

GENOCIDE / MASS KILLINGS AFTER 1950

SUBJECT READER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TANZANIA/ZANZIBAR

Dale M. Povenmire	1961-1963	General Officer, Zanzibar
Robert T. Hennemeyer	1961-1964	Deputy Principal Officer, Dar es Salaam
Donald Petterson	1963-1965	General Officer, Political Officer, Zanzibar
David Shear	1963-1966	Assistant Program Officer, USAID, Dar es Salaam

INDONESIA

Henry L. Heymann	1956-1958	Political Officer, Jakarta
	1959-1961	Indonesian Analyst, Intelligence and Research Bureau, Washington, DC
	1961-1965	Political Officer, Jakarta
	1965-1966	Principal Officer, Surabaya
Theodore J. C. Heavner	1964-1966	Consul and Principal Officer, Medan
Paul F. Gardner	1964-1968	Political Officer, Jakarta
Edward E. Masters	1964-1968	Political Counselor, Jakarta
	1968-1970	Country Director: Indonesian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1970-1971	Regional Affairs, East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC
	1977-1981	Ambassador, Indonesia
Marshall Green	1965-1971	Ambassador, Indonesia

GUATEMALA

James F. Mack 1979-1981 Guatemala Desk Officer, Washington, DC

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Alan Hardy 1981-1984 Ambassador, Equatorial Guinea

Frank S. Ruddy 1985-1988 Ambassador, Equatorial Guinea

INDIA

Eugene H. Bird 1967-1970 Economic Officer, Bombay

1970-1972 Commercial Attaché, New Delhi

George G. B. Griffin 1969-1972 Political Officer, Calcutta

PAKISTAN

Dennis Kux 1957-1960 Economic Officer, Karachi

1969-1971 Political Officer, Islamabad

Archer K. Blood 1962-1964 Political Officer and Deputy Principal
Officer, Dacca

1970-1971 Consul General, Dacca

Vincent W. Brown 1968-1972 Deputy Director, USAID, Lahore

Peter D. Constable 1968-1970 Political Officer and Deputy Principal
Officer, Lahore

1971-1972 India-Pakistan Desk Officer, Washington,
DC

1973-1976 Office Director for Afghanistan, Bangladesh
and Pakistan, Washington, DC

1976-1979 Deputy Chief of Mission, Islamabad

Sidney Sober 1969-1973 Deputy Chief of Mission, Islamabad

Edward C. Ingraham 1971-1974 Counselor for Political Affairs, Islamabad

George G. B. Griffin 1972-1973 Political Officer, Islamabad

1973-1975 Deputy Principal Officer, Lahore

BURUNDI

Thomas P. Melady	1969-1972	Ambassador, Burundi
Miles S. Pendleton Jr.	1970-1972	Political-Economic Officer, Bujumbura
Michael P. E. Hoyt	1970-1972	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bujumbura
Joseph C. Wilson, IV	1982-1985	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bujumbura
James R. Bullington	1983-1986	Ambassador, Burundi
Dennis Hays	1985-1988	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bujumbura
James D. Phillips	1986-1990	Ambassador, Burundi
Glenn Slocum	1990-1993	Director, USAID, Bujumbura
	1994-1997	Director, East Africa Office, USAID, Washington, DC

CAMBODIA

Paul F. Gardner	1972-1974	Political Officer, Phnom Penh
Timothy Michael Carney	1972-1975	Political Officer, Phnom Penh
Edmund Mc Williams	1978-1980	Desk Officer for Laos, Cambodia & Vietnam, Washington, DC
Marie Therese Huhtala	1990-1992	Office Director, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Washington, DC
Franklin E. Huffman	1995-1997	Public Affairs Officer, Phnom Penh
	2002	Acting Public Affairs Officer, Phnom Penh

EAST TIMOR

Erland Heginbotham	1971-1975	Economic Officer/ Commercial Counselor, Jakarta, Indonesia
Paul F. Gardner	1976-1981	Deputy Chief of Mission, Jakarta, Indonesia
Greta N. Morris	1990-1992	Policy Officer, East Asia, USIA, Washington, DC
Edmund McWilliams	1996-1999	Political Counselor, Jakarta, Indonesia

ARGENTINA

Robert S. Steven	1976-1977	Political Officer, Buenos Aires
John A. Bushnell	1977-1982	Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA, Washington, DC

ETHIOPIA

Princeton Lyman	1976-1978	USAID Mission Director, Addis Ababa
Richard C. Matheron	1977-1978	Chargé d'Affaires, Addis Ababa
Elizabeth Raspolic	1978-1980	Consular Officer, Addis Ababa

LEBANON

Morris Draper	1976-1978	NEA Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Washington, DC
Robert S. Dillon	1981-1983	Ambassador, Lebanon
David Winn	1984-1985	Political Counselor, Beirut

SYRIA

Edward G. Abington	1979-1982	Political Officer, Damascus
Richard E. Undeland	1979-1983	Public Affairs Officer, Damascus

IRAQ

David G. Newton	1984-1988	Ambassador, Iraq
Haywood Rankin	1986-1988	Political Officer, Baghdad
Nancy E. Johnson	1989-1990	Political Officer, Baghdad

BOSINA-HERZEGOVINA

Thomas M. T. Niles	1963-1965	Political Officer, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Warren Zimmerman	1965-1968	Press/Political Officer, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
	1989-1992	Ambassador, Yugoslavia
Marshall Freeman Harris	1992	CSCE Monitor, Macedonia

	1993	Political Officer-Bosnia Desk, Washington, DC
George F. Ward Jr.	1992-1996	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary- International Organizations, State Department, Washington, DC
Henry Allen Holmes	1993-1999	Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense, Arlington, VA
Bilha Bryant	1994	Yugoslavia Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Robert M. Beecroft	1996-1997	Special Envoy, Sarajevo, Bosnia Federation

SERBIA

Warren Zimmerman	1965-1968	Political Officer, Belgrade
	1989-1992	Ambassador, Yugoslavia
William A. Weingarten	1970-1971	Serbo Croatian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, VA
	1971-1974	Economic Officer, Belgrade
Victor D. Comras	1998-1999	Serbia Sanctions Program, State Department, Washington, DC
Leon Weintraub	1998-2000	European Affairs Bureau Coordinator, OSCE, State Department, Washington, DC

YUGOSLAVIA

Robert Rackmales	1989-1993	Deputy Chief of Mission/ Chargé, Belgrade
George Kenney	1992	Yugoslavian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Katherine Schwering	1992-1993	Analyst, Former Yugoslavia States, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Ronald J. Neitzke	1992-1996	Principal Officer/Deputy Chief of Mission, Zagreb
Rudolf V. Perena	1993-1996	Chief of Mission, Belgrade

RWANDA

Leon Spearman	1988-1990	Ambassador, Rwanda
Joyce E. Leader	1991-1994	Deputy Chief of Mission, Kigali
Prudence Bushnell	1993-1995	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Sub-Sahara Africa, Washington, DC
Robert J. Kott	1995	Rwanda-Burundi Task Force, Washington, DC
Richard W. Bogosian	1996-1997	Coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi, Washington, DC
Robert E. Gribbin	1996-1999	Ambassador, Rwanda

TANZANIA/ZANZIBAR

DALE M. POVENMIRE General Officer Zanzibar (1961-1963)

Dale M. Povenmire was born in Ohio on June 6, 1930. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from Baldwin-Wallace College in 1952 and a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1953. Mr. Povenmire served in the U.S. Navy from 1953-1957 and joined the Foreign Service in 1957. He served in Santiago, Zanzibar, Asuncion, Oporto, Caracas, Lisbon, Sao Paulo, Rome, and Washington, DC. He retired in 1986 and was interviewed by Morris Weisz on January, 29, 1994.

Q: *Were the Asians resented?*

POVENMIRE: To a degree. Many fled after the revolution in January, 1964, but not too many Asians were killed. Several thousand Arabs, I've heard up to forty thousand, but certainly many Arabs were killed and thousands of others fled the island. There weren't too many guns around so much of the slaughter was up close and personal, with machetes. I heard later from several people that some of the revolutionaries drove around town the day after the revolution with the testicles of the murdered Arab police chief tied to the radiator of their car.

Let me give you a little background. During our first week after arriving in Zanzibar we encountered Abdulrahman "Babu" Mohammed. Babu was the Secretary General of the predominately Arab Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). He was a far-left radical who had worked as a journalist in London. He was not seen with favor by the British. On this occasion Marilyn and I accepted a dinner invitation from an Asian businessman. We were picked up in his car but instead of being driven to his home we were taken on narrow dirt tracks far into the interior of the island. There in a clearing in the middle of a coconut plantation, with only a kerosene lantern

nailed to a palm tree for light, was Babu, a couple of his lieutenants, and three or four prostitutes. We weren't exactly kidnapped but neither were we voluntary guests at this particular party. Their purpose was to discover why the U.S. was opening a Consulate. We talked for a couple of hours on a reasonably cordial basis, ate chicken cooked over a fire on sticks, and tossed the bones over our shoulders into the darkness. It made for a memorable evening.

Several months later, the night before our new Consulate was to open, some of the young ZNP radicals allied with Babu threw a Molotov cocktail against the front door of our offices. It was a serious attempt to burn the building but the fire was extinguished before major damage was done. We held our opening reception the next day as planned.

In a real switch, Babu later left the ZNP and became Secretary General of the Afro-Shirazi Party. Following the revolution, he became the first Foreign Minister of the Revolutionary Government and rapidly established ties to the communist bloc.

The point I should make is that during our time in Zanzibar anti-Western, Third World, Pan African attitudes were so common and widespread in Africa that, even though there was opposition to the U.S. from the radical faction in the ZNP, many in the Afro-Shirazi Party did not trust us either. Looking back, it is interesting that we seldom felt personally endangered or threatened. The racial hatred that existed was almost entirely by the Africans against the Arabs and rarely if ever directed against the 300 or so "Europeans" in the Colonial Service and the tiny foreign communities.

ROBERT T. HENNEMEYER
Deputy Principal Officer
Dar es Salaam (1961-1964)

Ambassador Robert T. Hennemeyer was born in Germany and spent part of his childhood in the United States. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II and receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1947, he joined the Foreign Service in 1942. He served in Tanganyika and was ambassador to the Gambia. Ambassador Hennemeyer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: How about the situation in Zanzibar? That became rather volatile while you were there.

HENNEMEYER: Yes, it did. That happened in January of 1964. To me it came as a surprise, although, in retrospect, Fritz Picard, who was our consular there at the time, was aware of growing unrest. I don't think any of us predicted what finally happened. Yes, I remember very well. Then the press descended on Dar es Salaam to try to find out what was going on in Zanzibar. But we had no special brief for the Sultan's Government in Zanzibar. In fact, as you recall, the election, which had confirmed the Sultan's Government in power, was one that was a very dubious affair, and nobody was really happy with the result. It was clear, I think, to most observers that if it was going to survive, it was going to have a lot more representatives, and it didn't have a chance to do that.

A lot of people have forgotten what a bloody affair that was--there were several thousand people killed, Arabs driven down to the beaches and slaughtered at the beaches by the insurgents. There was an Italian photographer who chartered a plane from Mombasa, flew down there and got some extraordinary footage of the slaughter on the beach.

At any rate, our concern was exactly the same as the Tanganyikan Government's concern, and that was to contain the rebellion on Zanzibar and direct it to a more constructive end. That is, it accomplished its immediate purpose--that is, it brought a black African majority group into power. But then the question arose for Tanganyika's own security: What kinds of relationships would that new government have? As you know, very early on there was a fairly strong East Bloc presence, and that concerned us and the Tanganyikans.

So very quietly and discreetly we worked with the Tanganyikans to help them establish a police presence initially on Zanzibar, and we encouraged Nyerere in his efforts to develop a cooperative federal arrangement with the Zanzibar Government. That succeeded to some extent, although it never worked the way it was supposed to. But in time, the red house on Zanzibar, for whatever reason, calmed down and it never became what some sensationalists predicted, the "Cuba of Africa."

DONALD PETTERSON
General Officer, Political Officer
Zanzibar (1963-1965)

Ambassador Donald Petterson was born in California in 1930. Petterson served in the US Navy for four years before graduating from the University of California Santa Barbara. Petterson joined the Foreign Service in 1960 and served overseas in Mexico, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and as ambassador to Somalia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. In Washington, DC Petterson served on the Policy Planning Staff and as a deputy assistant secretary in the African Bureau. Ambassador Petterson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Lambert Heyniger in 1996.

Q: Let me ask you, Don. In Tanganyika at the time of independence, there was a small Indian minority as well as a few Arabs. If there were also these minorities in Zanzibar, what happened to them?

PETTERSON: The population, as I mentioned earlier, included about 250,000 Africans. A high percentage of them were them people from the mainland who had come over to pick cloves and then had stayed and had established their families in Zanzibar. Some of the Africans were longer-term inhabitants, many of whom, especially those living in Pemba, called themselves Shirazis, claiming that they were descended from the Shiraz people of Iran. In addition to the Africans, Zanzibar had 50,000 Arabs, and about 20,000 Asians of Pakistani and Indian origin. During the revolution, some 5,000 people were killed. Almost all of these were Arabs. That's one tenth of the Arab population. By the time I left the island near the end of 1965, the number of Arabs was less than 25,000. Those who remained had no place in the power structure whatsoever. The Asian population was also down by half or more by that time. As the

government of Zanzibar became more and more repressive, Asians wanted out, and those who could, left.

DAVID SHEAR
Assistant Program Officer, USAID
Dar es Salaam (1963-1966)

Mr. Shear was born in the Bronx, New York in 1932. He graduated from New York University and Harvard. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Nigeria, Tanzania, Ivory Coast and Senegal. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1998.

SHEAR: At that point in time it was Tanganyika, not Tanzania. Tanganyika and Zanzibar were two distinct states. Both of them were established in 1963 as independent countries. Zanzibar inherited a constitution which was untenable. The Arab minority was given control of the Zanzibar Parliament, and that was indeed a very small minority, comprising only about 15 or 20 percent of the population of the island. There was a great deal of anti-Arab sentiment on the part of the African population there because Zanzibar had been the center of slaving for the entire coast. The last slave sold at market in Zanzibar Town was late in the 1880s.

On a Sunday morning in January 1964, the Africans acted on an established plot to overthrow the government. They did so in a very violent and bloody fashion, driving all the Arab inhabitants from Zanzibar Town, which is the old town, into the harbor where they massacred them. Eight to ten thousand people were killed that Sunday, almost all with knives and machetes. It was a dreadful experience. The American Consulate faced the harbor and the American Consular officer who was there rushed out, tried to help the people and suffered a nervous breakdown. This was a terrible experience for him. The government of Zanzibar was overthrown and a revolutionary council established. That "initiative" was then copied by the armed forces of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Within two weeks there was a mutiny in each of those countries inspired by the events in Zanzibar. They were not funded by any outside source that we knew of, certainly at that time. What were exhibited were strictly local uprisings that caught fire throughout East Africa. All three governments were on the edge of being toppled. At that point, the British, at the invitation of the three chiefs of state, intervened and within 48 hours put down the mutiny.

INDONESIA

HENRY L. HEYMANN
Political Officer
Jakarta (1956-1958)

Indonesian Analyst, Intelligence and Research Bureau
Washington, DC (1959-1961)

Political Officer
Jakarta (1961-1965)

**Principal Officer
Surabaya (1965-1966)**

Henry L. Heymann was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1920. He graduated in 1943 from Princeton University with a degree in history. Afterwards, he served in the U.S. Army for four years. In 1950, Mr. Heymann entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, Italy, Indonesia, and Washington, DC. Mr. Heymann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993

Q: So you got up there very shortly after the coup. I know you've been asked by newspaper people, but there's this talk about this great massacre of Communists in Indonesia, and yet there has never been a real figure put on this from western sources. There really hasn't been many witnesses to this. Did you have any knowledge, or were you getting any intimations of what was going on in Surabaya?

HEYMANN: There were many stories of massacres. The Brantas River, on which Surabaya is located, was reportedly running red with blood. One story had it that a raft had been sighted with decapitated heads on poles. I went to the river frequently to observe, but I never saw anything. I believe all these stories were gross exaggeration. The only seemingly valid report was from the British Consul. The Consulate was located near the river and the Consul saw three bodies which had been washed up on the river bank. It is apparently going down in history that there was a huge massacre of Communists in Indonesia. I forget whether it was supposed to have been a million, or hundreds of thousands. It was probably in the five figures. From my experience in Surabaya, it seems there was a lot of exaggeration and imagination. Perhaps the reason is that Indonesians like to say things pleasing to their listeners and they thought that the massacring of the Communists was what Americans would like to hear. There may have also been a macho element behind the exaggeration.

**THEODORE J. C. HEAVNER
Consul and Principal Officer
Medan (1964-1966)**

Theodore J. C. Heavner was born in Canton, Ohio in 1929. He received his BA from Case Western Reserve in 1951 and he pursued graduate studies at the State University of Iowa and Harvard University from 1951 to 1953. He served in the US Army during the Korean War and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career has included positions in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Guyana. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 28, 1997.

Q: This is on Sumatra.

HEAVNER: Right. They were the dominate group in the province of North Sumatra. But the northern tip of Sumatra is a province called Aceh. That is where your really dogmatic Muslims are and that is where the communists, of course, immediately got into trouble. Sukarno and the Indonesian military really misjudged the communist strength, at least in Sumatra. At the time of

the abortive coup when all those generals were killed, General Mokoginta, who was the all Sumatra commander called me to his office and said, "Look, I know I can hold Medan, but in the Rantau Prapat area, I know the communists are rallying their forces and I am not sure about your people there. You had better get them into Medan where we can be sure to protect them." We still had a number of Americans on rubber estates in that area. Well, we did that but the truth was that almost from day one the communists weren't rallying their forces in Rantau Prapat or anywhere else in Sumatra, they were running for their lives because the Muslim youth very quickly became quite violent and were killing anyone who they suspected of communist sympathies, much less anyone who was obviously and openly communist. There was a lot of bloodshed in the countryside as well as in Medan. Later that year, my next door neighbor, who was Chinese as well as communist, which was a double whammy, because the Chinese were very unpopular and we had anti-Chinese riots, was beaten to death in his house.

Q: What happened in subsequent events. It was the army of Suharto's division that put things down in Jakarta, wasn't it?

HEAVNER: It was a very gradual process apparently in Jakarta. It took them close to two years to ease Sukarno out. From the beginning the military really took charge in Jakarta and never stopped being in charge in Sumatra, although they felt pretty threatened at the outset. They fairly quickly realized what was happening, namely that the communists were being put down by some youth groups which they, themselves, had supported. They not only continued to support them but then began to direct and reinforce their efforts to smash the communist apparatus. It was pretty scary sometimes to see these truck loads of youth with these enormous banners flying through the town chanting. Of course we had seen the same thing with the red banners not too long before, and we were the target.

Q: What about the killings? It became a real bone of contention, 1) how many, 2) who was behind it. Your friends at Cornell, I think, tended to back Sukarno and all of a sudden it was Americans responsible for the killings.

HEAVNER: Actually I think that flap was long, long after the fact. I don't recall anything like that coming up at any point close to the event. But, you may remember that Bob Martens had an interview with a reporter in which he said something to the effect, or at least that reporter thought he said that he had given a long list of names of communists to the military after the coup and that had helped them in some fashion to rout them out and, oh, by the way, to kill them. This generated a freedom of information search at the State Department which caused Paul Gardner to come up with a lot of documents, including some from Medan, none of which supported that assertion. Certainly it was not true of anything we did at the consulate. I don't recall that we had a list of communists. We knew, as did the military, that certain leaders in the government apparatus, like the governor, were communists in sympathies, if not in fact. We didn't have to tell them that. They didn't need any help from us. How much they generated, supported and directed the Muslim youths who carried out a lot of killings, and how extensive the killings were, for that matter, I don't know. I know there were killings. I did see some bodies, saw a lot more during the anti-Chinese riots, I might say, which followed in December of that year. But, certainly the accounts that we got from the rural areas and from the plantation areas were pretty hair raising. Even allowing for exaggerations, I think there was a lot of killing.

Q: Were you there during the anti-Chinese riots?

HEAVNER: Yes.

Q: Can you give your observations about them?

HEAVNER: They were pretty nasty. At one point I had a Chinese family who were employees of the consulate and a Chinese family that lived across the street from me, bivouacking in my house because they were afraid, with reason, that they might be set upon. The riots lasted over several days but the big occasion was the attack on the Chinese consulate. The vice consul had a house on the corner which looked down the street about two blocks away and had a good view of the Chinese consulate from the balcony of his house. We watched that event from his balcony. It was a really big mob, as big as we had ever seen outside our consulate, and a very aggressive mob. They did burst into the grounds and I am not sure whether they ever penetrated the consulate or not, but there was gun fire. I think some of that gun fire was coming from inside the consulate, although again, I am not sure. We saw several bodies carried out, so I think there were some deaths, or at least some very serious woundings.

Following that the demonstrators went on a rampage throughout the town smashing Chinese businesses and attacking any Chinese they could find. I don't know how many casualties there were, but there were enough. It was pretty damn serious. The military did ultimately appear on the scene and enforced some calm, but they weren't very quick about it and I'm not sure how premeditated that was either. But it was the military, not the police, who finally broke up the demonstrations and the rampaging youth groups.

PAUL F. GARDNER
Political Officer
Jakarta (1964-1968)

Ambassador Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas in 1930. He received both a bachelor's and a master's degree from the University of. Mr. Gardner entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Madagascar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, Turkey, and an ambassadorship to New Guinea. Ambassador Gardner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

GARDNER: In the first bloodshed after October 1 in central and east Java, the Communists came out ahead. But as these clashes built up and the military started arming the Islamic groups it went the other way and finally evolved into true massacres of communists. None of which we witnessed. I never talked to anyone who had firsthand knowledge of these killings. But I have talked to people who said they had someone working for them in the office who disappeared. We had sources that reported a lot of people were killed but they didn't see the actual killing. Most of the killing occurred at night. They would go into a village and kill, a lot of the killings seemed to concern grudges and had nothing to do with the political situation. It was one village against another to a large degree.

In Bali there were many indications that it was large family groups against other family groups who happened to be lined up on the Communist Party on one side and the Nationalist Party on the other. There were no Moslems in Bali, it was Hindu. But the killings in Bali were just as brutal as any place else, and perhaps a bit more. In Bali it was kinship wars and some class wars too. In east Java it was quite often an Abangan village against an Islamic village. They could get back at them now. At the people who were trying to get some of their land. They would quite often kill all the men in the village. We did travel to some villages much later and found that there were no men there. That didn't mean absolutely that they were killed because they could have fled, as many did, and come back later.

We never really got a hold on how many were killed and we said over and over again that it was something that we couldn't estimate. We kept hearing all these reports and Indonesians were very likely to exaggerate. They exaggerated this kind of thing and they got built up larger than they were. Nevertheless you had a large number -- I think Marshall Green used a figure of 250,000 at some stage. He now believes it was somewhat less than that. It was very hard to tell because you didn't know what the population was to start with. So even if you had a census taken, you didn't know what the prior census was because they hadn't had any in a long time. So it is hard to judge.

All I know is that no American in the Embassy ever saw a body and I think very few ever talked to people who had. Some sources bragged that they had been in killing groups. I am not sure whether I believe them or not, quite frankly. Nobody I talked to had ever witnessed a killing. Most of the killings were in the rural areas, not in the cities. There were some at the beginning in the cities. Where the army had word about these arms cache, they would go through the highly populated little villages (Kampongs) within the city and find the arms and kill off a few people. This was done quite often at night when people would be caught at home. There was a curfew. But I never realized that was going on in the city. I never saw it. All I saw was our intelligence reports afterwards, reports that somebody else said they had done this.

Not to my knowledge did any CIA person see any killings. They definitely talked to people who said that they witnessed these killings and may have participated in them. How often you believe that, I don't know, because some people like to brag.

EDWARD E. MASTERS

Political Counselor

Jakarta (1964-1968)

Country Director, Indonesian Affairs

Washington, DC (1968-1970)

Regional Affairs, East Asia and the Pacific

Washington, DC (1970-1971)

Ambassador

Indonesia (1977-1981)

Ambassador Edward E. Masters was born in Ohio in 1924. He graduated from George Washington University in 1948 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1949. He served in the U.S. Army for three years and then joined the Foreign Service in 1950. In addition to serving as ambassador to Indonesia, he served in Germany, Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Bangladesh. Ambassador Masters was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 14, 1989.

Q: How did we feel about the -- at least the estimates at the time -- that there was tremendous slaughter of both Chinese and Communists after (inaudible)? (Inaudible) feel that this was part of his policy, or this just sort of happened? Or was there really as bad a slaughter as thought at the time?

MASTERS: Well, it wasn't as bad as a lot of people thought. I remember there was -- I think it was Topping, in the New York Times, who came out and spent some time in the bar of the Hotel Indonesia -- (you couldn't travel them) who wrote that a million people had been killed. And other journalists who spent most of their time in the bar in the Hotel Indonesia, wrote about rivers choked with bodies, and so forth. Well, those of us in the embassy never saw any rivers choked with bodies. In fact, I never saw a body. Now, we didn't travel in the countryside right away. But fairly quickly on, we started to get out, and we didn't see the kind of carnage that was reported.

That's a long way of saying I don't know how many people were killed. It certainly wasn't a million; it wasn't 500,000. I would be comfortable with a figure of 100,000. At one point, in the embassy -- although I think it was probably not accurate -- we seized on the figure of 350,000, and we used that for a while. But I think as time went on, and as we did get out and did more traveling, we decided that it was less than that. But a lot of people were killed.

Some Chinese were killed. Old scores were settled. The Communist Party, which had been a large apparatus, was virtually wiped out. Because as I said before, the tensions were there between the Moslems and the military on one hand, and the Communists. They knew who the Communists were. And there was very strong reaction against the killing, and the mutilation of the generals. And of course, that gave a signal -- which they hadn't had before -- to go get the local Communists; they did, and they did it very effectively.

MARSHALL GREEN
Ambassador
Indonesia (1965-1971)

Ambassador Marshall Green was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1939 and joined the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in Sweden, Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, Indonesia, and Washington, DC. Ambassador Green was interviewed by Robert J. Martens in 1987.

Q: There have been many reports, of course, of the thousands or even hundreds of thousands of people that died in the cataclysm that followed. Many of these being Communists in Central and

East Java particularly, in Bali, in north Sumatra; many of them probably were not, they were people like those you mentioned who may have had nominal connections with the Communist Party but who had been induced to join the front organizations. No one really knows the total of this. Maybe the story has been overstated. There are some of us who believe that the numbers killed were probably much less, but nobody really knows. What is your view of that?

GREEN: I share your view that probably the figure was less than we reported. I was called back to Washington in early February, 1966. We were beginning to receive reports of killings already in November 1965. Most of the killings seemed to have taken place in October, but the reports were vague. There were no photographs. Nobody in our Embassy saw any bodies. Nor did we meet anybody who had seen the killings. They were all rumors. As I said, President Johnson called me back to Washington in early February and I knew one of the questions that they were going to ask me in Washington was how many people were killed. We didn't have any idea, so I asked everybody in our country team to put down on paper how many they guessed were killed and I averaged it out. The result was three hundred thousand, so when I was asked in Washington how many were killed I said "We don't know, but if we had to make a wild guess it was probably around three hundred thousand." I should have said about three hundred thousand, plus or minus two hundred and fifty thousand, that would have been probably closer to the truth. But our report leaked out, and the three hundred thousand figure was the one that came to be more or less generally accepted.

Q: I remember that Henry Heymann, after going down to Surabaya as the consul general, it was one of the areas where there had been considerable killings, he went out a number of times when reports came in that the Brantas River was choked with bodies and he never found a body. It was choked with bodies that weren't there, although he did tell me that the British Consul that lived on the bank of the river had seen two.

GREEN: That was the only report I remember: what the British Consul had told Henry Heymann.

GUATEMALA

JAMES F. MACK
Guatemala Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1979-1981)

Mr. Mack was born in Connecticut and raised in New York State. After graduating from Cornell University, he joined the Peace Corps and served in Honduras. In 1966 he joined the State Department and was sent to Vietnam in the CORDS program. Mr. Mack's other overseas service was primarily in Latin American where he served as Political Officer and Deputy Chief of Mission at a number of posts before being named US Ambassador to Guyana. Ambassador Mack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy March 20th, 2004.

MACK: My other important issue as desk officer was Guatemala's horrendous human rights record under the military dictatorship, which was waging a war without quarter with Marxist guerrilla group.

Thousands of people were killed in the rural areas where the insurgency raged. In the urban areas, hundreds were gunned down by Lucas Garcia's people working from death lists which it was my understanding he personally approved, kind of like the evil Ming the Merciless in the Buck Rogers movies. It was pretty awful. Not that we could do too much about it since the US already had cut Guatemala off from military assistance a long time before. Remember this was under the Carter Administration. But what this also meant was with no US assistance, we could not use the threat to cut it off as a lever to force greater respect for human rights, although I'm not sure that Guatemalan government would have been susceptible to pressure in any event. They had decided to fight the insurgency, and any suspected of supporting it, their way, which was brutally. In some ways they were successful. Not that they are better off today because of it. In fact a lot of the lawlessness, high level corruption and impunity in Guatemala today can be traced to that period.

In any event, all this was happening in the context of Central America going down the tubes. Remember, the Sandinistas come into power in '79 or '80 in Nicaragua. The insurgents were rapidly gaining strength in El Salvador. The Chichoneros were growing in Honduras. These were not the most happy times to work in the Office of Central American Affairs. And the nights were very long. We were seriously understaffed.

Q: Well now who were the Guatemalans dictator and his crew killing. Were they basically Indians or were they people who had gotten in his way, or were they unidentifiable group that was fighting him?

MACK: In the rural areas anybody who was perceived to give aid and comfort to the guerrilla was a target. I didn't have much access to what was going on. The Embassy could not travel to the worst areas because of security reasons. I really didn't know much unless an American or a missionary living there got caught up in it. In urban areas however they were going after anyone perceived to oppose his regime. Those killed were not necessarily communists at all. They may have been labor union leaders or democrats. I am sure there were some communists among them. I had some contact with the people that the dictator was going after when they would come to Washington. This included a Vinicio Cerezo who later became President. But he was certainly no communist at all. He survived a number of assassination attempts and so anybody who was opposed to the dictator seemed to be fair game for Lucas Garcia.

Q: Well now, this during the Carter Administration?

MACK: Yes, and Carter was going full bore on the whole issue of Human Rights. So here we are in 1979 in a situation in which on the one hand the leftist insurgencies in Central America were rapidly gaining ground, and on the other President Carter's Human Rights policies were coming on strong. The State Department was kind of caught in a bind. On one hand, obviously we didn't want to see all those governments in Central America be taken over by leftist guerrillas. On the other hand, we wanted to carry out the Human Rights policy. In the case of Guatemala, we did not have a friendly government to support. In fact, they did not want anything to do with us. They were not receiving any military assistance from us.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

ALAN HARDY Ambassador Equatorial Guinea (1981-1984)

Ambassador Hardy served in the Army from 1957-1959. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 His career included positions in Canada, Madagascar, Italy, Somalia, Hungary, Mexico, and an ambassadorship to Equatorial Guinea. Ambassador Hardy was interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker in 2001.

HARDY: But anyway, not many people know about Equatorial Guinea, which is in the elbow where Africa bends as it heads eastward and then heads southward. It's a little enclave on land and a little part out in the sea. Under the Spanish as a colony, it had been very prosperous. It had an interesting history. Cocoa was one crop, coffee was another.

But it all went down the drain when we had a Patrice Lumumba-type figure who had taken charge there and became paranoid, destroyed the country's fishing fleet because he didn't want anyone able to leave the island on a boat. Had all the country's currency in the country's banks rounded up and put in his garage. Persecuted the church. (The Catholic Church was rather strong there.) Killed a lot of people. Very repressive regime, kind of like Idi Amin in Uganda. And eventually, anybody who would rise up in some way, or become prominent in some way, or look like he had any stature at all, President Macias would either have him killed or exiled, or would attempt to kill him and the guy would flee.

Finally, in about 1980, I guess - I went in '81, so it must have been about a year earlier - he threatened the wrong guy, who then turned the tables and organized a coup. Then the Spanish were brought back. This guy had been educated in Spain in a military academy there. He seemed like a fairly progressive, nice guy. Name of Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Same tribe, and related to Macias.

The Spanish wanted help, so they wanted us there. We decided we would open an embassy there, where we had never had one before although we had had an office there. So we were there at the Spanish request and also because the Soviets and the Chinese and the North Koreans had all been very busy there. There was a rule that no matter how Godforsaken a place was, if the Soviets or North Koreans were there, we had to counter that. I suppose it would have been true for the Kerguelen Islands or anywhere, but it was certainly true. I never subscribed to that general principle. There wasn't much the Soviets could do to us by virtue of being in Equatorial Guinea, for example.

FRANK S. RUDDY Ambassador Equatorial Guinea (1985-1988)

Ambassador Ruddy was born and raised in New York and was educated at Holy Cross College, Loyola University, New York University and Cambridge

University. A lawyer by training, he joined the US Information Agency in 1969 as a lawyer at its Washington, D.C. Headquarters. He subsequently served in the White House in the capacity of Chief, Office of Telecommunications Policy before joining the private oil firm EXXON in Texas. In 1985 he was appointed US Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, where he served until 1988. Ambassador Ruddy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: I was going to ask if you were getting any support from the Desk?

RUDDY: They were very helpful, as helpful as they could be, but they just didn't know much. My predecessor in Equatorial Guinea, Alan Hardy, came home in the summer of 1984, and was retiring. We had lunch, and he told me a lunch worth's (we had lunch in the FDIC cafeteria across from State) about the country, and that was it. Then he was off to his retirement life, and I am sure the desk gave me whatever they had, but that wasn't much.

I was a lawyer at USIA in the 70's, and I remembered the weird cables coming in from Equatorial Guinea. ...The cables from E.G. were like dispatches from The Twilight Zone: "Soviet troops marching through the streets...the screams of victims being tortured by the E.G. Government are driving us mad ..."

These were the kinds of details in the cables from E.G. What made them less unbelievable was the situation in E.G. The country's dictator, Francisco Macias, was a mass murderer, a poor man's Idi Amin. He called himself "The Divine Miracle" and massacred people in the capital's soccer stadium to the accompaniment of Beatles music. He once settled a Cabinet disagreement by hurling the dissenting minister out a second floor window. Macias was certainly capable of the atrocities described in the cables, so desk officers and cable watchers suspended disbelief for a while. As the cables became more and more bizarre something had to be done.

* * *

With independence in 1968, the country destroyed itself, or, more accurately, the first President, the infamous Francisco Macias, destroyed the country. Cocoa production virtually ceased, and with it foreign income, and E.G. which had the second highest literacy rate in black Africa (behind Uganda) at 87 % produced destroyed the school system and produced a generation (from 1968-79) of illiterates. The city of Malabo decayed visibly during Macias' years, and when he was overthrown (1979), a bankrupt successor government was no more competent to restore the city than it was to revive the economy. A return to law and order and economic normalcy would have regenerated the country but attracting the necessary foreign and domestic investment, but that would also have diluted the government's power, and that was not an option the new dictator, who overthrew Francisco Macias, his nephew, Teodoro Obiang, was willing to consider. In any event, as you drive around the city and squint your eyes, you can see what the old Gothic cathedral, the Moorish building that serves as defense department, the Supreme Court building and 100 other magnificent structures must have looked like in their prime.

Q: Since Equatorial Guinea is a place that really does not show up on the normal radar, could you explain a little about its background?

RUDDY: Actually it is fairly well known among Africanists, but by the name Fernando Po, the

Main Island. The Portuguese discovered, or in political-correctese, encountered Fernando Po (Po rhymes with goo) in the 15th century. Many people had sailed down the West coast of Africa, but few made it back. They didn't have the technology to do so. The Portuguese developed the corsair, the height of naval technology in those days, a technological equivalent in its time to the nuclear subs we have developed which can sail around the world under water. The corsairs, with their special sails and Portuguese knowledge of the winds and tides, allowed them to get down the coast of Africa and back again. That is how they were able to get around the Cape of Good Hope, an achievement for those days equivalent to our moon landing.

* * *

The first President was Francisco Macias, and his accession to power was the result of a power struggle in the UN Poland, of all countries, was influential in gathering support around him. He was not Spain's first choice by any means, but in one of the great underestimates of all time, they went along with him as someone who couldn't do any harm. It is the vogue to say he was a madman. I think he was just a very bad and very stupid man. He gave himself the title of "Divine Miracle", and woe to anyone who snickered on hearing it. He took Equatorial Guinea which had the third highest per capita income in Africa, after Libya and South Africa, right over a cliff. He destroyed the economy. E.G. had the best cocoa in the world, and he destroyed its production and export. He made it a crime to be an "intellectual," the corpus delicti sufficing in owning a single book. He drove out priests and nuns, and many others fled for their lives. The schools, which the nuns had run with such great success, closed, and for a decade young Guineans had no schooling whatsoever. He also murdered many people, leading anyone with a brain and means to escape to flee. If someone drew up a plan to destroy a country, he could not have improved on what Macias actually did. When he was finally convicted... they had a trial for him of sorts...they named 4500 people that he was responsible for killing, some as I mentioned, executed in the national soccer stadium to the accompaniment of Beatles music.

Q: We are talking about a population of how many?

RUDDY: The current population is roughly 300,000. That's probably a good working figure. You know that records don't mean much in a country where many births and deaths are not recorded. Add to that the great numbers that fled, obviously without getting their passports stamped. There is no really accurate number of those killed or driven out by Macias, but the number I heard frequently was 100,000 or a third of the population. Those who could flee went to Gabon, to Cameroon, to The Canaries or to Spain itself, and probably other places as well, such as Nigeria, but how many is just guess work.

Those who were able to escape formed Guinean exile associations in the countries in which they settled. I have seen the minutes of some of these groups. They were, of course, all against the government of E.G. (you have to wait in line to do that), but they reminded me of the Young Republicans: they spent all their time trying to purge each other, half the group accusing the other half of disloyalty, intrigue, etc. It didn't matter where the group was, The Canaries, Paris, Gabon, the minutes always read alike.

Their plight, of course, was anything but humorous. Families were separated forever, many Guinean women became prostitutes to support themselves in places like Libreville (the red light district there is largely Guinean), and all because of Francisco Macias, who had done just terrible

things, abominable things, an Idi Amin without the publicity. Many people think he had to be demented. I think he was just a bad person. He admired Hitler whom he used to quote in his speeches. He used bhong, rhymes with gong, a kind of marijuana which he smoked all the time. "The Dogs of War" if you have ever read that book is about Equatorial Guinea.

INDIA

EUGENE H. BIRD
Economic Officer
Bombay (1967-1970)

Commercial Attaché
New Delhi (1970-1972)

Eugene H. Bird was born in Spokane, Washington, in 1925. He received a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Washington. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy as a mechanical engineer. Following the war, Mr. Bird attended journalism school at the University of Oregon. His Foreign Service career included positions in India, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 2, 1994.

Q: We've already referred to it, but can we talk a little more about the war between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh or East Pakistan? Were you there at the time? How was this building up and what were the contacts with our Embassy in Rawalpindi [now Islamabad, in West Pakistan] and all of that?

BIRD: Yes, I was there. Sidney Sober was one of the key people in the [American] Embassy in Rawalpindi at that point. He made two or three trips when the crisis erupted. At first we didn't take it too seriously. I went down to Calcutta a couple of times and talked with Herb Gordon, who was down there as Consul General, as I recall. We felt that there were very close relations between the two Bengals -- East Pakistan and the State of Bengal [in India], whose capital was in Calcutta. They were the same people. In many ways they shared the same kind of geography -- low-lying, rice-growing peoples of the river deltas and estuaries. They had the same disregard for both Delhi -- on the part of [the Bengalis] in Calcutta -- and on the part of the [leaders of] East Pakistan for their Muslim brothers in West Pakistan. I suppose that what was kind of shocking to me was that we did a lot in trying to stop the separation of the two states, East and West Pakistan. However, I think that we recognized -- right from the start -- that it was inevitable. It is these inevitable situations which we face in Bosnia and Serbia. We probably didn't want to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina quite as rapidly as we did. And we certainly didn't recognize Bangladesh as rapidly as we might have.

Of course, the breakup of a country is always very difficult for outside powers. However, seeing this [situation] develop, we essentially wrung our hands and stuck with our West Pakistan friends, who were all generals. We had given Pakistan a lot of things, including a submarine which, of course, they should have returned the year before but didn't do. It was discovered on the morning that war broke out between India and Pakistan, lying off the major Indian naval base of Vyzak. It

was sunk immediately by the Indians. It was the equivalent, I suppose, of the United States becoming involved in the war. That's the way the Indians played it.

Leading up to it [the war], I think that it was like leading up to the 1967 War [in the Middle East] which I had witnessed and which [resulted in my coming] to India. We didn't do nearly enough. Whether that's because we didn't have a president who was willing to get involved in a situation of this kind, [I don't know]. We didn't do nearly enough to try for a peaceful resolution of it. Maybe there was no peaceful resolution possible. The West Pakistani generals were our friends. Essentially, we warned India, "Don't try to take over all of West Pakistan." It would have been a great mistake for India to do that, of course. However, the fact was that everyone knew that there was going to be a war and that things were on the slippery slope for several weeks if not months before.

Q: Were you getting anything from Washington?

BIRD: From the desk officer, yes. But from the White House, no, I don't think that there were any warnings to the Indians not to encourage civil war [in East Pakistan].

Q: What were our feelings prior to the collapse of East Pakistan and to the reports of atrocities? Were they dismissed, believed, or how did we feel?

BIRD: I think that they [the atrocity reports] were dismissed in Washington. I didn't see any change at all as a result of this. We knew that that sort of thing was going to happen. It was inevitable when you have a small group of military, trying to maintain power with a very large, demographic imbalance against them. The fact was that we allowed American-made planes to be used to reinforce East Pakistan. We allowed the use of a lot of American technology in that war, even though there had been these reports of human rights violations.

GEORGE G.B. GRIFFIN
Political Officer
Calcutta (1969-1972)

George G.B. Griffin was born in Turkey in 1934. He graduated with a BA from the University of South Carolina in 1957, and served in the U.S. Navy as a lieutenant overseas from 1957 to 1959. After entering the Foreign Service in 1959, his postings abroad have included Naples, Colombo, Calcutta, Islamabad, Lahore, Kathmandu, Kabul, Lagos, Seoul, Nairobi and Milan. Mr. Griffin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: So what was going on in East Pakistan?

GRIFFIN: Archer Blood, the Consul General in Dhaka, got in trouble for honest reporting. We heard that he ran afoul of Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad, a political appointee and former Coca Cola Company executive. Arch was accused of going native and siding too much with the Bengalis. But then things began to snowball. Refugees started coming across into India, fleeing from the fighting. In the monsoon season, which would have been in June, July, and

maybe August of 1971, hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into West Bengal and Assam, as well as further north and east into Tripura and Burma. I went out to the West Bengal border one day, and found the land flooded as far as the eye could see. On the water were hundreds of rowboats loaded with people and their belongings, piled as high as they could without sinking, all looking for dry ground. At about the same time, resident Americans began to leave East Pakistan. The families of Consulate General personnel in Dacca were evacuated. Political Officer Scott Butcher pouched me all his biographic files for safekeeping.

At some point, it was evident that the Indians were planning a military move into East Pakistan. They closed air corridors between East and West Pakistan, so the Pakistanis had to fly around the southern tip of India to get from one side to the other. Tensions kept building up. A large group of American missionaries was evacuated by ship from Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong to Calcutta, where we helped them find temporary lodging and onward transportation. Then the American press began to appear. The first one was a journalist with whom I'm still in touch – Barrie Dunsmore. He was an ABC TV News correspondent stationed in Rome, and came out to see how big a story was developing. His trip led to others and, eventually, at the height of the war, there were something like 800 American correspondents in Calcutta. So as these events mounted, I dropped my scheduled tasks and focused entirely on the East Pakistan crisis.

The outflow of refugees increased steadily in the Fall of 1971, climbing to an estimated total of ten million people at one point. Several Senators and Congressmen came out to check on the situation. One was Republican Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who was Chairman of the Near East/South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Another was Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts. I took them out to refugee camps, as far as we were allowed to go. We weren't allowed into Assam or Tripura, so they only saw what was in West Bengal. More journalists came, and started getting in trouble. And then things got even more interesting for me.

Among the refugees was a group of politicians...

Q: Who would be Bengali politicians?

GRIFFIN: That's right. East Bengali politicians. They got together in Calcutta and formed a Bangladesh government in exile. In the midst of this, in early July 1971, Henry Kissinger made his secret trip to China to prepare the way for President Nixon. He came first to India and then to West Pakistan, where he disappeared for several days. We heard that he had fallen ill, but thought he was trying to talk sense to General Yahya and address other urgent problems of South Asia. Later we learned that he had other things on his mind.

In any case, it was decided in Washington (after a proposal by the Indian Ambassador there, and with the concurrence of Ambassador Farland in Islamabad) to respond positively to a feeler from the East Pakistanis in Calcutta. The Department instructed the post to give them a message, and I was selected to do it in secret meetings with a representative of the Bangladesh government in exile. The Department said it would be too official if the Consul General did so. This caused me instant problems with the Indian police tasked with keeping an eye on us. They may not have been fully briefed by New Delhi, and began to track my every movement. I almost couldn't go to

the bathroom without being followed, which got to be very irritating. I found a way to evade them and meet the Bangladeshi the first time, which they didn't like. At the same time, I was building better access to senior Indian officials. That included all the military commanders – from Indian Army chief General Sam Manikshaw, to Eastern Commander General Arora, to his deputy Lieutenant General Jackie Jacob – and the governors and chief ministers of West Bengal and the other states, plus Calcutta Police Chief Ranjit Gupta, whose men were assigned to follow me.

Q: Did New Delhi have a problem?

GRIFFIN: I have never tracked this down fully, but the East Pakistanis in exile – they thought up the name Bangladesh – were probably, if not put together by, at least facilitated by New Delhi – the Government of India – which didn't want an American diplomat nosing around their handiwork. I wasn't authorized to negotiate with anybody; I was essentially a messenger. I carried messages to and from the Bangladesh exiles. Henry Kissinger wrote about all this in his book "White House Years." Years later, he autographed my copy and wrote "Thanks for your help, George" in the margin.

Meanwhile, the war drums kept pounding. The Indians were playing a cat-and-mouse game with us. They wanted us to know certain things, but not others, so we played along while trying to find out what we were missing. The journalists were all over me too, realizing that I knew some things they didn't know. I encouraged them, because they knew other things I wanted to know. For example, they would sneak across the border during or after Indian military activities, and then come back and tell me about it. So I had a fair exchange of information with some top American and British reporters that you know or have heard of. It got to be quite a mob scene. My office wouldn't hold them all. I had to give them appointments to see me in small groups. It was the only way I could get my other work done.

Q: As you were doing this and acting, as you say, as reporter and as messenger, were you getting any feel for what the State Department was doing? It had this kind of opening which was the apple of the National Security Advisor's, Henry Kissinger's, eye.

GRIFFIN: Well, there are several ways to say it. We were at the end of the food chain. From our perspective, the Department, Embassy New Delhi, and Embassy Islamabad were squabbling about what our stance should be. In particular, Ambassadors Farland (in Islamabad) and ex-Senator Kenneth Keating (in New Delhi) seemed to us to be snarling at each other. We kept adding free advice to our reports that we should all cooperate, as we're on the same team. But differing views has been a problem between those two embassies ever since Pakistan was created. Embassy New Delhi finally arranged a meeting, asking Islamabad to send its political counselor. He didn't come, but his deputy did – my friend Bill Simmons. I was invited too, so I went to Delhi and sat in a series of meetings mostly chaired by Lee Stull, the Political Counselor. Dick Viets was the Ambassador's staff aide at the time, and Galen Stone was the DCM. They and lots of others, including the CIA station chief, got involved. But we ran into a buzz saw. Bill Simmons said Ambassador Farland was upset because we didn't grasp that East Pakistan was internal Pakistani business. He suggested that we shut up and do our jobs tracking India, which

seemed primed to attack our CENTO ally Pakistan. We said, “Wait a minute!” I’m still a friend of Bill’s.

Frustrated, I went back to Calcutta and kept doing my job. One evening my wife and I were invited to supper *a trois* by the deputy commandant of Eastern Command, a fascinating gentleman named Major General J. F. R. Jacob. After the war, he was promoted, and became the highest ranking Jew ever in the Indian Army – something he is rightly proud of. He’s from Bombay and is now a senior member of the ruling BJP. Jackie and I got to be pretty thick after a couple of false starts. At supper that night he showed us some of his prized Chinese artifacts, and we talked a lot about art. Finally, he said, “Don’t you have to go to the bathroom? Go through the bedroom.” It took me a few moments to understand, but once in his bedroom I found a huge map of the region on his wall...

Q: A large map, yes.

GRIFFIN: ...on which all of the Indian military formations were carefully plotted – all of them. I didn’t have a camera, but I had a pretty good memory. I studied the map for as long as I dared, then raced to the Consulate and filed the news that there were troops where we didn’t know there were troops, and many more than we had thought. Jacob was a disciple of the storied German General Heinz Guderian, who revolutionized armored warfare in World War II, and what the Indians did was rather remarkable. They took over East Pakistan almost without firing a shot. They did it by transporting an entire division across the Brahmaputra River by tank. Tanks that could swim. Soviet tanks. They did it covertly. Nobody tracked them. I guess we didn’t have good real-time satellite imagery in those days, and didn’t pick it up until I saw his map. It showed a whole division east of the Brahmaputra River that we didn’t know about. They just rolled into Dacca one day, and that was it. The Pakistanis surrendered or fled in various ways. The Indians let some of them go without shooting them, but most were sent back to the West Wing, as it had been called before, by ship and plane.

Q: Was there concern on our part about the brutality of the West Pakistani troops in the East?

GRIFFIN: Quite a bit, and every time Embassy Islamabad said it was an internal Pakistani affair we sent in a report showing how those “internal” problems had spilled over into India. People were fleeing in all directions from the nastiness, including several million refugees who came in India and into our consular district. We couldn’t count them, but we certainly saw refugees as far as the eye could see on the many occasions we went to the border in West Bengal. There were many Americans and other foreigners who came out of East Pakistan to Calcutta and spoke to us. There were lots of photographs and enough other evidence to document the brutality of the West Pakistanis. Later, when I was transferred to Islamabad, I met some East Bengalis who had been in the government in West Pakistan. They were locked up during the war and eventually repatriated, but they had some horror tales of their own to tell.

PAKISTAN

DENNIS KUX
Economic Officer

Karachi (1957-1960)

Political Officer Islamabad (1969-1971)

Ambassador Dennis Kux was born in England in 1931 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Lafayette College in Pennsylvania in 1952. He entered the U.S. Army in 1952, where he worked as a prisoner of war interrogator. His Foreign Service career included positions in Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the Ivory Coast. Ambassador Kux was interviewed by Thomas Stern on January 13, 1995.

Q: In 1969 you were transferred to Islamabad [Pakistan]. Was this at your request? Did you want to get back to your area of specialization?

KUX: ...I believe that the Pakistani Army had a "contingency plan" to take over East Pakistan. They started laying the groundwork for that by sending more troops there in early 1971. A series of negotiations were held in the middle of March, 1971, in East Pakistan to try to work out a settlement. During all of this the United States basically took no position. We were in contact with the government, but essentially as observers. We were not involved in Pakistan's internal politics. We hoped that things would work out, but we were not involved. However, a few days before the military crackdown we were approached by a man named Daultana -- a conservative political figure, a major landlord and former Chief Minister of the Punjab. He said: "Look, you have to intervene. If you don't, the Army is going to botch the job and there will be real trouble ahead." I remember that we had a big debate in the Embassy on whether we should do something about that request. Our options were to approach the government and say: "Look, you have to make some compromises...". That would have meant intervening politically. We debated this course of action. The one person who wanted to intervene politically was the CIA Chief of Station. His argument was: "Look, we are a great power, and we should be trying to help." I was among those who took a more "State Department" attitude, saying: "We can only lose if we do that. The Pakistanis are 'big boys.' They know what they're doing." The British High Commission in Islamabad, with which we consulted very closely, was headed by a very effective High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard. He took the same view. So we sat on our hands.

On March 23, 1971, the Pakistani Army "cracked down" in East Pakistan. They arrested Mujib and outlawed the Awami League. That set off the Bangladesh crisis which lasted until the war for independence at the end of 1971. In retrospect, I think that we should have intervened. We should have done something. We should have told the Pakistanis that we were speaking to them as friends. We should have said: "Look, you have to try to save your country. You have got to try to work something out with East Pakistan. The use of force isn't going to work."

The Pakistani military probably held the view it had no choice in Dacca, except to "crack down." I think that there, to some extent, they may have been "manipulated," or Yahya Khan may have been manipulated by Bhutto.

Here I will have to get into the details. There was supposed to be a national meeting, I believe, to write a constitution. This was after the elections of December, 1970. Bhutto refused to participate in the meeting. The Pakistani Army went along with Bhutto, which was not really in keeping with the rules that they had established. The Bengalis had a right to be aggrieved, but what they were demanding amounted to independence. It wouldn't have been "full" independence, but the central government would have been so weakened that it would not amount to much. That wasn't acceptable to the Army.

Of course, the people in East Pakistan were horror-stricken by the military's harsh actions. They paid the penalty and they were bitter and angry. Those Bengalis who were in the government were no longer loyal to it. Many Bengalis who were in West Pakistan no longer felt any allegiance to Pakistan.

* * *

The March 23, 1971 came just three and a half months before I left. The Pakistani Army was very brutal when it moved in. It made a large number of arrests and shot many students. The Consul General -- Archer Blood -- in Dacca sent in a "protest" telegram -- Dacca 231. This was an LOU [LIMITED OFFICIAL USE] or OUO [OFFICIAL USE ONLY] message signed by every member of the staff of the Consulate General. Essentially, this message said that the U. S. has no major strategic interest in South Asia. Therefore, our national values should prevail -- our concern for human rights and democratic freedoms. It urged U. S. condemnation of the Pakistani military "crack down" and called for support of self-determination in East Pakistan.

When the message came in, I happened to be with Ambassador Farland. The message was sent to the Department of State in Washington, with a copy to the Embassy in Islamabad. Farland shrugged his shoulders and said, "Hmmm." Sid Sober, however, took a very different view. He was very upset. The next day a cable came back from the Department, reclassifying the Dacca cable from OUO or LOU to NODIS [No Distribution Outside the Department of State], which was the highest restriction. Arch Blood had classified the cable somewhat disingenuously. At the very end of the cable he said that he had not signed the cable, because he did not think that it would be appropriate for a Consul General, but he added that he had the highest respect for the members of the staff, whose views he shared. In fact, the cable was distributed in about 85 or 90 copies and was sent all over Washington, which I assume was Arch's intention.

There followed a period of very, very bitter and bad feelings between our people assigned to East Pakistan, who were evacuated later, and our Embassy people in West Pakistan. There were also tensions within the Embassy. The Dacca staff felt that we were backing the Pakistani Government in Islamabad in its repressive activities in East Pakistan, which wasn't really the case. The Embassy didn't share those views, but understood that the Dacca staff would be much more agitated since some of its Pakistani friends had been arrested and killed. The "crack down" happened very fast. It was made worse by the fact that when the Consulate General staff in Dacca had to be evacuated, originally the intention was that our people would fly from Dacca to Bangkok, on an American aircraft which the US Government would charter. At the last moment the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that they didn't want the Consulate General to be evacuated via Bangkok. They wanted them to fly out by way of Karachi on a Pakistani aircraft. We didn't argue with the Foreign Ministry; our concern was to get our people out of Dacca.

We weren't thinking about whether they flew on an American carrier or a Pakistani plane to Karachi. We really didn't consider that. However, our people in Dacca were furious. The Americans in East Pakistan were furious that they had to fly to Karachi, which was quite far [around 1400 miles in the direct line]. They later said that, on the way to Dacca, the Pakistani airliner had ferried Pakistani troops that had come to butcher their friends. It was as if they were Jews leaving Eastern Europe on a train returning from the "gas chambers."

When the people from the Consulate General in Dacca arrived in Karachi, they were greeted by Sid Sober. There was a lot of tension and a bad scene ensued. The Dacca staff was very unhappy with the way they had been evacuated. They felt that the Embassy had let them down, and that we should have fought with the Pakistani Government.

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Political Officer and Deputy Principal Officer
Dacca (1962-1964)

Consul General
Dacca (1970-1971)

Archer K. Blood entered the Foreign Service in July of 1927. Blood has served in Thessaloniki, Munich, Athens, Algiers, Bonn, Washington, Kabul and New Delhi. Blood was interviewed by Henry Precht on June 27, 1989.

Q: *This is March of --*

BLOOD: March. The crackdown was on the evening of March 25th. I still remember that night vividly. We had invited some Bengalis and some members of the consular corps to dinner and to see a film called "Stella Dallas" -- no, "Cass Kimberling" with Lana Turner and Spencer -- what's his name?

Q: *Spencer Tracy?*

BLOOD: Spencer Tracy, yes. And just toward the end of the movie, I had a call from my CIA colleague who had gotten down to the office. Obstructions were in the road. Some Bengalis had cut down trees, and the army was beginning to move.

Q: *Was there violence that provoked this? What provoked this crackdown?*

BLOOD: Well, what had happened was that Yahya, who was joined by Bhutto, came over to Dacca for talks with Mujib to see if they could straighten this out. We had no contact with the Pak officials at that time.

Q: *Why not?*

BLOOD: Well, most of them were -- the people that we had known, the governor and the general officer commanding, had been withdrawn. We found out later because they had objected to the idea of a military crackdown.

Q: *Oh.*

BLOOD: And so they had been withdrawn. And, of course, the president's entourage had come over. They were secluded with Bhutto and Mujib. We still had contacts with the Awami League. From them, we had the impression that it was just like a roller coaster. I mean, for a moment, they looked optimistic, then be pessimistic, then look optimistic again. But then suddenly on the afternoon of the 25th, Yahya broke off the talks, and he and Bhutto flew back to the West wing. And then that night, the military moved in their brutal crackdown.

Q: *There was substantial violence beforehand?*

BLOOD: No, it was later claimed there had been . . . The Bengalis had torn down Pakistani flags that they had seen. Some of the bazaars had refused to sell supplies to the Pakistan Army. But there had been very little violence. One case, an American secretary had been accosted by some Bengalis. She reported it to me. I called the Awami League, and they said, "We will take care of it. You will have no more problems on this score." And we didn't. They were the de facto government. So we were dealing with them in that period from about March 5 to March 25; a very short period before the crackdown.

Q: *What was the crackdown, precisely? Barricades in the streets; what else?*

BLOOD: Oh, no, no. The crackdown was . . . They deliberately set out first to destroy any Bengali units in Dacca which might have a military capability. These included what was called the East Pakistan Rifles who were officered by West Pakistanis but had Bengali troops. They were sort of a paramilitary organization that was charged with border security and the police. And so they just attacked their barracks and killed all of them that they could.

Q: *When you say destroy, you literally mean destroy.*

BLOOD: Oh, yes, yes.

Q: *Not order them to other units.*

BLOOD: Oh, no. They just tried to destroy them and kill them all they could. And the police headquarters.

Q: *And these were unprovoked attacks?*

BLOOD: Oh, yes, they were unprovoked attacks. They also attacked the university, Dacca University, because the students had been active in this period, you know, with demonstrations. They machine-gunned, I guess used mortars too, against the dormitories and killed a large

number of students. They brought up tanks before the building that housed the major Awami League newspaper and blew it up.

Q: What about the Awami League --

BLOOD: They attacked the bazaars that had denied food to the troops and destroyed them. They went to the university and murdered Hindu professors. One of them I knew particularly was an elderly man, philosopher, who didn't have a political bone in his body. I think he was killed solely because he was a Hindu.

Q: What about the leadership of the Awami League?

BLOOD: They were arrested, if they could find them, like Mujib. The others went into hiding. A lot of them did escape.

Q: What about the activities at the embassy? Were you circumscribed by the military authorities? Did they tell you to stay at home?

BLOOD: Oh, yes. Well, there was a curfew. We were not allowed to move about for, I think, about thirty-six hours. We went up on the roof, though, that night, and we could watch, we could see, the battles raging. You could see the tracers and hear the tanks firing, machine guns. You could see those things.

Then the telephone lines were all cut. I found out later that the Pakistanis had cut those to prevent communications with resistance although they blamed the Awami League for cutting phone lines. We were out of telephone communications. Luckily, we had radio communications with the office and with our homes.

We were pretty much out of touch with our own embassy for about at least three weeks. They wouldn't allow anybody from the embassy over. And see there were no telephones. We had cables. That was it. And then toward the end of the three weeks, they allowed me to call the ambassador on a military phone on which I could speak to him. We were in cablecom communications, but they weren't allowed to get over there.

Luckily, we had the air attaché from the embassy who had been there before the crackdown. I had asked for him to come over. And he was very, very helpful because we were, in effect, reporting war from March 25th on, a civil war. He was the only American military person there. The British also had the foresight to get one of theirs over in time, too, so we could have some competent military advice in reporting the struggle.

Q: Now how did the embassy react? I assume you reported all this pretty much as you described it here. But how did the embassy react to this?

BLOOD: With disbelief. They, of course, were being told by the government of Pakistan that nothing much had happened. And this attitude of disbelief began to show up in their comments and their messages which was very depressing. I mean, people like the DCM, Sid Sober, who

had entered the Service with me were close friends and still are. I remember when he came over. I guess he was the first one over before the ambassador in late April when the government of Pakistan lifted the ban and after we had -- I'll get to the evacuation in a minute -- evacuated women, children, and nonessential dependents. And you could see that he just didn't believe it because a couple of Bengalis told him really nothing had happened.

Q: *The big crisis was over.*

BLOOD: Yes. The initial fighting . . . It took about two weeks before the Pak Army managed to defeat and drive out -- at least across the border into India -- most of the organized resistance to them. But what had happened then was, of course, a guerrilla type resistance grew up and spread.

Of course, now came the question of the evacuation. Even before the March 25th crackdown, a number of the foreign communities had been evacuated. The U.N., French, Germans, Japanese evacuated their communities.

Q: *Had there been some attacks on foreigners?*

BLOOD: No, there had been no attacks, but there was anticipation that we were headed toward a civil war. I had decided against evacuation for two reasons primarily. One was I knew with the Awami League in control that Americans were not in danger. Americans were very highly thought of. Nobody felt any sense of personal danger. Also, I felt that if we pull out, it would signal we sort of accepted the inevitability of a civil war and a conflict. If we stayed, then it was sort of evidence that we thought there was still some chance for a settlement.

Q: *Did that make you nervous about putting your fellow Americans at risk?*

BLOOD: Yes, oh, yes. It's a very awesome responsibility because you have to make judgments - - I was under no pressure from the American community to pull out.

Q: *What about Washington? Did they want you to do one thing or the other?*

BLOOD: No. Well, the ambassador, who was undergoing some medical treatment in Thailand, sent me a message saying, "My only advice to you is err on the side of caution." I wasn't quite sure what that meant.

But then after the military crackdown, the situation changed drastically. Now Washington found it hard to believe that Americans could be in danger once the Pak military was in control. But we were.

Q: *In danger from what? From whom?*

BLOOD: From the Pak military.

Q: *Oh.*

BLOOD: There were several instances of Americans being . . . Well, I should explain first that among the troops sent to East Pakistan, there were troops that were not regular army. There were frontier levies from the northwest frontier province who were not front line troops. There were several instances where Americans had been threatened at gunpoint by soldiers and told that they were going to be killed immediately. There were other instances where soldiers would leave their barracks in the evening and rob American houses. In one case, they took the watch off an American wife at gunpoint. In another case, an American confessed to me that he had actually killed a Pakistani soldier who had tried to kill him and had buried the body.

We were also harboring, all of us were harboring, Bengalis, mostly Hindu Bengalis, who were trying to flee mostly by taking refuge with our own servants. Our servants would give them refuge. All of us were doing this. I had a message from Washington saying that they had heard we were doing this and to knock it off. I told them we were doing it and would continue to do it. We could not turn these people away. They were not political refugees. They were just poor, very low-class people, mostly Hindus, who were very much afraid that they would be killed solely because they were Hindu.

Q: Did you have Hindu servants?

BLOOD: We had some. We all had a mixture of Muslim and Hindu servants. They worked very closely together, well together. So this was another danger. I don't think if I had ordered the community to stop that they would have stopped. It was just a humanitarian gesture that really was essential. It was really a humanitarian gesture that was being undertaken by our own servants out of humanity to fellow Bengalis.

I had had a squad of Bengali police who had been camped in a tent on my front yard because earlier there had been some left-wing death threats against me. The East Pakistan police had sent this unit to guard my residence. When the fighting began, of course, they were fearful of their lives so they took off their uniforms and buried their rifles in my back yard. Then later, the NCO in charge approached me and said that he had done nothing during the fighting. He wanted to return the rifles to the Pak Army, but would I go and vouch for him.

So I took him and the rifles to the nearest Pak military quarters and swore that what this gentleman had been doing and why he had the rifles in my yard and what he had done with them and that I could see him not taken apart. I hope he escaped safely.

Anyhow, so I decided to recommend to Washington that we evacuate.

Q: Is there a particular point, was it the evacuation, was it earlier reports, where is it that you think you took a step down or up, as you prefer to call it?

BLOOD: A little hard to pinpoint, but it would be right after March 25th when we began to report the crackdown. I will admit we did it very bluntly. We didn't disguise it in diplomatic niceties. We talked about, you know, 5,000 people probably being slaughtered that night. Things like that. We also had evidence. Of course, I mean, I never saw anybody murdered myself, but we had Catholic priests out in the countryside who . . . When Hindu villages were machine-

gunned by the Pakistan Army, these people would flee to the Catholic mission for sanctuary. We sent American doctors up there to treat their wounds. Actually, we didn't send them; they went up there on their own. So these were American eyewitness reports of atrocities which we were reporting.

VINCENT W. BROWN
Deputy Director, USAID
Lahore (1968-1972)

Vincent W. Brown was born and raised in the San Francisco area of California. Brown attended UCLA where he received his Bachelor of Science in business administration. Brown was hired by the Marshall Plan in Paris in 1950. In June of 1968, Brown became a fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He has served in Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan. The interview was conducted by W. Haven North in May of 1997.

Q: What was the political situation like at the end of the '60s and early '70s? I understand there was considerable turmoil.

BROWN: In November 1970 there had been a tremendous flood wiping out much of East Pakistan's rice crop. General Ayub Khan had resigned and turned over leadership to another military leader, General Yahya. Although AID and other donors made significant food donations under their disaster, the situation remained desperate in the East. The USAID through its PL 480 food program was the largest single donor.

In 1971, East Pakistan was in ferment. The local political party led by a Bengali leader named Mujibur Rahman, began calling for independence. His call had a tremendous response from the impoverished population. Over one million people showed up in downtown Dacca to hear Mujib advocate independence. The West Pakistan government responded by severe military interventions, which further inflamed the population. By September, not only was tension at boiling point between East and West Pakistan, but India leaning heavily in favor of the Bengali's drive for independence.

By the Fall of 1970, we had upped the amounts of PL 480 food going into East Pakistan and were going all over the country setting up supply depots to facilitate distribution. All economic assistance to Pakistan had been cut off except for humanitarian aid, as the repressive measures from the Central government (i.e. the West) escalated.

I still remember one of my East Pakistan field trips near Chittagong. I had spent a sleepless night on the floor of a guest house in a small town in the interior as the Pakistan army lobbed grenades over the roof into a local market. As we left the next morning for Chittagong, there were rumors of the Bengali rebels placing mines in the road. Our carryall came rapidly around a turn in the road only to see that there were a number round spots in the road about a foot or two in diameter where the asphalt had been dug up. All conversation stopped as we roared over these spots, expecting to hear an explosion as we ran over a mine at any second. Everyone breathed a sigh of

relief at the next corner when we spotted the provincial road repair crew. In Dacca, there was a curfew, but we could hear shooting in the streets every night.

I was fortunate to catch one of the last commercial PIA flights out of Dacca for Islamabad before the military closed the airport. I slept on the airport floor the night before departure to be sure I would be there on time for the early morning flight.

In December 1971, East Pakistan succeeded and called itself Bangladesh. As the violence grew, 10 million East Pakistani's fled to India. India intervened in early December with its army. There were major battles in the Punjab near Lahore. While West Pakistan's air force held its own against the Indian air force, the Pak army was no match for the superior Indian forces. In 13 days the West Pakistan army was defeated. While most of the USAID and Embassy staff had been evacuated to Afghanistan, our family remained in Islamabad. We watched the bombing of Islamabad's airport by two jets fighters from India from the terrace of our home.

After the surrender, on December 20, 1971, General Yahya turned the government over to Zulfikar Bhutto, who had been the leader of the opposition party. Since Bhutto was a leader elected by the people, the government was under civilian leadership, and the obvious domination by the military had receded, our development program for Pakistan was soon reinstated and back on track.

PETER D. CONSTABLE
Political Officer and Deputy Principal Officer
Lahore (1968-1970)

India-Pakistan Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1971-1972)

Office Director for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan
Washington, DC (1973-1976)

Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1976-1979)

Ambassador Peter D. Constable was born in New York State in 1932 and received his bachelor's degree from Hamilton college. He earned his graduate degree from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in 1957. After joining the foreign service, he served in Vigo, Tegucigalpa, and Lahore. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 17, 1990.

Q: The new Ambassador was Joseph S. Farland.

CONSTABLE: There was a tremendous amount of interaction between the consulates and the embassy. There was a regular process of having Political Officers and principal officers from the constituent posts go up to Islamabad, meet with the country team and thrash through the issues. All the reporting from the consulates was shared with each other, so that we had full access to

what they were saying from Dacca, what that point of view was. I thought that part of the operation was very good, it was really excellent.

It wasn't until '71, when Yahya ordered a military crackdown in East Pakistan, that the harmony within the country team began to fly apart, because the perspective from Dacca became dramatically different from the view of the embassy.

Q: Were you there at the time?

CONSTABLE: Yes. The crackdown started in March of '71. I left the post in May of '71 and then came back to Washington on the Pakistan desk, so I was still working on it.

Q: It was very brutal putdown.

CONSTABLE: It was terrible.

Q: I've seen pictures of people being killed and being beheaded in the streets. Now, this was a peculiar country anyway, two parts divided by a thousand miles by essentially a hostile country.

CONSTABLE: Held together by an airline.

Q: Which flew over hostile territory. Was there the feeling that the United States should do everything they can (I'm talking about the people you were dealing with), that we really have to hold this thing together, or saying, you know, this is going to go, this is never going to hold?

CONSTABLE: Views were really quite different, and they operated on a number of levels. I'm not sure the different levels entirely understood the views of the other levels and why they were held the way they were.

But the time was 1971, and we were in a period of domestic uproar over Vietnam and Cambodia, a feeling that the United States was somehow over-committed around the world, and that we were sticking our nose into things and we shouldn't be, and that we should be in a period of retraction, get out of Vietnam and bury our heads in the sand. Some of this affected our people around the world.

Prior to the actual crackdown, when there was a period of negotiation going on between politicians in East and West Pakistan, the embassy's view generally was that we should stay out of this, let them settle their own hash, and that no vital American interests were involved in this. We argued from Lahore that it wouldn't cost much for us to involve ourselves in a low-level way.

Q: Doing what?

CONSTABLE: Talking to leaders on both sides to see if there was any kind of a mediation that might help them to get to a political settlement and reach agreement on a continuation of a united Pakistan, but with some modifications for greater autonomy for the provinces, some formula like

that. Formulas which were being discussed and which came close to success, but didn't quite make it.

But the embassy and indeed the department didn't accept that view. And even in East Pakistan, our people felt that we should just keep our nose out of this.

I think, in retrospect, we should have had our nose in it, because once the separation became a serious problem and there was a military crackdown, there was a furor in the Congress.

Henry Kissinger's view of this was not so much that a united Pakistan was important to us, but that we had very important incipient relations with China that were involved in what happened to Pakistan.

Pakistan was China's oldest and closest friend. They were one of the first to recognize the Communist regime and had developed a very close relationship with China. That was important to China.

Henry Kissinger saw what was important to China as being important to us if we were going to develop any kind of relationship with China. We had to persuade the Chinese that we understood their interests and could support some of their interests elsewhere in the world, and that there would be a value in having a relationship with us.

But this was not understood in the department, because it was not articulated at all. Henry was running his own Pakistan policy over in the White House.

SIDNEY SOBER
Deputy Chief of Mission
Islamabad (1969-1973)

Sidney Sober was born in 1919 in New York state and attended the City College of New York. During the World War II he served as a naval officer in the Pacific. He earned his graduate degree from the George Washington University in 1964. He started his Foreign Service career in 1947 and had posts in Tananarive, Praha, Reykjavik, Ankara, Bombay, and Islamabad. He also served as chief of South Asia Division in the Office of Intelligence and Research and director of Regional Office for Near East and South Asia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in February 1990.

Q: *East Pakistan is what is now known as Bangladesh.*

SOBER: Now known as Bangladesh. It had been part of Indian, Bengal - which was partitioned in 1947 and the Eastern portion became East Pakistan. Since there were and still are more people in that area than in what was West Pakistan and is now just Pakistan, it meant that they would have, and were scheduled to have, more parliamentarians in the National Assembly than West Pakistan. A result of that election was the almost unanimous victory for one party in East Pakistan, which led, after several months, to the civil war which occupied almost all of 1971.

Q: *Was there much of an East Pakistani element in the army?*

SOBER: Virtually none. This goes back to the British days under the Raj. Certain ethnic groups had been identified as what they called, martial races. That did not include the Bengalis. They were seen as poets and dreamers. The bulk of the Pakistani army, as is true now, was made up of Punjabis and Pashtuns. There was a very small percentage of East Pakistanis. So that was a serious problem.

Another problem related to the civilian political element in West Pakistan, and how it would react to a circumstance where not only would it have a Bengali, East Pakistani, Prime Minister, but a man who really was in charge. Now there had been, in previous years in Pakistan, Bengali, East Pakistani, Prime Ministers. There were three. They were always brought in by, and in fact were under the thumb of, West Pakistani Presidents, Generals or Governors General. So Mujib would not have been the first East Pakistani Prime Minister, but he would have been in an assembly which really had the power, to which he was responsible. Not responsible to a President or a Governor General. Much has been made of this, going over the history. The question is how the man who was the most popular political elected leader in West Pakistan, the winner of the December '70 elections there, one Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would deal with being number two. Well, he would be the deputy Prime Minister. He had won an absolute majority of the assembly seats in the December '70 elections in West Pakistan. So he was clearly the number two man, but he didn't begin to have the number of backers that Mujib would have in the Assembly. A lot has been made as to whether Bhutto, presumably not willing to be number two, not willing to be anything but number one, didn't have a hand in making sure that the Assembly didn't get convened. There was a lot of politicking involving visits by Yahya as well as Bhutto to Dacca to meet with Mujib. They were not able to come to an agreement.

And ultimately on March 25, 1971, three months after the election, the Pakistani military which had been ferried over by air, over Sri Lanka (that's another story, why not over India) from West Pakistan had been reinforced in East Pakistan in anticipation of a possible crunch. And in fact on March 25, they were let loose. I would call it a military riot. We use the term police riot. That was the beginning of the civil war, with some very gross abuses of force by the Pakistan military. It was the beginning of a war that only came to an end in December when the Indians mopped up the Pakistani forces.

EDWARD C. INGRAHAM
Counselor for Political Affairs
Islamabad (1971-1974)

Edward C. Ingraham was born in New York state in 1922. He received his undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College in 1942 and subsequently joined the war effort and served in the U.S. Army overseas between 1943-45. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. In addition to Islamabad, his posts included Cochabamba, La Paz, Hong Kong, Perth, Madras, Djakarta, and Rangoon. He was interviewed on April 8, 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: *So you were in Islamabad from 1971 to when?*

INGRAHAM: 1971-74.

Q: *What was the situation in Pakistan during that time?*

INGRAHAM: Now this was a crucial, key period in Pakistan's history. It was exciting to be there. When I arrived in the summer of '71, there had been quite a cataclysm in Pakistan. After years of a rather benign dictatorship under Ayub Khan, for some weird reason the government decided to hold free elections. So they held free elections. Now the majority of Pakistanis were Bengalis from East Pakistan -- 55 million to 45 million, something like that -- but the country from the beginning had been run totally from the West. There was something called rather condescendingly "second capital" in Dhaka. The Punjabis ran the country. The Bengalis were second-class citizens, even though most of the foreign exchange came from East Bengal -- jute primarily. So you had a country of two separate people who spoke different languages, with totally different cultures. The only thing they had in common was Islam. And because of the strange doings of the Indian partition of 1947, the two parts of the country were separated by a thousand miles of India. By the time I got there it seemed utterly doomed. They had held those free elections. All the Bengalis had united behind Sheikh Mujib and his party. In the West meanwhile there were three or four parties. The Bengalis had won an absolute majority in the parliament in Islamabad. The East Pakistanis had taken over the government lock, stock and barrel. Well, the West Pakistani politicians and the army simply couldn't stand this. So they promptly annulled the election, threw everybody in jail, declared martial law, sent the Punjabi army to East Pakistan and the debacle started.

The East Pakistanis were supported diplomatically and materially by India. The Pakistan army in East Pakistan behaved very badly, not quite as badly as the Iraqis, but on that level. They didn't really consider the Bengalis to be fellow citizens. They considered them groveling, inferior beings. They shot them up, raped, murdered, burned down villages, etc. India began supporting Bengali guerrillas coming in from India. Hundreds of thousands, and eventually millions, of refugees moved into adjoining India, putting a terrific strain on the Indians. The Indians stepped up their aid to the guerrillas to get rid of Pakistani control and permit the refugees to go home.

So we had the crisis. We were sitting in Islamabad, we had a consulate in Dhaka. I remember spending three weeks in Dhaka in October 1971.

GEORGE G. B. GRIFFIN
Political Officer
Islamabad (1972-1973)

Deputy Principal Officer
Lahore (1973-1975)

George G. B. Griffin was born in Istanbul Turkey and raised in both Georgia and South Carolina. He served in the US Navy and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. In 1972 he was appointed as a Political Officer to the Pakistan embassy.

Q: So what was going on in East Pakistan?

GRIFFIN: Archer Blood, the Consul General in Dhaka, got in trouble for honest reporting. We heard that he ran afoul of Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad, a political appointee and former Coca Cola Company executive. Arch was accused of going native and siding too much with the Bengalis. But then things began to snowball. Refugees started coming across into India, fleeing from the fighting. In the monsoon season, which would have been in June, July, and maybe August of 1971, hundreds of thousands of refugees streamed into West Bengal and Assam, as well as further north and east into Tripura and Burma. I went out to the West Bengal border one day, and found the land flooded as far as the eye could see. On the water were hundreds of rowboats loaded with people and their belongings, piled as high as they could without sinking, all looking for dry ground. At about the same time, resident Americans began to leave East Pakistan. The families of Consulate General personnel in Dacca were evacuated. Political Officer Scott Butcher pouched me all his biographic files for safekeeping.

At some point, it was evident that the Indians were planning a military move into East Pakistan. They closed air corridors between East and West Pakistan, so the Pakistanis had to fly around the southern tip of India to get from one side to the other. Tensions kept building up. A large group of American missionaries was evacuated by ship from Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong to Calcutta, where we helped them find temporary lodging and onward transportation. Then the American press began to appear. The first one was a journalist with whom I'm still in touch – Barrie Dunsmore. He was an ABC TV News correspondent stationed in Rome, and came out to see how big a story was developing. His trip led to others and, eventually, at the height of the war, there were something like 800 American correspondents in Calcutta. So as these events mounted, I dropped my scheduled tasks and focused entirely on the East Pakistan crisis.

The outflow of refugees increased steadily in the Fall of 1971, climbing to an estimated total of ten million people at one point. Several Senators and Congressmen came out to check on the situation. One was Republican Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, who was Chairman of the Near East/South Asia Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Another was Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts. I took them out to refugee camps, as far as we were allowed to go. We weren't allowed into Assam or Tripura, so they only saw what was in West Bengal. More journalists came, and started getting in trouble. And then things got even more interesting for me.

Among the refugees was a group of politicians...

Q: Was there concern on our part about the brutality of the West Pakistani troops in the East?

GRIFFIN: Quite a bit, and every time Embassy Islamabad said it was an internal Pakistani affair we sent in a report showing how those "internal" problems had spilled over into India. People were fleeing in all directions from the nastiness, including several million refugees who came in India and into our consular district. We couldn't count them, but we certainly saw refugees as far as the eye could see on the many occasions we went to the border in West Bengal. There were many Americans and other foreigners who came out of East Pakistan to Calcutta and spoke to us.

There were lots of photographs and enough other evidence to document the brutality of the West Pakistanis. Later, when I was transferred to Islamabad, I met some East Bengalis who had been in the government in West Pakistan. They were locked up during the war and eventually repatriated, but they had some horror tales of their own to tell.

BURUNDI

THOMAS P. MELADY Ambassador Burundi (1969-1972)

Thomas P. Melady was born in Norwich Connecticut. He served in the Army during WWII and attended Duquesne University and the Catholic University after the war. He served as the Ambassador to Burundi and Uganda. Ambassador Melady was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 13 1995.

MELDAY: I remember I was there for two years and it was going on to almost my third year, and I knew the history was that every so often the Hutus, 85%, would attempt to change things. Then came the classical thing. We should have known the moment it happened. The economy was bad, and the coffee production was way down, it dropped, a major source of earnings. So there was a Hutu rebellion on a given day in April of '72. I had already received my transfer orders to go back to Washington and go on to Uganda. In the first three days, or perhaps five, it was relatively successful as an attempted revolution. And about 10,000 Tutsis were killed, the exact numbers none of us have although I have it in more detail in my book, Burundi, The Tragic Years. And then the Tutsis who were in control entirely, the military retaliated and eliminated in about a three week period about 150,000 Hutus, including anybody who had any kind of education beyond what would have been their elementary of about seven years. It was brutal, the tragic years, and deep alienation.

I came back, and in the book where I was spanked by various reviewers, because I said the alienation is so deep, and I documented various illustrations of it, and so much a part of the culture. It's in the folk tales that Hutu mothers will tell their little babies, beware of the awful Tutsis. If you're not a good boy, they will come and get you. I recommended the separation of the two communities as the only way out in both Rwanda and...and I really hate to come here and say, "I told you so that the alienation is so deep." They lost a half a million Tutsis in Rwanda. And in Burundi we've had several outbreaks since I left, one very bad one four years ago. Five hundred people just a month ago. I'm convinced that for a temporary phase there has to be a separation of the two communities because of the very deep rooted nature of the alienation.

Q: You and your staff were in Burundi at the time of this outburst in '73. Could you tell us what the staff of an embassy does when this sort of thing is going on?

MELADY: Of course, we were a small staff, no military attachés, no Marine Corps, etc. Once the fighting started what were we going to do? Our first interest was to protect our own staff, and I was concerned about the Americans who were there. I remember I went to see Colonel, Micombero and indicated that. The tragedy was that only one Belgian was killed. The saying

was, “if you’re white, you’re safe.” So our interest was to protect the Americans. This was our only “vital interest.” We must remember the historical period of the early ‘70s. You had people then, and less so now, who advocated that we should have taken a more active role, maybe military force. I recommended against that. While it was a tragedy in the historical period of 1972, the sending of any troops for any purpose other than actually to save our own people, as we did in Zaire previously, would be misinterpreted as another form of American imperialism.

MILES S. PENDLETON, JR
Political-Economic Officer
Bujumbura (1970-1972)

Miles S. Pendleton, Jr. was born in New Jersey in 1939. He graduated from Yale University in 1961 and received his MPA from Harvard University in 1967. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1967, his postings included Burundi, Tel Aviv, Brussels and Paris. Mr. Pendleton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: Can you tell me sort of the narrative of what happened, how you observed what led up to the ‘72 occurrence.

PENDLETON: Well, I saw very little in the months ahead that would suggest that we were facing an explosion.

Q: Question before we get there. You mentioned that when you’d throw a dinner party, people were being thrown in jail. Who was throwing whom in jail, and why?

PENDLETON: Well, usually it was President Michel Micombero, who was about 31 or 32 years old who had been president for five years. He would throw potential enemies in jail, but they didn’t have to be Hutus, and it could be for whatever reason. One would never figure out totally what was going on, but people at a certain level in the government or the military with whom we had some dealings(I taught English to military officers(led a life that had its ongoing uncertainties. And I didn’t think too much about people being jailed because they seemed to be released quite promptly. And that was one of the things that led to a slightly numbing sense of tranquility, that in terms of the underlying Hutu-Tutsi problem. And, indeed, David Rawson, who’s no dummy, and as I say, speaks Kirundi and Kinyarwanda, was out visiting us in the spring of 1972, and he and I went around the country and went through some roadblocks and didn’t recognize them as being precursors to the “events” (and in French they’re called “évènements”) of ‘72. And the word “events” disguises the fact that 200,000 people were killed, most all of them horribly and systematically with sledgehammers in a genocide during that period.

This was in April of 1972. My wife and I gave a dinner party in late April in David’s honor, and we tried to balance it very carefully between Hutus and Tutsis. He knew more Hutus than he knew Tutsis. As far as we could figure out later, within three weeks, all our guests were dead, both husbands and wives. People we thought were Tutsis turned out to have one Hutu grandparent, and *à la* Hitler became at the outset of the fighting from the wrong side and were

killed. I was reminded how, in a sense, naïve I was about what was going on and how hard it was to really fathom what was going on. I had a number of rather unattractive people practically on my “payroll”. I would give them a little bit of money, and they would give me gossip. But it didn’t seem to suggest an explosion.

At the embassy, we did not know that a rebellion or coup by Hutus was being prepared for the end of April, 1972. And one thing that happened that I probably should have paid more attention to was that a distinguished Hutu who had studied in the United States and whom I knew quite well, relatively speaking, and with whom I could converse in English, called me on the phone, and asked me if I knew any way to help get outboards for some friends of his that would survive the choppy water of Lake Tanganyika. He knew that we had Boston Whalers and whatever. I was sufficiently tranquilized that this didn’t mean anything to me, but upon reflection, it may be that I was being asked for help in terms of this Hutu uprising, which started in late April in the south and reached Bujumbura, but we didn’t have word of it, on the 29th of April. Micombero, the president, had dismissed his government at midday, and in the evening one began hearing noise that sounded like rifles and machine-gun fire around the town. I went around on my *mobilette*, which was a motorized bicycle, and didn’t see anything of great note. We got word, however, that something was going on which might be an uprising.

Q: How about your missionary net?

PENDLETON: Well, that’s partly where we got some of the word, and then the Ambassador got word from the Zaire ambassador that a coup or whatever had started. I went to the embassy and sent a cable to Washington, after talking with some of the key missionaries on the phone alerting them to get their heads down and then asking if they had any reports of anybody caught up in it, and the answer was no. Our first focus -- and this is something which I can remember stressing to the Ambassador-- was on the American citizens and trying to make sure that they were all safe and well. So the first little cable we sent (we didn’t know what the hell was going on (was to that end. We sent another cable at midnight, and then in the morning at first light I went around on my *mobilette* again which was probably a bit stupid. I saw a place where we (d heard something had happened, and it was clear that there were burned out cars and gutted cars and blood on the ground et cetera. There had been some kind of skirmish. And we began to put more and more pieces together to the effect that there had been a Hutu uprising of sorts and that the Tutsi army had pretty well controlled it.

Actually, it took them quite a while to control it, and it was very hard for us to get information from the hinterland. And it was very hard to tell where the combat ended and reprisals, systematically, began. But the Hutus were beaten almost immediately, it seems to me. I haven’t studied this perhaps as intensively as I should to get the dates right, but it was clear within a week to ten days that systematic reprisals were starting. And these reprisals really became genocidal and went on for a couple of months. Every Hutu over eleven who could read or write was rounded up if he had not fled, and an attempt was made to kill them. Many, many thousands were buried out at the airport, and you could see the mass graves as you flew in. In order to save ammunition, they were sledgehammered, usually, and pushed into mass graves and then covered with a bulldozer and suffocated to death if they hadn’t died from the earlier blows. A curfew was started at six in the evening, so we couldn’t see what was going on at night, when in the capital

city the trucks were going around loading the literate Hutus up. And we all had to be in our houses, or somebody's house, by six o'clock. I was trying to collect as much information as we could all day every day and get a report to Washington at 4:30 in the evening so I could have time to get home. As the days went on there were more and more overnight curfew parties to keep up the spirits of the foreigners in Bujumbura.

The daily events were really quite traumatic. For instance, we had a Hutu gardener who hid in our house. We stashed him even at one point in our bedroom. And then he went crazy and went out and killed his mother and escaped from our garden compound. We had Hutus and Tutsis working for us. One is here in the United States now, is an American citizen, who helped raise our children for many years, a Rwandan Tutsi. Her son is my godson and in the U.S. army out in Oklahoma. So life has its complexities, but trying to keep even those who worked for us from ratting on each other or whatever was not entirely easy.

And as time went on, the Catholic Church began to get very good demographic studies. They had census takers in Burundi who had been there before. And you began to get consolidated reports from parishes as to how many Hutus had died and how many had run into Tanzania or Rwanda. A lot didn't go. The Hutus frequently have a kind of subservient mentality, and we heard stories, which I believe, of a truck coming and soldiers filling the truck with Hutus and telling those who couldn't fit, "Come back tomorrow at 10 o'clock and we'll get you in." They would come back and get in the truck even though they must have known they were going to die. And they were only six miles from the border with Rwanda(I mean, really, quite astonishing to see this. And in the months that followed, between 150,000 and 200,000 people were killed, and we had a pretty good fix on that through the work of the census takers of the Catholic Church. Washington, quote-unquote, did not wish to hear about this. It was inconvenient. And that's another part of the story.

Q: What was the spirit? I mean, you've got your Ambassador, who from what I gather really couldn't quite admit what was happening, but Michael Hoyt, having his experience in Stanleyville, certainly is aware of, you know, the area. Was there any sort of feeling about what the hell sort of government are we representing, or concern about our policy?

PENDLETON: Well, I felt that way, but I was younger and less wise than Mike, and Mike had been through a lot, and he knew what to expect and what not to expect out of the State Department in Washington with regard to matters in obscure Catholic Church census-takers reported that now more than 100,000 had been killed. Mike put an addition to that: "Tick Tick" (A Numbers Game?) to leave it open. Whereas I was being dogmatic, he was experienced enough to trim somewhat.

Q: This is what I think these oral histories bring up. This is a different era. It's unthinkable of anything like that happening today, I mean to have, without having an uproar and the press moving in and everything else.

PENDLETON: Of course there was no TV coverage. *The Washington Post* arrived two months later, and I was sufficiently traumatized and, I think, by then suspicious of almost everybody that I pulled my punches in talking with the reporter. Then my wife told me she would strangle me if

I pulled any punches, so I opened up. My wife had been through a very unpleasant personal experience because she's an attorney and she was teaching law to the law students at the Official University of Bujumbura. She was in the midst of giving them two days of exams on morality and the law, when half her students, the Tutsis, killed the other half. And you could hear the cries from the classrooms. It was one of those things where, you know, my wife and I to this day (we think of it often, I mean, these sorts of events. They really were life-informing in a sense and affected our career in terms of what I wanted to ask her to do with her law degree thereafter. But unless you know people who've been through this sort of experience in a very personal way, it's quite distasteful to most people, particularly the nature of the killings, et cetera. We found when we served later in Brussels, that if you invited a group of old Africa hands over, which meant people who had lived in Rwanda and Burundi, you had a bond that went very deep, whereas you normally could do no more than tip your hat to a neighbor you might see every day, from Brussels, who didn't understand.

MICHAEL P. E. HOYT
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bujumbura (1970-1972)

Michael P.E. Hoyt was born in Illinois on November 16, 1929. He received a bachelor's degree and a master's degree from the University of Chicago and served in the U.S. Air Force overseas. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956. Mr. Hoyt's career included positions in Karachi, Casablanca, Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Douala, Bujumbura, Ibadan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Hoyt received the Secretary's Award for his performance as head of the American consulate in Stanleyville, Congo (now Kisangani, Zaire) when he and his staff were held hostage of the rebel Simbas for 111 days in 1964. He was interviewed by Ray Sadler on January 30, 1995.

HOYT: It was Sunday, April 25, 1972, and I had gone to Nairobi to discuss my next assignment with the executive director of the African bureau. We would do what were called non-professional courier runs to Nairobi.

Monday morning, I went to the embassy. I had seen in the morning newspapers that there had been some sort of attack by the Hutu in Burundi. I got to the embassy and found a message for me reporting on what had happened. There was a very good junior officer who I worked very closely with and trusted highly. He was Kim Pendleton, the economic officer. He did all reporting at the post, economic and political.

Anyway, I got a copy of the message in which Kim reported on a serious attack by Hutu on Tutsi in southern Burundi. The message said nothing about my coming back, but I immediately I immediately took my bags and got on the first plane to Bujumbura.

When I arrived in Bujumbura, there was a pall around the airport. The military was all over the place, searching all our bags. Fortunately, I didn't have a diplomatic pouch. In a later incident they did not respect the pouches. We managed to preserve their integrity, but it was tough.

Anyway, I got to the embassy and saw that the situation was very critical. I went to the blackboard in my room, my office was just opposite to the ambassador's, with our secretary in between. I wrote on the blackboard, "Kool it." It stayed there all through the crisis.

Most important, of course, was to get the facts, get a line on what was going on. That was Kim Pendleton's main job. He had established good contacts among the missionaries and the businessmen. I worked mainly with the other diplomatic missions, their personnel, and businessmen that I knew, and various people in the government. Of course it was almost impossible to contact anybody in the government unless they wanted to be talked to.

We learned that a Hutu band, accompanied by Simbas or former Simbas, had come from the Congo, across the lake and were slaughtering Tutsis.

I was queried, sometime later, with my experience with the Simbas, what I thought Simba involvement was. I said, as far as I could tell, all the symbols, all the rituals and so on of the Simbas, were being used. I was a close friend of the French air force captain who was the French technical military assistance man. From his descriptions, I felt they acted like Simbas. Whether they were, in fact, Simbas I didn't know.

Martin Kasongo's name was mentioned as being in the group. He was one of the crazies of the Simbas that I had known in Stan. But Kasongo and Martin are even more common than John Smith amongst Batetela, so it's hard to tell.

Anyway, they quickly learned that certain of the Tutsi elite, the extremists, the Bururi Hima group, Shibura, Rwuri, and so on, had, on the night of the attack, had immediately gone to Katanga, where some months before they had sort of lured the exiled Mwami, Charles. They killed him. And then they began a round up and slaughter of all Hutu people in government, all the important Hutu in Bujumbura. And then started a slaughter of Hutu country-wide.

This we could tell was going on. Melady, was in a kind of shock. It took us, Kim and I, several days to persuade him that, in fact, that what was going on was not a slaughter of Tutsi, which the government was claiming, but mass killings of Hutu. For us to report that fact, took some doing. But he finally he just gave up and left it for us to run. He said for us to do whatever you want to do.

His concern was getting out of there.

Q: Why is that?

HOYT: He wanted to get to his next post. He paid a farewell visit to Micombero by himself, even got a medal from him which I don't think he even reported.

Of course, my concern was first to get the facts out. Which I think we did successfully though, in the end, probably to excess. We would cable sometimes twice a day on developments. We had morning situation reports, afternoon situation reports, describing this terrible massacre going on country-wide. The utter passivity of the Hutu was something that was really difficult to believe.

We were constantly hearing stories such as a truck would drive up to a village and order all the Hutu men out. They would load the trucks, there would still be some men left. They would tell the men to go home and come back the next morning. They would drive off and come back the next morning and pick up those men.

There were instances where people were buried alive. The Tutsi military would bring Hutu to the prisons, kill them, haul them away in trucks to bulldozed trenches near the airport. We had people counting those trucks as they went by, so we could get pretty accurate a fix on the numbers. We had contacts with the missionaries, both Catholics and Protestants. We would get rundowns of individual parishes, and could determine the numbers involved.

In one of my cables, [I've obtained most of the cables through the Freedom of Information Act and a complete set is available at the Northwestern University Library in Evanston, Illinois], called "The Number's Game," 3 or 4 months into this, estimating that there were between 150 to 200,000 killed up to that point.

The other objective that I had was of course to try, other than getting the information out, was to try to find some way of putting pressure on the government to halt, slow down these killings. Melady was good at this. He came up with his African friends, Nyerere, Kaunda, and so on. We sent cables encouraging approaches to African leaders, to go to the UN. In fact, at the time George Bush was the head of the mission, in New York. I later saw one exchange of cables that he was instructed to go talk to the secretary-general but failed to do so. Just like at one point that Bev Carter, was appointed ambassador to Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, at the same time as the new ambassador to Burundi. When they went before the senate committee for confirmation, there are written transcripts of their joking about chopping off the feet of the Tutsis to make them like the Hutu! Carter was instructed to raise Burundi with Nyerere when he presented his credentials. We were copied the traffic and I learned Carter said he had decided not raised the issue. The next day, the foreign minister came to him and asked him why he hadn't raised and asked if that marked the level of our concern about the situation.

Anyway, I tried to get UN involvement, it was the path that I saw most promising. As a matter of fact, 3 different missions were sent out by the UN at various stages. The Tutsi government was denying anything was going on. At first they said that they were fighting for their lives. It became obvious that they weren't, and were just killing off a lot of Hutu.

At one point some journalists, Marvine Howe amongst them, came to Bujumbura. This was after Ambassador Melady had left, the 25th of June. I had moved into the ambassador's residence and President Micombero came and was interviewed. I had briefed them prior and after too. Their articles were very good, relating clearly horrible things that were going on. Micombero had them taken out the next day to fly them over where all the bodies were. I went with them in the helicopter. We did see a lot of bodies. floating in the rivers, but it was pretty hard to tell whether they were Hutu or Tutsi. Anyway, the government was very defensive about the whole thing.

The Papal Nuncio had proposed a letter to Micombero, very carefully drafted, an appeal to stop the killings. Although caged in language which was so delicate that it's hard to imagine, reading

it afterwards, that it was an appeal. Anyway, it apparently was strong enough that the French ambassador refused to sign it. I sent at least 3 cables to the embassy in Paris to try to get the foreign office, the Quai D'Orsay, to instruct the ambassador. Each time, our embassy people were assured the necessary instructions had been sent. Still, the ambassador refused to the end to sign. In fact, of course, the French were playing their own game, as in Rwanda with the Hutu, backing militarily the government.

Eventually, when I say eventually I'm talking about July, the killings almost died down to such a point that things were perhaps back to as normal as they could be. In August the new ambassador came. I stayed long enough for him to present his credentials. I had not thought we should have sent an ambassador that soon. However, I couldn't make that recommendation because it would have appeared to be too personally connected. It was not my place to do so. Besides, I was very anxious to get out. I had had enough of this sad country. Also, my wife had been forced to be gone from the post for many months to take care of our youngest son in Tucson.

It was a very emotional thing for me to leave. As I we pulled away from the airport, I looked down and saw the row upon row of trenches that had been dug for the killed. It was sad, but I was glad to be leaving.

I learned before I left that I had been appointed desk officer for Rhodesia. I expressed some surprise to be re-appointed in the same job as before, but there was no record that I had been Rhodesia desk officer. I went back to that. I found a pretty cold reception in the department in the African bureau over my Burundi experience. I was never debriefed. I never saw Newsom about it. Hank Cohen never saw me on Burundi.

I found out that, in fact, the African bureau had tried to play down events in Burundi. The only reason that we were as active as we were was that the international organization side of the department, were very concerned. In fact, there were 2 fellows there who did practically all the work. My reporting provided justification for us to go to the UN and encourage them to be more involved.

In the end, almost nothing was done. The UN reports were suppressed. Burundi has gone on in the same way since, with almost no reaction. It was only late in the 1980s that the Congress got very concerned over recurring episodes where Hutus would attack some Tutsis, and the Tutsis would retaliate by killing 10, 50, 100, thousand Hutu. The Congress finally enacted several different resolutions and laws which served to encourage the Burundi Tutsi leadership, under President Buyoya, to institute reforms, leading up to the '93 election of a Hutu president. He was assassinated in the Fall, and essentially since then, there have been massacres on both sides. Hutus and Tutsis chopping each other up at an ever increasing rate to this day.

JOSEPH C. WILSON, IV
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bujumbura (1982-1985)

Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson, IV was born in Connecticut in 1949. He attended the University of California at Santa Barbara and after working in a variety of

fields joined the Foreign Service in 1976. Wilson has served overseas in Niger, Togo, South Africa, Burundi, the Congo, and as the ambassador to Gabon. He has also worked in the Bureau of African Affairs, as the political advisor to the Commander in Chief, US Armed Forces, Europe, and as the senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. Ambassador Wilson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: I would imagine that, both in Rwanda and Burundi, every head of family has to figure out when am I going to get the hell out of here, or how am I going to protect my family, or something like that - these massacres occur, particularly since independence apparently; it's more a modern phenomenon.

WILSON: I think any family with some substance does exactly that. They try to have a way out and a place to go. In Burundi there was still this nightmare of the 1976 massacres. At the time that I was there, everybody was very sensitive to that; people sort of tiptoed around all the core issues. There was no such thing as a "Truth and Reconciliation" Commission. There was no such thing as facing up to the events of 1976. You would come at event somewhat obliquely; people would in confidence tell you the stories of their experiences during 1976, whether Hutu or Tutsi, because the massacres took place both ways. There were 60,000 Tutsis who were murdered during the first couple nights, and then maybe 600,000 Hutu that were killed in the aftermath in a systematic fashion by the Micombero government and by the military.

There was still some sense of reconciliation after the 1976 massacres; people seemed to be focused on that. Towards the end of my tenure in Burundi, the Tutsi regime was getting paranoid again, which is a common thread through the politics of the region. When the Tutsis are in power, after a while, they get paranoid and then they get oppressive, and then you have essentially a return to some war as they force people into guerilla activities.

JAMES R. BULLINGTON
Ambassador
Burundi (1983-1986)

Ambassador James R. Bullington was born in Tennessee in 1940, and received his BA from Auburn University in 1962, when he entered the Foreign Service. His assignments abroad include Hue, Saigon, Quang Tri, Chiang Mai, Mandalay, Rangoon, N'Djamena and Contonou, with an ambassadorship to Burundi. In 2001 Ambassador Bullington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: What was the situation in Burundi when you went there?

BULLINGTON: It was difficult. Burundi and Rwanda are truly twins. They're about the same size; they were both former Belgian territories, League of Nations mandates. They were originally colonized by the Germans in the 1890s, but they were awarded to the Belgians after World War I, under the League of Nations. They both have the same ethnic makeup, about 75-80% Hutu, and about 15-18% Tutsi, with a few other sorts of people. The conflict has been between the Tutsis and the Hutus. Long before the Germans came, both Rwanda and Burundi

had been Tutsi-ruled kingdoms in more or less the current geographic boundaries of what is now Rwanda and what is now Burundi. So this is not one of the many cases in Africa where the white colonialists came in and drew stupid boundaries and got different ethnic groups all mixed up. It was that way when the Europeans got there - two Tutsi-ruled kingdoms in what is now Rwanda and Burundi. When the Belgians were forced to give them independence in 1962 they took different paths. In Rwanda the majority Hutus took over and proceeded to persecute the Tutsis. In Burundi just the opposite happened. The minority Tutsis were able to maintain themselves in power and proceeded to do nasty things to the Hutus, denying them access to education and all positions of power. In 1976 there was a Hutu uprising in Burundi that was viciously suppressed in what amounted to a genocide. It was not quite on the scale of what happened in Rwanda in 1994, but still tens of thousands of Hutus were slaughtered after they had unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the government. It was said that the Tutsis either killed or forced to flee the country every Hutu with more than an elementary school education. As time went on each of these situations played off the other. In Burundi the Tutsis could say 'See, see Rwanda, what has happened there, what they have done to the Tutsis, and how nasty they've been. That's what will happen to us if these guys ever get power here.' Same thing in Rwanda. They said 'See, see these Tutsis in Burundi, what they did to our brethren there. That's what they will do to us if we give them half a chance.' So the two problems reinforced each other. In 1983, when I got there, Burundi was fairly calm, but it was only a calm imposed by the Tutsi military government. They held all the important levers of power, most importantly the Army. There were no Hutu army officers, none. There were no Hutus, except a few tame ones they had co-opted, at any significant level of government. The Tutsis ran things, keeping the country quiet, but suppressed. The government was paranoid. They saw enemies everywhere, particularly Europeans and Americans. They saw us as people who wanted to come in and organize the Hutus in a rebellion that would overthrow them. Harassment and expulsion of missionaries was one of the things that I dealt with from the beginning. There were still twenty or thirty American missionaries as well as a lot of European missionaries.

DENNIS HAYS
Deputy Chief of Mission
Bujumbura (1985-1988)

Ambassador Hays was born into a US Navy family and was raised in the United States and abroad. He was educated at the University of Florida and Harvard University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1975, he spent the major portion of his career dealing with Latin American, particularly Mexican and Cuban, Affairs. He also served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Burundi, and from 1997 to 2000 as U.S. Ambassador to Surinam. Ambassador Hays was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in 2001.

Q: Talk a little bit about what you found there, in terms of the problems of the country and to what extent the cleavages that we have come to connect with Burundi and Rwanda present at the time you went.

HAYS: By the time I got there in 1985, it had been thirteen years since the end of the last set of massacres. At that point there had been about 180,000 people killed, the vast majority of them

Hutu – like Rwanda it's a Hutu-Tutsi question, the Tutsi being nomadic herders and the Hutu being Bantu farmers. It was a feudal society that had existed for hundreds of years. Colonialism was a very light mantle on these countries. They were an appendage to the Belgian Congo after they had been originally German colonies. After World War I, they had been given over to Belgium. Interestingly, my German colleague noted that every month there were three guys who had fought for the Germans – they were Burundians who had fought to the German army in World War I – and they were still getting pensions 65 or 70 years later.

The Tutsis, when they conducted the last set of massacres, had systematically gone after every Hutu who had any education at all, even elementary school education. They would go into villages and kill all Hutu. The idea was to prevent the Hutu for at least a generation from presenting any kind of threat in the sense that they're educated and in touch with the modern world. So that had happened, in addition to the 180,000 dead, there were 200,000 who had fled with some still living in refugee camps in Tanzania and a few over in the Congo (Zaire). But you were starting to see some Hutu who had been to the university in Europe, let's say, and now had come back to the country. At this point, it was just beginning to be an issue again. The feeling was pretty upbeat though at the time. There was a sense that it was a new world, and that some accommodation was possible. Actually, one of my clearest memories of the humbling experiences in my diplomatic career was being at dinners and arguing that the Burundi really didn't need to worry about a repeat of the '72-73 massacres because in the modern day (1985), the world would no longer permit such a thing happening. Between CNN, and the New York Times, and Paris Match, the U.N. and everything, there was no way that a slow motion massacre like that could take place. The world just wouldn't let it happen. Well, of course, the world did let it happen and not too long after that. I was completely wrong on that point, but I believed it at that time and argued and worked for that.

There was a military strongman Jean-Baptiste Bagaza who was in charge. He had taken over in a coup from Micombero, his cousin, who in turn had taken over from the King who was deposed in 1964 or so. You had the Tutsi in control of Burundi and the Hutu who had taken over in 1959 in Rwanda, and there was no thought at all that Rwanda would ever be anything other than Hutu-dominated. They were 90% of the population; how in the world could they do anything but rule the place? There was this strain as I remember of this sort of melodic cousin culture that was active in Uganda at this point. The Dinka are sort of considered in this crowd. Along the Great Lakes region of Central Africa there were these sorts of contacts that were taking place. But we were more concerned at the time about Bagaza's engagement in a power struggle with one of the few groups outside his control, the Catholic Church. He was engaged in a series of repressive measures against foreign priests, local priests and what have you.

JAMES D. PHILLIPS
Ambassador
Burundi (1986-1990)

Ambassador Phillips was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his Bachelor's degree from the University of Wichita in 1957 and his Master's in 1958. After serving in the US Army from 1953 to 1955, he entered the Foreign Service in 1961. Postings throughout his career include Paris, Elizabethville, Luxembourg,

The Gambia, Copenhagen and Casablanca. Mr. Phillips then became the ambassador to Burundi and Congo. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 5, 1998.

Q: This problem was there in South Africa. In the Burundi context could you see any way of doing this, where you able to come up with any ideas?

PHILLIPS: South Africa had begun a process of bringing moderate blacks and whites together for regular discussions. I told Buyoya he should try that approach. The first step was to create a forum where Hutus could meet with Tutsis. It couldn't be the Parliament which consisted of hard-line Tutsis and docile Hutus. I argued it was important to start a meaningful dialog with Hutus who represented real Hutu constituencies. I don't want to take too much credit here. Buyoya had other advice and could himself easily see the merit of preparing the groundwork for democracy carefully. It was clear that he couldn't just announce elections in say six months time and have any chance of success. So he convened a group called the Council for National Reconciliation consisting of 16 prominent Hutus and 16 prominent Tutsis, all of whom were moderate and willing to work together. The goal of the Council was to begin healing the old ethnic wounds.

The Council decided that the first item on its agenda would be history. It counted as one historical period the pre-colonial era, another as the colonial era and another as the post-colonial era. They got through the first two eras quickly but then they started lengthy discussions about their history, taking it year by year from 1961 to the present. I thought that seemed like a rather laborious process. But Buyoya told me it was necessary because only by agreeing on what had happened after independence could they find a common frame of reference for the future. So they proceeded at a very deliberate pace.

While the Council was meeting, events occurred that underscored the gravity of the situation and gave an inkling of what was to come later. In the northern part of the country some Hutus went on a rampage and killed a number of Tutsis on neighboring hills. They massacred at least a 150 Tutsi men, women and children. They did it in a very barbaric way, with machetes, leaving dismembered bodies along the roadside, then they just faded back into the hills. Why they did it was never fully revealed. The Tutsi military got to the scene within 24 hours. They saw the carnage and reacted very brutally, massacring about 10,000 Hutus. They systematically went around the area killing Hutus.

This came as a great shock, because it was inconceivable that 10,000 people could be killed in a matter of days no matter what the provocation. We had thought that bloody Tutsi-Hutu conflicts on that scale were a thing of the past, but we were wrong.

Buyoya acted quickly and responsibly to bring the killings to a halt. He changed commanders in the field, personally went to the area, and eventually invited the diplomatic corps to the area to see it that the killings had stopped. He tried to repair the damage through a series of measures that were effective, but only in the short term.

The massacres brought international media attention to Burundi for the first time in many years. Reporters came from the New York Times, the Associated Press and CNN. A freelance reporter for the New Yorker magazine came to do a special in-depth report. The reporters stuck together. They traveled together in a cluster. They didn't speak the local language, and some didn't even speak French. I got an unsettling view of how the media works. I saw that stories feed off of each other and once a story line is established it is hard to correct.

Most diplomatic observers, relying on local contacts and on-the-scene accounts, had come to the conclusion that about 10,000 people had been killed. The journalists, however, came up with a much higher number. I think they checked their files and found entries like "Burundi, 1971 genocide," and assumed something similar had occurred. Buyoya gave the media free rein to travel anywhere in the country, which was a night-and-day difference in approach to what his predecessor would have done in a similar situation. So a group of journalists went to a hospital in the interior where a missionary doctor was treating injured Hutus. The Hutus of course had horrific tales of what had been happening to them. The doctor had been working for 48 hours without any sleep and was completely exhausted. The operating room was covered with blood and the reporters were probably a little traumatized as well. One of the reporters asked the doctor how many people had been killed. The doctor said he didn't have any idea. The reporter said that they were saying in Bujumbura about 10,000, and the doctor replied "multiply that by 10." He had no knowledge of the extent of the carnage beyond what he had seen in his small hospital. Nonetheless, the New York Times reported the figure of 100,000 killed and that became media gospel. The State Department urgently asked me to account for the difference between my estimate of 10,000 and press reports of 100,000 casualties. I rechecked the figures with my sources. I actually went to the hospital, about a day's drive from Bujumbura, and talked to the missionary doctor. He admitted that what he told the reporters was just a figure of speech, that he had no idea how many had been killed. I told the reporters this, and they half-accused me of being part of a cover up. The estimate of 100,000 took on a life of its own. The New York Times story was picked up by Le Monde and eventually the 100,000 dead estimate appeared in virtually every media story about Burundi for the next several weeks. I was able to convince the State Department that the 10,000 figure was more accurate, largely because virtually every Western Embassy in Bujumbura had come to the same conclusion. This was important because the extent to which we were able to support Buyoya in his efforts to restore calm depended to some extent on how the story played among human rights activists in the United States. If 100,000 Hutus had really been killed, and if the Burundi government was trying to cover up the extent of the massacre, pressure would have been intense to apply sanctions against the regime. Some Belgian scholars are working on a history of that period and I believe their work will vindicate our lower estimates. It was still a terrible massacre but not on the scale of what followed in Rwanda a few years later. After a several weeks the press left but the story had a shelf life of another couple of months.

The killings set off a stampede of Hutu refugees; probably 100,000 or more fled across the borders into Zaire and Rwanda where they set up make-shift camps supported by the UN. Buyoya wanted to get them back. He put guards around the hilltop compounds to keep squatters out. The guards protected not only the land but household goods and tools. He posted ownership lists in community centers and churches to assure that everyone knew who the land belonged to. He declared an amnesty for any refugees who might be accused of having taken part in the

killing of Tutsis that set off the violence. He convened a regional summit which included the presidents of Rwanda and Zaire to discuss the return of the refugees. He allowed foreign workers from the aid agencies, UNICEF, UNDP, and others to establish a foreign presence in the area. So refugees began to trickle back across the border at night. They would see that their property was intact and they would report this back to the camps. Within three to six months the refugees began coming back en masse. They returned because their land was secure and their safety was assured to some extent by an international presence. They didn't trust the Tutsi military, but the presence of priests, missionaries and NGOs like Doctors Without Borders reassured them. Between 75,000 and 100,000 refugees came back home in less than six months. It was unprecedented.

Let me get ahead of my story here for a moment. Hutus committed genocide in Rwanda in 1992 by systematically killing nearly one million Tutsis. A Tutsi guerrilla army moved from Uganda into Rwanda and ousted Rwanda's Hutu leadership. Hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled Rwanda for refugee camps in Zaire. I was a diplomat-in-resident at the Carter Center in Atlanta in 1993-94, and I wrote an Op Ed piece for the Atlanta Constitution on the refugee problem. I described what Buyoya had done to lure the refugees home and suggested it might serve as a model for defusing the current crisis. It didn't, however, because the Rwandan government, now dominated by Tutsis, was not prepared to do the sort of things Buyoya had done. Amnesty was the main sticking point. In Burundi in 1989 the Tutsis only lost about 150 people. In Rwanda in 1992, nearly a million Tutsis had been slaughtered in cold-blood and the new Rwandan government felt it could not declare a general amnesty for people who had killed on that scale. So the refugees never went back to Rwanda and the problem continues to fester to this day.

But back to 1989. Buyoya got the refugees to come home. The massacres, however, increased the sense of urgency about finding a long term solution to the power-sharing problem. Moderate Tutsis continued the talks with moderate Hutus. Buyoya named a distinguished Hutu as Prime Minister. You have to go back to the 1960s in Burundi to find that kind of ethnic cooperation. Buyoya did in fact hold free and fair elections which he lost. I was gone by then, but earlier I had asked him what he would do if he held elections and lost. His first reaction was that he wouldn't lose because he was popular among both Tutsis and Hutus. I pressed him by saying he had to be prepared for the possibility of losing. He said if he lost he would step down which, when the time came, he did, and rather graciously. Buyoya is one of the few African leaders that turned over power to a democratically elected opponent. His successor was a moderate Hutu named Ndadaye. There were high hopes that he would lead the country to a period of increasing Hutu/Tutsi cooperation. But it was not to be. Ndadaye never got control of the military which was still 100 percent Tutsi. Now I am talking about things that happened after I left the country. A handful of hot-headed Tutsi military officers could not tolerate a Hutu in power so they assassinated Ndadaye. This threw the country into turmoil from which it hasn't recovered. As we speak today, Buyoya is again President but he was appointed by the military. He is still trying to work out a power-sharing solution but has less leeway because of the genocide in Rwanda. I talked to some Burundi friends recently, some formerly moderate Tutsis, who have become quite hawkish. If Tutsis had not retaken power in Burundi, they argued, their fate would have been the same as that of the Tutsis killed in Rwanda. It's hard to convince them otherwise. So the situation is again back to an ethnic stalemate in both countries which probably cannot be resolved for many generations to come.

GLENN SLOCUM
Director, USAID
Bujumbura (1990-1993)

Director, East Africa Office, USAID
Washington, DC (1994-1997)

Glenn Slocum was born in 1940. After finishing graduate school at the University of Maryland in 1969 he joined AID. His career includes positions in Cameroon, Senegal, Paris, Washington D.C., and Burundi. Mr. Slocum was interviewed by W. Haven North in November 1998.

SLOCUM: Beginning in the late sixties, Burundian Hutus were inspired by their Hutu brethren in Rwanda and resisted the dominance of Tutsis in the ruling structure, which controlled the economy, the finances, the military, the political system, and held all of most of the key posts in government. Periodically the Hutus would get upset about this and take their frustration out on the Tutsi population. Usually they would start killing Tutsis in the countryside in order to challenge the Tutsi hegemony but also to show that the status quo was unacceptable. Because the Tutsis controlled the military, the military would conduct massive reprisals against the Hutus, targeting educated Hutus. The worst episode was the 1972 massacres, when all educated Hutu men, civil servants, teachers, professionals, business owners, etc. were brought in for “questioning” and never seen again. The documented stories are incredible and show the dark side of the Burundian mentality. The Hutus would be herded into areas, such as the local stadium, and slaughtered by the soldiers. The story is told, albeit incredibly, that when the sun went down, the soldiers would tell the remaining Hutus to go home and come back in the morning. And they did, according to published reports of the time. This “do-what-you’re-told” mentality, as baffling as it appears, was also responsible for the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda in 1994.

Q: Did you run into conflicts between the two groups?

SLOCUM: Not visible conflicts. But, the horror of 1972 had been suppressed for many years. It was only under Buyoya that the existence of two ethnic groups and their bloody history could even be acknowledged in public. I was at a conference on the ecology of Lake Tanganyika, where I met a European woman who had been there in 1972. I asked her about the experience of living through that period. She said, “We couldn’t talk about it. We knew that lots of people had disappeared, but couldn’t utter a word, not even in private.”

An anecdote demonstrates how suppressed the topic of ethnicity was. An American woman in the AID office who had been there eight years could compare the relatively liberal atmosphere of the early 90s with the repressive rule of the previous regime. You may recall there was a movie, I think in the mid eighties, called “Tootsie” with Dustin Hoffman. The lead character was an actor who was unable to find acting jobs, so he dressed as a woman and found work. Lorraine told the story that she was with her husband and other friends in a restaurant one night, talking about the new film they had just seen, “Tootsie.” Conversation at neighboring tables stopped abruptly, and

they were met with astonished stares. You weren't even supposed to say the words Tutsi or Hutu. Just saying the word was a violation of convention.

By the time I got there that wasn't true. You couldn't politely come up to somebody and say, "Are you a Tutsi or Hutu?" That would be too bold. But, after getting to know a person you could inquire.

Q: What was happening in Burundi and Rwanda to take up so much of your time?

SLOCUM: In October, 1993, four months after his inauguration, President Ndadaye was seized in his residence in the middle of the night by some Tutsi soldiers. They moved him to a nearby army camp and some hours later killed him, allegedly after torturing him. Underlining the organized and planned nature of the event, at the same time, several Government ministers and the head of the National Assembly were hunted down and killed. Other senior officials of the new government fled to western embassies for protection. Sylvie Kinigi, the new Prime Minister, fled to the French Embassy. Ex-President Buyoya camped out with his family at the American Embassy for several days, though this has never gotten much public attention. When news of the presidential assassination got out, Hutus in the countryside went on a rampage and killed hundreds of innocent Tutsis in retaliation for the murder of "their" president. Then the Tutsi military dispatched soldiers to the scene of the violence and cracked down with their own indiscriminate killing of innocent Hutus. What is sad is that most of the victims were innocent, poor, rural civilians. So there was general chaos and violence. This event set in motion just about all the other events in the region which have made it today one of the most unstable in the world. I was personally touched by these events. A number of people I knew in the Government were slain, others forced into exile.

As an illustration of the senseless yet logical nature of the killings, I will provide an example of someone I knew. He was the son of peasants, in his mid-20s, and worked in a low-level ministerial job in Bujumbura. He happened to come from a region not far from Bujumbura where a lot of killing took place, in both directions. Influential Tutsis from that hillside, furious at the destruction of their property by angry Hutus, provided lists of names of Hutus from the hillside who had no connection with the violence. But, in the tit-for-tat, eye-for-an-eye tradition of the Tutsi defense strategy, the young man was taken from his small house in front of his family and neighbors, told his papers were not in order, and carted off. The following day his body was found off the road to the airport, his throat slit. What makes this doubly tragic is that his family and neighbors saw the soldiers who picked him up and could identify some of them. Yet to this day not one of them has been brought to justice, and I predict will never be. These revenge killings went on for years, slowing down into a few of single-episode revenge and counter-revenge murders.

Q: Was this a maverick group of Tutsis who set all this off by taking the President or was there some concerted military fear of his presence, or influence? Do you know?

SLOCUM: I think we know. The Tutsis, being a minority in what to them is a hostile environment where they are outnumbered 7 to 1, have legitimate security concerns. Unfortunately, the "hard-line" radical Tutsis take an all-or-nothing approach to assure their

security. Taken to its extreme, the most radical approach, as practiced in 1972, is to eliminate any Hutu that is thought to be a threat. The point is, the Tutsi community is not monolithic, but there is a tendency in the Tutsi power structure to approach the issue of the Hutu majority with great apprehension, and when the Hutus go on a rampage and start killing Tutsis when their frustration boils up over the extent to which Hutus are disenfranchised from the centers of power, the only way the Tutsis know how to react is a massive crackdown especially targeting the educated Hutus. That is what happened in October 1993. Keep in mind, though, that it was Tutsi soldiers who set the whole thing off by assassinating the first democratically elected president of Burundi. Tutsis in positions of authority now try to distance themselves from this reality by saying the operation was carried out by a renegade band of noncommissioned army officers acting on their own. No one believes that, and human rights reports point to higher-level command involvement.

Q: This was triggered by the Tutsis?

SLOCUM: Yes.

Q: What frightened them that they would take such action?

SLOCUM: The fear that the new president would not be able to control Hutus' desire for revenge over what happened to their people in 1972. Another reason is that most of the Tutsi military were very reluctant to go along with Buyoya's democratization efforts. In getting the army to do so, Buyoya pulled off a major achievement. The army leadership had to agree to elections in the first place, and then to their results, the victory of Ndadaye. We probably will never have the whole picture, but within three or four months some elements of the Tutsi military, and probably other parts of the Tutsi power structure, concluded that the election of a Hutu president was too dangerous, and that Ndadaye would not be able to control the desire for "revenge" by some Hutus. In a worst-case scenario, all Tutsis would be killed and/or forced into exile. A lot was at stake for them; in fact everything, if you accept the possibility of the worst-case scenario. "So, let us retake power while we can" must have been their reasoning. Within a few hours of Ndadaye's death, Burundi Radio announced the establishment of a new, multiparty government with a Hutu figurehead, but the reaction, both domestic and international, was so opposed that this newly announced government never sat. Instead, the two major parties kept trying to adopt a formula for power-sharing that went on for three years, in fits and starts. Multiple efforts over the next three years to cobble a unified government met with only limited success. Although the mainly Hutu party dominated the parliament, the Tutsi party was careful to out-manuever it. They vetoed a number of choices to succeed Ndadaye as president. Finally a compromise candidate was chosen. They agreed upon Cyprien Ntaryamira as the new Burundian president. We knew him well. He had been Director of Agriculture during my time there, and was our key interlocutor in that sector. The mainly Tutsi party jockeyed for greater share of ministerial posts and influence. Negotiations continued, ceased, recommenced, new accords, periods of unrest and fighting. Two Hutu parties fled into exile and became an armed rebel force, which is rising in influence.

CAMBODIA

PAUL F. GARDNER
Political Officer
Phnom Penh (1972-1974)

Ambassador Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas in 1930. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Madagascar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Turkey, and an ambassadorship to New Guinea. Ambassador Gardner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: What was the situation in Cambodia when you went out there in 1972?

GARDNER: It was bad. I guess we were hopeful at that time. The entire time I was there the only areas held by non-Communist forces were larger towns and they were under periodic attack. Phnom Penh had some of its worst attacks before I got there, but there were several after I got there as well. Rocket attacks, principally, with one attack by sappers that actually controlled the central part of the city one night. They captured some armored vehicles in the stadium and actually took them over and controlled the central part of the city during the night. We learned this through our radio system and consequently stayed home until they were wiped out. But otherwise, we had periodic rocket attacks which caused some casualties. I think it was more or less going along this line before I got there and when I got there things really didn't change very much.

* * *

Primarily the programs I concentrated on were some counterinsurgency programs which I found gave disappointing results; some civil action gave slightly better results; and then I was saddled with helping them to install a draft, because they really didn't have obligatory military service even though the country was about to fall.

Again the draft was to a large degree designed by us and in order to see that they were doing things we asked to have periodic trips to the training grounds where they had these drafted youngsters. I felt it was essential. I had a very bad opinion of the other side. I was not as surprised as some by what occurred afterwards with the Khmer Rouge. So I felt they really had to be able to protect their lives. But the fact is that they really didn't want to do it. None of the people wanted to be drafted. None of them wanted to fight. None of the generals wanted to make them do it. This was sort of a permissive society to some degree and yet you felt that you had to get a draft program going. So it was quite dismaying visiting all these training camps and seeing how they were coming along and finding things were not all that gung ho with these groups.

Although they were carrying out the thing, because we insisted on it and their money and everything else came from us, I think they continued to rely on the B-52 strikes which occasionally hit some military targets. The B-52s blew up the ammunition dump of the Vietnamese with a loud bang at one time down south. But they also, I am afraid, killed a great number of civilians. Some on our own side. One of my grimmest tasks was to go down to a town on the Mekong River which was under friendly control and which had taken a rack of friendly B-52 bombs and see the disaster caused by the bombing. In this case they bombed territory which the Cambodian government held and there were many, many civilian casualties.

Q: Wasn't this depicted in the movie, "The Killing Fields?"

GARDNER: I haven't seen that. I think many of us who served in Cambodia shy away from such movies. We have some very strong feeling about what we saw there. We lost most of our friends, who were killed afterwards. I had a mental block afterwards. I couldn't remember things about Cambodia afterwards. I wasn't there when the country fell, but it was well along the way. It fell about eight months after I left. But it was a very, very disappointing period. Virtually everybody you knew was later killed. Many were people who you respected tremendously, perhaps not as generals and military people, but as people.

But I think we made a mistake then. I thought it when I was there and I think it now. We tried our best to buck them up and to give them the wherewithal to fight, but I think we were too big of a protective power. We were so powerful, we had so much money, that they really basically thought that we would handle things. And we didn't and couldn't handle things without their help.

Q: What sort of reports were you getting about the Khmer Rouge?

GARDNER: Well, they were killing people. They would take over a city, like they took over Kompong Cham, for a couple of days, knowing they would not be able to hold it. And they killed virtually everyone with any sort of education. I mean just massacred everyone. The place was recovered so we saw what they were doing. It wasn't just reports. We saw in this case.

Q: Not very optimistic when you left, then.

GARDNER: I still had some hope when I left. You had to keep hope or else you really became depressed... I mean, having seen what the Khmer Rouge was capable of at Kompong Cham. All the reports from the people of how the Khmer Rouge killed and how many were killed...they killed virtually anyone who had an elementary education. Whole schools were wiped out. Anyone with any type of education, whatsoever, they killed. We were aware of this, that they were brutal. You would be in the depths of depression if you felt there wasn't some hope. Once it fell, of course, you were in depression as well over what would occur afterwards.

TIMOTHY MICHAEL CARNEY

Political Officer

Phnom Penh (1972-1975)

Ambassador Timothy Michael Carney was born in Missouri in 1944 and graduated from MIT in 1966. Carney studied abroad in France for a year before joining the Foreign Service. In the Foreign Service Carney served abroad in Vietnam, Lesotho, Cambodia, Thailand, South Africa, Sudan, Indonesia, and as ambassador to Sudan and Haiti. Ambassador Carney also spent time working with the Cox Foundation, USUN and the NSC. Carney was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: When you arrived, how was the military system of the Khmer Rouge judged?

CARNEY: For a long time, far past the reality, the Khmer Rouge were regarded as the mere auxiliary of the Vietnamese forces. My view of it was signally limited because I did not have an SI [signals intelligence] clearance. I was never shown that material. That suddenly became clear to me one day when Tom Enders came down and said, "The prime minister has given me this. It looks kind of interesting. See what you can do and maybe report on it." I took a look at it - this was in '73. It was two long interviews by the Cambodian services of individuals who had been teachers and who had gone to the Khmer Rouge after the coup late in 1970, if not in '71, and had subsequently rallied to the government. Basically, these documents had who the Khmer Rouge were: The Communist Party of Kampuchea. It had individuals who were in it, their names - these were people who had disappeared from Phnom Penh into the bush - their revolutionary names or aliases.

I translated it. Fortunately, the interviews were in French so I could easily translate it. Translating Khmer at that point would have been damn near impossible for me. I sent it around for clearance. I did it as an airgram. It should have been a telegram. The NSA representative to the embassy came down and said, "You've got to get this out right now." I couldn't figure it out. Finally it dawned on me: the intercepts, all the radio stuff, had the revolutionary names of these people rather than their real names and this made the connection between a revolutionary name and an individual. A very significant intelligence coup. So, we got that out. One of those people subsequently published a book which came out in late '74 called "Sranaoh Proloeueng Khmer," which I translated as "Regrets for the Khmer Soul" and others have translated "Regrets of a Khmer Soul." I suspect the latter is a better translation. He, by the way, survived the Khmer rouge, wound up working for the CIA on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1979 or 80, and is now here in the U.S.

Q: Amazing. Were we getting reports that the Khmer Rouge was really something different?

CARNEY: We were getting reports because my predecessor, Andy Antippas, was hearing reports that in 1954 after the Geneva Accords, a number of the Cambodian revolutionaries, who were not given any status as a result of the Accords - Sihanouk wouldn't have it - those people boarded Polish ships and went to North Vietnam. There were a few thousand of them. Those people began re-infiltrating after the coup. By '72 or so, some of them were being executed or they would disappear. Clearly the indigenous Cambodian communist movement decided that these were the thin edge of a pro-Vietnamese wedge and were purging them. That ultimately led, after the Khmer Rouge victory, in about 1976, to the establishment of the torture/execution center at the Toul Sleng High School through which roughly 18,000 cadre were interrogated, tortured, and executed in the Khmer Rouge period.

Q: The ruthlessness with which this was carried out - you might say the extreme logic - just seems to be excessive.

CARNEY: It's, in fact, no different than Stalin or Mao or Idi Amin or Hitler. It was less systematic. There is a book in the process of being done now by an American academic whom I first met when he was just becoming a graduate student - he was in Cambodia - Stephen Heder. Steve stayed with us the first 3 or 4 months of this year (2003) while he had a fellowship at the Holocaust Museum. His studies are pretty convincing in showing that, however bad the Khmer

Rouge were, they were nowhere near as systematic as the Nazis, that defining an out group initially caused a lot of slaughter, and a lot of it was revenge for roles taken during the civil war, but you just didn't have that machine that the Nazis built. Maybe it was because the Nazis had to operate on a larger scale. Cambodia never had more than 8 million people or so.

Q: In a way, were we that much of a player in Cambodia? From what you're saying, you have an incompetent government and a military that was also incompetent.

CARNEY: Let me add here this isn't to say there weren't some good soldiers who were good; some leaders paying their troops, doing the job, and seriously fighting. There were plenty of those. But on the whole the national leadership and the military leadership were both corrupt and incompetent. It is the usual contradiction, to borrow the Marxist word, of the situation.

Q: You were talking to this Cambodian who said the Khmer Rouge had ordered the complete evacuation of Phnom Penh.

CARNEY: What they had said was that "You can go back to your native village." So, if you were an ethnic Cambodian, you almost surely had at least your grandparents from a particular native village. This particular refugee figured it out, and he said that his particular native village was in the far northwest of the country near the Thai border. He was moved out of town north across the Mekong in the direction of Kompong Cham. It was there at a ferry point that the Khmer Rouge gave little half sheets of paper that had mimeographed fill-in-the-blank portions on it. In the upper left hand corner was a rather interesting logo. In Cambodian, it read something that roughly translates, "Exodus Reception Committee." You filled out what your name was, who was with you, and where you were going. That was your pass to get to the villages. That was Khmer Rouge policy to take the new people from the cities and to deposit them in the village and to build or forge them into a modern Cambodian communist man or woman. Well, this fellow was aware that it was at that point that former military were separated out and he assumed executed. He carried on and heard several other stories of these executions and got out. That was the first solid report on what was happening with the people after the Khmer Rouge victory. It was several months later when you began to get more refugees coming to Thailand talking about all the horrors that we now know.

EDMUND Mc WILLIAMS
Desk Officer for Laos, Cambodia & Vietnam
Washington, DC (1978-1980)

A native of Rhode Island, Mr. Mc Williams was educated at the University of Rhode Island and Ohio University. In the course of his diplomatic career he served in several South East Asia posts including Vientiane, Bangkok and Djakarta. Other assignments took him to Moscow, Managua, Kabul, and Islamabad. In 1992 Mr. McWilliams was engaged in opening US Embassies in the newly independent states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While his assignments were primarily in the Political and Economic fields, in Washington he dealt with Labor and Human Rights issues. Mr. McWilliams was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005-2006.

Q: While you were there, I mean the two years you were dealing with Cambodia, were you getting any, what were we catching about later became known as the killing fields, the enormity of what was going on in Laos- or in Cambodia?

MCWILLIAMS: In Cambodia. Well, it was a very interesting time because as you remember at that point it was really very closed and there were rumors coming out of dreadful things going on and I can recall that some of the more left leaning academics, and there weren't very many academics focused on Cambodia but some of them, were reluctant to admit or to acknowledge, that the Khmer Rouge were doing terrible things. It was of course our point to suggest that this communist government was in fact a very bad government. But even we didn't have a lot of information.

Jumping just ahead a little bit. It was really only when the refugees began to pour into Thailand, across the border in '79 that it became clear just the enormity of what the Khmer Rouge had done. And I would credit Ambassador Abramowitz, who was then ambassador in Bangkok and his wife Sheppie for really alerting the U.S. administration and more broadly, I think, the international community just to the extent to which the people of Cambodia were suffering, both on the border and of course inside.

Q: We'll talk about that in a minute. But with Cambodia, I mean, from the administration point of view, the worst things were in Cambodia, the more easily it was to point to the horrors of communism. But then you had the, sort of the left wing which was quite powerful in those days in our intellectual environment because they had been opposed to the whole war in Vietnam and they were trying to portray all of this as, you know, these are the forces of goodness and light and all coming to the fore.

MCWILLIAMS: Regarding Cambodia and sort of the controversy about how to describe the Khmer Rouge government, I think that the United States government certainly initially, without any kind of contact with that government at all and knowing that it was a communist government, essentially an adversary obviously for us in the war was, we were disposed to be very critical of it whereas I think the left again, sort of remaining in their sort of war perspective were inclined to defend it to some extent. But I think both U.S. government and U.S. government critics were really unaware of just what was going on in Cambodia because it was such a closed society. I mentioned just a moment ago that there was basically a failed initiative at a very low level on our part to open at least communications with the Khmer Rouge. I should say the reason for that was in part our concern that the Vietnamese were emerging as real adversaries of the Cambodians and there was concern, at least at the analytical side to the extent also it influenced policy, that we may be facing tremendous Vietnamese pressure on Cambodia and that as a consequence we needed to be in communication with the Cambodians. In a sense we were correct because as you recall back in '79 the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, of course, very successfully in terms of their military operation and we were faced with what I think we had feared in '78, that is to say Vietnamese communists controlling Cambodia and we saw this of course in the same old domino context, that this would ultimately pose a real problem perhaps for Thailand, if you had Vietnamese communists occupying right up to Bahambong, right up to the border of Thailand.

Just one little reflection. I recall, I described the Vietnamese invasion as very successful. A senior Vietnamese I recall at that time told a French colleague whom he knew very well that we, Vietnamese, had succeeded in everything we wanted to do in terms of the invasion except we failed to free Sihanouk. Meaning to say they failed to capture Sihanouk because Sihanouk was then and I think to a very real extent even today remains a critical element in Cambodian politics even though he's now retired.

Q: You moved over to the Cambodian-Vietnamese desk. Well, let's keep with Cambodia first. Okay '79, why were refugees coming out? It had been four years.

MCWILLIAMS: Well now, I'm going to have to go back and scratch my memory here a little bit. As I recall the impetus for movement of Khmer inside Cambodia was the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime under Vietnamese pressure. Once the Khmer Rouge lost Phnom Penh, which was very soon after the Vietnamese invaded, of course, then you began to see the ability of people in Cambodia to flee. Not only the fighting between Vietnamese and Cambodians- Khmer Rouge but more specifically to flee Khmer Rouge control. Khmer Rouge control over Cambodia broke down and I think people were able to begin to move. So I think that was the impetus really that drove these people to the Cambodian border in '79.

MARIE THERESE HUHTALA
Office Director, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia
Washington, DC (1990-1992)

Ambassador Huhtala was born and raised in California and Graduated from Santa Clara University. Joining the Foreign Service in 1972, she studied Thai and Chinese languages and became a specialist in East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Her overseas postings include Paris, Quebec, Hong Kong and Chiang Mai (Thailand). In Washington, she dealt primarily with East Asia and Pacific Affairs. From 2001 to 2004 she served as US ambassador to Malaysia and, from 2004 to 2005, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Ambassador Huhtala is a graduate of the National War College and the State Department's Senior Seminar. Ambassador Huhtala was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Okay, well Cambodia then.

HUHTALA: Cambodia. Throughout the 1980's the U.S. had been supporting the non-communist resistance to the government imposed after the Vietnamese occupation began in 1979. The resistance was led by a party called FUNCINPEC, who were royalists supporting Prince Sihanouk, and included the KPNLF of Son Sann. Khmer Rouge remnants were also involved in the resistance, though we always kept our distance from them. There had been a sort of low-intensity guerrilla war going on all through that period. We saw Hun Sen as a Vietnamese-installed stooge and we didn't think he had much credibility. He was in charge of this communist government in place in Cambodia all through the 1980s. The horrific events of the Khmer Rouge period had all become known by then, so many heartbreaking stories.

So negotiations started in about '89 I think, led by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly the U.S., Britain and France. We had China's cooperation as well and put together a peace agreement which was signed in Paris in 1990. (I remember I drafted Secretary Baker's remarks for that. I thought that was kind of exciting.) The agreement led the way to the UN force which came in to restore order and produced the first elections in Cambodian history. Hun Sen reinvented himself as a democrat and leader of the Cambodian People's Party; he won the 1993 elections, together with Prince Ranariddh, the leader of FUNCINPEC. Because the results were very close, the two agreed to a coalition government in which they each became co-prime ministers, and there were dual ministers for some of the key ministries as well. Needless to say, this was a fundamentally unstable arrangement and boded ill for the future.

We had the sense during my two years on the desk that Cambodia was beginning to pull itself together and move towards a functioning democracy, though it still had a lot of problems, and not just the problems of poverty and corruption that any country in that region started out with. Boy, that was a country of shell-shocked people. The entire country had post traumatic shock syndrome in many ways. Every single Cambodian had lost people who were dear to them. An entire class of intellectuals and educated people had been completely wiped out. All educators were killed or executed, if you wore eyeglasses or if you were a doctor or a lawyer you were killed. It had just been a nightmare. Some of the same NGOs and charitable organizations that were helping out in Vietnam were also helping out in Cambodia. One good thing that we had to offer was a diaspora of Cambodians who had come to our country as refugees and got themselves educated. Some of them went back to head up human rights organizations, to help write the new constitution, that kind of thing. We did our best to facilitate that.

Q: Was the Khmer Rouge back in the jungle or along the Thai border doing something?

HUHTALA: They had retreated to the Thai border and a couple of other isolated spots around the country. Their leadership was scattered and they were not an organized force. I remember as part of this reconciliation process, Khieu Sampan, one of the original KR Politburo members and foreign minister under Pol Pot, returned to Phnom Penh for some official reason. A mob of Cambodians set upon him and beat him up, cutting his scalp; he had to be pulled to safety. The incident showed there were still incredibly strong feelings among the Cambodian people, even though most of them were not clamoring for a court process or war crimes trial at that point. I think they were just trying to forget the horror. They did put together several monuments to the genocide. There's the one at the Tuol Sleng Prison right outside of Phnom Penh that it will chill your bones if you see it.

Q: Is that the one with all the skulls?

HUHTALA: It's got a huge pile of skulls arranged behind a glass case but it also has mug shots of all the victims because the Khmer Rouge took a photo of each person before they bludgeoned them to death. There are hundreds of little black and white Polaroid pictures just wallpapering the entire building. It's the most horrifying thing to look in these faces of these people who know that they are about to die. Unforgettable.

FRANKLIN E. HUFFMAN
Public Affairs Officer
Phnom Penh (1995-1997)

Acting Public Affairs Officer
Phnom Penh (2002)

Franklin E. Huffman was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia in 1934. In 1955 he graduated from Bridgewater College and immediately joined IVS. From 1967 to 1985 he was a Professor of Southeast Asian languages and linguistics at Yale and Cornell. His second career was as a Foreign Service Officer with USIA where he was posted to London, Rangoon, Marrakech, Paris, Washington, Phnom Penh, and Wellington, with subsequent WAE tours to N'Djamena (Chad) and Phnom Penh. Mr. Huffman was interviewed in January 2006 by Charles Stuart Kennedy

Q: What was the situation like in Cambodia when you got there?

HUFFMAN: Well, there was a great deal of political turmoil. You have to go back a little while to explain what the situation was. The Khmer Rouge, from 1975 to 1979, led one of the most extreme agrarian revolutions in history; they had emptied the cities and destroyed money and murdered all those people who were educated, or who were in any way associated with the elite of society. Just how many people lost their lives under the Khmer Rouge continues to be debated but estimates range between one and two million, which would have been roughly about 30 percent of the population of the country at that time. It was a revolution that got out of control. The intensity of the reform differed from one part of the country to another, depending to a certain extent who was in charge. There was a lot of getting even taking place, a lot of the poor people rising up and saying okay, it's really okay to kill these wealthy people and these white shirts and these urbanites who have always oppressed us. Some experts on the situation feel that it was not so much that Pol Pot personally ordered all of the executions, it's just that things got out of control and he wasn't able to control the situation. Ironically, of course, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan and all of the leaders of that revolution had acquired their revolutionary ideals studying in Paris, but they took it to a much greater extreme than even the Maoist agrarian revolution in China. Then the Vietnamese came in after the Khmer Rouge had been in power for almost four years. The Vietnamese invaded in 1979 and basically pushed the Khmer Rouge out westward toward Thailand, and many of them escaped over the border into Thailand. The Vietnamese installed a puppet government, made up of people who had been in exile in Hanoi. The U.S. government supported the three Cambodian opposition groups along the Thai border – basically the royalists, the democrats, and the Khmer Rouge. For political reasons we supported the Khmer Rouge for the Cambodian seat at the United Nations rather than that of the Vietnamese puppet government installed in Phnom Penh, which is one of the darker periods of U.S. policy.

Q: Well, in your contacts with the Cambodians, both professionally and socially, did you find that there was a real gap, since the Khmer Rouge basically tried to wipe out the intellectual class?

HUFFMAN: Oh yes indeed. One of the most serious obstacles to development of the country is the lack of expertise. There were no doctors, there were no teachers, there were no technicians -- they had all either been killed or exiled. And curiously, as we've seen in several countries where you've had expatriates come back to try to help develop the country, it doesn't work. The attitude is, "Well, we stayed here and we suffered under the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese regime and we didn't run away and now it's our turn. You ran away and had a better life, now don't come back and tell us what to do and how to run the country."

I'll give you an example. There was an organization set up called CANDO, which stood for Cambodian American National Development Organization, a very nice acronym. They brought all these 20-somethings back from the United States, from California and from Michigan and Arlington and wherever they had been and they had degrees in health and education and this and that. So they were going to come back and be a Cambodian Peace Corps. Well, they weren't accepted. Here were these young people, they weren't making much but they were making maybe \$700 a month, which was about 20 times what a government minister was making (officially, at least). Furthermore in Asian culture you can't have young people coming in and telling the elders what to do. After about two years they gave up and left. This was the case of many expatriates who came back and tried to help. They were not accepted. There's one in particular who has just stayed, trying desperately to find a niche where he could be useful and the poor guy has been pushed from this job to that and basically humiliated; he used to come to my office and complain, but what could I do? It's unfortunate because the country desperately needs the expertise of the expatriates.

EAST TIMOR

ERLAND HEGINBOTHAM Economic Officer/Commercial Counselor Jakarta, Indonesia (1971-1975)

Erland Heginbotham was born in Salt Lake City, Utah in 1931. He attended Stanford University and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career has included positions in Korea, Nigeria, Vietnam, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 3, 1996.

Q: Could you describe the East Timor problem at that time and how it affected what we were doing?

HEGINBOTHAM: The effect of the East Timor on what we were doing was very remote. Timor is a far out of the way place. It was a part of Indonesia that just not been developed; it was very neglected, very difficult to reach, very isolated. When the Portuguese decided to pull out, it gave the Indonesian military a golden opportunity annex it without benefit of a U.N.-supervised referendum. We were put in a very difficult position, because practically no one recognized Indonesia's annexation of Portuguese Timor; the blood bath was horrendous; it was just really brutal. It opened a lot of eyes to the real nature of some of the military leadership in Indonesia. It was more of an embarrassment; it didn't have any direct impact on our efforts, but it was so difficult to be supporting what was going on elsewhere in Indonesia

when you had this kind of behavior which was repeated in other parts of Indonesia, where different cultures existed.

PAUL F. GARDNER
Deputy Chief of Mission
Jakarta, Indonesia (1976-1981)

Ambassador Paul F. Gardner was born in Texas in 1930. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Madagascar, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Turkey, and an ambassadorship to New Guinea. Ambassador Gardner was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.

Q: *Was East Timor a problem at the time?*

GARDNER: Yes, a very big problem.

Q: *Could you explain what the problem was and then what happened while you were there?*

GARDNER: It had happened just before I arrived there. Timor was a Portuguese colony and, as many of the other Portuguese colonies, it had some far leftist military there. There was a Marxist movement called Fretilin which was supported by some elements of the military. The Portuguese were leaving the colony and the Fretilin seemed to be taking over. These were pretty brutal people, the Fretilin were. Not as brutal as the Khmer Rouge, but they had already killed quite a few people. The Indonesians had already had a sort of puppet party there. A party they had promoted and were giving money to. It was a party of little significance.

Because the Portuguese colony shared the island of Timor, with Indonesia, the eastern part was Portuguese and the western part of Timor was Indonesian. So it was one of the few places where Indonesia shared a border with another country and this country seemed to be turning Communist. So Indonesia surreptitiously invaded it, basically to support the non-Communist side and put its own puppet party...although it was really a small minority party...in power.

This happened before I arrived, but we had to deal with the consequences of this in Congress and the bigger consequences in Australia because a number of Australian journalists had been killed by Indonesian military during this takeover. We will never know the complete story about this, but it was unfortunate, to say the least. But there was some bloodshed, of course, when the Indonesians went in and there had been bloodshed before of which the Fretilin were guilty. Then, of course, the Fretilin and the Indonesians engaged in combat. The Fretilin as guerilla troops mainly and the Indonesians controlled the cities.

So this was looked on by some as conquering another country. The United States didn't recognize that there had been free choice in Timor but recognized that Indonesia was the administrative power, because it was there. I don't think our policy condoned it, but it certainly accepted the consequences of it. Many in Congress were very, very worried about the human rights aspects of it. And we felt that Indonesia had its own reputation to think of, a reputation

which really could be blacken by Timor. Our policy was trying to get the Indonesians to open Timor up. In other words, let people in and see what's happening and they will understand.

GRETA N. MORRIS
Policy Officer, East Asia, USIA
Washington, DC (1990-1992)

Ambassador Morris was born and raised in California and educated at the University of California at Los Angeles, University of Redlands and Claremont College. Before becoming a Foreign Service Officer she accompanied her FSO husband to Indonesia. In 1980 she entered the Foreign Service (USIA), following which she served variously as Public Affairs, Cultural or Press Officer in Kenya, Uganda, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. Her Washington assignments at State and USIA concerned primarily African Affairs. She served as US Ambassador to the Marshall Islands from 2000 to 2006. Ambassador Morris was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2008.

Q: What was other than the tremendous operation of integrating two separate entities how about the East Asian side of things? What was going on?

MORRIS: Right before I left the Philippines in 1998, things were really coming to a head in Indonesia. Suharto stepped down and the process of democratization was beginning to take place in Indonesia. One of the things that lead to Suharto's downfall was the Asian economic crisis and countries in Asia were still very much dealing with that crisis.

Also, in Indonesia, the issue of East Timor was coming to a head. The Government of Jusuf Habibie, Suharto's successor, agreed that there would be a referendum, or "popular consultation" (as it was called) in East Timor, scheduled to take place in September 1999. The popular consultation was supposed to give the people of East Timor the opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to be independent or continue to be part of Indonesia. They had the popular consultation and immediately after that, when the vote went in favor of autonomy for East Timor, violence broke out, with rampaging by the Timorese militias that had been sympathetic towards Indonesia and, certainly, the U.S. and the international community believed there were elements of the Indonesian military that were also very much involved in that violence. People were killed and their homes destroyed. That violent confrontation and all of the destruction in East Timor had a major impact on our relations with Indonesia, which really had not completely recovered from the end of the Suharto era. We saw this as the Indonesian government going back on its pledge to allow the people of East Timor to make their own decision on autonomy or integration, to have an opportunity for genuine self-determination. This put a tremendous strain on our relationship with Indonesia and particularly any military to military relationships (military relations with Indonesia were cut off in 1999 for several years). I think that was certainly the big issue in East Asia. There were always continuing issues with China and with the human rights in China but I would say that a lot of the focus was on what was happening in Indonesia.

EDMUND McWILLIAMS
Political Counselor,

Jakarta, Indonesia (1996-1999)

Mr. Williams was born and raised in Tennessee and educated at Atlanta University, the University of Illinois and Howard University. After newspaper work in Atlanta, he went to Washington, DC, where he served several assignments on Capitol Hill before joining the State Department in 1962. There he served in the Office of Protocol and as Staff Assistant and Special Assistant in several departments dealing primarily with management issues. After his resignation from State, Mr. Williams in 1968 joined the University of Chicago as Assistant Vice President, where he was involved in the creation of the Universities Joint Center for Poverty Research. Mr. Williams was interviewed by Ambassador Ronald Palmer in 1994.

Q: Well, can you talk- first place, could you talk about the regime, who was in charge, who was doing what?

MCWILLIAMS: Yes. Well Suharto had taken over in a strange coup environment back in 1965. There is still historical debate as to who initiated the coup and how it was that Suharto became the great victor in this coup scenario but there's no question about the fact that it was an extremely bloody affair where over half-a-million people probably died in this coup attempt, principally victims of the military and some Islamic militias that they had formed. And we proceeded to work very close with Suharto in two senses. Certainly we helped his military, had a very close relationship with his military through the years but also we saw this as a great platform for development by U.S. companies. Big U.S. companies went in, extractive industries principally, oil and gas but also of gold and copper and so on. So it was a very friendly environment for the major corporations, it was a very close military-to-military relationship. Things began to become difficult only in 1991 when there was a massacre in East Timor involving the Indonesian military where they killed well over 270 peaceful students. And it turned out that a couple of American journalists were actually there and there was a German who was filming this. And it became kind of a cause celebre back here and finally I think what had been a longstanding concern about human rights generally in Indonesia came to a head and restrictions were put upon our ability to work with the Indonesian military. And this came in 1992. And really from 1992 until just a few months ago, in late 2005, there have been restrictions on our cooperation which I very much supported.

But this takes us to say, late '96, I'd been there about six months and the embassy wrote a message arguing very strongly for a reinstatement of the military-to-military relationship, specifically with the IMET program, International Military Education and Training program for the Indonesian military. And I felt this was wrong, I felt that we hadn't seen any real reform and I wrote a dissent on that and it was initially, I thought, well received by the ambassador, not by his DCM but the message went out as a dissent. It was a Friday night I recall and I thought well this was pretty good, the ambassador was true to his word, that he would allow dissenting perspectives to go out as he had allowed a lot of our reporting to go out that was essentially setting a new picture for Indonesia. But at the end of the day I got word from his secretary that he wanted me and my team to stay in the office past closing time. And he came down and pulled us all into my deputy's room and began a ranting lecture saying that he was very dissatisfied

with the political section, that it wasn't reporting what he felt needed to be reported and so on and so on, loud and intimidating. And he was very clear this was a consequence of my dissent earlier in the day. So we listened to this for three or four minutes of this I said Mr. Roy, I think you don't want to talk to my team, you want to talk to me. So let's go over to my office and talk this out. And he sort of said well okay. And as I went out I remember I slammed the door and then slammed my own door behind him and essentially lectured him and said this isn't right, this is not right. This is, first of all, this is not the way you respond to dissent and number two, you don't intimidate my team which has done a great job, you talk to me, you deal with me. And that, I think established a good relationship because we became well, I took evermore a dissenting perspective there on lots of issues but I think there was sort of a baseline respect between the two of us from that moment forward.

I might say my team, after he left our suite, was very shook up and I remember one of the members of my team saying, you know, in the future if I ever want to dissent I should talk it out with the team and I think I took the position essentially that, you know, they or I could and should dissent when we felt it was necessary because they agreed with my perspective on this but they hadn't anticipated the consequences. But it was just one of a series, I think I've had four or five major dissents in my career and each one has been problematic but I think that was the most confrontational that I encountered.

Q: What- can you talk about during your time, East Timor?

MCWILLIAMS: Yes. I think probably, at least in the early stages, the first year or two, that was the principle bone of contention between myself, my section I should say, and the military in the embassy. Because it was a horrific story, tremendous abuses going on out there. And for many years there had been I think growing concern in Congress, certainly in the press about what the Indonesians were doing to East Timor and the embassy for many years had acted as a defender, an advocate for the regime, trying to basically defeat these arguments that in fact Indonesia was guilty of human rights abuse on a grand scale in East Timor. Our reporting, and I had a particularly good officer, Gary Gray, who was out there, spoke Portuguese which helped a lot, as well as great Bahasa, and his reporting was particularly well done and I think established a baseline of much better understanding what was going on in Indonesia for Washington. There was in the summer of '97, excuse me, summer of '98 an opportunity to write another dissent in which I proposed that we begin thinking about advocating a referendum in East Timor. Not well received at the embassy, not well in Washington. I had a conversation subsequently with the assistant secretary in the fall of '98 in which he said look, I agree with what you've said, I've agreed you know, morally, historically you're right, but I just don't believe East Timor is economically viable and therefore I think an argument for a referendum which might lead to independence is just not going to work. And I undertook to write for him a long message which looked at the economic question, viability of East Timor, anticipating oil and gas revenues and so on. Oddly enough I published this, I sent out this very long report, 20-some pages on the very day that, in January that President Habibie announced that he was going to allow a referendum in East Timor. And I know there was great thinking in the embassy and I understand subsequently in Washington that somehow I had advance word of that; it was just a coincidence. But it was from that point forward, January, that we began to look to a referendum that would be monitored

by the United Nations in East Timor which along with the fall of Suharto was one of the two great events of those three years that I had there.

Q: Keep with the Timor thing, I want to come back to the political thing.

MCWILLIAMS: Yes.

Q: What about the Australians and this because they played quite a role? I mean, they, I mean it was a border town, a border city, a border country.

MCWILLIAMS: Yes. Australia had been, even more than I think we had been, a supporter of the Jakarta policy in East Timor. They had made a deal in the '70s whereby they drew a line between their oil and Indonesia's oil which was quite beneficial to them but the quid pro quo for that was essentially a policy that would support Suharto's occupation of East Timor. So they were not friends of East Timor but essentially Habibie, who was not highly regarded by anybody, changed the game because here was Indonesia finally saying well, let's have a referendum. So you had U.S. policy and Australian policy which had long essentially acquiesced in Suharto's occupation of East Timor now looking at a very new situation in which a referendum was coming.

I think the critical issue as it emerged up until that referendum was actually held in September of '99 was how we would deal with the growing military repression in East Timor in advance of the referendum, the intimidation, the killing and so on. Again, I had a reporter, Gary Gray out there much of the time who did a wonderful job talking about what was in fact growing militia attacks against civilians, militias obviously organized by the military against civilians. I went out there quite frequently also to support his reporting but unfortunately what we needed to that point was a strong U.S. position essentially telling the military to knock it off, that we were aware that they were setting up these militias basically as cat's paw to intimidate the local population into voting the way Jakarta wanting them to vote and so on, and we had massacres of over 50 people in this period, a very, very rough situation. But unfortunately the U.S. never actually took a hard line with the Indonesian military about stopping these militias which were conducting these killings. Our arguments was, in the political section, you've got to disband these militias and get rid of them whereas the embassy took the line favored by the DAT's office, the defense attaché's office that well, we just have to counsel with these people and you know, encourage Aubry, TNI as it became to be more responsible here and get the facts and so on. And as a consequence the United States didn't take an opportunity to require the military to reign in these militias in advance of what happened in September which was a mass killing of East Timorese as a consequence of their vote for independence.

Q: I mean, you know, and usually there's something that follows that's not necessarily a replica of the regime before. Did you sort of come out with the idea well, you know, this guy's probably, Suharto's maybe on his way out or something like that?

MCWILLIAMS: Well again, I sort of described it earlier as events taking control. We were only, by I'd say early '98 monitoring the situation, I had proposed, our section had proposed that we begin to insist on some democratic reform just prior to the end but in point of fact that didn't

happen. But I think the people were insisting on democratic reform. And Suharto was out. Not only that but I think for the first time there was really a flowering of criticism of what the old elite had done to Indonesia including the military, obviously very critical of the military and the military was very much on the defensive within Indonesia. I think also by virtue of what it did in East Timor in September, now this is after I left, in September of '99, destroying over 70 percent of the infrastructure of East Timor, killing 1,500 people, killing some foreigners, ex-pats died as well in this, as a consequence of that I think that in Washington there was a willingness and a readiness to basically shut off our cooperation with the Indonesian military. But what I found stunning was, now this is sitting back in Washington in a different job but monitoring the situation in Indonesia very closely, notwithstanding what had happened in September before the end of the year in '99, the Pentagon was again petitioning for reestablishing a relationship with the military. That basically has never not been the mindset in the Pentagon. This is the Clinton white house, of course. But I think essentially those people who had dominated our policy for years and years and years in Washington towards Indonesia essentially retained the same interests. That is to say to maintain as good a relationship as possible with the military and secure the environment for U.S. investment, major U.S. investment. And I think to this day that continues to be the dominating interests of our administration.

Obviously in the post-9/11 world a new element came into that which is to say concern about terrorism. Terrorism has become a growing problem in Indonesia, the Bali bombings twice now and bombings in Jakarta. And the Pentagon and the Bush administration generally have made the argument well, we need to work with the army to crush terrorism. Well, as the problem presents itself in Indonesia terrorism is a police problem, it's small cells, it's not like in the Philippines and the southern Philippines where you have armies roaming and so on where you need military _____. This essentially is a police problem and we've worked with the police, I think well, to develop their forensic skills and so on but nonetheless, and it's been defective in Congress to some extent, the Pentagon and the administration have argued that well we have this terrorism problem that means we have to work with the military. And a number of us who are on the NGO side now continue to argue that that really doesn't make sense, it's a police problem and number two we argue as well, that the Indonesian military itself has ties to Islamic fundamentalists which should give us pause.

Q: Talk about you arrived in what, '96?

MCWILLIAMS: '96 in January.

Q: And you were there until when?

MCWILLIAMS: Until July of '99.

Q: Okay. When you arrived can you talk about the political situation, leadership and all and what developed there?

MCWILLIAMS: Okay. When I arrived the Suharto regime was intact, there were no challengers or challenges to its rule, the only question being his health, he was in his middle to late 70s at that point but I think no one anticipated that he would not actually seek a new term, which he did,

of office, extending his rule in '98. But I think what essentially changed that scenario, that understanding was the financial crisis in '97 and-

Q: This is '98?

MCWILLIAMS: This is '98. And we recognized that this is perhaps going to be the spark that sets things off and that's why there's tremendous interest in the State Department that night about what was going on. But the next morning the riots began and this is the riots, principally in Jakarta but also in Malang and elsewhere and it was three days of rioting, burning of buildings in which the military played a very interesting role, apparently actually organizing some of the rioting, which leads me still to think that the military did have in mind a situation in which there would be rioting- by the way, President Suharto was out of the country at that time at a meeting in Cairo, which was again very suspicious in my mind. But we had three days of terrible rioting and I remember in the first day our embassy switchboard started getting calls from Chinese residents of the city pleading for the U.S. embassy to help them, that they were being attacked in their rather Chinese compounds, Chinese sections of the city, women were being raped and killed and so on. And I recall having the secretary at the switchboard send the messages up to the political section so we're talking to people who are screaming for help and so on. Meanwhile most of us of course are out in the city trying to report what was going on as best we could. And I got a couple of these calls and I said, especially the English speaking ones, I said forward this up to the ambassador's office. He got a couple of these calls. And I went up at that point, I said you know, we've got a situation that's coming out of control here, can't we contact the military here to at least go into these Chinese quadrants of the city to sort of establish some control there because it seems to be worse there? So he said yes and moreover I'm concerned about Americans living in certain sections, try to get the military out there to, you know, defend these areas against what is just wide scale rampant rioting.

Anyway. We started making the phone calls, couldn't reach any of our military contacts, no one would answer the phone. And it was at that point, I think I had said to him, sir if we can't reach the military then we basically cannot defend Americans in the city and, you know, this is the time we need to start talking about evacuation. So in the middle of this growing rioting in the city we began evacuation of the city of all Americans including the embassy staff, cutting way back on the embassy staff. But the thinking was that if we can't reach our supposed good friends in the military to act even to defend American citizens then this is not a stable situation for us.

Q: What happened?

MCWILLIAMS: Essentially the military belatedly stepped in. I think frankly the rioters simply got tired. After three days it began to quiet down. And the vice president, for whom no one had any respect, a fellow named Habibie, was moved in as the caretaker and did a reasonably good job.

Q: By the time you left what had happened?

MCWILLIAMS: Well, I left, unfortunately, just as things were breaking loose in July of '99. What I had done before I left my very good East Timor fellow, Gary Gray, had been reporting, I

think very accurately, of the growing threat of the militias so I made one last trip out there in which I sought to see what was going on across the East Timor border in West Timor and made a trip from Dili, actually commandeering a taxi to do it to get me across the border because no one was moving at that time in East Timor on the roads. But I went into West Timor and then along the border back into East Timor, trying to see if I could see military buildup or something that was going on on the other side of the border and I did see some things and I got that reporting out. But I think I didn't anticipate and I don't think certainly Washington didn't anticipate fully what the military had in mind if the referendum went against them.

I just was looking at some notes last night that I had written up. I did report, on the basis of that trip in, I guess June of '99, talk of a Plan B, which is to say what the military would do if they lost the referendum and it was pretty ominous. And that all got reported but Washington and the embassy didn't take it seriously enough and very frankly, to be fair, I don't think I fully anticipated how bad it would be.

Q: Yes. This was when they went in with- under the cover of militias-

MCWILLIAMS: Yes, exactly.

Q: -and practically leveled a country.

MCWILLIAMS: I had the assumption, made the assumption that so long as the international presence was there, the UN were there, it would be a restraining, there would be constraint. And it simply wasn't. And that was the amazing thing for me.

* * *

MCWILLIAMS: But that was a terrible time and just to reiterate the point I made earlier, I think, for my money historically the U.S. made a fundamental mistake in not leaning on the military to disband those militias. Because I think it would not have been possible for the Indonesian military to assault the UN as the militias did and that was the whole point of the militias. And unfortunately there's a fundamental flaw in the way we approached this. Stanley Roth, who was assistant secretary, who was out there like every four or five weeks it seems, I think was good. I think he got it and I think he made the points significantly that we wanted him to make, that you know, this is not working but we never took officially the position disband those militias. But as he was going out there representing the U.S. government you had very senior military players from the Pacific Command and so on going in there and they were taking a very different line. They were still being very soothing and kind in their discussions with the military, no hard points, no insisting that the militia things stop and so on and I think as a consequence the military chose to listen to our military, not surprisingly, which had a very soothing message, and frankly ignored this civilian. And as a consequence I think, U.S. policy was mis-presented and thereby misinterpreted and it was a mistake.

* * *

Q: Well do you see establishing these military to military relations in your experience has that helped? In other words, you know, I mean, sort of getting inside the tent, can we work things so that things are better or not?

MCWILLIAMS: That's the argument that's made in this Indonesian case. We argue against that by observing that for many decades the U.S. had a very tight relationship with the Indonesian military. IMET, the International Military Education and Training was available to them. They had all sorts of people here in the United States training and in point of fact during those decades we saw terrible abuses which were uncontrolled. Most recently just in the newspapers today as a matter of fact it's reported that there is now proof that over 183,000 people died in East Timor thanks to Indonesian military actions, that they used napalm, by the way dropped from U.S.-provided aircraft against civilian targets. And this is all now very clear. It was clear, it's been clear for a long time. But that military relationship we had did nothing to reduce the abuses that we saw in the Indonesian military and indeed some of the officers within the Indonesian military with whom we had the closest relationships, who took the most training, spoke the best English and so on were among the worst abusers. So I think the notion, which is argued by the Pentagon, that well, this is the way we can reform them, if we simply get close to them and show them how we do things. Well I'm sorry but that didn't work in the past and I think they're hard put to demonstrate how it's going to work in the future.

ARGENTINA

ROBERT S. STEVEN
Political Officer
Buenos Aires (1976-1977)

Mr. Steven was born in Massachusetts and raised there and in Rhode Island. He graduated from Brown University and served in the US Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. Mr. Steven became a specialist Latin America, where he served in Mexico, Chile and Argentina. He also served in Burma, Vietnam and Japan and had several senior assignments at the State Department in Washington. Mr. Steven was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: Did you get any feel or repercussions about the Dirty War that was going on with, you know, young students particularly, young people, who were getting involved? Was this affecting everyone?

STEVEN: No, I don't think it's fair to say it did. It affected those who were affected, in the sense that if your son was taken or your family was involved in the political activity and they were targeted, yes, you were affected. But I don't think that it was something that affected the majority of Argentines. The man in the street wasn't being beaten up by the police, and these were the students or the young people who were in trouble and there weren't that many of them. Many of them had lost, I think, a great deal of sympathy because of assassinations and kidnappings and things. There was some attitude I remember hearing once from someone I thought was a very liberal-minded Argentine when somebody had just been found assassinated and disappeared, "Well, he had it coming. They were trouble makers." It wasn't that it affected such wide numbers of people. They were more worried about their economic, I think, than their political situation. They didn't like the publicity, of course. Let's face it. Many of them were humane people after all, and they didn't like to see people being killed or tortured. I don't think

the majority of Argentines would have overthrown their arms because of that type of thing. The thing which the Argentine military did which forced them out of power was the stupid war in the Falklands. The dumbest thing they ever did.

JOHN A. BUSHNELL
Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
Washington, DC (1977-1982)

Mr. Bushnell was born in New York State and educated at Yale University and McMurray College. An Economic Specialist, he served primarily in senior level positions at Latin American posts, including Bogota, Santo Domingo, San Jose and Buenos Aires, dealing primarily with Economic and International Trade issues. An assignment to the Staff of the National Security Council was followed by tours as Deputy Chief of Mission at Buenos Aires, Chargé d'Affaires at Panama City, and subsequently as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Bushnell was the recipient of several awards for outstanding service. Mr. Bushnell was interviewed by John Harter in 1997

BUSHNELL: The military during 1996 was fully engaged in the Dirty War. The military operatives would pick up people they thought were in the guerrilla infrastructure, most of whom were in the infrastructure but some of whom weren't, and these people would never be seen again. They would be tortured to find what other people were in the infrastructure. Some were dropped out of planes into the ocean; most were killed and buried. Arrested pregnant women would be held in prison until the baby was born. Then they might disappear, and the baby would be taken by a military family or someone associated with the intelligence service who wished to adopt a baby. It was a truly horrendous situation. Most of the disappearances were from families with communist or far left political associations and beliefs; thus only a fairly small part of the population was directly impacted by the military's actions, a far smaller part than was directly impacted by the guerrilla attacks and kidnappings. But by 1978 the war was largely over. The attack on Walter Kline was one of the last terrorist acts. Disappearances stopped. Many political prisoners were released.

Then the question was what should our response to the improving human rights situation be. Yes, the military had done horrible things, and the guerrillas had done horrible things in 1974, 1975, and 1976. But nobody disappeared in 1978 and 1979; the number of political prisoners was down to a handful; progress had been made, but they hadn't had an election yet and no one in the military had been punished. How should we moderate our policy to reflect progress and at least verbal intentions of making more progress? In 1977, before I came into the ARA Bureau, Patt Derian made a trip to Argentina and told, according to when I was briefed later, President Videla, who was the general in charge, that he had not only to give up the presidency but he had to go to jail. He told me years later that he'd never been spoken to by anybody, let alone a woman, like she spoke to him. Had it been a man, he would have challenged him to a duel on the spot. I don't think such confrontations helped human rights or our policy.

ETHIOPIA

PRINCETON LYMAN
USAID Mission Director
Addis Ababa (1976-1978)

Ambassador Princeton Lyman was born and raised in San Francisco. He was educated at Stanford University, University of California and Harvard University. In 1961 he joined the Agency for International Development (AID), where he served as Program Director in Korea and Ethiopia. In his long and distinguished career, Ambassador Lyman held a number of high positions at AID Headquarters in Washington, D.C. as well as with The Department of State. After serving as Ambassador to Nigeria and later to South Africa, Ambassador Lyman was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations from 1996 to 1998. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: I know that the emperor sent many students to communist countries? The ones I met were turned off by their contact with Marxism. How did you find it?

LYMAN: The same way. I experienced elsewhere that Africans who studied in the Soviet Union came back very negative. I think the military was more influenced by what they learned outside the communist bloc. They were interested in their own power-grabbing. The alliance with the Soviet Union proved to be very profitable; much military hardware poured in – far more than we were ever willing to do. Furthermore, the Soviets were willing to back the nonsensical war against Eritrea. So the Dergue was opportunistic as well as ideological.

While we were there, a very strange split occurred. In the country, there was a very, very radical group. It thought that the revolution had become too military. They were ideologues who had studied in Europe. When they returned they became the ideological gurus. They became disillusioned because they found Mengistu was first and foremost a military dictator. He didn't understand the purity of the ideology. So these people formed an left opposition and started shooting ministers on street corners, etc. This situation ushered in what was called, "The Red Terror." The government went into homes, arrested or shot suspected dissidents, while the leftist rebels continued their killing.

RICHARD C. MATHERON
Chargé d'Affaires
Addis Ababa (1977-1978)

Richard C. Matheron was born in California in 1927. He received his bachelor's degree at University of California in Berkley during 1948. His career has included positions in Cameroon, Zaire, Ethiopia, and ambassadorship to Swaziland. Ambassador Matheron was interviewed by Lee Cottman in Mark 1989.

MATHERON: But the period when I was there, from October of 1977, was referred to as the period of "Red Terror" in Addis. There were thousands of people killed by one leftist group fighting against another. It was probably one of the grimmest periods of my whole career,

although we felt relatively safe within the embassy compound. Addis was one of the few capital cities in Africa where all of the major embassies had compounds. In Addis these dated back before the turn of the century, when Menelik had given grants of land to foreign governments on the edge of the city, mainly to help protect him from feudal lords who he was afraid might come in. Although we felt that we were not personally the targets of animosity, that our lives were not really in danger, we still went to bed every night to the sound of machine gun fire just a few hundred yards away, where the government was really killing people who were accused of not being 100% loyal, even anybody having a one-dollar bill.

Previous to 1974, American dollars circulated in Ethiopia, much as they do in Liberia and in Panama, as normal currency. So a lot of people had American currency from way before. Anybody discovered with any American currency was summarily shot on the spot by the "Kebeles," and it was a very grim period.

Q: Did not a lot of people, to escape the indiscriminate killings, flee to the Sudan during that period, also?

MATHERON: Yes, exactly. From then and continuing on, but the situation in Sudan was bad. It was really a very brutal period.

Q: I read in the history of that era whereby at one point the Israeli foreign minister had disposed selling arms to the Ethiopians to repel the Somalia-backed invasion, while Ethiopia, at the same time, denounced the U.S. and other nations for perhaps backing and aiding Somalia. Of course, today that would be a little bit strange that our ally in the Middle East would be supporting one side, and we were supporting the other. Maybe that's strange; I don't know. How do you feel about that?

MATHERON: I don't have proof of that, but I suspect that it was correct. Although the Ethiopians did not have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, they had informal relations. Ethiopia, despite the fact that it was a Marxist country, still saw itself as the old Christian Ethiopian empire surrounded by Islam. There's always been sort of a natural alliance between Ethiopia and Israel, because if you remember, even the Ethiopian monarchy traced its origins back to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. There's much more of a special relationship between Ethiopia and Israel that dates back so many hundreds of years.

ELIZABETH RASPOLIC
Consular Officer
Addis Ababa (1978-1980)

Elizabeth Raspolic worked for the Peace Corps in Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. She served mainly as a consular officer in France, Korea, Ethiopia, and China. Ms. Raspolic was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.

Q: Could you describe the political situation in Ethiopia when you were there, and what you were doing?

RASPOLIC: I got there toward the end of the Red and White terror. I must say the revolution had been three or four years beforehand. There had been sporadic uprisings since then. When I arrived, the first week that I was there, my predecessor was still in town, and so I was very graciously invited to all of his farewell parties.

I went to one downtown in an apartment building really about two blocks away from the building that I ultimately ended up living in, and it was a buffet. We were maybe on the third or fourth floor. We were all standing in line, waiting to serve ourselves at the buffet table, and there was gunfire out in the piazza, out on the square. The hostess dropped to the floor, crawled over to the French doors that opened onto this tiny little terrace, closed the French doors, turned around and urged her guests to fill their plates! (Laughs) I was sort of standing there thinking, "Oh, my God! What have I gotten myself into this time?"

I must say it all went uphill from there. It was relatively calm, although the Ethiopian public was generally very ill at ease and quite concerned about civil unrest.

LEBANON

MORRIS DRAPER NEA, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon Washington, DC (1976-1978)

Morris Draper was born in California in 1928 and graduated from the University of Southern California in 1952. An Arabic language officer, Mr. Draper served in a number of Middle East posts including Beirut, Baghdad, Jeddah, Ankara, Jerusalem, and Washington, DC. Mr. Draper was interviewed in 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: What were our interests in Lebanon?

DRAPER: We had sentimental interests, the University of Beirut, it was a sanctuary for the Palestinians, was flashpoint that could explode between Israel and Syria and others into another major conflict in the Middle East. It was a source of great instability.

Q: Was there a perception that the Palestinians might dominate the situation?

DRAPER: Oh, yes. By 1976, it was quite clear that the Palestinians had already set up a state-within-a-state. People had predicted this outcome starting in 1970 because as the Jordanians were kicking Palestinians out of their country, the latter had no other place to go but Lebanon. In Syria, they would have remained under tight Syrian control; in Lebanon, the government had been traditionally weak and the army and police forces were ineffective. So they went to Lebanon and by 1976, the Palestinian dominated the total area south of Beirut to the Israeli border.

Q: What role did Brzezinski play?

DRAPER: The rivalry between Brzezinski and Vance existed but it did not interfere with the orderly conduct of our foreign policy. Differences existed about other issues--Africa, Iran--but on the Middle East, Brzezinski cooperated well with Vance. Of course, we had a President who couldn't go to bed at night unless he had read the latest cables. We also knew that "night reading" and other memoranda would eventually get to the President, even if they might have an accompanying note from Brzezinski. So there were many ways of getting our ideas to Carter's attention. That all changed with Reagan; he didn't want to read that much and therefore got in some cases only papers that the ideologues had approved. If a proposal didn't quite fit a campaign promise, the NSC had no compulsion in just ditching it. So, as far as the Arab-Israeli issue was concerned, the Vance-Brzezinski rivalry was not a big thing. It did emerge on other issues. Carter himself was closer to Brzezinski than to Vance. Carter felt that Zbigniew was a fascinating personality and that he had a fascinating mind.

During 1978, I became deeply involved in the problems raised by the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. An Israeli bus had been attacked by Palestinian terrorists on a road just north of Tel Aviv. The Israelis, a few days later, moved into southern Lebanon intending to destroy all the Palestinians there. They bombed the hell out of the area. They came up to the Tyre area, close to the Litani River. It was not a very well conducted military exercise. The Israeli tipped their invasion and allowed the Palestinians to retreat to some safety; it was a sloppy exercise in many ways. But it created problems. Previous minor incursions and other incidents had involved Carter personally. In this case, we were afraid that the Israelis would not withdraw and would remain about 20 miles inside Lebanon. That would have raised many difficult questions, including what Syrian reaction might be.

One of my major career achievements had been participation in the establishment of UNIFIL (the UN peace keeping force) which had been created primarily at my suggestion, when I was chairing the Task Force on Lebanon. Secretary Vance did not think that the UN would approve it, but after working night and day on it for a few days--on the phone, in New York--putting a couple of UN resolutions together which described the force's mandate, we got them approved. The Soviets might have vetoed them, but they didn't--Vance talked them out of it. Very helpful was the UN Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We were fortunate in getting a Security Council meeting together before the Israeli Foreign Minister was able to reach New York. He was still on route when the Council met; so that the resolutions were all approved before he had an opportunity to interfere--he would probably have objected to them.

It was all put together so quickly that there really was no effort by Israel or its supporters to interfere with the process. So we put this UN force together which was designed to take over the territory and stabilize it as the Israelis withdrew from it. We got troops from all sorts of countries--Ireland, Canada, Sweden, Iran, etc--all of which had recognized Israel and Lebanon. The Israelis withdrew very slowly and a lot of pressure had to be applied to them. They would not however move from a very narrow strip north of the Israeli border; they stayed there and build up a local army of Christian Lebanese who became their allies. That strip became almost a permanent irritant in American-Israeli relationships because the Lebanese and Syrians and others

were always pressuring us to get these Israeli troops out of the strip, but Israel was not about to do that. To this day, that strip along the border is maintained. UNIFIL was very useful; it was the first time that we were able to put together a peace-keeping force of that nature that quickly. Despite the heavy criticism that has been levied against it, it has become a stabilizing force.

Q: Let me return to the invasion of Lebanon. How did you perceive all those events?

DRAPER: In 1981, we had a crisis when Syrians helicopters attacked Christian position. The Israelis sent some aircraft which shot down a couple of helicopters. That brought on an immediate crisis because the Syrians brought into the Bekaa Valley some anti-aircraft missiles, That was a violation of the so called "Red Line" agreement which was negotiated in 1976 and permitted the Syrians to enter Lebanon, but without their missiles. That in effect allowed Israeli reconnaissance planes to fly over Lebanon without being threatened. But by bringing their missiles into Lebanon, the Syrians had violated the agreement. The Israelis were ready to attack. One of the problems at the time was that some of the Reagan ideologues, such as the lower level NSC man I mentioned earlier, were trying to get over the Vietnam syndrome and were hoping for a situation which would permit the Israeli to bomb Damascus with our assistance. Or they looked for other pretenses equally idiotic. We tried to get some sanity into the process. I am not saying that any of these actions might have happened nor that Haig would have gone along with some of the wild ideas. But there were people that he occasionally listened to and who had some influence here and there in Washington that were just too wild.

Haig brought Phil Habib out of retirement as a Special Emissary. He and I went to the region to diffuse the crisis by trying to get the Syrians to pull back their anti-aircraft missiles or by developing some other kind of acceptable arrangement. But whatever could be done could only be brokered by the United States since the Israelis and Syrians were not talking to each other. This was in the midst of a heavy electoral campaign in Israel. It was a painful period. Phil and I saw early on that we wouldn't get any movement out of the Syrians; so we gradually made an effort to develop a program which would ease some of Israel's legitimate concerns in a pragmatic way. We came up with the idea of reducing the threat to Israel by the Palestinian forces stationed in Lebanon and with Saudi assistance, brought about a *de facto* cease-fire between the PLO and Israel, starting in July. We were hoping to reinforce this fragile cease-fire with other initiatives later on. We tried that, but were unsuccessful. But that was the first *de facto* agreement between Israel and the PLO; it was the source of great controversy in Israel. Began heard from many critics for seeming to recognize the PLO, but it did buy us about eleven months of relative peace.

Q: These Habib negotiations lasted how long?

DRAPER: From early 1981--about April-- to July when we achieved the cease-fire. The remainder of 1981 was spent traveling back and forth in the region trying to reach a follow-on agreement. We were trying to sell a plan which called for a pull back of forces from the Israel-Lebanon border--that would have pulled the PLO and other Arab groups out of artillery range of Israel. We had other schemes as well. It became clear when Sharon became Israeli Defense Minister that the Israel would move into Lebanon sooner or later to try to destroy the PLO and to set up a regime to their own liking. That was an absolutely stupid idea and in fact turned out to be one of Israel's biggest mistakes. We could see that outcome developing; Sharon practically

told Habib and me at one meeting in December, 1981 what he had hoped to do--he did indicate that he did not yet have full Cabinet approval. So some of us spent between December, 1981 and June, 1982--when the Israeli actually invaded--trying to head off what we perceived to be a catastrophe not only for Israel, but also for the West and the United States. I spent a lot of time briefing Haig and Larry Eagleburger, who was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Unfortunately, my prognostications were exactly on the mark.

The image of American supplied aircraft, munitions, arms crashing down on civilian targets in Lebanon created a horrible uproar in the world and isolated the United States in the Arab world. People like Nick Veliotis, then the Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, made similar predictions. Our trouble was, and it was the same trouble that we always had, that the administration could not develop the political will to confront Israel and to tell it that it could not invade Lebanon. Haig wrote in his memoirs that he warned the Israeli that they couldn't take any actions unless it was in response to an internationally recognized provocation; whatever the Israelis did would have to be proportionate to the provocation. That statement didn't mean a thing and no one understood it. The historians will have to decide whether the United States gave in effect a green light to Israel; many Israelis think so. The most common view is that when Sharon told Haig what he was going to do, he got the equivalent of a wink of approval. Haig did not: "You can't invade Lebanon" and he didn't wink; he just didn't comment in some cases. He listened to what the Israelis had to say; once the Israeli Chief of Intelligence told Haig that Israel would have to invade if they couldn't get a better control of the situation. At that stage, we should have said: "No, you cannot do that". We might have had to get Reagan to get in touch with Begin or take other measures to impress the Israelis that important US interests were at stake and that they just couldn't proceed. But we didn't. The Israelis wanted not only to knock out the Palestinians, and were trying to provoke a little fight with the Syrians, which they managed to do, but they wanted to install a regime in Beirut amenable to the Israelis. That would have changed the whole complexion of the Middle East and just would not have been acceptable or possible.

Lebanon was somewhat of an outsider in the Middle East in any case, but most of the countries of the regime wanted to regard it as an Arab country. Lebanon was a case, like Ireland and Cyprus, where religious strife would intensify political differences. It was a very complicated situation which made outcomes very unpredictable. From a professional point of view, it was very dangerous to have another Arab-Israel confrontation, such as between Syria and Israel, because we had to be concerned with the potential Soviet reaction. In 1967 and 1973, we were very close to an all out confrontation between the US and the USSR over the Middle East, which is what makes the area so dangerous. For all these reasons, we were very leery of any Israeli attack on Lebanon.

Q: When Haig didn't respond as he might have, did anyone suggest to him that he needed to take a stronger position?

DRAPER: Yes, indeed. There were some mild warnings. We wanted Haig and the President to go all out to stop, but the administration was not willing; it did not want a confrontation with Israel having been burned before. They did not want to do what Carter had done--seeming to turn against Israel. As it was, our relations with Israel weren't that good. Israel, in 1982, had attacked

the atomic reactor in Baghdad and while many in the administration secretly applauded, we had to go along with a resolution in the UN condemning Israel. Israel had also unilaterally absorbed the Golan Heights, not just occupied them, but had in effect extended its sovereignty. That was very upsetting to us because they had done it without consultation. They had done what Kissinger had asked them not to do--no more surprises. And then there was one surprise after another. The administration was so exasperated that it suspended the so called "Memorandum of Understanding" concerning security affairs that we had signed a few weeks earlier. That was the way we tried to show the Israelis that we were upset. We also held back the delivery of some aircraft that the Israelis had paid for. So at this juncture --1981/82--, our relationships were not outstanding. But the Israelis had the bit in their teeth and they were going to go all out regardless of what the American administration was saying--unfortunately. So we were not able to hold the Israelis back. Many of us were just holding our breaths knowing that the invasion of Lebanon would come sooner or later.

Q: How did the Israeli incursion begin?

DRAPER: It was set off by the attempted assassination of their Ambassador in London--Mr. Argov, who incidentally is still alive, but permanently crippled and hospitalized--terrible tragedy. But that was the excuse. Sharon had been secretly planning for this all along was able to sway the Cabinet and the Prime Minister. It started out for the first couple of days with air attacks on the Palestinians and a few other similar actions. Then it escalated until Israelis moved across the border with men and armor. Even then, they described the offensive as having limited objectives; they called it "Peace for Galilee". The announced intention was to drive the Palestinian forces 40 kilometers. When they had reached that line, they went on to Beirut and surrounded the city. There were intermittent cease-fires all along, but none lasted very long. When the Israelis moved on Beirut, the situation changed. The limited objectives had been superseded. The Israelis surrounded Beirut; it was the first time that an Arab capital was in danger of being conquered by the Israelis--that was a major turning point.

We desperately tried to diffuse the situation; we helped to bring about the various cease-fires. The Israelis destroyed with virtually no losses the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles systems in Lebanon. The Israelis shot down something like 90 of Syrians first line aircraft. The Syrians were quite bloodied; they dishonored themselves on the ground. From the military point of view, the Israeli operation was not that impressive. With all the resources that they had, they should have been able to move through a small country like Lebanon much more quickly. The Palestinian forces largely retreated in fair order without too many casualties to Beirut where they could hide in the warrens of the city and where they could defy the Israelis.

Q: As this invasion proceeded, what was the United States doing? What was the Pentagon saying?

DRAPER: The Pentagon was not dispensing any advice; it was basically describing what was going on militarily. The Israelis moved relatively slowly up the coast. What the world did see was vast bombing of essentially civilian areas. It was well covered by the media and TV particularly. The media fanned out over Sidon and Beirut and saw fires from bombs and other destruction; what it saw was a significant military power being applied to a small country that was basically defensive. Women and children were in the camera's eyes to the great

embarrassment of Israel. A lot of the destruction was caused by American-made aircraft dropping American-made bombs. Since the US was seen as such a close associate of Israel, we were blamed not only in the Middle East, but throughout the world, for allegedly having given the "green light". That happened even in the United States. In fact, our laws were being violated because the arms and munitions that we sold cannot be used except for defensive purposes. They cannot be used to subdue other countries. We had all sorts of restrictions on our arms sales and particularly with the Israel. For example, countries that resold any equipment that they had bought from us many years earlier would have been in violation of our laws. In all cases, we had many rules concerning the use of weapons of terror, like cluster bombs, which clearly barred their use unless the purchasing country had been attacked by another power. The Israelis used them in their offensive operations in Lebanon, clearly in violation of United States laws.

Q: Where were you physically during this period?

DRAPER: The night that Argov was killed a task force under my chairmanship was established in Washington. Habib was on his way to join the President in Europe; he was planning another mission to the Middle East and went to Europe to consult with Reagan and Haig. From there, he did go to the Middle East where I joined him a couple of days later. I met him in Damascus, so that we were when the fighting started. During the invasion period, we spent considerable time in Israel and visited Damascus again. Then we took a dangerous trip through the fighting by back roads to get to Beirut. Phil spent a lot of time in Beirut because he could have secret meetings with the Israelis there. I would occasionally helicopter to Israel to brief the government there.

When we got agreement in principle to evacuate the Palestinian fighters, we had to find new homes for them. We flew to Amman, even to London to meet King Hussein, to see whether some could be resettled in Jordan. We also flew to Cairo and then Damascus again. It was a shuttle that never stopped—it went on 24 hours per day week after week. Finally, in August, the evacuation started preceded by lot of preparations which of course raised a number of problems that had to be raised at the last minute. We had to--very regrettably because we would have preferred not to--find an international force at the demand of the Lebanese and the Palestinians to protect the latter as they were being evacuated. It was a reasonable request, but the Israelis would not accept a UN force which was our preference. We already had a UN force in Southern Lebanon, but the Israelis were adamantly opposed to anything that was connected to the UN. So very, very reluctantly, we put together a multilateral force of Italians, French and Americans. Reagan personally approved this scheme, but both Phil and I were very reluctant to do that, but we saw no other alternative. We still had to get guarantees from the good guys and the bad guys--the Israelis, the Christians, etc--to make sure that the Palestinians' families would be protected. We gave assurances, made all kinds of guarantees in good faith. Unfortunately, many of the assurances were broken later when then newly elected President Gemayel was assassinated and the Israelis moved into Beirut despite their promises. They allowed the Christians to massacre many hundreds of Palestinians in the Shatila and Sabra camps.

Q: Did we believe that the Israelis were implicated in this tragedy?

DRAPER: Of course. One of the items in the subsequent investigation records showed that I

personally had been in touch with the Israelis to protest the massacres. When I found out about the events, I dictated a message to Defense Minister Sharon which was given to Israeli intermediaries. I assigned full blame to him for what was happening because he had complete control of the area and could have stopped the massacres if he wished. It was obscene. We did everything we could to stop the Christians; it was a desperate and difficult situation.

Q: When you protested the Sabra and Shatila massacres, did you have instructions?

DRAPER: No. Habib and I, while we were in the region, operated largely without instructions. We were implementing a policy as we went along; the policy was generally to do the best we could.

When I returned to the Middle East on September 14, that was the day Gemayel was assassinated. I was in Lebanon on the 15th; on the night of the 16th--approximately--, we saw signs of some Israeli activity, although we weren't sure what was happening; it could have been the Christians moving back into Beirut. But we weren't sure of what was happening for another 24 or 48 hours. Of course, during this time, we were trying to get Israeli assurances and also Christian promises not to enter Beirut. We went to see Gemayel's brother, who later became President, to ask him to keep his Christian militias out of the city. A lot of this became public later when the Israelis investigated the events of these weeks and punished the people responsible--there were lot of people punished. But we didn't know what was going on at the time, except that we were getting calls from Lebanese people, intelligence services, reporters. We could see through binoculars that there was considerable activity in the city. For example, the Israelis were firing illumination shells near the Palestinian camps. That aroused our suspicion. We discovered later that on that first night they let the Christian militia into the camps.

The Israelis maintained, at least at the time of the massacres, that there were still 3,000 or 4,000 fighters in the area that had to be rooted out. They insisted that they had intelligence information that had led them to that conclusions. I kept asking them for their sources because our checks indicated that there may have been a handful of fighters who had gone underground. There was a handful of former officials who were hiding out--one or two of them we helped to reach Damascus safely. They were the so called "scholars"--people who ran the Palestinian libraries, etc. At most there were a handful of guerrillas; it was certainly not an organized resistance. There were a few armed men in the camps, some of whom our Embassy officials had talked to, but they were all men 60 or 70 years old. They may have had old shotguns, but they were not a threat. Essentially, the camps were disarmed.

Sharon, in particular, had pushed Gemayel, when he was still alive, to enter the Palestinian area. We have records of this. Sharon wanted all these people cleaned out. The Israelis and Sharon were partially correct because the Palestinians had stored large amounts of arms and ammunition in underground caves and vaults. The Lebanese forces had volunteered to enter the areas to remove these supplies. They had people who could have done the job over a period of time. There were undeniably great caches of arms and ammunition that had to be removed; that was part of the understandings. The Lebanese government wanted to do it their way; the Israelis wanted the government to invite them to do the job for it. Gemayel's assassination gave the Israelis the excuse to proceed. So the Israelis entered Beirut, breaking their promise, and found

gigantic caches of arms and ammunition that had been built up over the years. A lot was small arms. The Israelis got a lot of intelligence by searching the libraries and file rooms and other areas. So from one point of view, one can understand why the Israelis did what they did, but on the other, they did break a government-to-government promise. It was a shock to have the Chief of State of a country tell the emissary of another country, which was its main ally, something that turned out not to be true. That is quite an experience.

Q: Did you think Begin knew what was going to happen?

DRAPER: Someone in that room knew. Whether Begin did, is a mystery. The Israeli investigators of the Sabra-Shatila massacres found contradictory statements including a record made on the Jewish Sabbath which indicated that one Israeli official had called Begin to tell him some of the things that were happening. Begin, in his testimony to the investigators, denied having had such a call. Begin was a very faithful Jew; he would not customarily pick up a telephone on the Sabbath as he was preparing to go to a synagogue. So it is hard to tell where the truth lies.

Let me review the sequence: I had just returned from the United States and was in Israel, when we heard of the explosion which we later found out had killed Gemayel. Then we got the word that the Israelis might be engaged in some military activities; at that stage, we got in touch with Begin and got his promise that the Israelis would just encircle the city. We then left for Beirut to discover that the Israelis were going beyond encirclement; they were penetrating the city. Two days later, we found the evidence of a huge massacre. I was still in Beirut at that time. With Washington guidance, we then immediately focused getting the Israelis out of Beirut.

The condemnation of the massacre was world-wide. We wanted the Israelis out of Beirut, out of Lebanon if possible, but at least as far away from Beirut as possible. We encountered great resistance from the Israelis to move back at all, but the public pressure, both within and outside Israel were so tremendous, that the government had to retreat to some degree. The whole Beirut incident later led to an investigation of the invasion and the massacre and the fall of Sharon. Although we focused on getting the Israelis out of Beirut and the surrounding area, because of our guilt complex, we had to bring back international forces to police the area and lend a presence. That was not something that either Habib or I recommended. Phil was in Washington at the time, so I can't be sure of that, but I doubt that he would have recommended the return of the multinational force. The decision was made unilaterally in Washington on the grounds that the US had to do something. There has been a distortion in the history of the period. We did not bring the Marines back with a standard "military mission objective". But there was an objective and that was for the Marines to be a presence while the legitimate Lebanese government could re-establish its authority. We didn't have a peace-keeping mission. It was very amorphous. It is a fact that the military didn't have its usual objectives, which are all spelled. If they had that sort of objective, the Marines would not have been placed where they were. They were put in the airport area because the Israelis controlled the airport and they would not pull out unless Americans were assigned there. The Israelis didn't want to be fronting against the French or the Italians for various reasons. None of the multinational forces came as peace-keepers or police; otherwise there would have been thirty or forty thousand more--it would have been a major military operation which would have occupied the area. But our objective was political; it was to lean on the

legitimate government of Lebanon to assert their own authorities, build their own armies and use their police forces in a constitutional way. It was not an ideal solution by any means.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Ambassador
Lebanon (1981-1983)

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree from Duke University in 1951 and joined the State Department in 1956. In addition to serving as ambassador to Lebanon, his career included positions in Venezuela, Turkey, Malaysia, and Egypt. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

Q: Before we move on, I want to ask a question which happens to be timely in light of our prospective actions in Somalia. It is often said that "we don't want another Lebanon". Our Marines were in Beirut during your tour. They didn't seem to have a clear mission. Has anyone talked to you or any other Embassy staff member who was in Beirut at the time our Marines were there?

DILLON: ...The typical Marine battalion tends to be a collection of high school football players. They are very nice guys. Their officers are very good; they are all very disciplined so that you don't get all the accidental killings as you did with the Legionnaires and the Israelis. But what happened was that they came back without a mission and that was disastrous.

Within a very few days of their first departure, the newly elected President of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated (September 14). He was killed; the Israelis, who had promised to stay out of Beirut, immediately invaded to "restore order". That was just a pretext; there was no disorder. It was done over our protest. The Israelis cut off the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. As the world soon found out the Israeli army guarded the approaches to the camps. They shone spotlights on the camps while a group of Maronite militia entered the camps and murdered 1,500 people, I would guess. The Israeli reports indicated only 800 deaths, but I don't believe that; I think it was twice that. The Palestinians on their side used figures like 3,500 but I doubt whether it was that high. The Americans were terribly embarrassed by this slaughter because the whole deal with the Palestinian leadership included solemn promises, bolstered by pledges from both the Maronite militia and the Israelis, that there would be no reprisals and no violence visited on the Palestinians civilians who remained behind after the withdrawal of the PLO forces. But those promises were broken quickly. In an almost knee-jerk reaction, the Marines were sent back in.

I was not consulted on this at all. From then on, it was a process of finding a mission for them. Initially, there were no problems, but eventually the whole enterprise broke down. The operation as I have said was poorly conceived and defined. I don't think the Marines should have returned and certainly if they had to return, should have been in greater strength. There were only 1,400 lightly armed Marines; that is not many. The prestige of the United States and the prestige of the Marines is such that you can get away with a light presence for a short period of time, but after a while, that fades. The potential enemies are not stupid; they can count. After a while, they notice

how few Marines there are and how lightly armed they are. They didn't have artillery which some of the Lebanese militia had.

* * *

One reason I and my staff were so bothered by the Sabra-Shatila massacre is because we were present when Arafat, clearly very concerned about the fate of the Palestinians who were going to be left behind, was being given assurances that the women, children and old people would not be harmed. And they were butchered.

Q: What were you doing as the PLO fighters pulled out?

DILLON: ...On the edge of the city was a neighborhood called Sabra; in its center was a refugee camp called Shatila. The Israelis surrounded Sabra; cut it off completely. They mounted searchlights from buildings nearby to illuminate Sabra and Shatila. They allowed a group of Maronite fighters, all part of the militia, under the command of Eli Hobeika, who had been Bashir's personal bodyguard, and whom I had known well. He was a pathological killer. The group was fairly large. They entered Sabra and Shatila and began to kill people systematically. All the Palestinian fighters had been evacuated; there were almost no adult males. There were elderly men, women and children. By this time, I was in Washington. I was actually at the White House when the report of Bashir's assassination came in. I remember someone asking me who the next President would be; I immediately said it would be his older brother, Amin, which turned out to be correct. We all became very apprehensive about the Israeli entrance into the city. Then word came that "something was going on in the camps. As soon as I heard that, I felt sick because I guessed what would be going on. Our political officer, Ryan Crocker, and a couple of newspaper men got into Sabra and Shatila, about 48 hours after the beginning of the massacre. They were absolutely sickened by the mounds of bodies they saw. At a minimum, there were several hundreds of people killed, but the murders were still going on. Then there was an international outcry and the Maronite operation came to a halt. The Maronites withdrew. The Palestinians estimated that 2,000 people were killed; later an Israeli inquiry established the number at 850, which I think was a whitewash. The area stunk with the smell of bodies.

DAVID WINN
Political Counselor
Beirut (1984-1985)

David M. Winn was born in Texas in 1942. He graduated from Swarthmore College in 1964, received an MA from the University of Texas in 1966 and an MPA from Syracuse University in 1969. He served in the Peace Corps and then joined the Foreign Service in 1969. He has served overseas in Vietnam, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, France and Senegal. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: I just lost my thought. Well, what about, you know you had before your time this massacre done by Christian militia in Sabra and Shatila, but what was the feeling that you were getting from people who had been around there? Was this done in collusion with the Israelis or was the militia getting out of control?

WINN: Oh, I think the Israelis looked the other way. I think we'll never know whether the Israelis knew they would commit a wholesale massacre, but they were in general agreement I think. In fact the commission determined that Sharon sort of looked the other way. Yes, there was collusion and the Maronites went in with the collusion of the Israelis. Well, I'm not sure if anyone will ever know whether they, the extent of the massacre was predictable, but again things moved so quickly after I got there. Sabra and Shatila was almost like another era, another.

SYRIA

EDWARD G. ABINGTON
Political Office
Damascus (1979-1982)

Mr. Abington was born in Texas into a US military family and was raised in military posts in the US and abroad. An Arabic language officer and specialist in Near East Affairs, he describes his experience dealing with Israel-Arab hostilities and general regional problems while serving as Political Officer at Embassies Tel Aviv and Damascus. In his postings at the State Department in Washington, he also dealt with Near East matters. Mr. Abington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: What happened after this crisis?

ABINGTON: ...It was during the spring or summer of 1981 that this section of Hamas, the old section of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, really rose up against the government forces in the area. Hafez El-Assad in consultation with the Alaoui military leaders – and the Alaoui were in all the key military positions, the intelligence units, the special forces, a group called the Defense Forces which was headed by Assad's brother and was deployed in the Damascus area to defend the Alaoui regime – they decided that they had had enough of this uprising, of these assassinations. One has to keep in mind that it was very much targeted against Alaouis. There were many Alaoui officials who were assassinated because they were Alaoui. There had been these brutal car bombings. The government decided that it was going to crush the situation once and for all. Assad's brother, Rifaat El-Assad, deployed the Defense Forces equipped with T-72 tanks to Hamas, closed off the area, went in and just leveled this area where the Muslim Brotherhood was holed up. It was a civilian area. Basically, they shelled it and then they brought in bulldozers and just bulldozed the whole thing. No one knows how many people were killed. I know that it's become the common wisdom that 10,000 were killed. In fact, I don't think anyone really knows. But the Syrians sealed off the area. No one could get in or out for about a week until it was over. That really broke the back of the Muslim Brotherhood. There were assassinations, a few bombings, after that.

RICHARD E. UNDELAND
Public Affairs Officer
Damascus (1979-1983)

Richard E. Undeland was born in 1930 in Omaha, Nebraska. He graduated from Harvard University in 1952 with a degree in English literature, received an M.B.A. from Stanford University, and studied in Egypt from 1955-1956. In addition to Syria, Mr. Undeland served in Vietnam, Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July of 1994.

Q: There are a number of major things that happened while you were there. You were talking about the Muslim Brotherhood. Did that have any effect on what you were doing? How did you perceive it?

UNDELAND: It didn't affect us in USIS directly, but the challenge to the regime from the Muslim Brotherhood or whomever was the internal political issue in the country. The authority of the Government was challenged by a group of violent incidents, beginning with killing of a group of mostly Alawite cadets in an Aleppo military school shortly before I arrived. Then, there were the 4 major bombings in Damascus and the killing of Russians which I have mentioned, but the climax came in Hama, when an armed Islamic group tried to take over the city, some said start a nation-wide uprising to throw out the regime and end Alawi dominance. They killed a number of party and government officials. The Government response was massive and brutal, calculated to obliterate the insurgents and warn others of what retribution awaited them if they revolted. The uprising was labeled the work of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Jordan was accused of supporting, but whoever they were organizationally, they mounted a serious, organized challenge. Depending on your sources, the number killed in Hama ranged between 20,000 and 30,000; this bloody retaking of the city was the work of the President's brother, Rifaat al Assad, and his special forces. Apparently a standard tactic used was to level with artillery any building from which so much as a single shot came, killing all inside.

I drove north to Aleppo -- it was a long planned trip -- only a few days after the fighting in Hama, and on the way up was routed by security forces to the east of the city on back roads, so I did not see anything of the city. However, on the way back 3 or 4 days later, all traffic was sent right through it. The destruction was staggering. The large blue domed mosque you had had to make a little loop around on the main road in the center of the city had been totally leveled and the adjacent cemetery laid waste. Where there had been the buildings of the old city, you now had a clear view through to the Orontes River. One of the big water wheels was gone. I had visited Hama several times and had trouble believing what had happened, how much was just no longer there.

Q: Did the United States play up Hama at all?

UNDELAND: No, but then, should we have done so? The Embassy reported back to Washington what it gleaned, including what I heard and saw, and I think the Department spokesman fielded some questions, but the USG didn't publicly make a big deal out of it. Part of it was there was little hard information, for the Syrian Government first denied and then played down what had happened. Correspondents were not allowed in. Many details came from Phalange and other Lebanese sources, which were inherently unreliable for they had anti-Syrian axes to grind. Stories were everywhere, but it was hard to track them down and separate truth

from fiction. The tale of British correspondent Geoffrey Hurst is illuminating. Denied permission to go there, he traveled to Aleppo, where he hired a cab and went south to Hama, arriving at the height of the shooting. His reports of what was happening, filed a few days later after he got to Lebanon, were categorically denied by the Syrians, and there wasn't anybody else's stuff to back him up. Hurst didn't make the splash he would have with any reliable confirmation. The Syrians played their cards well, whatever you may think of their game.

IRAQ

DAVID G. NEWTON

Ambassador

Iraq (1984-1988)

Ambassador Newton was raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard University and the University of Michigan. An Arabic speaking Middle East Specialist, he served both in Washington and abroad in positions dealing with Middle Eastern matters. His overseas postings include Yemen (three times), Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. From 1984 to 1988 he served as US Ambassador to Iraq and from 1994 to 1997 as US Ambassador to Yemen. A graduate of the National War College, he was also assigned there as Deputy International Affairs Advisor, and in 1997 he was Special Envoy to Iraq. Following retirement, Ambassador Newton joined Radio Free Europe in Prague. Ambassador Newton was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: What is Halabja?

NEWTON: Halabja was the gassing of the Kurds.

Q: Gassing of the--

NEWTON: That whole village. The related to the fact was the fact that the Iranians had broken in through Kurdistan. The Iraqis, at a time when there was very a great deal of water coming down the rivers especially the Tigris that ran through Baghdad had to drain two of their dams, their reservoirs so that Baghdad began to sink under water. We had streets sinking and geysers appearing in the streets and so forth. Very serious threat. We came very close to having a major flood in the whole city. So it was just and of course the War of the Cities, which got the Iranians got the worst end of it. But we still got a lot of Scud missiles. In the end I think we had well over a hundred Scud missiles hitting, hitting Baghdad while I was there.

HAYWOOD RANKIN

Political Officer

Baghdad (1986-1988)

Haywood Rankin was born in the District of Columbia in 1946. He received both his bachelor's degree and law degree from the University of North Carolina in 1968 and 1971, respectively. His career has included positions in Tangier,

Algiers, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Muscat, and Abidjan. Haywood Rankin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 24, 1998.

Q: How did you get kicked out?

RANKIN: Things began to change quickly in the summer of 1988. The Iraqis suddenly had defeated the Iranians on the battlefield and were positioning themselves to recross the Shatt al-Arab. Khomeini sent up the white flag in July of 1988, and the war suddenly was over. About the same time our new ambassador arrived, April Glaspie, and a new deputy chief of mission. It was a small embassy and I was effectively the institutional memory, having served at the post for two years. I really looked forward to a year with April whom I had known in two previous assignments and with the new DCM whom I didn't know, Joe Wilson, an Africanist. It was a very hopeful moment.

We had had one black cloud on the horizon already in the spring in March when Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against the Kurds in a town called Halabcha. Halabcha had already begun to shake our theory that if you have a little bit of leverage with a dictator like Saddam Hussein he will be a nice guy and when peace comes you will find that he is going to become more democratic and use civilized methods. The gas attack in March on Halabcha, it turned out, was a correct signal. Shortly after Khomeini ended the war in July, in August, Saddam, instead of doing what he should have done - consolidate his international position and his victory, try to refurbish himself as somehow a "nice autocrat" along the lines of Mubarak - instead of doing that, he used his newly amassed chemical weapons against his own Kurdish population in substantial attacks on northern villages with results that were gruesome.

His first priority, as always, was absolute power. One of the first things he wanted to do after defeating Iran was to defeat the Kurds, to get that Kurdish rebellion finally off the boards and control Kurdistan once and for all. The easy way, if you like, was to use gas, rather like our use of atomic bombs. Gas didn't involve a lot of his own troops dying. It would scare the Kurdish population. What Saddam didn't understand - because Saddam has always had a weak understanding of the rest of the world - was that the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds would be the beginning of the end of his relationship with the United States and to some extent with the rest of the civilized world.

As political officer it was my job to investigate as well as I could on the ground what had happened and how the Kurds felt about it. That was my job to do. The earliest opportunity I had for that was in October. I put in requests to visit two Kurdish cities. I'm not talking about remote Kurdistan, I'm talking about Dohuk and Arbil. I didn't even attempt to go to Sulaymania. By then after two years I had developed a certain little network of contacts up in Arbil and I knew people who were associated with the Barzanis and Talabani. I applied to the foreign ministry to travel to the north and got permission to do so. I also contacted my network of people who are Kurds and let them know that I would be wanting to see some of their people in the north.

I even went with a British colleague called Charles Hollis who had newly arrived. I did not take my family on that but I did take Hollis. We met a lot of Kurds both in Dohuk and Arbil and I learned even from Kurds who were traditionally bought off by the regime that they were really

horrified by the use of gas. My political reporting was basically to say that Saddam Hussein had managed to humiliate even his own Kurdish allies in Arbil and Dohuk.

It was not until November that we got the news. Suddenly, April Glaspie, the ambassador, was called into the foreign ministry and was told that Mr. Rankin would have a week to leave. The ministry cited my trip to Kurdistan as the pretext. She was irate and did everything in her power to drive home the message that this would be another body blow to the American-Iraqi relationship and hoped that they would rethink it, but they didn't. Within a week, we were gone.

In retrospect, as I look back on it and taking into account the time it took the Iraqis to arrive at their decision, my suspicion is that my expulsion wasn't a reaction to the trip I made to the north. They would have expected me to talk to the Kurds. I'm a political officer and when they gave me permission to go to the north it was perfectly obvious what I was going to do. They always knew whom I talked with and I actually talked mostly to Saddam Hussein's bought-off Kurds, even if what they told me was actually extremely interesting. What burned them was the American reaction to the use of gas against the Kurds.

One of their senior advisors to Saddam Hussein, Saadoun Hammadi, had traveled to the United States in September. He was to have met Secretary of State George Shultz. When he arrived he was treated very coldly. He did not get his meeting with the Secretary. He was fobbed off on the head of Iraq-Iran Affairs, as I recall, or perhaps the Assistant Secretary. That very same day, Charles Redman, who was the State Department spokesman, read out an announcement which could not have been more critical of Iraq. We had chosen that moment to tell Iraq that we totally opposed what it had done. Saadoun Hammadi, who was actually a graduate of an American university, was humiliated. Saddam Hussein was angry.

NANCY E. JOHNSON
Political Officer
Baghdad (1989-1990)

Ms. Johnson was born in Washington, DC and was raised in Germany and the Washington, DC area. She was educated at Oberlin College and attended several colleges and Universities in the United Kingdom. After returning to the U.S. Ms. Johnson joined the State Department as a contract employee and later joined the Foreign Service, serving as Political Officer in Colombo, London, Algiers and Baghdad. Her Washington assignments were primarily in the Near East, South Asia bureau. Ms. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Were you getting any feel for the Kurdish, Sunni, Shia, Arab, Persian divisions within Iraq?

JOHNSON: The Kurds were always something separate. The Shia/Sunni division was less clear in those days. But the Kurds, one knew about Halabja, where Saddam and co. dropped chemical weapons on the Kurds. There were stories about the Kurds being carried south and killed. There were settlements. April sent me on a five day trip up into the north when I first arrived and we went past settlements of Kurds who had been moved out of places like Kirkuk when Arabs had been moved in. What we see now is a kind of ethnic cleansing in reverse. Saddam made an effort

to Arabize the oil industry. Now the Kurds want their towns back. You got a sense that the Kurds were somewhat separate. In 1967, when we were essentially thrown out of Middle East, it was the Kurds who closed up our Embassy in Baghdad, packed up peoples' houses and brought their household effects out through Iran. They looked after the Embassy property for years and years before the Americans went back.

BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

THOMAS M. T. NILES
Political Officer
Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1963-1965)

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor's degree from Harvard University and master's from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.

Q: Excuse me, Tom, but when we were recognizing Croatia, was it implicit in what we were thinking and all, that the Serb changes and boundaries eventually would go back to where they were?

NILES: We recognized Croatia with the boundaries that it had in former Yugoslavia. What we assumed regarding the ultimate boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, I can't really say. We didn't assume. It was just too unclear at that time what was going to happen, but as far as we were concerned, the boundaries were the boundaries, and whether they were the right boundaries or not, they were the only ones we could recognize. We weren't going to redraw the internal boundaries. We regarded those as fixed and we recognized them. That applied to all of the republics. Macedonia, for example, is in the same category as Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. In any case, the fighting intensified during April. We began to get really horrific reports of ethnic cleansing. As a matter of fact, Karadzic, who was nothing if not frank and outspoken, first used the term "ethnic cleansing," to describe what they were doing. It was sometime in April. This was in reference to the towns in Eastern Bosnia, along the Drina River, from Zvornik all the way south, down through Visegrad, and Foca. These towns, prior to March 1992, had been largely Muslim. All the Muslims were driven out. They took refuge in the countryside or took off for Sarajevo. Then, all across northern Bosnia, you had atrocious things going on with the Yugoslav Army, to a degree, but more often Bosnian Serb groups detached from the Army, and irregulars from Serbia led by criminals such as Ratzonovic/Arkon and his "Tigers" terrorizing the non-Serbian population, driving them out and killing people. Ultimately, prison camps were established in places like Omarska, near Prijedor, in northern Bosnia. We had reports on all this but we had nobody there to verify them. Nobody from the embassy could get down there. We didn't have anyone in Sarajevo at that time. The reports that we got were from refugees. They were, of course, garbled and not totally clear, but what was clear was that terrible things were going on. We worked in NATO and at the UN with our allies, with the Russians and the Chinese. Around June 1, 1992, the UN Security Council condemned Serbia for its actions in

Bosnia and adopted comprehensive economic sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro. If you consider the sentimental support of Russia for the Serbs, obtaining Russian support for the resolution was quite a triumph. On June 2, 1992, we went with Secretary Baker to a meeting in Lisbon, which was the second of three meetings during 1992 on aid to the former Soviet Union. The Chapter VII economic sanctions on Serbia, some of which are still on today, were a very blunt weapon and they did not work very quickly, but they did, ultimately, have quite an impact on the Serbian economy. I think they contributed to the readiness of Milosevic to cut the deal he cut at Dayton and basically to give up the largest part of what the Serbs had seized in Bosnia, as well as many of the other areas that were so important to the Serbs, including the Krajina and Slavonia (except the Easternmost tip, which was returned to Croatia later). This left Serbia bankrupt and full of refugees, humiliated and still under sanctions. It was an extraordinary failure by any stretch of the imagination, yet this man remains President of Serbia.

Q: *Along with Saddam Hussein.*

NILES: Well, Milosevic is very much like Saddam Hussein in this respect. He respects only one thing, and that is a guy with a big fist. If you don't have a big fist, you don't need to deal with Milosevic, and are prepared to use it, you have a chance with him. In any case, we were under pressure from the Congress, from then Governor Clinton, throughout the summer of 1992, to "do something" about Bosnia. It was a terrible situation. Reports came out about death camps in Bosnia. Richard Boucher, who was standing in for Margaret Tutwiler at a State Department noon press briefing at the beginning of July 1992 was asked about a report in the *Long Island Newsday* about "death camps" in Bosnia. Boucher was asked whether he could confirm these reports, and he somewhat injudiciously said, "Yes, we can confirm those reports." The natural reaction was, "The Serbs are running death camps out there, and you aren't doing anything." Coincidentally, I had to testify the next day before the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House International Affairs Committee, with Chairman Hamilton and others. I was asked about Boucher's confirmation that there were death camps in Northern Bosnia, and whether this was right. I said, "No, as a matter of fact, I can't confirm that. We have press reports to that effect, that there are prison camps and terrible atrocities are being committed, but we have no independent confirmation yet on whether that is true or not." I didn't have it, maybe others did. In any case, I said, "To use the term 'death camp' strikes me as being maybe a little bit inaccurate, because for me, a death camp is Auschwitz, or someplace like that, run by the Nazis, where people are being systematically exterminated." In real life, even though thousands of people, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people died in Bosnia, to say that the Serbs are running death camps, might be a little bit of a stretch. They really wanted not so much to kill all the Bosnian Muslims but to drive them out. Of course, if in the process of driving them out, lots of people died, they would shed no tears. But to say that the Serbs were running "death camps" in Bosnia, I felt then, and I feel now, was an exaggeration. Believe me, I don't have any sympathy at all for the Serbs, in terms of what they did in Bosnia or elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. At the session with the House International Affairs Committee, Tom Lantos of California accused me of complicity in war crimes, which I thought was a nice touch. There was a lot of pressure on the Bush administration to "do something." Basically, when people talked about "doing something," they meant using military force, in some way, to stop the terrible atrocities that were going on in Bosnia. On the U.S. side, there was no support at all in the Administration, at a senior level, for doing that. There was very strong opposition to military action from the

Pentagon, both from Secretary Cheney and from General Powell and all the Chiefs. All the other people who worked with Secretary Cheney in the Defense Department were of the same mind.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN
Press/Political Officer
Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1965-1968)

Ambassador
Yugoslavia (1989-1992)

Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was born in Pennsylvania in 1934. He graduated from Yale University, received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cambridge and served in the U.S. Army in 1959. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1961, his postings abroad included Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Geneva, with an ambassadorship to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Zimmerman was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Now what had happened in Bosnia when you left?

ZIMMERMANN: The war had been going on for about six weeks. There had been the immediate invasion across the Serbian border of the irregulars, paramilitaries, and they had shot up a lot of Bosnian towns and killed and imprisoned a lot of Muslims. The Bosnian Serb army had emerged, this was one of the great con jobs of military history. Officers and men of the Yugoslav army who came from Bosnia were all transferred back into Bosnia as members of the Yugoslav army. Then at a given time they all became the Bosnian Serb army all of a sudden. They were all from the Yugoslav army including their commander, the nefarious General Mladic who was a colonel in the Yugoslav army. So, the Serbs had an army of trained people with arms and equipment amounting to about 65,000 people, which is a good sized European army. Whereas the Muslims started with nobody.

MARSHALL FREEMAN HARRIS
CSCE Monitor
Macedonia (1992)

Political Officer-Bosnia Desk
Washington, DC (1993)

In addition to his service as Desk Officer for Romania, Marshall Freeman Harris served in London, Bulgaria, and at various other State Department posts. He was interviewed by Michael Springmann in August of 1993.

Q: How much media interest was there during the period you served on the desk? Obviously, there is considerable interest now that you have resigned and done so publicly. How was it earlier?

HARRIS: There was a lot of media interest, but perhaps not quite enough. What Americans respond to is generally television pictures--blood in the streets. I don't think the networks, although showing those pictures, have not put them in their proper context. You see and hear the shells being fired, you hear the sniper fire, you see people scurrying for cover and then you see the dead and the wounded, but that is all you get. There is no explanation of what and why these events are taking place. There is no discussion that Sarajevo has been encircled for seventeen months, that people cannot leave their areas, that they are terrorized every night with artillery and sniper fire. Had the networks told the full story, we would be arguing now not only what we should do for humanitarian reasons, but what we could do about the root causes of the conflict, which is Serbian aggression.

The other thing that had prevented a full discussion of the issues is that Secretary Christopher and the other Clinton administration policy makers would have you believe that what we see on television is not what is actually happening. Sarajevo is under siege; there are other Muslim areas of Bosnia under siege, but the Secretary and other officials insist that we are witnessing just a civil war and that all three sides are attacking each other and that they would continue to do so regardless of any U.S. action because they have been doing it for hundreds of years. That rationale supports a no-action policy.

GEORGE F. WARD JR.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary-International Organizations
State Department
Washington, DC (1992-1996)

George F. Ward Jr. was born in the borough of Queens, NY in 1945. He graduated from the University of Rochester in 1965. After a four-year term with the United States Marine Corps, Mr. Ward joined the Foreign Service in 1969. During his service he has been to Hamburg, Genoa, Rome, Bonn, and was Ambassador to Namibia. He was interviewed in 2001 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: There was horrendous example after horrendous example of what were warlords, particularly on the Serbian side, around Sarajevo, who were pushing the United Nations aside. It seemed like the United Nations' main object was to keep out of the line of fire and maybe even prolong the situation.

WARD: The historical record will show that Milosevic managed the actions of the Bosnia Serbs pretty skillfully from Belgrade. They did shove the UN around from time to time. Milosevic successfully modulated his bullying so as never to create a situation in which the UN would have been forced to act against him in a definitive way. He managed on the one hand to wage what some have called genocide while at the same time maintaining decent diplomatic relations with all the players in this game.

Q: What was this doing to you and your coworkers? You've got a situation which, if nothing else, was seen on TV with snipers, particularly Serbian snipers, happily shooting at women running across the street. Then you had things like the marketplace explosion and then Srebrenica, which killed about 5,000 and was a real genocide, where Dutch troops were too few and didn't act very

well. Whatever it was, it didn't work out well. But here you have what appears to be a Congress that's not giving you much support. In fact, Congress is spending most of its time going after the UN, going after government workers. They were pretty nasty people. This was the Newt Gingrich revolution. This had to have some effect on you.

WARD: I stayed in IO for four years. I find multilateral diplomacy interesting, a fascinating multi-tiered game. In my view, the U.S. government did not lead in the way we should have early in the Yugoslav episode. A lot of people should share in the blame. We were driven by events rather than driving them. We had the wherewithal, especially early in the game, to militarily dominate the situation. We failed to do it. The kind of military force that was later used, if used earlier, would have saved many lives. The Serb forces in Bosnia were never large, nor were they very effective militarily.

Q: As an old Yugoslav hand, it seemed like the Serbs spent an awful lot of their time sitting on top of hills shooting at artillery in a haphazard way like a bunch of mountaineer rednecks.

WARD: You can think of them as mountaineer rednecks or simply thugs who were bound together in a cause. Had they encountered serious military force, I just have to believe the situation would have been very different. At one point, having read an analysis that showed something like 30,000 Serb troops on the ground in Bosnia, I asked the three-star general who was the J-3 at the Joint Staff, "What would it take to defeat this force?" He said, "About 100,000 people." I said, "That would be possible for NATO." He said, "Yes." The reason it didn't happen is political.

Q: Going back to the Balkans, what happened on the ground in the Balkans that got NATO into it?

WARD: It was a progressive process driven by events. After the atrocity in the market in Sarajevo and with the constant sniping at innocents in the streets of that city, the U.S. and our closest allies decided that NATO military intervention was necessary. NATO indicated to the United Nations that it was willing to put together the Rapid Reaction Force, which consisted in large part of British artillery and U.S. airpower. There were some British troops on the ground also. That force was authorized by the UN to break the siege of Sarajevo. Even then, it was very tough to get money through the Congress. I remember the day when we had a call from the Secretary's office saying that Richard Holbrooke and I had to go up to the Senate to testify about the proposed appropriation to fund the Rapid Reaction Force. It was an interesting experience to go up to the Hill with Richard Holbrooke, who was of course the center of attention at the hearing. He succeeded in freeing up the money for the Force, but the Congress eventually placed stringent limitations on our ability to spend money for peacekeeping. Perhaps influenced to some degree by opinions they heard from U.S. military sources, Senators grilled us about objectives, end states, and exit strategies. They wanted us to predict the future in some detail.

After the Rapid Reaction Force was deployed, the situation in Sarajevo improved, but there was another setback yet to come – the massacre in Srebrenica. The Dutch UNPROFOR battalion in Srebrenica was nervous. They felt isolated and knew that other peacekeepers had been held hostage. They had been deployed to Srebrenica in fulfillment of the Secretary General's pledge

to create and protect “safe areas” for Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims). However, they did not have the strength necessary to fulfill their mission. A much larger force of Serbs surrounded them. To make matters worse, Bosniac militants used the safe areas as bases from which to launch attacks against Serbs. The Serbs succeeded in surrounding Srebrenica and demanded that the Dutch leave. The Dutch finally complied, leaving vulnerable the people they had been protecting. As we all know, thousands of men and boys were killed either on the spot or as they attempted to make their way back to Bosniac lines. That massacre was an action-forcing event that led to increased NATO and U.S. willingness to use force and also helped convince us to use our diplomatic clout in order to put together a real peace negotiation.

HENRY ALLEN HOLMES
Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
Arlington, VA (1993-1999)

Henry Allen Holmes was born in Bucharest, Rumania in January 1933. He Attended St. Paul's and continued on to Princeton where he graduated from in 1954. Mr. Holmes entered the Foreign Service in 1957. He has held many positions within the Department of State and positions abroad in Yaoundé, Rome, Paris, and was Ambassador to Portugal in 1982. He was interviewed in 1999 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Was there a certain amount of restiveness as we watched this thing develop, particularly the Serbs were bullying the UN - it's the only way. I mean, here were you know I mean they were humiliating these peacekeepers by including killing a vice president of Bosnia in a French troop carrier.

HOLMES: Yes, it was very restive, and people were very upset. And I remember a small Dutch platoon that was at a killing spree in Srebrenica, which was-

Q: Yes, you know, they were surrounded by a thousand bloodlust troops, and they were something like a platoon or so, and there really wasn't much they could do, but they shouldn't have been put in that position.

HOLMES: They shouldn't have been put in that position, and the Dutch were angry. They were angry, humiliated, and determined to get back into things. And then later on, of course, they did participate in arresting some of the war criminals in Bosnia. But it was a very bad situation, and it really only changed after the Dayton Accords. And of course we did the bombing, that first bombing run, which brought them to the table and resulted in the agreement - with Milosevic, of course, participating. But that finally worked out, and I must say, by the time I visited Bosnia, for the first and only time in the last summer, the summer of 1998, I went and visited our Special Operations Forces in Italy, Brindisi, Sarajevo, went up to Tuzla and then to Bircko and then on to Europe, Stuttgart and the United Kingdom. Things had really turned around by that time, and they were operating extremely well together, not only in the American sector but also with their British and French and Italian and other NATO allies.

BILHA BRYANT

**Yugoslavia Desk Officer
Washington, DC (1994)**

Bilha Bryant was born in 1934 in Bulgaria. Bryant served in the Israeli Army and worked in the private sector before joining the Israeli Foreign Service in 1959. Bryant resigned from the Israeli Foreign Service and married Edward (Ted) Bryant in 1963. With her husband, Bryant was assigned overseas to Mozambique, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Korea and India. Bryant then began to work for the State Department and served in the Soviet Bureau, Eastern European Affairs and Congressional Relations. Bryant was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: When you are moving into this, the real thing in a way shifted over rather quickly into Yugoslavia.

BRYANT: ...When I finished with this project I moved to the Yugoslav desk. Then it all started. I am not a great political scientist-but even I knew that we were handling the problems of Yugoslavia badly. I remember writing letters for the signature of President Bush, which showed in no uncertain terms the indecision and flip-flopping of the administration on the issue. If we had put our foot down there and then and shown Serbia our determination to prevent the conflict, we would have saved 200,000 people who died for nothing and a lot more misery for everyone in the country.

Q: Did you sense, as things developed, the siege of Sarajevo, the massacre at Srebrenica, and on? How were these things hitting you?

BRYANT: It had become a very difficult place to work. All of us on the Yugoslav Desk were very, very unhappy that after all our hard work, we couldn't stop the bloodshed. We were faced daily with reports describing in details the massacres of innocent people that occurred in many places. I remember reading about 16 or 17 Bosnians who got on a train for Sarajevo and never arrived there. Later on their bodies were found in a mass grave. We had to read the reports about the terrible rapes and just horrible situations-a young Muslim woman in Sarajevo who was raped by Serbs not being able to tell her parents about it not to bring shame on the family. And with all of that going on, we sat there and wrote platitudes. We are the most powerful nation in the world. If we had said to Milosevic, "Stop it. If not, we will drop a bomb in the middle of Belgrade"-just say it, don't do it. But we kept saying we would not get involved. Milosevic is a bully, and we all knew he was a bully. You have to use different tactics with a bully and yet we treated him like a normal man.

**ROBERT M. BEECROFT
Special Envoy
Sarajevo, Bosnia Federation (1996-1997)**

While Mr. Beecroft served as Political Officer at a number of posts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, his primary focus was on Political/Military Affairs, both in Washington and abroad. Later in his career he served as Special Envoy to

the Bosnia Federation and subsequently as Ambassador to the Office of Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) operating in Bosnia & Herzegovina. A native of New Jersey, Mr. Beecroft served in the US Army and studied at the University of Pennsylvania and the Sorbonne in Paris before joining the Foreign Service in 1967. Mr. Beecroft was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Today is the 23rd of November, 2004. Bob, Sarajevo, '96, what was the situation at the time you went there?

BEECROFT: I arrived in August. The shooting had stopped six months earlier. It was -- I wouldn't even call it a country, it was a collection of peoples who were still in a state of collective shock at what they had done to themselves and each other. You soon began hearing tales of those first few days in the spring of 1992, when Sarajevo was first targeted by Serb cannon and tanks and mortars. Everybody, whatever their ethnicity, all said the same thing: this is obviously just a passing phase. It won't last. Well, it did last. It lasted for three and a half years. People are still getting over it. I can tell you because I just left there last July, when I finished my second tour in Sarajevo. The first time, in '96, I went out as Special Envoy to the Bosnian Federation. There are two so-called entities inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of them is primarily, but not totally Croat and Bosniak, Bosniak being Muslim. That's the Federation. The other is overwhelmingly Serb, the so-called Republika Srpska, or RS. Now, at that time the RS was sort of a pariah, because we had Radovan Karadžić running around -- sadly, he still is running around.

Q: And Mladić, too.

BEECROFT: Well, Mladić is probably in Belgrade, but he's certainly in the neighborhood. They put me up in the Sarajevo Holiday Inn, which had been built for the Olympics in '84. It was one of these horrible Yugoslav modern monstrosities, built of mustard-color panels, and of course it was full of bullet holes. Even at this point, several months after the shooting had stopped, you didn't want a room on the so-called Sniper Alley side of the building. The going rate for a room fluctuated, but it was usually about \$250 cash per night, to stay in this building that had no working elevators, intermittent electricity, and no air conditioning -- and it was summer. The only way to get up to your room, and I was on the fifth floor, was to climb what had been the emergency staircase, which had been pounded to rubble, so you were holding the railing and inching yourself up and down this pile of fragmented concrete. It was quite an adventure. There was a row of overturned buses and old shipping containers that went from the side exit of the hotel to the corner of the nearest city block. This had provided cover while the shooting was still going on, and it was still the most direct way to get to the Embassy, several blocks away. After the Dayton Accords went into force at the end of '95, NATO came in very heavy, 60,000 troops of whom 28,000 were Americans. NATO finally did what the UN had failed to do, and that was stop the shooting and begin to create the conditions necessary to create a state.

The Dayton Accords are still in force. The Bosnian Constitution is Annex Four of the Dayton Accords, drafted at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Dayton and in Washington by State Department lawyers. My job was to try to get the Croats, who are Catholics, and the Bosniaks, who are Muslims, to work together and make the Federation succeed. The Croats and the

Bosniaks together constituted 51% of the territory and something like 60% of the population. There was a certain logic in the Bosniaks and Croats working together, but they had also been shooting at each during the war, so there was no love lost. I spent a lot of time talking with Alija Izetbegović, who was the great wartime hero of the Bosniaks, and with Krešimir Zubak, two of the three co-presidents under the Dayton constitution. Zubak who was a timid, lawyerly soul who kept his head down and didn't take risks. Izetbegović, by contrast, was a calculating politician and a very angry man, because of what had happened to his people, the Bosnian Muslims. From the outset, I did a lot of traveling around the country. I went down to Mostar a lot, because that's the heartland of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I worked regularly with Carl Bildt, the former Swedish boy wonder prime minister who was the first High Representative under the Dayton Accords. The Office of the High Representative, or OHR, was established at Dayton as the international community overseer of the peace process. The governor general if you will. He's not a UN official -- the BBC still makes this mistake and calls him the UN High Representative. The UN, I can't overstress this, failed badly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nobody -- not the Serbs, not the Croats, not the Bosniaks -- has much good to say about the UN to this day.

Q: Well, while we're on it, let's talk a bit about the UN. What was the analysis? Was it, just UN apparatus or the people or what?

BEECROFT: It was largely the assumptions. I've already described the NATO end of this when we were talking about NATO. The UN was given the lead, and treated Bosnia as a Chapter Six operation. You have Chapter Six operations and, much more rarely, Chapter Seven. Chapter Six is peacekeeping. Chapter Seven is peacemaking. For reasons having to do with Russian opposition -- because of the Serb angle, European timidity and, I have to say, American disinterest -- this was made a Chapter Six operation by the Security Council. The fiction was maintained, between 1992 and the end of 1995, when the UN threw in the towel, that Bosnia was a "benign environment." Amazingly that's the terminology that was used. UN tanks were painted white. A number of nice young men and women from the Netherlands and Spain and Italy and France and Germany who found themselves chained to fences outside of weapon storage sites by Serb soldiers. Tanks turned around if an old woman decided to sit down in the middle of the road, which of course they did regularly. In a word, you had a kind of fecklessness, which is very well reflected in some of the movies that have been made about Bosnia since then, one in particular called No Man's Land that won a best foreign film Oscar several years ago. If you have a chance to see it, it's terrific. Eventually, it all came to a head at Srebrenica, and the Dutch totally lost it. That travesty, followed by the second shelling of the market in Sarajevo, convinced President Clinton to press NATO to intervene. It was the CNN factor that did it.

SERBIA

WARREN ZIMMERMAN

Political Officer

Belgrade (1965-1968)

Ambassador

Yugoslavia (1989-1992)

Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was born in Pennsylvania in 1934. He graduated from Yale University, received a B.A. and M.A. from the University of Cambridge and served in the U.S. Army in 1959. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1961, his postings abroad included Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Geneva, with an ambassadorship to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Zimmerman was interviewed in 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes, well, I would say the first month of the Croatian, Serb-Croat war was a bit ambiguous because, after all the Croats had declared their independence which was to the army an illegal act. The army claimed during the first month that it was simply trying to restore order. Then it became clear that this pattern I just talked about, that the Serb toughs would go in and shoot up the Croatian village and then the army would come in and "restore order" but somehow the village would be left in the hands of the Serbs, not the Croats who used to live there. So it became clear say by August that the aggressors were the Serbs, were the Yugoslav army. There was a group of observers from the European Community who were there, whose role was ridiculed I think quite unfairly. They were unarmed. They wore white uniforms which made people call them Good Humor men. But they were there to make sure that atrocities did not go unreported. They were quite useful in doing that. The Dutch had the presidency of the community at the time, and they unleashed one particular Dutch diplomat who kept trying to negotiate cease fires in different parts of Croatia and who took a lot of risks. He was shot at many times in order to do that. So there were attempts to quiet things down. Vance came in September with a mandate from the UN to try to get a cease fire. He took a very even handed approach. He did not feel that the Serbs were the only aggressors. He felt that Tudjman had a lot to answer for as well. Vance had been a deputy secretary of defense for the United States. He had a lot of pride in the military virtues, and he saw what the Croats were doing to the Yugoslav army. For example, blockading them in their barracks so they couldn't get out, and sending in dog food when they said they were hungry, and taunting their wives who were often Croatian women. Many of the Serb officers in Croatia had been there a long time and had Croatian wives. It was pretty bad on both sides, and Vance got a lot of respect in Serbia with Milosevic for being even-handed about it. I think at the end of the day, there is no doubt that real aggressor was the Yugoslav army, but it wasn't all that apparent at the beginning.

WILLIAM A. WEINGARTEN
Serbo Croatian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute
Arlington, VA (1970-1971)

Economic Officer
Belgrade 1971-1974

William Weingarten was born and raised in Baldwin, New York. He attended Colgate University and served in the US Army in Korea until 1965. After entering the Foreign Service in 1962 he worked in Paris, Yugoslavia, Brussels, Australia, and Canada.

Q: Later, of course, these things we're talking about now - we're talking in 1999 - and Western Europe and the United States have been very heavily involved in the breakup of Yugoslavia - did you get any feel for the divisions in that society?

WEINGARTEN: No, I never did, and the funny thing is that both my wife and I spoke Serbian. We had Serbian friends. We traveled a lot within Serbia. We liked the place. We knew the people. People could tell that we liked it, so that helps them to be more open. We always admired the Serbs, thought the Serbs were terrific, straightforward, gutsy people. But you got a sense that a lot of history had passed between these people, but you never had any slightest inkling that they would ever take after each other the way they did. And I remember one of the most shocking things I've ever seen was coming back on a plane from Paris to Washington after a meeting in Paris and reading *Newsweek*, which I never read. I picked it up on the plane and read it, and I saw a picture of one of Captain Arkans' people in Bijeljina, in Bosnia, and it was just after they'd finished killing some unarmed civilians, and they were lying in the street-

Q: This was during the Bosnian-

WEINGARTEN: Yes, this was '91, right in the beginning. And this one guy, this thuggish looking guy, was kicking one of these dead people in the head. I think you'd recall the picture if you saw it again. I was shocked by that. I said I couldn't believe that Serbs could do this sort of thing. I always thought that they were... because they had propagated this myth that they had fought the Germans to a standstill in World War II, which as it turns out was a myth. The Germans only had a few divisions in Yugoslavia, and for the most part these guys fought each other. But still the myth lasts that they were brave and forthright kind of people that wouldn't kill women and kids and old people, but it turns out that they did. But you didn't have the impression going around Yugoslavia that this sort of thing was just beneath the surface, but it must have been.

VICTOR D. COMRAS
Serbia Sanctions Program, State Department
Washington, DC (1998-1999)

Victor D. Comras was born in New York State in 1943. Comras graduated from Georgetown University in 1964, the University of Florida Law School in 1966, and promptly joined the Foreign Service. While in the Foreign Service, Comras served overseas in Zaire, Nigeria, South Africa, France, Canada and Macedonia. He also worked on the Law of the Sea negotiations. Comras was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Today is May 5, 2003. Maybe we should talk about the whole Kosovo thing.

COMRAS: The story of Milosevic and Kosovo starts in April 1987 when Yugoslav President Ivan Stambolic sent Sloba to pacify the restive Serbs in Kosovo. Tensions had risen between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo soon after Tito's death. Albanians constituted the majority living in Kosovo and Albanians dominated the local Communist Party apparatus. But the Serbs were very distrustful of the Albanians and complaining of discriminatory treatment.

Kosovo holds an important place in Serbian history and lore, and Serbia has always had a very strong emotional tie to the province, which once had a majority Serb population. That changed during and after the Second World War as a result of the settling of additional Albanian families moved into the region during the Second World War and the expulsion of Serb families. Following the war the Serbian exodus continued, heightened again by civil disturbances in the early 1980s.

The Serbians wanted to curb the domination of the province by Albanians. They believed this could be accomplished by withdrawing Kosovo's autonomy and allowing the Serbs to benefit politically from the vast Serbian majority in Serbia (of which Kosovo was a part). Milosevic was directed by Stambolic to meet with the Serbs and to ask them to show patience and cooperation vis a vis the Albanian Communist party leadership. Milosevic reportedly broke away from his meeting with ethnic Albanians to mingle with an angry crowd of Serbians in a suburb of Pristina. This was his opening to play his new "Serbian Nationalist" card.

His actions in Kosovo served as a marker in Yugoslav history that the Tito era was over and that Serbs, who constituted a majority of all Yugoslav's would now be free again to demonstrate their own nationalistic inclinations. This helped set the stage for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars that followed.

Milosevic easily won the support of the Serbian nation in Kosovo and elsewhere, and released a pent-up nationalism that stormed across Yugoslavia. This force propelled him into a firm leadership position in Serbia as he pushed aside Stambolic. It also had a direct impact on growing Slovene, Croat, Macedonian, Bosnian, and Albanian nationalism throughout the region.

With his rise to power Milosevic moved quickly to suspend Kosovo autonomy and to impose direct rule from Belgrade. The Albanians lost their control of the province. They were forced out of the government, out of the bureaucracy, out of the police, and out of the schools. They began to establish their own parallel institutions in order to provide basic order, education and daily requirements for their community. Kosovo became a police state controlled and patrolled by special Serbian police.

The deteriorating situation in Kosovo led President Bush, on December 29, 1992 to issue his famous Christmas warning. Having obtained intelligence that Milosevic was planning to use military force in Kosovo, the Bush Administration warned Milosevic through diplomatic channels that the U.S. was prepared to take unilateral military action, without European cooperation, if the Serbs sparked a new conflict in Kosovo or Macedonia. These were real concerns. Many believed that Milosevic intended to use the JNA (the Serbian Army) to escalate and extend the Bosnian conflict into these areas. What was meant to be a private message was quickly and widely reported in the Press.

It was never clear what the Christmas warning really meant or how we intended to back it up. But President Clinton acted quickly to give the Bush warning credence. Plans were made during the final days of the Bush administration and then into the Clinton administration to place American soldiers in Yugoslavia for the first time. They were to be stationed along the

Macedonia border with Serbia as part of what was then the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia. UNPROFOR was the first experiment in deploying a preventive peacekeeping force. The initial force of 300 soldiers grew to almost 1,000.

The inclusion of American forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia was meant to send a clear message to Milosevic that if he did cross that line with Military action in Kosovo or Macedonia he might have to engage American soldiers directly. While the force contingent there was mostly symbolic, engaging even a small American force could lead the U.S. to become directly engaged in the conflict. This was something Milosevic wanted to avoid.

Milosevic seemed to heed that warning at the time. He did not make any significant military incursions into Kosovo and he did not make any at all into Macedonia. There were a couple of border issues that arose in the years that followed but nothing terribly serious. This remained the situation until the Dayton accords were concluded. But the situation began to change shortly after the Dayton Accords.

During the Bosnian war Serbia conducted a number of police actions in Kosovo and continued to institute a very repressive regime. However, he choose to tolerate the Albanian creation of parallel institutions to handle Albanian affairs in the province. It was clear, however, that Albanians had lost basic civil and human rights.

We were very concerned about this deteriorating human rights situation. And we used our efforts to place additional pressure on Milosevic to relax his repressive measures and to restore autonomy to the region. This became one of the conditions for sanctions removal. As I said earlier, some of these sanctions ostensibly were to continue after the Dayton accords as what was called the outer wall of sanctions. These included certain air traffic rights and steps restricting assistance for economic development such as international financial assistance, international loans and guarantees, other things that might help the Serbs come out of the big hole that they had dug for themselves during the sanctions period and the war. These outer sanctions were to be held in place to deal with the Kosovo issue as well as other human rights questions.

I was already greatly concerned, as were many others closely following the situation in Yugoslavia, that the U.S. had relaxed too many elements of the sanctions already at the outset of Dayton and had done so without establishing appropriate benchmarks for fulfillment of the Dayton obligations. We advised that the sanctions should be relaxed only as these various Dayton commitments were being fulfilled. But, this is not what happened. At Holbrooke's insistence, the sanctions were suspended at the beginning of Dayton and were formally lifted on the signature of the accord.

The Albanian leaders in Kosovo watched the Dayton meeting closely. They were quite upset that a return to Kosovo autonomy was not included in the Dayton agenda. They were also very upset to see that the principal economic sanctions on Serbia were being tied only to Bosnia and not to progress also on issues related to Kosovo.

LEON WEINTRAUB
European Affairs Bureau Coordinator, OSCE, State Department

Washington, DC (1998-2000)

Mr. Weintraub was born and raised in New York City, educated at Hunter College, Brooklyn College and the Universities of Pittsburgh and Wisconsin. After service in Liberia with the Peace Corps he entered government service, first with the Navy Department and then with the State Department Foreign Service. His service in Washington and abroad involved him with a variety of countries and issues including African Affairs, International Organizations, Narcotics and Peace-Keeping operations in Africa. His foreign posts were Bogotá, Tel Aviv, Lagos, Quito and Geneva. Mr. Weintraub was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

WEINTRAUB: Yes. So Kosovo has a high resonance within Serbia and the fact that the province had now become majority Kosovar Albanian really rankled many Serbs. There were a lot of allegations of human rights abuses by the Serb authorities, by the police forces against the Kosovars. There was the start of the Kosovo Liberation Army, an underground movement which was starting to inflict some casualties on the Serb forces and things were not looking good at all.

Well, we called in once again Ambassador Richard Holbrooke who had knocked heads together to get the Dayton Agreement in the mid-'90s, and he made some trips to Belgrade. And finally Holbrooke and the Serb leader Milosevic hammered out an agreement whereby the OSCE would play a major monitoring role. So in the fall of '98 when I was fairly new on the job we, the OSCE, was called upon to start a KVM, Kosovo Verification Mission, with Ambassador Bill Walker as head of it. There was an agreement where the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission would monitor behavior on the ground, activities on the ground in Kosovo. The Serbian authorities, the police forces, paramilitary forces, other security forces were supposed to pull back to certain areas and then NATO was going to overfly to verify through imagery that forces were being pulled back. So there were a lot of very long days setting up the Kosovo Verification Mission; like many of these things, once a paper's signed everybody wants like 100 people out there in a week.

Fortunately, at this time, the Norwegians were assuming leadership of the OSCE. The OSCE is headed by an annually chosen "Chair in Office," as it's called, a CIO, selected from among the members. There is a secretary general of the organization, but the secretary general is primarily an administrative head. The political leadership, or CIO, is by a rotating chairman in office and we were fortunate to have the Norwegians doing this at this time. So they, with our support, they dedicated a lot of resources, a lot of time, to set up this Kosovo Verification Mission. And I don't think we could have wished for a better job than they did. They installed a lot of communications facilities, a lot of physical facilities to set up a verification mission in Pristina, the major city of Kosovo Province and other areas around it as well.

Well, Ambassador Walker could probably tell you much more about this than I can but there continued to be serious incidents throughout the fall and the winter of '98-'99. Things were not getting better. Slobodan Milosevic was kind of an obstinate guy, a cantankerous guy, and the Kosovo Liberation Army didn't make things any easier. Obviously their aim was independence or merger with Albania, either of which would be unacceptable to Serbia. So under Madeleine

Albright's leadership we had another international meeting in Rambouillet, in France, where the Serbs, the Kosovars and major powers in the region all came together to see what could happen once again.

Now, I think what happened is that the outside powers wanted to put a stop to this so we put a proposal on the table: certain Serbian forces would pull back, the Kosovars would do other things; there'd be respect for human rights, etcetera, etcetera. At first point, neither side accepted it; neither the Kosovars nor the Serbs accepted it. I think this was in February. The common wisdom at the time then and afterward was that our side, the U.S. and others, leaned on the Kosovars to accept this. It didn't grant them autonomy, it didn't grant them independence. But we thought it was the best that could be available at the time. And I think we kind of leaned on them to accept it. Eventually they did, but the Serbs did not accept it and the conference ended without an agreement. And in the meanwhile the tensions between the two groups within the province are building and building. And then it was in March, I believe, that the bombing campaign by NATO began. Proposals to take stronger action by the UN went back and forth in the Security Council. Obviously we were quite certain that the Russians and the Chinese would both veto any call for action in the Security Council.

In addition to what was happening in Serbia and in Kosovo, there was an outflow of refugees from there, unsettling the region, particularly in Italy, which was the next country over after the former Yugoslavia. There were a lot of refugees coming into Italy and into Austria. And the decision was taken, in NATO, to bomb Serbian positions and bomb Belgrade as well.

Q: There was considerable human rights- essentially ethnic killing was-

WEINTRAUB: This was the term that started in the former Yugoslavia, "ethnic cleansing." There were, you know, very serious reports of atrocities.

Q: Yes.

WEINTRAUB: Very serious reports. And it was the kind of situation where years later -- how do you look at yourself in the mirror if you think there's something you can do about it and you don't? And this, of course, is five years after the massacres in Rwanda and, you know, people said the reason we didn't go into Rwanda is because memories of what went wrong in Somalia the year before, what happened there, in the "Blackhawk Down" incident. Now people might say, well, maybe the reason we did go into Kosovo is we're ashamed of what we did not do in Rwanda. These things have a cumulative effect.

So the bombing began in March of '99. I think there was a supposition it wasn't going to last too long. I think it lasted about six weeks. And we had that political incident where in error we bombed the embassy of China in Belgrade, very embarrassing, of course, and also there were significant losses of life and losses of property as well.

So the bombing campaign did last, I think as I said, about six weeks. It did generate a certain amount of opposition. I think Secretary General Annan went on the record as not accepting it as a legitimate use of force, since it was not sanctioned or approved by the Security Council. I think

that still rankled certain people who thought if ever there was a case where outside intervention was needed, just as it was in Rwanda, this was another one. But eventually we reached a situation where the Serbs sued for surrender and then we started working on a way to administer Kosovo. I think -- although the language is not out there in specific terms -- essentially the province of Kosovo is like a UN protectorate. It really has been, I believe, for several years after the bombing essentially run by the United Nations with other organizations as well, each doing certain jobs; the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) has certain responsibilities there, the European Union has certain responsibilities, the United Nations has certain responsibilities. So it's a somewhat unwieldy situation, and I think it remains so to this day. The majority of Kosovars probably would prefer, I think, number one independence, and number two integration with Albania. Obviously, Serbia would like neither of those outcomes. And it's now coming on six years after that campaign. I haven't followed it closely, but I don't recall seeing anything showing signs of a resolution of that situation.

YUGOSLAVIA

ROBERT RACKMALES **Deputy Chief of Mission/Chargé** **Belgrade (1989-1993)**

Robert Rackmales was born in Baltimore, Maryland in 1937. He studied history at Johns Hopkins University and graduated in 1958. He received a Fulbright Scholarship to Germany and this influenced him toward his entry into the Foreign Service in 1963. He had twice served in Nigeria, Yugoslavia and Italy at various rotations. He was interviewed by Professor Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 11, 1995.

Q: One of the things that precipitated resignations and tremendous emotion in the United States and all of western Europe were atrocities. Being in an area where the government with which you were working is involved, at least was seen to be involved in really horrible atrocities against others. How did you deal with this in these reports?

RACKMALES: By trying to report as fully as we could, as accurately as we could, as credibly as we could, not taking every initial account of an atrocity at face value. There is a long tradition in that part of the world to use claims of massive abuses, atrocities, etc. as a political weapon. It's a difficult subject to discuss calmly and objectively because by its very nature an atrocity seems to call for strong emotional response. That came up with regard to the first of the mortars that fell in the Sarajevo market in '93. In the western media, of course, there was no initial doubt expressed that this was a Serbian atrocity. When the Serbs denied that it was their shell and accused the Bosnian government of shelling their own people, I would say that 99% in the west said this is absolutely outrageous and ridiculous. Here are these poor victims and now you're accusing them of murdering their own people. On the other hand, the UN personnel in Sarajevo who investigated the incident were highly suspicious of the Bosnian government, as David Binder pointed out in an excellent Foreign Policy magazine article, using the cynical (but not always wrong) Italian yardstick of "who benefits from this action." The results are straightforward. The Serbian side doesn't benefit, they get bombed and the international community comes down on

them, while the Bosnian government gets more support, including military support. What worries me the most is that these atrocities, whoever is causing them, tend to drive policy. For example, the Bosnian government called for Holbrooke not to come to Sarajevo, to stop the peace process, because of an atrocity. That is comparable to Israelis and the Palestinians not talking to each other because of bus bombings, which are also atrocities. Often atrocities are carried out in order to disrupt peace process. Both the media and the administration would often apply a double standard perhaps because there were many more Serb atrocities which came earlier in the Bosnian conflict. Our Embassy for example, strongly complained following a Washington Post front page story reporting that Croat forces had come in and massacred several hundred Muslims in a town in central Bosnia. In contrast to the usual reaction to reported Serb misdeeds, the Department spokesman failed to condemn the action.

GEORGE KENNEY
Yugoslavian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1992)

In addition to Yugoslavian Affairs, George Kenney served in France, Zaire, and other tours in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Michael Springmann on September 10, 1993.

Q: So you became the assistant country desk officer? When in your view did American policy toward Bosnia begin to fall apart?

KENNEY: ... From 1986 through 1991, Milosevic was telling people that they had a lot of grievances that needed to be redressed. If they weren't persuaded what they heard on TV, Milosevic was also getting control of the police, the secret police and the army as well key unions and jobs. So people couldn't very easily resist all this. To make it even easier, the Croatian government, under Tudjman, was moving in a somewhat similar direction, although not as malevolently. Tudjman was kind of threatening the Serbs in Croatia. The Croats violated Serbian human and civil rights and in some cases, killed people and in some cases, stole property and put people in jail. The Serbs in Croatia had cause for alarm.

In any case, the Serbs started the conflict. No one on the outside world wanted to become involved. We went from bad to worse. By the time I arrived on the desk in February 1992, I immediately noticed that the CIA was predicting that Bosnia was very likely to blow up. As I considered the intelligence reports and analysis and talked to people to learn as much as I could, it seemed to me that the CIA estimate was probably correct. So I recommended that at a minimum, the State Department develop a contingency plan for dealing with the breakup of Bosnia, so that if it started to happen, we would not be caught unprepared. No one really wanted to listen to that kind of recommendation. We were so caught up in rationalizing non-involvement and on reliance on mechanisms such as the CSCE or the EC to produce some sort of settlement. We didn't want to contemplate how much worst the war could get.

Q: What was the position of our missions in the country? Did they just toe the line?

KENNEY: ...At several points, our Office was trying to cut some of the other Department off from the communications from Belgrade. The Office Director and the DCM from July through August wanted to characterize the Bosnian war as the U.N. was doing. Rather than reporting a variety of differing interpretations of events on the ground, the Office and the embassy increased their communications through the Official-Informal channel which is not circulated in the Department. Only one copy of these messages were made for filing purposes. Finally, the Office of the EUR Assistant Secretary decided to crack down on this process. It dictated that all cable exchanges with the Embassy should be in regular channels. So the Office and the Embassy began to use the classified FAX channel to agree on a particular line to be taken; after reaching such agreement, the message would be turned into an official cable. It was something!

There is one story that sums up the experience. In early July, we were having a flap about concentration camps. One reporter had just written a book "Witness to Genocide." That included a lot of material on concentration camps. He had been very brave. He had traveled through Bosnia visiting a lot of these camps. I had heard about some of his stories because he had told the Consul General in Zagreb that he was working on this book, and wanted the C.G.'s views and insights. The C.G. sent in a reporting cable, warning us that these stories and more would be made public soon. I thought that was an important break because I knew that once these stories of atrocities hit the press, we would be forced to respond. But I couldn't get anyone above me to focus on the issue. The problem was ignored until the stories broke. Then the Department reacted by saying it knew nothing of these matters. It would not acknowledge that there was a problem. The situation became very confused. At one point, the Department's spokesman Boucher had to admit that we knew about the concentration camps, then he retracted that admission. A day later, Tom Niles was testifying in Congress. Congressman Tom Lantos from California asked him what he knew about the camps. Niles had received two bits of advice on how to respond to that question: a) "stonewall" -- i.e., deny any knowledge (this advice was given by the Office Director) and b) admit that we had a terrible problem and were trying to find out as much as we could on an urgent basis (my advice). Niles "stonewalled." He was really dressed down by the Committee. When he came back from the Hill, the Department went through another two days of crisis. Finally Eagleburger issued a formal statement which said that we didn't have much information, but were trying to collect as much as we could as quickly as we could. In the midst of all of this, I had to compile a short narrative for the President's evening reading book, which includes 10-15 different items. This report is intended to supplement the President's daily intelligence briefing. My paragraph was about concentration camps. I said that we knew that Serbs ran some camps; that we knew that the Serbs were responsible for most of the abuses, but at the same time I said that the Croats and the Muslims also ran camps, although the abuses in these facilities were not as serious. I gave some rough estimates of the number of camps. By the time, I had finished circulating the draft for clearance, Eagleburger's office changed it to read that all factions run camps and that all factions perpetrate abuses. I thought that it was just too much for a factual statement to be censored so that the President would not learn the truth. The bureaucracy had taken its original instructions and had taken them to extremes. We were, in fact, saying that since our policy was not to do anything, the President should not be roused by fact; he might take some action. The Department would do what it was supposed to by keeping the U.S. out of this.

KATHERINE SCHWERING

**Analyst, Former Yugoslavia States, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Washington, DC (1992-1993)**

Ms. Schwering was born in Wyoming and raised abroad and various localities in the US. She was educated at Northwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She joined Chase Bank, where she was trained as an international economist, and worked with them until joining the State Department in 1978. During her career Ms. Schwering worked primarily on international economic, monetary and terrorist matters in Washington and abroad. Her overseas posts were in Burundi, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Ms. Schwering was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Vukovar and that area.

SCHWERING: Yes. As a result of that, Tadjman kicked most of the Serbs out of Croatia. That is when all of the foreign policy apparatus in Europe and the U.S. were focused on Croatia. The Serbs, in effect, took advantage of that by starting to ethnically cleanse eastern Bosnia. We didn't see that until March or April, we began to realize. Well, for a couple of months, the Serbs had been killing and driving non-Serbs out. This information only started dribbling out. I was not on the job until June, and it was in the summer that the scope of what the Serbs had done in Bosnia really began to come out. I literally thought to myself, "If this is what I suspect it might be, I am going to make sure this government never says it didn't know what was going on." What I did from then on in was just try and get the facts and report them. Only once, in August of '92, when the horrific stories really hit the fan, the Serbs had set up these concentration camps of Bosnian Muslim men, and we first began getting the photographs and reporting in the summer, that the State Department was challenged at a press conference when they were asked, "Did the U.S. government know this ethnic cleansing and murdering was going on and what have you done about it?" Of course, the seventh floor came screaming to INR saying, "Have you been reporting on this or anything?" And all we had to do was just pick up all the secretary's morning summaries and wave it in their faces, because I had made sure as soon as I could confirm something on the ethnic cleaning that it was in the morning summary. And I never put anything in there that wasn't confirmed. I think that maybe I made two mistakes the whole 14 months I was on the job. I made sure the administration could never say it didn't know there was ethnic cleansing. I didn't want a repeat of WWII. We succeeded. It was important.

Q. Well, when did this happen?

SCHWERING: This was August of '93. However, in the European office in INR, we all had to rotate to do the weekend duty on Yugoslavia. Again, it wasn't just European issues. However, mostly everybody worked Saturday and Sunday to do the reporting for the Secretary's morning summary on Yugoslavia. So, of course, I would skim through that every day. I could do that fast, so I continued to report, but not as frequently – not every day. So, I still followed it. Remember, we had no one on the ground. You have to have people on the ground to get signals. The Dutch had low battery power as I have read since; they couldn't even communicate with their own government. This is another one of those stories that only kind of leaked out over time.

We thought something was going on, but until we went back and looked at other kinds of intelligence, like imagery (you have to know what to look for) we did not know this was happening. In fact, the official view of the State Department was the Serbs would not go after Srebrenica or Gorazde. There were five UN protected areas in eastern Bosnia that were set up in '92 and UN troops were in each. They were in Srebrenica. I can't remember if they were in Gorazde. But, unbeknownst to us, the Serbs first took over the top two northern most small ones of these.

That is the point at which the U.S. really started pressing the EU, Serbs, Croats and Bosnians to sit down and negotiate. Things sort of hit a little bit of a stalemate at that point. I think this may be when Secretary Vance got involved with Lord David Owen to negotiate. At some point we started stepping in, I think this was before '95, and it was just to urge the parties to negotiate.

Paula and I and everybody, including INR and every intelligence agency, thought the Serbs would stop there and they wouldn't dare take on Srebrenica, which had a Dutch peacekeeping contingent. However, Paul Pickering and I sat there and said, "Well, why wouldn't they?" If they can take over the whole of Eastern Bosnia, why would they be content to leave these pockets? In other words, neither of us said they were going to do it, but neither of us could see any reason for them not to try and take over these last pockets. Indeed, Paul and I turned out to be correct.

At this point, we were contacted by the Dutch who wanted to see what we knew. [There is this professor at the Dutch institute for war studies or something. He has written a book on Srebrenica.] Nobody, even the Dutch, knew what was happening until after it happened. In true Serb style, it appears, now, after the fact, that General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb general, didn't even decide to take Srebrenica until a couple or three days beforehand. That is pretty typical; Serbs don't tend to plan ahead. So nobody really had any warning. Nobody knew. However, the U.S. administration was absolutely shocked, shocked that the Bosnian Serbs took that over.

That is when we began to get serious. Actually, I wasn't involved in the negotiations; that is when they brought Holbrooke in. I am pretty sure there was some effort to do a trading off of territories, like we will give the Serbs Gorazde in Bosnia if they will give us back the eastern part of Sarajevo or something. Anyway, that is when the Dayton negotiations took place. Actually, that was '95. But, as I said, everybody was kind of at a stalemate. Several incidents made the U.S. get serious. First, Srebrenica happened. One of the cars carrying some of the high level officials we had sent to Sarajevo drove off a mountain top and the officials were killed. And finally, the Bosnian Serbs took some UN peace keepers hostage, and chained them to likely military targets for NATO planes. Those all happened in the summer of '95, and that is when the U.S. said, "We have had enough; we are going there." At that point, everybody realized that the fighting probably wasn't going to stop. Negotiations had been going on for over two years and had gotten nowhere. So, we got involved.

Q: Were you getting information from our allies, the French, the Dutch, the British, and others who were in there. Was this part of our resources?

SCHWERING: Well, they were in there under the UN, and of course, we got UN reporting as we were a member of the UN. That is not classified or anything. Let me just say that there is always

somewhat of a cooperation with any ally, and even non-allies, so there was no change in that regard. This did not include the French, who were not very cooperative.

Q: Well yeah, the French at one point...

SCHWERING: Yes, they were partly to blame.

Q: ... they got someone like the vice president of Bosnia or something was shot inside a French vehicle.

SCHWERING: No, it was a UN vehicle. It was an armored APC (armored personnel carrier).

Q: I thought it was French troops who were there.

SCHWERING: I can't remember.

Q: Yes, it was the French.

SCHWERING: That is quite possible. What happened, if I recall this particular incident correctly, was this APC carrying some government officials was traveling through Sarajevo, and Bosnian Serbs stopped the vehicle and said, "We want to look inside." Whoever the UN troops were with the vehicle said, "Sure," and opened the door. The Serbs leaned in and shot the guy. That was stupid.

There is something else that has come out. The main problem was that some of the first UN peacekeeping troops in Sarajevo were Nigerian, Ukrainian, and Nepalese, among others. These were awful UN troops. They did not do anything to protect the city. The first thing they did was set up a black market in prostitution. APCs were used for smuggling stuff in and out. The human trafficking thing that is such a big issue now started there, and it was awful. It was UN troops that set it up and profited from it. We were sitting there in INR getting good information about these awful things that were going on, UN money that was being stolen by peacekeeping troops and stuff like that. INR couldn't get this out. Even when we did get involved, the administration, and particularly the U.S. military, just didn't want to hear about it.

* * *

SCHWERING: We got our first knowledge of atrocities from people who had gotten out of the country, women who had been raped or had family members killed or men who had escaped. It was our embassy in Croatia which started debriefing a lot of these. Our first 800 interviews were out of there. Well, the chargé there, whose name I can't remember, didn't believe these stories. He would literally often add a paragraph to the end of some horrific rape and torture story saying, "Yeah, but she says this. No one witnessed it, you know. Maybe it is true, but probably it is not." It was so bad. I was at the Yugoslav office desk once, when the deputy director picked up the phone and just really reamed out the chargé in Zagreb, because he didn't want to believe this was going on.

So, you really had to know which post's reporting you could trust. A lot of times you couldn't trust it. The Serb military, particularly in Belgrade, had our military absolutely bamboozled. We

would get all these DIA reports coming in saying Serb General so and so told me that they are not in fact bombing that part of Bosnia and they don't have any troops in that part of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serbs didn't do this. I mean it is like the DIA lacked the perspective and analytical gene. Maybe that is what DIA reporting is supposed to be. But, when we got our first general in there who was General Clark, General Mladic bamboozled him, took him up to Banja Luka. They posed for pictures with each other's hats on and gave each other pistols as gifts. I mean the reporting...

Q: This was Wesley Clark.

SCHWERING: General Wesley Clark. The reporting on that very first visit to Sarajevo by his staff and stuff was so pro Serb it just stunned us. Of course, that eventually changed, but I can tell you General Clark was not popular in INR at that point in time. But the Serbs could do that, and they had the French on their side the whole time. I think I pointed this out before, but what most people don't realize is the last nation to help the Serbs in their battle against the Turks and you know whoever, were the French. There is a monument to the French from WWI in the main park in Belgrade, Kalemegdan.

They don't have a statue to the Soviets. The Russians, as I said before, refused to help them in their battle for independence from the Ottoman Turks. However, the French helped them out. The Serbs are actually not close to the Greeks – that is a myth. They aren't close to the Russians. They are close to the French. Unfortunately when the UN divided up Bosnia into spheres of influence for the purposes of easier management, they gave the Serbian part of Bosnia to the French because of this connection. They should have realized the French could not be objective.

Q: And the French have Mladic, and Karadzic are still going strong somewhere.

SCHWERING: Oh yeah. In fact, after '95 we suspect the French of leaking some key intelligence, and tipping off the Bosnian Serbs about some actions such as an overflight that NATO might take

That is the way we did start participating. NATO would fly over Yugoslavia and do AWAC surveys in '93-'94.

RONALD J. NEITZKE
Principal Officer/Deputy Chief of Mission
Zagreb (1992-1996)

Ronald Neitzke was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Sts Thomas College, the University of Minnesota and Johns Hopkins University (SAIS). Entering the Foreign Service in 1971 he served in Oslo before studying Serbo-Croatian, the beginning of his career as specialist in East European Affairs. In Washington, Mr. Neitzke served on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and was Country Director for Czech and Albanian Affairs. In London he was Deputy Political Counselor, and in Zagreb he served as Deputy Chief of Mission during the conflicts of the split-up of Yugoslavia. He also had several

assignments in Washington in the personnel field. Mr. Neitzke was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

Q: We know Milosevic was playing the nationalist card, playing up hatred in order to gain his objectives. How about Tadjman? Were these two guys playing the same game or was Tadjman a different type?

NEITZKE: It always amazed me that Warren and others seemed to cut Milosevic, a pathologically duplicitous, first-order war criminal, so much more slack, at least on a personal basis, than they did Tadjman. Was it because Milosevic sometimes behaved better in person than Tadjman did? I've heard that people who met with Milosevic often came away with the image of a polished sort of Western business type, and that he spoke decent English. Tadjman's English, on the other hand, could be halting, and he preferred to use an interpreter when conducting serious business. Yet Milosevic calmly, methodically went about trying to realize his dream of Greater Serbia through sheer butchery, mass rape, and mass murder, whereas Tadjman did not, and personally was far more reactive. Tadjman may once have dreamed of hiving off at least the Croatian inhabited parts of Bosnia. We all heard the rumors – never substantiated, as far as I know -- about a pre-war deal struck with Milosevic at Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia between them. But by 1992 Tadjman had his hands more than full with devastation and Serb occupation in Croatia and concern for the very survival of some Croat-dominant communities in Bosnia. The contrast with Milosevic could hardly have been sharper. For all of Warren's concern for the plight of Serbs in Tadjman's new Croatia – and, as I indicated, on the whole I shared those concerns – he showed precious little understanding of why so many average Croats might not have wished to remain in Milosevic's Yugoslavia. And on that score, I think, unfortunately, Warren accurately reflected the studied biases of Washington's other senior Yugo hands.

I recall another, later meeting I had at the Agency with a couple of fairly senior people. When I expressed frustration about why they were continuing to get it wrong in terms of the balance of who had done what to whom in Bosnia, one of them bluntly said to me, we've known all along who the bad guys were, but we were not about to "help make Yugoslavia ripe for Croatian hegemony." I couldn't believe it. Was this 1943 or 1993? Croatia was then more or less on its back, sheltering hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and Bosnian refugees while Serb forces continued to run amok. And here was the Agency couching its analysis to fit, what, their own badly dated biases. So, no, Tadjman and Milosevic were not actually playing the same game. And I said so, openly and clearly, in a number of cables.

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NEITZKE: First, our call at UNHCR revealed the strain and suspicion already taking hold of that organization. These were the people, the only outsiders early on, who had witnessed some of the worst of the worst in Bosnia. At the senior working level, they were clearly afraid that Western military intervention, if it came, would worsen the humanitarian situation and make it impossible for them to do their jobs - essentially helping care for refugees and delivering food to embattled communities. So they were loath to sound alarm bells about mass murder or death camps. Later, when the full dimensions of the genocide became clear, some at UNHCR backtracked, claiming that they had duly reported what they saw all along but no one had paid attention. Journalists found that there had been some early UNHCR field reports, and that some had made their way, perhaps through USUN, to the State Department. But neither State nor UNHCR publicized them

at the time. By the summer of 1992, UNHCR was already functioning in something of a twilight zone of horror. As the killing and “cleansing” in Bosnia generated some million and a half refugees, UNHCR had, in a sense, to blind themselves to the atrocities generating the refugee flows while attempting to feed as many victims-in-place as possible until many of those victims too became refugees.

When Peter and I met with the UNHCR’s Tony Land in early August, the only alarm bell Land sounded was over the possibility of Western military intervention. Land was at pains to downplay the difficulties they faced and the atrocities they had witnessed. Two months later, however, their message had changed, as UNHCR Special Envoy José-Maria Mendiluce – one of the most decent, impressive individuals I met during my three years there – told me over dinner, and soon thereafter publicized, his estimate that some 400,000 Bosnians were at risk of dying in the coming winter of starvation, disease, and exposure. With fresh UNPROFOR troops then deploying in Bosnia, the Security Council’s command that relief be pushed through by “all means necessary” appeared initially to have welcome teeth in it.

Q: But we, I mean UNPROFOR, did not use all means necessary, did they?

NEITZKE: In retrospect, it’s clear that we never expected them to. The U.S., the State Department mainly, threw a monkey wrench into the process early on by leaning heavily on UNHCR to establish its base for supplying the most endangered Muslim areas – areas in Eastern, Northeastern, and Northern Bosnia threatened with Serbian ethnic cleansing – in, of all places, Belgrade, from which UNHCR would have to run convoys entirely through Serb-controlled territory. I don’t know what State’s thinking was on that. Looking back, it seems almost pernicious. In any event, that was the genesis of another tragic farce. A persistent pattern quickly emerged whereby Serbian forces would endlessly harass relief convoys escorted by UN troops who, in the event, proved unwilling to use force.

Let me stop for a moment to note that there was one brief period in which force was used. That was shortly after the British UNPROFOR forces deployed in the fall of 1992. Heavily armored and well led, they actually fought their way into a couple towns, going right through Serbian forces. All that earned for them, however, was a panicked reprimand from the UN military command that if the Brits kept that up they’d quickly endanger many other, less able UNPROFOR forces. So even the Brits were compelled to settle into a timid approach to aid delivery, under which the Serbs would typically allow to pass what were in effect starvation rations to encircled Muslims. In return, the Serbs alternately ripped off the convoys on the spot or demanded and got blackmail aid, part of which was sold on the black market and part of which was delivered to heavily non-refugee Serb populations, sometimes in Serbia itself. Whenever senior UNHCR officials would approach the point of throwing up their arms and screaming “this has to stop, we cannot do this anymore,” the international community would, in essence, force them to keep going. At all costs, the pretense had to be maintained. A high-profile relief effort to which we could point, and contribute, had become a vital part of our limited engagement policy. We were, in effect, feeding Bosnia to death.

Q: Well normally in a case like this, particularly in a country that is relatively easy to get to and all, it is not like a Sudan or something, you would have the American and European press all over the place. This is the sort of situation that would excite a media person.

NEITZKE: There were journalists covering some of this in the late spring and early summer of 1992, but not yet in the numbers that we would later see. Several journalists had been killed covering the Croatian war, and moving around Bosnia once the killing started there was extremely dangerous. I'm not sure whether the press at that point had full access to the Bosnian refugee camps in Croatia. One could fly into Sarajevo on a UN flight to get the story of the tightening siege, the sniper killings, the shelling, the increasing hardships, the latest "bread line massacre." But journalists couldn't get near the death camps early on, not until late summer, when, under growing international pressure incited mainly by such press reporting as there had been up until then, the Serbs allowed a few journalists into a couple camps that they mistakenly thought had been sufficiently cleaned up to permit this. That's when you got that initial video of the emaciated prisoners milling about. That upped the number of journalists dramatically.

We finally managed to get an Embassy Zagreb officer, John Zerolis, into one camp, Manjaca, in early September on a CSCE fact-finding mission. He saw no evidence of executions, obviously, but reported seeing hundreds of desperate looking Muslim men and boys held in sort of pens in pig or cattle sheds and, for food, run through a slop line. He said most of them didn't look as though they were going to make it. Before these limited visits to certain camps, however, a journalist had to be pretty determined – as only Gutman, Ed Vulliamy and a few others were - to get credible details about what was happening. Another early source that some journalists tapped was the Zagreb Mosque, which became a haven for some of the worst-affected victims, rape victims, for example. My initial call on the Imam there – later the ranking Muslim cleric in Bosnia - was another eye-opener - as he detailed the kinds of trauma that the many Muslims seeking refuge there had experienced.

But, as I mentioned, by late summer 1992, increasing numbers of journalists were showing up. Rarely did a week go by when I didn't give several background briefings for journalists. For the most part these were not second stringers, but some of the bigger names from some of the most influential U.S. and other Western papers, periodicals, and television networks. I was pretty candid with them, but none ever violated the ground rules or betrayed my trust.

Q: Okay, I want to get to another subject we have only touched on. That is the role of the U.S. military. But first, you mentioned other things you were doing that might have gotten under Washington's skin. Like what?

NEITZKE: Well, before we go there, I should say something about the primary source that informed our perception that what was happening in Bosnia was not a civil war, let alone a reemergence of age old ethnic hatreds, as some in the Administration alleged, but genocide. I mentioned that in early August we began sending in reports of alleged atrocities in Bosnia, but there weren't that many that were detailed enough or sufficiently corroborated. But that situation changed. The media had increased their focus on the Serb-run death camps – that, by the way, was a term Eagleburger hated and in late August was still disparaging; he set the death camp standard explicitly at the "Bergen-Belsen" level and referred to the Bosnian camps as

“unpleasant conditions.” In any event, as a result of the media’s focus on the camps and the ICRC’s belated attention to them, Serb leaders decided to close some of the camps, sanitized parts of others for Western inspection, moved some prisoners to less lethal facilities, and generally slowed the intake of Muslim prisoners. Then in September, this is still 1992, the Serbs decided to turn over to the ICRC an initial group of 1,000 or so survivors to be taken to the holding facility I mentioned in Karlovac, Croatia, a little over an hour southwest of Zagreb.

From that point on, I sent anyone we could spare down to Karlovac to interview these men. The most prolific contributor to this effort was a young TDY FSO from Embassy Bonn, Dubravka Maric, who spoke Croatian, or Bosnian, with near native fluency. Dubravka and other Embassy Zagreb FSOs, and two other female FSOs we later brought in specifically to interview rape victims, produced a steady stream of reports to Washington and our regular European embassy and military command addressees detailing multiply-corroborated, eye-witness accounts of mass executions and some of the most sadistic barbarities you could imagine one human being inflicting on another.

Well, I take that back. Actually, it would be all but impossible for you to imagine some of these crimes, some of the torture and killing techniques in the camps, they were so gruesome, unless you were a full-blown psychopath, which I suspect some of the worst perpetrators were. In all cases reported by the Karlovac survivor group, the perpetrators were Serb and in nearly all cases the victims were Muslim. These Embassy Zagreb reports, combined with those from a few other U.S. Embassies in countries to which some of these survivors were eventually moved, constituted a substantial portion of the eight compendia – brief summaries of which the State Department made public contemporaneously - that the U.S. forwarded to the United Nations between September 1992 and May 1993.

Q: This was because the UN was asking for these, or why send it to them?

NEITZKE: The Security Council had passed resolutions calling on member states to report information of this sort about what was happening in Bosnia. These reports, many of the reports we sent in, served as a key part of the initial data base for the UN Bosnia War Crimes Commission. Formally it was called the Commission of Experts, the Kalshoven Commission. It was set up in October 1992 and, after months of dithering, and worse, ultimately did contribute critically to the establishment of The Hague Tribunal.

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Q: You suggested that you and the Embassy were doing a number of things in that first year, in addition to the atrocity reporting, that may have gotten on Washington’s nerves.

NEITZKE: When the first group of death camp survivors arrived in Karlovac, and it appeared that subsequent releases would depend in part on the speed with which these men could be moved on to third countries, I sent in a message – the idea came from a Econ Officer Tom Mittnacht -- proposing that the U.S. quickly admit some of them, as something we should do for its own sake and as an incentive to other Western countries to do the same. Shortly thereafter, the USG itself estimated that there were up to 70,000 prisoners in 45, nearly all Serb-run, camps in Bosnia. The ICRC said nearly all were in unheated buildings facing “Siberian-like” conditions.

Yet the Department all but shot down our proposal, citing a host of bureaucratic reasons, behind which clearly lay the message that Washington really, really, didn't want to take these people.

Q: So, what happened to them, the former prisoners in Croatia, and those still held in Bosnia?

NEITZKE: We and a few other, mainly European, countries, did eventually admit some of these men for resettlement. But most of the initial tranche of released prisoners languished for months in cramped, fairly squalid conditions in Karlovac. There was heat, food, and health care, but it was still pretty grim. I visited a couple times. It was important to try to move these people along if one were to press the Serbs to release more prisoners. But, seeing that very few of these men were moving onward, out of Croatia, the Croats eventually balked at admitting many more, which played into the Serbs' hands. By then they had their own reasons to drag their feet on more releases. Some well-documented camp populations in Bosnia seemed to disappear. Others, with a bad winter setting in, presumably died from the effects of their mistreatment while waiting, against the odds, for their own release.

Here's another example of what we tried to do. An Embassy officer brought me what appeared to be reliable reports that women and girls being held in one particular mass rape facility could be gotten out for a specific per-head ransom. I appealed to the Department for a small amount of funds to explore this, to see whether we could get some of these women and girls out, again, a gesture for its own sake but something that also might help shed light on this widespread atrocity. My proposal was not well received, but they couldn't just reject it. Instead there began a lengthy runaround, with numerous requests for more information, which they knew would be tough to get. Finally, Washington asked ICRC and UNHCR to confirm the location of the alleged rape facility, as though they'd be able to drive right up and check it out, which of course they would not do and could not do but were reluctant to acknowledge. So, in the end, after all the foot-dragging, nothing came of that effort either.

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NEITZKE: I was saying how wildly off the mark our Yugo experts' analysis of Serb strength and fortitude was. From the hundreds of eye-witness victim testimonies that I saw, it was clear that the Serbs doing most of the killing in Bosnia were not the giant, hardened, fight-to-the-death Partisan warriors of Balkan myth and Partisan lore. Instead, cast together with JNA regulars and their Bosnian Serb henchmen were an amalgam of common criminals, punk wannabe gang-leaders, and former soccer fan clubs morphed into doped up weekend rape and execution squads. Even Karadzic later remarked, I believe, that 5,000 American troops on the ground early on would have caused them to stop.

Q: This is the thing that struck me at the time. It sounded like a bunch of, well, a bunch of guys with big beer bellies sitting around with artillery going after people who couldn't defend themselves.

NEITZKE: Most of these were very nasty types, not courageous, but capable of inflicting horrific brutalities on innocent people. One reason the Serbs suffered very few military casualties in Bosnia were the consistently cowardly tactics they employed – heavily shelling a village from afar, traumatizing the residents. Then they would enter the village or town and start rounding people up. Then, to focus everyone's attention, they might behead a few community leaders on

the doorstep of their homes, or rape to death a young girl or two in front of her siblings, parents, and townsfolk in the local square. The point was to desecrate the place, so that the people, once banished, would never wish to go back. And then the men and boys would be marched or trucked off to concentration camps where many of them would be starved, sadistically tortured, and killed, and the women and older girls would be hauled off to holding facilities where they were likely to be gang raped. In late 1992 the EC, I believe, sent out a team that estimated there had been some 20,000 rape victims by that point. And after the killing, raping, and roundups were over, the Serb looters would show up, stealing nearly everything removable, from toilets to wiring to doorknobs.

Q: Okay. But the Croats too...I mean I find it difficult to believe that the Croats, that this particular leopard had completely changed its spots from World War II. I assume there was some nastiness on the part of the Croats also.

NEITZKE: As I think I noted earlier, there were also some nasty Croatian elements – I'm thinking here especially of HOS and Paraga's gang – but some in the HVO too, and Croats did commit atrocities on a number of occasions. For example, in April 1993, in the Lasva Valley, in Vitez, in Ahmici and other villages, and in October 1993, in Stupni Do, Bosnian Croat forces committed crimes as heinous and unforgivable as nearly anything – except Srebrenica – that Serbs did, albeit on a vastly smaller scale. We'll get to what happened between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in 1993 in a moment. But keep in mind the key finding of the comprehensive CIA study: Serbs did at least 90 percent of the killing, raping, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. And that figure was pre-Srebrenica. This while Croatia was inundated with hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslim refugees, and while hundreds of thousands more sheltered in Bosnian Croat-held territory in Bosnia.

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NEITZKE: But getting back to Boban and the growing Croat-Muslim tensions, in January tempers had not quite yet boiled over in most Croat-Muslim areas. By April, however, the situation had grown much worse. That was the month when Bosnian Croat forces committed the Lasva Valley massacres to which I referred. And it was the month before Bosnian Croats in and around Mostar began driving Muslims out of West Mostar, mostly to the East Bank, and rounding up thousands of Muslim males and confining them in ad hoc camps set up around the area. But strangely, it appeared that as late as that same month, April, Croats were still transshipping Iranian arms to some Muslim forces.

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NEITZKE: I very strongly doubt, however, that either Tudjman or Susak authorized the cleansing of the Lasva Valley, let alone the massacres in late April. By the same token, it's difficult to believe that what briefly transpired in and around Mostar in early May, which was widespread and obviously coordinated, could have taken place without some kind of nod from Zagreb. There, Bosnian Croats, as I mentioned, drove nearly all Muslims from the Western part of the city and began rounding up large numbers of Muslim males and holding them in buildings or improvised camps throughout the area. Those who believe that, notwithstanding the CIA study, Croats treated Muslims just as badly as the Serbs did, often point to those camps around Mostar as proof of their contention.

I can only guess what might have become of these Muslims had the Croat roundup and imprisonment effort continued unimpeded. The Serbs did not have a monopoly on sadism. Fortunately, it didn't continue unimpeded. We, UN personnel, and others were on the Croats' case virtually from the outset. By chance, our military attaché and his assistant were in this area at the time. We had them seek entry to some of the holding facilities, and they got in. With their eye-witness accounts we were able to correct wildly overblown reports that the Croats had set up a system of brutal concentration and death camps similar to what the Serbs had established a year earlier. But, more importantly, we were able to confront the Croats early on with the disturbing details of what we had seen and demand that the process be halted and those detained freed. With pressure from us and many others, nearly all the roundup activity was halted and nearly all of the prisoners were eventually released. For a brief while, however, there was severe mistreatment, even torture of some of these Muslims. And there were a small number of now-documented killings.

Although this bold Bosnian Croat move had essentially been nipped in the bud, a line had been crossed; Croat-Muslim relations in these areas would never be the same. The Bosnian Croats had been reined in, but not completely. Incidents of Croat persecution of Muslims continued to accumulate, and East Mostar became a hell hole, especially for the many displaced Muslims swelling the population there. UN and Embassy DART officials visiting East Mostar reported the most god awful conditions. And then Stari Most, the beautiful old, medieval bridge, the symbol of Mostar, and to some extent, of Bosnia, was deliberately destroyed by Croatian forces.

Q: Well, again, how do you draw such a moral distinction between what the Croats were doing, or at least tried to do, and what the Serbs did? And also, is Tadjman himself, even if he didn't order it, not responsible for what happened around Mostar?

NEITZKE: On the first part of your question, drawing moral distinctions between what the Serbs and the Croats did to the Muslims, I'm reminded of the line that MacKenzie used, the pro-Serb Canadian UNPROFOR general. He compared the situation in Bosnia to that of three serial killers, one of whom had brutally murdered 15 victims, one 10, and the other 5. Do you really want to help the one who has only murdered 5, he would ask. His point was that all three parties were indistinguishably evil. But the best analysis of who did what to whom, of who killed whom, the comprehensive CIA study I've mentioned, destroys MacKenzie's contention. It was nothing like 15-10-5; Serbs were guilty of 90 percent or more of the killing, raping, and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. The Croats came in second at a few percent, and the Muslims a distant third, and much of that was probably retaliatory. So, yes, the comparative guilt of the parties is absolutely distinguishable, morally and in nearly every other way, and we do a great disservice, it seems to me, in fuzzing that over or failing to recognize it.

Q: Yes, well, but let us return now to the situation during Ambassador Galbraith's first year, that would be the summer of 1993 to the summer of 1994. You have mentioned the Croat-Muslim fighting and the Washington Agreement, but what led up to that?

NEITZKE: The heightened Croat-Muslim tension in mid-1993, and the various, mainly Croat attacks that that spawned were complicating Washington's standoff policy. As ugly as the situation in Bosnia had been up to that time, it threatened to get even worse. That's when Chuck

Redman, who had replaced Bartholomew as U.S. representative on the Contact Group, began his prolonged effort to quell the Croat-Muslim fighting and reconcile the two groups. He didn't have much to work with. One thing he did have working in his favor, however, was the aftermath of a summer 1993 marketplace massacre in Sarajevo. That particular massacre was followed by a burst of U.S. and Allied indignation and the shooting down of several Serbian aircraft for violating no-fly restrictions. The impact of that incident has always been underestimated; it was the most significant use of Western force against the Serbs until the summer of 1995 and for a moment put the fear of god not only into the Serbs but into the Croats and Muslims as well. It appeared briefly as though the U.S. were about to get serious. Other than through Chuck's initiative we didn't exploit that fear, but to me it always stood as a clear indication that at virtually any point a forceful expression of U.S. determination to halt the killing could have brought the Serbs to heel.

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Chief of Mission
Belgrade (1993-1996)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the National Security Council, specializing in Soviet issues. From 1998 to 2001 Mr. Perina was US Ambassador to Moldova. Ambassador Perina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006

Q: Before you went, what was your impression of the situation in the former Yugoslavia? What was our policy?

PERINA: This was a time when the Bosnian War was going full force and all the reports of atrocities were hitting the Western media. These included the reports on the concentration camps, the mass rapes, the use of rape as an instrument of war, the sniper killings in Sarajevo, and so on. All of these reports were coming out and arousing public opinion, generally in an anti-Serb direction because most of the publicized atrocities seemed to be committed against Muslims by Serbs. This was the time when three or four State Department desk officers in a row resigned from the Department to protest that the U.S. was not taking stronger action against Serbia. There was a feeling that the U.S. should be doing more to stop these atrocities, that it should intervene against the Serbs. It was a horrible time and horrible things were happening. The U.S. had started reacting to this, and military action by NATO was not ruled out. This was one of the reasons I was told there was a 50-50 chance of closing the Embassy.

There was also continuing tension over Kosovo. In December 1992, six months before I went out, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger gave Milosevic what came to be known as the "Christmas warning" that we would take action against Serbia proper in retaliation for any move against Kosovo. So U.S.-Serb relations were very bad, as you can imagine, and the State Department

increasingly felt under pressure to do more to stop the killing in Bosnia. Our initial approach had been to try to stay out and let the Europeans take the lead. We felt that this was a good example of a regional conflict that the European Union should try to handle. But the European Union was not doing very much, and pressure was mounting on the U.S. by domestic public opinion to do something.

RWANDA

LEONARD SPEARMAN Ambassador Rwanda (1988-1990)

Ambassador Spearman was professor at a number of colleges and universities in the US before becoming President of Southern University and, subsequently, President of Texas Southern University. Following a number of presidential appointments to several international organizations and conferences, he was named Ambassador to Rwanda, where he served from 1988 to 1990. The following year he was named Ambassador to Lesotho, where he served until 1993. He continued his academic career as Distinguished Professor at Coppin State College. Ambassador Spearman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

SPEARMAN: In 1955, '56, '57, the Hutus appealed to the Belgians for equality and equal treatment. The Tutsis rejected their request and said that they were the sons of kings and queens and these were squatters and peasants and were condemned forever to toil the soil. After two or three years of attempted negotiation, the Hutus struck back.

Q: This is 1960?

SPEARMAN: This is 1957 through 1960, and please forgive me on my times, but this is in the late '50s. They struck back with machetes, and because they constitute 85 percent of the population, they virtually decimated the Tutsi population, driving them into Tanzania, to southern Uganda, to Zaire, and some fled into Burundi. At this particular point, the military role of the Hutu became more and more confident and ultimately took over the government.

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Q: Well, this is an important point. The effect of demographic pressure, population density, and that thing where sometimes as in animal experiments you have species biting, fighting, killing each other.

SPEARMAN: Well, listen, here in the United States, an increase in violence occurs as you decrease the amount of space. What we have got here are people who are here together, who are afraid. The radio is the primary means of communication. Now a few zealots get on the line and say these Tutsis are coming back, you must destroy them. These cockroaches -- is the proper term for which they used to refer to them -- these cockroaches will take us over, they will maim our children and so forth. You must destroy them. If I repeat this on the radio village by village by village, and I have got this tremendous, as you point out, demographic issue of population

density, how long does it take a group of 25 Hutu to destroy with machetes and stones an entire village of helpless people? The answer is it doesn't take very long.

JOYCE E. LEADER
Deputy Chief of Mission
Kigali (1991-1994)

Ambassador Leader was born in Pennsylvania and raised in Ohio. He was educated at Dennison University, the University of Chicago, and the Columbia University School of Journalism. After work in the private sector and with the US Department of Education, he joined the Peace Corps, serving in Kinshasa and at headquarters in Washington. Joining the State Department in 1982 he began his career in which he was to deal primarily with African concerns, both in Washington and abroad. His foreign postings include Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Lagos and Marseilles. In 1999 he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, where he served until 2000. Ambassador Leader was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003

Q: Did you sense when you got there [in 1991] there was concern that you all might go through another Hutu-Tutsi genocide?

LEADER: Throughout the three years that I was there, mini massacres were happening. No massacre should be minimalized by the word "mini," but I say that because in comparison to what happened in 1994, these were killings that went on that were geographically isolated or restricted. They didn't spread. Maybe 300 people would be killed. It was always 300 people. Then it would stop. Nobody would ever know quite why it started, who started it, what was the impetus, and so on. These things would flare up in different places. Then they would go away. The government would blame it on the RPF, who would blame it on the government. There was a lot of insecurity at the time, too, because bombs were exploding in marketplaces and on busses. Land mines were run over by trucks on roads. So, who was doing all of this was never quite clear. There was never any accountability. Nobody was ever found responsible for this insecurity and for these massacres. In some of the massacres, I have to say that it didn't seem all that unclear to us that the government or people close to the government were serving as agents provocateurs. The first massacre that happened when I was there was south of the capital in an area where there were a good number of Tutsis who had been resettled from other parts of the country some years back. There were indications that people were going around and saying that the Tutsis were going to kill them, so they had to defend themselves and act before the Tutsis did that. That was usually the line that was taken, that if you don't kill the Tutsis, they're going to kill you. It was this kind of fear that prompted people to pick up their machetes and execute their neighbors.

But did we think that this was going to escalate into something worse? I guess we were maybe naive but I don't think my mind could imagine such a thing. It just couldn't fathom that that would take place. We did at the embassy keep our focus on the positive developments, what we thought were positive developments, in terms of the peace process and democratization, strengthening the political parties, helping to facilitate the negotiations between the rebels and the government when that got started. I was actually sent as one of the U.S. observers to Arusha.

I was expecting to go and be there for a short time and sort of oversee the negotiations on the refugee situation. As it happened, I got there when they were still discussing the military integration of the army, integration of the gendarmerie, and that went on and on and on. So I was there from April through June. The refugee matter was taken up in the middle of that and took about five days.

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At this time also, an independent radio station started up. It was called RTL, or the Radio Television Libre Mille Collines, Free Thousand Hills. It was started up by Hutu hardliners. It was broadcasting a lot of propaganda against the journalists, against the human rights advocates, against the people who had negotiated the settlement, and against the enemy (the Tutsis). We were talking to the government about trying to rein this group in, which we now called hate radio. They simply said, "Well, it's a free country and it's a free radio and the government has nothing to do with it and we have no control over it." It was a very, very difficult situation. A few weeks before the president's plane was shot down, a political party leader was assassinated outside of his home. For the first time, one of these "mini massacres" happened in Kigali. The people who brought the fear and the terror to the people of the capital for the second time (a year earlier the Tutsis had broken the cease-fire and almost captured the capital), at this point, they were very scared about massacres spreading.

Q: Was the embassy at this point or for some time on the alert that all hell might break loose and we'd better make plans?

LEADER: We had gone to evacuation a year earlier when the rebels had almost captured Kigali but for the intervention of the French. People had come back three months later. We continued our weekly security briefings of the community. We were keeping people very well informed about what was going on and what the risks were. But at that particular point in time, we weren't anticipating having to flee or there being a big eruption. Between the time that this political party leader was assassinated in February and April when the plane of the president was shot down, we had several high level visitors from Washington again putting pressure on the government to resolve the obstacles to implementing the peace process. So we were still looking to the positive, looking to the solution, looking to the resolution, believing that once this framework for a new government was put in place, that this violence could be controlled, the dissidents would be brought in, they would see this was the only game in town and so they would come into the process. It just didn't work like that. We were totally mistaken. Of course, we knew very quickly after the plane was shot down. The next morning, I awoke to gunfire. I think others did as well. I was getting calls from 7:00 AM telling me that the political moderates who were in the opposition to President Juvenal Habyarimana and who favored the peace accord were being systematically killed. I knew there were forces going house to house in some of the Kigali neighborhoods killing Tutsis. Right off the bat we had the killing of the Hutu moderates, not just Tutsis, and also ordinary Tutsi citizens were being slaughtered. That was evident before 10:00 AM. By that afternoon, we were hearing that the RPF might start to move its forces down from the north. There were rumors that forces already in the area were breaking out of the compound they were in, but I don't know to this day if that was true. But forces did start moving down from the north. By the next day, it was clear that Kigali could become the venue not only for killing Tutsis and killing Hutu moderates, but also renewed civil war, which had not happened in Kigali up to that time. So, we decided, and Washington decided, that it would be best if we evacuated.

Q: Now we're back to Rwanda. The president's plane was shot down when?

LEADER: April 6, about 8:30 PM, 1994.

Q: So we've reached that point before. You mentioned that there was some hope that the French might intervene. They had done so before.

LEADER: I don't think we thought there was hope that the French would intervene. It was not our policy to support French intervention in Rwanda. There were agreements between the Rwandan government and the French and we more or less stayed clear of pronouncing one way or the other. It's true that the French had come to the rescue of the government throughout this crisis with the Tutsi RPF invaders from Uganda. This started right away after the invasion in October 1990. Both the French and the Belgians sent troops. The Belgians withdrew their troops after 30 days. It was very controversial in Belgium about coming to the aid of that government. But the French never left. Of course, they were there ostensibly to protect their citizens. There were about 600 French citizens in Rwanda, some engaged in business, others engaged with the government, and many with the military. The French had a great deal of military assistance going into Rwanda. One of the provisions of the peace accord reached between the rebels and the government that was signed in Rwanda in Arusha in August 1993 was that the French troops would withdraw. But in fact about six months prior to the agreement the French augmented their troops because the RPF broke the cease-fire and launched an assault toward Kigali that came within 20 miles of the capital. So, they augmented their forces and were manning roadblocks on the access routes into Kigali. Yet, part of the peace agreement was that they would leave. They did this finally in December 1993. This was just weeks before the RPF brought a battalion into Kigali which was scheduled to provide protection for the Tutsi RPF members who were going to participate in the government when it got set up. But of course it never got set up, not at that point in time. So, at the time the president's plane was shot down the French had very few troops, if any, left in Rwanda. At that time, they had a base in the Central African Republic and they sent some troops down explicitly for evacuating their citizens. They provide armed escort for French people who were going from their assembly points to the airport to pick up planes that would take them to France. It was subsequent to this evacuation when the RPF had made considerable advances toward Kigali and the Hutu government that was committing the genocide was on the run that the French got permission from the UN Security Council to launch what was called Operation Turquoise. Operation Turquoise was a plan to rope off a portion of southern Rwanda which the RPF had not yet reached and use troops from Francophone African countries to provide protection for people in that zone. Of course, that made the zone a magnet for all what were subsequently called "genocidaires," the people who were committing the genocide. The French essentially became protectors of the killers. This was a contribution aimed at protecting the people from the killing that was going on, both the genocide and the civil war.

Q: As this developed, were we looking toward the government and saying, "They are promoting a genocide?" What was this doing to us?

LEADER: We didn't see that they were promoting a genocide. We knew there was resistance to implementing the peace accord. In the six months before the genocide which came after the

signing of the peace accord, our primary focus diplomatically was on removing the obstacles to implementing the peace accord. We were working very closely with the entire diplomatic community and there was a substantial African diplomatic community there. The leadership fell to the representative of the Vatican. He was the head of the diplomatic community, the nuncio. He would call the meetings and get people together. We worked with not only the French and the Belgians - the English were not there - but also with the Africans and the Tanzanians. The Tanzanians played such an important role in facilitating the peace accord and had a very prominent role in the diplomatic community. They were working with the two sides to try and bring the peace accord to fruition. Through this group we did call the government on its distribution of weapons. I was in a meeting where this happened. The nuncio said to the president, "Mr. President, this is just not odd, this distribution of weapons." The president basically avoided the question by going back to the issue of security for people in villages. He recalled that initially when the RPF had invaded, they passed out weapons to villages in the border areas but those weapons had since been retrieved. He just totally sidestepped the issue of what was happening at the moment, which was substantial. So, we never saw a genocide coming. That was just beyond our comprehension.

Q: The genocide really blew up after the president's plane was shot down?

LEADER: The genocide was launched after that, yes. The shooting down of the plane was the trigger that started the actions of the groups who were trained in the capital to do a very rapid and brutal killing with what they called "les armes blanche," not even guns, but machetes. In fact, in one of the stories which I don't think is a story, people were actually paying to be killed by a bullet rather than to be killed by a machete. It was horrendous. Whether the violence would have been launched by some other trigger, my feeling is, yes, it could have been a different trigger. But it just so happened that the president's plane became the trigger for launching the genocide and killing the opposition and renewing the civil war.

Q: Were we calling for intervention? Did it happen so fast that it was really too late for intervention?

LEADER: No, it was not too late for intervention. Immediately after the killing started our policy was to call for the killing to stop. Once the civil war was renewed we urged renewal of the cease-fire and an end to the fighting. So, it was stop the killing, stop the fighting, let's get back to talking. But at the same time, there was the issue of the UN force that was already in the capital. There were approximately 2,500 troops under the aegis of the United Nations headed by a Canadian general, General Romeo Dallaire. His rules of engagement forbade him to initiate any kind of action against the people who were committing the killing. He could only respond if his troops were directly threatened like if somebody raised a gun and pointed it at them. Otherwise, they could be standing right beside a checkpoint and people would be committing crimes, killing people, but they couldn't do anything to stop it.

Q: Who set up the rules of engagement?

LEADER: The Security Council set up the rules of engagement. And at this time, the Security Council was under pressure from the Belgians, who had had 10 of their peacekeeping troops

slaughtered the first morning after the plane went down. These were troops who were going to the prime minister's house to provide her protection. They never got there. They were instead kidnapped and taken to a military camp where they were brutally killed within hours. So the Belgian response was to withdraw all of its forces from the Rwandan peacekeeping mission, known as UNAMIR. They urged the other governments to do the same. So there was pressure on the U.S. not to enlarge the peacekeeping mission. This was the issue that was before the Security Council: to enlarge or not to enlarge the peacekeeping mission or to give it different rules of engagement. Madeleine Albright was our UN ambassador at that time. She was instructed by Washington to say that we were not in favor of enlarging; we were in favor of reducing. In fact, General Dallaire got left with 500 troops.

Q: Was your mission playing any role in this?

LEADER: Our mission was gone. The embassy was closed. The French were gone, the Belgians were gone, the U.S. was gone, the Africans, everybody was gone. All of the diplomats had evacuated. I believe that a couple of Tanzanians actually stayed at least for a while to try to get things back on track. But pretty much everybody left. So it was really Washington that was operating now. There was very little intelligence coming out of the country because nobody was there to provide it. We were in touch with people who were in the country and certainly our Deputy Assistant Secretary was talking by telephone regularly with the people who were running things.

Q: How did you get out?

LEADER: The Belgians and the French brought troops into the country and had airplanes landing at the airport, to evacuate their people. I actually spoke with the French. They said, "We can look at your situation after we take care of ours." So, those folks were focused on their own citizens. There were about 600 French and about double that number of Belgians. So they weren't going to get around to us anytime soon and we realized that we had to rely on ourselves. It seemed that without some kind of military assistance, we couldn't get to the airport because we would be crossing battle lines. If we went with the French, they were considered pro-Habyarimana government. If we went with the Belgians, they were considered pro-RPF. So we thought that maybe we had a better chance of being independent. We finally assessed that our best shot was to take the road south to Burundi. At that time, the killing had not spread south of Kigali. There were reports of killings north and east but not really south. We had already identified assembly points. Because we had been having security briefings regularly with our community, other Americans knew where those assembly points were. We couldn't discuss anything without involving everybody because we were using our two-way radios. Everybody could listen in if the ambassador and I were discussing something. If the embassy people were discussing, everybody was listening. So they all had a say from their perspective about what looked best to them. They all agreed that it was best to just go by road. We spent a lot of time trying to get some sort of authorization from the government side to give us safe passage and we succeeded. It just so happened that our defense attaché was there. He and our consular officer made it to the embassy on Friday, two days after the plane was shot down. They managed to get a commitment of safe passage and a couple of gendarmes to accompany any convoys out of town. The decision was made on Friday morning that we would evacuate and we only had that day to

organize. By that time, most of the people in the mission – AID, us, missionaries – had lost power. We could only have electricity if we put our generators on. That meant that to recharge the radios, we all had to have the generator on. Some Americans were caught in a crossfire on Thursday night, so they really did feel that it was time to get out. We think this particular crossfire, by the way, was internal fighting between branches of the military inside Kigali at that point. We sent two convoys on Saturday and two on Sunday and they all made it safely to Burundi. Some of them had some stories and it took them quite a long time past midnight to make it all the way there, but they did. On Monday the first convoy went. The ambassador's wife was in that convoy with their car and there was some concern that they wouldn't be able to get across the bridge out of town, that it might have been blown up or something. They went anyway because how could we get any intelligence unless we went? So, they went down there and they found that it had not been blown up and it was still passable, so they went across and then about 1:00 PM, our convoy, the last convoy, went. I closed the door of the embassy and we left. The ambassador and I were in the last car of the last convoy until we got to the bridge and they told us we had to be the first car. We had a 107 car convoy. I counted them when we got to the border. Of those 107 cars, there were only nine Americans. There were Omanis, there were all of the African diplomats, there were a number of Germans, some other European governments that weren't Belgian or French. It was slow going, but we made it with no serious incidents.

Q: Were there attempts by Hutus to get on board?

LEADER: Hutus?

Q: It was basically Tutsis killing Hutus, wasn't it?

LEADER: No, no, Hutus killing Tutsis.

Q: Okay. Then Tutsis trying to...

LEADER: No, we didn't really have that happen. When we got to the bridge in my convoy, there was one incident in which the military guards accused one woman of being Tutsi and said she would have to get out of the convoy. She happened to be the wife of a Tanzanian diplomat. I think she probably was a Tutsi. As you know, there were a lot of Tutsis who were in refugee camps in Tanzania. It was quite possible that they had met somehow in Tanzania. But anyway, it was our ambassador who kind of saved the day. He spoke Kirundi, very close to Kinyarwanda. When he saw that they weren't getting anywhere, he went over to see what was the problem because we wanted to get the convoy moving again. He told me later that the military said, "Well, she's a Tutsi. We know she's a Tutsi because she speaks Kinyarwanda." And the ambassador looked at them and said, "But I speak Kirundi and you're not going to say that I'm Rwandan, are you?" They sort of looked blank and had to agree that he had a point and that just because she spoke Kinyarwanda didn't necessarily mean that she was a Rwandan. We did get her out of that scrape. We moved on. Most people who were threatened by that time were in hiding. As a matter of fact, I had been in contact with a friend who was a lawyer and a human rights advocate. We'd been in touch up until Saturday morning. By Saturday morning, all contact with him stopped. He went into hiding. I later heard his story because he did survive. But most people were in hiding

by that time. Mille Collines was already beginning to be a rendezvous point. People were fleeing to that hotel or to churches to try to save themselves.

Q: I'm surprised that there weren't more people coming to the American embassy and saying, "Get us out of here."

LEADER: Well, we were in touch with some of our Foreign Service nationals who worked for us and told them what we were doing and what arrangements we were making for them to continue to be paid and that we would be coming back as soon as possible. But they were mostly in their homes or in hiding. We had no way of taking them with us. It was very distressing, but we didn't. It was something that we didn't like having to do, but we did have to do it. There were a number of Rwandans who were part of the government who went to the French embassy and were evacuated by the French to France. I heard that story from a Rwandan who was a human rights advocate. He was more than just a human rights advocate. He founded the first human rights organization. He lived very close to the French embassy, so he went there as soon as things started because he knew he would be marked. In fact, he was marked. The people who lived in the house that he had lived in before he had moved were killed. His house had been marked, but it wasn't his house anymore. They just killed the people who were in it – Hutus. He went to the French embassy and he was appalled because all of these pro-Habyarimana, pro-genocide perpetrators and so forth were in the French embassy. They didn't want him to get on the plane. They did not want him to be evacuated with them. As a matter of fact, the plane stopped in Bujumbura before it went on to France and he got off because he wasn't going to be evacuated to France with all those people and be associated with all them. So that was a big issue and it caused a lot of Americans anguish, because they had to leave behind people who worked for them in their homes, people that they worked with in their places of work whether they were in UN organizations or in the embassy or in AID or whatever. We all think about that a lot.

Q: You moved where? You went to another place.

LEADER: We went to Bujumbura, Burundi, which was usually a five hour drive but in fact took us 10 hours to get there. And from there, we were evacuated by one of the military planes that was in Burundi to Kenya. Then from Nairobi, we flew commercially home. People were then in evacuation status. Most were reassigned.

PRUDENCE BUSHNELL
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Sub-Sahara Africa
Washington, DC (1993-1995)

Ambassador Bushnell was born in Washington, DC into a Foreign Service family. She was raised in Washington and at Foreign Service posts abroad and received degrees from Russell Sage College and the University of Maryland. After working as a clerk at Embassies Teheran and Rabat, she became a Foreign Service Officer in 1981 and subsequently served in several posts before serving as Ambassador to Kenya 1996 – 1999. There she experienced the bombing of the Embassy by al Qaeda. In 1999 she was named Ambassador to Guatemala, where she served until 2002. During her career, the Ambassador served in several senior positions in the

Department in Washington. Ambassador Bushnell was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Your French of course came into?

BUSHNELL: Right. After five years in Senegal, my French came back, so this was easy for me to do. I went on TV and radio and called for a halt to the killing. The next day when I went downtown, a couple of people came up and said, "Are you the woman who was on television, thank you, the killing stopped last night." I was very moved.

A couple of weeks after that March trip, back in Washington, I was Acting Assistant Secretary -- both George and Ed were out of town -- when the plane carrying both the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot out of the sky as it was landing in Kigali, Rwanda. Within hours, barricades went up in the streets, moderate Hutu and Tutsi politicians were sought out and killed, and the slaughter of Tutsis began.

Had my husband, Dick, been given a medical clearance, I would have been in Kigali dealing with disaster. Instead, I was in Washington dealing with disaster. As I said earlier, it was the first time I began to believe in destiny.

The first order of business was the welfare of American citizens. Kigali was in chaos. The parts of the military were going door to door with lists to kill the people inside. The RPF troops came out of their barricades; fire fights began in the streets. We advised all Americans to stay home and stay down so our information was limited.

Q: This obviously had been planned.

BUSHNELL: Yes, although we had no idea at the time to what extent the killing would continue.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

BUSHNELL: David Rawson, who was unable to get to the embassy for a couple of days. Remember, the President of Burundi had also been killed, so we were very nervous about what would happen there, as well. We set up an emergency 24 hour task force, which I was to head, and I called Ed, who was on vacation, to ask him to come home!

The French were concerned about their nationals; there were many more of them than Americans. While they began to make plans to evacuate French citizens from the Kigali airport, we made the daring decision to send Americans out overland to neighboring countries. This was David Rawson's idea and a good one. Kigali was a killing zone. It made no sense to ask Americans around the country -- many of them, missionaries -- to come into the city and wait to be rescued by the French when they could more easily go over the nearest border to Tanzania, Burundi or Zaire (now Congo), whichever was closest.

Q: What about local employees, Rwandans, particularly Tutsi? Were they coming going out with us or not?

BUSHNELL: No. This will forever scar our reputation among Foreign Service Nationals. The agreement brokered with Rwandan government and military was that the overland convoys would contain ex-patriots only. We left everyone else behind. To be fair, we had no idea what was to come. Still....

Q: Well, there had been a record of several of these Hutu - Tutsi conflicts which had not reached the proportions that this one did. So that, you know, based on past experience, you could say, this is terrible, but we'll get out, we'll come back and it will settle down.

BUSHNELL: That was the rationale.

Q: You were in charge because you were acting secretary for African affairs. How much of a part did the seventh floor or the National Security Council play?

BUSHNELL: Other than concern for a prominent human rights advocate who had met President Clinton, the NSC didn't play much of a role. The seventh floor did. I came to the operation center very early one morning, about day two after the crisis started, and three senior people stopped me to say "Pru, the President called Secretary Christopher and the Secretary of Defense to say that he wants every American out alive. Good luck." As if I needed an order from the President to bring people out safely. Anyway, I felt that the waters had parted and there I was. Fortunately, not alone. I had a great team.

It soon became clear, however, that decisions had to be made swiftly, much faster than our bureaucracy would allow. For example, the order to evacuate took more than a day to get through the clearance process. So, Beth Jones, the Secretary's Executive Assistant, and I worked an arrangement. Any time I needed a decision from Secretary Christopher, I would contact her. She would get immediate access and a verbal response to whatever it was. On the basis of that response, I was authorized to take action. The clearance papers would follow a parallel track. It worked well. While the overland evacuations were pretty nerve-wracking because we had no radio contact once the last convoy left the embassy, we got all Americans out alive.

Q: The Americans are out, but all hell was breaking loose. I mean it was one of the great catastrophes of our time. What did you do?

BUSHNELL: It was awful, one of the worse periods of my life. As awful as the bombing of the embassy in Nairobi was.

Q: The bombing was finite period, but this, I mean to have a rolling genocide going on.

BUSHNELL: And not being able to do anything. I will never forget the look in the eyes of Kevin Aiston, the Rwanda/Burundi desk officer when I told him that the NSC and Secretary Christopher had made the decision to call for the withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers. I mean, everybody knew, or at least suspected what was going to happen.

There were already two dynamics occurring in Rwanda--a civil war between the Rwandan government military and the RPF, and the wholesale slaughter of civilians – mainly Tutsis – by militias and other civilians. Tens of thousands used machetes and farm instruments to kill their neighbors. This was a government controlled, systematic and well planned effort to use as many Hutus as possible to kill all Tutsis. The authors of the genocide deliberately induced an entire society to murder so that everybody would have life on his or her hands. The government structure was highly centralized, the infrastructure was excellent – thanks to the U.S. and other donors – and people were used to doing what they were told. Instructions would come from Kigali. The parts of the military that were not fighting the civil war took part. They used the radio, which was the primary means of mass communication as in many African countries, to exhort people to slaughter. Tutsis were taking refuge in stadiums, in schools, and in churches. In the past when Tutsis had taken refuge to the churches, they had been saved. This time, the Hutus used priests and ministers to call people into so-called safe havens. They'd pack them in, hurl a couple of grenades, then go in to hack survivors to death.

Q: Well, it sounds like almost a dramatic going back to the Holocaust planning of this thing.

BUSHNELL: It was.

Q: Lists, implicate people. In other words, this was not in a way of or in any way a spontaneous thing. This was a carefully thought out sort of almost physiological way of how we're going to handle this thing.

BUSHNELL: Yes it was. It was planned by Hutu extremists as they participated in peace talks. And I will go to my grave wondering why we didn't see it coming. Nor did we ever do an after-action review or anything like that to figure out what blinded us and what needs to change so it doesn't happen again. Sometimes I think we don't want to learn from mistakes so we will have the flexibility to employ them again.

Q: Had this sort of thing occurred or seeing glimmers of this in past? I mean, there had been this Hutu Tutsi thing both there and in Burundi. Had you seen this almost methodical way of dealing with this?

BUSHNELL: Yeah, but not like this. There had been paroxysms of killings in both countries, but never to this extent.

Q: While this was going on, did you have the feeling that we were looking over our shoulder at the government at developments in the Balkans and the whole idea was, boy this isn't our business, we don't want to get involved. Was this a factor or was this not a factor in what we would do or not do?

BUSHNELL: Oh, there was every reason in the book why we weren't doing what we could have or should have. Tony Lake, Clinton National Security Advisor, later said that the phones weren't ringing. He was right but I wonder why we should adopt that as a criteria for intervening in the mass slaughter of civilians. The Washington Post editorials were saying this sort of ethnic violence in an African country in which we had no interests was none of our business. Now mind

you, the slaughter was taking place at an un-precedented rate. I mean hundreds of thousands of people a day. In a hundred days, I think eight to nine hundred thousand people were killed. And in the mean time we were listing reasons why we couldn't do anything. That's incredible!

Q: And most of it by machetes.

BUSHNELL: Up close and personal, right. I remember meeting with my team one day and asking how people could physically sustain the energy to keep hacking up human beings.

The policy garlic and crucifixes were up all around the Department -- and Washington, for that matter. I'd sometimes report what was happening at Strobe Talbott's morning staff meetings and get looks of horror around the table but nothing else. My team and I were free to do whatever we wanted as long as we didn't use any American resources, ask anyone to use theirs, or augment the tiny peacekeeping unit left behind when the UN pulled the bulk of them out.

Q: Well, even after the slaughter of the Belgium's at the airport, was the UN saying hey, we can't do this?

BUSHNELL: Well, General Dallaire was furiously sending messages and was, I think, dumbstruck at the decision to withdraw the peacekeepers. The only reason a few were left behind is that thousands of Tutsis had taken refuge in a stadiums in Kigali -- as they had all over the country -- and to withdraw the limited protection they had would really be over the top. It was amazing the effectiveness of a very few. There were too few of them to save the hundreds of thousands of lives lost, but those who stayed were unharmed.

It was just so bizarre and horrible a period. A massive slaughter going on; a civil war going on; an international community sitting on its hands and watching in horror; and a tiny group of mid level people at State frantically trying to think of ways to stop the killing.

* * *

The discussion about jamming the radios was pretty reflective of the other conversations we'd have. The first thing I was told is that jamming is against international law. Then I was told it would be too expensive, then that DOD didn't have the planes, and finally, that all of the jamming equipment was being used in Haiti. One excuse after another. At one point, a JCS colleagues leaned forward to admonish me: "Pru, radios don't kill people, people kill people." I told him that I would quote him on that and actually did. When Debra Winger played me in the movie *Sometimes in April* I had them put it in the script.

Out of total desperation, I got on every international radio network broadcasting to Africa that I could. I remembered what had happened in Burundi and thought I'd give it a try. What a pathetic thing to do. I kept wondering where were the voices of the international community -- and especially the Pope. Rwanda was predominantly Catholic. Why we heard nothing from the Vatican is another question I think deserves an answer.

Q: Did you have problems with young officers or mid career officers presiding over something like this? Any resignations?

BUSHNELL: No resignations or even any thoughts – we were in the thick of it and didn't have time to think about much else. We were trying to keep abreast of information – remember, we had lost our eyes and ears with the closing of the embassy – and come up with plans of what we could do.

One of the things I did was to contact the Chief of Staff of the Rwanda military to let him know that we knew what was going on and wanted an end of it immediately. My talking points were to call for a cease fire and return to the Peace Accords. Under the circumstances that was pretty ridiculous, but there you go. I would set the alarm for 2 am because it would be 8:00 a.m. in Kigali. I'd go downstairs so I wouldn't wake Dick and use the wall phone in the kitchen. We'd have these bizarre conversations. I'd tell him to stop killing people and he'd respond "Oh, but Madame, there's a civil war going on. I don't have the troops to stop this spontaneous uprising." When I advised him to at least stop the hate radio, he said "But, madame, we are a democracy. We have freedom of the press." I mean he was really ridiculous.

I'd also telephone Paul Kagame, the commander of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. These were equally strange but very different conversations. I had the same talking points -- urging cease fire and return to Peace Accords. His reaction was astonishment: "Excuse me Madam, there's a genocide going on. At least we're keeping the military occupied. You want me to stop fighting?? A cease fire would only make it easier for them." We will never know if that would have been the case, but I understood his position.

Q: How was news of all of this getting out? I mean, if all the foreigners had left and you had no embassy.-

BUSHNELL: Journalists were there. Initially we thought that if we could get cameras to film what was going on, people would stop killing. They didn't.

Q: Yeah. Was Congress doing anything on this?

BUSHNELL: No.

Q: This was just something nobody wanted to touch?

BUSHNELL: Nobody wanted to touch this thing. I remember going to a congressional hearing and being scolded by Donald Payne, a member of the Black Caucus. "You're not doing enough in Rwanda." I was so indignant. I wasn't doing enough? I'm the one who is supposed to do more?! He finally had to say, "Not you! Not you personally, I mean you the Clinton administration!" I can't recall any other gesture made by the Congress.

The genocide finally came to an end when the RPF under Kagame's command soundly walloped the Rwandan military. At that point, the Rwandan government ordered a massive evacuation of the country. I mean the entire country! In Washington we went from watching in horror, a genocide, to witnessing in shock the exit of literally tens of thousands of people, streaming across borders – especially to Zaire – with everything they could take. Communities stayed

together as they installed themselves on the other side of the border. Everything remained highly organized.

It was as this was going on that the French decided to intervene with Operation Turquoise. They claimed they were sick of watching the genocide and decided to take unilateral action. However, they waited until the government they had supported was fleeing across the border before implementing their “noble” aspiration. Essentially, they put themselves between the fleeing government and military, which they had supported for years, and the RPF, whom they despised and mistrusted. I remember phone conversations between George Moose and Paul Kagame, who was absolutely incensed at the French. “You do not want to kill the French,” George would argue, ultimately successfully. Meanwhile, people with their household effects on their heads or in carts continued streaming across the border toward another humanitarian catastrophe.

Q: These were mainly Hutu?

BUSHNELL: These were Hutus. They emptied the countryside. Our interagency meeting took an abrupt turn to focus on what in the world we were going to do with thousands and thousands of people camped along volcanoes in Zaire – hardly a country known for its stability or government effectiveness.

Once the RPF took over Rwanda, I was sent to check things out. It was yet another surreal experience. The country side of one of the most populous countries in the world was literally deadly quiet. Berries ready to harvest were rotting on the coffee trees; houses stood vacant. The man who served as the ambassador’s driver drove us. When we were stopped by child soldiers at checkpoints, I learned never to look them in the eye. As we drove we heard the story of how the driver had hidden and what happened to some of the other embassy employees. Many were dead.

I participated in a memorial service for the FSNs who were killed. I will never forget looking into the stony faces of employees who had been abandoned by the US government. American officers who came up to speak would weep, to a person. The Rwandans just looked at us. I can only imagine what they were thinking and the trauma that was still with them.

Kigali was a mess. The government had taken everything, including the cash. What role does the international community play now? Here is a devastated country in which the victims of genocide became the victors of a civil war. That had never happened before. No one wanted to be associated with a government that may want to take revenge, but not helping meant punishing the victims even more. I sat on the sidelines of some of these Friends of Rwanda meetings watching one government representative after another asking:” What are you going to do?” “ Don’t know what are you going to do? “ For a while it just went in circles.

One of the greatest ironies to this was that during most of the genocide, the government that was perpetrating the killings held the presidency of the Security Council. They were not asked to leave until the very end.

* * *

Q: This could be the topic of another interview, because I think the portfolio of African peace keepers is part of your thing. We could talk about that on another interview. What about in this thing, what was the role of Madeline Albright who is our ambassador to the United Nations?

BUSHNELL: I think she understood more clearly than other policy makers what would happen if the peacekeepers were withdrawn. I know she regrets what happened. President Clinton apologized, too. Fine, but as I said earlier, the U.S. government to my knowledge has still made no effort to find out what really happened and what we have to learn from the Rwanda debacle. General Romeo Dallaire was sending cables back to the UN warning them of the preparations for genocide three months before it started and I did not know about them. Why? Why didn't a small diplomatic community in country to facilitate peace know about the preparations as late as March, when I visited? If I had the guts or the stomach for it, I would think about doing the research myself, but I don't want to. I feel badly enough now.

ROBERT J. KOTT
Rwanda-Burundi Task Force
Washington, DC (1995)

Mr. Kott was born and raised in New York City. He earned degrees from St. John's University in New York City and from the University of Oregon. After service with the Peace Corps in India, Mr. Kott joined the Foreign Service in 1971. An African specialist, Mr. Kott served in, Togo and Cameroon as Economic and Political Officer and in Malawi and Senegal as Deputy Chief of Mission. He also served in Indonesia and Canada. Mr. Kott was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: This was a period after the genocide but before the things have really spread in Congo, Zaire...?

KOTT: Yes. Right. The refugee Hutus from Rwanda, of course that's the genesis of so much of the problems that we are still experiencing in Congo, had spilled over into Congo of course. There were still many concerns. One was the concern on the part of the Tutsi led and dominated Rwandan government, post-genocide, their concerns about the armed Hutu militias that were basing, largely but not exclusively, out of the Congo. And the cross border raids, which were actually real. There were Rwandans being killed by this so-called Hutu militia. There was the issue of justice and judicial proceedings in Rwanda itself.

RICHARD W. BOGOSIAN
Coordinator for Rwanda and Burundi
Washington, DC (1996-1997)

Ambassador Richard Bogosian was born on July 18, 1937, in Boston, Massachusetts. He studied history at Tufts University and graduated from University of Chicago Law School. In 1962 he entered the Foreign Service and his career has included positions in Niger Republic, Chad, Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. Ambassador Bogosian was interviewed by Vladimir Lehovitch in 1998.

BOGOSIAN: The thing about Rwanda was that in 1994 there was one of the most horrible tragedies of the 20th century, the genocide of Rwanda, where several hundred thousand people were killed. But the thing that gave it its special quality as a subject for us to deal with was that there was a broad perception that the international community failed to respond. Now the principal deputy assistant secretary in the African Bureau at that time was Prudence Bushnell, now our ambassador in Kenya, and shortly after I started working we were having lunch together one day, and I said, "What is it about the Great Lakes of Africa?" which is the way one refers to that set of countries and what's gone on there. She said, "It's two things." She says, "It's guilt and frustration - guilt over what we failed to do and frustration that we don't really know what to do." And that, indeed, is the underpinning of what makes that job what it is because there are many places in the world that have serious crises; but either we don't get involved, like Tajikistan, or we do get involved, like the Middle East. But in the Great Lakes, the magnitude of what happened in Rwanda in 1994 gives it a moral dimension that not all political crises have, particularly since it's occurring around the same time as what's happening in Yugoslavia, where there's also a moral element to it and where we also weren't sure of whether to get in and how to get in and so forth.

Q: *Dick, let me just pursue this. If it had been perceived differently, what realistic reactions could one have taken?*

BOGOSIAN: Oh, I think we could have had a much more vigorous military action by UNAMIR. You wouldn't have gotten to the root of the problem, for sure, but you might have prevented the magnitude of the bloodshed, because, you see, that's part of it. The present régime in Rwanda feels that because UNAMIR existed before the genocide, but what happened was when the genocide began they pulled the troops out, and to a Rwandan this is immoral, the very reason you were there, you left when the going got tough. The other part of this, though, is that the people who committed the genocide, the radicals of the Habyarimana régime-

Q: *The radicals of which régime?*

BOGOSIAN: Well, the previous régime in Rwanda.

Q: *The Javier Romano.*

BOGOSIAN: Habyarimana - that's the president's name. They're referred to as *génocidaires*. They dominated, in terms of political organization, the refugees who were just across the border in Zaire. They continued their military engagements -

Q: *We're talking about Tutsi refugees.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no. Hutu.

Q: *Hutu refugees.*

BOGOSIAN: Not all Hutus were refugees, but those refugees were Hutus, and not all of them were *génocidaires*, but the *génocidaires* effectively ran that operation and they basically were financed by the Western countries that provided hundreds of millions of dollars of aid. So to a Rwandan survivor of the genocide, he says, first of all you pulled your troops out. They were actually there, and you pulled them out at the very time they were needed most because you were too timid to admit that a genocide was going on. But then you provided hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of aid to refugees who were essentially criminals. And so there's a kind of an international guilt that overhangs this whole Rwandan account.

* * *

And now while that was going on with Burundi, the situation with Rwanda was different at this particular time. The principal problem in Rwanda was the refugees. Now Rwanda itself was trying to get back on its feet after the events of 1994, and in '95-96, that process was underway. By and large, the country was, if you will, at peace, but clearly there was terrible trauma and suspicion, you know. The survivors suspected those who were linked to the Hutu community. The refugees were frightened of going back. There was certainly in the refugee community an effort by their leaders to heighten that fear and to demonize the régime in Kigali. In the meantime, thousands and thousands of people were being jailed. At that time it was about 30,000, and even that was terribly overcrowded. At one point it got up to about 120,000, and the prison conditions in Rwanda were just unspeakable. I visited a number of prisons in Rwanda during my time, and some of them were like black holes, particularly the local jails, as distinct from the prisons. In some cases, they literally were in boxes on top of each other, if you can imagine big packing boxes on top of each other. So that was one of the problems, and yet the government pointed out that these people were guilty of genocide, and they asked for help; and most of the donors were unwilling to help build jails. So there was a tension between the Rwandans, who felt that the international community let them down by looking the other way while the genocide was taking place, so they were upset that the international community was not helping the survivors while pouring money into the refugee camps, which in turn was misappropriated by the old *génocidaires*. The international community was concerned about the human rights situation in Rwanda, such things as the jails, a judicial system that essentially was dysfunctional. And this atmosphere has continued up to the present. There was an international peacekeeping operation called UNAMIR, but from a Rwandan point of view it didn't do anything worthwhile, and one of my first tasks in December of '95, was to ask Paul Kagame, the leader, the vice president/minister of defense, to permit UNAMIR to stay for three more months. In fact, they did permit it, but they did it in a way that was chilling. I found in that first meeting Kagame to be kind of a cold fish. In fact, over time, I've developed more respect and admiration for him as a leader, and he has become a little more warm in our meetings, but I discovered that dealing with Rwanda they were in an extreme sense a no-nonsense group, and some of their people were utterly humorless.

Q: *The UN crowd.*

BOGOSIAN: No, no, no, the Rwandans themselves. And the fundamental problem in Rwanda, in that sense, was this deep distrust over the United Nations for one reason or another, while the international community was seen as excessively sympathetic and accommodating to the refugees, who in turn were linked to the *génocidaires*. And to a Rwandan this is terribly unfair and illogical. But just to note that that was a part of this.

* * *

Now at the time when we were very worried about the Burundi situation, I had a meeting with Lansana Kouyate, who you remember was a colleague of mine in Somalia, and at this point he headed up the African part of the Department of Political Affairs in New York, and I would see him from time to time, and at one time I said we are worried about the Burundi situation. He said, "Dick, as long as there are a million refugees on the border of Rwanda, that's your most urgent problem."

Q: *Meaning? What does that mean?*

BOGOSIAN: What he meant was -

Q: *You can't do two things at once?*

BOGOSIAN: No, what he meant was that one way or the other there could be a war, and in that part of the world when you talk about war, you talk about the possibility of genocide. In effect, what the situation was was that, although the so-called RPA, the Rwanda Patriotic Army, had defeated the Habyarimana régime, they did so only in the sense that they got him out of Rwanda. But they still existed in the refugee camps, and therefore, in their point of view, the civil war continued; it was just that they were in the refugee camps and Kagame and company were in Kigali. So the threat of war and the threat of genocide continued. As a result, there was a feeling among many, including many in the United States, that some kind of international conference was needed; and the United Nations, in the latter part of 1995 - I think I mentioned this previously - took a look at this and, in a word, concluded that it wasn't going to work. Then at the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, and Mobutu, the president of Zaire, although enemies of each other, asked Jimmy Carter to take the lead in putting together a summit.

And so there was a summit meeting in Cairo in December of 1995, after which I went to Kigali, where I made the démarche on UNAMIR, and then on to Kinshasa, where I tried to urge the Zaireans to be more forthcoming with the Rwandans, having made the same démarche with the Rwandans. There was another summit meeting in Tunis, in March of 1996. The main thing that emerged in the end from these summits was to name Julius Nyerere to be the facilitator of Burundi peace talk.

Q: *Could you tell us who was at these summits?*

BOGOSIAN: The summits were attended by the presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania, plus Jimmy Carter and there probably was someone there from the UN - I can't remember now whether they were represented or not.

ROBERT E. GRIBBIN
Ambassador
Rwanda (1996-1999)

Ambassador Gribbin was born in 1946 in North Carolina and graduated from the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee and SAIS. He served in numerous posts including Bangui, Kigali, Mombasa and Kampala. He was named ambassador to the Central African Republic in 1993 and ambassador to Rwanda in 1996. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

GRIBBIN: Rwanda's genocide occurred in April of 1994. This genocide was a political crime. That is, it was a conscious decision by some of the ruling elite who were Hutu to solve their political problem, personal power problem and their economic problem by killing the opposition, and by this they meant not only the Tutsis, who were a minority in the country, about 15 percent of the population, but also political opponents who were Hutu.

Q: *It wasn't just a racial thing.*

GRIBBIN: Not just racial. Certainly, ethnic animosity generated the hatred necessary for this. There is a long history here, which I'll briefly recount. Prior to independence Tutsis were on the top of the social and economic pyramid. They had ruled and, in some ways, oppressed the Hutus for generations. At independence the tables were turned, the majority Hutus came to power and began a systematic repression of Tutsis, expelling some and killing others. Hutu leaders learned that they could make political hay by going after Tutsis. Before long this became an institutionalized part of politics in Rwanda. In 1990, a Tutsi exile army invaded from Uganda and tried to reclaim a national role. The invasion was thwarted by a combination of French, Belgian, and Rwandan troops. Ultimately the matter ended up in Arusha, Tanzania where a series of negotiations ensued designed to create power-sharing arrangements, which would give everybody a piece of the action. Well, most everybody - new internal political parties, the Tutsi exiles, and certainly the government in power - were scheduled to get a role. However, there were no provisions for the "kitchen cabinet," the insiders, the men around President Habyarimana, who stood to lose everything - lose their position, lose their power and lose their ability to steal from public coffers, direct contracts their way, etc. They began to see, we think, that Habyarimana was selling them out in order to secure his position so that he might continue as president in the new power-sharing government.

Q: *Well, what had happened to the kitchen cabinet?*

GRIBBIN: This group was called the *Akuzu*, and they were essentially his brothers-in-law and other relations of Habyarimana's wife. They began then to think in terms of genocide. Actually they took a couple of practice runs at it. In 1991, and again in 1993 they organized pogroms aimed at Tutsi residents in particular areas. Those deaths did not generate much of an international reaction and no internal sanction. From there plans expanded.

Q: *How did they do this? I mean, would they go out and stir up the people, use troops?*

GRIBBIN: They used some militia in these practice runs, and then began the creation of a large secretive militia called the *Interahamwe*, which means in Kinyarwanda "those who fight together." The *Interahamwe* was composed of unemployed youths and so forth who were susceptible to the message of ethnic hatred. Army resources were diverted to this militia for the

purchase of weapons. Secret training camps were established. It appears that the French had some knowledge that training was going on, although they apparently did not know for what purpose these men were being trained.

In any case, by January and February 1994, Habyarimana was under intense international and internal pressure to implement power sharing decisions that had been negotiated and accepted at Arusha a year earlier. The president went to Tanzania in April of 1994 where he, in fact, agreed to implement the remaining provisions that would permit this power-sharing to go forward. Elements of it were already in place. There was already an RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army) battalion in Kigali protecting the Parliament, where there were RPM (Rwandan Patriotic Movement) members of parliament. So some of the elements of the power-sharing were already in place. But in any case, Habyarimana agreed to complete the process. On the evening of April 6 as his plane was landing again in Kigali, it was shot down. The president and all aboard, including the president of Burundi, who was hitching a ride, were killed.

Q: *Who shot them?*

GRIBBIN: Who shot them down has remained somewhat of a mystery even today. There are allegations that the RPA shot them down. There are allegations that a Belgian mercenary unit shot them down as well as allegations that a French military unit shot them down. There's not a lot of compelling evidence in any respect, but the people who seemed to have, in hindsight, the best agenda for shooting down the president were in fact the *Akuzu*, his kitchen cabinet, who felt that he had betrayed them. Obviously the shooting down of the airplane became the signal for the genocide to burst forth. It started that night. The plane was shot down about 9 PM. *Interahamwe* militiamen were on the streets shortly thereafter with their lists, looking for in the first instance for Tutsi and Hutu opposition politicians who were in town - they were the most accessible - to kill. The killing started that night and as the Hutu opposition politicians were eliminated, the genocide expanded and took on a much more racist tone. Exhortations to kill Tutsis were broadcast over Radio Mille Collines, which was a popular "hate radio" station. The well-organized militia began systematically to slaughter Tutsi not just in town but also in rural areas. In face of the violence Tutsis began to gather at places of refuge such as churches or local government headquarters, where traditionally they gained protection of the priests in the case of the church or burgomaster, who was in charge of the district, or the *préfet*.

However, this time refuge did not work. Instead, local militia would ensure that a firm ring was set up to contain the Tutsis. Then they would call for the *Interahamwe* who would come, throw a few hand grenades into the church to panic and terrify everyone. Then the killers would wade in with machetes and clubs and kill everyone. Those who survived these terrible massacres were generally people who were wounded but who fell and stayed under the bodies of the dead that lay on top of them.

The genocide was organized to involve as many people from the Hutu community as possible in the crime. Thereafter, everybody would be implicated so no one would be able to call others to justice. By and large, this theory worked fairly well. It worked well because Rwandan culture had a strong tradition of discipline. People did what they were told. When leaders told them to take up arms and kill their Tutsi neighbors or turn them in or point out where they were hiding,

promising in many cases their land or their goods or their women if they did this, they complied. There was enormous peer pressure to participate. Sanctions – even one’s own death for refusing – cowed all but the most resistant. Estimates are that maybe as many as half a million Rwandans participated in some fashion or another in the killings. The upshot was that this was a very efficient genocide - if you can use the term - more Rwandans died in a shorter space of time than the Germans had ever managed to kill during the Holocaust. In about six weeks or seven weeks, almost a million people were killed, and almost all of them at close quarters. When I looked at Rwanda after the fact, I saw intact buildings and intact houses - it didn't resemble a war zone whatsoever. However, plentiful evidence of genocide was found in the killing places where thousands of skeletons, desiccating bodies, skulls, and bones were stacked in profusion. A number of these gruesome sites have been preserved as memorials to the horror.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time, and what was our reaction - I'm talking about the American reaction? And then let's talk about the international community.

GRIBBIN: David Rawson was our ambassador in Kigali. David was an experienced African hand and an experienced Rwandan hand. In fact, he's the only American diplomat who speaks Kinyarwanda fluently because he grew up in a missionary family in neighboring Burundi.

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Undoubtedly David had inklings, as did other diplomats, that something was afoot, but something always was afoot in rumor rife Rwanda. The first Washington reaction to the violence was that this was a continuation of the civil war. The fact that the violence was directed at civilians was just another sad aspect of the civil war. When strife occurs and law and order breaks down, our first inclination is to evacuate, and so essentially over that first weekend, virtually all of the foreigners in Rwanda left, with the exception of a few United Nations peacekeeping personnel, which I'll talk about in a minute. Americans evacuated overland to Bujumbura on Sunday, April 9. French and Belgian troops arrived to escort their nationals to the airports. Belgians troops that were part of UNAMIR, the UN force, departed as well. In short, everybody was gone by Sunday or Monday.

Q: You mentioned Belgian or French mercenaries. Who were these?

GRIBBIN: There weren't really any formal mercenary units that I knew about. When I talked about shooting down the aircraft, it was more to show the rumor mill at work.

There was, however, in compliance with the Arusha process, a United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda called UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda), which was composed of about two thousand five hundred men under the command of a Canadian general, whose name was Dallaire. The force was there to implement the peace accords, to supervise the cease-fire, to oversee the integration of the RPA into the Rwandan Army, and to ensure nationwide stability so the peace process could go forward. UNAMIR had a Chapter VI mandate, which made it a peacekeeping operation, with specific limitations on its use of force. The heart of UNAMIR was composed of about a thousand Belgian troops. Bangladeshis, Ghanaians and others filled out the ranks. An incident on the first morning of the genocide affected UNAMIR quite strongly. The prime minister selected by the Arusha process was a woman named Agathe Uwinlingiyimana. She happened to live, in fact, in the house next door to our DCM, Joyce

Leader. Mme. Agathe was targeted, obviously, as an opposition politician by the *génocidaires*. They came to her house. I understand that she tried to get over the wall to our DCM's house, but was not successful. Her bodyguard of 10 or 11 Belgian soldiers from UNAMIR were not able to protect her. She was killed, and her family along with her. The Belgian troops, who surrendered on orders from their commander to the militia, were taken to the nearby army camp, where they were tortured and killed. When Belgium heard about that on Friday, the 7th, the initial Belgian reaction was to unleash its troops, take control of the city and bring the Rwandan violence to an end, punish the guilty and so forth. But within several hours the Belgian position changed - and it has never been clear to me exactly why it changed - instead Belgium decided to withdraw from UNAMIR and leave Rwanda.

Q: So often in these cases, and particularly we have been going through some of the same thing in Bosnia at this time, the hand of the United Nations was one of essentially passivity or doing nothing. It sounds like -

GRIBBIN: Well, part of the problem was that-

Q: It sounds more like the United Nations at the spirit of the time than a military decision on the part of the Belgians.

GRIBBIN: No, the Belgian decision was not made by the Belgian commander on the spot, the United Nations commander or the Security Council. It was made in Brussels. In fact, UNAMIR chief General Dallaire argued throughout that he wanted an expanded mandate that would permit protection of civilians, including the use force to do so. He wanted more troops and a revised mandate. He didn't get either. He didn't get support from the Security Council in part because the United States was among the members of the council that didn't want to expand the mandate. The perception in foreign capitals, including Washington, was that this was a civil war; this was not something that merited greater UN involvement. Belgian destroyed Dallaire's ability to do anything on the ground such as unilaterally reinterpreting his orders. With the Belgian contingent gone, UNAMIR had no capable armed infantry, because its other troops were mostly support troops or not reliable enough to operate in that environment.

So UNAMIR became toothless. Without a full complement of troops UNAMIR was not able to pacify the city, create points of refuge or protect civilians in the city. Notable exceptions were the Mille Collines Hotel, one of the hospitals, a church and one of the stadiums, where UNAMIR held off the rabble for a while. The strain of not being able to help was a terrible psychological burden for General Dallaire. Subsequently, he had a nervous breakdown. The question remains unanswered whether or not, if Belgian troops had remained, would they have been able to make a difference. My view is that they probably would have. I think that's the view of most people who studied the issue. 2,500 troops would have made a difference.

Q: Well-disciplined troops up against militias usually do.

GRIBBIN: Exactly, although they may not have been able to take the battle to the militia, they would certainly have been able to defend key positions and probably pacify the city of Kigali.

Q: *The feeling is that this came from the Belgian Government.*

GRIBBIN: Yes.

Q: *Because they would imagine, particularly having your troops tortured and killed, the Belgians must have been rip-roaring mad.*

GRIBBIN: Yes, that's why I found the decision puzzling. The Belgian Parliament has looked at it, but they haven't, to my satisfaction, investigated that point sufficiently.

Q: *Maybe they don't want to.*

GRIBBIN: Maybe they don't want to. In any case, with the Belgian withdrawal, UNAMIR was gutted. Thereafter it was able essentially only to preserve itself and a few people. Nonetheless there were many heroic deeds done by remaining personnel, particularly in protecting the Mille Collines Hotel. Meanwhile, genocide swept the eastern part of the country but in the south the *préfet*, to show the power of officials, the *préfet* of Butare opposed the genocide, even though he and his team had been instructed to do it. There was no genocide in Butare Prefecture, or very little, despite exhortations from the center. However, the new central government that formed after Habyarimana's death was the pro-genocide government. It replaced the *préfet* and killed him. Immediately thereafter genocide started in that prefecture. Within the course of six or seven weeks even though genocide had not run its course, most easily available targets were dead. Killings happened at roadblocks. Rwandans carried identity cards, and if your card said you were a Tutsi, you were killed, but if you were a Hutu, you passed through. There are several books - Human Rights Watch, in particular, did an excellent summary of individual stories that chronicle both the heroics and the horror of all of this.

The RPA immediately engaged again because they recognized genocide and accepted the obligation to stop it. However, with the RPA moving out of its northern enclave and, with no western world eyes and ears left in Kigali, and with the genocide government decrying RPA perfidy even as it issued propaganda that all Tutsi were fifth columnists and needed to be killed, the explanation that the killings were civil war related made some sense. Remember also that the RPA was secretive revolutionary army that didn't have good public relations or make an effort to explain itself well to the outside world, In face of this uncertainty, the Western world paused while the genocide took place. Meanwhile, the RPA began to move through the eastern part of the country where it stopped the genocide, but its troops were too late, almost always too late. They came upon stadiums and churches that were full of corpses. Many Hutus, fearing the RPA advance, fled before them into Tanzania. Subsequently, the RPA army pivoted south of the city of Kigali and moved into the southwestern part of the country before finally closing in on Kigali itself. They took the city on the 4th of July, 1994.

Q: *The militia was pretty good at killing unarmed people and not very good at war fighting. -*

GRIBBIN: The militia did not put up much resistance to RPA soldiers, although there were elements of the Rwandan army that fought the RPA throughout. By July 4th the city had fallen; by July 17th the RPA had occupied most of Rwanda. Just prior to that the French Government - I

can only characterize my views of the French Government action here - the French Government concluded that something needed to be done in Rwanda. If the United Nations were not going to respond, France would lead a coalition to respond. France mounted an intervention called *Opération Turquoise*, whereby French and French speaking African troops were inserted into the western part of Rwanda from Zaire. The idea was to halt genocide in that area. These troops secured the southwestern portion of the country, about a sixth of the country. The French operated under the presumption that reasonable people could come to reasonable solutions. France judged the violence to result from civil war, which required resolution via power-sharing, rather than reciprocal violence. Nonetheless, while France did provide some protection to Tutsis in its zone, some genocide continued there as well. Most importantly, the French occupation permitted the leadership of the *Interahamwe* and the leadership of the genocide government to regroup and to exit in a rather orderly manner into Zaire, from whence they would pose problems that I had to deal with during my tenure.

The French withdrew from Rwanda towards the end of August, and the RPA took over completely. Ambassador Rawson returned and reopened the embassy and began to deal with the new authorities. The country was devastated. Not only had a million people been killed, but two or three million had taken flight and sought refuge in Tanzania, Congo and Burundi. Another several million were displaced internally. Some of them returned home rather quickly, particularly from the Congo, but there was an overhang of well over a million refugees for the next several years. That also was a problem that I had to deal with during my tenure.

Q: Before you went out, could you talk a little about what you were getting from the normal consultation from the non-governmental organizations involved and from Congress and from the African Bureau and all? What were you getting?

GRIBBIN: There was enormous concern that we needed to help Rwanda. There was astonishing pressure on the administration from non-governmental organizations. They rallied to the humanitarian cause by the hundreds. In fact, when I got to Kigali there were 120 different NGOs on the ground, not all of them American. Clearly there were at least that many back here pushing the administration and pushing Congress to do more. Virtually nobody said, no, let's leave this issue alone. All assumed the U.S. had a leadership role to play, and that the resources to play that role would be made available. We had already made progress. We had rectified some of the problems of UNAMIR by expanding its mandate and force numbers. The unresolved issue at the time was the huge refugee populations in Tanzania and Zaire. Those in what I came to call the "humanitarian-industrial complex" had a vested interest in seeing that funds were available to support their work. On the other hand, I was more interested in seeing that attention focused inside Rwanda on problems there, not necessarily on refugees. At the same time, there was a hesitancy on the part of some in Washington that we not get too closely identified with the new government. This reflected acceptance of the argument that it was the Tutsi quest for power that, in fact, kicked off the whole round of violence. Therefore, they had brought genocide down upon themselves. Additionally those adhering to this line of thinking suspected that Tutsi hands were not clean in the aftermath. They credited accusations, particularly emanating from Hutu refugee organizations, to the effect that the Tutsi army engaged in reprisals, even reciprocal genocide. The argument put forward by Hutu refugee organizations was astonishing in its premise. While acknowledging genocide of Tutsis by Hutus, it then asserted a reciprocal genocide perpetrated by

the Tutsis against the Hutus. The conclusion was that one genocide cancelled out the other; so return to the *status quo ante* was the solution.

Q: I would imagine, too, with the genocide, as with any genocide, they must have destroyed a lot of political, educational, and other governmental infrastructure within Rwanda.

GRIBBIN: In Rwanda itself the infrastructure of buildings was still present, but the systems for providing education and health services were gone. Most importantly, the people who staffed them had either been killed or were in refugee camps doing their same work there. So back in Rwanda - remember most people didn't leave Rwanda. Rwanda still had a population after the genocide of about five million or six million - the situation was grim. Additionally, Tutsi exiles returned from abroad and essentially replaced in numerical terms those who had been killed. Rwandans at home were not receiving the care that was being doled out in the refugee camps.

Because the refugee camps were controlled by the *génocidaires*, they began to clandestinely organize and train in order to sustain the insurgency - which was operating back in Rwanda - with the objective of finishing the genocide. Inside Rwanda those insurgents mounted terrorist attacks aimed at Tutsi families, including a refugee camp containing Zairian Tutsis. There were roadside ambushes, where insurgents would stop a bus and order everybody out. They would have the Tutsis line up on one side to be shot. Hutus would be released unharmed. Insurgents raided boarding schools and ordered the schoolchildren to line up by ethnicity, so they could kill the Tutsis. The schoolchildren, though, to their credit, on more than one occasion refused to separate according to ethnicity, so in that case the raiders indiscriminately killed either all or some of the children. Insurgents also targeted Hutus, local officials and government employees who were deemed to be collaborating with the new government.

We in the U.S. establishment tried to ensure that the army's response to these provocations was measured and appropriate rather than out-of-hand. At least initially the RPA response was very heavy handed. The army conducted "search and clear" operations in which it would sweep through an area in order to identify everyone. In the course of such operations, people were mistreated, beat up and there were cases of summary executions. I stressed to the Rwandan leadership, which readily accepted the point, that the RPA was supposed to be different. To be different the leadership had to ensure that their troops exercised discipline so that these sorts of abuses did not happen. Whenever allegations of abuses arose, I made a point of sitting down with the vice-president or the military leadership to insist that the army's code of conduct be applied. And it was. The leaders wanted to apply it, but it was a dicey thing. These were their boys; these were the boys that had fought the genocide. Many of them had family members who had been killed or massacred. It was easy for them to fly off the handle. Military commanders understood their troops, but they also understood the need for strict discipline. In fact, the army record of convening courts martials to hold soldiers accountable for their actions improved dramatically during the course of my time. The United States went an extra mile to help the Rwandan Army. We brought in the Naval Justice School from Newport, which conducted courses for magistrates, army investigators and human rights leaders. We helped develop a curriculum to support instruction in the code of conduct so that soldiers would know their responsibilities. These positive developments helped offset continuing criticism, supported very much by the still

functioning *génocidaire* propaganda machine, to the effect that the RPA government was engaged in policies of retribution.

Q: What about the assimilation of all these refugees back into Rwanda. There must have been an awful lot of people who had killed Tutsis in that group, more than you could absorb by pointing and saying, "He did it."

GRIBBIN: I was much involved during my tenure in the issue of reconciliation. A key part of the reconciliation process, as seen by the Rwandans and accepted by the United States, was justice. After the genocide there was no court system. It collapsed. There were no magistrates, no lawyers, no police, no staff - no one. Even so immediately following the genocide, people identified as being involved in genocide were jailed. Over time others were identified and arrested. The process worked a little more properly as systems began to function again. Next there were among the returning refugees a number of people who were identified as *génocidaires*. In short order, the prisons of Rwanda, which were built to house about 17,000 people, contained almost 130,000 people. That number has come down a little bit now. The prisons were terrible places. There was no room to move not even enough room for everybody to sit down. Disease was rampant. The guards did not go inside the prison. The prisons were controlled from the inside by traditional authorities. Hutus from all walks of life were imprisoned. My cook's husband was jailed. Several spouses of embassy staff were in prison, including a doctor who was the director of medical services for the previous government. The papal nuncio told me once that he had stopped celebrating mass in the prisons, and I said, "Why, was it a security issue?" He said, "No, there are more priests in prison than there are outside." That was an overstatement, but there were certainly dozens of priests in prison. All of them, according to the prisoners I talked to, were innocent, unfairly accused, as is true of prisoners everywhere. But they were an enormous problem. The laws applicable to killings in Rwanda were the murder laws, and they were very explicit. They were drawn mostly from Belgian jurisprudence. Following those laws, individual murder trials would take a long time. Additionally, to prosecute cases under those statutes more evidence was needed than was generally available in terms of individual culpability in tying an act of murder to a specific victim. The evidence about genocidal acts that was available was less precise, but powerfully compelling. Therefore, the donor community, including the United States, stepped in and worked very closely with the Ministry of Justice to reconstitute the court system, retrain magistrates, educate lawyers, provide resources - even buy typewriters and typewriter paper, put desks back into courtrooms and things like that. In addition, we provided experts to help consider what might be done in terms of a new law. Although it reflected some outside advice, an essentially Rwandan genocide law was drafted, which categorized *génocidaires* into four groups. The first group included leaders and major perpetrators of crimes, the second people who participated in a substantial fashion. The third included followers who were less notorious, and the fourth people who may not have killed but who identified Tutsis, seized assets or things like that. Even though a new, quicker judicial procedure was set forth for judging people under this law, there were 130,000 people in jail. The court system was capable, maybe, of trying 15 people a week throughout the whole country. Do the math. It was going to take forever. Nonetheless, a start was made via the genocide trials. The numbers when I left in January of 1999 were that about 500 of the category one prisoners had been tried. Most were found guilty. Most received a sentence of capital punishment. A few were acquitted, others given lesser sentences. Ministry of Justice officials estimated there were about 4000 people in category one in

custody and another four to ten thousand people in category two. The immediate objective was to try to move through those categories of prisoners. In April 1998 22 genocidaires were executed in public. Although many more have subsequently received death sentences, there have been no more public spectacles. The Rwandan government understands that it cannot execute 10,000 people.

Apparently, leaders felt they needed to execute some genocidaires to convey to the populace and the world at large not only that justice was going to be done, but that it was going to be delivered. Impunity was at an end. That message came out very, very clearly. One of the provisions of the law that U.S. advisors suggested to the Rwandans was a plea-bargaining provision, but it was not until after the executions that prisoners lined up to confess and plea bargain. That aspect of the genocide law subsequently moved forward steadily. I am pleased to report that the United States contributed several million dollars over the course of the years to help rebuild, restructure, and support the justice system.

More recently, the government of Rwanda recognized that tens of thousands of formal trials are not doable. It cannot try everyone. Instead Rwanda looked to traditional justice system called *Gacaca*, which was used historically to resolve civil disputes involving land, cattle, marriage, etc. *Gacaca* consisted of a long palaver following which a local committee meted out justice. Rwanda decided to adapt this system so that people in categories three and four could be sent to their home areas and have their cases decided by local courts. Punishments would include time served, community service, reparations or whatever. That process is moving forward. I'm confident that even though we have a long way to go in terms of justice, the three-part process is progressing.

The third leg of this process is the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which is a creation of the Security Council. The ICTR was established to bring to justice violators of the genocide and war crimes treaties. The ICTR is something that hadn't existed before. It runs concurrently with the Bosnian war crimes tribunal, has the same chief prosecutor and the same appeals court. It took a long time to get the ICTR in operation. The number of people in custody has now risen to about 34. The Tribunal accepted a guilty plea from the post-Habyarimana regime prime minister, and several other major *genocidaires* have been convicted via trials and sentenced to life imprisonment. The ICTR cannot mete out capital punishment. Clearly delivering justice in Rwanda to the medium-sized fish caught there requires that the big fish, that is those are truly responsible for the genocide, be held accountable for their crimes. When creating the ICTR, it was understood that those "big fish" would not be caught in Rwanda and would probably not be extradited by other nations back to Rwanda, but they might well be extradited to the international court. For example, the United States has extradited one individual to the ICTR for trial. When these planners; these masterminds, these conceivers of genocide are tried and convicted, it becomes easier for Rwanda to find other forms of punishment for the prisoners it holds. Justice is a big element in reconciliation.

I told Rwandans I'm from Alabama, where the key event in the United States in the 19th century was the Civil War. It took my ancestors generations before they reconciled with northerners, and they didn't have to live next door to them while they were doing it. Reconciliation in Rwanda is an enormous psychological task for the people involved. Survivors see people who killed their

family every day. Relatives of those who killed may still live next door. Victims of genocide live in an environment where everyone knows exactly what happened. Most Rwandans that I spoke to were fairly understanding about the need for overall forgiveness and reconciliation when talking in the abstract, but when it came down to specifics involving people who killed their relatives, they did not want anything abstract, they want the exaction of punishment. That remains troublesome.

The society rallied around orphans. There were many orphans of the genocide. There were many lost children in the subsequent massive population movements. Most of those children have been reunited in some fashion or another with a member of their family. That is an astonishing achievement in many respects. The international agencies did enormous good work in tracing children, and so now only a few thousand children remain in institutions. There are several fine such orphan homes, including one that's run by Mrs. Rosmund Carr, an elderly American lady. However, most orphanages were closed after their clients were placed in extended families.

Churches, survivors' organizations, widows' organizations - there are many groups involved in reconciliation, trying to get people to talk to each other, trying to get people to lay out their fears, worries and so forth. A thousand flowers are blooming. Some undertakings are successful, and some are not. Some people don't want to participate; others are very anxious to do so. One of the phenomena of present-day Rwanda is that the established churches - the Catholic Church, the Seventh Day Adventists, the Anglican Church - were tainted by the violence. People are going back to church, but often times they avoid those churches. Instead, they're going to a new group of Evangelical churches, perhaps because these churches permit the airing of emotions in a way that the traditional churches do not. Rwandans are reticent people, so worshipers at these churches find great release in such expressions.