

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

CRAIG DUNKERLEY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 15th of March 2004, the Ides of March; this is an interview with Craig Dunkerley. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.

When and where were you born?

DUNKERLEY: I was born in 1947 in the Midwest, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Q: Tell me something about your mother's side and your father's side of the family. Where are the Dunkerleys from and what were they up to?

DUNKERLEY: My father, Gordon Dunkerley, was a senior executive with Prudential Insurance. Both sides of the family came from the East, his from New York - New Jersey specifically. But, given the nature of his work, we spent a fair amount of time moving around the United States. My mother, Hazel Stockman, a former librarian, was also from Massachusetts-New Jersey area. I was a single child and grew up in a variety of places: Kansas, Ohio, Minnesota, going to elementary and then high school in different spots. After that, I went to Amherst College where I did four years of study getting a BA in history.

Q: Tell me a little about your early education. Were there any particular subjects or sports or activities that you were interested in before you got to college?

DUNKERLEY: Not right away. By the time I got to college, I was particularly interested in history. I had always been a considerable reader --- and I imagine that's where over time I developed an interest in that strange field, diplomacy. I remember early on reading for extra credit in high school Garrett Mattingly's book on the politics and diplomacy surrounding the Spanish Armada. And I also recall from that same time reading Harold Nicholson's book on Congress of Vienna. I thought all of it fascinating history – but I didn't make the connection back then to an eventual career for myself.

Q: You were at Amherst, when to when?

DUNKERLEY: I was at Amherst from 1965 to 1969.

Q: I went to school near your area; I went to Williams, class of 1950. You were a history major, any particular area of study?

DUNKERLEY: In my major, I focused primarily on European history, 19th and 20th Century. But I also did extensive readings in American history as well. At the same time, I spent a good of time active in drama at Amherst, reflecting a strong – and still continuing – interest in the theater.

Q: Did you get over to Europe at all?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, early on I went on an extended trip with high school classmates in – I believe – 1964, driving about for two months through Great Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria and ending up in the Netherlands.

Q: Any impressions of what you wanted to do at that time? Or did you run across the Foreign Service at all?

DUNKERLEY: No, not really at all. My first exposure to the Foreign Service came as I was preparing to leave Amherst. Given my interest in history I was increasingly steering toward some sort of engagement with international affairs. I applied for and was accepted at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, where I eventually received a Master of Arts. It was at that time I began to think more seriously about the Foreign Service as a possible job out of various alternatives. But I wasn't fixed on it. I took the exam, passed the written, and then – almost on a lark – took the oral exam a few months later, passed that as well. Then at a certain point in late 1970 when I was starting to debate whether I should continue my graduate studies at Fletcher or actually go out in the world and get a job, the call came to invite me into the Foreign Service in the next entering class. So all this was driven, first of all, by reading and then a growing interest in history which, over time, led me to a corresponding interest in the day to day workings of international affairs.

Q: How did you find Fletcher? They work hard to have an international experience in the school with students from all over.

DUNKERLEY: It had a very diverse international student body at the time. I recall friends from the UK, Germany, France, Iran, Laos, Singapore....

Q: Had the Vietnam protests penetrated?

DUNKERLEY: Yes. It was a lively time. The whole question of the Vietnam War and protests against it loomed very, very large.

Q: Did you get involved with those at all?

DUNKERLEY: To the extent that almost everyone else of that particular era was often engaged. I recall participating in teach-in's at Amherst and similar activities at Fletcher, including debates when Dean Rusk and Bill Bundy came to lecture.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions that were asked of you during the oral exam?

DUNKERLEY: Not really. I'll have to think.

Q: When did you come in?

DUNKERLEY: I came in very late in 1970, actually coming on duty in the A-100 course at FSI, the Foreign Service Institute, in the first few days of a cold January.

Q: How did you find your basic officer course?

DUNKERLEY: Obviously quite different than it is now. It seemed much more abbreviated. There was, at that time, very much a focus on practical preparations for the basics of traditional embassy jobs, how to draft a political memcon or economic reporting cable, how to prepare a diplomatic note. It all seemed geared in that direction. Of course, at that time most people were being shipped out to consular duties as their initial assignment. After initially being slotted for a consular job in Curacao, I was invited to apply, and ended up being paneled instead for a posting with the Consulate in Da Nang, Vietnam. I did six to seven months of Vietnamese language training in Washington and arrived in country in November of 1971.

Q: Back to the A100 course, what was the group like in terms of women, men, minorities, backgrounds etc.?

DUNKERLEY: All of the above. As I think back, there was a fair amount of diversity and mix among my classmates. Good folk. It certainly wasn't exclusively white males from Eastern schools. But I am not going to be particularly memorable in coming up with any special insight from that far back. Although I do recall now one of the questions put to me at my oral exam: How did I think world history might have been different had the horse been indigenous to America instead of Asia. I've forgotten how I ever got through the answer.

Q: How did you find Vietnamese?

DUNKERLEY: As a tonal language, it was difficult.

This was a period in which the American presence in Vietnam was shifting since most of our military forces in country were in the process of being drawn down. As a consequence there was an increased emphasis in my Vietnamese training towards the economic development assistance work and political/military functions that would be performed by the U.S. people going out there for CORDS - civil operations and rural development support. That is to say, the emphasis related to work out in the countryside

in the provinces and hamlets and such like that. I was in a slightly different situation by being assigned neither to that sort of work nor to our quite large Embassy in Saigon, but rather to the then small Consulate in Da Nang, the second largest city in Viet Nam and located in regional Central Vietnam with its own politics and problems.

I was there at the Consulate for about 18 to 20 months. The first half of my tour I was assigned primarily consular duties, but those increasingly became related to political/military reporting. That turned out to be what I was doing full time for the latter half of my tour there.

Q: When were you there?

DUNKERLEY: From late 1971 and through all of 1972 – which was the year of the Easter Offensive by the North Vietnamese Army when they came through Quang Tri City, just to the north. I was there through the first six months of 1973, following the Paris Cease-Fire Accords. During that latter time, I was involved in following local developments and the international monitoring group that was observing adherence to the Cease Fire Accords.

Q: Who was consul in Da Nang when you were there?

DUNKERLEY: Frederick Z. Brown was the Consul. Immediately following the Paris Cease-Fire Accords, when the post was upgraded and enlarged to become a Consulate General, he became Consul General. He was a very able, energetic individual. He was an excellent first boss.

Q: He has been teaching at George Mason.

DUNKERLEY: Yes, I believe so.

Q: Let's talk a bit about vice consular duties, what were you doing?

DUNKERLEY: Obviously, since this was still a war zone, consular duties were devoted to a fair amount of American Services-related work. We had an ebb and flow of American contractors and merchant mariners who would have a variety of problems. We also did a lot of adoptions of local orphans and the like – and I recall a fair number fiancée visas for U.S. servicemen. But, given that this was a region amidst war-time conditions – a highly artificial situation, I didn't face the full panoply of consular duties and visa work that you might usually have on a first tour assignment at a big embassy.

Increasingly, however, I was taken up with political/military reporting on developments throughout the region. As I said, this was a time when the American military presence was being drawn down significantly. It was still present with specific units and in smaller numbers, but the exercise of American military power by this time was increasingly by air. At the same time, the South Vietnamese were seeking, with our considerable assistance, to develop their own military strength, in both regular units of ARVN - Army

of the Republic of Vietnam - and those on the local level. But also on the political front, the Thieu regime in Saigon was attempting to build up new political parties, new political structures to support the country as the Americans pulled out.

All of this was tested severely in 1972 – after I had been in country a few months – during the major Easter Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese Army. They struck quite heavily in the part of Vietnam that I was in – that part of Central Vietnam which was known as I CORPS or Military Region One (MR-1). They succeeded in taking Quang Tri City in that spring, routing the ARVN Third Division that had been defending that town just to the south of the DMZ; they subsequently came quite close to seizing Hue City on the other side of the Hai Van Pass just to the north of the city of Da Nang. To the south of Da Nang, there was increased activity and attacks in neighboring Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces as well. There was at times intense fighting, air strikes, and massive refugee flows throughout these parts of the region. During this time the city of Da Nang itself and the military facilities around it were rocketed regularly.

(As I think back now on all of this, I can remember how some of those NVA rockets would sound coming in sometimes at night – oddly enough, it was like both sizzling bacon and fast sled runners on crusty snow when shooting overhead and then a loud dull-sharp crack as they'd hit a few blocks away).

So this was a six to seven month period during which the responsibility of the Consulate – the Consul General and the two Vice Consuls – was to provide a steady stream of reporting and analysis, from a Foreign Service perspective, on the efforts of the South Vietnamese regime, both militarily and politically, first of all to avoid collapse, secondly to regain lost ground and thirdly, to lay more viable foundations for the longer term. It was all a very close-run thing.

Q: What were you doing?

DUNKERLEY: We did a lot of reporting out of the city of Da Nang proper. Mike Owens, the other Vice Consul, and I would periodically go out into the provinces, visiting all the prefectural capitals in MR-1 like Quang Ngai City or Hue. We would meet with South Vietnamese figures: government officials and local politicians, local clergy, local businessmen, teachers and the like. We were seeking to gauge a sense of popular mood, track the effectiveness of local South Vietnamese government entities, determine if possible directions that some of these efforts might be going, and so forth. Though we reported how ups and downs in the military situation could have a decisive effect on all of this, we were not concentrating on straight military reporting because of course that was the province of the remaining U.S. military advisors with the ARVN units.

Q: On the non-military side, what was your impression of the South Vietnamese government, how it was reacting? Specifically, what did you think of the officials?

DUNKERLEY: It was a very mixed picture. When it came to the lessons learned as a young Foreign Service officer – from my months in Vietnam in watching the South

Vietnamese government and army respond to the great military crisis of 1972 and then the first six months following the Paris Cease Fire Accord in 1973 – I came away with several disparate impressions. For example, I developed a much greater sensitivity to the tremendous complexity and ambiguity inherent in such a situation. It was not something that lent itself to straightforward black-white interpretations. War and peace in central Vietnam in ‘72-‘ 73 did not lend itself to overly-simplistic interpretations, let alone easy predictions – either of the sort that one would hear in the era of campus protest within the United States or, conversely, in periodic official assertions as to the strength and effectiveness of the Saigon regime.

This was probably not surprising given the nature of Vietnamese politics and society of the time. There seemed few clear-cut good guys-bad guys in that sort of situation, as evidenced on a daily basis in my working contact with a variety of the local South Vietnamese officials, politicians and average citizens. Some seemed dedicated and effective, others less so, circumstances would change, and initial impressions could be misleading.

The other thought that I took away from my experience in Vietnam was probably a greater appreciation for the pressures within government service (often indirect and implicit) that shape the performance of U.S. organizations and their reporting and analysis in such situations.

At the time, I thought this might be particularly true on the military side; there was such an investment on our part in ARVN and in the efforts in the various prefectures in MR 1, you can’t help but think that that provided some incentive to accentuate the positive.

Q: What was your impression of the performance of the military up around Quang Tri?

DUNKERLEY: Again my impression was consistent with the theme: there was no simple answer. There was no monochromatic characterization that one could give of the South Vietnamese military performance that year. In some cases, there was great confusion and incompetence leading to very serious military setbacks, particularly initially. Some individual South Vietnamese military leaders and units failed. On the other hand, there were also a number of performances by senior South Vietnamese officers and their troops that were quite courageous, skillful, heroic, and indeed, in the end, they did succeed in 1972 against daunting odds.

Q: Was the Northern Army forced out of Quang Tri?

DUNKERLEY: Eventually out of Quang Tri City. I think some elements were still to be found the north of the Quang Tri River and below the DMZ. There were still significant portions of central Vietnam that were under serious North Vietnamese army control when, of course, the Paris Cease Fire Accords were signed in early 1973, ostensibly freezing the situation on the ground in place...

Q: Looking at the civilian side of things, what was the role of the Buddhists at that time?

DUNKERLEY: The A Quang Buddhists had been a major factor in political life in that part of central Vietnam in earlier years. We spent a great deal of time at the Consulate trying to understand their positions and to explain ours to them. So there was at the time some interaction with them.

Q: What was your impression?

DUNKERLEY: As the details were so long ago, I'll have to pass on that.

Q: How about working with CORDS?

DUNKERLEY: CORDS was still in place in 1972, but with the Cease Fire Agreement early the following year, its formal structure and much of its activities in MR-1 were subsumed into what then became the new Da Nang Consulate General and its operations. I recall that a number of the CORDS people still engaged in support and development activities in the countryside were then folded into a rather extensive reporting operation throughout the provinces following the Paris Accords – part of an immediate push to expand reporting. Additionally a number of FSO's with prior Vietnam experience were called back on temporary duty at the new Da Nang Consulate General. Similar efforts were made in other parts of Vietnam, the only difference being that there they were actually establishing new consulates. In our case of Da Nang, we were already in place.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

DUNKERLEY: I was there under Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker towards the end of his tour. I left in 1973 so I was not there when he was followed by Graham Martin.

Q: In your reporting, did you find either through Fred Brown or through the embassy that there were constraints on your reporting?

DUNKERLEY: No. I personally did not. For his part, Fred encouraged initiative in reporting.

Q: Did you coordinate early on with the CORDS people and the ones out in the field?

DUNKERLEY: There was always a fair amount of discussion with our CORDS counterparts. Of course, we were very eager to gain their insights. But prior to the consolidation in early '73, we both had separate reporting channels.

Q: How about our military presence at that time? We were withdrawing our troops as part of the "Vietnamization" program at that time. Were there military observers left?

DUNKERLEY: American military advisors were assigned to all the ARVN divisions and major units in MR-1. Also at the prefectural or provincial level, there continued to be

significant U.S. military assistance – and advisors – to the local Regional and Popular Forces as part of the overall CORDS effort.

Q: Were you getting much feedback?

DUNKERLEY: A certain amount, but it varied in volume and quality.

Following Vietnam, I came back to the States and did a brief stint in the East Asia bureau.

Q: What were you doing in the East Asia bureau?

DUNKERLEY: I was a staff assistant for a year in the Front Office of the Bureau and then served a second year as a desk officer in the Office of Japanese Affairs. In 1975 I went into a first year of Japanese language training – this was at FSI in Rosslyn. On that basis, I was assigned to the Embassy in Tokyo, joining the Political Section in the summer of 1976 where I worked on external political affairs until the summer of 1978.

I took this route because it was a particularly interesting time. By the mid 1970s, Japanese economic might, its role as an economic power of increasing competitive weight within the world, was well established. On the political side of the ledger, we saw in terms of foreign affairs an increasing sense of self-confidence on Japan's part, especially in regards the rest of Asia – but still within the context of continuing an exceptionally close and cooperative relationship with the United States.

Most of what I followed during that time related to Japan's relations with its neighbors, specifically China, the two Koreas, the Soviet Union and the like. Interestingly enough, a number of the same problems, or at least a reverberation of the same themes, can still be found in those relationships today. Professionally it was a very active brief, underscoring the interplay between Japanese external relations with those particular countries and its own internal political scene.

Q: When you were at the East Asia Bureau, you were an assistant to whom?

DUNKERLEY: Primarily Robert Ingersoll as Assistant Secretary.

Q: What was his area of interest?

DUNKERLEY: He was a former businessman, with Borg-Warner I recall, and had been a political appointment as Ambassador to Japan in the early 70's. He came in as Assistant Secretary for East Asia in 1973 and then, after about a little less than year, became Deputy Secretary of State in 1974.

Q: What sort of things were you doing for him?

DUNKERLEY: In the first instance, managing the movement of information – which in those days, of course, meant paper.

Q: Did you find that you learned how the system operates?

DUNKERLEY: One likes to think so. I began to get a first-hand sense of how information moved within the State Department, both vertically and horizontally, not just in the reporting of information but as importantly, in the prepping of policy and operational decisions. I began to get an understanding of just what a Seventh Floor principal needed to know for such decisions – and how it could be presented to best effect.

Q: You moved to the Japan desk?

DUNKERLEY: William Sherman was the Japan Country Director at the time. My own duties involved at first a variety of odds and sods. Over time, I picked up increasing responsibility for several bilateral science issues, including work on initial U.S.-Japan cooperation in the development of Japan's own space program. As various other issues came to fore, I ended up following bilateral fisheries negotiations and the like.

Bill Sherman became a very good friend and mentor. My work with him back then steered me towards what was turning out to be a major interest for me: US-Japan relations. So my initial year on the Japan Desk was necessary for deciding to undertake a long-term investment in language training.

Q: Had you applied for Japanese language training earlier?

DUNKERLEY: No, this was something that came about from my time with Bill Sherman – and colleagues like Tom Hubbard and Rust Deming – on the Japan Desk. It grew as a personal interest and then as a professional opportunity.

Q: How did you find language training?

DUNKERLEY: I think long-term hard language training can always be difficult in the Foreign Service. You take individuals who by their very temperament and selection are very articulate and you require them essentially to return to a very basic “me Tarzan” level of discourse for eight hours a day over nine months or a year, a long time before you begin to gain some fluency. That can be grating.

Q: Believe me, I know.

DUNKERLEY: Japanese can be particularly ferocious in that regard. I did a year of basic Japanese training in Washington before going out to the Political Section in Tokyo for two years. I then did more advanced language training at FSI's branch school in Yokohama, a second year of language instruction, before going down to be Principal Officer at our Consulate in Fukuoka in Kyushu.

Q: So you had one year of Japanese and went to the embassy, worked for two years and had another year of Japanese in country. Japanese foreign relations in 1976 to 1978, I assume that the LDP was in control?

DUNKERLEY: The LDP was very much in control. Indeed, the back and forth of domestic politics at that time related, in the first instance, to the internal factional competition within the party. This was the post-Tanaka period of Prime Ministers Ohira, Fukuda and Miki and before Nakasone's prime ministership.

That was the domestic political context. Among the foreign policy issues that I followed in the Embassy Political Section's External Division was tracking the course of a long stalled Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China: essentially a political complement – or rubric – for what was then the beginning of a burgeoning economic-commercial relationship with China.

At the same time, we followed Japan's relations with the Soviet Union – and the never-ending frictions between Tokyo and Moscow regarding the disputed Northern Territories, various disputed islands in the Kuriles between Japan and the Soviet Union.

And those of us in External also spent a good deal of time in following Japan's dealings with Korea which, as you know, is bound, on the one hand, by considerable political and economic and even strategic common interests. But on the other, it is also a relationship carrying particularly strong and continuing animosity, friction and suspicion given past colonial history.

One of the issues that came up while I was there with the advent of the Carter Presidency was the decision by the new Administration to rescale the American military presence on the Korean peninsula, revolving around possible withdrawal of the U.S. Second Division. That generated a whole set of anxieties on the part of the Japanese; that in turn generated an extended period of high-level consultations with the new U.S. team. The embassy political section played a particular role in that regard by providing running commentary, analysis and interpretation of the Japanese concerns.

Q: Let's talk about the Korean relationship. What was the feeling? They didn't want the Second Division out?

DUNKERLEY: At the time, the Japanese seemed concerned as much about what this particular move by the new American Administration, and its apparent manner of decision and announcement, might have conveyed about overall American intentions in the region over the longer term. Much of their commentary was cast in more specific terms of reliance upon the American military presence on the peninsula to provide continued stability. I had impression their anxiety was less motivated by a careful calculation of specific military factors—weighing various elements in terms of a dynamic strategic balance – than out of a more fundamental and inchoate concern about our longer-term level of interest, engagement and staying power.

Q: To put it in its time context, this wasn't too long after we pulled out of Vietnam. We had been forced out of Vietnam so there was considerable doubt about us. Carter had made pronouncements about withdrawing forces from Vietnam during the political campaign. I think he said, 'we'll get our troops out of Korea.'

DUNKERLEY: He made certain statements to that effect during the 2006 campaign; after the inauguration these were reiterated during an early visit to Tokyo by Vice President Mondale, the first visit by an Administration senior figure out to the region. You are correct that one of the basic themes of that particular period was the effort by the United States, in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle, to redefine, readjust, reaffirm the nature of its role in East Asia. The challenge was to do so in such a way as to provide reassurance to our partners in the area. That could be said to be underlying much of this. It took time – and some trial and error – to do so credibly.

Q: What were you doing on this particular issue?

DUNKERLEY: I was spending a lot of time with the Japanese Foreign Office and their Korean Desk in particular. But I was also seeing a number of Japanese journalists, politicians and the like, especially those engaged on international issues. Again, at this particular time the role of the embassy's Political Section was not just that of a passive watching brief on Japanese concerns and attitudes but that of a more active effort to help the Japanese interpret a new Administration in Washington. The ebb and flow of Japanese concerns, being political in nature, tended at times to be slightly irrational.

Q: During the same period, I was Consul General in Seoul. We were very concerned. It seemed like a stupid move at the time presenting the North Koreans with an opportunity to do something. As time played out, essentially they really didn't do it. They moved some batteries out. How were your Japanese contacts reading this? Did they understand the political life in the United States and why this came about?

DUNKERLEY: That covers a broad sweep of the Japanese. On the one hand, the Foreign Office's America desk, the First North American division, usually had – I thought back then – a sophisticated and realistic understanding of both American policy and American politics. On the other hand, that sort of sophisticated reading was not necessarily shared in the wider range of political thinking in Tokyo, especially as amplified in popularized generalizations.

Q: Were the newspapers playing this up? Were they across the political spectrum saying things like 'you can't trust the Americans, they're not committed to the Far East,' that sort of thing?

DUNKERLEY: I would hesitate to say that it was as blatant as that. But with allowance for the sense of understatement that is so often the case in the Japanese language and especially the language of politics, there were clear signs of uncertainty and in some cases anxiety.

Q: By 1978 how was it?

DUNKERLEY: Much of the open controversy had died down by then. As you probably noted from your post in Seoul, once an extended process of consultations between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and with Japan and other interested parties got well and truly underway, at a certain point, the issue began to be defanged.

Q: Was there much consultation with Ambassador Richard Snyder? He was a real Japanese hand.

DUNKERLEY: Obviously having him in Seoul, given his extensive knowledge and experience in that region, was a great benefit. He was very much involved. I had known him from my earlier job in the East Asia Bureau Front Office.

Q: As you were working on this, what sort of attitude were you picking up from the Japanese about the Koreans?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly the official Japanese were entirely correct in the views they expressed in their conversations with us. As you know from your own experience in that part of the world, however, if you're talking about broader society, there continued to be prejudices voiced towards the Koreans and vice versa.

During this time a new ambassador arrived, former Senator Mike Mansfield. He came to be very important in steering the Embassy's approach on this and other issues. He was an excellent man to work for; like others, I learned a number of lessons just in being able to watch how he operated. About the same time, Bill Sherman, for whom I'd worked earlier on the Japan Desk, became DCM for Ambassador Mansfield.

Q: What were some of the lessons that you picked up?

DUNKERLEY: In terms of management and leadership, Mansfield conveyed – among many other things – an excellent sense of how to prioritize, choosing among those issues on which to expend personal time and energy as ambassador and the President's personal representative in Tokyo, and those better to leave to a large and capable staff at the embassy. Not surprisingly, given his history as a veteran within the Senate, you could note how he'd go about carefully building political capital on this or that issue, and then deciding the right moment and manner to weigh in with either the Japanese or policy-makers back in Washington. Throughout he would display an exquisite sense of personal diplomacy in all his relations with the Japanese at all levels. It was useful reminder of the importance of conveying a sense of personal integrity in all your dealings – that very much characterized all that he did.

Q: Were trade pressures from the United States running counter to trying to have good relations with the Japanese?

DUNKERLEY: That's always been a recurring theme – of varying intensity and urgency. Indeed one can say that has been true of U.S.-Japan relations for as long as most of us can remember, certainly going back to the 1960s. There were all sorts of trade-related strains in the relationship when I was there, but sometimes taking new or unfamiliar forms. For instance: in the early 1970s there was a brief but abrupt cut off of soybean exports from the United States to Japan. That was driven by reasons extraneous to Japan as I recall, but for the Japanese body politic, it was very off-putting in its effect – a “shock” in the terms of that time for the larger relationship.

Q: Were the Japanese doing much with North Korea at that time?

DUNKERLEY: No...and I suppose yes. As you know from your own experience in the region at that time, the Japanese did not have a formal governmental relationship with North Korea – even as they enjoyed diplomatic relations and a web of close, but at times difficult, political and business ties with the Republic of Korea in the South.

Nonetheless there was geographic proximity and a long history at work as well. As a consequence, there was a certain amount of commercial trade and interaction between the DPRK and Japan, though it was much more important for the former than latter. And of course you had within Japan itself a large resident ethnic Korean population. Within this were significant organizations – some were supportive of the ROK and some that were very strongly and vocally pro-DPRK. Indeed, some of the latter were very much creatures of Pyongyang, Chosen Soren being foremost. These generated a modest degree of political leverage and a continuing stream of economic support, not least in the form of remittances, for the DPRK.

As a consequence, North Korea was a particular neighbor of special interest for us at the Tokyo Embassy. We would seek to follow North Korean developments to the limited extent we could. We did so, in part through regular discussion with Japanese counterparts working Korean issues and exchanges with those third-country diplomats with either a reporting presence, or first-hand experience, in Pyongyang. But in hindsight I continue to be struck by just little information, let alone insight, was out there.

Q: With China during this 1976-78 period, we had already gone through the opening of China and actually we recognized, we opened formal diplomatic relations during this period. Where were the Japanese standing on this? Were they trying to almost move ahead of us? Or, were they still annoyed about Nixon?

DUNKERLEY: I think it had been said by someone at the time that the ideal of Japan's foreign policy towards China would be to stay one step ahead of us – but only by about six hours. That is to say, while differences as to degree or detail might be periodically expressed among individual politicians or journalists, most political and business leaders of Japan seemed clearly interested in moving towards some form of greater normalization of relations with China. But, in the daily effect of its policies, the government seemed not so precipitate as to get very far out ahead of the U.S., presumably wanting to avoid any bilateral problems too great a divergence on this issue might entail. At the same time,

government policy-makers were exquisitely sensitive, still raw, that they not be surprised once again by the U.S. on something so important for Japanese interests as China – as they had been so visibly embarrassed in the Nixon-Kissinger period a few years before. And so, at this time in the mid to late-70's – one had the sense of Japanese diplomacy on China as being in a state of constant testing, modulation and adjustment.

Another aspect affecting Japanese calculations in their evolving relationship with China was, of course, what this might mean for their relations with the Soviet Union. At that time a regular feature of Chinese public diplomacy was the expression of concern about Soviet ambitions in the Far East, casting this in terms of resisting aspirations towards hegemony. As a consequence, one of the recurring questions wrapped up in the on-again off-again efforts to conclude a long-stalled Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty came to be whether or in what form Tokyo might accede to language, however oblique or elliptical, characterized as being “anti-hegemony” in intent.

I recall that, as an embassy reporting officer, I had any number of conversations with Gaimusho – that is to say, Foreign Office – colleagues on this or that turn in the unfolding of this negotiation. Interestingly enough, most of the Japanese concern then seemed related the degree that all of this might be perceived as being overtly anti-Soviet. At that time at least, the Chinese were not assertively pushing the public notion of “anti-hegemony” as applying to U.S. bases in Japan.

Q: Were you or the political section primed to encourage or discourage anything about the Japanese-Chinese relationship at the time?

DUNKERLEY: Not really. Given the delicacy of U.S.-China relations (recall we were also moving slowly and quietly towards a normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing as well); given the number of domestic factors that were in play in Japanese-Chinese relations, both pro and con; and given the degree to which the Japanese government seemed to be fairly cautious – advancing a step, testing the water and moving back slightly as necessary, there was no overt lobbying on our part either way – certainly from the perspective of my level. At much higher levels of our bilateral discussionsI wouldn't directly know but at that time saw little sign of any major campaign on our part.

Q: What about our relationship with Taiwan? How were the Japanese dealing with Taiwan during this period?

DUNKERLEY: This was a bilateral relationship of many different levels and different forms. There was, just as there continues to be now, important economic ties between Japan and Taiwan. Such commercial interests were matched by longstanding relationships among individual conservative politicians and various political support groups. Their relative weight within Japanese politics had evolved over the post-war years. So by this time, one had the sense, at least as an outside observer, that the interests underlying the Taiwan relationship – and its advocates – certainly were a factor that needed to be taken

into account, could not be neglected, but which by themselves would not prove to be the most decisive factor as Japanese policy came to develop.

Q: One last relationship is the one with the Soviet Union. It has always struck me that the Soviets could have made great strides on some of those islands. It was almost as if we were paying the Soviets to maintain this high line stance in the Kuriles.

These are, of course, the famous “Northern Territories” – four disputed islands in the southern Kuriles chain – all of whose names I much regret have slipped my memory today. Again this was a long-standing problem that the External Office of the Embassy Political Section had to follow in our reporting – not as a breaking issue (it certainly wasn’t) but more as recurring environmental factor for the conduct of Japanese foreign policy vis a vis the Soviets.

You are correct: There was a particular Moscow-Tokyo dynamic at play in those years which suggested at times almost a quality of strategic irrationality, not least on the former’s part. Territorial disputes are often tough because of the popular political emotions they can excite – and for a variety of reasons, both parties appeared to have boxed themselves into a cul-de-sac. But this seemed counter-productive in terms of the Soviet tactics – especially given what we assumed could be significant strategic objectives to be gained by them through a more normalized, more upbeat relationship with Japan as an emerging economic super-power whose investments and technologies could greatly assist in further development of the Soviet Far East.

From the Embassy’s perspective watching this play out, day-to-day diplomacy on Moscow’s part with the Japanese seemed clumsy, at times pugnacious. I remember that, at the time, Japanese colleagues in the Gaimusho and in the press would speculate about how particular personalities involved on the Soviet side, in either the MFA or Central Committee, with personal experiences in the past dealing with Japanese POWs in Siberia, tended to reinforce a particular tone to all of this. You see that Japan-Russia relations, even now, continue to face problems arising out of this long-term legacy of the Northern Territories.

Q: You then went down to Fukuoka?

DUNKERLEY: It was my great good fortune to be assigned as Consul – the Principal Officer – at our Consulate in Fukuoka from mid 1979 to mid 1981. It was a delightful experience – one that I still remember with fondness. It was an assignment to a very pleasant part of Japan, the consular district essentially covering the island Kyushu, which in turn was exceptionally rich in Japanese history and tradition, in the arts and traditional culture. For the most part, there was not at that time a pervasive Western presence, let alone numbers of Americans, in Fukuoka or Kyushu – at least as compared to Tokyo or the Osaka-Kobe area. This was both an advantage and an attraction to being posted there: if you wished, it was an opportunity to access and immerse one’s self in things Japanese in a way not readily available in Tokyo.

Much of the Consulate's activity was related, in addition to the usual sorts of consular work, to very active trade promotion and to extensive public affairs outreach. It was also a useful perch from which to gain a sense of domestic politics at the local level in that part of Japan – Western Japan – and so we provided considerable analysis and reporting during several national elections during that period. Given its location and past history, this was also a part of Japan with special and long-standing ties with both Korea and China. While the basic direction of Japanese relations with those countries was set at the national level, there were interesting regional aspects to those relationships. For example, Japanese investment and industrial projects with China were picking up then – this was the late 70's – and so the Consulate also followed several ground-breaking Kyushu-Shanghai projects of the period.

So in all of this, as Principal Officer I ended up doing a great deal of time traveling throughout Kyushu and its different prefectures, with the opportunity to meet not just local officials, business leaders, and journalists – but also various artists, craftsmen, actors and the like. From a personal perspective, it was a great time.

There were, of course, also occasional but quite serious problems to deal with. Early on there was a tragic fire in one of the consulate residences in which an American officer perished along with his visiting mother.

And there was a major political incident of an American submarine – the George Washington – sinking a Japanese freighter in, as I recall, early 1981 (Perhaps a recurring theme in U.S.-Japanese relations has been that of accidental submarine collisions). The accident was serious enough by itself, resulting in several deaths. The immediate aftermath was a casebook example of the problems and tensions arising out differences in culture: in this case, the divergence between an understandable but unfortunate reluctance on the part of some U.S. authorities to say too much prematurely, following our own legal standards and practices, and the need, seemingly hardwired into Japanese perceptions of what constitutes proper behavior in such situations, for prompt, sincere, and even emotionally evocative apologies. As much of this played out in Kyushu waters, and the Japanese casualties came from Kyushu. I ended up playing a certain role in the management of that problem.

My two years there went fast. At the end of that period, I was awarded a Fellowship – as an International Affairs Fellow – at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. After a year at the Council, I returned to the Department in Washington, working from mid 1982 to 1986 I was in the Bureau of European affairs – first in the Office of Soviet Affairs dealing with strategic arms control and then in the Office of NATO Affairs continuing this focus on negotiations with the Russians.

Q: I'd like to go back to Fukuoka. Was the political atmosphere different there than in Tokyo? Newspapers, political control and all that?

DUNKERLEY: Yes and no. There was, of course, a noticeable difference between being out in the provinces and being in the central metropolis. One could say that it was a

slightly slower pace out in Western Japan, though I wouldn't carry that too far. It was certainly not more insular. But as you know from your own experience out in that part of the world, Tokyo was and remains very much the center of Japan's political affairs, and its national media out of Tokyo similarly shaped much of the broad coverage of politics by regional and local outlets.

Q: How was the influence of U.S. military?

DUNKERLEY: Within Western Japan, you had a US Navy presence at Sasebo naval base not too far from Nagasaki. There was also a Marine Corps air station at Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, on the Honshu mainland but also part of the Kyushu consular district. Inevitably there were periodic civil-military problems with aircraft noise and the like.

But it was my good fortune when I was there not to have the sort of problems that had been seen there more recently, for instance in connection with our presence in Okinawa. There was a qualitative difference. Just looking at the numbers involved, the ratio of American military presence in Okinawa was much, much higher in a relatively small area than what we are talking about in Kyushu at the time I was there.

Q: Without overstating it, there is a difference almost in quality and outlook between an infantry and people maintaining airplanes. What happened during the incident between the George Washington and the freighter?

DUNKERLEY: The SSBN George Washington was running exercises. There was bad, foggy weather and low visibility. It surfaced and abruptly collided with a small Japanese freighter. It submerged and the freighter sank. Several of the crew drowned. Again, there was a question of responsibility for the initial act and then an apparent failing to respond.

Unfortunately, in the George Washington incident, it took 24 or 36 hours before we were able to say authoritatively through the U.S. Navy that in fact it had been an American submarine involved. During that time there was a certain amount of confusion on the Japanese side. That length of delay was unfortunate. Part of the problem that followed relates to the inevitable disconnect between a culture such as ours – where we are acutely aware of legal procedures, determining guilt and responsibility through a formal process – as opposed to a Japanese cultural situation where there is much more weight assigned to an immediate and profound expression of regret. It took a certain amount of time to work out – just as in the more recent incident off Hawaii of a few years ago.

Q: Off Hawaii where we sank a Japanese research and school vessel.

DUNKERLEY: Yes.

Q: What did you do? Did you have to wait?

DUNKERLEY: No, I had to get involved since it was in my consular district and all of the crew who were lost came from a small town in the southern part of my district – in Kagoshima prefecture. I had to get to the scene rather quickly and represent the U.S. in expressing at least our initial apologies to the grieving families. I had to make a variety of public statements to try to tamp things down even as the U.S. Navy was grinding through its own procedures to determine responsibility. I had to convey that sense of regret.

Q: Did you have the Navy trying to keep you from over apologizing?

DUNKERLEY: No, but I was the one who had to be out front on the local scene in those first few days.

Anyhow, enough of those days....

Q: What were you doing on the Council of Foreign Relations?

DUNKERLEY: I was based in New York for that year, and as an International Affairs Fellow, continued research at the Council on U.S.-Japan relations. Winston Lord, formerly head of Policy Planning at State, was the President of the Council at the time.

Q: How did they use you?

DUNKERLEY: The Council used me as an advisory resource. I helped put together a number of speaking programs for them on East Asia topics. Towards the end of my year, I arranged for a rather extended trip for Win Lord out to Tokyo for a round of discussions with Japanese politicians and business leaders.

Q: When were you dealing with disarmament?

DUNKERLEY: From the summer of 1982 to the summer of 1984, I was in the office of Soviet Affairs (EUR/SOV) at the Bureau of European-Canadian affairs (EUR) in what was called at the time the Multilateral Section of that particular office. That section dealt largely with political and military strategic issues outstanding between the United States and the then Soviet Union. At that time, a good deal of its work related to the various arms control discussions with the Soviets and the role these should play, or not play, as one tool out of several in dealing with the Soviet Union.

As you recall, that was a period where there were very strong views on these issues within the Reagan Administration between then Secretary of State Shultz and then Secretary of Defense Weinberger, between Assistant Secretary Richard Burt within the European bureau at State at that time and Assistant Secretary Richard Perle at Defense. There was an ongoing and lively debate within the interagency community about both large questions of arms control strategy and small issues of individual detail. If there turned out to be a single recurring theme to my own work at that time, it was participation – at the staff level down very much in the bureaucratic trenches – within that sharp debate.

All of this was, of course, reflective of the fact that the later years of the Carter Administration and much of the first term of the Reagan Administration, which was when I came onboard in EUR, had been marked by a sharp sense of erosion in the notion of détente, increasingly open political differences and a heightening sense of renewed strategic competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union, running across a range of issues: Afghanistan, Poland, human rights, military imbalances, and so forth. And further: for many of these same reasons the early 1980's were also marked by growing uncertainty and anxiety on the part of our European allies and others, particularly as a sense of increasingly adversarial U.S.-Soviet relations tended to dominate the international scene. In the face of all this, it was not at all surprising there was such a vigorous internal debate on the U.S. side over the wisdom or effectiveness of this or that policy. But this was, as even more apparent well after the fact, also a period when the Soviet Union itself was beginning to go through not just a very difficult leadership succession but amidst concern over increasingly serious economic and political stagnation.

So all of this made for an interesting time to be in an especially active job working both long-term issues like START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and immediate crises which might crop up (such as the Soviet shoot-down of the KAL 007 airliner over Sakhalin in 1983). And to be able to do so with such colleagues as Sandy Vershbow, Larry Napper, Steve Pifer, John Tefft – all first-rate professionals who became good friends.

I followed up that assignment by moving within the EUR Bureau to head up a section within what is still called the Office of European Political and Strategic Affairs (EUR/RPM). My portfolio there dealt with many of the same East-West Pol-Mil issues but from the perspective of – to use a term much in vogue then – alliance management. We dealt with Alliance consultations surrounding the stalled INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) negotiations in Geneva, the successful deployment of the U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles into selected NATO countries, the introduction of the President's SDI program (Strategic Defense Initiative), and with the advent of Gorbachev, the first steps in resuming a largely frozen U.S.-Soviet strategic dialogue.

Q: When you were dealing with negotiations in the early part of the Reagan administration, was there a feeling that you were marking time at that point?

I wouldn't put it that way. But as the Reagan administration went through its first term, there were arguments over a series of differing premises and options with regard to the use, or perceived misuse, of arms control in managing our relationship with the Soviet Union. There's no question but that some of the resulting substantive positions that came to be put forward at that time, such as global elimination of INF missiles to name but one, were deemed very ambitious for the time. The irony is, of course, although some critics assumed or argued at that time that these negotiating objectives were deliberately ambitious simply to mark time as you put it, at the end of the day, a number of them turned out to be successfully concluded and became a new reality.

Q: When you arrived on the scene, how did you find the troops you were working with? Were they cynical or hopeful?

DUNKERLEY: I am surprised that you would ever use the word cynical in association with any Foreign Service officer. [laughs]

Q: I have never dealt with negotiations of that nature, but when I think of generation after generation of Foreign Service officers who have been involved in arms' negotiations, it really took the advent of change in the Soviet Union to do anything. It had been a process that just kept going, but it didn't seem to be going anywhere for so long until Gorbachev came along.

DUNKERLEY: You raise a larger issue: the rise and fall – and future – of arms control. What should be our proper expectations of arms control negotiation as a means but not necessarily an end in itself? What should be the strategic role of arms control in any larger sense of U.S. foreign policy, within a national security strategy that has to be balanced, effective and sustainable over time?

Remember that for a long time, a central element – a key and highly symbolic indicator – of the U.S.-Soviet relationship came to be this particular process of nuclear arms control. It probably was, in retrospect, correct at the time to be concerned lest too much, especially in popular perceptions, was being put on that process as *the fundamental determinant* within a much broader and complex competitive relationship with the Soviet Union. There was as well concern as to what arms control as thus far defined was actually achieving in terms of strategic stability. Remember that the earlier SALT talks of the 1970's, the initial agreements in this area, were not about deep reductions, but in fact simply about limiting particular aspects of a continued expansion of nuclear offensive arsenals within which, some feared, destabilizing imbalances persisted or were growing worse.

Q: Did you find the process interesting?

DUNKERLEY: It was intellectually interesting. The issues at hand were self-evidently important. There were very high political stakes. All that counted for a lot.

And there was serious work to be done. There were rigorous, exhaustive inter-agency debates to be staffed up in the formulation of policy positions on particular issues. No less important were the frequency and intensity of our consultations with members of the Alliance and others, so necessary in winning their understanding and support for those policies.

But initially this was not a moment ripe for progress with the then Soviets. Here I am talking about the period of 1982-'83-'84. Progress required several things to change. One necessary factor was a demonstration of political will on the part of the U.S., European Allies, and NATO – that they were in fact resolved to go forward with the INF deployments in Western Europe absent an acceptable negotiating solution eliminating the

Soviet SS-20 threat. When those deployments did begin to go forward, the Soviet response of a walk-out from INF and other arms control exchanges in Geneva, in the fall of '83, was widely seen as a return to what was loosely called at the time a new Cold War. But in the end, of course, it turned out to be a political strategy on the part of the Soviets which proved to be self-defeating in its effect.

One of the projects I was involved in at that time of the Soviet pull-out from the Geneva negotiations in late '83 and early '84 was to find at least one area where some U.S.-Soviet negotiating progress in the Pol-Mil arena might be possible. So I became deeply involved in the negotiation of upgrading the U.S.-Soviet Hotline. At that particular moment, it assumed more of a political prominence, at least on our side, than perhaps was warranted simply because for a brief period it was the only thing in town seeming to involve a reluctant Moscow in such negotiations.

Q: The hotline seems almost self-evident...

DUNKERLEY: Yes. It was one area where, even in this time of their freeze on other bilateral negotiations, the Soviets readily saw an interest in moving forward. This involved a network of upgrades in terms of the technology.

Q: It was a teletype that ran through Finland?

DUNKERLEY: The original Hotline technology was quite dated by then. This new round of negotiations resulted in a minor technological revolution (for that time at least) of shifting to communications through a dedicated and secure net of personal computers. That now seems ancient as well.

As I mentioned, I was on the Soviet Desk for two years and then moved over to the NATO side. I worked closely with Rick Burt who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I spent a lot of time in Alliance consultations during this period, particularly in the context of a process known as the NATO SCG (Special Consultative Group).

In thinking back now on those experiences, what impressed me – the lessons, if you will – related very much to the art and science of “alliance management.” I suspect that our problems may change in substance, but the nature of the tasks for American diplomacy probably remains the same, even if in quite different forms or circumstances:

First, the need to develop and sustain a clear and consistent substantive message cannot be overstated. Second, implementing a continuous process of meaningful consultations with partners and potential supporters will turn out to be no less important, not least to be convincingly seen as taking their interests seriously. Third, in building upon both message and process, we need to make special efforts to provide counterparts with a persuasive political narrative that they in turn can use in explaining or defending our case with their own audiences.

Watching individuals like George Shultz, Paul Nitze, Rick Burt, Roz Ridgway (who was Burt's successor in leading EUR) work all three elements was an education.

Q: You say consulting the NATO people... Did the French delight in being odd man out?

DUNKERLEY: Not in this particular field so much. The French were not part of the original NATO decision in 1979 to deploy the Pershing II and cruise missiles in response to the Soviet build-up of SS-20's. Remember, that was a dual track decision – both to deploy these systems to counter the Soviet imbalance and at the same time, to seek to negotiate with Moscow an overall solution to this problem. It was, of course, a decision to go forward with NATO deployments absent progress and resolution through negotiations.

Although the French were not formally part of those decisions by the political-military policy-making processes of NATO, their position at the time was in fact helpful, positive in regard to the larger issue of maintaining a viable nuclear deterrent posture. As the NATO deployments went forward – and the U.S. negotiations with the Soviets progressed – we had frequent conversations with Paris even though France was not officially part of the formal NATO SCG consultative structure on INF issues, let alone the integrated military structure.

Q: How about the Germans?

DUNKERLEY: They were critical. As extensive press reporting at the time made clear, there were serious domestic political concerns within Germany, just as there were within a number of other countries: including the United Kingdom, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The resulting controversies were, I recall, what some journalists billed “The Year of the Euro-Missiles.” The Kohl government had a critical stake in how this all played out. It was seen by Washington as fairly strong in expressing resolve to go forward with deployments absent meaningful negotiating results, even as the German authorities also had an abiding interest in ensuring that those negotiations were real, viable and with some chance of succeeding.

Q: On the deployment and negotiation sides, were we having problems making our NATO allies see that we were really very serious about both deploying and that if we got the right negotiations we would take them out?

DUNKERLEY: A tough issue but this is why I would stress that our continuing diplomatic efforts under the rubric of consultations – providing our partners with a persuasive political narrative – were absolutely critical. We ended up with an almost continuous dialogue with the governments of the deploying states about the state of negotiations, about ideas for moving those negotiations forward, about what we were saying in Geneva, and no less importantly, about what the Russians were saying.

One further sidebar on the role of consultations comes to mind: Immediately following the successful Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in early 1985 - which signaled a

Soviet return to negotiating table - there was a decision that, in addition to the usual briefings of our Allies through NATO consultations and bilateral channels, small briefing teams would be dispatched to the various East European countries of the then Warsaw Pact as well. That was an innovation for the time. I was selected, for example, to go with one-two working level colleagues to brief the governments in Sofia, Prague and East Berlin. Various other teams, at a more senior level, handled the other capitals. That we were able to make our detailed presentations to these then Soviet allies on what had actually transpired in the U.S.-Soviet discussions in Geneva – even before the Soviets had provided them any sort of read-out – was noteworthy. There was clearly a strong local appetite on their part for more such discussions with us on European security issues. As a consequence I was sent to do a similar briefing visit to those same countries a number of months later following the first Reagan-Gorbachev Summit.

Q: Were the Italians the first to allow the installation?

DUNKERLEY: I think some of the first missiles that were deployed in the U.K. Then came Italy, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands as the final state to receive them. It was a rolling process.

Q: Were the two Scandinavian powers, Denmark and Norway excluded from this?

Not in the sense you seem to suggest. The original Alliance decisions regarding deployments went back to 1979 and were taken unanimously within NATO councils where the five nations I mentioned stepped up to indicate that they would be prepared to receive and base them. Other countries, while part of this Alliance decision-making, chose not to follow suit with regard to hosting these deployments – NATO allows for such individual policy positions.

Q: Were you on the side monitoring what the Soviets were doing?

DUNKERLEY: We had of course regular discussions with the Intelligence Community regarding ongoing Soviet deployments of SS-20s at the time. In turn, consideration of these assessments came to be a particularly important element in our regular consultations with the allies, both on a NATO-wide and individual basis.

This was especially the case with the Dutch with whom we had extensive exchanges, including with then Foreign Minister van den Broek in the lead. For domestic political reasons, their government of the time had, in making its public decision to receive cruise missile deployments within the Netherlands, set a particular trigger for going forward: if the number of deployed Soviet SS-20's went above a certain level. Given the Soviet operational churning going on during this period – new SS-20 bases being opened, missiles seeming to be withdrawn and then redeployed from other sites – the question of consensus among the Allies on these precise numbers came to be very important.

Q: When you moved over to this side did you feel that there was no momentum?

DUNKERLEY: During my two assignments on these issues - through the early to mid-80's – the most important development in which my EUR colleagues and I were involved was the restart of U.S.-Soviet discussions at the strategic policy level: beginning with the ministerial meeting between Secretary Shultz and then Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in January '85 followed by a break-through summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, also in Geneva, several months later that year. These were the immediate forcing events in regenerating this dialogue – which, in turn, led to an eventually significant change of course in U.S.-Soviet relations by the end of the second term of the Reagan Administration.

How and why did this come about in that particular way? There's been a good deal written on the question since, various memoirs, histories and journalistic accounts, so forth. But from a personal working-level perspective – involved at the time with helping in the staffing and support of some of the State principals in this effort – there seemed to be several factors at work. Certainly many of us at the mid-level felt strongly at the time that these developments were in no small part the result of a successful demonstration – against daunting odds - of U.S.-European unity and determination manifest in the INF deployments (and corresponding political failure of Soviet strategy of the moment).

At the same time, both Secretary Shultz and President Reagan had been sending out signals, even well before Gorbachev's rise, that indicated a readiness, should there be a Soviet return to the nuclear negotiations, to explore a more potentially positive course on a broad, multi-faceted agenda of issues with Moscow.

The prospect of SDI, and the prohibitive cost of racing the Americans in this field, seemed have captured Russian attention and was seen by some as a further factor affecting their decision to return.

But what my EUR colleagues and I did not at that time fully appreciate was the extent to which Soviet internal economic and political problems were mounting, let alone what Gorbachev's advent as a new leader might eventually come to foreshadow in terms of new policies.

Q: You were doing this job with SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative also known as "Star Wars") announced by Reagan at a State of the Union address.

DUNKERLEY: SDI became a major issue because it constituted a new and potentially significant direction for U.S. defense policy – one with implications not just for the relationship with our strategic adversary of that time, the Soviet Union, but no less for the fundamentals of our security relationships with allies and friends in the context of deterrence. That is to say, how might SDI impact perceptions of stability, or instability, within a structure of mutual assured deterrence that had grown up with our primary adversary? How might SDI come to affect hard-won political and military credibility of the structure of extended deterrence that had been built up at the core of NATO strategy over the years?

Those were tough questions. The concept of SDI at that most initial stage was at a high level of abstraction with considerable political symbolism and many practical uncertainties. Therefore one of the immediate tasks, at least from the perspective of those working such issues at State, was to develop a better sense of its potential substance and strategic direction in the face of a host of immediate questions and anxieties on the part of the Allies let alone the Soviets. Within the EUR Bureau at least, we spent a good deal of time during this period, both in interagency debate and consultation with the allies, seeking to explore what SDI could come to represent in the context of Alliance strategy and to build support for the notion of constructive cooperation in that direction.

Q: The SDI was viewed within the United States with a great deal of skepticism, of whether this would work. How was it for you all, tilling the gardens of arms negotiation, how did you personally feel about it?

DUNKERLEY: Skepticism was generated not just by questions surrounding the feasibility of possible technologies involved but also through uncertainty as to the fundamental goal and process by which it might realistically be attained. As you will recall at that time, there was initial confusion: Was SDI primarily a reinforcement of a near to mid-term political goal – generating leverage within the strategic nuclear negotiations? What would be possible under the existing constraints of the ABM Treaty regime? If SDI were to seek to bring about a comprehensive defense against ballistic missiles, how might a very different offense-defense dynamic come to play out in practice? What might be feasible in the face of Allied reactions and Soviet countermeasures? Or was SDI laying groundwork for something much more, which the President had suggested in his comments (but which, I suspect, few of us in the bureaucracy really fixed on at the time): the devaluation and eventual elimination of nuclear arms?

Q: When did you leave there?

DUNKERLEY: The summer of 1986 – before the Reykjavik Summit. I was paneled to go to Bonn but, at the last moment, I was asked by the Seventh Floor to go to Policy Planning to serve as a speechwriter for Secretary Shultz. This represented, in a number of ways, quite a change. On substance, for example, I recall that my first task in this new job was far removed from my nuclear preoccupations of the previous several years and took me back to East Asian issues: to draft a speech by the Secretary on the need for democratic political change within the Philippines (as this was in the context of Corazon Aquino's People Power campaign at that time).

And on a personal basis, this was also the moment when I had the great good fortune of marrying a fellow Foreign Service colleague: Patricia Haigh. Patricia was an FSO in the Economic cone. We'd met in passing when both on assignment in Japan but only started dating once we were both in Washington.

(Patricia tells me her own strongest memories from this particular time when I was speech-writer involved having to drive me into the Department to work ten-twelve hours

on a crash project for the Secretary very early in the morning of a snowy New Year's Day – after stopping at a White Castle in Georgetown, the only place open at that ungodly hour, to stock on cheap hamburgers to get me through a long day working in an otherwise empty building).

I think my most interesting assignment was to draft a speech for the Secretary to be delivered at the University of Chicago in November of 1986. It was intended to be part of an effort in the weeks following the Reykjavik Summit to put the objectives, achievements – and the many outstanding questions – coming out of the Summit into some sort of context and to dispel some of the uncertainties, anxieties arising out of its uncertain close.

Q: There has been controversy about the Reykjavik conference. Some people considered it a failure, but it broke ground. What was your feeling about it?

DUNKERLEY: First of all, I wasn't part of the preparatory run-up to the meeting nor present at Reykjavik. I was dealing from the Washington side in Policy Planning with issues arising in the aftermath. I would agree that initial press reactions, which tended to overstate the stalemated concluding round of discussion at Reykjavik, did not really capture all that happened there or its implications.

Among the things emerging out of Reykjavik was movement at the political level on some rather significant steps – the prospect of substantial reductions in both the START and INF fields. This opened the way for progress in those difficult negotiations and their eventual conclusion. While the President's insistence on keeping open SDI research and development options came to be highlighted as the big story out of the Reykjavik summit's awkward conclusion, the eventual effect of this summit exchange was to create, as the Secretary later came to emphasize, a rough framework for further discussion of "defense and space" issues.

But the most novel development – and initially the most potentially disturbing for many observers – was the fact that two leaders entered into the thorny question of even more far-reaching steps: the startling prospect of reducing to zero ballistic missiles or, at some point, even the elimination of nuclear weapons. Not at all surprisingly, it was not immediately apparent what all this might mean or where it might actually lead. (I confess that was certainly the initial case with myself at the time).

Secretary Shultz's speech at the University of Chicago was meant to put all of this into a clearer context and sense of direction, and in particular to relate some of the specific and ambitious ideas raised at Reykjavik with the question of how we might begin to think of steps necessary to reinforce strategic stability at each stage of increasing reductions. It was during the internal discussions surrounding the drafting and re-drafting of this speech that the idea initially emerged of "insurance policies" during this process through stronger defenses, eliminating conventional asymmetries and progressively smaller residual nuclear forces.

So measured in the art of Washington-Moscow summitry, Reykjavik was probably a very good thing, but more in the sense of what it might come to foreshadow for the future than what it decided at the moment. By itself, it was not a concluding moment. That may be part of the problem with the disappointed expectations for early results that come to be assigned not just to summit meetings but sometimes to arms control efforts in general.

Q: When you were writing a major speech for Shultz, what was the method of it?

DUNKERLEY: On significant speeches, there would be some initial exchanges with the Secretary's senior staff or with the Secretary himself. At the time, Charlie Hill was the Secretary's special assistant and Dick Solomon the head of Policy Planning; both would usually provide me (or my speech-writing colleague of the time, Mary Tedeschi) with guidance as to the general objectives envisaged for a particular speech. Depending upon the subject, we would of course call on the desks, the relevant offices within State, for suggestions, ideas or reactions. Sometimes – again depending on the issues involved – the net for eliciting comment would be cast wider and well beyond the Department alone. The post-Reykjavik speech in Chicago was just such a case.

The most interesting part would come midway or two thirds into the process when, as the primary writer for a particular project, you'd be bouncing specific ideas and language off the Secretary himself. He would take his major speeches very seriously; he usually had a very clear strategic sense of where he wanted to go with these efforts. He was very far sighted. Some of the speeches in whose development he was most interested related to the phenomenon that at the time we tended to call "The Information Age" and, in a subsequent decade, might come to be folded under the label of "Globalization." This raised questions that clearly interested him a great deal: what were the strategic implications of an acceleration and intensification of the global exchange of goods, services, and ideas already underway on a scope that was not yet fully or widely appreciated. Indeed, that was a particular set of issues – the relative competitive advantages of open versus closed societies within this new and rapidly changing environment – that he chose to expand upon in some of his initial exchanges with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze at that time.

Q: While you were doing this and in prior negotiations did you feel directly or indirectly the influence of Richard Perle and Casper Weinberger?

DUNKERLEY: It was, as mentioned before, a vigorous – at times contentious – inter-agency scene. For instance, for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in early '85, everyone of note went out on the Secretary's plane (I think a journalist at the time referred to it as the "ship of feuds.") I recall quite vividly the manner in which all of the Secretary's talking points, the talking points he was going to offer in his initial exchanges with his Soviet counterpart, were drafted, redrafted and then essentially negotiated line by line at the Geneva hotel by all these sub-cabinet personalities: Nitze, Burt, Perle, Adelman and all the rest.

Q: Was there a feeling of one side dominating or was it a meeting of equals coming to a consensus?

DUNKERLEY: The latter.

Q: The relationship between Weinberger and Shultz was well known when they were both out of California working for Bechtel. They were not the best of buddies. Down below this level, were you working sort of looking up, rolling your eyes wondering 'how are we going to make this work?' Was that the attitude or were you pretty much a State person or a Defense person?

DUNKERLEY: Let's just say that throughout those years there were rigorous inter-agency debates ongoing on all levels. These were highly professional but – difficult and preoccupying at the time.

Q: It must have been fun.

DUNKERLEY: Yes.

Q: When did you stop writing for Shultz?

DUNKERLEY: Summer of 1987. I went out to the U.S. Mission for NATO – or as it is known by its acronym: USNATO. And with some good luck, my wife Patricia was assigned to our mission to the EU at that same time.

Q: You were in Brussels?

DUNKERLEY: We both were. I initially went for two years as the Deputy Political Advisor; I then moved up to become the Political Advisor, heading up the U.S. Mission's Political Section for another two years.

Q: Could you talk about our mission to NATO. It sounds like a military thing, but it really wasn't. Explain what our mission to NATO does, particularly at the time you were there.

DUNKERLEY: You're quite right; USNATO was not a military entity. U.S. participation in the Atlantic Alliance as represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is reflected on the military side through our participation in NATO's integrated military structure. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, always an American senior officer, is based in Mons in southern Belgium. That headquarters and related staffs deal with military and operational matters. The integrated military structure reports to the political authorities of the Alliance represented by the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters in Evere, just outside of Brussels. The North Atlantic Council meets occasionally at the summit level, regularly at the ministerial level (back then usually twice or more a year). On a weekly or even daily basis the Permanent Representatives of all of the member states meet at NATO headquarters. All of these Perm Reps are

supported by national missions to NATO that include both diplomatic and military representation.

During that time I was involved in running the political section for the U.S. Mission to NATO. It was a large political section of ten to twelve State officers. There were also other offices within the U.S. mission, primarily representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, FEMA, and USIS. The ambassador at the time I first arrived was Alton Keel; he was succeeded by William Taft, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Q: That's William Howard Taft IV?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, that's correct. He was one of the best in my Foreign Service career.

Q: You straddled 1989, the crucial year. How was NATO seen prior to that?

DUNKERLEY: It was, of course, a time of profound change in European affairs. The term "historic" is usually overworked, but in the case of the events that got underway in 1989, that term is entirely appropriate. In 1987 and 1988 our focus was, at least in general terms, in continuing to take advantage of the openings for progress in arms control and the reduction of East-West tensions which had been generated by the policies of Gorbachev in Moscow. We were, for instance, continuing to negotiate for an INF agreement; that remained a major concern for the U.S. and the allies. But there was also the basic question – one that occupied most of my time within the USNATO Political Section in the first year or so – what comes next?

For example, internal Alliance debate over how this question might be answered was reflected in a lengthy negotiation among the allies in 1987-89 on the drafting of what was referred to in NATO jargon as a "Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control." (Given the German parentage of this particular item, it was often called the "GazamptKonzept"). Some of this was rather straightforward in terms of suggesting particular principles and general objectives for the Alliance in pursuing arms control. But the details of how these might in practice be translated into daily policies or negotiations were at the heart of protracted discussions, eventually going up to the ministerial level. At issue was the degree to which – or relative priority with which – the Alliance would pursue the next round of arms control. It was the U.S. approach to consider arms control less as an end in itself, but rather as a complementary means, necessarily taken together with a healthy deterrent and defense effort, towards a more stable peace. At the time, there were marked controversies in two areas.

One revolved about how members of the Alliance should pursue a negotiating strategy and specific substantive proposals for conventional arms negotiations in Europe. Efforts in this direction, involving some but not all of the allies, had been essentially stalemated for a long time in the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks in Vienna. What was new was that, through his various policy announcements, Gorbachev had expressed a willingness to pursue actual reductions – potentially substantial reductions – in Soviet forces then stationed in Eastern Europe. This was seen as a major opportunity that the

Alliance had to seize. But in doing so, we had to come up with an entirely new and substantively ambitious proposal.

Q: The fact that the SS-20 introduction and our response of the Pershing and Cruise missile, in a way created a crisis, but did it open up things saying 'hey this whole thing is out of control?'

DUNKERLEY: No, I wouldn't put it that way at all. What the earlier issues of the INF deployments and negotiations did, along with all the accompanying political controversies in the early 80's, was create a situation which apparently made clear to Soviet decision-makers that previous approaches no longer were sufficient. It would, in that case, require not just limits but significant reductions on their side to be able to address the increased U.S.-INF deployments made in response to their SS-20 deployments.

Perhaps even more importantly, it also had the effect of reinforcing a rather close pattern of consultations among the Allies on these issues, and in doing so, conveyed a powerful sense of trans-Atlantic cohesion and solidarity. As I mentioned earlier: A sustained consultative dialogue between Washington and various capitols on these issues helped both the U.S. and Allied governments get through the domestic controversies that the nuclear issue generated. Later on, the period of 1987-88, those consultative patterns held and were instrumental, but only after extended and painful negotiations within the Alliance, in enabling us to come forward with the beginnings of a coordinated Alliance position on conventional arms.

There was an important contrast here between the earlier Alliance management issues posed by the nuclear negotiations and the prospect of conventional arms control. The former affected American and Soviet systems, affording us a privileged position in the formulation of negotiating positions. When dealing with limits on conventional forces, however, you have to deal more directly with the military establishments, budgets and force levels of almost all the members of the Alliance. Some countries such as France, which had previously stayed out of MBFR negotiations, now had to focus close attention on the possible details of any new negotiation. That was one set of issues that was very much to the fore. (And of course I had no idea I'd be returning with a vengeance to this field a few years later).

A second and perhaps even more immediately contentious issue in '87-'88 related to those nuclear systems that were below the range level established under INF: SRINF (short range nuclear forces) to use the acronym of the time. Much of this revolved around the political problems posed by possible deployment of a follow on to the existing Lance missile system, a short range system now growing old. This was extremely controversial with the Germans on whose territory a number of these systems might be deployed. Foreign Minister Genscher had strong views about the inadvisability of moving forward with this and, together with some other allies, pressed the need to pursue negotiations to include these systems as well. They wanted a negotiated reduction, indeed elimination of those systems in Europe. From an American perspective, this began to raise concerns

about an ever-cascading de-nuclearization of Europe that, absent a reduction of the conventional imbalance on behalf of the Soviet Union, might be seen as being potentially dangerous. At the time – 1987-88 – all of this was reflected at NATO in an almost weekly round table of rather tough back and forth with the Germans and with other Allies in trying to establish a construct that would enable possible decisions on all of these issues at the highest policy levels.

Q: Could you describe during the period of 1987-88 how as ‘the new boy on the block’ you saw the positions of the major allies within NATO?

DUNKERLEY: At that time under Mrs. Thatcher, the United Kingdom’s diplomacy within Alliance councils consistently advocated a steady, rather cautious approach demonstrating a fair amount of skepticism towards the Soviets. The German political approach, which had been strong on INF deployments, could be characterized as more open, at times eager to take advantage of opportunities that they believed were opening up through the Gorbachev’s advent. Among other allies, France fell in between. Given its unique position in the Alliance – not a full fledged member of the NATO integrated military structure but a very active participant in the political workings of the Alliance – its diplomats were not surprisingly concerned with how individual issues would affect French political-military interests.

Much of this eventually came to a head at a NATO summit in Brussels that President Reagan attended in the early part of 1988. Negotiations on the Arms Control Comprehensive Concept went from a year and a half of debate – first at my working level for months, then among the various national Perm Reps – to conclude at the summit where it went to a post-midnight session involving Secretary of State and the rest of the Foreign Ministers – in their shirt-sleeves – thrashing out a compromise solution. The happy irony here was that – very quickly with the advent of a greater Soviet willingness to consider actual reductions in the conventional imbalance (fear of which was the driving force behind many Western concerns about retaining these short range nuclear weapons) – history quickly outpaced these issues and controversies.

One of the other issues that I recall – though it was of much less political prominence at the time – were early discussions within the NATO Political Committee (the regular standing body of political advisors) on the question of political stability within Yugoslavia. This was in 1987-88. In response to Washington interest, the U.S. Mission had urged a round of consultations --- an exchange of instructed views among the allies – about latent political and ethnic tensions within the Yugoslav state. This was well after Tito’s passing but in light of a spate of early disturbances in Kosovo. This was one of the first times that we really discussed this issue at NATO; most of the other allies noted the problems but thought at the time that such concerns were overdrawn – and of course no one at all at the table was thinking of the sort of break-up and violence that eventually occurred.

Another event of note during this period (at least to my mind in looking back) was a meeting of the NAC in the fall of ’87 to hear then Vice President George H.W. Bush

following a series of visits that he had just made to various East European countries. What was struck me was the message that the Vice President was trying to convey to the NAC: that the Alliance should be looking towards ways to generate greater engagement with these states, hitherto viewed at NATO largely in the optic as steady but secondary members of the Warsaw Pact, and that, in fact, there might be a potential for a degree of positive internal change within some of these East European bodies politic. Again, not many observers at the Permrep level at NATO then seemed prepared to grant, let alone run with, this sort of view on Eastern Europe. (Which, as I think about it now, may have been in contrast with amount of time the lower-level Political and Economic Committees would devote to analysis and discussion of the course, and unclear implications, of perestroika then underway in Moscow).

During this time, one of my duties was to meet periodically with the Soviet Political Counselor at their embassy in Brussels – an individual who was one of their overt NATO watchers. We would meet periodically, I think once every two or three months, for a rather carefully staged luncheon conversation. At first these were rather predictable – but as we moved into 1989, I noted, with each month passing, my Soviet counterpart's visible surprise and growing discomfort with the rapidity of events in Eastern Europe.

Q: What about the other, almost foreign power at that time, the Department of Defense? We talked about doing something with their toys. How did this work?

DUNKERLEY: Obviously there was State-Defense engagement and coordination on a variety of levels in NATO. The State Department components of the USNATO – in my case the Political Section – were in daily, sometimes almost hourly, contact with the various offices of the Secretary of Defense also resident in the Mission. We were on the second floor, they were on the third. We had a fairly good relationship there, with considerable transparency in our respective concerns and intentions in Brussels.

As we already discussed, certainly in the first term of the Reagan administration there was a difficult and scratchy State-Defense relationship. It was at the Shultz-Weinberger level, it was apparent in the competition between Rick Burt and Richard Perle in shaping policy, and so forth. But the important thing was that by the final years of the Reagan administration, while there continued to be strong views and strong interests held by the different elements of the bureaucracy, the interagency process seemed to be working a good deal smoother. This was at a time in which Secretary Shultz was having frequent trips and discussions with Gromyko's successor, then Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze. The team would include and involve National Security Advisor Powell, and McFarland before Powell, Roz Ridgway, then Assistant Secretary of the European Bureau, and senior members of the Pentagon team as well. And of course, in the following administration of President Bush, interagency deliberations were effective and collegial.

Q: What about some of the other players, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain? Where did they fit within this?

DUNKERLEY: I would hesitate to go too far in trying to come up with impressionistic one-liners, subjective characterizations of their policies because a lot would depend upon the issue at hand, the politics and personalities involved, the strength of their representation at any moment among their ministers and their permanent representatives. What your question does lead into is: How does NATO work? How are decisions made and implemented?

NATO is, on the one hand, fundamentally a consensus organization. On the other, there is clearly a difference in the weight and influence that particular countries bring on particular issues. There is no question but that the United States has a special role and a special voice. Similarly, some of the larger European powers, particularly in terms of the strength of their contribution – not only to the common defense effort but to the common political effort – would also have influential voices. The U.K. and Germany for example. Some countries such as the Netherlands, to use Geoffrey Howe's term, were able to 'punch above their weight' through the strength and sophistication of their representation. They were very, very good in this regard. But again, all this would vary with the issue. On some questions, the contributions of the Italians were quite important and useful. As you moved toward Mediterranean matters, one always had to take into account the balancing of concerns and differences between Greece and Turkey.

Q: Were they almost something you treated with a sigh or rolling of the eyes?

DUNKERLEY: Greek-Turkish issues were always a constant concern. There were a variety of difficulties involved. No surprise there. But the whole point about NATO was that, however strong particular voices might prove to be, you could not at the end of the day run totally roughshod over individual members nor ignore allies, whatever their size or political weight, on those matters they saw as vital to their own national interests. Indeed each country around the table would have certain concerns held exceptionally dear – and to which you had to pay careful attention if serious work was to be done.

And by and large, everyone recognized this. (One European colleague, who had had extensive experience both in NATO and in EU councils, would, I recall, compare the North Atlantic Council to one of the better clubs in London where within the club walls it was recognized that all of the members were inevitably a bit eccentric in their own ways and one simply worked around that fact of life in a gentlemanly manner. He'd go on to draw a comparison with "the more cutthroat zero sum quality" to decision-making within the EU when it came to something like fisheries or agricultural policy).

Q: In this time leading up to 1989, obviously you were all kind of looking at the phenomenon of Gorbachev and what was happening in the Soviet Union. What was your impression of how you and your colleagues looked at what was happening in the Soviet Union? Was this for real or not? Was this an opportunity? How did you see it?

DUNKERLEY: Probably all of the above. The ability to hold differing interpretations at the same time is perhaps the mark of some form of diplomatic acumen (Others of course might just call it cognitive dissonance).

Much of my time at NATO, particularly on the Political Committee, which supported the NAC at the Perm Rep level, was involved in a regular weekly discussion in trading information, opinion, and assessment on the course of events in the East. There was a lot of debate about the questions of just how far, how fast things might be going – the pace and scope, the implications of the policy initiatives underway on the part of Gorbachev. Let's not forget that during this period, there were lots of starts and stops, ambiguities...in effect crab-wise movement on the part of Gorbachev and his political allies as they tried to wrestle with reform of the Soviet economy and polity.

Soviet developments were indeed a mixed picture. They generated mixed reactions. I think everyone at the table at NATO came to recognize during this period that significant changes were in fact underway. There were differing opinions about whether these might succeed. There were differing opinions about what effect they might have in terms of Soviet domestic politics and the Soviet role vis-a-vis the rest of Europe. As I think back to those discussions, and the opinions voiced within the Political Committee in the run-up to the fall of '89, I suspect just about every government represented demonstrated at one point or other a range of views running from deep skepticism to ever increasing interest in taking advantage of these opportunities.

Q: Was there any look at Eastern Europe to see (countries such as Hungary which was going through a major change) if there were opportunities or problems because if one of the Eastern European countries got overly liberal, maybe the Soviets might move in again like in Czechoslovakia in 1968?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, that was one strand of thinking. You identify concerns that some had at that time – just as earlier, I forget when exactly, Kissinger expressed his own concerns about the need for finding a de facto understanding with Moscow about the pace and scope of future change in Eastern Europe.

From the American perspective, it would be interesting to go back and trace the way in which our own interest in having serious discussions about European security with the East Europeans came to evolve. We had long pursued, of course, bilateral agendas with individual countries. But previously – as I mentioned before – there had seemed to be a sense in some quarters that pursuing sustained exchanges with these capitals on European security issues, both general and specific, would likely be a rather empty exercise given their role within the Warsaw Pact (with Romania, of course, playing the occasional maverick).

I think several developments and processes during the 80's started to change that perception. One was the fact that the Helsinki Final Act launching the CSCE had established a series of regularly-occurring conferences on different categories (“baskets” to use the term of art) of political, economic and military issues affecting European security writ large – and that individual East European states increasingly came to be seen as playing active and more distinct roles in this process.

Another factor came to flow, I believe, from our major diplomatic effort to address Allied governments' and publics' political concerns in connection with the contentious INF debate. Our sustained consultative efforts with Western Europe in the early 80's made start-up of a very modest parallel effort with the East Europeans on arms control and other issues that much more natural as a secondary follow-on, as in our initial debriefs on the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva in the final days of Chernenko. But at no point was there an early expectation that things were going to evolve in the way that they did or with the pace and scope that they eventually unfolded.

Q: Back to Yugoslavia... I served in Yugoslavia from 1962 to 1967 and our concern there was the demise of Tito. Our feeling was that if Tito left and unless things were held together, it would cause a loosening there and offer an opportunity to the Soviets. In other words, we could end up in a hell of a war over this thing which neither the U.S. nor the USSR wanted, but there it was. What was the situation in 1987-88 period? Was that still a concern?

DUNKERLEY: You touch upon one of the more interesting of historical ironies. In any number of NATO tabletop exercises over previous decades, a favorite scenario had been something like the one that you described: what to do if there were an aggressive Soviet political-military incursion into a post-Tito Yugoslavia. The irony comes that in fact NATO's first real exercise of military power in Europe eventually came in former Yugoslavia in the 1990's – but, of course, under dramatically different circumstances (and indeed with Russian participation under American command in the context of NATO peacekeeping following the Dayton Accords).

The concern in 1987-88 was different from your question. It was generated by certain analysts looking at post-Tito political arrangements in Yugoslavia, noting signs of unrest among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and raising questions more about the dynamics of internal stability, less the likelihood of external incursion. As I mentioned before, and not to blow this out of proportion, this was one of the first things that I was instructed by Washington to raise in the Political Committee in '87 when few others on the European scene seemed to think that this a major risk.

Q: How well were you served by the intelligence arm of the American government? INR, the CIA, defense intelligence, did they play much of a role in what was happening? Were you using this?

DUNKERLEY: We were certainly using them in terms of the ongoing discussions between the U.S. and the Allies that took place within the Political Committee and on more a rarefied basis in the North Atlantic Council. One of the major assets that we brought to these exchanges was the ability to share extensively, under proper guidance and circumstances, various forms of American analysis of the course of events within the East. There were a number of INR products on Gorbachev's perestroika efforts that I can think back on. We relied quite heavily on the CIA and the Intelligence Community's overall assessments vis-a-vis Soviet military power.

With the clarity of hindsight it is simple to think back on that period and to assume that so many things should have been dramatically clearer once Mr. Gorbachev got into office and set in motion various attempts at economic and then political reform. But of course, as you look back even more closely, it confirms just how very mixed a picture events in the East presented us then – one with all sorts of fits and starts, uncertainties and ambiguities.

Q: All sorts of things could have happened. Gorbachev was not necessarily an elemental force of nature, I mean, he didn't necessarily have to happen or things got out of his control later on too. Were the Green Movement, the Left, the Labour Party in England working against you all?

DUNKERLEY: The high point of those particular concerns in Western Europe you mention came a little bit earlier in 1983-84 in connection with the INF deployments. Within many of the basing countries at that particular time, there were strong political concerns and expressions of opposition to the American deployments. Certainly the Greens in Germany were active in that regard. So was the Labour Party in the U.K. But recall that by the late 1980s – as the issue of assessing the implications of Gorbachev and his policies came to the fore – the Thatcher government had decisively defeated the Labour Party and Chancellor Kohl was still very much in command in Germany. So, as I think back on that latter period, discussion within the Alliance on East-West issues involved less a question of having to deal with policy opponents on the Left side of the spectrum than in pursuing more of a rolling internal debate amongst standing governments of the Alliance.

Q: In 1989 was there any feeling that times were changing?

DUNKERLEY: Of course there was. In early 1989 we had a follow-on NATO summit in Brussels. President George H.W. Bush used that opportunity to push forward a significant new proposal on conventional arms reductions within Europe on the part of the Alliance. This was an attempt both to seize the political initiative on this set of European security issues, in the face of popular interest generated by various forward-leaning statements by Gorbachev, and to jump over a number of the substantive obstacles that had previously stalled progress in this particular field.

By this time, conventional arms control discussions were no longer in format of the MBFR talks, but rather moving into a new set of negotiations: what became the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations. One important difference would be that CFE would involve a much broader cast of characters including all of the members of the then Warsaw Pact and all of the members of NATO – the major militaries of both East and West Europe.

There was a recognition that the new CFE mandate should not only be broader in terms of participating states and the military equipment that it would seek to cover, but that it should also aim towards much more significant mutual reductions than had previously been envisioned. This new conventional arms control initiative was conceived of as a

major step on the part of the Alliance. I recall that at the time, the initial concept was parachuted in from the top – a Washington initiative that National Security Advisor Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger flew over to sell on a very quiet basis to key Allies immediately on the eve of the summit.

All that was on the arms control side.

On the political side, yes, as signs of change increased, as problems continued to multiply for the existing regimes within Eastern Europe, there was a dramatic increase in discussion of these developments within the Alliance and within NATO committees in particular. Over the summer of '89, with the Hungarian opening of their border to the West, with events in Prague and Warsaw calling into question the Communist monopoly in local politics, these became the stuff of almost daily consultation at NATO headquarters.

Q: Most policies and government people like the status quo: they know what they are dealing with. Was there concern that things were getting loose and things may get out of control? Or did you see the thought that if we have a resurgence of the Soviet Union, they might come in and squash things?

DUNKERLEY: There was obviously a concern about uncertainties and possible Soviet reactions, but I would not overstate the point you just made. I did not see the sort of nostalgia for a Cold War status quo, and any such ostensible stability, that you seem to be alluding to in that regard.

Of course the major issue came to be what all this might come to mean for Germany – or rather, for the future of the two Germanies as a possible single entity – and in turn what the broader implications of that prospect might be for European security. Yes. There was considerable concern, as you suggest, with the question of Soviet reaction and “firepower” – that is to say, its on the ground presence and influence – and what this might mean for Gorbachev’s policies in general.

But it was more than just the Soviet factor to keep in mind. These events affected a number of actors and Europe as a whole. Unlike the situation in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, in Germany there was also in place a longstanding quadripartite political structure, affording a defined role, rights and responsibilities to the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin. Though this was a limited structure dating well back into the post-war era, it now provided a useful vehicle by which at least one key part of a multilateral approach might be organized in response to events as they unfolded in East Germany. It eventually morphed in what was termed the Two Plus Four process.

But that’s to anticipate. All of this really only came to the fore with the torrent of change set in motion by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th 1989 – which caught everyone by surprise.

I recall that during the course of the day the Wall fell, there was an emergency meeting of the Political Committee called by the A/SYG for Political Affairs in response to what was happening in Berlin and on the television. It paralleled a lot of corridor conversations and hurried telephone calls underway. But no one among colleagues – even, or perhaps especially, the German representative – had yet a clear sense as to what was likely to happen next, let alone how their respective governments might seek to manage what had been set in motion. What was apparent at that moment, I suppose, was everyone’s sense that this would now be the overriding issue for the Alliance in the year to follow.

In this regard, the fundamental concern among many seemed not so much the one that you identified in your question: would there be a resurgent Soviet snap-back or military incursion – but rather would the pressures, conditions and attractions of integration become such within the German body politic that it would lead to an eventual loosening of German ties, de facto or de jure, with such transatlantic institutions as NATO.

Another major dynamic that was in play from the start – and one we were acutely aware of within our daily discussions at NATO - was that the Germans quite understandably saw this as an issue of primordial importance. Their voice would need to be decisive – and there were periodic expressions of their sensitivity lest the role of others seem to suggest any dilution of that principle. At the same time, this was an issue that involved directly vital interests not only of the U.S. and other big European states, but no less importantly – perhaps even more importantly – the interests and concerns of the smaller European states, indeed of all of the members of the Alliance.

So an immediate question was how a sense of process might be generated and then sustained which could move discussions and decisions on the future of Germany forward in a stabilizing versus destabilizing manner. The objective would be to enable reunification in a way that would continue to anchor Germany well within the Alliance even while reassuring the Soviets. The process would need to be seen to give the Germans their proper lead role but no less to ensure that not only our own interests were met, but those of all the other European members of the Alliance. Both substance and perception would be critical for all parties. This was a diplomatic balancing act that President Bush and Secretary Baker spent a great deal of time on as the dominant issue in late 1989 to 1990.

Q: Was there a feeling that things were moving so rapidly that maybe NATO would become obsolete?

DUNKERLEY: At the time there were, of course, any number of questions about the future shape and details of Europe. Understandably so. With varying degrees of seriousness and depth, some in the public discourse questioned what this would mean for various transatlantic institutions, the foremost being NATO. But there seemed very little sympathy within Alliance discussions – or rather I should say meaningful resonance – with the notion that NATO should now simply go out of business. I don’t think it was ever a serious policy choice in most capitals, but it was one more factor that the Alliance

would have to address in terms of popular perceptions: reaffirming the rationale, role and continuing contributions of the Alliance amidst dramatically changing circumstances.

As a consequence, an important task in this overall process – as the Germans and the Quadripartite powers worked on the issues of reunification in a manner that might both reinforce the sense of consultations within NATO and reassure the Soviets – was for the U.S. and the Alliance to be able to put forward a sense of vision as to the future structure for Europe as a whole.

While I would have to think back for precise dates and sequencing, it was in December of 1989 that elements for such a concept began to come together. There was President Bush's shipboard meeting with Gorbachev in Malta at the beginning of the month – which was useful in setting a positive, constructive sense of reduced tensions. On his way home, he swung through NATO Headquarters to debrief Allied counterparts in a very quick summit gathering. It was also at this time that the fundamental U.S. position became increasingly clear: strong support for German reunification in the context of a united Germany's continued membership in NATO.

In mid-December, Secretary Baker drew on certain ideas that we had been working on at NATO in a major speech in Berlin. He described the notion of an "architecture" for a Europe whole and free built around three different but fundamentally complementary institutions: a transformed NATO, an expanding EU, and a revitalized OSCE. These were ideas that we already had in play within the Senior Political Committee at NATO (which we had earlier been able to feed into the Secretary's advisors). Following his Berlin speech, which was broadly supported, these ideas were subsequently expanded and reaffirmed by all of the members of the Alliance in an important NAC Ministerial later that December. I was involved at that time in the negotiation of that ministerial Communiqué. All this laid necessary groundwork for what followed through the next spring and climaxing at the London NATO Summit in July '90.

During the months that followed, a structure for negotiating the German issue emerged. I recall supporting the U.S. delegation, led by Secretary Baker, to a NATO-Warsaw Pact ministerial conference in Ottawa (ostensibly to launch negotiations on an Open Skies regime) at which the Two Plus Four formula was agreed – involving the two German states and Quadripartite powers – for negotiating conditions for a reunified and sovereign Germany. I recall this was not without some very sharp exchanges at the time between the German Foreign Minister and some of his ministerial counterparts in the NATO Caucus at Ottawa, notably the Italians and Dutch.

Later that spring, the Two Plus Four produced such an agreement on the outline and substance of unification, and Chancellor Kohl subsequently won Gorbachev's agreement to a reunified Germany's membership in NATO – albeit under certain particular self-restraints on the German military in the context of the broader and less specific notion of a transformed NATO.

The London Summit in July 1990 was thus important for two reasons. First, it provided a degree of political validation of the evolution of the Alliance and NATO in light of all these historic events – the “transformation of NATO” marked by, among other things, formal renunciation by the Alliance of the Soviet Union as the enemy and the launch of changes in NATO’s military strategy and defense posture. Second, it marked the first step of opening up the Alliance to a working relationship with its former adversaries, both the Soviet Union and the East European states – which by this time were rapidly exiting a soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact. These states were invited to establish permanent liaison missions at NATO headquarters.

Q: As the events of November-December were taking place how did you find your NATO watcher at the Soviet Embassy? This must have been a time of flux. Was it collegial?

DUNKERLEY: He started worrying about his job. Clearly the local Russian diplomats, Soviet officials at that time, were caught off guard. One could see that. It was reflected in our discussions with them at various levels.

In the midst of all these events I’ve been recalling, one of the most symbolic and interesting was the visit to NATO Headquarters – really at his initiative – of then Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. This was in that crowded December ’89. Again it had unique atmospherics, watching as he was greeted by most of the NATO staff as he walked into and through the main building. I remember talking with a Soviet MFA colleague not too long afterwards who took pains to show off his “NATO insignia pen” he had picked up on that occasion while accompanying the Foreign Minister.

For many of us on the U.S. side, much of this related to dealing with misperceptions of what NATO represented and confusion – among the Soviets and many others – as to whether it was a purely military organization or a much more broadly political-military institution. But this also coincided with an increased interest and desire within the Alliance itself to think seriously about transformation in light of dramatically new strategic circumstances. So several dynamics began to come into play in the period leading up to the London NATO Summit that July.

I already alluded to one of those elements: opening up the possibility of a new relationship with former adversaries. In the run-up to the London gathering, we put forward some rough ideas that met with some Allied skepticism and no little uncertainty about what that might actually entail. But this eventually resulted in the invitation for these countries to establish liaison missions with the Alliance for an expanded degree of consultation. It may seem rather modest now, but at the time it was unprecedented.

But there were a number of other, even more difficult issues related to “transformation” addressed at London. Alliance leaders agreed to commission changes in NATO’s traditional military strategy – the document which up until that time had been known under the term “MC (Military Committee) 14/3” and which had constituted the basic military strategy for defending against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. They also set new guidelines for NATO force levels and postures: smaller and restructured forces, less

emphasis on forward defense, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and so forth. They expressed forward-leaning intentions on a variety of arms control measures in the nuclear and conventional fields.

In sum, the London Declaration of July 1990 set out an ambitious work-program for adaptation of various Alliance policies – some quite long-standing. And not surprisingly, not without potential for controversy either. I recall that, in order to jump over extended haggling at the working-level in the run-up to the London Summit, Washington deployed an entirely new draft Declaration at the last moment at the Presidential/Head of State level. That led to no little grumbling among some lower down in the bureaucratic ranks at NATO Headquarters but in the end, it worked.

There were other processes underway during this period, also necessary parts of the overall process for managing the reunification of Germany and in the following year, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. These included bringing the negotiations on the CFE Treaty to closure within a year. As an Alliance project this involved an intense series of discussion at NATO about how to fill out the Alliance negotiating position and how to overcome the final differences.

One thing that I was struck with at the time – observing from my own position as a member of this process underway at NATO Headquarters – was the conceptual and practical contributions that Will Taft and his deputy, John Kornblum, made to some of these questions, particularly as they related to balancing German concerns with those of the smaller allies and the intense consultative effort in which Secretary Baker and the President were active.

Q: Looking at this after interviewing for a long time, I am struck by the effectiveness of the Bush-Baker work on this. Was there a feeling that you were on a strong team?

DUNKERLEY: Very much so. Being at NATO at this time was to be in a privileged position at a pivotal point in this larger process. As a consequence, we saw a lot of the Secretary, Bob Zoellick, Ray Seitz and other members of that Washington team. There was much interchange with them on their visits to NATO both on substance and on tactics.

Q: At the events of November-December and the fall of the Berlin Wall, was there an effort on instructions and on your part to be sure we weren't indulging triumphalism?

DUNKERLEY: The tone was set by the highest levels. There was clearly a conscious effort to avoid any notion of triumphalism on our part; that was an example set by the President and read as such by everyone. But I don't recall any specific Department instructions saying "don't be triumphalist."

Q: Did Condoleezza Rice, she was the Soviet watcher at NSC, did she come across your radar at all?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly by name, but not by direct engagement on my part at that time.

Q: You were there until 1991?

DUNKERLEY: Through the first half of '91. In August 1990, immediately on the heels of the German reunification project, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place. This then became the dominant preoccupation at USNATO through the spring of 1991.

Here again, a great deal of consultation took place at NATO Headquarters on this particular issue. At the very first, there was some reserve on the part of some delegations about the degree to which formal NATO discussion revolved around Iraq – in those days, that part of the world was still seen very much as “out of area.” But that sentiment quickly diminished as it became apparent the degree to which trans-Atlantic and European interests were directly affected by this issue. Not least, there was the fact that a NATO member, Turkey, bordered Iraq and was seen as potentially threatened. As Desert Shield/ Desert Storm played out, much of the attention was devoted to CENTCOM’s activities in the immediate region. But NATO and the European Command played an important role in terms of ensuring Mediterranean security and the use of Turkish air space, as well as a variety of anti-terrorist precautions.

Q: I recall that we were given the opportunity to take out significant military units and move them either to Iraq or to Kuwait and then eventually back to the States.

DUNKERLEY: Yes. There came to be a large movement of units, forces, and equipment from the European theater to the Gulf. What is noteworthy about that development was the degree to which all of those NATO plans and procedures for U.S. reinforcement from North America, practiced so regularly during the Cold War, worked quite well for a very different purpose and, in this case, going in a different and unexpected direction. Further, the degree to which individual Allies provided critical, if un-dramatic, support in facilitating that movement was a major factor. There was much that individual countries and the Alliance collectively did to facilitate success of the overall operation.

Q: Did your meetings take on a Kuwait oriented focus?

DUNKERLEY: To a certain degree – though there was still a good deal going on elsewhere in the world as well. The basic business of the Alliance remained East-West, and there was still much to be done with the Soviet Union and East Europe. But there was no question but that the Kuwaiti and Iraqi issues assumed increasing importance and that we had a particular interest in using NATO as one of the basic and proven vehicles of consultation with the Europeans (though we were of course talking with them bilaterally, through the EU and very much in the Security Council context as well).

I recall a particular example of such consultations came in January '91 when Secretary Baker met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva for what some termed “the final warning.” Immediately following, Ray Seitz, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, flew directly from the session to give a verbatim read out to the North Atlantic Council. There was a

special sense to that NAC. Seitz spoke and described in some detail Tariq Aziz's unsatisfactory response to Baker. It became increasingly clear as he spoke that some last-minute diplomatic fix involving an Iraqi pull-back was not going to happen – that war was going to occur very shortly. You could look around the room at the various national delegations and see that recognition dawning with individual ambassadors and colleagues. I thought it a quiet and tense moment.

Q: Was there towards the end a feeling of concern within NATO that maybe the OSCE was going to supplant NATO because it had a broader enrollment than NATO did?

DUNKERLEY: Occasionally one would hear particular concerns in that direction, but in fact these did not develop very far. Obviously, at that time the Russians would like to have seen such a development; some of their statements argued for such a course of evolution in the organization of European security affairs. At the same time, the Germans and other Europeans wanted to see a much broader role, an enhanced role for the OSCE in the future. And indeed, the U.S. itself – as in Secretary Baker's Berlin speech on a future European security architecture – foresaw an important role and growing function for the OSCE process.

But the notion of OSCE somehow coming to replace NATO was really a red herring. That is to say, given that the OSCE was itself still finding its way within a new Europe, and NATO was clearly continuing to play a major role in European stability and security, this was not in fact a serious proposition – nor at the end of the day, a truly serious concern for U.S. and Allied policy-makers.

Q: By the time you left was there any official discussion about whether we would see Hungary or Poland in NATO?

DUNKERLEY: In the first instance, I think policy-makers in capitals, let alone the officials and working level in Brussels at that time, were still wrestling with immediate issues and implications of implementing what had just been determined and decided in this remarkable period of 1989-91. That is to say, the Alliance and its members faced tough questions that flowed from German reunification and the accelerating dissolution of the Warsaw Pact: a host of political, economic and military issues.

It would take, for example, some time for the Soviet forces in Germany and elsewhere to withdraw entirely. There was in addition a complex of issues related to how the newly signed CFE Treaty would be implemented, involving not only significant reductions and destruction, but also an unprecedented degree of verification and monitoring that would have to be undertaken – even as, I'd note, the Eastern bloc within this Treaty structure was breaking apart. One example of the sort of knotty operational issues that had to be thrashed out in NATO at that time involved finding practical ways for members of the Alliance to coordinate among themselves to ensure that this new network of national verification and monitoring responsibilities could work in the most effective manner – a highly technical question but with major consequences and political implications.

At the same time, there was a new Open Skies Treaty to conclude and implement. There were political consultations and preparations at NATO for a meeting of Alliance members and Warsaw Pact members resulting in negotiation of “The Charter of Paris” – in essence an occasion to draw a ceremonial political line under the Cold War and to lay the ground for a major follow-on CSCE Summit in Helsinki. There were new liaison arrangements to be worked between NATO and these former adversaries. And throughout all this, there was also much of NATO’s day to day political-military business to manage.

So there may have been some people thinking at that particular moment about eventual membership in the Atlantic Alliance on the part of countries such as Poland and Hungary, but this was a rather more of a vision than an immediate prospect.

At this same time, of course, in the aftermath of Desert Storm, policy-makers in capitals and officials in Brussels also had to face the drastic deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia. From the perspective of being at NATO headquarters in the first half of 1991, one could only suspect that one reason why the Western response to the violent unraveling of Yugoslavia was less than effective may have been political and psychic exhaustion from all that had taken place in the previous immediate two years: having to deal with German reunification, dissolution of the East, and the whole Iraqi episode. By the time storm clouds had gathered over Yugoslavia, ministers and governments may not have been able to give it their best.

Q: Was there concern on the part of our delegation in 1987 that the presence of so many American troops that had been there since 1945 – their interaction with citizens, tanks roughing up the country – were we concerned that the hospitality of the Germans was getting a bit strained?

DUNKERLEY: What you describe was an ongoing set of issues that had always been there; both the German authorities and U.S. military at EUCOM had over time developed a whole structure of well-established procedures for dealing with these sorts of daily civil-military problems. It was my sense that the more fundamental issues with Germany at this time were less on that local or operational level but rather revolved about the constant tweaking required at the highest political level to insure broadly complementary political strategies, especially regards the tone and nuance of our respective dealings with the East.

Q: Bundestag members said ‘I can get those low flying, attack planes out of your area.’

DUNKERLEY: That’s always an issue – and not simply in Germany but elsewhere overseas - and that is not to say that there wasn’t the political need to focus periodically on specific local problems involving U.S. forces in Germany. But the point I would make is that as one looked at U.S.-German relations in totality, and particularly in the context of the Alliance and Alliance strategy during this important time, such problems tended to constitute constant background noise; they were in themselves not the main issue.

Q: By the time you left, had the Poles, Hungarians, etc. established liaison missions?

DUNKERLEY: They were in the process. This was a new and strange relationship for all concerned. Lots of practical housekeeping details – but the sense of significant history being made. I particularly remember the excitement – no better word for it – on the part of some of the East Europeans.

Q: You left in 1991?

DUNKERLEY: Summer of 1991. I came back for “Senior Seminar” at FSI that ran to the summer of 1992. I then went out to Vienna to be the deputy head of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE.

Q: You must have left with a certain amount of exhilaration. Not many of us leave thinking ‘things really worked out.’

DUNKERLEY: Very much so. It was a very personally and professionally satisfying experience. I counted myself lucky to have been a small part of history there – And yes, there was that sense of real success.

Q: Let’s talk a bit about the Senior Seminar in 1991-92. How did you find that?

DUNKERLEY: First of all it was a welcome chance to decompress. And recharge mentally. It was good to get back not just to Washington and the U.S. but to do so with an opportunity to step well back from my work, to expand my perspective which by necessity during the previous four years had been rather tightly focused on European security details.

It was a year to get to look at a whole range of domestic, economic and social issues, to travel about the U.S. with a diverse group of colleagues from different agencies. You are well acquainted with Senior Seminar. You know the drill; you know the opportunities that it affords. It was, to my mind at least, one of the better career development programs of the State Department.

Q: How did your next assignment come about?

DUNKERLEY: By this time I had had eight years of experience working various aspects of trans-Atlantic relations and East-West security issues, so I suppose this posting was a natural: that of Deputy Head of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE resident in Vienna. It was at an especially important moment for that particular international institution as it too was undergoing significant change.

Some background: As I may have mentioned before, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) flowed from the Helsinki Final Act concluded in 1975. Though conceived of at the time as a détente set-piece codifying a de facto Cold War division of Europe, the Final Act laid out certain basic principles. These principles were

for not only how European states should interact with each other but also, in their eventual effect, about how their governments should interact with their own peoples. In addition to being a political agreement upon this rather basic set of normative rules of conduct, Helsinki also established a series of periodic conferences and meetings at which there could be a regular review of the implementation of those commitments.

So for a long time all this really was much more of an ongoing series of discussions and negotiations than a formal international institution – the Helsinki *Process*, the *Conference on Security and Cooperation*. In the first ten-fifteen years these periodic review conferences in Belgrade and then in Madrid could be rather fiery and difficult affairs. The U.S. and certain Western allies used these as opportunities to press human rights, fundamental freedoms, a political agenda in the face of resistance from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact members. At the same time, there were also a series of discussions and meetings that slowly began to get into the field of confidence building in the European political-military field, with a major conference in Stockholm aimed at negotiating a set of such measures in the mid-80's.

As I described earlier, in December '89 Secretary of State Baker gave a speech in Berlin in the aftermath of the fall of the Wall which laid out ideas subsequently endorsed at the London NATO Summit Declaration and the subsequent Charter of Paris document, a declaration on the end of the Cold War concluded among NATO and former Warsaw Pact members almost exactly a year later. On that basis, there was another CSCE Summit in Helsinki in the summer of 1992; one of its basic objectives was to give more tangibility, more effectiveness to the CSCE as a European institution and its potential role in this new European security environment.

So, as a consequence of all this, the CSCE began to morph from this series of traveling conferences into a more regular series of standing consultations, debate and decision-making based in Vienna. As part of that development, the U.S. established a permanent American delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in the summer of 1982. This involved the amalgamation of some earlier negotiating delegations based in Vienna together with the U.S. team that had participated in the Helsinki Summit the previous fall.

Q: You were there from 1992 to when?

DUNKERLEY: Summer of 1995. The first head of this new U.S. delegation was John Kornblum whom I had known from NATO days. What was interesting about this new assignment was that it stood in sharp contrast with my previous experience at NATO. At USNATO, you were operating within the framework of an established institution with forty years of extensive history in developing its mission and procedures.

At this point following the Helsinki Summit of 1992, however, CSCE was still a quasi organization – brand new in many respects. There was much uncertainty about what it should do with its new mandate and in its new configuration, how it should operate, and what its priorities should be. This was politically important given the increasingly worsening situation in Yugoslavia and the development of all sorts of problems within

the former Soviet Union as the various republics assumed their own independence and identity. There were frictions within the Baltics, Moldova, Ukraine, and elsewhere. As the issue of building democracy and encouraging free markets within these new states came to a fore, all of a sudden there were a lot of issues where the CSCE seemed to have a natural lead – especially in those situations where Western policy-makers did not have a wealth of other options immediately available.

So the CSCE in Vienna in the early 90's was an especially interesting place and time for a Foreign Service Officer. There was an opportunity to help to build a relatively new multilateral institution and to create new diplomatic roles and instrumentalities for it.

Q: What was the CSCE or OSCE exactly?

DUNKERLEY: Again to be clear about this evolution: The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was the basic document that laid out the guiding and foundational principles. It established a follow on process of periodic conferences and meetings. That was the CSCE of the 1980's. From the second Helsinki Summit of 1991-92, however, there was a decision to make this a more regular and established entity, to base this process in Vienna, and have it assume much more of an institutional character. That progressed in the 1990s to the point that it was decided at the Budapest Summit of CSCE of December '94 that even more support and structure should be given to this process. That's when the CSCE became the OSCE. It moved from being a *Conference* on Security and Cooperation in Europe to an *Organization* on Security and Cooperation in Europe. By this time, it had become in fact an increasingly operational multilateral body in nature, fielding multinational crisis teams to places like Kosovo, Georgia, the Baltics, Ukraine, and elsewhere.

Q: I retired in 1985 and around 1994 twice I went to Bosnia where I was trained as an election observer by the OSCE.

DUNKERLEY: At that time it was technically still the CSCE.

Q: We were working for an operating organization.

DUNKERLEY: This is what happened in the early 1990s. Precisely because this was a new “proto-organization” and because it did not generate the high level profile that the UN Security Council or NATO commanded, there was much more flexibility and freedom to experiment and fail. As a consequence, you could undertake interesting initiatives with it. For example, there was a period in the early 1990s when there was an arms embargo and sanctions vis-a-vis Serbia. The question was: how do you best organize to help monitor and implement those sanctions in the neighboring states? How do you most effectively funnel assistance to those states in terms of sanctions monitoring and the like? Who does what? Who supports them? We ended up with a joint U.S.-EU operation in support of UN Security Council resolutions operating under the aegis, and with the support, of the CSCE.

We did so because the CSCE was a tool of convenience in terms of providing a multinational platform that couldn't be solely EU, couldn't be solely NATO, and wasn't a UN operation. At that time it offered that sort of flexibility. During this same early period, the U.S. and others could come up with the possibility of sending international monitors to places such as southern Ossetia in Georgia (a breakaway district). Because the Russian Federation was a member of CSCE, even as it was already intimately involved in that particular issue, we were able to work this out in a way that met Georgian concerns but engaged the Russians without seeming overly confrontational.

Q: What were you doing?

DUNKERLEY: As deputy head of the delegation, a DCM sort of role, I did a lot of negotiating; together with John Kornblum I did a fair amount of the advocacy of U.S. positions in these exchanges that we had in Vienna on an ever growing number of issues. I had basic management duties for this delegation that had about sixty to seventy personnel with a rather healthy spread of interagency representation – but which had been previously separate delegations. Now we were melding them.

Q: As this moved was NATO threatened? Was it a bridge organization, did it have a life of its own?

DUNKERLEY: The CSCE in Vienna very quickly developed a life of its own. It would be a mistake to approach the issue of European security architecture or the roles of European institutions in terms of neat, clean and bureaucratically tidy organizational boxes. The nature of the European polity and the complexity of the issues very quickly lead to a rather messy table of organization. There were, and still are, all sorts of potential ambiguity and overlap. But this notion of competition among institutions as a fundamental driver can be overstated. In fact, I would suggest that in practical terms this was much less of a problem at that time and indeed, in looking back, the situation suggested all sorts of opportunities for constructive collaboration.

Q: What about the European Union or was it European Community at that time?

DUNKERLEY: It was the European Union by this time and its members were trying to find ways in which they could manifest a common foreign and security policy. The CSCE was explicitly identified as a particular arena in which they should seek to do so. The problem in Vienna was that, given the premium that the EU members attached to developing a common position among themselves and given their own diversity of interests, this effort at times had the effect of delaying – or diluting --the contribution that they could make in terms of the most effective policy positions.

Q: Looking at it from your perspective, France and the United States are sort of like siblings who don't get along. How did the French-American thing work in this particular context?

DUNKERLEY: It was intimate and intense. It ran the gamut from close cooperation to expressions of sharp difference at the table. There was a very able French Ambassador to the CSCE in Vienna, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, who enjoyed fencing with us on occasion but could also be an excellent collaborator.

Q: Were you always concerned about the French exception?

DUNKERLEY: It was a fact of life. Certainly there were all sorts of Franco-American differences of approach on various issues, as there were with other states, but I would not want to over dramatize this phenomenon. The interesting thing about the diplomatic interplay among national delegations in Vienna was that this period also represented the coming out of the new diplomats, the new policy makers for a whole range of newly independent states. This was, for example, the first time that entirely new governments in countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and the like were fielding their own diplomatic teams. The quality and commitment of some of these new diplomats was quite impressive. It was an interesting and positive experience to work with them as colleagues in Vienna at this formative moment in their histories.

Q: During part of this period, I recall that we were helping to train some diplomats. I remember talking about consular affairs to a group of Albanian diplomats. At one point I went to Kyrgyzstan to talk to them about how to set up consular operations. Were there any major issues that you felt at that time?

DUNKERLEY: All of this was in the period of 1992-1995. It was playing out against the backdrop of the dramatically deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia. As Dick Holbrooke points out in his book and Ivo Daalder describes in his own, well before we got to the point of an eventual Bosnian peace settlement in Dayton there was a long period during which there was a painful split between the U.S. and its European partners about what to do in Bosnia. We were perhaps more sympathetic than some about the Bosnian plight; we were justifiably skeptical about the UN effort; but nonetheless, we were not initially prepared to make the investment of political energy and military effort that a more effective strategy to end the fighting might require. As a consequence, this was a very difficult and unfortunate time in our CSCE exchanges on these problems.

Q: What was the feeling? At one point Europe essentially said, 'this is a European problem.'

DUNKERLEY: I believe you are referring to Luxembourg Foreign Minister Poos' unfortunate statement early on in the process when he said that 'the hour of Europe has struck.' In the initial part of this crisis, in the final year of the Bush administration, it is perhaps not surprising that, having gotten through the trials of German reunification and Desert Storm, the U.S. did not immediately leap in to lead the charge to solve the Yugoslav situation. Certainly the same was true in the initial year of the Clinton administration following the unsuccessful trip by Secretary Christopher to Europe to win European acceptance to possible steps like lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians. There were lots of reasons why it seemed easier for the U.S. not to get more deeply

engaged at that particular time. All of this provided for a running divergence of views in the CSCE debates and discussions of the Yugoslav crisis.

(Break)

Q: Tell me again: When did you go to Vienna and what was your job?

DUNKERLEY: It was the summer of 1992 and I was the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) of the new organization that had formed there. As I mentioned before, this was to be a single, integrated interagency U.S. mission to the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Prior to that point the CSCE had been a collection of periodic conferences and separate negotiations. So as a consequence, U.S. representation to those various conferences was often ad hoc and separate. Several things happened as a consequence of the diplomacy surrounding German reunification. One was general agreement by all concerned that in a post Cold War Europe one of the institutions that should receive an increased role and backing would be the CSCE. There was a Helsinki Summit in 1992 of CSCE nations; one of the conclusions from that session was that the CSCE, which previously had been something of a wandering circus with periodic meetings in different cities, would have more of a permanent base in Vienna.

Q: Did the OSCE have any relation to this?

DUNKERLEY: The CSCE eventually morphed into a follow-on stage as the *Organization – vice Conference – for Security and Cooperation in Europe or OSCE*. The genesis of all of this lay with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which itself flowed from any number of years of preliminary back and forth and eventual negotiations. In brief, this Final Act was an agreement by all of the countries of Europe and North America, including not only NATO and Warsaw Pact members, but also those then called neutral and nonaligned: such as Austria, Sweden, Finland. It laid out a set of basic principles governing peaceful state-to-state relations in Europe but also suggested how governments ought to interact with their own populations. It set out a series of periodic review conferences and negotiations on different sets of issues related to how these principles were being observed. That essentially was the initial CSCE.

It was, in effect, a process: more a series of ongoing dialogues and negotiations than an institution or organization in the way that the UN or NATO were. What changed in 1991 with all the end of the Cold War was the recognition that a strengthened CSCE might have a potentially special role, precisely because it was pan-European and transatlantic, and accordingly could be a useful diplomatic tool. The second Helsinki Summit in 1992 agreed on that basic objective but in fact provided only relatively broad direction as to how it might be achieved in practical terms.

So the larger context of my Vienna assignment was, first, an opportunity to participate in the beginning of this experiment marking CSCE's transition into something more of an international institution. Second, this development required a change in the nature of the

U.S. representation and engagement in that changing institution. Third, we – the U.S. – needed to craft a new strategy for making effective use of this new situation.

On a personal note, I found it one of the more interesting engagements in my Foreign Service career precisely because there was a very modest degree of “present at the creation” quality to it. It was also at a period when attention in Washington to this effort was not overbearing. This was a relatively new body and attention was elsewhere, so there was perhaps slightly more latitude for creative thought and freedom of maneuver out in the field to help shape that new strategy.

Q: What was CSCE’s use for us?

DUNKERLEY: Let me jump ahead into the history. It is useful to think of this on a two or three decade timeline. As I mentioned before, this began its essence as a détente era set piece summit that led to a process: initially a series of periodic conferences accelerating in both frequency and substantive intensity which eventually lead to a point where this conference, CSCE, begins to take on more of an operational nature with a standing base in Vienna. In the period of 1992-95, the CSCE increasingly became a tool for our use in dealing with new problems arising in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. It became clear during that period that even more had to be done to give the CSCE the characteristics and capabilities of a serious multilateral institution. At that point, one of the major decisions at a Summit in Budapest in late 1994 was to further transform this body into an international organization – what came to be known as the OSCE.

All of this represented something of a challenge for American policy because, if you wanted an organization that could actually do something and was more than simply a talk show, that required serious institution building, larger budgets and staff, and increased expertise. At the same time, however, it was important for the United States that this evolving CSCE/OSCE body not simply become a mini UN with all the potential problems of an expensive, multinational bureaucracy. There was a constant tension between those two objectives. At various points, we’ve had to recalculate the balance and adjust.

This gets into the question of our strategy. What do we want this new and evolving institution to do? How can we use it? How can it best serve American policy making? One of the things that became apparent in the 90’s was that the CSCE/OSCE could offer opportunities and instruments for diplomatic engagement in trouble spots in a fashion that did not carry some of the costs and difficulties that a major UN operation might entail or the political stakes that a NATO operation would involve, but nonetheless could provide us with a useful degree of multilateral cover and burden sharing.

At that time we were facing what some colleagues in Vienna sometimes referred to as ‘aftermath of Empire.’ That is to say, some of the problems that were reemerging after the stasis of the Cold War period could be said to reflect distant legacies of the Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov/Soviet Empires. We saw latent problems with long histories beginning to resurface in places like Nagorno Karabakh, Moldova or Georgia – and

others which at that time were just on the horizon of most of the policy community. Things were local ethnic tensions, separatist movements, emerging conflicts and the like. There seemed to be a need for international engagement to tamp these down – or to seek to prevent their escalation or spread. The OSCE provided an opportunity to seek to do that at relatively low cost, low expectations, but with a degree of operational flexibility.

Q: So you arrived there in 1992? What precisely were you doing on the delegation and what was the state of things at that time?

DUNKERLEY: There was a lot of internal housekeeping – Not surprising given it was to be a new, integrated mission bringing together under a new chief of mission different delegations and agency offices accustomed to operating independently.

Q: They must have enjoyed that.

DUNKERLEY: There were moments when all of this seemed like rewriting a table of organization from hell, and I was sure at some point FSI could teach a course about the experience in terms of what to do and what not. We had the usual sorts of start up problems with any new mission, including new offices and operating procedures, but these were overlaid with the pitfalls accompanying any sort of consolidation and transition to a new successor generation and different style of leadership.

Q: What did you do?

DUNKERLEY: I suppose that I did what any good DCM is supposed to do. I spent a lot of time trying to make internal management work. Also, this was Vienna and, like Brussels, the city hosts several different U.S. missions. There is a bilateral embassy, the U.S. mission to the various UN agencies like the IAEA and then our crowd dealing with the CSCE/OSCE. Even under the best of circumstances, ensuring administrative support to meet all our special needs took some time and effort.

As we discussed before, all this was happening at a time when things were starting to go very badly in Yugoslavia. The Bush administration had come through the fall of the Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, the whole drama of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This had demanded a tremendous political effort. One sensed a certain degree of exhaustion on the European side as well. From the Vienna perspective, there was in the last months of the Bush administration and in the first months of the Clinton administration a sense that the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia, could be seen largely as a European problem.

Q: I think Europeans were touting that too.

DUNKERLEY: Yes. That was fed by a certain common sentiment at that moment. In Vienna, given its all-inclusive membership and broad agenda, the CSCE was one of the first places where you would see these new or fragmented states begin to assume a new role on the international stage. We had the various Yugoslav successor states – the

Bosnians, Croats, and others – all playing out their respective agendas in the Vienna discussions, competing for international legitimacy and support. It was also clear that actions were being taken in the former Yugoslavia that were directly counter to the Helsinki Final Act principles. The dilemma was, of course, that given the worsening dynamic of the situation and persistence of differing Western views, our initial options were limited.

One of the things we started to explore in the fall of 1992 – this began under the Bush Presidency, but was picked up by the following Clinton administration – was the notion of dispatching teams of international observers to troubled spots under the CSCE aegis. The advantages of doing this in a CSCE context, as opposed to relying solely on the UN, may have been – at least from the American perspective – greater flexibility and responsiveness. You did not have the Security Council and the institutional bureaucracy in New York to navigate, you did not have the problems that the UN Special Representative might pose. By comparison, within the CSCE some of these actions could be launched rather quickly. So we scrambled around trying to come up with how the international community – through the CSCE – could generate a small but effective multilateral presence for monitoring events and crisis prevention in a place like Skopje in Macedonia, for example, where things were very tense at that time.

Q: I am trying to capture the spirit of the time. Was there some feeling on your part that at the UN you have to worry about the Middle East disputes, you have to worry about Africans, Asians, Latin Americans trying to have their say, and the CSCE was just Europeans. It was a smaller stage and group of people who responded to the same things.

DUNKERLEY: It was remarked by a number of colleagues at that time that there appeared to be a different sovereignty threshold in terms of discussion within the UN and for our exchanges in the CSCE community. Don't forget that the starting premise, going back to the Helsinki Final Act, was that peace and stability depended not just on how European states interact with each other, but how governments might interact with their own people. Much of what the CSCE was about in the subsequent years was a constant, sometimes painful reaffirmation of the legitimacy of concerns of the international community as to what might be happening in what was previously characterized as internal affairs. That consideration came to be very much ingrained in the CSCE – such that there turned out to be a greater ability to address those “domestic” issues in Vienna.

Q: Was there a feeling of triumphalism? The Helsinki Accords had the unforeseen effect of helping break up the Soviet Empire.

DUNKERLEY: There are two narratives to the Helsinki Final Act story. Both have a good deal of truth, but by themselves are incomplete. The first narrative one hears a lot among Americans. It's the story that, almost by serendipity, the West stumbled into this particular instrument and process that – over a long time – came to give heart to courageous dissidents and activists within the Eastern camp to be able to use Helsinki's

emphasis on human rights and freedoms as a means of helping to dismantle the Soviet Empire. There is certainly enough validity to give this a real narrative appeal.

But there was another phenomenon going on at the same time that in many respects was no less important. This was that the CSCE process arising out of Helsinki was slowly building up a credible and eventually thick web of political and military confidence-building measures through continuous engagement, and promotion of the principles of equality, inclusiveness and reciprocity among the states of Europe. These weren't directed against any bloc or single state, and through constant regular review and gradual legitimatization created a more supportive political context for cooperation and security matters. That's a story you are more likely to hear in Europe. So both these phenomena were happening.

Q: Who was your ambassador?

DUNKERLEY: It was John Kornblum with whom I had worked at NATO.

Q: He was a German hand wasn't he?

DUNKERLEY: Very much so. He was a career officer. As I suggested earlier, what made Vienna professionally interesting was that it happened at a point not only when major events were happening and there was a sense of institutional potential to be tapped, but there was also a certain degree of latitude for creative thought out in the field. As a mission, there was a sense among us of being able to help create and shape what might happen next. There seemed more such potential opportunities than in other more established missions, like USNATO, with well dug-in Washington constituencies. John gave a great deal of thought to those sorts of issues and encouraged the people who worked for him to do so as well. As a consequence, as we saw certain things developing in the East, a lot of the initiative – as, for instance, in the development of multilateral CSCE missions out to Moldova or to the Baltics – was as much generated out of Vienna as it was in response to policy directives from Washington.

Q: In a way during your time there two big things were happening: Yugoslavia dissolving and dealing with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, for example, Moldova, the 'Stans etc. With the Clinton administration your number two man at the State Department was Strobe Talbott who didn't have much interest in any particular area.

DUNKERLEY: This was not a static period. The story I have started to tell is this: I think with time the CSCE came increasingly to the attention of those people in Washington who were working in European affairs as this potential vehicle to use. Because of the reasons I have described, it offered the possibility of one more item in the tool box – one that was not that expensive, might be a bit more flexible, and so forth. I already gave you one very early example: you will recall as things got bad in Yugoslavia in the early 90's there were various UN sanctions against Belgrade. Those sanctions were difficult to implement. Much responsibility fell on the neighbors of Serbia and this was an economic hardship for them. It also strained their own customs services. The idea was generated

that there should be some means of international, multilateral support and monitoring for the neighbors' customs efforts. The U.S. and the EU agreed to take a lead as the two key players on this. The OSCE was already in the region, and we didn't have to jump through incredible bureaucratic hoops to move rapidly. So we ended up using the OSCE as a vehicle by which the U.S. and EU with a certain amount of NATO support were conducting multilateral operations in support of UN sanctions. That's a table of organization that looks complicated and rather Rube Goldberg – but that was precisely that ad hoc quality that helped to make it work.

Q: You could also go and recruit professionals or volunteers. Like myself monitoring an election.

DUNKERLEY: This was a challenge. Recruitment of the right people for such missions and activities was a constant concern. I am delighted to hear that you are a CSCE veteran, an alumnus in that regard. The pool was never large enough.

Q: When you arrived how did the various elements of the CSCE fit together? Who were some of the major players?

DUNKERLEY: From a professional point of view, it was fun precisely because of the broad cast of characters. Everyone was there. The United States and the European Union occupied critical roles there. As we discussed earlier, the European Union was at that time still very preoccupied with finding ways that it might express its common foreign security policies. The CSCE was a designated area in which they tried to achieve that unanimity.

But there were also a number of the traditional neutrals – Sweden, Austria, Switzerland – all active and speaking out. All of the Eastern Europe states were there. The fragmented Soviet Union generated a tremendous new cast of diplomatic personnel. Many of these new diplomats were having their first time on the international stage.

For instance: The Albanian Ambassador in Vienna at that time was a very bright young man who, during the bad days under Hoxha, had squirreled himself away in the bureaucracy of the postal service of that country: one of the few places where he could have legitimate contact with the outside world. Now – suddenly – he was in the role of one of Albania's new (and very effective) ambassadors. We saw a number of such examples.

At the same time, we also saw a lot of traditional tensions and rivalries played out as well in our deliberations.

Q: One thinks about the role of the French.

DUNKERLEY: Again... The French role, not surprisingly, involved intense engagement with us. There were lots of debates and discourse, sharp negotiations, but often very productive collaboration.

Q: You had European Union and then the separate states. Did the French and the British speak through the EU or on their own?

DUNKERLEY: They often did both as they do now. Obviously, the EU caucus would develop a particular common position that would be put forward as such. But quite often, as discussion of an issue moved further into details or into a new direction entirely, there might also be a distinctive French, German, or British voice at the table. One of the most interesting players at that time was Moscow. CSCE initially presented an area where the Russian Federation had a legitimate and equal seat at the European security table. That situation has evolved since then and deliberately so – but it is for that reason of its all-inclusive nature, and especially with regard to Russia, we saw particular value in CSCE at that particular time. It was important to keep them engaged. From our perspective in Vienna in these early years, we saw our Russians counterparts, in a period of some confusion and disarray in Russian policy, with conflicted feelings about this operation. On one hand, they saw the CSCE as a potential opportunity to assert their role within a European institution that might have the chance of superseding organizations like NATO at some point. That was an unrealistic hope. At the same time they were naturally suspicious of CSCE because so much of its political attention was pointed to their part of the world.

Q: You were there at the beginning of the thing. How did you all see the debates about dealing with the very dangerous situation in Yugoslavia? A war was going on. You were there when it got started.

DUNKERLEY: Yes ...and as it continued to deteriorate. Everyone shared considerable frustration.

Q: What were some of the debates and issues at the beginning?

DUNKERLEY: I would have to go back to my notes. But in brief...there were several factors in play, beginning with all the long-standing differences and competitive tensions inherent in the Yugoslav concept that seemed to be released without check with the end of the Cold War. And, as we discussed before, in the aftermath of our efforts on German reunification and the Iraq war, there was a hesitation on the part of the U.S. to rush to the lead in addressing the complexities of Yugoslavia's collapse. There was uncertainty for us that, I suppose, increased in having a EU and UN lead as to opposed to U.S. and NATO role at those initial stages. In our discussions in Vienna, there were still differing attitudes among some states as to the relative responsibility of the different Yugoslav actors for the violence. It is easy with retrospect to see the degree to which specific Serbian actions represented a significant and dangerous campaign against its neighbors and different ethnic groups. At the time, however – this was in '92 for instance – there were some who argued more of a moral equivalence between all of the players: Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As a consequence, there was sometimes resistance to actions which seemed punitive vis-a-vis the Serbs. Not least, I recall, there was a profound debate over the possible use of force in seeking to curb the fighting and bring about a resolution. Our

own views were energetically matched by those, such as the British and French, who unlike the us at that time had peacekeeping troops of their own in potential jeopardy on the ground. There were serious questions: If external military force were to be applied, what would be the consequences, would the use of force – such as bombing – be effective? Not surprisingly there was hesitation on the part of many parties, not least on the part of some of the UN peacekeeping decision-makers.

Q: Was there a feeling within our delegation or in others about a growing horror? I think it got pretty nasty there.

DUNKERLEY: In Vienna we were in a position where we were acutely aware of such developments from official USG reporting and that of the press out of the region, from the reports of diplomatic colleagues from the region. Certainly the personal sympathies on the part of the U.S. delegation were very much that of “Friends of Bosnia” (or “FOB” as it was known at the time). The problem for American diplomacy in that period was that, as a government, we had not yet taken a decision that our own strategic and political interests would be so overwhelmingly affected by a continuation of the Yugoslav situation that would warrant us to take a lead in bringing that conflict to an end through both force and active diplomacy. Without that sort of political readiness, our ability to affect European policy – or rather the situation on the ground in Bosnia – seemed to be, in some important instances, self-limited.

Q: Did you have the traditional problem of a DCM where the senior officers in a mission see things in big terms and the junior officers were up in arms that ‘we’ve got to do something?’

DUNKERLEY: Not to the extent that you perhaps saw within the Department at that time. I think there was concern throughout the U.S. delegation over these Yugoslav-related issues and their implications, but I didn’t see it as quite as stark a problem for mission management as you characterize.

During this time there were also issues playing out in the former Soviet Union. Many of our junior officers were very deeply involved in those issues; that their individual sympathies were with the small newly independent states was quite clear and understandable. There I was more conscious of the need to be a little bit cautious in managing their work: it was easy to sympathize with the notion of “a plucky little country versus the Russian bear” but inevitably almost all of these situations were a good deal more complex.

Q: Particularly the Baltics.

DUNKERLEY: Particularly the Baltics. Our strong support and sympathies for them were accompanied by a realization that it would be very much in their own interests that some pressing issues needed to be seen to be addressed ... For instance, as with regards to the treatment afforded residual ethnic Russian communities within those countries.

In terms of mission leadership, John Kornblum was there for the first year. He was then replaced – and there was some difficulty in naming his replacement, so there was a protracted period when I was Charge d’Affaires. It was in my final year of three in Vienna – ‘94 to early ’95 – that Sam Brown came out, a former head of the Peace Corps and a political appointee. Since he had trouble with Senate confirmation, he came out without an ambassadorial title.

Q: Did that cause a problem?

DUNKERLEY: Not really in Vienna. Certainly there was no more than the usual need for all of us to handle many tasks at once.

Q: While you were there, were we sending these observer missions to the Baltic States?

DUNKERLEY: We had multinational missions to assist the governments in Estonia and Latvia. We also had one in Ukraine dealing with national minority problems in the Crimea.

In the former Soviet Union, we had a CSCE mission in Georgia seeking to deal with separatist problems there and then a similar one in Moldova. We had a standing brief known as the Minsk Process seeking to reinforce a fragile ceasefire in a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia arising out of Nagorno-Karabakh’s military effort to break away from the former. Further to the east, we had a CSCE mission in Tajikistan.

In the Balkans, we had for a time – until they were kicked out by the Serb government-- a monitoring presence in troubled areas such as Kosovo, Sandžak and Voivodina where there were significant ethnic tensions. CSCE also had a presence in the former Yugoslav province of Macedonia and in Albania, eventually Croatia and certainly in Bosnia.

Q: Was the CSCE running these posts? Was your organization running them?

DUNKERLEY: These were multinational teams launched by decisions of the participating states and operating under the authority of CSCE (or OSCE as it became), and they reported back to the CSCE as a whole in Vienna. One of the institutional developments during this period of the early 90’s were the ever-increasing number of meetings for consultation and, when needed, action on these missions – what became, in fact before in title, a permanent council in Vienna where all of the countries were represented. Its discussions and decisions provided the basic authority and operating mandate for each of these operations.

In the day to day business of supporting such missions and managing the growing agenda of the CSCE, the practice developed of assigning increasing independence and authority to the CSCE’s “Chairman in Office.” The formal Chairman in Office or CIO was the foreign minister of a country that would be selected by consensus on a rotating annual basis. At the start, this would usually turn out to be one of the neutrals or smaller

countries. The CIO in turn would assign a very senior and experienced diplomat to serve as a standing representative of the chair in leading the Vienna deliberations.

This was, as course, very different from the UN practice where, for example, you have a Secretary General who has a lead on various efforts and is essentially the public face of the organization. In CSCE, by contrast, that role is largely that of the CIO – while the post of CSCE Secretary General subsequently came to be established largely as a chief administrative officer or operating officer in support of the CIO.

This practice of the Chairman in Office had, by the way, the useful effect of providing an early opportunity for a number of the East European and newly independent states to showcase their effectiveness and credibility on the international scene. This was at a time in the early 90's when the whole issue of their prospects for eventual accession to both NATO and the EU was still up in the air. So, for instance, it became very important for the Hungarians – who assumed the OSCE chairmanship in 1994-95 and were still viewed with a certain amount of suspicion by neighbors like the Romanians (given past history over Transylvania) – to be able to demonstrate this role of leading the CSCE in an especially balanced and effective manner.

The Chairman in Office and the Chair's representative in Vienna came to serve as a primary interlocutor for the U.S. To ensure continuity and effectiveness, a useful practice grew up in which the incumbent Chairman in Office would rely on his or her immediate predecessor and successor national counterparts to form a sort of de facto troika. In Vienna they would enjoy frequent consultation with a small informal group consisting of the U.S. Delegation head, the head of the EU caucus, their Russian counterpart and those states with a special stake in whatever particular issue under discussion. These actors would consult on an almost daily basis in Vienna.

Q: How did the Russians play in this at the time? There must have been some management of trying to protect the minorities and at the same time making sure they didn't re-exert their authority.

DUNKERLEY: They seemed at times conflicted. Their policies and their actions in Vienna suggested this for some of the reasons that you just alluded to. On the one hand, the OSCE and its potentially wide-ranging mandate did provide them a seat at the table which, if they played their cards right, could be of particular importance. In the back of the minds of some, there was probably a hope that this particular institution would come to supersede others. On the other hand, however, because of this same broad mandate as to security, cooperation and human rights principles, the CSCE's attention and actions often came to focus on questions that they saw as cutting across their interests: dealing with not just the status of Russian minorities in newly independent countries but, more sensitively, the overall Russian role in Georgia, in Moldova and elsewhere – and further, the monitoring of the conduct of their own electoral politics within Russia itself. This latter consideration came increasingly to the fore as time passed.

One of the more difficult projects we had to undertake came with the outbreak of the first war in Chechnya within Russia in the spring of 1995. This was a situation where not surprisingly there were powerful political sensitivities on the part of the Russians to resist any sort of international involvement. At the same time, we were rapidly approaching the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe; President Yeltsin had very high expectations for an upbeat summit-level gathering in Moscow to celebrate that event. The political question arose for U.S. and Western leaders how they might participate in Moscow even while a bloody war in Chechnya was still underway – one over which there were mounting human rights concerns.

The CSCE/OSCE provided a lever to help finesse this dilemma that the Russians themselves eventually reached for – which was to have an CSCE multinational observer presence invited into Chechnya to monitor the situation there. That was, however, easier said than done.

There was a great deal of Russian reluctance in all of this. But after much debate and backstage negotiating, we eventually managed to get a meaningful multinational CSCE observer presence into Chechnya. It did not bear fruit immediately or directly in that difficult situation. But in the political negotiations that followed in the year following, the mission's work helped in the winding down of the first Chechen war. By a number of reports, the activism of the Swiss head of that OSCE mission – and the degree to which his group had developed credibility as a go-between among differing groups on the ground – helped to play a useful role.

I'd note that sort of experience has not been repeated in the subsequent outbreak of Chechen fighting in the late 90's. No such follow-on mission has been possible – not least because of Russian policy.

Q: Essentially your tool was moral suasion, wasn't it?

DUNKERLEY: There was a fair amount of that, I suppose, but as the OSCE has evolved we have gotten other tools. All of this has not been not a straight-line process – but to cite an instance jumping slightly ahead, one of the OSCE efforts that I became engaged in subsequent to my tour in Vienna involved how to encourage and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military equipment out of a separatist province in Moldova. At a certain point, scarce resources – money – became a factor. The degree to which we could use the OSCE to generate resources both to assume particular removal costs and to provide a monitoring arrangement for verifying such withdrawals proved important in making such actions possible.

So in answer to your question: There were a variety of instruments that came to be used. Certainly yes, the OSCE is at the lower end of the policy spectrum; it is not going to be involved in the exercise of force to deter or resist aggression. Neither is it going to be a peace enforcement instrument. But as we saw in Bosnia following the Dayton Accords, the OSCE can be a useful vehicle for doing a number of things in terms of political presence and international observation, all in an inclusive multilateral context. You can

call all of that moral suasion, but to my mind, OSCE involved a lot of traditional diplomacy and traditional political bargaining.

Q: What about Armenia versus Azerbaijan? Was there a problem with the Armenian international community particularly because they have a strong lobby in the United States?

DUNKERLEY: Diaspora support was to a certain degree a factor as Nagorno Karabakh separatist aspirations emerged in the late 1980's-early 1990s. But there have been many problems involved in that conflict and a number still continue. At various points over the years, we – that is to say, international negotiators – got close to agreement on certain points among the parties to the conflict, but were never able to get them the full way to a durable resolution. In my time in Vienna in the early 90's, two major inhibitions to progress seemed to have been: first, we had not yet reached a point where both sides were sufficiently convinced their gains could not be achieved or sustained through unilateral action – at certain moments one or the other side still thought, 'ah if we only do x or y we can win; we can hold out long enough.' They may have reached more of a state of mutual exhaustion later on when tough political decisions might begin to be envisaged, but during this early period they continued their focus on taking, holding or retaking disputed territory.

The other problem at that early stage seemed to be the Russian role. Nagorno Karabakh posed a set of issues perceived by the Russians as very much within their purview. For the first year or two, there was jockeying and elbowing between the Russian negotiators and the international negotiation effort through the CSCE (known as the "Minsk Process"). Of course in such a situation, the local parties concerned were delighted to forum shop and play each effort off the other. That was subsequently eased by a more formal merger of the Russian and OSCE negotiating efforts – by and large a recognition of reality that neither effort had much chance of succeeding without the other.

Q: Working with the Russians at that time, were their diplomats lost? What did they want in the world? Once you've had an empire and then it goes peacefully without a military disaster...

DUNKERLEY: We're jumping ahead in the story. A lot of what I did subsequently as Special Envoy for the CFE renegotiations can be said to involve the issues contained in your comments. Yes, one could see evidence of that larger question: how the Russian role might come to be defined not just in terms of European security writ large, but more specifically and immediately vis-a-vis their close neighbors. This was brought very much to the fore in the CSCE context because this was a forum within which all the actors were present and participating as sovereign and independent states. Of course, some countries concerned – such as Georgia – were acutely sensitive to any suggestions from the Russians as to spheres of special interest – as when they spoke of the notion of "Russia's near abroad." (I recall there were, at times, conversations with Russian colleagues in Vienna that sounded a little like hearing Victorian officers during the time of the Raj speak of indigenous peoples.)

Q: Can you think of any particular issue that might seem obscure?

DUNKERLEY: Sometimes they all seemed pretty obscure or arcane given the nature of CSCE and its broad scope.

Q: Were there any problems that particularly engaged you?

DUNKERLEY: Getting the CSCE team into Chechnya in '95. Much of what we were engaged in with that particular task related to working around Russian sensitivities to admitting third party presence into this situation while protecting the rights and capabilities of that mission to do its job....

Q: Were there other missions? Did the Swedes, for example, have a similar mission?

DUNKERLEY: Yes, they all had delegations to the CSCE, some were large, some were small. The Swedes were particularly active as Chairman in Office during an early part of this period, fielding some excellent people instrumental in the development of the role of the CIO.

Q: Was there a sense of collegiality? The missions unlike many where you're dealing with supposedly the Western European powers and the United States had unlike many other times a unanimity of trying to keep these unruly people together?

DUNKERLEY: There was certainly a general sense of collegiality. As I noted earlier, the interesting thing about the Vienna situation was the breadth of participation by many nations at a time when the new actors were coming relatively fresh to the scene. It was a time when all sorts of new diplomatic problems were emerging – so a sense of both promise and dangers. There was even an element of tabula rasa in terms of an opportunity for the delegations and governments concerned in coming up with possible responses.

One of the things gradually apparent from our meetings in Vienna came to be the CSCE's emerging role as a sort of early political warning network. That is to say, from our regular discussions and debates we would sometimes get hints and glimmers on certain issues sooner rather than later. These included potential problems at an early stage that normally wouldn't command much attention in other fora. For example, I recall a series of exchanges at the table and in the corridors in Vienna in the early 90's that had the effect of highlighting Greek and Albanian frictions regarding some of each other's schooling requirements. They were suggestive of an impending spillover exacerbating particular ethnic sensitivities. It was serious for the players directly concerned – a problem that you didn't want to fester – and it was useful to learn about that potential for trouble sooner rather than later. Sometimes it may also be useful to be able to have discussion of that sort of issue in a more neutral and politically supportive multilateral context than simply left to competitive public statements.

There were a variety of issues like that. There were discussions in which concerns, more tonal or thematic in nature, came across. I recall from the preparatory discussions for the Budapest Summit in late 1994 were mounting expressions of anxiety on the part the smaller countries to the East over impact of the EU's then new Schengen regime governing free travel – what the unintended strategic implications might prove to be for these countries in terms of the movement of their own peoples and resulting perceptions of new dividing lines in Europe.

Q: The Greek-Albanian conflict, for example, were you able to call our embassy in Athens and say, 'hey, get the Greeks to cool this.'

DUNKERLEY: No, I have difficulty imagining saying that to our embassy on Athens or our embassy saying that to the Greek government. But we were in frequent contact with many if not all of our embassies. Without overstating the utility of CSCE, during this time it was able to provide a modest number of additional tools for U.S. embassy efforts in various countries. Take the question of reporting, for example. In places like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Moldova and its separatist areas, having the CSCE multinational team of observers on the ground offered an opportunity to significantly increase the ability of the U.S. government to get reporting on developments where our local embassy might have limited resources or access. There was often close, informal cooperation on the part of the OSCE teams with our local embassies. At the same time, the leadership of many of these OSCE teams would make an effort to have good U.S. personnel on them. These were quite often either former FSOs, or talented FSO-2's and '3s.

Q: What about after Strobe Talbott came on? This was his area. He spent his life doing this. Did this enhance the American side of this?

DUNKERLEY: Yes. We worked very closely with him. He knew and understood what this set of diplomatic instruments could and couldn't do. He saw OSCE's potential utility early on and understood what was required. We saw him as a supportive friend in court.

Q: What about our embassy in Moscow? It really gets infected to one degree or another with "localitis." Did you find that they felt you were meddling in their patch?

DUNKERLEY: Not so much that, but being precise about the time period is important. In the early to mid 1990s I think the one area where I could see some divergence – and it wasn't necessarily between Moscow and our delegation but between Embassy Moscow and Embassy Tbilisi, especially during the fighting when Abkhazia broke away with apparent Russian connivance and support. Not surprisingly the perception from Tbilisi was one of a small, new state under siege. Whereas the Moscow perception seemed a little less stark in that regard. As I indicated before, within the U.S. delegation in Vienna, we tried to be conscious that few of these new issues were simple or a straight-forward black and white. We had to be careful not to fall into a situation of perceiving all of the issues arising within and among the newly independent states simply as the result of

Russian recidivism. That may have been a factor – but there were other dynamics and local complexities to account for as well.

Q: I would imagine in the case of Georgia the fact that Shevardnadze who was sort of a hero in the West because of his connection to making the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, there may have been more bias in his favor than in other places.

DUNKERLEY: I wouldn't necessarily overstate the case, but there was no question that the presence and role of Shevardnadze attracted much more positive Western attention to Georgia at that time than that country would have excited normally – had it been, for example, Moldova. My own meetings with Shevardnadze came later in the late 1990s in the context of my CFE work.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover?

DUNKERLEY: I do have to refresh my memory; this was all quite awhile back.

Q: Please add them as you look at your notes because the more detail... it's a very interesting overview of the work. Afterwards where did you go?

DUNKERLEY: I then came back to Washington, DC to head up RPM (the Office of European Security and Political Affairs) within the bureau of European/Canadian affairs. Richard Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary at the time. I was asked to take over that particular position in the late summer of '95.

Q: How long were you there?

DUNKERLEY: I recall that I was RPM Director from mid-95' to roughly mid-'97. Two big sets of issues were coming to a head as I arrived. One was the worsening war in Bosnia. Shortly after I had departed Vienna but immediately before I came on board in EUR and began my new responsibilities, there was the Srebrenica massacre. That set of events came to serve as a catalytic turning point in terms of U.S. policy in the former Yugoslavia.

Q: Please explain what that was.

DUNKERLEY: In early July, the Serbs – the Bosnian Serb forces – shelled and then captured an isolated Muslim enclave around the town of Srebrenica in the eastern part of the country. This had been declared earlier by the UN as a "Safe Area" and was ostensibly protected by a relatively small contingent of Dutch UN military peacekeepers. The Bosnian Serbs under General Mladic took the town, essentially took the peacekeepers hostage, and then, in the days following, undertook systematic killings of hundreds, ultimately thousands of the Muslim men and boys in this so-called safe zone. It took time for the full scope and details to come out, but it quickly became clear

something truly horrific had taken place – even by the worsening circumstances of the former Yugoslavia at that time.

Thinking back to that moment: For many of us who had been working European issues, Srebrenica seemed to demonstrate in the most painful way the hollowness of the international community's efforts up to that point simply to stop the killing in Bosnia.

Within the USG, there was also a realization in this general time period that NATO – and that would mean the U.S. in a big way – would be in fact very much on the hook if things really got threatening with the UN peacekeeping effort in the former Yugoslavia. There had been an earlier commitment to use U.S. troops as part of a larger NATO operation if the UN peacekeepers needed to be extracted under difficult conditions – something that seemed not unlikely given the course of events in early '95. All this gave force to an evolving realization in Washington of just how seriously U.S. interests might be damaged if things continued along the current direction. It underscored for some the need for a new course.

This was the context of the Bosnian issue when I first returned to the EUR ranks. Events struck as a rush. Just as I was arriving, the Administration was beginning a new round of diplomatic efforts. Holbrooke was undertaking the first leg of what would eventually become his constant “shuttle diplomacy” with the parties of the region. This trip was, of course, cut short by the tragic accident on Mt Igman in mid-August in which key members of his team – Bob Frasure of EUR, together with Nelson Drew of the NSC staff and Joe Kruzal of the Pentagon – were killed when their APC went off a dangerous mountainside road.

I remember very clearly going out to Andrews with so many colleagues from the Department to meet the return of their bodies and then attending the set of memorial services for the three at Arlington Cemetery. As Dick Holbrooke has described in his own writings, that tragedy, in turn, set in motion a number of high-level decisions that began to mark a major shift in U.S. course. That was certainly the sense for those us working at the EUR Bureau-level at the time – those August/September days – that in contrast with the preceding two years or so, we now had passed a major policy turning point.

The other major issue percolating at this time was that of NATO enlargement.

The basics as of late summer '95 were that, after intense internal debate, the Clinton Administration had decided on a policy in favor of the principle of enlargement. In the previous December, NATO had taken the decision, again at a level of general principle, to conduct a study of how enlargement might be accomplished. That report came out that September '95, launching the next stage of in-house Alliance debate and discussion.

So it was growing clear by the second half of '95 that the Alliance had moved on from the question of “Whether to enlarge” into more of a consideration of just what decisions might be required on the issues of “How enlargement might go forward.” (At this stage,

all this was far from any decision on the “Who might join”). An important part of this new phase of discussion, and as yet largely un-answered, related to how we might manage the Russian angle in all of this.

Looking back, I think one of the better histories of that period, for reconstruction of the bureaucracies involved and understanding the chronology of decisions and events, was a subsequent book by Ron Asmus called Opening NATO's Door. Ron, a RAND analyst who became a DAS in EUR several months after I arrived back in the Bureau, was directly involved in much of this; his book is a good reference point. I ended up spending a lot of time working closely with Ron over the following years.

So a long answer to your question.... Those were some of the issues as of August '95 when I took up my job as RPM Director.

Q: Let's take the enlargement of NATO. When you arrived there, who were your people at RPM? Can you generalize?

DUNKERLEY: RPM was one of the largest, and in some respects one of the busiest offices – certainly within the European bureau, and perhaps within the Department as a whole. At one time, we did an informal study with the Department Executive Secretariat about what our percentage was of the paperwork bound for the State Seventh Floor. I forget the exact figure, but it was a rather healthy chunk.

At that time, it consisted of around twenty-five to thirty people. This included a number of State FSO and GSO's, but also two-three military officers on TDY, occasionally the odd intelligence officer on loan, and sometimes an academic or two doing a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship with the Department. We would periodically have a diplomat from one of the key NATO Allies – Germany, the UK, France, Italy – doing a stint with us before assuming a regular assignment at their Washington embassy. In sum, this was a very talented, energetic and heterogeneous group. EUR/RPM had traditionally been seen, within the European bureau at least, as being a fire-brigade, directly supporting the Bureau Assistant Secretary and PDAS on a number of region-wide security and political issues.

At that time, the Principal DAS for the European bureau was John Kornblum whom I had worked with before in Brussels and Vienna. RPM worked most closely with Kornblum and Holbrooke. Both were quickly subsumed with Bosnia – the process that led to the Dayton Accords and subsequent peacekeeping effort. That came to mean that on most other issues of that time, the relevant office directors assumed greater responsibility.

Q: Was that course on enlargement as clear within the ranks of NATO as with the Americans?

DUNKERLEY: Increasingly so – but this was a step by step process and there were a number of questions yet to be addressed.

In terms of approach, we – the United States – were taking the point of view that emphasized that particular Rubicon had, in fact, been crossed. Among the Allies, there were at this point of time varying degrees of enthusiasm on the question of enlargement. It would depend in part on how the issue was phrased and whom you were talking with at a particular moment. But the important thing was that by this point, the notion of enlargement was not simply a U.S.-only project. It very much involved the others.

In this regard, it is useful to recall the important role that Germany played in all of this; they were very supportive of the larger objective of finding ways to imbed their immediate neighbors to the East into the West, to help them integrate more fully in Western institutions. This came to include the key question of Poland's future relationship with the Atlantic Alliance – an important German strategic objective for self-evident reasons.

Clearly the United States had a very special role to play in moving forward both the enlargement debate and the institutional process within NATO. At times, we did so vigorously. But – back to your question – this was not a situation of the U.S. versus the Europeans. There were a number of European states quite seriously interested in moving this project.

Q: Obviously, orders are orders, but did you find, for example, the Russian part of the European bureau pretty unhappy about this?

DUNKERLEY: You have to look carefully at specific time frames. In the 1992-94 period the issue was still open and there were more differing views and voices back in parts of the Washington bureaucracy. I was in Vienna at the time and could only get echoes of the debate. There was originally concern on the part of some that this not be pursued aggressively either for fear of diluting the Alliance or of antagonizing the Russians unnecessarily.

By the time I was there – beginning in mid-95, that period had certainly passed. With Dick Holbrooke as Assistant Secretary and Strobe Talbott as Deputy Secretary, there were rather clear marching orders that we were proceeding in a particular direction: that of opening NATO to enlargement. At the same time, there was considerable sensitivity that enlargement had to be done in a way that that the results did not somehow undercut the Alliance's effectiveness. Nor did we want to create an irreparable rift with the Russians. As a consequence, this was a moment when there seemed to be a certain openness to new tactical ideas as to precisely how we might seek to go about achieving what might appear to be contradictory ends.

Q: What about your military colleagues? Were they shaking their heads when they thought about bringing some of these countries into NATO?

DUNKERLEY: Not really. There may have been some concerns in that direction earlier on in the internal USG debate, but again – by the time I got back to Washington in mid '95, that stage had largely passed.

Q: How did things go with NATO expansion?

DUNKERLEY: In broad thematic terms....What happened during this period of '95-'96 was the eventual development of a multi-faceted, or multi-tracked, strategy aiming at doing several things simultaneously.

The first aspect was to seek to continue to move forward briskly with the enlargement process on the basis of certain principles and terms that we worked out with the Allies. For example: We sought to win early consensus that enlargement ought to involve the full integration of any new members and that there should not turn out to be different classes of membership. That there should be no dilution of effectiveness – which meant that membership in NATO was not somehow an automatic right, but that individual aspirant countries would need to meet certain political and operational requirements (although we didn't tend to use freely the term "criteria"). And finally, that this would be in effect a self-selection effort, depending very much on the level of commitment, energy and progress that individual countries would be prepared to bring to this process, putting more of the onus on their own decisions and follow-through. That was, if you will, the first general track.

The second track was related to reform and continued transformation of the Alliance. This involved a series of steps aimed at reshaping the political and military components of the Alliance to reflect better the evolving circumstances and requirements of this post Cold War environment. Some of this involved possible changes in NATO's command structure, reducing the number of various flag billets, or readjusting its emphasis on particular capabilities. In many ways, this was a continuation of the course set in motion at the earlier London NATO Summit a few years before.

Part of this effort at NATO's reform and transformation in the mid '90's also involved a quiet bilateral exploration of how, in this process of change, the French might be encouraged to engage more closely back within the Alliance, perhaps even to the point of returning to NATO's integrated military structure. During this period, there was a very active engagement at high levels with the government of President Chirac to see whether movement on that particular question might prove possible and under what conditions. In the end, this did not succeed at that time – having become stuck, as I recall, over French insistence on their assumption of the NATO AFSOUTH command (then held by an American) as their ticket for admission. That seemed to bring this quiet discussion to a slow halt.

There was a third track focused on engagement with the Russians, taking a variety of forms. Part of this was an exploration of ways in which Russia might have more direct, regular and meaningful engagement with NATO: something of an institutionalized window on the Alliance – what was referred to as "providing a voice but not a veto." This eventually led to the negotiation and conclusion (in March '97 as I recall) of what came to be called the "NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations" – a document which laid out certain agreed general principles on European security, such as that the two sides

no longer saw each other as adversaries and the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area should be seen as “indivisible.” It established a consultative mechanism called at the time the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council; and it identified a notional set of issues, such as peacekeeping and arms control, which could be initial subjects for such consultation.

At the same time, there was also an interest in steps and re-assurances which, properly crafted, might provide the Russians a sense of predictability and relative stability with regards the political-military implications of enlargement. That is to say, to make clear that with NATO enlargement, there would not be a drastic tidal wave rushing into the East of Western military equipment, troops and infrastructure. Jumping ahead slightly, the Russians made clear, and we eventually accepted, that one of the key instruments in this regard would need to be the negotiation of an adapted version – a significantly reworked version – of the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty which had earlier established legally binding limits on key categories of ground and air equipment held by the major militaries in Europe.

All of these tracks had to go forward roughly in simultaneous fashion and all were starting to get underway even as the U.S. was also trying to handle Bosnia – which involved a sustained NATO air campaign against the Bosnian Serb forces in September ’95, and Holbrooke’s full-press negotiating effort for the rest of that fall, which came to fruition in the Dayton Peace Accords achieved in November of that year.

There was some interesting interaction between the two enterprises, especially in late ’95 and early ’96 as the U.S. and Allies drew upon NATO in a major peace-keeping effort in Bosnia in support of the Dayton Accords.

For example: The Bosnian effort demonstrated in a most tangible and timely way the sort of political role we envisaged for NATO in ensuring European stability – rather than simply being directed against the Soviet military threat of the past. It also came to provide a very useful vehicle for “on the ground” NATO-Russia cooperative action. As the result of protracted negotiation between Secretary of Defense Perry and his Russian counterpart Grachev, we ended up with a structure in Bosnia which, under a very complicated wiring diagram, had a Russian unit essentially operating side by side with the NATO forces.

Q: I saw them.

DUNKERLEY: Yes, who would have thought it? That was the broad policy context for those two years.

Q: Any other comments on the expansion on NATO?

Simply to recapitulate: What the Department and specifically the Bureau of European Affairs was seeking to do was to ensure that we had both a process and criteria by which the potential new members could be identified and set forward moving along a road

towards their admission to the Alliance. This needed to be done in a way that could garner the broadest possible political support among the other allies (which was absolutely critical since it was consensus decision). We needed to ensure that we were not weakening the Alliance either in political or military terms.

At the same time there was also recognition that in all of this we had to find a way in which the Russian reaction could be managed. This was a high priority. We were under no illusions that the Russians would not seek to oppose this, but we had a sense – the beginnings of a game plan – how this process might be advanced in a way, and under conditions, that might mitigate possible negative effects. Part of that game plan reflected the conclusion that, just as the strategic environment in Europe was continuing to change, the Alliance itself would have to continue to adapt and evolve as well.

Q: This was brought home in the last couple of days in an editorial by Thomas Friedman where he talks about NATO having something like two million men under arms, but it doesn't project itself into anything in particular. There's no real airlift capacity, no desire to go anywhere else. We are talking about Iraq which of course is very unpopular, but even anywhere else. It just sort of sits there. At the time you are talking about, there must have been a feeling of if there's no longer a Soviet Union what are all these guys doing in uniform?

DUNKERLEY: You identify one of the longstanding issues about the Alliance during this particular period and especially how it relates to its disparate military capabilities. For four to five decades, the Alliance-- and particularly the Western Europeans' military posture and various contributions – were geared to deterrence and defense against a massive conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. It was in effect defense in place. For many, it was about defending Germany, defending Western Europe.

During the early 1990s it became clear that many of the tasks that the Western militaries would now be called upon to perform would likely be quite different – far more likely to involve sorts of actions which might be labeled peace enforcement, stability operations, or “peace keeping.” That would place new demands on the militaries of the Alliance quite different than what many had been thinking of in the past. As you suggest, it would bring to the fore the question of lift – “expeditionary capabilities.” It would require a much greater emphasis, not so much on numbers, as on agility and tailored capabilities. This is something that the U.S. military had long been wrestling with in its own way. But – speaking in very general terms – it would prove an even bigger problem for the Europeans. It's a long-standing issue: to develop those capabilities requires a commitment of resources. It's more expensive to have an agile, professional force than a large conscript-based force primarily for territorial defense.

What we saw in this period was an increasing disparity in responses. The UK, France sought to have those new capabilities. Others, such as Germany, found it more politically difficult.

There was a larger question which was – and it goes to the heart of the decision to enlarge the Alliance – the degree to which the stabilizing effects of a collective security system, such as the Alliance represents, can be expanded, enlarged – its promise in effect exported Eastward. We wanted to avoid redrawing a new de facto strategic division down the middle of Europe, one side containing those countries that could now enjoy those strategic benefits and another of those in essence declared without even that prospect for the future. Maintenance of that sort of dividing line over the longer term was viewed as likely to become destabilizing in and of itself. So you can say that there was a geopolitical or geostrategic conundrum within the decision to enlarge the Alliance – this goal of gradually expanding that zone of stability while minimizing the notion of new and permanent dividing lines.

Q: I am trying to capture the spirit of the time. Was there a sense of wanting to expand the tent as a stabilizing thing as opposed to being a real military force?

DUNKERLEY: To be clear: In all of this there was an acute sense that enlargement could not be a success if the end products proved to be a serious dilution of the Alliance either in terms of political or military effectiveness. There have been all sorts of problems related to the military posture and policies of the European Allies that you just alluded to by citing the Friedman article. But I would submit that those are problems which are as much endemic to Western Europe – the political questions of defense budgets and resource allocation in times of financial stringencies – than as a result of bringing the Poles and the Czechs into NATO.

To go back to the starting point, the three-prong strategy for managing NATO enlargement had to have the effect – and the perception – of adding to the collective strength and not diminishing it. While we encouraged NATO authorities to stay away from the notion of explicit criteria lest that come to seem too automatic in their application, there was nonetheless a long and detailed set of considerations and requirements set out in a series of extended consultations between NATO experts and their political and military counterparts of the interested prospective Allies. This was a process of ensuring their militaries, and other parts of their national security establishments, were brought up to a par with Alliance standards.

This was a rather broad, at times highly technical and detailed process involving a number of working level exchanges with these countries' militaries and their foreign and defense ministries. These discussions included rather nitty-gritty questions as to basic regulations and operating procedures, questions as to their security regulations and treatment of classified material and so forth. But there were also some rather fundamental political desiderata. For example: the Alliance made clear that we were not going to import outstanding bilateral differences among prospective member countries.

Q: What do you mean by that?

DUNKERLEY: For example, Hungary and Romania, dating back to the post World War I period, had long-standing differences over territory and populations. One of the

dampening effects on that particular dispute in the early 90's was the recognition by both those countries that, if these persisted or grew worse, they were not going to be able to go too far in terms of integration into institutions such as NATO or the EU.

Again, I'd stress our strategy was to gear admission into the Alliance in large part on self-selection. It was not a case of the United States or the Alliance picking out two or three countries and saying, 'we want you to join' but rather 'who is interested in making this serious effort?' Once a country had signaled its clear determination and interest in this regard, we sought to make clear the path by which their progress would be judged by the Alliance as a whole. There was in all of this an effort to make clear that the question of future membership should be a continuing prospect. Enlargement was not to be seen as a one shot affair.

Q: Going back, was there work on thinking about that all these people have mass armies and maybe some people should have mountain units, divide the labor?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly in the many discussions on the military side, there was sensitivity to the fact that a one size fits all formula – as applied to all NATO members, old and new – would not make sense. That had been, in effect, always the case. We encouraged countries seeking admission to look for those areas in which they could provide the most value-added. In the case of some of the East Europeans this might involve a certain amount of specialization.

There was another factor at work during this time and that was most of these countries had over the years developed large, Soviet style Warsaw Pact military establishments. That was not necessarily what was best either from an Alliance perspective or from their own national perspective as they sought to develop more modern, capable forces that made more economic and strategic sense. Certainly in NATO's discussion with a number of these prospective member countries, we sought to steer them away from simply replicating the past in terms of large tank armies and going for the most expensive of new equipment.

Q: Was there concern as we did this that we would be creating a stable, but almost neutered Europe? The whole idea was to stop these damn civil wars that dragged us into World War I and World War II between these powers. It leaves the United States as the only power that is interested in projecting its power to deal with matters in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. It was not going to be a force that could be used much anywhere else.

DUNKERLEY: No. I don't buy that, certainly not as a reflection of policy. At the time we continued to push within the Alliance for all sorts of force improvements aimed precisely at those "expeditionary" qualities of capability, agility and sustainability which would lend greater credibility to European forces—those that eventually could go to Afghanistan or elsewhere. There is a long history during this period and continuing through the present day of our encouraging the Europeans to do so. Maybe I am misunderstanding the thrust of your question.

Q: I was just wondering whether we were seen with the development of a European force which served an American purpose which was to keep these people from going at each other. We tended to get dragged in. It was going to end up as a local power center without much interest in using some of its force elsewhere for good purposes.

DUNKERLEY: I don't really agree with that sort of assessment. I would suggest that most such inadequacies, either in political and military terms, flow as much from European internals as from what or what not the United States is doing in the way of policy or exhortation.

Q: Let's turn to Bosnia. During 1995-97, what was happening in Bosnia?

DUNKERLEY: When I started at the EUR/RPM – in that initial period marked by the re-energized negotiating effort to bring about a Bosnian settlement led by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke – one of the issues that quickly arose was to develop a better sense of what sort of more effective international presence and process would be needed to support a settlement. It was clear from the immediately preceding years' difficulties and weaknesses of the UNPROFOR effort that particular model had been a part of the problem.

From the start, there was a strong desire to have a militarily effective presence and process that was not subject to the sort of political hesitation and delay that the previous years had seen with UNPROFOR and UN SYG's Special Representative. This meant we wanted a NATO force. But we also wrestled with how one could relate such a military operation to the Russian Federation – which was, of course, both a member of the UNSC and the Contact Group for the Dayton negotiation, and a desirable, perhaps necessary, participant in any sort of settlement implementation.

At the same time: How might we relate this NATO-led force, under the umbrella of UNSC authorization but without the constraints and flaws of UNPROFOR, with the development of a new international civilian presence as part of implementation of Dayton's political terms and reconstruction of Bosnia? There were a number of institutions and European organizations that could have a useful role in supporting and overseeing that implementation – and indeed, there was competitive jockeying as to that division of labor. Throughout that fall and immediately following the Dayton negotiation, all of this was being thrashed out first within the US government, then with close allies and members of the contact group, and then in ever-broadening circles with the rest of the NATO allies and other UN players.

Q: What was your role? Did you have a piece of the action?

DUNKERLEY: EUR/RPM was directly supporting the Assistant Secretary on a variety of the issues. Over time, the structure of the European Bureau evolved so that there were entire offices exclusively devoted to the Bosnia settlement and implementation. But at least at the start, RPM was directly involved in an important part of this.

Q: Were you there when we sent troops in and started bombing?

DUNKERLEY: Yes.

Q: The Europeans at one time said, 'this is a European problem, we're going to take care of this.'

DUNKERLEY: That had been several years before.

Q: At this point was there a sense of relief that we needed to do something? You come back to if the United States doesn't take the initiative, nothing gets done practically or is that unfair?

DUNKERLEY: I think it's a little overly-simplistic, but certainly one thing had become quite clear in the two-three years immediately preceding: to the extent there were significant and persistent divergences between a European and U.S. approach to the many problems of the former Yugoslavia, it became unlikely there would be any progress, any positive resolution. In the pursuit of the negotiations leading to the Dayton Peace Accords, yes – the active engagement, the leadership, of the United States was absolutely critical.

You have to be a little bit cautious about extrapolating from that experience that nothing good happens unless there is a bold and vigorous U.S. lead – or that the Europeans are somehow a largely passive or negligible factor in working such issues. That would be no less mistaken as well. It's all likely to be a good deal more complex than that. But my point is simply that our serious divergence is often a signal of substantially increased odds against solving major issues in European security. Conversely, energetic American engagement alone is not a guarantee of a successful outcome – but it can be critical.

Q: Did your office get involved in dealing with the Bosnians?

DUNKERLEY: Not so much directly with the Bosnians. While Dick Holbrooke's negotiating team, which included several people from our office, was dealing directly with the local participants, RPM helped to provide the back up support in terms of developing the details of what the NATO component of a peace settlement implementation might look like. This was very much part of a major inter-agency effort. Obviously the Pentagon and Department of Defense (DOD) played a key role on all these basic issues related to how the NATO support force would be put together and how the Russians would be related to it. As I mentioned earlier, on the latter point – the details of the lash up between the Russians and the U.S. forces in the NATO force – this went up to Secretary of Defense Perry in his discussions with his Russian counterpart.

Q: Did you get involved in opening up places like Hungary which was not in NATO?

DUNKERLEY: They were not in NATO at the time, but they obviously provided important support – not least in access to the region. Again, the two broad issues of NATO enlargement and Bosnia constantly resonated off of each other. The Hungarians, with an eye towards eventual admission into the Alliance, took pains to demonstrate what a good international citizen and useful prospective NATO member their country could be by providing that sort of support early on.

Q: Bosnia in a way did represent a chance for everybody to say, 'we can do it.' I remember going as an election observer and seeing Moroccan and Ukrainian troops. Indonesian observers were also there.

DUNKERLEY: It was also a validation of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program of the NATO that had been set up earlier in 1993-94 as a way of developing cooperative ties with non-NATO countries. For some countries, this was seen as a stepping-stone to eventually becoming members of the Alliance. Even for those who were not immediate prospects—or for that matter, even distant aspirants – the very fact that they had an up and running PFP relationship significantly added to the ability of countries like Ukraine – or countries even further afield – to be folded into the NATO-led peacekeeping force.

Q: From your perspective how did this work? When we were in Russian occupied territory we were told not to use cameras and it seemed that for this international group of observers we had to be much more careful where the Russians were than in other places. How did this relationship work out?

DUNKERLEY: As I indicated, it was one of the major issues for discussion during that initial period. There was obviously a significant political objective to be served by finding a way in which we could work together and they could participate. On the other hand, we wanted to avoid a situation in which there was a division of the country into specific regions of responsibility for different peace-keeping units in such a way that would hamper unity of command – or appear to legitimize further fracturing of an already divided Bosnian state by seeming to assign the Russians the de facto role of primary protectors of the Bosnian Serbs.

As for the basics, what I tend to recall at this distance was that the Russian forces were prepared to operate under the authority, under the command (I have forgotten the exact terms of the OPCON) of an American commander, but not ostensibly under a NATO flag. I believe it would be the Russians reporting to an American commander who in turn was part of this larger NATO operation, but it was not Russia directly under the control of NATO. That probably does not do justice to the subtleties of the final structure. On the ground it apparently worked out reasonably well.

Q: I was wondering whether there was any concern about command and control of Russian military forces and their civilian leadership at the time?

DUNKERLEY: I think you will find that, by and large, as one looks back on the history of the first year following Dayton, the military side went reasonably well.

There were far more concerns on the civilian side, and far more difficult daily operational problems to address in putting back together a fractured nation where self-divisions remained tenacious. Once the peace settlement had been agreed and once the peacekeeping forces were on the ground, I was not aware of major or persistent problems on the military side. Problems on the civilian side were due in part to basic contradictions inevitably contained in the Dayton settlement: the notion of a unified and sovereign Bosnia when, in fact, the structures resulting from the Accord allowed for the differing institutions between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims.

There were also issues to be settled in terms of who was doing what on different aspects the settlement implementation. In the early months, this involved, in effect, the creation on the fly of an entirely new diplomatic and military peacekeeping structure, one that would have to reflect the differing capabilities and various equities that different actors and institutions could bring to these issues.

There were, for example, debates about the respective roles of the OSCE in connection with the new post of High Commissioner. We saw the OSCE playing an important role in developing procedures for future elections in Bosnia. That was a critical benchmark in terms of developing a political end state that would enable us to move forward and move out. It was thus very important. For a while there were political differences with the Allies over who should head up the OSCE mission. Eventually it was a senior American diplomat, Bob Frowick.

Q: What about the French? They had a zone where a lot of the hard line Serbs were and they seemed to be unwilling to pick up people like Mladic and Karadzic. Did we see that as a problem at the time? Were the French acting in a different way than we would have liked them to?

DUNKERLEY: I wouldn't overstate that particular angle. In all of this, there were all sorts of contradictions and different points of view, even within the U.S. side. There would be some who would argue that one of the problems at the time was as a greater reluctance on the part of certain U.S. military commanders or NATO military authorities to do certain things – as Dick Holbrooke has made clear in his own writings.

Q: When you left there in 1998 was there a feeling that a pretty good instrument was being put together with the expansion of NATO and the implementation and use of NATO? It was not just a test case, but a real case.

DUNKERLEY: Yes. I think there was a great deal of satisfaction about the course of enlargement, rooted in the sense that the decisions flowing from successful Madrid NATO Summit of July '97, and the immediate follow-up with the Russians in the Secretary's subsequent discussions with her Russian counterpart in St. Petersburg, had set us in the right direction. Importantly those sessions were promptly followed by a hard-won agreement in Vienna a month later on basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty

(perhaps I should say more on that later on). Still a lot to be done, but an important foundation...

And yes, by that point in 1997 there was also a fair amount of satisfaction that the Alliance and the US had responded – finally but effectively – in preventing the situation in Bosnia from getting a lot worse. But everyone also recognized that there continued to be profound problems that still had to be worked and on a daily basis, not just in Bosnia but throughout the region.

Q: Did you have the feeling that you needed to also look at Kosovo?

DUNKERLEY: Certainly there was a broad recognition that the situation in Kosovo was full of unresolved tensions. But I think there was also a sense that this was one of those issues that might just be too hard to have tried to solve simultaneously with the Bosnian settlement reached with the Serbs and others at Dayton. Others, like Holbrooke, have provided their own arguments in that regard. But there may have been another more operational factor at the bureaucratic level: a preoccupation with immediate, real world problems that had to be solved this week or next in terms of prepping decisions involving the Dayton implementation in Bosnia.

Q: A nuts and bolts question about RPM: In the period of 1995-98, others who have served in political/military affairs have said that on the European side that at one point the “best and the brightest” of the Foreign Service seemed to becoming more and more civil service. Did you have any feel for that?

DUNKERLEY: There were a couple of things in play. First of all – and as I may have mentioned earlier – EUR/RPM was one of the biggest offices in the department. There was a continuing flow-through of very good mid-grade FSO’s, many of whom would then go on to postings either at USNATO, our delegation to the OSCE or – very often – to Pol-Mil responsibilities at a number of the embassies like Moscow, sometimes returning back to RPM after that for more senior positions. So there was a rough sense of professional development and career advancement at work. We also had a several very talented GS types – usually handling some very specialized topics – who enjoyed considerable expertise and long experience in the office. Some were recognized throughout the interagency community as “the go-to individuals” on particular issues. From my perspective at least, it seemed an effective mix.

Q: It was really more the political/military bureau. I am not making any judgment on it.

DUNKERLEY: I don’t really know whether that phenomenon may have been more in evidence in various PM offices or for whatever reasons. One of the additional factors affecting personnel was that of burn out. In RPM, for example, people usually put in exceptional hours in a situation where, thanks to virtues of technology, lead times and deadlines became increasingly compressed. The decision cycle was much, much shorter than previously – at least in terms of our preparing and supporting policy-makers.

Q: What then happened in 1998?

DUNKERLEY: Well, this leads us back into a question that I've touched upon in rather general terms: Which was the puzzle of how to deal with the Russians in the context of a radically shifting European security picture. To my mind, answering that posed both strategic and operational challenges, conceptual and practical difficulties.

U.S. policy towards Russia during the Clinton Administration calls for whole volumes and there are others – Strobe Talbott, Jim Collins, Steve Sestanovich come to mind – who all had certainly a much better overall perspective than I did. But increasingly during this period, beginning in '95-'97 and then continuing on well through '99-01, I was drawn into one very focused small part of that larger policy effort: How to engage with the Russians, and with the Allies and others, in generating a greater degree of restraint, transparency, predictability and stability within a European political-military environment which was continuing to undergo dramatic changes.

To be more specific: Much of my work during this latter period of four-five years or so had to do with revising (or revitalizing) the CFE treaty – the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

As I touched on earlier: That treaty was originally negotiated in the late 1980's and concluded almost concurrently with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union itself. It established a series of ceilings on holdings, transparency procedures and verification mechanisms for critical categories of military equipment – tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and so forth – which were held by the major armies and air forces in the European theater.

And as mentioned awhile back, CFE was derived in great part from the much earlier (and long stalled) MBFR talks. When it emerged as CFE in the late 80's, it was negotiated on a NATO-Warsaw Pact basis. It had the objective of striking a conventional military balance between two blocs and reducing the risks of sudden attack.

This Treaty came to be regularly characterized in NATO ministerial communiqués and the like in architectural terms – a cornerstone, a foundation or pillar of post Cold War European security. But it was no less important to see it as a critical political tool in managing political-military change. As such, it played an important role in convincing the then Soviet Union to acquiesce in the unification of Germany in '90.

But the original treaty created a regime that, having been conceived in Cold War circumstances and concluded only in the final days of that competition, was constructed on a bipolar basis. Already by the mid '90's, the CFE Treaty's terms were becoming increasingly out of date. There was awkwardness in its structure within this new European environment in which “the Eastern bloc” of states parties to the Treaty, the former Warsaw Pact, had not only dissolved their own alliance but a number of them were now actively aspiring to join NATO, the counterpart “Western bloc” within the original CFE terminology and structure.

So there was a growing need to find a way to adapt – to update, revise or modernize – the CFE Treaty in a way that brought its terms more in line with the post-Cold War optic but preserved its many provisions and benefits. And to be clear, the fundamental substance and workings of the regime were not a problem.

By itself, adaptation of the CFE Treaty would not have been a priority issue solely because of this. But one of the questions we and key Allies became actively interested in during the mid 90's was whether the renegotiation of this legally binding treaty could be accomplished in such a way as to provide a degree of meaningful reassurance to the Russians that, as NATO enlarged, the results would not jeopardize their basic national security.

But that objective would also have to be accomplished in a way that not only maintained the basics of the CFE regime but did not impede NATO enlargement – that is to say, the results of any such renegotiation, or adaptation of CFE, should neither specially penalize the new members of the Alliance nor suggest that future enlargement might be limited to only one tranche of new members.

All that would be far easier to conceive of in broad terms as a general strategy than to hammer out in its details at the table. This set of issues was something that I became deeply involved with as Director of EUR/RPM. Following the conclusion of my regular assignment in that capacity, I was asked to stay on in the EUR Bureau to focus on these issues and was eventually named Special Envoy of the Secretary of State for renegotiating the treaty.

Q: When you were in RPM how did you find the Soviet/Russian hands? With Strobe Talbott and others, you had a very powerful group who were extremely sensitive to the Soviets/Russians. I would imagine that everything that you did was examined very carefully. They constantly thought: what will the Russians think about this? Did you find that atmosphere?

DUNKERLEY: Again I wouldn't overstate or oversimplify. Clearly there were sensitivities. For example: there were differing concerns and priorities vis a vis the Russians early on in the '95-96 period when Lynn Davis was Under Secretary of State for Arms Control. Over time, however, I didn't come to see all of this as a problem. On the contrary, a fair amount of practical cooperation on these issues grew up between the part of EUR that I was in and that part of the Department that became known as S/NIS (Newly Independent States). In all of this, we worked very closely with the office of the Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbott, and his personal lead made clear to all concerned in the bureaucracy the need for a fully collaborative effort. It was my sense that most of the people working these issues realized that a challenge of this complexity, on both policy and practical levels, wasn't going to work if there was a divergence or instinctive competitiveness at play between different offices.

Q: I am not sure it was competitive, but rather concern. What did you do as Special Envoy?

DUNKERLEY: As a starting point, it's important to keep in mind that this was a treaty regime which involved all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact and all of the members of NATO – thirty countries by this time – and all with differing concerns and perspectives. It was far from a straightforward U.S.-Russian bilateral matter but rather a big, sprawling multilateral complex of issues and interests. As a consequence, the development of national policies and working out of NATO negotiating proposals – let alone the actual negotiations among all the states party – took place on a variety of levels and different timelines.

Not the least difficult of these processes was, of course, right here in Washington among different agencies. Not surprisingly, that interagency process had to balance all sorts of different agendas and perspectives. It needed to take into account our fundamental political objectives vis a vis the Russians as well as our no less critical interests with regard to solidarity of the Alliance and the varying concerns of our Allies and prospective allies. It needed to meet our own basic desire to maintain as much latitude and flexibility as feasible – both politically and militarily. So here in Washington, we faced a protracted, sometimes contentious process of interagency negotiation and decision-making on the broad outlines and many details of a U.S. negotiating strategy. At times, this seemed an endless rolling of the rock uphill, month after month.

Then, of course, we would have to work with our NATO negotiating partners, the Allies and – over this period – increasingly with prospective Central European Allies as well. Most of the NATO coordination on negotiating strategy and positions would continue to take place through the vehicle of what was called the High Level Task Force or HLTF. This was a special group of arms control policy officials from capitals who would come together in regular meetings at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to hammer out Alliance consensus decisions on specific CFE issues. The tempo of the HLTF would vary – sometimes it would be meeting every two-three weeks during crunch times.

In addition, there were of course a number of other CFE consultations also taking place during all of this, either on a bilateral or small group basis. There was regular discussion on our part with our British, German and French counterparts in capitals, as well as with those allies particularly affected by specific provisions under re-negotiation – for example: the Turks, Norwegians and Greeks in the case of the so-called Flank limitations. As the adaptation negotiations progressed, there were increasing discussions with the Central Europeans and a number of the newly-independent states as well. There was a steady tempo of such exchanges.

In terms of the day-to-day negotiations underway among all of the states participating in CFE, there was the Joint Consultative Group or JCG that was based in Vienna. This was taking place somewhat under the umbrella of the OSCE although rather distinct from that organization in terms of its composition and its very specific CFE-related agenda. The U.S. representatives to the JCG were part of our overall delegation to the OSCE. This

CFE team in Vienna was led throughout this period by retired Brigadier General Greg Govan, very able and knowledgeable; he had previously been our Defense Attaché in Moscow. A very good negotiator.

In sum, there was lots going on with CFE at different levels and in different formats. It was my responsibility both to oversee much of this and to lead and participate in a number of these exchanges. In addition – and precisely because during this time CFE became an issue increasingly to the fore at the level of the Secretary and sometimes the President – assisting in the preparations for their exchanges with the Russians became a regular item in my work.

So when not tied up in interagency arm-wrestling in DC, I ended up traveling about quite a bit over this period – on one level, all this was intellectually and professionally challenging and exciting; on another, it was often closer to a grueling marathon.

Q: You were doing this from when to when?

DUNKERLEY: I did it until late 2001.

Q: Where did you deal with your Russian counterparts? Washington? Brussels?

DUNKERLEY: All over. Moscow, Vienna, Brussels, New York, on the margins of various ministerials....

Q: Did they have a team and we had a team?

DUNKERLEY: At a certain early point in discussions between Strobe Talbott and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, they agreed that I should regularly meet on these issues with a designated Russian counterpart – Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov, one of their arms control veterans. He was regularly supported by Oleg Chernov also of the MFA, and Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov. For my part, I was usually seconded by Jennifer Laurendeau of EUR, one of Washington's very best on CFE policy and substance – a first rate individual, and others from State, as well as a full interagency team of working-level regulars from OSD, JCS, ACDA and the Intel community. And very important – Anne Witkowsky of the NSC staff often accompanied us for our more important sessions, another key player.

The negotiation of an adapted CFE regime can be seen as an episodic process, essentially beginning in late 1996-early 1997, running through several stages and political deadlines, and eventually leading up to the signature of a new treaty at a major multilateral summit in Istanbul in November of 1999. During the process we developed various sidebar commitments, some relating to the reduction of the Russian military presence in neighboring countries, whose implementation we had to thrash out and seek to facilitate. I focused on that latter question of implementation in 2000 and 2001. Some of these latter implementation issues posed dogged problems that persist on the US-Russian agenda even today.

Q: What were some of the major issues in the CFE negotiations?

DUNKERLEY: As I suggested earlier, the first issues related to the implications of NATO enlargement. From the start, we – that is to say, the U.S. and the Allies – were prepared to look at this new round of negotiation of CFE, the updating and adaptation of this major multilateral treaty, for ways that could provide a greater sense of predictability and transparency as to specific political-military consequences of new members joining NATO – in the process, to make clear to Russian planners and policy-makers that NATO enlargement was not going to automatically result in some sudden and massive surge of military equipment and potential moving 400 kilometers to the east without any restraint.

At the same time, however, we were not prepared to impose on ourselves, or on the Alliance, political or military restrictions which would create a second class of NATO membership by putting unusually onerous or discriminatory restrictions on the new members from Central Europe: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Nor would we agree to CFE provisions with the longer-term effect of giving a de facto veto over the course of any future enlargement.

Similarly, while we had some flexibility in considering our own future equipment numbers and lower ceilings, we also thought it important that any adapted CFE regime still afford basic operational flexibilities that SACEUR and American commanders, and indeed Alliance political leaders, viewed as necessary to retain in terms of military capabilities to meet future challenges. Like any negotiation, there were both certain margins for maneuver and certain red lines for us.

On the other side, the Russians were also very much seeking an adaptation or revision of the CFE treaty regime as originally negotiated and concluded. And they portrayed this as a necessary step – one of the key determinants – in any new NATO-Russia relationship.

Some background: There was an important scene-setter to this eventual adaptation effort of the late 90's. When the CFE treaty had been originally negotiated and signed in the late 1980's/early 1990's, places like the former Soviet Union's Caucasus Military District were seen as well to the rear and quiet, where the treaty's equipment limitations specific to that particular area seemed of less import. Obviously, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this region went from being a backwater to an international boundary area with new states emerging in the South Caucasus; Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. There were a number of separatist conflicts emerging in this area like Nagorno Karabakh, Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia, and then in the North Caucasus within Russia's own borders, the first Chechen war broke out.

So by the mid 1990's, the original CFE perception of that particular region was quite overtaken by events – this was now an area of profound security concern for the Russian Federation and, Moscow argued, the sub-regional equipment limits under CFE posed increasing operational problems for the Russian military. I recall that at the time, their concerns had a particular focus vis a vis the number of Russian ACV's – armored combat

vehicles to use the CFE term of art – able to be present in the northern Caucasus area. These specific operational concerns only gave force to a larger and often-heard complaint voiced by the Russians that such limits on their domestic deployments were fundamentally discriminatory and inequitable.

The resulting Russian calls for relief from these so-called flank limits, beginning in '94 and '95, posed one of the first major challenges for CFE as a November '95 deadline approached for all parties to come into complete compliance with all of the terms set by the original Treaty. There was both calendar and political pressure in play since the Russians weren't going to be able to make that deadline with specific reference to some of their equipment levels in the flank.

There were several considerations shaping our own response at that time. There was a political interest in avoiding this sort of early break-down in CFE compliance on the part of the Russians. There was some sympathy – perhaps on our part and that of a number of the Allies – with the Russian argument that basic circumstances had substantially changed, and thus some adjustment in the relevant limits might be warranted. But there was also a fundamental principle that we saw as critical to maintain: that any adjustment in the existing terms of the CFE regime, changes in the rules of the road if you will, needed to be accomplished through a decision of all parties. It should not be simply the result of unilateral decisions or the actions of a single party. In this case, any easing of Russian ACV numbers in the flank areas would have to be the consequence of everyone agreeing to such a change and only in the context of accompanying conditions.

This would be far easier said than done. The question of Treaty limits on equipment holdings in specific regions to the North and South – the so-called “Flanks” in CFE terminology – was one where various other countries, some good allies of the U.S., have traditionally held strong and immediate national concerns. For example, the Turks in the South and the Norwegians in the North were both extremely sensitive lest any adjustment in the CFE regime limitations seem to increase the potential for a Russian build-up of equipment holdings in their own immediate neighborhoods. Any solution had to be sensitive to these concerns as well as those of Russia.

Without getting into much detail – which can get pretty arcane quickly – a series of steps were worked out over late '95 and early '96 that would adjust the map of the Russian sub-region within which these particular limits would apply. It might thus provide the necessary additional flexibility the Russians sought but only under enhanced transparency and verification conditions. But precisely how that new map might be redrawn was contentious. At a certain point, in the course of discussions between then Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian Defense Minister Grachev, there was U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement between them on one version. But this Perry-Grachev formulation was vigorously opposed by Turkey at the time, and an internal NATO stalemate of several months resulted. I was finally able to work out a back-channel arrangement with my Turkish MFA counterpart Josef Bulic in which we – the U.S. – came to step back from that particular Perry-Grachev formulation (to the annoyance of Moscow) and for their

part, the Turks moved to accept a new map variant we then offered which proved the basis for an eventual Flank solution.

That solution involving a de facto easing of the original flank limits was finally achieved in a special round of negotiations in Vienna in the late spring of 1996 (and jumping ahead in a side note, I recall this agreement was finally brought into force with U.S. Senate ratification a year later). Undersecretary Lynn Davis led the U.S. team in these closing negotiations. But the perceived implications of this Vienna deal, its practical results of greater flexibility for the Russians in places like the Caucasus and the North, and the manner in which much of this agreement was hammered out bilaterally continued to be very sensitive for a number of the smaller states. The Georgians, for example, feared all this might come to work to their own disadvantage at some point. And in some cases, they made their sensitivity and unhappiness known on the Hill, leading to push-back on the Administration from SFRC staff.

So there were important lessons we learned from this Flank adjustment process and deal of '96 – which could be thought of as the initial step in the adaptation of the CFE Treaty regime. Not least, we learned that efforts to strike quick bilateral deals with Moscow, seemingly over the heads of other concerned states parties, could generate serious blow-back, including in our own Congress. We were reminded that, to be negotiable and politically viable, the fundamental task of providing credible reassurance through CFE had to be cast broadly; it would be critical for solutions to be seen as meeting the varying concerns of the Central-East Europeans and other neighbors of Russia no less than those of Russia itself.

So the subsequent negotiating challenge in updating all of the CFE Treaty, and not just the specific flank map fix of '96, centered on the difficulty of striking a workable balance between all of these competing interests and reassurances.

At the same time, you could say there was a certain rough parallelism at work. In regards NATO enlargement and its implications in Central Europe, the Russians wanted increased constraints on the Alliance now and in the future – while we of course sought to preserve as much latitude as possible. Conversely, on the flanks, the Russians very much wanted to minimize, or eliminate entirely, constraints on their own flexibilities, especially those limits on deployments on their own national territory. Whereas we were concerned about the maintenance of some such restraints in light of both the strong concerns that some of our Allies had and the security interests of some of Russia's small neighbors. That gives you an idea of some of the fundamental dynamics.

There were other issues that quickly came to the fore, however – especially as preliminary negotiations got underway. For example: We had to negotiate a new structure for this adapted treaty regime, which previously had been built around equal limits between two blocs of states – NATO and the then Warsaw Pact. Now we were discussing a new structure of limits on individual countries: In effect, how much of CFE-limited equipment each could possess in their own armies and air forces, and how much more could be located on their territories by their allies. Or put another way, national and

territorial ceilings. Defining this latter category in the right way was critical for us, and for the Alliance, because it provided the means for allowing stationed forces, U.S. stationed forces in Europe, under an adapted CFE treaty regime and rules.

At the same time, this emerging network of national and territorial ceilings would have to be constructed in such a way as to provide a certain amount of Treaty-allowed flexibility to account for the sort of temporary deployments and additions that might prove necessary in some future contingencies. One of the knottiest issues to be resolved in the first year or so of this process – the subject of extended debate between the U.S. and Germany in particular – was to agree upon the specific sizing limits of such temporary deployment flexibilities to be contained in the NATO negotiating proposal.

Another critical implication of this new structure of individual national and territorial ceilings would be its role as an alternative to what the Russians sought – which would have been a formal and explicit collective ceiling on all of NATO holdings, in effect to cap the Alliance now and for any future enlargement. The U.S. and the Allies were united in resisting that sort of explicit collective approach. But we did have a degree of potential flexibility in just where the new individual national ceilings might be set. For example: In the case of a number of states, including current Allies but especially some of the leading Central European aspirants to NATO, it was possible for the national governments to envisage certain military equipment reductions. This was possible in the case of the Central Europeans because, as they prepared to join the Alliance, their respective military establishments were on the cusp of modernizing and moving away from past Soviet-style models built around large numbers of tanks and the like, and more towards the smaller and more agile military structures with a greater emphasis on quality versus raw quantity.

But it took some time in getting agreement among all of the Allies and prospective Allies on such ideas and their details. In the first few weeks of 1997, we had a series of exceptionally intense, tough negotiating sessions in the HLTF at NATO headquarters – I can still remember at least one ended with especially sharp words around the table – all in an effort to hammer out the central elements of a NATO-agreed negotiating proposal to table in Vienna as soon as feasible. Politically that step was becoming increasingly important for NATO-Russia relations. We were finally able to do so in February of that year.

By itself that would not have been sufficient to meet Russian concerns. But in various bilateral discussions with them leading up to and surrounding one of the visits of Secretary Albright to Moscow – in early spring of '97 I seem to recall – we were able to make a plausible case that, even absent an explicit collective ceiling on NATO members, the de facto effect of the sum of their eventual individual national holdings would constitute overall reductions from current levels of equipment held among NATO members. This elicited some grudging Russian interest: a useful step forward but deep differences remained.

As I mentioned earlier, there was a larger political process and timeline within which the CFE adaptation effort was playing a role. That May of '97, for example, a series of

general principles were agreed upon to govern a new working relationship “between a new Russia and a new NATO” (as I remember the characterization of back then). This agreement known as the “NATO-Russia Founding Act” contained certain commitments political in nature – a notable one was that NATO had “no intention, no plan and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. But the Founding Act also recognized the need to conclude “as expeditiously as possible” adaptation of the CFE treaty regime because of its legally-binding obligations and its very specific limits.

Notwithstanding that commitment, a big problem was that a fully adapted CFE Treaty involved such a number of state players, complexity of unresolved issues, and necessary technical detail as to be impossible to be concluded in a satisfactory manner in only a few months.

In July of '97 there was a major NATO Summit in Madrid at which the leaders of the Alliance agreed upon enlargement invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. During the course of the summit, I sought out Strobe Talbott at the U.S. delegation's hotel in Madrid to float some ideas for seeking an interim agreement in the immediate near term that, given the impossibility of concluding a complete adapted CFE Treaty anytime soon, might nonetheless serve our political purposes of demonstrating tangible forward movement on CFE. He liked the ideas and took them to Secretary Albright; she in turn raised the notion with Foreign Minister Primakov in St. Petersburg of making such a concerted special effort at striking a “Basic Elements” deal in the weeks to follow.

On their instructions, I joined the delegations in Vienna immediately afterwards for an accelerated push to win agreement – with the Russians in the first instance but also with all of the other 28 parties – on just what such a “Basic Elements Agreement” might be able to contain. It would not answer all of the open questions but could serve as the guide to the further work on CFE adaptation and the creation of a new Treaty regime. It was a tough slog for one-two weeks but it worked out in the end.

I remember now that all of this played out in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna – up on the fourth or fifth floor where there was a large conference room for all thirty of the delegations to be seated in the midst of faded Hapsburg glory and splendor, surrounded in turn by a rabbit warren of small rooms and crooked corridors ideal for quiet conversation and sidebar bilateral sessions. It also comes back to me that, at one point in an especially drawn-out and stalemated bilateral with the Russians, I had to start to rise from the table to walk our team out – only to have my Russian counterpart call me back and begin to show a bit of modest flexibility.

The resulting “Basic Elements” document of August '97 usefully keyed off a number of ideas put forward in the NATO negotiating proposal. It demonstrated progress on one of the political objectives laid out in the NATO-Russia Founding Act and, no less importantly bought us much needed time and political space to work on the many, many still unsettled questions in the negotiations.

And there were a number of such issues and complications to be addressed in the months that followed. For example: As the adapted CFE regime under negotiation moved towards a much finer meshed series of limits than had been contained in the original Treaty, we needed to pay attention to the increased demands such a structure would place on effective verification and transparency. This would include not just revised inspection arrangements but a new range of notifications and information exchange provisions.

But strengthened transparency and verification arrangements would also pose a challenge for the daily operations and normal movements of U.S. forces in Europe as well. Here again we had to strike a balance – one not at all easy to determine – between our enhanced verification requirements within this new regime and the need to preserve sufficient Treaty room for operational flexibility of our own forces. I remember quite well how specific details of such provisions were debated within the interagency between the Pentagon and Intelligence Community almost to the very end; they were some of the last items to be finalized in the final negotiations at 30 in Istanbul.

There were, of course, other issues requiring further work on how sub-regional ceilings might be expressed in the new Treaty structure (again echoes of the Flank question). Unlike in 1996, however, this time we were able to ensure that some of the Allies most directly concerned – Turkey and Norway – could take a visible negotiating lead with the Russians in developing possible solutions. And within NATO itself, there was considerable back and forth over the division among member states of particular equipment entitlements under the new national ceilings.

But one particular set of issues increasingly came to the fore in '98 – '99. These revolved about the presence of Russian forces – under a variety of circumstances – in such countries as Georgia and Moldova, and to a much lesser and direct degree Ukraine. These former two cases became more and more tied up in the negotiating end-game.

A step back to the period immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union is probably necessary. For Moscow, there had long been an interest in asserting that issues related to a residual Russian military presence in these countries were bilateral in nature and by and large to be treated in a bilateral context. In some cases, this military presence had been originally and ostensibly related to the need to tamp down fighting arising out of local separatist movements – as in Transnistria in Moldova or Abkhazia in Georgia. But the Georgian and Moldovan governments gradually came to see political utility in placing these issues into a broader multilateral context, engaging the interest and support of the rest of Europe and the U.S.

With an eye to those sensitivities (and those in our own Congress), one of the political principles that we and other allies were seeking to reaffirm in the text of an adapted CFE Treaty was the necessity of host state consent for the presence of stationed forces. By the final year of negotiations in 1999, the governments of Georgia and Moldova decided to use this opportunity to the extent possible – and to make their own final agreement to any negotiated CFE adaptation contingent on this.

In the final end game – in the run-up to an OSCE Summit to be hosted by Turkey in Istanbul in November 1999 – this meant an effort to work out terms of withdrawal, or at least partial withdrawal, of some of those Russian forces and equipment from specific sites in Georgia and Moldova.

Q: While you were doing this did the episode of the Russian brigade move out of Bosnia? It seemed they were under no control, but the local commanders.

DUNKERLEY: No, that was part of the late stages of intervention by the U.S. and NATO forces in Kosovo in 1999. The related problem that I got involved at that time – at least in terms of Kosovo – came in the run up to the NATO military operation when there was a dilemma for us as to the application of certain international commitments.

Under the existing CFE treaty regime, the Russians had the right to inspect our air base in Aviano, Italy, which was playing an important role in these operations. That went off reasonably well, as I recall.

But under a separate OSCE political agreement on confidence building measures (known as the Vienna Document), they also had certain rights for receiving notifications with regard to the build up of U.S. and NATO forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, bordering Kosovo, once these deployments reached a certain size. This was more problematic as at that point, we were moving into what could soon become a hot war. It brought to the fore concern over preserving operational security – especially on the part of SACEUR and his people – even as there was a political requirement to be seen as meeting our obligations for transparency as required under the Vienna Document (something we had criticized others for neglecting). Reaching an acceptable way ahead took some time and discussion within the USG and NATO.

Q: The assumption being that anything that we divulge to the Russians would immediately go to their colleagues, the Serbs.

DUNKERLEY: Right.

Q: It isn't a good way to run a war.

DUNKERLEY: You're right, but remember that we weren't at war at this point. This was period of pre-hostilities—and in a political situation that presented a difficult circle to square.

Q: How did we work on it?

DUNKERLEY: There were some protracted negotiations in both Washington and then in Brussels, both with the Allies – some of whom were very concerned about the Alliance being seen to meet its established commitments to transparency – and with SACEUR, General Wesley Clark. In the end, we ended up doing some things as required.

Q: What were the roles of Sweden and Finland during this time?

DUNKERLEY: On what issue?

Q: Coming up with a new defense posture, expanding NATO, dealing with Russia. Were they in or out of a particular camp, or were they consulted or sidelined?

DUNKERLEY: I think you have to differentiate among specific issues. Certainly they were important actors. On a number of issues related to the Balkans, the Swedes and the Finns were very active and constructive in support of the international efforts at ending the fighting in the different parts of the former Yugoslavia and then in implementation of the Dayton accords. We saw them as very useful partners, particularly on Russian-related issues within the OSCE context.

As the overall security environment changed – with the end of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the re-emergence of various states – their policies evolved as well. One of the most useful things they undertook at this time (along with Denmark and Norway) was in their political and practical support of the Baltic states. There was active diplomacy on their part, along with political-military advice and assistance in helping these countries develop and rebuild their own national security policies and establishments.

Sweden and Finland were not formally participating states in the CFE treaty regime which had, of course, originally consisted only of the members of the two blocs. With the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, however, the regime would become opened up for the participation of other European states if they so wish. This might include the traditional neutrals, or the Baltic states (who had opted out of participation in the original CFE in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet break-up). During this period, the Swedes and Finns had not yet made any such decision – in no small part, I suppose, because they wanted to see what the terms of adaptation might turn out to be. Their own particular military postures have been such as to rely to a much greater degree than others on prepositioned equipment sites in the context of national mobilization. Consequently, some of the rigorous CFE notification and verification measures that we would want to see applied further to the East gave the Swedes and Finns some concern. We had active consultations with them during the course of all this, but they were not our primary focus during this negotiation.

Q: Was there concern of dealing with the problem of deteriorating Russian military? There is a fleet up around Murmansk that is nuclear that is rusting away.

DUNKERLEY: Perhaps at the next time I will have to bring some further notes. We may need a little bit more structure to this particular discussion.

Certainly there was a sense of prickliness in a number of quarters because of many problems that the Russian Federation faced during this period, especially those affecting the Russian military. Not least of these latter may have been real budget constraints on

the military establishment – which in turn affected, in the specific CFE context, their ability to sign up for the implementation of CFE measures that involved equipment destruction or extensive redeployment, or the organization and preparation of inspections to be hosted – all things that cost money.

For example, and to jump ahead in time to the period following the November 1999 OSCE Summit where we reached political agreements related to withdrawal of Russian equipment from certain sites in Georgia and Moldova, it became clear that one of the reasons often cited for slow movement on their part was a lack of funds for such activities.

This was a real problem. So one of the things that I became involved in – around 2000 and 2001 – was exploring ways by which US Government assistance, and comparable assistance from other interested OSCE governments as well, might help cover some of the costs for the destruction or withdrawal of Russian military equipment from those places. That presented, of course, a whole set of its own issues and problems to be addressed: Who receives such assistance and under what conditions? At what rate is assistance geared to the actual progress of withdrawal? How are these actions verified and the expenditures accounted for? Given the degree to which the Russian military establishment was fractured at this time – with whom are you talking, Moscow or the local commanders? But that's jumping well ahead in the story – and as I said, let me recreate a timeline that may help give this discussion some structure.

Q: Going back to Kosovo, what about the errant Russian troop movement? From your perspective, how did you see this? Was it a power play on the part of a local commander of the Russian military or was it the Russian government?

DUNKERLEY: No. I would not second-guess Strobe Talbott's characterization of this in his own accounts.

Q: How did he characterize it?

DUNKERLEY: He characterized it, as I recall, as a decision from Moscow but apparently one not involving the Foreign Minister and other senior officials with whom he had just been dealing. It was a surprise to us – but quite honestly, the diplomatic activity on Kosovo at that particular moment was at a more senior level. I was not directly involved in that particular issue at that specific time.

Q: I would have thought that something like this would make you wonder about the reliability of agreements.

DUNKERLEY: Of course, all of this did. Throughout this difficult period – that is to say, during Moscow's unhappiness over the course of events in Kosovo and NATO's intervention – we recognized that there were frustrations, stresses and contradictory impulses at play with the Russians and their decision-making. Just as there were, though perhaps to a lesser degree, with other actors in these negotiations. We also understood

that simply reaching an agreement on the diplomatic level was not to be an end in and of itself but more likely to be only one stage within an overall process, involving all sorts of delays and difficulties in follow-through. We knew that implementation would be key – indeed the hard part.

As I've described, what I was doing as Special Envoy initially involved the negotiation of an adapted CFE Treaty. That was eventually signed at the presidential level in November of 1999 in Istanbul. But my work didn't stop at that point. It merely shifted focus more to the problem of facilitating and ensuring implementation of these agreements. We knew that was not going to be at all easy, given the complex nature of the issues and attitudes of the various parties concerned, that we couldn't rest on our oars following the Istanbul signing ceremony. In all of this, the U.S. team sought to approach individual implementation issues with a degree of cautious skepticism and a recognition we would have to undertake sustained and patient follow up.

Q: Any further background?

DUNKERLEY: I've gone into a lot of complex CFE substance – at times confusing and probably not widely-understood even then. It might be useful to step back for a moment. I think the key point remains political: There was a lot happening politically and strategically during that period – and the CFE adaptation process, and the different issues shaping the scope, direction and timing of that process, were all related to how we could seek to dampen down possible negative effects of all this change underway within the European political-military environment. Remember that even as we were seeking to end open conflict in the Balkans and head off new outbreaks, the concept of NATO enlargement increasingly came to the fore in our approach to post-Cold War European security and stability. That in turn required both an effort on our part to avoid any dilution of the Alliance's political and military effectiveness and a credible strategy for managing Russian concerns and reactions – and all this as politics in that country struggled with its own internal problems.

Q: But was this strictly Russia? Were we sort of dismissing Ukraine, Belarus, was it centered on Russia?

DUNKERLEY: No. We weren't "dismissing" anyone. But to be effective, any negotiating or reassurance strategy inevitably put great weight on the Russia angle because they were such a key player. Their actions and reactions would further shape the concerns of many of the other states during this time.

But again: our negotiating strategy was definitely not Russia-exclusive. As specific issues evolved in the CFE context, we had to take into account not just Moscow's unique concerns but the interests that the whole set of the former states of the Soviet Union and those of Central Europe might bring to the table on individual issues – how they saw their own roles and security affected by CFE adaptation.

A useful question is just why our political focus at this time on CFE specifically? Given its sometimes highly-technical subject matter, its arcane details, CFE was not always well-understood at policy-levels, let alone among press or public. In some quarters, it was seen as overtaken by the end of the Cold War and thus dispensable.

On the other hand, CFE had, after all, turned out to be one of the major vehicles for an ongoing and substantive interaction among nations about the European military picture. It provided a forum where individual concerns and ambiguities could be raised and addressed. To the extent the CFE regime could deliver greater predictability, greater stability, greater transparency, and a clear sense of mutual restraint in the form of specific and binding numerical limits, it was not at all surprising we and others would keep turning back to CFE as a management instrument amidst strategic change.

Coincident with our own renewed interest in CFE as a policy tool at this time, the Russians had of course their own desiderata. To the extent they could, they wanted to use CFE – its adaptation – as a way to get legally-binding constraints on the effects of NATO enlargement both in the immediate and longer-term. As I've noted earlier, the Russian leadership also had major concerns related to levels of constraints that were applied to the Russia itself in the Caucasus through provisions of the original treaty.

This latter effort on the part of the Russians was long a source of concern for several of the NATO allies, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Caucasus such as Turkey (for self-evident reasons), but also Norway because given the peculiarity of the way the original treaty was structured, flank limits applied both in the North and South. As the northernmost Alliance member, Norwegian planners were no less sensitive about what the implications might be for a sudden lifting of limits on the Russians in these areas. That is why, in the course of our own negotiating strategy, it was so important to move those states to the fore in the development of solutions with the Russians on these particular issues.

Q: When you talk about the flank, you mentioned Norway being concerned, but outside of having lots of submarines out around the peninsula, why would Norway perceive the Russians as threatening?

DUNKERLEY: Somewhere they're weeping in Oslo to hear you say that. One can argue that the particular security concerns as expressed by this country or that country might be overdrawn. But they still need to be considered seriously, not least as members of the Alliance in the development of NATO negotiating strategy.

During the history of NATO, the Norwegians have long been sensitive to the fact that they have been, in effect, on the front line, bordering the Soviet Union just as Turkey was – even as much of the attention throughout the Alliance has often been to the center of Europe. Certainly the unique geography in the north suggests a different sort of threat than might have existed on the central plains in Germany. For Norwegian political leaders and their national security establishment, this was not an entirely academic concern, even with the end of the Cold War. They were sensitive to the politics of how

this issue might be seen to be addressed in any negotiations. They wanted to avoid a situation in which it appeared that Norway's perceived security interests were somehow being sacrificed because another political objective of the Alliance was somehow of a higher priority.

So you're right that one can raise question marks about the particular concerns expressed in these negotiations by the Norwegians as well as by the Turks and others, not least as their respective security situations in the late 1990's – the period of which we're speaking – was immensely improved over what it had been for much of the decades preceding. That should probably be the case in considering all of the national positions.

But in all of this, our own negotiating agenda in CFE – the overall dynamic of how we might seek to accomplish certain basic objectives in an unusually complex and diverse multilateral context – was driven not simply by hard and fast calculations of straightforward military balances. Rather the underlying driver was, in effect, the political psychology that might apply in how each capital came to view its own particular national security priorities in the context of this CFE adaptation exercise.

I learned as Special Envoy that you might not agree with all of the logic behind such priorities as set by other actors – but as a negotiator, to ignore them would be at your peril.

Q: Did Kaliningrad below Lithuania play a part?

DUNKERLEY: Kaliningrad was part of the so-called Flank region within the Russian Federation in the complex maps of the original CFE Treaty structure. And the Baltic States – though not yet participating states in CFE – were very much concerned and influenced by what might occur under an adapted CFE in their immediate neighborhood. So we conducted a number of consultations with those governments during the course of adaptation to hear their concerns and to make sure they understood what our own negotiating positions were – and were not.

Additionally, I recall that in this period there was a separate bilateral negotiation among the parties concerned – Vilnius and Moscow – relating to the transit of Russian military equipment to and from the geographically separate Kaliningrad enclave. There was some concern on the Russian side about ensuring continued transit rights across Lithuania in light of that country's aspirations to join NATO. There were no less vigorous concerns on the Lithuanian side on the need for some form of constraint on transit activities given their own history – especially the manner in which the Soviet military forces occupied that country in 1940. As Lithuania enters the Alliance, that is an issue which seems to have been resolved.

Q: There were Soviet troops stationed in some countries.

DUNKERLEY: Yes there were in some cases. And I should note that the concerns of those countries – Georgia, Moldova – were also echoed at times by various members on

the Hill, particularly then SFRC Chair Senator Helms and his staff. We were acutely conscious of that factor as we went forward in the negotiations, especially as the terms of any adapted Treaty would, of course, eventually require Senate debate and ratification

But in addition to all the substantive and political problems, there was another recurring complication: time. How could we mesh the calendars of the very different processes underway?

I already mentioned, for example, how as NATO enlargement was going forward, a NATO summit was scheduled for Madrid in July 1997 when the Alliance would make decisions about inviting specific countries to begin the process of entry into the Alliance. Working from that meant that by that summer of '97 we would also need to have in place the basics of a broad (but not detailed or comprehensive) understanding on CFE adaptation with Moscow – hence the push to conclude the interim “Basic Elements” agreement of that August which I described earlier.

That pattern came to be repeated over the following two years: a series of staged steps aimed at agreements in providing steadily growing clarity about the substantive direction the negotiations, all on a timeline geared to larger political forcing events.

Q: Why did the French and Germans have a different agenda than we had?

DUNKERLEY: They brought differing objectives and priorities to the table. The Germans, for instance, were – as in the original CFE negotiations – sensitive to any CFE element which might give an impression of singularizing Germany in this context. “Singularization” was a catch phrase that one would hear often during the first part of this period – late '96 and most of '97 – when we and the Allies were debating the best way to construct a new treaty structure of limits. This new structure should not, to the extent possible at least, seem to put an onus of particular constraints or special obligations on a single country or a single class of countries. It was a perfectly understandable objective, but there were fundamental differences of approach within the Alliance in no small part because of the inherent differences in our military postures and requirements.

Reduced to basics: The American military has always been “spread out.” As a global power with global responsibilities, we require a fair degree of flexibility in being able to deploy our military according to contingencies not only within the European region itself, but from and through Europe to areas outside of the European CFE region. As a consequence, we have been acutely conscious of the need for a degree of operational flexibility – and this shaped our own thinking within these negotiations. While we were prepared to enjoy some restraints, we wanted to be careful that these not be constructed in such a way that they might create an entirely new set of overly rigid requirements on our own forces and how we might be able to deploy them in the future.

The Germans and their own military did not face – and don't now – that particular concern to the same degree as the U.S. So not surprisingly, it was a lesser priority as their negotiators thought about just what the terms of a new treaty might look like.

A lot of this was conceptually tricky to begin with: How you moved from a treaty structure which was essentially built around the principle of equality between two blocs of parties (which were NATO and the then Warsaw Pact) into a new emphasis more focused on limitations, of varying levels, as applied to individual nations, independent of their alliance membership or not. And as I noted before, it would be an entirely new structure limiting not only how many tanks an individual nation might possess in its own forces, but also how many tanks from another country it might host on its territory.

Q: I would have thought that the Russians would be thinking in terms of the West trying to increase NATO and they must have sought to slow down the process.

DUNKERLEY: There was of course much Russian unhappiness with NATO enlargement. We heard continued assertions that it was a serious mistake on our part and their deeply rooted conviction it could only turn out to be to Russia's profound disadvantage. At particular moments – as during the NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo intervention in 1999 – the anger of Russian counterparts, especially among their military, was especially visible. So these were tough negotiations, certainly protracted, the conclusion often in doubt.

On the other hand, there was also an underlying factor in play: the overall strategic situation was such that, if there were not a CFE treaty, if CFE limitations or transparency disappeared, a primary victim might, in fact, turn out to be the Russians themselves.

Our argument was that CFE – with its legal basis, binding limits and wide scope – provided the Russian with a certain handle on what would be happening militarily on their Western border. If they didn't have that degree of predictability, Russian policy-makers and military planners would presumably have to allocate much more of scarce resources to compete in an unrestrained, increasingly opaque military environment. I may be mistaken but there seemed to be some realization of that consideration among some of our negotiating counterparts.

And there was at that time in '99 probably also a sense that, Russian tough tactics or growling noises notwithstanding, a train-wreck in the CFE adaptation negotiations would not necessarily be to their political advantage, particularly if Moscow were to be seen as the immediate cause.

Q: What was the attitude at the time towards the rebellion in Chechnya?

DUNKERLEY: This evolved over time, in no small part because of the complex situation in Chechnya itself. Remember that the first Chechen war was at the beginning of this period in 1994-95 and eventually came to a stalemate and negotiated cease-fire. It was a military setback for Moscow. During that original conflict, one could sense conflicted views among Western observers, a certain latent sympathy with the separatists and their aspirations for national independence and a serious concern for Russian tactics and

response. But there was also a realization of the arguments to be made on behalf of efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

As we discussed earlier in connection with my previous assignment in Vienna, we focused – at least in the OSCE context – on an effort to get an international presence into Chechnya in the form of an OSCE monitoring mission during the first flare-up of fighting. During the immediately subsequent period, one could say Chechnya was quiet as measured by the amount of international attention it generated, but it really wasn't, it was festering. The local security situation became such the OSCE presence had to withdraw. There were all sorts of problems and conflict within the Chechen body politic itself. Which, in turn, reignited a hot war in the second half of 1999 through terrorist action in neighboring Dagestan —and then a spate of mysterious bombings elsewhere in Russia – eventually leading to a massive re-introduction of Russian troops in late '99. During this time, the degree to which the Chechen cause was apparently overtaken – and misused – by genuinely extremist elements which certainly colored Western views and reactions.

Q: When looking at conventional arms, were you looking at Russian ability to exert power? It didn't seem to be very effective.

DUNKERLEY: We were acutely conscious of the constraints the Russians now faced, the sad state that the Russian military had fallen into. This had two effects.

The first was that this whole set of negotiations – and our dialogue with the Russians on European security – was qualitatively different, certainly in focus and objectives. Remember that only a decade or so before, the big concern revolved about the conventional military imbalance favoring the East. The East-West discussions in MBFR in the 1970's and early 80's had as their primary objective to achieve arms reductions in such a fashion as to minimize the risks of conventional surprise attack.

There were real military threats that lay at the core of these earlier negotiations. That was much less the case when – in the late 90's – we undertook the CFE adaptation process. In the latter situation, we came to talk more of measures with a strategic political objective and the desired effect of reinforcing stability and enhancing predictability rather than further reductions in a military order of battle context.

I need to be clear: in talking of this reduction of potential threats, I am speaking on a macro level if you will – I am speaking in terms of possible post-Cold War military risks that the U.S. and NATO might face, which in this later period were most unlikely. But remember as well that smaller and newly-independent countries – such as Georgia – or those with difficult histories of occupation like the Baltic states – had different, and not unjustified, security perceptions vi a vis their large Russian neighbor and its political, economic and military power relative to their own. That phenomenon had no less a significant influence on the course of CFE adaptation negotiations.

The second effect of the Russian military's difficult state in these negotiations was – again as I mentioned earlier – that it generated a constraint on what the Russians could do in terms of various CFE-related activities. In some situations, their military hurt quite badly for money; the easiest thing to do in that sort of situation is nothing. It costs money to reduce weaponry, to destroy equipment in accordance with CFE requirements, or particularly to redeploy them to new areas. It also costs money and resources to agree to submit to verification regimes requiring a number of inspections that have to be prepared for and received. As a result, we were negotiating with a partner who was able to poor mouth their own ability to do certain things rapidly or easily. This factor became increasingly important as we discussed questions related to equipment withdrawal from Georgia and Moldova.

Q: Were the Russians interested in verifying what was going on in the West?

DUNKERLEY: Yes. But I suspect there were conflicting priorities on their part just as on our side. What you wanted to accomplish in the treaty through verification and information exchange posed an interesting negotiating problem.

As I noted before: the U.S. intelligence community was interested in as ambitious a transparency and verification regime as possible. In the original version of the CFE treaty, designed to reduce the risk of a major conventional surprise attack, the overall magnitude of the equipment limits were relatively high and structured on a bloc to bloc basis, and the task of the intelligence community in those circumstances originally envisaged for CFE was to be able to detect a militarily significant violation – or put another way, to be able to detect cheating where an additional thousand tanks or so might make a difference. However, we now would be constructing an adapted treaty regime, aimed at reinforcing stability, where the national and territorial limits would be more finely-grained, focusing on specific countries or even on specific parts of a country and in some cases on fairly low numbers of equipment. In those situations, it might become important to determine whether there were an additional fifty tanks or so in a very specific area.

By contrast, the U.S. military was well aware that it would have to live under such provisions and requirements as well. And at a certain point, those could become increasingly onerous for any operational commander. A prime example of this were the painfully negotiated provisions – first in a common NATO proposal and then in Vienna with the Russians and other states parties – laying out requirements, timing and details of notifying the movement of CFE-limited equipment. How low should the threshold of equipment numbers be to trigger such a notification? And how detailed should the information in any such notification be? At a certain point, too rigorous requirements could, in fact, begin to cause all sorts of problems. It would be impractical if your regime starts to generate concerns and non-compliance violations when, as in a normal movement by rail or road of a modest number of tanks or ACV's, delays or accidents or other problems somehow call into the question the information contained in an overly-detailed short-fuse Treaty notification. And so – for good reasons of operational

flexibility – the Pentagon and our commanders in Europe had an interest in keeping the ambitions for extensive notifications and verification under a certain rein.

That took us through some fierce discussions within the U.S. government interagency process as to just where we should set our mark. The Allies had differing views as well. The Russians had strong concerns; they certainly did not want to be singularized in any way. They did not want overly onerous requirements laid on themselves. But they also wanted to be able to exercise their ability to inspect U.S. and Allied forces (even though it would cost money and on occasion, they did not appear to take full advantage of the opportunities provided). In this regard, they were especially interested in capturing greater transparency vis a vis U.S. and NATO air deployments, where we in turn had particular red-lines to preserve.

Jumping ahead, all of these and other CFE negotiating issues began to come to a head in late '98 and increasingly so in early '99, again driven by the political schedule on a higher level. The NATO Summit to mark the 50th Anniversary of the Alliance was set to take place in Washington in April of that year. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic by that point had done what was required of them and they would formally join the Alliance around that time. (And, of course, the Kosovo drama, NATO's intervention against Serbia and Russian opposition to that move were all playing out during this same period as well).

Once again, it became critical for us to make a concerted push to register sufficient negotiating progress that would enable the Vienna process to begin to close on an overall adaptation solution – not least to keep visible pace with the enlargement progress to be accomplished and celebrated that spring. Throughout late '98 and early '99, we undertook an intensified series of bilateral conversations with our Russian counterparts – meeting periodically in Vienna, Brussels, Moscow, New York, often on the margins of U.S.-Russian ministerial encounters. We paralleled these with consultative visits to a number of Allied and Eastern capitals and almost continuous telephone discussion with our HLTF counterparts and other opposite numbers.

All of this led to an extended multilateral negotiation at 30 in Vienna in March-April of '99, succeeding in reaching agreement on a basic product that filled in a lot of the substantive blanks necessary for adaptation of the Treaty. That could now be turned over to the lawyers to translate all of these substantive points into Treaty language.

Underpinning all of this was a common commitment to have the CFE Adaptation Treaty wrapped up for signature at the presidential level by November '99 at an upcoming OSCE Summit in Istanbul. But to ensure that all participating states would be willing and prepared to agree and sign at that time, we now needed to find ways alleviate Georgian and Moldovan concerns over Russian forces in their countries.

In the first instance, that meant a good deal of travel for myself and colleagues to both of Tbilisi and Chisinau in that April-November period. To be clear: The Georgians and Moldovans quite properly would have to take the lead in pressing and negotiating the

details of just what they wanted from the Russians on these issues. Our own role was to gauge their seriousness in doing so and to provide both substantive advice and political support to strengthen their odds of being able to strike an acceptable deal. We made that clear to them – and to Russian counterparts at the time (who, I'd add, by this time also shared an interest in seeing that the Adapted CFE Treaty could be agreed to and successfully signed by all by the Istanbul Summit deadline).

Q: With Moldova, there is a sizeable Russian contingent there that doesn't want to leave.

DUNKERLEY: It was a good deal more complicated. At the time of the break up of the Soviet Union and coincident with a declaration of independence by the Republic of Moldova in 1991, there was a separatist movement among certain localities refusing to accept Moldovan authority (for a variety of reasons reportedly including a degree of local Russian-Romanian ethnic suspicion and anxiety). This in turn led to an outbreak of violence and fighting in early '92. The resulting stalemate saw an autonomous enclave based in a narrow strip on the eastern side of Dniester River – hence the title Transnistria. Though this was ostensibly Moldovan territory, it became very much run by a collection of former apparatchiks and some unsavory characters based in Tiraspol.

The Russian forces in the region at the time – the 14th Army as I recall – brought an end to this early round of fighting. There was a resulting tripartite ceasefire arrangement that, the Russians would frequently assert, provided justification for their continued military presence. And separately and shortly afterwards, there was an OSCE observer mission deployed at the invitation of Moldova. Based entirely in the Transnistrian region, the Russian forces were commonly seen as exerting a certain amount of favoritism and support on the behalf of the separatists, reflecting perceptions of extensive political and economic ties between Tiraspol and Moscow interests.

Over the past several years, the Russian military presence has shrunk considerably in number; most of the enlisted troops came to be locals. Of greater concern was perhaps the military infrastructure in Transnistria that had previously supported the Warsaw Pact southern flank. There remained, for instance, a major Russian arms depot – I believe it was Kolbasna – that reportedly contained over forty thousand tons of all sorts of things: ammunition, mines, rockets – and there were continuing reports and fears of illicit leakage from these arsenals. (Indeed, Transnistria was commonly seen in those days as a source and transit point for all sorts of illegal activity in terms of smuggling and such).

So this was an unhealthy, potentially destabilizing situation and seen to undercut the viability of the Moldovan state. The Moldovan authorities indicated during this period that they wanted to use CFE as a lever to get the Russian forces out which, in turn, would presumably strengthen Moldova's political position vis a vis Transnistrian separatism. But because of the twists and turns of Moldovan domestic politics, the fragility of the government of the day, and perhaps as well a sensitivity in Chisinau not to overplay their hand vis a vis Moscow, the Moldovan pursuit of this objective was sometimes hesitant and inconsistent in effect.

The Georgian situation was different and complicated in its own way. I ended up visiting several times for conversations with President Shevardnadze and Foreign Minister Menagarishvili. They were quite vigorous in pressing the issue.

In Georgia the Russian forces occupied several military bases throughout the country. The one of most immediate concern for the Georgian authorities involved a significant Russian presence at the air base of Vaziani just outside of Tbilisi, the capital city. Operations and transit through Vaziani were not under Georgian control; indeed individuals involved in an earlier assassination attempt against Shevardnadze had reportedly exited the country through that particular air base. This lack of transparency and control generated strong interest in getting Vaziani closed or under Georgian authority, getting the Russians out of there.

There were other Russian facilities in Georgia, some located in areas where the central government did not have full or even tenuous control. The Russian base at Gudauta in the separatist region of Abkhazia was the most difficult case in this regard. But there were also ones in more remote parts of southern Georgia – I particularly recall Akhalkalaki – where their presence was of some sensitivity for the central government. Again it was less the question of large, well-armed Russian military units; rather most of the personnel were locally recruited. But the base would have an economic impact in an otherwise poor area, and one result was to suggest a relationship to local elites not fully accountable to the central government.

Q: Did we see them at the time as being an effort by Moscow to use these local warlords?

DUNKERLEY: I think there were a variety of factors involved. There were local groups and different interest-networks involved in each of these cases, and there were probably assertive Russian efforts to use them as leverage vis a vis the host governments at various times. Simply standing pat could also be seen as consistent with a basic way of thinking that the maintenance of such a military presence in these areas was simply part of a line of political defense for the Russian Federation. We also probably shouldn't underestimate the ever-present power of inertia. Expending political capital and financial resources needed to close these bases and move out troops and equipment would require Moscow to take unwelcome decisions and incur tangible costs.

Q: How did things come out?

DUNKERLEY: In the end, the adapted CFE treaty was signed in Istanbul by all the participating countries' heads of state or government on the morning of Friday November 19th, 1999. President Clinton, of course, signed for the U.S.

Concurrent with this signature – and annexed to the new Treaty, I recall – were sidebar commitments. There was a general Political Declaration adopted by the Summit as a whole which, in one part, welcomed a commitment of the Russian Federation to an orderly withdrawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of 2002.

Concluded under the authority of Presidents Shevardnadze and Yeltsin (Istanbul was, by the way, the latter's last major foray on the international scene before his resignation on behalf of Putin), there was also a separate Russian-Georgian political agreement. It was specific in detail regarding a withdrawal of Russian forces from Vaziani and Gudauta on a timeline; it also set in motion a bilateral process for negotiating the closure of the other bases in country.

These came to be known as the "Istanbul Commitments." The U.S. and NATO members made clear at the time, and subsequently reaffirmed in various forms, that our own ratification of the adapted Treaty would of course be contingent upon fulfillment of those political commitments. We saw the commitments as integral to the agreement on the adapted CFE Treaty and bringing that regime into force.

Additionally I should note that in the second half of 1999, as the CFE adaptation negotiations entered their last stages, the Chechen war reignited again. Questions as to Russian equipment levels in the North Caucasus again came to the fore especially as they related to the Flank limitations in force. Their levels were high in the southern flank. So we also required at that time another commitment from Russia that their overall force levels would have to come down to what the new limits would be in the Adapted Treaty before other countries would go to ratification. Now, in the period since then, their force levels in that area have in fact come down.

At Istanbul all of this was, in fact, more of a close-run thing than apparent to most at the time. The signing ceremony for the Treaty was scheduled for first thing that Friday morning, November 19th. But specific language in one of the associated political documents – a sentence or two dealing with "facilitation" by the Moldovan government of Russian equipment withdrawal from separatist parts of that country – was in contention until the very end, and without that in place, Moldovan agreement and signature of the whole package was very much in doubt.

I recall being asked to join in a small group negotiation with the Moldovan Foreign Minister in a back room of the Ciragan Palace Hotel, trying out different language formulations. We only reached agreement around 3 am – this for a multilateral summit-level signing ceremony to be held only six hours later – and then I had to race back to do a quick note for Secretary Albright and the White House contingent when they awoke. All very fraught at the time, but with an upbeat outcome...

I also think back that, immediately after the ceremony finally went off that Friday morning and we'd returned to the Ciragan, the Secretary was good enough to seek me out. She made a point of giving me the pen used by the President to sign the new Treaty. I then retired to the bar downstairs for a glass of champagne with my wife Patricia, who used the pen to sign the bar tab.

At that time, as everyone was departing Istanbul, I also remember remarking to State colleagues that "now the really hard part begins" – seeking to ensure full implementation

of what we'd spent negotiating for the last several years and which the leaders of the thirty states had only just agreed.

That proved to be an accurate prediction – not least as to my own duties for the next two years or so. Early on there was recognition in Washington that the political commitments for reduction and withdrawal of military forces and equipment from Georgia and Moldova could all too easily stall out. Their implementation would not be an easy process as there were various logistical challenges, and a number of competing political equities and interests involved, certainly on the Russian side but also even within the two countries concerned. These included individuals and groups that could be at best grudging or ambivalent about the implementation of these commitments and at worst were actively opposed.

As I mentioned earlier, this was a time when the Russian military was operating under severe budgetary constraints and we quickly found that factor critical. Condensing the story of the next year or so, we worked on finding ways that U.S., key Allies and other interested members of the OSCE could help pick up a significant portion of the costs associated with particular withdrawals.

I would have to recheck the precise details but I recall that in this fashion, the U.S. early on facilitated, and monitored firsthand, the initial withdrawal by sea of a large number of Russian tanks, ACVs and other equipment out of Georgia. The Russian base at Vaziani was closed on schedule, which was a major step, and subsequently – following further Georgian negotiations with the Russians – those at Batumi and Akhalkalaki were also.

Using the OSCE Mission in Moldova (under the leadership of former FSO Bill Hill), members of that organization worked a similar arrangement there – funding, facilitating and verifying the rail shipment of excess ammunition and equipment out of the Kolbasna arsenal back to Russia, eventually some 50 plus trainloads as I recall. This was in addition to the destruction of some 100 tanks and such in place.

So 2000-2001 saw important progress in the implementation of the Istanbul Commitments necessary for bringing into force the new adapted CFE regime but also identified a number of tough problems. Now a few years later – 2004 - 2005 – I'd note that, despite various best efforts, they are still outstanding and thus blocking further movement by the U.S. and Allies towards bringing the adapted Treaty into force.

At a certain point, the Russians began to balk as to the political commitment to complete, as opposed to partial, withdrawal of their military presence from the separatist Transnistria – whose authorities' long-standing obstructionism to the project provided an excuse.

Similarly, the remaining Russian base at Gudauta in Georgia was located in separatist Abkhazia which asserted de facto independence, which the Russians argued had the practical effect of precluding their dismantlement of the base and its return to Georgian authority.

So in effect, it might well be that we made important progress in this effort on behalf of implementation on these commitments in Georgia and Moldova, perhaps as much as possible in that period. But we've gotten to a point where remaining obstacles will be dependent upon larger political solutions vis a vis separatism in both countries.

In any event, I was active in the CFE effort until late 2001. At that time, I was asked to serve as Assistant Dean for the Senior Seminar for a year at FSI (Foreign Service Institute) to fill in an unexpected opening. Following my work at FSI, I went over to National Defense University for a several months of teaching at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies before my retirement from active duty in 2003.

Q: When you went to your senior seminar, when were you there?

DUNKERLEY: They had just lost the individual designated to lead the Senior Seminar program. As I had been a Senior Seminar participant about a decade before, I was glad to have the opportunity to step back in...

Q: How did you find that year?

DUNKERLEY: It was useful to be able to tackle that assignment with the perspective of a former participant – to return to the Senior Seminar with a certain sense of what I had found most useful, what I thought could have been stressed more, and so forth. I remain convinced that it has been a program with considerable potential value both for the individuals concerned and for the Department.

Q: I was there back in the 1970s during the 17th Senior Seminar and one thing that disappointed me although I thought it was a great program, the military contribution was minor. These are people who were at the colonel or navy captain level and I don't think went anywhere. This was not a stepping stone to general officership.

DUNKERLEY: I think that experience varies. I've seen examples in which the past military participants in the seminar have gone in both directions: those who rose in rank and responsibility as well as those who retired out.

I think the larger and more interesting question is how the State Department has made use of the Senior Seminar program. Now since then, management has stopped the program and, I gather, is seeking to try other variations of leadership and management training...hopefully for a wider cast of participants. But even before that step, there has been the issue of how seriously – or consistently – the Department itself has taken the Senior Seminar as a vehicle for identifying and developing talent for the next senior level of responsibilities, for generating a more effective sense of firsthand knowledge and ability to work across agency lines, and so forth.

Q: Were they rumblings while you were doing the seminar of closing it down?

DUNKERLEY: I think there were at the time, but I wasn't really part or privy to that discussion which I gather was more at the Undersecretary for Management level. I suspect the question of continuing the Senior Seminar intersected with consideration of a larger problem at the Department regarding the scope of training and across the board preparation in management and leadership skills in the face of constrained resources – and unfortunately, the Senior Seminar lost out.

Q: The military, of course, has a very structured thing.

DUNKERLEY: It also has much more of an established tradition of fitting recurrent training into both their overall staffing levels and their career patterns for individuals.

Q: When did you retire?

DUNKERLEY: The fall of 2003. I did Senior Seminar for a year and then went over to National Defense University. I became a distinguished adjunct professor at the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies where I am still teaching.

Q: Particularly your experience in these negotiations which were at the core at much of the expansion of NATO, are you able to keep up with that?

DUNKERLEY: To a certain degree, yes. Indeed, I continue to travel a lot and I do a number of conferences, meetings, and writings on these European security issues. But I am also increasingly drawn into a number of Track II – unofficial exchanges among adversaries – on Near East/South Asia issues. There's an interesting inter-relationship and substantive overlap in terms of some specific problems.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop.

DUNKERLEY: I think it is. Obviously, I would have to really dig through some notes on dates and places because I am conscious of how much I've forgotten.

End of interview