The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
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AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN

Interviewed by: Self
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By

MARSHALL GREEN
AMBASSADOR (RETIRED)
INTRODUCTION

Though entering the Foreign Service as a Japanese area specialist, five of my assignments between 1956 and 1973 had much to do with US-China policy during critical years of change. These five assignments were:

1. Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East, 1956-60;
2. American Consul General to Hong Kong, 1961-63;
3. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, 1963-65;
4. American Ambassador to Indonesia, 1965-69; and
5. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, 1969-73.

When I was assigned to Indonesia in June 1965, the Washington Post editorially deplored the sending of an American Ambassador to Indonesia because of President Sukarno's destructive policies and because "Green's departure would remove from Washington the one policy man in the administration charged with taking a long-range look at US relations with Communist China." My four years in Indonesia nevertheless turned out to have a lot more to do with China and China policy than anyone could have foreseen. It was also in Indonesia in April 1967 that I first met Mr. Nixon (a New York lawyer at that time) and engaged in the first of several conversations I had with him over the next several years on US-China policy.

I am no scholar, historian or writer, and I have long vowed that I would never author one of those now-it-can-be-told books. On the other hand, I recognize that all of us who have participated in the formulation of American foreign policy--in whatever role--are under obligation to pass on to posterity some record of our involvement and insights. This is the central purpose of the recently inaugurated oral history program of the Association of Diplomatic Studies; and it was while reviewing transcripts of my oral history that I recognized the need for reporting my China experiences in a more accurate and complete manner.

Hence this manuscript which is almost entirely based on personal diaries, memoranda, letters and notes, almost all of them preserved and filed by my invaluable assistant and secretary over the years, Emma Johnson.

I am also greatly indebted to a number of Foreign Service China language/area specialists--especially Jack Service, John Lacey, Lindsey Grant and John Holdridge--with whom I served at one time or another and from whom I learned much. Bob Martens, a Foreign Service Soviet specialist who interviewed me for my oral history, deserves
special mention for his enlightening assistance. However, any errors or shortcomings in this manuscript are certainly my own.

It is to be hoped that this record, along with those of other Foreign Service Officers involved in China policy, will be made widely available to scholars, diplomats and others. Perhaps, some day, a complete record of the Foreign Service's role in China policy can be assembled, from the dark days of World War II and subsequent McCarthyism to the brighter days of the 1970's and 1980's brought on by the rise of pragmatism in Peking and of maturity in Washington.

CHAPTER I

WORKING WITH ROBERTSON AND DULLES;
THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958

My involvement in China policy dates back to 1956 when, on leaving the National War College, I was assigned as Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East working in the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. The Bureau at that time was dominated by Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, the quintessential Virginia gentleman, a banker by profession, who had powerful connections in the Administration and Congress. Robertson's overriding interest in world affairs was to uphold the position of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as President of all of China, even though Chiang and his defeated Nationalist forces had fled the mainland in 1949 to take refuge on Taiwan, China's island-province.

Because of Robertson's sinocentrism and because I had to draft a number of his speeches, I was automatically drawn into China-policy issues—especially those relating to the defense of what we called Free China or the Chinese Nationalists (Chinats) or, most correctly, the Republic of China (ROC), as opposed to the Chinese Communists (Chicoms) or the Chinese Reds, or, most correctly, the People's Republic of China—a term we rarely used in those days.

For me, this was not an assignment I contemplated with unalloyed joy. I liked Robertson personally. He was kindly and thoughtful towards all members of his staff. He was also a strong defender of the Foreign Service at a time when many Foreign Service Officers were still reeling from the effects of McCarthyism. All 14 of the Ambassadors in his area (East Asia and Australasia) were careerists—a record never before or since achieved by any bureau in the State Department.

I was also fortunate in having Ambassador J. Graham Parsons as my immediate superior. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at that time, and was to replace Robertson in 1959. Jeff Parsons was one of the ablest officers in the Foreign Service, articulate and a master of diplomatic practices, so essential in our business. On the other hand, Walter Robertson's single-minded dedication to upholding the position of Chiang Kai-shek as the
President of all of China was one I could not altogether share, and writing acceptable speeches taxed my New England conscience to its limits.

We also expended vast amounts of diplomatic capital on upholding the ROC's position in the United Nations as the sole legal representative of all of China; and our highly visible military presence on Taiwan, especially in Taipei, was bound to affront the nationalistic feelings of people on Taiwan. It certainly affronted the sensibilities of foreign diplomats like the Japanese Ambassador who was billeted in a US military area in the center of Taipei identified on large billboards as "Freedom Village."

I happened to be visiting Taipei in May 1957 as a member of a Presidential Mission headed by Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, which was looking into problems related to our world-wide base presence. Just as we were being reassured by the US Chargé d'Affaires in Taipei that there was no problem with the public over our base presence in Taiwan, our Embassy was attacked by a mob which sacked the Embassy, beat up some of our personnel hiding in the basement, and scattered official US files all over the streets of Taipei. This mob action was touched off by the shooting of a Taiwanese peeping-tom by an American sergeant, who was then acquitted by an American military court in Taipei amidst the cheers of his compatriots and in the presence of the peeping-tom's weeping widow and her friends.

Armed with evidence like this, the Frank Nash mission came up with convincing conclusions and recommendations that did much, world-wide, to help lessen friction over the presence of US bases overseas.

Another China-related issue of major interest to my office at that time was evidence of a growing split in Sino-Soviet relations. I twice visited the Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, where a team of experts was analyzing Peking's reactions to the launching of Sputnik in 1957. It was increasingly clear to these experts (including my former State Department colleague Alice Hsia) that China efforts to share in, and benefit from, Soviet technological breakthroughs were being rebuffed by Moscow. Two China delegations returned to Peking empty-handed. This was briefly followed by Chinese propaganda broadcasts calling for a nuclear-free Far East, but it was clear that this line, probably parlayed to Peking by Moscow, was in conflict with Peking's own aspirations to become a nuclear power.

It was not until the following year that I became directly involved in the formulation of US policy toward China. This occurred during and after the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 when I fortuitously became Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' action officer at the working level dealing with the crisis.

I will undertake to describe this incident in some detail because existing accounts (at least the ones I have read) are incomplete with regard to how Washington policymakers grappled with the crisis.
For several months before the Chinese Communists (Chicoms) opened up their artillery barrage against Quemoy on August 23, 1958, I had been chairing a working-level interagency task force (State, Defense and CIA) which was one of several established by the White House to examine US capabilities to cope with two or more simultaneous military crises in various parts of the world. One of the scenarios our task force had just completed related to a Chicom aerial or artillery interdiction of the Quemoy island group (Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, Tatan, Ehrtn and Tungting) held by the Nationalists but located just a few miles off the shore of mainland China.

So when in fact an artillery interdiction was launched against the Quemoy group where one-third of the Nationalist forces was stationed, I was able to submit to Jeff Parsons that same day our agreed task force recommendations on US countermeasures. These recommendations called for a cautious escalation of US naval and air support operations as necessary to protect Taiwan from a Communist take-over. Parsons and, subsequently, Robertson approved the recommendations which were forwarded to Dulles. However, Robertson commented to me that the US would, of course, never make first use of nuclear weapons. I found this remark rather astonishing coming from one of our leading hawks.

Dulles, flying down from his vacation retreat on Duck Island in the St. Laurence River, immediately called a meeting in his office. He had obviously read our recommendations but his first concern was legal. What were our defense obligations towards the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu? What restrictions applied to the involvement of US forces in their defense?

These small offshore islands were not included in the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty's definition of the treaty area, but a subsequent joint resolution of Congress in January 1955, at the time of the first Taiwan Straits crisis, authorized the President to employ US armed forces in the protection of not just Taiwan and the Pescadores but also "related positions and territories in that area."

Dulles had no difficulty in making a legal case that the joint resolution covered the offshore islands in this crisis, since Peking, in attacking them, announced that its objective was Taiwan. The President and Congressional leaders agreed. Establishing rules for the engagement of US forces was more difficult.

The Quemoy group of islands was so close to mainland shore batteries that they could be blanketed with enemy shells, although there was no evidence of any impending Chicom landing operation against those islands. In fact, the shelling occurred immediately before the typhoon season when amphibious operations would have been most precarious. It was fairly clear that Peking did not want to take the islands unless, in doing so, it brought down the government on Taiwan.
Peking's evident intent was interdiction of the offshore islands: to prevent provisions, including food and ammunition, from reaching the defenders, thereby wearing them down to the point of surrender which in turn would precipitate a collapse of morale on Taiwan and a takeover from within by the Communists.

The problem therefore came down to one of resupplying the embattled Quemoy group, a task that was beyond the capability of the Nationalist Navy which was not only poorly led at that time but had to contend with incessant bombardment of the Quemoy group by Soviet-manufactured artillery, rough seas and alleged 27 foot tides which further complicated the landing of supplies on the islands. Thus it was arranged that the US Navy would escort Chinese resupply convoys to a point three miles offshore from Quemoy but would not enter Quemoy's territorial waters. Nationalist vessels had to cover the last three miles on their own, loaded with supplies including shells for Quemoy's 8" howitzers and other guns.

Secretary Dulles, acting under President Eisenhower's instructions, decided against US air operations in the Taiwan Straits and reached agreement with Taipei that US and Nationalist planes would not overfly mainland China, thereby ruling out air attacks on Chicom shore batteries. One important reason for this decision was that there was no way of silencing these batteries short of use of nuclear weapons or extensive air-drops of napalm bombs, actions President Eisenhower strongly opposed. It was also increasingly apparent that Chicom air capability was being used with great restraint, there being no bombing of any Nationalist-held territories.

Our limited rules of engagement reflected awareness of the lack of support in the United States for getting involved in a war over distant islands that "weren't worth the life of a single American boy." Nor did we have international support beyond that of the Republic of China on Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. Governments of key nations allied to the US like Great Britain and Japan were correctly restrained in their criticisms, but public opinion in these countries was highly averse to US involvement.

Secretary Dulles was accordingly bent on finding some diplomatic course of action to bring the fighting to a halt. He set little store by what the periodic US-PRC ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw could achieve on this issue, though he appreciated that their publicized existence offered relief from criticisms that the US was out of diplomatic contact with the Peking government on this and other issues.

Very early on the morning of September 7, 1958, I received a phone call from Dulles, who had evidently had a restless night, suggesting that it might be best for the US to take the issue to the United Nations, since the General Assembly would be reconvening the following week. Dulles mentioned the possibility of having the British and French introduce a resolution in the UNSC calling for a UN-supervised cease-fire and neutralization of the offshore islands.
I was strongly opposed to this suggestion which both Peking and Taipei would reject out of hand, and it would impose great strains on our relations with Taipei which in turn might strengthen the case for Peking occupying China's seat in the UN. However, I said nothing about all this to Dulles over the phone but replied that he would have our Bureau's reactions as soon as possible. I forthwith prepared a memorandum, approved by Jeff Parsons and signed by Robertson, pointing out the negative factors entailed in Dulles' suggestion and alternatively recommending that we ask the British and French to introduce a UN resolution welcoming Washington's and Peking's discussions of this issue at Warsaw and urging that the issue be resolved between Peking and Taipei without further resort to force. Also included in Robertson's memorandum was a suggestion that our side might at some point in the near future take unilateral and unannounced moves such as shifting our regular Taiwan Straits patrols further away from Chicom territorial waters, and the Nationalists suspending artillery fire from Quemoy, to see whether this invited any reciprocal moves from the Communist side.

However, before any of these strategies could be pursued, our attention focused on the immediate, urgent issue of Quemoy running out of supplies. The daily consumption of supplies by the 80,000 military and 45,000 civilians on the Quemoy group was estimated at 700 tons and yet, since August 23, only 125 tons had been delivered to Quemoy. This appalling record was ascribed to all the usual reasons--bad weather, tidal conditions, heavy shelling--but it also occurred to some in Washington that Taipei was deliberately holding back, or providing us with false figures, in an effort to get the US more involved in the islands' defenses.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff could see no reason why, with the exercise of guts and ingenuity, the Nationalists, under existing rules of engagement, could not off-load up to 1,000 tons of supplies a day under favorable weather conditions. Admiral Arleigh Burke recommended new ways of delivering supplies, including floating them ashore.

Over the next two weeks there was some improvement in deliveries but not enough to prevent, according to Taipei's reports, an alarming run-down in the availability of food and ammunition on the Quemoy. By September 28, Taipei reported that only a few days of supplies remained. Cables from the American Embassy in Taipei were full of dire warnings.

It was at this point that Secretary Dulles decided to go to New York to take the issue to the UN along the lines he had suggested over the phone on September 7. However, the very day he left for New York, I received word from a colleague in CIA that a reliable report had just been received from Quemoy stating that its supply situation was nowhere near as desperate as we had been led to believe. There were several weeks of supplies on hand, most of them stored in the extensive network of tunnels on Quemoy.

Robertson asked that I deliver this information in person to Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter who immediately called a meeting in his office. There it was decided that
I should go to New York to bring these developments to Dulles' attention, with a recommendation from Herter that Dulles might wish to postpone any UN initiative.

I was met in New York by Ambassador Philip Crowe of USUN who took me to Dulles' suite in the Waldorf. When Dulles heard our reports, he canceled scheduled meetings with the British and French Ambassadors to the UN, returned to Washington, and called a meeting that evening at his house. The star performer at that meeting was Admiral Burke who was very up-beat on prospects for resupplying the Quemoys, mentioning for the first time in my hearing the fact that two of the Navy's LSDs (Landing Ship Docks) were about to arrive on station in the Taiwan Straits. These huge landing ship docks could contain dozens of amphibious landing craft, manned by trained Nationalist crews, which would run up on the shores of Quemoy with supplies.

Meanwhile spirits on Taiwan had been lifted by the deadly effectiveness of several Nationalist fighter aircraft on patrol, whose US-provided Sidewinders downed five MiG-17s.

It was against this background that Peking radio announced on October 6 that it was temporarily suspending its bombardment of the offshores, emphasizing that its action was taken to spare the lives of Chinese compatriots inhabiting those islands. Our side immediately reciprocated by suspending US convoy activities and modifying our naval patrol routes in the Taiwan Straits.

The outlook remained unclear, and when Dulles departed on October 20 for Taipei, via Italy and England, Peking announced the end of its cease-fire on the alleged grounds that one of our LSDs had intruded into the territorial waters of Quemoy. [Dulles included Italy on his itinerary to attend De Gasperi’s funeral. His brief stop-over in England prompted a black-bordered box on the front page of the London Times headlined “England’s Darkest Hour” and reading as follows: “Asked today why he had come to England, Secretary Dulles replied that his plane came here to refuel.”]

On October 25, following the issuance of a joint US-ROC communiqué at the conclusion of Dulles’ visit to Taipei, Peking announced its intention to observe a cease-fire on the offshore islands on odd-numbered days. Taipei retaliated by firing on occasional Chicom vessels from batteries on Quemoy.

This curious arrangement left each of the Chinese governments with the satisfaction that it was master of the situation, but we had no idea of how long this arrangement would continue. Thus, when Dulles returned from Taipei, his first concern was to preserve the relative calm while doing everything he could to get the bulk of Chiang's forces off the offshore islands. On the other hand, we felt we had to be careful in handling this effort, lest sharp open differences between Washington and Taipei tempt Peking to renew the bombardment.
I well recall Secretary Dulles' comments on his return to Washington: "If nothing is done now and then a year-or-so hence the Chicom again attack the offshores, it will be extremely difficult for us to give the ROC any military support. Already we have had to strain our relations with Congress and foreign governments to the breaking point. Our experience with the offshores was agonizing enough in 1955. It is worse today. We can't go through this a third time."

Our efforts to effect a drastic reduction in the garrisons on the offshore islands never succeeded. There was an eventual sizeable reduction, but meanwhile we came to appreciate that the Chinese in their own peculiar way had found a solution of turning their hot war into an endless propaganda battle--of propaganda shells, blaring loud speakers, and balloon-delivered leaflets. Peking also issued a long series of "serious warnings" to the US every time one of our naval patrols in the Taiwan Straits came within Chinese mainland territorial waters as defined by Peking, but not by Washington. The serious warnings had nearly reached the thousand mark by the time President Nixon's trip to China was announced in 1971. Thereafter the warnings ceased.

In retrospect, I have often wondered whether Moscow had any hand in Peking's decision to halt the heavy bombardment of Quemoy. We know that almost all the 580,000 shells fired on the islands were produced in the Soviet Union, and that the first signs of serious Moscow-Peking differences appeared soon after the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, about a year before the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. It is possible that Moscow imposed conditions on its support of Peking's offense. However, we assumed during that crisis that Peking had Moscow's unqualified support. Moscow said little to suggest otherwise. In fact, Khrushchev warned on several occasions that any use of nuclear weapons would not go unanswered by the USSR. (Peking exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964.)

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Finally, a few comments about Secretary Dulles' handling of the crisis. I was deeply impressed by his excellent working relations with President Eisenhower, as well as with his associates in State, Defense, and CIA (headed by his brother, Allen). On several occasions, near the conclusion of meetings in his office, Dulles would pick up the secure phone and tell the President of our conclusions and solicit his comments or, where relevant, his approval. Dulles thus made it clear to all present that he was acting under Eisenhower's orders. That, in turn, strengthened Dulles' position with all his associates.

I was also impressed by the way Dulles took charge of the problem, making it his personal responsibility to work out a peaceful solution, losing many hours of sleep in the process. Yet he sought advice from his associates. I recall how Gerard Smith, at that time Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, used to argue almost instinctively against the emerging consensus of several of our meetings. Dulles seemed to welcome the ensuing debate which helped to fine-hone the final decisions.
Diplomatic biographer Sir Harold Nicholson once wrote that the worst kind of diplomatists are zealots, lawyers and missionaries; and the best kind are humane skeptics.

In his first years as Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles seemed to fall clearly in the first category. He was a dyed-in-the-wool lawyer with a cold-war missionary zeal. For him, countering Soviet aggressive acts gave rise to a new term in diplomacy: "brinksmanship." He stonily refused to shake the extended hand of Zhou En-lai at Geneva in 1954—an insult never forgotten by Zhou. He was also associated in the minds of many of us Foreign Service Officers with Senator McCarthy and his ilk who pilloried the Foreign Service and hounded out of office several of our best China specialists whose only "crime" was the accuracy of their reports out of China during World War II, predicting the decline of the Chinese Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang and the rise of Mao's Communists.

John Foster Dulles may be remembered by history as one of our most zealous, hard-line Secretaries of State, especially in his dealings with Moscow and Peking, but from my vantage point, in the next to last year of his life, he appeared as a man of moderation and reason, an able practitioner of diplomacy as well as of law.

CHAPTER II

HONG KONG 1961-63

NEED FOR A NEW LOOK AT OUR CHINA POLICY

After two stormy years in Korea, I arrived in the relative political calm of Hong Kong where the US Consulate General served as our government's eyes and ears covering events inside the vastness of China. The steady stream of refugees from mainland China provided a wealth of information about economic conditions in China—information made available to us through Hong Kong government and private sources—as well as receiving an assortment of sometimes useful information contained in the masses of periodicals, newspapers and letters that reached Hong Kong from all parts of China. We had on our staff 21 people whose sole function was to translate and analyze these written materials.

For me, being head of a large staff comprising some of our most experienced Foreign Service Officers in Chinese affairs, provided a unique opportunity to listen and to learn. I well remember my first lesson, shortly after my arrival in November 1961, when India seized the Portuguese enclave of Goa. I was alarmed that China would now feel impelled to seize the Portuguese enclave of Macao, some 30 miles from Hong Kong. Since I was also US Consul to Macao, my responsibilities to the several dozen Americans there would seem to involve ordering and assisting in their immediate evacuation. But the head of our Political Section at that time, Dr. Harald Jacobson, recommended otherwise. In fact, he was completely confident, as was Jack Friedman, our Macao expert, that Peking would not take Macao, for such a seizure would precipitate a collapse of business confidence in Hong Kong and a resulting loss of almost a billion dollars a year which Peking was making at that time (today it is many times that) through its business ties with
Hong Kong. In other words, Peking was not about to kill the goose that laid the billion dollar golden egg and which was China's principal source of foreign exchange. So, abiding by Jacobson's recommendation, I wired Washington our conclusions in order to head off likely pressures from the State Department for evacuating all Americans in Macao.

The early 1960's was a period of deepening turmoil and economic disaster in China, due in part to Mao's ill-conceived Great Leap Forward--a desperate effort to achieve rapid modernization through forced-draft industrialization, including a program for building thousands of small furnaces designed to produce steel. Agriculture was badly neglected in the process, resources squandered, and the whole effort collapsed leaving ruin in its wake.

Analysts in our Consulate General estimated that China's grain production (including potatoes) in 1961 was 160 million tons which was some 30 million tons short of levels required to provide China's teeming population with an adequate diet. Our analysis, based on a variety of sources (especially comprehensive weather reports and interrogations of thousands of refugees about their daily food consumption) was challenged by Joe Alsop in his syndicated columns as being too high, but we were vindicated a year later when Zhou En-lai told Lord Montgomery that grain production in China in 1961 was 160 million tons.

I arrived in Hong Kong thinking of China as a powerful threat to its neighbors--purposeful and single-minded in its expansionist design. But I soon learned that the Communist regime was floundering, and that its attempts to disperse "surplus" urban dwellers to the farms had deepened discontent among urban and rural dwellers alike. The touted public discipline of China was decaying, as evidenced by signs of growing corruption, bureaucratic indifference, and general laxity that permeated even the youth and armed forces. Of course the capacity of the Chinese people to endure privations was legendary, and China's ability to exploit troubles along its borders unchanged, but it was clearly not the fearsome dragon conjured up in the minds of many Americans.

More importantly, China no longer had an ally in Russia. The Sino-Soviet rift that made its first appearance after the Sputnik launching in 1957 had, by early 1962, reached the stage where it was beyond the ability of our Consulate General translators to find expressions in English equal to Peking's scatological denunciations of the Kremlin.

Many of us in the Consulate General felt that we overly advertised our concern and worry over China's aggressive power--and that this invited bluster, threat and intervention from the Communist side. Psychologically we would be in a stronger competitive position if we appeared to be less harried and worried over Peking's threat. We would also stand to gain greater international support for our position if our views were expressed in more objective, factual and unemotional terms.

At the same time, we fully supported continuation of a US policy of firmness in the defense of "free world" positions and maintaining adequate capabilities for pursuing that
policy successfully. We did, however, weigh in strongly against unnecessary provocations of Communist China, such as the occasional sabotage operations being conducted by the Chinese Nationalists from Taiwan against targets on the China mainland. These operations were not only fruitless, but they damaged the Republic of China's international standing. Moreover, such operations, to the extent they involved Hong Kong, could endanger Hong Kong and were deeply resented by the Hong Kong government.

A golden opportunity to present these views to key figures in the new Kennedy Administration occurred in the Spring of 1962 at a meeting of all our East Asia/Australasia Chiefs of Missions at Baguio in the Philippines. This meeting was presided over by Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and Assistant Secretary Averell Harriman, both of whom reacted favorably to my presentation of how we in the Consulate General evaluated the scene in China and its implications for US policy. This established a useful meeting of minds between our Consulate General and policymakers in Washington.

One of the effects of economic set-backs in China was the way it stepped up the flow of refugees to Hong Kong. This problem continues today, but at no time did it reach the levels of mid-1962. A principal reason for the great surge of refugees into Hong Kong from the adjoining province of Guangdong in 1962 was a severe drought in South China coinciding with a temporary breakdown in the ability (or willingness) of PRC officials in Guangdong to restrain the flow of refugees--many of them young people who had been forced out of the cities to live in rural areas. It appeared for a while that the Chinese authorities had decided to allow them to flee to Hong Kong, if only to ease pressures on food supplies and to lessen problems for China created by these disgruntled elements.

The numbers of refugees got so large that the Hong Kong government constructed massive barriers of concertina wire all along its land frontier with China. But every night the refugees merely threw planks across the wire and swarmed in, only to be rounded up by the Hong Kong garrisons and forced back into China (although many eluded the Hong Kong police and managed to get into the city of Hong Kong).

At first, the Hong Kong Government forbore from making any representations to Peking on this appalling situation, evidently fearing that Peking would reject Hong Kong's protests, and Hong Kong would then have to live with the results. Besides Hong Kong had only the status of a colony, and had to deal with Peking through London. Meanwhile, I was receiving expressions of concern from the State Department which was torn between wanting Hong Kong to accept refugees as a matter of principle, and a sober awareness of how such huge numbers of refugees could turn Hong Kong into another Gaza Strip. [Curiously, U.S. media gave this dramatic human interest story almost no coverage. This included the New York Times whose managing editor, Turner Catledge, visited Hong Kong just as the refugee crisis ended. When I told him what had happened, he turned to his Hong Kong correspondent to ask why this wasn't reported. The correspondent answered that evidently the New York Times editors did not consider the story newsworthy because he had filed daily reports to New York.]
Washington was quietly urging London to take the issue up with Peking, but Hong Kong recommended otherwise to London. As I learned from Murray Maclehose, at that time political adviser to Hong Kong's Governor Black (later Maclehose became one of Hong Kong's most effective governors), Hong Kong had reason to believe that Peking would soon, on its own initiative, restore controls along the Hong Kong frontier because of the bad press China was receiving world-wide, with millions of Chinese seeking to escape China. Governor Black's policy proved successful, but not before 170,000 Chinese refugees had succeeded in sneaking permanently into over-crowded Hong Kong in the period of one month.

It was instructive to observe the interrelationships between authorities in Hong Kong, Peking and Canton (with whom Hong Kong transacted most of its business with China). Many practical issues had to be addressed on a day-to-day basis between Hong Kong and Canton relating to trade, transportation, migration, water supply and finances. All these issues were handled by Hong Kong officials with low-key common sense in a way best designed to avoid affronting its giant neighbor. There was recognition on both sides of the compelling material advantages in peaceful co-existence, even though Hong Kong's spectacular economic success story on the very doorstep of backward China was, in itself, an affront and provocation. Hong Kong was at pains to pay for the water piped in from China (about 20 to 25 percent of Hong Kong's requirements), even though China offered to provide this water free of charge. Hong Kong wanted to ensure that China had a material stake in continuing the water supply in order to minimize chances that China might cut it off at some point in order to impose pressures on Hong Kong for whatever reason. To me, this was convincing evidence that constructive relations with revolutionary Communist China were possible for the United States provided Peking came to see compelling material (especially strategic) reasons for such relations.

Not only were we mighty busy those days with refugees, consular work, textile negotiations, and countless visitors, but I had to meet, wine and dine the many Congressional delegations who were attracted to Hong Kong. We also put on some good briefings for VIPs on developments in China, including our policy conclusions. We found that almost all the Congressional visitors shared our views on U.S. policy implications. [One of these visitors, Congressman John Rooney, who was Chairman of the House Subcommittee handling State's finances, indicated to the State Department that he would welcome my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. I was called back to Washington where I resisted pressure from the top brass of the Department to take the job. I resisted because I had no qualifications for it other than Rooney's blessing. I returned to Hong Kong, rather apprehensive as to my future career.]

During my 21 months in Hong Kong, I had lengthy discussions with my deputy, John Lacey, who was not only an excellent administrator and negotiator on U.S.-Hong Kong textile issues, but whose views on China policy were practical and forward-looking. We drafted a message to Washington in February 1963, in which we posed the question
whether we were missing any opportunities to abet forces in China that might be seeking pragmatic changes.

We then recommended seven specific ways for enhancing our capacity to influence attitudes in China in a desirable direction, though admitting that even their combined effect might be very slight in the immediate future.

The final two paragraphs of our airgram came close to being prophetic.

"Distasteful as it has been for Mao and his cohorts, they have already been obliged to make some concessions basically in conflict with their ideologies. When the hard-line doctrinaires no longer dominate the scene, the influence of pragmatism may well intensify. Our present containment policy should be aimed at abetting that process.

"All this argues for a policy of continued constraint which allows and encourages change with mainland China..." We also urged a review of American regulations relating to Americans wishing to travel to mainland China and to do business with China.

Many of us in the Consulate General were struck by the folly of American policy preventing our newsmen and scholars from visiting China—not that they would likely be admitted, but a relaxed U.S. policy would make it clear that it was China's fault, not ours, that China was closed to much of the outside world.

We also were critical of the U.S. foreign assets control regulations which we had to administer in Hong Kong. These regulations made it illegal for any American individual or corporation to buy, even in Hong Kong, any article originating in mainland China.

On one occasion I had to phone the Texas owners of the new Hong Kong Hilton to point out that they already had on the walls of their new hotel (which was about to open) Chinese mainland artifacts which would have to be removed under U.S. law. It was to the credit of the Texas owners that they uncomplainingly agreed, even though, in disposing of the artifacts, they took a considerable financial loss.

As mentioned earlier, there were officials in the State Department who shared these views, and it was a pleasant, but not an altogether unanticipated, surprise when I was called back to Washington in August 1963 to be named Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, charged with taking a new look at US policy toward China.

CHAPTER III

EFFORTS IN WASHINGTON (1963-65)
TO MODIFY US POLICY TOWARDS CHINA

On returning to Washington in September 1963, I was named principal deputy to Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, who had an extensive background
in research and intelligence and was a personal friend of President Kennedy. Hilsman wanted me to devote most of my initial time to a China policy review, naming as my principal assistant, Lindsey Grant, a brilliant young China specialist. We also received generous help from Jim Thompson (on detail from Harvard) and Joe Neubert, Hilsman's assistant. We held periodic meetings with leading American scholars knowledgeable about East Asia, a practice our Bureau was to continue for many years.

Our first move was to reorganize State's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs in order to give greater attention to Communist Asia. At that time we had only two officers (out of the hundred or more in our Bureau) who were devoting their full time to Communist China and none of our officers were giving much time and attention to North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia, even though Communist Asia comprised two-thirds of the land area and population of East Asia. We accordingly established a new office called ACA (Asian Communist Affairs) whose four officers were responsible for mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia. We also managed to have two able Foreign Service officers sent to Moscow for several years of instruction in Mongolian, but our recommendation for establishing US relations with Mongolia, accepted in principle by key officials like Governor Harriman, encountered years of delay in implementation.

US diplomatic contacts with the Chinese Communists at that time were confined to the ambassadorial level talks at Warsaw which had been going on intermittently ever since they started at Vienna in 1954. These talks achieved only limited results but they ultimately succeeded in bringing about the release of all but two of the Americans held in mainland China. They further provided a forum for clarifying our position on certain issues, especially a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Above all, they enabled the US government to say quite truthfully that we had, in Warsaw, more opportunities to meet with Peking officials than had most governments which recognized the Peking government.

Maoist doctrine sharply circumscribed what new courses of action were open to us, and our ability to influence events inside China were almost nil. But, over the longer range, opening China's contacts with the outside world could have more of a salutary impact than a negative one; and it seemed important that we at least demonstrate to the world that Communist China's isolation from the world was self-imposed and not the result of US policies to contain Chinese Communism. This was not easy to do. The United States had taken the lead year after year in trying to keep Peking out of the United Nations. We had also taken the lead in establishing COCOM controls designed to prevent any strategic materials from reaching Communist China from the Free World. Carrying out these policies involved constant pressures on friends and allies, contributing to a rather widespread impression that it was US policy to cut off Chinese contacts with the outside world.

This, in fact, was not our policy. In 1959, the US, at long last, allowed 25 selected newsmen to have restrictions removed from their passports to permit them to visit mainland China. For months they sat it out in Hong Kong seeking Chinese visas. None
were granted. In 1962, we announced that we would give favorable attention to any bona
fide Chinese request for purchase of US wheat or other grains. Peking never responded.

The first substantive policy recommendation which Grant and I made to Hilsman on
October 10, 1963 was that our government should seek to lift all US travel restrictions.
This would be a world-wide change in travel policy, and would not be presented as an
initiative to "liberalize" US policy towards Communist China (or other Communist
countries) for this would be immediately interpreted as a softening of the US position.
Nor did we proclaim that our efforts to broaden contacts with mainland China were based
on the assumption that they would probably be rejected. We did these things because of
their intrinsic merit--to break down barriers between nations and peoples, to broaden
knowledge and understanding. Privately, we could explain that our changes in travel
policy were designed to show our strength and confidence at a time when China was
fearful of outside contacts because of the ferment brewing behind the curtain.

Recommendations for liberalizing rules governing travel of Americans was not a new
idea. The Legal Adviser's Office (L) and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
(SCA) had already favored the idea when it was first advanced in a more modified form
by Hilsman in June, 1963. However, Governor Harriman (Under Secretary of State)
believed that a formal modification of existing regulations would stir up too much
adverse attention. He recommended that the State Department quietly adopt a more
permissive policy governing exceptions to the current travel ban, and that is where the
matter stood when Lindsey Grant and I became involved.

When we met with representatives of the Legal Advisor's Office (L) and of the Bureau of
Consular and Security Affairs (SCA) on November 4, it was concluded that any attempt
to issue passports without travel restrictions to only those applicants approved by the
State Department would raise constitutional questions. The Legal Advisor also felt that
any changes in existing practice would require consultation with appropriate committees
of Congress.

Abba Schwartz (SCA) and I agreed with L's reservations. We also felt that a great deal of
the advantages we sought would be lost through a surreptitious approach.

Early in December, 1963, the matter was brought by Mr. Chayes (Legal Advisor) to the
attention of George Ball, Acting Secretary of State. Mr. Ball enthusiastically supported a
proposal for a total removal of travel restrictions and obtained telegraphically the
approval of Secretary of State Rusk. The issue was now up to the White House.

I recall attending a meeting later in December attended by top State Department
representatives and by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. At that meeting Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin, convinced the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State that an exception would have to be made in the case of
Cuba because of an existing agreement among members of the Association of American
States banning travel to Cuba. This effectively ended our efforts to change travel policy,
because the administration did not want to change travel policy unless it could be done on a world-wide basis. Moreover the death of President Kennedy had an overall dampening effect on any proposals for policy change.

All we could do at that stage was to press for liberalizing exceptions. In that regard we succeeded in having US passports validated for travel to mainland China for three categories: representatives of accredited news gathering organizations; family members of Americans in prison in China; and, in 1965, US doctors and public health experts.

Our Bureau was similarly frustrated in its efforts to ease restrictions on US trade with China, starting with putting medicines and foodstuffs on general license. We did not think China would make any US purchases in the light of its "buy anything but American" policy, but it would create a useful precedent if at some future date the Chinese would wish to move away from their present frozen hostility.

In one important respect we succeeded. That was in recommending that our public treatment of Communist China be more moderate, civil, and factual. This was reflected in a key speech made by Roger Hilsman at San Francisco on December 13. At first Secretary Rusk was annoyed over Hilsman's failure to get top-level clearance, but public and press reactions to the Hilsman speech were so overwhelmingly favorable that the Secretary reflected the same points of view in a speech he made on February 25, 1964. Meanwhile, we sent guidance to our Embassies on the importance of making it clear that it was the Chinese Communists, not the US, who were bellicose and unwilling to accept a world of diversity, as well as the importance of US officials speaking more coolly, factually and civilly about Communist China in order to gain maximum credibility.

In retrospect there is little question but that our efforts in 1963 to liberalize US policy toward mainland China failed due to major events on the other side of the Pacific.

Even if President Kennedy had served out his full term in office, it is unlikely that any major revisions in existing China policy would have occurred during that term. It is true that his thinking about China paralleled that of his associates like Harriman, Bowles, Ball and Hilsman. On the other hand, he was being drawn more and more into the vortex of Vietnam, and Vietnam was to claim the full attention of President Johnson. With Peking evidently giving strong support to Hanoi, it seemed all the more unlikely that any US Administration would or could make substantive changes in China policy.

More importantly, in 1964 Mao Zedong and his entourage of ideologues were intent on revising the across-the-board liberalization of the early 1960's. The Socialist Education Campaign--a precursor of the Cultural Revolution which was launched in late 1965--sought to carry out class education of youth, eliminate bourgeois influence, and stamp out "the spontaneous tendency to capitalism." This coincided with China's successful nuclear weapons test in 1964. The opportunities we saw in 1962 and 1963 for improving long-term US-Chinese relations were now fast disappearing. US-China relations were about to enter the deep freeze of the Cultural Revolution which lasted until the early 1970's.
In a well-publicized speech I made at Princeton University in May 1965, I said: "Peiping's policy toward the US is very simple. It is one of avowed hostility. It does not allow even for the working out of lesser problems in our relations... As a Chinese Communist document puts it, `we do not wish to settle our disputes with the United States on a piecemeal basis; else we will undermine the revolutionary fervor of our own people. When the time comes for a settlement, it will be done all at once.'"

I did not realize at the time how prophetic that underlined statement proved to be: China, in 1971-72, decided it was time for a settlement with the US "all at once" in the form of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972.

A further obstacle to US-China relations in the period 1964-65 was the war in Vietnam. As I wrote in May 1965 in a memorandum to Bill Bundy who had succeeded Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs: "The Chinese Communists see the US as caught on the flypaper of South Vietnam, and they do not want to see us wriggle off through negotiations and settlement." On the other hand, Peiping was concerned that the Soviets were moving into Southeast Asia in a way designed to rob Peiping of the fruits of victory. What we didn't appreciate in Washington was the growing tension between Hanoi and Peking.

As usual, our Consulate General in Hong Kong had the clearest view of trends in Communist Asia. On returning in late 1964 from a meeting with Consul General Ed Rice and his Hong Kong staff, I reported their view that Hanoi was definitely opposed to any large presence of Chinese Communists in North Vietnam--"in fact a threat of their coming in might be a major inducement for Hanoi to come to terms with us." The Consulate General also believed that "our bombings of the north are making the North Vietnamese even more tough and resistant, and the only merit of the bombings is temporarily to bolster morale in the south." The Consulate General foresaw little likelihood of any real settlement of the war being reached at the Conference Table, given the positions of Hanoi and Peking.

The following month (June 1965) I was named US Ambassador to Indonesia, an assignment that unexpectedly was to involve me, once again, in US China policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABORTED COMMUNIST COUP IN INDONESIA--THE CHINA CONNECTION

At the time of my appointment to Indonesia in June 1965, the US was deeply preoccupied with Vietnam. Washington never did focus on Indonesia as a potential Communist country, even though it was headed in that direction.
It is true that President Sukarno's words infuriated Washington as did Indonesia's armed confrontation with Malaysia, the attacks on foreign missions in Jakarta, plans for expropriating foreign companies including Caltex and Goodyear, Sukarno's raging at my predecessor Howard Jones "to Hell with your aid," Indonesia's walking out of the United Nations and its agencies, and its increasing alignment with China and other forces hostile to the United States. But these were considered by many in Washington to be the antics of a vainglorious man--a dangerous man, to be sure, but not a very serious man, rather one who sought the world spotlight.

The Chinese Communists took Sukarno far more seriously than we did. They recognized Indonesia to be a significant potential Communist state and ally. By 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had become the largest and most influential political force in Indonesia, as well as being by far the largest Communist party outside the Sino-Soviet blocs. The PKI favored Sukarno, and he them. On one occasion when Sukarno was referring to PKI leader Aidit, he shouted before the crowds at Senayen arena: "I wish I had a thousand Aidits." Sukarno's drift toward Communism also related to Indonesia's imminent economic collapse due to inept policies, extravagance and mismanagement.

Even though Sukarno's avowed goal was to establish a NASAKOM government (acronym for Nationalism, Religion, and Communism), Washington continued to see Indonesia as a fractious element, not as a potential hostile force in the constellation of world power.

By late 1964, Sino-Indonesian relations were converging both at the PKI-CCP level and at the governmental level. At the party level, the PKI had sided completely with the CCP in the latter's view that revolutionary prospects were highly favorable in the former colonial world (especially Southeast Asia) and that the leadership of the world revolutionary movement was passing from Soviet to Asian hands. Differences with the Soviets were also reflected in positions taken by Sukarno's government, even though it continued to receive considerable Soviet aid, especially military hardware.

At the governmental level, Sukarno announced to the million or more people crowding Merdeka Square on August 17, 1965, (Indonesia's national day), the formation of the Peking-Jakarta-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. This announcement was made in the presence of top officials of Communist Asia, including Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi. I realized in advance of this occasion that it would be used by Sukarno to blast the United States in a way that normal diplomatic practice would require my walking out of the pavilion where all the diplomatic corps was seated. But I had already decided, with Washington's telegraphic approval, not to give Sukarno that satisfaction, so I stoically sat it out, with press cameras trained on me.

During Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia and the U.K., Peking was urging Sukarno to accelerate the radicalization of his policies, especially to use the confrontation as a means of establishing and arming a "Fifth Force," largely composed of Communist organizations, to be a counteragent to the Indonesian Army. All these developments
polarized differences between the Indonesian Army on the one hand, and the Communists (PKI), supported by Sukarno, on the other. Sukarno became seriously ill in late August 1965 which immediately raised fears among the Communists (and probably the Air Force which was led by leftists) that, should Sukarno die, the Army would move in and crush the Communists. It was in that setting that the PKI planned a coup against the Army, almost certainly with the knowledge of the Chinese Communists and possibly with their approval.

On the night of September 30-October 1, 1965, the PKI hunted down and killed six of Indonesia's eight top army generals and seized control of Jakarta, announcing over the radio that the "September 30 movement" had taken control of the government in order to forestall a CIA-supported plot by the Generals to oust Sukarno and establish a military government. (There was no CIA or other US foreknowledge of the Communist coup or of any General's plot to oust Sukarno. Army generals deplored Sukarno's Communist leanings but they would not challenge him or refuse to take orders.)

However the Indonesian army moved quickly against the Communist coup and suppressed it within a day or two. This left Sukarno weakened and suspect, and he eventually was replaced by Suharto, one of the two ranking surviving generals. Meanwhile the PKI was shattered and tens of thousands of suspected Communists, including a disproportionately high number of Chinese ethnics, were assassinated by anti-Communist forces mostly in the rural areas of Java and Bali. Here it should be pointed out that the Indonesians had a racial bias against the 3 million Chinese living in Indonesia. The Chinese were mainly resented because of their control of money-lending and retail trades.

The aborted coup was a devastating set-back for Communist China whose role in the coup was highly suspect. Twelve separate Indonesian delegations were in China at the time of the coup, including delegations headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Head of the Air Force, and the Head of the National Defense Institute. There was also a large PKI delegation which, unlike previous PKI delegations sent to China, did not include any of its top level officers who evidently remained in Indonesia because of the critical events about to unfold.

Most significant of all was the evidence, subsequently received, that the Chinese knew what to expect. According to Robert Martens, our Embassy's expert on Sino-Soviet affairs who has spent many months researching the events of September 30-October 1, 1965, the Chinese leadership at that critical moment, showed itself to be remarkably well informed. The Chinese reportedly had a complete list of the assassinated generals by 11 a.m. October 1, which was 5 hours before this information was announced in Jakarta. The list included the name of General Nasution (who had escaped assassination but whose inclusion suggests that the Chinese had an advance PKI target list.)

October 1 was also China's National day and it was apparently to be not only a day of celebration of past victory on the China mainland but it was also to coincide with a far-
reaching new victory that would add the world's fifth most populous nation to the Asian Communist Camp.

The Communist failure in Indonesia was a severe setback for China, shattering its alliance with Indonesia and its hopes for a radical tide sweeping over all the developing world led by China. The famous Lin Piao speech of September 1965 had boasted that the world village was surrounding the world city, which meant an Asian Communist encirclement of the US and USSR. A successful Sino-Indonesian alliance would also have created a giant pincer of China to the North and Indonesia to the south within which the American forces in Vietnam would have been caught. On the contrary, Indonesia under General Suharto crushed the PKI, gradually removed Sukarno, established a New Order in Indonesia with close ties with its neighbors and the West, rejoined the United Nations, and, along with Thailand, took the lead in forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia also severed diplomatic ties with China.

The extraordinary reversal in Indonesia in the period 1965-67 never received the international attention it deserved, especially in the United States, which was so totally preoccupied with Vietnam. Our Embassy in Jakarta was also at pains to warn Washington against taking any credit for what happened in Indonesia. The aborted coup was entirely an Indonesian performance in which we played no role whatsoever. Any US government efforts to take credit for the reversal would only bolster Communist claims that the US was involved in a plot to remove Sukarno and the PKI.

It is beyond my ken to estimate how the aborted Communist coup impacted on the Chinese Communist leadership. In the short run, it seems to have spurred China's self-destructive course toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, putting US-Chinese relations in an even deeper freeze. But in the long run, these setbacks and excesses strengthened the hand of the pragmatists led by Zhou En-lai.

One other event occurred while I was in Indonesia that came to have a bearing on US-China policy. That occurred in the form of Mr. Richard Nixon's visit to Jakarta in April 1967 where he was my wife's and my house guest for two days. When Mr. Nixon and I called on President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik and others, Mr. Nixon took down notes on key points they made and when we got back to my residence, we had a long conversation on events in Indonesia and the rest of East Asia, especially China. Our conversation was tape-recorded by Mr. Nixon, and when I asked him what he did with all these notes and tapes, he replied that he had them transcribed, filed and cross-filed for later reference. For example, I told him that the rate of inflation in Indonesia in 1965 was 635%. He included that obscure fact in his Guam Doctrine press interview on July 27, 1969. His tape-recording was, of course, to lead to his eventual undoing, but I remember him as the best informed on foreign affairs of all the luminaries who visited Jakarta during my four years there.

This opinion of Mr. Nixon was reinforced when I read the article he wrote for the Foreign Affairs Quarterly's October 1967 issue. In that article, which began with a tribute to
Indonesia's new leadership, Mr. Nixon made a strong case for the US improving its relations with the Peoples Republic of China, a country with one-quarter of the global population and with extensive strategic, political and economic influence.

During my last few months as Ambassador to Indonesia, I was assigned to serve concurrently on the US negotiating team to the Paris talks on Vietnam; and in March 1969 to being assigned as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, a position I held for four years.

This brought me back into the center of US-China relations, working for a President who was destined to make those relations his greatest foreign policy triumph.

CHAPTER V

THE REAL BEGINNINGS OF WASHINGTON-PEKING RAPPROCHEMENT

1969-71

Three months service on our Paris delegation provided opportunities to meet President Nixon, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger (for the first time), and it was clear from the moment I met the President in Paris that he recalled our conversations in Jakarta two years earlier, calling me "low-profile Green" because of the emphasis I had placed on maintaining a low-profile American presence in Indonesia. I had also given a publicized talk to the American Chamber of Commerce in Paris advocating more "Modesty, Mutuality and Multilateralism" in the conduct of US foreign policy.

Shortly thereafter, I was named Assistant Secretary of State, returning to Washington to replace my old friend and Yale classmate, Bill Bundy. But before I took over Bundy's job, I requested an opportunity to say farewell to friends in Indonesia--especially Suharto and Malik. At the same time, I figured such a trip to Indonesia would give me an opportunity to visit other countries in my area of responsibility, and that, as the first emissary of the Nixon Administration to be sent to that area, I should be in a position in conversations with Asian leaders to reflect accurately the views of our new President.

I accordingly requested a private White House meeting with the President, which was granted. But before going over to the Oval Office, I co-drafted with Ambassador Win Brown, my deputy, and with Bob Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Economic Affairs (who had also been of invaluable assistance to me in Indonesia), an informal three-page memorandum setting forth what the three of us regarded as President Nixon's viewpoints on key policy issues of interest to Asian leaders. This memorandum was based on things the President had said or written or which we believed reflected his viewpoint (or should).

President Nixon approved my use of the memorandum but, just as he did so, in walked Henry Kissinger who was visibly annoyed by my having by-passed him in getting to the Oval Office.
Upon my return from a long Asian trip in April 1969 that included meetings with top leaders, I included in my written report to Secretary Rogers a statement that there seemed to be a universally held judgment among all the Asian leaders I met that China had never been in such a negative, truculent mood as it was at that time. Asian leaders felt that any hope of progress in establishing a constructive dialogue with China was out of the question until the Cultural Revolution subsided.

President Nixon pencilled "this is great" on my trip report when Secretary Rogers sent him an abbreviated copy, and the President directed Kissinger to circulate copies of the report to top officials in our foreign policy community.

The President showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in our frozen relationship with the PRC. I recall that on our return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at Midway Island in early June 1969, President Nixon invited me to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly two hours we discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was interested in the history of our efforts to achieve some thaw in US-China relations. I also told the President about my recent meeting with the old Gimo on Taiwan, where President Chiang seemed out of touch with reality, at least on the Sino-Soviet dispute which he regarded as a collusive effort by China and Russia to delude and divide the West.

The President stressed that we should try to remove unnecessary irritants in our relations with China, but that we should not do this in a way that would unnecessarily provoke the USSR, or that was designed to exploit Sino-Soviet differences.

Shortly thereafter in late July 1969, I accompanied President Nixon on the Pacific-East Asian phase of his round-the-world trip. I had co-authored with Bob Barnett the so-called "scope-paper" for that phase of his trip, and much of the scope-paper's contents were reflected in Nixon's famous press backgrounder on July 25 at Guam, the first stop of his trip. In the scope-paper I had emphasized the great economic up-surge of East Asian countries and the growing ability of most East Asian countries to assume greater burdens for their own defense. I also said that our general position in East Asia should not be one of trying to solve East Asia's problems but rather of helping East Asia's problem-solvers.

The President made several references to China in his backgrounder, including modifications he hoped to see in permitting travel of Americans to China and allowing limited tourist purchase of Chinese products.

But what undoubtedly interested Peking most in the Guam backgrounder was the President's thesis that (a) the U.S. would stand by its treaty commitments, (b) the U.S. would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened any U.S. ally or a nation whose survival we considered vital to our own survival, and (c) the U.S. looked to the country threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense.
The President also left it clear that the U.S. should learn from the experience of Vietnam and not get caught in another comparable situation of "creeping involvement." "I want to be sure that our policies in the future, all over the world...reduce American involvement."

In retrospect, it is fair to assume that these statements of America's role in the world helped set the stage for the Chinese-American rapprochement that was to occur within two years of the Nixon Doctrine. [I did not attend the President's press backgrounder in a hotel in Guam, but Nixon told the press that I would answer any questions they might have on the backgrounder.] The President also asked me to brief the large press corps accompanying him at our next two stops in Manila and Jakarta. This assignment was one I could scarcely handle since I did not attend the President's meetings with President Marcos or President Suharto. No one from the State Department was included in these meetings, not even Secretary Rogers or our Ambassadors. During 1969, the Administration made a number of statements and moves, beyond those already mentioned, to create a better climate in U.S. Chinese relations. We publicly expressed our willingness to renew bilateral talks with the Chinese in Warsaw or elsewhere; and Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw was authorized by the President to tell his Chinese colleague of the President's wish to discuss an improvement in relations. All these statements and positions, including liberalization of American travel and tourist purchases of Chinese products, were favorably received by the great majority of our newspapers and members of Congress.

Whereas the Chinese early in 1969 had castigated the Nixon Administration in the harshest terms, Peking attacks moderated in the course of the year. Previously, Chinese representatives conveyed to a number of foreigners their awareness that U.S. policy toward China was under review. However they also made it clear that the issue of Taiwan, including U.S. military forces deployed there, created a major obstacle to any Sino-U.S. rapprochement. We also received indirect official word from Peking that China appreciated U.S. restraint in not seeking to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute and that the U.S. obviously did not see a Sino-Soviet war as being in its interests.

In late 1969 it was announced that the U.S. would automatically validate passports of persons in six categories for travel to the PRC. These categories were members of Congress, journalists, teachers, scholars, medical doctors and Red Cross representatives. On December 19, it was announced that foreign subsidiaries of American companies would be permitted to sell China non-strategic items of foreign manufacture, while U.S. companies were permitted to buy or sell Chinese goods within or between foreign countries but not to import Chinese goods to the U.S. U.S. tourist purchases of Chinese goods were allowed without limit.

All these and other moves to ease restrictions on U.S. travel and trade with China were instituted either by our bureau or by the NSC where a Senior Interdepartmental group chaired by my deputy, Ambassador Winthrop Brown, prepared a policy study for Dr. Kissinger as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.
Our bureau was encouraged by the interest shown by the President in all these moves to ease restrictions on U.S.-Chinese trade and travel, although we were pressing for a complete lifting of all travel restrictions on Americans desiring to visit China, and on all restrictions on Chinese bona fide visitors to the U.S. These steps were finally approved by the White House in March and April of 1971.

In the President's Foreign Policy Message to Congress in February 1970, Mr. Nixon declared that the U.S. aim was to establish a "more normal and constructive relationship with Communist China. He asserted that the U.S. had "historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict."

1970 was not a significant year (like 1969 and 1971) in terms of changes in U.S. policies towards China, but 1970 must have been an important year for Peking's policymakers in determining the future course of China's relations with the U.S., Japan and the Soviet Union.

We concluded at our Chiefs of Mission meeting in Tokyo in July 1970, attended by the Ambassadors serving in the Western Pacific region and by Washington policy makers concerned with that area that:

(1) Peking is on the defensive, being acutely concerned over the Soviet military build-up in Siberia.

(2) Peking is worried that the U.S. will be pulling back militarily from the Western Pacific, and is much concerned over future Japanese capabilities and interests.

(3) Peking is determined to heal the scars of the Cultural Revolution, and rebuild the Party and the economy. The latter will entail a trade relationship with the U.S. which advances China's development.

These and other conclusions of the Conference, which was attended by Secretary Rogers, were forwarded to President Nixon in a memorandum I drafted which concluded:

"We have no reason to apologize for the past. The very protection we extended to the nations of Asia these last two decades has now permitted us to draw back somewhat and, indeed, to focus on the dangers of our over-involvement (as in Vietnam) and unwarranted tutelage. This is not a question of getting out of Asia, but of finding the right way and right degree of staying in Asia....We accept the risks--and yet the ultimate safety--of involvement."

All during 1970 and early 1971 we continued to pursue our talks with the Chinese in Warsaw--to no avail. Kissinger raised with the State Department the possibility of sending a higher level emissary to Peking, but we questioned whether the Warsaw talks could ever produce such a result. Furthermore, in the absence of any clear signal from
Peking that it would react favorably on any of the issues we had raised in Warsaw over the years, it was doubtful that any emissary would accomplish much. It never entered our minds in the State Department how far the President would be willing to go in personally involving himself in this politically sensitive issue.

All the back channel soundings that the President and Dr. Kissinger were making to Peking through third countries and various intermediaries in early 1971 were carried out under the strictest security precautions--leaving us in the State Department completely in the dark, except for the Secretary of State who was kept informed.

On the other hand, we recognized that the massive build-up of Soviet military power in Siberia, hard along the northern frontier of China, was profoundly disturbing to the Chinese leadership. This would entail a re-evaluation of China's policy towards the great powers.

The first overt indications of a new Chinese policy towards the United States took a curious form. During an international ping-pong tournament in Japan in April 1971, the Chinese team invited the American team to visit China--an invitation the U.S. accepted and reciprocated. Shortly thereafter, the White House authorized the State and Commerce Departments to liberalize foreign assets control regulations affecting U.S. trade with China. Win Brown and Bob Barnett spent many days with their Commerce colleagues working out necessary changes in the Federal Register.

U.S. policy towards China, and the Chinese representative issue in the UN, were major topics for discussion at our Chiefs of Mission meeting which I chaired in Baguio, the Philippines, May 17-20, 1971.

Walter McConaughy, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China on Taiwan, reluctantly concluded that a change of U.S. tactics would be required if there were to be any real chance of preventing the ouster or walk-out of the GRC at the UNGA session in October. Eight more countries had recognized Peking during the previous few months, and even the GRC itself realized that perhaps a dual representation formula (seating both Chinas in the UN) was its only chance for survival in the UN. However the GRC was adamant, according to McConaughy, on the subject of the GRC representing China in the UN Security Council--a solution Peking would almost certainly reject.

Our Consulate General in Hong Kong, represented by Consul General David Osborn, made what turned out to be a remarkably prophetic analysis of the terms under which a Washington-Peking rapprochement could be achieved without the U.S. abandoning its commitments to the Republic of China.

According to our official account of the Chiefs of Mission Conference in 1971, Consul General Osborn said:
"Regarding the status of Taiwan, we should say that we do not disagree with claims of both parties that Taiwan is a province of China. We are deluding ourselves if we believe we can have good relations with the PRC without such a declaration."

As a second point, Dave Osborn said he did not believe we need remove our military forces from Taiwan completely to have better relations with the mainland. We must, however, start moving in that direction.

As a third point, he said we should de-emphasize verbally our bilateral security treaty with the GRC, while continuing to keep that treaty in force.

In the fourth place (Osborn concluded) we should continue to favor a peaceful resolution of GRC-PRC problems through direct talks, but we should low-key this in our public output. Usually it is better for us to say nothing and let the countries directly concerned work out their own problems.

Osborn and I agreed that Peking was now moving in a more pragmatic direction, making it probable that Peking would accept a U.S. position embodying the above four points.

Meanwhile, as earlier stated, unbeknownst to all of us in the State Department (except Secretary Rogers), Henry Kissinger and a few key White House colleagues were involved in highly secret preparations for Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking in June 1971.

The President had a passion for secrecy based in part on his distrust of the bureaucracy. Never was secrecy more strictly pursued as it was over preparations for the Kissinger trip, and with considerable justification. Had word leaked out, it might have raised all kinds of criticisms from the right wing of the Republican party, not to mention deep concern in Taiwan, Japan and other countries affected.

So I am not faulting Nixon and Kissinger for their secret diplomacy, although not informing people who are expected to be informed can give rise to some real dangers. Let me cite a specific example. I recall meeting one morning in June 1971 with several key members of my staff, one of whom mentioned that it had just been announced over the radio that Dr. Kissinger, who was in Pakistan on a round-the-world trip, had contracted a case of intestinal flu, and was therefore planning to take several days rest by motoring up from Islamabad to the Pakistan mountain resort area of Murree.

I commented to my staff that this was ridiculous--that no one with what we used to call "Delhi belly" would take off on a long bumpy motor trip. I then observed blandly that Henry was probably off on a secret trip to China.

As soon as I said those words, it occurred to me that my impromptu speculation, if true, would immediately spread to the newspapers, and I would be responsible for the worst leak of the Nixon administration. So I quickly excused myself from my meeting, dashed up to Secretary Rogers' office, and told him what had happened. The Secretary paled
visibly, for I had uncovered the truth. On his instructions, I rushed back to my office and swore all present to utter secrecy about my speculation. They kept the secret.

Such are the dangers of not telling officials of events occurring in their area of responsibility.

Right after the President amazed the world with his widely televised revelations in the summer of 1971 about Henry's trip to Peking and plans for the President to visit China the following February, I received a telephone call from Secretary Rogers who was with Nixon in San Clemente. He asked what I thought of the announcement. I said it was great, but that we were going to have problems with the Japanese. Secretary Rogers seemed surprised, pointing out that we had given Prime Minister Sato several hours advance notice of the President's announcement (as indeed we had to other allies). I said that the announcement nevertheless left Prime Minister Sato in a most embarrassing political position. For years we had been urging restraint on other countries about opening relations with Peking; and the Japanese, largely out of deference to us, had continued to vote in the UN against the seating of Peking's representatives in China's UN seat. And now we had secretly reached Peking before Japan (known as Sato's nightmare), exposing the Japanese government to the first of what were to be several "Nixon Shockus" that rocked U.S.-Japanese relations.

Anyway, I told Secretary Rogers that Dick Ericson (Director of Japanese Affairs) and I would work immediately on a draft message from Nixon to Sato explaining the reasons for tight security and apologizing for any embarrassments this might have caused our most important Asian ally. Our draft message, telexed the next morning to San Clemente, was approved by the President, but I doubt it did much to allay Sato's concerns.

In his memoirs published in 1984, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and close friend of Sato's, revealed that he had been alerted by Nixon to fly out to Tokyo to give Sato advance notice in a way that would show special consideration for Japan. But, for some reason, the White House canceled the Johnson trip.

The President's announcement was an even greater shock to President Chiang Kai-shek and to the Republic of China on Taiwan--but there wasn't much we could do to allay the shock. Indeed, the President's impending trip to China had the effect of completely undermining the position our government had taken year after year in marshaling international support for the Republic of China (Taiwan) retaining China's seat in the UN.

Not that I found this to be any great loss--the eventual seating of the PRC was inevitable--but we in the State Department were nevertheless under orders from Nixon in 1971, even after the President's China trip was announced, to do all we could to preserve the GRC's position in the UN. It took a lot of our time and effort--and eventually we lost.

During the autumn of 1971, Jack Service, who in the 1940's was the most able of all the State Department China-language officers and who was later hounded out of the service
by McCarthyism, made a trip to China with his wife, Caroline, as personal guests of Premier Zhou En-lai. I, as Jack's close friend from the days back in 1946-47 when we had served together in New Zealand, visited the Services on their return to Berkeley, California, where Jack gave me a blow-by-blow account of his China trip, as we walked all over the hills of Berkeley.

Jack met with the top leaders whom he had known from the World War II days when they were together in the Yenan Caves. He found the Cultural Revolution rapidly subsiding. It was clear that Zhou En-lai, in particular, was preparing the way for serious productive talks with Nixon. The key issue would be Taiwan. Zhou recognized that the U.S. could not switch its policy overnight and that some evolution over time would be required. From Peking's viewpoint, it was absolutely essential that the U.S. not promote or encourage any Taiwan independence movement. If the U.S. looked for a successful outcome of President Nixon's trip, it must accept Taiwan as an integral part of China. Of less immediate consequence was the removal of U.S. forces on Taiwan.

Jack Service's account was of interest in many regards, especially his account of the notable improvements that had taken place in the lives of most Chinese people over the last two decades. Jack reported Zhou's surprise over the PRC victory (October 25, 1971) on the UN seating issue. The Chinese clearly had not anticipated this favorable result. During his conversation with Zhou En-lai on October 27, 1971, there were constant staff interruptions with regard to developments in New York and hasty arrangements for China's participation in the UN. I reported Jack's views to the White House, State and CIA.

Also during October Henry Kissinger made another trip to China to prepare for the Presidential visit and to do some initial work on the final (Shanghai) communique which was to set forth what was agreed to at the summit meetings.

CHAPTER VI
PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO CHINA, 1972

Nearly 200 people accompanied the President to China, including security personnel, administrative staff, press and others. The official party numbered 13, ranked as follows: President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, Presidential Assistant Bob Haldeman, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, Presidential Military Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Assistant Secretary Green, Presidential Deputy Assistant Dwight Chapin, Speechwriter Pat Buchanan, Personal Presidential Secretary Rose Mary Woods, State Department Director of Asia Communist Affairs Al Jenkins, NSC staff member Foreign Service Officer John Holdridge, and Special Assistant to Kissinger Winston Lord. But it was clear from our initial seat assignments in the Presidential plane that the White House was going to dominate the show and that the State Department was to take a back seat literally.
While in Hawaii enroute to China, I had a useful meeting with Dr. Kissinger who gave me the benefit of what he had learned about negotiating with the Chinese, based on his two recent visits to Peking. Kissinger suggested our meeting in Hawaii since I would be assisting Secretary Rogers in handling what were known as the "counterpart talks" with the Chinese Foreign Minister and his staff. The counterpart talks dealt essentially with specific problem areas like trade, travel, consular affairs, property rights, while leaving broad strategic issues to the top level, namely Mao, Zhou En-lai, Nixon and Kissinger.

"Never," I recall Henry Kissinger saying to me, "use the language of the marketplace in dealing with top Chinese officials. Don't talk about deals or quid-pro-quo. Always talk about principles...That as a matter of principle we are prepared to do so-and-so, and that we would trust that you as a matter of principle would do this or that..." "The Chinese," he added, "are real puritans--not like you New Englanders."

"Another thing," Henry added, "is that the Chinese have a lot of things to get off their chests--decades of humiliations at the hands of the imperialist West. The Foreign Minister may well spend two full days sounding off on that subject before he is willing to get into substance. Don't interrupt him. Let hem get it out of his system. If you interrupt to rebut him, he'll start all over again--and you'll get nowhere." (He implied that this is what almost happened to him.)

That was Kissinger at his best--astute, articulate, a master of maneuver. But he was also a megalomaniac, and as long as he was in the White House he lost no opportunity to build his power base at the expense of the State Department, undercutting the Secretary of State and shamelessly exploiting President Nixon's long-standing suspicions and prejudices against careerists in the State Department (despite our loyalty to all Presidents and our high respect for Nixon's extraordinary grasp of strategic issues).

For Secretary Rogers, the China trip had many humiliating moments, especially not being asked to accompany President Nixon (and Kissinger) to their only meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong. Secretary Rogers was uncomplaining because he did not want to add in any way to the President's problems.

The crowning achievement of the Nixon China Trip was the final communiqué--known as the Shanghai Communiqué--which was to become the charter of our new relationship with China. The format of the communiqué was in itself unusual. Each side--first China, then the U.S.--presented its contrasting view of the world scene and the main tenets of its foreign policies. This was followed by identifying areas of understanding and agreement. In this section the U.S. acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. does not challenge that position." On the thorny issue of withdrawing U.S. forces and military installations on Taiwan, the U.S. stated this to be its ultimate objective, but related it to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves: meanwhile the U.S. would progressively reduce its military presence on Taiwan as tension in the area diminished.
Credit for the negotiation of this document must go largely to Henry Kissinger and his Chinese counterpart Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. Dr. Kissinger went through the motions of consulting Secretary Rogers and the rest of the State Department contingent. From time to time Rogers and I would meet with Kissinger or we would receive sections of the draft communiqué for our comments, but at no stage did I ever see the entire draft until it was already approved by the President, Kissinger, Rogers and the Chinese leaders.

The first opportunity I was given to read the approved draft was on February 26, the day we left Peking for a one-day rest stop at the scenic city of Hangzhou before our final day at Shanghai. When we reached our hotel in Hangzhou, Secretary Rogers showed me the approved text. I read it rapidly, detecting a major flaw which I immediately drew to Rogers' attention. He agreed with me, and so did Al Jenkins. The flaw was simply this: although the U.S. reaffirmed in the text of the Communiqué its support for U.S. security treaty obligations to Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, SEATO and ANZUS, no mention was made of our treaty obligations to the Republic of China on Taiwan. This would almost certainly be seized upon by the world press, and especially by those in the Republican party who were opposed to the President's trip, [Even top cabinet officials like Vice President Agnew and Treasury Secretary John Connally had privately expressed strong concerns over the President's trip to China.] to charge that the President had sold the Republic of China down the river, that the U.S. had unilaterally terminated without advance notice its treaty obligations to the ROC, and that this could even be interpreted as suggesting to Peking that it could attack Taiwan without involving the U.S.

Rogers could see my point right away. He, too, remembered how Secretary of State Dean Acheson had come under heavy fire for excluding South Korea from a map showing those areas in East Asia of primary defense concern to the United States.

Secretary Rogers immediately put in a telephone call to the President who was staying at the nearby government guesthouse, but he got Haldeman on the phone instead. Haldeman refused to disturb the President who was resting--besides, he said, the President had already approved the draft.

I was in a black mood that night at the dinner party given in the President's honor by the Hangzhou Revolutionary Committee. Ziegler noted my mood and asked what had happened. When I told him, he evidently then got in touch with Haldeman.

Around 1 or 2 a.m., John Scali beat on my door and said that "all hell had broken loose in the Presidential suite." Evidently Haldeman or Rogers had got to the President about the issue, and the President was enraged.

According to Henry Kissinger's memoirs, the President was furious at the State Department for belatedly coming up with a long series of nitpicks about the Communiqué, and yet failure to correct these nitpicks, the President allegedly feared,
might result in the State Department bad-mouthing the Communiqué. Henry depicted the President as "storming about the beautiful guest house in Hangzhou in his underwear," swearing that "he would do something about that State Department at the first opportunity--a threat he made at regular intervals since my first interview with him...."

Well, of course, there was no series of nit-picks--just one major objection--a point which, amazingly, no one had spotted until I drew it to Rogers' attention; and it is quite possible that the President's fury was directed at Kissinger for having put him on the spot.

The following morning, at breakfast, Secretary Rogers told me that he had managed to reach President Nixon late the previous evening to express our concerns. He said he didn't know what the President would do. After breakfast, we left for the airport to go to Shanghai. While proceeding to my plane, Henry Kissinger intercepted me. He was angry about what he termed my "poor-mouthing of the Communiqué."

For the first time in my three years of association with Henry, I did not hold back. "Since when was the Secretary of State offering constructive criticisms defined as poor-mouthing?" I further reminded him of the constitutional responsibilities of the Secretary of State to advise the President--especially on an issue as critical as this, one that could affect the whole outcome of the President's trip.

"But you've been talking to Scali, who has no right to be involved," was Henry's weak retort, to which I replied that Scali had a right to know as press adviser to the President. Henry then did an about-face. He asked with a seeming genuine warmth if I would join him that evening in briefing the world press at the time of the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué.

I replied that I would do so if the President so ordered. I was not happy about the prospect of being conspicuously identified with a communiqué I found badly flawed, and it was left unclear whether that flaw would remain in the Communiqué.

So I arrived in Shanghai in an angry mood until it was revealed to me later in the day that Kissinger had worked out with the Chinese Vice Minister late the previous evening a way of handling the problem I'd raised.

I was also told that the President specifically asked that I accompany Kissinger to the press briefing and that I participate to the extent of summarizing what had gone on in the counterpart talks between Secretary Rogers and the Chinese Foreign Minister.

Kissinger never told me specifically what arrangements he had concluded with the Chinese side regarding the critical objection I had raised, but during our briefing of a large press gathering in Shanghai at 6 p.m., February 27, it simply took the form of an agreed removal of the offending sentence from the Communiqué and of Henry stating in answer to an anticipated question from the press, actually Mr. Kraslow of The Los Angeles Times who asked, "Why did not the U.S. government affirm its Treaty
commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?"
Kissinger answered that this issue was an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss at that
time and place, but, he then added the key passage: "we stated our basic position with
respect to this issue in the President's World Report, in which we said that this Treaty will
be maintained. Nothing has changed on that position." Kissinger said he hoped that that
would be all he would have to say on that subject--and his request was respected.

Thus was adroitly averted what could have been a serious setback. Neither Henry nor the
President ever thanked me for my initiative. President Nixon understandably acted as
though the event never occurred, while Kissinger took it upon himself to leave history
with a self-serving account of the incident--one that is misleading and damaging to the
State Department, and one that I am now, many years later, moved to refute.

In any event, this red-letter day concluded on a most pleasant note. I was asked to meet
with President Nixon in his hotel room at 10:30 p.m. to discuss the trip which I was about
to undertake with John Holdridge, in which we would call on the top leaders of all East
Asian and Australasian countries in the course of two weeks to explain American policy
in the wake of the Shanghai Communiqué and to answer questions.

The President was warm and gracious. He gave me instructions as to what I should say
about his talks in China--their frankness, their lack of double-talk, the fact that there were
no secret agreements or understandings--it was all out in the open as presented in the
revealed record. He also urged that I stress America's constancy of purpose and its
continuing search, in consultation with our allies, for "finding the right way to stay in
Asia," and that under all circumstances we would stand by our commitments. He also
gave me special instructions regarding Korea and Thailand.

In assigning John Holdridge to be my assistant, he ensured that we would be in a more
authoritative position to answer certain questions relating to the top level talks with Zhou
En-lai which John had attended as an NSC adviser to Kissinger and as an interpreter.

That was the last full day of the President's trip to China. He took off the following
morning from Shanghai with all his party (save for John Holdridge and me) direct for
Washington by way of Anchorage, Alaska.

For me, the most exhilarating and important moments of the trip all occurred that last
day--my final meeting with Henry Kissinger which turned out so satisfactorily, our joint
briefing of the Press (in which he did almost all of the talking and answering of
questions), and my final meeting with the President late that evening (February 27). But
there was one other event that day which deserves special mention.

In the course of the afternoon, Premier Zhou En-lai made a personal call on Secretary of
State Rogers in his hotel room which I was asked to join. [Secretary Rogers' suite and
mine were on the 13th floor, Kissinger's on the 14th floor and the Nixons were on the top
floor, the 15th. The symbolism escaped no one.] In the course of this call, the subject of
my flying direct to Tokyo from Shanghai was raised by Secretary Rogers. Our earlier application to the Chinese government for permission for this flight had gone unanswered. We realized the uniqueness of our application, for no plane of any nation had flown either way between China and Japan in the preceding 23 years. So when Bill Rogers raised the question with Premier Zhou in our hotel meeting, Zhou just smiled and said through his interpreter: "Mr. Secretary, you just go ahead and do what you think is right."

Zhou never gave his permission, but he never denied permission. He thereby established no precedent which someone else could invoke. [The thought later occurred to me that Zhou's unusual courtesy call on the Secretary of State might have been prompted by concerns expressed to him by Nixon or Kissinger over the State Department's "poor-mouthing" of the Communiqué. In other words, Kissinger, in justifying to Chiao Kuan-hua the last-minute change in the Communiqué that I had urged, had probably talked about how the State Department might otherwise "poor-mouth" (a favorite term of Kissinger's) the Communiqué and thereby undermine much of what the Shanghai Communiqué purported to accomplish. Zhou was also mindful of how shabbily the State had been treated by the White House and wished to offset this by his courtesy call on the Secretary. Zhou, in typical Chinese fashion, was keenly aware of the need for officials to save face.]

It all worked out fine, and when, the next day, following President Nixon's departure, I took off in the President's back-up plane for Tokyo, Premier Zhou actually drove down to our plane to say farewell to John Holdridge and me. For the first time, in my hearing, Premier Zhou spoke English: "Goodbye, Mr. Green, have a good trip. Good luck." He knew I faced some difficult moments, especially when I reached Taiwan where I was scheduled to meet with President Chiang Kai-shek. I left China feeling that Zhou En-lai was perhaps the most remarkable of all leaders in terms of his broad command of world events and yet his extraordinary attention to detail.

CHAPTER VII

AFTERMATH OF NIXON TRIP--ASIAN AND U.S. REACTIONS

Arriving in Tokyo on February 28, John Holdridge and I were met by my wife and by special assistant, Paul Cleveland. We four were to make the long journey from Tokyo to Seoul, Manila, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Singapore, Jakarta, Sydney, Canberra, Wellington and back to Washington. From Tokyo to Singapore, we traveled in a small executive jet provided by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific. The rest of the trip was by commercial airlines.

The most challenging talks I had were in Tokyo and Taipei. As The New York Times put it on the day of our arrival in Tokyo: "The Japanese press is beside itself in frustration--and the government is not far behind--that Japan's overtures toward normal government relations with Peking have been spurned; while President Nixon has been welcomed.
China professes to fear revived Japanese militarism and Japanese economic hegemony in Asia."

My meetings with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda were nevertheless warm and friendly, based on many years' acquaintance, even though they were under criticism in Japan for the way the U.S. had overtaken Japan in the race to Peking. They were also anxious for "inside" information regarding what had transpired in the summit meetings in Peking beyond what was already announced. This placed me in a bit of a spot because I had not been directly involved in the top-level negotiations with Zhou--a fact known to the Japanese press. On the other hand, Kissinger and President Nixon had given me background and guidance, and John Holdridge had attended most of the summit meetings.

The Japanese government had already made favorable official statements about the Shanghai Communiqué before our arrival in Tokyo, and the government's statements after my departure would indicate that our talks in Tokyo had gone well in the sense of removing suspicions that there were secret deals in Peking, perhaps involving Japan, in reaffirming our defense commitment to Taiwan, and in suggesting that we had no desire to beat Japan in any race toward diplomatic recognition of Peking.

The two things I remember most vividly about our busy schedule of calls in Korea were: (1) the 90-minute grilling I had from the Korean Foreign Minister with regard to every detail of the President's China Trip, plus my assessment of each detail's implications, and (2) the friendly solicitude expressed by my old friend (and one-time adversary) President Park Chung-Hee regarding my personal safety when visiting Taiwan in view of the strongly adverse reactions he anticipated there.

I accordingly prepared careful talking points during the Seoul-Taipei flight in our 4-passenger jet--points that I later checked with Ambassador McConaughy in Taipei before our meetings with top ROC officials. President Chiang Kai-shek refused to see us, but his able, level-headed son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was Premier at the time and later President of the ROC, was our gracious, albeit dismayed host. I assured the Premier and Foreign Minister Chow that, while we had modified our policy toward Peking, we had not changed our policy toward the ROC with which we continued to have diplomatic relations and a defense commitment. We also expected to do even more to encourage trade and investment in Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communiqué we made explicit our view that there is but one China, rejecting any suggesting that we favor a two-China policy or a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We do not pretend, I added, to know how the Taiwan issue will eventually be settled. This is a problem to be resolved by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We only insist on the issue being resolved peacefully.

After a busy day of meetings in which these themes were stressed, and many questions answered by John Holdridge and me, I said to the Foreign Minister at our final meeting that I hoped his government would not convey an impression of dismay and bitterness over President Nixon's China initiative, for that would only give satisfaction to those who
are enemies of the ROC and instill fears on the part of Taiwan's business contacts. The ROC has many strong friends in the U.S. and elsewhere, and it must remain that way.

Subsequently our Embassy reported that reactions in Taiwan remained skeptical but the "GRC leaders were impressed with Green's reaffirmation of the defense commitment and most interested in his comment that he believed Peking is prepared to accept the status quo in Taiwan for an indefinite period. Most important of all, the GRC leaders did not engage in a further public quarrel with the U.S. Private comments also indicated relief and a shift from earlier sharp criticism."

With the help of Walter McConaughy and John Holdridge, my difficult mission to Taiwan succeeded.

Our next stop after a scary flight through a tropical electrical storm was Manila, a scene of utter confusion. Mrs. Marcos was taking off for Peking just as we landed. Our ashen-faced Ambassador, Hank Byroade, explained that Mrs. Marcos was looking for new relations with Peking, now that the U.S. had allegedly changed its policy. Byroade also said that I was being served with a subpoena to appear the following day before the Philippine Senate to answer questions about "how the U.S. was reneging on its 2-China policy," which Foreign Minister Romulo had thought we were pursuing. The Philippine press reaction was shrill and irrational, urging that, since the U.S. had jettisoned Taiwan, the Philippines should now negotiate a deal with Peking.

According to the Embassy's telegraphic reports of my 36 hours stay in Manila, my meetings with Marcos, Romulo, the Philippine Senate, the press, etc. had been "indispensable in halting the snowballing erosion in Philippine confidence in U.S. Asian policy."

Our meetings in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were held in a calmer atmosphere and went off without incident, except for President Lon Nol's unexplained absence from Phnom Penh. I had little regard for him anyway and was glad to have my meetings instead with Sirik Matak, the Foreign Minister, a wise and courageous man.

The King of Thailand, reflecting the sentiment of his government and people, expressed to me profound skepticism of PRC intentions and of U.S. ability and preparedness to deal realistically with the Chinese. However on our departure from Bangkok after long separate meetings with the King, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the National Executive Council, the SEATO Secretary General, and the press, the Thai government released a statement describing our talks as "most satisfactory to both sides while at the same time creating excellent mutual understanding. " The usually critical leading newspaper The Nation said I had done a "superb job in allaying suspicions." During my talks in Thailand I was in a position to provide private assurances that Peking was likely to reduce, and possibly terminate, material support for Communist insurgents operating in Thailand.
Our stops in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore were relatively uneventful but entirely satisfactory.

Indonesia posed a special problem in terms of Indonesia's deep suspicions of the Chinese, who were regarded as co-conspirators with the Indonesian Communist Party in assassinating 6 of Indonesia's top 8 generals in the aborted coup of September 30, 1965. On the other hand, President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik, and the Army leaders welcomed Nixon's China Trip as offering hope for peace and stability. Press coverage emphasized my assurances that there had been no change in U.S. commitments and no secret deals.

In Australia there was no need to explain or justify the President's trip to China. It was widely accepted as a sensible move. However, Australia posed an interesting challenge since the leader of the Labor Party opposition, Gough Whitlam (who was Prime Minister during my assignment to Australia 1973-75) had adopted the position that Australia should now establish relations with the PRC. The leader of the Country Party was similarly interested in early recognition of Peking as giving Australia a diplomatic advantage in selling wheat and other farm products to the huge China market. I found myself in something of a quandary in justifying the President's opening to China on the one hand and advising caution regarding any Australian move to recognize Peking on the other. All I could do was suggest that Australia might be best advised to adopt a wait-and-see policy before any moves to break relations with the GOC on Taiwan in order to recognize Peking.

New Zealand, our last stop, was delightfully relaxing. After a useful 2 hour talk with Prime Minister Marshall and Foreign Minister Holyoake, the Prime Minister suggested that we conclude our talks on the Heretaunga Golf Course, which we did. Sir Keith Holyoake told the press that my "briefing was the best one he had ever heard in his life." This was a pleasant note on which to end a trip that had covered a dozen countries in fifteen days.

In looking back on this trip, my wife remarked on the wisdom of President Nixon in entrusting this mission to Foreign Service officers who were not only well-known personally to leaders of the Western Pacific region, but who were seen by them as careerists with no political axes to grind.

On our return to Washington, I reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and to the White House, before going on the nation-wide NBC program "Meet the Press." The President, when I met with him on March 23, along with Al Haig, Deputy Head of the NSC, and John Holdridge, was anxious that I play down the Taiwan aspect as much as possible in my "Meet the Press" appearance. He did not want me to make any headlines--and I did not disappoint him in that regard. Al Haig called me up after my NBC performance on March 26 to say "they didn't lay a glove on you" which was the highest compliment I received for what I fear was a lackluster TV performance, given my instructions.
There was one further development in which I was involved in 1972, relating primarily to our relations with Japan, but also involved U.S. policy toward China.

Prime Minister Sato resigned in mid-1972 and was replaced by Prime Minister Tanaka who had already announced his intention to negotiate later that year with the Chinese on normalizing Tokyo's relations with Peking.

On August 30, 1972, I accompanied President Nixon to Hawaii where Nixon and Tanaka met for the first time, largely to get to know each other and to discuss issues of concern.

I recall that on our flight from San Clemente on Air Force One to Hawaii, there was a long meeting in the President's cabin attended by the President, Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson and myself, in which Alex did most of the talking. He had previously been our Ambassador to Japan and felt strongly that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had unnecessarily affronted the Japanese in the way we had suddenly shifted our policy toward Peking in 1971-72 without adequate consultation or even notification of Japan.

It was clear that Prime Minister Tanaka was now going to move rapidly, under strong internal Japanese political pressure, to normalize Tokyo-Peking relations. Some concern was expressed in our Air Force One meeting that Tanaka might normalize on terms adversely affecting U.S. interests, but President Nixon seemed surer than the rest of us that Tanaka and Zhou would act responsibly and that we should not press the Japanese on this issue at our forthcoming meeting at Kuilima, Hawaii.

Since the President's main meetings in Kuilima with Tanaka were strictly private and separate from the plenary talks, I have no way of knowing whether China-Japan issues were discussed. But, in any event, when Tanaka did go to Peking several weeks later, he was evidently under no pressure from the Chinese to accept terms that would create difficulties in U.S.-Japanese relations. In fact, China seemed to be at pains not only to improve relations with Japan, but also with the United States and between Japan and the United States.

Commencing then, in 1972, for the first time in memory, a foundation was laid for a constructive relationship between Washington, Peking and Tokyo; that is to say, between the world's most powerful nation, the world's most populous nation and the world's most economically dynamic nation--all three of them having been at war with each other at some point earlier in this century.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
When future historians contemplate the events of this century, few things will stand out more prominently than the interface between China and the United States. Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* captures all the frustrations of our war-time allied relations when she writes in her final sentence: "In the end, China went her own way, as if the Americans had never come."

Thereafter, for over two decades, U.S. relations with mainland China remained in a deep freeze. There was a brief period between late 1961 and early 1964 that offered some hope that relations might thaw a bit due to Chinese reactions to the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and to initiatives from the American side to enter into a more civil discourse with China. This period was marked by U.S. efforts to relax certain restrictions on American travel to, and trade with, China. It was also marked by U.S. pressures, known to Peking, to restrain our Chinese allies on Taiwan from raids against the mainland, especially during the period of economic and social unrest resulting from the collapsed Great Leap Forward.

However, it takes two to tango, and there was no evidence of Peking's willingness to relax tensions with the U.S. even during the 1961-64 period. The U.S. was nevertheless able to demonstrate that it was Chinese, not U.S., policy that was principally responsible for the continuing deep freeze in our relations.

The Chinese government was obviously averse to any gradual improvements in its relations with the U.S. As I pointed out at Princeton in mid-1965: The Chinese Communist leaders have remarked that when the time comes to improve relations with the U.S., "this will come all at once, inasmuch as to improve relations piecemeal would have a harmful effect on the Chinese people's revolutionary fervor."

Partly as a result of the setback to China caused by the aborted Communist coup in Indonesia in 1965, China entered into another dark period of left-wing fanaticism known as the Cultural Revolution which did not abate until 1969. Intensified efforts were made by China during that period to cast the U.S. in the devil's role in order to whip up mass fears of an external threat and thereby achieve national cohesion.

A major reversal of Chinese strategic policy occurred in the period 1969-71, brought on by increasing Chinese nervousness over Soviet intentions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by the rapid build-up of Soviet military power in Siberia, especially in disputed areas along the Chinese frontier, created an atmosphere of war-panic in China. Air raid shelters were built on a massive scale. A CIA estimate of October 1969 placed the chances of a Soviet effort to knock out China's nascent nuclear weapons factories at about 1 in 3. Meanwhile, ever since Khrushchev came on the scene, China had been nervously observing U.S.-Soviet relations and was increasingly concerned that China might face U.S.-Soviet collusion.
It was against this background--plus the growing influence of Zhou En-lai and the pragmatists--that President Nixon's initiative was realistically possible of achieving success.

Just a few observations on why the President took this extraordinary initiative on China. Certainly it was out of line with the thinking of many in the Republican Party. It also involved a lot of risks--risks that secret preparations might leak to the press, risks that the highly publicized summit meeting might fail, risks of bad reactions in Japan, Korea, Taiwan or elsewhere. Moreover, he was undertaking this trip at a time when the war in Vietnam was raging and when the U.S. was suffering heavy casualties at the hands of an enemy supported by Peking. Finally, his approach to China could be seen as a bit premature. Why not wait until Mao passed from the scene--which seemed fairly imminent?

The very fact that the President took all these risks underlines the great importance he attached to a U.S.-China rapprochement. As he said to me on one occasion: "We simply cannot go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the PRC grows in military power." There was a need to move promptly at a time when the Chinese leaders were fearful of a Soviet attack and when we could not allow the Soviet Union to take Sino-U.S. hostility for granted in its policy calculations.

The President also had sound internal political reasons for his China initiative which was widely popular in the U.S., especially in academic, press and other circles critical of our role in the long, bloody, fruitless war in Vietnam. For many months, China took the headlines away from Vietnam. It cast U.S. foreign policy in a positive light during a critical year for the Nixon Administration.

It must be remembered that President Nixon also had a strong sense of the mark he would leave on history. That was evident from my first meeting with him in Jakarta, with all his note-taking and tape-recording of conversations.

China's affirmative response to Nixon's initiatives related overwhelmingly to its fears of Soviet aggressive intentions and of possible Soviet-U.S. collusion against China. But other factors were also undoubtedly involved. One of them was the perceived advantage to Peking in having closer ties between Peking, Washington and Tokyo, both in economic terms and in terms of better ensuring that Japan's military capabilities would remain limited and confined to Japan's self-defense through its defense ties with the United States. This point came through to me loud and clear in a conversation with a top Chinese official in Peking during the Nixon visit. The Chinese have long memories, and surely one of the most painful of these memories is Japan's harsh occupation of North China and its half-century colonization of Taiwan.

President Nixon failed to recognize Japanese sensitivities in the sudden announcement of his trip to China. For years the Japanese had followed the American lead on China policy, even though they were anxious to get into the Chinese market through early recognition.
of the Peking government. It had been the nightmare of at least one Japanese prime
minister that he would wake up one morning to find the Americans in Peking and the
Japanese left in the lurch. It would have been possible to soften the blow to Prime
Minister Sato and his government had President Nixon sent a personal emissary like
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who was well known and trusted in Japan, to explain the
President's initiative at least a day in advance of its announcement. This would have given
the Japanese government time to ready its public response, while underlining our respect
for Japan's special interests in this important strategic move. I sensed that both Nixon and
Kissinger compared the Japanese leadership unfavorably with the Chinese, seeing the
Japanese as preoccupied with economic issues while the Chinese leaders thought in
Nixon-Kissinger global strategic terms. It was not until Nixon returned to Washington
from China that I learned that his obsession with keeping his China initiative secret was
not, as alleged by Nixon, out of consideration for the wishes of the Chinese but for his
own.

Some time after the President returned from Peking, I suggested through Under-Secretary
Alex Johnson and Henry Kissinger that President and Mrs. Nixon might show their
respect for Japan (and make amends for the Nixon shocks) by flying to Alaska to greet
Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor and Empress of Japan, who were stopping over at
Anchorage for refueling en route by polar flight to Europe. This was the first time in
history that any reigning monarch of Japan was to set foot on foreign soil--and it was to
be American soil. President Nixon took warmly to the idea (which he probably assumed
was Kissinger's) and Japanese reactions were highly favorable.

A black mark in the President's China trip was the shabby way he treated his old friend
and loyal supporter, Secretary of State William Rogers. American presidents in recent
memory have had a tendency to rely considerably more on White House Staff than on
government departments, but in Nixon's case it was carried to extremes, abetted in large
part by the power-seeking Henry Kissinger who played on President Nixon's longstanding
distrust of the Foreign Service. Ironically it was we in the Foreign Service dealing with
Far Eastern affairs who were the most enthusiastic supporters of the President's China
policy. After all, we had long striven for the goals reached during the Nixon
Administration.

It was a curious coincidence that my 17 consecutive years (1956-1973) in dealing with
U.S. China policy should have started and ended by working for two right-wing
Republican lawyers--John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon--both of whom started out
their public careers as anti-Communist zealots with simplistic solutions to international
issues, but both of whom ended their careers as international statesmen. It remained for
President Nixon to shake the extended hand of Zhou En-lai in 1969, in dramatic contrast
to Dulles' refusal to do so in Geneva in 1954, a slight Zhou never forgot.

U.S.-China relations had come a long way.
End of interview