

Excerpts from the France Country Reader

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FRANCE

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Thomas W. Wilson	1937-1938 1949-1952	Journalist, <u>Paris Herald</u> Information Officer, Marshall Plan
William C. Trimble	1939-1940	Consular Officer, Paris
Ella DeSchaub	1939-1940	Personal Assistant to Ambassador & Mrs. Biddle, Angers and Paris
Constance Ray Harvey	1941-1942	Vice Consul, Lyon
James Cowles Hart Bonbright	1942-1949	France Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Paul F. DuVivier	1942 1958-1961 1961-1962 1962-1965	Consular Officer, Marseille Deputy Commercial Attaché, Paris Commercial Relations, Bordeaux Principal Officer, Nice/Monaco
Robert C. Haney	1943-1945 1945-1949 1951-1959	XVIII Airborne, US Army Journalist, <u>Paris Herald</u> Press Officer, Paris
Ridgway B. Knight	1944-1950	Special Assistant to the Ambassador, Paris
Richard Funkhouser	1945-1947 1965-1968	Petroleum Attaché, Paris Political Counselor, Paris

Harold Kaplan	1945-1950 1952-1957	Information Officer, USIS, Paris Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Jacques Reinstein	1946-1947	Foreign Ministers' Peace Conference, Paris
Peter J. Skoufis	1947-1950	Veteran Affairs Officer, Paris
Frederick W. Flott	1947-1952	Consular/Political Officer, Paris
John Berg	1947-1998	Locally Hired Employee, Paris
Robert G. Cleveland	1948-1952	Economic Officer, Paris
Arthur A. Hartman	1948-1953	Economic Officer, Paris
Edgar J. Beigel	1948-1970	French Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
A. Lincoln Gordon	1949-1950	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Jack B. Kubisch	1949-1950	Junior Assistant to the Ambassador, Paris
Melbourne L. Spector	1949-1951	Deputy Personnel Officer for European Region, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), Paris
Elizabeth A. Burton	1949-1952 1952-1954	Statistician - Marshall Plan, Paris Statistician – NATO, Paris
Virginia Hamill Biddle	1949-1954	Passport Clerk, Paris
John Gunther Dean	1950-1951	Economic Analyst, ECA, Paris
William J. Cunningham	1950	Clerk – Typist, Paris
John C. Leary	1950-1953	Vice Consul, Cherbourg
Laurent E. Morin	1950-1952 1952-1954	Economic Officer, Le Havre Economic/Commercial Officer, Paris
Leonard L. Bacon	1950-1954	Consul, Strasbourg

James McCargar	1950-1954	Political Officer, Paris
Jacob J. Kaplan	1950-1959	Board of European Payments Union, Paris
William A. Crawford	1950-1954	First Secretary, Paris
James M. Wilson	1951-1952 1953-1954	Air Force Representative, Paris USRO, Paris
Albert E. Hemsing	1951-1958	Marshall Plan Film Division, Paris
James G. Lowenstein	1952	Administrative Officer, ECA/Mutual Cooperation Administration, Paris
Stanley D. Schiff	1952-1954	Consular Officer, Strasbourg
John W. McDonald	1952-1954	Staff Secretary, Office of the Special Representative in Europe, Paris
Frederick H. Sacksteder	1952-1955	Senior Vice Consul, Lyon
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1952-1955	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Paris
Joseph F. Donelan, Jr.	1952-1955	Consular Officer, Paris
Richard T. Davies	1953-1955	NATO Staff, Paris
John A. Linehan, Jr.	1952-1956	Visa Officer, Paris
William J. Galloway	1952-1956	Special Assistant, NATO, Paris
Rudolph Aggrey	1953-1954 1954-1960	Information Officer, USIS, Strasbourg/Lille Youth Activities Officer, USIS, Paris
Carl F. Norden	1953-1956	Economic Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Economic Officer, Paris
Jean Mary Wilkowski	1953-1956	Assistant Commercial Attaché, Paris
Elden B. Erickson	1954-1956	Industry Reporting Officer, Paris
C. Douglas Dillon	1953-1957	Ambassador, France

Edwin McCammon Martin	1953-1957 1968	Marshall Plan, Paris Director of Development Assistance Committee, OECD, Paris
Ralph E. Lindstrom	1954-1957	Economic Financial Officer, Paris
Robert H. Miller	1954-1957	U.S. Delegation to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Elizabeth A. Burton	1954-1958	Coordinating Committee (COCOM), Paris
Lucius D. Battle	1955-1956	Deputy Executive Director, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Alan Fisher	1955-1957	Motion Picture Officer, USIS, Paris
James F. Leonard	1955-1957	Consular Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Albert Stoffel	1955-1957	Economic Officer, Paris
Manuel Abrams	1955-1958	USRO Director of Economic Division, Paris
L. Dean Brown	1955-1958	Internal Affairs, Paris
Herman J. Cohen	1955-1958	Consular Officer, Paris
Bertha Potts	1955-1959	Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon
Philip H. Valdes	1955-1959	Political Officer, Paris
Edmund Murphy	1956-1958	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon
William D. Morgan	1956-1958	Staff Aide, USRO, Paris
John W. Tuthill	1956-1959	Minister of Economic Affairs, Paris
Daniel L. Horowitz	1956-1960	Labor Attaché, Paris
Alan W. Lukens	1956-1960 1961-1963	International Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris Political Officer, Paris

W. Garth Thorburn	1956-1961	Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Paris
Henry E. Mattox	1957-1958	Vice Consul, Paris
Thomas R. Donahue	1957-1960	Program Officer, Free Europe Committee, Paris
Thompson R. Buchanan	1957-1960	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
David A. Korn	1957-1960	Political Officer, Paris
John A. McKesson, III	1957-1960	Political Officer, Paris
L. Michael Rives	1957-1961	Ambassador's Aide, Paris
George L. West	1957-1959	Political Counselor, Paris
Lewis Hoffacker	1958-1960	Political-Military Officer, Paris
Thomas W. Fina	1958-1960	Economic Officer, United States Regional Office, Paris
Robert E. Barbour	1958-1961	Political Officer, Paris
Dorothy A. Eardley	1958-1963	Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Paris
Cecil B. Lyon	1958-1964	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Robert Bauer	1959-1961	Media Officer, USIS, Paris
Harriet Curry	1959-1961	Secretary, OECD, Paris
Jacques J. Reinstein	1959-1963	Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, Paris
Robert Anderson	1959-1961	Political/Economic Officer, Bordeaux and Paris
	1962-1968	Political Counselor, Paris
Gilbert H. Sheinbaum	1959-1962	Economic Officer, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1959-1962	Treasury Office, Paris

Richard B. Finn	1959-1963	Political Officer, Paris
Robert J. Ryan, Sr.	1959-1964	Counselor for Administration, Paris
Ralph S. Smith	1959 1960-1964	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Lyon Assistant Press Attaché/Special Assistant to Ambassador for Public Affairs, USIS, Paris
Woodward Romine	1959-1965	Political Officer/Ambassador's Aide, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1959-1965	Regional Public Affairs Officer, USIA, Marseille
Thomas D. Bowie	1960-1962	Labor Attaché, Paris
Wingate Lloyd	1960-1962	Economic Officer, Marseille
Frederick Z. Brown	1960-1962	Consular Officer, Nice
John Howard Burns	1960-1965	Political Aide, France
Jay P. Moffat	1960-1965	Aide to Ambassador, Paris
G. Richard Monsen	1960-1966	Information Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Wells Stabler	1960-1965	Political Officer, Paris
Donald R. Norland	1961-1963	Political Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Paris
Robert L. Funseth	1961-1964	Consular Officer, Bordeaux
William V.P. Newlin	1961-1964	Special Assistant to the Economic Minister, Paris
Anthony Geber	1961-1967	Development Assistance Advisor, OECD, Paris
Richard J. Dols	1962-1963	Consular Officer, Bordeaux
Thomas F. Conlon	1962-1963	Consul, Le Havre
Norbert L. Anschutz	1962-1964	Political Counselor, Paris
Margaret J. Barnhart	1962-1964	Consular Officer, Paris

Stephen H. Rogers	1962-1964	Economic Officer, Paris
Peter K. Murphy	1962-1965	Consular Officer, Paris
James D. Phillips	1963-1965	Rotation Officer, Paris
Howard Imbrey	1963-1966	CIA, Worldwide Information Services, Paris
Stephen Paterson Belcher	1963-1966	Cultural Affairs Director, Dragon Student Center, USIS, Paris
Denise Abbey	1963-1967	Cultural Officer, USIS, Paris
Michael H. Newlin	1963-1967	Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Operations, Paris
Alan G. James	1963-1968	Political Advisor, European Command, Paris
Robert H. Maybury	1963-1968	UNESCO, Paris
Perry J. Stieglitz	1963-1967 1968-1970	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Marseille
John L. Loughran	1964-1966	Deputy to Political Advisor, NATO, Paris
Dorothy M. Sampas	1964-1966	Spouse of Foreign Service Officer, NATO, Paris
Cornelius D. Scully, III	1964-1966	Consular Officer, Nice
Idar D. Rimestad	1964-1967	Counselor for Administration, Paris
Jack R. Perry	1964-1969	Political Officer, NATO, Paris
William A. Crawford	1965-1967	Special Assistant for International Affairs, Paris
John E. Hall	1965-1967	Consular Office, Bordeaux
Stephen T. Johnson	1965-1967	Staff Assistant, USRO, Paris

Cecil S. Richardson	1965-1968	Consular Officer, Paris
Harlan Cleveland	1965-1969	US Ambassador to NATO, Paris
John Gunther Dean	1965-1969	Political Officer, Paris
Mary Chiavarini	1965-1968	Consul, Paris
Donald A. Kruse	1965-1968 1968-1970	Political Military Advisor, NATO, Paris Assistant to NATO Security General, Paris
William A. Weingarten	1965-1968	Economic/Political Officer, Paris
Harvey E. Gutman	1966-1967	AID Attaché, Paris
Richard W. Bogosian	1966-1968	Consular Officer, Paris
Denis Lamb	1966-1969	Administrative Officer, Paris
Woodward Romine	1966-1969	Desk Officer for France, Washington, DC
Lester E. Edmond	1966-1970	Counselor, US Mission to OECD, Paris
Christian A. Chapman	1966-1967	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs and Information, NATO, Paris
Serban Vallimarescu	1966-1969	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Perry W. Linder	1967-1968	General Services Officer, Paris
Frederick G. Mason	1967-1969	Deputy Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Robert B. Oakley	1967-1969	Political Officer, Paris
John H. Adams	1967-1969	Consular Officer, Marseille
George M. Barbis	1967-1969	Principal Officer, Bordeaux
James Dobbins	1967-1969	Consular Officer/Staff Assistant, Paris
Edward C. McBride	1967-1970	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Michael B. Smith	1967-1969	Economic Officer, Strasbourg

	1969-1970	Principal Officer, Lyon
Max W. Kraus	1967-1972	Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Carl F. Salans	1968-1969	Delegate, Vietnam Negotiations, Paris
Robert O. Blake	1968-1970	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Thomas F. Conlon	1968-1970	Consul General, Nice
Robert H. Miller	1968-1971	Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam), Paris
Maynard W. Glitman	1968-1973	Political Officer, Paris
James Mocerri	1969	Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Frances Cook	1969-19970	USIS, Staff Assistant to Ambassador Shriver's wife, Paris
David T. Jones	1969-1971	Rotation Officer, Paris
Teresa Chin Jones	1969-1971	Instutite Pasteur: Post Doctorate, Paris
Charles L. Daris	1969-1971	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Stephen J. Ledogar	1969-1972	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Joseph A. Greenwald	1969-1972	U.S. Representative, OECD, Paris
Andrew Steigman	1969-1972	Political Officer, Paris
Charles Lahiguera	1969-1973	Political Officer, UNESCO
John H. Trattner	1969	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Strasbourg, France
	1969-1970	Regional Information Officer, USIS, Paris
	1970-1974	Press Attaché, USIS, Paris
Burnett Anderson	1969-1977	Director, USIS, Paris
James D. Rosenthal	1970-1972	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1970-1972	Economic Officer, Paris
Carl C. Cundiff	1970-1973	Economic Officer, OECD, Paris

Patrick F. Morris	1970-1973	Deputy Director, OECD, Paris
Henry A. Holmes	1970-1974	Political Counselor, Paris
Stephen Bosworth	1971-1973	Economic Officer, Paris
Jack B. Kubisch	1971-1973	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
James Dobbins	1971-1973	Consular Officer, Strasbourg
Ronald D. Flack	1971-1974	Trade Promotion Office, Paris
James D. Phillips	1971-1975	Political Officer, Paris
Peter J. Skoufis	1971-1975	Administrative Counselor, Paris
Peter K. Murphy	1971-1975 1975-1977	Consular Officer, Paris Principal Officer, Nice
Anthony Quainton	1972-1973	Political Officer, Paris
Donald M. Anderson	1972-1973	Political Officer, Paris
Marshall P. Adair	1972-1974	Rotation Officer, Paris
John O. Grimes	1972-1974	Counselor for Labor Affairs, Paris
Richard Sackett Thompson	1972-1974	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
William H. Marsh	1972-1974	Delegate, Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris
Stephen H. Rogers	1972-1975	Counselor, OECD, Paris
John N. Irwin, II	1973-1974	Ambassador, France
Robert M. Beecroft	1973-1975	Staff Aide to Ambassador Irwin, Paris
Marie Therese Huhtala	1973-1975	Consular Officer, Paris
Galen L. Stone	1973-1975	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
William Veale	1973-1975	Vice Consul, Strasbourg
Gordon S. Brown	1973-1976	Economic Officer, Paris
Mark S. Pratt	1973-1978	Member, US Delegation to International

		Conference on Vietnam, Paris
Joan M. Plaisted	1973-1980	Commercial Officer, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1974	Consul General, Marseille
Elizabeth Raspolic	1974-1976	Vice Consul, Lyon
John Hurd Willett	1974 1975-1977	Consul, Bordeaux Political Officer, Paris
Herman J. Cohen	1974-1977	Political Counselor, Paris
Woodward Romine	1974-1977	Consul General, Strasbourg
George Q. Lumsden	1974-1979	Economic Officer, Paris
Samuel R. Gammon, II	1975-1978	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
David M. Adamson	1975-1976 1976-1977	Deputy Principal Officer, Strasbourg Executive Secretary, Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), Paris
Victor D. Comras	1975-1978	Deputy Delegate to COCOM, Paris
George Jaeger	1975-1978	Political Officer/Deputy Counselor, Paris
Raymond Malley	1975-1978	Minister Counselor and U.S. Representative to OECD, Paris
Roy Stacey	1975-1978	Program Officer, USAID, Paris
Howard R. Simpson	1975-1979	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
James Dobbins	1976-1978	Officer in Charge of French Affairs, European Bureau, Washington, DC
John H. Kelly	1976-1980	Political/Military Officer, Paris
Jon G. Edensword	1977-1979	Consul, Nice
Warren Zimmerman	1977-1980	Political Counselor, Paris

Joseph Cheevers	1977-1981	Consular Officer, Paris
Arthur A. Hartman	1977-1981	Ambassador, France
Samuel S. Rea	1978-1980	USAID Liaison Officer, Paris
William D. Morgan	1978-1981	Consul General, Paris
Robert B. Duncan	1978-1982	Economic Counselor, Paris
Paul K. Stahnke	1978-1982	Counselor of Mission, OECD, Paris
Christian A. Chapman	1978-1982	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
Richard Fenton Ross	1979-1984	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
Anne O. Cary	1980-1983	Trade Policy Officer, Paris
Michael E. C. Ely	1980-1984	Economic Minister, Paris
Lynne Lambert	1981-1985	Investment Advisor, OECD
Philip C. Brown	1981-1986	Assistant Information Officer, USIS, Paris
Aurelius Fernandez	1982-1986	Economic Officer, OECD, Paris
Terrance Catherman	1983-1985	USIS Director, Paris
William V.P. Newlin	1983-1986	Consul General, Paris
Richard Fenton Ross	1984-1988	Public Affairs Advisor, UNESCO, Paris
Glenn Slocum	1984-1988	Club du Sahel Officer, OECD, Paris
Timothy Deal	1985-1988	Deputy Representative to OECD, Paris
Kenton W. Keith	1985-1988	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Paris
William P. Pope	1985-1988	Political Officer, Paris
David M. Winn	1985-1989	Political Officer, Paris
Victor D. Comras	1985-1989	Consul General, Strasbourg

W. Robert Warne	1986-1988	Economic Counselor, Paris
Denis Lamb	1987-1990	Ambassador to OECD, Paris
Mark C. Lissfelt	1987-1991	Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris
John Hurd Willett	1987-1991 1991-1992	Deputy Political Counselor, Paris Consul General, Strasbourg
Ints M. Silins	1989-1990	Consul General Strasbourg
Miles S. Pendlton, Jr.	1989-1993	Political Counselor, Paris
Walter J.P. Curley	1989-1993	Ambassador, France
Franklin E. Huffman	1990-1993	Director of Programs, USIS, Paris
Ronald D. Flack	1990-1995	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls, Paris
George Kenney	1991-1992	Visa Officer, Marseille
Luke Kay	1992	State Department Intern, Paris
Shirley Elizabeth Barnes	1992-1995	Consul General Strasbourg
William A. Weingarten	1992-1996	Minister from Economic Affairs, OECD, Paris
Joyce E. Leader	1997-1999	Consul General, Marseilles
Larry Colbert	1997-2001	Consul General, Paris

LESTER MALLORY
Foreign Agricultural Service
Marseille (1931-1934)

Consular Officer
Paris (1934-1939)

Political Officer
Paris (1944-1946)

Ambassador Lester Mallory entered the Foreign Agricultural Service in 1931 and

became a Foreign Service officer in 1939. His career included assignments in France, Mexico, Cuba, and Argentina, and ambassadorships to Jordan and Guatemala in 1959. Ambassador Mallory was interviewed by Hank Zivetz in 1988.

MALLORY: And it came to my attention, through the head of the outfit, that the Department of Agriculture, in Washington, was recruiting people for the Foreign Agricultural Service, which was then a small, specialized, rather elite group. So I applied.

I claimed a knowledge of French, because they wanted somebody to go to Marseille. I'd had high school French, and I'd had a couple of years of college French, but my French wasn't very good; anyway, it worked. I got a job, with the stupendous salary of \$2,600 a year, to become the Assistant Agricultural Commissioner in Marseille, France, for the Foreign Agricultural Service.

We had a regional operation, which covered Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Northern Africa, and in some respects we reached out elsewhere. So it was tremendously good training. That lasted until 1934, when we had the bust-up in Washington.

Roosevelt devalued the gold dollar, and some of us were pulled back to Washington. I spent about a year and a half with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Then in 1934, I went back to Paris, where we had moved the offices at that time because the French wanted to collect income taxes on people who weren't actually in the consular service – in Marseille. So I spent five years in Paris.

Then Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, thought there was much too much emphasis being put onto Europe, and nothing on Latin America.

Q: You were in Paris on the eve of the war. Could you give us some impressions of what was happening at the embassy; what was the reaction to the events that were leading up to the Second World War?

MALLORY: We were stationed in the embassy, but we had no information on policy. We attended the weekly staff meetings, with the ambassador. And we were not aware – embassy wise – of what was going on. Of course, we heard Hitler's speeches on the radio. (I can be confidential about this, I suppose.) I remember one day Ambassador [Bullitt] said, "Look, the French are now finally waking up. They need an air force (inaudible), and they want planes. If you people have something that you want to get out of the French government, now is the time to strike."

Well, Pierre Cot was the minister of aviation at that time, and they'd resisted all this business, but it was by then pretty late. That was the only concrete thing that I remember.

Q: What year was that?

MALLORY: That would be about 1938. But we weren't privy to these things, and it wasn't until much later – after I got here – that I read Bill Bullitt's biography, by his brother; which covered

his correspondence to Roosevelt, in which much of this stuff came to light. It's beautifully done; it's very, very interesting, particularly those things which get into some of the nitty gritty, and the internal politics, which aren't very pleasant.

When Joe Kennedy was ambassador to London, and he had been told by Bullitt that the Gray Code had been jeopardized; but Kennedy wouldn't do anything about it. The Germans had our stuff for quite a long time, right from our cables. Bullitt told Roosevelt about this, but I don't know what happened. But Kennedy, as far as the information on the war (inaudible), was just strictly bad news. I don't know that his sons – Jack and Joe at that time – were old enough to appreciate any of this or not, because they were quite junior. But it wasn't a good time, by and large, and our appointments weren't good.

Bullitt was a very dynamic, forthcoming guy, and he operated a lone-wolf sort of operation.

Q: What do you mean by lone-wolf?

MALLORY: He didn't bring a lot of people into his confidence, as far as I know, and a lot of his stuff was done very directly. Many of his things – as you'll see in that book, if you ever get a chance to look at it – were “for the eyes of the President.” And when he had something that he wanted to get off his chest, he stayed up until 2:00 in the morning and got on the telephone; and this happened quite frequently. He called Roosevelt directly.

As I say, in my position, as number two in the agricultural office, we were not aware of what was going on, except what we saw in the newspapers. I was aware of a group of younger Frenchmen, who were quite concerned with relations with Germany; and they were preparing a sort of – not a coup – but a situation where they were going to support the Germans. They didn't come out much in the open, but I do know that at least one or two of them had had their houses searched by the French secret police. Apparently the police were getting on to this. I knew it, in part, from friends of mine in the Associated Press and United Press, who had been friends of mine for years there; and they were getting on to this.

Also, I heard of it because I was a member of a sort of social club, with not much importance, and a lot of these people were in it. And they were people of maybe 35, 40 years old.

Q: This was a French social club?

MALLORY: Yes, a French thing. I don't know why I was in it, just by chance I guess. I think they had to run for cover when things broke, but I have no recollection because I left there in June of '39.

Q: So you left before the war broke out?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Was there a sense, in Paris, that things were coming to the edge – that the war was imminent?

MALLORY: Not really. I wasn't privy to enough of the French thinking. But again, I say my close association with the correspondents should have been enough to know what was going on; and I didn't get much of that feeling at all.

Q: I see. Now, interestingly, you came back to Paris after the war. How soon after the war were you back in Paris?

MALLORY: I arrived in Paris during the Battle of the Bulge. As I mentioned, Henry Wallace thought that Latin America ought to have some attention. So they decided the first agricultural attaché should be in Mexico. I came back from Paris in June, of '39. (Somebody in Washington was pretty clever about this, because they were beginning to close down our operation.) I spent five years in Mexico, getting things started, trying to build up a background of information, which we didn't have at all.

Q: A background of information on what?

MALLORY: On agriculture – the food production, needs, and so on. Then the war broke out, and I became terribly involved in the whole business about rubber, and medicinal plants, and strategic things of that nature. But then, in late '44, I heard from Washington, and they asked if I would go back to Paris? I said I would go back for a year, if they would bring me back to Washington afterwards, because I wanted to get married.

The business in Paris was to reestablish the office. The embassy was just opening with a few people. But the important thing was food supplies. The American army needed munitions; the French wanted food stuffs. How much food stuff did they need?

Well, by great good luck when I got back to Paris, after five years, down in the basement I found my complete files! So I had the basis of operations. It wasn't much extra effort to sit down and make a judgment on food production; what was available. Because the French were under rationing at that time, they were screaming, but actually there was plenty of food if it had been distributed. They couldn't get it from the farmer to the town. So the rationing went on, particularly for bread stuffs.

Anyway, I was able to pull things together, and submit some reports to Washington pretty promptly – relatively speaking. It took a little while to catch up. That was my primary job when I got back, to see what the food situation was. I worked on that pretty intensively, and I had a young man with me who was good. We spent a lot of evenings over in the embassy; there wasn't anything else to do around there.

Q: Was this an American or Frenchman?

MALLORY: American.

Q: Who were you dealing with on the French side?

MALLORY: Primarily their Ministry of Agriculture.

Q: And was there the beginnings of the division of the Gaullists, or the communists?

MALLORY: No, not at that time. The people we were dealing with were a few of the older holdover bureaucrats; but primarily, people that had come out of the resistance, and had worked in it and knew it. And we cooperated right across the board with them.

Q: And when the war ended, did things change? Did the relationship between the French and the Americans change after VE Day?

MALLORY: No, it just went on as far as we were concerned.

Q: And you felt it was a cooperative arrangement?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Because, as you know, with de Gaulle and so forth the tensions began to arise.

MALLORY: That was later.

Q: Later, okay; that's what I wanted to know.

MALLORY: Yes, I think that was later. As a matter-of-fact, when the war was over, and things broke up, we had tremendous demands for certain things. For example, French agriculture – as far as grains were concerned – was still based on the combine; and the combine needed binder twine. They didn't have binder twine, and we didn't have a lot of stuff to give them because we were using it all up for cordage for the Navy. Well, I had a whole commission of Frenchmen go to Washington for binder twine. This was just after the war was over, you see, and the approach of harvest. So we had things like that come up.

Q: Was there a great deal of hunger in France, at that time?

MALLORY: No. Hunger – not really; a lot of people got thinner, but I wouldn't call it hunger.

Q: Now, you stayed in Paris until when?

MALLORY: Until the end of 1945 – beginning of 1946.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Vice Consul
Naples (1937)

Vice Consul

Paris (1937-1942)

Consul

Paris (1951-1953)

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II came from a distinguished military family and spent his childhood in various cities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1935. His career included positions in Canada, Italy, and France, and ambassadorships to Japan, Belgium, and Austria. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

Q: When the war started in September of '39, what were you doing? What became your role?

MACARTHUR: I did some liaison work with the French foreign ministry, which had asked us to be the “protecting power” of French interests in Berlin. Woody Wallner, was in Paris on a vacation from Spain and we held him over to work on French interests in Germany. He had come into the Service at the same time I came in and spoke excellent French. He was then in Barcelona, I think, or Valencia. He’s dead now. As for the Embassy, we kept in close touch with the French on their perceptions of what the Germans were going to do. But the whole emphasis of the reporting was not any longer on the domestic political side, but on the international side and the relationships with Italy, which did not come into the war until June of 1940, when France had fallen, the relationships with neutral Belgium, Holland and the like. The emphasis shifted, with everybody in France but the communists rallying behind the government in time of war, from domestic political reporting, to the relationships with France of countries in Europe that were not yet involved in the war, and their positions and the French attitudes toward them, and the like.

Q: We had a really remarkable crew in Paris at the time in the embassy. Bullitt was the ambassador, Robert Murphy as the . . .

MACARTHUR: They had very able men. Bob Murphy was there, but Ed Wilson was there the year before him, and Edwin Wilson was extremely able. Bob took his place. But we did have a very able crew. Maynard Barnes.

Q: Freeman Matthews.

MACARTHUR: Doc Matthews, who was one of the best. I’ll have more to say about him.

Q: Did you feel that there had been a deliberate strengthening of the embassy at the time? Or was this happenstance?

MACARTHUR: This was pure happenstance. Bob Murphy was consul general. Bullitt liked him, he was a very able man, he had never had a diplomatic appointment before. He’d been in the consular branch in Germany, and he headed a consulate general there. But he knew a lot of people and had political savvy. When Edwin Wilson, who was what we now call the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) was transferred to become a minister in Latin America – Bullitt

selected Bob Murphy to replace him as councilor of the embassy. Doc Matthews; Hugh Fullerton had been there for two or three years; Bob Murphy had been there for two or three years. Doc Matthews came in late '38, I think. It just so happened that there were some extremely capable people there.

Q: Tyler Thompson is another one.

MACARTHUR: Tyler was there. Bill Trimble. We had a good team.

Q: Looking back on it and putting yourself in the position you were then, was there a feeling within the embassy staff that France really was – maybe it's the wrong term, but rotten to the core, as they say, or at least there was something wrong with the spirit of France at the time?

MACARTHUR: I think it was more a question of something wrong with the spirit of France. Bullitt had become an absolute Francophile, and he could not see the weaknesses that France had. I'm speaking primarily of military weakness. We had a very able military attaché, Colonel Horace Fuller, and Horace Fuller told Bullitt that the French Army was a very disorganized, incoherent outfit, in effect. Bullitt wouldn't believe him. When war broke out, we thought Paris might be bombed by the Luftwaffe, so I took a little cottage outside of Paris at a village called Gambais beyond Versailles, for my wife and child, so that if there were bombing, they would be out of the way. To take this house, you had to have a notaire for the contract. The notary in France is like a court officer and other things. This little notaire had been mobilized to a unit in Versailles. He took the train in every morning, came back in the evening, went on with his notarial work. And this was characteristic. When they mobilized, it was a farce. Some of the units that were mobilized were no more capable, were no more battle-worthy or capable of action than children. You know, enlisted men went home for the weekend, they went home at night. There was no training. They'd do a little close-order drill or something during the day, but there was no real training, and there was no readying of the reserves that had been called up and mobilized. It was business as usual. It was the so-called phoney war – drole de guerre.

Bullitt lived with the conviction that the French had, with the Maginot line, and one of the greatest standing armies in the world and that there was no question of a German breakthrough. The French were like ourselves; we slept the same way. Let me cite a the most typical example, I served in the Army for a while under Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, who later was the famous General Patton, who was absolutely rabid in the early 1930s about armor. He was a cavalry man. He wanted the cavalry of the future armored, and he was 100% right. There was an American gentleman named Mr. Christie. Mr. Christie developed a tank that had the piece (the gun) in the turret, and the machine guns down below, you could lie behind the crest of a ridge, with just the gun protruding over it, and destroy your enemy. As for others, the French produced a tank that they claimed was the best tank in the world called the B-1-bis. The B-1-bis had the piece, the gun mounted down low between the tracks, and it had to get up on the ridge and silhouette itself to fire. It was a sitting duck. We on the other hand produced the General Grant tank that had a gun in the lefthand corner of the tank, so that if it were immobilized and lost a track or anything happened, the gun had only a 30 degree traverse and was also virtually helpless. Whereas the Germans and the Russians both bought the Christie rights and produced the Christie type of tank with the gun in the turret with a 360 degree traverse.

But again, this is not the first time this sort of thing has happened. There was a gentleman named Browning, who early in this century came up with a machine gun that our Army ordnance people said was no good. So Browning went to Belgium and founded what is now Fabrique National, one of the great arms producers of the world, which, incidentally, also produces Browning shotguns, the Browning revolver, the Browning automatic, the Browning machine gun, we had a chance for them all, but we just turned them down cold, and they went someplace else.

Q: Did you get any direction from the ambassador? One almost hesitates to say the Secretary of State, because one has the feeling that the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was pretty much bypassed.

MACARTHUR: He was bypassed.

Q: But did you get any direction both from the embassy and from Washington about what your role was when the war started?

MACARTHUR: I can't recall any specific instruction, but the ambassador certainly made it clear that our role was to do everything we could to build up support for the Allies – that is, the French and the British, who were fighting. I don't recall any specific role. To follow developments with France's relations with the neutral countries, because most countries of Europe were neutral, BENELUX, Scandinavia, Italy, Switzerland, Eastern European countries: this to be abreast of their views and report them in. But I don't recall any indoctrination of any specific kind. I do recall that Bullitt had staff meetings once a week, and in these meetings he would lay out assignments to various officers, saying, "You find out about this or that". But those were details.

Q: Was the pace, I assume, much more hectic? Were you pretty much on a seven-day week?

MACARTHUR: No. We weren't on a seven-day week. The ambassador was sometimes, but not often, in the office on Saturday or a Sunday. But on weekends he operated out of his residence. Telegrams went out and came in, and if he (Ambassador) had something to do, somebody he wanted to see, or some minister he was going to call on during the weekend period, he would do so and then dictate his telegram to Carmel Offie. Carmel Offie was absolutely incredible. He could take shorthand, he could type, he had a memory like this recorder. He was a fantastic person. So Bullitt operated that way. We had duty officers, of course, at the embassy on weekends in all the various sections but except for one at the chancery, the others were just on call.

Q: Were you contacting mostly other embassy people? You say you weren't working with the political parties then.

MACARTHUR: We did maintain close contact with political leaders to have their views on the war and we worked with the foreign office much more closely, also with people in the economic side of the French Government. The economic and financial side was extremely important. We developed excellent relations with Couve de Murville and Gaston Palewski, both inspecteurs d'finance, France's elite, and with some of the other people who later became very prominent in

the de Gaulle era. Herve Alphand, who later was ambassador here for some time, and Foreign Office Secretary General Rochat. Financing a war is a big business – trade, economics, the problems of submarine warfare. But we were not in the war. We had sympathies. The President, the American people, they had great sympathy with the French and the British, but we were not in the war. We of course saw people of other embassies to find out their views.

Q: Can you give any reflections on the consular side of the attempts of refugees who fled Germany to try to get out of the country at that time?

MACARTHUR: Certainly, but the big exodus did not come at that time (1939). The big exodus started in May 1940, when the Germans broke through at Sedan. Before that, there were a few people that said, “We’d better get out. War has broken out, and you can’t tell what’s going to happen.” But it was quite manageable. What became unmanageable was when you had about 10 million people on the roads, and you had tens of thousands of Jewish refugees from the low countries and France that were streaming over, trying to get out either through Bordeaux or out over the Pyrenees through Spain and Portugal. The Spanish were not very easy about letting them through, and the Portuguese were not anxious to be inundated by a tremendous group of refugees in Portugal.

Q: This was in May?

MACARTHUR: No, this was later. May was when they started. When the Germans broke through and the refugees started by the end of May, the roads of France, down from the north, if you tried to go north, you couldn’t get anywhere. The cars were coming down three abreast on a three-lane highway, where that’s all there was. Wagons, people coming through Paris, these big farm wagons, with the dogs tied underneath, trotting along, or walking along, or dragging along, the kids in the wagons, the guy walking, leading the horses, automobiles crammed with kids in the things, and all the rest of it – that came only in May of 1940. You see, until then it was the phoney war, the drole de guerre, where there was a bit of shooting here, a bit of shooting there, a guy might be killed here, a guy might be killed there. But suddenly, when the Germans hit through the Ardennes, which the French had thought defended itself, to use their phrase, and struck through the Sedan, and then drove first to the sea . . .

The Germans broke through at Sedan, and they turned first, quite properly, to the sea, to encircle the British and liquidate that before they knew that there was nothing between them and Paris. Paris didn’t fall until the 12th or 15th of June. But on May 20, we were told, “There is absolutely nothing between the German Army and France that can put up even the slightest kind of a defense.” The Germans turned to the sea to roll up the British, liquidate them, and then take over the rest of France.

It was in this period, when they broke through at Sedan, that the refugees started streaming down from the BENELUX countries and northern France, and absolutely clogged the roads. I can tell you that as late as June, when I went to join the French Government at Tours, the roads were impossible. I left at 2:00 o’clock in the morning to get a little bit ahead of the business, and by the time of 6:30 or 7:00, it was four abreast. The stukas would come down and bomb the column to create confusion, so the French units couldn’t use the road, and get low-flying aircraft to do a

bit of strafing and the like. But that was the bad period, from the 20th of May until the armistice.

Q: Were you prepared for this? How did the embassy react?

MACARTHUR: I don't think anybody was prepared for the extent to which the whole damn thing collapsed – literally – in a matter of several days. Call it a week. Actually, on May 10th, I'd been having the duty, weekends, and we were prepared, in case we had to evacuate Paris, each embassy had a place across the Loire, a chateau or something like that, that the owner had made available if the bombings and so forth were such that you wanted to pull back some of your people and have them located in areas that didn't have military targets or objectives. I drove down one afternoon, would spend the night, and the next day drive back and the next night. It was one a two-and-a-half hour drive. It was still business as usual.

I got a call, the morning of the 10th, from Carmel Offie, saying, "The Germans have broken through at Paris. Get the hell back right away, quick." We took off. By the time we got past the airfield at Tours, as we were approaching the airfield at Tours, the sirens went off, and we were within about a mile of it, on one of those typical French tree-lined country roads. All of a sudden, these planes swept over, and we pulled the car under a tree, and jumped into a ditch. They started bombing and strafing the airfield. We got back to Paris all right, and there it was. But the lack of preparedness, you can see. From September 1st until May 20th, there had been this war, where both sides appeared to be stalemated along a fixed line, where no breakthrough, and certainly the Allies, the British and the French, weren't trying to break through; the Germans weren't trying to break through. They seemed to be satisfied that they didn't have the strength. They would suffer too many casualties if they committed themselves into a World War I type of operation, and so there they were.

You recall the drole de guerre, the phoney war. Business went on as usual in Paris, in the life of the French people, and in the life of France. It was business as usual.

Q: What happened to you, then, when the breakthrough came?

MACARTHUR: I came back immediately. Plans were made for evacuating, because it was quite clear that this was it. Plans were made for evacuating wives and family at once. Bullitt did that, very wisely. They were given a choice. The hope was expressed they would return to the United States, but they were also given a choice, if they wanted to, to go to Spain or Portugal. My wife and I decided that staying in Portugal would be the best bet, rather than go back across the Atlantic. So while some of them left on ships that were going out still from Le Havre and particularly from Bordeaux, my wife and daughter were shipped off to Lisbon.

The news got worse every day, and finally, by the beginning of June, it was quite clear that it was just a question of time. Mr. Bullitt asked me to go down. Bullitt decided that he did not – the French Government had to retreat before the advancing Germans, which was quite clear that they had to do – he did not wish to accompany the government, because the government might go on to – although he didn't put it this way, to North Africa, to continue the fight there, and he had strong ambitions to be either Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy, and he didn't want to be immobilized in North Africa or someplace at that time.

So Mr. Bullitt elected to stay in Paris with Bob Murphy and the majority of the staff. He then decided that there would be a small group, a liaison group, that would have to accompany the French Government, and he selected to head that group from the embassy Doc Matthews, then myself and Woody Wallner, who had been reassigned from Spain to Paris, because we needed him for this liaison work with the French on protection of French interests in Germany. The three of us would go, but Bullitt also decided – and talked the President into saying that Tony Biddle would be ambassador-at-large, sort of. They didn't use that term; I've forgotten. He would be an American ambassador near the French Government. Tony Biddle, when Poland fell in September of '34, had retreated through Poland to Eastern Europe, and then when the Polish Government, in exile, was set up in Angers, France, Tony Biddle was there with the Polish Government in exile. So Bullitt communicated with Tony Biddle, and then he sent me in June down to see Tony Biddle and explain the whole deal, and get back to Paris.

I went down, saw Tony Biddle, then detoured by Bordeaux. Our airplanes had no cannons in those days; they had just machine guns. It was quite clear that what was happening between the Luftwaffe and the British RAF that if you didn't have cannons, you might just as well not get up into the air. So we had gotten the plans of the Hispana-Suiza cannon, 20-millimeter cannon, from Switzerland, and they were to be bundled aboard the America, which was the last ship that was obviously going to leave Bordeaux, an American ship, and this captain was a reserve naval officer. The plans were turned over to him. I did not bring the plans down. Our military attaché, brought them down. I had detoured to Bordeaux to see about the last ship out, and that everything had gone well, and to get a reading, then go back to Paris.

I got back to Paris after a very bad day, when the roads were still congested. I was going the wrong way, and the roads were very, very congested. I had had only about four hours' sleep, because there was no place to sleep. The hotels in Bordeaux, the Royal George, and all the hotels were filled with French parliamentarians and politicians and refugees. I started out at 4:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q: *Were you driving a car?*

MACARTHUR: Yes, I was driving a car. It was the only way to go. Fighting the four lines of people coming down, we were dive-bombed twice and strafed a couple of times. I got back to Paris at about 6:00 or 7:00 that night, and I was told that the French Government decided to move, and that Doc Matthews and Woody had already left with Raymond Bastianello, a code clerk, and Clarence Palmer, a very capable crew of Foreign Service clerks, who had been with us for many years, of senior intellect quality. I was told to rejoin them. So I left at 7:00 o'clock, with the clothes on my back, going on side roads which I knew well out to Gambais, where I had this house, bypassing Versailles and the main roads that were still clogged and congested, on these little secondary roads, picked up a suitcase, filled a suit in it and some shirts and pajamas and a toothbrush, and left at 3:00 o'clock in the morning for Tours, where the government was.

I got there in the morning, about 11:00 o'clock. Normally it would have taken me two hours. I reported to Tony Biddle, who was there, and Doc and Woody. At this time, the French were working on a message for President Roosevelt, which they had let us know they were working

on. Paul Reynaud had replaced Daladier as prime minister. So I went with Tony Biddle, who didn't speak much French, spent the night with him at the Chateau Azay le Rideau, and we left at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, because they were afraid Tours would be bombed, and the French Government was about 100 kilometers up in the Loire at the chateau. We got there at 6:00, Biddle and myself, and Reynaud was in a dressing gown, had this vinyl text. He had the final appeal of the French to the American Government, to President Roosevelt, which was basically a propaganda ploy, to exonerate himself more than anything else, because there was nothing we could do.

Q: Yes. I was going to ask what could they hope that we could do?

MACARTHUR: There was nothing we could do, and it was one of those final appeals. You can say, "Well, you know, I appealed, but our friends didn't help us or wouldn't help us," or whatever it might be.

So we talked about ten minutes, and then Roland de Marjorie, the father of the present French ambassador today, I think, a very capable French diplomat, and I sat down and went over and worked out the English translation of this final appeal from Reynaud to Roosevelt, which was in French. We got an agreement on the English text, that it conveyed all the nuances and the other things. Then I went back to join Doc. Tony Biddle said that he was going to push on toward Bordeaux, because they told us they were moving on from Tours to Bordeaux. So Tony Biddle went directly down to Bordeaux, picked up his wife and went on to Bordeaux, and I went back and met with Doc and joined him where he was located, and then dictated the telegram of this final meeting with Paul Reynaud, the French prime minister, and the text of message. We sent that off. By the time we finished with the PTT, the telegram place, because we had no communications other than the local communications within the community, we left about 7:00 o'clock that night for Bordeaux.

We got down eventually to Bordeaux early in the morning and moved into the house there. The government had arrived. Doc covered the prime minister's office, and Woody and I covered other people that we knew in the foreign ministry with the government there, and some of the ministers, like Georges Mandel, who was later assassinated by the Germans. He was Jewish. We got messages out about what was happening, because this was in the midst of the power business, where Laval and Petain were working to replace Paul Reynaud. This went on until Laval and Petain replaced Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, and in the meantime, the Germans bombed us. To hasten the decision-making process of the French Government with this change, the Germans bombed Bordeaux. We'd hear a bomb drop, and all of a sudden you'd see the columns of debris and smoke coming right towards you. The nearest one hit about 200 meters from us. We took refuge, needless to say, under the desks in the office.

Then the Petain-Reynaud government came in, said they would sign the armistice. The armistice was signed, and it was announced that the government was established in Vichy, and we proceeded from Bordeaux, in our cars, to Vichy.

Q: During this time of change of government, if that's the right term for it, in Bordeaux, your role – really, there was nothing constructive that the United States could do at this point.

MACARTHUR: Absolutely nothing. We were 3,000 miles away, we had no forces mobilized, we had nothing that we could do. There was nothing that we could do. Our voice was absolutely zero. With Laval, you must remember Laval staked everything on a German victory. In fact, you may remember that in '41, after the staff of the Vichy Government had been all set up and established, he made that basic statement, "Je souhaite la victoire allemande" – "I want a German victory." And Laval saw France as Germany's first satellite. With the evil conviction they have of their superiority, Laval was convinced that the French intelligence and everything else would fix everything up if Germany won the war. They would be the first of the satellites, and he had a very special condition by collaborating with the Germans.

Q: So at that point, you moved to Vichy.

MACARTHUR: Yes. We moved, actually, to a little place called La Bourboule, because we had no place to stay in Vichy. Then we got Florence Gould's villa, Villa (Inaudible), in Vichy, as an office. We moved to Vichy. First, Bullitt came out while we were quartered at La Bourboule, which was about 45, 50 minutes away.

Bullitt came out and decided that he wanted to go back to the United States, so without waiting for the President, he took off for Portugal, where he could clipper home. The Germans held him for about three weeks in Paris before they let him go. Bob Murphy stayed in Paris temporarily for about another five days to leave Maynard Barnes in charge there and Tyler Thompson. We still had an establishment there, and we were not at war with Germany. Then Bob came down and took over the Vichy operation from Doc Matthews. Bullitt, when he left, he had three cars. He had a Cadillac. In those days, the government didn't furnish ambassadors with automobiles or chauffeurs. The ambassador furnished himself with automobiles and chauffeurs, and so did everybody else, if they had one. He had a Buick, and he wanted this Buick also, so he asked me if I would drive the Buick down, not to be his chauffeur, but to take the French Minister of Air, Guy la Chambre, across the Spanish frontier into Portugal, because Guy la Chambre, who had been in the Deladier Government and then staunchly anti-German, they were afraid that the Germans would go after him and liquidate him. So Guy la Chambre had been given a false American passport by Bob at the ambassador's written instruction, and his wife, (Inaudible) Madou, had been a famous singer and stage actress. So in a convoy with the ambassador, I drove the ambassador's Buick with the former minister of the air and his wife down. We drove from La Bourboule to Barcelona, and we left at about 7:00 or 8:00 in the morning, and we got to Barcelona about 4:00 in the morning. My companions in the car, the minister of air and his wife, were extremely nervous at the border, but that went all right.

Then we drove across the next day to Madrid, and then we drove the next day from Madrid to Lisbon. They communicated with the President, who was now happy with the departure.

Q: That was sort of the end of Bullitt.

MACARTHUR: That was the end of Bullitt. The President wanted him to stay on with the French Government. He wanted him to not pick up and leave, but to stay, because they were convinced that some kind of a French entity would be set up.

Then I stayed in Lisbon for a month or so, because they had nobody there, and there was an influx of thousands of refugees, many of them Jewish, poor bastards. I say “poor bastards,” because there was no sympathy from the Portuguese authorities under Salazar, and they put them in camps. I used to go up and get these people out of camps and process them.

Then I went back to Vichy, and I was in Vichy until the end.

Q: I was just thinking, it's probably a good time to cut off now. Then we'll continue this at a later date.

MACARTHUR: We can take on the Vichy part, which leads right into the war, because it was the Resistance thing that led me going to Normandy, which led to the other thing.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, on our last session of January 29, 1987, we finished our interview at the time that you had been repatriated to the United States from detention. You were in the Black Forest, was it?

MACARTHUR: We were on the edge of the Black Forest in Baden-Baden. There were three camps in that area, one with British soldiers taken by the Germans in North Africa; another was a mixed bag of various people that had been collected here and there, some of them irresponsible people, or what the Nazis considered irresponsible people from some of the Eastern European countries they had overrun; and I forget what the nature of the third camp was. We were interned in a hotel. Our treatment there was correct, and we had only one extremely painful and disagreeable business when the Gestapo came down and went to work on Thomas Cassidy, our assistant naval attaché in Vichy, their brutal interrogation, and it's no fun to hear someone being interrogated, when the moaning stops, and you know they've passed out. Cassidy was being interrogated probably because he was a contact point with some of our French Resistance people. Actually he worked for Colonel Donovan's OSS organization, and obviously some French contact who had been taken by the Gestapo and tortured had given his name. So the Gestapo came down, and if it had not been for the intervention of a fine young Swiss diplomat who periodically visited us, his name is Kiya Bordier (phonetic), who was later an ambassador, Cassidy might have ended extremely badly, except rather than just being painfully abused for a couple of days.

Q: You were repatriated after we landed in . . .

MACARTHUR: No, we were taken by the Germans after the Allied landings in North Africa at the beginning of November 1942. The Germans burst into our embassy, although we had so-called diplomatic immunity. They burst into our embassy with tommy guns and started removing us, when the dean of the diplomatic corps of Vichy, Mr. Stukey, heard what was happening and went to Laval, and said that this would create a major scandal for the Petain/Laval Government if it wasn't stopped immediately. So Laval called the Germans off and said we would be interned and exchanged with the members of the French diplomatic Vichy mission in Washington, headed by Ambassador Henrier.

Well, they interned us, shipped us down to Lourdes, the shrine city in southern France, of Bernadette fame, but we had been there a very short time when Laval gave the Germans the green light, and a group of SS and German soldiers arrived and bundled us into a train and took us off to Germany to hold as hostages.

We remained in Germany from that time – that's the end of '42 – until March of '44, when, finally, an agreement was negotiated for the exchange of our group plus a few very badly wounded Americans against some Germans that had been taken by us in North Africa during the North African campaign, including Ribbentrop's niece and her husband and some other Germans that we had picked up in this country or in transit between Latin America, where they had been active, and this country.

When the agreement was finally reached in '44 – the end of February, it was reached, I think, if I recall correctly – part of that agreement was that we would be repatriated to Lisbon, and the neutral Swedish vessel Gripsholm – was it Swedish? Yes. It would carry over those exchangees that the Germans wanted from the United States and the others that had been in North Africa, would be brought together in Lisbon, and we would be exchanged there. So we left Germany on a sealed train that went through France, to the French border. There we were held overnight to await the final arrangements with the Spaniards for transit across Spain, and we were put in a sealed train, but no longer with the German guards, and dispatched from Confront, which is just below Biarritz on the French-Spanish border. Maybe it wasn't Confront. It was the border point just below Pau to Lisbon.

In Lisbon, after a couple of days processing, we were placed in the Gripsholm and returned to the United States.

Q: Obviously, you had a lot of catching up to do with your family at that time, but sort of moving beyond that, how did the State Department treat you when you came back?

MACARTHUR: Oh, they treated us very well. I think all of us that came back, the war was going on, and we had missed a good part of it. We were anxious to get back to work. I took – I think it was two and a half weeks' leave with my wife. We went down to visit her family in Kentucky, and then I came back and went to work on the so-called French desk, because they had no one there that had been in France during the period of the occupation from '40 to the end of '42 who knew personally some of the Resistance personalities and other people and had some feeling. I was put on the French desk, because they wanted, at the time of the liberation, to ship me back to Paris to head up the embassy political section in Paris when it would be liberated. I'm speaking about the spring, because then the Allied landings in Normandy had not occurred. So this was a preparatory visit.

Well, in the course of the debriefings I had, including those of the OSS, when the OSS discovered that I had worked personally with people like Dr. Mazze, who was the leading Resistance leader in Brittany, and Laniel, from Normandy, and some of the other people, they proposed that I join with them and be parachuted into France at the appropriate time, about three weeks before our landings, which I did not know, and they didn't reveal, if they knew when those would be. I said that was agreeable to me if it was agreeable to the State Department.

The Department felt that a better use of me could be made by having me go into Normandy after we landed, and then at the liberation of Paris, presume a place in the embassy political section, because obviously when France was liberated, there were going to be all sorts of new political leaders who would emerge from the French Resistance, as French Resistance leaders and heroes, and have somebody that would work personally with a number of them, and had the credentials of not only having worked with them, but having also been deported to Germany and gone through that experience, too, which many Frenchmen had gone and never returned from. They felt that this whole combination of background would make me a useful person in the Paris Embassy.

Q: Sounds like they were using more finesse in their personnel policies, at least from my experiences, than normal.

MACARTHUR: The personnel policy – it wasn't personnel policy at all; it was Doc Matthews.

Q: Ah!

MACARTHUR: Later Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews, who had been in charge of the embassy in Vichy from 1940, really, until Admiral Leahy came, when he went to London. He knew intimately the inside picture of a France that was being occupied, but that would emerge, and he was the deputy director, I think, of the whole European department of the State Department under Jimmy Dunn, who also was extremely interested and sympathetic to the idea. So they simply said, "This is the way it's going to be."

In those days, during the war at that time, when it was a question of personnel in critical spots or spots that might become critical, I don't think the so-called administrative and personnel people of the department had much to do with the assignments, because the people that knew the qualities and experience and background were in some of the active policy-formulating departments of the department, the geographic bureaus, and they knew the capabilities, personalities, experience, and so forth.

Of course, in this plan, the Defense Department's approval had to be concerned for me to go back into Normandy after the landings; that would be before France was liberated. That represented no problem at all. We had a political advisor in General Eisenhower's headquarters in London, before the landings, and then when the time came for the landings and to send somebody into Normandy, he was a very senior diplomatic personality, former ambassador. And they decided that they wanted, in the rigors of a campaign in Normandy, where you never knew quite what was going to happen, they wanted two people, a younger officer to be the so-called POLAD, political advisor, who really was an advisor on international affairs, to work with General Eisenhower's staff, of course, and also particularly with the G-5 people, who had to do with the relationships with the military, the headquarters, the military, and the liberated civilian authorities in the areas as we gradually liberated them.

So I went into Normandy, went to London first for a couple of days' briefing. I was no hero in terms of landing in Normandy; the landings had been accomplished, the headquarters had been

set up in Normandy, and I flew over in an old C-47 with some officers, and was in Normandy a relatively short time until it was clear that when General Patton broke out and started the big swing up in the encirclement, it was clear that the Germans were going to have to pull back or risk having very, very substantial numbers of their forces trapped.

I went to Bedell Smith, who was General Eisenhower's chief of staff, and said, "I'd like to go in with the T force into Paris for practical reasons connected with the fact that obviously, when Paris was liberated, the National Council of Resistance members, we would know who they were, and I'd like to establish contact with them immediately."

And Bedell laughed at me and said, "Doug, if you went in with the T force and you were shot, everybody in America would say we were putting civilians in front of our military guys to protect them. But you can go in the next day."

So Paris was liberated on the 25th, and I arrived the morning – we left very early – the morning of the 26th, with two general officers.

Q: This is 26 August 1944.

MACARTHUR: August. Yes. With two general officers. We drove up a road that I knew very well, up through Dreux and Houdan and La Queue-les-Yvelines, Trappes, Versailles, and as we headed in, these two general officers had never been in France before the landings, and I was feeling emotionally very charged up, because I had left Paris around the tenth of June 1940, with the Germans pursuing us. I was one of the three people that went to the French Government, the three American diplomats that went with the French Government as it retreated. And to be entering Paris and to see it for the first time, it was a beautiful day, not a cloud in the sky, the sun was warm, I suggested, as we drove in from Versailles, that we go through the Parc de St.-Cloud, which is a bluff above the Seine, just above the bridge of St.-Cloud, where you can look out and see all of Paris. They thought that was an excellent idea, so we went in with our escort and came to that marvelous sort of platform above the river, a cobblestone platform above the river, and there looked out, and before us was the Seine and the Bois de Boulogne, and the Eiffel Tower, and the dome of Les Invalides, the two towers of Notre Dame, and way off on the left was the glistening spire and dome of Sacre Coeur. I must say I was so emotionally moved that tears started streaming down my face to see this beautiful city totally intact.

So we drove in, and after I got set up in the general officers' hotel that had been taken over for the night, I went down to the embassy, where we found a very faithful French woman who had been in the embassy before, who had been kept on by the Swiss. I went into the embassy, and it was intact, except in several places where the fighting had occurred. Bullets had come through the windows, and one had pierced a portrait of a former ambassador. But there was firing still going on, and there were Germans holed up still in the foreign ministry, right across the Seine from La Place de Concorde, and in other places. You could hear the rat-a-tat-tat of machine gun fire as the forces cleaned them up, our American boys and the French boys in the LeClerc division, which General Eisenhower gave the honor of entering Paris first – quite properly.

Mixed up with all this was the confusion of all these Resistance fellows running around with

their armbands, brassards, of different things, saying, “FIFI” or “FTP.” Frontier Terre Partisan was the communist one: FIFI was the Free French Forces of the Interior, with (inaudible) guns firing guns into the air in joy. [Laughter] And the people of Paris just absolutely delirious. So it was emotional – still is, when I think of it – highly emotional.

Q: Did you have any instructions? There was this sort of uneasy relationship with General de Gaulle during this entire period. Did you have any instructions how to treat the various Resistance groups, especially those associated with General de Gaulle?

MACARTHUR: No, because by the time we landed, virtually all the Resistance groups, except the communist resistance group, Frontier Terre Partisan, were associated and had pledged allegiance to the Free French of General de Gaulle. There were people that had ambitions to be head of France and one thing or that kind, but there was no problem in dealing with the French Resistance. There was no problem with de Gaulle’s people or from the French Resistance people with whom we knew. This was the thing that you had to play by ear. We had no instructions from the department that I recall, other than to establish and maintain contact with all our contacts across the broad spectrum of French political life, including the communists, because we were still allies of the Russians at that time. So that we did, and with the de Gaulle people, there was no problem at all. Some of them were people that immediately were surrounding him, that we had known before, like Gaston Palewski, who became his director of cabinet and sort of eminence, who screened everybody that went in and out, and Couve de Murville, both of whom I had known as inspecteur des finances before the war. There really was no problem at all insofar as the Quai d’Orsay was concerned.

Some of the people that I had worked with in Vichy, including Jean Chauvel, a marvelous man, had escaped and gotten over to London, and he came back and was set up as the secretary general of the French foreign office. So I had access through Jean, whom I knew intimately and whose wife was a great friend of ours, of my wife’s. There were really no problems at all.

There was one problem, though, because de Gaulle moved in, but the CNR, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, kept its organization intact, kept its leadership, which included people like Bideau, who was later foreign minister and prime minister, Laniel, who was prime minister, and other people. They kept their organization intact and used to have regular meetings, where they felt that they were the people that had gone through the occupation, they knew what the French people wanted and needed, they felt much more than people that had been living in exile in London knew about the requirements of the situation.

So in that autumn, that is, in the early days, end of August, September, right up into October, I think, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, the highest Resistance body, they had grabbed a building that belonged to the Earl of Gloucester, a very nice building on the Left Bank, a big palatial residence. The Earl of Gloucester’s son being then Lord Forbes, Arthur Forbes, an air commodore in the RAF, they commandeered that building and held regular meetings there, and they used to hold these meetings in the evening. Then I had arrangements with Laniel and a couple of them that I would go over about 10:30 and 11:00, when the meetings broke up. They would brief me on exactly the position they had taken at the meeting, with respect to what they would say to the government, because they did not consider themselves a government; they

considered themselves the most knowledgeable advisory body that the de Gaulle people could have. I used to go back to the embassy and write out a telegram in longhand, so that Washington would know. After Mr. Caffery arrived there, with his full approval, I used to go out at 11:30 or 12:00 and let him look at the telegram, and then we'd send it, because that way it would be on the desk of the people here in Washington the next morning at 9:00 o'clock, whereas if we'd waited til the next morning, with the time difference, they wouldn't have gotten it until the following evening or the day after.

Q: Just to backtrack a little, when you arrived, you actually set up the embassy?

MACARTHUR: No. I arrived. I was the only person there. I was the first person into the embassy.

Q: You and the cleaning lady.

MACARTHUR: And the cleaning lady. Well, she was more than that; she was sort of a custodian.

The whole plan had been laid out that the people from North Africa – because we had a mission in North Africa, where General de Gaulle had moved following the successful landings there – Algiers. We had a mission headed by Selden Chapin. He had the rank, I think, of minister counselor. They were to come up that diplomatic representation, NEAR. They called it NEAR – the Free French Government in exile, the so-called Free French Government. They would come up and take over the embassy.

Q: NEAR? You said NEAR.

MACARTHUR: NEAR. You didn't accredit them, too. It was NEAR. Because the whole question – that was one of the thorny questions of the legitimacy of de Gaulle. As long as the de Gaulle government, the Free French, as they called it, was in exile, we had a diplomatic mission. NEAR, I think, was the euphemism they used, rather than accredited to, which would mean that you recognized it as the government before the people of France themselves had had an opportunity to express themselves as to what they wanted in free elections.

Q: I understand.

MACARTHUR: So they were to come up and assume the thing. Well, there was still shooting going on for three or four days after the 25th of August, and they finally, if I recall correctly, arrived up in the first week of September. Then Selden Chapin became chargé d'affaires of the embassy, and he brought up people that had been with him down there. It was a small group – Jerry Drew, there were about five or six officers. I was sort of set up as the political section, because I had had the good fortune to know so many of these people that suddenly had become very prominent.

Q: I want to go back to one thing, though, that you mentioned: your relationships with the various Resistance groups and so forth and de Gaulle people.

MACARTHUR: Our instructions were to keep in touch across the board so that we would be able to assess the situation, including the communist role of the French Communist Party, which, you may recall, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement was signed in August of 1939, which precipitated World War II, because it gave Hitler's Germany a secure rear in Eastern Europe against Russian business, the French Communist Party denounced France and Britain's imperialistic war against Nazi Germany, was declared illegal by the Deladier Government, and it went underground. It just laid doggo and did absolutely nothing during the period of German occupation of the first year – that is, from June 1940 until June 1941. Of course, it was the only group that had in existence a secret cellular organization along classical communist lines, an underground, and it laid doggo until June 25-26, 1941, when Hitler's Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Then suddenly, this organization appeared as the leading resistance group, because it had its secret underground organization all in place, it had weapons, it had means of communication, it had people scattered – not scattered, but people in virtually every urban community, and it was prepared to go. And go it did. It started a campaign of sabotage and assassinations of Germans, sabotage of railway lines and things of that kind the Germans used, one thing and another.

But then as the liberation of France came, it became also clear – during this period, when I was there, after, that is, almost a year and a half between '41 and '42 . . .

Q: This was when you were in Vichy.

MACARTHUR: When I was in Vichy, yes. The FTP, the Frontier Terre Partisan, the communist people, I was in touch with some of them, but all they wanted was weapons from us. They didn't want to cooperate with anybody else or anything else; all they wanted was delivery of weapons. There were some arms drops to them made by the British, because it was in everybody's interest to have them creating problems for the Germans.

But at a time when the original, authentic Resistance was just getting really organized, because when France fell, there was no organization, there was another, it was just a few individuals or people or people with some leadership qualities here and there who said, "What can we do to help Britain? What can we do to make it tough on the Germans?" But there was no organization, nothing at all, and these little groups sprang up in different places. Then some of them came together, and then formed their larger réseaux, and then they had cross-relationships. But the Frontier Terre Partisan, the communist group, wouldn't play with any of those groups; they kept to themselves, and they manifested a tendency for complete authority. So that was the situation that existed when France was liberated.

Then we got disquieting reports as the Germans withdrew from Normandy and Brittany, in some areas where the FTP, the Frontier Terre Partisan, where they were strong, they took out some of the minor Resistance leaders who were known to be anti-communist, and shot them as collaborationists. These reports were disquieting.

So when I arrived in Paris, liberated Paris, at the end of August, in late August, one of the first persons I made contact with was Marcel Cachan, the head of the French Communist Party, who I

had met when I worked in the embassy before the war, because I worked for a while with Lawrence Higgins. The embassy was divided into sections; one had the left, and one had the more conservative elements, and another man had primary responsibility for the political thinking of industrial leaders and the like. I worked with him, and I'd met Cachan, had been in his apartment, and Madame Cachan, I think, had been born in Boston, although, I think, of French parents. She spoke accented English. So two days after I arrived in Paris, there were Frontier Terre people all over the place, and I saw a lieutenant of Frontier Terre, and I had prepared a little message to Cachan, saying, "Dear Mr. Cachan, mon cher Monsieur Cachan, I don't know if you . . ." It was in French, of course. ". . . if you remember me or not, but I'm So-and-so, and we met [and so forth]. I'd be happy to see you." I gave it to this lieutenant of Frontier Terre Partisan, who was there and seemed to be in charge of some people that were massed around the Place de la Concorde, some FTP people.

The next morning, I was in the embassy. This was before the people of North Africa had arrived. I was in the embassy, and the next morning a FTP guy – they had a guard. We put a guard at the embassy. He said, "There's something to see you."

I went down, and he said, "Be standing out on the corner of the Place de la Concorde, right at the corner of your embassy, sharply at 12:00 o'clock, and a car will pick you up and take you to see Monsieur Cachan."

So I went out and stood on the corner, and sure enough, promptly at 12:00 o'clock, a car drove up, a little Citroen, with three people in it – a driver and two tommy gunners with tommy guns, one in the back and one in front. When I came up, they put me in front, and the two guys with the tommy guns got in back, and we drove out to the so-called red belt of Paris, and we stopped in front of one of those mass small apartment dwellings that had been built for the French workers, and got out. The two tommy gunners escorted me up to the door, and inside the door there was another man with a tommy gun. He checked me again for weapons. Then they took me to an apartment on the first floor, knocked on the door. It was opened by another guy with a tommy gun. I went in and there embraced my friend Mr. Cachan, who I had not seen. Mr. Cachan then described to me what had happened to him during the war, how he had grown a beard. He showed me a picture. He had a flowing white beard, much more whiskers than Santa Claus. I understand how he was able, with false identities, not to be recognized, because nobody would have recognized him. We had an excellent lunch, aided by a bottle of wine, with his wife, who was very much a part of his political communist life. It was a very interesting conversation.

Then after I'd been with him about two and a half hours, we wound up. I had questioned him about what their plans were for the future, one thing and another, and what the role of the party would be. We had a long back-and-forth about the history of the party in France and what it should be and what its role should be. He made it clear that the French communists were loyal to France, but that it was time for a new era, the people who had been responsible for the war and all the ills of the war should no longer have any role to play, and that the French Communist Party should be the vanguard of a peaceful revolution.

Q: Did the question come up, what would the role of the United States be in the future of France at all?

MACARTHUR: No. They knew that we were deeply engaged and committed. They knew from statements that the government had made that we would do everything we could to alleviate the suffering that was bound to exist in a liberated France that had been deprived of things for so long. But I don't recall any particular probing on his part about our activities or policies, because what everybody wanted in every party, regardless of their own political views, was American aid and assistance to get France back on its feet. So the problem never came up. But I did do a long report which I sent. I used to send these to Doc Matthews in numbered letters, rather than at that particular time, in those first days, we could send telegrams through military channels to the State Department, and we could send things through a form of pouch, which is what I did, because we had no diplomatic pouch. But the military had facilities to get back to the Pentagon, and they shifted the stuff over. So in that first period until we got set up with Selden Chapin and his people and had a code room and our own facilities, and had a diplomatic courier tied in with the one in London, and so forth, I used the military facilities.

Q: You said that Jefferson Caffery came rather soon after.

MACARTHUR: Yes. Jefferson Caffery came in September, the latter part of September. He was obviously Doc Mathew's candidate for the job. Matthews had worked with him as a DCM in Latin America. Caffery had had experience. He had served in France after World War I as an embassy secretary. He spoke some French. But Caffery was not a very articulate man. He was very bright and perceptive, but he was not very articulate; he had sort of a stammer or a stutter. But he was bright and ran an excellent embassy, I must say. He knew how to manage his human resources and get the most out of them very well indeed. He, not having been associated with any of the politicians of pre-war France, that the de Gaullists blamed for France's debacle that had occurred to France, he was, in one respect, as pure as snow insofar as they were concerned. He didn't have any close ties to the old guard that had gone out with the war, but some of whom were trying to make a comeback. He got along extremely well with – I say “extremely well” – he got along well with General de Gaulle. I remember that General de Gaulle had a small dinner not too long after Caffery arrived, at which I think there were ten people – General and Mrs. De Gaulle, George Bideau and Suzy Bideau as foreign minister and his wife – she was a former career diplomat – Ambassador Caffery and his wife, myself and my wife.

Q: Your wife had joined you by this time.

MACARTHUR: She had joined me by this time. This was the end of October, beginning of November. And two of his staff, Colonel Guy, I think, and Palewski. But it was a very intimate dinner. The general was very kind to me because I had helped some of his people who had been parachuted in during the Vichy days. The embassy's relationship with not only de Gaulle, but with these disparate Resistance leaders, who were part of the French system because they were all elected to the Parliament in landslides in the first elections and the like, was really very, very good. There were no problems. The problems, of course, arose for France as the communists made it increasingly clear that they planned, eventually, to run the country.

Q: I was looking through the foreign relations series, and I noted that by January of 1945, Ambassador Caffery was saying that the French were very sensitive about some things, that they

felt that the United States was treating German prisoners too well, much better than German POWs would be treated by Germans in Germany, and that the United States wasn't giving enough supplies, and that we weren't clearing out the Germans who were still in the channel fortresses, such as St. Lazare, Brest, and all, and that the Americans were treating the French like children, and also the Americans didn't believe the stories about what the Gestapo had done in France. I mean, it was obviously a time of sensitivity.

MACARTHUR: There were these news reports that we got of ill treatment of German prisoners of war. I was not personally involved in any investigations or anything, because, if I recall correctly, these prisoners were largely being held in northern France or Germany...

Q: Mr. Ambassador, in a tape that we did before, for technical reasons, we didn't really cover your mission as a young officer to General Weygand very well. I wonder if we could go over that once again. Could you explain how that took place?

MACARTHUR: Certainly. You will recall that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which brought us into the war. And shortly after that attack in December, Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to the United States to meet with the President, because that act of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor brought us into World War II. They discussed strategy and tactics and all sorts of things, the role of the United States, which is all a matter of history. But they also discussed in some detail the question of a second landing, or a landing, rather, in France. They reached the conclusion that the best way to eventually liberate France was to first go in and move in and take over North Africa, which would provide a springboard for either a second front, a dual attack on German-occupied France, or a springboard up through Italy and the like.

The problem that they faced was that in French North Africa there were elements that were not terribly pro-de Gaulle. They wanted to find a French leader that was respected, who could rally the French military, which had some strength in North Africa, to the Allied cause, as well as the general population. And they came to the conclusion that General Weygand was the person. General Weygand had been in France in French North Africa, and he was known to bitterly oppose any effort by the Germans to take over North Africa, to occupy French North Africa. In fact, he was finally removed from his position of commander of the French forces in North Africa by the Vichy Government at German request.

I might add a personal thought, that the rather difficult personal relationships and feelings that President Roosevelt had for de Gaulle probably played an important part in seeking someone other than de Gaulle to head up the French effort in North Africa.

Q: Do you think President Roosevelt was also looking to the future beyond, to develop a new leader other than de Gaulle to deal with France?

MACARTHUR: Well, he did not personally like General de Gaulle. I mean, that is a matter of record. And I think, basically, he was looking for somebody that the French could rally to other than de Gaulle. I should add, parenthetically, jumping ahead a bit, that at a later date, President Roosevelt also tried to set General Giraud up as an alternative, if you will, to General de Gaulle.

But to go back to the Weygand mission, when this was decided, Doc Matthews, H. Freeman Matthews, who was consular of the embassy in London, and who had been our chargé d'affaires in Vichy, France, and the Vichy Government until he was assigned to London, after Admiral Leahy had arrived and taken over, and who knew, Doc Matthews knew intimately the atmospherics inside the so-called unoccupied zone of France, he was called to Washington to participate in some of these meetings. And then it was decided by Roosevelt and Churchill that an effort should be made to enlist General Weygand on a contingency basis, that if it was necessary to go into French North Africa, we hoped that he would head up the movement in support of Allied landings.

Doc Matthews then flew to Portugal on his way back to England, and there he contacted Butch Leverich, who was a second secretary, as I recall it.

Q: *Butch Leverich?*

MACARTHUR: Henry Leverich, I think his name was. He was known as Butch, as his nickname. Doc Matthews got Leverich, and had Leverich memorize, in great detail, the instructions which would be sent to the embassy in Vichy, with respect to contacting General Weygand. The instructions were extremely detailed. And I remember that a message came in – I can't remember if it was from the department or from Doc Matthews – to our embassy in Vichy, saying that Leverich would arrive from Portugal with some extremely important instructions for Admiral Leahy, our ambassador, and myself.

We awaited Leverich's arrival in Vichy with great interest, because we didn't have a clue what this was all about, and when he arrived, he gave us, in great detail, the full message. And what the full message involved was A) a completely innocuous but very nice letter from President Roosevelt to General Weygand, a short, friendly letter. This letter was to serve as the credentials to establish the bona fide of the oral message which would accompany the delivery of this written message. Doc Matthews had suggested that because, obviously, it was impossible for Admiral Leahy, the ambassador, to go anywhere without being followed, and because the admiral did not speak French, that I should be the emissary that carried out this mission, as I was the only officer that had been continuously in France since the fall, since 1940, when the Vichy Government had set up, and knew a great many people, and knew my way around, and had friends in various Resistance organizations and groups. Admiral Leahy concurred in that decision, and I was assigned to carry out the mission.

The first problem was to find out where General Weygand lived. We did not dare go and start asking our French Resistance friends where General Weygand might be found in France, in unoccupied France. We knew he was someplace there after he had been relieved by the Vichy Government of his duties in North Africa. Because we feared that some loose-talking Resistance fellow might say, "Well, I wonder why the American Embassy in Vichy is asking where Weygand is. What's up?" And news could spread swiftly. Secondly, if we asked a Resistance member, who was quite reliable, or we thought was quite reliable, and the Gestapo should pick him up and torture him, and it came out, the mission could be blown also. So all we had heard about General Weygand was that he was living someplace in the south of France, in Province,

someplace near the French Riviera.

So we then developed a cover story, and the cover story was that since I had been in Vichy since the beginning of the Vichy regime, virtually, I was tired, needed a rest, wanted to get away with my wife and daughter from the very ingrown and strange atmosphere of Vichy, which had a collaborationist government, and wanted ten days' rest someplace. And with this cover story, my wife, my daughter, the daughter's nurse, took off in my little Ford car for the south of France, and we proceeded to Cannes, which we had known before the war. And we stayed at a hotel that was open. It was in January by this time. It was cold, damp. There was occasional sleet. But the good life was still going on, and a casino which was open every night for gambling, collaborationists, and people of that sort with money to spend, and so my wife and I decided that the best way – or the only way, really – to try to find out where Weygand lived, without giving away the show, was to go to the casino and have a few drinks of champagne and gamble a bit, strike up acquaintances with some of these people that were there, and then individually, she or I, depending on what personal group we were with, would say something like, “Isn't it a pity that there isn't a single famous well known Frenchman left on the Cote d'Azur, when before the war it was filled with well known personalities like the Windsors and international personalities like the Ali Khan and all sorts of French wealthy people of various classes and the like?”

So for about four nights, we ruined our alimentary canals by going to the casino each night, gambling, having a few drinks, picking up people here and there, chatting with them, and we tried this gambit on them. And nobody came up with anything. They all said, “Yes, it's very sad that there are no longer any French people here.” And we got very discouraged.

By this time, I believe it was a Sunday, it was a very rainy day, the casino wasn't open, and we drove over to Juan les Pins for luncheon, which is a small, little Riviera village just before the peninsula that sticks out to the east of Cannes, that houses the Hotel de Pacques and some of the famous properties. We found a delightful little bistro, a French restaurant, and there we ran into two couples who were having drinks before luncheon, attractive young Frenchmen and women, and we started chatting with them. They were interested in the fact that we were Americans but spoke French, and they were also interested that we came from Vichy. So we had a few more glasses of wine and had lunch together, and then my wife tried the gambit about, “Isn't it a pity there are no longer French people?”

And one of these girls who lived in Grasse, about 15 kilometers up in the hills above Cannes, said, “Well, there's one famous Frenchman that is still there, and is still down here, and that's General Weygand, who lives at the Hotel So and So, about a kilometer or two from Grasse.”

So with this golden nugget of information, we returned to our hotel and ordered a bottle of champagne, and then got ready for the next day. The next day, I asked carefully about the parfumerie, a factory in Grasse that I asked the concierge of the hotel, said that I wanted to go up to Grasse and visit the famous parfumerie, where they made these marvelous French perfumes. So he gave me instructions, and my wife and daughter and nurse, we all took off and drove up that day, just before lunch, and visited the parfumerie, and found out where the hotel was. Then we had lunch. Bought a bit of perfume at the parfumerie, and then we had lunch.

After lunch, we drove to about a half a kilometer from the hotel, which was on a rather deserted road, and my wife and daughter and the nurse got out under the trees, and I walked to the hotel. I arrived, and I had written out a little card to General Weygand, which said, in effect, "Dear General Weygand, I am the nephew of General MacArthur and served with the French Army, and who knew and respected you. I served in the French Army in World War II under General Giraud, and knew and respected you greatly, and I'd like to pay my respects." And I had this all ready in an envelope, addressed to General Weygand. I went into the hotel and asked if the letter, without identifying myself, could be delivered to the Weygand apartment, and I would await a reply.

I got word down to please come up to the apartment. I went up, and there was Madame Weygand, who said the general was out for a walk, but would I not come in and have some tea with her. So I went in and had tea, and we chatted inconsequentially about one thing or another, and then the general returned. I then gave him the rather very nice but innocuous letter from President Roosevelt, and said that the letter which I presented him, which he read and asked me if I would thank the President for his good wishes, I said, "The letter is simply to establish my bona fide. I have a very important and personal message for you from President Roosevelt."

I then started off by saying, which was part of the instructions which I had, which Leverich had memorized and brought from Lisbon, that there had recently been three new international developments of great significance. The first were the serious German military reverses in Russia, which raised questions about a final German victory; the second were the recent British successes, which made it impossible for Hitler to seize the Suez Canal and have control over North Africa and the Middle East; and the third was the entry of the United States into the war as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the entry into the war on the side of the British and the Allies, with this tremendous economic and industrial and military potential, which would greatly increase the strength of the Allies and their ability to successfully prosecute the war against Nazi Germany.

I said that while these developments, in the judgment of our government, meant clearly that Germany could not win the war, they led the American Government, at the same time, to attach particular importance to French North Africa, because what happened in North Africa, French North Africa, could affect the length of the war, the number of people of occupied countries that might die as a result of it, and it could also play an important role, ultimately, in the liberation of metropolitan France.

Knowing, as the President of our government did, of the French sensibilities about being replaced in the French colonies, which the German propaganda had been spreading assiduously throughout France from the moment that France fell, to divide them from the British, saying that the British and later the Americans wanted to take over all French colonies after the war. Knowing this, my instructions included saying to General Weygand that the President wanted him to know that the United States intends to see to it that the integrity of France and her empire is respected after the war, and that the French possessions in North Africa would remain in French hands. The United States had no desire to replace France, nor to see the British or supporters of de Gaulle take over that area, knowing that Weygand, parenthetically, did not appreciate General de Gaulle too much.

I then went on with General Weygand to say that in the light of what was obviously a German objective, which was to seize French North Africa, the President wanted Weygand to know that if there were any indications that the Germans were or might move against North Africa, the United States would be obliged to take protective action to keep French North Africa from falling into German hands. These steps would necessarily include an attack on German forces, should they move into North Africa. In other words, if there was any indication of a change in the status quo of North Africa, we would be obliged to act. And insofar as what changes in the status quo might entail, I listed several, which were: 1) the replacement by the government of Marshal Petain by government until total German domination; that is, simply a completely puppet government; the utilization of the French fleet against America or its Allies; the ceding of African bases by the Vichy Government to the Germans. We knew the Germans had been asking for bases in French North Africa. A military threat against North Africa, such as preparations for a German attack through Spain or from any other direction; and finally, if there were signs of German infiltration into North Africa, which was clearly an indication of a prelude to an attempt to take it over.

I said that the President greatly regretted that General Weygand was no longer in French North Africa to cope with the German endeavors to take over that vital area, and the principal objective of my call was the President's desire to know whether in the event of any of the eventualities leading to a major threat against North Africa, which I had listed, occurred, whether General Weygand would be willing to play a role of leadership in French North Africa. The President, I said, believed that no one was as well-equipped and as knowledgeable and as respected as he was to fulfill that role, and that such a mission could greatly speed the liberation of metropolitan France from the Nazi occupation.

General Weygand replied to me that, in effect, he no longer had any role to play, civil or military. He was retired, he was out of action, and he did not feel that he could play any role in the events of the scenario that I had described.

I then said to him that I had been asked specifically by the President to say that if he could not accept the role which the President had in mind, in the event the Germans attempted to take over North Africa, that he would keep entirely secret and to himself the proposal which I had made to him and outlined to him; it was to go no further. And General Weygand replied that he could not, in honor, do so. He was honor-bound to inform Marshal Petain, and he would inform Marshal Petain.

I said that Marshal Petain lived in the Hotel de Pacques in Vichy, which was riddled with collaborationists, and that if he did so, word would probably get back to the Germans very swiftly. And he looked at me and said, "I have ways of doing this so that the Marshal alone will know, and I know the Marshal will not break the confidence that I impose, and that the knowledge of this will go no further."

So that was the end of a mission which ended in failure. But there is, however, an epilogue. I went back to Vichy, and we reported cryptically, as we'd been instructed to do, the message that the initiative had not succeeded. Admiral Leahy sent a telegram which was for the President's

eyes only, through a special communication channel which, I think, has been later released. But there is an epilogue. About a month later, after my return to Vichy, the admiral called on Marshal Petain, and I went along, as usual, as the interpreter. And the admiral went in and shook hands with the Marshal and said, "I've brought along, as usual, Mr. MacArthur, to interpret for me."

And the Marshal looked at me with a quizzical smile and said, "Monsieur MacArthur, I believe you've been doing a bit of traveling lately." And he smiled again. In fact, he said, "I think you've been visiting with your family in the south of France." And the Marshal never let anyone know, Laval or any of the others, know about this initiative, which indeed he did keep entirely to himself.

Q: Let's start all over again on this part about Yalta.

MACARTHUR: After the Yalta Conference, the date and place had been agreed to by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, but before the conference was actually held, President Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins to Europe to meet and consult with various European leaders and with General Eisenhower. He came to Paris, and General Eisenhower put him up at the Brown House, which was a special guesthouse that General Eisenhower had as Supreme Allied Commander. And a little dinner was arranged at Brown House, with General Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, his executive chief of staff, Winston Churchill flew over from London, Duff Cooper, the British ambassador to Paris was there. I've forgotten who Churchill brought with him. Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador, was there. And I accompanied Ambassador Caffery to this very small, intimate dinner. Harry Hopkins was the star of the occasion. He was the one who was the occasion for the dinner. I recall, without going into all the details of the discussions and the back-and-forths, the fact that the French had felt very, very insulted – or de Gaulle had felt very insulted – about not being included. I remember that Churchill, I believe it was, who asked Harry Hopkins the following question. He said, "Does the President really believe that as a result of our cooperation with Russia, with the Soviet Union, during the war, that after the war Stalin will change in any way his ambitions and the declared intention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to see its system triumph throughout the world? Does he really believe there's a good chance or there is a chance of that?"

To which Harry Hopkins replied, "The boss," he said, "feels that after all we've done for the Russians, lend-lease support, cooperation, that there's a good chance, a 50-50 chance that he can turn Stalin into a good Democrat."

I was shocked by this answer, because it was quite clear at that time that the Soviet Union, through the French Communist Party, was doing everything it could to be disruptive inside France and create a situation from which it might – that is, the French Communist Party – might ultimately emerge as the primary influence of any French Government. But there it was.

I should add that we had had, all through that early partial liberation period of France, that is, partial in the sense that the greater part of France had been liberated, sign after sign that the French Communist Party's true intent and certainly there was at that time no Communist Party in the world more totally subservient to Moscow than the French Communist Party. They supported the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact that brought on the war. Then when the Soviet Union was attacked

by Hitler, they turned right around, and in the early liberation period, as some of the towns were liberated, the communists, who were perhaps in that area, who, when they happened to be most powerful, would on a number of occasions take out other Resistance leaders who were known for their anti-communist feeling, but were staunch French Resistance leaders, they were taken out and shot as collaborationists, they also looted banks. When the Germans withdrew, the FTP, the French Communist Resistance organization, would move right in on a bank and loot it, and we had one very serious incident where a convoy of six FTP trucks was challenged by an American sentry group on a road in France. And instead of stopping, they pulled out their guns and started shooting at our guards. We shot back and killed some of them and captured some of them, and the five trucks were loaded with the French currency that they had looted from a small city that had been liberated several days earlier, and the FTP had seized the money in the banks before our forces arrived and took over the town.

So there were all these indications that the French Communist Party was really trying to bring about a situation where eventually it would be the government of France.

Q: In your role in the political section of the embassy, were you able to report this, even in a wartime situation, where the communists are Allies?

MACARTHUR: Yes. We not only reported it, but I still was acting as the liaison with the SHAPE staff. And the military, of course, our military reported it back once through military channels. We reported it through our channels, because we got it through our military. There were people that told us about this incident. But one must remember that after four years of German occupation, when France was liberated, there was a mess in the sense that there were all kinds of splinter groups, splinter Resistance groups of various kinds while de Gaulle had an overall umbrella over the Resistance. There were individual groups, some of leaders who had centrist or center right aspirations; other non-communist leaders of the socialist-left persuasion, and the political situation was extremely fragmented. There was also a situation at that time where, after the liberation, although de Gaulle moved in and established his government, the National Resistance Council, which was the top Resistance body that brought together the Resistance leaders of many groups into the National Resistance Council, the Conseil Nationale de la Resistance, all groups – except the communists, who refused to participate with other groups, kept to themselves – they held meetings. The National Resistance Council held meetings several times a week on policies that the government had decided. And in those meetings, there were frequently very substantial disagreements within the National Council of Resistance on what should be done in that early post-liberation period.

Because of my friendship with several members of the National Council of the Resistance, including Joseph Laniel, the big Resistance leader from Normandy, and Ito, whom I knew, and Tsetjin, I used to go over at 10:30 at night and wait until the meeting broke up, and then I would get from one or two different sources an account of what they had been up to or what they had been discussing.

Q: Go ahead.

MACARTHUR: So later, when we had a rather chaotic domestic political situation, where the

Fourth Republic was finally formed, but in the Fourth Republic, if a prime minister lasted a couple of months, it was almost a miracle, it was, in part, a result of this terrific fragmentation of political views, and the resistance of some people to de Gaulle's government – that is, the initial government that was set up there before the elections were held eventually that brought the constitution in the Fourth Republic, which in itself, because of the instability, some of which I've mentioned, was later replaced by the Fifth Republic.

Q: Running the political section at that time, what was your role? Did you report on this? Were there instructions of how to make them move?

MACARTHUR: I don't recall any instructions. Our role was to encourage, to the extent possible, stability in the French political system, but if you know the French as I know them, it's very difficult for a foreigner to offer suggestions to a Frenchman about what he might or might not be doing, without creating a very, very considerable backlash. And our basic effort was concentrated certainly on reporting. I think, because of my background, I was one that had the very large number of contacts with different people in the French military, as well as the French Resistance people who turned out to be future political leaders of one kind or another. But we had a special section that dealt with the communist-left, under Norris Chipman, which reported and followed very closely what the communists were doing, and that section of the embassy reported, at the specific request of the department, that felt certain that we had been infiltrated by Soviet moles, and they were proven right, as the Alger Hiss trial later proved, and Harry Dexter White's suicide.

Q: He was in the Treasury.

MACARTHUR: He was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and worked for the Soviet Union, and committed suicide when it all started unraveling. We had a special office in the State Department, to which Norris Chipman's numbered reports went, and then went directly to Doc Matthews and Jimmy Dunn. Jimmy Dunn was the head of the European bureau, and Doc was his deputy. We did not dare trust at that time reporting on communist activity through ordinary channels, for fear that it would be back to Moscow within 36 hours.

Q: How were you informed of this particular problem?

MACARTHUR: Well, we were informed of it through people like Ray Murphy, who headed the special little office in the department that dealt with this problem. I mean, it was no secret what the Russians were up to then, and that's why many of us were so disappointed at the Roosevelt performance at Yalta. The first thing that you know when you deal with the Russians is that if you get an agreement, you have to nail down every single clause in airtight fashion; otherwise, if you just sign some general agreement that you agree in mother love, that you agree with mother love and be kind to animals and that sort of thing, the Soviets will run with that 1,000 miles before you can even see them. Certainly that's what happened at Yalta, when they agreed to free elections. I remember later when we challenged Molotov about that at the Berlin Conference, he said, "But the elections are free."

We said, "Yes, elections are free, but you have to be a member of the Communist Party and you

can only vote for the member that the Party sets up a single candidate set up by the Party.”

Molotov replied, “Yes, but anybody can vote, or they can vote ‘no’ if they want to, or they can vote for that man or oppose him.” And the performance at Yalta was one for which, at that time, when we had the monopoly of the weapon, and we had a great deal of cards to play, one of which we didn’t do ourselves a great amount of good.

Q: Was this perceived at the time, basically throughout the officers?

MACARTHUR: Well, it was certainly perceived by those of us in the European bureau, and I think there was no mystification, I think, in the minds of people who had responsibility for Soviet affairs in the Foreign Service. Certainly Norris Chipman had served in Moscow, and that was why he was picked to come to Paris, because he knew there were no scales on his eyes about what the Soviet leadership was really up to in terms of the rest of Europe. And while Chip Bohlen was perhaps never as vocal on the subject of what they were up to as Norris Chipman, I’ve talked to Chip, I knew him well, many, many times, and there was certainly not a shadow of a doubt about his understanding of what they were up to. Actually, how we knew that they knew that Hiss and Harry Dexter White were working and passing information to the Soviets, I don’t know. I don’t know what the details are.

Q: But you knew that in the atmosphere . . .

MACARTHUR: But we knew that both of them were passing things on to the Soviet Union, and we knew that in that atmosphere and with what the Soviets were trying to do through the use of the French Communist Party, if it got back to them, it would make the job that much easier for them, if they knew what we knew about what they were trying to do. So we also had some brilliant people who had left the Party. You must remember that when the French Communist Party was formed, it was a split-away from the Socialist Party, after the Socialist Congress of Tours, in 1917 – I think it was 1917; it could have been a little later – the communist wing, there was no French Communist Party then, the ultra Marxist left of the wing splintered away and formed the French Communist Party. And among those people were a number of people who were idealists. One in particular, whose real name I’ve forgotten now, he had a pseudonym, was a member, until the 1930s, was a member of the Politburo of the Party, and he and another member of the Politburo split away, when finally they understood, during the great Stalin purges, that this was not a great social experiment that was designed to lift the well-being of man and make life a better place for all people, in democratic political surroundings; that it was a simple, total power autocracy with expansionist desire. And indeed, these people, who were close to people in the Communist Party, although they’d split from it, were a very, very valuable source of information to Norris Chipman and to myself, when Norris was away. There were a number of them, and they knew exactly what was up. They knew the leadership of the Communist Party intimately; they knew all about them. They knew they had their feelers into the Party, and so they kept us very, very well informed at that time.

Q: Turning away from dealing with the Communist Party, but dealing with the French Government towards the end of the war, you wore two hats. You were both working with Eisenhower’s headquarters and with the embassy. Were there any particular problems?

MACARTHUR: Yes. After I left, after the liberation of Paris, there on General Eisenhower's staff in Normandy, then I was assigned to the – they had a SHAPE liaison group, and I was assigned to that. Then when I was reassigned to the embassy, my official membership in the SHAPE liaison group was severed, but the informal relationship of working with them continued on. So I continued to work with them and be sort of a channel, if you will, middle-level channel, of information that they wanted passed on to the ambassador in the embassy.

And in the military sphere, we ran into one very serious problem just before the end of the war. I think it was in April. As Germany was beginning to collapse and the eastern front was giving way, and we were advancing on the continent, our intelligence had information that the Germans might try to regroup in an Austrian redoubt in the Alps, and if that happened successfully, it could represent a very difficult target because of the terrain, and we could lose a hell of a lot of Allied lives. So a drive was put on. General Eisenhower mounted a drive which was to kick off and strike – I guess it was across the Rhine and in toward the heartland of the so-called Austrian redoubt, and cut off any connection.

In the Allied forces, of course, the French Army was included in the Allied forces under the overall command of General Eisenhower. The advance led by a French general, was triggered to kick off – I think this was in April of '44, at 5:00 in the morning or something like that. There had been heavy preparation before artillery barrages and things of that kind, and then to the consternation of our forces, of our commander of the Army group of which the French Army was a part, the French Army, instead of advancing in the direction of the line of battle, as indicated in the plans, marched right across the front – I think it was the French Ninth Army or one of the armies – to grab Stuttgart and Hume. In other words, it advanced at a 90-degree angle, directly across the front of the advancing Americans. We either had the choice of shooting our way through the French or holding up the advance. We held up the advance for 36 hours, and this created a real crisis. The answer was that General de Gaulle had given the orders to the French commander, and he so informed our Army group commander to take these places, and this is part of his move to move into this part of Germany, so that France would have a zone of occupation or a larger zone of occupation than it might otherwise have had. This did nothing, of course, to make our government any happier about General de Gaulle. I think President Truman had taken over by that time. President Roosevelt had died.

Q: Yes, I think that final push into Bavaria had taken place after, probably in late March, early April.

MACARTHUR: I think it was early April. And of course, President Truman, one of our great Presidents, it didn't do much to give him much confidence in General de Gaulle, to have a partner in a war, with a world war going on, who, when the plan has been accepted, or you understand has been accepted, and everybody has their orders to march, suddenly disrupts the whole plan because of his own political objectives.

I had one other interesting experience at that time. As we moved forward in April and started liberating these concentration camps, I alerted the T forces every time we passed through the SHAPE liaison group of the . . .

Q: *The T forces?*

MACARTHUR: The task forces. The T force is the force that goes in first. It's the attack force, the initial point force, that goes into the area of combat, the objective that you're trying to take. I gave to all CORE and Army headquarters a list of people who had worked with us in the Resistance that I knew personally or whom I knew of because their group had worked with us, who were missing. Because during the period '44-'44, there had been a terrible blood-letting of the French Resistance. A lot of the reseaux, the Resistance groups, had been broken, and a great many people disappeared.

From Dachau, I got word that one of the finest contacts that had done a great deal for us in the Vichy days, with two other people that I had worked with, were alive in Bergen-Belsen, had been picked up alive. They all had tuberculosis and were very ill, but they survived. And then I got word from Gaston Palewski, General de Gaulle's director of cabinet, and his sort of *imminence grise*, that they would like me to go forward when Dachau was liberated, to see if I could find any of the listed Resistance leaders that they would give me still alive, and if so, if I could evacuate them back at once to Paris. So I went forward to General Sandy Patch's headquarters in a little L5, I guess it was called, a little two-passenger liaison open biplane, and got there the day before the liberation, the night before they were going to move in the next morning, and then went forward and stayed with the medical groups behind the T force, until the T force went in and the shooting stopped.

I went into the camp, and the Germans in these PW camps, Dachau then had 32,500 people still in it, they divided them up into national groups, a French group, an Italian group, this group, and Dutch, and they quartered them together, and they had one man who, in French, is known as the chef de fil, the head man, and the Germans would only deal with one man in that national contingent. So I went forward, and it was the most ghastly spectacle I've ever seen in my life. As we advanced toward the camp when the shooting stopped, there was a train on the side with about 50 boxcars, a terrible smell coming from it, but there was a trail of bodies from one of the cars. They'd obviously broken open the doors, and there was a trail of skeletons. I couldn't call them bodies; there was nothing but bones and skin. It went about 100 feet and then stopped, where they simply collapsed and died. The rest were just dead bodies in these boxcars. They'd been moved from another camp, and they had never been let out of the boxcars.

I got into the camp, and there was a mound of bodies outside of what was the crematorium, a mound of bodies 12 feet high, perhaps 150, 200 feet long, something over virtually 8,000, 10,000 bodies. There were people dying. As I came in, a man was sitting against the front, just a skeleton with skin, looked up at me, and he whispered something. I leaned over to listen, and I understood him to say, "Cigarette, cigarette." I pulled out a cigarette and lit it and put it in his mouth, and he gave me a beautiful smile, and then he just fell over dead.

But in any event, I finally found the chef de fil of the French, and to my amazement, he was number three or four on de Gaulle's list. I said to him that I had a plane, and I could take 26 people back, would he designate 26 people, Resistance people, from this list that General de Gaulle had given me to fly back to Paris. And of course, he would be one of them. He looked at

me with great pain in his eyes, and he said, "I am the leader of the French group. There are 3,200 Frenchmen here still alive." He said, "They're dying like flies." He said, "I will leave Dachau when the last Frenchman has been repatriated or died, because some of them are never going to make it back." And he did. He stayed three and a half weeks.

Q: With the French dealing with the problems of peace, I believe there were peace negotiations going on during the time you were there.

MACARTHUR: There were indeed, and the embassy was involved to a certain extent. Jimmy Byrnes, our Secretary of State, former Senator Byrnes, came over with a delegation from Washington, but the people in the embassy were drafted to serve on various subcommittees, working groups, you might call them, international, of the peace council group. I served on a subcommittee of a group that was deliberating the French-Italian border. You remember that after France fell, Italians, who had been neutral until Paris and France fell, stabbed the . . .

Q: The hand that held the dagger in the back.

MACARTHUR: (Laughs) Yes. They stabbed the French in the back, and the French were determined to have a hunk of that Italian territory as a bit of payment for that. I got my first real experience with negotiating with the Soviets. They, of course, were part of the peace . . .

Q: This was about what period are we talking about?

MACARTHUR: We're talking about '46, '47. It's after the war is over and the peace machinery has been set up and so forth. I'll never forget. The Soviets, if they disagreed with – there was general agreement on the Allied side, the British, French, and American side, but the Soviets, when they disagreed, would go on and on and on and on. I discovered later, when I was responsible as coordinator for some of our negotiations in the post-war period with the Soviets, that it's a standing tactic. You wear the guy down. You go on, and you go on, and 8:00 comes, and 9:00 comes, and 10:00 comes, and 11:00 comes, and 12:00 comes. I remember once they simply want to wear you down. Once we were there until 5:00 in the morning, and we just sat it out, and eventually, when they saw they weren't going to get what they were after, they folded up, not then, but the next day, when they saw that we were not going to finally in fatigue or whatever it might be, just sort of say, "Oh, well, what the hell. Let's give an inch here or there," or something like that. But one of the tactics, there are two basic tactics. One is to wear the opposite negotiator that's on the other side down, but the basic tactic is to get language that is so vague and general that it is subject to almost any interpretation that they want to give it, and that is why any negotiation with the Soviets – any negotiation – it's got to be spelled out to the last word and every "t" crossed and every "I" dotted, or else you're going to find yourself that you've got absolutely nothing, and they're proceeding ahead and saying, "Well, the agreement says this and this, and that's what we're doing within the terms of the agreement."

Q: How did the negotiations you were involved in work out, between the French and the Italians?

MACARTHUR: I don't even remember, it was such a small, inconsequential part of the business

as a whole. I think there was a section of a small piece of territory, if I recall correctly, but it was not terribly important.

The most serious problem we had with France then, at that time, involved the so-called European Defense Community. Basic to American policy after World War II, with respect to western Europe, had been the question at the very center of our policy, was the problem of Germany. How could you weave Germany into a western European fabric, economically, politically, militarily, so that the German strings would only be part of the strings that composed that fabric? And if at some future time undependable leadership emerged in Germany, it would become extremely difficult for the Germans to unravel their threads of this European fabric and go their own way, floating between east and west or signing up with the wrong side. And, of course, in pursuit of that policy, we ran immediately into the centuries-old animosity between France and Germany and the bitterness that still existed in that early post-war period on the part of the French, because of the German victory and occupation of France, and the suffering they had gone through, and the rest of it. It was quite obvious to us that without Germany in some form of European fabric, the defense of Europe would be extremely difficult. To try to defend Europe on the Rhine would be logistically, and in other ways, against the kind of forces the Soviet Union had, with no cushion, nothing, would be extremely difficult and highly problematic.

So the problem came up of how could you integrate Germany into a European fabric. Economically, we thought by encouraging European economic integration, which developed into the EEC, and militarily, there had to be some way, because we certainly, with all that we were doing, did not have the resources to put men in the other countries of Europe recovering from the devastation of war, didn't have the resources, we certainly needed a German military contribution at some appropriate stage. And as I recall it, a Frenchman first came up with the idea of the European Defense Community.

Q: It was a French proposal.

MACARTHUR: A French proposal which would integrate at low level, about company or battalion . . .

Q: A brigade level.

MACARTHUR: Well, it was below brigade. I think it was regimental level, units of different countries. I was told later by a Frenchman that it was put up because they thought it was so absurd that it would never fly. But to their surprise and chagrin, the British and ourselves both said, "All right, if this is what it takes to weave Germany into the fabric to do it," the French then walked smartly away from the proposal, and the French prime minister at that time refused to go along. This created very considerable stresses and strains on our relationship with the French, but the damage was repaired fairly swiftly at a later date.

Q: Did we feel that this was going to be a workable system, or was it something that we went along with more for European cooperation than military?

MACARTHUR: Our position was that we would do nothing, we would accept nothing that

couldn't be made to operate militarily with a degree of effectiveness. The thought was that in extremis, our military said this could be made to work. It was not a preferred solution. In fact, it was just above the borderline of unworkability, but they could make it work, and it would bring the Germans in with all the advantages, and overall, the advantages of bringing them in militarily outweighed the absurdity of the proposal, of trying to integrate forces at that low regimental level.

Q: There must have been quite a few conflicts between you and the State Department and the Defense Department.

MACARTHUR: There are always conflicts between the State Department and the Defense Department because of their perception that their responsibility is military, for military security, whereas the State Department has to take into account infinitely broader considerations. It may be fine militarily, but if your friend and ally, on whom you depend, isn't going to agree to it, it's no good at all. And some of the things that the Defense Department has put forward has been things that manifestly would be unacceptable to friends and allies; they just wouldn't agree to it. And if they wouldn't agree to it, they're a non-starter. So diplomacy, I think, is the art of the possible. You have to do what you can with what you've got to work with, always trying to bring the other people along to your persuasion, but that is not an easy task, and it takes time. You know, we're always going to have a difference between a purely military point of view that disregards all the political, social, psychological, and other aspects of a problem. From a purely military point of view, it may look, you know, super. But when you have to take in the other things, and when you are in the position that we're in, where we do not have the resources to assure our own security by ourselves without friends and allies, then you come into a much broader problem of what can you do to achieve this goal, when you can't do it by this narrow military position, because it's unacceptable. What can you do to move it in that direction?

And our position is compounded, of course, by the fact that we have no constituency. The Foreign Service, the State Department, has no constituency whatsoever. The military have the families of millions of people. I'm talking about politics now. We've got no political constituency; we've got no constituency in the news world. There's nothing the news world likes better than to talk about striped pants diplomats and cookie pushers and the like.

THOMAS W. WILSON
Journalist, Paris Herald
Paris (1937-1939)

Information Officer, the Marshall Plan
Paris (1949-1952)

Thomas W. Wilson was born in Baltimore in 1912. After Graduating from Princeton University, he worked as a reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun and later the Paris Herald. He served on the National Defense Advisory Commission, the War Production Board and the Economic Warfare Agency in World War II.

After the War, he worked as an Information Officer for the Marshall Plan, and would later serve as a Political Advisor to the United Nations. Mr. Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 30 1996.

Q: *You say you left the Evening Sun and you went where then?*

WILSON: The Paris Herald.

Q: *First I'd like to get the dates. When did you go to the Paris Herald?*

WILSON: In 1937.

Q: *In 1937. And you were with the Paris Herald from when to when?*

WILSON: 1937-1938. Then I was hired by the INS, the International News Service in Paris in their bureau. So I was in Paris for two and a half or three years.

Q: *How did you get this Paris Herald job. This must have been like going to heaven in a way wasn't it?*

WILSON: It was unbelievable. I had been on a story that had a lot to do with a guy, I guess he was the public affairs vice president of the American Express Company in Baltimore. We got to be fairly friendly. He asked me what I wanted to do next, and I told him I wanted to leave Baltimore. I was thinking of a classmate of mine working on a newspaper in Texas and I was thinking of writing him to see if he would like to swap jobs. Texas sounded like a more lively place than Baltimore did. He said he was public relations director of the American Express company in Paris for several years and got to be fairly good friends with Hills, who was publisher of the Paris paper. He happened to know there was a vacancy there. They have had several Baltimore Sun people, and they have always turned out very well. Would you like me to write him and see if he would like to hear from you? I said, "Yes I would." Sometime later I was down at a murder story near Stillville, Maryland and I got a call from my office saying we've got a telegram from Larry Hills offering you a job. "Keep it. I'll be right there." In any event that's what I did. It was just as lucky and as silly as that.

Q: *May I add for the record that the Paris Herald in those days and for many years on was the pre-eminent American newspaper in Europe. It was a top job. It was associated with the New York Herald which was a close rival to the New York Times in those days.*

WILSON: The Paris Herald was the European edition of the New York Herald. There also was a Paris Tribune which was a European edition of the Chicago Tribune. The Chicago Tribune folded and the Herald bought some part of it, so the old Paris Herald became the Paris Herald-Tribune. Then somewhere along the line the New York Herald bought the... Was there a New York Tribune? I'm not sure. Yes! There was the New York Herald Tribune. So these two things worked together. Anyhow it was the Paris Herald Tribune which was the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune. That's what it was when I went there.

Q: I might say that the New York Herald Tribune had some of the top writers in many fields. I particularly think of the sports writers, but others were extremely... I mean it was a classy paper. Could you tell me about, I mean here you are a boy from Baltimore and you are in the big city of lights. What was your impression of Paris in the late 1930's?

WILSON: I roomed with Jim Lardner who was one of Ring Lardner's four sons.

Q: Ring Lardner being a pre-eminent writer and columnist of that era.

WILSON: Yes. Jim Lardner and Walter Kerr. There were two Walter Kerrs. This was the one who was head of the Paris Bureau and then head of the European Bureau and head of the Washington Bureau. Not the theater Walter Kerr. The three of us lived together. It was a night job. We went to work at 6:00 to 8:00 for the so called day side of the paper, and then went out to dinner for an hour and a half or two hours and then came back because of the time difference, the US. News was just beginning to come in around 10:00 there so then we worked until 2:00 maybe a little less than that because you could be out at a nightclub if you want at 2:00 and things were still going on in Paris nightclubs. Then you sleep eight hours and get up and have the whole day free. It doesn't work that way now, but it was a great time.

Q: What did the job consist of?

WILSON: It was mainly re-writing. You'd get little one or two sentence or paragraph items from New York. For the follow story, you kept the story in the files and you expanded a one or two sentence lead in to a new lead on an old story.

Q: I can speak as a retired Foreign Service Officer, I was Consul General in Naples, I read it every day. Then it was the Paris Times Herald. It was an amalgamate but essentially it is the same paper. This is where you got your news and it served beautifully.

WILSON: It was very good. I don't know why the New York Times tried to put out a European edition after WW II; it didn't work. It was just a shrunk down New York Times. This was a paper by itself.

Q: Yes it really is unique. It was very influential. How about the French? Were you getting involved with the French while you were there or were they a difficult people to crack?

WILSON: No. I'm afraid that Americans are not much better than other people when they live in other countries. They tend to hang around with their own. The staff of the Paris Herald Tribune at that time was roughly divided into two groups. One were leftovers from WWI and the other were people who had been there a year or less. I fell in with some expatriate American news people who had been there long enough to have had a lot of French friends and French relations. Actually I got married over there.

Q: What about the great political waves going on in France. As Americans were you observing the rise of the United Front and the almost fascist right in French politics. I mean this was all getting very close to WWII. Or were you all sort of focused on what was happening back home?

WILSON: I think when I left the sit down strikes were on in Detroit, but so was the Spanish Civil War, and that's what I sort of grew up on politically. As a matter of fact, I had notions that I could volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln brigade, part of the International Brigade. As a matter of fact, Jim Lardner did and was killed. We were absolutely obsessed with the rise of fascism and the Spanish Civil War and the nonsense in Italy.

Q: You are talking about Mussolini and his thing and the rise of Hitler.

WILSON: Yes the rise of Hitler. That's what we talked about. That was the overwhelming political interest at that time.

Q: What was your impression of the French body politic? Did you have a feeling that this was a country that was going to sort of be the bastion of democracy?

WILSON: France was? I'm really getting into very fuzzy memory. I think Leon Blum was still in when I got there in 1937. But the failure indeed refusal of the French and British before you get to the Americans to do anything for the Spanish was our dominant scandal of the times as far as I was concerned. And certainly some of the people I spent time, I didn't go to the Deux Magots. I went to the Dome. I walked home after the paper and there was always somebody sitting there in the Dome I and you would sit around there and have a few beers and pretty soon the sun's coming up. There goes the day.

Q: You left there when? No you had sat a certain point moved over to the International News Service.

WILSON: Do you remember when the Duke of Windsor was coming to the United States for a trip and there was a big story in the American press. The Duke of Windsor was a great pal of a Frenchman who was supposed to be the originator of a system of industrial production that increases the speed...

Q: We can fill this in later but I know what you mean. It was a time management system.

WILSON: That's right and some Baltimore labor leader made a particularly nasty speech about the Duke of Windsor coming over. Because of his friendship with this dirty guy who was speeding up production on the industrial line, and he canceled his trip. That is to say the Duke of Windsor canceled his trip because of this lack of welcome. It so happened that the INS guy, poor fellow, had been around the Crillon Hotel all day waiting to find out whether the Duke was going to the United States tomorrow or not. And unfortunately the bar was on the same floor and he got drunk up in the course of the day. I wrote the story in the office. He canceled his trip at 11:00 at night which as I say was a big story in the U.S. I wrote the story for the Paris Herald. Unfortunately the INS guy had gotten crocked and missed the story entirely. As a result, the head of the INS Bureau fired him and hired me. So I was with the INS for several years.

Q: What type of work were you doing for the INS?

WILSON: The INS was strictly office writing. Lots of mailboard stuff. Background stories and feature stories. Otherwise just compiling news. We had a very able French journalist who covered Parliament for us. Otherwise we just read the news.

Q: *You say Parliament, you mean Chamber of Deputies.*

WILSON: Chamber of Deputies, yes.

Q: *You were in Paris until when?*

WILSON: '49 until '51 or '52.

Q: *Could you talk a bit about Averell Harriman. I mean he was a major figure in American diplomacy for many years. During the time you dealt with him in Paris, what was your impression and how did he operate?*

WILSON: Well I did know Harriman very well and worked with him several times. I don't know anybody who worked with him, if they could work with him, who didn't love him. He was a man who was absolutely totally committed to what he was doing. He worked like a dog. He expected you to also, but he didn't expect you to do anything he didn't do himself. He was really a wonderfully effective person. Everybody felt they had to respect him. I'm not talking about the non-Americans with which we had to deal. I think quite apart from the fact that sure he was a very welcome man – he was an ambassador, and he was running in this case the Marshall Plan. He was running a program that the Europeans were absolutely dependent on. But I think he was, now that we begin to talk about it, very persuasive in private. He was never a very good speaker. If you are talking about diplomacy, I'm talking about private diplomacy. He always knew what he was talking about. I think he was probably more responsible than any other individual in forcing the Europeans to take the Marshall Plan in a way that I think became ultimately its most important impact. That is to say, I don't know if he's responsible for this but we, the United States Government, refused to deal with the French and the Italians and the rest of them, nation by nation, which they all wanted. They thought they could get more from us I guess. He insisted that it be a European plan, that they put together their requirements subject to our review and approval, but that they do it themselves; but that they not do what all of them tried to start doing which was to face their terrible economic problems on a national basis. All of them wanted to deal with their problems by cutting imports and exports. They wanted to nationalize their currencies, and in any event, I think he had more to do with it than anybody else, insisting on a daily, practical day to day basis that this was a European recovery program. They had to present their combined requirements. We would allocate against it. They would then have to re-divide it among themselves. They could not do it by nationalist priorities

Q: *Germany at this time of course was not in it. I mean was Germany in it too?*

WILSON: Yes, from the beginning.

Q: *Your job again was making sure the European public was aware. Looking at it sort of country by country, we've already looked at England, what about France? Did you find any difficulty getting the message out to the French?*

WILSON: Well the Marshall Plan information program in Europe, I believe, probably engaged in the most open, active, large scale propaganda warfare that we've ever had. The Russians were out to ruin the Marshall Plan. You remember they refused to...

Q Yes they made Czechoslovakia withdraw from the Marshall Plan aid and all that.

WILSON: The first ships arrived in Europe in Le Harve with Marshall Plan goods. The dock workers refused to unload them. They had to be unloaded by the French Army. The mine workers not only went on strike but they flooded the coal mines in France and Belgium. Some of the European governments, as I said before, had Communists in them as part of their coalition cabinets. This being a quite understandable reward for having conducted active anti fascist, anti German activity during the occupation. The only people who really fought were the Communists in some of those countries, and they were sometimes taken in to those cabinets and had people in the governments. While they weren't at the top nonetheless, you're in a – I'm thinking of France in the early days – country that is short of paper for example. It turns out there's a Communist in control of paper allocations, and you can believe me the Communist press gets plenty of paper, while the anti-communist press doesn't. The same sort of thing could be said about film stocks and that sort of thing. What's more they had money. They could afford publishing when some other people couldn't. If you've ever walked down a street where the walls only on one side are covered with posters, and they are all the same posters and they are all the same source, they carry a sense of power.

Q: Oh yes I've seen it. The workers with the sickle and hammer. You really feel like they are the movement of the future.

WILSON: Exactly! The Communists had a monopoly on the walls of Paris. So this was a real fight. So we did everything. We put the story in every media. We ran traveling exhibits in trucks and in trains and on barges down the canals of Europe. We had access to the non communist press completely. We could get our stuff in the British newsreels but the newsreels ran, I can't think of the neighborhood of Paris, it was almost completely communist. It didn't run in those theaters because if it did they'd get bricks through the screen. I remember every now and then getting a call from a French mayor from some town saying the local communists tried to bust up your exhibit this afternoon. We've got them arrested. Do you want to charger them? We never did; that's not the point. I remember we published a paper for French unionists. It used to get thrown off the train sometimes as the train went over the river somewhere. So it was a good fight.

Q: How did you find the French bureaucracy at that time? Was it difficult to, I mean the ones with whom you would have contact. Were the ones who were not Communist sympathetic to the Communists or not?

WILSON: No. They were trying to get France back on its feet, back in business so they could tell us they didn't like us. They were very active allies.

Q: By this time it was quite clear to everyone who was involved that the Soviet Union was the

enemy and these were their surrogate warriors in a way. Was there any doubt in anyone's mind what the battle was about?

WILSON: No. Well of course there was. There were always left wing French intellectuals to worry about, but they were also hard to deal with. In due course even the French got into it. They didn't like us. We gave all of these things to the program in France, but they didn't have much choice, and they put up with it when it was easy to do so. We would rather have their name on it than ours anyhow. You know sometimes we'd want to do some things they just didn't know how to do. That was embarrassing. The French were also curious about things. This was probably about half way through the Marshall Plan and emphasis was starting to shift, I think Paul Hoffman had a thing about productivity; that was the key to manufacturing and industrial success. I remember we sent a group of journalists over once to the U.S. to visit some high productivity plants in the U.S. They came back and all wrote the same set of columns. I'm sure this is not true, they all had the same title, at least a number had the same title, "Quest que c'est la productivitee?" They were intrigued. They hadn't thought of productivity. It was a strange idea to them. So it had a kind of intellectual level to it.

Q: Did you find there was any sort of approach you could make to the left wing intellectuals or did you almost write them off as somebody you couldn't make any impression on? I'm not talking about the hard line Communists; I mean the...

WILSON: Well, some of our most active help came from the Socialists. They knew the Communists. They knew you couldn't work with them. By this time there was an anti communist free trade union.

Q: Yes. There were two trade unions. One was dominated by the Communists and the other was not. I forget the name. We had a representative, I don't know if you knew him, Irving Brown. Did you work with Irving Brown at all?

WILSON: Yes. I don't think I did personally but I remember the French had something called the Quai Liberte. They were anti Communist. This is when I thought about the walls. And they did some wonderful things. There would be these huge Communist posters up. They would invent a little piece to go across it to paste over it. I remember the French, no doubt with some encouragement from us, were about to extend their military service from 12 months to 18 months. Of course the Communists took a battle against this. They had posters all over the place "Down with the 18 months." The Quai Liberte people made a little banner kind of thing that would go across these things and it said, "We want 36 months like they have in Russia." This killed it. They just couldn't get anywhere with it. Who was the famous head of the French Communist Party for many years?

Q: Maurice Thorez?

WILSON: Thorez. Of course. Thorez became very ill, or apparently very ill. The Russians sent a special plane to Cairo to pick him up and take him to a hospital presumably on the theory that he couldn't get competent treatment in France. You also know how any time any communist would get put in jail they would slap the posters all over the place "Liberee whatever the guy's name

was.” So as soon as the Russians took Thorez to Russia, they plastered France with things saying “Liberee Thorez.” So they had some real competition. The French were active too.

Q: *You finished up in 1953?*

WILSON: ‘52.

Q: *‘52. How did you feel about it when you left? Sort of you had done your bit and as far as you were concerned people in France and all pretty well knew what we were doing?*

WILSON: Yes. I’d like to think a job well done. I thought like most of us, there would be a United states of Europe within a decade. That was 40 years ago and they haven’t made it yet. I’m not sure they are ever going to make it. Yes, thoroughly convinced that it had been a very wise policy and a very effective program, and it was on the right course.

Now I think the Marshall Plan was actually kind of deceptive for many Americans. Because when we went over there the continent was a mess, and we fixed it in a few years. It didn’t really occur to us we didn’t do it. All we really did was provide the one thing that was missing from their point of view. The industrial revolution had started there. They knew how to build factories and bridges, things like that. They had just been bombed out, and they needed steel etc. etc. which you could only get from one place in the world, and it took dollars to buy it. We provided them with the dollars, that’s all. That they didn’t have and couldn’t get anywhere else. They made the recovery plans. We provided them with the money to buy the stuff they needed, and so it worked perfectly. But it gave some of us I’m afraid, the notion that we know how to fix a country if they’re in trouble. I think a good deal of our foreign aid program probably was driven by that myth. That’s not quite the same thing as going to a country that has no experience and in some cases effectively no government that knows how to work. I think we had that illusion that we knew how to do things and in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the same thing doesn’t apply. But I think we also failed to understand the significance of forcing them to decide what it was they wanted and what they needed. I think when it came around to running the, what did they call that in the Kennedy administration?

Q: *The Alliance for Progress.*

WILSON: The Alliance for Progress, we stuck to a country to country basis. I think it was because our people probably liked to do it that way. We were used to running those countries.

WILLIAM C. TRIMBLE
Consular Officer
Paris (1939-1940)

Ambassador William C. Trimble was born in Baltimore, Maryland. He entered the Foreign Service in 1931. His career included assignments in Seville, Buenos Aires, Estonia, Paris, Mexico City, London, the Hague, Rio de Janeiro, and Bonn,

and an ambassadorship to Cambodia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Well, now, then you were really thrown into a hot spot. Could you tell where you went and what you were doing?

TRIMBLE: Because of my work in graduate school, the courses there in economics and finance, I was transferred to Paris.

Q: This was in 1939.

TRIMBLE: We arrived four weeks before war broke out.

Q: As I say, it's a vintage 1939.

TRIMBLE: Yes, it was. My wife and I went over leaving the children. We were hoping to get an apartment somewhere in Paris. Of course, they never got there. I was meant to be working on financial matters, but then when I got there, there was such a rush of people – immigrants, refugees, the German Jewish refugees wanting to get into the United States – that I was put on the visa desk, as also were several other officers. And we did that until war was declared.

Q: Could I ask you a question? Because this is really a very crucial part of American policy in this period. What was our attitude? I mean, you know, there you were on the visa desk, and you had people trying to get out, particularly the Jews. And, of course, we know now what was waiting for those that didn't get out and that was the gas ovens for many.

TRIMBLE: We didn't know that.

Q: We didn't know it then.

TRIMBLE: No.

Q: And it's been claimed that the State Department was indifferent and all. What was your feeling? And what were your instructions at that time in dealing with that situation?

TRIMBLE: Well, we knew about Kristallnacht and having served in Europe. –

Q: Kristallnacht being – would you explain what it was?

TRIMBLE: Kristallnacht was when Hitler's Brownshirts attacked and burnt synagogues and broke the windows of Jewish stores in Germany. And that was the beginning, really, of the persecution of the Jews and the Jewish population in Germany. Many of them had gotten out mainly to France, but most of them remained in Germany.

Our job was do everything we could to help them get out. Immigration law was bent. Regulations were bent. For example, there used to be a provision of the law that said that skilled

agriculturists had a preference. Jewish groups in this country formed a school in Paris where in three months refugees studied agriculture. Well, that school was a subterfuge and we knew it. But we overlooked that.

There was also an institution called the New School For Scientific Research in New York, and people would come to join it. I gave so many visas to so-called “professors” that I’m sure the number of people on the staff of the New School For Research was far greater than the number of students. Yes, we leaned over backwards. Indeed I was criticized several times, by the Immigration Service for being overly lenient. And the rest of us were doing it, too. We were doing everything we could to get the refugees out.

Q: I come from a basic consular background, and often you get people at the top who get very consistent on the regulations within an embassy, but down below the vice consuls who are dealing with the problem, see what the problem is and do everything they can to help.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: How about in the Embassy? Were you getting any sort of pressure from above, say, “What are you doing?” Or even from Washington?

TRIMBLE: Well, the Ambassador, Mr. Bullitt, William Bullitt, was very much in favor with what we were doing. Actually, he had Jewish blood, but that had nothing to do with it. But he believed strongly in what we were trying to do. He gave us all the support he could. Washington wouldn’t tell us directly. But, yes, it was unwritten that you do all you can.

Q: You had that feeling?

TRIMBLE: And we twisted regulations. We really twisted regulations, and we got an awful lot of people out. And I’m sure it was done in other posts, too. Then war was declared.

Q: This was September 1, 1939.

TRIMBLE: Yes. By that time, we knew that war was coming. There was no question about that. People would come down from the Embassy in Berlin who told us about it, and we realized that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement meant the Russians would not help the Allies. Yes, we knew that war was imminent.

And so the visa work practically ended for there were no more ships to carry refugees, except for those who got to go through Portugal and for a few to Holland. I then worked on trying to get the American tourists out. And that was quite a job. There were thousands of American tourists. Practically no ships! How are we going to get them out? The Department arranged to have River Line boats sent over.

Q: Fall river-line boats? These were coastal cruisers.

TRIMBLE: Yes, but they put some planking on the side to make them a little bit more

seaworthy. After all, it wasn't a bad season of the year for the passage to the U.S. A couple of American liners were still running, the Washington and Manhattan.

Q: What was this?

TRIMBLE: The U.S. Line ships, the Washington and Manhattan.

Q: Oh, yes.

TRIMBLE: But then the French issued a regulation that you had to have special visas to get out of the country, and the French red tape can be something. So I was put in charge of that work, getting people out, American tourists out. I was assisted by a young naval officer who had been over studying naval architecture in France, and a young Marine officer who had been attending some military school. We worked out a system to get them out – special trains, group exit, etc. And we did get them out, except for a few who refused to leave. But that's another matter. It was quite a job, and ships were awfully crowded.

Then came the "Sitzkrieg" period.

Q: This was the so-called "phoney" war, the sitzkrieg, the sitting war.

TRIMBLE: This was the winter of 1939-40 and the time of the Soviet attack on Finland. Next the Germans invaded Norway, followed by Denmark, Holland and Belgium and the war really heated up again. During that winter we had, under Washington's instructions, worked very hard to get all resident Americans, to leave, requiring that their passports be validated to remain in France. Unless they had a very good reason, they had to go home. The reasons some gave to remain in France were really absurd. But we did get most American residents out. Unfortunately a few refused to leave.

Then came the invasion of France. In preparation for that period – we knew it might happen – the Embassy had been divided into two sections. In anticipation that Paris might be bombed or gassed and so forth, most of the Embassy personnel would move to southern France, and only a small staff remain in Paris. Actually things moved so fast that the two became three, one followed the French government to Bordeaux, one went to a place in southern France, and a nucleus remained in Paris. Since I knew some German – my wife spoke it quite well, but nevertheless was evacuated – I stayed on in Paris along with Bob Murphy and Ambassador Bullitt and not more than six or seven others. So I saw the Germans arrive, which was really pretty awesome.

Q: But to go back a little, did you see Ambassador Bullitt operating prior to the sort of collapse, the breakthrough and all, but before that?

TRIMBLE: I'd worked with Ambassador Bullitt. Some people criticize him. I know he had enemies. But he was very able, particularly for that job. He spoke French fluently, and he was a great speaker. I remember when we were doing visa work, he would come down almost every day and see how we were doing, hurrying us to get –

Q: I might say this is quite interesting. I speak as a consular officer. It's usually a cold day in hell when an ambassador gets close to a visa line, even in a case of emergency.

TRIMBLE: Oh, he did. He was very good at that. However he and Sumner Welles did not get along well together. That was one of the difficulties we had. Welles was Under Secretary when he was there and a great friend of President Roosevelt. I never knew all the inside details. That wasn't my business. But I thought he was a very good ambassador.

Q: Looking at this as things developed, what was the Embassy doing during, say, this period outside of the visa issue, during the sitzkreig? I mean, were we going out?

TRIMBLE: We had to get Americans out.

Q: So really we were concerned with day-to-day immediate operations, not looking at the greater picture or something. You were just busy.

TRIMBLE: I was not in the political side of it, you know. I was assigned to the Embassy for financial and economic work. And trying to get Americans out, that was my big job after the immigration stopped, and then doing economic financial reporting as well. Reporting on political matters was done by others. Except I do know when the Germans finally arrived, just before they arrived, we had to burn all the archives. In those days in the Foreign Service reports or dispatches were always bound in books. Well, to take those damn bindings off, and put them in the furnace was quite an operation. But we did it and burned all the codes. The process left the Place de la Concorde covered with ashes.

Q: Well, how did we feel? I mean, after all, we were not at war at the time. How did you all feel?

TRIMBLE: We were probably going to war. I certainly did and I remember telling Mr. Bullitt that having been in the ROTC at college and given a 2nd Lieutenant's commission in the Reserve, I felt I should rejoin my unit in Maryland.

This was in 1940, early 1940. He said, "I think you're more useful to your country as a consul in Paris than you would be a second lieutenant, field artillery, horse-drawn reserve division in Maryland," which was quite true. But we all felt that way. We knew it was going to happen.

Q: In the Foreign Service the feeling was, "It's coming!"

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. There's no question about it. At least, it certainly was in Paris and I should think elsewhere, too. Yes, we knew we would enter the war. But we didn't know when. Isolation was so strong. After all Senator Borah, who was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, said there won't be a war and if there was one, we must stay out. But we in the field knew that the war was coming, and also believed that we would get in it sooner or later.

Q: Well, now, then we come to the point, if you would describe, please, how you felt and what

you saw when the Germans came in and how the Embassy reacted at that point.

TRIMBLE: Only a skeleton staff was left. Beforehand, we had seen the poor refugees from Holland, particularly Belgium, passing through. It was a pathetic sight. These poor people pushing baby carriages, dogs running around, and then, of course, French refugees from the north. There's nothing we could do for them. The Norwegians, I will say, had it organized – although Norway had already been occupied. The Norwegians in Paris organized soup kitchens, and that helped. However, the French government was not prepared for it.

And so then after the Germans came, or just before the Germans came, the Embassy took over interests, foreign interests, of England, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, one or two other countries, which meant that I was given that job in addition to the financial matters. We put up signs in German, English and French, "This building, is under the protection of the United States of America." We put them on every apartment, every house where staff members of those diplomatic missions had lived.

I also arranged to have all the furniture and belongings of U.K. staff members moved to the British Embassy. We had truckloads, horse-drawn vehicles, bring the stuff in. When Goering wanted to take over the British Embassy as his headquarters, it was full of furniture. The British said when they went back after Paris was liberated, the floors were falling in. [Laughter] It was one of those funny situations.

Let's see, what was I talking about – oh, yes – getting the Americans out and the Germans came in, and they tried to – Mr. Bullitt felt strongly that an American ambassador or an American minister always remained in Paris at the time of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and –

Q: Particularly during the commune and all that. The famous thing during the siege of Paris.

TRIMBLE: Yes, during the War of 1870 and aftermath.

Q: The Ambassador stayed on.

TRIMBLE: The American Ambassador must stay there, which he did. He was later recalled when the French government was established in Vichy and Bob Murphy was temporarily in charge. So we got nearly all of the Americans out and we helped the British and other foreigners to do so.

Just before the Germans arrived, I remember, Italy entered the war and kicked all the English out of Italy, civilians, officials, etc. and they all came in trains to France. This was just in early June – Paris fell on June 14, 1940, and this was about a week before. Those poor English people didn't know what to do. They couldn't speak French, and the British Embassy had gone, the Consulate had gone and we must look after them. Just before leaving, the Consul informed me that arrangements had been made for special trains to take them from Paris to Brest and thence by boat to England. Most managed to find their way to the Consulate where I instructed them to go to the Gare de l'Ouest. There I found thousands of people milling around the station including

several hundreds of English. One was standing on top a pissoir holding an umbrella shouting “Britishers here!” [Laughter]

And then when I went inside to see the Stationmaster, he said, “All trains are stopped. The Germans are Stuka-bombing all the trains.”

Q: Stuka being a type of dive-bomber.

TRIMBLE: Yes. So it was pretty awful, these poor people. But they finally got out somehow or other.

Q: Were you there when the Germans came to our Embassy?

TRIMBLE: Absolutely.

Q: This was a rather tricky period. We didn't quite know what was going to happen.

TRIMBLE: Well, the 13th of June, I think it was, Paris was declared an open city. The French government was gone. The Germans were outside, hadn't come in. They were waiting to come in the next day. They were shaving and getting their uniforms pressed to make a great impression, which they did, on the population.

Mr. Bullitt thought there would be rioting in the streets, so he made all of us – his small staff – spend the night in the Embassy. My room, where I had a cot, faced on the Plâce de la Concorde. It was a beautiful night. I remember the stars and moon shining, and we all were upset, of course. I looked about 4:00 in the morning, 5:00 maybe, because the sun was coming up, and you could see German helmets behind the bec-de-gas, the street lights, in the Plâce and then more poured in, hundreds and hundreds filling the entire square.

We had heard the German soldiers were in pretty poor shape physically because of malnutrition after the First World War. They weren't. They were well-fed and husky, tough-looking and able. No question about it. And they poured in all that day. And then afterward came the reserve groups, the German reserves, and they were rather older men who composed a military garrison. But they were also able and almost as well disciplined. We also saw many of the fifth column people who had been paid by the Germans.

Q: These are the French.

TRIMBLE: French. And, of course, many of them were Communists, because Germany and Russia had reached an agreement in 1939, and the Communist Party in France had helped the Nazis. There's no question about that. It was pretty awful.

Q: In the first place, were you around when the first meeting between somebody official from the German side and –

TRIMBLE: Yes. Mr. Bullitt left shortly thereafter on instructions from Washington. He was told

to get out. Bob Murphy was left in charge, and he spoke German quite well – he was Ambassador Murphy afterwards. He met with the Germans, and they wanted to take over the British Embassy. We stopped them. I remember seeing one German soldier putting up a telephone line on the – tying it on to the gates of our Embassy running over to the hotel next door where they had their headquarters. We stopped that, of course, but we had to deal with the Germans.

I had to – that’s another long story. I had to deal with one German who was an officer in the German Army intelligence service, who had been a Rhodes Scholar after WWI. He spoke excellent English but claimed to hate the British because of his experience there. However, he was in charge of dealing with all the British still in Paris and all the Americans, a nasty little type, but he had lots of guts. On returning to Paris in 1949, I found out that he’d been a British agent the whole time! His mother had been part Jewish. He was actually very anti-Nazi, secretly working the whole time for the British until finally caught and shot. In my mind he was a nasty person but tough and very able. We saw all sorts of strange things like that.

But then France had surrendered. The government at Bordeaux had been forced to agree to a demarcation between north and south. Germans occupied all the northern part of France and the coastal area on the Southwest. The capital was moved to Vichy with Marshal Petain as Head of State. There, as you know, we had a small Embassy.

Q: At Vichy, yes?

TRIMBLE: Yes, Vichy. I remained in Paris until September, 1940 and then transferred to the Embassy at Vichy.

Q: Well, during this period of time from June 14th until September what were you doing in our sort of “rump” Embassy in Paris?

TRIMBLE: I was trying to do whatever I could on financial reporting, which was my job. The Germans were flooding the country with their occupation Marks with bad effects on the economy – a recourse to barter, black marketing, etc. As the codes had been destroyed, we had to rely on couriers to get reports out. Once in a while one would come down from Germany, and he’d carry the pouch back to Berlin and from there forward it on. But it was hard communicating with Washington, very difficult. So much of my work was helping such Americans that still remained to get out some how or other, and protection of foreign interests, seeing that the Germans did not steal – which they did – things.

Oh, there’s one more story which I’d forgotten. Well, four days before the Germans arrived, the French Minister of Finance, urgently called concerning the French gold reserves. They had been shipped to Casablanca, and the Government wanted them carried by an American ship, the USS Pittsburgh, to the United States.

Q: The American naval cruiser.

TRIMBLE: Well, so Bob Murphy, and I together with an American secretary went to the

Ministry to draw up the transfer document in both French and English. As you know, in French, where we put a period, \$1,000.75, they put a comma instead of that. And when we put a comma, \$10,000, they'd put a period, and more trouble over that. [Laughter]

Q: Oh, yes. Because we're talking about millions and millions of dollars worth of gold there, and you have to get it just right.

TRIMBLE: And it was really something. All this back and forth, "How are we going to reconcile this in a legal document?" But we finally did, and the gold arrived in the U.S.

Q: Robert Murphy, of course, was one of the great figures in American diplomacy in this period, and you were working with him. How did you see him operating, and what sort of a person was he to work with?

TRIMBLE: He had great charm, very Irish charm, very able, people liked him, a very smooth operator, and intelligent. He was very – I wouldn't say he was an intellectual type. I don't think he was as bright as Mr. Bullitt, but he had more stability than Mr. Bullitt who was emotional, and Bob Murphy wasn't. He was a very, very able officer.

There's one nice story about Bob Murphy. He had been consul in Munich before the war, just the time when Hitler was coming on the scene. And one of his great friends was the Papal Nuncio. Do you know this story?

Q: No, I don't know the story, but I know the Papal Nuncio because he later became Pius XII.

TRIMBLE: That's right. One day when they were meeting together Bob said, "I'm worried about this man, Hitler, and what he may do" to which the Nuncio replied, "it's nothing, just one of those passing things." When many years later, Bob asked his old friend, "How about that?" to which the Pope responded, "Well then I didn't have papal infallibility." [Laughter]

Q: Well, then how did Murphy deal with the Germans?

TRIMBLE: He spoke German well. Yes, and he stood up for our rights, everything, and they respected him. At that period, yes, he was very good with them. Later he was assigned to Vichy and then to Washington, but returned on a short visit in the Spring of 1941. By then Admiral Leahy had been appointed Ambassador there, an excellent choice.

Q: There was North Africa.

TRIMBLE: That came afterwards.

Q: Yes.

How did he deal with the Germans? I mean, what was the relationship with the Germans?

TRIMBLE: Bob Murphy?

Q: Yes.

TRIMBLE: At what time?

Q: After they came in. Was it sort of a very standoffish situation?

TRIMBLE: No, because Bob was not that type of person. He stood up for our rights and made sure the Germans respected our rights as neutral. But he wasn't antagonistic. He said, in a sense, "You can't do this!" He'd tell them very firmly what our situation was, and they had to acknowledge, and they did, by and large. But then he was moved shortly afterwards down to Vichy. And so just a small group of us remained, a skeleton force.

Q: And what did you do then? I mean, again, I'm interested in this relationship with the Germans.

TRIMBLE: Since I had to handle the British interests and Americans living there, I had to deal with this one German, as I told you.

Q: The nasty type.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: Who was a secret agent.

TRIMBLE: A fellow whose name –

Q: You can fill it in later, because you'll get a transcript.

TRIMBLE: I can't remember his name. I have it in notes somewhere. [Rostin] I had to deal with him when the Germans would try to arrest the Americans for alleged spying or some other charge. And that took a lot of time. Then also seeing that they respected buildings under our protection, homes of people, and did not interfere with the movements of household effects to the British Embassy, and so on. So it was a standoffish type of thing, but I had to deal with him, because we were neutral, and he was responsible for matters concerning American civilians and British civilians. And, as I said, tough as hell.

Also I was doing what financial reporting I could, what was happening to the French finances as we saw it in Paris and with the Germans flooding the market with their occupation marks.

Q: Wasn't this a peculiar thing, because this was an Embassy sitting where an ambassador and all had moved, the French government had left there. You must have felt that you were dealing on borrowed time.

TRIMBLE: We were, in a sense, but we kept on. Actually, the Embassy remained on until Pearl Harbor. We kept it on an even smaller staff but then it was interned, of course.

Q: Well, you were transferred down to Vichy.

TRIMBLE: To Vichy.

Q: What were you doing down in Vichy and what was the situation there?

TRIMBLE: Doc Matthews, H. Freeman Matthews, was the Chargé. Bob Murphy had already left for Washington and Mr. Bullitt had resigned. It was a very small Embassy. We had a military attaché and a naval attaché in Paris, and, let's see, three 3rd Secretaries – Douglas MacArthur, Woodruff Wallner and me, and a couple of American clerks. We had cable communications and a code room and thus sent and received messages in code with Washington.

Doug and Wallner worked with Doc Matthews on political matters. Mine were largely financial and economic. I dealt with representatives of the Bank of France and Ministry of Finance and was able to work out an arrangement to help the British civilians living in southern France. The French owed the British quite a bit of money from the period where they were fighting together before the fall of France. So to pay that off an arrangement was worked out that the French would give me so much, transfer to me so much – or rather to the Embassy – a sum of money, hundreds of thousands of francs, of which, in turn, went through the Consulate General in Marseille and Lyon Consulate to provide a small monthly stipend to each English subject.

And then we tried to work – I worked very hard with Ted Achilles, who was then the third secretary in London, through cable, to have a ship come over from England which would take back to France a number of the French soldiers who had been evacuated from Dunkerque, and wanted to come home – France was then out of the war – and return with British who were stuck in France. We had to get permission, of course, clearance for the ship from the Germans, the Italians, the British and so forth.

We finally worked the thing out. It was called Djienne. But then the British didn't want to leave. I remember once I got so angry when one of them said: "Well, can we have – we always play bridge together – our friends in the next cabin?" Another said: "I don't want to go back to England. It's cold, and I'm used to living in Italy and so I must have a warm climate. If you get me down to South Africa it would be different."

Q: Wasn't P.G. Wodehouse one of those then?

TRIMBLE: If he was one, I don't remember him. It was the darnedest. Anyway, the French came back, but very few British went home.

Again on the subject of foreign interests protection, a number of British soldiers had been hidden in northern France after Dunkerque and in French peasant homes. The French underground was very, very good. It smuggled many out across the demarcation line, which was the line between where the French Vichy government controlled and the Germans occupied zone, and some came to the Embassy for help. As they were not civilians, all I could do was give them enough francs to reach an internment camp the French had set up for British soldiers who had managed to

escape to unoccupied France and where under the terms of the Armistice Agreement to be held until the end of the war. The site chosen happened to be on the coast near Marseille, and it also happened that the guarding was relaxed on nights when a British submarine would anchor offshore. [Laughter] So it was quite a transient camp.

Most of the people in the French government – not most, I won't say most, but the ones I was working with, were pro-British or rather very anti-German, I'll put it that way. What they would do in the daytime was something different at night. And there was some fascinating stories.

I remember one time we received a note from the Papal Nuncio in Vichy that he had been called on for assistance by a young Canadian student seminarian and since we had Canadian interests under our protection, would we handle the matter. So I arranged to receive him. He was dressed in a soutane, one of those flat hats worn by French priests, black shoes with buckles on the top and having a tonsure. And he was obviously Canadian which I could tell from his accent which was French-Canadian, not French. He said that he had been in Paris and studying at a seminary when the war broke out and then after the Germans came they said, "You get out. You're non-combatant. We don't want to feed you here. Go south." So he came to Vichy, and went to the Papal Nuncio who told him to see us. Under questioning, however, I found he was actually a Canadian Army officer who had been hidden by a French family in northern France. He later had gotten to Paris where the French equivalent of our Army's G2 had provided him with priest's clothing to get into the unoccupied zone. He had also fooled the Nuncio. The French can be very clever.

Q: I think Canada should be spelled out, that here we were, we were neutral, but we were doing everything we could. I mean, there was no doubt in our minds of not trying to help the British at that point.

TRIMBLE: We were anti-German, but after all this country was still neutral. The President knew that we would probably get into war, but the Congress didn't want us to get entangled. We had gotten into the First World War and we mustn't do so again was a strong neutrality feeling in this country. So we were –

Q: But within the Embassy in Vichy, I mean, you knew what we were supposed to do and you were doing it.

TRIMBLE: We did a lot of things we shouldn't have done.

Q: But this is almost instinctive then?

TRIMBLE: Surreptitiously, yes. Instinctively, I suppose. Yet we felt that the people in the Department knew, what we were doing and the President also knew. But we had to do it very carefully.

Then I had another kind of job. The Red Cross was sending over some shiploads of wheat flour to be given free to French school children because of malnutrition. It was pretty bad. The Red Cross representative sent to arrange the details was a nice fellow, but he couldn't speak French,

so I worked with him. And the French ministry with whom we dealt said: “How were we going to fit this free wheat flour for children alone into our bread rationing system? Maybe you shouldn’t send it at all.” You know, the bureaucratic attitude, “You can’t do this! It’s against the regulations.” Well, we got it all worked out. But it was quite a lot of work.

At times I would go to see the former governor of the Bank of France, Jacques Rueff, who was Jewish or half Jewish, I think, and while retired or forced out of the Bank was living in southern France under the protection of Marshal Petain for his wife had been Mme. Petain’s goddaughter. We would discuss financial matters, and I would tell him about news not reported in the controlled press. A very good man as were many in the Foreign Ministry, younger officers, I knew and in the Finance and Agriculture Ministries. Very anti-Hitler, very patriotic and some pro-British.

Q: Well, at that time, de Gaulle was not much of a figure, was he?

TRIMBLE: He was broadcasting, but he hadn’t been, no. There was the feeling in France at the time of pouriture, meaning rottenness, that that had caused France’s defeat. It had been rotten in the Popular Front Governments of the 1930s and further weakened by pacifism and Communist infiltration. But the military, by and large, were very French – not pro-English but anti-German.

Q: I suppose the French Navy was, of course, always anti-British.

TRIMBLE: Yes. And Admiral Darlan was very anti. He was jealous. That’s traditional of the French Navy.

Speaking of that inspires an interesting story. The French before the Second World War had developed naval architecture to a very high degree. The British had many ships, but the French hadn’t, and so were able to concentrate on a few. The Jean- Bart was one of them.

Q: Yes. As a battleship, the Richelieu.

TRIMBLE: Yes, the Richelieu and Jean-Bart.

Q: Dunkerque.

TRIMBLE: And they were very advanced in naval architecture. As I mentioned earlier, one of the young officers who helped me in 1939 had been a student of the subject in Paris. Well, in early 1941 the French Navy Ministry in Paris gave to our naval attaché, Hillencotter, who became afterwards head of the CIA –

Q: Hillencotter, Roscoe Hillencotter.

TRIMBLE: Gave him 10 or 15 large bags of blueprints for the Jean-Bart which, of course, was completely against the armistice terms.

Q: Oh, yes. Yes.

TRIMBLE: We were able to get them down – I never knew exactly how – from Paris to Vichy: It was all very secret. There Doc Matthews said: “Bill, I want you to take the pouch – it’s a rather large pouch – over to Switzerland. And I can’t tell you what’s in it, but there are 15 or 20 bags.”

I was naturally suspicious but asked no questions only replying: “Yes, sir.”

So I took the train from Vichy to Lyon where you had to transfer to another one. Fortunately, there were porters to carry all this stuff to the second train where it filled my compartment. I was scared that something awful might happen, for the train passed through the German occupied zone. Regulations required that the window curtains be pulled down, lights turned off, and there I was in the compartment sitting on top of these bags for what seemed hours. Finally I raised a shade a little and seeing the lights of Switzerland thought, “ Thank God!” I delivered the bags to the Consulate in Geneva where a regular courier would take them from there to Washington. But if the Germans had known, that train would have been stopped, and I would have disappeared. It was a scary thing.

Q: Oh! Well, you left there before our invasion of North Africa.

TRIMBLE: Yes.

Q: We ended the whole Vichy period for us because then the Germans came in and took over all of France.

TRIMBLE: After Pearl Harbor.

Q: When did you leave? Well, even with Pearl Harbor, they didn’t come into Vichy. They didn’t come into Vichy until we landed in November of 1942.

TRIMBLE: That’s right. You’re quite right. Doc Matthews had left then, and the Vichy staff had been cut even further down. My wife had been evacuated in June, 1940. All the wives had to leave for the United States. I hadn’t seen my children in two years. I hadn’t had any home leave for three or four. So I asked to have home leave, and it was approved by the Department. This, I think, was June 1941 – maybe May or June, I don’t remember which month.

As Doc Matthews’ wife, who had joined him in Vichy, had to go back and see her children who were in school in this country, the Department said, “Both of you can go back together.” So we drove south – I spoke Spanish as well as French – in my car and got enough gasoline to get to the Spanish border and then on to Madrid, and finally to Lisbon where we both took the PanAm clipper back. So I got home.

Q: This is when?

TRIMBLE: June 1940.

Q: Well, now, before we go to that, we were mentioning at lunch – you mentioned there was an

episode going way back about Eleanor Roosevelt.

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes.

Q: I wonder if we can put that in now?

TRIMBLE: Yes. In 1940, the Spanish Civil War was just over. A number of Spanish refugees who had fled to France were put in camps, internment camps, in Southern France – Gurs, Septfonds, Argeles and one or two others. At this time, as you recall, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement had been signed.

Q: This was about August of '39.

TRIMBLE: No, this was around March – well, they signed in August, 1939. This was January or February of 1940, before the French pulled out and France fell. The Russians were backing the Germans, and the Communist Party was very strong in Paris, still strong in France then, although the Russian influence was weakening. And they put out rumors about harsh treatment the French were giving to the Spanish refugees in these camps. Now, Mrs. Roosevelt had a very big, great heart, and thought about the refugees and so forth, was quite upset about it.

So she had the State Department instruct Mr. Bullitt that he send out somebody to inspect the camps to see whether the allegation was true or not. Since I spoke both Spanish and French, I was assigned to make this trip. And Nancy and I – our children were not here, still hadn't joined us and actually never did – went down and saw each of the camps. And I could talk freely to the refugees. Only in one camp did the French have people watching me, listening to me. I found that they were, by and large, well treated depending on the commandant, some were very good. The food was just as good as the French had at that time. I saw the meals, saw what they had. And at one camp I remember seeing the French soldiers, guards, and the Spanish having a snowball fight together, laughing and playing together. I wrote back and reported on each camp. I said one camp was bad. And that's where the military guards were Senegalese.

Q: These were French colonial troops in Senegal.

TRIMBLE: Yes. They were pretty nasty. And the commandant wasn't much good. But in the rest of them, the French were doing a very good job and this when there was war. They were helping these people. They really were doing the best they could. And so I wrote the report, and it went back to Mrs. Roosevelt, because she was worried about the propaganda against the French as affecting our policy towards the Allies.

Q: Well, this, of course, was coming particularly from the left wing.

TRIMBLE: Oh, yes, very much.

ELLA DeSCHAUB

**Personal Assistant to the Biddles
Angers and Paris, France (1939-1940)**

Ella DeSchaub describes her life as personal assistant to Ambassador and Mrs. Anthony Biddle in Poland, France and Norway. She describes vividly wartime life in those countries with Ambassador and Mrs. Biddle. A biographical sketch is included as addendum. The interview was conducted in 1991 by Randolph W. Baxter

Q: Was your loyalty ever questioned by any of the Poles, because you were Swiss?

DeSCHAUB: No, no -- I must say, on the contrary, I stayed very friendly with people -- the ones we saw later on found houses for me, in Angers [France, where the Embassy relocated after reaching Paris]. That was my main duty. I was sent to this place, Angers -- I'd never been there before, but I knew where it was -- and Mrs. Biddle said, "You go find us a nice house." By that time, we had been in France for quite a few weeks or months, maybe, and everybody had found a house, already. So I had to -- what do you call it, when a country is allowed to take it --

Q: Lease an estate -- or requisition it?

DeSCHAUB: Requisition. They had a requisition for them in a chateau which I have pictures of because I had become friendly with the proprietor and his wife, two elderly people. They were there all alone in that big chateau -- a chateau-fort really -- which had a moat around it, and they had those old caves [for wine storage] just like at Fontainebleau. They were very nice people, and I would see him go out to the gate, and clean, and go about their other things. The Biddles had part of the castle, [but] not entirely [all of it] -- they didn't have the library, which was quite big, and the chapel, and then there were those poor proprietors had one wing. But they seemed quite resigned to it, because, you know, it was war[time]. I went to see them quite often to see if everything was in order.

But it was too primitive for Mrs. Biddle. They had very little heat -they had those big faillances - heat, what do you call it? -- faillances des poiles --

Q: Grates?

DeSCHAUB: Grates. They all had the doorway heated with the grates, and you had to throw in coal -- all along the couloir [hallway], and they had these long couloirs. Every morning, probably at seven or before, the man came and put in the coal in all the [grates] all along. So it wasn't warm, but it was better than outside. That still existed in all those castles. They had towers -- it was a chateau-fort, really -- an old, old castle. The little -- restroom, or whatever you call it - was in one of those, and there, of course, there was no heat at all! That was also something the Biddles didn't quite understand. I suppose he did, but Mrs. Biddle didn't.

Q: The toilet room didn't have any heat at ail?

DeSCHAUB: Oh, no! It was that round place, you know, and it was freezing cold! That was one

of the dark sides of life in a chateau. But the proprietors were very nice and accepted everything we said or did. Of course, we kind of turned the whole place upside down. Mrs. Biddle said she wouldn't stay there because it was quite a distance from the town, so Mr. Biddle had to go out very early. He couldn't come for lunch, and he'd be out quite late -- and she didn't like that. So finally, they told me, "Find us a house -- in town." By now, everything was taken -- it was true, there was hardly any room! They had 40,000 more inhabitants by that time during that time, with the Americans and foreign people. We had the French Ambassador to Poland was there -- it was such stupid, stupid thing to have a French Ambassador in France, because he came with a whole court -- he had to stay! I had to find a house, first for the Turks -- why I forgot -and then [for] Mrs. Biddle with her request, "Something in town." I said, "Mrs. Biddle, I don't know Angers, number one. [When] I came here, it was my first visit to this city. I don't know a soul." "Oh," she said, "you'll meet people." [laughs] So I went first to the bishop and asked him for help, if he would know [of anyplace]. He was very pleasant, but he didn't know. Then I went to the prefecture [police station], to the Prefect [Police Chief], and he was much better. He understood. I said, "You must give me some leads, someplace I [can] go and see." It was very difficult, but he was good. He was very good; he gave me some addresses of people who might have a house - - nearby -- not in the city.

I set out, until at last, there was a Madame de Pimodan [phonetically: pee-moh-DAH-N], who had a little castle outside [Angers], and she had a house in town like practically all the wealthy people had. I went to her and said, "Oh, please!" But she said, "I have to have a place in town." I said, "Oh, but you can't refuse, because Mrs. Biddle can't stay in that castle. You know which one. It's cold, and impractical." She said [demonstrating a despairing sigh] "Will you let me have my room?" [laughs] It [turned out to be] a big house with three stories, and I said, "Of course, certainly, we'll do all we can to make you --" and she said, "But you must come and see my little castle outside." I said, "All right, I'll come and see the little castle. We went -- we had a car, of course, so it wasn't difficult -- and we arrived the day they were killing the pig! You know how they scream -- but she talked to the people, and they seemed very friendly. She called them all by their first name, all of them. We looked at the place, and it was all right for Angers people. But the first thing I saw, there was a mouse in the -- baignoir, what do you call it?

Q: Bathroom? [meaning "salle de baigne" or room with the bathtub; different in French from the "w.c." or room with the toilet]

DeSCHAUB: Bathroom, that's it, yes. A big mouse -- she didn't pay any attention. I said, "No, I don't think that's for us." Anyway, we came back, and we settled for the town house with the room for her. She could leave all her things in that room, and we locked it -- she was satisfied.

In that house -- Mr., or Mrs. Biddle's son [who] was in the Red Cross -- he and his sister, both, gave several ambulances to the Poles [wounded Free Polish soldiers]. While we were there, the war [May 1940 German invasion of France] was on -- and those poor Poles had such miserable equipment, and were at the end of their lives. Three or four men came one night, Poles, uniformed, tattered, looking like death! And they sat there in the hall, and I said to Ted, "Who are they?" He said, "That's all they have left of their regiment." It was ghastly.

Q: This was in Angers?

DeSCHAU: In Angers, yes.

Q: The house you stayed at in Warsaw, was that more luxurious than the one in Angers?

DeSCHAU: By then, we were out of Poland. We had to get out, after they bombed it! They bombed that castle that was [unintelligible] to the Biddles in town, and they bombed it thoroughly, and it was -- I always find [the word] in French -- the Military Attaché of the Germans, who had been there for several dinners, directed the bombing. It was completely flat. [It had been] a beautiful place [with] a beautiful library.

Q: Right. How did you get to Paris earlier? Did you have a mission that you had to go with?

DeSCHAU: I had to do something for Mrs. Biddle or the children - I don't remember. Anyway, she told me, "Stay - don't come - don't come." I would have gone to Warsaw to be with them, but they said no. So I stayed there, and there they arrived. It was marvelous to see them again. You don't know, in a war, what happens. They had a hard time. Probably Genie told you, they were reported wherever they stopped for the night. Any little village -- a few hours later, they were bombarded. They were reported -- they [the Germans] knew all the numbers of their cars -- they knew everything -- German or Russian, I don't know which ones. It was a very bad time.

Q: Then, did you leave with the Biddles back to the United States, fleeing through Spain and Portugal?

DeSCHAU: Yes, yes. But that was when Genie went -- it was Mr. Biddle's idea -- Genie was sent with him to England; that's when she went to England. "Oh," Mrs. Biddle said, "You can't go, you can't go." I said, "Why?" She said no, because Peggy was expecting her first baby. "I wouldn't have any news, maybe, and it's better that you stay with her -- she'll be very lost, you know, without her family." And so [cut off]

Q: That was in Washington, you stayed?

DeSCHAU: No. She stayed -- Mrs. Biddle bought a little place for her, very nice -- in Maryland. That's where she was, though she had the baby in Washington, of course. That was her first one.

Q: Mrs. Biddle had gone on with her husband?

DeSCHAU: Yes, yes, she had gone to London. But all the time we had communications. I was never lost -- if she wanted this or if she wanted that. Genie told you, of course, London was a terrible place at the time. They didn't get good food -- they didn't get this, they didn't get that -- so I had to send all that, as much as I could. Coconut, and [unintelligible] was very, very big. And writing -- it was all right [that] it was censored -- we knew that we shouldn't say anything political. Genie probably didn't tell you: by chance, I once had sent little tubes of onion, or some

type of condiment. So I sent one of those [unintelligible] that was all. And the cook at the Ritz was so enchanted to hear about me [that] he said, "Could you have some more sent? 'Cause I have a client, he would just [be] in heaven if he could have some of it." They didn't have any of it! So I sent some of them [unintelligible] -- and he took them and gave them to the client. It's strange what takes value at some time, when nothing else counts.

But in France, it wasn't bad. It was cold -- it was very cold in winter. It was exceptionally cold because, I remember that one night, I was coming home -- I had had a little supper, I don't know where -- and [when] I came home, I had to hold on to the side of the houses because it was so slippery [since] it was all ice!

Q: This was in Angers?

DeSCHAU: No, Paris. By then, I was in Paris. Mrs. Biddle had this house there, still, and guardians, and one dog. [laughs] I was there all alone for quite a while, in that big house on the second floor. But they were very nice, the guardians, both of them -- a husband and a wife. She would often just cook a little soup or something for me. It was not pleasant to go out and walk dark streets, you know! There were no lights! Not so long ago, I heard that they lived somewhere in the south of France, that couple who lived in that house and were the guardians of Mrs. Biddle's house. They were still alive, I was surprised to hear.

Q: And then you met the Biddles in Paris?

DeSCHAU: Yes. I had this friend who later she came to Oslo with us, and she was the one who knew the Biddles, she and her sister. She wrote to me -- and I found, the other day in my old papers, the telegram she sent. She'd said, "You could come and stay with the Biddles for a school year, because the children are coming." Mrs. Biddle was divorced, and she had already obtained the permission to have the children. They were coming, and were by then already twelve, seven and nine -- something like that -- a difficult age, and they were taken away from their father and from their life here [in the U.S.]. She knew it would be difficult, and she was not particularly fond of children. She said, "They are arriving, and would you be willing to stay for a school year? We'll be half in the States, and half in Paris. You should meet them and see, if you like."

That's how it started. I spoke to a very dear aunt I had, who said, "Oh, you must accept -- for a school year, what's that?" I said, "I don't think I should go." Finally, she said, "Do it for a school year," so I did. I met them and the way it started, I might tell you, it's so strange and ridiculous. They had rented a house in Paris -- with a garden; it was very nice -- and they said, "Come for tea." So I came for tea, not knowing what to expect! They both were there, and they said, "Oh, let's go walk in the garden and walk around and then we'll have tea." So that's what I did, and we talked about this, and that -- and not a word about anything!

[At this point the tape ran out; remainder of DeSchaub's story taken from Baxter's notes: The Biddles didn't mention employment to DeSchaub, who left rather disappointed and thinking she

didn't have the position. DeSchaub later heard from some friends, however, that the Biddles thought she was wonderful and were expecting her to start taking care of the children right away. DeSchaub never did figure out why the Biddles hadn't mentioned the job during her "interview" but she nonetheless accepted the job, which she would end up holding for a quarter century!]

CONSTANCE RAY HARVEY
Vice Consul
Lyon (1941-1942)

Constance Ray Harvey was born in New York in 1904. She received a bachelor's degree from Smith College and a master's degree from Columbia University. Ms. Harvey entered the Foreign Service in 1930. Her career was comprised of mostly consular work in Milan, Basel, Bern, and Lyon. Ms. Harvey received the Medal of Freedom in 1947. She was interviewed by Dr. Milton Colvin in 1988.

HARVEY: There was another period (when I was already interned in Germany in '43) which I don't know much about except by hearing that Switzerland was almost invaded a second time. They had expected that the Germans would try to send troops across to Italy by rail. That didn't happen either. I think I understand why, because in about July or August '42, when I was still in France at that time, I happened to be traveling on the train from Lyon to Berne, and asked a Swiss officer who was riding in the compartment with me what would happen if the army decided to take to the réduit, as they called it, the fortified area in the mountains, if anybody, German or French, should cross the line. I said to him, "You mean to abandon the cities?"

"Oh, yes," he said.

And I said, "Your wife and children in the hands of the enemy?"

And he said, "Of course." So that, of course, was a typical Swiss attitude, and it was why Switzerland was not invaded. It would not be worth that much today.

Well, they didn't get us until the landings in North Africa took place on the seventh of November, a Sunday. We had had a slight indication that we had to be ready to burn documents and possibly to leave perhaps a day before, so I had spent all of the Saturday of the sixth of November and the Sunday morning of the seventh of November, burning everything in the consulate that I could lay my hands on that had the names of anybody who had come in there. How they ever reopened that office afterward, I don't know, but I was determined that no French people or anybody else who had had any contact with the Americans could be traced from the records in that office.

I remember that I went home to get my coffee which I'd left, when the message came over the radio early on the Sunday morning, which made me rush back to the office immediately: "The Americans are landing. No news from Vichy." And we wondered where they were landing. Where? We had no idea! Of course, it was taking place, but we didn't know where! We thought

it was undoubtedly the coast of France. I certainly got over there to the office to start my burning as fast as I could.

I remember I had a rather wild Haitian diplomat spend part of the morning with me. He had been up in Paris until the last moment, because Haiti wasn't in the war, but he described to me how his place in the country had flown a Haitian flag, and how the Germans had come in and lowered the flag. He immediately packed up and went right straight to headquarters in the Palais de Versailles, this very insignificant diplomat, I should say, and stamped his foot, and he said, "I'm an independent neutral nation, and this cannot take place. You are occupying my property, and you've pulled down the Haitian flag." They sent somebody out immediately to put it up again, and they only sent a colonel. He said, "Not so! It was pulled down by a general; a general should put it up!" (Laughter) I cannot remember his name, but he was well known in various circles, and he spent that morning with me as we got ready. We knew that we were going to be in serious trouble.

I might tell you what happened on Monday morning. My Belgian clerk that I have told you about, who helped me so much with the Belgian passports and so forth, he had been already arrested and was in Montluc prison, in the hospital part of the prison, because he was ill. He'd been there for about ten days. I got news on Monday that he had disappeared from the prison, and finally, we discovered what had happened. He'd been put on a train to go to the south of France, to an assembly point, where they were getting people ready to send them to concentration camps. I said to my chief, "I'm going to the prefet de police immediately." We couldn't stand this man. I can't remember his name, but we didn't like him a bit. "I'm going to see him."

He said, "It won't do any good."

I said, "I'm going to go anyway." I must say, I was absolutely beside myself. I stayed in that man's office over an hour, an hour and a half, and I wouldn't leave. I think I kicked and screamed and cried, and I said, "Never, never will I go to a diplomatic internment," which we knew we were headed for on Wednesday, "and let this man go to a concentration camp. I went to school in France, France has been my second country for all these years. I will spend the rest of my life fighting against France if this occurs."

Finally, he said, "I'll telephone." And we got him off the train just ten minutes before the train left, and he was put back in an ambulance and rushed back to the hospital. His wife and I trailed after the ambulance, and we got in and sat down on his bed, where he had crawled back, and ate up all his dinner, and laughed and laughed and laughed. We could hardly believe what was going on.

Then after we were interned, everything in that part of France changed. I mean, the day it was occupied. People who had been very reluctant to do very much started to do things they'd never had the courage to do before, really.

Q: That was America coming into the war, a catalyst for that.

HARVEY: It was also the occupation that did it. You see, now they'd lost everything, and now they weren't afraid in the same way. It's the same kind of psychological thing.

So the nuns who were running the hospital in the prison got Jack – that was the day or the day after we left; I think the very day we left – dressed up in some kind of nun's garments, whisked him across to the Archbishop's palace across the road, where he was hidden, I don't know, for not very long, but then friends came and finally smuggled him out of France, also with his wife, I think separately, into Switzerland, where he spent the rest of the war and mostly working for Allen Dulles. So that was the beginning of occupation for me.

Q: Then you were interned? You were picked up and sent to Lourdes?

HARVEY: Yes. We were put on the train. We were taken and put on a train on the very day that the German Army passed through Lyon on the way to the Mediterranean. I really didn't see any of that, because I was being taken in the police car to the train, to leave Lyon. What happened was that we got there and, of course, there were all kinds of people, official guards and everything, to see us off. There were only three of us, the consul general and I and our non-career vice consul, a very elderly gentleman who had just recently joined us. When the time for the train to start came, none of our luggage had arrived. We were allowed a couple of suitcases, and I said, "I will not go into internment without my suitcases. I'll never see them again. I'm going to get off this train."

So they both got off with me, because they hadn't got theirs either, and the train just left without us. And there we were, completely unchaperoned. All the officials had gone away, and all the people who had come to say goodbye to us, of course, had gone away, too. One very crazy man who was the president of the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce, a Monsieur Jacquel, whom I knew, because so many Alsations on the Chamber of Commerce were enefit, as they said (that means they had come to Lyon from occupied Alsace), was there with a great bouquet of flowers for me. I said, "Get Mr. Jacquel and his flowers off this platform and don't let him come near me." It was the craziest thing I had ever heard of, to have these people coming to say goodbye to me.

Q: I think it's a marvelous touch.

HARVEY: It was, really. It was an amazing thing. In any case, the train was gone, there we were, nobody there. I said, "I think we'd better inform the authorities that we're still here. Otherwise, they'll make some trouble."

So we telephoned to the enefited, and they said, "Well, your luggage is on the way. Just take the next train which goes down toward Marseille, and there you can get the train that's coming from Marseille, pick it up and go on the night coach to Lourdes. That will be all right."

We had had nothing to eat, and there was nothing to eat in the restaurant, there were no taxis, nothing running, of course. By this time, the German Army had gone through with their tanks and everything else. So we decided, "Well, we've just got to walk back and see if we can't find some black restaurant somewhere that will give us some food, because it's going to be a great

many hours before we see food again.”

So we started up the road, along up the Rhone, and we came to a restaurant that we knew about, where you always had to have a reservation at least two days in advance to be given any food. We stuck our heads in, and they said, “No, no, no. No, there’s no food. No place, no place to sit down, no food.”

So I went and put my head behind a curtain or something and said, “Do you really want to have the consul general of the United States and his two officers who are on their way to be interned, do you want to turn them away without feeding us at all?”

And they said, “Come in, come in.” They hid us behind a curtain, and we had a champagne lunch, a perfectly marvelous lunch, and two and three people that we knew for some reason – I don’t know how they found out where we were – came and joined us and stayed with us. Then we turned around and walked back to the station, where we were going to get on the train.

On the way back, just going along back – it was a long walk – we passed two Polish secret service men whom we knew. Of course, we didn’t recognize them, we didn’t say anything or do anything at all, and they looked as if they’d seen ghosts. Well, they sort of had. (Laughter) Then we got on our train and left for internment in Lourdes, with our luggage.

Q: Pick up a little bit, Constance, on the interment in Lourdes and then what happened when you were brought into Germany.

HARVEY: I think we were there about two months and a half. We were interned on the 11th of November, and we left about the tenth or 12th of January, something like that. In any case, we didn’t know about our future; we just thought that we were going to be exchanged and sent out through the Pyrenees to Spain, you see, across to Lisbon. That was what we all expected. We were put in three different hotels.

Lourdes, at that time, didn’t have many visitors in cold weather, and mostly the hotels weren’t open, but they provided us. We had a member of the French Foreign Service, a very young man, a very young officer, staying in one of our hotels. We were guarded, so to speak, in a very gentle sort of fashion. We could go out and go shopping and get various things if we were taken out by somebody. Whoever took us out would just stand in the middle of the square, and we could go in all directions and do our errands, then come join him again and go back to the hotel.

We also had the opportunity occasionally of going and having a meal, a dinner, in one of the three hotels where some of our friends were, instead of always eating in our own hotel. This is important, really. It was in January then when I was with this Frenchman whose name was Pierre Dupuis, sort of like Joe Jones, you see. He had been in the United States and had taught in Smith College for about two years, and he’d married an American girl, but he was a very young widower and he was stationed in the Foreign Service at the government in Vichy. He had been assigned to go with us, wherever we would be, Mr. Dupuis would be with us as a member of the neutral government of Vichy. If you ever really have physical contact with somebody who is scared to death, you never forget it. Because we’d been talking at dinner, at the hotel, with

Dupuis at the table, about the possibility of maybe the Germans might come and get us, because we were not being exchanged as we had expected, you see. We sat there for two and a half months. It was kind of spooky.

As we went back home, in theory, Mr. Dupuis took my arm to try to keep me from stumbling in the dark, but he was shaking like an aspen leaf. I practically had to hold up the little man. We got back to the hotel. Then a couple of days later, we were interned by the German Army. I will tell you later what happened to Monsieur Dupuis. That was during internment.

To go back to Lourdes itself, I had a visitor who came. I can't remember exactly when it was, but I think it was sometime perhaps just before Christmas or after Christmas. A woman from one of the Resistance groups was sent to me by a friend of mine, and she came with a carte d'identité with my picture on it and everything, to help me escape. I thought, "Well, this would be very fascinating." But unfortunately, just the night before – yes, this is well before Christmas – "Kippy" Tuck had got everybody together and he said, "Now, no matter what happens, none of you must try to escape. It would be very dangerous for the rest of us. This is very, very important that we stick together. We have old people and children with us, and we can't just put people in jeopardy by somebody trying to do some funny business."

So I had to say to this young woman, "No, I'm sorry. This is impossible. I will not come with you."

She said, "I can arrange everything for you and see that you get railroad tickets and everything."

I said, "No." So I didn't.

And when I got back to Washington, I went in to see Jack Earhardt, talked a little about my experiences, and he said, "Constance, we thought if anybody would escape, you would. Why didn't you escape?" And I was as mad as could be! I thought, "Well!" But I think I probably could have made it into Switzerland. In any case, I didn't. So my life was different because of that.

Q: Yes, but let's pick up on the Frenchman you mentioned who was so terrified.

HARVEY: He went with us, too. He was one of the people who went with us into internment, as a representative of the neutral government of Vichy. We had a Swiss diplomat with us, who was a representative of our protecting power. Then when we got there, we also had a German diplomat who was delighted to be in Baden-Baden looking after us, instead of being bombed in Berlin. (Laughter) He was with us the whole time, and I think his wife was with him, too. We were 150 people altogether, which was quite a collection. But they wanted to get, for us, you see, the German Military Commission in North Africa which had been captured during the landings. They would have been of great assistance if they could have gotten them even some months later, and that's why, for 13 months, the governments haggled about this. But our government never gave them up. That group spent the rest of the war in Texas, and we were finally exchanged in February of '44 for German diplomats held at White Sulphur Springs.

I think that one story which I may have told you off the cuff explains it pretty well. I was very pro-English, pro-British, although I personally never lived or was stationed in England, and I remember saying to one of my close French friends one day, who had been in the Army himself, had been captured and escaped in the very first days of the war, “Why doesn’t France pull itself together and continue to join up with England, to help save England? Why doesn’t France get back into the war?”

And he looked at me and said, “Oh, you don’t know what it was to see men running.” And I felt deeply, deeply ashamed of myself when I realized what the defeat and humiliation had meant to that country. Of course, in a sense, that also explains the power of De Gaulle later.

Q: It just was a wrenching experience for the nation, with this great military history, to essentially be defeated and be humiliated in the process.

HARVEY: Yes, and so rapidly. In World War I, it was a terrible, murderous war, but in a sense, at that time, the country wasn’t overrun, you see, practically overnight, in 1940, in such a short time, a complete collapse. This was really very, very shocking to the French. They weren’t really prepared for that sort of thing at all psychologically. I think a great many of them just had to have a “father figure” to hang onto psychologically, and the general was there.

Q: Was there to some degree an anti-British feeling because Britain had not been defeated, and somehow or other, the British were still in the war when France was out of the war? In other words, was there sort of a mixed feeling of admiration for the British for keeping up, and at the same time a dislike for the British because the French had capitulated and the British had not? Was there a sort of schizophrenia there for the French? Because there was, I know, a strong anti-British feeling among many of the French. Is that the traditional anti-British feeling, going back to the Middle Ages, or is that the French feeling that somehow or other, British should have quit, too?

HARVEY: I think, above all, latently there’s a great deal of anti-British feeling still in France, probably even today. This is something that goes way, way back, and you can find it in England, too, definitely, even before Napoleon. That was reactivated by various things, as you say. The British bombing at Mers el Kébir, of course, had been a shock to them, especially to the French Navy. Of course, of all people, it was the French Navy who hated the British more than anybody else.

You see, we Americans were not frequented by the people who were anti-Anglo-Saxon, so to speak. I mean, we knew that they existed and we knew we had to be careful about this, that, and the other, but there were people who were really our friends. I happened to have some very good friends in Lyon, because I went with one letter of introduction to a prominent family when I arrived there, which was very helpful. They were very pro-British. But you had to know who in a family was pro-Vichy, and who was against it. You couldn’t trust anyone just because he was related to or had a certain position or was the brother or son of somebody. You had to know each individual well, and you had to be very careful what you said. You couldn’t let any cats out of bags just by chatting too much.

Q: Were the French astonished that the British could stay in the war? Did they sort of expect the capitulation of Great Britain shortly after the capitulation of France?

HARVEY: Again, the people I knew kept up their hope that the British were going to hang in there, and they did admire them, even some people that didn't like them that much. That doesn't mean that they necessarily liked De Gaulle. That was quite a different story. Of course, anyone who had anything to do with the Navy was not likely to like the British in any case, but I don't think I ran across many naval people there in the middle of the country.

I had one French friend, this family I knew well, very well indeed. He did business with the Germans right up to the last moment. All the time I was there, he was going up to Paris and further north on business with the Germans. I knew perfectly well he was betting on the British winning the war, but he wasn't giving up his business because of that. They, of course, wanted very much for the Americans to come.

I've never told you about down in the country. I had a house in the country because I couldn't have an apartment or anything in the city; I just had a room in a hotel. But I had a house in the country in the department of the Ain, and there I had people down for weekends to this country house. To get food, you had to go scrounging. I would go around to one place where they sold butter right from where they made it black market, of course, naturally. The man who ran this, the fruitier, as they called the man who does butter and cheese in the country, he would call me aside. He'd say, "Mademoiselle, come, come. Let's have a little drink in the room above the shop. I want to talk to you."

So I would go up with him to this little room above the shop, and he'd put his great hands and arms on the table, lean forward earnestly, and say, "When? When? What should we do in the meantime? When are the Americans coming? Are we supposed to work now?" This was just one of the common people. But there were lots of people who were looking for their real savior, you see, for the Americans.

Q: The United States was the real savior?

HARVEY: Well, there was always a feeling of friendliness, in general, for the Americans, still. You see, the Americans were not just Anglo-Saxons to them; they were the people with whom they'd been involved in our revolution and then we'd taken on theirs and so forth. They remembered that, and they remembered us as friends.

People were divided about the Vichy Government. We couldn't help but see both kinds in a way, but people made little waves. They didn't dare talk too openly, you see, because they never knew when the Gestapo would arrive and scoop you up. We had Gestapo coming into the office constantly. We were very careful not to find out too closely who came into that office. We didn't ask too many questions. We found it better not to know always. Some of them, we knew pretty well were members of the Gestapo, which was quartered right across the street from my hotel, in the hotel where my consul general was lodged.

For instance, people got around things in funny ways. There was nothing to be bought in the

shops. It was practically impossible to buy any objects. I had a maid whom I would send to buy anything she could find, and one day she came back with a teapot. She said, "It was the only thing I could buy anywhere."

I said, "That's great." I'm still using it.

But for instance, in a picture shop where they did beautiful picture framing and sold pictures, they had nothing left to offer because no merchandise was created during all this period. But in one window they had a great big picture of Petain, and in another was a great big picture of Laval. Under the picture of Petain was "Epuisé." And under the picture of Laval was a sign "Vendu."

Q: *That says everything.*

HARVEY: Other funny things would happen. One day, a horse came down the main street of Lyon, the Rue de la République, right where our office was, and everybody stopped and clapped. (Laughter) Nobody had seen a horse in they didn't know how long!

One had to be very careful with whom one spoke, because they might be on one side or the other and go and tell what you said. So before you got into politics of any kind, you had to know the person really well with whom you were speaking. The French are apt to chatter a bit too much. I was traveling on a train from Vichy back to Lyon once, and happened to sit next to one of the rather famous French generals, General De La Laurencie, and he started to talk to me, you see, because he was very anti-Petain. I was terrified with what he was talking about. I thought he was doing the most imprudent thing I'd ever known. People could pick up what he was saying. So we were very careful, you see.

Q: *Now we come to one of the questions that fascinates me, and I know of interest to others. That's what you can tell us about your meeting with, and your knowledge about General Giraud and also under what circumstances you met him and what role he was at that time assuming, or just anything that you want to say about that. And if you want to bring in anybody else, that's fine, too. We'll call this a Giraud chapter.*

HARVEY: Before I talk to you about Giraud, whom I got to know probably in late July of '42, I want to back up a bit and tell you a little bit more about the work I'd been doing regularly for our attaché in Bern, General Legge. I told you about one or two things that I did for him, but I went personally to Switzerland every once in a while, carrying documents to him and reports which we had from the occupied zone and from other places and, of course, from Belgium and so forth.

Once, for instance, I arrived and we met in a field outside of Geneva. I presented him with some documents which I knew what they were, and which had been brought down to me by one of the agents that we had working in the north, who brought information to us. They were the maps of all the emplacements of the antiaircraft equipment of Germans all in and around Paris. He turned sort of white and said, "Oh, for goodness sake, you just brought this in by hand?"

I said, "Oh, yes, no problem." And the way I did it: I had a Ford car, and when you crossed the

frontier, there was always a member of the Gestapo right at the frontier with a French officer, watching as you went back and forth. I knew all about that. Fortunately, that Ford car had a glove compartment for which there was a separate key, not the key to the rest of the car, the ignition, which is more usual. So when I went in, I very often just locked up papers inside the glove compartment and turned the key down inside my bosom. When I went into the place to check out with the French officer and the Gestapo to go into Switzerland, I left my car open, with the keys just hanging from the ignition. Everybody trusted everybody else, of course, and there wasn't any problem about it. Sometimes people had hidden things in the machinery under the hood, and they sometimes looked under the hood. I thought that was something to avoid. So if a package weren't too bulky, it could get into that glove compartment and often did.

I remember the general said, "I shall remember that, Constance." So later, when he gave me the Medal of Freedom, I guess he remembered.

However, this was just part of the story. So to go back to your more specific question. Toward the end of the summer of 1942, Giraud had arrived in France and having escaped from a German prison east of Dresden. We didn't know much more than that, I had a good friend, Leon de Rosen, a Frenchman working with the American Red Cross, helping distribute milk and other supplies, various things, mostly for children. He got Red Cross parcels and other things to people in the occupied zone. He moved around a good deal, and he was a very patriotic Frenchman. One day he said to me, "Constance, you know Giraud is here in this area, and I've told him about you and he wants to meet you. He's very anxious to have a way of communicating safely with the Americans, and he doesn't see any way in which he can do that." You will remember he was at Vichy, but he left Vichy, I think, for good in May or thereabouts, and never went back. "He is here and staying at the Chateau de Fromente outside of town, and I could take you up there if you would like to meet him."

I said, "Oh, yes, sure, I'd love to. That would be very interesting." As usual, I didn't say anything to anybody. I just went with Leon.

He said, "I will stay outside in the car. You are to go in. Just go in, open the door, go in. Don't stop to ring the bell. Just walk in."

I went in. It was, to me, a memory I shan't forget. It was a beautiful entryway, black and white marble floor, a staircase, and there was no one there but this very tall general, a very elegant-looking gentleman. Apparently there was no one else in the whole building. I think the servants had all been sent away. Then we met and talked, and he said that he was very anxious to try to get in touch with Americans, but didn't see how he could. He couldn't go back to Vichy, wasn't about to go back to Vichy. There had been attempts to assassinate him and rumors of assassination, and he had to be very careful.

I said, "Well, I have a way of doing that."

He said, "My young friend thought maybe you might be able to help me."

I said, "Yes. A good friend of mine is the military attaché in Bern, and I see him, and I could

easily take a message if you want to send one. I would be very happy to do it.”

So we talked for a little while, and I told him I had gone to school in France, and then he said, “Let’s get De Rosen in, and we’ll talk together.” So De Rosen came in, we strolled in the garden, and had a nice chat about things, and I departed.

I went back once more some weeks later. I guess I got another request to go. I went alone that time, and I didn’t take my American car. I had, by that time, also acquired a little old dirty Peugeot for such occasions and thought that was better. So I drove up the hill outside of town to the Château, and went in and saw him once more there.

Then I saw him a third time, a few weeks later, by appointment. He sent word that he wanted to see me. I was to go to a very humble part of Lyon, the working-class quarter, and just go in the door and up to the apartment on the second floor. He told me just where to go, so I did. When I arrived, I found a room with nothing in it but a couple of chairs and a table and an enormous bouquet of carnations on the table. Carnations from a French gentleman for a lady visitor, you see, just to make it look attractive. So we talked again, and both times he gave me papers to take to Legge. One of the times, I don’t remember which time, but probably during that third visit, he gave me the papers which were his proposals for the landing in the south of France. He had mapped out exactly how he wanted to have it done and how he would personally take command. I took those papers to Legge. That was the last time I saw Giraud.

One of Giraud’s adjutants was Colonel de Limarès. I went to see de Limarès a couple of times, and he always gave me documents to take to Legge. Sometimes I think I had messages from Legge to hand in the other direction.

Then toward the end of October 1942, Giraud left the area and went to join his family near Aix-en-Provence, and I didn’t see him again until after the war, when he came to see me in Zurich.

Q: Why don’t we just jump that for a moment? How was that meeting after the war, when he came to see you in Switzerland?

HARVEY: Oh, that was fascinating. When he came back to Switzerland, I think it was in ‘48, my last year at Zurich. Here he is back, seeing friends in Zurich. [Looking at photographs] These are some of them, the people he saw when he was brought through Switzerland, when he escaped from Königstein fortress on the Elbe, which was really quite an episode. It was way off beyond Dresden in what is now East Germany. He spoke German very well, and he got himself across the border out of Germany and first into a part of Switzerland.

Q: He climbed out on a rope or something, didn’t he? And here he is, this extremely tall man.

HARVEY: Yes, very tall for a Frenchman. He shaved his moustache off when he escaped. Here he is with his moustache, but this is when he came to see me. He came to my office to see me.

Q: Tell us a little bit about that meeting, when he came to see you. Was it to thank you?

HARVEY: Yes, yes, and to talk to me about lots of things. In any case, that was the last time. He said, "Do come and see me in Paris sometime," but I never did get to that. I was very shortly afterwards transferred to Athens.

I had a letter from him not very long before he died. He died thinking he'd been poisoned. I heard this afterward. But he didn't; he died of internal cancer.

When in 1942 he joined the troops in North Africa, he took one son with him, leaving his wife, a daughter, and another son, I guess, behind. They were taken to Germany. His daughter died in Germany in a concentration camp.

Q: Going back to Eisenhower's memoirs, where he meets Giraud and Giraud says that he is prepared to take charge of the Allied forces, and Eisenhower has to explain to him, no, that's his job. Obviously, that came as a shock to him, in that here he was, in a sense, the ranking general, and he was not going to command that. Did that come up in later discussions, that he was essentially pushed aside? I'm quoting the book, Diplomat Among Warriors, and it's dangerous to quote without the book, but as I remember, basically in that book, they said, "You can command the French forces."

HARVEY: Yes. After the assassination of Darlan, he sort of took charge, in a sense, in Africa. He claimed, I think, to me, and he certainly claimed in his second book, of which I do not have a copy, that he had sent a message to President Roosevelt, and something had come back or something was written about it, "Okay. Roosevelt." I was queried on this by the military historian, but I had never known the answer to that. I think he certainly wanted, before he actually got to Africa, and expected that he would be in charge, in command of any force landing on French soil, because he was the ranking French general. Weygand was too old to do anything, that Giraud would be in charge. But whether he ever got any real acceptance of that, I very much doubt. I knew what Eisenhower did. I knew that, but I didn't go over this with him. I certainly didn't talk it out with him. I have no idea whether there was this document. I don't know. They've never found out. It may be in some archives; I have no idea.

Q: He may very well have gotten a letter from Roosevelt which could be read in several different ways, Roosevelt keeping his hands open to De Gaulle or Giraud.

HARVEY: Yes. I don't think he thought so much about De Gaulle, but the command was to be Eisenhower, obviously. I think that knowing, at least at a distance, a little about Roosevelt, I think his being equivocal was quite possible. And knowing Giraud, I think Giraud interpreted it the way he ardently desired it to be. But that is only, of course, what I deduce.

Then there is one other mystery about the whole thing. After I met Giraud the first time – this is in his first book, Mes Evasions, his daughter got a message that somebody should go and talk to somebody at Vichy. A young woman went up and talked to somebody else, and came back and said that, "There is somebody in the American Embassy who wants to talk with some representative of Giraud, wants to get in touch with him." Giraud sent one of his officers, General Baurès. I didn't know about that. Giraud never told me about it. Whom Baurès saw in the forest outside of Vichy, no one seems to know. No one. I never knew, never heard about it

until after the war. They apparently have talked to Admiral Leahy, to Doug MacArthur II. In a sense, you would have thought it would have been the military attaché in Vichy, who was Bob Schow, with whom I was interned for 13 months. But as I never spoke about these matters to anyone when I was interned, or at any other time, I have no idea about that. I don't know who it could possibly have been. I don't know who it was. I don't know who would know, because nobody seems to be living except possibly Schow. I don't know if somebody could find out if Schow is still living and ask him.

Q: Somebody in the State Department could probably track that.

Let me ask you this indelicate question, and you answer it as you wish. In any meetings with Giraud, including the post-war meeting, did he ever express any opinion about General De Gaulle?

HARVEY: I don't remember any kind of comment about de Gaulle. He expressed He said to me often an idea which was virtually the title of his second book, Un Seul But: La Victoire. Translated, "My Only Objective: Victory." I think it expresses him and his attitude very strongly. He was a soldier, and he wasn't interested in, nor had a real concept of the political future of France. Of course, that is the difference between him and De Gaulle, the real difference.

Q: I'm glad that you said that, because you had told me that once, and I thought that was very important, that essentially De Gaulle had the concept.

HARVEY: Oh, yes, and he had it all worked out in his mind what he was going to do with France. There's no doubt about it.

Q: And Giraud was the soldier who would bring about the victory and then retire.

HARVEY: Oh, yes. I don't think he had any real political ambition in that sense whatsoever. I don't think it occurred to him. I think he thought that he had the right and station to be the general, you see. When I saw him after the war, I don't think that he ever mentioned De Gaulle to me. I don't remember that. Nothing striking.

Q: In Bob Paxton's book on the French Army, a very interesting book, how the French – Juin, for instance, as an example – were first with Vichy, then against Vichy. There was no unity in terms of the French Army, in terms of supporting, until after the North African landing. Am I right on that?

HARVEY: Supporting De Gaulle?

Q: Yes.

HARVEY: He wasn't that popular, as I gathered it, when I was there, with the leading officers in the French Army. This is something that I was interested in myself. I think our government understood this, and that's one reason they were perhaps interested a bit in Giraud, because they were not entirely against him, you see. He made a trip to the United States, you know, before De

Gaulle did. I don't know which year it was, but during the war while I was still in captivity, I guess. It was in '43 sometime when he made a trip to the United States. He was received, of course, by Roosevelt. I think that they felt that many French officers in France would follow Giraud rather than De Gaulle, and I think that that was possible. The ones who wanted to follow De Gaulle had already gone to London.

Q: *They'd gone to England, yes.*

HARVEY: They'd gone to England, and also there was a certain jealousy among the people who hadn't gone, I think. It wasn't quite the same thing. Masses of people and the younger people were perhaps attracted to De Gaulle. Of course, there were people who were De Gaullists. One of them was the young daughter of the subsequent ambassador to Washington, whom I knew well. She was only 17 years old at that time, Violaine Hoppenot, a very, very brave girl. She was working for the Belgian underground. Afterwards, she went back to Paris, I don't know just when, but after we were interned.

Q: *You mentioned one thing I'd like to come back to in a moment. Giraud was one of the very senior officers, a five-star general in the French Army. So was Weygand.*

HARVEY: So was Weygand.

Q: *Was there any liaison between Giraud and Weygand?*

HARVEY: Giraud would go down to talk with Weygand. He did that, I think, a few times. I didn't know much about this, but I gathered that was the case. But Weygand always said, "I'm too old." He was old at that time. "I'm too old to really play any part." I think that was part of the story. Of course, there were a number of people who felt that Petain was secretly in favor of what was going on, but nobody knew that.

Q: *Does anybody really know that to this day? It's sort of a mystery point, isn't it? It was not brought up when Petain went on trial. There was some sort of attempt, as I remember it, to bring this up, and nothing came of it. It made Petain, in that sense, a mystery man, didn't it?*

HARVEY: I think the trouble really with Petain was that he was really too old. I think I've said in various places. It was generally known while I was in Lyon that one of the tricks was to get him to sign papers late in the afternoon when he was vague, that they didn't give him important documents in the morning when he was more alert. This became a sort of practice. He was surrounded by a bunch of people who . . .

Q: *Psychopaths?*

HARVEY: Oh, no. People who were really playing the German game. Quite a few of them. After all, the country was divided. One forgets this, that there were people who were afraid of communism, and there were the extreme right who existed in France, and a good many of them were really virtually pro-German and thought that, after all, they could work things out with Germany.

Q: There was that wonderful book and movie that was made some years ago, which brought this out, when we heard that young aristocrat talking about how he was educated to hate the Jews. "The Sorrow and the Pity" is the movie. That came out very strongly that there was that element.

HARVEY: Oh, yes. There was always the group which was the far right. They were, as always, interested in their positions. They were sure the Germans were going to win, and they didn't want to be on the losing side. I think it's as simple as that.

Then there were these other people, like my industrial friend, who would talk with and do business with the Germans, who told me once, while I was still there, that he had been in a conference in Alsace. This was sometime in '42, before I was interned. He said, "One of those Germans said, 'We know what's going on with the Jews. Even if we lose the war, we should have gained the annihilation of the Jews.'" And this chap came back and told me, and various other people.

Another thing I just couldn't believe my ears: in about August of '42, a woman from the Swiss Red Cross came to my office and said that their group, the Red Cross, sometimes got permission to go in to see the really sick people in some of the German concentration camps, as well as the prisoner of war camps. She said, "We have learned that they're actually taking their victims and making soap of Jews." We talked it over. Of course, it was literally true, it really was. I remember this woman. Actually, the Swiss Red Cross got out quite a number of elderly people into Switzerland just a little bit toward the end of the war. One of them had been my dressmaker, the most important dress maker outside of Paris. I had known her for years, and I didn't know, of course, that she'd been captured. She was almost 60, and she went through an awful business, being in a camp. They brought her out, dying of tuberculosis. She finally recovered, and I saw her before she went to the hospital. I saw her in St. Gallen, and she told me about some other people, what had gone on in the camps. I knew what had happened. I had eight people I knew who went to concentration camps. Two of them that went were clerks at the consulate in Lyon.

Q: Did they come back?

HARVEY: The woman died in Ravensbrück, and the man was finally liberated by our troops at Buchenwald. He came back, and I had long talks with him afterward, but he didn't live very long. He died young. But he told me about what it was like to be sent there.

Also, I must say just a few words about one of our Canadian friends, a young man, Frank Pickersgill. He stayed in my house out in the country for a number of weeks, quite a while in 1942. He had been studying for the Canadian Diplomatic in Paris, had overstayed his time and been picked up by the invaders and taken to the prison at St. Denis. There's a big prison there just north of Paris. He and another Canadian boy were there for a year and a half, and they escaped. Frank, you couldn't have told he wasn't a Frenchman; he spoke absolutely flawless French. My French friends couldn't believe he wasn't French. He didn't have a drop of French blood. He'd been brought up, I think, in Manitoba, and he had learned French from a French governess. He didn't have French blood, but he sure knew how to talk French, and he knew Frenchmen all over the country, all over France.

He stayed at my place quite a while because he had escaped, and we picked him up and said he was not to try to go out on one of those “lines” that people had rigged up for people to go out, that we’d get him out with a passport. We were pretty sure we could, with a proper passport and a permit, because he was deaf in one ear and therefore a non-combatant. Very unfortunately, he’d had a gun go off near his ear. So after a number of weeks, we did get him off to go through Spain to Portugal, and on to England. He showed up again in England. After intelligence and communications training, he was parachuted back into France by the English, with a number of other people. I’ve heard that about 20 were parachuted at the same time. That was probably sometime in ‘43, after I was interned. They were all picked up almost immediately, and put in prison again in Paris. He almost liberated the whole bunch of them, but he fell and broke his leg, and that didn’t help any, so they got him again. They finally took him to Buchenwald, the concentration camp, where he was hanged as a spy. The man who was our consular clerk, and who also had been in that camp, told me later, “When he walked in, he was just the same old chap we had known before in Lyon. He was just as cheerful as anything, and he acted in a perfectly normal way.” That was our last news of him. He was a brave guy.

Q: About the possibility of Spain entering into World War II on the side of Germany and Italy. You mentioned that you had an interesting story to tell in relation to that.

HARVEY: It concerns an American who was very well known to our service, but not in our service, Royal Tyler, who lived in Geneva and had a chateau in Burgundy, and went back and forth occasionally between the two residences. I got to know him. He had lived a life in his youth in constant connections with Spain. He had done his undergraduate studies and, I think, some graduate studies, entirely at the University of Salamanca, and he knew all of the Spanish nobility and everybody of consequence in Spain, and had gone back and forth and seen a lot of them over the years. He told me, when this was discussed occasionally, when I was in Lyon, that he just knew that Franco and the Spaniards would never, never join the war with Hitler, that they were going to stay out of it, they weren’t going to do it, and there was no use thinking that they would.

A great deal of our policy was based on the belief Spain would join the Axis, especially efforts to get people as fast as they could through France and into Switzerland before something like that happened. Of course, that is one thing that the Department did soon after Pearl Harbor. They kept sending people into Bern, so that they’d have as many people at listening posts as possible before the frontiers all closed.

I myself was sent up with two other people from our office in Lyon, just before Christmas of ‘41. Finally, after demonstrations on my part, I was sent back in January of ‘42, to Lyon, where the staff of Americans had been considerably reduced.

Q: When you were sent back there, Constance, in the meantime, Pearl Harbor had happened.

HARVEY: That’s right.

Q: So when you arrived back there, we were no longer a neutral nation, but we were an enemy of the Axis powers. How long did it take before they got hold of you and took you to Germany for

internment?

HARVEY: It was a good many months that we were still there. Of course, our French friends and the people that really were our friends were delighted that America was in the war. They'd been waiting for this moment as their real hope of salvation. During the summer of '42, that was a very interesting period. Some information together about the result of British bombings. There were no American bombings yet, you see. It was all British. And Dupuis was taking this out, and the girl was sending the messages in some way or other. That is what has happened to Dupuis. We went through the rest of our internment without him.

Then there is a sequel to this grizzly story. I don't know, perhaps six or eight months after the war had ended, our embassy was back and working in Paris, and in walked Monsieur Dupuis! He had been this timid little man. I didn't see him. I wasn't there, of course; I was then stationed in Switzerland. But I talked with the people I'd been interned with, several of them that were in the Paris embassy, and they said, "Constance, he is a changed man. You can't imagine how he has changed. You remember what a Mr. Milktoast he was, scared of his shadow and everything, so timid? Well, he's calm and collected."

He was taken to the Alexander Platz prison in Berlin under sentence of execution, put in solitary confinement, and he was there until Berlin was liberated. They probably forgot about him. He even survived the bombing. Instead of breaking him, he had become a man. It was absolutely unbelievable!

Q: A transformation of character.

HARVEY: A transformation. He had faced up to it, whatever it was, and he lived through it. He really had a different personality.

Then later on, quite a few years later, when I was stationed in the embassy in Bonn, and I knew the people in the French Embassy well, one of the top people there said to me, "We told him, when he got back, we'd give him any position he wanted. We would send him back to Washington." He'd been in Washington and knew America well. "We'd make him cultural attaché, and he said, 'Oh, I don't think I could do that.' We said, 'Nonsense, of course you can do that. We'll send somebody to teach you just how to do it. Anything you want, anything we can do for you, we will do.'" So he did. He went to Washington, where he was cultural attaché, and then he married another American girl. Some friends fixed up a cocktail party for him to come to see me with just one or two other people, but at the last moment, he called and said he had something else, he couldn't come. I think he just didn't feel he could see somebody from those days. He didn't live very long. He was really the greatest man I've known, because he was scared to death, but he went ahead with it. When Tom asked him to help, he helped.

Q: That's true bravery. That's right.

HARVEY: That's true bravery.

Q: It's the scared man that did the right thing.

HARVEY: Who really did the right thing, and it transformed him. The fact that he had done that, you see, made him a different person.

Q: *Constance, picking back up on this, you were then exchanged.*

HARVEY: I must tell you just one or two things.

Q: *Yes, please.*

HARVEY: About my life there. Everything was more or less all right, and we were taken on these walks and so forth. Then when we knew we were going to be exchanged, we knew ahead of time, things began to get kind of – I don't know, go in every direction. People who had been quite fond of each other began to quarrel, one thing and another, and people were emotionally upset. Then one day, it was snowy weather and people had gone out for their walk with the Gestapo, about eight men had gone out. I don't think there were any women in the group. Sometimes these Gestapo took us up to a little wine place, a weinstube, up in the hills, and we had a drink of some kind of odd wine or something or other with them, and then they brought you back. It was all quite friendly.

The group came back, and one of the Americans was missing. Oh, my! Well, the Gestapo were not very much worried. The German diplomat wasn't that worried, but the person who absolutely couldn't stand it was the U.P. correspondent, because the man that was missing was the A.P. correspondent! He said, "That so and so, if he isn't back in half an hour, I'm making a break for the frontier. That's where he's gone. He's on his way to Switzerland."

Q: *With all the news!*

HARVEY: With all the news! (Laughter) We tried to calm him down. Poor McHenry finally did appear. I think he had perhaps stopped behind a tree or something and lost the rest of them, followed the lights in town and was glad to get back into the hotel again, you see. About the correspondents, when they got to the frontier of Spain, there was a terrific rush for the telephones. All the lions and lambs who had been lying down together were clawing each other at the telephones once again.

Then we were taken to Lisbon, and we were there about three days or so in the Lisbon Triangle. We were put on the Gripsholm and came back to the United States.

JAMES COWLES HART BONBRIGHT
France Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1942-1949)

Ambassador James Cowles Hart Bonbright was born in 1903. He entered the Foreign Service in 1928. His career included positions in China, Yugoslavia, and

France. Ambassador Bonbright was interviewed by Peter Jessup on February 26, 1986.

Q: I'd just keep it rolling chrono-wise. Reber was in Fort de France, and you were "French-desking it."

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Of course, the big problem at that time with the French and a long time after was our relations with de Gaulle and his Free French. We got off on a very bad start. This was before my time; I think it was around Christmas of '41. Without consulting us, General de Gaulle ordered an admiral, who was loyal to him, to take the two French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, two ratty little places off the coast of Newfoundland, of no importance except they'd been a thorn in our sides all through the Prohibition era, a haven for jolly boating. This infuriated FDR and Mr. Hull, on reflection a little bit more than it should have, but it did, and caused Mr. Hull, I think, to refer to the takeover as "by a group of so-called Free French." That, really, we never recovered from.

Q: That slur.

BONBRIGHT: I'm not sure that it was meant with quite the sense that it sounds. The name "Free French" hadn't been in use all that long. I think he was using it more as a descriptive, and not in the sense as "so-called but not really Free." But who knows?

Q: Yes.

BONBRIGHT: He may not have. But this upset things. We were upset fundamentally, I think, because we still had maintained relations with the French Government in unoccupied France, in Vichy, and we didn't want that upset. Of course, it was a very unpopular policy at home. All the papers practically were all for de Gaulle, and people like Walter Lippmann went around basting the President and the Department for keeping on this connection. But we thought it was important to have people still in unoccupied France and keep an eye on Petain and try to keep him from going overboard, and also as a sign that those French were loyal and hopeful, and at no time did it ever allow it to appear that we approved or loved them, the Vichy government.

Q: Keeping channels open.

BONBRIGHT: Keeping channels open, I think very valid. Of course, that blew up when we invaded North Africa. The Vichy crowd broke diplomatic relations with us. The French fleet, too, had all scuttled, which we would have preferred to get it intact, as indeed we should have; I mean, before the fall of France. That fleet should have been ordered to sail the hell out of there. It wasn't. But it was better sunk than in the hands of the Germans.

Q: Didn't the British bombard?

BONBRIGHT: They had hit them at one time, yes.

Q: In North Africa.

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: Was Ambassador Murphy operating out of the Department or secretly for FDR? I mean, with his maneuverings around Europe.

BONBRIGHT: He did go through the Department. I'm not too clear about the details of the preparations for the landing. There was a special group that was formed with military and State Department people to do that. So that was separated from the normal work of the French desk. I was aware of a lot of it, the work of the vice consuls that we had in North Africa had helped make preparations for the landing, but not in detail. Murphy had carried a good deal of clout when he reported in those days. Of course, the big fight was over Admiral Darlan, whom we sort of recognized as the controller. It became enormously unpopular in our press, but it was designed to save American lives and cut down the military opposition to our landing, and which I think was pretty successful.

Q: Casualties were minimal.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Then he, of course, was assassinated shortly thereafter. Of course, the Gaullists all wanted to move right in on that, but we had brought out this General Giraud in France, who had been a prisoner of war in Germany, I think, a fine man with a good military reputation. He was dating a civilian, Ruth. Actually, I don't know who picked him. It turned out to be a pretty poor choice. He had no political savvy, he had no stomach for the end-fighting. In fact, finally he just threw in the sponge. He wasn't a viable opponent for de Gaulle; he wouldn't have lasted one round with him and didn't. Of course, we were all criticized then for not being more forthcoming with de Gaulle, for whom there was great sympathy. Everybody appreciated what he'd done. His stand at the independence and to keep on fighting and so on were all very noble and appreciated everywhere. But after things like the St. Pierre and Miquelon episode, they refused to commit themselves to having this man going to France as the French Government without the French people having a chance to express their opinions of what they wanted after the war, because while there were all sorts of rumors coming out, de Gaulle claimed that he had enormous support. It was hard to judge.

Q: You couldn't take a poll.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, you couldn't take a poll. So basically, I think our Vichy policy and our holding off on running 100% out for de Gaulle was sound. What wrecked it was the public relations job. Even when we did something for de Gaulle – and we did many things – we seemed to do it reluctantly.

Q: Or it was painted reluctantly.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Or under pressure, or it really didn't mean anything, anyway. Some of us in the lower ranks of the Department were bothered by this, and we tried to push the vine further up, but if you're going to do something, for God's sake, let's do it gracefully and try to see if we can't get a little credit for it. But that didn't work with the President and Mr. Hull.

Q: Wasn't there a factor also in there that General de Gaulle was not an unbending back-slapping type; he was a very arch-imperious person?

BONBRIGHT: Indeed he was. First, the British, you see, agreed with us privately. That was the difference. They agreed privately. In fact, Churchill used to say that, "The cross of Lorraine (which was de Gaulle's logo, so to speak) is the heaviest cross that I have to bear." But he didn't say it out loud, publicly. Everyone had heard it, I suppose de Gaulle himself, but it wasn't the public sphere. So the British got away with much more just by that attitude than we did.

Fundamentally, too, the French group that was allowed to set up business in London, they were just too damned unreliable. There was a sieve. We all found, the British, too, by bitter experience, that you couldn't pass on anything of a confidential nature to the French in London that didn't go back to Vichy and eventually to the Germans. Any military planning was out; you just couldn't do it. That's really, I think, why de Gaulle was not drawn into any of the planning for the invasion. I don't think he even knew about it until maybe the boats were already on the way. Anyway, it was last minute. They were taking no chances, and they had to, no question about it. I've often wondered, and many people have, if things might have been better after the war if we had treated de Gaulle differently. Surely, I think, in our own interests we could have done some things a little bit differently, but I honestly don't think it would have made any difference. I think he was a great man, no question about it, but he wasn't on the same wavelength with us. I mean, he got plenty of support from us once he was accepted by the French. We did all sorts of things for him, like letting French troops lead the way into Paris at the time of liberation, when they had had nothing to do with liberating whatsoever.

Q: They let General LeClerc or somebody move in with the division.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Of course, the French in the town, the underground, was not without its importance in the liberation and turnover. Then at other times de Gaulle would go right against direct orders and move his troops sometimes right in front of where we were going, things of that sort, just for political reasons. When NATO came along, he supported it all right, but then he wouldn't let his troops serve under the NATO command. Always the grandeur of France. I think this attitude, particularly during the war, was important in helping to maintain French morale after the disaster, and up to the point of getting them back on their feet after the liberation. But I think he overdid it; I think maybe he got the French to feel that they were stronger than they really were. Anyway, we had trouble with him always to the day he died.

Q: Was his French in writing and oratory superb?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, yes.

Q: An American general in English couldn't match his eloquence?

BONBRIGHT: I don't think so. He was very, very intelligent. He was something, great contradictions. Of course, he had that enormous height up above most people.

Q: Would you say one of his great accomplishments was fighting all those right-wing generals and everything and getting Algeria to be independent? I mean, realizing the handwriting on the wall.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think so. He's the only one who could do it. I don't think anybody else would have got away with it. I don't know. That's a pretty messy place still, I think. I look back with some nostalgia to the days of the French and British empires, I confess. They were galling at times, and a servant of British crown colony in the old days could be personally very humiliating, they were so patronizing and arrogant, but it was a far, far better world when they were top dogs. They ran pretty tight ships.

Q: Africa, with all its multiple little countries, was pretty much a disaster area as far as not being able to manage things themselves economically.

BONBRIGHT: No. Perhaps they can work themselves out.

Some time in 1943, I think it was, we gave a form of recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation, the de Gaullist group. It agreed to certain powers that we would deal with them, but it was, of course, short of their ultimate goal, which always was that they wanted to be recognized as the future government of France; nothing else was good enough. But when this recognition took place, it was carefully worded, and we thought it was doing them a pretty big favor. Mr. Hull had a press conference after the announcement of this recognition. I give this as an example of Mr. Hull's ability to obfuscate a question.

“Mr. Secretary, when the Allies reconquer France, will the administration of the recaptured territory be turned over to the French Committee or the Allied military government?”

Mr. Hull: “You mean metropolitan France?”

“Yes, sir.”

Mr. Hull: “If you will read these terms of recognition, you will find where those phases will be taken up and dealt with as each comes up or as they come to them, or if they should do so earlier, they may do that.”

I don't often sympathize with gentlemen of the press; I think they're spoiled brats, a lot of them. But I did feel pity for the man who was covering this press conference and how to write about that announcement.

Q: There must have been similar obfuscation.

BONBRIGHT: Yes.

Q: About some of the others in the Department that helped with the problems or didn't help.

BONBRIGHT: My real boss through all this period was H. Freeman Matthews, known as “Doc,”

who was head of the European office. He himself had been in Vichy, I think, and had been a French hand for some time. He also worked in South America. He was a wonderful man.

Q: He still lives in Washington, doesn't he?

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I believe so. He sits in a chair all day long and doesn't recognize anybody. But then he had a mind like a steel trap and a tenacity that a bulldog would admire. If he once got his teeth into an opponent, he never, never let go. I owe a great deal to him. He really got me started by arranging for me to go as number two in Paris at the end of my time in the Department. I remember the day he called me in and put this before me. I was greatly flattered. I was only a Class 3 officer at the time, pretty far down still. Of course, the end of the war saw an explosion in the number of people. Everybody who was already in was apt to go up pretty fast because they needed bodies in all directions. I had not particularly looked forward to being in any really big embassies, and I told this to Doc that I'd like to think about it. I could feel his cold eye on me as I left the room.

The next morning he called me in again and looked at me coldly, and said, "With regard to what you said to me yesterday, if you don't want to go to Paris, if you prefer a small post, I'm sure I can arrange to have you sent to Bulgaria."

At which I said, "Doc, I'd be pleased and honored to go to Paris." So he laughed, and we talked about it often afterwards. He was a great friend and a pillar of strength in that department, I always thought.

Another that I worked with not too long was Woody Wallner. He had been in Vichy, too, and Doug MacArthur, the general's nephew, was also a Vichy veteran, both very good officers. I always held it in Doug's favor that he leaned over backwards to ignore the relationship with his famous uncle. He wanted to do it on his own, and he did.

Q: He wasn't like Warren Delano Robbins, waving "Delano"?

BONBRIGHT: No, no, not in the least, which was pretty good. His wife was the daughter of the veep, Senator Alben Barkley, and that didn't do him any harm either. But the thing that really rocketed him up was that after being in the Paris Embassy for a while, he was sent to SHAPE as political advisor to General Eisenhower, who got to depend on him greatly. When he came home after this tour with Eisenhower, when he first became President, Doug was slated to go to Saigon as consul or something, and Eisenhower refused to let him go, and kept him in the State Department as counselor, which is an old slot of many years standing and has no exact place in the hierarchy, but it had always been influential. You could make anything out of it that you could. So he served in that.

Q: It isn't correct to say that as there are so-called Kremlinologists in the Department who devote much of their lives to the Soviet problem, there was not a similar corps of French specialists, were there? They kept shifting around?

BONBRIGHT: No, but there were several of them who did different tours of duty in that area.

Wallner, I thought, of all the officers I ran into, knew more about France than any of them. He had the ultimate fate of being number two to Mr. Kennedy's brother-in-law Shriver, who didn't like to have people around who knew more than he did and made life pretty miserable for Woody. So I think Woody pretty much retired after that; he never got another mission, which he richly deserved.

Q: But there wasn't a "Mr. France" as Hickerson was "Mr. Canada"?

BONBRIGHT: No. We regarded Matthews as our guiding light. Of course, Murphy in a way had his own entourage. Basically he was, to me, an Irish Catholic politician.

Q: An operator?

BONBRIGHT: Yes. He got his start under Bullitt in Paris. He was a consul general in Paris at the outbreak of the war. He hadn't had anything to do with the political side before that. He knew how to cut the butter. He was very highly regarded and had a good reputation, but I wouldn't put him in the same room as Bob Matthews.

I'll talk a little about that later when I come back to my last assignment with the Department. Perhaps I can comment about the Russian boss.

Q: So you had a laugh with Freeman Matthews and accepted that assignment.

BONBRIGHT: Yes. Before going to the embassy, I was assigned to the Peace Conference, which took place in Paris in the spring of 1946. I went over first for that. Mr. James Byrnes was Secretary of State at that time and head of the delegation. Those of us from the Department, career people, were scattered around in different jobs, but Matthews was the guy who pulled our strings. We all lived in the Hotel Meurice, which was comfortable but not gaudy. The food was not up to our standards at that time right after the war, as you can imagine.

My particular assignment was on a couple of the peace treaties with the Balkans, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. My boss was General Bedell Smith, who I had never met before, a very impressive officer and strong-willed, and had, unfortunately, one of the worst tempers I ever saw.

Q: That was purportedly induced by ulcers from which he suffered during his life.

BONBRIGHT: Yes, he did. He did have bad ulcers. I'll describe my run-in with him later back at the Department. Here everything went all right. Everybody helped with the difficult job of negotiations. I fought a little bit with the general. He thought he could win points with these ardent communists by small gestures. He used to hand out fountain pens, things of that sort. I remember when the Czechs sent him back a case of Czech beer; he thought he had it made with these fellows. I found that I. I guess he got over it when he went as ambassador to Moscow at that time and felt that you could maneuver these things on a personal basis, which you couldn't, nobody could.

At the end of the conference, then I moved over to the embassy. My boss there was Jefferson Caffery, who had a long and distinguished career mostly in South America, Cuba, Brazil. He was a very strange man. He worked with only a handful of people. Although I was his number two and I got on all right with him, I was never his favorite. His favorites were Douglas MacArthur, who he had worked with him, and in his whole outer office he had a man named Elim O'Shaughnessy, a Foreign Service officer.

To digress a little bit, Elim's history is amusing. He was the son of a Foreign Service officer, educated abroad, and he had acquired very British mannerisms and accent, wore his pocket handkerchief in his sleeve, like Mr. Roosevelt, smoked a long cigarette. He gave the impression of being a real striped pants-lah-de-dah, which the press would love. Actually, he had a very tough mind and a good one. He took exams for the Foreign Service and two or three times he passed the written, and every time they turned him down on the orals.

Q: Too effete or what?

BONBRIGHT: Finally, he went to somebody on the board and said, "What's the matter?" He was told very frankly that his manners and everything were too European and too un-American, and there wasn't room in the Service for all of this. This fellow suggested to him that he take the orals once more, but that before doing so, he go out in the Middle West somewhere and spend six months in any old job, sort of rubbing elbows with the great American people. So he went out to St. Louis, actually, where he got a job in a gas station, and he worked there for almost the required six months, I think, and never a peep of complaint from him. Finally, an officer from the Department who was going out west to give some exams out there stopped off. He had been instructed to stop off and see O'Shaughnessy.

Q: Was he on a leave without pay or a sabbatical, or what?

BONBRIGHT: No, he wasn't even in the Service then.

Q: Oh, I see. He hadn't been accepted yet.

BONBRIGHT: No, he hadn't been accepted. So this fellow stopped off to have a look and see if O'Shaughnessy had really tried to do as had been suggested to him. When he got back to the Department after this trip, they said to this fellow, "Now how about O'Shaughnessy? Has he changed?"

He said, "I'm sorry to have to report that O'Shaughnessy hasn't changed in the slightest, but everybody else who worked in that gas station was walking around smoking cigarettes out of a long amber cigarette holder."

Q: That's a wonderful story.

BONBRIGHT: A nice fellow. They took him, of course, and never regretted it. He was very good.

Q: *Mr. Caffery also had been in Egypt, hadn't he, in Cairo?*

BONBRIGHT: He went there afterwards.

Q: *He could be described as an eccentric, couldn't he?*

BONBRIGHT: Very much so. He was a bachelor for most of his life and married just before he came to Paris. She was a nice woman, his wife, but on the mousy side. He treated her without any consideration whatsoever. I think she had money and that helped. He was a stickler for protocol. I have seen him walk into somebody else's dining room and go up to where he thought he should have sat and see that his name card was somebody else's, take it up and tear it apart and throw it on the floor. Talk about arrogant.

He had a large supply of these little tiny pads on his desk, and he'd write these messages all day to different people. I once got a letter from a congressman or something, he had sent for me to draft a reply, and five minutes later I got a second follow-up: "Mr. Bonbright, how about that letter?" Well, hell, I hadn't had it for five minutes. I finally went in and said, "I'll do my best for you, but I really can't do it this fast." He started laughing. He'd write you three or four at a time and then just feed them into the "out" basket and his secretary would get these.

I remember he was a devout Catholic and used to go to church every morning and read all the papers at home. He got to the office at about 10:00 o'clock, and then he'd stay all through the day. He never ate lunch. He'd go home and run in his garden. But one day he came up to the office at 10:00 with Elim O'Shaughnessy, and he didn't say anything to Elim. A few minutes later after Elim got to his office, he found a note from the ambassador, saying, "Mr. O'Shaughnessy, don't you think that you are exaggerating when you get to the office as late as I do?" He wasn't a man who was greatly loved, I mean, like old Herrick, they said, who couldn't speak a word of French but who was greatly loved there. He was all business.

Q: *What did the diplomatic corps think of him? Did they get along with him?*

BONBRIGHT: His relations with the British were poor, I think. The British were much more sociable. Duff Cooper was there at the time and Caffery didn't care for him much. O'Shaughnessy and some of the boys used to see a lot of the British but they didn't talk about it in front of Caffery. They had to be a little careful. On important matters, his instincts were good, nothing frivolous about his approach. A strange, strange man.

Q: *You've mentioned a number of people who had certain odd quirks and so forth, as all of us do, but time and again you have found career Foreign Service people, when you get right down to it, they really were extremely intelligent and able. Do you attribute that to picking the best of the best in the selection process or to training within the Department and just the learning process as you go from post to post?*

BONBRIGHT: I think it was that.

Q: *And serving under other good people.*

BONBRIGHT: Good men pick good people, as a rule. I think that's how the better officers got ahead. God knows the Foreign Service had lots of people that are not what you would call top-notch. Others have certain qualities that are good, some that are not so good. But it's how the machinery works in contacts. When you're in a job with a bunch of people under you, you instinctively seek the ones who you think can deliver and see that those people move up. One result of that is, I'd say, a lot of people who didn't serve in the Department were at a disadvantage because they never served under the people who were in positions of influence. A lot of them didn't want to be in the Department, but I think they suffered on that account.

Q: I thought of all places, somewhat like the Army, a general will get maybe a couple of people he asks for, but the rest will just come out of the computer or what existed before, and in the Department, an ambassador might get the DCM he wants but the others are just assigned there.

BONBRIGHT: Absolutely. That happens a lot, particularly in the smaller posts. By chance, for instance, I had what I consider a good staff in Lisbon, and what I consider a good staff in Stockholm. I had nothing to do with picking any of them.

Q: I see. That makes it difficult.

BONBRIGHT: Except my counselor in Stockholm, Liv Merchant was in the top slot in those days, I got a letter from him saying that I could have my choice of three men, and he suggested strongly that I choose this fellow. Well, if I had really known any of them well and thought one was really much better than the other, I wouldn't have hesitated to, though contrary to his recommendation, but I didn't. In fact, the one he named was the one that I knew most about and would have picked anyway. Otherwise, I had nothing to do with that.

Q: There's no such thing as surrounding yourself with the eight people you know best?

BONBRIGHT: Everybody tries. They try, and they're lucky if they can get one or two good ones.

I'd like to quote here from a letter which my friend Woody Wallner sent me as I was taking off for Paris.

“Dear Jamie,

This is to say Bon Voyage and to add a word on a threadbare subject, one worn thin by self-appointed Panegyrist from Transylvania, Rosario, and Nebraska. Paris is Paris, has a life and being of its own and a beauty that quite apart from what can be captured on a photographic plate, grows out of that almost autonomous life and being. It doesn't seep in all at once, but it seeps and stays quite independently of the quantity or quality, success or failure of the things one does while living in Paris.”

Q: That's very nice.

BONBRIGHT: I always kept that. It was very true. I liked it.

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