: Oh, yes, okay.

HEICHLER: A non-career man, a political appointee of Ronald Reagan's, who, to put it bluntly, was quite paranoid about the Foreign Service and convinced that "we were out to get him" and undermine him and his policies. Therefore he tended to use mainly CIA back channels to communicate with Washington, leaving us in the dark. In general he was a very difficult man to work with. He was already over 80 years old, irascible, totally unpredictable. He could be very pleasant when he felt so inclined, but he could suddenly take offense, usually at something imaginary or not worth mentioning, fly into a rage and become insulting and downright impossible. I remember a time when I was acting DCM. The ambassador had written a cable which was automatically, as a matter of course, passed to me to clear off on. When he discovered that I had actually dared to initial it, he got absolutely furious: "What business of mine was it what he wrote to Washington?" and so on. Finally I asked him whether he'd rather have me move back to my own office and leave the DCM's office vacant, but he said, "No, no, no," and

allowed me to sit there until the deputy chief of mission came back. I have met very few people in the course of my life whom I disliked more intensely than the Honorable Robert Strausz-Hupé.

One of my concerns during this period, of course, was my own future. I was number three at the embassy in Ankara. I had reached the rank of minister-counselor and was naturally interested in becoming a DCM or head of a consulate general, but I had no luck with that. I found it an increasingly losing proposition because I discovered that especially the politically appointed ambassadors preferred younger, more junior people whom they thought they could control more easily than a very senior officer like myself.

The most promising job opportunity which came along was that of Political Advisor (“POLAD”) to SACEUR, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe at Mons in Belgium. I was “short-listed” for that position, i.e., one of only five final candidates that were invited to Belgium to be interviewed, but in the end the position went to someone else. After my tour in Turkey ended, there was nothing for it but to go back to the Department in Washington and start hunting for whatever assignment might be available.

AMBASSADOR ARMA JANE KARAER
Commercial Officer
Ankara (1980-1983)

Arma Jane Karaer was born in Minnesota in 1941. She received her bachelor's degree from University of Minnesota and during this time also attended Osmania University in India. During her career she had positions in Australia, Zaire, Turkey, Pakistan, Swaziland, Finland, and ambassadorships to Papau New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Ambassador Karaer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

KARAER: In 1979 I went back to Washington to study Turkish in order to go to Turkey to be the head of the commercial section in Ankara.

Q: Today is the 14th of June 2004. Arma Jane, how long did you take Turkish and how did you find it as a language?

KARAER: Let's see. I think we took Turkish for six months at that time. It's difficult, because, unless you already speak Farsi or Arabic, it's a totally new vocabulary. On the other hand, although it has a very complicated grammar, it's a very regular one. I mean, it's unlike French or English, where you learn all the rules about the verbs and then you learn about all the verbs that don't fit the rules. In Turkish, once you know how to form a tense, every verb gets formed in that tense the same way. From that point of view, it's quite a precise language. Modern Turkish had evolved so quickly. Ataturk gave a speech to the youth of Turkey in the late '20s or early '30s which is engraved on walls in colleges everywhere in Turkey. Our teachers told us that that speech, which was in Ottoman Turkish is to modern Turkish as Chaucer's English is to modern

English. Just think what a huge difference that makes. Our teacher had a cartoon on the class bulletin board commenting on the rapid evolution of the language. The cartoon was from a Turkish magazine and it showed a young boy and his father in the foreground. They were speaking German to each other. The mother is standing in the background explaining to the neighbor in Turkish that her son and husband have to speak German to each other because they can't understand each other's Turkish anymore. That actually happened to my husband when we got to Turkey. He was looking for an address in a far part of Ankara and asked a young man passing by where this place might be. The fellow said, "I don't know," but he said it in modern, newly created words that my husband couldn't understand. My husband was starting to wonder whether the man was a foreigner. The reason that that happened was because Atatürk wanted to reform Ottoman Turkish so that it could become a language that was intelligible by the entire population. During the Ottoman Empire, the language of government and well educated people was very heavily laden with the Persian and Arabic words. The firmans (decrees) of the Sultan literally had to be translated by the local officials so that the farmers out in the countryside could understand what the new rules were.

Atatürk did two things. One was to create a Turkish Language Commission that exists to this day. It reviews the language and tries to expunge foreign words and replace them with words with Turkish roots. In other words, it makes up words, but it's easy to do that in Turkish because the same root can then be manipulated to become a noun or an adjective or whatever you need. Also, he called in linguists from all over and had them create a new alphabet for Turkish, because, until he took over the government, Turkish was written in Arabic script and this Arabic script isn't really suited to Turkish because in written Arabic they leave out vowels. It works for the Arabs, but in Turkish it became very confusing and very difficult for people to learn to read. Also, of course, he wanted to modernize Turkey, and by adopting the Roman alphabet with some adjustments to match the Turkish sounds, he was able to create a method of writing Turkish that is very easy to read. Unlike English, where vowels have several different sounds depending on the word, in Turkish every single letter has only one sound and you memorize that and you can read.

We decided to send our oldest daughter, who was just turning five when we got to Ankara, to a Turkish elementary school, so that she could learn to speak Turkish. I was amazed. Those little kids start first grade in September just like ours do. By Christmas those children can read any word in a Turkish newspaper. They may not know what the word means, but they can read it and pronounce it properly. It's so easy.

Q: Did you find that you were coming home and speaking Turkish? Arma Jane's husband was born in Turkey.

KARAER: Unfortunately, no. I think this may be true in lots of marriages. My husband couldn't help but give long disquisitions on whatever mistakes I made in the middle of something I was trying to tell him, so it just became unbearable. I spoke Turkish to other people, but not to him.

Q: I understand. I can't make the bed with my wife. She keeps telling me what I'm doing wrong. I just won't make the bed with my wife. Well, then you went out to Ankara in what, would it be by '80 then about?

KARAER: Yes, it was 1980.

Q: You were there until when?

KARAER: 1983 summer. When we got there, there was a near civil war going on in Turkey between the far left and the far right. People were getting shot in the streets and a number of Americans working for companies there also had been killed by the leftists. I had responded to a recruiting telegram that the Department had sent out the previous year looking for people to volunteer to go to Turkey. As a consequence they gave me a choice of three different jobs. I wanted to volunteer. First of all, I feel very much at home in Turkey obviously. I'd already done one tour there. My husband's family lives there. I wanted to get the Turkish language training. I chose to be the head of the commercial section in Ankara.

Q: How did the quasi-civil war affect you all?

KARAER: When we arrived in Istanbul, our plan was to stay with my mother-in-law for a few days and then take the train to Ankara to take up the job. The first night of the day we arrived the sun was going down, and my husband said he was going to go out to visit his old friend who lived a couple of streets away. We could hear these pop, pop sounds outside like firecrackers, and my husband stopped at the door and said to his sister, "What's that?" She said, "Oh, they're shooting. As soon as the sun goes down they start shooting." He took off his jacket and said, "Well, I guess I'll wait until tomorrow morning." When we got to Ankara and moved into our apartment we were sort of halfway up the hill that leads to the area of Chinkaya which is where the President's house is and where the ambassador's residence is, so our neighborhood was quite a nice one, but every night when we were going to bed we opened the window and heard the gunfire in the working class neighborhood at the bottom of the hill. We got there in August. A month later the military took over. It was the last military takeover in the series of such takeovers in the history of republican Turkey. While the takeover in 1980 was a great scandal as far as Europeans were concerned, and yet another excuse not to let Turkey into the European Union, the relief of the Turkish population was palpable. The Army put a curfew into effect after the takeover, but the first night, people were still out in the neighborhoods walking around just enjoying the fact that they could count on not be shot by accident. A lot of innocent bystanders got shot in this feuding between the left and the right. Well, two things happened as a consequence of the takeover. The Turkish military has been very wise in their takeovers. They do not put military officers in charge of the government. The head of the Turkish military resigned his position as general and became the president, but the other positions were filled with technocrats. The reason that the Army took over was that while this internecine fighting was getting worse and worse, the two major political parties could not cooperate with each other, kept changing positions with votes of no confidence every few months, but it didn't matter which party was in charge, neither one of them could get enough cooperation from the other one to get enough votes pulled together to do something definitive about the violence.

The other thing that happened following the takeover, and the thing that became most interesting to me as well during the time I was there, was that the man who was the head of the Turkish Government's office of economic planning, Turgut Ozal, came to the forefront with a number of

economic reform policies that the new government adopted and really pushed forward. By 1980, in addition to all of the political violence, the Turkish economy had just about crumbled, and they had almost no foreign exchange whatsoever. This was shortly after the invention of OPEC and oil prices had gone up tremendously. Turkey's economic policy, until Ozal's reforms were adopted, had been pretty much "We can go it alone. We can do it ourselves. We don't need trade and foreign investment." Up to that point, industry was primarily owned by the government. This had started during Ataturk's time when he couldn't get investment from outside the country, so it was only the government that was in a position to create modern industry. But by the 1980's, this "statist" economic policy had gone too far. State-owned companies had become places where people would be hired just to soak up unemployment. Therefore these companies never made any money. Furthermore, the goods that they made were shoddy, and they couldn't or wouldn't export them. They had wonderful agricultural products to export, but their market was Europe and they had to go either through Bulgaria or Greece to bring those products to the market. Since those governments weren't friendly to Turkey, their customs guards would leave Turkish trucks sitting at the border with tomatoes and oranges rotting in them. Turkey had a lot of basic raw materials and could pretty much go it alone as far as trade was concerned, but it didn't have oil. That was the major thing it needed to import. When the price of oil went up, Turkey's foreign exchange just disappeared.

Q: The mid '70s was when the big oil price increase hit.

KARAER: Right. Well, the winter before I got to Turkey, 1979-80, things had been so bad that there was no heating oil for the buildings, and in Ankara it's really cold in winter.

Q: The Antalya plain with all sorts of wind whipping down from the north.

KARAER: Yes. In fact that winter, the President of the Republic went to work in his overcoat and his gloves because even his office wasn't heated. Up until that time, Embassy housing was the old system that we had in most countries where each officer got a housing allowance and then you went out and found your own apartment. We had people living all over Ankara in apartment buildings where there was one American and 50 Turks. Even though the American government could get heating oil through the NATO pipeline and was able to heat the embassy and the ambassador's residence, for example, they couldn't very well buy enough oil to heat buildings that would heat one American and 50 Turks. Our people were truly miserable that winter because, you can imagine, with no heat the pipes froze and then there was no water and the electricity was very much off and on. When we got there, my husband was offered a job in the general services office to help them find housing. They had decided to start a new program under which the Embassy would rent whole buildings, put our people in those buildings and provide the housing directly. That way they felt that they could make sure that those buildings had heat, water and electricity. My husband did a terrific job, getting landlords with half-finished buildings to adapt the layouts to American standards and then sign long-term leases with the Embassy

Q: When the military took over, did the war between the right and left stop or how did that work?

KARAER: Oh, you bet. The Army just swept through and arrested a whole lot of people. You know that the Turkish government has had a long struggle, with our government to a certain extent, and certainly with the European community, over human rights violations. Certainly there's no question that the Turkish prison system and the Turkish military can be very rough on people and in many cases it stepped over the line totally. On the other hand, Turks respond to strong leaders who enforce the rules strictly. My husband points out that in his childhood, when the villagers took little kids to school, the father would tell the teacher, "The flesh is yours, the bones are mine". What that means is that the teacher has carte blanche to beat the kid if he doesn't behave. That's the general attitude in the society. When authority tells you to do something, you do it and no questions, otherwise you expect to get whacked. That certainly was the Army's attitude toward misbehaving students and others who wanted to shoot people because they didn't share their political views.

There were soldiers on the streets with guns patrolling just to make sure that there weren't people planting bombs and so on. Everything got a lot more orderly in a hurry. For example, when we first arrived, whenever we drove down the main street of Ankara, I had my heart in my mouth, because you'd have these folks in from the countryside and they would stand in the middle of the block, watch the traffic going by and then they would just grab their kids and rush into the traffic. It reminded me of the Turkish soldiers, who cry "Allah, Allah," as they charge, hoping to survive or go to heaven when they get to the other side. When the military took over, one of the first things that they did was station a soldier about one every ten feet all along the sidewalk and along the main street. Nobody dared to cross anywhere except at the intersections. After a couple of months everybody crossed at the intersections.

Q: Had much of the trouble had been coming out of the university in student groups and all that?

KARAER: There was one group of leftists that existed at the time of my first tour in Turkey, called Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left). The rightists had their own organization called the Gray Wolves, a sort of fascist thug thing. During the mid to late '70s these groups took over entire campuses. If you went to a particular school or particular faculty at one of the schools, you had to at least pay lip service to the controlling political group or they would beat you up, or worse. Even though there were a lot of students who just would have preferred to stay out of it, if you wanted to go to school you had to go along with them. They were using young people as their foot soldiers, but there also were older men, politicians who the military had managed to keep out of the political system up until then, who were also getting a lot of support in the countryside. In Turkey, ever since Ataturk's time, there had been two cultures, one in the big cities, like Istanbul or Izmir, where most of the inhabitants were westernized. In the countryside, people still remained very religious, very Islamic.

During the '70s more and more people were coming into the big cities from the countryside, and the big cities had really expanded tremendously at this point. It was amazing when I got there how much bigger Istanbul was than when I had been there the first time. The rightist groups were holding rallies in the smaller towns like in Konya in central Anatolia. People were anticipating a military takeover for a long time before it actually happened. The military had shown great reluctance to step in one more time. Then the rightists had a big rally in one of the Anatolian cities, during which they were flew green banners with the Arabic on them, generally giving the

impression that Islam was going to take back the country. That did it. In addition to the thugs and troublemakers, the military also arrested the leaders of the two main political parties. I thought this was hilarious, because they put them under house arrest in an otherwise untenanted seaside resort. These two men hated each others guts, and they had no one to talk to except each other. It was their fault, both their personal animosity and political rivalry, that this thing had gone this far.

Q: What was sort of the feeling in the embassy saying, well, he is I mean thank God they've done it, or did they look at it somewhat askance?

KARAER: I think that the embassy took it in a very practical way. The military takeover was expected for a long time, now the question was making sure that we were able to deal with the military and the new government and to maintain our influence. We certainly didn't want these extremist groups to take over the government in Turkey. If the military took over the government, we would want them to behave in a way that would keep Turkey inside of NATO. Turkey has the second biggest army in NATO after ours. We had a lot of difficulty managing the relationship between the Greeks and the Turks in NATO, but primarily because of Greek agitation. Turkey was guarding a huge section of the Soviet Union's border with Europe. In addition to that, we had very important listening post stations in Turkey that we needed to keep up. So, we had a big military assistance program there and our relationship with the Turkish military was extremely close.

Q: In other words, we weren't spending all our time protesting?

KARAER: No, no. We didn't want human rights violations to get out of hand. They didn't actually. I think the Army took a very moderate approach, although they did lock an awful lot of these people up. The other thing that was very gratifying for us was that this government let Turgut Ozal do his thing with the economic reforms. For me, Zaire had been three years of watching a government do everything that your economics 101 textbook says will ruin an economy, in Turkey I got to watch a textbook reform of an economy. It was very gratifying because the Turkish economy, although it is fairly large, is still small enough so that when you make major changes, you can see the effect very quickly, unlike ours where it may take five years before you actually see the impact.

Q: Before we turn to that, talk a little bit about the embassy, who was the ambassador, DCM and was there an economic section and how you found the embassy.

KARAER: When I first arrived there, our ambassador was Richard Spain. He was very much liked by our FSNs and well known to the Turkish bureaucrats. He had been an officer in Turkey before. He spoke Turkish. He went out boar hunting with the Turkish officers and all this kind of stuff. A very nice man. His DCM was Richard Boehm, who later became our ambassador to Cyprus and our ambassador to Oman. The head of the economic section was Clay Nettles. Clay had been the head of the economic section in Zaire and he was the one who brought the telegram to me that was recruiting people to go to Turkey. He already had decided that he was going to try for the economic position in Istanbul, in Ankara. We knew each other very well and our two sections were able to work together really well.

When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, Ambassador Spain was replaced by Robert Strausz-Hupé a political appointee and long time Republican supporter. He had helped write the Reagan foreign policy positions. He'd already been ambassador to Sweden, to Sri Lanka, and to NATO. He was a student of geo-politics, very much a believer in the theories that geography dictates your political position and your international political position. A brilliant, elderly man. A month after he got there he turned 80 years old. He stayed in that job the whole time that Ronald Reagan was president. While I admired his intellect very much, he was one of those stereotypical political appointee ambassadors who is very suspicious of the career Foreign Service. Dick Boehm stayed on as the DCM, for which the rest of us were grateful, because he knew how an embassy was supposed to be run and provided a buffer between the ambassador and the rest of the Foreign Service staff. I sometimes thought he must have had mental black and blue marks from that period in his career. It was difficult for a lot of the people on the staff to work with the ambassador.

Q: Well, how then did you find, what were, I mean as the commercial officer, what did you find was the status when you got there and could you talk about the changes?

KARAER: Yes. The status was that an awful lot of stuff that had been sold to Turkish companies on credit a few years before had not been paid for and so there was a very big debt owed. The Turkish government was slowly working out the means to repay these debts. One of my principal jobs was to pursue these payments. Companies would be informed, for example, that the \$3 million owed to you will be paid over such a period of time and the first installment of so many hundreds of thousands of dollars will be whenever. Only the payment schedule didn't always work smoothly, and so the company would say, "Whoa, we didn't get our money on time". To try to keep things on track and be able to give our companies some reliable information, I would call on the gentlemen who had responsibilities for these payments in the Central Bank. We worked up a good relationship. Sometimes foreign exchange that they thought was going to be available, and sometimes getting the computer records straightened out was a huge problem. I remember one time going in there about a missed payment and he admitted that the payment hadn't been made on time, but according to his latest computer printout it would be paid on such and such a date. As I was leaving, I said, "I'll come back to see you next month, I hope that the company will have gotten their money by then". He responded, "Inshallah". Now, Inshallah is a common expression throughout the Islamic world, which means "if God wills it", and I said, "Ali Bey, I don't like that word".. He said, "It just means if God wills it". I said, "Right, but God didn't make this debt, So no Inshallah, let's be real sure that this is going to happen".

Q: I was told when I was in Saudi Arabia that Inshallah was the equivalent of Manana, but without the same sense of urgency.

KARAER: There's a wonderful story. Do you know the Nasreddin Hoja stories from Turkey?

Q: No.

KARAER: The Hoja is a folk hero who is very clever. In one of these stories, he gets up in the morning and he tells his wife, "If it doesn't rain today, I'm going to work in the field, and if it

does, I'm going to repair the horse's harness in the barn." She replies, "Say Inshallah." He objects, "Why should I say Inshallah? I've got a plan to suit either contingency." He goes out and is working in the field when a troop of soldiers happens by. The officer asks him, "Which of the forks in the road do we take to Konya?" He says, "It's that one." They start to beat him and they say, "You show us." They make him run in front of them all the way to Konya to show them the way. By the time he gets back home it's after dark, his field hasn't been plowed, his harness hasn't been repaired. He scratches at the door and his wife says, "Who is it?" He says, "It's me. Inshallah."

Q: I mean did you find yourself as a commercial officer as a debt collector almost?

KARAER: Oh, well, that was one of my jobs. The other thing was to assist American companies in making business contacts. Of course that wasn't something that we expected to have a lot of in a situation where the Turks still were trying to repay other people that they hadn't paid before. However because of Ozal's policy, they had drastically changed their policy on foreign investment, and for the first time ever the Turkish government was actively courting foreign investors. They had a problem, however, in that they not only had to convince the foreigners that they really meant it this time, but they had to convince the rest of the Turkish bureaucracy as well, because Turkish bureaucrats had up until then had believed it one of their main functions to protect Turkey and its resources from being raped by foreigners who they had imagined were just sitting on the borders of Turkey drooling over the prospect of what they could get from the Turks. For years their job had been to make things hellish for any foreigner who was trying to invest money and thought he ought to earn some kind of a return on his investment.

I hadn't been there for even a month when one of Ozal's top aides came to call. This young man was very serious, as Turks tend to be. He said, "Mrs. Karaer, we have a new investment policy." I said, "Yes, I know." He said, "Well, why haven't any American investors come?" This investment policy was what, a year old maybe? I said, "Well, why should they come?" He started reeling off their five points of why Turkey was a great place to invest your money, and I said, "Yes. We understand that that's your position now, and we are sending that message out to our people explaining that, but they don't know whether they should trust you, because the Turkish government's reputation has been totally different in the past and they wonder if perhaps the government will change the policy again in a few months." "Humph", he says, "well, okay, fine we understand each other" and away he goes. I'm sure he got similar receptions in other commercial sections around town.

As I made my calls around town I would find people who were really anxious to be as cooperative as possible in assisting people who were expressing interest in investing there. In other places, the response was very bureaucratic. "Oh, you can't see me unless you get the appointment through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I told one fellow, "Look, It's not my country that's going to lose money if your business people aren't able to follow this export plan. It's your exporters. If you don't want to see me that's fine." He said, "Oh, well, I think you can come this afternoon." I really do like Turks, and because I knew Turks well personally I knew that when I was dealing with these officials I could talk to them that way. Their brusqueness was on the surface, and if you made them understand that you really cared about them succeeding, then they would talk to you and cooperate with you.

Q: Well, did you find that there was a strong cadre of people within the economic sector of Turkey who really knew what was going on because I think of bankers and you know, Turks have been involved in European banking for years and I was wondering if there were people coming out, getting their Ph.D.s at the University of Chicago or the like. I mean was there a cadre of European/American trained economists in Turkey?

KARAER: It was starting. You see, another group that was coming up in Turkish society and of great importance in the Turkish economy were private businessmen. Until then the government really was mostly concerned with the government-owned companies. As far as the bureaucrats were concerned, private Turkish businessmen were almost as suspect as the foreign businessmen. They were all potential crooks in their eyes, so the bureaucrats made the business licensing provisions as difficult as possible.

Q: Had the business people been before Ataturk essentially Greeks, too?

KARAER: Oh, before Ataturk, yes, but there were important Muslim Turkish private businesses well established there by the time the Ozal reforms were taking place. One thing that Ozal wanted to do was to get Turkey to export. One thing he pointed out to the rest of the world, including us, was that the money was in the Middle East, and, guess what, we're Muslims, and so it's easier for us to do business with those people. For example, he directed his agricultural exporters toward a very lucrative market in the Middle East so now a lot of fruits and vegetables were going to Saudi Arabia instead of fighting with the Greeks and Bulgarians to get them into Germany for example.

The other thing was that the Arab countries, OPEC, was now making tons of money. Saudi Arabia was building everything and they were letting out contracts to foreign companies. Turkish companies were already making good quality building materials for the domestic market. As Turkish contractors became involved in big contracts in the Middle East, these companies were also able to export their goods. This development interested us. If these guys could export goods and services, then they could earn foreign exchange and buy stuff from us and their internal market became more interesting to American investors.

The two types of American investments that really expanded quickly there after the Ozal reforms were adopted, was banking, because they made it much easier for foreign banks to operate there. Also, they were paying real interest for the first time ever, and so, instead of buying gold jewelry or investing in real estate, Turks were finally putting their money in banks. The other early investments came from oil companies. Oil companies were being allowed to explore and American companies were among them. The far east of Turkey, which is contiguous with the oil producing areas of Iraq, were interesting to them. We had people coming to inquire about investment in Turkey over the three years that I was there, like people who canned food products. The southern part of Turkey grows oceans of tomatoes, most of which rotted on the vines because they had nowhere to export it up until then. American companies, like Hunts, that would make tomato paste for example, would build factories there. We really didn't get a substantial investment outside of banking and oil until about three or four years after the adoption of the economic reforms. It takes that long for the companies to be convinced that the

government is not going to flip on them and let them build factories and bring all the money and then say, "Oh, we've changed our mind, now you can't export your earnings".

Q: Was the embassy trying to read the Turkish government because as you say governments can flip and change and were you seeing fundamental changes that seemed to be that okay in the military back in the barracks which was I assume was expected they wouldn't go back to protectionism and all?

KARAER: Well, besides talking with the people who ran the economy as much as we could ourselves, we got them together with our business community. The ambassador asked me to arrange for the American businesses that had representatives in Ankara and Istanbul to come to a meeting at his house with Ozal, while he was still the czar of planning and economic reform. We did things like that that would bring the community together because Ozal had to sell this himself and the government had to behave in such a way to show that they were in fact supporting him. The more frequently that a prospective investor got real cooperation from the Turkish government, the more inclined everyone was to trust them. For example, they set up an office that was supposed to be a one stop shop for prospective foreign investors where, instead of running all over town dealing with 15 different government offices, they could deal just with this office that was devoted to promoting investment and would run interference with these other offices. It didn't always go very smoothly for them either. There still were people buried in the bureaucracy who were going to do everything they could to dig in their heels, because they didn't really believe in opening Turkey to foreign investment. However, Ozal's guys stuck with it. And their construction companies came to us to help them get in touch with our big construction companies, like Parsons Brinkerhoff. We encouraged them to go to the U.S., visit those companies and show them that Turkish companies were very twentieth century. I'm afraid that for a long time most Americans thought of Turks only in terms of flying carpets and turbans. In fact, these guys had engineering degrees from American universities and spoke English well. We were helping them with contacts with American companies who were doing business in places other than Turkey, but in the end that effort would make a loop coming back to benefit us as well.

Q: This is tape six, side one with Arma Jane Karaer. What about the German connection for decades now Turks have been going to Germany as just gastarbeiters. Were they coming back with skills that were being used or were they staying I mean was there a German connection there?

KARAER: They weren't coming back from Germany. That of course still is a big issue in German politics. You see the Germans who did the recruiting didn't recruit educated people. They recruited people to work in their factories, to do stuff in Germany that the Mexican immigrants do in the United States. One of the things that the Ozal government did was to change the banking regulations, so that if you were an overseas Turk who was earning foreign exchange, you could open a foreign exchange account in a Turkish bank, send your marks, your dollars, your Australian dollars, or whatever, to that bank account and be guaranteed that you could withdraw it in foreign exchange if you wanted to. Of course Turkish workers were also sending money back to help support family left in Turkey. Many of them built homes out in the countryside that they would come back to for the summer vacation. So, when you drive through

the Turkish countryside now you find little German chalets in the middle of nowhere. Every summer the workers would come back, driving their Volkswagens through Yugoslavia and Bulgaria piled high with all the goodies they were bringing back home. Again, the government had loosened the import regulations so that if you could show that you were a Turkish citizen working outside the country earning foreign exchange, they'd let you bring all these household goods in duty free. Before Ozal, if you tried to bring a bag of coffee in, they would charge huge duties on it. That, too encouraged the workers to bring back stuff that they had invested in with their foreign exchange and helped improve living conditions in Turkey.

Q: Well, was your section at all promoting Turks going to Harvard Business School, you know, I mean the major business schools in the United States at all?

KARAER: No, there had been Turkish students at Harvard for a long time. When I was in Istanbul, my first tour in Turkey, a lot of young fellows that were graduated from the Turkish Technical University and from Robert College, the American missionary-founded school, came in with I-20s from Harvard and MIT and places like that. That had been going on for quite a while, but we were not promoting that, no. What we were trying to promote was the sale of American goods and services.

Q: You were there at the time when the commercial service was being taken over by the Department of Commerce?

KARAER: It had been by that time.

Q: It had been taken over. How did that from your perspective, did you feel that you were serving two masters or was it a pretty smooth operation? How did that work?

KARAER: It worked well in Ankara. I had great cooperation from the DCM and the economic section. I had one other Foreign Commercial Service Officer working for me whose office was in Istanbul. He was a Commerce employee. He was not a Foreign Service Officer. He and I got on fine. He did a good job, but he asked me for help with a potential conflict that was developing between his office and the consul general. The Consulate General had just lost the senior FSN in the economic section. There had been a reduction in force, but the Consulate depended very heavily on that person to collect economic data for them. So the C.G. informed the commercial officer that now the senior commercial section FSN was going to do that work instead. The young fellow who was working for me said, "I want to get along with the consul general, but I need these people to do the work that we're supposed to do." We were collecting a tremendous amount of information on Turkish companies and building a database for the Commerce Department. After all, the Commerce Department was paying these people now. I told him I would come to Istanbul, talk to the C.G. myself, and to the DCM, if necessary. In the meantime, I asked him to make his FSN available for a limited period of time to help out with the economic data collection, which, after all, was also used by Commerce.

Also, in order to take over this resource, the consul general had said that he since the commercial officer worked in the consulate, he wanted to write his efficiency report. I of course couldn't possibly have that. I went to the DCM and said, "I'm going to go there and explain to the consul

general that this is a non-starter. But, one thing that might make this easier, if its all right with you, is to allow him review that EER rather than have it reviewed by you.” Of course who doesn’t want to get rid of an EER, you know? Also, Dick Boehm really is a great Foreign Service Officer and really knew his stuff. He agreed. I explained to the consul general that the Commerce Department expected to see a return on their investment and that State couldn’t take over its resources. However, in a pinch, they had agreed to be as helpful as they could, but their work had to come first. I also told him that I would be writing the commercial officer’s EER, but if he wished to review it, he certainly could. After that, I don’t know if the DCM spoke to the consul general or not, but in any case we didn’t get any more static out of him and the commercial officer was fine. They didn’t bother him.

Q: What were some of the major elements of interest from American commerce in Turkey? Was tobacco still an item, or was that long gone?

KARAER: I can’t remember. They may have been exporting some tobacco, but I know that everybody wanted to smoke American cigarettes. Have you ever smelled a Turkish cigarette? Yuck. One of the things that I had to deal with there was the American companies that wanted to sell to Turkey, but get paid by AID money. In other words, get guarantees that they would be paid. I remember a General Motors salesman coming in to see me, just having come from Egypt where we had a huge aid program. I should add that about this time Turkey was about the third biggest aid recipient in the world from the United States after Israel and Egypt. The Turks needed buses and trucks, but our deal with the Turks was different from the deal in Egypt. For one thing, we knew we could trust this government to manage its money well and the deal with them was that their aid money would just be a green U.S. government check. While we would talk with them about their economic policies, they got to spend the money the way they wanted to. Which meant that there were no US government guarantees for the GM truck salesman. So, I had to ask that gentleman, “Have you got a credit program for these international buyers?” He said, “Oh, my company is not interested in that.” I said, “Well, then tell your company that they can save money on your airplane ticket here, because no credit, no sale.”

Oh, another thing was that Ozal started this huge infrastructure project at the same time. He said, and I think we certainly agreed, it was needed if Turkey was ever going to catch up economically with the rest of the world. Secondly, he needed to convince the people in eastern Turkey, who are primarily Kurds, that they really had a stake in Turkey and were not just going to be a poor minority forever. His great idea was to harness the water and the power in the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers, which both start in Turkey. They ended up building this enormous dam on the Euphrates River which is called the Ataturk Dam with a huge system of irrigation canals that turned the southeastern tip of Turkey into an immense cotton producing area that had only supported goats before. When I was there, they were beginning to plan this project and starting to put out bids. That was a major thing. Of course American companies wanted to be in on that.

They had another huge coal power plant project. Turkey, infamously, has huge deposits of soft coal. I say "infamously", because that was the coal that was being burned to heat the buildings of Istanbul and in Ankara and had caused a horrible smog problem. Ankara is built in a bowl surrounded by mountains. In the wintertime, when all the smokestacks are belching, this black yuck from the soft coal would just sit over the city. It wouldn’t go anywhere. That’s the one time

that I lived in really horrible smog. The air turns yellow. What they decided to do, was to go far away from any cities and build a huge electric power generating plant that was close to the coal mines. That was another project that American companies were interested in.

Q: I'm not sure if there's any connection, but did you get involved in the poppy substitution?

KARAER: I wasn't involved in it, but that was going on during my first tour in Turkey. That was back in the late '60s. That problem was pretty well taken care of by 1980. We still had Drug Enforcement Agency people working out of Turkey with the Turkish government, but I think we had real cooperation with them. Unlike Pakistan, where I worked later and where the military was deeply involved in dealing in drugs, the Turkish military was very much involved in making sure this stuff did not get around.

Q: Did you see evolving a solid small business class with these sort of governmental economic dinosaurs being disassembled during that time?

KARAER: They were trying very hard to sell them off. In some cases they were able to do it and, in other cases, it just wasn't possible. In some cases they just had to close things down. There still are a couple of these places in operation. I think they're textile companies. Although there are a number of private textile manufacturers now. Selling off the state owned companies was difficult, because private buyers didn't want to keep on the excess employees that had been accumulated in them by the government management, and the government couldn't afford to have a lot of people suddenly thrown out of work.

Q: Well, this was, I was in Italy and they had these steel mills. The main reason for being was that they employed 5,000 people. The steel wasn't particularly needed. Well, now, did you find in the commercial field, was there competition over anything say with the French or the Germans or the British from your perspective or were you all trying to encourage people to invest?

KARAER: Well, everybody was trying to do it. I don't remember having any particular problem. I mean unlike Zaire where the Belgians pretty much figured they had the foreign trade sewed up in the country and that was difficult to break into. In Turkey, the competition was in finding representatives to represent your company's goods. That was not difficult. There was no under the table deal going on with somebody else. It was whoever could offer the best price for the deal.

Q: Corruption at all a problem?

KARAER: At the time as far as I was aware, it wasn't. I mean there always was some going on somewhere, but my concern was helping businessmen who wanted to set up companies or offices there and because of the great importance that the government put on assisting foreign investors I don't think anybody would have the nerve to put his hand out at the time. That didn't mean that Turks didn't have to deal with it elsewhere. I remember a wonderful joke that the Drug Enforcement Agency head's wife told me. When they were stationed in Istanbul, she went to a lady's luncheon. The Turkish ladies were discussing how hard it was to get a driver's license. She said, "Oh, I didn't find it hard to get a driver's license here." One of the ladies looked at her

and said, "Oh, but you know how to drive." In other words, the difficulty was what price you pay for your driver's license.

Q: Were there any big concerns like telephone telegraph outfits or anything trying to take or set up a telephone system or something like that from America?

KARAER: At one point we were trying very hard to sell a particular kind of radar system for airports. Every country that develops this stuff develops some sort of a system that can't work with anything else. If you adopt that then everything else that goes with it has to go with it. We had those sorts of things.

Q: Nuclear developments. Any?

KARAER: No.

Q: How did you find living in Ankara?

KARAER: We had a very nice apartment, but during the first winter it was cold, even though by this time there was fuel oil available. We lived in an apartment building where there was an American from the embassy on the ground floor, I was in the middle, and the Turk who owned the building and had built it was on the top. He managed the heating system at the time. His idea of being conservative was to turn off the heat when he and his wife went to work and his kids went to school, and then turn it on again at night. I was at work, too, but the maid was there with my daughter. By the time the building got warm, it was time to go to bed when I didn't want it hot. But the Turks, they're the ones who wrap up their babies in woolen sweaters in July, so they loved to be really hot. However, as the embassy's housing program got underway and we were renting more and more buildings which had only one Turkish family or none, the embassy started providing fuel for the houses, and we worked out something where the house would be reasonably heated all day long. Then they started installing generators, so we would have electricity. At that time, partly because of the fuel shortage, electricity would be turned off at different times of the day during the week. The government would announce a schedule for blackout hours in the newspaper, but it never seemed to actually work according to the printed schedule. Not only didn't you have electricity all the time, but you never knew when the heck it was going to be on. They put gas stoves in our kitchens and took out the electric ones. Then they put the generators in, which prompted a big ethical moment at the American Embassy. We agreed that it really wouldn't be very diplomatic for us to turn on our lights during a blackout, even though we could, because it would look like the mean Americans could sit there with all their lights on and everybody else had to sit in the dark. We all agreed that our policy would be that if the electricity went out, we would still use our electric stoves and our hot water heaters would work, but we would just use candles. My husband is great on kerosene lamps, which, by the way, are great. Kerosene lamps you can read by. We always had our lamps ready, and I was fine with it.

Well, our new policy went into effect. The next time all of the lights went out in the neighborhood, we looked out the window, and where are the lights blazing away? In the apartments of the Turkish families that live in the buildings where the American generators are located! Within a year and a half or so, things were quite comfortable again. I really enjoyed

living there so much so that when I got back to the States and was living in a suburban development in Montgomery, Alabama, I felt so isolated. I mean, living in the typical American suburb you couldn't buy a bottle of milk unless you got in your car and drove to the shopping mall. In my neighborhood in Turkey any service or commodity that you need for your everyday living was within a two-block walk.

Q: How did your daughter do?

KARAER: Fine. I think I mentioned that we decided that we were going to send her to a Turkish elementary school so that she could learn to speak Turkish. She was just five years old when she started school there. I expected that I was going to get a lot of complaining from her during the year because of difficulties with the language, but I never heard anything. It was as though one minute she couldn't speak Turkish and the next minute she could. Now I know that there was a period when she was babble babbling away and she wasn't communicating a great deal, but it didn't seem to bother her at all. One day she was playing Barbie dolls with the little girls upstairs and my daughter was talking a blue streak. She had learned quite a few verbs, but she didn't know very many nouns. The word in Turkish for "thing" is "shey." She's telling these kids, "shey" this and "shey" that, "thing" was doing and going, etc. Finally, one of the other kids looked at her and said, "I don't understand a word you're saying." It didn't bother her. Within three months she was speaking everything. The older American children would ask her to come down to translate for them with the Turkish children in the street. There was no place to play in the neighborhood except the street, and when the American and Turkish kids would get into squabbles, they would ask Alex to come down and sort things out. Little Alex would go down and tell the Turkish kids what the American kids wanted them to understand and vice versa and then everybody would play well together and Alex would be the great interpreter. No, she was fine. She did really well there. However, one day I realized she might be slightly out of touch with American culture when she asked me what that "funny ball" that the American boys threw around was for. It was an American football.

Q: Then you left there in '83?

KARAER: Yes.

Q: Where did you go?

KARAER: Something else important happened to me while I was there. I had another baby. She was born in October, 1982. In those days they normally would send pregnant women from the embassy either go to a U.S. military hospital in Germany or to the American military clinic at Incirlik Air Force Base in Adana. However, in both cases you had to leave home quite a few weeks before you were due to deliver, and I didn't want to do that. I found a sympathetic American military doctor in Ankara who had talked to the people at the Turkish military teaching hospital in Ankara. The doctors there very much wanted to provide medical services to the American official community, because through NATO arrangements, we provide a lot of medical treatment for Turkish military officers at our military hospitals like the Walter Reed. They wanted to reciprocate. The American doctor who was doing my prenatal care was pushing the idea that we should be willing to use the facilities if we wanted to. Of course one of the big

drawbacks was hardly anyone at the Turkish hospital spoke English. The head of the obstetric-gynecological section spoke English, because he was trained at Johns Hopkins, but the rest of the doctors and the nurses didn't speak English. I said, I'm going to have my baby there. I'm not going to go far, far away.

Another young woman who had just arrived in Ankara had talked it over with me and decided she was going to have her baby there, too, a week before I did. For me it was neat. In Turkish there is an expression, "gechmish olsun" which means "may it pass," and which covers everything bad that happens to someone short of death. We had just arrived at the hospital the night the baby was born. We were going up in the elevator, I was in labor, with my hands and teeth clenched. A young doctor got into the elevator, took one look at me and said "gechmish olsun." Perfect.

Americans are often so sure that American medical care is better than anyone else's. Not necessarily. I had had my prenatal care at the American military clinic in Ankara. About a month before I was delivered, I went to the Turkish military hospital to meet the head of the obstetrics unit. The doctor there looked at my medical file and said, "Mrs. Karaer, this is serious. We're going to have to arrange for transfusions." I said, "Why?" He said, "Well, you're blood type whatever and your husband is this and so the baby will probably have transfused." I said, "That's not correct. I'm A positive and I've got my card in my wallet that shows it." He said, "Really? Well, this says something totally different." He wrote something in Turkish on a note and he gave it to me and he said, "Take this down two floors. There's a man in the courtyard sitting at a table, give it to him and he'll take some blood from your finger." I go down and there's a man sitting at what looks like a card table on which there are four white tiles and some little bottles of reagent. I show him the note. He [tested me A]-positive. The American clinic had wanted to send me to Germany earlier on to have an amniocentesis because I was almost 41 years old when I had this baby. I had refused, because I don't believe in abortion. Later I thought if they got the blood test wrong, what would they do with an amniocentesis. I was really upset with those military orderlies.

Q: I take it everything came out all right?

KARAER: Oh yes.

Q: What was the child's name?

KARAER: The child's name is Ceren Jeanette Karaer. Her name in Turkish means gazelle. I named her after a heroine in the Yasar Kemal novel that I was reading just before she was born. Her middle name is after her grandmother. When my husband went to record her birth at the Turkish birth registry office (you don't exist in Turkey unless you have the "nufus" card that they issue), the fellow there told him he couldn't register a foreign name unless he had permission from the attorney general's office. My husband wasn't going to bother with that, so in her Turkish records she's just Ceren Karaer, forget the Jeanette. When he came back and told me that I said, "See, that's why these people are going to have such a darned hard time getting into the EU. It's those little nationalistic nastinesses."

Q: I used to be baby births officer in Frankfurt, Germany and this was back in the '50s and we had a lot of troops there. I registered over 300 baby births a month. Americans would come in and they'd name their sons Pretz or something like that. I'd say, "Our rules won't allow you to name a child after a title of nobility or something like that."

KARAER: The Germans?

Q: The Germans wouldn't. We got around this or we would put something else and they would have the thing, but you run across these things. Germany was not that benign.

KARAER: Yes, okay, but in Turkey this meant that anybody who wanted to name their child something other than a Muslim name, and there are non-Muslim minorities in Turkey, were being given a hard time.

ARNOLD SCHIFFERDECKER
Political Officer
Ankara (1980-1983)

Arnold Schifferdecker was born in Missouri in 1935, and received his BA and BJ from the University of Missouri. He served in the US Navy from 1958 to 1964 overseas. During his career, he was assigned to Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Kabul, Ankara, Lahore and Rabat. Mr. Schifferdecker was interviewed by C. Edward Dillery on May 14, 1996.

Q: That brings us up to 1979 and then you go to Ankara. You haven't had Turkish language at this point?

SCHIFFERDECKER: No, I hadn't so I took a ten-month intensive Turkish training course at the Foreign Service Institute. When I left EPA in 1979 I spent almost a year in preparation for my assignment to Turkey from 1980-83.

Q: How did that assignment come about? Was it a bidding situation or did someone approach you?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Up to this time I hadn't focused a lot on my career or careerism issues, but I needed to go overseas by this time, having been in the States since 1973. How I got the job in Turkey was that the incumbent in the job in the political section in Ankara, Robert Peck, had to leave a year early because he was under a security threat. So, the job came open a little bit off cycle and through contact with somebody in the Bureau of Personnel, I was able to put my bid in for this assignment and it happened very quickly.

Q: What did you think about the Turkish language program?

SCHIFFERDECKER: It was an excellent language program. The language programs and area

studies were integrated into the same time frame so one day a week out of the five workdays was devoted to area studies and the other four days to language training. I ended up after the ten months with a 3+/3 in Turkish and with a pretty good grounding and updating in American/Turkish and regional affairs. So, I am very high on the training at FSI.

Q: Did your previous language help you at all?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I had a smattering of Turkish when I was in Istanbul as a junior officer but had forgotten much of it. I had never really mastered the grammar very well. Turkish has a rather convoluted grammar by our standards so it took some effort.

Q: Isn't the normal Turkish program longer than ten months?

SCHIFFERDECKER: No, that was the normal time and I believe it still is today.

Q: When did you arrive in Ankara?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I arrived in July, 1980, about two months before the military takeover in Turkey. At that time there was considerable anarchy between leftist and rightist groups in Turkey. You were country director at that time.

Q: Yes.

SCHIFFERDECKER: The most frequent clashes and terrorist incidents between the extreme left and right were taking place primarily in Istanbul and the larger cities, but also in some of the cities where there were Sunni and Shia populations living together. Ankara was not so bedeviled by these incidents, although there were some shootings and bombings. There were frequent demonstrations and the general atmosphere was one of instability when my family and I arrived, so we were wondering what we were getting into.

[End Tape 2, Side B]

Q: What was your particular job in the political section in Ankara?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I was the number two in the political section to Dan Newberry, who later became consul general in Istanbul. For a while I was acting political counselor, but we had a replacement for Newberry who came from the Arab world, Mr. Jay Freres.

Q: How many people were there in the section?

SCHIFFERDECKER: We had a rather large political section which included the political/military people. About the time I arrived, political-military affairs became a separate section.

Q: So, as the number two in the section, did you have a specific area or were you a real deputy and were across the board?

SCHIFFERDECKER: My primary work when I was assigned for those three years was domestic political issues, but much of the time I was asked to supervise other officers, including two junior officers. You ask the number, as I recall now we had a total of seven when I was there: two junior officers, one under me who did international issues and foreign policy issues, and the other one did primarily domestic issues.

So, we had a rather well staffed section with two Foreign Service National employees who supported us. We also had a labor reporting officer in our section and a labor reporting Foreign Service National, so we had three FSNs assigned to our section as well as seven officers.

Q: What were the living conditions like and how did the security situation affect you and your family?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I arrived with my wife, who had never been overseas with me, as I had recently remarried, and two stepchildren. They didn't know what they were getting into. So, I concentrated a great deal in getting my family settled in, as all Foreign Service officers do, and getting them set up in schools. Things went very smoothly. Ankara did not seem to be as affected by the political terrorism that was going on, which wasn't in any case particularly aimed at the United States, although the US was under a lot of rhetorical attacks by the left. However, I mentioned earlier that one of our officers, the one I replaced, had been under a possible terrorist threat, so Americans were not exempt. There was an American military officer who had been shot in Istanbul several months before I arrived. So, we were on our guard, were well briefed on security matters. We were a little bit fearful I have to admit coming into the situation. US and Turkish military cooperation continued as it had for many years earlier. However, we had only recently gone through the period where much of the military cooperation had stopped, because of the embargo that we placed on Turkey as a result of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. This was 1980 and we had just entered into a new agreement to lift the embargo and reopen the Turkish/American bases under Turkish sovereignty and to resume military assistance. I believe you were in large part responsible for that being restarted, getting Congress to go along with it.

Q: That was a very interesting period with the clear requirement to have a good relationship with Turkey because of NATO reasons and the problems that were occasioned by the Cyprus problem.

SCHIFFERDECKER: Because this military cooperation had resumed, the left in Turkey was very incensed, wanting Turkey to be neutral or even handed between Moscow and Washington, this was precisely the reason that Americans were living under something of a cloud in Turkey.

Q: How did your brand new family, on their first tour, do?

SCHIFFERDECKER: As I mentioned things went smoother than we might have imagined and only two months after we arrived the Turkish military took over the reins of government, crushed at least temporarily the left, arrested many people and terrorism was effectively ended. It was the most tranquil period that one could imagine in terms of living in that country during that period. I might also mention that the Turkish military intervention and takeover of the government on September 12, 1980 was one of the most popular military coups I have ever heard of. People

were absolutely celebrating this event because they had been afraid to go out of their houses and apartments at night due to the near anarchy. Even in Ankara, where I lived, night life was virtually non-existent and restaurants had suffered tremendously because people were afraid of street attacks, demonstrations or things that might threaten them. So, they celebrated as soon as the military curfew ended a day or two after the coup by going out, filling all the restaurants, night clubs, tea houses, etc. all over the country. It was a tremendous sight to see and experience to have to see how popular a military regime could be.

Q: I always have the feeling that we almost always define the consent of the governed in our terms. We think you need votes, etc., but there are occasions that you can see that the people are willing to accept for some reason a different kind of power structure.

SCHIFFERDECKER: The Turkish military kept their promises. They occupied government for a little over three years and that is about all. They turned the government over to civilian control and held elections after developing a new constitution and a little bit more muscular administration than had existed before. The problem had been that the main two parties in Turkey had developed such an antipathy towards each other that they were unable to cooperate and gridlock occurred in the government and when there was no governmental solution to the problems of the country, the military took over.

Q: Your time working on domestic issues must have been very interesting during that time. What were the main trends besides what you have just said?

SCHIFFERDECKER: After the military takeover, the job became more difficult because there were no politics per se. There was no parliamentary politics, only the politics of the Turkish bureaucracy and their military masters existed so that our job was made considerably more difficult because our contacts with the military were limited to military cooperation. The generals did not confide in us on their intentions and progress in reforming the political side of the equation, so we were somewhat hampered in our reporting.

However, as in many countries, it doesn't take long for politics to reassert itself and many of the former politicians and through family ties, etc., and through the connections that we had in the bureaucracy we were able to get a much better sense of how things were going and we were also able to access some of the decision making centers in the military, so that we had a pretty good handle on what they were doing and in what direction they were heading. In foreign policy, the Foreign Office never ceased to operate and with the same people basically. The Foreign Minister, Ilter Turkmen, was a career Turkish diplomat.

Q: You mentioned before when we were talking about Kabul that you were in with the people all the time, did you notice a difference in being a junior political officer and a senior political officer, or did you do the same kind of things?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Inevitably there were some differences, in part due to my own age and my position.

The two societies, the one in Afghanistan and the one I encountered in Turkey, were quite different in many ways. The level of education of Turks was considerably higher. I would say that there was a broader array of Turks that I could deal with and I did a considerable amount of

traveling within the country as political officer in Ankara. We were expected to travel all over the area that we supervised, our consular district, and also traveled to other consular districts either while on vacation or while working to talk to people and decision makers. For example, I went to Istanbul a number of times. I had been there before and knew a number of people there and had many Turkish friends. Many of the people I dealt with initially when I arrived were journalists because they were the ones who would be the most talkative and the most interested in sharing information, so I made friends with quite a few Turkish journalists, and some of those were in Istanbul.

Q: You were able to keep those relations up even while you were in Ankara?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Very much.

Q: What did you think of the Turkish press?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Very unbridled and sometimes undisciplined, but very competent too. There are quite a number of Turkish newspapers, very colorful printing in Technicolor all over the front pages and other sections of their newspapers. They vary in degree of responsibility from scurrilously yellow journalism to fairly responsible reporting. One of the newspapers that we thought was the best was a former leftist paper which became much more centrist after the military took over, that's Cumhuriyet, the newspaper published out of Istanbul which was the least colorful, more like the New York Times in appearance than the Daily News. Its journalists were quite well-educated, competent and responsible. As I say their politics shifted somewhat to the center of the political spectrum after the military takeover. Their diplomatic reporter in Ankara and I became very good friends. I believe he is still working as a journalist in Turkey. Some of the other foreign affairs correspondents who were either in Ankara or Istanbul or traveled a good bit were people that I liked to talk to from time to time. We developed relationships where they would not ask me certain things or expect me to give them certain information but were able to share some insights with me on domestic issues where presumably I was less well plugged in than they and I would be able to give them more insights on US foreign policy or official bilateral relations with Turkey, areas that I was able to talk about.

Q: One of the big policy issues, at least for the United States, if not for Turkey itself, was its relationship with Greece. What was that like during this period?

SCHIFFERDECKER: After the military takeover things were fairly quiet with Greece. It was clear that the Turkish generals did not want any confrontation with Greece or to take any new initiatives on Cyprus or anything that would upset Turkish-Greek relations while they were reforming the domestic politics of Turkey. There were, of course, the same issues between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus and the disputes over the Aegean and whether or not the Aegean zones of economic activity were Greek or Turkish, depending on whether you were talking about extending out from the mainland or from Greek islands. The Greeks wanted to insist that each island had its own territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. The finishing touches were put on the Law of the Sea in 1981 and as it turned out because of the Reagan Administration's concerns about sharing of the economic wealth of the sea did not subscribe to all of the Law of the Sea agreement's provisions. As a result we found ourselves very much in harmony with Turkish

policy, which was also not to sign the Law of the Sea agreement because of their reservations about Greek claims and islands having the right to claim not only territorial seas but economic zones. That was one of the issues that animated Greek/Turkish relations while I was there. But, there were no hot disputes in the Aegean as occurred recently where some Turks occupied a small island right off the coast of Turkey that the Greeks claimed was theirs. Incidents like that were fairly minimal. Cyprus was the main issue.

Q: How was our relationship with the Turks in Turkey about Cyprus?

SCHIFFERDECKER: We were primarily trying in Ankara to promote a flexible approach by the Turkish Cypriots and by Turkey to resolve the Cyprus problem. We had a special mediator, Reg Bartholomew at the time, who was trying to see if there was a basis for a settlement in Cyprus and we are still trying almost 16 years later.

Q: And we have more mediators.

SCHIFFERDECKER: We have had a parade of mediators since then and we have one right now, a presidential envoy, Mr. Beattie...

Q: And the Special Cyprus Coordinator.

SCHIFFERDECKER: And the Special Cyprus Coordinator, Ambassador Williams, who worked for you I believe.

Q: Yes, that is right.

SCHIFFERDECKER: In any case, because we had a special mediator we did not play a leading role in trying to hammer out terms of reference or positions on Cyprus, although we were asked to make demarches from time to time to the Foreign Ministry. One of the foreign policy issues I dealt with was this one when I was acting political counselor and I got to know the Cyprus director in the Foreign Ministry quite well. He genuinely seemed interested in an agreement on Cyprus, but, of course, toed the Turkish nationalistic line which was that there had to be a bizonal confederation style of government before Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would agree to settle and before Turkish troops would even think about evacuating from Cyprus.

Q: What kind of pressure did the Turks impose on us? Did they feel we were pro-Greek Cypriot in this issue?

SCHIFFERDECKER: I think the Turks were relatively satisfied with our posture which was that we wanted an agreement that everybody could live with and that we were not putting undue pressure on them. You have to remember that at this time in the early '80s we were trying to build up Turkey defensively, enhance our security relations, increase the amount of our military assistance and economic assistance as well during these early Reagan years. Turkey was a big part of our strategy to try and develop a stronger military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which only a year or two earlier had invaded Afghanistan and had made other moves which were

interpreted by the Administration as being a bit too bellicose for comfort. So, Turkey being a big part of our strategy was not under strong US pressure to make settlements on other issues such as Cyprus even though we recognized this as an important issue and one that we wanted to see resolved because the issue was basically between two NATO members. But the Turks did pressure us or did feel that we were being unfair to them by providing military assistance to them on a ratio with Greece, the famous 7 to 10 ratio, which I am sure you are very familiar with having been director of Turkish/Greek and Cypriot affairs at the time.

Q: That is right. The 7 to 10, which still exists by the way, is ...

SCHIFFERDECKER: This is Senator Sarbanes' legacy.

Q: That's right, it still is in effect. Another sensitive issue that has some impact on domestic politics in the United States is the Armenian question, the suggestion of all the terrible things the Turks did in World War I. During this time there were attacks on Turkish diplomats in the United States as well as elsewhere. How did that impact on your work in Ankara?

SCHIFFERDECKER: This was a very sensitive issue, as you know, for the Turks and the Turkish government. One of their major foreign policy efforts was to try and gain support for their view that

Turkey should not be brought before the court of world opinion or be forced to suffer by attacks on their diplomats because of something that happened during the Ottoman Empire right in the period before World War I and during World War I. The Turks were very emphatic to us in Ankara during my time there that they didn't want the Holocaust Museum, which was being constructed in Washington, to deal with the alleged Turkish massacre or Turkish genocide against Armenians in eastern Turkey during this period of 1915-19. They felt so strongly about this that the ambassador and others were frequently called to the Foreign Ministry or the Turkish embassy in Washington went in to see you and others in the State Department to try and insure that the United States did not join in this Armenian publicity campaign to force the Turks either to admit that they had committed genocide or for reparations, or for whatever. I know that many Turks felt at the time I was there that although atrocities may have been committed they genuinely felt that Turkey had been stabbed in the back by the Armenians at a time when they were about to go under as a nation state and that atrocities were also committed against Turks in eastern Turkey.

Q: So, it was something they felt very strongly about and was murky at best.

SCHIFFERDECKER: Very much so. Of course, we were also witnessing in 1981-82 the beginning of a campaign against Kurdish extremists, which is a contemporary issue of alleged Turkish atrocities against civilian populations in southeastern Turkey. These are very difficult issues that the Turks have been dealing with for a long time. However, it should be noted that there are many Kurdish ethnic Turks living all over Turkey, they don't just live in the southeast. Many of them migrated for jobs and a better way of life out of eastern Turkey into the big cities and into the western parts of Turkey. Many of them would like to see the problem of Kurdish separatism go away so that they can get on with their lives. But, the Turks have never taken kindly to efforts by Kurds to have a measure of autonomy or even to be able to use their own

language in the schools, etc. The Turks, since the time of Ataturk, have sought to build the country around the idea of Turkish ethnic language, institutions and to downplay separatism. Of course, this is a problem that exists in many other countries since the end of the Cold War.

Q: Changing the subject slightly, were there any notable visits by senior Americans during this time?

SCHIFFERDECKER: We had numerous visits by State Department officials. We had a visit by Secretary Alexander Haig during my time there. The emphasis was very much on building the bilateral relationship for purposes of NATO solidarity and solidarity against the Soviet Union. We did not have a presidential or vice presidential visit during my time, although we have had subsequently. Part of the reason for this, perhaps was that during almost my whole time there Turkey was under a military regime and I think it was felt that it would be better to send officials at more of a working level, although the Secretary of State visit is not considered just a working level visit and the Turks were very receptive, of course, to just about any official attention from Washington, including the Congress.

Q: Who was your ambassador and are there any anecdotes about him?

SCHIFFERDECKER: When I arrived Jim Spain was ambassador. However, his tenure was cut short by the election of President Reagan and the assignment of Robert Strausz-Hupé as ambassador shortly after the Reagan Administration took office. Ambassador Strausz-Hupé was focused on the strategic picture, the big picture most of the time and on enhancing the value of the Turks and the Turkish military in support of US security policy in the southern flank of NATO.

Q: This is Arnie's interview but I must tell one anecdote and that was while I was the director of the office for southern European affairs, I actually stayed with Ambassador Strausz-Hupé one time and he was a rather elderly man at that time, at least in his late '70s and he still played tennis.

SCHIFFERDECKER: Early '80s.

Q: I became his doubles partner and found that he really was still pretty good but did not move much. He took one corner of the court and I was expected to cover all the rest. Your labor attaché was his usual partner, but he really enjoyed that day I took his place.

SCHIFFERDECKER: He made you run around a good bit. I used to play with the ambassador. He would have his staff assistant ask around the embassy for people who would like to play. Some people preferred to be busy but others felt that they ought to take advantage of this invitation. So, occasionally we would play. We learned that if we were going to hit the ball to the ambassador's side of the court to try to hit it to him, and he did a pretty good job. He retrieved a few balls that were not close to him, but as you said, generally he was fairly stationary on his side of the court and expected his partner to make up a lot more ground.

ALFRED JOSEPH WHITE
Financial Officer, Economic Section
Ankara (1980-1984)

Alfred Joseph White was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on August 16, 1929. He attended Syracuse and Georgetown Universities and served in the US Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. His career has included positions in countries including Germany, Sudan, Italy, Austria, Turkey, and Venezuela. He was interviewed by John J. Harter on September 17, 1997.

Q: Was this experience of the NATO Defense College useful to you in preparation for your next assignment to a NATO country?

WHITE: Very much so. First of all, on the personal level, I later dealt with some of the Turkish officers and diplomats who were at the NATO Defense College with me during a subsequent assignment in Ankara. Obviously, one of the things that we dealt with in the NATO context was the relationship between the Greeks and the Turks is a very complex relationship. I knew well the Greek and Turkish officers and had many conversations with both. So I was able at least to begin to understand both of their points of view.

In a larger context, many of the issues with which NATO dealt were matters that involved Turkey, one way or another, directly or indirectly. So I think that the preparation was excellent for my assignment to the Embassy in Ankara.

Q: Did you go directly to Ankara or did you go first to Washington?

WHITE: I was transferred directly from Rome to Ankara.

Q: Then you didn't get all of the briefings in the Department.

WHITE: No, I didn't.

Q: Was that a disadvantage to you?

WHITE: Well, something very peculiar was happening. While I was at the NATO Defense College, I kept asking Personnel about my onward assignment. I ran into a stone wall. Nobody could tell me anything about this. Now, I think that anyone has to regard that kind of reaction as rather peculiar. I would call Personnel and I would be told nothing.

Q: That might not be too surprising at the beginning of your six-month assignment to the NATO Defense College. But at the end?

WHITE: I was assigned to Ankara only at the very end of my tour at the NATO Defense College. Then I went back to Washington for personal reasons. I went into Personnel and inquired as to what had been going on. It's an interesting reflection on the way we deal with

people in the Foreign Service.

Someone else had been assigned to a position in the Embassy in Ankara. The position was Financial Officer in the Economic Section.

I was ultimately assigned as Financial Officer. We had a program, as you know, of economic and military support for Turkey, including ESF funds [Economic Support Funds]. The level of those funds was influenced by our economic calculations and by balance of payments analysis. That was my job. I was not a financial economist. I spoke no Turkish. My assumption had been that, after the NATO Defense College, I would wind up in Rome or possibly in Germany, because of my German background.

For months the matter of my assignment after the NATO War College had been under consideration. The person first selected for the Financial Officer position did not want to go to Ankara, but our Personnel people were determined that this individual was going to be assigned to Ankara. This became an issue which was ultimately referred to the Director General of the Foreign Service. Well at the end of the day that person did not go to Ankara. That is when I received a phone call one evening, out of the blue, saying that I was being assigned to Ankara.

Q: Was this when you were in Washington on personal business?

WHITE: No, I was in the last week of my assignment to the NATO Defense College. You know, it's a rather embarrassing situation when all of your colleagues were telling you that they had their orders to go here or there. Many members of the class had their orders before they even went to the College. It's a natural question for people to ask: "Well, where are you going?" Having to say: "I don't know," sounds rather silly.

Q: It certainly is from so many points of view to have advance notice of an assignment. Among other things, so that you can concentrate your reading and preparations for the assignment.

WHITE: Obviously, that is true, to say nothing of language training, or at least SOME language training.

Q: Language training would logically be in addition to other subject matter in connection with an assignment to Turkey.

WHITE: The Department could have arranged for language training, had it wanted to do so. Anyway, that's how I was assigned to Ankara. In a way, it was an assignment by default. I was not a financial economist, I had no background in Turkish affairs, and I knew practically nothing of Turkey, except that I had visited Turkey with the class at the NATO Defense College. That was the sum and substance of my knowledge of Turkey. [Laughter]

What was your first impression when you arrived in Ankara? That is, the country, the job, and the Embassy.

WHITE: Actually, I got my first impression before I even knew that I was going to be assigned

there. In December, 1979, I had gone to Ankara with the NATO Defense College group. We visited Ankara and then Istanbul. This visit covered a crowded two or three days.

Q: You didn't go to the Embassy then?

WHITE: I did. Sure. I met people at the Embassy. I met Clay Nettles, who had been a colleague of mine in FSI economic training. He was then Economic Counselor in Ankara. In fact, he hosted a cocktail party for the NATO Defense College class.

Q: Then he was later your boss when you were assigned to Ankara?

WHITE: That's right, but neither of us knew that I was going to be assigned there at the time.

At that time Turkey was in a very dismal state of affairs. Every country has its ups and downs, and the Turks were definitely having one of their down periods. I think that 10 or 12 Americans had been killed in the previous year by terrorists in Turkey. They were all military, and all or most of them were killed in Istanbul.

The Turkish Government was a democratic government, but it was virtually powerless to govern. The political parties were at each other's throats. The country was in a state of impasse. It was a time of economic and political crisis. One result of this was terrorism on a very wide scale, all around the country. Businessmen were being murdered at their desks. Students were afraid to go to school, because the campuses had become battlegrounds for ideologically extremist groups. It was a classic case of a country virtually collapsing under the pressures of extremism from both Right and Left.

There were two major political parties. They were very Western oriented and moderate. One of them was headed by Suleiman Demirel, who led what you might have called the "Right of Center" party. The "Left of Center" party was headed by Bulent Ecevit.

Ecevit and Demirel were almost like Disraeli and Gladstone [Conservative and Liberal leaders in late 19th century Britain]. One of them would form a government, which would last for a while. Then the other one would replace him. Both of these men were Prime Ministers on several occasions.

When I arrived in Turkey, the government was headed by Prime Minister Demirel. The country was in a bad way, economically, and this, of course, aggravated the political crisis in the country. Turkey has very little petroleum. They have to import most of their oil. They didn't have the money to pay for it.

I arrived in Turkey in March of 1980 by myself, by the way. Everything about this assignment was a little off the usual arrangement. I didn't bring my family with me and I wasn't going to bring them until I could see for myself if I wanted to bring them. The security situation was very tense. There were some parts of Turkey that you could argue were not under the effective control of the central government. It was one of the worst winters in years, everyone said.

Q: When did you arrive there?

WHITE: In March, 1980. There were electric power shortages all the time. People would give parties and not know whether or when the house would be plunged into darkness or when the electric stoves would go off. It was a bizarre time. Certainly, in those days Turkey was a hardship post, no question about that. The Economic Section, where I was assigned, was headed by a Counselor. I was the second officer in the Section, along with two junior officers who did economic analysis, mainly macroeconomic work.

I was in charge of financial affairs, balance of payments reporting, and several other matters. I was Mission Narcotics Coordinator which, by the way, turned out to be a fascinating position for me. Because of the security situation, the Embassy had reduced its staffing. I already mentioned that we had lost about 12 Americans killed. People not considered absolutely essential were either sent home or their positions were not filled when they were transferred in the normal course of things. The Agricultural Attache was there in Ankara when I arrived, but he was leaving in a matter of weeks. Rather than close down the whole agricultural reporting operation, I was given that as a kind of sideline to handle.

The Commercial Section was then separate from the Economic Section. Remember the year now. We're talking about 1980. The Foreign Commercial Service had just been created, although the Commercial Attache when I arrived in Ankara was actually a Foreign Service Officer by background. However, the Commercial Section had already been split off. It functioned as a separate section. It was not even in the main Embassy building but was across the parking lot in an Annex. The Ambassador had just arrived.

Q: Who was the Ambassador?

WHITE: James Spain.

Q: Oh, yes, I know him.

WHITE: Ron Spiers had been Ambassador previously. Jim Spain arrived in February, 1980, and I arrived in March, 1980. So we were practically on the same plane, so to speak, when we arrived there.

Q: What did you think of Jim Spain as your Ambassador?

WHITE: Jim Spain had a very deep knowledge of Turkey. He had been Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara at one point, I think under Ambassador Bill Macomber. Jim Spain had also been Consul General in Istanbul. So he knew the country well.

Q: Hadn't he been an Inspector in the Foreign Service?

WHITE: He knew the Foreign Service. Whether he had been an Inspector, I don't know, but he had a solid background in Turkish affairs.

Q: He once inspected a post where I served.

WHITE: By the way, Jim Spain had written a book on one of the tribes in the Khyber Pass area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He had deep knowledge and interest in that part of the world. So he could hit the ground running, so to speak.

The situation was bad. I remember that at the first dinner by the Ambassador which I was invited to at the Embassy Residence, I arrived early, of course. FSOs are expected to do so. It was a beautiful spring evening in May. I remember that Ambassador Spain and his wife were discussing whether or not they could invite their guests to go out onto the terrace. The Ambassador's Residence in Ankara is a beautiful building with a terrace and lawn that slopes down from the main building. It is on top of a hill and has a beautiful view of the city. Ankara is in a bowl and is surrounded by hills. One of those hills, called Cankaya, is where most of the diplomats lived, including U.S. diplomats.

While they were discussing the pro's and con's of whether they could let their guests go out on the terrace and enjoy the yard and the view, we heard a rattle of machine gun fire, and that settled the issue! The guests did not go outdoors.

This was a very bleak time for Turkey. As I say, it was a bad time both economically and politically. During the first few months that I was there, Turkey was supposed to elect a new President. Turkey had one of those systems where the President was elected by Parliament. The Italians do that, too. The President was not elected by direct suffrage of the people. Even though the country was falling apart, the Parliament went through countless ballots and still couldn't elect a President. The two principal political leaders, Demirel and Ecevit, able as they were, and honorable men as well, could not or would not bury the political hatchet and form a kind of coalition government to govern the country.

The victims of this stalemate, of course, were the Turkish people. Every day we read of terrorist incidents, shootouts, and fire bombings. This went on and on. I remember vividly that most of the European diplomats had sent their wives and families back home because the winter was so bad. They didn't have heat.

On the diplomatic cocktail circuit, the Europeans were always and very impatiently asking the question: "When is General Evren going to do something?" He was the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army. He had been appointed by Prime Minister Demirel and was a widely respected man. He was very moderate, sensible, cognizant of his responsibilities to the government which had appointed him, and a rather mild-mannered, avuncular type of figure. He was sharply criticized for not doing something to terminate this impasse, in which the country was almost literally falling apart.

In September, 1980, I joined some of the officers in the Political Section to go over and watch a session of Parliament. It was fairly near to the Embassy, only a few blocks away. So I tagged along. I had never seen the Parliament and I thought that this would be a good opportunity to do so. Three or four of us from the American Embassy attended the Parliament that day. We were shown into the diplomatic gallery. We looked down on the proceedings of the Turkish

Parliament. One half of the Chamber [of the unicameral Parliament] was empty, because one of the two major political parties had gotten into a fight over something and had walked out.

As I looked down at that spectacle, it was perfectly obvious that this situation could not go on. Here was a country in crisis, and its politicians were just playing politics as usual, with the country collapsing around our heads. I walked out of Parliament and thought: "This cannot go on." After all, a country has to be governed.

While it was all being done according to Parliamentary rules, the country was effectively left without a government, despite the fact that both of the major political leaders were well known, sensible, honorable men. However, neither of them could overcome the impasse. Turkish politics can be very personal.

Q: Was there a small third party?

WHITE: There were third parties, but there was no third party which could have altered the situation as I recall.

The answer, of course, was for the two major parties, to act together. We were not talking about a situation where you had Fascists and Communists shouting at each other in Parliament. These were broad political parties, which we would call middle of the road.

Anyway, to make a long story short, my family came to Ankara during the summer of 1980.

Q: You had two children at this point?

WHITE: Yes. They had been staying in Rome.

Q: How old were your children?

WHITE: Let's see. Susi was 8 years old, and Helen was 12. They had been staying in Rome with their mother to finish the school year. They came by ship through the Aegean Sea, and I met them in Izmir in August, 1980.

A few weeks later the phone rang at about 3:00 AM. It was the Embassy Duty Officer saying: "Don't come to work tomorrow morning. Something's happened." Well, what had happened is that finally General Evren, in what is called a bloodless coup d'etat, and it was really bloodless, simply announced that the country was not being governed. It had to be governed. He put the leaders of both major parties under house arrest and formed a government of technocrats. He also set a date for the promulgation of a new Constitution. He made it clear that the Army would be back in its barracks within two years, or whatever the time period he set.

Now if ever there was a reluctant general, General Evren was that person. The next morning I went down to the Embassy. I went a little later than usual, after I saw that there were no disturbances. Nothing was happening. I didn't take the car for some reason. I took the bus downtown. Traveling by bus is a nice way to find out what people are thinking. The sense of

relief among the people was palpable. For the first time I saw Turks smiling. There is an unwritten article in the Turkish Constitution that says, in effect: "If the government isn't governing, the Army has a moral responsibility to step in and make things happen."

This is what General Evren did. He appointed a government of technocrats. He sensibly realized that the Army knew nothing other than the Army. So there wasn't a situation of colonels running ministries that they didn't understand. He brought in a man named Turgut Ozal and made him "Economic Czar." In effect, he told Ozal: "I don't know anything about the economy. They say that you do. So you run the economy."

I think that Turgut Ozal turned out to be one of the most remarkable men of our generation. I first knew Ozal as the head of an office called The State Planning Agency. It was involved in state planning in the sense of a think tank. The Agency turned out academic reports on what should and needed to be done. It was that kind of office. Actually, Prime Minister Demirel had appointed Ozal to a fairly important position. I forget whether he had cabinet rank or not, but he was pulled out of this think tank and given real power in Demirel's government.

Ozal essentially took over the economy of Turkey. This was a heavily statist country where much of industry consisted of state-controlled enterprises. They all follow the same pattern. They had bloated payrolls and, altogether, were inefficient operations. They were heavily influenced by politics and cronyism.

Q: How long was Ozal in control?

WHITE: Well, this was in September of 1980. We all knew that he was a gifted economist and technocrat. To jump ahead, two years later [in 1982] he surprised everyone by forming a political party and getting himself elected Prime Minister. He later became President of Turkey and died in office about three or four years ago.

Ozal had a very clear vision of where Turkey should go. In effect, he wanted to scrap the state enterprises, open up the economy, do away with foreign exchange controls, and in fact do away with all controls, or at least as many controls as possible. We were talking about the deregulation of our airline industry. In effect, Ozal was talking about deregulating Turkey.

For example, smuggling was a huge problem. American cigarettes were much sought after in Turkey. They couldn't be imported because the Turks had a domestic cigarette industry. The Turks produce cigarettes. In fact, all American blends of cigarette tobacco have some Turkish tobacco in them. However, Turkish cigarettes are made entirely of Turkish tobacco. They are rather strong and have an acrid odor. So everyone in Turkey who was able to do so would buy smuggled American cigarettes.

Ozal's solution for this was very simple. Let foreign cigarettes come into Turkey legally and then apply a high import duty to them. If people are willing to pay a high duty when they buy American cigarettes, let them buy them. So smuggling disappeared almost overnight.

He did that with the whole economy. The whole apparatus of import controls was swept away or

drastically reduced. The Turkish economy was opened up to foreign investment. U.S. banks, which had been denied entry into Turkey for years, were suddenly welcomed. In other words, what was said to the international financial community was: "Come on into Turkey and let's do business."

This program worked fantastically well. We could see it in our own office, because one of my jobs was, of course, handling financial reporting. I saw all of the American bankers who were coming to Turkey. Turkey, of course, had been mired in debt. When I arrived in Turkey, the existing foreign debt was small in today's terms, although it increased over time. I think that the Turks owed something like \$20 billion in foreign debt. Of course, American banks were among those who were owed money. American banks regularly sent representatives to Turkey.

Meanwhile, remember the time frame when all of this was going on. Jimmy Carter was still President when I went to Turkey in 1980. Remember the American hostages who were being held in Iran? The Iranian situation had shocked the U.S. I think that it is arguable that the sudden fall of the Shah and the Embassy hostage crisis are what drove Jimmy Carter out of office. All of that was going on, which only gave a heightened sense of crisis to Turkey in the view of the U.S. Government. This was a time when Turkey was on the front burner, as seen by Washington.

We could see this in the messages we were getting from Washington. They were all high priority messages. Messages from our Embassy to the State Department, which would normally go by routine priority, had immediate precedence. This was because everything going on in Turkey was considered important. We had major military bases there. We didn't want to see Turkey go the way of Iran. We had a very high stake in getting Turkey back on its feet. We did this by providing Turkey with military and economic assistance and by providing diplomatic support.

Q: To what degree was all of this related to Turkey's NATO connection?

WHITE: Well, of course, Turkey is a NATO country. Turkey has, or had, the largest ground forces in European NATO. Turkey is a huge country, by the way. You could put most of Western Europe in Turkey. It is hard to grasp these realities, but if you superimpose Turkey on a map of Europe, you can see that it is a large country, with a huge population of more than 50 million people in the early 1980s and growing by 1.0 million per year. Turkey is the southern bastion of NATO.

Q: At one point Turkey was also one of the foundations of the Truman Doctrine, right at the beginning of the Cold War.

WHITE: You go right back to the Truman Doctrine and the visit of the USS MISSOURI, which is something engraved in the Turkish mind, even to this day. Are you familiar with that story?

Q: Was that in 1947?

WHITE: In 1947. The Turkish Ambassador had died in Washington. This was at a time when Stalin made demands on the Turks. Stalin was really in a rambunctious mood just after World War II. You remember what he was doing in Europe. He wanted Soviet rights to pass freely

through the Bosphorus Straits, he was talking about territorial concessions along the Turkish-Russian border in Eastern Turkey, and the Turks were thrown into a fright.

We decided to send the remains of the late Ambassador back to Turkey on the battleship USS MISSOURI. Of course, it was more than that. It was a "show of force." It was meant to be that, it was understood as that, and the Turks, to this day, have never forgotten the appearance of the USS MISSOURI in Istanbul. Remember that this is the same battleship on which General MacArthur accepted the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay in September, 1945. This was a classic example of diplomacy in which ships are used to project force. That's exactly what it was intended to do, and it worked!

Our relations with the Turks were excellent. We had had an aid program in Turkey for some years, but that program had been terminated by the time I arrived there. One of the things that AID [Agency for International Development] did right, and I am a critic of AID, as you know, is that it sent an awful lot of young Turks to the United States for college or graduate school work. Those young people returned to Turkey and rose rapidly to senior positions in the bureaucracy.

You may remember that our relations with Turkey, while they were good and even excellent, had been very severely strained by the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey.

Q: You were connecting this embargo with U.S.-Greek relations?

WHITE: The Greek lobby, of course, was active then, and still is active in projecting or promoting Greek interests, particularly vis-a-vis the Turks. There is an historic rivalry there. It's a long, long story, with plenty of pros and cons on both sides. But in any case...

Q: We agreed to lower levels of imports from Turkey, following the events in Cyprus in 1974...

WHITE: Well, Greece and Turkey have almost gone to war several times. The U.S. Congress embargoed U.S. arms shipments to Turkey some time in the 1970s. Of course, the administration didn't want this, but it happened. Now, I don't know the circumstances and the in's and out's of how that happened, but it did, and, of course, it put a tremendous strain on our relations with Turkey. I am convinced that the only thing that prevented a rupture in our relations with Turkey at that time was the fact that so many senior officials of the Turkish Government were U.S. trained.

When I made my calls around the Turkish Government when I arrived in Ankara and over the next few years, I was struck by the fact that practically every conversation with senior officials such as Directors or Directors General and people at that level would begin with a little reminiscence of the time they had spent in the U.S. Very often a given official would point to a book on his bookshelf which was still in one of those college book covers, with the seal of the school on it, whether it was from the University of Virginia or what have you. The head of the Turkish Central Bank, whom I got to know very well, spoke English with a Southern accent. I think that he had attended the University of Georgia and had a Ph.D. from that university.

Q: Who were the main kinds of people that you were in contact with?

WHITE: As I said, my major job was financial reporting. That was not just an academic exercise. The U.S. Treasury Department took a really strong interest in Turkey because, of course, the Treasury had a major say in how much money we gave the Turks in terms of Economic Support Funds [ESF]. One of the ways in which they measured that need was by projections of the Turkish balance of payments.

The first thing that I was asked to do was to prepare a five-year projection of the Turkish balance of payments. Well, to begin with, I was not a financial economist. I was there in Ankara by default, in that sense. I knew very little about balance of payments reporting.

Q: This kind of thing would have to be speculative, depending on the assumptions you make. Even for real experts there is no precision about this. It's hard to do.

WHITE: That's very largely true. It certainly was a field in which I was not very comfortable. Before my family arrived in Ankara, I lived in a bachelor apartment there. Remember that I was in Ankara by myself from March until August 1980. That's a good six months.

I went up to the USIS Library and took out textbooks on national income accounts and balance of payments reporting. I had to teach myself how to do something in which I had little or no training. I had had the economics course at the FSI [Foreign Service Institute], which was excellent, but it wasn't that technical.

I approached this job with great trepidation, as you may imagine. In my mind's eye I could just imagine the Treasury Department in Washington, with its banks of computers, ridiculing my poor attempts at prognostication. However, I soldiered on, and Clay Nettles, the Economic Counselor, was a very seasoned and able guy. Somehow, we produced these projections, which went to Washington.

Then I realized the importance of contacts. Obviously, there were people in the Turkish Government who were very knowledgeable in this area. One of them was the Director General of the Central Bank, whom I got to know very well. Again, he was U.S. educated and was a very affable fellow. I used to go and call on him. We would actually place bets on the various elements in the Turkish balance of payments. What would exports be, for example? He would say: "Oh, we'll have \$8.0 billion." I would say: "Oh, no, you're not going to have more than \$6.0 billion." And we would go on in this way. But in that way I would get a feel for the subject matter.

I could supplement my analysis with ongoing discussions with Turkish officials in the Ministry of Finance. I developed excellent contacts there, as well as in the Central Bank. Those were the two key sources of information in that part of our work. We never received any complaints back from Washington about our balance of payments projections. Our reporting was considered quite good. In fact, some people said that we were closer to the mark than some Washington analyses.

Q: What about the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] people? Did they have a role?

WHITE: They had a big role to play. Of course, in a sense they were out in front. We kept in very close touch with the IMF and the World Bank. Officials of these two institutions would often come to Turkey and visit Ankara.

Q: They usually are excellent people.

WHITE: They had very good people. We would always talk with them. We didn't do this openly or publicly. We didn't do this secretly, either, but we did it discreetly. We would usually get together for lunch and compare notes.

Q: How about the UNDP [UN Development Program]?

WHITE: The UNDP was active in Ankara. It was headed by a German, a good friend of mine.

Q: He was the Resident Representative of the UNDP in Ankara?

WHITE: Yes, the Resident Representative. The UNDP, by the way, was part of my bailiwick.

Q: Was the UNDP a useful operation in this connection?

WHITE: Yes, it did useful things in Turkey.

Q: I assume that the U.S. Export-Import Bank had an interest in Turkey.

WHITE: It did. Well, all of the agencies in the U.S. Government dealing with economic issues sooner or later had an involvement in Turkey. The Export-Import Bank was also heavily engaged in Turkey. Of course, private U.S. banks were watching Turkey closely.

Q: Did they have people permanently stationed in Turkey?

WHITE: At first they had very few people. In fact, at first I'm not sure that they had any people permanently stationed in Turkey.

Q: Their numbers increased while you were there.

WHITE: Oh, yes, very dramatically. In fact, we had a visit by David Rockefeller [former Chief Executive Officer of the Chase Manhattan Bank] when I was in Turkey. He came to Istanbul to open their branch. CITICORP was there. I forget which others now, but I guess that by the end of my tour in Turkey there were four or five major U.S. banks with offices in Istanbul.

Q: Well, private U.S. banks were very knowledgeable and ready to interact with us.

WHITE: Oh, very much so. I think that some of my best conversations were with American

bankers. They had their own sources of information. I recall talking to one of them one day. He came by to see me and wanted to know what was going on. They would fly in, you know, from Istanbul and New York. They always came to see us, and we always had excellent conversations with them.

One day we were talking about Turgut Ozal. I was giving my impressions of Ozal. The banker was being very receptive, listening to what I was saying. Turgut Ozal had a heart problem which, every now and then, took him to Houston, Texas. Maybe it was in that context that I said: "I haven't seen Ozal in the last few weeks. I don't know how he is," referring to his medical problem. This banker said to me: "He looked fine when I saw him this morning." They had their own access to sources of information. We had our access, and we had mutually beneficial exchanges.

Q: I gather, Al, that when you got to Turkey, you didn't have a very clear picture as to how the international financial community works in a particular country. However, you became deeply involved in this and came out with a much clearer picture of how that functions.

WHITE: Very definitely. The roles of the World Bank and of the IMF were very strong there. Of course, there were also commercial aspects to this.

There were huge projects under development in Turkey which were World Bank financed. We had people from the World Bank, just as we had people from the IMF coming to Ankara all the time.

Q: Do you remember what were two or three of these projects?

WHITE: There were big, infrastructure projects down in southern Turkey, including irrigation and coal mining projects. Turkey has extensive lignite reserves.

A little later in my tour in Turkey a major project was undertaken in Turkey to control the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. This involved the construction of numerous big dams and the expenditure of large amounts of money. Of course, the World Bank was heavily engaged in that.

Q: Construction of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates has been going on since about 8000 BC. This involved the first flowering of human life. The archeologists have pretty well confirmed that.

WHITE: In fact, there's a town in southeast Turkey called Urfa, which was known to the Crusaders as Edessa. That is considered to be the town where Abraham, the Old Testament prophet, was born. There are all sorts of traditions about this.

Q: I thought that Abraham was born in Ur of the Chaldees.

WHITE: I'm talking about traditions now. Who knows how valid these traditions were? Who knows where Abraham was born? Anyway, there is one tradition that he was born in southeast Turkey.

Under Ozal Turkey was turned around. His economic policies paid off dramatically, and far sooner than anyone expected. Meanwhile, the Turkish Government had formed a Constitutional Council to draft a new Constitution and to return the country to civilian rule. This happened during the first two years I spent in Ankara.

Q: Then your job changed. You were promoted.

WHITE: That's right, to economic counselor. That couldn't have happened without the support of certain key people, including the Economic Counselor, the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], and the ambassador.

Q: Who was the DCM?

WHITE: Dick Boehm was the DCM. Later on, he was Ambassador to Cyprus and to Oman. He retired a few years ago.

Q: Was Jim Spain still in Turkey as Ambassador?

WHITE: Jim Spain had left Turkey by this time. Remember that there was a change in administration. President Carter was defeated in the election of 1980. Of course, in 1981 President Reagan came into office. I think that Jim Spain was Ambassador to Turkey for about 18 months. He was replaced by Robert Strausz-Hupe as Ambassador.

Q: Strausz-Hupe was a real, hard-line anti-communist guy. He was pretty old by that time, eh?

WHITE: He was 80 and a remarkable man.

Q: He wrote the classic textbooks on international relations just after World War II.

WHITE: That's right. When I was an undergraduate in college, I saw his name very often. In fact, I used to tell him that I met him before he met me! By this I meant of course that I had read some of his books.

Well, he was from the Right Wing, but in no sense a fanatic. He was a very moderate, balanced and fascinating man. He was originally from Vienna. His mother may have been French, and his father was Austrian.

Q: The textbooks to which I refer were written by Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan Possnya.

WHITE: They collaborated in writing some of these books. You're right. Strausz-Hupe taught at the University of Pennsylvania. He retired there as a full professor.

He supported my promotion and after two years I moved up to be Economic Counselor for the last two years of my tour in Ankara.

Q: So how did your job change?

WHITE: I now had the responsibility for running the Economic Section. Of course, the economic stabilization program introduced by Ozal was a fascinating thing to watch. It required a lot of reporting.

While I was Economic Counselor, George Knowles came in as the FCS [Foreign Commercial Service] officer. We had an excellent relationship. I was determined that the Commercial Section and the Economic Section were going to work well together and very closely. I think that they did. Of course, that depends on the people involved and how well they want the Commercial and Economic Sections to work together. George certainly wanted them to work together, just as I did, and we got on very well together. In fact, if he was out of town, I would pick up some of his work.

In fact, I remember that once we had to complain because we thought that a contract hadn't been awarded fairly. We thought that an American company had the inside track, but the American company didn't get the contract at the last minute. It was one of those last minute things that can happen in commercial affairs. I remember that George and I went over together to lean on the Turkish Government official involved. That worked out very well. The bidding was reopened.

Of course, the staff of the Commercial Section had all worked in a combined Economic and Commercial Section for years. We had no real sense of separation between the two sections. For all practical purposes we worked as one section, even though the Commercial Section was across the courtyard from the Economic Section and in another building.

One of the things that I watched very closely was aviation relations. Turkish Airlines, which is a fairly big airline, had major routes to Europe and was about to buy a new fleet of airplanes. Boeing was the American contender in this transaction. You mentioned the Export-Import Bank. While I was there, a Vice President of the Export-Import Bank came to town. He stopped off in Istanbul and then came down to Ankara to see me. We were chatting about this purchase of new aircraft by Turkish Airlines. This involved a very big contract. He was very confident about it. He said: "I think that Boeing will get the contract. It's an open and shut case." He was quite sure of this, as he had just taken some soundings.

I said: "Look, don't be too sure." Airbus Industrie, a European consortium, was the other contender. I said: "When you're talking about Airbus, you're talking about what basically is a Franco-German consortium." In this connection Airbus played its cards very well. French relations with Turkey at this point were very poor. I won't go into the reasons for that, but they were very poor. The relationships between the French and Turkish Governments were practically down and out, really.

By contrast, Germany had excellent relations with Turkey. Bear in mind that Germany has always loomed large in Turkey. Remember, during World War I the Turkish Army was practically commanded by German officers. Remember the Berlin to Baghdad Railway and Kaiser Wilhelm's interest in that part of the world? Germany loomed very large in Turkish eyes, and has always done so. It wasn't the French who took the lead in the negotiations in selling

Airbus aircraft in Turkey. It was the Germans, with the French as silent partner. If the French had been in the lead, it would have been a disaster.

I said to this official from the Export-Import Bank, whose name escapes me now: "Look, one of the things that the Turks want badly is something that we cannot give them. We can't even influence the decision. They want to join the European Common Market. Only the French and the Germans can give them that." I said: "I'm sure that they will do any kind of bargaining, and it won't be confined just to aviation issues. The Turks want an awful lot from Europe. They want to draw close to Europe. Most of their foreign trade is with Europe. So don't be too sure that Boeing has the advantage."

I think that on that very same day I took this Export-Import Bank official out to the airport to take a plane back to Washington. As I walked back through the terminal at the airport, whom did I run into but the German Ambassador, whom I knew. He nodded to me and he had a visitor in tow. I also knew who the visitor was.

Q: An Airbus representative.

WHITE: You're right. He was Franz-Josef Strauss, former Minister of Defense in the German Government and a heavyweight in German politics. At that point he was the German Chairman of Airbus. The visit had not been announced. Now, that's very strange. Someone of that prominence who comes to Ankara without any public announcement?

I saw the two of them scurrying out to a private airplane. It didn't take much to figure out what was going on. The first thing I did was to send a cable back to Washington, marked IMMEDIATE and for the Export-Import Bank, pointing out that Franz-Josef Strauss had just made an unannounced visit to Ankara that we only learned about accidentally. I had nearly bumped into him at the airport! At the end of the day, Boeing did not get that Turkish Airlines contract. That's an interesting example of how things work in the real world.

Of course, the Airbus family of aircraft are wonderful airplanes. Nothing that I am saying here is intended to downgrade that. However, the French and the Germans were in a position to do a lot, or to withhold a lot, from Turkey.

There was a striking anomaly in our relationships. Turkish-U.S. relations were excellent. However, Turkey and the U.S. are a long way from each other. The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea separate them. European relations with Turkey are, always have been, and I think still are, very ambivalent. Turkey wants in in Europe. The Europeans never said, "No," but neither did they want to say, "Yes."

The reality is that the Europeans are worried by the thought of how many Turks there are. There were about 50 million when I left Ankara, not to speak of the millions of Turks in Western Europe. Turkey really is culturally part of the Near East. They are Muslims. Their pay scales are very, very low. The Europeans want it both ways. They want the Turks to be their strong guardian on the southern flank of NATO. They want the Turkish Army to be out there on the flanks, serving as a buffer between the Near East and themselves. However, the Europeans did

not want to make the kind of commitment that the Turks want from them.

Q: Part of this is the Islamic factor, in the sense of culture and politics. The Europeans are more cognizant of that these days, not only in terms of Iran and Iraq but also in terms of the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and all of those territories.

WHITE: Above all, Turkey is a Muslim country. However, there is a very strong tradition of secularism in modern Turkey. This goes back to Kamal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey.

Q: He was prominent in the 1920s. He moved in after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, which was destroyed at the conclusion of World War I. You might discuss the whole legacy of that.

WHITE: You know, before Ataturk was a figure in Turkish political life, he was a general. He's the general who defeated the British at Gallipoli. He was an obscure, infantry general then. He's the man who turned around the Gallipoli campaign, and of course you know about that and Churchill's involvement in it.

Q: That was in 1916.

WHITE: 1915. The British failure at Gallipoli led to Churchill's resignation from the British Government. It was one of the great, tragic campaigns in British history.

The Turks had made a tragic decision. They joined the Central Powers, the losing side, and they paid for it with the loss of the Turkish Empire, although this empire had been receding for a long time. Turkey itself was on the verge of partition at the end of World War I. The Greeks were in Izmir and were sending an Army half way to Ankara in 1922.

The French had carved out a sphere of Turkey along the Syrian border. The Italians had carved out a sphere along the southern coast of Turkey around Alanya. The British, of course, were in Constantinople, as Istanbul was then known and had been for centuries. You may recall that there was talk at the Conference at Versailles of creating a separate, Armenian state that would be carved out of Turkey.

Turkey was on the verge of disintegration. Ataturk was one of those remarkable figures who come along in the history of a country. He was very astute, very shrewd and very able. In a word, he saw that the only salvation for Turkey was to make it a modern country which in that context, meant removing religion from the totally dominant role which it had had in society. He attributed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in large part to the overwhelming influence of the Islamic clergy. So he secularized Turkey.

Q: How long was he in power in Turkey?

WHITE: Until just before World War II broke out.

Q: From around 1922 until...

WHITE: He consolidated his power in Turkey in 1920. He was the dominant personality in Turkey until he died in 1938.

Q: So he dominated Turkish history until the beginning of World War II.

WHITE: Totally. He put his stamp on Turkey. By the way, he was not a brutal dictator. He did this mostly by the force of his personality.

Q: He is usually described as the stereotype of the benevolent despot.

WHITE: Very much so. Remember that his country had been a despotism and knew nothing about freedom, as we understand that term. Actually, he executed a few people at certain critical points. He dealt with the Soviet Union but was merciless in suppressing communists in Turkey.

Ataturk secularized Turkey. For example, he abolished the fez [round, brimless hat, usually a shade of red]. He abolished the use of the Arabic script to write the Turkish language. Turkish is written today in Latin letters, because of Ataturk. He introduced all of these steps to push Turkey into the modern world. He felt that this could not be done in accordance with the customs of the old regime.

Turkey had fallen hopelessly behind the times. It had no modern industry worthy of the name. It had no technology.

What he did with the imams [religious scholars] was very simple. He created a Department of Religious Affairs and he put them on the public payroll. In that way he controlled them. He was determined to depoliticize the power of the Muslim clergy in Turkey.

As far as the Turkish Army was concerned, Ataturk might just as well still be alive. He still is the guardian of Turkey. Go into any office in Turkey, I don't care how remote it is from Ankara, and there is a picture of Ataturk on the wall. It is de rigueur to have a picture of him on display. He is the great father, the George Washington of modern Turkey. The basis of his policy was secularization, and that tradition remains very strong in the Turkish Army and is very strong among the Westernized, urbanized elite groups. The last thing that they want is to go the way of Iran.

The Iranian experience has traumatized the world, and there is much concern about Islamic fundamentalism. Of course, Turkey is an Islamic country, and so there is always that possibility. You asked about a third political party. Even when I was there, there was a third party, basically a Muslim party, headed by a man called Erbakan who, by the way, was recently Prime Minister of Turkey. There has been a resurgence of Islam in Turkey.

Now, how much of that resurgence is pernicious is another question. You know, we've had religious revivals in the West, too, but we don't think that they are pernicious. So it doesn't follow in my mind that a religious revival is necessarily bad in Turkey. After all, their tradition is Islamic.

I must say that in the course of the four, and nearly four and a half, years I spent in Turkey, we drove around Turkey with our two, little girls in the back seat. We never felt insecure for a moment. The Turkish people have a wonderful sense of hospitality. They are open, they are friendly, and helpful. The more remote the village that you go into, the more helpful they are. The roads in Turkey were terrible when we were there. We had a beat up old Buick Regal that we had dragged to Turkey from Washington. We never made a trip without having a flat tire. However, the joke in my family was that we always had flat tires but never changed the tires. Your car could break down in the most remote area of Turkey. You'd look around and wouldn't see a soul for miles. Within minutes, somehow, a crowd would begin to gather, and people were changing your tire. They wouldn't let you do it. They would do it. They have this incredible, Near Eastern tradition of hospitality, and it's very genuine.

Personally, I'm not as worried about Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey as others are. First of all, there is the rampart of the Ataturk tradition, which is very strong and very powerful. Educated Turks are Westernized. They may attend services in the mosques. However, they are Western in the sense that their education and outlook are Western. Turkish women have been liberated. In fact, the Turks claimed, and I think that it's true, that on a per capita basis, they had more women as Directors General in their government than in any other government in the Western world. I dealt with several Directors General in the Turkish Government who were women. Turkish women in the cities are emancipated and also very stylish. There's no question about that.

Turkey is still two countries, in the sense that you can walk down a street in Istanbul and see two women walking together. The older one may wear a veil. With her will be a younger woman, probably her daughter, dressed in the latest Paris fashion. I cannot see Turkey lapsing back into something like what we're seeing in Iran, although I suppose some people would have said that that couldn't have happened in Iran, either.

However, there is a difference. Iran is very different from Turkey. In fact, there's a wonderful story, and I've heard it often enough that I think that it's true. When Ataturk was ruling in Ankara, he had a great admirer in the father of the Shah of Iran, whose name was Reza Shah. He came on a state visit to Ankara and saw all of the things that Ataturk was doing. He said to Ataturk: "Well, I'll have to go back and do all of this. What's the secret?" Ataturk replied that there were three things he had to do: "First of all, you have to stop calling yourself 'the Shah of Shahs.' Just call yourself 'President,' and that's it. Secondly, you have to switch to the Latin alphabet. Otherwise, your young people aren't going to get an adequate technical education. "Third, you have to control the mullahs [Muslim religious officials]." The story is that the Shah went back to Iran, and he couldn't do any one of those three things.

Q: Some people in Iran, over the last few years, say that, when we concluded in the early 1950s that Iran was becoming too dangerously leftist, we toppled the Mossedegh Government, through a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] operation. For 20 years this was interpreted as a dramatic success in the U.S. Then the Shah was overthrown, and conditions became worse than they ever had been.

WHITE: You know, I'd like to know a lot more about Iran than I know. I've talked with many diplomats in Ankara about what was going on in Iran. My own sense is that maybe there were

too many Americans around. You know, one culture can interact with another culture, but not too much, too fast.

Q: I know that Loy Henderson [former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Department of State] felt that the CIA intervention in Iran in the early 1950s was tragic. He told me this in a tape-recorded interview. He said that Kermit Roosevelt [CIA officer in Iran in the early 1950s] lied to Loy Henderson about the situation in Iran. They got Loy Henderson out of town when they pulled off this coup d'etat.

WHITE: As I say, I'm not that familiar with the situation in Iran in the early 1950s.

I'm told by friends and colleagues who have been in Turkey a lot more recently than I that much of the vote which the pro-Islamic party is getting in Turkey is a protest vote. You know, it's very much like what happened with the communists in Italy in the 1940s and 1950s. Most of the vote which the communists got was not from convinced communists. This was a large protest vote. Indeed, in the old Red Belt of Italy, in the Emilia Romagna area of North Central Italy, local government affairs functioned efficiently under the communists.

Q: Before we turn again to Italy, Al, do you have any further comments about Turkey and your experience there?

WHITE: I haven't really mentioned much about the personal side there. We traveled a great deal in Turkey, which is a fascinating country to travel in.

Q: Although they do say that in any country you get much more of a feel for what it's all about outside the capital city.

WHITE: Oh, absolutely. If there's a Rule Number One for a diplomat, that has to be it. You've got to get out of the capital. No question about that.

We did. I often traveled from Ankara to Istanbul. I had to go to Istanbul on business all the time. I always took the sleeper train up to Istanbul, which was called the Anatolian Express. Often I would have to fly back to Ankara, but I always liked that train ride to Istanbul. You arrived at the Hyder Pasha Station on the Asian side of the straits. This station had been part of the old Berlin to Baghdad railway. Have you ever been in Constantinople or Istanbul?

Q: No, I haven't.

WHITE: It's like Venice, in a way. The Bosphorus in Istanbul is like the Grand Canal in Venice. Istanbul has to be one of the most beautiful cities in the world. You know, it is one of those places that was destined to be a great capital, because of its position on the Bosphorus. You could see why Emperor Constantine established his capital there. The Western part of Turkey is the old, Greek part of the country. If you want to talk about ancient ruins, Italy has nothing like the ruins that you can see in Turkey. There are Roman amphitheaters and dead cities all over the place. The place is festooned with history.

Then in the Eastern part of the country, you have the Old Testament.

Q: Are Philippi and Antioch...

WHITE: Antioch is in Turkey. I would say that most of the area described in the New Testament of the Bible is particularly related to Turkey, because Turkey was not a backwater. It was the center of the classical world. St. Paul wouldn't have been wandering around in the backwaters of the empire. There were his Epistles to the Ephesians, the Galatians, the Colossians, and the Seven Churches of Asia, all near Izmir. To me the most fascinating aspect of Turkey, more so than any other country that I know, is that this country is built in historical layers, something like the Grand Canyon.

Actually, the Turks were late arrivals to Anatolia. The Turks entered Anatolia, perhaps, in the 11th century, A.D. Turkey was Christian for a over a thousand years. Before that, of course, it was part of the Roman domain and before that it was part of the Persian domain.

There are beautiful beaches and scenery in Turkey. I might make one general point about Turkey. Perhaps it's a little difficult to state, but I think that, in a way, the American presence in that part of the world has not been particularly constructive. I mentioned earlier as an anomaly that U.S.-Turkish relations were somehow stronger than European-Turkish relations. The Europeans have to come to terms with Turkey. Up to now, they have been in a situation where they could say: "Well, the Americans will take care of the Turks." I'm not sure that that's a healthy situation.

The other element here is Greek-Turkish relations. The population of Greece is about 12 million and static. As I said previously, the population of Turkey was about 50 million when I was there, and I think that it was increasing by 1.0 million a year. There is a demographic explosion taking place in Turkey. The Turks don't seem to be agitated about the Greeks. At least during the four years I was in Turkey I never sensed this. I never really heard anything critical of the Greeks.

The Turks just didn't talk much about the Greeks, and you can see why. Turkey is so big, by comparison with Greece, both in terms of area as well as population. Turkey doesn't have to worry about Greece. The Greeks have a consciousness of history. Bear in mind that the Greeks were in Izmir [Smyrna in Greek] until 1922. The Greeks have to worry about the Turks, because the Turks loom so much larger than the Greeks do. In a way, it's kind of like Canada and the U.S. Americans don't worry about Canada, but the Canadians think differently about the U.S. You know, the Canadians are a little bit like the little cat in a rowboat with an elephant. Even with the best of intentions, if the elephant sneezes, the boat may capsize.

The problem between the Turks and the Greeks is not so much the people as the politicians. Politicians are always looking for issues. Take Papandreou, for example, who was the firebrand Prime Minister of Greece until he died a few years ago. By the way, he taught in two American universities. His stock in trade and his rhetoric was anti-Americanism. I'm sure that he had an American passport in his desk drawer, in case he needed it in a hurry.

I think that the Turks and the Greeks would get along with each other better if our presence in

the area were not so great. The Greeks and the Turks kind of dance around in a very dangerous way. When the dance reaches a certain point of intensity, what happens? An envoy arrives from Washington and straighten it all out for a while. I think that if the Turks and Greeks believed that an American envoy might not arrive to calm things down, they might play the political game a little less recklessly, because they would know that they have to live with each other.

In a way we are an extraneous force. The problem with an extraneous force is that it interferes with the local equilibrium. Ironically, I think that both Europe generally, and Greece in particular, might get along better with the Turks if the U.S. was less conspicuous there. I'm not suggesting for a moment that we should withdraw our presence from the area. That would be foolhardy. However, maybe we could be a little less overwhelming. The Turks and the Greeks might get along with each other better if they realized that there's no Seventh Cavalry that's going to arrive dramatically on the scene with a solution to a given problem, that no special envoy is going to arrive with some magical tricks to pull out of a bag.

Q: Has there been some diminution of the U.S. military presence in the area?

WHITE: There has.

I left Turkey in the summer of 1984. I returned once and briefly for a conference a few years ago. Relatively, though, we're still the big player. I'm not saying that we shouldn't be a big player. However, I'm not sure that we're playing our part in a way which is most conducive to a solution to that problem.

Look at Cyprus. You know, the Greek Cypriots are talking about buying Russian made missiles. The Turks have said that that would be a casus belli.

As long as we had overwhelming force, we could smother the fire. However, since we no longer have that same degree of overwhelming force in the area, in a relative sense, we may not be able to put out the fire. In a way, ironically enough, we might, willy-nilly, allow the situation to grow critical but not have the means to smother the flames.

Something else is happening in that part of the world, which is very interesting, in the old Soviet area along the Russian-Turkish border. The people who live in that whole area of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and all of these other territories, speak a dialect related to Turkish. In fact, they are Turkic peoples. Now they are much removed, over the centuries, from Turkey, but they are still Muslims and of Turkish stock.

There used to be a movement in Turkey called Pan-Taurism." This was a little like "Pan-Slavism," a movement to put all of the Turkic peoples under one regime. The Turks have become a real bridge leading not only to the Near East, but also to Central Asia as well. By the way, remember that the Turks ruled the Middle East, as we know it, for about 400 years. That's a long time. They know something about that part of the world.

Q: In other words, from about 1453 to 1917.

WHITE: More or less. Well, most of the Balkan Peninsula was ruled by the Turks at one time.

Q: That was the Ottoman Empire.

WHITE: I remember once meeting a distinguished old Turkish gentleman who attended one of the Ambassador's receptions. Maybe it was the reception on July 4. Somehow we got on the subject of Lebanon. I said: "You know, Lebanon is such a small country, but its politics are terribly complicated. I can't figure them out." He said: "You know, my father had the same experience when he was writing the Lebanese Constitution of 1905!"

We could go back to something that we were saying about the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and what replaced it. Nothing replaced it, nothing but war and trouble. What has happened since the Turkish Empire collapsed in the Near East and ever since then? War and trouble. It's been a powder keg. That's what always happens when a great empire collapses. Now, the Turks are not Arabs. The only thing that they really share is the Islamic religion. In fact, there are lots of problems historically between Arabs and Turks.

In the Central Asian region, where all of that oil and natural gas is, a lot of American businessmen are entering that area, often through Turkish connections, which I think is very sensible. The people of Central Asia speak Turkish-type languages. I am told that there are obvious differences, but that they can understand each other. In fact, one day the new Chinese Commercial Attache came to call on me in Ankara. Diplomats always call on each other. He walked into my office, and I expected to see someone who looked Chinese. He didn't look Chinese. He was Turkish - that is, from Chinese Turkistan.

CHRISTIAN A. CHAPMAN
Special Assistant on Cyprus
Washington, DC (1982-1983)

Christian A. Chapman was born in France in 1921. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Lebanon, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Cyprus, and Washington, DC. Mr. Chapman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 3, 1990.

Q: Then your last assignment was Special Assistant on Cyprus. You were there from '82-'83. Could you tell me what you were doing and what was your impression.

CHAPMAN: The history of that position was that General Haig became involved in the Turkish-Greek confrontation when he was SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander-Europe). He became active in trying to deal with a very difficult and ugly problem. He carried over that interest when he became Secretary of State and created this position, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Cyprus. Reg Bartholomew was the first and I took over from him. I eventually went to Cyprus to meet the cast of characters there. Called on Kyprianou and Denktash. The former was formally President of Cyprus, but in reality of Greek Cyprus only, and the latter was head of the Turkish

Cypriot community. I also met with a variety of other officials on both sides of the dividing line. I came away convinced that there was nothing we could do. The problem for the administration was that there was that the strong Greek American community is always actively pressing Congress to have the government do something. Like reducing military assistance to Turkey. And the Administration considered Turkey as an absolutely vital ally in the eastern Mediterranean.

The reason I felt that nothing could be done was that Kyprianou and Denkash as heads of their communities were probably in a better position than they could possibly have in a united Cyprus. Both would lose some of the power that they had, and I just didn't see that they were men of the dimension who would want to diminish their power or prestige by reaching a compromise even one in the interest of the country. I felt that the best thing the US could do was to do nothing. But politically here, it was very difficult to do nothing.

Q: *Were we doing much? Was it just a charade?*

CHAPMAN: It wasn't a charade. We had an ambassador and we tried to get both sides to come to terms and we strongly supported the UN Secretary General who took a very active role in searching for a settlement, and had a permanent representative in Cyprus.. And things have not changed much in all these years: just last week Greek and Turkish Cypriots were in New York working with the Secretary General. The Secretary General had a personal representative on Cyprus. But there was just no movement then and not much that I can see even today, seven years later. I thought that the United States would be best served by getting completely out of it so that both sides would not use us as a crutch, as a way of trying to get at the other side. With the Greeks putting pressure on us to put pressure on the Turks and vice versa.

DAVID M. EVANS
Political Advisor to Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces in Europe
London (1982-1986)

Mr. Evans was born and raised in Philadelphia, PA and was educated at Harvard University and the University of Belgrade Law School. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963. As an Economic Specialist, Mr. Evans served in Warsaw, Belgrade, Moscow and London. In addition to his economic assignments, he served in senior level positions dealing with International Security and Counter-Terrorism. He also served as Political Advisor to the Commander-in Chief, US Naval Forces in Europe. Mr. Evans was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996

Q: *How about the Greek/Turkish dispute? Was that a thorn in your side?*

EVANS: That was mostly a NATO issue. For example, when my admiral went there, we went to discuss strictly bilateral American/Greek or American/Turkish issues. When the admiral went there in his NATO hat, he went there with the other POLAD from Naples. Then, they discussed

Naples issues. The NATO admiral in his NATO hat forbade himself in his other hat from talking about NATO issues. The Greek/Turkish dispute was one that I had enough of back in PM. I was glad to be out of it. We were aware of the problems which occasionally it made it difficult to deal particularly with the Greeks, on whom we were very dependent for facilities and repair facilities, and basing facilities. The Greeks were very supportive of the PLO, we felt, and lenient toward terrorism in general. They were not reliable partners in that sense. There was unhappiness with that. Turkey was viewed, again, from our national point of view, as a very strong ally. Our military seemed to have a really good relationship with the Turks. But the Greeks were difficult.

FRANK PEREZ
Deputy Chief of Mission
Ankara (1983-1984)

Frank H. Perez was born in Washington, D.C. in 1924. He received his Bachelor's and Master's Degree from George Washington University and served in the US Army from 1943 to 1946. He was posted abroad in Brussels, Geneva, and Ankara. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Perez on February 15, 2006.

Q: In '83 you left that job, and you're off to Turkey. What were you doing there?

PEREZ: I was the Deputy Chief of Mission.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

PEREZ: It was Robert Strausz-Hupe.

Q: How was he? How did you find him at that point?

PEREZ: I served under him in NATO. After David Bruce, Strausz-Hupe became the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, so we had established a relationship there. When he needed a new DCM in Turkey, he asked me if I'd like to go, and I said, "Sure".

Q: What was the situation in Turkey when you were there? This was '83. You were there from '83 to '8...

PEREZ: To 1984, Yes. They had had a military take-over two or three years earlier. By the time I got there, they were preparing for elections. I was there during the period of the elections, setting up of the Parliament and the establishment of a new government under Prime Minister Ozal. Things went very smoothly during that particular period. It was a very democratic election. The military candidate was not even in the running.

Q: How did Robert Strausz-Hupe operate? He'd been an ambassador at a number of places, but he was getting on in years.

PEREZ: He'd been Ambassador in Sri Lanka, in Belgium, Sweden, NATO, and then Turkey. He stayed on in Turkey for eight years. He functioned rather effectively, but he focused on policy and dealing with the higher levels of Turkish government. The running of the embassy was the sort of thing that I tried to do for him to ensure that things went smoothly. Despite his age, however, his intellect remained sharp.

Q: How did you find the embassy at that time?

PEREZ: I found the morale to be good. There was a certain amount of unhappiness with the ambassador because he was not the typical ambassador who works closely with his staff, and they felt that perhaps he wasn't as concerned for them as he should have been.

Q: Did you find yourself playing the normal role of the DCM, sort of the middle man trying to keep the staff happy, at the same time trying to coax the ambassador into showing a little more, at least appearing more often?

PEREZ: Yes. It worked fine. But I was there only for a year because under the new Foreign Service regulations, if you were in grade as a Class I Officer for a certain period of time and not promoted to Career Minister, and I had been 12 years as a Class I Officer, you were out. The aim was to open up the senior ranks to younger and deserving officers. Efforts on the part of the Ambassador and others to have me extended failed because of the unwillingness of the Director General to bend. I had been shocked to be told by Washington shortly after arriving at post that I would be retired in several months hence. After all, I had disrupted my life to go to Turkey and the government had paid the not insignificant costs of sending me and my family there. The Ambassador awarded me a Meritorious Honor Award for my period of service. When saying my farewell to the Acting Foreign Minister of Turkey, he told me that I was very much appreciated in Turkey because of my respect for the people and the country, my willingness to be open and to listen to their views and in not trying to dictate to them.

Q: What were some of the major issues you had to deal with?

PEREZ: Our relations were generally good to excellent. We were renegotiating the defense agreement and as always it had many sticky problems, but we were able eventually to overcome them. The Turks were unhappy with the military assistance and economic aid levels we were able to give them and they pointed out to me more than once that the U.S. was giving more aid to Egypt than to them, a staunch NATO ally. The so-called Armenian holocaust was always a sensitive issue when our Congress was contemplating a resolution. Cyprus was a sensitive issue and the Turks were always trying to convince us of their position. When the Turkish north of Cyprus declared its independence, I was Charge D'Affairs. As it was late in the day, I called right away for a meeting with the Foreign Minister, knowing I would be getting instructions from Washington to register a strong US objection to Turkish recognition of North Cyprus. I saw the Foreign Minister without receiving instructions. When I returned to the Embassy the instructions had arrived and were essentially what I had conveyed to him. There were little problems as well. One day I was called to the Foreign Ministry and was presented with a U.S. AID study that contained a map of Turkey showing the Hatay province in southeast Turkey as part of Syria, a

very sensitive subject in Turkey. Hatay had been annexed by Turkey in 1938 and still showed as Syrian on older maps. Obviously, I was somewhat embarrassed and said I would get to the bottom of it.

ARTHUR A. BARDOS
Public Affairs Counselor, USIS
Ankara (1983-1986)

Arthur A. Bardos was born in 1921 in Budapest, Hungary. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951, serving in Vietnam, Belgium, Turkey, Washington, DC, Austria, and with the Voice of America in Germany. Mr. Bardos was interviewed by Hans Tuch on January 25, 1990.

Q: We are going to skip about 25 years, or 20-odd years, in your Foreign Service career, where you spent time in Vietnam, in Austria, in Belgium, in Germany, and go on to your service in Ankara, where you went, I believe in 1983, as public affairs counselor. I think you were specifically requested by your ambassador, and so you might as well start with the reference to your coming to Turkey and this period of three years in Turkey. This was actually your final period in the Foreign Service. I think maybe you have some observations there. Let's start with your going to Turkey.

BARDOS: My acquaintance with Turkey was nil. It was one of the last -- certainly the part of Europe that I would have least thought of going to. What I knew about the Turks was from Hungarian history, and it was not totally favorable. But it so happened, when I was finishing my tour at the Fletcher School, that I mentioned in a letter to the ambassador there, Robert Strausz-Hupé, whom I worked for in Belgium many years previously, and without the slightest purpose, that I really didn't know yet what I would be doing next. Shortly, the telephone rang and he said, "You must come to Turkey as my public affairs officer."

I said, "Well, that doesn't make any sense. I don't know anything about your part of the world. You can get somebody who knows something about it. You are doing yourself an injustice by bringing in an amateur."

He said, "No, the specialists are no good." He said, "They think they know everything about the country, and that hampers their seeing things as they are. You will learn fast. Besides, the Magyars and the Turks have all kinds of connections and that's all to the good. You'll learn Turkish very fast."

And he kept at it, until, in the third or fourth phone conversation, I finally said, "Well, okay. If the Agency goes along with it, so be it." He made sure that the Agency went along with it, and I went to Turkey.

Q: In 1983?

BARDOS: In 1983. Our personnel cycles worked in amazingly well with Turkish history. Sam Courtney was PAO there in the late 1970s, in the years of chaos, when there wasn't very much anybody, including USIS, could do there. When the military took over, he was replaced by Marshall Berg, who started rebuilding the program and did a very beautiful job of it. When the end of the military period was coming on, I replaced Marshall for a period of not entirely easy normalization, in which we were often perceived as being much too friendly to the military. But at the same time, we had to try to keep reminding the Turks of human rights, which they were a little prone to forget in that period. So it was an interesting historic moment when I arrived there.

It was interesting in many other ways, as well, and this will explain why a good deal of energy there had to go into what probably is considered the cultural area. We were living in Turkey -- I guess we still are living in Turkey -- on the cultural capital that was produced during the Marshall Plan, when a whole generation of Turkish intellectuals and leaders were trained in American universities financed from AID funds. I went there to find an already enlarged, but still ridiculously small, Fulbright program, replacing waves -- I think in the top year of AID programming, there were 600 people annually in American universities from Turkey -- by maybe 40 under the Fulbright program, or 50 a year.

Certainly one of the most important things we could have done in Turkey at that time, but didn't do -- we tried -- was to introduce a fairly massive program of university education in this country.

Q: Would that have been undergraduate university education?

BARDOS: Yes. At that time, Senator Mathias was beginning to be interested in going back into undergraduate education on a massive basis in some countries, and I was in touch with his staff. I guess if he had run for reelection, something might have happened, but in the end, the plan petered out.

Q: So you were still primarily in graduate education with the Fulbright?

BARDOS: Yes, entirely. No undergraduate Fulbright program. Another problem we had was that a lot of institutions that we had reason to be interested in had become totally chaotic, one of them a very large Turkish-American Association, a binational center, which had a huge building in totally devastated state.

Q: In Ankara?

BARDOS: In Ankara. Staff at loggerheads with each other, a board of directors that was in danger of being taken over by very dubious, politically questionable, individuals for their own aggrandizement. So we had to run a Tammany Hall type operation to get a new board. We did that successfully. We organized every member we could get hands at. I mean, American members. We made everybody join, first of all. The ambassador helped us. At every staff meeting, he announced that this was the last chance to join the Turkish-American Association. [Laughter] Once we had joined them, we got proxies from all of them for the annual meeting, and we voted in a first-rate board. That's how it started. It ended with my going around to all the

big companies, American and Turkish, and collecting something like \$80,000 for the refurbishing of the theater for the Turkish-American Association.

So all of this had to be done because we were seriously considering -- Marshall Berg was and I was -- trying to close down the binational center, but it was obvious to us that we couldn't do that. It would live on, it would be associated with the United States forever and ever, and it would be an ever greater embarrassment. So there was really no alternative to making it something that we could live with. This, on the whole, succeeded.

But the politically interesting part was the inevitable need, on the one hand, to be faithful to our human rights concerns; on the other, maintaining good relations with one of our most important allies. One of our most important allies, partly because of the size of its armed forces; it's the second largest army in NATO after ours.

Q: After the Germans?

BARDOS: No.

Q: They are bigger than the Germans in their Army?

BARDOS: Much bigger.

Q: I didn't realize that.

BARDOS: Not as well equipped, but much bigger. And also because of their location. As my ambassador used to say, "You can't argue with geography. Turkey controls the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." So we could not shrug our shoulders and let the Turks go whichever way they would. On the other hand, we could not accept unacceptable human rights standards.

WILLIAM E. RAU
Consul General
Istanbul (1985-1988)

William E. Rau was born in Michigan in 1929. After receiving a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Montana, he served in the U.S. Army as first lieutenant from 1953 to 1955. His postings abroad have included Thessaloniki, Port Said, Cairo, Pretoria, Izmir, Istanbul, Kabul and Athens. Mr. Rau was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Well then, you had in writing that you were going to Istanbul. What happened?

RAU: Yes, I went. Yes, the assignment held. I took a brush-up in Turkish. I joined the advanced Turkish class toward the end of that year and took, I guess, about a month or so kind of brush-up for me, and then in September of '85, I went to Istanbul.

Q: You were there from '85 to when?

RAU: To '88.

Q: '88.

RAU: And this was a very energizing period of time in Turkey, because Turgut Ozal was the prime minister, and he had decided to open up the Turkish economy. You talk to Turkish businessmen and say, "What was the one thing that Ozal did that was most pleasing to you, that you think was the right thing?" And that was freeing up the currency, because before, when they would have to go out on a business trip or something, they either had to have money out of the country or they were only allowed to take out a certain amount without smuggling. And he just made it free - you know, "You can go, take out whatever you want, bring back whatever you want" - and made it so much better for them. I guess the best way I can explain my feeling when I went back the second time was in looking at the consular office in the consulate there and seeing the kind of people on the Turkish side - we had a lot of Iranians at this time - but seeing on the Turkish side the kind of people who were trying to come to the United States. We'd been there before, and I did some consular work before, in Izmir. The average young person in Turkey who was educated wanted to get out. He wanted to go out to the United States for an education and then stay there, not come back. He didn't see any future for himself in Turkey. This time, when I went back, a lot of the bright ones were coming back, under the influence of the kind of open régime that Ozal was fostering. And I must say, I had a great deal of time for Ozal and his people, a very simple man who spoke from the heart and made his message very clear to the peasants as well as all the way up the line. And this was a time when Turkey was really beginning to expand its line abroad as well as internally. They had a lot of large construction companies, etc., that were winning contracts all over the world. Turks are traditionally very great engineers, and they were winning them in the Middle East they were winning them, as later became the case, in the Soviet Union and all over Eastern Europe. So it was a very energetic, as I characterized it, time, especially in Istanbul. I didn't know the backcountry that well. I'd get out there once in a while in my consular district I was in, maybe on vacation. But Istanbul was a full-time occupation. The city was growing. It's now about 12, 13 million. It's expanded enormously from what it was before, almost all of it on the Asian side. We used to say that you could take a train - to show you the extent of Istanbul's expansion - you'd get a train at Hyderpasha on the Asian side and start off in the direction of Ankara, and it took you an hour before you were on the outskirts of Istanbul. Just growing like crazy. In terms of our life there, my family's and mine, but principally my wife - the children were gone by that time - it was - do you remember these cardboard cutouts down near the White House where you could have your picture taken with the President or something? Well, my wife and I got invited to so many things - and the Turks didn't want to see a number two; I mean, it was very hard to send someone else - that we seriously thought about having those cutouts made up and sending them over to the party saying, "He made an *acte de présence*; he was here." Yes, it was just - but it became exhausting, with five, six nights a week, for two or three affairs every night. And these were big affairs. I mean, the whole Istanbul festival in the summer had really taken off, a world-class festival now, and you got invited to everything, and you had to show the flag, in effect, to go to these things. So that part of it became very draining after a while. But I must say that we enjoyed - we still do

- the Turkish people and relating to them, and the result is I now have a son who's a teacher in Uskudar in Turkey and he's married to a Turkish girl. So it's still going on.

Q: What about the political situation there? One is particularly these days concerned about fundamentalism. But there's also sort of the equivalent of the Red Brigades or the Grey Wolves in Turkey, terrorism and all that. Were these factors you dealt with then, or not?

RAU: Well, the biggest event that happened of that nature while I was there was the bombing of the Nevi Shalom Synagogue, which was very close to where the consulate was. It happened on a weekend. I was in the office, but just a few other people were, and we just were having a crisis task force for about 24 or 48 hours because we didn't know what this was going to mean, until they found out who had caused it, etc. That was from outside, though; that wasn't Turkish. It was an attempt by somebody trying to do away with part of the Jewish community in Istanbul.

Q: What was it, Iranian or PLO?

RAU: No, it was mainly Arab-sponsored. I don't know if it was PLO or not, but it was definitely Arab-sponsored.

Q: What about Turkish fundamentalism. Again we're talking about the '85 to '88 period.

RAU: Well, I think that Turks are now beginning to realize in changing, as my son tells me, their educational system, because what happened when I was there - and it's really mushroomed - was the establishment of these so-called Imam Hatip schools. These were fundamentalist schools which did the traditional thing. They would get village people who would come to Istanbul or one of the large cities because they were looking for work or whatever, and they would meet them at the buses when they came in by bus and introduce themselves and say, "Now we've got this situation where you are going to need help, you are going to need a place to stay, you're going to need food, you're going to need a job, your children are going to need education, etc. We'll help you." Basically what they said was, "In return, we want you to remember on election day who you should vote for." And it worked. They got their first fundamentalist government, even though, as the Turkish ambassador here and others rightly said, it was a minority government. It was not a majority government, but still they had enough following to form a government.

Q: Now this election was after you left?

RAU: Yes, but you could see that it was coming, because people had not - Ozal, to give him his due, could see the dangers of this. And for example, on the Kurdish problem, he wanted to open that up. He wanted to let the Kurds have their own radio station, to have their own schools, be taught in their own language, have their own newspapers, etc. He was beginning to open that up. The problem was the military. The military followed Atatürkist tradition basically, which says, you know, "Give them an inch, and they'll take a mile. We can't allow that to happen." And that's the other thing that still makes - after Ozal died - this was after I'd left Istanbul, when I was back in Turkey - I talked to a number of people and with some here in the embassy, too, who said, "You know, Turkey has to get another leader, and they're going to have a long time before

they have another one with the leadership qualities that he has.” And it’s true. They’ve been floundering ever since. They elected a lady prime minister, and everybody was very hopeful - you know, Western educated and all these things, speaks very good English - and she became a tool. In order to make coalition with the fundamentalists she went over. It was a big mistake, and the others, in order to seek a place for themselves, including the current prime minister, have refused to make the necessary changes. So economically, Turkey’s doing very well, but politically, they’re still under that threat of a military takeover.

Q: Well, now, I would imagine in Istanbul you would not be particularly aware of the military, or not?

RAU: Oh, very much so. We had an artillery unit outside of town that we would visit once in a while that was in our consular district, and the First Army command is there, and that was one of the people you called on along with the governor and the mayor, etc. You went to all their dos that they would invite you to. Got to know the commanding general fairly well, and of course we had a couple of officers who were still going - I think they are still going - to the Higher Defense College in Istanbul, American officers. And then we had the fleet visits, of course, and you got to know the Turkish Navy stationed there. I got to know the admiral in charge there fairly well. So yes, there was a lot of relationship with the Turkish military.

Q: When you’re up in Thessaloniki one is very much aware of the Third Army and what it’s concerned about, which is the Turkish Army. How about when you’re looking from Istanbul at the Turkish First Army? What were their concerns?

RAU: Their concerns were more to the north and also the Bosphorus and the straits themselves, until this Seismic, the one ship that went looking for oil off the coast, and the brouhaha that ensued with Greece. Then they became very interested in this. But the Greeks would not believe that the Turks were not looking in on everything that they did. And the Turks, I still believe with my heart of hearts, that they didn’t really. I mean, they took it into consideration, but except for the fact that Cyprus was only 50 miles away and they knew about that, they weren’t concerned about anything on the Greek border.

Q: Well, now, by the time you were there - we’re talking about 10 years eleven years after Cyprus was partitioned by force - was Cyprus sort of considered a fait accompli, that’s that and move on to other things, by the Turks you’re talking to, or were they thinking - I mean, the Greeks, you keep talking about negotiations or doing something. I was just wondering how you were sampling the Turks.

RAU: The Turks - they still do today - they poured a lot of money into Northern Cyprus. It has become a tourist Mecca for a lot of Turks to go over there because it is cheap and air flights are frequent and the weather is always good there, you don’t have to worry about that. So it has become a tourist Mecca for tourists. I don’t think they’re that concerned. I mean Denktash was spending a lot of time coming to Ankara all the time to talk to whatever Turkish government was in power.

Q: Denktash being the Turkish Cypriot leader.

RAU: The Turkish Cypriot leader since, you know, since the beginning.

Q: The turn of the century practically.

RAU: Yes.

Q: He and Clerides. I mean, those two are like the Siamese twins of-

RAU: Well, they both went to law school and knew each other in London. The Inns of Court in London is where they got to know each other. But I don't think the Turks - yes, the Turkish military was very aware of the situation because they have 20,000 plus troops there and they keep a pretty tight rein on that. When I was in Athens was when they declared a separate state there, and the Turks recognized it immediately and nobody else did. Pakistan flirted with recognizing it at one time for a while, but never did. And the Turks, although they spend a lot of money there and have to expend resources keeping the army there as well, I don't think unless there are some sort of moves, which the Greek Cypriots seem to try to design to put the gouge in once in a while (like these missiles), I don't think they're concerned about it. But they are concerned about something like that, because they see it as a threat not just to Northern Cyprus but to the Turkish mainland as well.

Q: Well, now, as the American consul General six times a week going to two to three functions, what was the main thing that Turks who would grab you and take you aside wanted to know about and talk about?

RAU: It wasn't me so much, but yes, they did do this. While I was there we had a political Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé who I think spent half of his time in Istanbul. Any drop of a hat, he was down in Istanbul, not in Ankara. So we had to, in effect, entertain him, and he would go to many of the same functions that I was going to, but for those that I got to know pretty well, there were many times we had long discussions, not about aid programs - the Turks did not broach that with me so much; they knew about that - but maybe the military situation, as to say, what was the US position? What was going to be the our position with regard to - they knew that our American military were very much in favor of the Turks, not just those who were in country, but all those that came in at times. But they wanted to know what our position was with regard to Turkish membership in NATO. Did we still consider them a very stalwart member of NATO, the southeastern flank and all that. And also what about supporting the Turkish position to get into the Common Market? That was always a very big one that was always brought up. And they were trying to interest more American firms to invest in Turkey, which they would bring up with me occasionally. We had a program - I say we, it was mainly run by Richard Perle while I was there, who was an under secretary of Defense at the time. He'd worked for the senator from-

Q: From Washington, Scoop Jackson.

RAU: Yes. He had a theory - was very supportive of Turkey. He had a theory, he said if we can get the right mixture of staff aides from these various senators and committees - not the senators and representatives necessarily themselves - to come to Turkey, that we will have a good group

that will support whatever position we want to take on Turkey on the Hill. So he would fly over with a planeload of these guys or gals and then we would call on the Turkish business community to help out, because we didn't have the financial resources, but they would host them and take care for them for two or three days in Istanbul. I think it made a lasting impression on a lot of them, because it was their first experience in Turkey; they didn't know anything about Turkey.

Q: In a way, this is to counter the -

RAU: The Greek-American lobby.

Q: -which is probably more pervasive than the Jewish-American lobby.

RAU: It think it may be.

Q: I mean the Jewish-American lobby is, essentially, you take New York, Miami, and Los Angeles out of the equation, and you begin to fall off, whereas the Greek-Americans are all over the place.

RAU: They are spread all over and friends of mine always ask me, "Why can't the Turks do this, you know, like the Greeks?" Well first of all, the Turks don't have an Orthodox Church that they all gather around. And the Turks seem to assimilate more into the American community, when they come here, than the Greeks do.

Q: Did you find that you were having - I wont say problems - but aware of some of the Greek-American Congress Senators like Sarbanes of Maryland and all who were reflexively pro-Greek and anti-Turkish?

RAU: We didn't have that much trouble with the Congress when I was there. We had to keep our relationship very clear and correct with the Patriarch, the Ecumenical Patriarch who was there. And although he was an old man and later died, I got to know the man who is currently Patriarch, his second in command there, pretty well, and he's a very bright articulate man as well, well thought - of, not only in Turkey, but elsewhere as well. He's quite an improvement.

Q: I would have thought - you had been in Greece, you're an economic officer looking at the Greeks getting into the European Community. I think there they've got one veto and you can't get in. And then it's a foregone conclusion that once the Greeks got into the European Community they would never, never, never allow the Turks in.

RAU: That's true, except that I don't blame the Greeks as much because everybody knew that this was what the Greeks were going to do and pressure could be applied to them to change their minds by other members, but I'm convinced in my own mind that countries like Germany don't want Turkey in the Common Market because they want it to remain a Christian community. And that's why I think we're going to have more problems, in terms of the European Community, than taking in parts of Eastern Europe. And Ozal has said when he was alive that the Europeans don't want Muslims in there, and Turks are, at least in name, Muslims; they're not Christians.

Q: How did you read the ties of the Turks that you saw to Islam? I mean, was it of a different nature?

RAU: Except for the village Turks, some of the village Turks, the average Istanbuli and people from the large cities, they don't pay that much attention to organized religion, with a few exception. They really don't. They're not fundamentalist in the sense that some Iranians are, for example.

Q: What about Israel? Did this play much of a role?

RAU: That's one of the most fascinating things, I think, about the current relationship. If you go back in history, when Spain threw out the Jews in 1492, the Ottoman sultan at the time invited them to come to Turkey, and they were a class that brought a certain amount of modernity to Turkey. They were first-class merchants; they were first-class in many fields, doctors, etc. The result is that some of the most prominent Sephardic families in Istanbul are a major part of the business community now and own large segments of it. But they always considered themselves - for example, to give you an example: I went to the memorial service after this Nevi Shalom bombing-

Q: The synagogue.

RAU: - of the synagogue. There was the Israeli representative there from Ankara, and there were many members of the Jewish community in Istanbul, but the spokesman for the community, when he stood up to speak, it was in the sense that "We are Turks first and Jews second" and that this has been an insult and a force against Turkey, not so much against Judaism *per se* or Israel. And that's the way most of the Turkish Jews see themselves now. They're more Turkish first and Jews second. But Turkey has regularized and improved its position with Israel now, because they never have had much of a love or even a liking of the Arabs, anyway, and now the technical abilities of the Israelis are being exchanged in Turkey for the rights of their pilots to be able to use Turkish airspace for training, and I think the Turks are very happy with this and so are the Israelis.

Q: During a good part of this time the Iran-Iraq war was going on.

RAU: Yes.

Q: They were kind of neighbors, I mean, Turkey had a common border with both. Did that have any particular resonance during the time you were there?

RAU: Well, it did in the sense that we were overwhelmed with Iranian visa applications. There were a lot of Iranians that were secretly fighting each other within the city of Istanbul. There were certain sections of Istanbul that became Iranian rather than Turkish. The signs in the store windows, etc., were all in Farsi. They just took over part of the city. But where we had problems was in the visa lines.

Q: How did we deal with the Iranians visa-wise?

RAU: Well, finally, after much importuning Washington, we got two officers who were fluent in Farsi, because our biggest problem there was that the people that would come in as interpreters for them were charging them - even to make an appointment they had to have a pass at a certain time, and they would sell those off, and it was a major problem. But it did help a lot when we got those two American officers who spoke Farsi. But I'm sure it's still a major problem for them, differentiating between and among the legitimate ones.

Q: Were Turks that you would be talking to at all choosing up sides on Iran and Iraq or was it "a plague on both your houses" or "isn't this sad" or how were they? What were they?

RAU: They played it pretty close on both sides. I mean they were even-handed, let us say, to both sides. They did, however, have, as you know, major truck traffic in and out of Iraq, much more so than Iran. I knew the Turkish ambassador to Iran fairly well through his brother, and I don't think the Turks had any real great love for the Iranians. But on the trade side, they don't like the Arabs either, but they certainly liked the arrangement they had for pipelining oil from Iraq, and that was a big loss after the Persian Gulf War, when they closed that.

Q: This was a time when it hadn't reached the dissolution point but it was moving towards a point of the Soviet Union. There was change under Gorbachev during this time. Were they following events closely in the Soviet Union?

RAU: I'm sure the military were, but I'm not sure... Well I shouldn't say that. The business community was, because by that time they started building in Moscow - the Turkish construction firms, major projects: hotels, housing, all run by Turkish firms or put up by Turkish firms - and they all opened offices in Moscow. So they were starting to expand in terms of their business relationship with the Soviet Union at the time. In the consulate - the Soviets still had a fairly good-size consulate in Istanbul, but I didn't see much activity there on the business side with them, which was by and large, besides the representation function, what the consulate was all about - plus the visa-issuing and the consular part of it. So I didn't have that much contact with them *per se*. We had a couple of committees which are still in existence that we got together with our colleagues for administering the cemeteries there, the allied Christian cemeteries, etc. We would meet once in a while and go over there, but other than that we didn't see them.

Q: I would assume that during this particular period there wasn't a lot of traffic of the Soviet Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean back and forth, so you weren't having someone at your place look out the window looking at Soviet ships.

RAU: They had a special office there - which I'm sure they still do - in the consulate, that they ran.

Q: But it wasn't a big deal.

RAU: No, it wasn't a big deal. They'd have a boat, and they'd go out and check anything that goes through but they rely on the Turks quite a bit for this too, because the Turks are the ones

that really keep an eye on the military warships that go through.

Q: When you left in 1988, whither Turkey, did you feel?

RAU: When I left in '88, I thought as long as Ozal can stay alive - I mean he had a family that was getting him in trouble - but

Q: Do you mean the usual thing, corruption, brothers-in-law or something like that?

RAU: That's right. Sons, daughters. And Mrs. Ozal wasn't any help to him either, Sema, but as long as he was in control and was in power I thought Turkey would be able to turn the corner. When my wife and I led a group of people to Turkey - I think I mentioned this earlier - and we landed in Ankara that day and the flag was at half mast, that was the day he was killed, or died, coming back from a trip to Central Asia, where he had been. I think Turkey still is in for a period of prolonged turmoil, politically especially, but it's a very resilient country. When you have over 90% inflation, as they had for the last 10 years almost, there is a disparity of incomes that is taking place, but to show you the kind of incomes that exist in Istanbul, the school my son teaches in, from 6th grade through high school, is probably the equivalent - he says better - of any U.S. junior college today. The tuition for that school is US\$ 8,500 a year, and they have too many applicants. They can't take them all.

Q: We're talking in today's terms that \$5,000 is considered, for a good school here in Washington, where there's a lot of demand, pretty steep, so it gives an idea.

RAU: It gives you enough perspective on it. The other thing is that my son's wife now, who has finished college, is going to be teaching in the school with him, but they've set up a new primary school that's all taught in English, from the beginning, an immersion course. The tuition for this primary school, for the first year at least, is \$13,000 a year.

Q: Good God!

RAU: What they are doing is they are charging them the \$8,500 that the others pay and asking all the parents who have a child going to that from the first year to put in an extra \$5,000 to help the school get started. I mean, with that kind of money, if you have several children, \$13,000 a year to go to primary school is a lot more than I can afford, or most Americans, for that matter. So there's a lot of disparity of income in Istanbul, but it's a very wealthy country in many ways, and it has a wealth of young people. I mean, over 50% of the people are below the age of 20.

G. CLAY NETTLES
Economic Counselor
Ankara (1985-1990)

George Clay Nettles was born in 1932 in Alabama. He attended the University of Alabama for both a bachelors and a law degree after serving in the US Army.

Nettles joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and served overseas in Japan, Vietnam, Venezuela, Lebanon, Pakistan, Zaire, Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as attending the NATO Defense College. Mr. Nettles was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 1997.

Q: So in 1985 you were up for assignment and you were ready to go overseas and where did you go?

NETTLES: Well back to Turkey, to Ankara. I had been assigned to go to Stockholm and one morning at a staff meeting, I heard that Marshall Casse who was the economic counselor in Ankara was being brought back early for a special position within the State Department. I knew that the post was open and wanted to return. I let word get back to Ankara to say that I could not risk jeopardizing my assignment to Stockholm, but if you want me I'd much rather go back to Ankara than to Stockholm. And, they did and fortunately it was all within the European Bureau so they were able to break my assignment to Stockholm and I went back to Ankara again.

Q: Now the reason you felt that way is because you had been there before, you knew it was an important, interesting job?

NETTLES: And because we had a significant economic assistance program to Turkey. In Stockholm, I would be reporting events. In Ankara, you had an opportunity to influence events because of our economic assistance program. I remember the first night I arrived there was a party. I remember saying that night that I was back to Turkey because I found the job to be extremely interesting, because I'm an amateur historian and Turkey had a great deal to offer in that field. I liked the Turkish people.

Q: You had been gone about three years and when you got back, was the military still pretty much in charge?

NETTLES: Yes, they were, but elections were scheduled.

Q: Turgut Ozal, what was he doing at that point?

NETTLES: Turgut Ozal had organized his own political party and this came as a surprise to people who had known him originally, because we thought of him as only a very capable technocrat. We didn't think of him as a politician. He proved to be an extremely able and capable politician and his party, the Motherland Party won the first elections. One of the reasons many people thought they did win was because the Turkish President, the military leader who had been the head of the coup, had the temerity to criticize Turgut Ozal right before these elections. As a result, the Turkish electorate chose Turgut Ozal. He probably would have won anyway, but he won by a landslide and it was generally considered because of the criticism of the military.

Q: As you say, it was at this point that he was elected, it meant that his party had a majority in the Parliament and he became the Prime Minister because later on he was also elected President.

NETTLES: I'm sorry, I should have gone into more detail. His party won such a large majority that he became Prime Minister. You don't run for Prime Minister in a parliamentary system like the British.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you returned?

NETTLES: Strausz-Hupé was still the ambassador and he continued to be the ambassador for the next three and one half years while I was there. He served for a total of eight years as ambassador to Turkey.

Q: The economy was flourishing - booming?

NETTLES: Yes, it really was and you saw a continuation of what had begun during my first tour in Turkey. Twice a year there would be a meeting in Paris of the OECD donor countries. I remember, the head of the OECD said, and we agreed, that the economic program succeeded quicker and better than any of us had dared to hope at the time when it began. It was due to the efforts of the Turks with the outside assistance. The Turkish efforts might have eventually achieved these results, but they couldn't have produced them so quickly without the outside assistance. On the other hand, had they not had a program, I think the assistance would have been wasted.

Q: A program that the Turks had devised and were very much behind?

NETTLES: Yes, and the Turks had devised it, but in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF particularly the IMF.

Q: We are really talking about a total of about eight years that you had as counselor of Economic Affairs in Turkey. We're in a sense blending together these two assignments in one official position. Maybe at this point, can we go back and talk a little more about the internal situation within Turkey, the economy and your travels? I started to ask you before what extent you were able to travel in eastern Turkey where I know there have always been restrictions and difficulties?

NETTLES: Right. My second tour in Turkey, I was able to travel throughout the country with the exception of one area, the Hakkari province which is the province in the southeastern corner between Iran and Iraq. That was the only place that was basically off limits.

Q: Was that off limits because of Iran and Iraq or the Kurdish situation?

NETTLES: Because of the Kurdish situation. If I might interject briefly, when we were talking about my first tour in Turkey, we were talking about terrorism. Basically the terrorism that I was speaking of then was between the left and the right. The Kurdish situation was not a significant part of that. When I returned, the left/right confrontation and the terrorism connected with that had basically disappeared—not entirely, but basically. I hesitate to use the word terrorism in association with the Kurdish situation, but the problems, the incidents that occurred were in Kurdish territory or areas where there were large numbers of Kurdish inhabitants and between them and the Turks. It is much more complicated than that because much of eastern Turkey has a

large Kurdish population. The Kurds for economic reasons had settled throughout Turkey. Istanbul, a city of eight million people, probably has at least two to three million people of Kurdish origin. Ankara and Izmir also have large Kurdish populations.

Q: How about the Armenia element? There were certainly attacks on Turkish diplomats abroad by ASLA or some like that - the Armenian Liberation Army. Is that something affecting you in the embassy? Probably not.

NETTLES: Not really, I remember when a Turkish diplomat was assassinated in California by an Armenian, the entire embassy staff went to the state funeral and, as is the custom in Turkey, we walked after the casket from the mosque to the cemetery more than a mile away.

Yes, we were aware. The Turks were frustrated by what they felt was international sympathy for the murder of their diplomats. A number were killed and assassinated, but it wasn't something that affected you on a day-to-day basis and the Turks didn't seem hold you responsible.

Q: It wasn't happening in Turkey, it was more abroad?

NETTLES: Exactly.

Q: Let's talk a little more about the rest of Turkey outside of Ankara from the point of view of the economic counselor over this eight-year period. You said in your second tour '85-'90, you traveled a little more. I assume you had to go to Istanbul all the time, because that is the center of business community and the banking community.

NETTLES: That is correct. We have a large and very effective consulate there and we have a good economic officer who could handle much of the business. We were in contact by cable, radio or phone two or three times a day. I didn't have to be there on a day-to-day basis but I tried to get there once a month - certainly every six weeks. And then, of course, if there was a major event or something where I was needed, I might go down for that too. Istanbul was the financial center and that was important, but I tried to and did travel throughout the country.

Q: In the Economic Section, besides your reporting services, did you have an officer from the foreign commercial service or did you do that yourself.

NETTLES: When I first arrived, I was economic commercial counselor, but, as you know, commercial responsibilities were given to the Department of Commerce, which had a commercial officer in Ankara and one in Istanbul also. We worked closely together, as it should be, but I was no longer in charge of commercial functions.

Q: So in your second tour, you were primarily involved in economic negotiations, reporting, dealing with the international organizations, Turkey's external policy?

NETTLES: Correct, Turkey was the third largest U.S. recipient of economic assistance and we did the economic analysis to justify that. There was no AID mission in Turkey so we had that responsibility. Also, we did such things in Turkey as the negotiations for a tax treaty. And as

Turkey developed, we began to have the normal trade problems which one would expect and which are inevitable.

Q: I think one of the exciting things for you, I think, Clay, in this period we are talking about which is basically over 10 years - you were gone about three in the middle - is that Turkey went from being a basket case economically or at least perceived as being one to being a success story. A success for Turkey, but for the international community as well that supported it.

NETTLES: That's right. The classical example that if you do what the textbooks say, the result can work out. I think it is also important to point out that Turkey has a large educated population at every level - not just from technocrats, but good mechanics.

Q: Would you want to comment on the economic significance of the Turkish workers abroad over the decade or so that you were involved with Turkey?

NETTLES: Well, in the early stages, their economic importance to Turkey was very important because of the foreign exchange earnings which they sent home.

Q: They were mainly in Germany, correct?

NETTLES: When I first arrived. Then for political and economic reasons the Germans basically stopped issuing visas for anyone to work within Germany. On the other hand, those that were there could stay so the level remained more or less constant. But, Turkey, as I mentioned earlier, became very active in the Middle East and Libya. There were tens of thousands of Turks working in Libya and Saudi Arabia and these people were there without their families, unlike in Germany, where many had their families with them. Even those in Germany would send money, but those without their families would send 90 per cent of their earnings home, so the foreign exchange continued to be a significant item for the Turkish balance of payments, but the composition changed.

Q: Had other sources of foreign exchange earnings increased in importance - tourism certainly did?

NETTLES: And, certainly manufactured exports did. Carpets were about the only manufactured exports when I first arrived in Turkey, but later there was a broad variety of exports.

Q: The tourism, the facilities had significantly increased? The number of arrivals of tourists from Europe had gone way up, I think.

NETTLES: Correct, it had become very important. One must remember, too, that unlike the Caribbean where most of the food is imported, (most of the food that the tourists eat in Turkey, the construction materials that are used to build the hotels) the food is grown in Turkey and the majority of the hotels used mostly local materials. Tourism was much more important than it would be in the Caribbean where the tourists that go there buy souvenirs that are usually made in Hong Kong or someplace. Relatively little of local content other than labor is provided in the Caribbean, whereas in Turkey, the expenditures made by tourists largely remain in Turkey.

Q: You talked about in your second tour traveling extensively throughout the country. I know you always have been and still are a great traveler, Clay. Did you travel in the region outside of Turkey or did you pretty much confine your travels within Turkey itself?

NETTLES: Well, I traveled extensively and I think that I mentioned that twice a year there would be a meeting in Paris with OECD and also there would be a meeting on debt rescheduling and I was fortunate to be a member of the U.S. delegation for that.

Q: Did you ever go to Cyprus from Ankara?

NETTLES: No, I didn't. I would have liked to, but at that time it was very difficult. The Greek/Cypriot government did not appreciate the people from Ankara going there and it was discouraged. I have been there, but only from Beirut.

Q: What else should we be talking about in terms of these ten years in Turkey? I feel like we haven't done justice yet. To have a foreign service assignment of that length is very unusual and essentially in the same capacity. Although I'm sure the problems changed, the economy changed as you said. Do you think it was too long or was it ok?

NETTLES: It always, of course, depends upon the individual. As you know, I was there for five years my second time and, as you know, five years is the maximum consecutive time that you can stay in one place. I have been told by Personnel that it becomes more and more difficult to be objective so five years is the arbitrary cutoff point.

Q: Did you feel that was a problem for you?

NETTLES: Not for me, for I was certainly still enjoying it up to the time I left. I remember my first assignment though in Japan if we can go back to that. The wife of the British consul general in Yokohama said, "How do you feel about leaving Japan?" I said, "I hate to go, but I'm looking forward to my next assignment." That was the way I felt about Turkey. I was still enjoying it, but I was looking forward to something different. I have seen, and I'm sure you have too, people who stay too long in one place and become a little bitter. Certainly, I didn't feel that way. I will say this. It probably was not good for me or rather "not good for my career" to stay that long, but I've never worried about my career. What was more important to me was to do something which I enjoyed and I was enjoying my time in Turkey. I felt I was doing something useful and constructive which again is the reason I enjoyed it. That's more important.

Q: Well Turkey is a very large complicated country and I'm sure you were always learning new things and asking questions right up until the last day.

NETTLES: That's right, but, as you know, to get ahead in the Foreign Service, one has to do a good job and one has to be lucky to a certain extent and do certain things in preparation. To that extent I meant it wasn't good for my career to stay in one job too long. Had I wanted to be promoted, probably my chances would have been better had I stayed in Surinam as DCM for example, but I didn't choose to do that. That was a choice which I do not regret.

Q: You certainly had many Turkish friends and you value and appreciate their culture and history, as you say.

NETTLES: I do. There would be something wrong with one if you spent eight years of your life in one place and didn't make friends there. I have tried to continue friendships, have been back to Turkey, and I have also been active in the Turkish/American Association here in the States which is one of the largest of the bi-national organizations.

Q: We talked a little about the Turkish military organization in terms of their heritage of Ataturk and the fact that they have intervened on several occasions when the legacy of Ataturk was in jeopardy in their opinion. U.S. military assistance has been important as you said. The U.S. military is in Turkey in a large way. Would you want to say anything about your relationship with the military in Turkey or your perception of the importance of the geopolitical or military point of view of Turkey?

NETTLES: Yes, when I was there those eight years, we worked very closely with the U.S. military. I was very impressed with what they did. They didn't try to do anything without full concurrence of the ambassador and Washington, of course. It was the right kind of a relationship which it is always hoped will occur. Certainly, I was never aware of an instance where full cooperation did not exist. Conditions have changed dramatically since I was there with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Turkey was considered the southern bastion of NATO. Today they don't even have a border with the Soviet Union. Plus, Turkey was extremely important as a listening station and the U-2s, as you know, operated out of there. Today, with a different type of satellite technology, Turkey does not have that position either so its value to the U.S. has changed.

Q: It's still significant because of its geographic position vis-a-vis the Middle East, Africa and Russia.

NETTLES: And after us, they still have the second largest army in NATO. With the breakup of the Soviet Union though and the emergence of other countries in the area, the Turkish role is different - perhaps equally or more important, certainly different.

Q: We've talked about military assistance being high during this period you were there after the end of the embargo of military assistance relating to the events of Cyprus and so on. U.S. Defense contractors or suppliers must have been very evident, because we were supplying quite a bit of equipment to the Turkish military. Did you work closely with them or did they work more with the MAG or the military people?

NETTLES: We worked very closely with the people who were building planes, specifically the F-16 and they had a lot of problems. We helped them to a certain extent. They, of course, worked very closely with the military. They were the only military people with whom we were involved on a day-to-day basis. One of the main reasons why we worked so closely with them was because of the offset agreement. In return for Turkish U.S. military purchases, the U.S. company agreed to make certain purchases of Turkish goods, services and we were able to assist them with that - not directly, but by giving advice and information.

Q: Clay, before you went on your first assignment to Turkey, you had six weeks of Turkish language instruction at the Foreign Service Institute. You, at that point, probably didn't think you'd be in country for eight years. How was your Turkish at the end of the time and did you get to the point that you could use it fairly extensively?

NETTLES: Oh, yes. When I was there, I was very pleased to find that it hadn't deteriorated significantly. When I returned after three years in the U.S. I could converse on a basic level with anyone in Turkey. Turkish is very similar to Japanese. Many people claim that they are actually related. Both languages are easy to speak the basic language but extremely difficult to become fluent.

Q: Anything else about Turkey we should talk about?

NETTLES: Not really, since I have left, there are many problems in Turkey today. For example, the Prime Minister has been forced from office by the military because he was from the religious right. One of the problems of Turkey is that they have often had coalition governments and coalition governments can lead to unfortunate situations at certain times. It's regrettable that you see these problems today persisting as before.

Q: That Prime Minister Erbakan was in government before the time you were there. Did you ever have any encounters or experience with him? What he stood for even then was a stronger Islamic element certainly in government. Was that something people talked about when you were there or is that something that came later?

NETTLES: Of course, the people I dealt with were business people or professors or government people. They prided themselves as being secular. They said that they tended to think of the people on the religious right as the poor country people, but they said they would never come to power in Turkey. In every election up until recently, the religious parties had won no more than eight per cent, I believe, of the vote.

Q: Not even in the last election where they have come to share power, it was only a little over 20 percent.

NETTLES: Correct. Turkish friends of mine say that the strength of the religious right has come at the expense of left of center parties. The religious right party has provided social services which historically was done by the major leftist party, basically left of center.

Q: And that was true in cities like Istanbul?

NETTLES: Yes.

Q: Okay, have we done Turkey?

NETTLES: I think so. One could spend many years there which I did, but I think for our purposes we have.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you left?

NETTLES: Mort Abramowitz was ambassador when I left. I served under him for approximately a year.

Q: Robert Strausz-Hupé - let's say a few words about him. He was well along in years when he was ambassador, but still very actively interested in everything?

NETTLES: Yes, and I thought did a very good job. He is in his 90s now and I see him from time to time. He lives in Pennsylvania, but he still comes down occasionally to Washington. I understand he has recently written another book. Should one live to be that age, I would hope to be as active mentally as he is.

Q: I've read a memoir by Ambassador Jim Spain which I don't think has been published. This goes back to an earlier period particularly right after the military intervention in 1980. As I recall, he argues that the embassy felt very strongly that the United States should be very supportive of the military continuation of the economic program and that there was some resistance of the State Department in Washington. I was involved in the State Department in Washington at that time and I don't remember that resistance. It seems to me that we were very much on the same wave link. For the reasons, as you mentioned before, felt that it was a very correct action, very popular within Turkey and that it would probably be limited in time and as long as it was not repressive of individual liberties and was a continuation of good economic policies, it was worthy of understanding and support. So if the embassy was pushing in that direction, they were pushing on an open door, there was no resistance. I'm not asking you to particularly comment on the ambassador's views which you haven't read, but does all that I have said sound more or less right to you?

NETTLES: Correct. I was economic counselor and twice a week I would have been in Country Team meetings where these types of problems would have been discussed. I do not recall any such opposition from Washington being mentioned at those meetings.

Q: Well, you had a very rich experience and you talked about it in terms of your career. I guess it is true that if you did one thing for too long, that from a career progression point of view, it is not necessarily seen as the best thing for you, but I can see in terms of the importance of Turkey and the real content of what was happening during the eight years you were involved, there was a lot of good things to look back on and to have contributed to in a very meaningful and significant way.

NETTLES: Thank you, Ray, I certainly enjoyed it. I think it might be appropriate to mention that I did talk about my career. I retired 36 years to the day after entering the State Department. Today, it would be impossible to stay that long in the State Department with the kind of a career that I had. The State Department has become more like the military system: up and out. So no one could expect to stay as many years as an economic counselor as I did. To serve as many years as I, one would have to be a DCM and then become ambassador. That would be the only way you could do it. I think that is unfortunate that the normal career is now 23-24 years. To a

certain extent, I'm a creature of the past.

Q: I would agree with the comment you just made. I think the other aspect of staying eight years in one location even though it was broken up by a period away, the good side of it - you enjoyed it, you were able to make a significant contribution, there were enough changes so that I think it was always lively and challenging for you. The other aspect, of course, is not only could one become a little jaded or bored or one could assume they knew it all and no longer had to ask questions and dig into it. I can't imagine that was a problem for you after that period of time.

NETTLES: Thank you and certainly I thought so. Of course, the five years was not automatic. There was a three-year assignment and then two one-year extensions. Of course, that was at my request, but it also had to be approved by the State Department.

Q: And had to have the support of the ambassador and I guess we are talking about a couple of different ambassadors?

NETTLES: Yes.

W. GARTH THORBURN
Agricultural Attaché
Ankara (1987-1990)

Winston Garth Thorburn was born in New York in 1928. He graduated from the Hampton Institute in 1951 and served in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. His postings abroad have included Paris, Sao Paulo, Bogotá, Brasilia, Lagos, New Delhi, Ankara. Mr. Thorburn was interviewed in 2006 by Allan Mustard.

THORBURN: I was transferred to Turkey for three and a half years, and that was my last assignment in the Foreign Service.

Q: And that's where we met.

THORBURN: That is where we met. You were in Istanbul and I was in Ankara. And that was an eye opener, because growing up in the West Indies, where we learn a lot about British history and the British Empire, and I learned a lot about what's happening in Greece, et cetera, I didn't learn too much about Turkey. And Turkey turned out to be very fascinating from a historical point of view. Things in Turkey were just an eye opener to me, and from a work standpoint, it was fascinating, and from a culture standpoint and exposure to another culture, I think it was unbelievably good.

Q: Well, at the time that we were in Turkey, that was when Turgut Ozal was prime minister, and of course he was taking the Turkish economy in a whole new direction at that point. Could you talk a little bit, maybe, about that and then maybe also talk about the ambassadors that you worked for?

THORBURN: Well, we worked with – I can't remember the name of the organization, where they imported stuff from us, the wheat.

Q: TMO.

THORBURN: TMO.

Q: TMO, the Turkish Soil Products Office.

THORBURN: We worked with TMO, and it was a very good organization. I had very close relations with the head of TMO, and we did a lot of market development. We actually did some CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) there with rice. We got some rice in from the United States. We got some wheat in from the United States. We started with the tobacco organization and you know about that. We managed to get some full-cured Virginia tobacco into the country so that they could make a cigarette similar to Marlboro.

Q: Yes, that was the Tekel 2000, the Tekel Ikibin.

THORBURN: And we had a little bit of problem with that because it came in under CCC, and somebody reported to someone in Washington that something was funny there, and one of the guy's from the inspector general's office came over and we had to open some of the – I think we called them hogsheads. And we had to open to them to make sure that it was Virginia full-cured tobacco. And after opening about four or five of the things, the guy who was the manager said, "Look, this is our stuff. Please don't open anymore." So we stopped. But we had some problems there.

Generally speaking, here again, the minister of agriculture was a political appointee, but everybody at the echelon below that went to USC (University of Southern California) or some other U.S. agricultural university, so we had good rapport with most of the people in the Ministry of Agriculture.

Q: Well, I remember there was one undersecretary we had a problem with that involved the Cochran Program. Do you want to talk about that?

THORBURN: As a matter of fact, he was a graduate of USC, and it was kind of difficult to figure out why he was giving us problems. The Cochran Program actually was a very, very good program, and a lot of the people who went to the United States on the program came back and it helped a great deal. I don't think I was ever able to figure out why he gave us problems.

Q: I just remember that nobody from the Ministry of Agriculture could travel on the Cochran Program because he would not give them permission to do so. And, as I recall, it was because he at one point had sent his nephew, and we sent his nephew home.

THORBURN: That is probably correct. I don't remember that, but things worked like that there. Yes.

Q: Well, then, you retired out of Turkey.

THORBURN: Yes, I left Turkey and officially retired on the 20th of December, 1990. I flew from Ankara to Frankfurt, from Frankfurt to Tampa. A year and a half before that, I bought a home in Sarasota, Florida, and we loaded up a minivan with my two kids, 13 pieces of baggage and my dog and drove down to Sarasota.

NELSON C. LEDSKY
Cyprus Coordinator
Washington, DC (1989-1991)

Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department's Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

Q: How did the Cyprus job come up?

LEDSKY: Jim Wilkinson was leaving the job of Cyprus coordinator. I think the Department really wanted to abolish the job; it didn't fit its normal organizational pattern. But then Friedman, who was the country director for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, came to me and said that he didn't want the job abolished but that he had no candidate to fill it. He asked whether I would be interested. I first said that I was most reluctant but he persisted and then after a month or so, I finally gave in and accepted it. During the intervening month, I was looking around for a good assignment, but nothing seemed available. There were a couple of possibilities. George Vest had me on a list of potential ambassadorial candidates for Oman, but that didn't fly. George was then the director general and I talked to him on a couple of occasions. He tried to find me something, but nothing exciting really came up.

Finally, I agreed to become the Cyprus coordinator. I had an interview with Ray Seitz, who was about to become assistant secretary for European affairs. I had known Ray for some years. So he and Friedman went to work to try to get me this job, which was to be part of the Seventh Floor organization. I understood that it took some effort to get me approved. I don't think anyone really wanted me. However since all of the principals were new, none of them knew me or vice-versa. They certainly didn't want the job to continue. My guess is that no one else was interested in the job so that in the end it was mine – by default if nothing else. White House approval was required, particularly since I would be given ambassadorial rank. However, I was told that pending White House approval, I should start the job.

I got a little office across from Seitz's office. I started in and stayed until I retired in October, 1992. During those three years, I also did a couple of jobs for Seitz unrelated to Cyprus.

Q: Did you finally get an ambassadorial rank?

LEDSKY: Yes. I did have a hearing in the Senate and did get confirmed. I had to pay my respects to Sarbanes and a couple of other senators. The hearing was not entirely smooth because I had to answer questions on Cyprus and my own past record on this thorny issue. In the end, as I said, I was confirmed, but Cyprus – even in 1989 – roused some passions. Sarbanes was a friend and that helped; he was pleased that I had been nominated, although he did raise some awkward questions in his usual probing manner. He got me to promise to do certain things, but it all came out alright.

Q: In your role of coordinator, to whom did you report?

LEDSKY: Essentially, nobody. I was appointed by the president and as such, I think I was the president's special coordinator for Cyprus. In practical terms, I worked most closely with the assistant secretary for European affairs. I looked on myself as a deputy to Ray Seitz. I never dealt with the secretary or the deputy secretary, but through and with Ray, we discussed Cyprus with the undersecretary for political affairs, who at the time was Larry Eagleburger. But essentially, I was a lone operator and had very little to do with the Seventh Floor. Most of my contacts were probably with the Greece, Turkey and Cyprus country director.

The political situation on Cyprus was frozen. A new government had been installed, headed by George Vassiliou. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish sides had completely broken down and there was almost no dialogue at all. Nothing had moved since the negotiations of the mid-1980s, which I described earlier. Those had culminated in meetings in New York with the UN secretary general. Although the meetings did not produce any positive results, an outline of a potential agreement was drafted, which was first initialed by the Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. When the latter finally decided to also initial the framework agreement, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew their approval, thereby collapsing the whole process. This all happen before Wilkinson was appointed special coordinator. Between 1986 and 1989, there was practically no movement in reaching any kind of agreement between the two sides on the island.

I started almost where I had left off in 1976. Essentially, time had stood still. During the period I was not working on Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou was the president of Cyprus. His term ended in January 1989. History judged him as a recalcitrant, uninterested in reaching any agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, who were also hardly forthcoming. There was some activity in Cyprus managed by the UN representative but he had had only a modicum of success. There had been some discussions between Denktash, the Turkish leader, and the Greek side, but nothing resulted from them.

Q: What were the issues?

LEDSKY: They had not changed from the mid 1970s, and probably from earlier even. Foremost

was the question of security for both populations: what it would be and how it was to be provided. Troops would be required, which raised the question of whose troops would be stationed where on the island. Security questions also encompassed the defense of the island: who would be responsible and how it was to be provided.

The next question concerned the line to be drawn on the island between the two nationalities. That issue raised questions concerning the refugees: how they would be handled and compensated, and which would be allowed to return to their ancestral homes and which would be permanently displaced.

These were the same issues that I worked on in the 1970s. Twenty years later, nothing had changed, and I might add, these are the same issues being confronted today.

Q: Let's start with the defense-security issue. What were the key questions?

LEDSKY: Since 1974, the Turks had stationed a large military force in northern Cyprus. The Greeks had a small contingent on the southern end of the island. The Greek Cypriots had their own armed forces in the south and the Turkish Cypriots had a small army in the north. The British occupied two small parts of Cyprus, where they had bases. The defense of Cyprus was guaranteed in 1960 by a treaty signed by the Greeks, Turks and British, which allowed any of those parties to intervene militarily in the security of Cyprus was threatened. That was and had been the security situation over a thirty year period.

Q: How about the territorial question?

LEDSKY: The Greeks were about 80% of the island's population. During the 1974 invasion, the Turks occupied about 38% of the island – a far greater percentage than its population percentage would suggest. Obviously, the Greeks view this as entirely unfair and demand a portion of the Turkish occupied territory be remanded to them.

Q: Compensation?

LEDSKY: The Turks essentially took all of the properties which were in their part of the island. There are a few exceptions to that, tiny pockets of houses still occupied by Greek Cypriots. But essentially, all the Greek Cypriots were ousted from Turkish-occupied territory and became refugees. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots ousted all the Turkish Cypriots who used to live in their part of Cyprus, thereby creating more refugees. The Greeks want to return to their former homes or at least want compensation, and the Turkish Cypriots want compensation for their lost properties in the south.

There are other issues as well. Since 1974, the Turks have brought "settlers" from Turkey to the island. The Greeks want these people sent back to their homeland. That is an added complication to the refugee issue but by no means the only one.

Q: Tell us a little about Greek-Turkish relations as they pertained to the Cyprus problem?

LEDSKY: One has to go back a long way. For a Greek government, Cyprus has always been a burden. The Cyprus nationalist movement developed in the 1950s and 1960s; its objective was and is *enosis* (union with the motherland – Greece). There are people in Greece who would like to see an annexation of the island. This view was very strong during the 1950s and 1960s. It began to fade after 1974 but today is still an unmentioned undercurrent of Greek Cypriot policies. I think many in Athens view Cyprus even today as a part of Greece. It belongs to the Greek world, in their view.

The Turks, on the other hand, see Cyprus as another island that lies off their shore. They don't see it as necessarily an integral part of Turkey, but certainly not part of Greece either. Cyprus is one of the islands that lie off Turkish shores, which are perceived to be part of Turkey's security system. These islands have been held over centuries by foreign powers who used their off-shore presence as a way to influence Turkish policies. The islands are perceived by the Turks as potential daggers to be used against the mainland. The alleged presence of oil is only a problem in the case of islands in the Aegean Sea and is a separate issue. The basic issue concerning Cyprus and the other off-shore islands is a security one.

This is the problem stated in the most extreme terms. On the one hand, the issue is one of nationalism and on the other, one of security, that is, the islands did not have to be part of Turkey, but had to be in none-threatening hands to satisfy both elements is difficult indeed.

There is another Cyprus issue that needs resolution and that involves the constitution and the governmental structure that flows from it. The question is how to structure a new Cypriot government that is viewed by both sides as fair. The present constitution that was written and approved in 1960; it provided for a very minor version of power-sharing. The Greek Cypriots controlled most matters; that was not enough for them and they tried to change the constitution in 1963, which led to the first Cyprus crisis when the Turkish Cypriots revolted, disrupting the established order. Therefore, the question became how to re-establish an orderly constitutional process. The Greek Cypriots wanted a process based on population while the Turkish Cypriots wanted equality of treatment for both communities. That issue has played out in different ways over the course of the last four decades.

None of the issues have been resolved. Some say that the _____ Plan solves all of the problems. That is not a generally accepted view. It is true that the Plan deals with all four issues and includes some resolutions, but the two sides on Cyprus are still haggling over the details.

Unlike many other parts of the world, religion *per se* did not play a role in the Greek-Turkish rivalries. It is true that the Greek Orthodox Church plays a major role in the affairs of the island, but the Turks are essentially secular, so that religious fervor does not really play a role.

Q: When you became the coordinator in 1989, what other agencies had any interest in your work?

LEDSKY: None. When I first started on the job, a fellow by the name of Nicks was the chargé. Bob Lamb was eventually was appointed ambassador to Cyprus. DoD had no interest in the

Cyprus issue; their interest was focused on using the British air bases and overflight rights. What was happening on the ground outside the bases was of no interest to them.

Congress showed some interest. George Stephanopoulos was Chairman Ed Feighan's aide on this issue. He used to be in contact with me periodically. I always had a good relationship with Feighan, in part because he too was from Cleveland. Senators Brademas and Olympia Snow, and some Congressmen showed some interest, but the rest of the Washington establishments showed no interest in the subject at all. I was on my own. I think by 1989, most of the people who had earlier been interested in Cyprus had pretty much given up any hope of a resolution; as long as matters were quiet on the ground, no one really cared.

I should modify my comment a little. President Bush did show interest in Cyprus and I went to the White House on a couple of occasions when foreign visitors came to see him. Then I would send briefing papers and attend some of the meetings.

Q: Did you feel that during your tour as coordinator, some progress was made?

LEDSKY: I think so. When I took over, the political situation on the island was stalemated. The UN had appointed a very good mediator, who was from Argentina. He began to shuttle between the two sides in 1989 and developed what he called a "Food for Thought" paper, which analyzed the status of the four stumbling blocks in outline form. He used this paper as a device to get both sides to agree on a framework document. He found an ally in the new president of Cyprus, George Vassiliou. I also found him committed to getting the issues resolved. During the course of 1989, the UN representative put this paper together; I helped him formulate the issues and worked with him on drafting the paper. No one took credit for writing it; it had no fingerprints on it.

The paper outlined approaches that might be taken to the four major sticking points. I took the paper to Ankara, in part because it was very difficult physically for the UN representative to get from Cyprus to Turkey. The U.S. government assisted the UN in bringing this paper to the attention of the Turkish foreign office. I made a series of visits to Ankara, starting in 1989. It took repeated efforts, but we slowly began to marshal support for the concepts outlined in the paper in the Turkish foreign ministry. Then in 1989, 1990 and 1991, we tried to convene a series of meetings, which would bring Denktash and Vassiliou together in New York. We finally did bring them together to discuss a document which was based on the "Food for Thought" paper. We called that document "A set of ideas." This document, which was written, rewritten and refined during the 1990-91 period, was submitted to the UN Security Council in the summer of 1992; it was to serve as the basis for negotiations between the two sides.

It was a very intricate process, which is hard to describe in full detail because it was very much a step-by-step process. Full credit for progress made must be given first of all to the UN secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru. He was quite knowledgeable about the Cyprus issues, having been the UN special representative in Cyprus during the 1980s. He knew all the intricacies of the situation, as well as all of the players. He was doggedly determined to bring the two sides to the bargaining table to conclude an agreement. The other hero was the UN special representative, Ambassador _____ and his associates, who worked tirelessly in

New York and Nicosia. One of these was Gustave Feissel, who became a close friend. It was the UN group, together with the U.S. team – Tony Friedman and myself, who were the movers of the process. Some credit must also be given to a few officials in the Turkish Foreign Office who were committed to getting a peace settlement, but faced formidable obstacles in the form of the foreign minister and Turkish political leaders.

The Security Council approved the document. The UN secretary general met with Vassiliou and Denktash in New York to discuss it. The document subsequently went through further refinements and elaborations, but the solutions proposed in it are the same as are contained in the Annan agreement, which is on the table today. Today's version is more complete, more comprehensive, and improved, but doesn't deviate much from the solutions proposed in the 1992 draft, which was based on a paper put together in 1989. So you can see that the outlines of a settlement were proposed 15 year ago and that in the intervening period, there were refinements and elaborations, but no major substantive revisions.

The current version does not suggest resolutions to all of the issues, but for most of them. The document provides for a weak central government and two constituent strong regional governments – one run by the Greek Cypriots and one by the Turkish Cypriots. There would be a rotating presidency. It includes a complicated formula for choosing the method to construct the central parliament. All the functions of a government are divided between the central and the regional administrations. A map is attached which divides the island between the Greek and Turkish sides – it reduces the present Turkish holdings by 4 or 5% and gives that territory to the Greeks. Concerning the settlement issue, the paper provides that there be applications and selection based on certain criteria which are spelled out. It would allow a few Greeks to return to their former homesteads; the rest would be compensated for their losses. There is no mention in the paper of settlers – that is, those who made new shelters after being pushed out of their former homes.

On the military side, the paper provides for security guarantees by Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. It also calls for a reduction of Greek and Turkish forces now stationed on the island to be implemented over a period until both sides have 5 or 7 thousand contingents on the island. As you can see, the paper was quite comprehensive, but managed to suggest remedies for all of the outstanding issues in twenty-five pages, as compared to the present document, which is about 100 pages long. That just shows you what happens when a paper is allowed to be worked on for 12 years!! In any case, we do have a paper, which can be used as the final agreement.

Q: Why wasn't an agreement reached when the paper was first issued?

LEDSKY: As I said, we started with the paper drafted by the UN representative. The Turks denounced it almost immediately, because they said that since they had no participation in the drafting of the document, they couldn't possibly subscribe to it. They objected to the alleged emphasis on security and the reduction of forces on the island. I should note that while the political leadership in Turkey was denouncing the document, their Foreign Office officials were still working on it and showed interest in further negotiations. I think the political leadership did not want to be seen as having anything to do with settlement of the Cyprus issue as long as Denktash was opposed to it. Denktash and his political partners in Ankara were primarily, if not

solely, interested in establishing an independent entity in northern Cyprus – run for and by the Turks.

It is quite astounding how Denktash has been able to manipulate the Turkish government so that he always has its support. Those governments seem not to have paid any attention to their domestic constituencies. Those governments have never wanted or been able to cross Denktash; what he wants, he gets. There is no doubt that he has a following in Turkey; I don't know how strong it is, but there is no question that he has great influence in Ankara on Cyprus matters. Today there may be some movement away from his policy monopoly, but I can't tell you how far nor how fast that change will be. After all, he has held sway for forty years. However, I think the new government now in Ankara may be taking a different tack, and I am hopeful that some accord can be reached in 2004, something I would never have predicted earlier. Denktash himself may be losing some of his grip on Turkish Cypriot politics; there is a new generation of politicians that may be more forthcoming. The lure of Cyprus joining the European Union has considerable attraction to many Turkish Cypriots and that may be enough to bring a new day to the Cyprus stalemate.

Q: You have met Denktash. How would you describe his views?

LEDSKY: He just doesn't trust the Greeks because he was brought up in an era of strong anti-Greek feeling in Turkey. He will not believe that the Greeks do not have some ulterior design on the island, perhaps even *enosis*. He sees all of the issues through this prejudiced prism. When I have talked to him, he continually cites what he believes happened in Crete at the end of the 19th century. He will tell you that the Turks at the time held a lot of Crete and were forced by the Greeks to leave the island. It is his version of history, which he will never change. He has no doubt that the Greeks will repeat that history in Cyprus, because he firmly believes that the Greeks want to possess all of the island off their shores. That view blocks Denktash from considering any kind of deal, because he believes that once the Greeks get some agreement, that is the beginning of the "slippery road," which will eventually lead to *enosis* for the whole island. Every diversion from the status quo is the first step to Greek annexation of Cyprus, in Denktash's view. It is a completely "black and white" view, which leaves no room for any kind of settlement – except perhaps an independent entity in northern Cyprus. So Denktash has said "No" to all proposals up to now; he just cannot get over his innate fear of a Greek take-over of Cyprus.

I am giving you a thumbnail sketch of events that took place over a 15 year period. It is a very complex picture and I would not wish to minimize that through my brief summary. There has been movement on both sides, especially the Greek Cypriot one. During my four years as coordinator, Vassiliou moved in the right direction; he and his supporters wanted an end to the issue so that Cyprus could return to normalcy and have an opportunity to develop economically with the return of foreign investments. Economic growth would not occur without political stability. Vassiliou recognized that the Turks were 20% of the population and that therefore had to be given their share of the island and political power. He was not interested in his government running the whole island. He hoped he could deal with someone on the Turkish side, who would be willing to enter into a bargain fair to both sides. Such a bargain would be seen by the world as an end to a continuing crisis, which in return would encourage foreigners to invest in Cyprus, as

I said earlier. This was a very pragmatic approach. From my acquaintance with him, I would say that he was not anti-Turkish in any way; he had witnessed an era during which the two sides have lived together amicably and saw no reason why such a period of history could not return. The Greeks were willing to give the Turks their autonomy, just as long as the feud would come to an end.

The Turkish Cypriot population has slowly come around to the view that they must make a deal. Denktash did not win the last election – he didn't really lose it either. I guess one would describe it as a stalemate. But, in any case, it showed that his influence was diminishing.

Q: Are you now optimistic that an agreement can be reached?

LEDSKY: Not in the short run. In the longer term, I think the two sides will reach some accommodation. I think the feud is coming to an end, but precisely when that will happen I cannot tell you. All the signs are much more positive than they were ten or twenty years ago. The basic paper, from which an agreement will be reached, was begun in 1989, although its seeds go back to even the 1970s. There will be an agreement; Denktash will not be a factor sooner or later and the Turkish Cypriots will come to the table and sign an agreement. I think when that day comes, everybody will blame Denktash for the 40 years of delay and difficulties and the Europeans will take credit for inducing an agreement through their offer of membership in the EU. As often happens in situations of this kind, historians will come up with a variety of rationales for why it took so long to reach an agreement. I believe that it should not have taken so long; the issues should have been resolved by the mid 1970s.

I need to add a caveat to what I just said. I think there will be a negotiated solution. Whether that will also lead to peace on the island, I cannot say. I don't think the agreement now being negotiated will actually work. I don't think the country of Cyprus is a viable entity as it is currently envisaged by the draft agreement. This agreement does not provide for a workable solution; it provides for a solution, which over time will probably not be sustainable. Changes will have to be negotiated or imposed. I think, for example, that the Greek Cypriots will eventually take over the whole island. Denktash's fears may be realized. I think it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the agreement as presently constituted will fall apart, two or three or five years after it has been assigned. The governmental system now being envisaged is intrinsically unworkable.

I think it is possible that the two communities will clash again. Cyprus is a good illustration of an ethnic tension to which there is no good or permanent solution. Human beings can cobble something together; in fact, we have done just that. But that does not guarantee a peaceful future. Stability on the island could last forty or fifty years, but the situation is intrinsically unstable, almost guaranteed to break out in ethnic tensions once again. Cyprus is an example of many similar situations around the world, where ethnic divisions are almost permanent and not subject to long-term settlements. It could be resolved if all the Turks or all the Greeks left the island, but you can't count on anything so drastic occurring. It is just very difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability and peace when a small piece of territory is occupied by an ethnic majority of 80% and a minority of 20%. There are many comparable situations in the world, such as the Caucasuses, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia, which continue to be unresolved. I don't know

whether any of them can be resolved or whether they will continue to fester undeterred by the displeasure of the world community. The most likely solution is that one ethnic group absorbs the other. But that is not foreseen as a solution in Cyprus or anywhere else in the world. It is an issue which needs to be addressed by the world community for it is the source of instability in too many places.

Q: During your tour, did you feel that the U.S. government was as fully engaged in the Cyprus issue as it might have been?

LEDSKY: No, of course not. It did practically nothing. It should have been more active. I think that had it been so, we could have reached a settlement. We had influence on both sides that we did not use. Had I had a free hand, I would have been much more active. I think that description was true even after I left the coordinator job. Whether additional U.S. efforts would have been worth it, is another question. I believe we should have been more active, but I recognize that I had a very narrow view of the world. When you work on a problem, you believe that there is no more important one in the world.

MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Ambassador
Turkey (1989-1991)

Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.

Q: This brings us to 1989 when you were appointed as our ambassador to Turkey. How did that come about?

ABRAMOWITZ: I had been in INR for four years and it was time to move on. Secretary Baker agreed to appoint me to an ambassadorship. There were a number of openings that were discussed with me, but I finally focused on Turkey.

I wanted the ambassadorship to Korea, but that was well filled. I thought that China was then beyond "my reach." (I was offered it in the Clinton administration.) So I looked around for an important and interesting post and came up with the idea of Turkey. I didn't know much about Turkey, but I thought it was an important post not getting adequate attention and the ambassador would be very important.

It is fair to say that James Baker, when he became Secretary of State, wanted to put his own

people in the positions occupied by Shultz' appointees. He talked to us; I briefed him on what I thought were the major issues facing the U.S. and the intelligence role. After he was officially sworn in, he called me on the phone and asked me what I wanted to do on my next assignment. I had been giving that question some thought; I would like to have become a regional assistant secretary but I knew they were not available. I did consider retiring, but thought I would give it one more shot. So I told Baker that I would like to be assigned to Turkey. That afternoon to my astonishment Baker called and said he had talked to the President and cleared my name, a total contrast to my experience in the Reagan administration.

I had, during my INR incarnations paid some attention to Turkey and NATO, and Turkey and the Kurds, etc. I had insisted that we blame Iraq publicly for its use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. So I wasn't a total stranger to Turkish issues, but I did not have the background which I had had for Thailand. I certainly had no feel for the people, their culture, or their history. So I spent about two months trying to reduce my gaps of knowledge, including learning some every elemental aspects of the language. I left for Ankara in the summer of 1989.

Turkey attracted me because it was a member of NATO and a player in the Muslim and Central Asian worlds. It was an important U.S. ally with whom we had to maintain good relations. In 1989, I had no idea of what would happen in the Middle East in 1990 and 1991.

In fact, once I got to Ankara, I found it very difficult to gain the attention of the Seventh Floor, not to mention the White House, to Turkish issues. I couldn't even entice an assistant secretary to visit Turkey. The Turks had gained a reputation for always asking for assistance; Washington senior officials did not want to be the target for such requests. The Turks were not viewed too favorably in Washington outside the Pentagon. We did have a number of DoD officials visit, but their visits were driven by our military presence in Turkey, particularly the Air Force. Richard Perle was a strong supporter of funding and was the dominant figure in town until the Iraq war.

During my second year in Ankara, that situation changed totally. That was due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Secretary Baker's frequent visits to Turkey. Baker was all business; he would arrive, talk to the president and a few other Turkish leaders and then leave. He did that on three of the four occasions he visited Ankara. Before his last visit, I went to see the president to tell him that Baker would like to come again to see him. Ozal said that was fine with him, but that Baker had to stay long enough to have dinner with him. So Baker did have dinner with the president and enjoyed it. You never know what problems will confront you as an ambassador! In any case, the second year of my tour was much easier in terms of Washington support.

Q: In discussing Turkey with other officers who served there, one gets the feeling that our relationships with Turkey were filled with day-to-day problems, one after another, thereby minimizing the opportunity to build an overall framework for the relations between the two countries. Did you have that feeling?

ABRAMOWITZ: That point of view is accurate – up to a point. That there were always problems is accurate because we had such extensive relations with Turkey. We had military bases on their territory; we had a large military assistance program; there were frequent NATO issues. Then there was the Greek-Turkish animosity continuously fueled in large part by Cyprus.

So there were always challenges that required discussion with the prime minister, the president, foreign minister or his staff. Marc Grossman, our DCM, was very helpful in this connection and handled many of these matters very well indeed. My recruitment of Grossman was one of my best ideas even though the personnel establishment – and others – were upset since he was grade-wise too junior for the DCM position; I got the Seventh Floor to agree. As you know, he later became ambassador to Turkey and Under-Secretary for Political Affairs. Going back to your point, the nature of an overall framework for relations was the Cold War and the alliance. The problem of another framework became important after the end of the Soviet Union.

Despite daily problems, one distinct difference between Greece and Turkey was the reactions of American officers. I have never met an American Foreign Service person who did not enjoy serving in Turkey. On the other hand, most of those I knew who served in Greece ended up celebrating their last day there. I did not experience Greece. Life was apparently much more difficult in Greece for American officials than it was in Turkey. The Turks are always hospitable and accommodating which allowed us to get past the daily problems and establish good personal relations, even though we come from different cultures. Turks clearly do not now like America – all the polls show that – but I have not experienced that animosity in personal relations. The only departure from that was a calculated show of hostility toward visiting Defense Secretary Cheney over the Greek DECA.

Turkish officials could be difficult. That often happens in dependent relationships such as we had at that time with Turkey. With the end of the Cold War, the situation began to change and that dependency has mostly evaporated. Turkey increasingly marches to its own drummer. During the Cold War, our presence in Turkey was a major security concern for the Turks; we provided a shield for its defense and huge amounts of defense assistance. The principal goal of Turkish foreign policy was to maintain our strong military alliance.

Q: We had a number of situations in the world where we were looked upon as “lord protector” or “big brother”. How did you feel about being in that position?

ABRAMOWITZ: Thailand was far more that type of situation, where I was often viewed – wrongly regrettably – as being able to move mountains. That was much less true in Turkey. In any case, my personality does really not fit the role of “viceroy.” I don’t wave the flag, make all sorts of public appearances, and give orders. That is not my style. I am not entirely comfortable as being occasionally viewed as a savior; when that happens, I find it quite troublesome and certainly overstated.

I sometimes got annoyed with the Turks, in part because they would question our assurances or because they would raise problems of such minor nature that they weren’t really worthy of discussion at senior levels. They could be very bureaucratic, particularly during negotiations. But by and large, I very much enjoyed my tour in Ankara and met a lot of Turks whom I became very fond of. I found and still find Turkey endlessly fascinating; so much so that I have maintained a continuing relationship to a far greater extent than any of the other countries in which I served. I still keep up with the Turkish English press. Back to the point, the role of the American embassy is important but it has declined because Turkey has become a different country.

Q: What was the situation at the end of the 1980 decade with Turkey's participation in the EU?

ABRAMOWITZ: The issue was just beginning to bubble up. Historically, the Turks made a serious mistake by letting the Greeks precede them in getting EU membership. The Turks should have insisted on simultaneous admission; they had the opportunity to do so, but let it pass. Ozal made the decision to join the EU in 1987, but there really wasn't any progress made while I was in Turkey. During the Gulf War I tried to move the progress along by getting the USG to issue the first statement during the Gulf War supporting Turkey's efforts to get into the EU, not only because I thought it was the right policy, but also to show the Turks that we were interested in helping them achieve their goals. By 1995, long after I was gone, finally a customs union was agreed to which was followed later by the EU accepting Turkey as a candidate for membership. Turkey still has a long way to go.

The two major issues during my tour were the Armenian "genocide" and the Gulf War. There were, as I mentioned, a number of other issues, many of which were operational in nature – e.g., use of bases. There were some questions concerning Bulgaria-Turkey relations, some economic issues, the Soviet threat, which was often a NATO issue than just a bilateral problem.

Q: Were you surprised by anything you encountered after your arrival in Turkey?

ABRAMOWITZ: Right from the start unexpected things happened: a) Turkey suddenly had a huge refugee problem – fleeing Bulgarian-Turks. I saw this as an opportunity for the U.S. to be helpful both to refugees and to the host country. It was a humanitarian issue with which I had had some familiarity from my Thailand tour. I was aware of tensions between Bulgarians and this Turkish population, but neither I nor the Turks had any expectation that some 300,000 people would flee to Turkey. Once I grasped the magnitude and its causes the embassy went to work in publicizing the issue and particularly in finding assistance for the Turkish Bulgarians.

Friction between the Turks and the Bulgarians was of course not new. It centered on discrimination against the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria, most recently for me on their surnames. But the embassy and Washington were surprised by the rather sudden and very large flight from Bulgaria. I spent some time with President Ozal on this problem which helped me in establishing a good relationship with him. I think that my immediate reaction and our offer of assistance was a positive introduction to the president and the foreign office and to Turkey in general.

The American embassy has always been an important institution in Turkey. The American ambassador was an important figure covered thoroughly by the Turkish press. American presidents rarely spoke to the Turkish president – it was a different relationship than he had with leaders of other NATO countries. During my tour, no Assistant Secretary for EUR visited Turkey. It is somewhat stunning to remember how we left so much distance from Turkey prior to 1990, even though we used its territory for bases and saw Turkey as an integral part of NATO. Assistant Secretaries disliked meeting with Turks because they always seemed to be asking for something. They were tired of Turkish complaints and "demands." None visited on their own when I was there. George Shultz did make an effort to maintain good relations with the Turks; he

liked and respected his counterpart.

In the late 1980's I would describe our relationships with Turkey despite its ups and downs as "okay." I think it is fair to say at that time that the major player in Washington in determining our policy toward Turkey seemed to be Richard Perle, then Assistant Secretary for ISA in DoD. He was viewed both in Washington and in Ankara sort of as "Mr. Turkey."

The Turks used to complain long and hard about what is known as the 7-10 ratio, which governed the allocation of U.S. assistance between Turkey and Greece. They were unhappy with what they saw as their military requirements were tied to Greece and they also perceived a bias in favor of Greece on the Cyprus issue. Days when we didn't have some tensions about one issue or another were few.

The major source of tension during my first year was the Armenian genocide resolution. I became deeply involved in this problem in 1990. It was a long difficult issue; loaded with enormous emotions on both sides. I didn't think that the Turks have really yet come to grips with their past. While I had some sympathy for the resolution, I was opposed to it being introduced in the Senate. The Senate was not a proper forum for making decisions about Turkish history, one which was strongly disputed by the Turkish government. But even more importantly for American interests, I also had strategic concerns. By early 1990, it was clear to me that we would likely be going to war against Iraq. We would need Turkish assistance and support to mount an attack to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. We did not want to imperil that.

I returned to Washington and spent two or three weeks primarily going from senator to senator, lobbying against the resolution. I must have seen some 60 senators. I did this because the Bush administration was reluctant to becoming publicly involved in the debate; they did not want their fingerprints on any debate about the resolution for domestic political reasons. While opposed to the resolution, the administration was reluctant to be seen taking any highly public actions which might alienate the Armenian-American community. That left the lobbying burden mostly to me.

Senator Robert Byrd played the key role. He mobilized Senate opposition to the resolution. There was a remarkable – and poorly covered – debate that lasted for two days on the genocide resolution. Two of the Senate's leading figures opposed each other on the floor for several hours daily. Bob Dole supported the resolution; Bob Byrd opposed it. The two days were filled with eloquence, which received very little media attention. I thought it was a remarkable event. You don't often see two Titans of the Senate debating an important issue on the floor in a great personal contest. The final vote was very close with Byrd's side winning by a narrow margin.

I had talked to President Ozal at length about the resolution. He was annoyed with it all. It got in his way to do other things with the U.S. He did not like the resolution but simply wanted it out of the way. But he could not publicly take the position of pass the damn thing and let's move on, as he once said to me, his bureaucracy and public vehemently denied any Turkish participation in a genocide. Nevertheless, the conclusion of Senate debate took the issue off the agenda; it came up annually but not in a major way until late in this decade.

We avoided a major confrontation with Turkey in 1990 when the resolution was not passed. The

history is a very sensitive issue and all U.S. governments understand that. The Turks resent having their ancestors branded as committing genocide. Perhaps even more important, the Turks believe that if a resolution on genocide is approved, it will be followed by an avalanche of demands from the Armenians for restitutions and reparations. The Armenians deny that they would pursue such a course, but that does not assuage the Turkish concern.

The Armenians are determined to have a genocide resolution passed by the Congress. They have pursued it for more than thirty years. Such a resolution was passed in the French parliament and some other legislatures. But the U.S. Congress is really their target. There are a million or so Armenian-Americans, concentrated in California – a key state in any primary or general election. Pressure will always be mounted again when a new administration comes to power in Washington. The Armenian-Americans had great hopes for passage in the Congress in 2008; after all, one of their key representatives is now Speaker Pelosi. She was supported by George Miller, also from California; in fact they did come very close with 218 representatives prepared to vote in favor of the resolution. But at the last minute, Pelosi barred the resolution from coming to the floor of the House. The Turks made their position very clear including threats of retaliatory actions and there was great concern that they would deny the U.S. the use of Turkish bases for Iraq. This motivated the administration to put on a full court press which finally forced Pelosi to avoid a vote. There is no question in my mind that the passage of such a resolution will be costly to us. I have told Turks that they have lost the battle of history; that concerned Americans, regardless of Turkish views of the confused wartime situation, most concerned Americans believe that genocide did take place; that point of view will not likely change. Only a clear exposition of the potential costs to national security can prevent ultimate passage of such a resolution.

When Saddam invaded Kuwait in August, President Ozal supported us immediately, but not the bulk of Turks. They were opposed and did not want to get involved. I cannot say that his support would not have been given regardless of the outcome of the Senate action on the genocide resolution. But Ozal hated Saddam Hussein, and resented the Iraqis controlling oil prices; their hold on prices would have increased substantially had they been able to keep Kuwait and control that country's oil production. Turkey had taken a major economic blow in the late 1970's when the Middle East oil producers reduced their output; indeed, it went into a deep recession. Ozal was very sensitive to Iraqi behavior. He fully supported all that Turkey could do to help us, that was important to our war effort. But we dodged a bullet by the defeat of the genocide resolution.

Dealings with top leaders was very important. James Baker, much to his credit, did something that Colin Powell as Secretary had never done in the run up to the Iraq war in 2003. Powell never visited Turkey. Baker came four times in eight months. That was very important. The presence of Ozal made the biggest difference; he was very much pro-American, hated Saddam Hussein – he was on the same wave length with us.

Q: I would like to ask now about the book you edited Turkey's Transformation and American Policy for which you wrote a chapter on "The Complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey". First of all, I want to focus on Cyprus. Did it play a major role during your tour?

ABRAMOWITZ: There were two major episodes during my period about Cyprus. One was

Baker's difficult encounter with Cyprus. We of course during my time kept pushing for a resolution of the Cyprus issue. Ozal was indeed interested in reaching such a resolution. I had a meeting with the Greek prime minister in Ankara during which I was grilled about Turkish intentions in reaching a settlement. I told him that there were a wide range of views in Ankara with the military and some politicians taking a very hard line while Ozal was very interested in reaching a compromise. During the Iraq war, James Baker came to believe that he could bring the parties together to reach a settlement. I thought he was over-optimistic; and minimized the political difficulties a compromise faced at least in Turkey. Furthermore, his timing, I thought, was very poor; our war with Iraq was not popular in Turkey, despite Ozal's support, and any efforts the U.S. might make on Cyprus would be viewed with deep skepticism by the Turks. I told the Secretary that he should not push for a settlement and I personally did little to pursue the issue with the Turks.

Most of my communications on Cyprus were with the EUR country director; from time to time I raised the issue with the office director at State, Towny Friedman. Towny was a very smart and sensible person. He was also sometimes too secretive. He basically agreed with my skepticism on the Cyprus issue. Baker became quite upset with me, blaming me for building an antagonistic atmosphere for a solution of the Cyprus issue. I thought that was not a fair charge; I always told the Secretary that his timing was wrong, but I did not vent my skepticism with Ozal and other Turkish officials. The Secretary's efforts were in vain. No progress was made on a resolution of the Cyprus dispute. A decade had to pass before there was progress. But that failed largely because of the Greek Cypriots

After the end of the Iraq war, President Bush visited Turkey. He was warmly greeted, despite popular distaste for the war, not as vociferous as in the 2003 war. Bush was very gracious. After all, he had won the war. Cyprus was on the list of issues to be discussed by the two presidents. To the best of my recollection, Bush suggested that he convene a trilateral meeting – Turkey, Greece and Cyprus – to see whether the leaders of those countries could not reach some broad agreement. Unfortunately Turkey had just gotten a new prime minister who broke with Ozal – unlike his predecessor who marched to Ozal's tune all the time. The new prime minister was not interested in such a conference because he was concerned that he would be up-staged by Ozal. He wanted to be seen as his own master and one who was in charge in Ankara, not Ozal. So the Bush proposal – an interesting one – went nowhere and the U.S. held the Turkish prime minister responsible for its demise.

In late June, 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney visited Ankara. Tensions on the Kuwait-Iraq border were already rising. Shortly before the SecDef's arrival, the U.S. and Greece announced that they had concluded a defense agreement. I knew nothing about it; I didn't even know that negotiations were taking place. As you can well understand, I was not a happy camper; I was mad as hell. I learned subsequently that I had been intentionally left out of the loop by our country director because he was concerned that we might object to some of provision or other and might try to sabotage his efforts to reach an agreement. In fact, it was not a bad agreement and I think his concerns were unwarranted. It did include some rhetorical language which could have been misinterpreted. That might have been changed. The Turks, however, became incensed by some of the language in the agreement. So when Cheney arrived, he became a target for the Turks who surprisingly ranted to him.

The normally very hospitable Turks treated Cheney almost as if he were a leper. Very few senior people came to the reception the embassy gave for him. I had a conversation with him about the whole business and told him that what he had gone through was “a tempest in a tea-pot”. The agreement posed no threat to Turkey. I asked him to go back to talk to the President and try to convince him to call Ozal to calm things down and dispel any misconceptions that we had just signed on to an anti-Turkish agreement. Cheney did that. Bush made that call and asked Ozal whether he wanted the White House to issue a statement clarifying the agreement and assuring the world that it was not in any way harmful to Turkey. Ozal liked that idea and Bush did make the statement. That calmed the waters in Turkey. Perhaps even more important, this episode established a very close relationship between Bush and Ozal which paid major dividends to us during the Gulf War. I believe that Bush probably consulted with Ozal by phone more often than with any other leader except John Major before the war and during the war period. There were fifty or sixty calls in that 12 month period. Fortunately, Nick Burns at the NSC would brief me after each call, which allowed me to make suggestions for the next call. This president to president exchange became a very valuable tool. So an episode which had such a disastrous beginning ended up in a very positive manner. The law of unintended consequences at work again.

The Turks used the Cheney visit as a means to express their anger and frustration. Not only were the Turks concerned by some of the wording in the Greek-U.S. agreement, but they also resented not having been informed beforehand on a matter they considered to be of vital interest. They might have valid reasons for their displeasure at the Secretary, but I think they also vastly inflated the matter.

Q: The use of Turkish facilities for our military presence in the Middle East plays a major role in our relationships with Turkey. Did they cause you any special challenges?

ABRAMOWITZ: There were always problems with the bases. They were mostly small problems: e.g., the need to remove certain individuals from Turkey for transgressions, the use of bases for special activities, etc. They arose continually and took a lot of our time to resolve.

The major issue arose with the Gulf War and the use of Turkish bases to fight that war. I mentioned that President Ozal hated Saddam and viewed him as a real threat to Turkey's stability. So we had an ally in spirit even before we sought Turkish assistance. At our request, Ozal moved very quickly to shut down the pipeline that carried oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean, even though it was an income earner for the Turks.

Our requests to Turkey included: 1) using their bases for military strikes, 2) moving Turkish troops to the Iraq border as a potential threat to Iraq thereby forcing Saddam to keep Iraq troops on this border rather than moving them south to fight us, and 3) sending some troops to Saudi Arabia to be part of the anti-Saddam coalition. At this time the Turkish military were not on good terms with Ozal because they were unhappy with how he managed national security concerns, which to them was in a free-wheeling manner. By and large, they did not support that war against Iraq.

In any case, Ozal approved our requests for the use of the bases although he delayed all decisions until we actually initiated military actions against the Iraqis. He was not interested in our expanded use of the bases unless actual hostilities broke out; he did not want to have made an unnecessary decision which would have left him politically exposed. Ozal had the implementing legislation immediately approved after we had started bombing; it was done in one day. He called me that day and asked: "Are you satisfied now?"

We had no problem getting the Turks to send troops to the border. On the other hand, the Turkish military refused to send any forces to Saudi Arabia. I don't think I ever fully understood their rationale other than they did not want a direct participation. Ozal was not in a position to really push his military since he already had a somewhat tense relationship with them and didn't want to take on another fight. The Turkish chief of staff at around this time did something which was quite unusual. Instead of leading a coup – as well might have happened in earlier times – he resigned in protest against Ozal's policies and management although he did not publicly put it that way.

We of course were primarily interested in the expanded use of the bases, and were able to use them as needed throughout the war.

Let me go for a minute to one aspect of the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Turkey had had a long tumultuous relationship with its Kurds. Many Turkish citizens living close to the Iraq border are Kurds. Ankara hadn't – and still hasn't – found a way to maintain a peaceful and fruitful relationship with the south-east part of its country. The Turkish military dominated the area and ruled it as if martial law had been declared. In 1988, the Turks, after Saddam's use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, accepted about 60,000 refugees. They did that in part at American urging. This humanitarian gesture caused a lot of commotion in Turkey, who did not want refugees, and, as long as Saddam ruled Iraq, there was little chance for those refugees to return home. It also raised tensions between us and the Turkish government. In the final analysis, the Turks allowed the refugees to enter Turkey and let them stay.

Another major Turkish concern had was the PKK, the insurgent Kurd forces operating in bases in northern Iraq. They were not nearly the threat from Iraq that they became later, but it was an irritant to the Turkish military. Turkey had an understanding with Iraq which allowed its forces to move across the border if necessary in pursuit of PKK insurgents.

The major development in this history occurred during the Gulf War and has shaped events since its occurrence. We had called on the Kurds and the Shiites to raise up against Saddam. There was some response, particularly from the Kurds. Saddam came down hard on Kurdish insurgency causing a very large flow of Kurds to the Turkish border, reaching eventually about half a million refugees. Another million Kurdish refugees fled to the Iranian border. Much of this outflow occurred after the end of the war. Ozal felt it was politically impossible to allow these Iraqi Kurdish refugees to enter. The Kurds on the Turkish border was a major political headache for Ozal.

It was of course a major humanitarian problem. Regardless of where they were, it was obvious that these refugees needed continuous assistance. Furthermore, the Kurds could not stay in their

mountain shelters too much longer because summer was coming and potentially serious health problems because of a lack of water. It was a depressing situation. We pressured the Turks as much as we could to provide assistance to these Kurdish refugees. They provided some, but it was insufficient. I kept insisting to Washington that we take more aggressive action to help the refugees. Washington wanted to send John Bolton who was then the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations. I said we needed higher than that. Suddenly Secretary Baker came; he helicoptered to a site which had Kurds strung along one mountainside. He made some comments, but more importantly, even in that brief period, he saw the desperate nature of the situation. It was a decisive moment. He convinced the President to get the Pentagon involved and the military joined immediately the assistance effort. It was costly, but it made a major difference. It was a turning point in dealing with the Kurdish refugee situation in northern Iraq. Even the Turks, who in general were not happy with the situation welcomed the assistance.

Such assistance was only a short term fix. The fundamental problem of a permanent home for the Iraqi Kurds was unresolved. After many discussions among Bush, Ozal and John Major and sometimes with my involvement with Ozal, it was decided that the Kurdish refugees would be settled in the area many lived in northern Iraq and protected from Saddam. This required some U.S. forces on the ground at least initially to accompany them home, but for the longer term the Kurds would be protected by an allied air monitoring program from Turkish bases. We had to persuade the Kurds to agree to this arrangement; they obviously wanted assurances that they would be sufficiently protected and eventually they agreed to move to the protected area.

It took about six weeks to move the half-million Kurds to their new grounds. The Kurds who had fled to Iran witnessed this migration and came to the conclusion that they should join their fellow Kurds in Iraq. Another million Kurds moved back to northern Iraq. The “protected” zone was created from which Saddam and his minions were excluded – any violation would have had severe military consequences. Ozal was pleased and relieved with this resolution. On the other hand, many Turks were very unhappy because they believed that the creation of this “protected” zone would become the embryo for an independent Iraqi Kurdish state. Such a creation, they felt, would have had a major impact on Turkey’s own Kurds. This new scheme had to be approved by the Turkish legislature – every six months. The first legislative approval was very difficult to obtain, but Ozal managed to squeeze out the necessary votes. Thereafter, for an extended period, this legislative approval became the primary focus of U.S. policy toward Turkey.

The law of “unintended consequences” again followed. I assured all concerned that we could be fully trusted and that we would faithfully maintain watch over the territories occupied by the Kurds and it took assurances from many parts of the U.S. government to have the Kurds and others believe us. The Turks, as I indicated before, were not that enthusiastic about our program. We took special pains to try to reassure them that no independent Kurdish state was contemplated and that after Saddam’s eventual downfall, there would be no more serious concerns about an independent Kurdish state. In fact, our assessments turned out wrong because of another totally unexpected Iraq war. Iraq did disintegrate after our invasion in 2003 which led to the creation of almost a de facto Kurdish state. This semi-independent area in northern Iraq also became a problem for the Turks, most immediately because it was the principal base for periodic Kurdish incursions into Turkey. The U.S. has wrestled with the problem since our invasion. To this day, the issues arising from our invasion as they concern the Kurds are a very,

very sensitive matter for the Turks. The U.S. ____ to build and maintain a stable Iraqi nation, friendly with the Turks and providing no home for the PKK. Over the past year Turkey's position on Iraqi Kurdistan has evolved and a more fruitful relationship has been established between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds.

There is of course considerable uncertainty about the future of an Iraq nation – whether it will survive as a state and what the relationships between the central government and the various regional entities. So our creation of the “safe area” in the 1990-91 period has had unforeseen consequences that deeply involve us today. We were not interested in the establishment of an independent Kurdish nation. I certainly did not in 1991 foresee today's situation – nor do I know of anyone who did, except the Turks whose “nightmare” scenario actually became reality.

On the other hand, I really didn't see any alternative in 1991 to what we did. It was a humanitarian necessity that we help a million and a half people survive and give them protection so they could decently survive. I also thought that it was the right approach even from a Turkish political point of view. We wish our crystal ball had been clearer.

It is true that in 1991 the Turks were not unanimous in their concern over an independent Kurdish state and its potential impact on Turkey's own Kurds. The military, saw the developments in Iraq as very dangerous. Ozal had a somewhat different view. He didn't worry too much about a Kurdish state; he thought that in such a case, the Turks might act as an “older brother” and establish a positive connection. His formulation was quite vague; he was primarily interested in getting the Kurdish problem off the Turkish political agenda by getting the Kurds away from the border.

The second year of my tenure focused on winning the Gulf war and protecting the Iraqi Kurds. In that second year, we also had difficulties with our presence in Turkey. We had one American killed. Many families were scared and wanted to leave. I was constricted in my travels and received a lot of death threats. There were a number of incidents involving Americans. Americans were worried about their safety and sought assurances. Marc Grossman and I spent a lot of time trying to calm those fears. There were some in the official American community that wished for a draw-down of the American presence in Turkey. I did not agree much to the unhappiness of some of our staff. I never thought that the situation had deteriorated to a level requiring any mandated reduction in our official presence.

The anti-Americanism exhibited by some Turks was not organized. Some of the feeling stemmed from a religious fervor fostered by Islamic fundamentalists; some of it was just an opposition to our policies. Popular opposition during the Second Gulf War was far, far worse. As far as I can remember, there were a number of disparate groups making anti-American waves, but no single entity or even a coalition was driving these sentiments. Unlike 2003 the President of Turkey strongly supported us. I don't remember the PKK being involved. The death of the one American weighed heavily on the whole American community in Turkey. Interestingly enough, I received a nice note from Brent Scowcroft well after that incident thanking me for providing support for the American community and for not succumbing to the pressure for evacuation.

Q: On several occasions, you have referred to the Turkish military-civilian relationship. How

would you describe it?

ABRAMOWITZ: The Turkish military is and remains a respected institution in Turkey, stemming from the successful liberation efforts led by General Kemal Ataturk in the early 1920's. He was of course the “father of his country” and the military sees itself as the keeper of Ataturk’s political philosophy. The Turkish military is an autonomous institution, not under civilian control. This has been true from the beginning and is still, by and large, true today, although its power has diminished somewhat and its reputation has been a little tarnished. When I was in Turkey, the military was run by a general who did his best to stay out of politics, while trying to calm whatever restive feelings existed in his military. Unlike some of his predecessors, he was not a “puritan”; he liked informality. The situation in Turkey in the late 1980's and early 1990's was not like today; there wasn't that sharp cleavage between the secular and the religious as you have today. There were plenty of people who thought Ozal was a “closet” fundamentalist, but I never saw any evidence that he had an Islamic agenda. He was a devout Muslim – even though sometimes he took an alcoholic beverage – but I don't think that had much, if any, influence on Ozal's political and governmental agendas.

The Turkish military was not the easiest societal sector to deal with. I don't know whether they ever disclosed much information to us. I felt, as is true in other similar situations, that its relationship with the U.S. was through our military and not the embassy. I saw them often, in part to provide information that Ozal had not passed on to them. I tried to develop a close relationship with the Turkish military leaders; I think on the surface it appeared perfectly civil, but I never reached the point at which I could pick up the phone and chat with a senior officer. The relationships were very formal. I would be invited occasionally to their homes. I would invite the leadership periodically; sometime they would show up and sometime only one or two. It was uneven.

Military to military relationships were, as far as I could see, quite good. We were NATO partners; Turkey depended on us for more modern weapons. I think everybody recognized that we were the key component of Turkish security. The military to military relationship may not have been as close as they were in Korea where both belonged to a unified command, but they were close. Even with the U.S. military, I felt relationships were pretty formal, even though they were deeply involved in Turkish military affairs through our military assistance program and our presence on Turkish bases. I would characterize U.S.-Turkish military relationships as close but not warm.

Q: Let me move to another aspect of your job. Did you have much pressure from American interest groups (e.g., Greek American, Armenian American, Turkish American)?

ABRAMOWITZ: I spent a lot of time with Armenian Americans primarily on the genocide issue. We discussed the issue at great length particularly during the period in 1990 when the Senate was fighting over a resolution of condemnation, which I described earlier. These conversations were held in Washington when I would return for consultations. I think they perceived me as being dispassionate and able to see the various aspects of the issue. They knew what I was doing on the Hill; they were not thrilled by my position against the genocide resolution, but I had reviewed the situation as I saw it with some of them and they understood

where I was coming from. As I suggested earlier, this was one of the most difficult moral issues that I had ever confronted in my work, but as a representative of the U.S. government, I felt had to be concerned by the practical aspects of the situation and the needs of the U.S.

I spent less time with the Greek-American community. I didn't spend much time on the Cyprus issue and had very little contact with Greek government, except for that one session I mentioned earlier with the Greek prime minister. Senator Sarbanes, the voice in Congress of the Greek-American community, spent a few minutes during my confirmation hearings to air his views of the Greece-Turkey situation, but it was mostly for the record. Periodically, when I would return from Ankara, I would call on him to bring him up to date; we obviously disagreed on the situation, but he was always cordial and very well informed.

I should mention that in November 1990 I was offered the presidency of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I decided to take it, but I informed the board that I could not accept it formally until the Gulf War was over. I informed the Department of the offer and my response. Then the Kurdish migration occurred and I told Carnegie that I could not take the position until that problem was resolved. I hoped that by the summer of 1991 that problem would be resolved. The Kurds indeed were returned to their homes by July and that was the end of my Foreign Service career.

Q: How was the Washington backstopping?

ABRAMOWITZ: I was satisfied with the support I got from Washington after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. As I had done in Thailand, I came back for consultations frequently. Also having the advantage of knowing many of the senior policy makers both in State and in Defense. I could always speak with them if necessary, and frequently did. For example, I would always call on Secretary of Defense Cheney during my trips back. Relations with the NSC were close and exceedingly helpful. Nick Burns kept us well informed of president-to-president communications as well as assuring that certain actions took place. Towner Friedman was very good as the country director in State and we talked frequently by phone. He was smart and active. I had contacts with Secretary Baker. So I had no problem getting senior officials to focus on the small number of issues that I raised. For example, with the help of Bob Zoellick, then the counselor of the Department, and over the opposition of EUR, we got the U.S. government to issue a statement in support of Turkey's membership in the EU – the first we had made. Now its almost a monthly occurrence.

MILDRED A. PATTERSON
General Services Officer
Ankara (1989-1992)

Mildred A. Patterson was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. She graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and entered the Foreign Service in 1976. Her postings abroad included Copenhagen, Brussels and Ankara. Ms. Patterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

PATTERSON: The commander of Sinop was then Colonel, later General, Chuck Thomas. Chuck occasionally had business in Ankara and would stay with us when he came to the city. One evening he told us that a few of his soldiers had formed a rock band and he said they were really pretty good. Some time later Marc and I invited the Sinop band to play at a big party that we gave, a big representation party. Well, this was a huge success. All of the guests and we the hosts had a great time. The USIA officers at the party liked the music so much that the cultural affairs officer scheduled the band from Sinop all around Turkey and had them play at four or five Turkish universities. So, a connection from the War College ended up serving U.S. representation interests and USIA program interests for nearly a year until the band members' assignments were finished.

Q: Well, then you were in from '89 to?

PATTERSON: '92.

Q: '92. What was the situation politically and all in Turkey when you arrived?

PATTERSON: We went to Turkey in the fall of 1989. That was a surprise. We were supposed to be going to Paris where I was going to be the deputy in the consular section and Marc should have been the political counselor, but in late spring of 1989, Ambassador Morton Abramowitz asked Marc to come to Turkey to be his deputy chief of mission. For awhile it looked like I was going to go on leave without pay, but in the end I took the general services course and went to Turkey as the number three general services officer. I took a two grade downstretch to do that. After training, I arrived in Turkey in November of 1989.

When I first arrived bilateral relations were quite cool, because the U.S. Congress was involved at that point in passing a very tough anti-Turkish resolution having to do with the Armenian genocide that had occurred in the early 1900s. The Turks were furious about it. Ambassador Abramowitz flew back to Washington to try to persuade the Congress not to pass the resolution. When I first arrived the Abramowitzs had been there since August and Marc had gotten there in September, and we were all kind of frozen out. Senior Turkish government wives that Mrs. Abramowitz had expected to call on were not available and the Ambassador and Marc were also having quite a time in getting in to see Turkish officials. By the spring of 1990, relations were slightly warmer, but still not what they should have been. Turkish Government representatives boycotted that year's July 4th reception, because no senior U.S. officials had attended the Turkish National Day reception in Washington the previous October. Then with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Ozal jumped right in to support President Bush, and the nature of the relationship changed and warmed up immediately.

Q: Were you, during the time you were there was there a problem with terrorists? I mean you had the Kurds, was it the Kurdish Liberation I mean it was a Marxist group. What was it called?

PATTERSON: Right. The PKK.

Q: The PKK and then the... But were there other groups coming out of the university?

PATTERSON: There were, yes, they were called Dev Sol. They were extremely dangerous and murdered several Americans and others in Turkey at that time.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

PATTERSON: I was the number three general services officer although I rather rapidly became the de facto number one, because the person I was supposed to work for had a heart attack and died just before I got to post. Unlike an assignment to a consular section where you would have a general idea of what was going on politically because you'd attend the country team meetings, that's not necessarily the case for a general services officer. I knew about what was going on in trying to keep the Embassy running in terms of customs and shipping, the motor pool, transportation, peoples' plumbing, etc, but unfortunately didn't get much political context for all of that. I had a staff of about 100 Turkish employees, of whom 30 or so were white collar employees and the other 70 a variety of porters and plumbers, electricians, chauffeurs, and carpenters.

Q: How did you find as a working force, how was this?

PATTERSON: The Turks are extremely hardworking and productive. An inspector who was doing a follow up inspection came from inspecting London and Ireland. He kept comparing the Turkish employees very favorably to the Irish and the British FSNs. He just couldn't believe how hard the Turkish employees worked. They took few breaks and were very efficient.

Q: How did you find this with this tandem couple? Here you were running the area that kept the embassy working. I mean you were essentially in the bowels of the ship making the engine run, but all of a sudden you're the DCM's wife. You went from one or did you play the DCM's wife?

PATTERSON: Oh, sure, I did. Mrs. Abramowitz was a very active ambassador's wife. She enjoyed and was wonderful at being the ambassador's wife and did most of the representational things that the spouse would do. We split responsibilities so I served on the board of the American Turkish Library, while she was on the board of the Turkish-American Womens Club. I did the things I could manage within my work responsibilities. I did my share of entertaining within the Mission wearing my spouse's hat. For example, the Embassy Christmas party moved to our house rather than being held at the Ambassador's. The Easter Egg hunt took place at the Ambassador's. It all worked it out.

Q: How did the embassy family work in Ankara, Ankara being sort of stuck in the middle of not the most beautiful place in the world? I'd think it would be a little difficult.

PATTERSON: Well, one difficulty the first year we were there was the terrible air pollution that came from the burning of soft coal. By our second year Ankara was converting to natural gas to heat the buildings and that made a huge difference. Because Ankara is located so far from Turkey's great cultural or historical sites, many Embassy employees actively sought to get out to see things. There was an outstanding organization in Ankara called the American Research Institute in Turkey, which provided an intellectual underpinning for a lot of us who enjoyed

lectures on the archeological ruins. The archeologists themselves would come and talk about their digs and lead tours to their sites. People who liked music went regularly to the Ankara Symphony. In other words, there were things to do, but you had to actively seek them out. Many of us loved going to Istanbul. Istanbul is a world class city and that's where the Turkish art world was happening.

Q: How did you find relations between the embassy and the consul general in Istanbul?

PATTERSON: Consulates usually complain that an Embassy neglects them and I think that's generally true, not just of Turkey, but of all other big Missions as well. My relationships with the admin officers in the consulates were very good and I tried to help them all. We had had three consulates at that time, Istanbul, Izmir and Adana. So, I did my best to make things go well. The consulates felt that the Embassy held the purse strings a little too tightly. They would have liked to control their money more than they did, but I tried to stay out of the conversations between the consulates and the budget officer.

Q: Now did the Gulf War and the British participation and all that, did that have much effect on the embassy?

PATTERSON: It had a tremendous effect on everything the Embassy did. My personal involvement occurred when Saddam Hussein began threatening to take foreign diplomats hostage in Baghdad. I was sent to Diyarbakir to find a place to shelter people coming out of Iraq. For some days we thought many Americans and other foreigners were going to come north from Baghdad and Kuwait, but in fact only some Americans did. We had a group of about 30 Embassy Kuwait and Embassy Baghdad women and children with their pets cross into Turkey. A day or so later Saddam Hussein let foreigners fly out of Iraq.

Q: You're talking about refugees, I mean, people who had been hostages or working there and all of a sudden they were caught, both in Kuwait and in Iraq.

PATTERSON: Right. Washington had forced many of the surrounding posts to evacuate and they tried to force Marc and the Ambassador to send people out of Turkey. They resisted and I always thought that that was a good decision. I thought it was great that we didn't have to evacuate because in the end they needed all of us doing our jobs in Turkey.

Q: Did you get involved in the Kurdish refugee problem?

PATTERSON: Yes, for a short time. That was a year later, in the spring of 1991.

Q: Because you know we had that enclave there. I think Secretary Baker came and took one look and said we've got to do something about this.

PATTERSON: Right. You know, again because I was the GSO, I was involved in the support structure of all those Secretary Baker's visits, but not in the political substance of the visits. He came four or five times.

Q: This was, how about contacts with other than the work force, with the Turks? I mean had this opened up?

PATTERSON: It did. Over time we had begun to make a lot of friends in Turkey. Often at other diplomats' dinner parties we would Turks whom we hadn't met before whom we enjoyed knowing. We met a lot of nice people through our fellow DCMs in Turkey. Also, we had so many Washington visitors to Turkey so that almost all of the entertaining we did was connected to a visit and that brought us into contact with yet more Turks.

Then in July of 1991 we had the big visit of President Bush to Turkey, which was the first visit of an American President to Turkey since Lyndon Johnson. This was a huge undertaking both politically as well as from the point of view of the general services officer. Seven hundred people came to Ankara and another 700 people accompanied the President to Istanbul.

Q: Why don't you I mean actually of course the archives usually talk about the Lyndon Johnson visits because he's a legend, you know, meeting this and that. From your perspective which was of course very much the management perspective, how did these go, the visit go?

PATTERSON: Well, as with all White House visits the planning started months in advance. We had a pre-pre-advance team, then a pre-advance team, and then the advance team came and changed the previous groups' instructions. Most of them were nice people. The advance team people I had encountered when President Bush had been Vice President and he visited Belgium were a less friendly and less cooperative group of people to work with and did some serious damage to working relations with the Belgians. As President, however, he had an extremely professional, though demanding, advance team. We rented every car in Ankara that there was to rent and we rented every Xerox machine that we could find. We had to put special fittings on the Embassy's pick-up trucks so that the TV cameramen had the right support as they took their pictures. We booked every hotel room in town because a traveling group of 700 people exhausted the resources of the two major hotels, the Sheraton and the Hilton. I can't remember how many military planes brought in how many tons of communications and other equipment. Among other things the planes brought in three different limousines.

Q: Who the hell are these 700 people?

PATTERSON: I think it was about 150 journalists and another 100 White House communications people. There was the official delegation, which included businessmen and others, and they probably added up to another 75 or so. We didn't have any congressmen as I recall on the visit. Somehow the numbers mounted. What I thought was amazing was that it was 700 in Ankara and then another 700 different people in Istanbul. The President and Mrs. Bush were in each city for a day. President Bush and President Ozal had developed a strong relationship during the Gulf War and liked each other. The visit was considered a huge success by both sides.

Q: It drew some of the venom out of this Armenian thing. It's something that keeps surfacing and it never goes away.

PATTERSON: Yes.

Q: Somewhere along the way, maybe we haven't come to that, you produced a child?

PATTERSON: We adopted a child.

Q: Well, adopted a child.

PATTERSON: It was at the very end of that first tour in Turkey. She was born in Giresun, which is a town on the Black Sea. Friends of ours in Turkey, an American married to a Turk, helped us find her and in June of 1992 when she was three months old, we went to court in Giresun and the judge approved the adoption.

Q: Oh, how wonderful. Well, then you left there in '92 along with the daughter?

PATTERSON: Right.

Q: Whither?

PATTERSON: We came back to the United States and I became the director of what was then the Emergency Center in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, which was a job that I did for a year. This was the part of the Consular Bureau that worries about private Americans traveling overseas. We handled the Washington end of prisoners, deceased Americans, lost Americans. I was the director of the office for a year. Then, really because of the baby and not wanting to be on call 24 hours a day, I curtailed and moved to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for a year where I shared a job with a civil service colleague as the analyst for Armenia and Georgia.

Q: All right. I think this is probably a good place to stop and so we'll pick this up in 1992 when you've come back to Washington and we'll talk about consular affairs dealing with emergencies. Great.

Today is the 16th of June, 2003. You mentioned that we had forgotten to cover your involvement with the Kurdish refugee affairs. This happened when in '91?

PATTERSON: Yes.

Q: Well, anyway, it probably would have been '91. This is during the aftermath of the war in Iran, I mean Iraq.

PATTERSON: Right.

Q: You want to talk about what your involvement was?

PATTERSON: Yes. In the spring of 1991 I was sent to Istanbul to be the acting chief of the

consular section and I was there worrying about the usual kinds of summertime consular problems. We had a few Mormon missionaries who were being thrown out of Turkey for evangelizing and who would just get on a ferryboat and go to Greece and turn around and come back again. There was a continuing terrorist threat from some anarchist groups who murdered some private Americans and a number of American companies were quite concerned about their Turkish and their American employees. I was dealing with those kinds of issues when a call came from the Embassy in Ankara to come back immediately to Ankara because the Ambassador wanted me to take on a different assignment. I left Istanbul very hurriedly and went back to Ankara where Ambassador Abramowitz said that I needed to go to the Air Force Base at Incirlik because we were going to start a food drop to the Kurdish refugees who were attempting to drive north over the mountains into Turkey. My very first task was to deal with the actual contents of the food drops, because the Air Force was going to drop "meals ready to eat", otherwise known as MREs, and in each box of six or eight MREs there was always one that had pork products in it. The Ambassador wanted me to go to Incirlik to see if there was any way that we could extract those pork meals from the boxes so that we would not be offending the Kurds.

I got to Incirlik and the General in charge at the time, General Jamerson, and the others who were involved in the relief supply drops were extremely concerned because they had been telling the Ambassador that it was impossible to separate out those meals. Indeed, when I saw what the parachute riggers were doing and how the relief bundles were prepared, I saw immediately that there was no way that you could open up individual cardboard cases of MREs, subtract the pork one, repackage and then put it on these bundles. Now, a bundle was actually an enormous wooden platform piled high with cases of MREs and then wrapped in plastic sheeting and then wrapped in a plastic tarpaulin. The bundle weighed about 600 pounds. So, the idea that we all had from the movies of parachutes with something underneath floating gently to the earth was complete nonsense, because what these were going to do was just hurtle down to earth. Indeed, before the Kurdish refugees understood how fast they dropped and how heavy they were, there would be people who would run toward them and wait under them. There were a number of Kurdish refugees killed by the force of a 600 pound bundle coming down on them. As I made the decision that we were definitely not extracting the pork MRE from the cases, the civil affairs and the psychological operations experts proceeded to put together leaflets that were dropped out of the airplanes explaining first how to eat, how to use the MREs. They had to do this because many of the Kurdish refugees were illiterate, though not all. Many of them had come from the Northern Iraqi cities, Mosul, Kirkuk and there were pharmacists, doctors and other very well educated people among them, but there were uneducated Iraqis as well, so the explanations had pictographs in addition to written instructions. There were also leaflets that reminded the Kurds that Allah had said that in an emergency the rules could be bent in order to stay alive. The U.S. was trying to help them not starve to death.

My other job then was to act as a liaison between the American generals who had come from EUCOM and the Turks and the Embassy in Ankara. It was fascinating to me to see how our military came in to deal with this crisis, how well organized they were, how they used the psychological operations unit and the civil affairs unit, how they restored order, built latrines and laid out tent cities for the refugees. Some important generals took part in this whole operation beginning with Air Force Major General Jim Jamerson and Marine Corps Brigadier General Anthony Zinni, who later became the head of CENTCOM. Then as the effort grew larger and

they needed to bring in French and British forces as well, the military doctrine required that once forces were internationalized, a three star general had to be put in charge. So General John Shalikashvili arrived. He later became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The whole effort in Turkey ended up involving people whose careers continued to be connected to Turkey and northern Iraq and the Middle East for some years afterwards.

Q: Were you called into this after Secretary of State Baker had made his famous took one look at the refugees, flew down to the border and saw what was going on and turned around and said we've got to do something about this?

PATTERSON: Yes.

Q: Were you there when we lost a helicopter with our consul general and others who were accidentally shot down by an American plane? Do you recall that?

PATTERSON: That happened later. My tenure lasted about a month at Incirlik before I was called back to Ankara.

Q: Were you able to pick up any vibes from the Turkish military and all who were involved in this about this mass of Kurds on their border?

PATTERSON: There had been previous refugee influxes to Turkey and they had a huge Kurdish refugee population surrounding the city of Diyarbakir and they were still dealing with that. So, the Turks were determined that this next influx was not going to actually cross the border. Because of their own interests they supported the United States and the other countries in trying to keep the Kurds on the Iraqi side of the border.

Relations between the U.S. military and the Turkish military at Incirlik were always prickly. So, there was a little bit of mediation that needed to go on between the two military staffs. The Turks assigned a very diplomatic, charming Turkish general to be the liaison to General Jamerson and the two men worked out a professional and congenial relationship that helped things so that Operation Provide Comfort could go forward fairly easily. There were always things to work out that Turks were sensitive about, sovereignty issues, etc, but by and large the Turks certainly supported what we were trying to do. They did not want more refugees in their country.

Q: Did you feel an engagement of our troops in this Turkish relief effort above and beyond the normal this is a job and this is what we do?

PATTERSON: Very much so. First because of the humanitarian crisis and then because it was the beginning of creating the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds had fled their cities and in many cases had gotten in their cars and driven north as far as the cars would go until they ran out of gas and then they had gotten out and walked further. It was cold, muddy, in those mountains and they had no food. In the beginning American troops who were there were very involved in trying to help the crisis. (End of tape)

Q: Looking at this, were there recommendations made to make MRE meals ready to eat Islamic

pack, in other words.

PATTERSON: That's a good question and I don't know the answer to that.

Q: I was thinking this would come up and I would think it could be done.

PATTERSON: Sure. I want to say one other thing about someone involved in helping to save the Kurds. A person well known in refugee circles who arrived to help was Fred Cuny. Fred was an expert in organizing camps and figuring out solutions to refugee crises. Later he went on to other crises in Eastern Europe and most notably Chechnya, where he was taken hostage and then killed.

Q: Well, then were you picking up any sort of frustration from the military about how the Gulf War ended? Probably not. This is when you go back to Washington?

PATTERSON: That was the summer of 1991. We were in Turkey for another year, until 1992 and then in August of 1992 I took up my position as director of the emergency services office in the Consular Affairs Bureau.

Q: Who was in charge of consular affairs?

PATTERSON: Right then it was Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Tamposi, but she departed the scene after about two months because of the incident of getting into the passport files.

Q: Well, that was one of those serious little things. You might, since you were sort of in the office, could you explain what that was?

PATTERSON: My memory is hazy, but she asked someone in the Passport Services Directorate to retrieve the passport applications and files belonging to some Democrats and particularly those of Bill Clinton, the Democratic nominee for President of the United States. The point was to discover whether he had renounced his citizenship while he was in England as a student during the Vietnam War.

Q: Yes, because of the draft. He was overseas and the rumor was that there was a letter asking to renounce his American citizenship and of course this is just too attractive for a political person not to go after.

PATTERSON: Tamposi was a Republican appointee. When news of this passport file search came out in the press, she left and was succeeded by Mary Ryan, a career Foreign Service Officer who had been her principal deputy sometime earlier and whom Tamposi had fired and who now came roaring back, to the great delight of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Q: How long were you doing this emergency services?

PATTERSON: I did the job for a year.

Q: What, so this would be '92 to '93?

PATTERSON: '93.

Q: When you say emergency services, what do you mean?

PATTERSON: This is the part of the State Department that worries about the welfare of private citizens who reside or travel abroad. There were about 45 employees, a mix of Foreign Service and Civil Service, who handled the Washington end of the cases of Americans who were arrested abroad, who were ill, who were lost, all those backpacking kids who really generally aren't lost, but who forget to call home and whose parents then panic and think that they are lost, deceased Americans and then crises such as civil war in a country where we then have to evacuate a population of Americans. There were no evacuations the year that I was the director of the emergency services, which set a record, but we had the gamut of sad and awful death cases, such as college kids on spring vacations who fell overboard from their cruise ship because they'd been drinking too much.

Generally there are about 2,000 Americans in jail at any one time, and I remember at that time we had many Americans in prison in Jamaica. Jamaica was a place where a lot of drug dealers were recruiting young people from the New York area. They were called "mules". They would be recruited by drug dealers to go to Jamaica and pick up a stash of drugs and try to slip them into the U.S. As those young people began to fit a profile, Customs and DEA picked up more and more at the U.S. ports of entry, and the Jamaicans arrested them before they could even leave Jamaica, so that we had over 70 Americans in jail just in Jamaica alone.

Q: Can you recount, in other words, tell young people who were going to Jamaica, don't mess with us?

PATTERSON: We did. We started some very targeted campaigns. As I recall we were working closely with some of the congressmen from the New York area because in many cases the "mules" were young African American New Yorkers and there were several congressmen from New York who caught on to that. CA put a special brochure together warning of the risks of smuggling illegal drugs and the likelihood of incarceration and there was a press campaign and radio ads. We also made a real effort to target students before spring break in order to remind them that they were subject to the laws of whatever country they were in. We tried very hard to put accurate information in the consular information sheets so that travelers would have a realistic picture of a country they had chosen to visit. Mexico was a popular destination for college students and the Mexican consular information sheet even at that time was quite long and detailed, especially the section on the consequences of getting involved with illegal drugs.

Q: How was the prisoner exchange program? What was your impression of how it worked?

PATTERSON: With Mexico it worked reasonably well depending on whether the Americans in jail in Mexico had abided by Mexico's rules. We had some prisoners in Bangkok that had a harder time and then for years we have worked on a prisoner exchange agreement with Japan that is only now finally coming into fruition.

Q: What was the problem with Japan?

PATTERSON: I can't tell you specifically because the last couple of years I've been away from the American citizens services side of consular work and I just don't know the ins and outs. I do know that the Japanese had legal point after legal point that they wanted to negotiate and then the treaty needed to go through their various bureaucracies and authority. It's really been a long struggle with Japan.

Q: I've seen people, I can think of sort of two cases that pop up from time to time. One was somebody hiking in the Andes and never showed up. Another one was I think maybe two people in Indonesia or something like that. It must have been some of these cases with people, they just disappeared.

PATTERSON: Absolutely. Now, really one of the longest standing cases involved some Americans who disappeared, but we knew some of what had happened to them. There were three young men who were New Tribes missionaries who were kidnaped in Panama by guerrillas from Colombia and taken across the border into Colombia. They were taken in January of '93 and have never been found.

Q: At this point consular work has changed over the years, but at this point, great emphasis was there on going to prisons, seeing the prisoners quite frequently?

PATTERSON: Yes, we were requiring consular visits between two and four times a year and a report each time, a quite detailed report on the condition of the prisoners, what they were eating and how they were being treated.

Q: What about, let's say the conditions were poor in a country, but everybody else is being treated the same way in that country. What could we do?

PATTERSON: We couldn't do much. We had no grounds to protest on their behalf if they were being treated exactly the same as the nationals in that country, but generally the consular officers could try and rally the American community to provide them books. In some countries where we had to feed them using the loan program available to destitute American prisoners, the consular sections would have to find people shop for them. We also supplied them with vitamins. Certainly in Bangkok we were feeding them or we had to arrange that meals were brought to them everyday from the outside.

Q: Where did the money come from?

PATTERSON: You're going to ask me the whole name of it and I can't remember it. It's called an EMDA loan, an emergency dietary loan that comes from appropriated funds specifically for destitute prisoners and the prisoner is supposed to repay the loan once out of jail.

Q: Were there any particular countries where there were particular problems?

PATTERSON: There were always some arrest notification problems. Vietnam, as I recall, was a problem, because most of the Americans who were arrested in Vietnam – there were somewhere between six and twelve of them - were Vietnamese Americans. The Vietnamese did not consider them Americans and therefore didn't feel obliged to let us know that they were there. They could be there for months before we learned that there was an American in prison. Often we first heard about a case from family members in the United States who, after months of trying to be patient and work quietly in Vietnam to get their relative released, would eventually come to us out of frustration.

Q: Did you run across the problem of say with the Mexicans of informing us if our citizen was arrested, where my understanding is that particularly with the Texas authorities often aren't and so many other states bordering on Mexico, aren't particularly forthcoming as far as notifying. Mexican consuls if they've got a Mexican citizen, was this a problem for you?

PATTERSON: That became an issue later in the 1990s. In 1992 we were badgering the Mexicans all the time, but they were not casting back at us that we were not reciprocating nor did they seem particularly interested that their citizens might be in our jails. It was really one sided in 1992.

Q: Well, in '93 where did you go?

PATTERSON: Because of the baby at home and my worries that a crisis in the world would potentially keep me in the office for days at a time, I curtailed my assignment in CA, so I did the job for only one year instead of the usual two. Starting in August of 1993 I shared a job with a civil service partner in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. For a year I was a part-time analyst for Armenia and Georgia.

Q: Question. How was adoption proceedings, how did you find them in Turkey in those days?

PATTERSON: Unlike, say, Romania or Russia or China or Korea where they have an organized system that allows foreigners to come in and adopt a child, there is no routine way that foreigners adopt children in Turkey. For one thing most Turkish children who are orphaned are taken in by their extended family. Our daughter was born in a maternity hospital and abandoned there. We went to court in Giresun, a town on the Black Sea, and we went through the Turkish adoption procedures as if we were Turks. We were very fortunate, because a Norwegian couple had adopted a baby in Giresun several years before we did and the judge simply followed what had been done for the Norwegians. After the judge made his decision, the case was turned over to a notary, who wrote up the actual adoption document. It was not until the notary's document was signed that actually the baby became ours.

Q: Job sharing. It sounds like all of a sudden, it's hot bedding the desk. Somebody leaves and you take over. How did this work?

PATTERSON: INR was known in those days, and may still be known, for its flexibility in hiring. So, I went first to INR asking what kind of jobs they might have for somebody who didn't want to work the crazy 60 or 80 hour days that you can in other places in the State Department.

There was a young mother in INR, Toby Davis, who was also interested in sharing a job at that point and the two of us worked it out between the two of us how we would do it. Her bosses were very supportive and the INR personnel officer was extremely supportive. The trickiest part of the whole thing was getting paid because the timekeeper kept making mistakes.

My partner had worked in INR a number of years and really knew the two countries well and I admired her expertise very much. I was the junior partner in the deal I will certainly have to say and I never made a major judgment about either Armenia or Georgia without checking with Toby first. That kind of analytic work in INR requires putting tiny pieces of information together to form a larger picture. You just had to get a feel for it. I only did the job for a year and that's not nearly enough to develop any kind of significant analytic expertise. The job involves a lot of sifting of information. I did quickly learn to know what we had seen before, what was not going to be of particular interest to anybody although it would be small details that later on might become interesting. INR had excellent computers, a much better computer system than any place else I had worked in the Department and of course it was a classified system. They had all kinds of information being dumped into the system that I just found fascinating in and of itself in terms of how the intelligence world gathers information.

In terms of the actual logistics, Toby worked Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays until about 2:00 pm, and I worked Wednesdays from about 11:00 am until Friday evening. So, we split the week with some overlap on Wednesdays. I had been warned, and it proved to be true, that when you work part time you don't work just the part time hours, you actually end up working more. Although in theory I was only supposed to work 20 hours a week, I actually worked somewhere between 26 and 30. Briefly, the job was to watch what was going on in both countries and write analyses that the INR Assistant Secretary would use either in briefing the Secretary or that would go into the Secretary's Morning Summary.

Q: Well, let's take Armenia first. What was going on when you were there?

PATTERSON: We watched Azerbaijan as well, but our main focus was on Armenia and Georgia. The Armenians were just getting on their feet in terms of being an independent country after the break up of the Soviet Union. We were watching the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and what that meant domestically in Armenia. Another item was the status of Armenia's energy supply and its dependence on one of the old fashioned nuclear reactors of the type that had blown apart in Chernobyl. That reactor sits on a major earthquake fault line. Armenia's dire economic situation was another issue. The Armenians were poor as could be and cold most of the winter and we watched much of the Armenian population go to Moscow and stay with relatives in order to escape the winters.

In Georgia we were watching the civil war between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. We watched the attempts by the Russians to keep their thumbs on Shevardnadze and his efforts to deal with the Russians, the tremendous crime in his country and the bleak economic situation.

Q: Well the breakaway group there, how did we read them? I mean were they, was somebody else prompting them or was this an indigenous thing?

PATTERSON: We were reading them at the time as enjoying huge support from the Russians.

Q: What was the feeling, I mean what did the Russians want to do, retake Georgia essentially?

PATTERSON: Yes, they did not like the idea that it would slip away from its influence and that they wanted its ports.

Q: Were we doing anything in either of these places?

PATTERSON: At that point, no. Now some American troops are there as military trainers, I believe, but in the early '90s all we were doing was watching. We were giving Shevardnadze lots and lots of moral support, but we were giving him very little actual support.

Q: Was the American community in the United States a factor as you looked at what was going on, I mean the Armenian factor in America?

PATTERSON: Yes, they were a factor because Armenia was getting a tremendous amount of aid from us. Tremendous aid. The Armenian Americans made sure of that.

Q: At that time was the devastation of the earthquake from some years before still a factor?

PATTERSON: Yes. They were so poor they hadn't been able to rebuild, and the Embassy and any Washington visitors were still reporting seeing wrecked buildings.

Q: It sounds that what you're saying particularly at that time, but particularly Armenia, but also to a certain extent Georgia were you know, sort of ideals of wouldn't it be nice for the Armenians to have a country, but there wasn't anything to put a country together there.

PATTERSON: They were both basket cases economically. If it weren't for the Armenian Americans and Shevardnadze, the U.S. probably would have paid very little attention to them. But the Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbot, was an admirer of Shevardnadze, although as I said there was very little that we actually did for them. That was '93 to '94. Then in 1994 my husband was nominated to be Ambassador to Turkey, so I left my job in August of '94 and went to Turkish language training for a semester.

Q: You were in Turkey from when?

PATTERSON: We arrived in Turkey in January of 1995 until June of 1997. This time I went back as the wife of the Ambassador and not as an active duty officer. I was on leave without pay for two and a half years.

Q: How did Marc get to be Ambassador? There's often a political appointment there. I was wondering.

PATTERSON: When he was chosen he was the Executive secretary of the Department and working very closely with Secretary Christopher. I can't tell you how within the inner sanctum

of the Department it was decided to put his name forward, nor can I explain particularly why the White House agreed.

Q: I was just wondering if you were aware of any of the normal things that are going on when somebody gets to be an ambassador to a major post, which this was.

PATTERSON: Well, what I do know is that there were discussions between the State Department and the White House over which posts would go to political appointees and which posts would go to career people in the posts that were coming open. I know that the various posts on the two lists kept changing and I think for a while Turkey probably was on the political appointee list. It's possible that when the White House looked around to see whom they would send to Turkey, maybe they couldn't easily come up with a political appointee.

Q: Sort of as the wife of the chief of mission, how did you find this role?

PATTERSON: It was harder than being an active duty Foreign Service Officer for several reasons. One is that when you are working at the embassy all day you are, by a kind of osmosis, absorbing information all the time, but being at the residence cut me off from information. As hard as Marc tried to bring home as much information as he could, he couldn't replace the things you learn from meeting someone in the corridor or in the cafeteria. I missed that and I immediately had much more sympathy for other spouses who didn't work and who were consequently out of the information loop. I also found it hard because there were a number of officers who basically just thought of me as a potted plant. Each time that we put on an event at the residence for certain sections of the Embassy, I always felt that their respective section chiefs had no idea of the amount of work and organization that was required.

I enjoyed the role in many ways, however, and it's a wonderful privilege to represent your country in that role. At dinner parties I was the lucky one because I would be the one who sitting next to the foreign minister or whichever Turkish minister it was whereas Marc was dealing with their spouses, many of whom were very interesting, but a number of whom didn't speak English. I would often come home from the dinner parties having had a much more interesting evening than Marc. We traveled as much as we could. Marc was on the road more than I, but as much as I could I joined him, and that is a unique way to see a country.

Q: We're talking about sort of the new Foreign Service where there are no longer, almost a practically not a category of Foreign Service wives. You can be what you want to be, but that doesn't take away the work of the wife of the chief of mission. How you slice it, she has a big machine to operate. How did you find dealing with the wives' side of this equation, you know, I mean I'm talking about official business, putting on dinners, receptions and all. Did you find this difficult?

PATTERSON: It depended on which wives. The military wives were wonderful. They would help me at the drop of a hat, the attache wives.

Q: They had been trained.

PATTERSON: They had been trained to and they did it willingly and cheerfully and they were just wonderful. There was a charming wife who had been a florist before she and her husband were assigned overseas and she would come before big parties and at Christmas time to decorate the residence. The residence had an infinite capacity to absorb flowers, I mean it was so big. The attaché wives were also a huge help with the Fourth of July reception. Many of the wives in Ankara were employed so that meant that the cadre of people available to help was small. What it really meant was that for many things we had to pay to have things done and of course we were always trying to stretch representation funds. That was a challenge always. I always felt like I was putting on a play with the residence as the theater and I simply was changing the scenes all day long. We would put on a breakfast and maybe there would be a press conference in the middle of the morning and then maybe Marc would have two people to lunch. He would have people to tea and then we'd have a dinner. For the kitchen to work well, we couldn't have an enormous dinner and an enormous lunch on the same day. One or the other, but not both. You learned what your kitchen could handle, what your staff could handle, how many extra staff were required for larger functions. I felt that I was in charge of a great logistical operation.

Q: Did you find there you are you're sitting at dinner next to the foreign minister, you know, people are coming, were you putting on your Foreign Service professional hat?

PATTERSON: Yes, always.

Q: With Marc would you sit down and because it's been my experience that often the wives come back with information that the guys don't get. This is the old Foreign Service. They'd say such and such is happening and hell I hadn't heard about this.

PATTERSON: Right, absolutely. The Turks loved to talk politics whether they were at the top of the social structure or at the bottom. I would have fascinating conversations on whatever was the issue of the day, asking what they thought, where it was going. I would try to gather a little bit of biographic information as well. The days when junior officers put biographies together seem to have faded away. It's too bad, because when you're in the position of either ambassador or wife of the ambassador they are very useful to have.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, what was your during this '95 to '97 period, what was your sounding of Turkish American relations?

PATTERSON: They were really were quite good in those years. The Turks were beginning to work more closely with the Israelis and that was bringing a new perspective on Turkey from the American Congress. The fact that the U.S. Government had sent Marc back as Ambassador meant a lot to the Turks. The Turks value friendship and they knew that Marc was coming as a friend. It didn't keep him from blasting them over human rights or from talking about torture and some of the truly hard issues, but they knew that he was coming not as a scolder, but as a friend, saying "come on, you can do better than this. This is beneath you to do this." There were many others in the Embassy who were there for their second or third tour as well, so the Embassy was quite lucky with its team right then. U.S. investment in Turkey was increasing and the Turkish economy was looking a little brighter and that helped, too. Marc worked very hard to try and help Turkey get the pipeline built that would come from Tajikistan to the port that's called

Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.

Q: Was Cyprus an issue that came up all the time?

PATTERSON: Always, but the Turks were a little tired of Cyprus so it wasn't a dominant issue.

Q: Having served, I was consul general in Athens for four years. I'd left in '74 in July just before all hell broke loose, but Cyprus, I mean Turkey dominated Greek thought and I always felt that Greece was sort of a nagging problem to the Turks, but not as up, at a lower priority of Turkey.

PATTERSON: When I say that the Turks love to talk politics, those politics never included Greece. Turks were consumed with the politics going on in their own country and with their own economic problems and rarely would a Turk bring up anything having to do with Greece. Now, the Turkish military was watching Greece constantly because of course they were monitoring each other's airplanes and wandering into each other's waters. Of course those waters are the same, because there is so little distance between some of the Greek islands and Turkey. But the average Turk on the street, the taxi drivers I talked to, for example, never mentioned Greece. They would talk to me about all of the Turkish political parties and who was up and who was down, but they'd never bring up Greece. Turkey is a huge country, 67 million people in those days. Greece was like a little fly that they brushed away.

Q: Yes. What about, how did you find, were congressmen more aware of Turkey, you know for a long time I had the feeling that there were so many Greek Americans involved in American politics that next to the Israeli lobby the Greek lobby was considered the most powerful and of course the one thing that unites sort of the Greeks is beating up the Turks. Did you find though that by this time, I imagine you get lots of congressional representatives there? Did you find that they were more amenable to Turkey?

PATTERSON: We did have many congressional delegations, though not enough. It was a time that the Congress was getting lots of criticism for traveling and so there was less traveling going on. We would have loved to have more Congressional visitors because once Congressmen, anyone comes to Turkey, by and large they leave Turkey as a friend. Especially, if they had any understanding at all of Turkey's strategic position and what that actually means for the United States, the ability to move our ships around in the Mediterranean. Congressmen would at least go away thinking harder about Greece and the United States and Turkey and the United States. So, they would generally leave as friends and we just wished we'd had more of them.

Q: Did you sometimes feel that you were in a dual capital country? I mean I'm thinking of Istanbul and Ankara.

PATTERSON: Very much so. Ankara is the seat of the government, but the commercial life, the artistic life, the wealth of Turkey is concentrated in Istanbul, so that Marc was in Istanbul at least once a week. Sometimes when we had visitors he would be there three times a week. I would go less frequently, but yes, you definitely have to keep a foot in both places. Then there's a lot of interesting things going on in the smaller cities in Izmir and Adana as well.

Q: Were there any major earthquakes or something like that?

PATTERSON: No, very fortunately there weren't. There were some terrible mining accidents, but nothing like the big earthquakes that they've had now in the last couple of years.

Q: Did the Kurdish problem come up while you were there?

PATTERSON: Yes, all the time. The Turks were still fighting the PKK. This was the great Achilles heel of Turkey in terms of the drag on the economy, in terms of their human rights record and in terms of the way the rest of the world viewed Turkey. The Turks wanted to be part of the European Union and the Europeans kept casting back to them their handling of the Kurds in Turkey and the PKK. So, yes, that was a dominant theme.

Q: What was your impression of the Turkish higher command because in Turkey the pattern has been the politics are certainly going to get out of hand and the troops come out of the barracks, take over for a while and then with luck they'll go back fairly soon. This must have been something everybody was watching.

PATTERSON: We were always watching. The Islamic party was becoming stronger and the Turkish generals at our dinner table began to say this was very bad, but they would also say they didn't want to take over the country. The Turkish generals were quite conscious of the fact that they were not economic experts, that they didn't have the skills needed to put the country back on a more solid economic footing. On the other hand they considered themselves guardians of Ataturk's legacy and of democracy. They wanted Turkey to be a secular country. They would talk openly about not wanting to move in and take over the government.

Q: As a woman were you noticing, it seems with the Turks one of the things that comes up all the time is the head covering issue. What do they call it?

PATTERSON: Head scarf.

Q: Head scarf. Did that play any role at dinner parties, I mean things that you were involved in or just women in discussion because it was in a way a national issue, but it was also obviously a woman's issue.

PATTERSON: Absolutely. The Turkish military wives were often the most heated on the subject though some of the academic professors, women academic professors, could get pretty hot as well. The Turks genuinely believe that you can control people's thoughts and therefore their actions. As an American I couldn't understand how they thought that by saying "no" to the headscarves they were going to be able to control whether people were religious or not.

Secular Turks were often vehement that the minute headscarves were allowed, it would mean the "Iranization" of Turkey. Very secular women were adamant that this had to stop at the doors to the university, at the door to parliament, that allowing women to wear headscarves at the universities was the beginning of the slippery slope. It continues to be an issue that roils the social fabric. Right now, I think it's the foreign minister's wife who wears a headscarf and she

can't enter parliament, because there's a law that says you can't enter parliament's doors with your hair covered.

Q: Did you run across it at dinner parties this issue at all?

PATTERSON: Not at dinner parties, but many other times, for example, in my women's conversation group, which was a mix of military wives and others. We had some lively discussions in those groups.

Q: How did you see Turkish women in their, within Turkish society?

PATTERSON: Well, you know, Turkey has two societies and it's a country that's divided in two. The western part of Turkey is a country of the 21st century and in the eastern part of Turkey it's maybe still in the 18th century in many ways. There are more Turkish tenured professors who are women in Turkey than there are in the United States. They have many doctors and pharmacists so there is a very educated population of women. In the eastern part of Turkey, although education is compulsory through the fifth grade, sometimes the girls are taken out of school after third grade. It depends on which part of Turkey we're talking about. There are parts of Turkey where the men still have several wives because they're all working in the fields and it's a question of extra hands to help.

Q: Extra hands, yes. In sort of discussions groups and all, what elements of the United States seemed to elicit the most interest from the women you associated with?

PATTERSON: Often it was a discussion of democracy and politics and the free-wheeling atmosphere of the United States that they perceived as almost anarchy, because we let people think anything they want to think and write anything they want to write. They were horrified at the way Americans would wear the flag, that our flag would be a t-shirt or a bathing suit or a pair of shorts. That's inconceivable in Turkey. The flag is a revered symbol and you don't wear it as a piece of clothing.

Q: Not too long ago I think the thought would have been the same in the United States.

PATTERSON: Yes. My women friends were also interested always in American culture, American movies. My Turkish friends went to the movies a lot. Many were also very interested in the evolution of language and of new American slang.

Q: My impression from just on the periphery of Turkish society particularly the ones in the 21st Century are in a way much more dedicated to their country than I think in many Western societies. I mean it's more of a patriotic I'll do it for my country type of thing or something.

PATTERSON: I think that's right. One of the reasons why I love Turkey so much is that intellectually it is fascinating. They're still trying to decide what kind of country they want to be. Do they want to be secular or do they want to be Islamic? That's why talking politics was so interesting and that is why everyone talks politics, because they are keenly interested in what is going to become of their country, what is their role as a citizen, what is the role of the

government. When we were there they still had the old, long time leaders of the political parties who had been leaders for 30 years. People called them “the dinosaurs” and talked often about needing a new generation of political leaders.

Q: I think of Demirel there forever.

PATTERSON: Forever. So, to go back to your point, I think that the Turks are very proud of their country and keenly interested in its future.

KATHERINE SCHWERING
Economic Officer
Ankara (1991-1992)

Ms. Schwering was born in Wyoming and raised abroad and various localities in the US. She was educated at Northwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She joined Chase Bank, where she was trained as an international economist, and worked with them until joining the State Department in 1978. During her career Ms. Schwering worked primarily on international economic, monetary and terrorist matters in Washington and abroad. Her overseas posts were in Burundi, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Ms. Schwering was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

SCHWERING: I had been assigned to Turkey as my next assignment. I went into a year of language training and area studies, Turkish, which I think is by far the hardest language to learn. I think even Japanese is easier. I am not sure.

Q: What did you find difficult about Turkish?

SCHWERING: The logic of their language is the exact opposite to English. A possessive noun is usually in the beginning of a sentence but what it possesses is at the end or vice versa. And the verb is always at the end. I generally found I had to take an English sentence and translate it backward to translate into Turkish. I got a 3/3 in it but I never really got the hang of it.

Q: What were you being sent to do?

SCHWERING: Financial economist in the economic section in Turkey. I was put in the deputy econ position. It was a stretch for me and language designated. I tried to get confirmation that when the current person who was the deputy left, I would be the deputy. Well, that didn't pan out, and I was just furious. I curtailed that assignment after eight months. This other woman, who was the deputy, retired suddenly, so I should have been put into the deputy position. But, in recruiting someone for her position, they promised the individual coming in he was going to be deputy. He was in a job graded below mine and it also wasn't language designated. They weren't going to change it. What a waste of training. They had spent a year training me in Turkish and I was the most qualified to do that job. The assignments panel agreed to bring me back, which I

understand is extremely rare after you've been trained.

Q: Did you ever find out whether the person who came in had clout?

SCHWERING: No.

Q: Was this just a screw up in personnel?

SCHWERING: A screw up by the economic counselor. The guy who came in and I were both the same grade, but I was in the higher rated position and had the training. I had more seniority than he did. It was just a real screw up and I had had enough of being given a hard time by the State Department.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Turkish economy while you were there?

SCHWERING: Yeah, I had studied it. I understood it pretty well, because of course while you have language studies you have area studies and always have to do a paper. I did my standard economic analysis. I had a good feeling for it.

Q: What was our impression of the Turkish financial situation?

SCHWERING: The Turks are incredibly smart. Oddly enough, they are the only culture with which I have worked that is most like America. This surprises people, but the Turks are very much like we are. But they don't emigrate as much, which is why we don't know that. We know the Greeks, but the Greeks emigrated because they have a very poor country. The Turks were the center of a great empire once, and they still thought of themselves that way. In that sense they are very much like the Chinese. They see no reason to leave their country, and they are very happy with it. They think the Greeks run U.S. policy toward them.

Q: Well, they do.

SCHWERING: Yes, because the Turks are very passive. They think that somebody else should do it for them. Because they were the center of an empire, they are used to embassies coming to them. That was the original use of the term you know.

Q: Well, sure.

SCHWERING: It never occurs to them to reach out, because they are the great power.

Q: Yes. This is where the first embassies were. They were with the Ottoman Empire. They were Constantinople, which is in Istanbul. Like the Greeks, they have political clout. Next to the Jewish lobby, the Greek lobby is the most powerful.

SCHWERING: Yes. But, that is really because the Greeks make an effort.

Q: There are more Greeks than Turks in the United States. They contribute money to Greek

policy-making efforts.

SCHWERING: Yes, exactly. The Turks don't invest in the U.S. They don't emigrate. They never lobby us. They could; and, given their geographical position, they could have had tremendous influence over the U.S. government because they bordered the Soviet Union, and they were a listening post. So it is that way even when I worked with them on investment. They would say, "Why don't any American companies come and invest here?" I would say, "Well have you ever been to the United States?" "No." "Have you ever called on the U.S. embassy. The commercial section?" "No." "Have you contacted the international chamber of commerce?" "No." "Have you contacted the American chamber of commerce?" "No." It turns out they just sit there and wait for someone to come. They are, literally, puzzled. As someone once put it, "they lacked the marketing gene." They don't understand they have to go out and attract investment. So they blame the Greeks. They think it is political, but the Greeks originally came here for economic reasons. The Turks don't get it.

Q: Well then you left there.

SCHWERING: I have one more story. A week or two after I arrived was the week the Soviet Union broke up, and when the central Asian states all declared their independence. I don't know if it was then the CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States come into being. It turns out no one from the embassy had been up to the Georgian border, which was the border with Turkey for three years. So, a political officer and I were sent up there for three days to find out what was happening. The U.S. government was afraid of a repeat of the Kurdish overflow into Turkey after the Iraq War. Remember when hundreds of thousands if not millions of Kurds fled into southern Turkey? It was the week before I arrived in Turkey in 1991 that the U.S. government had ended its aid program to the Kurds.

Q: Oh, yes. Operation Provide Comfort was what they called it.

SCHWERING: Something like that. We were afraid the same thing would happen with Georgians and Azerbaijanis flooding into Turkey because of political instability.

We were sent up for three days. We hung around the border, but nothing happened. What was happening was the usual coming and going of traders. There were these little flea markets set up along the shore of the Black Sea.

Then I became involved in Operation Provide Hope, which was getting our assistance to those states. There were some funny incidents with regard to that. I don't know if you want to go into it.

Q: Oh, sure.

SCHWERING: Well, the U.S. had never flown over the Soviet Union since 1945 or '46.

Q: With the exceptions of the U-2's.

SCHWERING: Exactly. I was first asked to figure out how to get aid to Azerbaijan and Georgia. We were going to get aid through Turkey to them. However, it turned out the eastern third of Turkey was off limits as that is where the Turks and Kurds were going at it. You also couldn't get your hands on any maps. I worked with the Turkish Red Crescent Society to find out if there were any roads or railroads out there leading to Azerbaijan. We also called on the Turkish military. They would not give us any information because it was a security issue, even though they were interested in supporting Azerbaijan...

Q: This is tape five, side one with Katherine Schwering. We were just beginning to talk about Operation Provide Hope. So you might start from the problems you had getting maps. We will pick it up next time there. This would be in '92?

SCHWERING: '91.

Q: '91 Okay.

Today is 31 October 2005, Halloween. Boo! Katherine, we are starting on this Operation Provide Hope. Maybe we had better put a context?

SCHWERING: This was just as the Soviet Union had broken up and I think had formed the Commonwealth of Independent States, which didn't hold together I think even for a year. But, gradually, all the 15 republics or so of the former Soviet Union were one by one declaring independence or seceding. Anyway, the United States government decided to encourage this 'democratization' of the former Soviet Union as we saw it, by helping newly established independent governments. We helped them economically, and gave them assistance, and did what we could to help them remain independent of Moscow. It was decided that we would supply assistance to the central Asian states of the former Soviet Union through Turkey. One of the interesting things – as I mentioned before – was that the Turks would not provide us with any information as to roads or crossings in eastern Turkey. By talking to Turks who had been around a long time, I was able to determine that there were one or two border crossings, one of which wasn't even paved. Now these crossings were into Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, or was that in Armenia?

Q: You were talking about Nagorno-Karabakh.

SCHWERING: Karabakh. Initially it was just Azerbaijan. As I recall, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and attempt to secede came a little bit later. But this was in, I think, January – yes, January of 1992. We were beginning Operation Provide Hope, and that was just a mess.

Q: That was the Kurds.

SCHWERING: No, this was after the Kurdish one. That was Operation Provide Comfort I think. We had wound-up and wheels-upped the Kurdish effort just the week before I arrived in Turkey in 1991. Since I was in the economic section, this was assistance I was put in charge of doing what we could for Operation Provide Hope. One of the most interesting things is that because the U.S. has not, as I said before, officially flown over the former Soviet Union, we had no pilots

who knew the airports in the central Asian states, how to get there, how to navigate, how to communicate with the air traffic controllers. The plan was to fly U.S. military cargo transports down to Incirlik Air Base, which is a Turkish air base that NATO can use. It is not a NATO air base. This is an important distinction, because even as diplomats, we were not allowed onto the air base without permission from the Turkish government. These U.S. planes were to land at Incirlik and pick up Azerbaijani and Georgian pilots who would then co pilot our planes into the Central Asian States for the first time since WWII. It was interesting. The plan was for the very first flight to be a C-5A transport full of supplies.

Q: These are huge transports – the biggest plane in our stock.

SCHWERING: Yes, just huge. Only the ex-Soviet cargo one is bigger. I was put in charge of this operation. What the embassy wanted to do was have the very first flight land in Ankara so that we could have an official ceremony with the U.S. ambassador to Turkey making a speech.

We had been working with the Turkish Red Crescent Society, which is the Moslem equivalent of the Red Cross. I worked with a wonderful man there. The society were the ones who were trying to help us get aid to Azerbaijan. Now, the one thing Turkey had done on one or two previous occasions, I think, was to provide some aid to Azerbaijan. From what I was able to find out, the Turkish Red Crescent actually had to give the assistance to the Azerbaijani government. They didn't have the equivalent of the Turkish Red Crescent Society in Azerbaijan, I suppose the former Soviet Union didn't allow that. This concerned me, and I told the embassy about it, because the people who were taking over the Central Asian States, of course, were the old communist apparatchiks. I knew that nothing was going to change right away, despite their independence. I told the embassy this, but they didn't want to pay attention, which caused problems quite a bit later on.

Well, anyway, I worked with the U.S. military in Ramstein. This was the most confused operation you have ever seen. We had a significant military attaché office in the embassy in Ankara. They, however, were not involved in this at all. They did not communicate with their own military and the military in the United States didn't communicate with them. It was just astounding. It fell to the economic section, and therefore to me, so I was the one talking to Ramstein. At this point, the Air Force headquarters was I think in Ohio. I had to work with Ohio, and the military never called me. The only way I found out after months and weeks of this working these things out is a civilian at Ramstein Air Base called me and said, "By the way, our flight is leaving today and is going to land in Ankara." So, after all of this effort, the embassy still had not been informed. The U.S. military just didn't seem to think they had to communicate with the embassy, and it was we who were getting their air traffic clearances. We do that for them, not the DAO offices.

I just had this gut feeling. Indeed, their first flight to Turkey was delayed several times for engine troubles in Ramstein. The plan had been to write a speech for the ambassador to give in Ankara when the plane landed. It was also to get the Turkish press there. The Red Crescent Society was also to be there to accept a token donation from the flight, which was later to go on to Incirlik and then on to Azerbaijan and other central Asian states. Nothing goes right the first time. Finally, the flight came. I decided what we would do, and I worked with the Red Crescent

Society guy and said, “We will go out to the airport and consider this first flight a dry run.” I am not sure I even told the ambassador. These things never go right the first time, and we wanted to make sure that when the ambassador did come out and make the big public announcement of our assistance through Turkey and of Turkey’s cooperation – which was very important to Turkey because they wanted to gain influence in the central Asian states, that everything went perfectly.

Q: They were making the big play about being the center of ‘Turkdom’ or whatever, because many of these people spoke a Turkic language.

SCHWERING: Yes. Actually, the Azerbaijani language is Turkic. I could understand it. A lot of Georgia spoke Turkish, and it really did extend to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Turkish aspect of the language is sort of diminished the farther east you went.

The Red Crescent Society gentleman – and he truly was a gentleman – and I went out to the airport to practice this landing. Now, one of the issues was that the Ankara airport could not service a C-5A if there were any problems; only Incirlik Air Base could, and this plane had been having engine troubles. So the Red Crescent Society gentleman and I were standing out on the tarmac watching this huge plane approach Ankara Airport. It kept going; it never stopped; it never landed. The reason was it had developed engine trouble on the way down from Germany and had to go to Incirlik. As I said, if it had landed in Ankara, we would never get it off the ground again, literally. Boy, was I patting myself on the back because we could have had the ambassador and the press corps out there. Then we arranged a second flight, and that one came off all right. I had the ambassador and the press corps out there and everything else. But, by this time, experience had really paid off. I don’t know if anybody knows about all this. I am sure I told the embassy, but I don’t think it ever went beyond.

There was a problem later. In addition to flying these flights directly to the central Asian states, we also started delivering assistance to the Turkish Red Crescent Society for Turkey, in an effort to help Turkey build relations with these countries. I curtailed my tour at that point for reasons mentioned earlier and returned to Washington in April of 1992. Not long after that, I began to get some questions and almost accusatory faxes from the embassy in Ankara saying, “Did you know that that assistance would go to the government of Azerbaijan, not to the non-government organizations we hoped would take it?” I again had the satisfaction of faxing them back saying, “Look at the memo to the files I wrote up in January, 1992, to explain that this is what would happen.”

Also, as I’ve said, the embassy couldn’t get maps of eastern Turkey. However, having worked in INR, I know that they did, as did the intelligence community. But, no one in the embassy knew that, not even the U.S. military officers there. It absolutely astounded me because we could have answered many of our questions if anybody had just contacted INR.

Q: Is there anything more on Turkey?

SCHWERING: Oh, just a couple more things. When I was there it was just the beginning of our use of sanctions as a political tool. We’d had economic and financial sanctions against South Africa for 20 years, as well as others against a few other countries such as Cuba and North Korea

for varying lengths of time. However, until Panama in '88-'89, we hadn't really used this as an instrument of foreign policy the way we are now. Of course, I was involved in Panama. But when I was in Turkey, one of the things that happened is we enforced sanctions against Iraq, so I worked a lot on that. This was a new sanctions program. I worked a lot with the Turkish financial system to do that.

Even more interesting, we had gotten a number of the Gulf States to pledge money to Turkey for its cooperation during the Gulf War in 1990-'91; however, none of this money had been forthcoming as last as '92. It was my job to collect from Kuwait and from the UAE. The reason it was the U.S. embassy doing this collection work was that it was we who had put together the Gulf Cooperation Council for the war, and we were its leader. We had bludgeoned these other countries into making these promises to Turkey; it had been very difficult.

Certain countries, if I recall correctly it was Kuwait, although I am not sure, never sign documents when they make financial commitments. All of a sudden the money would show up in a central bank's account.

But the funniest incident was in early '92, just before I left. I got a call from a U.S. military base in Izmir, in western Turkey, saying, "We have a container of medical supplies addressed to the ambassador in Ankara. Where should we deliver it." Now we are talking about a shipping container. It turns out this was assistance we had pledged some three years earlier for the Turks who were taking care of the Kurds. This was part of the U.S. compensation to the Turks. Well, the most amazing thing was that three years earlier, just as a place holder on the shipment, the military had put 'U.S. Ambassador, U.S. embassy Ankara.'

Once this shipment finally got to Izmir three years later, the military were set on delivering it to the U.S. ambassador. There was no one left in the Pentagon who would remember this pledge of aid as they had all been rotated out, and far be it for a low level sergeant in Izmir to change the mailing address. As a result, I had this incredibly funny standoff with the sergeant in Izmir in an effort not to get them to deliver this container of medical equipment to the ambassador's door. Literally. I said, "If you think we are going to allow an unopened container to be parked in the ambassador's driveway, you're nuts." It all eventually got worked out, but it was just amazing.

The military is one of the most dysfunctional organizations that I have ever run into. They just don't coordinate; they don't have a clearance requirement the way the State Department does. There is such duplication of effort it is unbelievable.

Q: Yeah, I have run across this.

SCHWERING: You are thrown out into your first assignment, and all other assignments with no real education about what resources are available. That is why I don't call the A-100 class what it is normally called. I call it an orientation; it is not 'training.'

Q: No, it isn't. I don't even think they call it 'training.'

SCHWERING: They used to when I was in it.

Q: But it really only is 'orientation.' that is all you have time for.

SCHWERING: Yes, well it is too much information at a given time. In my class there were six people who had never been outside of the United States. Every day a different U.S. government agency came in and said, "This is what we do." You just can't keep track of it all. There is a great deal more, as well, that we need to learn. I was never taught how to write a cable or how to open and close a safe.

RICHARD C. BARKLEY
Ambassador
Turkey (1991-1994)

Ambassador Richard C. Barkley was born on December 23, 1932 in Illinois. He attended Michigan State College, where he received his BA in 1954, and Wayne State University, where he received his MA in 1958. He served in the US Army overseas from 1955-1957 as a 1st lieutenant. His career has included positions in Finland, the Dominican Republic, Norway, South Africa, and Germany, and an ambassadorship to Turkey. Ambassador Barkley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 12, 2003.

BARKLEY: Well once again they didn't know what to do with me. I came back to Washington. Of course I was on TDY status for awhile, and tried to get my family settled. It took awhile. Then we decided we would buy a house. To be perfectly honest I decided this would be it for me because you know, I was a Minister Counselor, and I had had my embassy. Of course there were a lot of people who wanted Embassies. So when I came back I had the usual meetings. I actually met with the Secretary. It turns out, though I didn't know it then, that the secretary had written to members of his staff, saying he wanted me to be given a good future assignment. That, of course, helped enormously. That alerted the powers that be. I had very long talks with Larry Eagleburger who asked what I wanted to do. I gave him a couple of thoughts of Embassies that I knew were coming up. Larry had this marvelous style you know; he is very candid. I said that I heard Harare was coming up, Zimbabwe, and that having been in South Africa, I thought that would be a very interesting posting. Of course, the African bureau already had their own candidate. I didn't know that. I expected it was the case. I remember he said, "Dick you just want to go to Harare and sit pool side and relax." "Now you think alright, you are high on everybody's agenda but in a couple of months we will have forgotten you, and there will be nothing coming." I said, "Yes, Larry, that thought has crossed my mind." He said, "Well I am sure that is not going to happen." Anyway after awhile I was given one of these strange assignments to do some research on some area over in the Pentagon. I don't know exactly what it was anymore. It was a holding pattern. So a couple of months later I was told that Mort Abramowitz, who was our ambassador in Turkey, was coming out a year earlier to take over the Carnegie endowment, and that my name had been put forward for that assignment. Well of course I was ecstatic. I knew nothing about Turkey except what I had done in NATO. Indeed I had been part of the task force on Cyprus in 1974. But it was such a major post of course I was flattered, but I didn't quite believe it would

happen. But within a certain period of time it was confirmed that was what they had in mind. Of course you go through that extraordinary procedure that only Americans go through, that you have to first get the approval from the White House. Interestingly enough, with few exceptions, Turkey has never been a posting that political appointees want. So it tends to go to careerists. I think it was because of the reputation of Ankara as being an inhospitable place. But anyway I had to go through this process of confirmation by the Congress. It took a long time. I came out in October and I was almost a year before I went off to Turkey. During that time I took some Turkish language training. I did a lot of traveling. I got my home leave. They gave me things like that. I bought a home and settled in. We bought our home in February, and I got my orders in March. In September I was confirmed. I was off to Turkey in November of '91.

Q: Good heavens. Well we will pick this up, this is a good place to stop. We will pick this up when you are off to Turkey in November of '91. However I would like to talk to you, but we will put this next time, about what you learned about Turkey and sort of what were you carrying in your briefcase when you went out to Turkey. I mean what were the issues you were going to be dealing with, and what were you getting in Washington and finding out about Turkey while you had plenty of time to do your work.

BARCKLEY: Okay, great.

Q: Today is 12 September 2003. Dick, '91. Let's talk about what you found out about Turkey because it took a while to get going. What was the situation vis a vis the United States and also the internal government of Turkey that you heard before you got out there?

BARCKLEY: First of course it is an area in which I had no experience whatsoever. My only exposure to Turkey had been through NATO councils and third country activities. So it was not an area that I was familiar with. At the same time I had developed over the last ten years of my career, certain administrative capabilities I thought, and so the idea of going into a large mission didn't deter me. But the facts on the ground were still somewhat vague in my mind. I spent a lot of time trying to prepare for that.

Q: How did you do that?

BARCKLEY: Much of it the traditional foreign service way of reading everything you can get your hands on and trying to figure out what was going on staying current. Of course you had total access to the desk as to what was happening at that time. Obviously it was a time in some respects that our relations with Turkey had seldom been better. In that sense I was extremely fortunate to be arriving right after Turkey's active participation in Desert Storm. When I say active participation, not so much the matter of troops, but as a matter of absolutely total support. One of the first things that President Bush, the elder, did was to contact a man who had been a friend for a long time. Turgut Ozal, the President of Turkey. And Ozal supported him completely after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He did a number of things, and it cost him a lot to do it, it proved just the tip of the iceberg as we found out later as to costs. He closed down the pipeline that Iraq had into Turkey and into the Mediterranean. He ordered troops south. It took quite

awhile for those troops to get there actually. The Turkish army was large but at that time quite unwieldy. He of course supported the President totally in every other aspect. He made Turkish land available for American troops and planes. I don't know the exact historical record on this development, but he was certainly one of the very first to support President Bush completely in his effort to get Iraq out of Kuwait. At the same time there was a lot going on in Europe. We talked for the last couple of hours on what was happening in Germany. Germany was reuniting of course at the same time Russia was beginning to fragment. The fragmentation of Russia had an awful lot to do with Turkey because the Soviet Union had extended its rule all the way into the Caucasus. In sum, the whole eastern border of Turkey was faced by the Soviet Union. Of course, there was also the deterioration in the Balkans because of the breakup of Yugoslavia. So there was an enormous amount of uncertainty on all of their borders. To the South with Iraq and Syria and Iran, all states that we had condemned as state sponsors for terrorism. Of course the Caucasus in the East and then to the north and west was the chaos in the Balkans, so there was enormous unrest. But at the time I landed there, Desert Storm had successfully concluded. There had been as a result of Desert Storm as you recall, a number of groups, particularly the Kurds in the north of Iraq had raised up in revolt against Saddam, and Saddam turned on them with a vengeance. Part of the result of that was an enormous refugee flow into Turkey. Turkey had to handle that problem. It was an enormous human right problem to bed them down etc. The border area there is very mountainous and very remote and very hard to get to. As a result of that President Bush and members of the coalition announced a no fly zone in Northern Iraq which we monitored and controlled actually out of Incirlik, Turkey, which is a large American base near Adana.

Q: You were saying at the same time...

BARKLEY: At the same time Kurdish separatists in Turkey were exploiting the situation to ratchet up a lot of guerrilla activity in the southeast provinces of Turkey where much of the Turkish population are ethnic Kurds. Prior to the war Iraq had been one of the major trading partners of Turkey, and much of that trade was focused in those provinces in the southeast. So the devastation of their economy as a result of the war allowed those guerrilla movements to thrive. They had sanctuary in the northern part of Iraq. Their headquarter operations were run out of Syria, which of course has always had hostile attitudes towards Turkey, or at least wanted to keep the relations unbalanced. So there was a lot of chaos at that time. Chaos which continued. So when I arrived in November, personal relations between the United States and Turkey were at an all time high, but there were enormous numbers of problems elsewhere, and eventually they had bilateral implications.

Q: Well again before you went out, what about the two groups that would have had interest in your going. One is the Greek-Americans; the other is the Armenian-Americans. Did they get to you?

BARKLEY: Well there was an interesting bit of byplay on both counts. It was somewhat shocking to me. I was not unaware of the historical animosity between Turkey and Greece and Armenia. But the strength of the lobbying groups within the United States was something I wasn't totally prepared for. An interesting thing had happened actually on Greek Turkish relations. In Thrace in northern Greece, there is a sizable number of Turkish Muslims. There has

always been some volatility I think in the situation there, but before I went, there had been an effort on the part of the Greek government to exert new controls over the Muslim groups in Greek Thrace. They eliminated the elective Mufti and put in an appointed mufti. There were counter demonstrations on the part of the Greek Islamic community. They were set upon by a whole variety of Greek groups, mostly young vandals. The Muslims were beaten up rather badly. That kind of pressure seemed to be rather endemic to that part of the world. Nonetheless, there was a Turkish response. One of the things that is totally predictable is anything that erupts in Greece against Turkey, there will be a response. So nationalist groups assembled in Istanbul and demonstrated in front of the Fenner, which is the home of the Greek Orthodox patriarch. This set off alarm bells in the Greek community in America. One of the first things that sort of sobered me as to the situation there was a letter from Archbishop Javros from New York. It was really quite a plea. The letter was addressed to the Secretary of State saying we must stop these kinds of pressures on the Patriarch, which he called the Patriarch of Constantinople by the way. Constantinople disappeared in 1453 after the Turks conquered the city. Nonetheless at the end of the letter I remember one particular phrase that said, "Beware, the barbarian is again at the gate, this time in western attire." Quite obviously, infinitely more heat was generated than light out of this whole situation, but it showed indeed the power of the Greek community. Then we started getting phone calls from different groups that were sympathetic toward them. They were quite obviously orchestrated. Exactly how much, I don't know. It was something that came up in my hearings. Of course on the foreign relations committee was Senator Sarbanes who as an American Greek was sensitive to them. So that was the first shock that we had on the Greek side. Meanwhile, of course, Armenia was declaring independence and trying to recreate itself. The Armenians for a long time had organized different terrorist groups worldwide against the Turks. One was called ASALA. They basically targeted Turks, including many Turks in the diplomatic corps. They gunned down the Consul General some years ago in Los Angeles etc. So there was always among the Turk a certain not only anxiety but anger toward this Armenian group which we, by the way, had labeled as a terrorist group. Nonetheless ASALA had a lot of sympathy in large segments of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. And of course then, as it was becoming independent, one of the first things the Armenians did, wisely they took a leaf out of the Israeli notebook, and they went to work with their lobbyist groups and support groups in the United States to support Armenia. And they did get some support. But one of the things Armenia did which was always somewhat difficult for me to accept, and yet I had to realize that is the way it was going to be, is name as the new Armenian Foreign Minister an American citizen. He of course was acting as Foreign Minister for a foreign country but maintained his American citizenship. His name was Raffi Hovannisian, and he came from a prominent California family. So it just shows you there was this nexus between the American, Greek and Armenian communities with respect to Turkey.

Q: Well I have to say you are talking about the first time getting exposed to this, I spent nine years in the Balkans, five years in Yugoslavia and four years in Greece. They learn these hatreds and all from their mother's milk and at their father's knee, and the churches of course foster this as we keep seeing. Well anyway, when you went out there, what were you getting from your military colleagues, from the sort of Pentagon briefings.

BARKLEY: Well first is in Turkey where I had for some time a large American military mission. It has been out there a long time, but now we had a huge American presence, primarily

air force. So I got all of the briefings at that time about their relationships with the Turkish military. Military to military relations have always been extraordinarily good. We, of course, were always interested in where the Turkish general staff was on any particular issue, and of course the Turkish General staff had carved out for itself since Ataturk times a position of being the guardian of the Ataturk revolution. There were always the overtones that they had political interests, that they would allow the politicians to go only so far but if they strayed from the western moorings that Ataturk had proscribed. So the Turkish general staff was a powerful element. I recall just before I got there a member of the European Union had gone through and had done a study on the situation in Turkey and had come to the conclusion that the government was weak, but the state was strong. Basically what he was saying is the government parties tend to fragment in every different direction, but the state, which was in the hands of a large military component, was extraordinarily strong and kept Turkey basically grounded on its Ataturkist roots. It is sort of hard for Americans I think to understand exactly the role of the Turkish military. One of them is that every Turkish young man goes into the military. I think regardless of the politics of most Turkish people, they have an affection for the military which is sometimes actually at odds with their political desires for greater democratic movements. The United States liked the military because it is extraordinarily professional. Many of them had trained in the United States. Of course the largest of the military components of the military in Turkey is the land forces. But the Turkish air force had always insisted on buying and flying solely American airplanes. The navy, which was quite small, but nonetheless quite proficient was quite closely tied to the U.S. navy. So there had been very close ties. Those play out in different ways. One of the things I can say is during my entire tenure, the American military had been particularly sensitive to the importance of Turkey. Obviously having enormous responsibilities not only in the Med but for that segment of a world which had become increasingly volatile, our military components all understood the strategic as well as the regional importance of Turkey.

Q: Were we getting anything from the NEA bureau, actually Turkey of course is in the European bureau. Sort of a stepchild of the European bureau.

BARCKLEY: This goes back historically into the organization of the United States State Department. If I am not wrong, in the mid 50's early 60's the State Department placed Turkey into Southern Europe, an office that is basically Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Part of the reason was is the Turks had expressed often their unhappiness with being grouped into the Middle East. They considered themselves part of Europe. They wanted to be a part of Europe.

Q: That actually came over in '74.

BARCKLEY: Oh is that when?

Q: Yes, because I had been in Greece. It came over just about the time the Cyprus thing blew up in '74 almost, and it was I mean you know somebody had expressed that somebody had defecated in the marble halls of the European bureau. What is this? Two brand new allies and they are ready to fight each other. This just didn't happen in the European bureau.

BARCKLEY: Well it was always difficult in the European bureau. People looked at southern Europe with, oh my goodness, is that where we want to be. It was in many respects very much

where you wanted to be because action was going on. The problem was grouping those three countries together that the bureau...

Q: Well also at one point Iran was in there.

BARCKLEY: Oh was it?

Q: Yes, the Greeks, Turkey and Iran and Cyprus, but nobody paid much attention to it.

BARCKLEY: Well, Turkey came much later for me and I didn't much understand the previous organization.

Q: Well anyway were you getting things either from the desk or the CIA about currents within Turkey that were disquieting?

BARCKLEY: Actually by the time I arrived, many of those reports, particularly about fundamental Islam in Turkey had been shelved because of our preoccupation with what was going on in Iraq. Not only in Desert Storm but our preoccupation with what was going on in that region generally. It seemed indeed the Turks had fundamentalism under control. It is my understanding that from the time Ataturk appeared on the scene, even as he was celebrated as the Gazi, the military hero and as the leader of a new nation, and a republic, there have always been between ten and fifteen percent of the population that had been disquieted by his assaults on Islam. Whether you would call them fundamentalists or not, I don't know, but they certainly did hold very closely to fundamental tenets. They had always been there, and I think they certainly are there today maybe in somewhat stronger force, but there are many reasons for that. In 1991 our concerns about Turkey in that front were not clearly evident. All of the things that were going on had a regional character to them. Besides that, Ozal was probably the strongest Turkish leader since Ataturk. He had done a lot of things to the country that no other leader was prepared to do. He opened the economy to the west. He was an economist. The economic scene in Turkey at the time I arrived was particularly favorable. Certainly there was hyperinflation, but at the same time there were very high rates of growth. The economy was buzzing along very nicely, so there weren't any of these particular problems in 1991 that began to appear a year or so afterwards. Everybody was quite optimistic about where things were going.

Q: Were you there from 1991 to when?

BARCKLEY: Until 1994, December of '94.

Q: Well once you arrived so what were you doing?

BARCKLEY: As soon as I arrived I went through the normal introductory procedures etc. I wasn't there very long before I presented my credentials. It was much shorter than has usually been the case which I think indicated how important the United States was to Turkey. Actually I had put off my arrival because there was an election going on. Of course the appearance of an American ambassador right in the middle of an election is the last thing you want.

Q: Yes.

BARKLEY: We of course let that play out, and the election brought into power Suleyman Demirel who had long been a political figure. I think this was the seventh time he had been designated Prime Minister. He formed a Coalition government with the old Atatürkist party, the Progressives, with Mr. Inönü who was the son actually of İsmet İnönü the old colleague of Atatürk. The president was Turgut Özal. They represented three different parties, but they were all very much in the western camp. They were more progressive. There were some lines between them, some were conservative, some were progressive etc. Nevertheless, there had been hardly any murmurs coming out of the Islamic camp at that time. It is true that in that election the Islamic groups joined together with some other disparate kinds of groups, on a common ticket so they could get over the 10% parliamentary hurdle. So they were represented in a very small way in the parliament. Nobody at that time actually considered them particularly troublesome. But then I presented my credentials to President Özal. President Özal was an interesting figure. He had been Prime Minister. He had made his career in international finance. He had been a member of the World Bank. After the military coup of '79 he was asked to form a government, the first civil government after that coup. He showed great energy as Prime Minister. Then he decided he would move from the Prime Ministership into the Presidency, which had been somewhat of a more symbolic office. But he fueled it with an awful lot of energy and his party was still in power and the Prime Minister tended to listen to him. So he was President with an extraordinary level of influence, above and beyond that of a normal presidency. So of course when I went in to see him, we were all extraordinarily curious as to what he was going to say. We naturally discussed mutual U.S.-Turkish interests at that time. He was particularly interested I think, because I had just come out of Germany. He told me, "You know, with Europe being at a level of uncertainty with German unification and with the Soviet Union disintegrating, it is ever more important that the United States be anchored into Europe. To that end I will do whatever I can." There will be natural forces in Europe, particularly in Germany that would begin to question an American presence. But while they were careening around in political uncertainty, Özal was determined to anchor the United States as best he could. He explained the immediacy of his action in Desert Storm as part of that effort. And of course this showed a level of statesmanship from an American standpoint that was very welcome. From that period of time until his death a few years later, he followed that policy line accurately. This was still during the administration of George Bush the elder. I was pleased of course as ambassador there to discover the professionalism, the policy professionalism in the administration was extraordinarily high. The President would occasionally call Özal and the President had a policy that within 24 hours of any personal call to any foreign leader, the ambassador would get a full report. Now believe me, as you well know, that was very much appreciated. So during the last years of the administration of President Bush, I was extraordinarily well informed as to what was going on at the upper levels.

Q: Were you ever able to use the call to go to the State Department and say I wonder if the President could call, I mean or was this, the calls came out of the President's office or were you ever able to sort of get one of those calls?

BARKLEY: Actually from the time I was there, there were no issues that I actually flagged that said the president must inform President Özal. President Bush was extraordinarily professional in

foreign policy. He understood that those personal relations which had served him so well during Desert Storm were things he had to curry. Of course, Ozal was not shy. Whenever he saw fit he would lift the phone and call the President. For me the remarkable thing was that I was always informed of it. Now you can imagine any Ambassador who is fully aware of these things has greater influence in the government because then you usually knew even more than the Turkish government did. Which of course is a position everyone is after whenever possible. So I must honestly say I was an unabashed admirer of the way that administration conducted foreign policy. President Ozal periodically went for medical checkups in the United States during which time he would stop by the White House. Of course most ambassadors would loved to have been there at that time, but as those meetings tended to be very irregular, we never knew exactly when that was so I never did attend any of those meetings. But the Bush-Ozal personal relations were extraordinary, and brought us enormous rewards.

Q: Well now just looking as you did the map, and you look at Turkish borders particularly to the north, I mean here Turkey has been living in threat of the Soviet invasion. Were the Turks going through the same thing that really the United States and the NATO countries are doing, what are we doing now? I mean...

BARCKLEY: Well of course, there was enormous confusion as to where all this was going. I think Americans have a sort of a sketchy feeling about the Balkans. I mean just the word Balkanization has entered American terminology, it indicates inherent ethnic chaos. But for some reason we have never transferred the same thing to the Caucasus which if anything is infinitely worse than the Balkans. So a "Caucasusation" if there is such a word, would be worse than a "Balkanization". Well both of those were on the borders of Turkey. They had to be attentive to that. In the Caucasus three countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia that had become independent and were groping their forward. These were areas where the borders and the ethnic grouping were extraordinarily scrambled. It is something that the United States didn't seem to be sensitive to. One of the things we were sensitive to was Armenia because of the Armenian Diaspora and the influence of the Armenian groupings in the United States.

Q: Also Georgia because of Shevardnadze.

BARCKLEY: Well that was a personal relationship particularly with Baker. Shevardnadze didn't immediately enter into that picture. He entered into it somewhat later. But I recall when I was out there, that I read one of the first cables that indicated the United States was contemplating how we would handle the newly independent countries from the Soviet Union. The first cable I read indicated that we would establish an embassy in Armenia from which we would cover Azerbaijan and Georgia. I thought you don't have to be a genius to know that that is a recipe for disaster. So I weighed in and said, "You know from this perspective that simply will not work." My perspective was from Turkey, but I thought somebody had to weigh in. It was a typical State Department kind of thing, how can we do this all on the cheap, because establishing an embassy in each one of these countries would be an enormous undertaking. Well finally they indeed they did decide they would send embassies to each one of these countries. Maybe I was still too wrapped up in what was going on in Germany, but I thought I should send in a personal analysis of what things in Turkey we should be attentive to. I focused on Armenia saying that I thought it extraordinarily important for our future relations with Armenia to concentrate on our relations

with Turkey, who indeed was the Western access door for the Armenians. I suggested in this cable what we could do to accelerate fruitful exchanges between the new government in Armenia and Turkey. I pointed out that all of these new nations had subscribed to the CFCE regulations, that there would be no border changes by force etc. I said, "I think we should anchor that, and it would help us a lot if the new Armenian government would censure ALALA and distance itself from the terrorism against Turkey, a particularly neuralgic point with the Turks." And that indeed they also renounce their claim to the five eastern provinces of Turkey which the Armenians had historically claimed. It was one of those irredentist claims which are particularly nasty because they overlap with claims from Kurds as well as everybody else. The Turks obviously weren't prepared to bargain with this kind of thing. But the issues were very tense. Subsequently, I can't remember exactly when it took place, but Secretary Baker raised these issues with Raffi Hovannisian, the American Foreign Minister of Armenia, who dismissed them out of hand and said they weren't going to give Turkey a "blank check" for the future, something like that. I saw right there that these problems were with us to stay, particularly among American Armenians. But one of the things that we were able to do very early on was to convince the Turks that a gesture towards Armenia was important. The Armenians were in a very bad fix. They were running out of wheat. They didn't have enough to feed their people. So in an effort to use the situation to reduce the tensions, we convinced the Turks to send wheat to Armenia. I went and I saw Suleiman Demirel who had become actually quite a good confidante. He understood the situation, and he said, "It will be done." Now the problem was that the trains that would carry these things, couldn't cross the Armenian border because the tracks were different sizes. Nonetheless, over the terrible objections of a number of Turkish labor groups who were not particularly fond of the Armenians to begin with, he did this. As we didn't have the wheat readily available, we convinced him to take it out of his own stocks, promising that they would be replenished by either American or European wheat, which never totally happened. I began to realize that commitments to Turkey were always relative. Nevertheless, the Turks I think, took a rather courageous stand to do this only to discover that much of the wheat ended up in the Nagorno Karabakh which was a contested area in Azerbaijan largely populated with Armenians. Armenian forces were engaged in a warfare and a cleansing of the Azeris out of Karabakh to add it to Armenia proper. Which over the course of time didn't quite happen. It happened Defacto but not Dejure. And of course that was the kind of thing that the Turks simply could not take. So they curtailed all of their shipments. Then of course there was at that time a CNN team in the Caucasus.

Q: CNN being...

BARCKLEY: American news.

Q: It was American based but an international news TV network which was watched worldwide.

BARCKLEY: Right, and in 1992, they happened to be in Armenia. Of course they were covering what was happening elsewhere. They witnessed actually an Armenian massacre a number of Azeri village. Of course if it is on CNN, it is on the American consciousness, and also was on the Turkish consciousness. Well the Turks went ballistic at that point, and they were furious of course because the Azeris were as close as you can get to Anatolian Turks. So we had a real problem controlling that. They didn't blame the United States; I can't say that, but they did of

course indicate that this was indicative of the kinds of problems that were endemic at that time in the Caucasus. Then we opened up negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, led by Jack Maresca. We did try and get with the Russians and others, the so-called Minsk group, to try and get the Nagorno Karabakh situation addressed diplomatically. So that was going on, but at the same time the ethnic cleansing continued in that area with a very brutal way.

Q: In a way, looking at the map and looking at Armenia, way off in the Caucasus, and you think about the Armenian people who really went to the United States, they really came from Turkey, and many from the western part at least sort of the Mediterranean part of Turkey. Was there any line, did you see, between those Americans who identify themselves as Armenians with this little state stuck up in the Caucasus which is very far from what had been their home.

BARKLEY: Well as we pointed out earlier, the historical memory in this area is not always accurate, but it is active. There is a tendency towards the virtuous in arguing your side. You are right, the vast majority of people who suffered under the last gasp of the Ottoman Empire were the Armenians that were living actually in Turkey. There was a huge Armenian population in Turkey at that time. They had been there for centuries and they had always been treated with a measure of tolerance as had almost all of the minority groups. One of the things I had to learn very early on is that when we talk about human rights in the United States, we talk about racial or ethnic groups. When the Turks talk about human rights, they talk about religious persuasion. There are only three minority groups that were recognized in Turkey in the Ottoman Empire and later on by the Turkish Republic. They were Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jews. Those three groups, all of which had prospered at particular times in the Ottoman Empire had no love for each other, for they were often competitors. They tended to be intellectuals and business men and they tend to compete in different areas. It was extraordinary. Of course, all of them still have active remnants in Turkey. I spent some of my most delightful hours with the Greek Patriarch Bartolomeo. The Armenian Orthodox Patriarch, I only saw once. He had a flock, mostly in Istanbul of 60,000 people, who are still there. It is a large and vibrant community there. The Jewish community which now is much smaller. In the 17th century Istanbul was the largest Jewish city in the world. Many of them have gone now to Israel. But there still is a very vibrant community. There is no love lost among those different groups however, even today. So it was a different world, and you had to begin to think in somewhat different categories when addressing the situation. The Greek situation of course was particularly prominent because there are many Greek Americans, several prominent in the United States Senate and Congress.

Q: Those that know say that know say that next to the Jewish component in American political life, the Greek one is right there.

BARKLEY: Oh I think that is probably right. In the first place they have been very successful. They are very well organized. They seem to have a particular devotion to their heritage, and of course, they have been successful in American political life, which is very important. American senses of right and wrong depend on these particular groups in American political life. I know when I went out, just before, after I got to my hearings, I met with Senator Sarbanes whom I respect enormously. I had gotten to know him quite well in East Germany. He was always very professional. He told me to establish good relations with the Patriarch. He considered it is very important. Interestingly enough, right after that meeting I went back to the office only to

discover that the previous patriarch had died. So I was able to call the Senator and alert him before anybody else heard the news, I think he appreciated that. Then came the question of electing a new one. There are enormous problems with all of these things. One is that any new Patriarch must be endorsed by the Turkish government under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Patriarch must also be a Turkish citizen. There are not many now in the seminaries, the seminary in Turkey has been closed for a number of years. So the question of who would be the new patriarch was still open. The Turks happily kept their hands off, and they let Bartolomeo II who is a man of enormous stature and decency. So that worked very well. But throughout my tenure, you are always looking over your shoulder at angry Greek American or Armenian Americans who had some grievance that usually went back hundreds of years.

Q: What about Cyprus?

BARKLEY: Cyprus is seen by American and by Turkish somewhat differently. At the time that this decision was made on Cyprus, the Prime Minister who was Bulent Ecevit, who is still a very active political figure in Turkey. I met with him very early on. He is western educated. He speaks extraordinarily beautiful English, and indeed writes poetry in English as well as in Turkish. He is an exceptionally sophisticated Social Democrat, but without the international bent of Social Democracy. He is very nationalistic. He is one who, after the failure of the London conferences, authorized in '74 the use of Turkish troops. The Turks tend to look upon the operation in Cyprus as having saved the Turkish community on Cyprus, from extinction. They look upon this actually as a victory. The rest of the world looks at it somewhat differently. In that sense, the Greek Cypriots have been extraordinarily successful in publicizing their positions, and the Turkish Cypriots have not. But the military operation in '74, went in initially to save the lives of the Turkish community, or stop them from being cleansed from that area, and of course to eliminate Enosis. Of course they ended up doing that. They also ended up getting rid of the colonels who endorsed Enosis at that time. In the process they went further and occupied almost half of the island. Of course that was received with great censure in the international community, to the extent that nobody extended recognition to the new Republic of Northern Cyprus except Turkey. We have been struggling with that situation ever since.

Q: Well how much did you during this '91 to '94 period, how did you deal with Cyprus? Did this keep coming up on your plate?

BARKLEY: It would periodically come up. We always had a Cyprus coordinator, somebody who was working with United Nations. The United Nations proposal on Cyprus was actively supported by us. In some respects you began to think we had almost taken it over from the UN. The Cyprus coordinator would periodically come out and visit Greece and Turkey. There was a requirement that a report be made to Congress on the progress made. Ralph Denktash had been the leader of the Turkish community from way before the 1974 operations. He was so traumatized by the events of '74 and fearful that they would come up again he never seriously considered the UN attempt to resolve the problem. What we were looking for was some sort of federal status under the United Nations charter. But Denktash always was successful in handing out the lure that something might be possible. All of the time I was there and actually for almost ten years since, the Cyprus coordinator always sends in his reports and is always hoping for some sort of resolution.

Q: Is the Cyprus coordinator an American?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: I always wondered about, it almost you know, I sort of figured this is sort of a sop to the Greek American community. You know, nothing is going to come of it, or maybe someday. How did you feel about this?

BARKLEY: Well I think most of us knew there was a charade going on. I mean I think this is a problem, an intellectual problem, Americans tend to look at a problem as something that must be solved. Other people look at problems as something that should be managed. Those are two different things. I think there is a tendency on the part of the United States to see that in everything we do we can come to some reasonable solution, but I don't think we were dealing with reasonable players. On top of that of course, in the course of years the Greek community in Cyprus had become quite prosperous. They had of course, all of the advantages. I mean not only a very enterprising population, but they also had international recognition. For the Turks in the northern part who usually were better educated than the Turks in Turkey had economic difficulties. Those difficulties were of course increased by the lack of international ability to trade except through Turkey.

Q: Were you under any pressure to try to get something from the Turks about...

BARKLEY: Oh, yes, there was always somehow a facile belief in the United States, it was astonishing, that the Turks could just deliver on Cyprus. But what we never seemed to understand is the emotional aspect, that Denktash was a greater hero in Turkey than he was in Cyprus. To try and force a solution over Denktash it was politically impossible for any Turkish politician. Now I must say while I was there, several times, President Ozal, said, "You know you must put increasing pressure on us." He wanted to solve the Cyprus problem in the worst way. He believed as indeed did many of us, that Turkey had lost so much international credit over this issue, and that it had become actually the tail wagging the dog as far as Turkish interests were concerned. Still, Cyprus was a situation that even he couldn't address effectively using his considerable influence in Turkish foreign policy. The same thing was true of Demirel and Inonu. You know, all of my talks with them, they were reasonable and said we must do something, but they were not going to toy with an idea that it could lead them to lose their own influence and power in Turkey. A very emotive issue.

Q: This is tape 10 side one with Dick Barkley. Was there you know on the Israeli-Palestinian problem, I think most people can see there is a solution. Eventually settlers out of the west bank, Palestinians have fixed borders and learn to live within this and stop the bombing. But was there a sort of general consensus of what the Cyprus situation, how it should be resolved if the political will was there?

BARKLEY: Well it is interesting that you bring that up particularly today in view of the fact that the Palestinian situation doesn't look so rosy. It is an interesting thing. I was there right after, of course not only Desert Storm but a couple of years after the Oslo accords which brought a

certain amount of optimism in the hearts of both the Israelis and the Palestinians that something could be done. An interesting thing I thought because having served in Norway, I knew a bit about it. One of the reasons the Oslo accords succeeded at this came out was that it was done between Palestinians and Israelis without the knowledge and participation of the United States. The reason I think is as soon as the United States enters the picture every nation wants to have the United States on their side. That was their focus more than anything else, more than addressing the issues. I think that was somewhat true of Cyprus. I remember Hikmet Cetin, who was the Foreign Minister under the Demirel government, came to me after I was there about a year and said, "You know, we really have to address this issue. There is no reason in the world why Cyprus should be any different than the Middle East. If they can come up with Oslo accords, we should be able to do something. Our thought is that we should get an independent player to try to act as an intermediary in this thing. Do what the Norwegians had done in the Oslo accords. I would like to ask you to ask your government if they would endorse such a move." I said, "You know, Mr. Cetin, this is a personal view, but the reason Oslo was successful is because the United States did not know about it. I will certainly ask my government and inform them of what you are saying, but maybe you should be thinking along some other lines." So I asked our government whose response was absolutely predictable. No, No, hold on to the United Nations plan and keep the Cyprus coordinator etc. So I told Cetin that we believe the important thing is to hold onto the program we have got. Now between you and me that was the kind of answer that was almost predictable when the United States gets involved. We had our interests already engaged. The idea of going to Poland or somebody else and saying can you take this on for awhile, which is basically what the Norwegians did, was a non starter from the beginning. What is interesting to me is that the officials in Turkey were looking for ways to try and address the issue more effectively. They had been fully aware that the way it had been done up until then was not going anywhere. Here we are ten years later still struggling with the problem.

Q: Well how about the problems during the time you were there Yugoslavia was going through much of its agony. I mean the Turks were the colonial power the occupier of that area at one time. In fact all the Yugoslavs if nothing else blame everything that happened, at least while I was in Yugoslavia, particularly, they said, if the elevator didn't work, they said, "If you had been 500 years under the Turkish yoke, your elevators wouldn't work either." I mean you know this is, how did the Turks react?

BARKLEY: You are absolutely right, the Turks had sort of an ambivalent position with their historical relationship with the Ottoman Empire. As you can imagine, they constantly refuse to believe it was quite as venal as portrayed in the past. That is particularly so in places like the Balkans which was one of the key areas of the Empire's expansion. There were sensitivities involved, and they knew that. But they had sensitivities too. One should remember that an enormous number of Turks actually trace their origins to the Balkans, particularly those in Ismir and the western parts of Turkey, Ismir and Istanbul, had large populations that came out of Bosnia and Albania, areas which had always been key supporters of the Ottoman Empire. And, of course, Bulgaria to this day still has a large Turkish population. So there was deep concern about what was happening. And when things deteriorated in Bosnia, particularly as discussions things developed along religious lines (there was a large Islamic population in Bosnia) Turkish sympathies were totally with those people who were taking it really in the neck, the Muslims. It was an extraordinarily ugly period of time. I think it is however endemic of empire that it

provided the excuse for any group that is unhappy, to go back historically and say it is because of the Turks. The Arabs feel that way, certainly most Balkans feel that way. Greeks feel that way. The Turks have enough self confidence that they don't overly worry about this. They are used to it. At the same time of course, if it comes down to what they consider a slur on their national honor, they can get very aggravated. Throughout the entire development in the Balkans, President Ozal kept saying the only nation who has sufficient influence to stop the bloodshed was the United States. Ozal spoke very persuasively to groups of U.S. Congressmen on that issue in my presence. Yugoslavia began coming apart in September of 1990. Secretary Baker went to Belgrade then and gave a speech saying that rampant nationalism would lead to disaster for the region. He was almost booed off the stage. I think he left with the feeling a "plague on all of your houses".

Q: He was also the one that said we don't have a dog in that fight.

BARKLEY: You are right. Basically, as Bismarck said. "Yugoslavia is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier." I think there was a general feeling that it was a horror to get involved. At the same time the United States was gearing up in '91 for a presidential election campaign. I don't think there was any inclination to take on any more foreign policy activities.

Q: Did the Turks identify at all with the Islamic group in Bosnia?

BARKLEY: Absolutely. I remember I used to get quite a bit of grief during that period of time. All of these horrific pictures were coming out of these camps. These boys looked so emaciated; it was reminiscent of the concentration camps in Germany. Awful pictures. We were aware of course that there had been systematic expulsions, rapes and murders of Bosnian boys and girls, primarily by Serbs. But the Serbs and the Croats were also at sword points. That goes back longer in history than I could possibly remember. They would come to me all the time and say, "Would the United States allow this if these people were Christians? Or if they were Jews?" Well how do you answer that? But at the same time there is no question where the sympathies of the American people lie. As you know both France and Germany engaged in a rather futile effort to do something in that area. It only showed indeed their political impotence.

Q: Well I think this was a time when the Europeans said let us take care of this. This is a European matter, and we were delighted

BARKLEY: Well that is true, of course until we saw the results, which were a disaster.

Q: I think it serves as a lesson to us that you cant, rightly or wrongly, this western European group can't really produce.

BARKLEY: Well also it is hard to keep all of the events of that time in mind. During the Presidential campaign, Clinton campaigned on the idea that we must do something about this terrible thing in Bosnia, and that we can not allow this kind of thing to go on, and the United States must engage. So there was a certain amount of sympathy during that campaign for the kinds of arguments heard out of the Clinton-Gore camp. Then as you perhaps know right after the election, there was an attempt on the part of the State Department and the Defense

Department to get the allies in line for an American engagement along the lines of the political commitments made during the campaign. I think this has all been written up rather effectively by Elizabeth Drew and others, but as I understand it, the President read Robert Kaplan's book "Balkan Ghosts" and decided the situation was too fraught with danger. So he decided to pull back on that commitment. And it was actually not until many years later that Richard Holbrook brokered the Bosnian agreement. By then there have been almost a quarter million deaths in and around Bosnia. I have always considered American dithering at that time to have been almost criminal.

Q: Well what about the Kurdish situation? Was that something that was on your plate?

BARKLEY: Oh yes, all the time. As I said, the Kurdish population which 20 years ago was very heavily located on the border between Iran, Iraq, Armenia, and Syria, had begun an out migration into Turkey's large cities. There were large groups soon in Istanbul, Ankara, Ismir. The Kurds began their own sort of voluntary Diaspora out of traditional Kurdish areas. But even traditional Kurdish areas in Turkey as well as Iraq and Iran were not homogenous. It was what we used to call a measles chart of different groups where there always Turkmen among the groups and a whole variety of Arabic Sunni, Shia and Alewi. Nonetheless, the situation in Turkey became more interesting because 20% of the population began to spread around the country. Many of them also went to Europe, primarily as guest workers in Germany. Of course they soon became relatively prosperous. While they were outside of Turkey, many of them organized in support of the PKK which was the regional terrorist organization that raised the flag of the insurgency in Turkey. Now much of the insurgency took place there on the border with Iran as I pointed out earlier. The Turkish economy in that area had been devastated, and these groups preyed on that to recruit not only the unemployed, but to work on the general dissatisfaction of the population. The group never had an agenda that was particularly clear. Of course they did have the grievance that they were unable to use the Kurdish language in public life. That had been a policy that the Turks had applied for a long time, sort of like the one language problem that we are facing in the United States now with Spanish. They tried to force Turkish onto the population. They were relatively successfully, but most of the Kurdish population still used their own language at home. I found out subsequently that the different Kurdish groups spoke differently, and that a northern Kurd in Turkey would have a hard time communicating easily with a southern Kurd in Turkey. It was interesting that Abdullah Ocalan who was the head of the PKK actually used Turkish as the language of command.

Q: Was he captured while you were there?

BARKLEY: No, that happened afterwards. It was well known that he was in Syria and that one of Assad's sons was a good friend of his. The Turks knew exactly where they were. In fact several Turkish journalists went down and interviewed him. Of course there was an attempt not to give him too much publicity on the part of the Turks, but he did indeed use bases in Syria and was able to infiltrate a lot of arms into southern Turkey over the Syrian border with both Iraq and Turkey.

Q: Were these a threat to you?

BARKLEY: Not that I am particularly aware of. Of course I lived with several security threats. Many of them at that time originated out of groups of Iranians who were living in Turkey. Large numbers of them left Iran when the Ayatollah came in, and some terrorist groups went with them. They had gone after a number of Israelis in Turkey. When I arrived, a sergeant in JUSMATT, which was the American military grouping, there he had his car bombed. He had died just before I arrived. Subsequently bombings, several of them were focused on Israeli diplomats as well as Egyptian diplomats, had a lot to do with efforts to reach peace in the Middle East. Whenever there was any progress, some terrorist in Turkey would blow up a bomb. Several Israeli diplomats died in the bombings. I remember visiting the Egyptian who was in a car when a bomb went off. His windows were open only half way, so he only lost his legs. Nonetheless I had the opportunity to visit him in the hospital. Almost all of those had some sort of connection with what was happening in the Middle East.

Q: Well we had this enclave that we were protecting with the start of Operation Provide Comfort I believe.

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: Did that, did you get involved with that? This was an Iraqi enclave that kind of more or less we had helped establish.

BARKLEY: Well, it was an attempt actually to allow the Kurds, particularly those who had fled into Turkey, to return to their homes. We declared basically a safe zone, telling the Iraqis to stay out of this zone, and if they don't we are going to respond militarily. We sent a small group down into that area. It was called Operation Provide Comfort. Although the Turks referred to it as "Hammerforce," which had been the original term for the operation until people realized that probably wasn't a very sophisticated way of getting people on your side. So Provide Comfort became a major success story and it allowed the Kurds to return into northern Iraq. The small military group there at Provide Comfort was never more than 10-15 people, and with a U.S. colonel in charge. When I first came there it was a Colonel Nabb. There were two very strong groupings in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. There was the Barzani group and the Talibani group. They were about equally divided. Many of them had great suspicions about each other. I mean the Kurds are factious. They are willing to kill each other on points of principle. So it was a difficult time. At the same time the PKK was using the chaos in northern Iraq to mount a lot of cross border operations. The Turks were extraordinarily concerned about this. No sooner had I arrived actually than they picked up that radio reports of American helicopters bringing food and clothing to people who were extremists in different parts of northern Iraq. Part of these groups, according to the Turks, were members of the PKK. Well you can imagine what kind of reaction there was in Turkey that Provide Comfort was indeed supplying food and comfort to PKK operatives. The difference was, I don't think our guys could spot the difference between one Kurdish group and another. They saw people who were hungry so they fed them. That is when I said, "From my standpoint you would be very wise to have a Turkish officer with you on every flight to make sure you are not doing something that you can't handle." That began to help the situation a little bit. But there always was the suspicion that we were down there to create a Kurdish state. We were "nation building" in northern Iraq, and the results would be total unrest not only in Turkey but in Iran. Typically the Syrians were fishing in troubled waters. That is why

they were supporting the PKK.

Q: Well in a way I mean this suspicion, it might not have been our policy, but it had the some of the elements of creating the sort of defacto state.

BARKLEY: Well I think that is true. Once they established their own government and had parliamentary elections the first element of an independent government were in place. The Turks were extraordinarily unhappy with this development. We said, "They have to get their lives back into order, and without some semblance of government, they are not going to be able to do that." We actually got all of the Kurdish players to say independence was not their goal, but that they wanted to be part of an independent, a democratic Iraq. Whether they believed that or not, I can't tell you. But all I know is that it was a constant problem. The Turks then found out that the PKK was able to mount all kinds of attacks that could no longer be handled by the police, so the army was called in. Now counterinsurgency is extraordinarily nasty, and the PKK wanted to provoke as much nastiness as they could. So they assassinated a large number of civilians. They focused very much on teachers and other groups that were vulnerable. The Turkish military tried to crack down. It wasn't long, predictably, before we were on their case for human rights violations. Of course it wasn't long before groups like the Armenians and Greeks were saying "there they go again, just out slaughtering decent people". Well it wasn't that way at all. It was an extraordinarily nasty kind of business. It cost them an enormous amount of treasure, not only financial but in terms of human life. At different levels, over 40,000 people died. That is a lot of people. When you talk about less than 3,000 at the Twin Towers disaster. The Turks were a little upset at the international community who was censuring them. They look upon it, of course, as a situation directly attributable to their loyalty to western policy in Iraq. Of course our effort to make sure, right after Iraq, that Turkey didn't suffer unnecessary financial harm didn't really develop very much. We did get the Kuwaitis to give them some commitments on financial assistance, and they got some, but they didn't get anything at all close to what they were spending on problems that came out of their participation in Desert Storm.

Q: Did Iran play much while you were there? Was that a...

BARKLEY: Well there was a tradition, and it continued while I was there, that the Turks periodically pay a state visit to Iran. They had solidified their border more or less, although there was an enormous amount of smuggling and things that have always gone on between them. There was some economic exchange, but not nearly to the level of what there was with Iraq. They would go and come back and give us a readout as to what their meetings meant. I am not an expert on Iran, but the Turkish assessment was is that Tehran was facing a serious problem because the young population was expanding to such an enormous level, and their economy had nose dived after the Islamic revolution.

Q: What about while you were there the rise and the development of fundamentalism? Was this something, you know, one things of, one was hearing at that time about things like the head scarf in schools and all that. I mean what was happening?

BARKLEY: Turkey has always had a difficult problem coming to grips with their past. Turkey as you perhaps know, is the only secular state that has a majority Islamic population. And of

course that is inscribed in their constitution, and they abide by it very strongly. The military watches it particularly keenly. There have been attempts at one during the time of Ozal and before, to try and bring Islam more into line with democratic order. They allowed a number of schools to open with Islamic curriculae. Theoretically they were watched very carefully by the government to make sure they were not endorsing traditional Islamic programs such as the imposition of Sharia law. Nonetheless, there was a growing Islamic sympathy, I think, while I was there, and it had a lot to do with issues far beyond Turkey, not the least what was happening in Bosnia. A certain feeling that, okay, we are not out to impose Islam on the rest of the world, but the world can not just treat Islamic people you know, with disdain. So there was a certain sympathy throughout, particularly throughout the time of Bosnia that said that indeed Western bias is poisonous and will come back and haunt us. There was increasing sympathy among Islamic groups. Now Islamic groups had coalesced under a group called REFA which was the prosperity party. REFA had a number of quite adept politicians. Erbakan was the leader of that party, and he subsequently formed a coalition government. So there was an increased feeling among Islamic communities that the international community closed their eyes to not only violence against, but disregard for Islamic peoples. At the same time a very interesting thing was happening. It happened actually from the time right after I arrived there. In the wake of Desert Storm, the U.S. put together a Middle East peace initiative. The Turks very much wanted to participate in it. They had of course, among their population a certain sympathy for the Palestinian cause. At the same time they always had a very loyal and active Jewish community in Turkey. Well the only two countries in southeastern Med, that were devoted to principles of democracy and modernization were Turkey and Israel. I remember one particular case early in my tenure, I had developed some close personal relations with the military, primarily because I stayed away from political discourse. I remember talking to Haus Burhan who was the head of the Air Force at that time. I said, "Haus, it would be very wise for you to look upon alternatives particularly if European and Americans become upset with your policy for whatever reason. Have you thought of Israel?" He said, "Oh yes." Well shortly thereafter he told me that his Israeli counterpart have just visited. The Israelis for a long time had been interested in Turkey for strategic as well as historical reasons. That was the beginning actually of a relationship that is going on to this day between the Turkish and the Israeli militaries. At the same time the government, right after the Middle East peace process began, upgraded their diplomatic relations with Israel. Shortly thereafter Cetin visited Israel and was received very warmly by the large sizable Turkish-Israeli community there. So things began to warm up. It soon became an article of faith that Turkish-Israeli relations were extraordinarily important to both of their countries. They were afraid to label it a strategic relationship, because there was some domestic resistance to that, but in fact it was. They began to hold joint military maneuvers, some of which we joined in on. We were a little cautious on how to handle this, we understood it was a good thing but thought there could be some downsides to it too. But I think that during my time there this was one of the really positive developments that took place, the warming and thickening of Turkish-Israeli relations.

Q: What about relations with Syria, I mean how were the Syrians viewed at that time? Assad was the...

BARKLEY: Assad of course is an extraordinarily duplicitous fellow. One of the first things I had to learn in that area was that the regional players would look you right in the face and lie. Not

that the Americans and the Europeans can't put spins on things, but a flagrant kind of falsehood is something that you tried to avoid. I remember the Turks were always trying to get us to tell the Syrians to stop supporting the PKK. My answer was "What do you do yourself? I mean you have relationships with these guys." So the Turkish Minister of the Interior at one time went over, talked to the Syrians and said, "You know we really have concerns because the PKK leadership is here in Damascus." The Syrians looked at him and said, "Who are these people?" I mean it was just absolutely incredible to hear that kind of shameless dissimulation. The Turks said, "Well we have not only pictures of the guy, but we can give you his address as well." The Syrians said they would look into it and of course did nothing. It wasn't until after I left that the Turkish military decided that they had had enough, and they moved military forces into Hatay province which is on the border with Syria. The Syrians finally got the message and asked Ocalan to leave. That was the beginning of the end for him. As you perhaps know, he found asylum, initially in Greece and then the Greeks gave him asylum in Kenya where he was finally picked up by Turkish commandos, which was extraordinarily embarrassing for Greece. This occurred after I had departed Ankara.

Q: Well what about during this time the Soviet Union was breaking up. I know it because I spent three weeks in Kyrgyzstan just about '94. It was obvious that the Turks were looking on the creation of these Stans as an opportunity to spread the influence of Turkey. What was happening?

BARCKLEY: That is true. Turks claimed that there was no better model for an Islamic nation than the Turkish model, the Atatürk model if you will." Which embraced both modernization, and western orientations. So they tried to establish a number of policy lines to address these issues. Now of the new Stans, the ones that had large Islamic populations were Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. They all spoke some sort of Turkish language, although some were quite distinct. Except for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, it was hard to understand what an Anatolian Turk was saying. Nonetheless, they all had a Turkish background. So the Turks decided to bring in numbers of students from all of these groups to train at Turkish universities. They also expanded their military presence and tried to put some money into different programs. At the same time the Turks told me that the most of the money that flowed into those areas came from Saudi Arabia for mosques and Islamic schools. The Saudi variant of Islam is considerably less secular. So Wahabi elements were quite active in that area, and indeed provide a certain amount of nuisance value. We Americans were just trying to get our feet on the ground in that area at that time. It was an area where we were politically blinded for centuries and never been particularly interested in. But in principle we tried to encourage the Turks because as I said, their brand of democratic Islam was something we endorsed. They did make some advances; they had some reverses. I remember meeting a couple of groups that came from these areas. As you can imagine, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was only one ambassador in Ankara. Afterwards there were multiple ambassadors. They were all seeking some sort of relationship with the United States, so I got to know almost all of them. Almost all of them came out of the communist apparatus that the Soviets had in place for many years.

Q: Well I mean you really were in an extraordinary place, because when you think about it, we just had a border tour of the horizon as they say. Turkey at that time was really in the center of things. Was this sort of pepping the Turks up or sort of discouraging them?

BARCKLEY: We would say to them, and they understood and agreed, that they had gone from being the southern anchor of NATO into being a regional power. They said, "You know we are in a Bermuda triangle here between the Balkans and the Caucasus and the Arabic and Persian countries to the south. Whatever came out of this area was not going to be particularly good. Therefore levels of stability should be appreciated here in Turkey. Now the Turks of course, always looked upon things like the Kurdish problem and elsewhere as part of regional Balkanization, which they were determined to resist. Of course, it was a messy business. As we talked earlier, there were high levels of human rights violations on both sides, and a huge amount of violence. Of course those ethnic groups that were not particularly friendly to the Turks anyway were not willing to be tolerant of these things. I mean I spent as much time trying to say you must follow humane practices at all times. I remember the military telling me if they didn't follow humane practices, they would have solved the problem long ago. "The reasons the insurgency is still going on is we have got kid gloves on, to make sure that our western friends know we are trying our best." It was extraordinarily messy. And as you can see by this discourse we jumped all over the place in three years. There was no really sort of chronological order in which you could put things.

Q: How about on the economic side? What were American-Turkish economic relations?

BARCKLEY: The Turks, of course, would like to have had the United States give them trade advantages, but the things the Turks were particularly competitive in were things like textiles, which are extraordinarily difficult in the United States and subjected to all sorts of quotas and restrictions. They wanted the quotas increased and things like that. There was resistance in the United States to do that. We were always about five or sixth in line as trading partners. The biggest trading partners were always France and Germany and Switzerland, actually a lot of trade. And of course for political reasons, more than economic reasons, we strongly supported Turkish efforts to join the European Union. The European Union for its own political reasons were not very enthusiastic about this although we kept saying the political realities are that you better try to find a friend in Turkey rather than shut them out. It had been a long odyssey from the beginning until they were finally given status as a customs union with the EU (European Union). But full membership, they keep being pushed further and further down the line by the Europeans. It is quite clear the Europeans have no interest at all in adding an Islamic based nation into the mix.

Q: What about you were there during an election when George Bush senior lost and was replaced by Bill Clinton.

BARCKLEY: Yes.

Q: Did you, was there a change? How did that work from your perspective?

BARCKLEY: Well of course we had gone from an administration that had been extraordinarily active in foreign affairs, to a new administration that seemed to view itself primarily as a domestic administration. There is always a certain gap while the new people took over. The people that did come in of course tended to be known to some of us because they were part of the

earlier Carter administration: Secretary of State Warren Christopher of course, and Tony Lake as head of the NSC. We weren't quite sure how any of this would shake out. It turns out that Ozal, very quick off the mark decided that he immediately wanted to get the measure of this new administration. After the election, the first U.S. group to visit were three congressmen. We usually didn't get many congressmen and senators because Turkey was often a problem for their domestic constituents. The group that came out was headed by Richard Gephardt. He had with him Dan Glickman and Robert Torricelli from New Jersey. I think Glickman was from Kansas. I am not quite sure. He later on became Secretary of Agriculture in the Clinton Administration. They were well received. A dinner was given for them by Demirel and they were received by Ozal. Ozal, of course, was extraordinarily effective in presenting regional foreign policy problems. Demirel was just very congenial and told them that Turkey always looked to the United States as a firm and loyal friend. The meeting with Ozal was extraordinarily good. After that meeting it became clear that he was determined to meet with Clinton. Well it is always hard with a new administration to you how get in the door. Ozal arranged to have a medical meeting either in Florida or in Texas. Then he showed up in Washington and sort of beat on the door. I mean protocol never deterred Ozal. Of course we were all desperately trying to get them to agree to a meeting. For me it was instructive how this took place. Everything I tried in Washington got no response at all, none. Whether the stuff was even being read I don't know. The State Department was also at sixes and sevens, not quite sure what to do. I am sure the desk was doing its best, but was not getting any response from the White House. Subsequently I discovered that indeed that the White House staff finally did agree to see Ozal for a half hour. He showed up, and President Clinton who was notorious for not watching the clock too closely was late. After he arrived and they had coffee and started to talk. Clinton was absolutely fascinated by what Ozal had to say. Ozal, God bless him, was marvelous at this kind of presentation. So I guess to the horror of his staff, after about a half hour, Clinton said, "This is much too interesting to break off." He said, "Bring us more coffee." So it went on for a good long time. I am not exactly quite sure how long. It was also somewhat of a wake up call for me too because I had gotten used to getting readouts on every kind of serious meeting from President Bush and his staff. That stopped completely. I got no resonance at any time when I was there from the Clinton administration. So I don't know what went on. Whenever there was a big meeting there was a policy to disinvite the American ambassador. That was the position I was told, that Tony Lake took. I don't know if that goes back to his time with Kissinger or not, but I was basically shut out for the rest of my tour. What I found out, I found out more by chance and through readouts from the Turks. So the situation had changed 180 degrees. Now from what I was able to hear, I believe President Clinton had extraordinarily well honed strategic sense. However whatever he decided always passed first through the filter of domestic politics. Several groups in the White House were not particularly friendly to Turkey, although the president was. In any event, that was of course in January of '93. In April of that year, quite unexpectedly Ozal passed away.

Q: Was this sudden?

BARKLEY: Well he had had some health problems, but nobody expected it. He looked tired. In any event Prime Minister Demirel decided he wanted to be president. Of course he was in a better position I suppose to go after that. But the immediate problem for us was to make sure that we have high U.S. representation at the funeral. We tried desperately to get Washington to look at this. We knew the president couldn't come. The natural inclination in view of the size and

importance of Turkey would be that the vice president could come or maybe actually the first lady, whomever. We got shot down on all of those fronts. Apparently there was great effort in the Department to try and get someone special. Certainly that was true on the part of my ex-DCM, Mark Grossman who was working for Secretary Christopher. But for whatever reason they couldn't come up with anyone. Of course it is times like this that countries pay attention to how important the U.S. response is. Finally, Washington discovered that Jim Baker was traveling in the region. The Department asked if he would head the American delegation as ex-Secretary of State. He agreed to do that. Clifton Wharton, who was the Deputy Secretary of State joined him. It was a delegation with Mort Abramowitz and a couple of other people, but it was certainly not a high level group. Nonetheless, Secretary Baker knew "God and the world" as they say in Germany. Everybody knew him and respected him highly, so he did a good job, but I think that among members of the Turkish government there was a level of bitterness.

Q: Could you get across the duties of your people. I mean that is pretty tricky.

BARKLEY: It is very difficult. I haven't addressed that. The vice president said, "I don't do funerals, or something like that." He actually did them I guess for the King of Morocco and royalty. I don't know, I can't tell you what it was that went into their thinking. But it was of course something that would haunt us a little bit among key levels of the government, particularly in the foreign office, for they had a great affection for Ozal and his wisdom. Ozal had, of course, gone the extra mile for the United States so many times. Now we did try to get ex-president Bush which would have been a natural, but it turns out that exactly on that day he was opening his library in Midland, Texas, so you can imagine he had scheduling problems. Baker came out with this group, and we went through the program. We also had a whole variety of high level meetings there which Secretary Baker did not participate in because he was not a member of the government. Most of that was taken up by Secretary Wharton, who did a very nice job, but he was new to the office and was not at all read in on the area. But during that period of time we met with a whole number of people including Ter Petrossian who was the President of Armenia. That was an interesting session. But Ozal's death put the whole political scenery in Turkey into disarray. There was a huge realignment within the ruling parties. The new leader of Demirel's party was a woman by the name of Tansu Ciller, a young, U.S. educated, extraordinarily beautiful young woman in her early 40's. Then the coalition partner, the Progressive People's Party, Mr. Inonu, also stepped back and he was replaced by Murat Karayalcin who was at that time the mayor of Ankara and an up and coming young man. So the whole political scenery had changed. The only real long time familiar figure from the old political party was Demirel who became President. A couple of the other historical figures were still around including Ecevit himself. Who later on parleyed this confusion into political advantage. In any event, one of the first things that the new prime minister wanted to do, was to visit the United States. So once again we went to work, and once again it was an extraordinarily unrewarding kind of effort. We made the point there was a western oriented, western educated female, the first female head of the secular government of modern Turkey. All the things that we should be not only appreciative but endorse and support, stressing that it was important for her to see the President. If she didn't see the president, she would take serious political licks back home and might not be able to survive. We got no response, no response, I mean no response. She was on the phone to me all the time and was working through her ambassador in Washington. I know they did everything they could to try but they couldn't get through the White House. So she came

to me and said, "I don't know what to do. I have to see the President. If I don't see the president, I can't go." But at the same time her program began to coalesce as it does at a time like this. So she took a fling and went. It took some courage on her part. Then I was told that a meeting indeed was put together. I got that from the State Department, and once again I had no idea what went on. I mean ideally once again, the ambassador should be called back. I was on the phone saying, "Look, this is the Prime Minister, the Head of Government. I think I should be there." They said, "No, this is one of the new policies of the administration. No ambassadors are invited to the meetings."

Q: Did you feel the hand of Tony Lake there?

BARKLEY: You know I can't really tell you. Many of the people I knew in Washington thought this was a policy that Tony Lake had put in place. I wasn't there; I can't tell you that. But I did know that I was not invited. Of course then you had to go through the diplomatic nuances and all the other stuff, because quite obviously I went from a position where I was the best informed person in turkey on American policy to one where I had no idea whatsoever. It was astonishing. But from what I understand it was an extraordinarily good meeting. The President, once he saw her, and saw that not only did she speak perfect English, but was extraordinarily beautiful, he apparently developed an instant rapport. They addressed a number of issues. From what I understand, one of the things that she did bring up is the Turks had been very interested in getting air refueling tankers for their military to increase their military reach, particularly to the east. We hadn't been able to get an answer there, and she brought that up and a number of other issues and seemed to have gotten a very positive response from the president. Upon her return, it just turned out there was a diplomatic reception, and she was there, and she asked me to come over and see her. She said, "You know I saw the President. We had a very good meeting. Besides that Mr. Ambassador, I won't need your help anymore." I don't know if this was a slam at my inability to help her before or not. She said, "No the president has given me his personal telephone number, and said if I ever had any needs I should call him directly which I intend to do." I have no idea if she ever did that. I have reason to believe from other comments later on that she did perhaps often. But I had no idea what the contents of those meetings were. I do know that she subsequently told a number of Congressmen that she was cross with the president because he had made a number of commitments to her that had not panned out. So I was flying blind for the rest of my tenure. It was most uncomfortable.

Q: How did you evaluate Ciller as a political figure during the time you were there?

BARKLEY: Well she was infinitely more attractive to a western audience than she was to a Turkish audience. Both she and Karayalcin represented a generational transition. They were well educated. They were the heads of political parties that had some stature and some influence. It was our belief that indeed they had made the transference from an old leadership to a new leadership, and that they were all positively inclined to the west. It turns out that although that was true, they were also extraordinarily inept politically. Ciller, who was a trained economist, thought that she could dictate economic developments. In March of 1994, she tried to curtail the interest payments that banks were making for long term loans which of course led to an immediate flight out of the Lira into Deutschmarks and Dollars and caused a terrible economic crisis, one they never got over. Although she survived up until my departure, it was clear that

Turkey was on hard, hard times. Things that happened during the few years I was there, they had gone from a time of buoyancy and economic expansion to a full fledged insurrection in the southeast and economic dislocations of a serious nature. Things were obviously unhappy times.

Q: What about the unification of Germany which you were intimately acquainted with? Germany had always been sort of the Berlin to Baghdad connection, you know that Turkey had always been very favorable to Germany and vice versa. Turks have gone to work. Did the unification play any impact on Turkey?

BARCKLEY: Not appreciably, not while I was there.

Q: I was wondering about their money and the fact that the Germans became self absorbed and all that.

BARCKLEY: No, but there was a constant problem. The Germans had enormous sympathy at different levels in Turkey. Turkish guest workers had gone there in huge numbers, and many of them had become very successful and remitted a lot of money to Turkey. But at the same time there were domestic problems in Germany with Turkey. For example, trying to absorb the number of Turks coming in. The Turks wanted to have dual citizenship; the Germans resisted. Also their concept of a guest worker is they did not stay permanently. In fact, the Turks did stay permanently.

Q: Some in third generation.

BARCKLEY: But among the working class for example, although the language, the most popular western language among intellectuals was English or French, among the working class it was German. Huge numbers. You could go to almost anywhere in Turkey and encounter German speakers, which of course, made it easy for me because we were able to communicate. So there was a great deal of sympathy, but there were problems. For example, the problems that Turkey is going through with the Kurds replayed itself out in Germany. Also fundamentalist groups found fertile ground in Germany to expand their efforts. And all of these groups were able to send enormous amounts of money into their particular causes in either Turkey or surrounding territory. The PKK was largely financed by German marks. The same thing was true basically of the Islamic party in Turkey. In fact I was told the Islamic party in Turkey denominated their own party coffers in deutschmarks, because that is where they got so much of their money. So there was a huge payoff between the two countries. We were constantly trying to get the Germans to put pressure on the PKK which of course used extortion among other things to get money out of people in Germany, to stop it and to censure them. They were reluctant to do that, thinking that it would cause domestic unrest. So the relationship was an interesting one. Of course many Germans did not support Turkey's ascension to the EU. Not least of course Helmut Schmidt who many times was known to have met with Giscard d'Estaing and to have agreed Turkish culture did not fit into the European pattern. So it was active and somewhat tense relationship. At the same time it held great promise.

G. JONATHAN GREENWALD
Chief Political Officer, US Mission to the European Community
Brussels (1993-????)

Born and raised in Pennsylvania, Mr. Greenwald earned degrees for Princeton University and Harvard Law School. His first government assignment was General Counsel in the Department of the Air Force. He later transferred to the Department of State, where he served as legal advisor as well as Political Officer, both in Washington and in various assignments abroad. His foreign posts include Germany (East and West Berlin), Yugoslavia, Hungary and Belgium. He also had assignments concerning anti-terrorism.

Q: Then there's also a question of effectiveness. You may be able to persuade through the embassy in Rome the Italian government that it should take a certain position, but sometimes it doesn't actually take that or doesn't speak up at the right time. Jon, I'd be interested maybe in delving a little bit into one or the other of two areas. One is the whole question of enlargement of the European Union. I assume in the mid-90s while you were there that was a topic. And the second -- choose one or the other or both -- would be the whole question of the crises that were cropping up in various parts of the world where the United States was involved, the European Union had an interest in some cases, the Balkans, Rwanda, I don't know what else. Where these things that preoccupied you or got you involved, or was this kind of marginal to your responsibilities?

GREENWALD: No, they were the bread and butter of what we were doing, in both sets of issues, enlargement and the sort of ad hoc crises. Enlargement, of course, is the fundamental question. It's whether the European Union can do to and for Eastern Europe what it did for itself, go back to the reason for the Monnet concept, which was to make war impossible between Germany and France, and that was achieved brilliantly. It's inconceivable that there could be a war in Western Europe, because everything is so tied together that you'd be fighting yourself. Whether that kind of coalescence of enlightened self-interest can be developed and extended to Eastern Europe is the big question of enlargement. Everyone agrees with that strategic concept on both sides of the Atlantic. All of the devils are waiting to pounce out of the details. Early on in my time in Brussels, Secretary Christopher made a speech in Budapest in which he strongly criticized the European Union for, as he put it, moving too slowly and for using Eastern Europe as an area from which to draw resources rather than an area in which to put resources. He used as his citation for that fact that in the past year the Eastern Europeans had bought more goods from Western Europe than the EU was selling or sending into Eastern Europe. We were quickly demarched on that at a number of levels in Brussels, because they felt that there were several things wrong with it. First, there was the economic fallacy that they pointed out, and I think persuasively, that if you have economies which were as run-down as those in Eastern Europe which have to retool, which have to get new machinery and new wherewithal to compete, it's only natural that there would be a period in which they make substantial purchases in the West before they can produce the goods that could be sold and bought in the West, they could sell goods which were of quality that would be of interest to Russia or the Third World or, if they didn't make enough, that could be of interest in the Western markets, and they had to retool to do it. The more important point they made was that, while we could argue about the pace of

enlargement -- and they had their arguments about why they had to go more slowly than we would like, some of them, I think, quite good arguments -- at the higher policy levels we tended to see the European Union as something like NATO, a club of like-minded. You let somebody in when you decided it was politically opportune to let somebody in, which basically is the NATO case. The European Union is different. It doesn't do anybody any good if you let them in before they're able to stand on their own feet. They'll hurt themselves and they'll hurt the larger entity, so they were arguing, "We're really much more like a government than we are like a like-minded club, and these states aren't ready. To some extent, we're not ready. We have to do certain things. You're right, we've been slow about that. But they're not going to be ready for quite a few years, because they have to make enormous changes in the very root structure of their societies." But regardless of that argument about how fast or how slow one could go, one shouldn't use megaphone diplomacy in dealing with each other. They should not go into the heart of Eastern Europe and make a statement that will sound good in the ears of your immediate hosts but which takes a dispute into the newspaper headlines. We need a new type of relationship where we talk quietly and in confidence to each other and not the megaphone approach. That's been one of the issues that's continually haunted us on enlargement. It's come up periodically. It's come up very recently also with regard to Turkey, where there are differences that we have about what the approach to Turkey or the relationship to Turkey should be in the European Union. It's a very complicated question, but we tended to deal with that all too often in a public way rather than a private way. That's been one theme, the question of megaphone diplomacy versus quiet diplomacy. The other is this really more fundamental issue of how fast can you go, are they dragging their feet, because it's already been almost a decade. Nobody thinks that there will really be members in Eastern Europe or the European Union before 2002, 2003, maybe 2005. Is that irresponsible, or is it really necessary because it's the complexity of the situation? I think there's a little bit of truth in both, that there's still very fundamental issues that the European Union has to resolve internally before it can take the Eastern Europeans in. Even if the Eastern Europeans were ready today, the European Union isn't ready for them. But to give them the benefit of doubt, I think that all those kinds of decisions would become easier to take if they get through the number-one priority which they have, and that's economic and monetary union. Almost all of their psychic energy, ability to make political compromises, to force through unpopular measures is being directed toward making EMU a success. They think that's the most important thing on their agenda, the step which will most dramatically, most effectively advance the integration process, and which, if it fails, will most dramatically negatively unravel a great deal which has been achieved over the last 40 years. If they get through that successfully, then they'll be ready and able to jump the hurdles that remain before them on enlargement, which they're not yet ready to jump. Since it's going to take a number of years for the Eastern Europeans to complete their own transformation, I think we can afford to give them the benefit of the doubt on that. The ad hoc crises continually raised the question of what leadership is. From our point of view, leadership has generally been us making up our mind as to what needs to be done and then telling the Europeans what that strategy is and asking for support. From the European point of view, that style has increasingly, as they would see it, evolved into a situation where we are saying to them we will lead and have the prestige of leadership, we will contribute our political prestige to that common cause, and you please write the check. The Europeans are feeling annoyed that to some extent it has to be that way, because they aren't yet able to reach those policy decisions which we've reached for themselves, because their differences among themselves are still substantial and their mechanisms, procedures and mindsets for resolving

them all too often go toward lower common denominators. There is also a belief that in many instances they are more able than we're prepared to give them credit for to play a political role. Since both sides agree that the Europeans have a substantial number of checks which they can and need to write, there should be a political payoff for that, that there needs to be a different kind of approach toward shared political leadership. That's been very much the case in the Middle East, very much the case in the Balkans. Of course, it's a particularly difficult one because of the painful history of Bosnia. There you have I would say a cartoon view in the United States that it's a little bit like the Second World War or the First World War all over again. The Europeans got into a mess and couldn't handle it, and we had to jump in and save them. The European view, of course, is that, yes, they got into a mess, they couldn't handle it, but we didn't handle it either, and we stood on the sidelines while they tried to deal with it, and we then got in and provided the absolutely indispensable additional element to resolve the matter, but we couldn't have done it alone either, and now they're providing both a lot of troops and an awful lot of money to try to shore up the situation and rebuild. All of that means that there should be some kind of shared leadership, whereas what they tend to get is the Richard Holbrookian style of leadership, which is accepted at times of crisis but rubs raw quickly when it isn't a time of crisis. That kind of dispute was constant throughout the years that I was there, and I think probably still is. Our role is constantly to mediate; again to explain to Washington attitudes which were sometimes irritated and explain why the irritation; explain ways around it; explain that if we wanted to get that check, we would need to be somewhat more diplomatic in the way we asked for it; and, of course, the traditional role of explaining to the Europeans why it was that Washington was coming at them for this or for that. There was a great deal of suspicion that we had to deal with. You can multiply the examples, but to take just one: the U.S. came up with a rather nice idea which was called the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, SECI. It was basically developed by Richard Shifter at the NSC. It is a modest proposal for encouraging economic cooperation within the Balkans and in the immediate surrounding area of the Balkans, to try to deal with the animosities that had been exacerbated by Bosnia and to encourage cooperation instead of hostility within the region. We had no financial resource to put into this idea. We had the idea, and we were willing to provide political dynamism. Now when we went to the Europeans and said we have this nice idea and we don't have any money for it but we have political dynamism, of course that sent all of the warning signals up that we were really going to ask them to provide the money and write some more checks, and we had to work hard to keep Washington aware of that sensitivity and to persuade the Europeans that in fact this was an idea that was meant to work without anybody putting any financial resources. It was really meant to encourage cooperation on the ground, but it would have been an easier idea to sell if we had made a little more progress in that more fundamental approach, which is the goal of the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda, which is ultimately to encourage Washington to rethink its concept of what partnership with Europe is all about. So I think we made a start in moving things along in that direction. The next few years will be crucial. That will be determined substantially by what happens with EMU, whether it is made a success. Will it lead, as I think it probably will if it's a success, to a great increase in European self-confidence and ability to make substantial movement toward greater integration and, therefore, a more efficient common foreign policy as well as economic policy. Can the United States make the adjustments that will have to be made on our side to deal with a different kind of Europe, dealing with a Europe which is much more our equal.

C. DAVID ESCH
Chief of Party, Academy for Educational Development
Moscow, Russia (1993-1996)

Mr. Esch was raised in Wisconsin and educated at the University of Oregon and Vanderbilt University. He joined USAID in 1987 in the Office of International Training, and in 1989 joined the Foreign Service, working in the Office of Education Study of Human Resources Development (HRD). Continuing in this general field, Mr. served in Moscow and Ankara with USAID. He also served in the State Department as Desk Officer for Pakistan and Afghanistan and in the private sector dealing with educational development. Mr. Esch was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

ESCH: I once went to Turkey on three different trips in a month. We could travel on Turkish lira because we had counterpart. THY and Pan Am had an arrangement to accept Turkish lira, so there was actually no operating expense cost at all to travel, and whenever Jim wanted something I got on a plane and went. I got to know the Turkey (inaudible) over the three or four years.

Q: What were some of the main features of the program?

ESCH: Large (inaudible) support through balance of payment saved, so you had a policy dialogue component of the program. Again, mainly focused on exchange rate reform and those sorts of issues. Large TA program, the miracle wheats we introduced in Turkey. One of the places where the Mexi-pac really took off. We did a lot in the way of land leveling and irrigation in Turkey. I'll come back to that in a second because its sort of interesting. We built Middle East Technical University, Roberts College, one of the American School Hospital Abroad programs in Istanbul was there. We tried to at another university in Eastern Turkey, in Erzurum so it was a large university component. We spent a lot of money trying to get the Turks to do something with the State Economic Enterprises. It was a huge Bob Nathan team out there. I'd say the mission staff was about a hundred... eighty-five to a hundred. I think they had seven or eight economists full time working on the staff. Larry Jones was the Program Officer at that time and most of the time I was there. There was an equally large TA. Rob Gleason was the TA. In Health we had a huge population program which is still going on, smaller stage now but still (inaudible) going into Turkey. Didn't do much in primary and secondary education, mostly university at that time. Art Hanley was the Public Administration Director. He had a big Bob Nathan team working on fixing up the State Economic Enterprises. I think at the time I started working....I should say also we had a major international consortium. It was the only OECD run consortium at that time. It was under the auspices of the OECD and we met twice a year.

Q: Who chaired it?

ESCH: The DAC chairman chaired it. There had been two, one Greek and one Turkish. The Greek one had died a long time ago, but the Turkish one was still very, very active. The Turks, till this day, go on sort of five-year cycles. They get their prices right and their economy sort of

squared away, then the politicians can't hold back the spending and the economy begins to go downhill. They get debt rescheduling and start over again. If you look at the history from the 60's this is what happens. Every five years we were dealing with major debt rescheduling and intense IMF negotiations to deal with these issues. I worked throughout this period with an absolutely delightful guy at the IMF called Ernie Sturc. Ernie had dealt with Turkish affairs early in his career, and was now the Director of the Balance Payments department of the IMF, and had much wider and larger responsibilities. Because of the relationship he had established with the Turkish planners, the IMF let him stay on and he was the person who was dealing with all the exchange reform and the debt rescheduling. I, on the Washington side, developed a nice working relationship with Ernie. The AID image was a capital projects image. We had big Capital Project staff. They were well staffed in terms of quality of people. I've tried to remember who was the Director of that office when I first came in but it had in a junior capacity folks like (inaudible) folks like Rod Wagner; a whole team of folks from Morgan Guarantee and some of the other banks in New York as sort of a junior training program. These guys were sharp. On the project side they knew their business. Because Jim Grant wasn't of that sort, I think they decided to send Rod Wagner out as Deputy Mission Director, to oversee the project portfolio. The expectation was doing sixty to eighty million dollars in large capital projects in the future. There was a never-ending need for this kind of opportunity, and given the military relationship with Turkey, Congress was going to give them the money. I and others were convinced that none of that was going to work until they started getting their exchange rate sorted out.

It was during this period that the program began to switch much more to a policy dialogue where we became much more critical of where we put the project's capital money. With the IMF and the World Bank much more involved, exchange reform became the principal focus of our, if you will, conditionality at the time. Basically Rod left-he served two years-but left Turkey and frankly left the agency, and went back to a very successful career in the banking business. It was clear to him that the power was no longer going to be on the capital project side of the business. The power was shifting into policy kinds of questions. Jim Grant developed, in this frame of what was called the assistance completion plan, which forecast to the Turks our expectation that if they got their policies right, we should be able to complete assistance by 1973. Which was in fact something they had said themselves in their planning documents, although they probably weren't serious about it. They had sort of forecast independence. It came pretty close. Obviously that's as much a political kind of things as it is economic, but when they reformed the exchange rate, their balance of payments improved very dramatically, very quickly. They did some other things right, and the politics wasn't bad...wasn't great but whatever.

Q: Was there U.S. political pressure, State Department type, on trying to influence your role and not pressing too hard?

ESCH: No. It was the backwater for NEA. I mean it wasn't unimportant, and you had a large military assistance program during that period. As long as that was secure. Of course you had the ambivalence because the Turks would always screw up something on the Cyprus side to make the Congress angry at them. It wasn't the same environment that you faced, say in Egypt or Israel if you wanted to deal with those AID programs, which had no bearing whatsoever to economic issues. You couldn't go extreme. We weren't going to bring down the government kind of conditionality, and the IMF was not involved with policy issues at that time. They were

involved in loan stuff but not the policy.

Q: They're very much engaged in the policy now and process with the government.

ESCH: The Turks had an office in Washington, which was part of their state planning organization. It was only attached to the embassy. They took their orders from SPL and that was my counterpart back here. We met weekly to go over a whole range of things, and then I would have lunch with my counterpart in that office at least once a month. The subject of that lunch was almost always interest rate reform or exchange rate reform. This person was not of the rank to make those decisions and neither was I, but this tended to reinforce what Jim was doing out in Turkey at the same time. I had no illusions that this was going to happen tomorrow. I was more than happy to have a five to ten year perspective on what was going on.

Q: What was the impact of the program other than the microeconomic? Were there other areas where (Inaudible)

ESCH: Obviously a part of this was Turkey went from being a major food importer to being an exporter, during this period. The Mexi-pac, the new miracle wheat varieties were introduced by an AID technician who smuggled the stuff into the country. The Turks had all kinds of rules about everything. Turkey is a country, which believes in control. They keep track of everything and have rules about everything. One of the rules was that any new seed varieties had to be grown under very tight controlled conditions in Turkey for a period of two to four years before they could be used in Turkey. Well, you're not going to get anywhere very fast that way. One of the AID technicians brought fifty pounds of Mexi-pac in and started growing it in some of the experimental fields we had in the program. All of a sudden farmers saw it and told other farmers. Within a year we had farmers coming and standing around the fields to look at what was going on, and it just exploded. The Turks never asked where the original seed came from and it exploded into a huge program. Within three or four years, Turkey went from a major importer to a major exporter of wheat.

Q: What was our role other than the seed?

ESCH: Mexi-pac requires a whole range of new cultural practices. You're dealing with dry land farming, and so land leveling was an important part of the program, so the water didn't run off. Various kinds of stubble mulching processes were used to keep the moisture level up. Also obviously fertilizer. One of the capital projects we were involved with at the time was fertilizer production. The Turks were making ammonium nitrate very inefficiently and we wanted to upgrade their fertilizer capacity. They, all of sudden, faced huge demands for increased nitrogenous fertilizers. That whole package we were probably moving close to sixty or seventy million dollars worth of Title I when I first took over, and within three or four years that had all ended. It was one of the more successful programs. We had a major technical assistance programs with the Ministry of Agriculture, in which we brought at least a third of all their senior folks over to the United States for a Senior Seminar kind of management program. Then we sent them back to Turkey and maintained that seminar kind of quality within the Ministry of Agriculture when they came back. In a relatively short period of time you had a large number of senior administrators, all familiar with the same kind of management way of doing things. It

really made a huge difference.

Q: That's an unusual technique I guess, isn't it? The seminar approach?

ESCH: Yes. I don't know of any other cases in the countries I've been involved in where we did it in such an organized fashion. It was promptly a management approach which our USDA was itself using at the time. It was really an extension of something they had found worked very well. The key was to build the sense of comradery among these folks, so when they got dropped back in their own bureaucracy they had other people to interact with who had the same sort of management philosophy in trying to solve problems. Frankly the Turkish bureaucracy's objection was not to solve problems, but to prevent problems from happening and avoid being caught. We did the same thing in an earlier period, which I wasn't really involved in, with the highway department. The Turkish Ministry of Transportation and one of the western states, I don't think it was Idaho - it may have been Wyoming - had, when I came on board, already been six or seven years into an exchange program between the two. By the time it ended there had been enough training going on so almost all the senior managements in their highway department had some exposure to American education and the American ways of doing things. In later years, it was that experience which the Turks wanted to replicate and they even started using some of their own foreign exchange to send these folks overseas to get the same kind of jump start on management which they'd gotten from this old program. When I came on board the program was near the end of it, but in later years I went to a meeting with Peter McPherson. I was Near East DA then, but Peter had been asked to go meet with Turkinozol, who, when I was working, had been head of the State Planning Organization in Turkey. He went on to become Prime Minister. He was over on a state visit and the AID program was down to nothing. What he wanted to talk about was starting a Participant Training Program again, using the Highway Department as a model, because he had been involved in that in the early years.

Q: What other aspect of public administration in regular government functions were we involved in?

ESCH: We trained a lot of Turks. We built Mid East Technical University as well as providing technical assistance to it. AID funds built the buildings, too. There was a Public Administration component of that program. We also provided a TA to Hacettepe University, but that was much more in the health area. Hacettepe was already a university and that became the leader in the population/ health/child survival kinds of activities.

Q: What was the health program at that time?

ESCH: Largely population.

Q: Population started at that time?

ESCH: Yes.

Q: Easily accepted by the country? How did they get started?

ESCH: Well, Dr. Doramagi who was one of the great names in Turkey at the period, became very interested. He had his own population interest at Hacettepe. Women's health, etc. Jane Grant became convinced that population was a terribly important thing to do. He had no entrée into that. Hacettepe could only take so much in terms of a national program. It was a private university. So he got working with the Ministry of health, and what the Ministry of Health said they needed was transportation. They couldn't get their health workers out into the countryside. If Jim would help them get them out, then they would add population components to the program that the health workers operate. I think it was for twenty-four million dollars. We had the first inter-uterine Jeep program in the agency. Jim, under the guise of a population program, came in with around twenty, maybe even twenty-four million dollar loan program, to provide the Ministry of Health with Jeeps. The big bucks were on the Jeeps. I wouldn't say it was a disaster. They used the Jeeps. They had all the problems with that kind of program. They didn't put money into maintenance. There were the classic sets of issues and the technical assistance wasn't always the greatest, but it was a start.

Q: What was the philosophy of the population program? Just the straight contraception distribution or was there more than that?

ESCH: It was largely contraception distribution, and we got into issues of manufacturing contraceptives in Turkey and quality control issues. I'm sure there were some religious components to it in those days, but I don't really remember major issues of that sort.

Q: No opposition or?

ESCH: I'm sure. But the leadership of Turkey was very much folks who had grown up with Ataturk. You were still living off a generation who were comrades in arms with Ataturk, so they still owned that vision of Turkey of being a Western country. It was fun. You could drive around anywhere in Turkey and there was always a picture of Ataturk in an office or hanging on a wall in a hotel. He was always in green...his face was always green, I don't know why, and he always wore a tuxedo or a business suit. You never saw him in local dress. He always had Western dress on. The army - to this day they're still overthrowing governments over there - was the keeper. Under the constitution the army was responsible for keeping Ataturk in green. That was their job. Leaders at that time were comrades in arms of Ataturk. There was a Muslim Brotherhood, and yes, there were locales of very devout religious belief. It was very conservative Muslim, but you did not see the veil over the head, etc. The girls went to school. Obviously there were issues, but there was a much better treatment of women in that sense than elsewhere. They wore Western dress at school. All the Turks I knew drank scotch, all the restaurants. I'm dealing with the sophisticated level in large case. It didn't have any of the Middle Eastern religious issues that you get into in Syria, Iran and Iraq.

Q: Do you think there was any sort of subsequent backlash to the impact of our program at all, or did it pretty much sustain itself?

ESCH: No. Obviously we had people then who were saying Turkey was too dependent on the U.S., and of course the Cyprus issue was there then. It's more now, depending on how we dealt with issue on Greece. We usually tended to favor Greece over Turkey, because of the political

complexion of the Hill. There were time I will admit, that our program tended to deal with the relatively more sophisticated parts of the Turkish environment. We didn't work in Eastern Turkey that much. Erzurum University was the only major investment. Keban Dam was in Eastern Turkey but that really fed Western Turkey, it didn't feed Eastern Turkey. We didn't get involved in the Kurdish issue at all.

Q: Did you get involved in rural populations?

ESCH: Certainly rural, but the Anatolian Plateau kinds of populations. The Mediterranean kind of populations, but we didn't do an awful lot in animal husbandry. So the truly nomadic tribes which there were we didn't do an awful lot with.

Q: Poorer farmer?

ESCH: Well, through the Mexi-pac, yes.

Q: That was pretty wide spread in it's impact.

ESCH: Yes. We did a lot of dry land farming. This is a dry land farm, and irrigation.

Q: Small farms?

ESCH: Not by the definition of New Directions, but in Turkish context, yes.

Q: What could you do in three weeks?

ESCH: I think that the biggest thing that happened in three weeks was the exposure to another culture, another way of life and another economy. The training would be on top of that. Of course, as in most situations, some participants gained more from the training and some less. But I think most everybody woke up to the fact that Russia was closer to looking like a Third World country than it was a First World. The first year many of them came back just totally amazed that Americans lived in single family housing, and that these were not the richest people in the world. These were very normal, average people, in fact, many of them making a lot less than the Russians were, who were Senior government servants or senior business people. They really were just flabbergasted by that. On the same hand they could turn around and say "Why can't we do it? Why can't we do that kind of thing?" and it was like "Yeah. Why can't you? Just keep going." I think some of the real impacts of this particular program were that when the elections came up for Yeltsin in '95, that enough people had seen other things and been out, through the U.S. programs. I'm talking U.S. Information Agency, Department of Commerce programs as well as NASA was there, we had Treasury there, we had FBI. All kinds of different groups were taking people out as well as the (inaudible) community. All the people getting out really did help people to see that they couldn't go back. They wouldn't be able to go back to the communist period or way. Yet, even staff in my office did not vote for Yeltsin on the first go around. They voted for him definitely on the second go around. They wanted to send him a message that they didn't really care for him, but in the end they would accept him instead of going backwards the other way. Most of the staff owned and had dachas from the Khrushchev period one way or

another, through family or through their own. Because of the hard currency they were paid in partially, they were able to improve their dachas. They were able to improve how they lived. I think especially around Moscow, you had the emerging pieces of a middle class starting up. I think we very much contributed to strengthening many other regions, and that's been a long term trend in Russia. The regions are getting stronger and more independent of Moscow. I think that's a trend that the U.S. government has fostered and encouraged, and the Russians have grabbed a hold of.

ESCH: Lots of wonderful success stories. One was a woman who had started up an independent television station in her basement and was running it. She came here and did a short course, three weeks, in investigative journalism. She got so encouraged by that she went out and when she got home discovered that there was no bread in town. She used her investigative journalism skills and found out that reason that the bread wasn't there was because one of the very senior ministers in the government was selling off the flour on the side before it ever got to the bakery. She did an expose on him and got him ousted from the government and the bread started to flow. We had lots of smaller businesses that people had concepts and ideas, but when they came here to the U.S. they could see how somebody had done a small business. They went back and actually started up small businesses. NGO wise, I remember a story where a woman said she thought fund raising was begging, but after she went to a course in California, she realized that fund raising was a part of life with non-government organizations, and that you had to do it. She came back and she did fund raising within weeks of arriving home. She was able to buy three computers for her office, get people set up with being able to publish their own documents and manuals for training and do a lot more. Those kinds of transfers of skills when you only come here for three weeks, some people pick up quite a bit, some people pick up less.

RICHARD MCKEE
Political Counselor
Ankara (1994-1997)

Richard McKee was born in Pennsylvania in 1941. He attended Cornell University for a BA, the University of Virginia for a MA and then joined the Foreign Service in 1965. McKee served overseas in Bolivia, India, Pakistan, Tunis, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. McKee also served as the Office Director for the Arab Peninsula and on the Board of Examiners. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Did, you were there until what, '90...?

MCKEE: I was there for the two longest years of my life, '91 to '93. And then I was up for reassignment. It's a funny story. I tried for a couple of DCMships and got shot down, so I put in for some counselorships. It got sort of narrowed down to Bogota, which would have meant a return to Colombia, or Ankara. I was sort of leaning toward Bogota. Then I got a call from a dear friend of mine, Anne Woods Patterson, who had been the Economic Counselor in Riyadh, who was then I think Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America. She asked me what in the world I

was doing, bidding on this job. She said 'It's only narcotics, that's all it is, is narcotics, day and night. Week in and week out.' And so I backed out of that one and pushed hard for the Ankara job, which I got. The Ankara job was one of the best assignments certainly that I had in my career.

Q: Well this is probably a good place to stop. So we'll pick this up next time...

MCKEE: We can do language training in '94, '94, in very short order, and then we can do three years in Ankara, '94 to '97.

Q: All right, good.

Today is the 9th of March, 2003. A propos nothing except the conversation we had was Foreign Service stories, I'm going to let you tell that and then we'll move on.

MCKEE: Well this is a story of Angie, Angier Biddle Duke, who was a marvelous Ambassador in Morocco, as I think I mentioned earlier. He told the story more than once on himself. After World War II, in the late '40s, when Dean Acheson was Secretary of State, we upgraded any number of legations to embassies, including the one in El Salvador. And Angier Biddle Duke, who was then in his late 20s or early 30s, was named Ambassador to El Salvador by the Democrats, by Truman. In his interview with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Acheson asked him, how does it feel to be our first "shambassador" to El Salvador. Angie didn't say how he responded to that really rather insulting question. He did have the charm and grace and wit to tell that story himself. So now I think we want to move into the...

Q: Well first place, it was '93, '94 when you came to Turkey.

MCKEE: That's right.

Q: How did that go, how did you find Turkish?

MCKEE: Well, actually, this is the kind of the thing where I break my arm patting myself on the back. After Arabic and Urdu, Turkish wasn't too tough. There's a lot of Turkish in Urdu and there's a lot of Arabic in Turkish, so that wasn't so difficult. And thanks to Ataturk, they use the Western alphabet, the Roman alphabet with a few small changes, so that wasn't so hard. But also Turkish itself is, among the world's major languages, the most regular. Linguists love it, because even the most common - verbs, to have, to go, to do, to be - are regular. The other thing I would say is that we started in out in '93, '94, in the old rented quarters in Rosslyn, which of course were wretched, poor heating, poor ventilation, not designed for language teaching, but in mid-course we moved into the marvelous new FSI campus at Arlington Hall, in Arlington. It was subsequently was dedicated to George Schultz, and absolutely right, because it was George Schultz who kept the construction money in the budget year after year.

Q: And he, this was his, a real consternation is that probably the only Secretary of State we've

ever had that really understood the importance of training, except perhaps the present Secretary.

MCKEE: I would include the present secretary, those two, and also of course they're outstanding for two reasons. They both have military backgrounds, and they both carried, as far as I can see, that military concern for subordinates and for management and for organization and for process into their incumbencies as secretaries of state. I applaud diplomatic readiness initiative of Secretary Powell, which aims at strengthening the whole training function, recruiting a sufficient number of people that training assignments aren't routinely curtailed, which we all know has been the case forever, especially over the summer in the Foreign Service, and giving credit in terms of promotion to FSO's who do well in the training. This all redounds very much to the credit of Secretary Powell. As you say, you really have to go back to George Schultz to find anyone who began to have that level of passion.

Q: Before that, I think probably, George Marshall wasn't in there long enough, it was just beginning. Now, '94 you went to Ankara, and you were in Ankara from when, until '97?

MCKEE: I was in Ankara from the summer of '94 to the summer of '97. That means in terms of the Embassy the last few months of Dick Barkley's incumbency and then actually all of Marc Grossman's incumbency. It was a marvelous assignment, in the sense that our relations with Turkey are complicated, Turkey itself is a very complicated country, there was an immense amount of variety. With a few exceptions, the Embassy staff was absolutely superb. Certainly such colleagues as Bill Eaton on the admin side, he particularly comes to mind, there was a wonderful working environment overall. Grossman is of course a superb, a very thoughtful guy.

Q: He's presently Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

MCKEE: Having served with great distinction after he left Ankara as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Director General of the Foreign Service. Much of the groundwork, as I understand it, for this diplomatic readiness initiative of Secretary Powell's is traceable to the work that Marc did when he was Director General.

Q: From my perspective, he'd taken quite an interest in oral history, and promoting, in fact we're going to be doing something for Under Secretaries of State and Political Affairs, getting a group together. He's one of the few active officers who thinks historically, I think.

MCKEE: He's also, I must say, if I can put in a plug for DACOR, the organization that's given me employment, an avid reader of our monthly Bulletin. I know this because he sent a message saying that he was very happy that we were working with AFSA on the Elderhostel outreach program. He says that his own parents were avid Elderhostel people, as indeed is my own mother, and that if we ever needed him for an Elderhostel program, all we'd have to do was call. By the way, this is also true of Marc, if we ever need him to speak, he tries to find time for us. He has come to several of the receptions that we give for newly commissioned officers and their families. He is really, as an example of an absolutely superb officer rising to the top as he should.

Q: '94 when you arrived there, what was the status of our relationship with Turkey, and what were, where were the complications?

MCKEE: Well...

Q: Firstly, what was your job?

MCKEE: I was Political Counselor. It is important to know that there was also a Political Military Counselor. The Embassy in Ankara was one of the few that still retained a separate political-military section. And that obviously speaks to the importance of the military relationship, military element in the bilateral relationship. In terms of our relations with Turkey, first of all, the whole period that I was there was a period of essentially unstable coalition governments. No party had a majority in Parliament, and this meant a lot of sort of jerkiness in Turkish policy. It frankly facilitated corruption at various levels. Inflation was steadily eating away at the economy during the entire three years that I was there. Inflation is also, as we all know, a great encourager of corruption. The weakness of the coalitions also provides the military opportunities to meddle in domestic, Turkish domestic politics, which is, for my money, not a good thing. Internally, at that time, Mrs. Ciller was the Prime Minister. She was, in great favor with the Americans, because she was young and female and quite attractive and very articulate in English. She had spent a year in the United States. She also proved to be a notably corrupt, for my money, Prime Minister, and one who even by Turkey's low standards for civilian politicians, was quick to change the coloration of her policies to suit the changing political climate. Her partner, Mesut Yilmaz, was frankly no better. It was a time when human rights were a major concern in the bilateral relationship. Restrictions on freedom of speech, particularly, and the subject of torture, we worked very hard on that one. It was also a time when the Islamist political forces were on the rise. They had won the municipal elections of early 1994, including the mayoral offices in such big cities as Ankara and Istanbul. And indeed, in the Christmas elections of 1995, they, just by a nose, came in as the largest single party in Parliament. This meant that the Embassy, which was very close to the secular elite in Turkey, had to scramble a bit to reach out and make contact with these Islamist forces. This was not easy. They had been ignored before and they were, many of them, very narrowly educated and suspicious of the United States. But actually, in a way, and again I don't want to break my arm patting myself on the back, I think it was fortuitous that I had come from postings to several Muslim countries where I had been involved in reporting on and analyzing domestic politics. I could bring a certain familiarity and a certain vocabulary to that effort. As far as I know, I was the first American diplomat to call on Abdullah Gul, who is now Prime Minister of Turkey. Anyway, so that was a concern. Another big concern with Iraq. And one of the things that I did in the Embassy was to persuade the Ambassador to convene an all-day meeting of all of the elements of the U.S. Mission, the military, the less public types, what have you, the information service, everybody. Just to talk about who they were and what they did with regard to Iraq, because it was quite clear that Iraqi was taking up staggering amounts of our time. Now what do I mean by that? I mean a number of things, on the political-military side, Operation Provide Comfort, the effort by, initially the United Kingdom and the United States and France, France, remember this...

Q: And France was actually almost an initiator, it was Mrs...

MCKEE: Mrs. Mitterrand.

Q: Mitterrand who was the driving force behind that.

MCKEE: She had a very soft spot in her heart for the Kurds, for reasons that probably don't belong on this tape. But anyway, yes, and so that was a complicated thing, because of course there was the whole military logistical aspect to it, there was indeed also a very lively domestic and foreign-political aspect to it, because of course this effort protected the Kurds. And one element of the Kurds at that time was in full revolt against the government of Turkey, the PKK-led combination insurgency/terrorist effort. So that took up a lot of time. Operation Provide comfort took up time on the economic side; there were NGOs, charitable groups in the States and Europe who were doing all kinds of good things in northern Iraq in the zone that was protected by Operation Provide Comfort. We were trying to get the two Kurdish factions together, the Talibani faction and Barzani faction, so that the government in the protected area of northern Iraq could be seen as democratic, as not corrupt, as effective in terms of providing social services. In other words, as a counter-point to the government in Baghdad, which was of course none of those things. The Turks were very suspicious of this effort. It looked to them like nation-building, and they weren't interested in building up anything that would look like a Kurdish nation, so we had lots of things to do. I should also point out that the PKK, and I insist that theirs was an insurgency/terrorist effort, was obviously a very complicating factor. We had been much more forthright perhaps than the Europeans. We had condemned the PKK as a terrorist organization. The Europeans did not do so. We do not have a large Kurdish population in our country, the Germans particularly do have a large Kurdish population in theirs. So there was, there was all of that. There were many other elements including, for example, the Caucasus the whole question of the Turkish role and the American role and the Russian role and others' roles in trying to resolve the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The other really big thing during my tenure was the effort to get the Turks into a European Customs Union. In other words, the European Union would sign a free trade agreement with Turkey. We accomplished it at Christmastime of 1995, I think I have the date right, anyway. That was a big plus for our relations. Not full membership for Turkey in the EU, but customs arrangements. The customs union would have been more beneficial had the Greeks not blocked the full implementation of the incentives for Turkey. Cyprus was a continuing concern, Greek-Turkish relations were a continuing concern, there was a dustup over of an uninhabited island, Kardak, for, I think the Greeks' Ikizley, which means 'twins' for the Turks, the only way that that one was solved was by direct American intervention. All in all it was a very lively time. I traveled a lot around Turkey and enjoyed traveling immensely.

Q: Well let's pick up some of these items, let's pick up dealing with the Islamist party. Was it a, did you find you were having to sort of turn the political section around to go out, or was this, to go out and make better contacts with the Islamist, or were the Islamists not wanting contact with them, or..?

MCKEE: Well first of all, in terms of my own political section, there was no problem. I had such brilliant officers as Janice Weiner, whose Turkish was so good. She was the human rights officer. When she conducted interviews with human rights abuse victims she needed no interpreter, which changed the whole context of the interview. The problems in reaching out to the Islamists were, first of all, to a little extent within the Embassy. Dick Barkley particularly, for whom dealing with Islamists was just simply not in his background, was very cautious. Certainly our secularist contacts among the Turks were very suspicious of our reaching out to the Islamists,

and there were people in the States who were very suspicious of this effort as well, I must confess I was encouraged a bit by a visit of Mrs. Albright. When she was Permanent Representative to the UN, she came out to Turkey. She convened one of those, frankly for my money, rather hokey town meeting kinds of things at the Embassy. One of the comments that she made in speaking to the Embassy staff, including FSNs, was that she was happy that the Embassy was reaching out to the opposition because during the Reagan and Bush years, when she had been in the opposition in the United States, she was flattered when diplomats came to call on her. So I thought that was very nice. So the opposition was more on the side of, as I say, the secularists, to cast broadly, than the Islamists. The Islamists were intrigued that the Americans were interested in them, a little bit apprehensive, there were certainly one or two who were deeply suspicious, but on the whole they were flattered and intrigued.

Q: Obviously we had all been bitten by the Iranian bug and Khomeini's taking over. And we had to be using that as a yardstick and figuring out what Islam was becoming. Where did we figure that Turkish Islamists were?

MCKEE: Well, it was a difficult time, because there were some Islamic terrorist groups running around Turkey, and some of them had support in various ways from the Iranian Embassy. Some of these groups had killed Americans, so that was certainly a concern. My own view, which I think was the prevalent view in the Embassy was, if I could be crude for a minute, reflected in old LBJ line about the difference between a caucus and a cactus. You know, in a caucus, the pricks are on the inside, and with a cactus the pricks are on the outside... anyway, that's not a very good analogy, it probably should be dropped. The Islamist party was participating in the democratic and parliamentary systems in Turkey with all of their flaws. They were established by the Constitution of 1983. In other words, it was better to have this Islamist sentiment channeled into this peaceful electoral effort, rather than isolated, and therefore have it go underground and perhaps erupt in very violent and bloody ways.

Q: I noted with, at the time there was tremendous concern about women and head scarves and universities, which all struck me as, you know, we, how did we view that at the time? And other outward signs of...

MCKEE: It's important to understand that, in the Muslim world, how people dress is tremendously important. How people dress can indicate such things as which branch of Islam they belong to, whether or not people are descended from the prophet, whether or not they have gone on Hajj to Makkah, and obviously the status of women is very important. But it's more than that, I mean the fact is that one of Ataturk's reforms was the shapka reform. "Shapka," is a word meaning cap. It comes actually from the Russian. He decreed that Turkish men would not wear turbans anymore, that they would wear European style caps, and this meant the abolition of the Ottoman fez. It is also illegal for members of the Turkish armed forces or the civil bureaucracy to wear beards, and I think mustaches as well. You must be clean shaven. So in other words it's not only women that are involved in all of these dress restrictions, but also men. Certainly on the secular side, on the military side, on the Turkish republican side, the rules were very strict. Women could not cover their hair if they were to appear in Parliament, if they were to appear in court, if they were to teach and study at the state universities. If they were to enter any government building. This, for my money, worked a tremendous hardship. I'm indebted to Murat

Mercan, who is now the Deputy Chairman of the ruling party, the Ak Party, now they call it the Justice and Development Party. Murat got his doctorate in the States, I think in Florida, taught here for some years. His wife was a delightful lady who has a master's degree from the States. He has been sort of the number two to Abdullah Gul for many years. He's now the number two man in the ruling party. Murat, pointed out to me one day that if a devout Muslim woman who interprets the faith as requiring that her hair be covered is the mother/sister/wife/daughter over age twelve or fourteen or something, of a Turkish soldier who is wounded and is in one of the military hospitals, major ones in Ankara, she cannot visit the wounded soldier in the hospital unless she uncovers her hair. This rule places her in an impossible position. It's that kind of thing I think that in a lot of ways fuels the Islamist vote. The other thing that fuels the Islamist vote is the corruption and unresponsiveness of the secular parties. So this is a big thing, that a woman who actually turned out to be an American citizen was elected to Parliament on the Islamist party ticket. And she wore her head scarf into parliament, it created a huge uproar, and she was basically thrown out. Merve, I can't remember her last name, Kavakci. So this was a tremendous issue.

Q: Well, did we overtly, covertly, I think that's the wrong term, I mean were we telling the Turkish government, you know, this doesn't work very... or did we just stay out of it?

MCKEE: As I say, it's complicated. In the, as I mentioned, Christmas of '95 elections, the Islamists came in first. After a lot of backing and filling trying to create coalitions of one kind or another, a coalition did come to power in the summer of '96, led by Mr. Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist party, with Tansu Ciller as his deputy, the coalition between those two parties. Now Erbakan was a veteran, old time Islamist. He did frankly a lot of symbolic things which were silly and upset the military and upset the middle class secularists and led to his demise after a year as a leader of the coalition. He visited Libya, he visited Iran, he didn't really need to do those things. He talked about building a mosque in Taksim Square, which is the great republican square in Istanbul. In January of '97 the National Security Council recommended a whole range of things for the government to do, the implementation of which essentially would have meant that the Erbakan's Islamist Refah Party would have had to betray its principles. The tension between the National Security Council, essentially the military and his government rose. His government fell in, I think, June of '97, just as I was preparing to leave Turkey. The United States in all this was sort of on one foot and on the other. We thought that parliamentary democracy was a good thing, so therefore we were not happy with the efforts that were mounted by the secularists to declare the Refah Party illegal, which efforts eventually succeeded. We were given the things like saying we support democracy and secularism. Well, that's wonderful, except in Turkey in '96, '97, and some would argue to the present day, these two principles may be in conflict, and then what do you do? I don't think we've sort of sorted that one out, yet.

Q: Did, on the human rights, I think I was asking you about human rights.

MCKEE: Well, you didn't, but that was a major concern the entire time I was there. The Turks tend to promise more than they can deliver on human rights. It's certainly true of Tansu Ciller, and Mesut Yilmaz, who was her Deputy Prime Minister. Complicated issue, various aspects to it. The Turkish constitution and the Turkish legal structure reflecting fear of disturbances stirred up by religion and by ethnic confrontations. They place very severe constraints on freedom of speech. There was the particular problem of the Kurds. Turkey for a long time denied that there

were any Kurds, in the country; in fact there are twelve to fifteen million of them. And then finally Turkish leaders said yes, there are Kurds, they're not "mountain Turks," but you know, they're all assimilated. We've had presidents and generals and ministers who are Kurdish, all of which is true. But at the same time the Kurdish language was forbidden to be used, or was until very, very recently. Certainly during my term it was forbidden in print, which I think is a violation of the Lausanne Treaty, which essentially created modern Turkey in terms of international law. And the denial of cultural rights to the Kurds was really in a lot of ways the proximate cause of the PKK effort. On the other hand, the Kurds have been revolting off and on for the last hundred and fifty years against Turkish rule. There was a somewhat separate question of torture, police torture, torture in police cells. Torture by the Jandarma, particularly the intelligence arm of the Jandarma. The Jandarma are a semi-military rural police force. Their lower ranks are separate from the Army, but their senior ranks are filled by officers on loan from the Army. And certainly there was torture by the counterterrorist branch of the police, which again was a separate elite group that really operated with impunity. It was an area where we continued to press. Here I think again Marc Grossman gets full marks. The Europeans would just say "we detest you, you're engaged in human rights abuses, this has got to stop." Ambassador Grossman scratched around and came up with public and private money to help the police with things like training and forensics. Their forensics capability was pathetic. He provided a technological alternative to beating, so that the police don't have to beat confessions out of people, as they had done for I guess centuries in Turkey. Now this is not a full answer, you also need political will from the top and you also need patience, because you're talking about very deep cultural behavior patterns, but I thought that Ambassador Grossman deserved full marks for essentially looking at alternatives and encouraging Turks to think in new ways about getting rid of torture. He was also very straightforward in talking to all Turks, including Turks in uniform, about the need for human rights reform. He was also very blunt in saying 'Look, you Turks can make the sequential argument that we cannot do anything about human rights until we defeat the PKK terrorism,' then he said, 'It's not sequential, it's parallel, you've gotta do both things at the same time, as hard as that is.' And I remember a Turkish member of Parliament telling me that it was very difficult for him to advocate human rights reforms, when he had to go back to his constituency and appear at funerals of nineteen-year-old kids who had been killed fighting the PKK down in southeastern Turkey. If you advocate human rights reforms in that environment, the people assembled for the funeral simply see it as apologizing for terrorism.

Q: Did the Armenian lobby and the massacre of Armenians keep cropping up?

MCKEE: Once a year. In April. I can't remember the exact date, but it's the Armenian Commemoration of godawful things. On that occasion the Congress, by an overwhelming majority, passes resolutions.

Q: Our congress...

MCKEE: Our Congress, and press, and the various people there, meaning Armenian-Americans, would press the White House to issue a statement on the Armenian massacres using the word 'genocide.' That's one of those words that really sets off the Turks, and so we would have our annual confrontation about that. As we had our annual confrontation on the human rights report. The Turkish Government was very cooperative as we worked to put together the human rights

report. In some ways they got sandbagged, because we used their material, and they didn't look good. The Turkish section of the annual human rights report was longer than that on almost any other country. In a lot of ways it pays countries where human rights are abused not to cooperate with the U.S. Government, because basically the U.S. Government then sandbags them. On that particular question of the Armenian massacre, the President did not ever during the years I was there use the word 'genocide'. It's a very complicated question. For my money the historical case is unproven one way or another. There's no question that millions of Armenians died, there is no question that a lot of Turks died, there's no question that there was a series of bad harvests, there's no question that Turkey was at war with Russia, there's no question that some Armenians collaborated with the Russians. The real question is whether the Ottoman government, actually it was the "Young Turk" government, ordered the expulsion and massacre of the Armenians. That's, for my money still not clear.

Q: Did we have any contact with, what should we call, the Armenian party or something of that nature?

MCKEE: There are very few Armenians now left in Turkey. There are several thousand still in Istanbul, almost all of them.

Q: How about with the Kurds? Was there a legitimate Kurdish party?

MCKEE: There was a legitimate Kurdish party, and at one point in alliance with other parties in the early '90s, it had representation in Parliament. Under the Constitution it is illegal for any party to be based on religious or ethnic origins. But everybody in this one party was, essentially Kurdish. The Supreme Court just declared it illegal, and it reappeared in a new guise, as often happened. This happened maybe half a dozen times in the '90s. Similarly there was a newspaper which was published in Turkish, which was the pro-Kurdish newspaper, and it would be closed down and then it would reappear with a new title.

Q: In Turkey itself with the Kurds, were they suffering from strange diseases that seem to affect the Kurds in Iraq and Iran, splundering and...

MCKEE: Oh, absolutely. My line about the Kurds is that whenever three Kurds get together, two will plot against the third one, who will call in outside assistance. It's something that you see in a lot of cultures where you have essentially mountain tribal people. They're very shortsighted, they can't see into the next valley, they certainly have a lot of trouble seeing any kind of larger national cause, and this makes it extremely easy for outsiders to prey on the divisions, exacerbate the divisions that are already there. That's certainly true in the case of the Kurds in Iraq and of Turkey. I know much less about the Kurds in Iran, Syria.

Q: What about the Cyprus thing? The Greek lobby has always been the mar of our relations with Turkey. During your time, how did that work?

MCKEE: Well, thank God the strictly military aspects of it were the concern of the Political Military section of the Embassy. I didn't have to get into that, but there were a number of elements there. The first one was the question of the territorial seas in the Aegean. If you accept

the Greek claim then in many ways the Aegean was simply barred to Turkey. There was the question of undersea rights. You have to remember that some of these islands are visible from the Turkish shore. They're very close together. But there's that question of overflights. There was the huge question of Cyprus, and the fact that you had the government of Cyprus recognized internationally, including by us, and then you had the area in the north that was recognized only by Turkey. You had a very high level of armaments on both sides. You had a U.N. mission which had really gone nowhere since 1974. This also flowed into the whole question of EU entry for Turkey, because Cyprus was also a candidate for EU membership and the Turks were very sensitive about this. It's often complicated. It took up a fair amount of time, not as much time as Iraq, but yes, trying to keep Turkish-Greek relations on some kind of an even keel, took up a fair amount of time.

Q: What about the island problem? I've interviewed Tom Niles, who was our Ambassador to Greece at the time, but you had this uninhabited island...

MCKEE: My memory is that there was, you know, there was a Greek politician from the islands who wanted to make a name for himself, so he and some journalists went over and planted a Greek flag on this island. Now, this is one that the Turks has always considered theirs. You go back to varying interpretations of the Treaty of Paris. This became, quite a bitter controversy between the two countries, and they almost went to war over it. It took the intervention of the U.S. government for them to back down. It's interesting, the European Union could do nothing.

Q: This is something that crops up today, we, you know, the European Union talks as though it were a real entity, and in some ways it is, but in Foreign Affairs in Bosnia it was hopeless, and this, they don't seem to be able to, I mean, how were we seeing Europeans dealing with this vis a vis Turkey from your vantage point during that period?

MCKEE: Well, I think you're actually right. The Europeans tried to speak with one voice on a whole range of foreign policy issues and rarely succeeded in doing so. We engaged in major efforts, successful, to have the Turks and the European Union conclude a customs agreement. The Europeans in their dealings with Turkey, first of all, had to think of the fact that there is a large and essentially unassimilated Turkish minority in a number of countries, primarily Germany. They had to deal with the fact that there's a lot of history there. The "terrible Turk" is a phrase that goes back to the Bulgarian massacres in the 1870s, when the liberal prime minister in Britain was horrified by that. For some people it goes back to the siege of Vienna, the two sieges of Vienna, actually, it must have been 1683. There are certainly Europeans who think of Europe as a Christian continent, and the European Union is in many ways a Christian organization. The Turks know this, and they resent it. I must say there are also a lot of Europeans who see very solid economic and even political reasons to bring Turkey into the European Union. Anyway, the Europeans resented our pressure to them on behalf of the Turks. On the other hand, I've gotta confess that over the years I've become less enamored of the Europeans. I gave dinner parties at which European diplomats seated at the table with Turkish diplomats talked about Turkey and about Turks as if the Turkish diplomats were simply not in the room. Now Lord knows the United States has had its racial and ethnic problems over the years, but there's a level of racial arrogance in Europe which far, far exceeds that which foreigners are likely to experience in the U.S. When we were putting this European Union customs agreement together, the Spanish were the presidents of the EU for the crucial six months. We worked

together very carefully, closely, properly and successfully with them.

Q: How did corruption affect, from our perspective, how did the corruption, and what form was it taking and how did it affect the effectiveness of the Turkish government?

MCKEE: Well, regarding the effectiveness of the Turkish government, I think the problem there with corruption was that really many, many, many Turks were simply alienated from their own government. This corruption was just sort of additional proof that this government was really not legitimate. The '83 constitution was adopted under pretty dubious circumstances, so that just really made things worse. Corruption affected the bilateral relationship in that U.S. investment in Turkey was surprisingly small given the size of the Turkish economy. American investors just didn't want to go to a place that was rife with inflation and had corruption problems on top of it.

Q: Did you see the government while you were there being able to deal with this, was there any interest here?

MCKEE: You have to say that the government didn't really care very much. I certainly don't remember any common bureaucrats or what have you being hauled up on corruption charges. As an example of this, one of the conditions under which the coalition government, led by Erbalcan and supported by Tansu Ciller came into power in summer '96 was simply that her parliamentarians would vote to absolve the Islamist party of pending corruption charges, and the Islamist deputies agreed to vote to absolve Tansu Ciller and her party of pending corruption charges. Any government created under these circumstances cannot inspire confidence.

Q: How did you find dealing with Turkish officials?

MCKEE: Wonderful. I respected the Turkish officials I dealt with, primarily the Foreign Ministry, but also the President's office, which is staffed to some extent by Turkish Foreign Service people. Straightforward, professional, unemotional, in comparison with frankly, the Arabs. I think really a lot of them were very sympathetic to the United States. There were some attitudinal problems - they tended to try to play us off against the Europeans, which wasn't really a very profitable game for Turkey. They certainly contested the legitimacy of human rights as a subject for discussions between diplomats Janice Wiener, our Human Rights Officer suffered for that. But I was quite happy to defend her, and I did. And I defended the legitimacy of what we were doing. But overall the Turks are very good.

Q: Were we sort of carrying the Turkish water, trying to get them more integrated into the European Union?

MCKEE: Oh, yes, absolutely. No question about it, we thought that it would be a good thing for Turkey and a good thing for Europe if Turkey would join the European Union. There were a lot of reasons for this. Oddly enough, a lot of economists said at the time about the customs agreement that it really wasn't a good thing for U.S. trade and investment. It would make European goods and companies more competitive in Turkey at the expense of U.S. trade and investment. But I think we look at it very broadly Turkey is very important Muslim majority country to the west. I noticed that some European diplomats, particularly from the Mediterranean

countries, Italy and Spain and maybe even Greece, some of them, think that it would be a very good thing essentially if the European Union had a Muslim interlocutor with the Muslim states. They of course are all across the southern border, on the other side of the Mediterranean from Europe. So, yes, we certainly did carry a lot of water for the Turks.

Q: Is there anything else we should discuss, do you think, during the time you were there?

MCKEE: I think we've pretty well covered the waterfront.

Q: Well one other question, there was a political military officer, but if you're dealing with political affairs, you have to keep an eye on the Turkish military. They're a 300 pound gorilla. How did you work this? Was your political military counselor, was he looking at the political aspects, did you get together, how did you deal with this?

MCKEE: There were three political military counselors during the three years I was there. It's unfortunate, most of them were just getting started really when their tours ended. Bruce Thomas, the last one, was particularly talented, but they were all good officers. In the Defense Attaché's office there was and as far as I know is a guy named Bob Pistana. He is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Army who has spent most of his adult life in Turkey. He's a graduate of the Harp Akademesi - the Military Academy - and he speaks Turkish. He has lots and lots of contacts among the Turkish military. I relied very heavily on Bob for the political aspects of what military officers were thinking. But also, you know, the Foreign Service training dies hard. I looked around in the Turkish Parliament, and found one or two retired generals who'd gone into politics and were members of Parliament. I went to call on them and some of them gave me some very valuable insight into how senior military officers looked at Turkish politics, the United States, what have you.

Q: Were we concerned that at some point, given the corruption problem and all, Turkish military might step in again?

MCKEE: I think that we were concerned during the Erbakan government, which as I said blundered from one symbolic gesture to another, all of which frosted the military. We worried that the military might conceivably step in again, and frankly that would have had an unimaginably bad impact on Turkish relations with us and Turkish relations with the Europeans. Certainly, in the spring of 1997, there were concerns that that could happen.

MILDRED A. PATTERSON
Wife of Ambassador
Ankara (1995-1997)

Mildred A. Patterson was born and raised in Kansas City, Missouri. She graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and entered the Foreign Service in 1976. Her postings abroad included Copenhagen, Brussels and Ankara. Ms. Patterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

PATTERSON: Then in 1994 my husband was nominated to be Ambassador to Turkey, so I left my job in August of '94 and went to Turkish language training for a semester.

Q: You were in Turkey from when?

PATTERSON: We arrived in Turkey in January of 1995 until June of 1997. This time I went back as the wife of the Ambassador and not as an active duty officer. I was on leave without pay for two and a half years.

Q: How did Marc get to be Ambassador? There's often a political appointment there. I was wondering.

PATTERSON: When he was chosen he was the Executive secretary of the Department and working very closely with Secretary Christopher. I can't tell you how within the inner sanctum of the Department it was decided to put his name forward, nor can I explain particularly why the White House agreed.

Q: I was just wondering if you were aware of any of the normal things that are going on when somebody gets to be an ambassador to a major post, which this was.

PATTERSON: Well, what I do know is that there were discussions between the State Department and the White House over which posts would go to political appointees and which posts would go to career people in the posts that were coming open. I know that the various posts on the two lists kept changing and I think for a while Turkey probably was on the political appointee list. It's possible that when the White House looked around to see whom they would send to Turkey, maybe they couldn't easily come up with a political appointee.

Q: Sort of as the wife of the chief of mission, how did you find this role?

PATTERSON: It was harder than being an active duty Foreign Service Officer for several reasons. One is that when you are working at the embassy all day you are, by a kind of osmosis, absorbing information all the time, but being at the residence cut me off from information. As hard as Marc tried to bring home as much information as he could, he couldn't replace the things you learn from meeting someone in the corridor or in the cafeteria. I missed that and I immediately had much more sympathy for other spouses who didn't work and who were consequently out of the information loop. I also found it hard because there were a number of officers who basically just thought of me as a potted plant. Each time that we put on an event at the residence for certain sections of the Embassy, I always felt that their respective section chiefs had no idea of the amount of work and organization that was required.

I enjoyed the role in many ways, however, and it's a wonderful privilege to represent your country in that role. At dinner parties I was the lucky one because I would be the one who sitting next to the foreign minister or whichever Turkish minister it was whereas Marc was dealing with their spouses, many of whom were very interesting, but a number of whom didn't speak English. I would often come home from the dinner parties having had a much more interesting evening

than Marc. We traveled as much as we could. Marc was on the road more than I, but as much as I could I joined him, and that is a unique way to see a country.

Q: We're talking about sort of the new Foreign Service where there are no longer, almost a practically not a category of Foreign Service wives. You can be what you want to be, but that doesn't take away the work of the wife of the chief of mission. How you slice it, she has a big machine to operate. How did you find dealing with the wives' side of this equation, you know, I mean I'm talking about official business, putting on dinners, receptions and all. Did you find this difficult?

PATTERSON: It depended on which wives. The military wives were wonderful. They would help me at the drop of a hat, the attache wives.

Q: They had been trained.

PATTERSON: They had been trained to and they did it willingly and cheerfully and they were just wonderful. There was a charming wife who had been a florist before she and her husband were assigned overseas and she would come before big parties and at Christmas time to decorate the residence. The residence had an infinite capacity to absorb flowers, I mean it was so big. The attaché wives were also a huge help with the Fourth of July reception. Many of the wives in Ankara were employed so that meant that the cadre of people available to help was small. What it really meant was that for many things we had to pay to have things done and of course we were always trying to stretch representation funds. That was a challenge always. I always felt like I was putting on a play with the residence as the theater and I simply was changing the scenes all day long. We would put on a breakfast and maybe there would be a press conference in the middle of the morning and then maybe Marc would have two people to lunch. He would have people to tea and then we'd have a dinner. For the kitchen to work well, we couldn't have an enormous dinner and an enormous lunch on the same day. One or the other, but not both. You learned what your kitchen could handle, what your staff could handle, how many extra staff were required for larger functions. I felt that I was in charge of a great logistical operation.

Q: Did you find there you are you're sitting at dinner next to the foreign minister, you know, people are coming, were you putting on your Foreign Service professional hat?

PATTERSON: Yes, always.

Q: With Marc would you sit down and because it's been my experience that often the wives come back with information that the guys don't get. This is the old Foreign Service. They'd say such and such is happening and hell I hadn't heard about this.

PATTERSON: Right, absolutely. The Turks loved to talk politics whether they were at the top of the social structure or at the bottom. I would have fascinating conversations on whatever was the issue of the day, asking what they thought, where it was going. I would try to gather a little bit of biographic information as well. The days when junior officers put biographies together seem to have faded away. It's too bad, because when you're in the position of either ambassador or wife of the ambassador they are very useful to have.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, what was your during this '95 to '97 period, what was your sounding of Turkish American relations?

PATTERSON: They were really were quite good in those years. The Turks were beginning to work more closely with the Israelis and that was bringing a new perspective on Turkey from the American Congress. The fact that the U.S. Government had sent Marc back as Ambassador meant a lot to the Turks. The Turks value friendship and they knew that Marc was coming as a friend. It didn't keep him from blasting them over human rights or from talking about torture and some of the truly hard issues, but they knew that he was coming not as a scolder, but as a friend, saying "come on, you can do better than this. This is beneath you to do this." There were many others in the Embassy who were there for their second or third tour as well, so the Embassy was quite lucky with its team right then. U.S. investment in Turkey was increasing and the Turkish economy was looking a little brighter and that helped, too. Marc worked very hard to try and help Turkey get the pipeline built that would come from Tajikistan to the port that's called Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.

Q: Was Cyprus an issue that came up all the time?

PATTERSON: Always, but the Turks were a little tired of Cyprus so it wasn't a dominant issue.

Q: Having served, I was consul general in Athens for four years. I'd left in '74 in July just before all hell broke loose, but Cyprus, I mean Turkey dominated Greek thought and I always felt that Greece was sort of a nagging problem to the Turks, but not as up, at a lower priority of Turkey.

PATTERSON: When I say that the Turks love to talk politics, those politics never included Greece. Turks were consumed with the politics going on in their own country and with their own economic problems and rarely would a Turk bring up anything having to do with Greece. Now, the Turkish military was watching Greece constantly because of course they were monitoring each other's airplanes and wandering into each other's waters. Of course those waters are the same, because there is so little distance between some of the Greek islands and Turkey. But the average Turk on the street, the taxi drivers I talked to, for example, never mentioned Greece. They would talk to me about all of the Turkish political parties and who was up and who was down, but they'd never bring up Greece. Turkey is a huge country, 67 million people in those days. Greece was like a little fly that they brushed away.

Q: Yes. What about, how did you find, were congressmen more aware of Turkey, you know for a long time I had the feeling that there were so many Greek Americans involved in American politics that next to the Israeli lobby the Greek lobby was considered the most powerful and of course the one thing that unites sort of the Greeks is beating up the Turks. Did you find though that by this time, I imagine you get lots of congressional representatives there? Did you find that they were more amenable to Turkey?

PATTERSON: We did have many congressional delegations, though not enough. It was a time that the Congress was getting lots of criticism for traveling and so there was less traveling going on. We would have loved to have more Congressional visitors because once Congressmen,

anyone comes to Turkey, by and large they leave Turkey as a friend. Especially, if they had any understanding at all of Turkey's strategic position and what that actually means for the United States, the ability to move our ships around in the Mediterranean. Congressmen would at least go away thinking harder about Greece and the United States and Turkey and the United States. So, they would generally leave as friends and we just wished we'd had more of them.

Q: Did you sometimes feel that you were in a dual capital country? I mean I'm thinking of Istanbul and Ankara.

PATTERSON: Very much so. Ankara is the seat of the government, but the commercial life, the artistic life, the wealth of Turkey is concentrated in Istanbul, so that Marc was in Istanbul at least once a week. Sometimes when we had visitors he would be there three times a week. I would go less frequently, but yes, you definitely have to keep a foot in both places. Then there's a lot of interesting things going on in the smaller cities in Izmir and Adana as well.

Q: Were there any major earthquakes or something like that?

PATTERSON: No, very fortunately there weren't. There were some terrible mining accidents, but nothing like the big earthquakes that they've had now in the last couple of years.

Q: Did the Kurdish problem come up while you were there?

PATTERSON: Yes, all the time. The Turks were still fighting the PKK. This was the great Achilles heel of Turkey in terms of the drag on the economy, in terms of their human rights record and in terms of the way the rest of the world viewed Turkey. The Turks wanted to be part of the European Union and the Europeans kept casting back to them their handling of the Kurds in Turkey and the PKK. So, yes, that was a dominant theme.

Q: What was your impression of the Turkish higher command because in Turkey the pattern has been the politics are certainly going to get out of hand and the troops come out of the barracks, take over for a while and then with luck they'll go back fairly soon. This must have been something everybody was watching.

PATTERSON: We were always watching. The Islamic party was becoming stronger and the Turkish generals at our dinner table began to say this was very bad, but they would also say they didn't want to take over the country. The Turkish generals were quite conscious of the fact that they were not economic experts, that they didn't have the skills needed to put the country back on a more solid economic footing. On the other hand they considered themselves guardians of Ataturk's legacy and of democracy. They wanted Turkey to be a secular country. They would talk openly about not wanting to move in and take over the government.

Q: As a woman were you noticing, it seems with the Turks one of the things that comes up all the time is the head covering issue. What do they call it?

PATTERSON: Head scarf.

Q: Head scarf. Did that play any role at dinner parties, I mean things that you were involved in or just women in discussion because it was in a way a national issue, but it was also obviously a woman's issue.

PATTERSON: Absolutely. The Turkish military wives were often the most heated on the subject though some of the academic professors, women academic professors, could get pretty hot as well. The Turks genuinely believe that you can control people's thoughts and therefore their actions. As an American I couldn't understand how they thought that by saying "no" to the headscarves they were going to be able to control whether people were religious or not.

Secular Turks were often vehement that the minute headscarves were allowed, it would mean the "Iranization" of Turkey. Very secular women were adamant that this had to stop at the doors to the university, at the door to parliament, that allowing women to wear headscarves at the universities was the beginning of the slippery slope. It continues to be an issue that roils the social fabric. Right now, I think it's the foreign minister's wife who wears a headscarf and she can't enter parliament, because there's a law that says you can't enter parliament's doors with your hair covered.

Q: Did you run across it at dinner parties this issue at all?

PATTERSON: Not at dinner parties, but many other times, for example, in my women's conversation group, which was a mix of military wives and others. We had some lively discussions in those groups.

Q: How did you see Turkish women in their, within Turkish society?

PATTERSON: Well, you know, Turkey has two societies and it's a country that's divided in two. The western part of Turkey is a country of the 21st century and in the eastern part of Turkey it's maybe still in the 18th century in many ways. There are more Turkish tenured professors who are women in Turkey than there are in the United States. They have many doctors and pharmacists so there is a very educated population of women. In the eastern part of Turkey, although education is compulsory through the fifth grade, sometimes the girls are taken out of school after third grade. It depends on which part of Turkey we're talking about. There are parts of Turkey where the men still have several wives because they're all working in the fields and it's a question of extra hands to help.

Q: Extra hands, yes. In sort of discussions groups and all, what elements of the United States seemed to elicit the most interest from the women you associated with?

PATTERSON: Often it was a discussion of democracy and politics and the free-wheeling atmosphere of the United States that they perceived as almost anarchy, because we let people think anything they want to think and write anything they want to write. They were horrified at the way Americans would wear the flag, that our flag would be a t-shirt or a bathing suit or a pair of shorts. That's inconceivable in Turkey. The flag is a revered symbol and you don't wear it as a piece of clothing.

Q: Not too long ago I think the thought would have been the same in the United States.

PATTERSON: Yes. My women friends were also interested always in American culture, American movies. My Turkish friends went to the movies a lot. Many were also very interested in the evolution of language and of new American slang.

Q: My impression from just on the periphery of Turkish society particularly the ones in the 21st Century are in a way much more dedicated to their country than I think in many Western societies. I mean it's more of a patriotic I'll do it for my country type of thing or something.

PATTERSON: I think that's right. One of the reasons why I love Turkey so much is that intellectually it is fascinating. They're still trying to decide what kind of country they want to be. Do they want to be secular or do they want to be Islamic? That's why talking politics was so interesting and that is why everyone talks politics, because they are keenly interested in what is going to become of their country, what is their role as a citizen, what is the role of the government. When we were there they still had the old, long time leaders of the political parties who had been leaders for 30 years. People called them "the dinosaurs" and talked often about needing a new generation of political leaders.

Q: I think of Demirel there forever.

PATTERSON: Forever. So, to go back to your point, I think that the Turks are very proud of their country and keenly interested in its future.

Q: This is, again a fascinating country. When you left there in '97.

ALPHONSE F. LA PORTA
Political Advisor to Commander of NATO forces in Southern Region
Naples, Italy (2000-2003)

Ambassador La Porta was born and raised in New York and educated at Georgetown and New York Universities. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1965. During his career the ambassador had several assignments in Washington in the personnel and administrative field. His foreign assignments include Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, New Zealand, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission, and Naples, Italy. In 1997 he was named Ambassador to Mongolia, where he served until 2000. Ambassador La Porta was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Let's talk before we move to the broader picture, the squabbling NATO allies.

LA PORTA: Not having served in Athens, but having served in Turkey, one of the things we always used to say is don't forget that hysteria is a Greek word.

Q: I'll agree with you.

LA PORTA: From the NATO command standpoint you're exactly right, whether it was commanders like Admiral Crowe or more recent ones, you could always count on these two allies behaving badly and consuming inordinate amounts of time of very senior people in NATO. The only, let me put it this way, I think there are a few good ways of getting beyond the history of challenge and response, like two teenagers who continually are needling each other and cannot find it possible to behave in a civil way toward each other. These two countries still have not grown out of their adolescence in the modern era.

One of the things that I felt that was consequential in terms of NATO attitudes vis-à-vis both Greece and Turkey was really developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and in other places in the Middle East. I argued both in Naples and in Brussels, and even in Washington, that it was time for NATO to adopt a mature alliance policy on the two rivals. This couldn't be done at the regional command level, but needs to be said to both Greece and Turkey, look, we've got more important business than to tend to your disputes over air space, ostensible rearming of one or another Greek island off the coast of Turkey, or some other dispute concerning transit of ships or aircraft. Until you guys figure out that you really want to adopt a more mature approach – mature probably wasn't the word we want to use but something like that – then NATO is not going to consider using any of the locations in your countries for exercises, training or other purposes. In other words, if they are not willing to fulfill their obligations as allies, then some of the political and tangible benefits can be withdrawn or held in abeyance.

They did begin to get a little of that message, especially as the Iraq conflict was warming up. The Greeks found ways to distinguish themselves from the Turks over develop the "second front" in Northern Iraq and moving supplies and forces through Turkish territory. The Greeks decided to play ball and put a lot of the command and control arguments behind them. They allowed NATO forces to do some training in Greek waters and to use the bases in Crete for counter terrorism operations and for maritime interdiction. We were able to make very good use of those training opportunities.

The recent Turkish problems that we had vis-à-vis Iraq truly constitute a blunder in U.S. diplomacy. I've said that many people whom I tend to admire, like Paul Wolfowitz and Marc Grossman who were the two people in the United States government most conversant with Turkish affairs, botched it so badly in the run-up to the Iraq conflict. Although those individuals jointly and individually made virtually monthly visits to Ankara to try to get Turkey to come around to some kind of agreement on using Southern Turkey as a conduit for troops as well as supplies and other things into the North and also to put some limits on the potential bad behavior of the Kurds. This would have been in Ankara's interest but we failed to secure that agreement. On the basis of my contacts in Ankara, both on the U.S. and Turkish sides, Washington simply didn't understand what the Turks required in terms of assurances, more than assurances, guarantees that they were going to benefit from the situation in the post-conflict environment.

For example, the 1991 Persian Gulf War resulted in a huge outpouring of Kurdish refugees from

the North across the border into Turkey. There were reasons for that, but basically the international effort to contain and mitigate the plight of those people cost a few billion dollars along the way. The Turks rightly so didn't want that to happen again, yet nothing that the United States could do could give them assurances that wasn't going to happen. Likewise, Washington found it impossible to give a guarantee that the Kurds would not eventually go their own way and have some kind of independent or excessively autonomist status within Iraq. We could not find a way to bridge that gap. Beyond the political realm we wouldn't even give them assurances that the Turks would get a cut of the military supply business, construction and other things in Iraq that we ourselves could not do well.

Q: You know, you were following this and I was just actually looking at newspapers, I got the feeling that part of the problem was that you had a new Turkish government, more of an Islamist government that you've had before, but a secular Islamist government and all and sort of voting against helping the United States is kind of a way of cutting its teeth and it required a little more time to say, okay, you got that out of your system, now let's talk Turkey or something like that.

LA PORTA: Literally and figuratively. I think that's correct, but I think there was also a fourth fundamental misunderstanding in addition to the ones I've listed. We did not understand clearly what was happening on the political side within Turkey. The Turkish General Staff (TGS), no matter how long we negotiated with them or thought we were negotiating with them, really was passing the buck to the new government of Tayyip Erdogan as a litmus test on whether that government was going to measure up in pursuing Turkey's national interests as the TGS defined them.

Q: As opposed to being more Islamist.

LA PORTA: Exactly. We didn't understand that it was too late by the middle of January 2003 that we had to start writing down these understandings and guarantees, unlike the Gulf War in 1991-92 when a lot of assumptions made, but the United States was seen by the Turks and others not to deliver. Secondarily, I think that we didn't understand what the Turkish General Staff was trying to do politically, that was basically to put the monkey on the back of the civilian parliament to sanction their role as a NATO member in the Iraq conflict.

Q: The Turkish General Staff is doing this and you're NATO SOUTH, I would think that TGS would say, hey fellows to the admiral and to you and all this is what we're doing, go back to your State Department, Department of Defense and explain what we're doing.

LA PORTA: I don't recall whether they made it that explicit although I think that there were some people in the Turkish General Staff who had closer contacts with high ranking American military officers who said that. On the other hand, Washington basically tried to get away with the argument that was clearly inadequate that you, our allies, have an obligation to do things for us and, by the way, don't forget all the things that the United States has done for Turkey over the years. It wasn't enough. I don't think that the specificity and degree of understanding or knowledge on the part of our top people was adequate, based on looking at correspondence, records of meetings and reports from Washington as well as reporting from the field in that pre-Iraq conflict period.

Q: I may be showing a prejudice or a bias or something, but from what you're saying I feel a couple of things all over of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz who was very impatient and had taken the State Department almost out of the picture and were pressing ahead and everything was in a hurry and they knew best. Were you getting that feeling in Naples?

LA PORTA: There was no question about that, but in the Turkish situation there was a fundamental miscalculation in terms of how we chose to deploy our forces. We had ships laden with logistical supplies and later on, just before the onset of hostilities, with troops sitting off the coast of Southern Turkey for four months. Our commanders were distraught from day to day at not getting anywhere on the Turkish problem. I believe it was the result of fundamental understanding in Washington as to what the Turks really required.

Q: I mean here you are sitting as the political advisor to, as I take it although this is done out of CENTCOM, essentially this was NATO SOUTH troops and all that, what were you all doing on this?

LA PORTA: In a technical sense there were a couple of things that were our responsibility, not CENTCOM's. Number one, NATO did set up a defensive command because they weren't going to allow troops and other things to transit Turkey. That command, after some negotiations which really weren't all that painful, was set up in Southern Turkey at Izmir and Incirlik Air Base. NATO did insert air defense batteries and we deployed AWACS aircraft to surveil the battle space over Southern Turkey in defense of allied territory. And the Turks appreciated although they welshed out on their large alliance obligations.

Q: Who was the enemy?

LA PORTA: The expectation was there could have been an adventure by some Iraqi armed forces or the use of weapons of mass destruction of some sort against, if not Turkish territory, against the Kurds in the North. There were also concerns about potential Russian reactions to the onset of hostilities. The Russians were making threatening noises, as were the Iranians, about taking over some territory. The Russians were going to send "humanitarian forces" from Russia to take a role in the situation. Then the Iranians were clearly supporting the Ansar al-Islam, which was holed up in extreme eastern Kurdistan, but still adjoining Turkey. There were a few things out there, not to mention the security of the pipelines that ran through Southern Turkey. But NATO did stand up a command that was largely air defense. It was a multinational command, and it took a lot of negotiations with the Turks to figure out where to put in the communication centers and other things. What the whole escapade showed, in my view, was that the U.S. political miscalculation revealed fault lines between a number of important relationships in the region.

For example, our command in Naples was responsible for conducting Operation Active Endeavor in the Eastern Mediterranean. Active Endeavor was a counter terrorist maritime interdiction force that tracked civilian shipping for nefarious activity. It also was a means of

deploying a defensive task force in the Eastern Mediterranean to anchor that strategic region while U.S. and coalition forces were in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. ... There were also contributions from the Greeks and the Turks in this task force.

End of Reader