The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: December 13, 1988
Copyright 2013 ADST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background
Born in Holyoke, Massachusetts
Father was textile manufacturer and lobbyist
Annual family travel to Europe
Educated at Groton and Yale (’39)
Secretary to Ambassador Green

Japan, Tokyo 1939-1941
Appraisal of Grew
Warnings of war
“Magic”
Influence of Japanese Army
Assistant Secretary Hornbeck
Protocol duties – football
Staff influences on Grew
Opinion on American youth
Effect of the Japanese on the war in China

World War II 1941-1945
Enlistment in the Navy
Japanese language school
Service in ONI
Entry into the Foreign Service

Japan desk in the State Department 1947-1950
Trip to Japan with George Kennan
Kennan v. MacArthur
Ending the purges: Dean Rusk
Kennan’s style
Briefing John Foster Dulles
Ignorance in Washington about Korea
Regional Planning Advisory Bureau of Far Eastern Affair 1956-1960
  Ambassador Rob McClintock
  Prince Sihanouk
  East Asian country relationships
  Asian sensibilities
  Cambodia's mentality

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 1959-1960
  Characterizes of Assistant Secretary Robertson
  Origin of mutual security treaty with Japan
  State Pentagon relations
  Regional Planning Advisor
  Establishing a POLAD at CINCPAC
  Air-sea-ground demonstrations in East Asia
  The CIA role
  Soviet planning toward Japan

Korea 1960-1961
  Japanese-Korean relations
  Independence leader Syngman Rhee
  U.S. presence in Korea and Washington desk officers
  Korean economic and political situation
  Ambassador Walter McConaughy
  Elections fraud, "justifiable grievances," student demonstrations ·
  Relations between Syngman Rhee and Ambassador McConaughy
  President Eisenhowers visit
  New elections: President Yun Po Sun, Prime Minister Chang Myun
  Devaluation of Korean won
  Attempts to improve Japanese-Korean relations
  Living conditions
  Chargé
    Prime Minister Chang Myun’s government
    U.S. involvement in Korean government
    Military discontent

Military Coup
  U.S. position on coup
  War games and contingency planning ·
  Embassy reaction to coup ·
  Attempts to arrange compromise between government and insurgents
  President Yun Po Sun
  Washington’s reactions to embassy actions
  Chang Myun’s letter
  Military Junta’s marshal law
  Fear of North Korean action
  Meeting with American community
Korean military
Arrival of Ambassador Samuel Berger
   Working with Ambassador Berger
   Role of the CIA
   Meeting with General Park Chung Hee
   Importance of Integrity
   Leaving Korea
Conclusion

Deputy Assistant Secretary 1963-1965
   Relationship with Bill Bradley
   Consultations: Japanese concerns

Ambassador to Indonesia 1965-1971
   Sukarno-Sihanouk relationship
   US B-52 attacks on Viet Cong in Cambodia
   Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi (1969)
   Congressional interest in Cambodia
   Promoting Cambodian neutrality (vis à vis Vietnam)
   Sihanouk deposed
   Lon Nol government
   Lon Nol requests for US arms
   Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia
   US forces committed to Cambodian incursion
   Al Haig involvement
   Far Eastern Chiefs of Mission on Tokyo
   FANK strength buildup
   Nixon-Kissinger policies

Assistant Secretary 1969-1973
   The Nixon Doctrine
   Henry Kissinger
   Being “cut out”
   Japanese reaction to change in US-China policy
   Chinese concern about Japan
   Nixon’s propensity to favor China over Japan
   Impression of Secretary Rogers
   Leakage in Japan
   State-Pentagon relations
   Korea and Japan
   Japan and China normalize relations
   Japan’s reliance on the United States
   How the Japanese operate

Ambassador to Australia 1973-1975
Labor Party in power
The shipping boycott
Whitham visit to Washington
Diego Garcia base
US bases in Australia
Importance of the Coral Sea battle
Kissinger and Australia

Population Coordinator 1975-1979

Population problems in Indonesia
  President Suharto
  Bubonic plague
State and AID differences over population program
Assistant Secretary Dixie Lee Ray
NSDM 200
Henry Kissinger
AID’s narrow approach
  Dr. Ravenholt
  Bangladesh
  Pakistan
Christopher Herter
CIA background papers
Department of Agriculture
Embassy reports on population
Lack of interest by US leaders
Congress 20
Status of women
Carter Administration
Assistant Secretary Patt Darien
Lack of population programs
Robert McNamara and World bank
Ministers of Health running programs
Support b women’s organizations
Village approach
Philippines, Korea, Taiwan
San Salvador
George Ball
Islam and population control
  President Mubarak
Abortions
1984 World Conference on Population
  Regan Administration
AID programs re birth prevention and birth control
Retrospect
INTERVIEW

Q: Today is March 2, 1995. This is an interview with Ambassador Marshall Green. This segment of the interview will be devoted mainly to the Japanese connection. We'll also fill in concerning Australia and some of Ambassador Green's earlier assignments. Mr. Ambassador, could you tell me a bit about your family, your date of birth, and when and where you grew up. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

GREEN: I was born on January 27, 1916, which means that I've just turned 79. I was born in Holyoke, Massachusetts. My father was a wool manufacturer and also a lawyer. He was sort of a champion of the New England textile industry in Washington, DC. He "lobbied" for them, quite apart from his being the chairman of the Farr Alpaca Company, which at the time was the second largest wool manufacturing concern in New England. It handled not only wool but also mohair, cotton, and other fabrics. We had a beautiful home, called Meadow View of which not a trace remains today, the house having been burned down and its 300 acres bulldozed to make way for Route 90 interstate and the rest for estate development.

My parents loved to travel. We went abroad to Europe, just about every summer after I was seven years old. My whole orientation was toward Europe. I knew nothing about the Far East. My father's connections with the Far East were simply as spokesman for the woolen industry. He fought against imports of textiles from Japan, always trying to raise the tariffs on them. How well I remember his declamatory performance before the House Ways and Means Committee and the National Industrial Conference Board of which he was once chairman.

My father and mother were great travelers, spending most of their summers in Western Europe where father pursued his interests in pre-history as chairman of the American School of Pre-History, and mother pursuing her interests in art and architecture. My two sisters and I accompanied them on all these trips, though we were left in a small summer school in Houlgeath, France, for four of those months while they traveled about Europe.

Both of our parents were great readers, with father concentrating on Sir Walter Scott and on British voyages (which he read aloud to us on many an evening) and mother immersed in Jane Austin and meeting the people.

As far as schooling was concerned, my sisters and I attended a small private school of which mother was principal benefactor, before I went on to two years at Indian Mountain School and then six years at Groton school. My four subsequent years at Yale, were, I fear, largely taken up with sports and an active social life, with too little time devoted to the serious pursuit of my areas of concentration in French literature and American government.
This is all by way of background. It meant that, when I finally went to Japan, I had no
familiarity with East Asia. There was nothing in my whole background that entitled me to
be Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's secretary. So that's my background.

Q: You made these trips to Europe, and your father was involved in trade matters. Did
you have any interest at Groton and Yale about the Foreign Service and working for the
State Department?

GREEN: I moved in circles that knew little about the Foreign Service, except that my
school, Groton, had many illustrious graduates, including [President] Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, Sumner Wells [Under Secretary of State during World War II], Governor
Averell Harriman, and people like that. So there was a tradition at Groton of men going
into public service. In fact, its well-known Rector, Endicott Peabody, continually used the
pulpit to exhort young men to get out there in the world and to serve society. The motto
of our school was, "Qui Servir est Regnare," which means, "To serve Him is to reign."
That did have its impact upon me. There's no question that the Rector at Groton had a
great impact upon me.

One of his graduates was Joseph C. Grew, who was Ambassador to Japan before World
War II [1932-1942]. He later served as Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of State,
and it was he who eventually asked me to be his private secretary.

Q: What was the timing? When had you graduated from Yale?

GREEN: I graduated from Yale in 1939. I was already enrolled in the Law School, when I
overheard two people in French class, I think it was, talking about Grew looking for a
private secretary. So I went down to Washington, DC, to apply for the job. Quite frankly,
one of the requirements to be his private secretary was to have gone to his old home
school, Groton. In fact, he used to ask Endicott Peabody to suggest someone who would
take that job on. He had four such private secretaries over the course of time.

So I went down to Washington and was interviewed by Ambassador Grew. We had lunch
at the Metropolitan Club and then went back to his house on Woodland Drive. I was
talking to him when suddenly a voice came through the wall, saying, "Whom are you
speaking to, Joe dear?" He said, "I'm speaking to Marshall Green." She said, "Who is he,
for heaven's sake?" He said, "He's interested in being my private secretary." "Oh," said
this voice, trailing off. Then I resumed the conversation with the Ambassador. Again
through the wall came this voice, "Ask him, Joe, if he plays bridge." The Ambassador
asked, "Do you play bridge, Mr. Green?" I said, "I'm crazy about bridge, Mr.
Ambassador." He said, "He's crazy about bridge, Alice." Her voice came back, "Well,
take him, Joe, take him, and let's get it over with." So I became one of two leading
candidates through that conversation, and eventually the other candidate was eliminated
when it became known to the Rector the other candidate had rather rigged the election
against me to be captain of Groton's football team in 1934.
Anyway, I was freshly out of Yale, having graduated in June. By October I was on my way to Japan. The process moved that fast.

Q: Was this October, 1939?

GREEN: Yes.

Q: World War II had just started.

GREEN: Yes. World War II had just started. I was driving west on my way to Japan, spending a good deal of time visiting friends. I went all over the place. I remember that it was in Eureka, California, that I overheard the report of the outbreak of war in Europe.

So I joined Ambassador Grew in San Francisco and went out on the "Tatsuta Maru", a Japanese liner. I put my Ford convertible in the hold of the ship. It was transported to Japan for $50. I had it during the whole time I was in Japan. Finally, I sold it to the younger brother of the Emperor before I left. Then it was painted maroon, because all of the Imperial family cars had to be maroon in color. That is just a sidelight.

So I went out to Japan. It was during our transpacific trip that I got to know Mrs. Grew, who was to be a great bridge companion. Then en route to Japan, I played golf with the Ambassador in Hawaii. I shot about the best score that I ever had. That endeared me to him, and I became his constant golf companion in Japan.

Q: Obviously, you were brand new and really still "wet behind the ears" when you arrived in Japan. How did you view Japan at that time? How did it appear in your eyes in 1939?

GREEN: Yes. I had very little in the way of background, except that I was highly knowledgeable about geography. I was also interested in demography, being convinced that the expansionism of Germany, Italy, and Japan was rooted in population pressures of those crowded countries. So I went to Japan, knowing all about the geography and demography of the area, but almost nothing of its politics and little of history and culture.

I arrived in mid-October 1939 as a freshly minted, potential Foreign Service Officer, but I wasn't in the Foreign Service. I was being paid out of Ambassador Grew's own pocket the princely sum of $50 a month, for which I wrote out the checks, and he signed them. But on $50 a month I could live pretty well because my Embassy compound apartment was free and many of us converted US dollars on the black market in China into yen at four times the rate you could get in Japan. We could do that through colleagues and friends in China. That was illegal, but everybody did it, except the Ambassador.

On the other hand, since we saw Japan as a potential enemy, it wasn't terribly hard to square my New England conscience with this kind of activity.
Q: How did you view the Japanese system?

GREEN: I never claimed to know much about how the Japanese system operated and I had to depend on the Embassy viewpoint of others whom I encountered. Of course, I was more impressed by the views of Ambassador Grew who showed me his daily diary entries. I was also influenced by the views of senior Embassy officers like Gene Dooman and Ned Crocker or more junior ones like Max Schmidt and Jim Espy. I also had many good friends in the diplomatic and consular corps both in Tokyo and Yokohama. But, as you can see, I had almost no Japanese friends except those with whom I played football and golf or whom I met at Embassy social functions.

Q: "Turbulent Era," for example.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: I read that book, and that decided me to go into the Foreign Service.

GREEN: Oh, yes. Well, anyway, I can tell you this. I wasn't very helpful to Grew, except socially. I didn't know anything about Japan. I wasn't a very serious student of Japan. I never wrote any reports for him about Japan or took on a particular subject, as, indeed, one of my predecessors, Jeff Parsons--J. Graham Parsons--had done. He'd been with Grew for three or four years and had become very helpful to Grew. My successor, Bob Fearey, also became most useful to Grew, being deeply involved in events that occurred just before Pearl Harbor. And then, during their incarceration, he helped to put together Grew's report to Secretary Hull.

Q: You were there...

GREEN: I was there for almost two years--not quite. A year and three-quarters.

Q: You left when?

GREEN: I left Japan in May, 1941. My feelings about Japan at that time, as I say, were very much shaped by Grew and by the people around him. Eugene Dooman was the Counselor of the Embassy, was born in Japan, and spoke Japanese absolutely fluently. Grew didn't speak a word of Japanese, nor did Mrs. Grew. I was shocked at that. He and Mrs. Grew had been in Japan for many years. She had been there as a young girl and later on as the wife of Ambassador Grew. The Ambassador had already been in Japan for about seven years when I arrived there. I remember that on Thanksgiving Day, 1939, when we were down in Kobe to take the train back to Kyoto, where we were staying, they didn't even know how to say, "Where is the train to Osaka or Kyoto." They couldn't speak a word of Japanese.

I don't really believe that Ambassador Grew had very much, first-hand information about the inner workings of the Japanese system. He relied for his information on the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, on the Imperial Household, on the ministerial group, on his Foreign
Service colleagues, and on his diplomatic colleagues. At the same time, he had an infinite
capacity for detail. He worked very hard and conscientiously. He applied himself to the
task. He "lived" the problems.

One could criticize Grew, as many did, for being too pro-Japanese, for being too oriented
toward Japanese goals, rather than, say, Chinese, American, or other goals. That's unfair.
The fact of the matter is that he was a great American statesman. He thought in broad-
minded terms. One must admit, nevertheless, that he was always hopeful, always playing
for the chance that Japan might straighten itself out, that maybe by one more diplomatic
effort we could avoid what seemed to be an almost inevitable Armageddon. He tried
every route to see if there wasn't some way to avoid war.

What he was warning Washington about all the time was this: we're talking awfully
"tough" back in Washington, but we don't have the stick to back that up. We ought to be
damned careful about being "tough" as we were regarding economic sanctions or
holding back on shipments of scrap, ships, planes, or even oil, which was the most critical
of all. If we (including the UK, Holland, France, etc.), were going to embargo shipments
to Japan of these things (especially oil), Japan is going to be driven to the wall, and we
were going to find ourselves at war with Japan, inevitably. But he was always wondering
whether there wasn't some way out of that.

Of course, meanwhile, we were already well into World War II. During the first half or
three-quarters of my first year there, it was a "phony" war. Then the situation became very
serious when Japan joined the Tripartite Axis.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Grew was "distant" from the fighting which was going on in
China. He was "distant" from the Manchukuo puppet empire there [in Manchuria]. I think
that a lot of people in Washington--and, certainly, people in our Embassy in China--felt
that Grew really didn't understand what a horrible machine the Japanese Army was and
the cruelties that they visited upon the Chinese. Well, now, Grew did know that. So these
comments aren't fair. On the other hand, if you don't experience these things at first hand
and don't see or hear or live through them, you're always going to be seen as not knowing
the real, inside truth.

Q: Did he make any effort to get out and around, or could he have done so?

GREEN: Well, I don't think that he did enough of that. I also think that he should have
gone back to Washington once or twice to pursue his case, because he had a very good
case. However, you have to remember that traveling to Washington, in those days, took at
least a month or two. Even if you took Pan American Airways, which was just starting its
transpacific route, you still had to go by ship all the way down to Manila or Hong Kong to
take the flying boat. So it was very difficult to communicate in person with Washington.
On the other hand, you could pick up a phone, but the phone was insecure. There was
another problem, and that was the problem of coded communications. Grew did not know
about "Magic," in other words, that we had broken the Japanese [diplomatic] code, although I don't think that we had broken it much before Pearl Harbor.

Q: It was pretty close to the time of Pearl Harbor.

GREEN: There's one thing that one must always remember. That is, if you do have access to "Magic," as they called it, you may feel that you are in the know with superior knowledge in relationship to those without access to broken coded messages. Therefore, there is a tendency that outsiders' views are not given the weight that they would otherwise be given by insiders.

Back in Washington Secretary of State Hull was privy to "Magic," as well as President Roosevelt, presumably. I don't know whether Dr. Stanley Hornbeck was privy to "Magic." He was the head of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Whatever it was, this was an "angle" which, I think, was worth taking into consideration.

Q: Did Grew have access, as Ambassadors often do, to "movers and shakers" in Japan who came in to meet with him and discuss various issues over cigars, and so forth?

GREEN: Yes, there were, of course, lots of people who would come in and who had various kinds of experience. Especially journalists. The newsmen tended to get around. Obviously, in Japan they were subject to censorship. The extent to which they knew things and were able to communicate them back to their home offices was not too good. It isn't as if there were well informed newsmen of the type you have today. There were some. But mostly there was lots of information dealing with little issues or scandals involving individuals. But when it came to knowing the real "inside" of what the Emperor, the Japanese military and particularly the Army, or the people who "really mattered" were thinking, there was very little way of knowing.

Q: How about our military attachés? Did they have any particular entree?

GREEN: The attachés did have some entree to the military, to the Japanese Navy, but very little to the Japanese Army. After all, the Navy had had more foreign connections than the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army, though, was politically more powerful than the Japanese Navy, and really ran the whole "show."

Q: At this point Japan was more or less under a military dictatorship, or a military oligarchy, or what have you.

GREEN: Yes. The Army was "calling the tune," getting ever more deeply involved in Manchuria and then in China. It made heavy demands, both in terms of finances and personnel. What is hard to say is the extent to which the Emperor would prevail if he were to take a strong stand against what the Army wanted. Or would the Army simply find some way of "hushing him up." One never knew. I think that Grew was making his "pitch" very much to the Imperial Household and the Emperor.
Q: How did this take place?

GREEN: Well, really, it took place through intermediaries: people like Marquis Kido, Count Kalyana, and Baron Maeda. They all had connections with the Imperial Family. He invited the brothers of the Emperor to the Embassy for dinner parties and things like that. Obviously, the Emperor knew a lot about Ambassador Grew. We went through the formal "bows" at the Imperial Palace once a year—or twice a year, in his case. But, by and large, the Emperor was "out there somewhere." Ambassador Grew had these intermediaries through their insights into how the Emperor felt. On the whole, he felt that the Emperor could exercise a beneficial and stabilizing influence in a country that otherwise seemed to be plunging rather relentlessly toward war, thanks to the powerful position of the military, especially the top generals.

Q: What was the feeling in the Embassy at the time about the Japanese invasion of China? Where was it going, what did it mean, and how would it play out?

GREEN: Well, the Embassy was involved in all kinds of protests that came out of the situation in China, like the sinking of the USS PANAY [a gunboat on Yangtze patrol which was sunk by Japanese bombers].

Q: When did that happen?

GREEN: That was in 1937, I think. These were incidents which occurred in which Japanese force resulted in the killing or injury of Americans or damage to their property or interests. Those were things that had to be taken up in Tokyo by Ambassador Grew.

I am not aware that Ambassador Grew had much first-hand knowledge of what was going on in China. Even if he did, I'm not sure that it would have changed his thinking. The fact that he was continually trying to "get through" and ingratiate and commend, which is the typical way a diplomat functions, was seen by some as being "soft" toward Japan. However, I think that when you read his diary, you realize that there is no "softness" there. He was just trying to use all of the diplomatic arts to keep peace.

During those last six months before the Pearl Harbor attack (I had left Japan in May), Grew was involved in a major effort through Prince Konoye to try to set up a meeting between Konoye and President Roosevelt in Alaska, in which the two leaders would get together and come to some agreements which would at least have staved off war. I think that Grew felt that President Roosevelt would welcome such a development, because Roosevelt was so anxious to keep supplies going to Europe and keep our Navy [in the Atlantic] to protect British merchant ships carrying supplies to beleaguered Britain. If the United States became involved in a war in the Pacific, it would have been quite a blow to our total capacity to help Britain in its beleaguered hours. So I think that Grew felt that Roosevelt would be sympathetic to some efforts [in this direction], and there was some evidence that Roosevelt was.
This brings up the whole question of Dr. Stanley Hornbeck and his extraordinary powers. I don't recall if I ever met him or not. However, we are talking about a man who was a presence we felt very strongly [in the Embassy] in Tokyo. He was the equivalent of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. His official title was Director of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department.

He was born in China of missionary parents, or perhaps his father was a businessman. Anyway, he was brought up in China. He was pro-Chinese in his viewpoint and very anti-Japanese. Ambassador Grew used to send copies of daily entries in his diaries to Hornbeck in the hope that Hornbeck would be able to see the issues in a more balanced way and realize what Grew was trying to do. But I think that Grew was dealing with a man [Hornbeck] whose views were rigidly set and who was very bitterly anti-Japanese, as anybody whose experience was in China would make him. The difficulty was that Ambassador Grew's communications with Washington were by cable. There were almost no telephone calls. It was all done by telegram. The telegrams went to Hornbeck before they went to Secretary Hull. Or, if they went to the White House, Hull would be asked to comment and would ask Hornbeck [for his views]. So Hornbeck's input became rather governing, with regard to Washington's reactions to [what Grew reported or recommended].

This became a very major issue just before Pearl Harbor. I had left Japan, and my successor, Bob Fearay, was deeply involved. He's written articles about this whole episode that deserve careful reading.

Q: What were your duties when you were private secretary to Ambassador Grew in the Embassy in Tokyo?

GREEN: My duties were largely of a social nature. I made the seating arrangements for luncheons and dinners. "Chief of Protocol" would be a better description of what I did. I had to take the inventory of the wine cellar of the Embassy. I had to handle the checkbooks and keep the Ambassador's local accounts. Not his investments, of course, since we are talking about his expenditures from day to day. I often played bridge with Mrs. Grew and golf with the Ambassador.

I had played football during my years at Yale--on the 150 pound team. I found myself playing football in Japan and was eventually elected to the "All-East Japan Football Team." I remember playing football on New Year's Day in both 1939 and 1940. In 1940 I had to change my clothes immediately from morning suit (after attending a palace reception) to football clothes in the Ambassador's stand-by limousine, with shades drawn, while I sped from the Imperial Palace to Korakuen Stadium, where we won handily against the All-West Japan Team from the Kansai, the Osaka-Kobe area.

Q: Did you have any particular feeling about the Embassy? Let's start with, say, Eugene Dooman. What was his relationship...
GREEN: Well, I think that Doorman had a profound influence on Ambassador Grew--probably disproportionately so, because of his knowledge of Japanese and his background in Japan. He shaped Grew's thinking to a large extent. There were others around Grew, like Ned Crocker, a First Secretary who was later to become my father-in-law; Stuart Grummon, the other First Secretary; and "Chip" Bohlen, Second Secretary, who had a lot of expertise regarding the Soviet Union and had come to Tokyo direct from Moscow. These were all able people who had a marked influence on Grew's thinking. However, I would quickly add that the Japanese whom I earlier mentioned had a lot of influence on him, as did some of the American newsmen, either stationed in the Tokyo area--the ones who spoke English and ran the "Japan Times," the Fleischers--people like that had influence on the Ambassador's thinking.

Then, of course, there were lots of distinguished visitors who came through Tokyo. The Ambassador would meet with them. So he had a wide exposure to other people's thinking on world problems, quite apart from the fact that he had a long background in diplomacy.

Q: How would you characterize the Embassy, either professionally or otherwise? This was the first glimpse you had of an Embassy family. How did Grew and Doorman run the place?

GREEN: By today's terms it was not a big Embassy, which meant that personal relationships were closer than is usual today, with Grew and Doorman heading up the Embassy family.

Q: You played football with Japanese. What was their attitude toward China and Korea?

GREEN: I had a feeling that the Westernized Japanese, mostly "Nisei" (second generation Japanese-American) who came back to Japan, stayed out of politics. They talked very little. For the most part people were pretty damned super-cautious about expressing their opinions and views, because there was the "Kempeitai," and other police and thought control organizations. People had to be careful. It wasn't as bad as we've seen in some of the dictatorships in modern times, but it was approaching that.

Q: Did you feel that when you traveled around Japan?

GREEN: Yes, I felt it. I can't say that I traveled very much around Japan. I wish that I had traveled more. I did take one long trip which took me through Korea, Manchukuo, and North and Eastern China. I was carrying messages and materials for our Embassy in Peking, as well as to our Consulates in Shanghai and Mukden, which is now Shenyang. I must say that, having taken that trip, I had a rather different view of Japan. You saw Japan from a different standpoint, and it was a critical one. Of course, things were almost chaotic in China, but clearly, the Japanese were invaders and ruthless occupiers of neighboring countries, that's all. There was no other way of looking at it. I might say that,
after taking that trip, I was more anti-Japanese than I had been. Frankly, I was rather "spoiling" to go to war with Japan.

Q: Was this a common attitude...

GREEN: No, I felt more strongly about these issues than did almost all my US contemporaries. If I could just read from a letter to my father, it will give you a little bit of what I felt. I didn't come across this letter until I was preparing for this interview.

Q: What was the date of this letter?

GREEN: The date of the letter is August 8, 1940. After deploiring widespread isolationism in the United States, including my father to some extent and certainly many of my classmates of Yale, I went on to write: "Isn't it strange that the usually impetuous youth, red-blooded, go-getting youth, the back bone of totalitarian parties abroad, in America are so defeatist, so lacking in the qualities which built our nation. We are over civilized"--these are my words--"Over-humored by the good fortune to which we have fallen heir. Where the youth of other lands are aggressive, we are retracting, and our doom, like that of the Greek and Roman civilizations, is sealed when we produce, in our declining years, men not willing to fight for what they have. American support for material aid to the Allies comes from older men, wiser men, like Nicholas Murray Butler [Chancellor of Columbia University at the time] or Henry Stimson [former Secretary of War and of State], and, please note, World War veterans, such as General Pershing. But from the youth, only isolated instances. I have read with delight the opinions of many of our university presidents, leading educators, novelists, and journalists and with equal disgust the opinions of the youth they instruct. I tell you, it is a dangerous condition that we are in, when a nation-wide appeal for enlistments brings in only 9,000 enlistees, of which only a fraction are able to meet the physical requirements. Conscription we must have and will have. It is the only way, maybe, that we can condition our cloistered, theorizing youth to realities." So, these were my thoughts.

Q: Fairly strongly expressed.

GREEN: I felt very strongly about it.

Q: It's hard to recapture how the "America First" and others felt. It's difficult...

GREEN: They divided our class at Yale very sharply. In 1939 we could see the war coming. We had already seen what Neville Chamberlain [British Prime Minister] had said and done and how the German occupation had affected Czechoslovakia. But we had the "America Firsters," as some of them were called, and Father Coughlin, and some of that group...

Q: Father Coughlin of Detroit, a Catholic priest.
GREEN: Yes. These were people that I just loathed. I was quite strongly pro-Roosevelt, because I could see that he was carefully and conscientiously girding and conditioning America to the realities of having to go to war.

Q: You say you saw Grew's diaries. Did he discuss in those diaries where Japan and America were moving during the time you were there? How did he feel about the situation?

GREEN: I believe he was projecting events over the long term, that he saw that there was enough in common between Japan and the United States--particularly the Japanese he knew. He could see that their way of thinking of the world was very much the same as his own and that of his friends back in the States. He felt that if we could only get rid of the damnable Japanese "war machine," things would improve. Meanwhile, and this is an important thing to remember, although most people forget it. The Japanese people were getting fed up with their long bloody war with China. They'd lost several million men--or perhaps hundreds of thousands would be a safer figure to use.

Q: It was not an easy war for them.

GREEN: No! Every family in Japan had been affected by war.

Q: And the Chinese fought a lot harder than they're given credit for.

GREEN: That's right. Oh, the casualty rates were terrible. The Japanese were really suffering and they were having to "pinch" all the time--"onion peel" as they say. So the anti-war sentiment in Japan was potentially powerful. Now Ambassador Grew realized this. I don't think that Dr. Stanley Hornbeck fully appreciated that, nor did most Americans. When you do realize that, then there's a certain realism to Grew's thought that for by keeping negotiations going, then the anti-war sentiment in Japan would continue to grow to the point where there would be a possible breakthrough between the leaderships of our two countries. In that way, there could be peace. So I don't think that Ambassador Grew was unrealistic about the possibility of peace. What I am saying is that I don't think that a successful secret meeting between [Japan Prime Minister] Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt was possible. They could have gotten together, but to have such a meeting in secret? No. It was unrealistic to think that the Japanese Army would even allow this to happen. They would certainly have "bolted" and taken over power.

Now [a rapprochement between Japan and the United States] might have been achieved in a certain way. Grew was trying to work toward that end. People like Bob Fearey and others believed that Grew's proposal [for a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt] was a fairly realistic one and might have worked. I don't entirely agree with that.

Q: Even if there had been a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting, the Japanese Army had shown that it was quite willing to go in and assassinate him.
GREEN: That's right. And you have to remember this, too. The senior Japanese Army officers had to think about the younger officers, the "hot heads," under them.

Q: They had just...

GREEN: These young officers were a pretty bloodthirsty lot. Once they had tasted blood and become accustomed to "ruling the roost," they would have become very difficult to control. Anything that looked like "appeasement," even if the top military people had condoned it, which is totally unlikely--but if they had, you still had the problem of the younger officers. And that came up in the February 26 incident, when some of the lower-ranking officers took over control of Tokyo, for a short time, revolting against their superiors.

Q: What year was that?

GREEN: 1936.

Q: Talking about various groups, we had our China specialists, who basically came out of missionary families. You had Eugene Dooman and others, who also came out of missionary families, too. However, they had two very different outlooks. While you were in Japan, was there ever any effort to get American Chinese and Japanese specialists to get together and talk?

GREEN: No, not that I was aware of. That's a good question, because I think that nowadays the first thing that we would do would be to try to get them together. Of course, we were handicapped by travel considerations before World War II, in view of the distances involved.

Q: It was very difficult.

GREEN: However, it is true that we would have benefited a great deal from the kinds of meetings we later had. We have had regular Chiefs of Mission meetings since World War II. We didn't have that kind of opportunity earlier.

Q: Because of considerations of money and so forth.

GREEN: However, I don't think that the "pro-Japanese crowd" [in the State Department prior to World War II]--the people with experience in Japan--could possibly have stood up to Stanley Hornbeck, who was too powerful for them.

Q: Well, this is a question which came up at a later date--and not too much later--in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, under Walter Robertson. That bureau, from time to time, has been "dominated" by one person.
GREEN: That's right. It has been, although I don't think that I "dominated" it when I was head of it.

Q: When you get someone who is almost an "ideologue" in there. Now, returning to your experience, because someone else can review how Grew operated during the time when you weren't with him. You left Tokyo in May, 1941. First of all, how did you return to the United States?

GREEN: I came back on one of the "President" liners--the "President Coolidge."

Q: What were you "after" at that point?

GREEN: I was coming back to take the Foreign Service exam. I went to a "cram school" for a month or so--didn't get anything out of it--and took the exam. I just barely "squeaked" through. Then came the war. I was going to be drafted. So I saw an opportunity to enlist in the Navy, in the Japanese language school, and I took it. So that's how I moved from Tokyo into the Navy, within eight months.

Q: Where did you go to the language school?

GREEN: At that time [1942] the school was located in Berkeley, California. This was a "crash" course which had been launched, I'd say, at some point in 1941. I got into the second group that went through the course. The groups at that time were rather small. The course lasted for about a year, during which you were supposed to learn Japanese, I wouldn't say that they turned out people who were proficient in Japanese, although we had some very bright students. Our Navy made a mistake in not accepting Japanese-Americans as language officers since most had some knowledge of the language and some were bilingual. This all reflects the bad prejudices against all Japanese, whatever their status and however long Japanese descendants had lived in the US.

What was worse for us at Boulder was the order by President Roosevelt (and urged by General DeWitt) that all Japanese-Americans had to be relocated 200 miles East from our Pacific coast. This included our Japanese-American teachers, requiring us to move the whole language school to the University of Colorado in Boulder. That's where I completed my year of training.

Q: We know by experience today that one year isn't going to do a great deal...

GREEN: No. No. It doesn't help much. You are immediately thrown into the fray. Of our class of about 30 students 27 went into Combat Intelligence with a short period of training in Hawaii before going out to the Pacific Islands. Three of us were sent to Washington to serve in ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence. That's where I was located all during the war, except for the last year of the war, when I moved into "Communications Intelligence." This office is still on Nebraska Avenue, NW
For me it was really a fascinating period. I did make one trip, for several months, to the CBI theater.

Q: That's the "China-Burma-India" theater.

GREEN: That's right. But basically I was always here in Washington. I was not interpreting. I was translating--lots and lots of documents, some of them fascinating. I was once given documents we took out of the I-1 submarine sunk off Guadalcanal. This was a bunch of oil-soaked documents flown to Washington, to the Naval laboratories in Anacostia, MD. I worked for several days and translated this stuff. It was absolutely fascinating. The Chief Engineer of the I-1 submarine kept careful records of all of the ships that were being built in Japan for the submarine fleet, both the coastal and seagoing types. All the names were listed down one side of the document followed by the specifications of each ship, both those that were afloat and those that were being built--and where they were being built: Ominato, Jure, Yokosuka, and Sasebo.

So on this great, pullout sheet, with a minimum amount of effort, I was able to get all of the details of the Japanese submarine fleet. We put out two "Fleet Bulletins" on the basis of that. That's one thing that I was able to accomplish. It was very typical of my whole career. I was lucky, just lucky.

Another accomplishment was in communications intelligence, when I got the idea that the "call signals" new ships were using related to their standardize sizes and uses and to where the Japanese were building them. Therefore, we were able to nail down, merely from call signs, roughly what kinds of ships they were.

Q: You remember the way that the US Navy used to name ships. Battleships were named after states, aircraft carriers after famous battles, and so forth.

GREEN: The call signs were just four letter signals. We would find out, for example, that there were 200 barrels of tung oil loaded at Tientsin aboard "Shiminoskei-7 Maru" with call signal JABC. We had never heard of the "Shiminoskei-7 Maru," but we could immediately deduce from its call sign the size of the ship and whether it was an oiler or freighter. Of course, that was immediately passed on to our air and naval commands.

Q: After looking at these documents, what was your impression of how the Japanese ran their fleet?

GREEN: One reaction was that their security was terrible. Why they ever allowed their soldiers to carry diaries, with gun positions sketched out in them. Now, I wasn't dealing with that kind of intelligence, but our combat intelligence people were. The second thing was that they had no typewriters of the kind we have. Everything had to be done by longhand and then by mimeograph machine. Well, now, there was a tremendous difference between the way we were doing things and the way the Japanese were doing
things. Most insecure of all, the Japanese relied too much on code books which we had already seized.

**Q:** *We are now moving toward the end of World War II. What rank did you have [in the Navy] at the end of the war?*

**GREEN:** I was a full lieutenant.

**Q:** *When did you leave the service?*

**GREEN:** After "V-J Day" in August, 1945, I immediately tried to get into the State Department. The Navy was reluctant to release anybody in intelligence who knew the Japanese language, because they wanted these people for occupation duties and things like that. So it wasn't easy getting out. Meanwhile, I took my Foreign Service oral exam, and the Department accepted me, so I was in the State Department. However, I was still in Navy uniform. My first job in the State Department was to get other naval officers, who were Foreign Service Officers, back into the State Department. I can tell you, to go up to a salt-encrusted Navy captain to try to persuade him to release some of his men back to the State Department wasn't easy. That was my first job.

The files and records in the State Department were in a state of utter chaos. My first job was working under Findley Burns, who was sort of in charge of this whole process of getting people back into the Foreign Service. We had some extraordinary experiences which I won't go into. They're anecdotal.

**Q:** *I don't mind going into them.*

**GREEN:** Well, one person whom we got back was Llewellyn Williams who, we thought, was a Foreign Service Officer. He had the same name as a Foreign Service Officer, but the man we got back--all the way from across the Pacific Ocean--was a young nuclear scientist. When we got him back to Washington, he said, "Well, what am I supposed to do?" We showed him his record, and he said, "I'm not that man." So we took the matter up with the head of personnel, who decided, "Well, we're going to have to get into the nuclear business, so let's give him a job" in this new-found field of nuclear diplomacy. He was one of the first people involved in this field, simply because of our mistake.

Anyway, I was only in that job for a short while before I was sent to the Legation in Wellington [New Zealand]. Before being commissioned an FSO and sent to Wellington, I had a month's training as an FSR in consular work in the old Soviet Embassy building on Connecticut Avenue.

**Q:** *What was the training like at that time?*

**GREEN:** The training was confined to learning about visas, immigration laws, and consular problems. It was terribly dull. I can't say that I ever mastered it or ever had much
use for it. For curious reasons my career has been almost totally focused in the political and especially the politico-military side. That was the "growth industry" at the time.

Q: Shall we move on chronologically or...

GREEN: Let's keep on the "Japan track."

Q: All right. We'll come back at a later date to review your time in Wellington, New Zealand, and Stockholm. So what was the next...

GREEN: The next "tranche" of my Japan career was when, in 1947, after less than two years as Third and then Second Secretary of Legation in Wellington, New Zealand, I was assigned to the Japan desk in the State Department. I served there from 1947 to 1950 as a Japan desk officer, working very closely with Bob Fearey, who was my successor as Ambassador Grew's private secretary. He had not served in the military because of a detached retina. He probably knew more about current US-Japan relations than anybody in the State Department at that point, because he worked [on Japanese affairs] right on through World War II. Bob and I were very close friends in those years and have been ever since.

We worked under John Allison, who was the "chief" of NA (Northeast Asian Affairs). The deputy "chief" changed and was replaced by Max Bishop. The head of the "bureau"--FE [Far Eastern Affairs]--was W. Walton Butterworth. Walt Butterworth "took a shine" to me, and I found myself in his office a great deal. This created some problems with John Allison, who was diplomatic enough to know how to handle that one. Anyway, it was largely through Walt Butterworth that I was assigned as George Kennan's only traveling companion to Japan in February, 1948.

This trip turned out to be extremely important. What had happened was that when the occupation of Japan was undertaken in 1945, it was our expectation that it would only go on for two or three years, and then there would be a peace treaty. Meanwhile, to jump ahead a little, John Foster Dulles had been "brought aboard" in 1950 to try to negotiate the peace treaty with Japan. Until there was a peace treaty, Japan would be under Allied occupation. Since it appeared that the occupation period was going to be extended much longer than had earlier been anticipated, it was strongly felt in the Office of Policy Planning in the State Department, especially by George Kennan, but also by John Davies, Walt Butterworth and Secretary of State George Marshall, that occupations can go sour. It was felt that, in the case of Japan, we had to be very careful.

So George Kennan was sent out to Japan in February 1948 by Secretary of State Marshall to discuss with General MacArthur how the emphasis in the occupation of Japan could be shifted from "reform" to "economic recovery." The idea was to normalize things as far and fast as one could to stave off growing, nationalistic resentment against the occupation.
At that time we had various mechanisms for dealing with Japan and with the occupation. In Washington there was the Far Eastern Commission, on which all of the countries that had been enemies of Japan had their representatives. We met in the old Japanese Embassy here in Washington about once every two or three weeks. I used to go to those meetings. Another international mechanism was the Allied Council in Japan, on which representatives of the Great Powers sat. It met periodically and discussed the broader issues. However, neither of those bodies carried any weight with MacArthur. MacArthur "ran the show" the way he wanted to, and to heck with all these other people. He had a little bit of the same attitude toward the White House. He felt that Japan was his exclusive domain. Of course, we came to learn a lot about that in Korea later on.

Now, when George Kennan was sent out to Japan to talk to MacArthur about changing the emphasis of the occupation, he was treated, on his arrival in Japan, just as though he was a visitor from a not too friendly power. He was almost seen as a "spy" from the State Department. MacArthur held him at arm's length. Of course, he couldn't ignore Kennan. George Kennan had his orders, but MacArthur kept him at arm's length and wouldn't meet with him, except socially--for example at a dinner party.

It was interesting to see how Kennan operated. Kennan got through to MacArthur two ways. The State Department already had a representative in Japan in SCAP [Supreme Commander, Allied Powers] headquarters, William Sebald. Bill Sebald was the head of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP. There were 14 Sections in SCAP--including Sebald's Diplomatic Section answerable to Major General Fox who, in turn, was deputy to General Almond, a four-star general, who was chief of staff of SCAP. So the State Department's representative, Bill Sebald was "way down the line."

George Kennan eventually got through to MacArthur by casually observing to Major General Willoughby, head of SCAP Intelligence, that MacArthur should not be too concerned about the views of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, whose work was now largely complete. MacArthur was in the best position to judge what now needed to be done in Japan, and Kennan could be of help to MacArthur in getting MacArthur's views across in Washington.

Through Willoughby and through my intervention with General Babcock (an old friend from our service together in the Embassy before the war) it was arranged that Kennan would discuss the origins and current nature of Soviet conduct in the SCAP HQ briefing room where some 100 top brass were present.

I found Kennan's presentation--and I suspect most others attending would agree--absolutely brilliant. It was as though we were at one with eternity like that old advertisement of the Rosicrucian Society, where an eye is seen, piercing into eternity. Of course, all the clouds rolled in afterwards, but there was a transcending moment of truth.

Now, MacArthur recognized brains when he soon heard about the speech. After that, all doors were open to Kennan. In fact, MacArthur provided us with a railroad carriage of
our own to go wherever we wanted to go. I'll come back to what we wanted to talk about, but I just want to say that we did go down to Kyoto, where I was left for a week to write our report at the Miysho Hotel. Meanwhile, Kennan went on to Korea and the Philippines and then came back to Japan, where we rejoined and returned to Washington. I did some of the writing of the report.

To return to the fundamentals of what Kennan was saying to MacArthur. He said that we have to move as fast and as possible toward a more normal type of relationship with Japan and toward putting Japan much more on its feet and taking care of itself. We must be aware that if we move too slowly, nationalism will overtake us, and heaven knows what will happen. This was always presented in terms suggesting that MacArthur knew this better than he did. Kennan never lectured MacArthur. The kinds of things he wanted to end as quickly as possible—and it was carefully targeted—included the reparations and decartelization programs. He called for an end to the "purges" immediately or as soon as possible. He said that the Japanese should have some kind of economic representation abroad. (This last point I was to take on as my own responsibility and work very hard on it.) Improvements should be made in communications channels. Kennan placed the greatest emphasis on setting up better internal security in Japan. He was appalled to see how the Police Force was all divided up. The Japanese had inadequate means to maintain law and order in the country on a national scale. He made some recommendations on how to strengthen a democratic Police Force and establish a Japanese Coast Guard that could protect Japan against smuggling, illegal entries, and things like that. There was quite a long list of things that had to be done. All I can say is that our report covered all of these points. So we returned to Washington.

Meanwhile, Kennan suffered from a terrible case of ulcers. Walt Butterworth, with my help, really had to put this report through the National Security Council in Washington, which we did.

Let me go back to give you an illustration of one of the things that happened, while it is still clear in my mind. While I was in Kyoto, writing up the report, I was asked by some Navy friends to come down and see the Osaka docks. They thought I would be shocked by what I saw. And there--stacked all down the docks--was dismantled machinery from Japanese industries. The machinery was being greased, crated, and shipped--at great expense and effort--to North China, as part of a reparations program to China. Meanwhile, North China was being overrun by the communists. The whole thing was ridiculous. The American taxpayer was paying for taking machinery out of Japan, which we were meantime supporting, and taking it to China, which was falling into the hands of the communists.

It will not surprise you that Kennan not only spoke extremely effectively but wrote even more effectively. The telegrams which Kennan sent back to Washington were really bristling.
Q: Well, here were MacArthur and Willoughby, who was his "guard dog," you might say. Here were two men with tremendous egos, particularly MacArthur. Here came Kennan—bright, and all that, but was he criticizing MacArthur's handling of the situation?

GREEN: No. What he was saying was that we want MacArthur to remain in charge, but we wanted to anticipate and head off whatever kinds of forces that might undermine his authority and effectiveness. I think that this appealed to MacArthur, because MacArthur was an intelligent man. Now, where we were running up against problems was with the architects of these policies in SCAP headquarters, for example, the Political Section, which was headed by General Whitney...

Q: Courtney Whitney?

GREEN: Yes, Courtney Whitney. His principal deputy was Colonel Kades. These people had been the architects of the "purge program," for example. They hated to see it dismantled and resisted our efforts to end the purge, even though it was the expressed will of our National Security Council.

Q: Could you explain about the "purge"?

GREEN: The purge involved removing from public office or from top positions of influence, in business or in government, those who were considered to be responsible, in any major way, for the war effort. This meant, basically, anyone in a prominent position was "purged." Kennan was opposed to this way of tarring everybody with the same brush, without any kind of examination of the individual's record. By the way, he had also been opposed to "war crimes trials," but they were all over in Japan by the time he got there.

Anyway, I would like to finish the story of the "purge," because we had difficulty ending it. Meanwhile, Walt Butterworth had been replaced by Dean Rusk in 1949 as Assistant Secretary for Far East Affairs. So after two months of frustrated efforts by Washington to end the purge, Rusk asked me to draft a personal message for Marshall to MacArthur. I thought my draft was "pretty hot stuff," but Rusk said, "Do you think that this will turn the trick, Marshall?" I said, "No, I don't think so, Mr. Secretary, but this is putting it on the record." He said, "The object is not to put it on the record. The object is to stop this damned thing." He added, "I suggest you go back and rewrite this 10-page telegram and make it no longer than a page and a half. Make the point that MacArthur thought originally that the purge should end by this time and that we'd been reluctant as had other governments in the Far Eastern Commission. However, now we've come to see the wisdom of his earlier position, he should go ahead and do it."

So I wrote the telegram accordingly. I gulped pretty hard because I come from New England, where we have strong consciences. I knew that MacArthur had never said this, but we attributed it to him. That did the trick. The purge was ended 48 hours later. I reminded Dean Rusk about this, many years later. He said, "Marshall, I hope you don't go around telling people that story. It casts me in such a cynical light." I said, "Not at all, Mr.
Secretary. It casts you in the light of somebody who knows how to get things done through diplomacy."

Q: What was your impression of Kennan? You traveled with him. He was a complex personality. He was my Ambassador in Yugoslavia. I regarded him as a great intellectual, but I was not impressed with him as an Ambassador. How did he strike you?

GREEN: I've always admired his eloquence and his ability to write and speak. His mission to Japan was a great challenge to him. He rose to it, and that's why he succeeded. Now, you know in his "Memoirs," he recalls all this. He says that he thinks that that trip to Japan was probably the most important thing that he did, after the Marshall Plan. Then he went on to say, "Perhaps it was even more important than the Marshall Plan, in the long run." So he attached great importance to this, even in retrospect.

It was marvelous to see how he operated. I mentioned how he "co-opted" people on MacArthur's staff who paved his way to MacArthur. But there was also the way that he drafted reports and telegrams. It was something to behold. He would sit down and start dictating. One of my jobs was to "look intelligent." He would speak to me, while Dorothy Hessman, his secretary, took it all down as a telegram. So he was basically dictating a telegram to Washington while speaking to me. The result was that the telegram had a kind of conversational flow that made it far more effective. When he was through, he didn't have to change a word of it. Articulation is something I admire in any diplomat.

Q: What were you getting? How was the occupation? Did you think that it was close to "going sour?"

GREEN: No, I don't think so. I don't think that it had gone that far. Some of the reforms had been very successful--the land reform, particularly. Wolf Ladejinsky had been largely responsible for that along with Bob Fearer. There were other things that they had done that were successful, and MacArthur himself did very well in his handling of the Emperor and the Japanese people, and the respect that he showed them. This was really most commendable. On the other hand, I do think that Kennan's concerns were valid. We simply had to move, "or else." We had to move in a timely way. Then you don't have to act out of weakness, in response to demonstrations or protests.

Q: Did you have anything to do with John Foster Dulles at that time?

GREEN: Not on this trip. Of course, John Foster Dulles "came aboard" on the Japanese problem in 1950. It was in the course of that year and the beginning of the next year that he managed to put together the Japanese peace treaty. He handled this issue with great effectiveness. I was, perhaps, the first person to brief him when he came to the State Department. They gave him an office near the Secretary of State's office on the fifth floor of what was called, at that time, the "New State Department Building."
First of all, we put together briefing papers for him with the help of Bob Fearey and INR (State's intelligence division). I had done the paper on the political situation in Japan and was briefing him on that particular aspect. He was sitting there, in a deep chair--kind of a sofa-like chair--his arms clasped in front of him. His head was nodding. He looked to me as if he was going to sleep. Finally, his breathing got so heavy that I thought that he was asleep. I just tiptoed out of the room. That was my first connection with John Foster Dulles. [Laughter] I didn't have much to do with him because shortly thereafter I went to Sweden. That was the period when most of the work was done on the peace treaty with Japan, with Bob Fearey being Dulles' principal assistant on the critically important and successful project.

Q: What about Japan's role in the Far East? What kind of position did we see for Japan, with the Cold War on?

GREEN: That's a very good question. Actually, I've seen very little written about it. My recollection was that George Kennan favored a "neutral" solution for Japan. Of course, General MacArthur did, too. You'll remember that MacArthur talked about Japan being the Switzerland of the Far East. There was a kind of visionary and unreal "latching on" to this idea of neutrality as the solution to Japan's future, with the United States and other countries serving as guarantors of Japan's neutrality. It was felt that that was the way we should proceed. Of course, that would have fitted in closely with the mood of Japan at the time. Meanwhile, under its constitution, Japan had been denied having armed forces. Of course, much changed with the Korean War. Even so, my own feeling was that this was not a solution for Japan. If you think about the Far East, you have the four great powers of the world there--the United States, China, and Russia, with Japan potentially as one of them. With such power converging around Korea, the idea that anyone was going to respect Japan's neutrality seemed crazy.

The Korean War just rubbed all of that out. If there hadn't been a war in Korea, I don't know what would have happened. Nobody ever knows about things like that.

Q: Were you still on the Japanese desk on June 25, 1950?

GREEN: Yes, I was.

Q: How did the Korean War hit you? Was it a surprise to you?

GREEN: Oh, yes. It was a surprise. I was struck by how little we knew about Korea. In our Office of Northeast Asian Affairs we had one officer working on Korea who knew little about it. The fact of the matter is that, during World War II, when I was in Navy intelligence, nobody in my intelligence circles was concerned with or about Korea. The same was true before that, when I was in Japan with Ambassador Grew. The ignorance about Korea! Even to this day there is still the supposition that the Chinese Communists first came into the Korean War when MacArthur appeared to be about to cross the Yalu
River. The Chinese were across the Yalu River a long time before that. The ignorance about Korea continues to this very day.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, why don't we cut it off at this point? This makes a good point to break off. I thought that we might then take up the period from 1956 to 1960, when you came back to deal with Japanese affairs.

GREEN: Yes, that was a very important period.

Q: I think that you'll be fresher at that point. So we'll do that.

***

Q: Today is March 17, St. Patrick's Day, 1995. This is an interview with Ambassador Marshall Green. Our subject today will concern Southeast Asia and, particularly, Cambodia. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Mr. Ambassador, I'm going to turn it over to you to talk about whatever you'd like to say.

GREEN: Cambodia has not been a central part of my career, which has concentrated on Northeast Asia--China, Japan, and Korea--and also the Pacific Islands and Indonesia. However, as far as Indochina is concerned, I was drawn into events during three assignments: 1) as Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East (1956-60); as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East (1963-65); 3) as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific (1969-73). Most of my comments will relate to (3) above, because of major differences between the White House and State Department over US Cambodian policy, including President Nixon's decision to commit US ground forces in the Cambodian incursion of 1970. I believe that my account of that period contains information that has not appeared in any publications to date.

The first section, which is rather short, relates to two trips which I took to Cambodia when I was Regional Planning Adviser (in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs).

Q: What period was this?

GREEN: I held that position from 1956 to 1960.

Q: This was during the Eisenhower presidency.

GREEN: Yes, that's right. I was working for Walter Robertson (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), whose job was then taken over in 1959 by his deputy, Jeff Parsons. I made two trips to Cambodia during this period. In 1956 my wife and I took a trip through the whole area just after I was named Walter Robertson's Regional Planning Advisor. At that time Cambodia was pretty isolated, had bad relations with (the Republic of) Vietnam and Thailand, on two of its borders. It had no relations with Laos, which is a rather wild country and hard to understand. Cambodia had been a French colony (Protectorate) and the officials we met there spoke French. When we visited Cambodia in
1956, we stayed with Mac Godley who later became Ambassador to Laos after being Ambassador to the (former Belgian) Congo. The Ambassador to Cambodia at this time was Rob McClintock.

I'll mention a few things about Rob McClintock, because they tell you something of the problem we had with Cambodia. He was one of the brightest people in the Foreign Service, but he couldn't help parading his superior knowledge and intellect before others. In the case of Cambodia, this was a very serious drawback, because there was only one man in Cambodia who was supposed to excite any kind of veneration and respect—or to be in the headlines. That was Prince Sihanouk. As the Prime Minister and the Prince, he was completely in charge of the country. The whole history of Cambodia during the last half century has revolved around Prince Sihanouk.

During this first visit I heard that Rob McClintock conducted business in a way that grated on the nerves of many Cambodians, especially Sihanouk, whom he addressed without the deference which Sihanouk expected and which was his due. Rather, McClintock had a habit of carrying a field marshal's baton with him, which he used at the staff meeting I attended to emphasize his points.

Q: Oh, my God, no!

GREEN: We had problems with Sihanouk, on and off, all during the time that I was Regional Planning Advisor (in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs). As Regional Planning Advisor, my principal aim was to develop some kind of constructive relationships between all of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which we had strong commitments: military, economic development, or exchange student support. However, all of these countries were at each other's throats. So I spent four years trying to bring about a certain degree of reconciliation.

As I think I've told you before, Stu, Washington at that time could best be described in its relationships with East Asian countries as being the hub of a wheel, with spokes going out to all of these different capitals: to Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and so forth. But there were no relationships between the ends of those spokes: between Tokyo and Seoul, between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, between Phnom Penh and Saigon, between Phnom Penh and Bangkok, and so forth. And, of course, Burma had no relations with anybody.

On my second trip to Cambodia in 1959, as assistant to J. Graham (Jeff) Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, I recall that we first visited Burma and then Bangkok. I left my wife there while Jeff and I flew up to Vientiane, Laos. From there we flew to the ancient Laotian capital, Luang Prabang, which is really out of this world. That's where the Prince Heritier (Crown Prince), who was really the King or the ruler of Laos, lived. But he had no control over eastern Laos, which was under Hanoi's control or over northernmost Laos which was under Chinese control.
But my point about the visit to Laos was that Laos was so distant in time. Jeff and I had an audience with the Prince Heritier--all three of us on separate divans. At a command from the Prince Heritier three servants came charging into the room and prostrated themselves on the floor, sliding the last five feet or so, holding up cigarette boxes. We each took out a cigarette. Then the Prince clapped his hands and three more servants came running in, holding up lighted brackets to light our cigarettes. This is the kind of service you can't get in Washington. (Laughter.)

As we left the palace, we were serenaded by what passed for a military band. It looked like something out of "Babar and the Elephants." If there had been monkeys and elephants playing instruments, I wouldn't have been the least bit surprised.

Then we flew down to Saigon (where Lisa rejoined us) with the idea of our going on to Cambodia the next day. In Saigon we learned from Ambassador Trimble in Phnom Penh that Parsons would be seen, not by Sihanouk, who was in Paris, but by Son Sann, who was the Acting Prime Minister. This shows you how influential we were in East Asia at that time.

Trimble mentioned that all the diplomatic corps was invited, including the Chinese Ambassador. This would have been Peking's Ambassador. Standing State Department instructions in those days prevented any American official from attending any party where the Chinese Ambassador was a fellow guest. So we immediately wired back to Bill Trimble asking whether the Chinese Ambassador was actually attending. At that point a tropical storm knocked out all communications and we had no way of getting our message through to Phnom Penh, not even through French rubber plantation owners, which was another possible channel of communications. However, all communications were out.

Jeff thought this over and decided to send me alone the next day to do the honors on his behalf.

So the next morning I set off on a special executive plane provided us by CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific). As we approached the Phnom Penh airport, to my horror, I could see what seemed like the whole cabinet and diplomatic corps lined up near the point of landing, plus a military guard of honor. A "march past" was obviously scheduled with the troops all dressed up with their pennants and other regalia.

When we landed, and I stumbled out of the plane, there was the Cambodian Chief of Protocol. He asked, "Où est M. Parsons?" (Where is Mr. Parsons?) I had to explain Mr. Parsons had a "crise d'estomac" (stomach ache) and could not travel on the plane "car il manque un w.c." (as it lacked a toilet). The Cambodian officials were crestfallen. They dismissed the band and all of the rest of the welcoming party. I went to the Embassy car waiting for me, and there was Ambassador Trimble. He was absolutely ashen-faced. He said, "Didn't you get my telegram?" I said, "No, what telegram?" He said, "I wired that the Chinese Ambassador wouldn't dream of going to any party where an American
official was going to be the guest of honor." I said, "Well, we never got it." He said, "What are we going to do? We've got to go ahead with this big party." I said, "Let's send the plane back." It wasn't very far--the round trip would take about two hours. The next thing we knew, two or three hours later, Jeff Parsons arrived with my wife, with Jeff lamely explaining to the Chief of Protocol that he had been miraculously cured.

There was a big ceremony out at the airport. Jeff went through all of the honors denied me, while the Cambodians acted as if nothing was amiss. That evening we attended a lavish dinner at the palace seated at the longest table and the finest nappery I had ever seen, all under a row of massive chandeliers. Jeff Parsons had the seat of honor, next to the Acting Prime Minister. Everyone was served course after course of exotic foods--all, that is, except Jeff. All he was given was a bowl of boiled rice, out of thoughtful consideration for his indisposition. That's the way the Cambodians got back at him (Laughter), and it gives you a sampling of how we deal with Cambodia and how Cambodians deal with us.

Q: Let me ask you. In 1956, where did Cambodia rank in Pacific or East Asian affairs?

GREEN: I would say that it ranked rather low until we became more involved in the wars in Indochina after 1963. We were increasingly concerned over how North Vietnam was violating Cambodia's neutrality, largely in the form of its Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam which led through Cambodia.

Q: But couldn't we prevail on those who had signed the Geneva Accords of 1954 to reaffirm support for Cambodia's neutrality?

GREEN: Nothing effective could be done through diplomatic channels because of Hanoi's obduracy. Since both Moscow and Peking were competing for influence with Hanoi, they refused to take issue with Hanoi's position in this matter.

Q: And I assume Cambodia lacked the military power to keep the North Vietnamese out.

GREEN: Absolutely, and that's why Sihanouk felt so strongly that Cambodia's only hope for survival as a nation lay in trying to gain as much international support as possible for Cambodia's neutral status. With that I agreed, much as I disliked Sihanouk personally with his vanities, prickliness, squeaky voice, and long periodic absences from Cambodia to take "the cure" on the French Riviera. He was nevertheless revered by many Cambodians as "the soul" of his country.

***

Q: This is Tape 2, Side A, of an interview with Ambassador Marshall Green begun on March 2, 1995, we're still dealing with his connection with Japan. You were talking about your service in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 1956-1960, during which time
you worked closely with Assistant Secretary Walter H. Robertson. Did Robertson agree with the way Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin thought about the Far East?

GREEN: No, his views were not as antique as that. However, he was a "dyed in the wool" Republican. He was a man who believed very strongly in the "right wing cause" as far as Asia is concerned, but his views were different from, and opposed to, those of Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin. Moreover, he was a very strong upholder of the Foreign Service. It is interesting to note that all 14 of our Chiefs of Mission in East Asia and the Pacific at that time were Foreign Service Officers--a record that probably has never been matched anywhere and at any time in history.

Now, I got along very well with Assistant Secretary Robertson. For one thing, one of my first jobs was running the United Fund Campaign for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, which came out far ahead of its quota. To Assistant Secretary Robertson that was very pleasing and cast me in a favorable light. I also wrote a lot of his speeches. He liked the way that I wrote, and his speeches got good reactions on Capitol Hill [Congress]. In the speeches, of course, I always gave proper play to his known prejudices regarding...

Q: Was it a problem to write speeches for him? You were a professional Foreign Service Officer, close to your political masters, but at the same time...

GREEN: I knew what his strong views and prejudices were. I had to play them up in his speeches, because they were his speeches, after all. I would present the material as I knew that he would present it. It was more in discussions of particular issues, where I was present, that I would sometimes mildly take exception to what he was saying. It was always mild because, if it went too far, that would be the end of my close association with him.

The one time I can recall when he "blew up" was when I took issue with him over something which Syngman Rhee [President of the Republic of Korea] had done regarding the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels. We had tremendous responsibilities in both Korea and Japan. We were doing everything possible to try to bring them together. With Syngman Rhee around, there was no chance of doing that. I felt that this was a primary issue, to which Robertson was giving insufficient attention.

When Robertson left in 1959, Jeff Parsons succeeded him. He was an old like-minded friend and career colleague.

Q: Robertson was focused on Korea and China. We are talking about Japan at that time [1956-1960]. What were his interests and concerns with Japan?

GREEN: I had no difficulties in writing for him or talking with him about Japan. He recognized the primacy of Japan. Our overall relationships with any country in that part of the world had to be based on a healthy US-Japan relationship. That was something of a concession for a man like Robertson, who put so much emphasis on China.
The Japanese Broadcasting Company recently wanted to interview me about the Security Treaty of 1960 between Japan and the United States. I said that I did not have very clear recollections about that. They replied, "On the contrary. We see you as being a principal architect of that treaty." I said, "What?" They said, "Yes, let us show you the documents." Then they showed me documents which they had arranged to have declassified [under the Freedom of Information Act] from our archives. These showed that while working for Robertson I was the one who originated the proposal for the Security Treaty of 1960 between the United States and Japan. It took the form of a 17 page memorandum dated December 28, 1956 [to which the Japan Broadcasting Company referred] addressed to Douglas MacArthur [nephew of Gen. MacArthur], who at that time was Counselor of State Department, and to Bill Sebald, who was then Robertson's deputy in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. What I wrote was something of a reflection of what I had gone through before with George Kennan [in 1948 when he was Director of Policy Planning and with whom I visited Japan]. I pointed out that the Japanese considered our sizable military presence in Japan as a carryover from the occupation period and as a form of foreign control. Furthermore, this presence had the danger of involving Japan in war because we had extensive military bases in Japan which were seen by many Japanese as a kind of a magnet which might draw even nuclear war to Japan. Therefore, our political position in Japan was quite perilous, unless we moved very rapidly to put these bases on a mutually beneficial basis. In other words, we couldn't be "dictating" to Japan. We had to be "consulting" with Japan. I urged that we replace the Security Treaty of 1951 between the US and Japan with a truly mutual security treaty, which eventually became the Security Treaty of 1960 between the US and Japan which is still in force today. Judging from what's happened to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], I'd say that it's even more durable than NATO.

This long paper made specific recommendations as to how we should go about negotiating a mutual security treaty with the Japanese and what in general might be the terms of such a treaty. All I can say is that it received the strong endorsement of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. Later on, actual machinery was established in Japan to negotiate the treaty between our Ambassador in Japan and CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific, with his headquarters in Honolulu], on the American side, and the Foreign Minister of Japan and the head of their Self-Defense Forces, on the Japanese side. They had all sorts of people down the line, working on this negotiation and finally came up with a very good security treaty.

This was the principal issue regarding Japan during my years from 1956 to 1960 [as Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs].

Q: Let me focus on what is probably the most difficult, adversarial issue. It was not between Japan and the United States but between the Department of State and the Pentagon--over Okinawa, over bases [in Japan], and all that.
GREEN: Well, I would say, Stu, that ever since the days of General Eisenhower, when he organized the National War College, there have been good working relations between State and Defense. The State Department and the military were prone to sneer at each other--with references made to "the military mind," and "to cookie pushers" and that kind of thing. After a while, you didn't hear that so much. We had improving personal relationships and mutual interests and we expressed ourselves accordingly.

I think that this was very well reflected when I got back from Sweden where I had been for nearly five years [1950-1955]. It was rather refreshing to find that the military and the State Department were working in more constructive terms, particularly in the case of Japan. The same thing might have been true in terms of Europe as well.

We had an interesting time negotiating the Security Treaty of 1960. Douglas MacArthur had meanwhile ceased to be Counselor of the State Department and had become Ambassador to Japan. He came back to Washington in 1959 to try to get the Joint Chiefs of Staff completely "aboard" on the new Security Treaty. He knew that they were generally supportive but we still had the final steps of the negotiations to complete. Ambassador MacArthur called a meeting in the Secretary of State's conference room, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on one side of the table. On the State Department's side of the table were Jeff Parsons, who had meanwhile taken over as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from Walter Robertson; Ambassador MacArthur; myself; and one or two others. MacArthur chaired the meeting.

I'll never forget the meeting, because a rather amusing situation arose. Doug MacArthur, in his didactic way, was telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the essence of diplomacy and how to negotiate a treaty. He said, "Gentlemen, it's absolutely essential, when we sit down with the Japanese, that we know exactly what we want to get out of the Japanese. We want to have our whole position worked out and ready. Then we can do a real "snow job" on them." Admiral Arleigh Burke, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "You mean, Doug, the way you're doing on us right now?" [Laughter] Well, I was the only one on the State Department side of the table who laughed, though I quickly suppressed it. That was one of the things that I found so delightful about Admiral Arleigh Burke.

Anyway, that treaty was negotiated. I don't want to go into all of the details.

Q: Before we leave that, the United States had major bases in Yokosuka and Atsugi, and Okinawa was off to one side. But these bases must have led to a lot of discussion about what we were going to do with them. Or were our military fairly well...

GREEN: Oh, no, I'm not finished talking about the bases, because they raised critical issues. All of the points you have made are valid. We had various problems with our bases in Japan and the Ryukyus--and we of course had to distinguish between the two, because the Ryukyus didn't revert to Japan until 1972. At this point we are talking about 1960. The bases in Japan and especially the Ryukyus were also very important to carry
out our treaty commitments in other parts of East Asia. To some extent it might appear to our other allies in East Asia that the Japanese had some kind of controlling hand over the use of our facilities in support of missions for the defense of those other countries. That could wreak havoc with the fabric of our relationships with those countries.

The skill was how to come up with a treaty which, on the one hand, comported with Japan's feelings that it did not want to become a "lightning rod," and that it did want to be able to control all that went on in their country. At the same time there were the views of the countries which were protected by our bases. I think that diplomacy really triumphed in this situation. The negotiations were handled with great skill by the powers that be. I take no credit for this. They were handled by our ambassador, CINCPAC, the Secretary of State, as well as by Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and his officials.

We came up with a formula under which the treaty left it unclear as to the precise extent to which we would be responsive to Japanese requests not to use our bases for particular missions. In essence the formula involved an exchange of letters in Washington at the end of 1960 which stated that in carrying out our missions each of the parties would take into account the concerns of the other party. Whatever we did would comport with Japanese concerns about not having any nuclear weapons in Japan, not drawing Japan into a position of being a "lightning rod," and so forth.

That was a very sensitive and difficult maneuver and an example of diplomacy at its very best, involving some very good men at the helm in the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's Office. We had, too, especially Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, a superb diplomat.

Now, you mentioned something else just now, Stu, which is very close and parallel to this. That is, we had bases throughout East Asia, especially in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, but increasingly elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including Thailand and, eventually, Vietnam. With all these bases, we inevitably had numerous problems between our forces and the local communities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Frank Nash, was assigned the task in 1957 of going around the world with specialists in the field of politico-military affairs to see what steps we should take to forestall the dangers of "blowups" as well as to improve, in constructive terms, troop-community relations. I went on a long trip with Frank Nash in May 1957. Also on that trip were Henry L.T. ("Barney") Koren, Jim Wilson, Len Unger, and Tim Hoopes. I was the specialist for East Asia and the Pacific. The others were more or less European or Defense specialists.

The first country we visited was Japan, where we had a real "blowup" over the so-called Girard case. This involved an enlisted man who had shot a Japanese woman who was collecting brass casings [from shells] on an artillery firing range. The matter blew up overnight into a national scandal. So we had that problem right off the bat. We had a similar case that I have already mentioned in my oral history on China. This had to do
with a GI shooting a "peeping Tom" in Taiwan. I won't go into that. We had some similar cases in the Philippines. Overall, the results of this trip, not just to East Asia but other trips to Europe and the Middle East, did a great deal to improve troop-community relations.

However, my real job was that of Regional Planning Adviser. The task of a Regional Planning Adviser was quite clear in Europe where we had the Marshall Plan, NATO, and all other regional organizations. In East Asia we had no regional organizations at all. Therefore, the region contained four divided countries [Korea, China, Vietnam and Laos] and less important countries--Communist China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea--were not represented in the United Nations.

Here let me point out that the only real unifying factor in the East Asian region at that time was the United States which had close ties with most of the countries of the region while those countries had generally poor or non-existent relations with each other. Moreover, the more responsible we were for the problems of our friends in the region, the less inclined they were to resolve issues with neighboring countries.

Meanwhile between 1952 and 1960, the US had established military alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the Philippines. These were all bilateral alliances and efforts to establish any multilateral alliance in the region never really succeeded. SEATO collapsed, though it did have a legacy of enduring US military ties with Thailand into the Rush-Thanat Agreement.

Q: Getting back to Japan, how did we view the internal situation in Japan from 1956 to 1960? Were there concerns, or...

GREEN: I don't think that there were any major concerns. My recollection of the internal situation in Japan is that we faced some problems regarding the status of the Koreans in Japan. We also had some problems, which I mentioned before, about our base-community relations. However, as far as the Japanese political figures were concerned, the Liberal-Democratic Party was clearly in the saddle. The democratic process in Japan, if you want to call it that--was under the thumb of the well-heeled Liberal-Democratic Party, which was oriented toward the United States. So we didn't have much to worry about. However, the left wing in Japan was vociferous and could whip the people up, as indeed it did, on the military base issue. So the situation was nothing to take for granted. We worried about it a good deal. It was an incentive for us to move forward on the recommendations I mentioned earlier about the need to enter into a more truly bilateral mutual security relationship with Japan.

Q: Was this the time when the Zengakuren, a radical student movement, emerged? At that time were we concerned about some of the groups in Japan really going "off?"

GREEN: Undoubtedly, we were, although I can't remember which they were. I know that there were some troublesome groups.
Q: Was part of your job--and this was clearly its politico-military dimension--involved in developing the position of Political Advisers?

GREEN: That's a good point. I think that the idea originated with Bill Sebald. Bill Sebald was a close friend of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, who, in turn, was a close friend of Admiral Felix Stump, who was CINCPAC. Admiral Stump was a touchy salt-crusted sailor, who had the same kind of suspicious attitude toward the State Department that military officers of his vintage--he was well on in years--commonly had. The idea of having anybody from the State Department "snooping" on him or keeping an eye on him was disturbing to him.

We got around this problem through the diplomacy of Admiral Arleigh Burke. Arleigh sent a personal message to Admiral Stump, saying, more or less, "Felix, we think that you have one of the most important jobs in the world. In addition to having the best in the way of staff, you ought to have somebody on your staff who knows how to get things done for you in the State Department. We have such a fellow in mind. His name is John Steeves." Sebald and I had recommended that John Steeves [later Ambassador to Afghanistan and Director General of the Foreign Service] be Admiral Stump's first Political Adviser. Well, to make a long story short, Felix Stump got along beautifully with John Steeves, and vice versa. That was the beginning of a string of Political Advisers, all of whom did very well.

Admiral Felix Stump was also very useful in this period in connection with something else. In September, 1957, the Russians put up "Sputnik," [the world's first man-made satellite]. Secretary of State Dulles was extremely concerned over this development and the implication that we were falling behind the Soviet Union in the "race for space," as well as the "race for science and technology." Dulles put out a circular asking each of the bureaus of the Department for suggestions as to how we might counteract this development.

Psychologically, there was need for counteraction, because in the world at large the Russians appeared to be moving ahead of us. People might begin to knuckle under to the Russians, thinking that they were the "wave of the future." I don't know whether the idea was John Steeves' or Arleigh Burke's or Felix Stump's. However, let's give Admiral Felix Stump credit for it because he was the one who carried it out.

The idea was that, once a year, Admiral Arleigh Burke would conduct an air-sea-ground demonstration in East Asia. The demonstration would be carried on by the Seventh Fleet, with Admiral Stump as the host. He then invited the Defense Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff of all of the countries in East Asia to attend. Most of them came. The demonstration started at Clark Field [in the Philippines], went from there to Subic Bay and Cubi Point [also in the Philippines], and ended up in fleet exercises en route to Okinawa, where there were Marine Corps "vertical envelopment" exercises [helicopter insertion of troops on a given point], for the edification of these leaders. On top of it all the Navy was able to demonstrate how quickly it could bring reinforcements and supplies into the Far East.
from the West Coast of the United States, as well as from Hawaii. It was very impressive, and I think that it left a very deep mark on all of his guests, that the US was a powerful friend who could deliver.

Q: Looking at some of the things that you were involved with, was there a Japanese connection with the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958?

GREEN: Yes, I think that there was. The Japanese were very nervous about Taiwan, bearing in mind that Taiwan used to be part of the Japanese Empire, and the Japanese are very conscious of being on a long chain of Islands running South from the Kuril Islands right down to Taiwan.

Q: During this time, 1956-1960, did you feel that the Japanese, in some sense, were "coming of age?" They had been through this traumatic war [World War II], we had occupied their country, and...

GREEN: Yes, they were coming of age, but still very slowly. We're talking now about the period 1956-1960. The Japanese were still "reeling" from the effects of the American occupation. The 1960 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was yet to be finalized. They were beginning to make real strides forward economically, but as you know, this process moved rather slowly in the beginning. It wasn't until 1961 or 1962 that the Japanese economy began to boom. It was a bit later that they began to score very rapid increases in their GNP [Gross National Product].

Q: How effective was their Foreign Service, their representation abroad and especially in Washington? I'm trying to keep it to the 1956-1960 period. We'll talk about later periods at another time.

GREEN: They had very good people. Incidentally, during that period, when Prime Minister Kishi came to Washington in 1957, there was no official Japanese-American organization here, as there had been in Japan for many years. So Kishi had no suitable organization in Washington to serve as host for an occasion where he could deliver a major speech on US-Japan relations (as Grew had done in Japan under the auspices of the American-Japan Society in Tokyo).

So, three of us Foreign Service Officers in the Far East Bureau (all specialists on Japanese issues) undertook to establish the Japan-American Society of Washington, DC which then hosted a dinner party for Kishi. (The Society was to flourish over time, later headed by Alexis Johnson whom I succeeded as President in 1985.)

Q: Did the Japanese Embassy [in Washington] and visiting Japanese cabinet ministers who came over--did they know how to "play" Congress?

GREEN: Well, I'm not sure that they knew how to "play" Congress. They included able and experienced diplomats who were true professionals, albeit somewhat reticent about
promoting their points of view directly with our Congress. They rather looked to the State Department to front for them.

Q: During this period and still concerning Japan, how well do you think our policy was supported by the CIA, as far as intelligence went?

GREEN: The CIA? I think that our policy was pretty well supported. However, there is one weakness about the Agency which was disturbing to me. That is, they tended to get involved in doing things which, if they ever became publicly known, would have been deeply embarrassing to the United States. In other words, they interfered in the Japanese electoral process. They did this in Japan and they did it in the Philippines. When I became Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I saw to it that there would be no more of that. I think that it is a very poor idea for the Agency ever to get involved in the internal politics of foreign countries.

Q: It is counterproductive.

GREEN: Especially in democracies.

Q: Perhaps it is a matter of "don't just stand there--do something."

GREEN: Yes. The CIA was involved in Japan in this sense. As it turned out, there was an article in the press a few months ago about this involvement. I was surprised and shocked to read about it. I didn't know that there had been such involvement.

Q: Then why don't we move on to the next subject? Is there anything else that you wanted to cover?

GREEN: Yes. The Soviet Union and the relationship of the communists in Japan to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union played its cards vis-a-vis Japan just about as badly as it could. That was a real blessing to us. Consider that when the US-Japan Security Treaty was being negotiated the communists, the socialists, and a lot of the intellectuals were urging a foreign policy of neutrality for Japan. But the Russians came through with threats which really made such a policy impossible, quite apart from the record of Korea itself. You would have thought that once the Russians saw how much success our mutual security treaty had achieved in US-Japanese relations, they would have seen the wisdom of turning back at least some of these islands in the northern territories of Japan. This is something they have never done--even to this day. They have never understood that by simply turning over these woebegone islands they could have gained an opportunity for getting loans, investments, and a peace treaty with Japan. They still don't have a peace treaty. The Russians acted in ways that made our job easier in Japan.

Q: Obviously, the Kuril Islands...

GREEN: Well, the southern Kuril Islands.
Q: What was our reading of why the Soviets wouldn't turn these islands over to Japan?

GREEN: That was hard to understand, because we're talking about four islands. Two of them are fairly large, but all are without resources except their proximity to fishing grounds, valuable to the Japanese. The Russians had more territory than they could ever use. By turning back these islands to Japan they would gain all kinds of opportunities...

Q: Was it submarine passage or something like that?

GREEN: There were several available passages for Soviet vessels going through the Japanese chain of islands. Evidently the Russians were (and still are) opposed to any territorial concessions lest this constitutes a bad precedent elsewhere along the borders of Russia—and it was probably an issue of special sensitivity to the Soviet (now Russian) armed forces.

Q: This subject has always been a source of puzzlement to me. Talk about a cheap way of winning some points.

***

Q: Today in December 13, 1988. This interview concerns the events when Ambassador Green was in Seoul, South Korea, 1960-1961. Mr. Ambassador could you explain how you came to be assigned to Korea?

GREEN: At that time I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, working under Jeff Parsons, who was Assistant Secretary of State, and I was about to be named the regular Deputy Assistant, when we had to find a job for Julius Holmes, who had been ambassador in Iran. There had been some scandal over World War II shipping in which he was involved. Since they could not get him approved by the Senate, the Secretary of State offered him any job he wanted that did not require Senate approval. He said, “I want Hong Kong.”

John Steeves had just gone to Hong Kong, so I said to Jeff Parsons, “Look, we’re going to have to send Julius Holmes to Hong Kong. He’s asked for it, he’s enormously respected, he’ll do a great job. Give John Steeves my job as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far East. I’m already regarded as being too young for it anyway. I’m on the market.” So that’s how I got to go to Korea.

Q: I find this interesting, because everybody knew all the players there, and you sat down to figure out, ‘How are we going to solve this problem?”

GREEN: So I solved the problem by sort of offering my body up to be sacrificed in Korea. I’d been following Korean events from Washington, and I was particularly interested in the problems between Japan and Korea. As you know, they were at
loggerheads, with Syngman Rhee seizing Japanese fishing vessels. Here were bad
gerations between two countries in both of which we had enormous interests and great
security stakes.

So I went to Korea, bound and determined that I was going to do everything I will to see
if I couldn’t help resolve Japanese-Korean differences.

Q: Could you give me a little bit of your background, looking at it mainly from the
Japanese perspective?

GREEN: From the Japanese perspective, quite frankly, they looked on Korea with
something bordering on contempt. They had mistreated the 700,000 or so Koreans who
were in Japan working in the coal mines and regarded as second—class citizens. Some of
the Koreans were left-wing and wanted to go to North Korea. The South Korean
Government didn’t want anyone going to North Korea. So that was another bone of
contention. But the principal bone of contention came from the Korean side, because
Syngman Rhee hated the Japanese, occupied Korea for some 40 or more years in what
was regarded as a rather brutal occupation, although this may be overstated. Japan had
given the Koreans education, had given them certain kinds of advantages, but by and
large, of course, the Koreans regarded the Japanese as hated colonialists that put them
under the yoke of Japanese domination. So this was the general background.

Q: From your particular perspective, what had you been doing on Japanese affairs over
a period of time? ‘

GREEN: Before World War II, I had been in Japan as the ambassador’s private secretary.
During the war I was a Japanese interpreter. After the war, after service in New Zealand, I
had been working on the Japanese desk in the State Department for three years before
being assigned to Sweden. Then I’d come back, gone to the National War College,
became regional planning advisor for East Asia. We called it the Far East at that time,
working under Walter Robertson. It was at the end of that three-and-a-half-year period
that I was Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. So I had a considerable background
in Japan, but not much background in Korea.

Q: How was Korea viewed from the State Department before you went out?

GREEN: Korea, of course, had gone through the war. We get a bit of the impression of
Korea from the “M.A.S.H.” programs that we’ve seen lately.

Q: You’re talking about a popular TV series.

GREEN: Yes, that depicted Korea as a hardship place, where the people were living in
misery and penury, and where they were slowly recovering from World War II and
Japanese occupation, but then the Korean War shortly after that. So it was a country that
had gone through a tremendous amount of turmoil and misery. It was surrounded by
countries, China, North Korea, the Soviet Union, Japan, with all of which the Koreans had bad relations. Korea was isolated and was entirely dependent upon the United States. As a regional planning advisor, my principal concern was to see if there couldn’t be some kind of relationship, if not with North Korea, then certainly with Japan. That was the only neighboring country with whom the South Koreans (ROKs) could have beneficial relations. As a regional planning advisor with Japanese language background, I was very concerned about trying to improve that relationship. I didn’t see any future for that truncated southern half of the Korean peninsula without some kind of if not warm relationship with Japan, at least a beneficial, profitable relationship based principally, of course, on trade. They didn’t have any trade with Japan, they didn’t have any Japanese representation in Korea, or Korean representation in Japan. It was as though I they were at two entirely different ends of the earth as far as relationships between the two countries were concerned.

This was a ludicrous position for the United States to be in, and that’s why y I say I went there in the hope that maybe I could contribute something to relieving that problem.

One of the principal problems we faced, of course, was Syngman Rhee, who at that time, when I went out there, was 84 years old. He was the great independence leader of Korea, a man who had very strong connections in Washington. People tended to regard him as a great patriot. Amongst the Korean people in the beginning, he was warmly regarded, but increasing with time, he became more and more senile and backward—looking and intransigent.

He had some friends in Washington in high places, especially amongst our military and right—wing members of Congress, and with certain top-level officials. They tended to be his principal supporters and protectors in Washington. Therefore, any efforts on the part of the State Department to try to get Rhee to face realities and to deal with the Japanese and stop seizing their fishing vessels came to naught largely because Rhee went behind our back to his friends in high places in Washington, and somehow got our efforts either called off or suspended or postponed or whatever it was.

Q: Can you think of any people who were particularly effective in his support?

GREEN: My old boss Walter Robertson was a good case in point. He was Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East for five years, just before Jeff Parsons took over. I had worked for Robertson the better part of three years, written his speeches and been his principal policy advisor for the area in regional affairs. I found that one of the areas where I differed with Robertson was on Korea and on the treatment of Syngman Rhee. I can remember at one meeting I voiced my opinions. It’s the only time in my life that he got mad at me, he just flushed with anger, the idea that anybody on his staff should be speaking against Syngman Rhee! That gives you a little bit of the flavor. Another person that was a strong supporter of Rhee was General Van Fleet, who had retired, a distinguished four-star general. He had lots of friends in high places.
Q: He had been the military commander in Korea during the latter part of the war and had done very well.

GREEN: Exactly. So General Van Fleet and all of his colleagues, again in the military, the Pentagon, were supportive of Rhee.

Then there were important members of Congress. Senator Knowland, for example, was a very strong supporter and defender of Syngman Rhee, as was Congressman Walter Judd.

Q: Was there almost a duplication between the supporters of Rhee and the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek?

GREEN: Very much the same kind of supporters, yes.

One thing to remember when I went to Korea in 1960, was that this was the last year of the Eisenhower Administration. I left in the first year of the `Kennedy Administration. The time I went out there was probably the time when the United States had the greatest preponderant economic and military power in the world. It was a time when America could seemingly resolve problems simply by overwhelming them with their military and economic resources. There was no area in the world where the United States carried greater weight and where we had a more critical position of almost running things than in Korea, partly as a legacy of the war, partly because Korea was completely dependent upon us for economic support, as well as, importantly, for military support.

We had at that time over 70,000 U.S. GI’s in Korea. The general in charge of the Eighth Army was also commander-in-chief of the United Nations’ forces in Korea. In that CINCUNC capacity, he was in charge of the ROK [Republic of Korea] First Army, which at that time had about 470,000 men. 470,000 troops were under the command of the United Nations commander, who was American, who was also the Commander of the Eighth Army. So we had enormous responsibilities in Korea.

In Korea we had the largest AID mission in the world. We had a tremendously large USIA operation in Korea. Our embassy, in other words, was undoubtedly the largest in the world, when you include AID and USIS and all the other components.

Q: There was a very active program, embassy concern with Korea. It was not a backwater

GREEN: No, it was anything but a backwater. My ambassador at that time was Walter McConaughy who had a long background in East Asian affairs. He had been Director of Chinese Affairs in the State Department, and he knew the area. He had a very magnetic personality, a charming wife. Both of them were Southerners from Alabama. I used to say, “According to the Chinese, he came from Outer Magnolia and she came from Inner Magnolia.” They were both very attractive people and great personal friends of my wife and myself, and I was delighted to be his deputy. I always used to tell him that my
definition of a successful ambassador was one who went around with a worried look on his deputy’s face. Such was my look.

My function in the embassy as the number two, I later became minister counselor (they gave me that additional rank), was obviously to be the general factotum and to be the ambassador’s principal advisor on everything.

Q: Looking at it from the perspective of when you were in Washington before you went out there, you’d been reading the reports that came out of there. How did you feel the reporting function was?

GREEN: I thought the reporting function had been done very well, that Ambassador Dowling, who had been his predecessor, had done as well as humanly possible. But I did feel, as I’ve already mentioned that not enough attention was being given to a long-term solution for Korea, one of the long-term issues being the question of the reunification of a divided Korea and its isolation in world affairs. I had written a number of papers, when I was regional planning advisor, on that subject. I’d gone out there to look at that problem. I’d come back more or less resolved that there was nothing that could be done about reunification at that time, that it would have to wait on events.

But the question of Korea’s economic recovery was going to depend very heavily upon its relationship with Japan. Japan was obviously a potential market, a potential source of capital investment, quite apart from American investment. When I went out to Korea, Korea’s per capita GNP was on the order of something like $60 to $90. Today, of course, as you know, it’s more like $6,000. At that time, Korea’s total foreign trade was $30 million a year.

Q: Good God!

GREEN: Today’s it’s about 1,000 times greater.

Q: Were you getting any support from our Japanese desk on the American side?

GREEN: Yes, because we were all in the same bureau together, including the Japanese and Korean desk. My function as regional planning advisor was, of course, to work very closely with them, as indeed I did with all of the different sections of FE, as our bureau was called in those days.

No, there was no real difference of opinion with regard to what I’m saying now, within our bureau, once Robertson left. Jeff Parsons himself had had a background in Japan. In fact, he’d preceded me as Ambassador Grew’s private secretary before World War II. There was no difference in the bureau with regard to this. There were some differences in Washington, but not within our bureau.
Going to Korea at that time, in my opinion, was an honor, not only because I was working for an ambassador I liked very much, and also because of the importance of the job, but I also felt that we were about to move into a new era. Some revolution was about to take place.

*Q: The time is rather important. When did you go out to Korea?*

GREEN: I went out there during January 1960, and I left on Thanksgiving Day in 1961. During those 2 years, I was charge d’affaires three times. I did have some very critical moments in which I think my voice did matter, and during the time I was there, the country did go through a tremendous political upheaval.

*Q: You arrived in January of 1960. Could you describe how you saw the situation when you got on the ground in Korea, within the country?*

GREEN: It was a country which was desperately poor. I arrived there in the winter when poverty was most visible, people were living in packing crates on the sidewalks, many of them dug caves into the sides of the hills that make up the city of Seoul, which you know. The misery was very, very obvious. There was a kind of pervasive sadness to the country, not in terms of climate so much, because it had a salubrious climate, but in terms of the coldness, the bleakness, the loneliness of the country internationally.

Because of the rather dominant American presence, I, as a diplomat, was sensitive to the fact that this could rouse nationalist reactions. This was not really a healthy climate, diplomatically speaking. As a career diplomat, I sensed all this very strongly. The Koreans needed us desperately, but to the extent that they depended upon us and the extent to which we sort of ran the country, we, in a way, were going to weaken their ability to run themselves. In time, we were going to provoke a nationalist reaction against the United States. So it presented a dilemma. We needed to be there, we had to do a lot of things, but the more we did, in time the more nationalist reactions we were going to incur.

*Q: How effective was Rhee’s government as you saw it when you were on the ground?*

GREEN: I thought the government was out of step with the times. Syngman Rhee, of course, was the dominant figure. There was a great deal of corruption. His number two, Chang Myun, the vice president, was under house arrest and belonged to a different faction of the government. The real designated successor to Rhee was Lee Kibung, who was utterly corrupt, and he I was to suffer a sad fate shortly after I arrived.

The United Nations had a predominant position there, quite apart from the United States. I already mentioned the United Nations command. The country was divided right across the middle, 125 miles of demilitarized zone. The zone (DMZ) was about six miles wide.

The DMZ was overseen by a Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission consisting of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. They had representatives stationed in
the DMZ, with meetings held about once a month between North Korean and South Korean representatives. The original purpose of these talks was to compare differences and advance the reunification of the country, but almost always it came down to cases of somebody having violated the neutral zone including North Korean tunnels being built under the DMZ. There were charges, in other words, made by one side against the other.

The representatives of North and South Korea, as well as, on our side, an American representative, would just face each other across this table and engage in long tirades. There was no real communication. It was artificial.

My wife spent some time up there and knew many members of the NNSC, especially the Swedes, as well as the American observers. She used to take many of the embassy wives or visitors up there to see what was going on in this pantomime of international discussion.

Q: How did you find the embassy when you got there?

GREEN: I found the embassy a united group of like-minded officers who got along with each other, including the competent economic and political sections in the embassy. We had very close connections with the huge USAID mission, which was headed by Ray Moyer. The commander of the Eighth Army, who was also CINCUNC, was General Carter Magruder. Between General Magruder and Ray Moyer and the ambassador, there were very good relationships. In other words, I would say the American official community had excellent relations amongst each other.

Q: This has not always been the case.

GREEN: No.

Q: But they were basically of like mind?

GREEN: That’s right.

Q: Could you discuss Ambassador McConaughy’s operating style.

GREEN: Walter McConaughy was the traditional diplomat, who believed in long diplomatic discussions with leaders of the government concerned, as well as minutely detailed reports back to Washington, in which he not only reported what his interlocutor said, but what he thought he might have meant. He allowed people sometimes to take too much of his time.

He used to concern himself with details to an extent that I found a little bit frustrating. This is the only area where I might have had differences with him. But I would say that when it came to the practices of diplomacy, there were few people that could beat him. His ability to get along with his colleagues diplomatically and with the ones I just
mention now, his ability to get through to Rhee was phenomenal. I’ll come back to that because this is very important.

McConaughy was a southern gentleman. For example, I’ll be talking later on about the students’ uprising that took place in the square right outside the embassy. While that rioting was going on with people being shot, he was sitting at his desk reviewing the annual consular report. I rushed in and out of his office, along with the head of the political section, because we were trying to figure out what was going on and we wanted to report all this back to Washington. We kept breaking into his room because it looked out on the square where the shooting was taking place. He rarely lifted his eyes from the paper he was reviewing. That paper had to get in the following day. That was the deadline, and by God, he was going to meet that deadline! Whereas Don Ranard, head of the political section, and I were racing in and out, trying to figure out what was going on, composing telegrams which later the ambassador reviewed in his meticulous way, and sent back to Washington.

So he was not a man that would ever lose his composure. His attention to detail was phenomenal. But his ability to convince and get through to Rhee was of critical importance.

Q: At this point I’m going to let you tell the story. I may interrupt from time to time.

GREEN: The story goes back to the time of my arrival. I’ve described the setting. The principal event that we were heading towards at the time of my arrival were the elections, originally scheduled for May, 1960, but Syngman Rhee suddenly decided to hold them in the middle of March, which was two months, roughly, after our arrival. The United States was hopeful that these would be free and fair elections to determine who was going to be the next president and vice president. That’s essentially what the elections were about.

The government candidates, the candidates of the Liberal Party, as they called themselves, were Syngman Rhee, who was going in for the fourth term, I believe, and his vice president, Lee Kibung.

The opposition party had two principal contenders that belonged to different factions, as I recall it, of the Democratic Party. One was Chang Myun. The other was Cho Pyong-ok. Cho Pyong-ok, who became the principal opposition candidate, had cancer and died in a hospital in Washington shortly after I arrived in Korea. One of the most searing memories I have was of the funeral services that were held for him in the sports arena. All the diplomats were there. I’ll never forget that mournful day in Seoul. The weather added to the general atmosphere of gloom, with cold rains and lowering clouds.

I thought to myself, “Poor Korea, with all that it suffers, now to lose the one man who might have led a successful opposition against Syngman Rhee and his corrupt government.” Rhee was increasingly unpopular, especially with people in the cities and the educated. Cho Pyong-ok had a reputation of being a doer, whereas Chang Myun was
regarded as a nice man, but rather weak personally, not the kind of leader that Korea really needed. So that was my initial introduction to the Korean political scene.

Then the elections were held on March 15. I was, by the way, chargé d’affaires at the time when the elections were held. There was a United Nations Commission for Korea, UNCRK, that was supposed to supervise the elections, but they didn’t have enough people. They couldn’t get around. The elections were obviously rigged, and the results were clear in that regard, because Rhee seemed to have won just about all the votes in the country, and we knew perfectly well there was overwhelming opposition to him in the cities, but not in the rural areas. In those days, the great majority lived in the rural areas.

Reports of election fraud were rife, and this contributed to growing unrest, especially on the part of the young people, the students. On April 12, there was an incident in Masan, which is about halfway down the peninsula from Seoul, in which a student had been killed and a photograph of his body, in which there were four pegs protruding from his eyes, was widely published. This grisly photograph touched off such a reaction, especially in the student population of Korea, that clearly Korea was headed towards a real first-rate crisis. The question then arose as to what position we should take in that situation.

Q: Were you still chargé at this time?

GREEN: I was chargé during the elections and for about two weeks after that. As the issue came to a climax, the ambassador was back.

I did a great deal of the drafting. The ambassador did relatively little. He would review drafts in which other sections of the embassy made contributions, but I often brought it all together. My wife used to say I was the thinker and the drafter, and the ambassador was the talker and the doer. We had that kind of relationship.

We reported all these developments to Washington and presented the policy options, but Washington relied very heavily upon us for our advice. Our advice in this situation was to call upon the Korean people to try to maintain order and respect for law and authority, but to call on the government to recognize the justifiable grievances of the people. The phrase “justifiable grievances” is one that I cooked up, and that phrase was to become a very famous one, because when we used it publicly, “justifiable grievances,” identified the U.S. with the people. The minute we used the word “justifiable grievances,” the students were with us. The populace, by and large, especially the better educated people, were also with us.

This brings us, then, to the events after the Masan incident, after these things all came out in the open. The demonstrations became more and more frequent, particularly in Seoul. On April 19, 1960, the largest demonstrations Korea had ever seen were about to lead to a very bloody week. The afternoon of April 19, there were probably about 100,000 demonstrators in the streets. The Rhee government, in fearful reaction against the masses, ordered the militia and the palace guard and the police to put down the demonstration. In
so doing, there were estimates that between 100 and 200 students were killed and maybe 1,000 or more wounded.

In fact, my wife went to the hospital with two of her friends to see if she could help, and she said that the corridors were jammed with wounded students. The worst thing of all was, she said, the wounds caused by armor-piercing shells. The carnage was fearful.

The electricity in the streets that night was very, very high, one of the reasons being that when any student was killed, they would take his body and hold it up on top of a jeep that was weaving through the masses of people, whipping them up into a fury. Obviously, the sentiments of the country were turning very strongly against Rhee.

The ambassador and General Magruder called on Rhee the following day, and they tried to persuade the old man this was a situation that needed to be redressed. This was April 20. They didn’t get too far with him. Rhee made some sounds that this was all caused by troublemakers, and also he was critical of the Japanese, as he always was. He was shaken, but he obviously was still obdurate.

The next several days were relatively quiet. Meanwhile, Chang Myun, the vice president, had resigned on the 22nd of April. But on the 25th of April, since Rhee clearly had not heard the voice of the students and there were some 200 professors who started a procession down the street. I’ll never forget that. They were followed by little kids, primary schoolers, followed by their parents, followed by secondary school-level and, finally, by university students. A tremendous parade down the street. That night I had a feeling of deep apprehension. I got up early in the morning, the morning of the 26th of April, and I drove around the streets in the dark. I could see already there were large formations of students on the outskirts that were about to move in massive phalanxes into the city, obviously to the palace where Syngman Rhee’s offices were located.

Meanwhile, I saw that around the palace and the headquarters of Rhee’s government, tanks were lining up with their barrels facing out towards what were going to be the advancing phalanxes of students. In other words, carnage was impending.

I rushed to the ambassador’s residence. He was asleep. I woke him up, told him what I thought was about to happen. He immediately got on the phone to the Minister of Defense, Minister Kim, and together they called up Syngman Rhee and urged that he meet with them, which he did. As a result of this meeting and before the students had actually reached the palace, Syngman Rhee had announced that he was going to meet the grievances of the people, and that he was going to consider the question of his continuation in office.

This broke up the student march. They began to cheer wildly. I remember when the ambassador drove back from his meeting with Rhee, the embassy was surrounded by thousands of people cheering the American government, the American people.
Q: The fact that the ambassador had gone there was well known?

GREEN: It was well known. What is not well known, and what I’d like to just touch on briefly is the relationship between McConaughy and Rhee, because this has escaped the notice of history.

Ever since my arrival in Korea, one of the principal functions of our ambassador was to take up with Rhee a whole range of issues. I mentioned, of course, the relations with Japan and the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels as being a principal one, but there were a number of other issues, too. I accompanied our ambassador on all of his principal calls on Rhee. There were four of them. I took notes at these meetings, and I reported by cable back to Washington along with our reflections on policy implications. I remember being rather put out with my ambassador because he would listen to Rhee’s long catalog of injuries that Japan had visited upon Korea, going all the way back to the time of Hideyoshi.

Q: The “little Napoleon,” or “the Napoleon of the Orient.”

GREEN: That’s right. At one of our meetings, I recall that the ambassador tried to turn Rhee away from his ranting against the Japanese. The ambassador never interrupted; he just listened and listened. This morning, he decided he was going to get the discussion off on a different track, so he talked about the kite-flying contest that was coming up. The Koreans put a kind of abrasive substance on the kite strings in order to saw the string of the other fellow’s kite. The last one flying is the winner.

I remember McConaughy thought this was a good subject to try to get the old man to talk of other things. But lo and behold, old man Rhee’s reaction was that this annual kite-flying contest was very important to the Koreans because it was symbolic of the time when the Koreans had flown fire kites over the Japanese forts, had cut the strings, letting down kites that had some inflammable substance on them, which burnt down the Japanese forts. Therefore, kite-flying was symbolic of Korean resistance against Japan, and that’s why this was such an important event in Korea. So we were right back on the same old anti-Japanese track again.

In all these conversations McConaughy was a true Southern gentleman, who, as guest in the country of Syngman Rhee, treated Rhee with proper deference and respect, and listened to him. When the critical moments came later on, when the ambassador accompanied by the Minister of Defense, called on Rhee, Rhee heeded their advice about resigning. Why did Rhee heed the advice? After all, in 1959, the year before I arrived, Eisenhower had sent Dr. Walter Judd, who was a member of Congress and a friend of Rhee, out to Korea to try to persuade Mr. Rhee to name a successor and step down, grooming his successor for the job. Rhee had simply laughed in the face of Dr. Judd.

But he accepted McConaughy’s advice, partly because of the gravity of the situation, but also partly because he saw McConaughy as being well-informed as to the facts. After all,
McConaughy had listened so attentively to what Rhee had said, that he was seen as the repository of wisdom. Any counsel he supplied was based upon knowledge of the facts and therefore was an objective recommendation. All those many hours of painful listening paid off. This was one of the greatest lessons I learned in diplomacy: the importance of attentive listening.

Q: In a way, to prepare the ground, particularly coming from such a great power as we were, and still are.

GREEN: Well said.

Q: Not to always be coming out with, “This is what you should do,” but to listen to the other person’s problems for a long time, and then only weigh in when it’s really critical.

GREEN: Yes, I think that’s a very good point. I hadn’t considered the incident in that light, but it’s very true that there was a tendency on the part of the Americans everywhere to try to run the world.

Q: When Ambassador McConaughy went to R/zee, this was April 26th. Was General Magruder there?

GREEN: No. He’d been there earlier, as I said, but he wasn’t on that day.

Q: What was the situation with the Korean military at that point? I’m thinking of the first Army, the first ROK Army that you mentioned. In the 1980s, there was an accusation that we had the same military setup and our military commander let the Korean troops release them in order to put down another student rebellion.

GREEN: That’s an interesting point, because in that time, Magruder did not interpose any objection to the use of forces under his command for dealing with this situation. Actually, the issue never arose, but I thought about it many years later on when this became a hot issue, especially in the Kwangju incident a few years ago.

Q: This was 1982 or something like that.

GREEN: Our military commander came under sharp attack in 1982 because he released ROK forces under his command to put down a student rebellion. In 1960, this question didn’t arise and was not an issue.

When McConaughy returned from this final successful meeting with Rhee, U.S. prestige reached a new high. I don’t believe it ever was higher before or since. Over the next day or so, Rhee did resign, and the whole Lee Kibung family committed mass suicide.

Q: He, his wife, and two sons.
GREEN: That’s right. They all committed suicide.

Q: He was vice president elect, I believe.

GREEN: That’s right. So clearly the slate was clear. Rhee was out, Lee was out. Now came the question of “What next?”

The acting head of the government succeeding Rhee was Huh Chung. He was a senior economic minister whom we knew very well and respected. He was named acting president. The national assembly declared that the March 15 election was invalid, and called for a constitutional amendment to provide for a new system of government, a British-style parliamentary system headed by a prime minister, for which elections would be held, they hoped, in July.

The next mini-crisis we faced after this was the question of Rhee’s sudden decision to leave the Blue House, his palace, and walk in penance from there to his house, which was some miles away, in Peach Blossom Street. We could see that this would be very provocative. Rhee, walking through the streets, might precipitate more riots for and against him, and it might even embolden him to reassert his authority. There again, the United States had to move, because the Koreans didn’t seem to be prepared to do anything. There were many telephone calls to various ministers, and we did embolden them and encourage them to get in touch with Rhee and persuade him not to do this. So he didn’t do it.

He went to his home by car, quietly, unobserved. But as long as he remained in Korea, he was a potential lightning rod for a reactionary move by his old supporters and by some military elements, for all we knew. It was important that he leave the country, and he indicated that he wanted to leave the country. So it was not a question of forcing him out. The problem was how to get him out of the country without again precipitating an inflammatory situation.

We worked out, with the Korean authorities, Huh Chung in particular, a way of getting Syngman Rhee out of the country in the early dawn, before there were people around in the streets. He was driven in a car, with blinds drawn, out to the airport, where we had transportation arranged for him to take him to Hawaii. Therefore, he got out of the country without precipitating more trouble.

There were many reports that he had stashed away large amounts of money, the way President Marcos of the Philippines later on had.

Q: Who presently is in Hawaii.

GREEN: Exactly. There were many charges in the paper at that time, especially in the American press, that Rhee had large amounts of money stashed away in Swiss banks. As you know, Syngman Rhee had a Viennese wife who was involved in charges of
corruption and ill-gotten gains. Anyway, Syngman Rhee and his wife went to Hawaii, they didn’t have any money, and they lived out their remaining days in penury, living off the charity of friends. So that brings the Syngman Rhee chapter to an end.

The next crisis that we faced -- actually it was a headache, rather than a political crisis - - was the question of President Eisenhower’s decision to visit the Far East, ending up his visit in Japan, and while in Japan he was going to fly one day over to Korea, which was going to be on June 22, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War.

Q: This was June 25, a date that anybody my age will remember very well because of the war.

GREEN: He was going to come over on the 22nd, which was just a few days before that particular day of the 25th. Then fly back the same day.

Meanwhile, there had been developing in Japan growing tensions over the conclusion of the security treaty that we had initialed with the Japanese. We were to get it through our Congress, they were to get it through the Diet. Accompanying the anticipated signing of this new security treaty with Japan, there were increasing riots in Japan led by of the Communist Party and the left-wing of the Socialist Party.

Our ambassador in Japan at that time was Douglas MacArthur II, nephew of the great general. We watched his telegrams with great interest, because he kept reporting, “Go ahead with the visit,” and everything was going to be fine. Jim Haggerty, the President’s press secretary, had flown over in advance of the President’s impending arrival to make last-minute arrangements, and the ambassador went out to the airport to meet him. On their way back, the car was surrounded by rioters, who smashed the windows, and only through last-minute efforts of the police, were MacArthur and Haggerty saved. Despite this incident, MacArthur continued to recommend that the President visit Japan.

The President, meanwhile, was on the cruiser St. Paul, down in the East China Sea. A general strike was called in Japan. At that point, the Kishi Government decided that it wasn’t going to be wise for the President to come to Japan. So the visit was called off to Japan, but this left the President with the question of going to Korea and how was that going to be arranged.

So with only two days’ advance notice, what was going to be just a daytime stay became a two-day stay, and I was put in charge of making arrangements for that two-day visit.

Q: One presidential visit is the equivalent of two earthquakes. (laughs)

GREEN: About ten on the Richter scale.
So we worked desperately all night setting up arrangements. There were only 32 hotel rooms in Seoul at that time that were available in the old Bando Hotel and the Chosen Hotel. Only 32 hotel rooms, and the presidential party was over 200. So what we had to do was to house most of the presidential party and the accompanying press in Embassy homes. Embassy children were sent to the Eighth Army compound, where they were put into kinds of dormitories. Jeff Parsons and Bill Sullivan stayed at our house, as did the President’s naval advisor. So everybody had to get in the act. We also had to reschedule the whole trip in Korea.

I flew down to Okinawa and met President Eisenhower. The purpose of my going down there was to brief him on the events in Korea and to help out with the arrangements of his arrival in Seoul.

We flew up from Okinawa in Air Force One, and his arrival in Seoul was a scene of absolute pandemonium, not at the Kimpo Airport, because that was under security guard, nor at the Eighth Army’s South Post, to which we choppered from Kimpo. At South Post a procession of limousines had already been drawn up to take the presidential party. The ambassador was there to receive him, and the two of them would drive in a motorcade through the streets of Seoul, to the embassy residence, a distance of about four miles.

We had no standby arrangements in case the presidential party couldn’t move, in other words, if the mobs got too thick. We couldn’t bring helicopters to evacuate the President because the streets were covered by trolley wires. The presidential party had proceeded about two miles along a route thronged by 2 million people. The mobs got so thick that the car just couldn’t move any further without killing somebody. So with just body pressures, a way was cleared for the President’s car to go up deserted side streets to the residence.

President Eisenhower felt terribly about this. By the way, he was accompanied by his son, John Eisenhower, and daughter-in-law Barbara. President Eisenhower couldn’t stand seeing some million or more people disappointed by not seeing the presidential procession. They’d been out there all day waiting for him. So one of the first things he asked me to do was reschedule this drive through the streets and give out notices so people would be there and he’d have a chance to wave to them. That, had to be added to all the other things we had to arrange the following day, which included luncheon with Huh Chung at the palace with some Korean dances and then addressing the National Assembly, thence going up near the DMZ to one of our bases where there was a huge stadium where the President was going to make some appropriate remarks on the occasion of the tenth anniversary. All that had to be managed by the Embassy.

By the way, the President also addressed the whole embassy community in the ambassador’s residence gardens. There must have been about 2,000 people there. He made some moving remarks which don’t appear well in the text, because Eisenhower had a way of talking that doesn’t record very well on paper, but he came through very well when you heard it. I must say I found President Eisenhower a very likeable person,
although he seemed to me much heavier and redder-of-face than I had ever thought of him as being and a good deal older than in the pictures that I had seen. Anyway, that was to be the last time I ever saw him.

**Q:** You briefed him in Okinawa on the situation in Korea. Did he show interest? Was he absorbing what you said? Was he asking questions?

GREEN: No, I don’t recollect that there was any such reaction as that. In fact, I recall being a little bit disappointed that there wasn’t more interest and attention focused on what I wanted to say. I think he was terribly upset over what had happened in Japan. He was wondering how this could be explained, and the press was very critical that our officials in Tokyo had been so obtuse as to not foresee these events and to have planned accordingly. In other words, he was literally red in the face because of events.

Then the question came, “How is he going to leave Korea and get back to Washington?” He had to avoid Japan. He had to fly all the way to Wake Island. In other words, he was preoccupied, but the trip did come off well. As you said earlier on, these things are the equivalent of two earthquakes. In some ways, his called-off visit and truncated visit to Japan and prolonged visit in Korea were one of the most difficult problems that the embassy had to face. However, it’s a time in which the two countries were brought very close together.

One thing I forgot to mention is the problem of Huh Chung, the acting president. He didn’t want to receive Eisenhower personally. He didn’t feel that he was the proper head of state, and he was also a little bit nervous about being prominent on the world scene. He was a rather retiring type of man, a very nice man, but reticent. He was just plainly embarrassed and overwhelmed by the honor, and wanted to get out of it. We really had to pump a bit of iron into his …

**Q:** I can imagine a certain amount of panic on your side. (Laughs)

GREEN: That’s right! Panic all over the country, you might say. But the people loved it.

**Q:** The Eisenhower visit is also an outpouring of the feeling of our support during a critical time.

GREEN: That’s right.

**Q:** Just for the record, did you find that the presidential staff was hovering around, I trying to be overly protective of him?

GREEN: Yes, I did.

**Q:** I’d like to get a feel for this, for the record. This is often a Foreign Service criticism.
GREEN: Because the thing was so sudden, it wasn’t as bad as it might otherwise be. The advance parties that come out usually are a headache, and then the people around the President seem pushy, bumptious, arrogant, and demanding. They don’t adequately take into consideration the feelings of the countries concerned. They’re thinking almost entirely in terms of the President and his prestige, or in terms of impressing. And in this age of television, it’s probably even worse. They’re really thinking about press opportunities and, of course, security.

In the case of Korea, there didn’t seem to be any real need for the kind of security that we see nowadays. As a matter of fact, I don’t recall being bothered by the security people, by the Secret Service. The Secret Service can be a real headache, but in this case, because of the brevity of the visit and the sudden nature of it, and because of the fact that Korea was virtually under American control, you might say, and the people were so utterly friendly, particularly after the events of April 1960. We were very popular.

So there didn’t seem to be that problem. But having to give up your homes! And then there was a certain lack of gratefulness on the part of presidential parties. They sort of come and go, they assume it is all relatively easy. One expects a little bit in the way of thanks from the President personally, as well as from members of his party. My recollection of that event is that it was not adequate and it was very slow in coming. As a matter of fact, the President’s interpreter, whom we had to provide, was the son of a missionary, a very nice man, and I don’t think the President ever personally thanked him for his job. He did a splendid job. I

Q: Was this one of the Underhills?

GREEN: Exactly! It was.

Q: I might mention that the Underhill family is a very famous missionary family that goes back four or five generations and are still very much a major force in the Korean-American missionary group.

GREEN: I think the President shook my hand. I can’t recall very well. His departure from the stadium, direct by helicopter to the Kimpo Airport and out, was very rapid. There wasn’t much opportunity to be around thanking people and so forth, so one can’t expect too much. But you’d like to get a personal letter. You would like to get something that you could hang on the wall. My wife’s memory about these things is much better than mine, and she reminded me that we got little round medallions commemorating the President’s visit, but that was about it.

So the whole thing has to be seen as something which has to be done, which isn’t going to be particularly pleasant, but which, in the long run, probably serves a good purpose in terms of our relations with that country. Having said that, I’m not always sure that it always adds up to being that much of a positive factor. There are so many negative factors
involved in a presidential visit that one wishes somehow that it could be done more simply and more smoothly and with less officiousness.

Q: Unfortunately, I think the tendency is to make it worse.

GREEN: It’s getting worse all the time.

Q: Obviously, relations, at least with the Korean people, have reached a real high point at this point, the fact that Eisenhower was the first President to come there, just at a perfect time, really, to sort of lay his blessings on the newly developing democracy there. America’s role was seen as a positive one. Yet things went from literally better to worse. How did things play out after that?

GREEN: The next problem was the question of holding the elections, and the elections basically were for a new-style government based upon a parliamentary system, where a prime minister would be the head of the government. But the head of the country would be a president, and that would be more in the French tradition of a president or, in the case of Britain, more like the Queen, the symbol of a country, and would be the one that officiated, the one who presided, the one who is highly visible in terms of ceremony. But the real government leader would be the prime minister.

The elections were held on schedule in the middle of July, and there were two principal contenders. The voting didn’t give either a clear majority. One was Chang Myun, who had been vice president under house arrest during Rhee’s last years in power. The other was Yun Bo-seon, who was a respected member of the national assembly. It was worked out peacefully and agreeably, that Yun Bo-seon would be the president, and that Chang Myun would be the prime minister. So then came the question of whether they could effectively run the government? Could they deal with all the ills that faced the country at that time -- political, economic, Korea’s isolation and its problems in the United Nations.

By the way, speaking of the United Nations, let me just point out one thing which I neglected to say. There was a debate on the Korean item every year in the United Nations, and countries like the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were always attacking the Republic of Korea, the ROKs, for their “lack of democracy.” This, of course, was a ludicrous spectacle to have a country where there wasn’t true democracy, but where they were struggling to achieve it, where it was the goal, and where they were working their way slowly toward that goal, to have them criticized by countries that bore the name of the People’s Republic of So-and-so, but where they were anything but a real democratic republic.

Once, when I was chargé d’affaires, I think it was back in March when I first arrived, I sent a telegram to Washington, commenting upon this ridiculous situation, and expostulating at the end, “Let him who is without sin castigate the first ROK.” The trouble was that the word “castigate” was corrupted in transmission, and I therefore never
tried to send a humorous telegram after that. Talk about learning your lessons in diplomacy, that was a real lesson!

The problem now was to get Korea moving politically and economically. Politically, it required strong leadership, and economically it required Korea promoting development and trade and normalizing -- or having -- commercial relationships with Japan.

_Q: This is back to your original theme._

GREEN: In other words, having disposed of Rhee, the problem was now to face the realities of the future. This was a particularly difficult time, although on the surface it seemed harmonious and Chang Myun and the people in the ministries we worked with were very reasonable people. The only trouble was that Chang was too nice. He was too reasonable, too charitable. He was a Roman Catholic and a very devout one. At the same time, he was being pressured by the United States.

We had pressures from Congress in terms of reducing appropriations for Korea. We were anxious to get the Koreans to shoulder more of the burdens for their own defense and for improving their own economy. In other words, developing import reduction industries, making more of their own and supplying their Army with their own products, their shoes and jackets and things like this. That would help relieve us of some of the costs of our military responsibilities in Korea.

Another problem we pressed on the government was to adopt a realistic unitary exchange rate. When I arrived in Korea, there were 500 won to the dollar. This was clearly an overvalued won, even though it was 500 to one, and the result is that it contributed enormously to corruption, including the corruption of many of our GIs who would sell dollars on the black market. Therefore, we applied pressure for getting a unitary realistic exchange rate. We eventually did, getting the won to 1,200 to one. But when you achieve a realistic exchange rate, there are many people who lose in the process. Korea, as a whole, lost. It meant that everything the Koreans bought from abroad cost that much more money. It meant that those that had won they wanted to change into dollars would have to pay that much more, and therefore, all of a sudden there was a feeling of impoverishment on the part of all the Koreans. This did not contribute to the popularity of Chang Myun. Increasingly, Chang was being seen as having to give in to U.S. pressure.

_Q: We were pressing very hard, if I recall. In fact, there was sort of almost a scene, wasn’t there, where they wouldn’t go to the new exchange rate, or they came up with a different one, and we said, “We’re not going to play that. That’s the end of aid”?_”

GREEN: That’s right. So these pressures that we brought to bear on the government were very visible. The process involved a lessening of our popularity with the people and a lessening of the popularity of the government which was being seen as supine and yielding to our pressures. These are very important factors to bear in mind in terms of what was to happen the following May.
Q: Before we end the 1960 period, I wonder if you could discuss how relations with Japan worked out, having been a prime mission when you went out there.

GREEN: Obviously the major achievement in improving Korean-Japanese relations was the disappearance of Syngman Rhee from the scene, his replacement by Chang Myun, who was a moderate and who understood the importance of improving relations with Japan, although he recognized this would be unpopular and would be difficult to achieve.

There were several things that happened in the course of 1960 while I was in Korea that indicated to me that the Korean people, by and large, were prepared to accept a constructive relationship with Japan. One was that there was a soccer match between Korea and Japan that was held at some point, I believe, in the spring or summer, and where we all anticipated there would be some terrible incidents. We had an observer at the stadium with a walkie-talkie telling us play by play what was happening. At half-time, the Japanese were ahead two to one, and we were worried that that would touch off riots at the stadium; instead of which the Koreans were perfectly respectful of the Japanese players and there was no incidents. Fortunately, the game ended up by Korea winning 3 to 2, so we don’t know what the incidents might otherwise have occurred. But we concluded that a constructive relationship was possible between the two countries.

The other incident was a visit by a Japanese foreign official, Kosaka, who was the first Japanese official to come to Korea in many years. Most calls he did on his own, but I accompanied him on one or two, and he was a guest at our house for a reception. Again, I was impressed that he seemed to get along perfectly well with the Koreans, and there wasn’t the kind of hostility that Rhee depicted.

However, there was no real trade between the two countries. That was to come later. The key to a better relationship was how that relationship would contribute to easing Korea’s economic problems, which now clearly were emerging as being the number one problem. As I said earlier on, the pressures we put on Chang Myun were, in the long run, to contribute to his overthrow.

Q: Would you discuss your family life while you were there?

GREEN: I was accompanied to Korea by my wife and two of my three sons. My youngest son at that time was about seven years old. My second son was about 15 years old, high school age. My oldest son had just left Groton School and was going to University of California at Berkeley. He came out and visited us several times while we were in Korea.

Schooling of American children was not too much of a problem at an early age, because the Eighth Army ran a school. But as children got older, schools in Korea became more and more a problem. So while we were in Korea, the schooling of our children was satisfactory and not as much of a problem as it was to be, for example, in Hong Kong, our next post.
The house we lived in was an old Japanese-style house that had been built maybe 30 years earlier, and it was on one of the two Embassy compounds. The first compound contained the ambassador’s residence, which had grounds and two guest houses next to it. That was one-half of the compound. The other half of that first compound was shared by the DCM’s house, the homes of the heads of the economic and public affairs sections, and one small house by a member of the political section. So we were a relatively spacious compound with relatively few people, whereas compound two, which was up near the main government buildings about two miles away, was smaller and housed almost all the rest of our embassy. That is to say our State Department personnel, not including USOM (AID).

Living conditions were not the best, but we did have access to the military commissary and the PX. In that way we got supplies, so that we didn’t have to live on Korean food, which I found abominable. In fact, I couldn’t eat the stuff. I used to get so sick and tired of it. Living conditions were good in terms of the economy of the country, and we lived like princes compared to almost all the people. One was very conscious of the poverty all around us.

I remember my wife, one day in the dead of winter, I think the second year we were there, saw a big Korean youth pin a little kid down, take off his shoes, and abandon him shoeless and crying in the snow. People were that desperate for clothing.

While I was in Korea, I was a strong supporter of a special Salvation Army canteen that was held under one of the bridges, just to help people during those awful months of the winter. So life was hard, and we, in contrast, lived pretty well.

Our own residence, however, was inadequate in terms of construction. It had been built of green wood. The wood was continually springing, and the walls couldn’t support the weight of the roof of heavy red tiles. In fact, the ambassador’s residence had been condemned year after year by inspectors who came out there. The question came where to build a new residence and how to build it. The old residence was a former royal residence. The Americans had taken it over. The beams were very low. You had to sort of duck your head if you were tall, even in the living room. So clearly we had to have a new residence, and a dozen or more years later we built a new Embassy residence patterned on the old royal residence.

Q: It is a beautiful residence. I was there about when it opened in 1976. It was beautifully done, and the beams were much higher up.

GREEN: One of the things about living in Korea was that when we entertained, we had to entertain in our houses. There were no decent hotels. There were no restaurants that were appropriate for foreigners. Therefore, visitors -- and they were frequent -- with all those American responsibilities you can imagine, mostly officials, but having to entertain them and put up with them involved an enormous outlay of personal effort. Unlike Hong Kong,
where visitors could take off and shop and live in beautiful hotels, entertainment was a chore in Korea.

Q: You felt very much that you had to play the part of the all-involved host, rather than, “Have a nice time and come back.”

GREEN: That’s right. Your guests lived in your house, and you had to provide for their entertainment every hour of the day.

My wife exchanged letters regularly with Caroline Service. Then they exchanged their old letters back, so they each have now a record of what they said about what they did at that time. The Services at that time in Liverpool. Reading over my wife’s letters, I realize what a hectic life we led and the enormous amount of entertainment we had to do. There were a lot of distractions.

Q: Often forgotten when you talk about diplomatic things, the work that goes on underneath this whole business.

GREEN: That’s right.

Another thing I neglected to say about that year, we were trying to negotiate a Status of Force agreement with the Koreans. We never did succeed. But that entailed a lot of work. I mention this in connection with visitors because it involved a lot of visitors coming out, mostly people from the State Department and the Defense Department, in connection with those talks.

Q: Thank you for a very interesting interview.

***

Q: Today is December 20, 1988. Mr. Ambassador, we are now coming to 1961. Could you describe the situation as you saw it at that time, that led to the coup of 1961?

GREEN: Yes. 1961 was an even more tumultuous year for me and, I might say, for Korea, than 1960. It contains many memories that are both bitter and sweet. On March 10, Ambassador McConaughy received word that he was going to be assigned to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, which meant that I would be taking over the job as chargé d'affaires, not knowing who the new ambassador was going to be. When he left, which was in mid-April, he was leaving in my hands a rather dicey situation.

The Chang Myon government had been in power for about nine months, during which there had been considerable accomplishments. On the other hand, these accomplishments were largely pressed upon them by us, entailed a number of political risks, especially for Prime Minister Chang Myon. For example, he agreed to the institution of a realistic
unitary exchange rate. This was not going to be popular. Secondly, he took measures to raise transportation and power rates, cutting out subsidies. Thirdly, he took measures to normalize AID, or our aid, procedures, so that the Republic of Korea took on more of the responsibilities for funding infrastructure costs of our military and ROK military in Korea than they had previously. Fourthly, Korea was assuming more of the costs of their own defense, yet continuing to observe Status of Forces agreements that clearly gave the United States more rights in this situation than are usually present. We were engaged in Status of Force negotiations, which never bore fruit, at least not for many months.

Q: What was our role? You mentioned the various reforms and Status of Force. Were we calling the tune?

GREEN: Yes, we were.

Q: Were there any pressures? How did you operate?

GREEN: Yes, we were exerting a great deal of pressure. The pressure, in the last analysis, derived from congressional restraints, congressional limitations on funds that were available, and therefore we had to accommodate to that situation. In other words, we had to get the Korean Government to do more to help itself, since we couldn't be giving the kinds and levels of aid that we had previously, due to cutbacks in our defense and other budgets. Therefore, if we were going to maintain the levels of defense that we had in Korea, they had to take on more of the responsibilities. So that fact, and also this problem with the exchange rate, where we were not only taking something of a schlacking because of this exchange rate, where the won was greatly overvalued, but it also meant that there was a black market in won, and that this was going to exacerbate the problems of corruptions that were already prevalent in Korea under the Chang Myon government as, as a matter of fact, it had been under almost all governments prevalent.

So the rigors of these accomplishments that we pressed upon the Koreans created all kinds of tensions from the Korean community, and it made it appear that Chang Myon was running errands for us. He was never a strong or forceful leader, and all we were doing was to contribute to the impression of his weakness of succumbing to US pressures.

Q: This raises an interesting point. Here is a government on which we can exert a lot of pressure. Were you or the embassy or State beginning to get worried? Sometimes there is such a thing as being overly successful in making your points. Were we looking at the cumulative effect of this?

GREEN: Stu, you've made a very sound point, obviously reflecting your own diplomatic expertise. Of course we were very aware of the dangers present in this type of situation. Furthermore, we knew that nationalism in Korea, which had been delayed by the war and reconstruction, was now becoming an important factor in the Korean makeup. We in the embassy were well aware of the dangers in this total situation. We leaned over backwards
to avoid appearances of dictating to the government or of pushing them around. I can remember very well that our meetings with Chang Myon were carried on in private homes, not in offices, that we did everything we could to lower our profile in dealing with the Korean government on these issues, if only to try to minimize the dangers that our pressures on the Korean Government might become too visible and, therefore, to the point of explosion.

Q: What about Status of Forces? My impression is that once the American military gets a policy in its bed, mixing a metaphor, it will press for everything it can possibly get, without regard to really thinking beyond the consequences. Were you having to rein in our military as far as trying to get more out of the Koreans?

GREEN: I was very familiar with the political aspects of the problem that you just noted, having served on the NASH mission back in 1957, when, on a worldwide basis, we did what we could to improve community-US force relations and to avoid the kinds of problems that we had been having.

In the case of Korea, the problem was particularly complicated because we had a United Nations command headed by an American, with all the ROK First Army, which was all their fighting-effective forces, 450,000 in number, under his command. We had two divisions there, plus a corps headquarters and some air units. How that would all fit into a Status of Force Agreement made it particularly complex. As I say, we entered into negotiations, but as I recall, while I was in Korea we never finalized them. The very fact that we were holding these negotiations obviously came to widespread attention in the military, probably created certain concerns. On the other hand, I can't believe that this was, in itself, a major factor in stirring up the military.

I think here one has to bear in mind something which became more apparent after the coup occurred, but I mention it because in retrospect, this seems to be a very important factor. That is that in the Korean military, there were many, many young officers, field grade officers, although many of them had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel, who had served in key exposed positions in the Korean War. They were serving under senior officers, many of whom had not really been in the fighting, and many of whom were now receiving various kinds of favors. In other words, corruption was rather widespread amongst many of the senior military. Of course, it was widespread in the community in general. But it may not have been as widespread as you might say the lieutenant colonels thought it was, so that within the military there was a great deal of disgruntlement. It wasn't necessarily directed at Chang Myon, but it was directed, really, at life in general.

When the coup did occur, it was this kind of feeling of resentment and disgruntlement that, in turn, churned up very strong feelings for wanting to correct things, a kind of a Puritanism, where they wanted to impose their will upon all the people of Korea. I think that this was a very important force behind the military coup. I mention this now in terms of what was building up in the atmosphere before the coup.
Another thing that was a problem was Prime Minister Chang Myon's shy manner, his quiet personality, and his lack of rapport with the people, with his inability to be a rallying call for Korea that was badly in need of leadership. These were things that could not be corrected by anybody. These were simply facts of life we had to live with. I remember Ambassador McConaughy, in his very tactful way--and by the way, he was a superb diplomat--he urged the Prime Minister to get out of Seoul, get out amongst the people, identify himself more with the national picture, the national scene. He also urged him to draw younger leaders into higher positions. He was quite conscious that the youth of the country was disaffected, and there was a feeling of estrangement with the government, that the government was sort of composed of older people that didn't know their problems and didn't share their hopes and dreams.

Q: Was the government pretty much of one class?

GREEN: That's hard to say. I can't recall exactly its opposition, but it would be basically the older guard, people who had had advantages of better education, civilians, who had many contacts abroad, probably had good education. Some of them were good economists, and they were people that sort of talked our language. But I'm talking about people that we didn't know very well, but we were very conscious--or at least increasingly conscious--of their importance and the fact that they had to be brought into the picture.

Basically, as I have said before, it was a very bleak picture in Korea, with a lot of recriminations, recriminations against the United States, against the government, against different groups of people, and it was wide open to exploitation from the communists in the north. We have to remember that here we were in Seoul, which represented maybe 30% of the population of Korea, just 20 miles below the DMZ, above which there were something like 600,000 North Korean forces.

Q: And you were on the wrong side of the Han River, too.

GREEN: We were on the wrong side of the Han River. So it was not a comfortable situation to be in from any viewpoint, internally or in external terms. Externally, also bearing in mind that Korea had no friends in the world, really, except the United States, and we were half a world away. But no relations to speak of with Japan and China and the Soviet Union and North Korea. Its other neighbors were all hostile. This is the kind of situation that was almost unique in the world for a United States diplomacy to operate.

I can remember, I was just rereading some of my wife's letters to her friends, which she got back after they'd read them, in which I remember one quotation. She said, "The hopelessness of everything here, the confinement, the isolation, the bleakness, almost anything could happen at any moment." That letter was written in mid-April 1961, just about the time the ambassador was leaving and we were taking over chargé d'affaires. She goes on in another letter to say, on April 26, about how I was working around the clock and how worried I was, and how there were rumblings in the night and there were
demonstrations. The students obviously were restive, and there was a sense of tension you could cut with a knife.

That brings us to the coup itself, exactly one month after McConaughy's departure. In the wee hours of the morning of May 16, 1961, I was woken by a phone call from General Magruder, CinCUNK (Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces in Korea), which had the ROK fighting effectives under his command, as well as two American divisions and other components, Turkish, some Commonwealth, Ethiopian, Thai, and other forces. He called me up in the wee hours of the morning and asked me if I heard any shooting going around because there was shooting going around there in the south post. He was about four miles away in the south post. I said, no, I could hear no shooting, "What was it all about?"

He said that he believed that a coup was in progress, and that the chief of staff of the Army, General Chang Do Yung, had already been in touch with him about a coup that evidently involved several thousand, was taking over in various parts of Seoul. He asked General Magruder for support in the form of US forces, as well as ROK forces, suppressing the coup. Magruder had said to me that his answer to Chang Do Yung was that we could not involve US forces, and that he, Magruder, in fact, was going to order, or was ordering, them to return or stay in their barracks, not to go out in the streets, not to get involved.

Q: These are the Americans.

GREEN: The Americans. I told General Magruder that I completely agreed with that latter order, and I went on to say that I thought it would be very important that we, as soon as possible, make it publicly clear that the United States has nothing to do with this coup, and that the United States Government, in fact, supports the duly constituted government of Chang Myon, that had been elected in free and fair elections after many years of United States urging, that we clearly could not turn our backs on that government now in its hour of peril. This was a matter of very important principle. Would he go along with me on such a statement? This was around 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, over the phone.

He replied that he would have to think that one over, and perhaps we could have breakfast together around 7:00 the next day.

He called me up around 6:00 before we had breakfast, to say that he felt we should go forward with that kind of a statement immediately, his principal reason being that General Lee Han Lim, who was the commander of the First ROK Army, had been in touch with him just a few minutes previously, to urge that the United States clarify its position, because the coup group was spreading the word through all these commands of General Magruder, that the United States was behind the coup, that we supported the coup, and that unless we made our position crystal clear, we would bear a responsibility through inaction in allowing the coup to consolidate its hold on the country.
General Magruder had great respect for General Lee, and he therefore came over to the embassy, or perhaps we did this over the phone; I can't recall. But he drew up a statement for public release to be accompanied by a statement which I would make. His statement would be made as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces; mine would be made as a chargé d'affaires of the American Embassy. He would be speaking, in other words, in an international capacity; I would be speaking in a national capacity.

So Magruder's statement called upon all military personnel and his command to support the duly constituted government headed by Minister Chang Myon. My statement, which paralleled and accompanied his, strongly concurred in the position that was taken by General Magruder, adding that I wished to make it emphatically clear that the United States supports the constitutional government of the Republic of Korea as elected by the people of the republic last July, and as constituted last August with the election of a prime minister.

Both statements were immediately carried every hour on the hour by the United States Armed Forces Radio, located in Seoul.

Q: This would be broadcast in English?

GREEN: Broadcast in English and in Korean.

Q: Because normally these broadcasts were only in English for the troops.

GREEN: But our announcement was carried in only one newspaper, of course, not carried in any Korean broadcasts, because meanwhile the coup had taken over the communications of the country.

There was, of course, no time to clear these statements with Washington.

Q: We're talking about the role of an embassy, of the military. Over a period of time, there had been rumblings. You knew there was discontent. Did you and General Magruder have essentially a "coup file" which you pulled out, and in consultation with Magruder's superiors and with your superiors back in Washington? What do you do?

GREEN: We could be faulted on those grounds that we didn't have any contingency plans to deal with a coup. I don't think that it occurred to us that a coup was likely. By the way, a coup is never going to succeed, and therefore you never hear about a coup in advance. Because if you do, it doesn't happen! But I do think, in retrospect, that every country or every embassy and every command would be wise to have a contingency plan. I think the best way to develop such contingency plans would be to come up with a hypothetical situation where this were to occur. What do you then do about it?
I might say that this whole experience made me a very strong believer in these war games, these politico-military war games in which I've been engaged in about five of them, all of them have been highly instructive. The only trouble with these war games is that nobody pays much attention to them in high places, so that it becomes a little bit of an exercise of value, but of futility, too.

**Q:** Just to add, war games are not just in case of war, but in case of disasters, terrorist incidents, coups, etc.

GREEN: Precisely. We are carrying this, as you know, to great lengths so that we have all kinds of exercises against terrorists conducted by all our embassies. Our embassies all have contingency plans. So that this experience in Korea would merely fortify the argument that more should be done in this field. But anyway, we hadn't done it, to answer your question.

**Q:** Let's talk a little about communications. Was there anybody you could actually call to talk to and say, "What do I do?" or, "What should we do?"

GREEN: We didn't have that time. We had to get that announcement out right away if it was to have any effect. It never occurred to me that there would be anything but support for the position that Magruder and I were taking in Washington. Maybe I was naive in that supposition, but since we had worked so hard for so long to get this duly constituted government, and since this small coup group, led by God knows who and for what purpose . . .

**Q:** Because it was not a matter of absolute anarchy in the streets and all this. Somebody had to come and do something.

GREEN: It was a question of what should the United States do. We had to react. We couldn't just sit there and say, "We have to get Washington's word." Some people might have thought that that would have been the right course, but if we'd done that, then our voice never would have been heard.

**Q:** Silence would have been acquiescence.

GREEN: Silence would have been acquiescence. I think it would have left the Korean people with a great sense of disillusionment in the United States. As it was, the action that I took that day, as, indeed, the action we had taken the previous year, in talking about the justifiable grievances of the students, still left the United States with a pretty good record of not siding with those who were going to seize power from the people's representatives. This was a record that was going to be important, not only in Korea, but in Turkey, Thailand, and many other countries that had experienced coups. We have to bear in mind that what we do, wherever we do, has a world connotation.
All these thoughts as an experienced diplomat raced through my mind and left me with no choice but to move quickly. In so doing, I obviously kept Washington informed. We told them immediately what we were doing, what we had done. We sent in a stream of messages to Washington on an hour-to-hour basis. Our political section was headed by Don Ranard, a very active, conscientious, and able officer, with people like Elmer Hulen on his staff. They were all first-rate people. We had a very good cultural attaché and USIS staff.

Q: What did you have your staff do?

GREEN: I put this in the hands of who was effectively my deputy at that point, Don Ranard, and I said, "Look, I'm going to be busily engaged, as you will see, in a whole series of involvements here. Your job now is to send out messages to keep Washington as fully informed of events going on as is humanly possible, and in your messages to urge that we get some early reaction to know whether we're on the course that they would support." So that was their function.

My next move, realizing that every minute counted, after issuing this statement and proceeding on the assumption that Washington would endorse a course of action that I now had to take--again, every minute counted--was to call, with General Magruder, on President Yun Po Sun at his home at Blue House, the presidential residence, the one that was tenanted by Rhee for so many years.

We made the call on Yun Po Sun, who seemed glad to receive us. Magruder gave his evaluation of the situation to the extent that he knew about it, which was that the coup group was actively supported by a small group, maybe several thousand, young insurgent dissident officers, but that the Army chief of staff, General Chang Do Yung, remained loyal to the government, a situation which, by the way, was to change in the course of the day. Magruder stressed that the insurgent forces, many of them, were under his command, and that their action undermined his authority and imperiled the Republic of Korea by withdrawing forces from the front lines to participate in a political action against the government, and that he thought it was essential that steps be taken to deal with this coup and to get the forces to return to their positions, the ones under his command.

I pointed out that Korea's international standing was very much involved in this issue. We had to support the Republic of Korea every year in United Nations debates. They had a huge United Nations presence there, aside from just the UNC command. They had all kinds of UN machinery that I've talked about before. These events were going to create some real sound waves abroad.

General Magruder then, somewhat to my surprise, because he hadn't mentioned this to me before, suddenly asked the president whether he would approve calling upon loyal ROK Army units under General Lee Han Lim, to take up positions surrounding Seoul in overwhelming numbers in comparison to the relatively few coup units in Seoul, so that
negotiations with the insurgents could be carried on from a position of government strength.

President Yun was understandably reluctant to take such a bold step, lest it lead to a lot of bloodshed. I thereupon suggested that he call immediately to his office Prime Minister Chang Myon and the leaders of the coup group, to see if there could not be some reconciliation of differences based upon Chang Myon accepting the legitimate demands of the coup group, without wrecking the recently elected government of Korea. In other words, reaching some kind of compromise which, as I said, has occurred on several occasions in Chinese history. I was very interested in this problem of how governments could reconcile differences with insurgent groups.

The president wavered. He couldn't bring himself to make the decision. Meanwhile, Magruder left the Blue House, and I lunched alone with President Yun, who was desperately unhappy, at times in tears. He asked me repeatedly whether the position that I had taken reflected instructions from Washington, and I had to say that I had received no word from Washington, since the coup had only occurred nine hours earlier, but that I was certain Washington would support any peaceful means for trying to resolve the crisis in a way that preserved the constitutionally elected government and did so without bloodshed. At least I believe I added the latter.

President Yun remained undecided, so I returned to the embassy.

Q: This is really a remarkable thing that you're saying, and here is a government on the verge of toppling, with the president of the government, who holds the ultimate power, spending a great deal of time sitting and talking with a foreign ambassador. Granted, we had many of the cards, but still, weren't messengers coming in? Weren't other people coming in and saying, "My God, you've got to do this or that"?

GREEN: That's remarkable, when you think of it. I don't recall that there were any interruptions, and I was there for four hours.

Q: The main focus, I would say, at that time would be there, and yet you and he were together.

GREEN: Yun Po Sun, for one thing, was a personal friend. Only two weeks earlier, he and his wife had come to our house for a reception, which was unique in terms of the president going to any foreign establishment. He never did. But Yun Po Sun was a good friend. Incidentally, he was no friend of Chang Myon. Therefore, I was talking to a man in the form of Yun Po Sun, who was not naturally disposed to want to get together with Chang Myon, because Chang Myon was his political rival.

Q: What was happening to the government apparatus at the time?
GREEN: I had no idea what was happening to the government apparatus! I had no idea. Things were moving so fast, I was focused on the central point of trying to get the government in these very few hours that we had, or they had, to bring about some kind of solution that would retain the constitutional government. That was the focus, and everything I did was focused on that one thing.

Q: That was your focus, but what was his focus?

GREEN: Well, that was his focus. His focus was one of being desperately unhappy to see his country caught in this terrible crisis. The United States had this enormous power and influence and so forth, and it was natural that he would turn to us. Everybody did turn to us in these terms.

Q: I don't want to dwell on this point, but was the Korean government apparatus, in a way, not working? Weren't people coming in with information and how this thing was developing and other Cabinet members saying, "My God, we've got to do this or that"?

GREEN: I just don't know, Stu. There were undoubtedly a great deal of things churning around and messages coming in. All I can recall was that the conversation seemed to me to be uninterrupted, that this had the president's full attention, because this was a critical point. We were seriously talking about what could be done and what could he do. I was focusing on that. If he was going to do anything, he obviously had to have the support and blessing of the United States, because in this situation, he didn't know who really was on his side.

I returned to the embassy, you might say, empty handed. But several hours later, as I recall it was around 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening, I got a call from President Yun, and he said that he'd been thinking it over and decided that my counsel was probably the best course to take. He, therefore, had tried to get in touch with Chang Myon, but he couldn't locate him, and did I know where he was. I told the president that I would try to find out, and through our various sources, including CIA--we had a very good station chief--we found out where he was, evidently hiding in a nunery that was run by the French.

I got a message through to him that it was very important that he get in touch with President Yun Po Sun immediately, that I would hope to hear from him as soon as possible.

I heard nothing that night, but early the next morning, the French ambassador said that he had received a message from Yun in writing, to pass to me, and that the French obviously didn't want to get involved, that he would pass this message on to me in the south post, where it was arranged that I should meet him, which I did. I picked up a letter addressed to me from Chang Myon.

Q: The prime minister.
GREEN: The prime minister. Before I get into that letter and what it led to, in order to keep the time sequence here, I think perhaps I should return to a little more about what we had learned about the coup during the day of May 16. As I said, we had received no message back from Washington during that day.

Q: We're really talking about 3:00 in the morning, so I would have thought that there would be a response.

GREEN: No, there was nothing that came back from Washington. We did receive in the course of the day one or two telephone calls, one from Bob Fearey, who was in our embassy in Tokyo, a good personal friend, to say that he and his colleagues there fully understood and supported us. I got a similar kind of message from Don MacDonald in the State Department, saying that they were working on it, they understood our position very well, and they were doing all they could to be of help. Those were the kinds of messages that I had, but I had nothing from Washington.

Meanwhile, of course, the press ticker was coming in, and we were getting all kinds of play in the international press, some of them supporting what I'd done, some saying I'd goofed. The Chicago Tribune called me a dunderhead, and The New York Times and Washington Post apparently were playing this up favorably in terms of what we'd done. So there was a mixed kind of reaction, a confused reaction, and the ticker was tapping out constantly editorials and other kinds of press coverage. That was to go on and on for weeks. But my point is that nothing came from our government that was official.

What we had learned in the course of the day was that the real leader behind the coup was Major General Park Chung Hee, who had recently been named deputy commander of the ROK Second Army located in Tegu, which is 100, 200 miles south of Seoul. He was a 44-year-old general, not well known in CinCUNK headquarters, since the Second Army in the southern part of Korea was not under CinCUNK command. Park's inner circle of supporters consisted of colonels and especially lieutenant colonels, of which the most dominant one seemed to be Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chong-pil, who had married General Park's niece.

The proclaimed leader of the coup, however, as it emerged in the course of the day, was no other than Army Chief of Staff General Chang Do Yung, who initially had asked Magruder to help put down the coup, including the use of US armed forces under CinCUNK command, something I guess you know that Magruder had wisely refused to do. General Chang had evidently, during the next few hours, determined the coup was likely to succeed, and he decided to ride the bandwagon by agreeing to become its titular leader.

The coup group, shortly to be called the Junta, declared that its mission was to rid the nation of a weak and corrupt government, and to stamp out any incipient communist influences, referring, of course, largely to the student population, and to the Chang Myon government, which, of course, was wrong, and to restore law and order.
As I said, we still hadn't received orders from Washington or any response from Washington, but I realized that President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were in Canada. The State Department was under, at that point, Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles, who obviously knew nothing about the Korean situation. As I suspected, there were some very strong divided opinions as to how to react, particularly since the coup group seemed to be consolidating its hold on power in the face of apathetic reactions on the part of the Korean masses.
To me, in fact, it was very disillusioning to see with what ease this coup group was able to consolidate its position. You would have thought that there would have been a lot of citizens groups, when all these students and professors and others had been marching through the streets that brought down Rhee, you thought this would have stimulated this kind of reaction. It didn't at all. This, I think, reflected the disillusionment with the duly constituted government. One could almost conclude that, indeed, Korea wasn't ready for democracy! It was that kind of gnawing doubt about the Korean people that I found rather upsetting.

Q: Did you have officers out looking at the streets and seeing what was happening?

GREEN: Oh, yes. They were under orders to report everything that went on, which meant fanning out. We had quite a few people in our various sections. They fanned out and looked and observed, and they talked. Many of them spoke Korean. We knew as much as one could know about the situation. All I'm saying is that there was this general feeling of apathy, of people not standing behind the old government, but not supporting the new, of just waiting to see how things turned out, waiting to play the main chance. To General Magruder and I and our colleagues who had taken a strong stand on behalf of letting these people speak up, because if we hadn't, there would be no time, no encouragement or inclination on the part of anybody to speak up, so we did get into that time. As I say, this seemed to be the reaction, one of general apathy at that time. This was to change, but this is at that time.

We began the second day of the coup, May 17, with still no word from Washington, although, as I said, we had indications from telephone calls that there was a good deal of sympathy in the State Department for the position that I had taken.

But there were also indications that DoD, the Defense Department, was taking a rather different view. They were rather critical of General Magruder, and I think the reason for this criticism was that many of the old-time military who had served in the Korean War and who were very dedicated to the Korean armed forces sort of automatically sided with them, thinking that they represented the military viewpoint. Of course, they didn't. I mean, Lee Han Lim, for example, was against it, and he was the commander-in-chief of the ROK Army. Also the former ROK Army chief of staff was opposed to it, and others. So their suppositions were not well based.
In any case, DoD was reluctant to get involved. They didn't know what to do, whereas State felt that we should come up, as it turned out, with a statement.

So this meant that I had to begin the second day of my trying to rally the government to take some position through Yun Po Sun and Chang Myon, without real Washington authority to do so. As I said, I was now in touch with Chang Myon, and he sent me this letter which was dated the morning of May 17. The letter expressed gratitude for my statements supporting his government, but he wanted to know whether the US Government would continue to support that government, and how far we would go if what he called "the rebels" refused to relinquish power. "Would you," he asked, "either persuade or force the rebels to support the incumbent habitant or make some compromise with them, or let them take over on their own course of condemning the Chang Myon government?" which he said, "Would almost certainly entail court-martialing me and my colleagues, and God knows what would happen to us."

After several further paragraphs pointing to the long-term adverse consequences to the United States of our not opposing the coup, and the loss of CinCUNK's authority and prestige, he talked about how failure to act now would inevitably result in many years of authoritarian military rule, in violation of all that the United States and most Korean people stood for. He said he felt he had to remain in a safe place until these points were clarified.

By the way, he ended the letter by saying, "Destroy after reading," but I evidently didn't, because I came across this letter in my files the other day. I'd squirreled it away somehow, thinking that perhaps it would have some importance for history, and I still have that letter.

Q: It sounds as though he were reading the American mind. The points he made were well suited.

GREEN: Well suited and well formulated. Remember that he had been ambassador in Washington, and I think he knew our government's thinking very well.

Two hours after receiving this letter, he called me up to ask what my reaction to the letter was. I told him that I had received it, and I felt that he still should establish immediate contact with Yun Po Sun, since the president seemed interested in finding a constitutional solution. In fact, over the previous 12 hours, I'd received seven calls either from Yun Po Sun or his chief assistant with regard to the importance of getting in touch with Chang.

Chang replied, expressing concern that they had tried to get him, which implied fear, that he didn't trust Yun Po Sun. As I said, they had been political rivals, although both standing for the same broad principles. I ended the phone conversation by noting that I continued to stand firm in support of his government and, in fact, that I'd just been meeting with the international press at noon on May 17, in which I had reaffirmed my
position, despite all the mounting evidence that the Junta was beginning to assert control and hold over the country.

Chang Myon remained uncertain, and that was to be, as I recall, my last conversation with him.

Returning to the subject of my press conference, the air space over Seoul seemed to be black with planes bringing in the press corps, the international press corps in particular, but also a lot of Japanese newsmen from Tokyo. Huntington Damen, the USIS chief, had announced that I would meet with them all in the USIS conference room. It was already apparent to these correspondents that the coup was succeeding, that the Korean masses seemed apathetic, as well as apprehensive, and that the US Government in Washington was undecided. In the face of all that, they persisted in asking me, wasn't I going to change my position. I defiantly said, "No! What I said yesterday still stands."

"Does it reflect the position of your government?" they asked.

I said, "My government has been fully apprized. I am sure they're sorting this all out, and I await word from Washington." They were dumbfounded that I should take such an independent position without having cleared it all with Washington in advance, and I took pains to point out the whole timing factor of why we had to move when we did. I think, by the way, that most of them clearly understood that and sympathized. At least it was reflected in the articles that they wrote. People like Abe Rosenthal, who rose to great heights in The New York Times, I remember was one of them, and was one of the most prescient and wise of the group.

Some hours later, I did receive a press ticker item that State Department spokesman Lincoln White had declared, in response to questions, that "the State Department stood behind the statements made by the American chargé d'affaires." However, there was no statement by the White House or the Defense Department, and it was already clear to me that Walter McConaughy, Assistant Secretary of State, was pulling out all stops in Washington to give Magruder and me the backing we needed.

Q: McConaughy had already assumed his job?

GREEN: That's right. Not in terms of trying to reverse the coup, because it was already too late for that, but in reasserting support for the principles long advanced by our government. Incidentally, by so reasserting these principles, retaining some kind of leverage over the new military Junta with regard to the return to civilian rule and making them perhaps more attentive to our viewpoint than they would be if we had just supinely gone along with their position or kept quiet. In other words, I could see that our position was going to gain us some leverage, which was going to be critical, although I won't say that that was the reason for my original statement, which was based completely and simply on principle.
Meanwhile, the Junta was beginning to visit on Korea a harsh régime of martial law, curfews, censorship, some 800 newspapers had been closed down, arrests, beatings, and campaigns to root out what they called "moral laxity and corruption." A stream of new austerity and disciplinary regulations were issued. Some of them went to ridiculous lengths. Traffic laws, in fact, for example, were being rigorously enforced by gun-toting military in a highly ostentatious manner, in order to "teach everyone a lesson" to obey the law. Jay-walkers, for example, were forced to squat down on the curbside for half an hour to an hour, to teach them a lesson, and do it in a visible way that other people could find "edifying."

The Junta group was making a great deal of the fact that they were militantly anti-communist, as though that fact in itself would amply justify the coup in the eyes of the Korean people and especially of the United States. It occurred to me, I could say parenthetically, that the United States had, ever since the McCarthy days, made so much of this anti-communism that we really hadn't supplied an affirmative measure as to what we did stand for. So that anti-communism was really what we stood for, rather than being pro-this or pro-that.

Q: This has been an unfortunate theme in our foreign policy, that almost every government that takes power by force, particularly coming at all from the right wing, has used this as its main excuse. And often it's been bought by at least significant elements within American society.

GREEN: Absolutely. In this connection, there were a lot of incredible stories, rumors, going around that Kim Chong-pil, who had married Park's niece, had had leftist connections in his university days, and that even Park Chung Hee himself was tainted really by associations with his nephew.

Q: These were people you really didn't know.

GREEN: These were people we didn't know. As I say, there were rumors all about them being this or being that, and I do think that one can say the very stress upon being anti-communist suggested that they might be otherwise. Some people in our embassy felt that way. I can't say that I felt that way. I did think that it was a possibility, and I did think we had to be always wary of that being a possibility.

Q: You're talking about the lack of a firm response from Washington, the fact that the prime minister and president of Korea couldn't get their act together. But you're not mentioning the one other thing that anybody who has lived in Seoul, as we both have, [knows]. You looked 20 miles north. Was there concern at this time about the North Koreans making a move because of the obvious disarray?

GREEN: Yes, I think there was a good deal of concern about that, although things were happening so suddenly that I don't think the North Koreans would have been able to put themselves in a position to do anything really. We had all the armed forces still up on the
DMZ. They also, by that time, might have rallied the country together, you know, which is what they didn't want. What they wanted to do, realistically, was to see things falling apart, which was happening. So from the North Korean viewpoint, the logical thing might well have been to just let things go the way they are, sliding out of control and increasing internal dissension and so forth. Then when things were appropriate, when things were ripe to move in prematurely--this is all, of course, conjectural--we were always conscious of the proximity of hostile forces, and undoubtedly Yun Po Sun's reaction to the suggestion that there be some kind of a military preponderant force brought to bear around Seoul to deal with the coup group, was unacceptable for that very reason, that it would possibly invite attacks from the north. I don't know. But in any case, we didn't want to see any organized armed clashes in South Korea, that's for sure.

Q: This was a major factor.

GREEN: I was dealing entirely in terms of a kind of political solution, not a military solution, one of the important reasons being the one you cited now, the proximity of North Korea to the scene.

Late May 17, I received a confidential telegram from Assistant Secretary McConaughy, which said that the State Department agreed with the embassy's assessments and agreed that the coup was contrary to our principles and interests, and supported the position that I had taken. However, the telegram went on to say, the State Department had to adopt a position of "wait and see." In the absence of some indication the Chang Myon government was willing to put forth some additional effort to save itself, the Department would refrain from additional public information of US identification with what might be a lost cause.

This was an eminently sensible position. I could appreciate why the State Department had come to that view. I would have, too, now that Chang Myon and President Yun were clearly unable to restore the duly constituted government. The problem now was to get on with the show, and what we were going to do with this new government. The State Department refused to declare a policy toward the coup itself, which I think, again, was wise, and merely acknowledged that Magruder and I were acting within our rights. So as far as the public was concerned, the State Department simply said we acted within our rights. They still hadn't given us the kind of public support, but privately they were fully supportive, so I knew that I was operating on the same wavelength as the State Department would wish me to.

One of the problems that I faced at this time was keeping the whole American community together. We had a lot of Americans there, lots of missionaries and businessmen, and we had the world's largest aid establishment, called USOM.

Q: And a lot of military dependents.
GREEN: A lot of military and other dependents and so forth. So it was a big American colony. I wanted to be sure that they were kept apprized of what was going on, why we were doing what we were doing, and answer any questions that they may have had.

I remember particularly my meetings with USOM and the missionaries. In the case of USOM, the aid mission, they had an auditorium there that seated about 750 people. All the seats were taken and there was a spillover of another several hundred, so I'd speak to the same group twice over, each time for about half an hour, in which I explained our position and answered questions. With the missionaries, I remember them all coming. There were about 140 of them that came to the embassy residence, in the gardens. It was a lovely evening. I stood out there with them and just talked my heart out as to why we had done what we'd done. I had complete support. I felt I had defined support.

The American business community wasn't very big, but it was supportive. I didn't involve myself so much with the military, because that was Magruder's responsibility, and I'm sure that he met with his people. I was really talking about the civilian community.

Q: I want to emphasize here for the record that an American ambassador, particularly in this period of time—and this is true in other places, too—you had several jobs. One, you had to work with the government. You had to work with the American military, but then we had such large civilian components abroad that part of your responsibility, and a very important part, is to be concerned about the welfare, which includes, in this case, the safety, but also the information of this large American community. It's something that you can't put to one side and worry about later; you have to keep this group fully apprized.

GREEN: Absolutely. One of the most heartwarming experiences in my whole career was the support and unity of opinion that I experienced in dealing with the American community. It led me to feel that when Americans are faced with a common danger, they really rally together. This may be true of all countries, but it was certainly true in Korea. Korea, as you know, had had a long history of bickering amongst the missionaries, and yet that evening I had with the missionaries, we were all one. So this was one of the compensations of those difficult days.

Meanwhile, on May 18, Lieutenant General Chang Do Yun, now entitled Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which was called SCNR, sent President Kennedy a letter in which he listed the following as being the policies of the revolutionary government: anti-communism, adherence to the U.N. charter, complete elimination of corruption, effectiveness in combating communist tendencies, and transfer of the control of the Korean Government to clean and conscientious civilians upon completion of the revolutionary government's mission.

Shortly thereafter, he announced to the press that he was going to Washington to discuss these things privately with President Kennedy. We hadn't heard of any such trip, Washington had not heard of any such trip, and I knew right away that the White House would be vastly irritated by his unilateral declaration of a meeting with the President.
Q: You had had no communication with this group?

GREEN: I had had no communication with this group. So what I did immediately was to get, I believe, on the phone to Walter McConaughy, inform him of this, and say, "Look, I know I'm supposed to try to turn this one off, am I correct?"

He said, "Yes."

So there was a quick exchange of messages through whatever channel--I can't quite recall--authorizing me to persuade Chang from going to the States, on the grounds that the President's schedule wouldn't permit it.

Thereupon I called on General Chang to deliver this message, and he persisted in thinking it was most important that Kennedy officially recognize the new Korean Government before he left for the summit meeting. He went on to say that all he asked for was a brief, even 30-minute informal meeting with the President, and that he was preparing a joint communiqué that he hoped the President and he could sign. I was firmness itself in dealing with him regarding this trip to Washington, but I said that his message to the President was entrusting and helpful, and that I trusted there would be a response from the White House. This, indeed, was to come some days later when I was authorized to inform Chang, which I did, that the US Government noted with approval the pledges that he'd made about intentions to return the Korean Government to civilian control.

There was a question, as I recall, also of my trying to get in touch with the real coup leader, General Park Chung Hee in order to establish personal contact and to bring to his attention our views, hear his views. As I recall my meeting with him, which took place the latter part of May, was also for General Magruder to once again express his strong concerns about restoration of the integrity of his command.

By the way, at that time I had about 14 Marine bodyguards, which were regarded as essential for my safety, and they followed me in two station wagons wherever I went.

Q: This was during or prior the coup time?

GREEN: During the coup time and for maybe two weeks afterwards.

So this whole group of cars swept up to General Park's headquarters, which was an old dilapidated building. Of course, all the guards stayed out. Magruder and I, and I think I was accompanied by my military attaché, we called on Park. The principal thing I remember about it was the icy atmosphere in which we were greeted. General Park Chung Hee never smiles anyway, and his lips were firmly set in a thin, straight line across his face. He looked very dour. After the most perfunctory of greetings, he set about strongly avowing his long record of being anti-communist, as though I thought otherwise. He pointed out that the military coup was based on fear of the previous government.
becoming communist-tainted, again to try to develop a feeling on my part of being against a duly constituted government, on the grounds that it was communist-tainted, which, of course, was not really so.

I then pointed out what our reasons were for opposing the coup, and why the United States Government would always stand by a friendly government in time of peril. That remark, by the way, was a very important one, and I'll come back to that later on.

The other main purpose of our meeting with Magruder was to try to get some affirmation about restoration of his authority over the elements that had been taken to Seoul from their positions on the front lines, and he got some kind of assurances from Park on that score, which eventually was an issue that was worked out. It took a bit of doing on General Magruder's side, and his efforts were not helped by the rumors coming out of DoD, especially on the part of those retired generals like General Van Fleet, who were criticizing Magruder publicly. So it undermined his ability to get things back where they should have been.

You know, you could learn very little from the tightly controlled press and radio in Korea as to how the people really felt about these developments, but our embassy staff knew from its many contacts with the Korean community that feelings of bafflement, insecurity, and disillusionment were rife, and that recriminations abounded against the United States, against the old government, against the new military regime.

I wrote a note to myself, which I found in my files at that time, saying that the Koreans are basically a very dissatisfied people, with expectations far exceeding possibilities of realization, that they were sort of dreamers and hopers, and therefore very subject to feelings of disillusionment and resentment against all those that they thought stood in their path. We were dealing with a very kind of fundamental problem in this situation.

_Q: I've heard this before, and I tend to think there's some truth to it, of calling the Koreans "the Irish of the Orient." In many ways, it's the same type of race._

GREEN: There are people that I greatly admire for many reasons. In fact, my wife and I have often said that of all the Asians, we think we like the Koreans the most. We never could explain exactly why. I think it is because of their independence of spirit and also because they're going through so many difficulties. One cannot help but sympathize with Korea for all the dangers and sufferings they've endured.

_Q: There's an outgoing and a directness there, too._

GREEN: Yes. We got some very frank statements from many Koreans, even from Chang Do Yun, by the way, talking to our cultural attaché, Greg Henderson. There were some amazingly frank statements about how they really felt, which tended to confirm all that I'm saying now and to confirm that there was a great deal of inner doubt with regard to this new government.
This new SCNR was obviously being wracked by internal struggles. It wasn't as though they were all one united group. Later on, General Chang Do Yun was to be suddenly ousted from his position as leader. This was preceded by an arrest of all of his entourage, and then suddenly he was grabbed and had nobody to defend him. There were also very clear indications that the lieutenant colonels, in particular, were a source of strong action-mindedness to move, to crack down on the people, and to visit a kind of austere régime on them. There was a kind of vengeancefulness in their position against all those that they thought had stood in their way in the past.

Q: Why lieutenant colonels? In 1961, they were in their late '30s?

GREEN: I say lieutenant colonels for this reason. Lieutenant colonel is the highest level in the military that doesn't really have its hand in the till. The colonels and above are in positions, usually, where they can make something out of their positions. Lieutenant colonels are not. They've also come through field-grade responsibilities where they saw all this and where their resentment deepened, and also lieutenant colonels are the ones that, in the case of Korea, were held up longest in promotions. So that there was this tendency, as I say, for lieutenant colonels to be your politically volatile element. They, of course, were the most senior of all the people below those who didn't get the favors, and therefore they were looked up to by all the people down the line to take the lead. That's why I say lieutenant colonels, not only in Korea, but other places, are very likely to be the incendiary element. Of course, as I said early on, in the case of Korea, they had gone through the Korean War, and what had they got from it? Not very much. But what had their elders got for it? A lot.

These younger colonels within the SCNR, I think, were an increasingly difficult problem for Park Chung Hee to control, and that he was trying to balance one off against the other. I don't think that we ever had access to what really went on in this Junta group, that we'd find that every day there was a great deal of bickering and a great deal of tension and a great deal of differences, which Park Chung Hee was put in the position of trying to moderate, to try to keep under his control, and it wasn't easy.

Meanwhile, on June 21, our new ambassador, Samuel Berger, arrived fresh from his post as Deputy Chief of Mission in Athens. My days as chargé were over.

Q: Had he been nominated before?

GREEN: That's right. We had already known two months earlier that he was coming, and it was not a prospect that I particularly welcomed. The ambassador had a lot of experience in labor and economic issues, and was good at handling them, but he had no experience really on the kind of situation that we faced in Korea, the political strategic position. In fact, he had no experience in Korea at all. He made it clear from the day of his arrival that his views differed from mine. Whereas I was counseling a continuing policy of friendly reserve in our contacts with the SCNR, Ambassador Berger favored
going all out to befriend members of the SCNR, to reassure them of our total unqualified support for them. I warned him that that kind of outgoing position ran the danger of the government taking the bit in its teeth and, for example, locking back up in jail all those Cabinet ministers that we at great length had finally got out of jail. Well, he didn't agree. I might say that the Cabinet members were soon back in jail again.

My views were shared by my staff. Berger, in a way, found himself saddled with an embassy that had a viewpoint that was not in accord with his own. We felt that he was jumping to conclusions very early without absorbing the full measure of what was going on in Korea. We thought he'd be wiser to size up the situation more carefully before adopting a position, but he was very much of a matter-of-fact, get-down-to-business type of person, and he did not like to sit back and think about things like that. He knew damn well what to do.

Q: Do you think also this came from his background? He had made a name for himself early on as being the labor man who was the entré to the socialist government in Britain when we really didn't know anybody when labor first came in, and he had been dealing with essentially friendly governments in Greece and in Europe? It's also an American tendency that the best way to get what you want is to co-opt. If you're wide open and friendly and supportive, you'll get what you want, which doesn't work in many societies. Do you think there's something behind that?

GREEN: Oh, yes, I think there's a lot of truth in that. What you said about his experience in England is a very important one, and he had similar experiences in New Zealand as labor attaché there. Frankly, I liked some of the things about Berger very much. I liked his directness. He did not ignore me; he did consult me. He would draft telegrams and then pass them to me for my comments. My comments were so numerous, my suggested changes so numerous, that most ambassadors would cease turning to a deputy of that type, but he didn't. He was quite prepared to sit down and argue. So to that extent, I liked him. He also gave me a free hand to continue on, but he obviously wanted a deputy of his own choosing, someone whose views were consistent with his own, and preferably who was new to the scene and therefore did not carry as much intellectual luggage as I carried, and who would be more malleable in terms of his own views. As a matter of fact, he was pretty blunt about this.

One time he said that he attached a great deal of importance to the fact that he was specifically asked by General Park Chung Hee and Chang Do Yun that I not accompany the ambassador on his initial calls on those two generals. He interpreted this to mean that these generals did not wish to treat with me. He then went on to say he hoped I wouldn't leave too soon, for he needed my counsel during this transition period, but he wanted me to know that if I wished to be looking for a new job, he would not stand in my way.

I accordingly wrote to Walter McConaughy, who set the wheels in motion, and after many, many months of waiting and uncertainty and unhappiness on my part, and many frustrations, particularly on the part of my wife, who found it rather difficult sometimes to
deal with Mrs. Berger, that after many months, suddenly I was assigned as consul general to Hong Kong, which was probably the most sought-after position in the Foreign Service, certainly in our part of the world, and I'm forever indebted to Walter McConaughy for all he did to give me support in those difficult times and to land me with such a fine job after Korea. As a matter of fact, that assignment was important in itself in telling the Koreans that the US Government, far from putting me in Coventry after my actions, was honoring me with an even more important assignment.

Q: Just to get a little bit of the timing, Mr. Ambassador, how long did you work with Sam Berger until you left?

GREEN: I worked with him from June 21 until my departure from Korea on November 23, five months. I worked with him five months. However, in the course of those five months, I was chargé d'affaires for about two weeks at one time while he went to the Chiefs of Mission meeting, and I also went back to Washington on consultation before I was to go to Hong Kong.

Q: Berger was not assigned to Korea because the coup had happened and he was there. This was just a routine assignment for him, in a way.

GREEN: Yes. It was a routine assignment. As a matter of fact, I was left as chargé d'affaires en pied for two months, from mid-April to June, which is longer than most interims.

Q: I would like to talk about the staff there during this whole period that we're talking about. How well were you served by the CIA? Again, this is an unclassified interview.

GREEN: I think I was pretty well served by the CIA after the coup, in terms of their ability to foresee. Forestall the coup, no. I'm not sure anybody could have done that. That's the kind of thing that's carried on in a way that nobody's ever going to find out about it, if the coup is to succeed. I did get daily briefings from the CIA, including some fascinating interviews which came to our attention through various ways, of what the coup leaders were saying about me, for example, which, I might say, were very alarming at times. I was a marked man at one point. That's one of the reasons why I had all those bodyguards.

Q: The bodyguards were not against communist infiltrators. (Laughs)

GREEN: No, these were against. We didn't say that.

Q: We are talking about a time when you had some lieutenant colonels, direct-action types, with reason.

GREEN: That's right. So all these things through CIA sources I learned. The ROK CIA, meanwhile, had been established under Kim Chong-pil, and we began to have contacts
with them. I think that might have been useful because when our intelligence people worked with other intelligence people, there's some useful results that occur from that. It certainly [was better] than their being at war with each other. So there was a development of ties between our CIA and their CIA, even though we didn't trust Kim Chong-pil further than you could throw an anvil.

As I said, there was one very important development that occurred during those last few months that I was in Korea, in which I was the principal actor. One of my closest friends in Korea, who had been a fellow member of the economic club, we met every week to discuss the economic scene in Korea, a small group of us, came to my house. In fact, he'd come there several times before to talk about the importance that a number of key generals set to a rapprochement between me and General Park. This time they came to my house, however, he came with the news that General Park did want to contact me, and Park proposed that an informal confidential meeting be held, during the course of which Park would explain the position he had taken, and what was most important was to let me know of certain moves that he proposed to take in the near future.

I asked Tchah Ken Hee, whom I called Kenny, if Park would prefer to have the meeting with the ambassador or with the ambassador and me together.

Q: Ambassador Berger was already on board, so seeing the number-two man in the embassy was highly unusual.

GREEN: Very unusual. Tchah replied that Park definitely wanted to have this meeting with me alone, and not even inform the ambassador. I replied that I had to inform the ambassador and to have his approval, which I was fairly sure he would give.

I then asked Tchah if Park had, in fact, indicated at any time that I should leave Korea the way the ambassador had suggested to me. Tchah replied that some of Park's associates so recommended and had tried to convey threats to me so that I would leave, but that situation had recently been completed changed.

Ambassador Berger gave his consent, and on the night of July 12, I and my interpreter were picked up by an unmarked jeep with blinds drawn, and taken to a back-alley restaurant in Seoul. There I was led to a private room, where I met for four hours with Park Chung Hee and his close friend, the mayor of Seoul, Brigadier General Yun Taeil, and a Colonel Cho, serving as their interpreter. My interpreter was Kenneth Campen.

Throughout the evening, Park's manner was friendly, almost affable at times, for example, when he asked me whether he thought I could be his friend, even though he didn't play golf. That kind of joking which was very unusual for him. And forthcoming and direct.

General Park gave a very frank account of the background of the coup and how Chang Do Yun had deceived both Park and Magruder, and under the circumstances, he said he fully
understood why General Magruder had acted the way he had. In fact, Park added had he been in Magruder's shoes, he would have done exactly the same thing. He also wanted me to know that my outspoken support for the duly constituted government was correct and proper and in the best long-term interest of Korea. This is an important point that I will come back to again.

I replied that my concern was not on past events, but on the future and, indeed, on the real success of General Park's government. "This is now in our common interest. Let's put the past aside and consider the future." The question really comes down to how his government can develop good support and understanding at home and abroad, yet over the past eight days there had been a rapid succession of moves, including many arrests and accusations, together with reports of punitive measures being taken by the Secret Police all over the country. "Things like that," I said, "contribute to apprehensions and misunderstandings both at home and abroad," and I thought that kind of thing helped explain the continuing business stagnation, the lack of foreign investment, and the economic decline, that you couldn't have any degree of economic upsurge until these things were straightened out.

Park then gave his indication of his government's intentions to deal with that situation. He said there would be speedy trials and fair trials for all those accused, that many hundreds detained on political charges would be released on July 17. When I asked him about General Lee and Chang Myon being released, he had reasons for not immediate releasing, but indicated that as soon as the young colonels cooled down, that that would be done, which was a clear indication of the problems he faced within the SCNR. He said that orders were being issued to the Army to treat the populous kindly. As to the return to civilian government, yes, that was desirable, but could not be done until age-old social evils and corruption and communist infiltration were corrected, but the government would, nevertheless, soon announce a specific date for return of government to civilian hands. Meanwhile, a new cabinet would be announced, half of whose members would be civilians, that all military officers would in the course of the next year or so be removed from civil service positions and replaced by honest, competent civilians.

Park also asked me if the United States could provide him with an economic advisor, an American, who would be in his outer office, at his beck and call, and supply him with the best in the way of counsel on issues related to the development of the economy. I was prepared for that through Kenny Tchah having forewarned me, and I came up with a name--I've forgotten the name right now--of an officer, and Park agreed to it right away. This was a very important development.

In response to further questions, Park allowed that the power struggle within the SCNR was still unresolved, although he said it was mainly over.

After discussing a number of specific economic and aid issues--I've forgotten exactly what they all were--I took the opportunity to raise with General Park something that had been on my mind ever since I was named to Korea, and that was their relationship with
Japan, that if there was to be any real economic recovery, a constructive relationship with Japan was going to be essential, that Japan's economic upsurge presaged a similar upsurge by Korea. Korea could cash in, in other words, on what Japan was doing. Now that they didn't have a civilian government with a parliament or a National Assembly, which was so terribly anti-Japanese and where it was politically expedient to be anti-Japanese, he was really in a position now to be moving behind the scenes to improve their relationship with Japan. Park was nodding his head, but he was not committal on that point. I do think I got through to him, though.

I remember leaving that meeting with the impression I had been talking with a man who was deeply motivated. He said at least twice in our conversation that he had staked his life on accomplishing the revolution, and he gave every evidence of really meaning it. Park's most revealing remark of that memorable evening, in which many bottles of sake were consumed, causing Park to be periodically leaving the room to go you know where, was when we parted. He turned to me, as he shook hands to say goodbye, and said, "Mr. Green, before leaving, I want you to know that you have done me a great favor."

I was very surprised. I said, "What favor?"

He said, "You made it so difficult for me to pull a coup d'état in this country, that I don't think anybody will ever try it here again. And that's the way I want it to be. You have made it more possible." Of course, I had never really thought of it in those terms, but from his viewpoint, this was really a very telling remark and clearly indicated why he had confidence in me. That's because I had opposed him or anybody else that would suddenly seize power. Now he had confidence in a man like me or my government.

Q: Once in power, he saw it from quite a different perspective.

GREEN: That's right. Once he was in power, he saw it from an entirely different perspective! That's why, basically, he wanted to have that long meeting with me. It's that last final remark. I'm confirmed in that view because over the next several weeks, he asked me out several times to go to one of these kisaeng houses.

Q: Kisaeng being the equivalent to a geisha house.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: For dinner.

GREEN: For dinner and watching dances and things like that. It was really rather baffling as to why he asked me out, because he spoke no English and I spoke no Korean. I don't even recall we had an interpreter, or if we did, he wasn't used very much. Because Park just wanted to sit down there in my company and watch the dances and drink sake and be friends. I really got the feeling that the man liked me, and I had come to like him. A strange kind of chemical process that one cannot explain.
This is to be borne out, if I can leap ahead in history, by the fact that after I left Korea, he wrote to me at least once a year. He frequently urged me to visit Korea. In fact, he urged me to do so when I was assigned as ambassador to Australia in 1973, and I did stop in Korea to visit him, obviously at my expense, not Korea's expense. But it did set up a kind of rapport between two people who had been at one time at loggerheads.

Q: One of the elements that seems to come through is a respect for integrity, that had we taken a passive role or acquiesced, I think this may apply, if one looks at what happened in Vietnam two years later. When you get involved with a coup and you foster a coup, you're unleashing all sorts of forces, but the overthrow of a legitimate government constitutes a disregard of integrity, of supporting that government, that hurts all parties.

GREEN: Yes, I couldn't agree with you more. You said it very well. That was one of the reasons why I was so appalled by the reactions of many Americans, both in Washington and in the press, about "Green backing the wrong horse," as though our role in international affairs should be playing the main chance, a policy of expediency, rather than a policy of principle. I think that, as I said earlier on, our principles had been too much confined to anti-communism and not enough in affirmative terms of human rights and human responsibilities. The two go closely hand in hand. And in terms of supporting governments that reflect the will of the people.

Q: I had an interview more than a year ago with Robert Woodward, who expressed concern about our growing reliance on the CIA, undercover work, and all this. He felt that we had dissipated one of our great advantages in the world; again I come back to integrity. By looking, as you said, for the main chance. I think this is an example of where integrity pays off, and I think it does pay off in the long run.

GREEN: That's right. What our country stands for, not just what it stands against, our willingness to stand by friends in their hour of peril, our reaffirmation of our commitments to other countries, these are the stuff on which our relationships with other countries are based, and if you de-base those in any one country, it spreads and weakens your position everywhere.

Just one final note about my stay in Korea. First of all, Park's promises that he made to me that day weren't all fulfilled. He continued to have difficulties with the SCNR, and it was a long time before many of these things really happened. They did eventually happen, although during his years he never did really return the government to civilian rule, although he civilianized the government. I do think he gave Korea a good government. Some will dispute that, but on balance, I think he certainly gave Korea enough stability that it was able, during the next 20 years, to score the most remarkable economic progress and growth rates of any country in the world at any time in history. So in that sense of the word, he succeeded.
Just one last point about my departure. I left Korea with many regrets, with many feelings of deep attachment. When you've been through that much together, your attachment to your colleagues and friends that you were leaving, people like Don Ranard, who had worked with me hand in hand, and others, was a personal relationship, too, that you hated to see ended. But I was really glad to get on to a new job. I felt that my mission really was over, that a new ambassador was prepared to follow a different line which may or may not have been the wisest thing. I wasn't able to follow Korean events closely after that, although I was to revisit Korea many times when I was Assistant Secretary and in other capacities, and most recently on population issues. I had long been concerned with that as being one of Korea's principal problems.

In my meeting in 1982 with the Korean prime minister, he said to me, in response to my question of what he thought the two greatest dangers were that Korea faced, he said, after a moment's reflection, "A world business recession that lasts more than two years, and the fact that 40% of the population of Korea lives in the city or around the city of Seoul, which is only 20 miles south of the DMZ." Korea had come a long way. Early on, that question was always answered in communist, anti-communist, or the north and the south, or whatever. Now it was expressed in terms of international economic issues, and in terms of demographic cum over-urbanization cum threat terms. Korea had come a long way.

To get back to my narrative, my wife and I and our ten-year-old son Brandon, left Korea for Hong Kong on Thanksgiving day. The fact that we were flying to Hong Kong on Korea Airlines, at that time a pretty shoddy outfit with a very low international reputation, at least in international aviation, drew very favorable front-page notice in all the Korean papers, that my family should risk their lives in that plane, as it were! (Laughs)

The Kimpo Airport was thronged with reporters to interview me on my last day, and I told them a bit about my views on all the difficult, challenging times that I endured, and yet my continuing respect, indeed, affection, for the Korean people. But I said it had been a very aging process. I had arrived in Korea in early 1960, 20 years younger than the President of the United States, and here I was leaving almost two years later, one year older than the President of the United States. I said, "That's how much I've aged." (Laughs)

Q: You mentioned Don Ranard. I recall him when I was serving in Seoul in the late '70s, really, you might say, the twilight years of the Park Chung Hee régime. By that time, he had left the Foreign Service and was very much involved as the activist expert on Korea, opposed to the régime within circles, particularly in the United States, often missionary circles, but others who felt that the Park régime was very harsh. Could you talk a little about his development while you were there and you saw him? It was typical of a certain type of officer.

GREEN: Yes. Don Ranard had a very emotional attachment to the democratic government and democratic process in Korea. He was very much opposed to the military
coup. He was not the kind of person that was prepared to forgive and forget. His position as head of the political section enabled him to retain that position for a long, long time.

My position as chargé d'affaires and later on as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of that area did not permit me to indulge in emotional feelings about the situation in Korea. I also had this personal contact with Park Chung Hee at the end, and as you can see, it frankly left me with a feeling of personal friendship for the man, despite what he had done to democracy in Korea. This doesn't mean that I rationalized that the coup d'état was a good thing, because God knows Korea was to go through all kinds of turmoil--still is--over return to civilian rule. But I did learn a lot from that two years in Korea about human nature and how governments operate, including our own.

I often thought to myself of those words in Oliver Wendell Holmes' poem, "Once to every man and nation comes a moment to decide/Then it is the brave man chooseth and the coward stands aside." That line kept reverberating through my mind all during those difficult May days. It was a very emotional experience to be placed in the position that I was. It was very easy to see things in terms of those who are for us and those who are against us. I fought against that, because I realized that if there was going to be any solution in Korea, there was going to have to be a meeting of the meetings. There was going to have to be a reconciliation.

I was also mindful of something that you raised earlier on that has been a dominant consideration in my mind ever since I joined the ranks of diplomacy. You spoke of how far the United States should go in telling other countries what to do. To what extent does this confront nationalism, the strongest force in any country? How do we deal with a country like Korea, where we had such enormous responsibility and, in those days, were footing the bill, and we had commitments of forces and all that, and had to defend them with the United Nations? How do we go about dealing with the government of a country like that, where our interests are just about as strong as theirs and yet they won't act unless you press them pretty hard, because you're accustomed to do things that are not, from their viewpoint, popular? And to the extent that they accept your urgings, they weaken themselves in the eyes of their own people, and therefore, in the long run, you may be bringing them down, rather than strengthening their hand.

This is a dilemma. I tried to square that circle many ways. I mentioned earlier on how we treated Chang Myon. We were aware of this danger, but evidently partly our persistence in pressing him on these issues, partly his own lack of stature and gumption and strength, will, and partly the forces I mentioned before, the growing discontent. Korea has that combination of poverty and lots of university graduates, and that can be a very dangerous brew, because dissatisfied intellectuals tend to take to the streets. They tend to do something about it, whereas the oppressed masses or ghettos full of poor people don't in themselves constitute a challenge to authority. But well-educated graduates who cannot find jobs with their skills and who are aware of who are the fat cats and the corrupt elements in their society, they are going to be taking to the streets, and they're going to find a lot of people that are going to follow them.
In the case of the military, there was this group of disgruntled officers, and it was they, in the last analysis, who were really the coup itself. Park Chung Hee was using this discontent to bring about a new order in Korea along the lines that he mentioned to me in our conversation. In other words, he was deeply motivated to carry out, he had this group of discontented younger officers, he used their force to get the power, to get through the things he wanted to do, whatever they were, and he succeeded.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, this has been a fascinating conversation. We will have another one later on about population control. I thank you.

GREEN: Thank you.

***

Q: Today is March 17, 1995. Now, as I recall, you left the Far East Bureau to become Ambassador to Indonesia from 1965 to 1969. Did you have any dealings with Cambodia during that period?

GREEN: No, but neither did the US government have much contact. That had much to do with some ill-advised CIA operations against Dap Chuon, a Cambodia provincial governor, which led to Sihanouk's refusal to receive our newly appointed Ambassador to Cambodia, Randy Kidder. (So in effect we had no diplomatic relations with Cambodia from 1965 to 1969.)

On August 17, 1965, shortly after my arrival in Indonesia as Ambassador, President Sukarno of Indonesia announced before a huge national day gathering, including delegations from China and North Korea, the formation of a new Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi-Jakarta-Phnom Penh axis. In actuality this did not mean that Cambodia had abandoned its neutrality or that it had closed ranks with the Asian communist countries in any way. What it did signify was Sihanouk's personal friendship with Sukarno and his desire to gain greater leverage in his dealings with Hanoi.

Q: You mentioned that normal diplomatic relations were restored between Washington and Phnom Penh in 1969, and, as I recall, this was the result of goodwill missions President Johnson sent to Cambodia, one of those missions being headed by Chester Bowles, our Ambassador to India at that time. Now early in 1969 you were detailed to our delegation at the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam. How did Cambodia feature in those talks?

GREEN: Surprisingly little, to the best of my memory. Of course, it was at that time, early in 1969, that the US was beginning a series of secret B-52 attacks against Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia. But at that time we knew nothing about those air raids, either in Paris or in the State Department. (Secretary Rogers may have been informed. I just don't know.)
Q: Yet Sihanouk must have been aware of these B-52 raids involving Cambodian targets. Why didn't he protest?

GREEN: I can only suppose that, if he did know, he kept quiet about it, because there wasn't much he could do to stop the raids and he wouldn't want to advertise his inability to do so. Moreover, if he did know, he might have derived some satisfaction that the hated Vietnamese in Cambodia were being bombed.

Q: But there must have been some American officials in Phnom Penh who knew. Here you are sitting in a country which was...

GREEN: You would think so, Stu, but in fact no American in Phnom Penh or Washington was in the know except for very few in the White House, DOD and probably CIA. Besides, we had no official relations with Cambodia at that time.

Let me now turn to a major development that occurred in September 1969 when Sihanouk visited Hanoi to attend Ho Chi Minh's funeral. While in Hanoi, he entered into certain secret agreements with the North Vietnamese Prime Minister regarding the amounts of North Vietnamese supplies Sihanouk would allow to be shipped through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces operating in easternmost Cambodia against the South Vietnamese. The amounts involved were not large.

Q: How long did this so-called Hanoi-Phnom Penh understanding last?

GREEN: Not long. Some weeks after Sihanouk's trip to Hanoi, he tried to visit two northern provinces (Mondolkiri and Ratnakiri) but he found that he couldn't even enter these provinces which were under the tight control of Hanoi. That's when Sihanouk suddenly realized the true dimensions of the problem he faced in keeping the Vietnamese out of his country. It was probably at this point that he decided on the fateful trip to Moscow and Peking that he undertook several months later.

Q: How did our government react to all these developments?

GREEN: I don't recall that we were aware of all the foregoing events until a bit later. On the other hand, we had a number of practical problems in our relations with Cambodia, problems that involved Congress.

It was in October 1969 that I first met with Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield at the suggestion of Secretary Rogers (and presumably with White House approval).

One of the practical issues was to find out whether Congress would be likely to approve the funds needed to meet Cambodian defoliation claims against the US I can't recall the origin or reasons for those claims but I do recall that both Mansfield, and subsequently
Nixon, believed such claims should be paid by the US In fact, John Holdridge, an FSO detailed to Kissinger's staff, phoned me to say that the President reacted very favorably to the idea advanced in a memo I wrote. I mention this point specifically because it shows how closely the White House and State were cooperating on Cambodia at this stage, both together and with Congress.

Another issue I discussed with Mansfield was the question of assigning any CIA personnel to our Embassy in Phnom Penh. State was opposed, while the White House favored it. But both CIA (Dick Helms) and Mansfield sided with State on this, and the idea was dropped because of Sihanouk's hypersensitivity to the CIA after the ill-fated Dap Chuo incident.

Q: Turning to the fundamental issue of Cambodia's future, how did the US plan to cope with the way North Vietnam seemed to be taking over parts of Cambodia. You mentioned two provinces already under their effective control, as well as the Ho Chi Minh Trail and Viet Cong privileged sanctuaries in areas of Cambodia bordering South Vietnam.

GREEN: At that stage--that is in late 1969 and early 1970--the White House and State seemed to be agreed on doing all we could to uphold Cambodia's neutrality. That seemed to be the only effective way of preserving Cambodia's territorial integrity.

With the approval of Secretary Rogers, I met several times with French Ambassador Lucet in Washington to discuss how best to promote international support for Cambodia's neutrality, since the French seemed to be so keen on the idea. I also visited Paris to discuss this issue with Froment-Meurice who was my counterpart in the Quai d'Orsay (French Foreign Ministry), and the French were seeking to promote support for Cambodian neutrality with China through the efforts of their Ambassador in Peking, Etienne Manache.

Q: Wasn't there some kind of international group composed of representatives of Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia that was seeking agreement among all the principal powers on respect for Cambodia's neutrality?

GREEN: You're right, but I can't recall the timing of this international group's efforts. I think it was a bit later that they visited Washington as well as Moscow, Peking, London and other key capitals. But their effort got no positive results because of Hanoi's strong opposition conveyed to Moscow and Peking. Anyway, it was all a futile exercise because of what was about to happen.

Q: What was that?

GREEN: Sihanouk left Cambodia in late January 1970 for France where he planned to spend a couple of months on the Riviera for health reasons. He did this often, but on this occasion he may have had in mind to extend his absence from Cambodia in order to visit Moscow and Peking with regard to North Vietnam's operations in Cambodia. Anyway,
Sihanouk departed for Paris, leaving the government in the hands of General Lon Nol and his Foreign Minister Sirik Matak.

During Sihanouk's absence in France, there were growing student-led demonstrations in Phnom Penh against corruption involving the Sihanouk government in general, prominently including Princess Monique, Sihanouk's wife, who was running gambling casinos. There was also resentment against Sihanouk's inability to keep the Vietnamese out of Cambodia. Overall, it was clear that the better educated Cambodians were tired of Sihanouk's rule and had no trouble in gaining the support of students and the military. The peasantry was not involved, remaining loyal to Sihanouk.

Starting with demonstrations in Svay Rieng Province, followed by the sacking of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Embassies in Phnom Penh by thousands of youth (probably with Lon Nol's connivance), Sihanouk angrily left France for Moscow on March 13. It was at that stage the views of State and the White House began to diverge.

The deposing of Sihanouk by unanimous vote of the National Assembly on March 18 marked the beginning of a new era in Cambodia, which the State Department saw as fraught with dangers but which the White House saw in terms of opportunities to build up Lon Nol and strengthen the FANK (Cambodian army). President Nixon asked me to draft several personal Nixon-to-Lon Nol telegrams containing rather extravagant expressions of friendship and support. I was concerned that Lon Nol would read into these messages a degree of US military support and commitment that exceeded what our government could deliver on (given Congressional attitudes in particular).

I also regarded Lon Nol as lacking the qualities needed to lead his country out of its mess. I further downgraded him for having sent his family to Singapore for its safety, while the US kept its Embassy families in Phnom Penh partly in order to show our confidence in the Lon Nol government.

Q: But hadn't things progressed to the point where any restoration of Sihanouk was out of the question?

GREEN: You're right, Stu. A solution based on Sihanouk's restoration was by then out of the question, at least for an indefinite time. So what to do?

This prompted me to prepare a recommendation in the form of a 4-page memorandum reviewed and approved by my colleagues in State, including INR. With Rogers' approval, it was sent to Al Haig, Kissinger's deputy, since he was emerging as the key man in the White House on Cambodian policy.

The memo analyzed Peking's and Hanoi's conflicting interests and motivations with regard to Cambodia. Peking, for example, probably saw its interests served by an Indochina composed of separate "independent" states, whereas Hanoi seemed bent on making all of Indochina subservient to Hanoi.
As to US policy, I warned against active US intervention in Cambodia since that would inevitably connote a continuing US responsibility to sustain its government and that could not be achieved without a sustained large deployment of US forces there—an eventuality which was politically impossible given the mood of our Congress and people. Under the circumstances, our policy should be one of "waiting on events, saying little except acknowledging our broad support for Cambodia's neutrality." (France was still hoping to entice Sihanouk back to France and thence to have him return to Cambodia possibly with Soviet and even Chinese connivance.) As to South Vietnamese cross-border operations against communist sanctuaries in Cambodia, that should be encouraged but without any US involvement, for we must do all possible to support the case for Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity.

My memo was ignored/rejected by the White House. Haig, in fact, urged US intervention, and the President, and then Kissinger (somewhat reluctantly), agreed.

At about this time (early April 1970), differences arose within the State Department over the issue of US military weapons assistance to Cambodia. All of us were opposed to US force involvement, but Bill Sullivan (my deputy who was also chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Vietnam) favored sizeable US arms assistance to Cambodia, insisting that all such assistance had to be overt. Concealment was both impossible and politically unacceptable. I argued that Congress would never approve arms assistance to Cambodia, at least not on any meaningful scale. Rogers supported Sullivan until he learned of how strong Congress' opposition was.

Q: So what could be done to deal with the build-up of Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia? After all, we were committed to a policy of Vietnamization; yet it was going to be most difficult to carry through successfully on that policy, if the communists could operate increasingly from bases in Cambodia.

GREEN: Well, I felt that rather than trying to arm and equip the Cambodians (something Congress strongly opposed), we should encourage the South Vietnamese to conduct raids against these sanctuaries in Cambodia. However, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams evidently sided with the White House in believing that the South Vietnamese were unable to conduct successful raids against these sanctuaries without strong US support. My reaction to that thesis was: well, if that's so, then our Vietnamization program was a clear failure—and we will never be able to get out of the Vietnam quagmire.

It was at that point, around April 20, 1970, that Lon Nol sent Nixon a long telegraphic request for weapons to defend Cambodia. The request far exceeded levels which even the White House felt our Congress would support.

So, at that point, Nixon evidently came up with a stratagem to gain strong Congressional approval for the secret plan he had evidently been drawing up with the approval of
Bunker and Abrams (but completely behind the back of the State Department, including Rogers). He sent Rogers on April 27 (I believe) to the Hill to gain Senate support for a strong South Vietnamese attack against the sanctuary areas in Cambodia. I accompanied Rogers.

Rogers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we had just received a request from Lon Nol for US military equipment. Senator Fulbright asked for specifics about what kinds of weapons, and in what quantities.

At Rogers' request, I then read out the list of specific requests. Fulbright exploded: "Why that must amount to over half a billion dollars!" Then Rogers said: "You tell them, Marshall, what we figure it all adds up to."

I told the Committee that it amounted to $1.4 billion.

This shock treatment had its calculated effect. Said Senator Church (with the nodding assent of his colleagues): "I have no objection to South Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia. Cross-border operations are okay. Here, in fact, is a good place to test the effectiveness of Vietnamization." Said Senator Cooper: "The President now has support for Vietnamization. Let's not destroy that."

Now, what Rogers didn't tell the Senators (evidently because Rogers didn't know) was that the White House was not just seeking Congressional endorsement for South Vietnamese attacks against the sanctuaries but also to have these attacks supported by US ground forces. All this was, of course, to lower Rogers' standing with Congress: either he knew and was artfully deceptive, or he didn't know and was without influence.

Q: When did you first learn of Nixon's decision to commit US forces in the Cambodian incursion?

GREEN: Let's see. I learned of it the day before the incursion was launched on April 30. So that would be at the WASAG meeting on the morning of April 29. I was astounded when Kissinger mentioned the President's decision to commit US ground forces. When I registered my objections as State representative at that meeting, Kissinger said the operation was already approved by the President. I could see what a spot the decision put Rogers in with the SFRC.

Rogers was subdued when I called him about the WASAG meeting. I gathered he had just given his reluctant consent to this ill-advised operation.

I was with Rogers in his hideaway office on the 7th floor of the State Department late in the evening of April 30, listening to Nixon's announcement over TV of his rationale for ordering the incursion including US ground forces. As Nixon concluded his maudlin remarks about the US otherwise appearing as a "pitiful, helpless giant," Rogers snapped
off the TV set, muttering, "The kids are going to retch." He clearly foresaw how the
speech was going to inflame the campuses. That was several days before Kent State.

Q: That was the incident when the Ohio National Guard fired on the Kent State campus
protestors, killing three.

GREEN: Shortly after the President's TV performance, there were several of Kissinger's
staff who resigned in protest. Less spectacular was the letter of protest signed by 200 in
the State Department, including 50 FSO's. However, not a single member of my bureau
(EA) was among the signers, for which reason Rogers rewarded me by naming me
chairman of a new special group on Southeast Asia, which held weekly meetings for the
next 18 months, and submitted analyses and recommendations to the Secretary of State. It
had little influence with the White House.

Q: Returning to the morning of May 1, 1970--the day of the incursion, what, in fact, was
the State Department's responsibilities in supporting the President's decision?

GREEN: As usual, in such situations, we in State, responsive to White House direction,
immediately set about the task of giving diplomatic, VOA and other PR support to the
President's decision (including explanations to Lon Nol why he was not consulted on the
incursion). As a May 9 WASAG meeting in the White House basement concluded, Nixon
wandered in and took an empty seat next to mine at HAK's conference table. He turned to
me and said something to the effect that, whereas I had opposed the incursion, he
appreciated the fact that I loyally carried out the President's decision.

Q: Was that a compliment or a threat?

GREEN: Probably both. All during May, I was the leading State Department briefer on
events leading up to, and justifying, the incursion. I had to put up with some heckling in
the State Department auditorium, but, by and large, the briefings went well, since we
were assisted by a lot of "factual" information supplied by our intelligence regarding
enemy losses of ammo dumps and the like in sanctuary areas. But the Senate, especially
the SFRC, reflecting the angry mood of the media and campuses, finally passed the
Cooper-Church amendment on June 30. By then, a reluctant Nixon had already ordered
the withdrawal of US forces from Cambodia. I suspect Rogers had some influence on that
decision.

Meanwhile Alex Johnson under White House pressure, had set up an informal group of
legal and pol-mil advisers to figure out ways in which the US could most effectively
provide aid to Cambodia in the face of all the legal restrictions now in force. Tom
Pickering proved to be the most effective member of this group which abided by the
letter, but not the spirit, of Congressional restrictions.

From May onward, two of my particular headaches (which put me at odds with HAK and
Haig) were: (1) White House efforts to involve Southeast Asian countries, especially
Indonesia, in support of the Cambodian military; and (2) Al Haig's missions to Phnom Penh.

With regard to (1), the White House tried to supplement the paltry $7.9 million MAP program for Cambodia, established by presidential determination on May 21, through Indonesia and Thailand providing Cambodia with some of their MAP-funded equipment. However, the White House refused to face up to the fact that, under law, such transfers would have to be paid out of Cambodian MAP funds. The State Department was committed to report to Congress all such MAP transfers by September 30, 1970, and periodically thereafter.

The issue was further complicated in the case of Indonesia by how these White House pressures were creating some serious internal political problems within Suharto's government.

At some juncture, I can't recall the date, Kissinger, before leaving Washington for the weekend, left with me a request to send a priority telegram to Ambassador Swank in Phnom Penh instructing him to seek Lon Nol's approval for (a) Indonesian military teams to provide field training for FANK, and (b) Thai AF planes to deliver supplies by air to FANK field forces. In carrying out HAK's request, I included a sentence in the telegram to the effect that it was only fair to point out to Lon Nol that costs for such Indonesian and Thai support were chargeable to Cambodian MAP funds. Lon Nol rejected the proposal out-of-hand. HAK was furious.

Q: Well, I can see why he was, but you, as a State Department official had to answer to Congress on all these matters.

GREEN: Yes. Moreover, it was not just a question of being honest and avoiding serious misunderstandings, but also a question of how such Indonesian and Thai involvement would spread the poison of Cambodia into other parts of Southeast Asia. Clearly our sights had to be set on damage control.

Earlier I mentioned Al Haig's missions to Phnom Penh as being my second biggest headache. I tried unsuccessfully to have a State Department Cambodian specialist accompany Haig on his trips to Phnom Penh. I received only the skiniest of oral reports form Haig about his trips, which left Mike Rives upset because he was excluded from Haig's meetings with Lon Nol. A more fundamental objection to Haig's missions was the way he was deliberately undercutting Rives and, after November 1970, Coby Swank. He arranged to establish an exclusive CIA channel between himself and Tom Enders, Swank's deputy, who was considered to be more activist and gung-ho (like Haig). From then on, it was Haig who was running the "sideshow," step-by-step building up our defense assistance team, replacing Fred Ladd (the sensible military adviser Alex Johnson had originally selected) with the loud-mouth bumptious General Mataxis, and generally undercutting any credible Cambodian claims to being neutral. Spiro Agnew's trip to Phnom Penh in late July 1970 was a PR disaster, with photos in the world press showing
Agnew escorted by highly visible machine-gun toting SS men. Rives' efforts to get these men not to display weapons so openly resulted in Rives being fired from his job. Haig had been spoiling for an opportunity to have Rives removed.

Q: Did you visit Phnom Penh during the period 1970-71?

GREEN: Yes, twice. My first visit was in early July 1970, accompanied by my wife. We were traveling with Secretary Rogers, but for some reason he decided to stay in Saigon and sent us on to Phnom Penh for three days before rejoining his party in Saigon. Lisa and I stayed with Mike Rives. He had only a few officers on his staff at that time. In fact, he had no chauffeur, so that when he took us to the Paris Restaurant (excellent cuisine) the first evening, he drove the limousine separated from Lisa and me by the glass partition. (It's funny how little details like that remain fixed in one's memory.) Another thing I remember about this visit, which was the first of any Washington official during that period, was the good conversations in French that Mike Rives and I had with Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. Of the two, Sirik Matak was more impressive with his considerable experience in diplomacy (Japan and the Philippines) and with his command of governmental operations, for he was in real charge of the Cabinet, just as Lon Nol was of the FANK.

I had good, detailed briefings by Mike Rives, Fred Ladd, Andy Antippas and others in the small mission.

They had mixed feelings about the foreign press corps and the visits of US congressmen and other VIPs. The views of such visitors tend to be too assertive, hawkish and optimistic. The visitors seemed to be surprised how much better things looked in Phnom Penh than they had been led to believe. In fact, one group of five House members I met in Phnom Penh were irritated with the State Department for being so cautious about their visiting Cambodia.

It was clear to me that Mike Rives had his problems with the foreign press whose numbers had dwindled from 100 in May down to 40 while I was there. These problems seemed to be related to Mike's shyness and unfamiliarity with how to handle the press. Mike also needed an experienced administrative officer who spoke French.

On the other hand, Mike was highly knowledgeable, hard-working and courageous. He clearly deserved far more appreciation for his accomplishments than he got from Al Haig and the White House.

Aside from my Embassy briefings, by far my most interesting conversation was with French Ambassador Dauge, who had a wide range of information sources (businessmen, missionaries, planters, government advisors). Dauge pointed out that the North Vietnamese in Cambodia treated the populace discreetly, never stealing, paying for their food and services, ever seeking good will and honoring the name of Sihanouk which resonates well with the peasantry making up 85% of the Cambodian population. At the
same time, the North Vietnamese have made no real effort to set up political cells, relying for that purpose on the Khmer Rouge, long opposed to Sihanouk.

Dauge attached more importance to the Khmer Rouge than did any other official I met in Cambodia. In his words: "Hanoi has been carefully training Cambodians in Hanoi for the express purpose of supporting the Khmer Rouge against Sihanouk, eventually bringing Cambodia under North Vietnamese domination." (Quoted from my diary.) Dauge continued: "These Khmer Rouge, unlike the North Vietnamese, are not making the pro-Sihanouk pitch that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are making in Cambodia." It is a "curious dichotomy" he concluded, "though I feel that Sihanouk has no future in Cambodia," one reason being Sihanouk's turning to China rather than to North Vietnam.

I mention the foregoing in some detail because, quite frankly, I did not comprehend then, or for some time thereafter, the importance of the Khmer Rouge, or who they were or what were their goals. I guess I had them confused with the Khmer Krom, the Khmer Serei and the Khmer Communists. They were not conventional communists but rather extreme zealots out to remake the whole nation in the bloodiest manner.

At the time of this July 1970 visit, there was a strong nationalistic upsurge, with young Cambodians flocking to the colors. Phnom Penh was spotlessly clean and superficially peaceful, though ancient Khmer-Tonkinese hatreds boded ill and there were thousands of Vietnamese refugees crowded into holding areas along the Bassac River banks. Atrocities against Vietnamese refugees were widely reported, as were Vietnamese atrocities against Cambodians.

I was well aware that the FANK was no match for the well trained and armed North Vietnamese and that the best we could hope for was to keep as much of Cambodia out of North Vietnamese control as possible and to retain as much of Cambodia's spirit of nationalism and appearances of neutrality as possible. In any case, we had to live with the realities of strong Congressional and public opposition to the US getting further involved in Cambodia.

Flying back to Saigon, Lisa and I rejoined Secretary Rogers' party headed for the Far East Chiefs of Mission Conference in Tokyo which I chaired. Since there were no US representatives from Cambodia at the conference, it became my responsibility to provide the overall assessment of prospects in Cambodia. The record of that meeting has me concluding that, "Cambodia faces a tenacious and resourceful enemy, a collapsing economy and insufficient outside assistance." However, these are somewhat offset by "true nationalism, Buddhist antipathy toward the atheist aggressors, and a countryside generally hostile to the North Vietnamese and their puppet Sihanouk..."

When I visited Phnom Penh in May 1971, in the company of Jack Irwin and Bill Sullivan, we were concerned, as we said in our report, "how the weight of official Americans in Phnom Penh, both civilian and military, were helping to suffocate Khmer nationalism and
enthusiasm." We recommended that the size of our mission not exceed 100, that marginal programs be phased out, and that DOD should consider waiving end-user check requirements in order to keep down the numbers of Americans in Cambodia. By May 1971 a supplemental appropriations bill provided for well over $200 million in both economic and military assistance for Cambodia. Khmer leadership was more seasoned, having withstood many challenges. However the leaders were less sanguine, more sober about prospects. Rather than seeing victory in the offing as they had in 1970, they were gearing up for the long haul, with FANK now 200,000 strong in comparison to 35,000 in 1970.

Yet more and more of Cambodia was passing under NVN control so that only Phnom Penh and the land corridors to Sihanoukville and to Thailand via Battambang were relatively secure.

It remained pretty much that way through my remaining time as Assistant Secretary, with US bombers pounding away at NVN positions largely in eastern Cambodia. The fate of Cambodia was now inexorably linked with the fate of Vietnam. It might have been otherwise.

Q: It seems to me that this whole tragic saga throws a lot of light on personalities, as indeed all such crises do. First of all there is the question of Nixon and Kissinger. Of the two, who would you say was the more determined to go ahead with the US ground force involvement in the Cambodian incursion?

GREEN: I would say Nixon, because he had an absolute "thing" about being the tough guy (like General Patton), especially so that the North Vietnamese would not take us for granted and would eventually be willing to settle on a peaceful solution. And, of course, Nixon had a lot of people in Saigon, both US and Vietnamese, who agreed with that tactic, including Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams.

Kissinger, in order to solidify his standing with the President and to weaken that of Rogers, was the President's willing accomplice in carrying out the fateful decision. But I cannot see Kissinger as urging the president to make the decision he did, for it brought Kissinger a lot of grief, as he must have known it would. Shawcross' "Sideshow," a best seller, is a blistering attack in the Nixon-Kissinger policies toward Cambodia, with Shawcross' comments about Kissinger being excessively unfair.

Q: Your mention of trying to keep down the number of American officials in Cambodia reminds me of a long interview I did with Andy Antippas, who...

GREEN: Oh, yes, I remember him well as one of the best informed officers we ever had in Cambodia.
Q: Andy said that we were also flying advisers into Phnom Penh in the morning, but they would leave at night. The idea was that they didn't stay overnight, so they didn't count on the total number. That sort of circumvention of Congress was being too clever by half.

GREEN: You're right; and of course people on the Hill including investigative staffers (of whom there are plenty) know, or get to know, all about such shenanigans. You can't operate that way.

Q: What about the problem Coby Swank faced when he must have known that Al Haig was by-passing him in order to deal with Coby's deputy, Tom Enders?

GREEN: Coby just learned to live with the problem. It didn't affect his standing with the State Department. On the other hand, Tom Enders was running risks by his by-passing official channels in dealing directly with Al Haig. Tom Enders has always been an ambitious officer, but he could see that, while events were elevating his standing with the White House, they might have the opposite effect with the State Department. I know, because Tom broke down at one point and confessed to me how all these events were affecting his sense of duty toward the Secretary of State. This was no play-acting performance. He was genuinely in anguish.

Q: Let's talk about the role of the foreign service officer when faced with carrying out a presidential decision with which he disagrees. I recall there were several on Kissinger's staff, including one FSO (Bill Watts), who resigned over the president's decision to commit US ground forces in the Cambodian incursion of April 30, 1970.

GREEN: Alex Johnson has as interesting passage on this subject in his book, The Right Hand of Power. He points out that some 50 junior FSO's, none of whom served in Southeast Asia, addressed "a protest letter" to the Secretary of State over this decision. They were perfectly entitled to do this through the dissent channel, so long as it remained private and confidential. But they naively xeroxed multiple copies for a maximum number of signatures. Copies of this letter reached the press. When Nixon found out about this, he ordered the Secretary to fire all who signed. Rogers and Alex eventually calmed the President down and none were fired.

Q: Yes, but to get back to those who did resign on Kissinger's staff. How about you? After all you opposed the President. Did you at any point consider resigning over his decision?

GREEN: Yes, but then we FSO's are like our military--we carry out orders once those orders are determined and issued. Moreover, in my case, I managed to stay on to fight further battles over our Cambodian policy, at least insofar as successfully opposing White House efforts to involve Thailand and Indonesia in its losing proposition.

Q: I think that's a good place to stop, unless you had any further involvement in Cambodia after 1973.
GREEN: Only in 1981 when I chaired the State Department's Advisory Panel on Indo-Chinese Refugees. By that time, the war in Vietnam had ended disastrously, although the disaster was even greater in Cambodia where Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge was still visiting some of the worst horrors in modern history on his fellow Cambodians, as well as on Vietnamese who were trying to flee from Vietnam through Cambodia to Thailand.

I surreptitiously spent a day in a part of westernmost Cambodia which was not under Pol Pot's control. But all of that is covered in the report issued by our Advisory Panel in 1981.

***

Q: This is a continuation of the interview started in March 1995.

Now we're returning to the time when you were returning from Korea in 1962, was it? Then you were...

GREEN: No. I went from Korea around Thanksgiving Day in 1961 to Hong Kong as Consul General. I was Consul General there for about a year and a half when I was called back to Washington.

Q: Let's take that period. When was that? 1962?

GREEN: I came back to Washington in 1963 to be Deputy Assistant Secretary, basically to take a long, hard look at China policy. However, after President Kennedy was assassinated [in 1963], it was clear that we couldn't get some of our major proposals through our government, although we almost got liberalization of travel to all countries, removing any restrictions on travel. However, ARA [Bureau of American Republic Affairs], claimed that this would upset their understandings with the Organization of American States. So we never got that one through. Meanwhile, Vietnam was increasingly taking up everybody's time.

During this period from 1963 to 1965 when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, my concerns with Japan were really quite secondary. In fact, it's rather hard for me to remember some of the things that we did at that time.

I remember one meeting we had at the Chiefs of Mission Conference in 1971 in Baguio [Philippines], where Armin Meyer, our Ambassador to Tokyo, made a very "upbeat" presentation on Japan. It certainly pictured Japan as our most important partner in the world. Our Ambassador in Korea, Bill Porter, really "sawed" Ambassador Meyer on that. He made a long, fairly sarcastic and sometimes humorous reply to Armin Meyer, asking what the Japanese were doing for us. What burdens were they carrying? What is their attitude toward the world and toward Korea--which had been the object of Japanese contempt for a long time. Ambassador Porter was speaking like a Korean.
Q: But in a way, isn't there a considerable kernel of truth in this? In the case of those two countries, China and Japan, haven't we had something of a "love-hate" relationship? But the "love" relationship gets more involved. It strikes me that we really weren't asking much of Japan.

GREEN: No, we weren't asking much of Japan. We could see that Japan was going to be terribly important in the future. Its GNP was rising very rapidly with growth rates running around 9% a year. Japan loomed as the major contributor to economic development support programs for East Asia and even for Africa and other parts of the world. We saw Japan in those terms.

During these years we also developed closer contacts with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. When I was Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bill Bundy [the Assistant Secretary] had meetings quite often with the Japanese. That was a system which I carried on later. In fact, during Bill Bundy's tenure as Assistant Secretary, I was more or less the person representing the Bureau of East Asian Affairs on all issues relating to Northeast Asia, because he was so involved with Vietnam and Southeast Asia. I was virtually the Assistant Secretary for Northeast Asia, as he was for Southeast Asia, except when he would go on a trip, I would have to take over his problems, and vice versa. He and I were a very close team. We had gone to school and college together and traveled to Europe together between our graduation from Groton and arrival at Yale. So we knew each other very well.

I would say that there was a lot of forward motion in Northeast Asia during that period. The growth figures, of course, would show that. While we felt that Japan could do more to help developing countries, its "rate of donations" was greatly improved over what it had been earlier on. We were grateful for that. Furthermore, on the diplomatic side Japan was eager to play a more active economic and developmental role in all parts of the world, including in Afro-Asian affairs. As I was to find out in Indonesia, Japan was able to help out in these aid donor groups. Japan was "coming of age"--that's all, though it had a ways to go.

We had these annual meetings with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. I remember attending one such meeting during this period in Williamsburg, VA. I also went to Japan as the chief of our delegation to a meeting with the Japanese up in Miyano-shita, near Mt. Fuji. We and our Japanese Foreign Office counterparts felt that we had a common stake in the world, with the US coming to depend more and more on Japan, particularly in economic terms. We also saw advantages for all concerned in the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, because it provided a kind of protection for everybody, including, paradoxically, China and Russia. So the Japan-America relationship was highly "stabilizing" in that part of the world.

Q: In some countries you can talk to the Foreign Ministry, but they just don't play any significant role in their government. There is a sort of "disconnect" involved. With Japan
did you find that the Foreign Ministry played a strong role, as did the State Department, with some exceptions, in our government regarding foreign policy?

GREEN: The officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry were very important within the Japanese Government because, first of all, the ministry contained many of Japan's elite. They were extremely well educated. They had good foreign connections, with Japan heavily dependent on other countries, both politically and, of course, economically. The problems we had with Japan at that time were not so much directly with Japan. They were largely subjected to third countries problems.

Japan was worried about our relationship with China. They were worried about our relationship with Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. They were worried that the United States was going to draw Japan into "dicey" situations. When they read about how our Congress and Washington in general behaved, they weren't always sure that we would act sensibly in crises. If we did wrong or guessed wrong, Japan would be drawn into the vortex. So these are the kinds of things that bothered the Japanese.

Q: Could you "allay" these concerns at all?

GREEN: Yes, we allayed them by consultations--real consultations. Before we did anything, we made a practice of letting them know. We would try to get their agreement. That's how this whole question came up of not having gained their support when President Nixon went to China. This was such a major irritant in our relationship, because we'd been telling the Japanese, year after year, to stay with us on the Chinese representation issue. They did. They "played ball" with us, though they were very anxious to trade with China. We advised them to "go easy" and so forth. So we had a staying hand on their wrist. And all of a sudden, without telling them, we got to Peking first.

Q: This was when you were Assistant Secretary?

GREEN: I was Assistant Secretary. We'll come back to that, of course. I've been jumping ahead. I was simply trying to say that the whole question of consultations developed during the period we're talking about--1963 to 1965. This was part of the formative period in the consultations process.

Q: When you were Deputy Assistant Secretary, what was your feeling about President Johnson's interest in Japan?

GREEN: I'm not sure whether I remember much about President Johnson's interest in Japan. I don't remember his being that much concerned with Japan.

Q: Well, that's an answer.

GREEN: I remember talking with President Johnson about Indonesia and about how important Japan was as the principal economic supporter of Indonesia. I also told him that
I consulted with my Japanese colleagues, whom I'd known very well. This became kind of a way to "get through" to Sukarno. Sukarno's Japanese wife was a close friend of the Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia, who then introduced me to her. Of course, LBJ was primarily concerned with our growing involvement in the wars in Indochina, and he must have become aware of the fact that any heavy bombing of Asians in Southwest Asia was likely to be deeply disturbing to Asians elsewhere, including Japan. The Japanese government cooperated with us in not raising major obstacles to our military operations in Indochina, but they did this with many reservations and considerable reluctance.

Q: There were those who felt that there was a certain amount of racism in that situation.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: I wonder whether we might not stop at this point.

GREEN: OKAY.

Q: We'll pick it up the next time, because it's another long period of time, when you were Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Unless there's something that you would like to raise.

* * * *

Q: Today is March 10, 1995. We're moving to the period of the Japanese connection when you were Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific in Washington. This was 1969-1973. Let's talk about Japan. When you took over this position in 1969, how did you view Japan as a factor in our foreign relations at that time?

GREEN: I had already had several assignments related to Japan. Japan had been a thread throughout my career. During the period from 1969 to 1973 I saw Japan as increasingly important on the world scene, and especially in East Asia. I saw the primacy of the US-Japan security relationship in the broadest sense of the word. We had a common goal. Many objectives on the world scene were shared objectives. Japan had the technological and economic strength. We had a lot of that but we also had the military strength. Therefore, by working in unison, with each country participating to the maximum extent in accordance with its special strengths, we could make quite a mark on the world in terms of peace and progress. Not for any expansionist reasons but simply for improving conditions of life for the people of the world.

Q: We're talking about 1969, when you became Assistant Secretary. This was...

GREEN: The first experience I had with Japan in 1969 right after I was appointed Assistant Secretary by President Nixon, was in the course of a trip through the whole of East Asia, meeting with the various national leaders, all of which I've covered in the book I co-authored entitled War and Peace with China.
As Assistant Secretary-designate, I visited Japan in April 1969 at the end of a long trip through East Asia. My purpose was principally to convey to Japanese leaders impressions of my trip and to answer questions about President Nixon's views. This segment of my trip was very much like the others. In Japan my pitch was that we would stand by our commitments and that we considered our security treaty with Japan to be the keystone of our whole security position in that part of the world, and so forth.

I also mentioned a number of things about the countries of the area being in a better position to "fend for themselves." I also explained the Vietnamization program, which was already under way, involving turning over more responsibilities to the Vietnamese. So that was my first connection with Japan during the Nixon administration, when I met the leaders.

The second contact with Japan during my time as Assistant Secretary was very closely related to the first one. That concerned "The Nixon Doctrine" itself. You remember that "The Nixon Doctrine" originated on July 25 [1969], when the President was making a trip around the world. He stopped off in Guam and had a background press conference at the Top-of-the-Mar Hotel.

In this press conference President Nixon expressed what became known as "The Nixon Doctrine." Well, along with Bob Barnett, I had written the "scope paper" for his trip through Asia in July [1969]. In this paper I suggested that the President say many of the things that I had mentioned earlier on in March and April [1969] about the countries of the area being in a better position to fend for themselves.

In his backgrounder, the President put his emphasis more on military affairs, on our defense commitments, and on our progress to help strengthen the defense capabilities of our friends and allies. However, it was the primary responsibility of each country to provide for its own defense, to the maximum extent possible. We could only provide assistance in a supplementary sense.

Quite frankly, this had a lot to do with Japan, because in the scope paper that Bob Barnett and I had written for the President's trip around the world we emphasized the fact that these countries were "more on their feet" these days, with Japan beginning to provide economic assistance, as indeed it had in Indonesia, where they were giving just as much assistance as we were. Later on, they gave more. My idea of "The Nixon Doctrine" tracked back, in many ways, to Japan.

The Japanese reaction to the Nixon Doctrine was generally favorable. They formally expressed their complete support several months later, in November [1969], when Prime Minister Sato gave what he called "The New Pacific Age" speech, which was a distinct reflection of the Nixon Doctrine. The whole concept of this speech concerned the United States working together with Japan and in support of the economic development and progress of all of East Asia.
The United States and Japan were further drawn together, I would say, by the Nixon Doctrine and what it expressed. The reactions of some of the other countries of East Asia were generally good, but they were nervous, fearing that the United States was preparing a rationale for minimizing its assistance to them. So I had a great deal of difficulty in reassuring the countries concerned that we were not "getting out." Once again, I talked about other countries (like Japan) being in a position to do more. As economic development progressed, the countries that were doing the best were in a position to help other friendly nations.

Incidentally, after the President gave his backgrounder to the press in Guam, he said that I would be prepared to answer further questions. Well, I didn't know what he had said not having been invited up to the press conference. It was a little embarrassing for me because I then had to brief the press both at the next stop, which was Manila, and then in Jakarta.

The press kept asking questions about what had gone on at the summit meetings between Nixon and Marcos in the Philippines and Nixon and Suharto in Indonesia. Since nobody in the State Department, including the Secretary of State, was present at those meetings, only President Nixon, Kissinger, and the head of government concerned knew what the President had said. The press people were not interested in general background. They wanted to know precisely what was said. All I had was a slip of paper from someone on one or two points that I could make. Probably, Ron Ziegler [President Nixon's press spokesman] got this slip of paper from Henry Kissinger. That was about it. It was very embarrassing for me. I recall that "Newsweek" magazine came out with an article, saying that my briefing in Manila was very much like a travel lecture. That was about all I could do.

Q: You were the principal person dealing with Asian affairs at that time and you had largely spent your career dealing with Asian matters. How did you feel about Kissinger's views on Asia at the beginning of the Nixon administration?

GREEN: I saw a good deal of Kissinger during 1969. I could sense increasingly that he wanted to have nothing to do with the State Department and that he was going to "run" foreign policy. I realized that I was going to be his principal victim as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, the area which was primarily "on the block" at that time. I could see that I was going to spend a lot of time dealing with an evasive White House. Another thing that bothered me, since we are talking about Japan, is that the only person Kissinger had on his staff who knew anything about Japan was Dick Sneider [a Foreign Service Officer and later Ambassador to Korea]. Shortly after that Dick Sneider found that he couldn't get along with Kissinger and was assigned to Japan. After that, they had nobody on the White House staff who had real Japanese experience. The Japan factor wasn't adequately considered in a series of situations that were to arise.
Q: As I do these interviews, there is one thing that comes through. That is, first, Henry Kissinger was very "bright." However, and secondly, there were areas that he didn't know very much about and relied on his "brightness." Often, it didn't work out very well. Africa was one such area. Latin America was another...

GREEN: I think that Kissinger had lots of gaps in his knowledge of the world. He was a splendid tactician. In a given situation he knew how to maneuver very well indeed. He also is very good at briefing and is highly articulate. These were his strengths. However, depth of knowledge about East Asia, no. He had none. I think that his failure to draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was a great mistake on his part. That is not the way we should run a government. To pay these people for all of those years of work and then not use them is pointless--worse than pointless.

Another problem is one that nobody ever speaks about. Let me mention it right now. When you are "cut out" of things, the way other people and I were "cut out" of them, and you know that you are being "cut out," you begin to lose confidence in yourself, because you know that you don't have all the threads in your hand. You don't have the complete picture. Meanwhile, Kissinger knew that you didn't have the complete picture, and therefore he tended to discredit your views accordingly. It ended up by nobody really knowing what the other person knew or didn't know. It's a very bad way of running a government.

Q: Because the information flow must be "up and down."

GREEN: Right. He was playing his proper role of maneuvering and conducting certain kinds of delicate negotiations. However, with the assistance of key people in the State Department, we would not have made some of the mistakes that we made. Furthermore, we would have had a strong, effective foreign policy because it was headed by a man [President Nixon] who came into office, probably knowing more about foreign affairs than any president in history. We had a wonderful opportunity but, of course, a lot of that was not properly used. We could have done much better.

Q: As we keep our focus on Japan from 1969 through 1973, what do you think were some of the major developments?

GREEN: I would say that the two major developments were the opening to China and the "reversion" of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. I would also mention the Nixon Doctrine and the related Vietnamization program as being a fundamental development. So those were the principal developments during the Nixon administration that related to Japan.

Q: Let's talk about China. One of the great moments in the Nixon administration was the opening to China after many years of isolation between the United States and China, although there had been contacts. You've already talked about the US and China. How about the Japan factor? What were some of the points that you were concerned with?
GREEN: The July 15, 1971 announcement by President Nixon in California of his intended trip to China (following Kissinger's successful earlier trip to China) produced a deep shock in Japan. This was known in Japan as the first of several Nixon "shocks." This reaction is very understandable if you bear in mind that the United States and Japan had a partnership. No third country was more important to the United States and Japan than China. That the President should suddenly announce this surprise visit, reversing policies which we had been pursuing for a long time, was deeply embarrassing to the government of Prime Minister Sato. One of the things we must remember was the fact that, year after year, the United States had been trying to keep communist China out of the United Nations. Sentiment in Japan had been rather favorable toward the People's Republic of China as being a member of the United Nations. We had kept Japan "in line" on this issue. When we suddenly announced that President Nixon was going to go to China, it also looked as though we were "abandoning" Taiwan, which had been a Japanese territory at one time and where the Japanese had enormous interests. Taiwan is very close to Japan. All of this boded ill to Japan.

However, above all, this subject was what was known as "Asakai's nightmare." Asakai was the Japanese Ambassador to Washington [at the time of the Nixon announcement]. His nightmare was that he would wake up one morning and find that the United States was represented in Peking. All of this put Japan in a terribly difficult position. It left the Japanese Government--and Prime Minister Sato in particular--with a feeling that they had been worsted, that Sato himself had been overshadowed by Nixon, that we were not reliable partners, and that we didn't consult, when consultations are fundamental to any viable relationship. The Japanese felt that we were committed to consult on all issues and hadn't done so. As a result, the reaction in Japan [to the Nixon announcement] was quite severe, at first. I don't think that the White House had really thought about this.

When Secretary of State Rogers called up on July 15, shortly after the President had made his announcement on television, to ask me and Jack Irwin, the Deputy Secretary of State, how we felt about the news, I said that it was "great but what about Japan?" Rogers said, "Well, what about Japan?" I said, "The Japanese are going to take this terribly hard." Rogers said, "But we gave them advance notice." I said, "You gave them an hour or two advance notice, but that's not much advance notice, and that's not consultations." I said that we were going to have a severe problem with Japan.

At that point I said that Dick Ericson and I would draft a message of explanation from the President to Prime Minister Sato and get it to the President by telex immediately. So Nixon sent that message to Sato. It was an effort to try to placate the Japanese. When we were in Peking, as I said in my book on the subject, as well as, I think, in my oral history of the time, there were indications that Peking was very concerned about the US-Japanese relationship.

Q: Leaving China to face Japan and Russia.
GREEN: They [the Chinese] didn't like that. On the other hand they suspected that all this US-Japan partnership talk might have a contrary design. Maybe the United States was building up Japan as a military force before it left the area, so that Japan could take over China.

When I was in Peking [with President Nixon], I had a number of talks with a man who was very close to the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-lai. His name was Hsiung Hsiung-hui, a special assistant to the prime minister. On three occasions during the visit he took me aside--during automobile rides and once when we were rowing on the lake at Hangzhou--to talk about Japan. It was clear that he and the prime minister were deeply concerned about Japan. They feared that we were playing our hand in such a way that Japan was going to be a new military power on the world scene. China's memories of Japanese occupation were very deep and rather fresh. I said, and it turned out that Henry Kissinger had said the same thing when he was in Peking in the summer of 1971, that, on the contrary, our whole purpose in our relationship with Japan was to ensure that Japan did not have to be rearmed, except for self defense. We would provide the "Sunday punch," and Japan would not "go nuclear." Japan would not have any expansionist capabilities, because of our treaty alliance. The Chinese had never thought of it that way. I added that the more lasting our security relationship with Japan is, the greater the chances were that Japan would never be, or pose anything like, a military threat to China. Anyway, I think that that went over well.

We must remember here that Japan and China have a long, long stormy relationship, particularly during the years preceding and during World War II. Therefore, there are very deep-seated Chinese fears of Japan. I don't think that the White House ever took them adequately into consideration. This Chinese fear of Japan was more in the calculations of the State Department.

The person on the State Department side who was the most knowledgeable on Japan was U. Alexis Johnson, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Johnson's book, "The Right Hand of Power," devotes a good deal of attention to this particular issue at this particular moment. He graphically described the concerns which our China policy had created in Japan. He reproved the President rather strongly about our failure to consult with the Japanese properly, such as by sending Alex to Japan, maybe a day or so in advance of the announcement. This would have had the effect of giving Prime Minister Sato time to prepare his position publicly and how he was going to express it. Secondly, for us to have taken the unusual step of sending a special emissary to Japan, would be evidence of the primacy we accorded Japan and the importance we attached to Japan's constructive relationship with China. However, for reasons which have never been explained, the administration called off plans to have Johnson make that trip which left a permanent scar on US-Japan relations, according to Alex.

In my meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda following Nixon's China trip, they acted like the old friends that they are. Even though the press, including especially the press in the United States, was talking about what a
disaster this had been for US-Japanese relations, that was not my impression at all. I read Selig Harrison's and other people's accounts of the mood in Japan at the time I arrived. By the time I left I had the impression that this view was far too pessimistic. The fact of the matter is that I got along fine with both the prime minister and the foreign minister. The Embassy in Tokyo later reported that what a success our visit had been in terms of allaying Japanese concerns over our China policy. So I think that we got over that hump. That doesn't mean that there are no residual fears.

I might add one other thing here, and I'll come back to this later. I mentioned the Nixon "shocks." We had other problems with the Japanese, largely over trade.

At the time of the agreement with Japan on the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in November, 1969, there was an understanding that one of the things that Japan would do, in response to our rather generous offer on the return of the Ryukyus, was that they would respect certain "restraints" on textile [exports to the United States]. President Nixon was under very heavy pressure from a number of members of Congress from the South, where our textile industry had moved, to "deliver" on these restraints, so that the Japanese would not export such large quantities of textiles.

Well, to make a long story short, from his end Prime Minister Sato was unable to bring "his" textile industry along. Therefore, that understanding fell apart. President Nixon was furious. This was another area where I don't think that the President ever understood the Japanese leadership, as he did the Chinese leadership. I'm sure that he compared Sato, Fukuda, and others rather unfavorably with men like Zhou En-lai, who had a great, broad political and strategic vision of the world. The Japanese leadership seemed to be narrowly focused on economic issues, and the President and Henry Kissinger were not very strong in that area. That was another reason why they were rather prejudiced against Japan.

There has always been a tendency in our Foreign Service, as, in fact, in the US Government, which goes way back, for at least 100 years, for officials to be either pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese. It seemed that we had fallen again into that syndrome, with the President favoring China over Japan. He would never say so, but that would seem to have been the case. It came largely down to personalities and the fact that, as interpreters, the Chinese used attractive young ladies, who would laugh uproariously when the President made a joke, before they even brought themselves to interpret it, which was a clear signal to the audience that they had damned well better laugh. The Japanese interpreters did their work in a solemn, matter of fact voice. Interpreting Chinese is much easier than interpreting Japanese--that is simultaneous interpreting. The word order in Chinese sentences is similar to the word order in English, whereas Japanese word order is more like German--very difficult. These are the kinds of things that have added to problems in US-Japanese relations.

Q: How did you rate our Embassy in Japan during the 1969-1973 period? This was a major period.
GREEN: We had very good people in Japan, although Ambassador Armin Meyer was not a Japanese expert. He had come from being Ambassador to Iran. As a matter of fact, I had been offered the job and given the choice. To make a long story short, I decided to be Assistant Secretary instead. Armin had some very good Japanese specialists on his staff, including Dick Sneider. So I would say that it was a strong Embassy.

Q: So you felt that the reporting...

GREEN: The reporting was excellent.

Q: We were speaking of Henry Kissinger and Japan. This reminds me of his book, "The White House Years." He talked about going to Rome. When I read the book, I had the feeling that, in Kissinger's view, the Italian Government was really just a coalition--sort of the same coalition, with people "trading" government portfolios. So you couldn't get anything done. Kissinger--and, I guess, President Nixon, too--were people who wanted to sit down with somebody and make a deal. You can't make a deal with a coalition government because there are too many people involved, who tend to "water down" things. It sounds as if there was a similar process going on with the Japanese. It's well known that In Japan you don't talk to somebody in the Japanese Government and really reach an agreement. It takes extended negotiations with both the government and within the bureaucracy to reach a consensus.

GREEN: Absolutely. The bureaucracy in Japan is all-important. Where we have political figures at the top, they have experts and bureaucrats--and these include bureaucrats who specialize in foreign affairs and are very knowledgeable.

To be a leader, people have to know where you're going. When a US leader suddenly and independently changes his course and direction--or seems to do so--it causes a great deal of concern. It was our task to allay that concern. My wife's remark about how wise it was for the President to send two Foreign Service Officers to explain the Nixon visit to China to Far East leaders was entirely valid, since John and I, were known to leaders in Asia. They knew we didn't just come in with one administration and then left. We didn't have any political axes to grind. We were not trying to make a career out of this matter. We were trying to do what was best for the United States and for friendly countries concerned.

Q: When William Rogers was Secretary of State during this period, did he have much "feel" for Japan?

GREEN: I think that Bill Rogers had a good feeling for public opinion. He would have been a first rate Minister of Information, which many countries have. Of course, his activities were so sharply curtailed and circumscribed by Nixon and Kissinger that it's not fair to judge the man. I knew Bill Rogers very well. We were very good friends and played a lot of bridge and golf together, quite apart from our office contacts. I trusted him. I think that he liked the Foreign Service. I felt that he could have done more in the way of
taking up with the President the fact that the Foreign Service strongly supported his policies. I remember that I had an impassioned discussion with Rogers about this at the President's poolside in San Clemente, CA. I couldn't get Bill Rogers to say more than that he would take this up at the right time. I don't think that he ever did.

In particular, as I pointed out in War and Peace with China, the President made a serious mistake not only in his unwarranted distrust of the Foreign Service but also in his refusal to take Alex Johnson and me into his total confidence. As a result he ran some serious risks which are mentioned in my book and one of those included his unnecessarily sharp affrontal of the Japanese Government. Subsequently Nixon was able to allay Japanese resentment when the President and Mrs. Nixon, at my suggestion, journeyed all the way up to Alaska to greet their Imperial Majesties en route to Europe by polar flight. This was the first trip outside Japan by any reigning monarch of Japan; and the first foreign soil he was to step on was US soil.

Q: One of the rationales given out, and I tend to be very dubious about rationales, which are usually developed on an "ex post facto" basis, is that the White House was concerned that, if it consulted Japan on any subject, the country "leaked" like mad. So the White House felt that it had to be very careful. Half the reason for Nixon's problems was always...

GREEN: Nixon always put it in the sense that it would be a great blow to China if the news of his trip to China should leak out. He acted as though secrecy was something enjoined by China. That's not the case at all. It was his own desire for secrecy that was the controlling consideration here. However, he carried this penchant for secrecy to ridiculous lengths. The arrangements for the President's trip to China by Kissinger had to be secret. I fully agree with that. That they didn't inform the Japanese, say, a week or two weeks in advance, was understandable and justifiable. It is true that the Japanese Government party, the Liberal-Democratic Party, is a coalition of factions whose leaders usually have to be consulted before the Prime Minister takes any action. So the Prime Minister would probably have been under some obligation to "check in" with the LDP factional leaders if there had been, say, more than a day or two advance notice. Had we done that, probably the whole matter of the President's visit to China would have leaked to the press. So, as I say, it's a question of degree. I think that sending Alex Johnson to talk with Prime Minister Sato 24 hours in advance would have been very helpful on that issue.

Q: Shall we talk about the reversion of Okinawa [the Ryukyu Islands]? I always felt that this was one of the most difficult things to handle, internally within the US Government. The US Department of Defense was almost adamantly about not giving Okinawa up, at least from some points of view.

GREEN: The Department of Defense was a bit "sticky" on this issue--more than it was on the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960. Incidentally, the Security Treaty of 1960 came up for renewal in 1970. So the questions that came up in 1969 regarding the reversion of the
Ryukyus also had to take into consideration the fact that, if the reversion negotiations fell through, the Security Treaty with Japan might not be renewed by the Japanese. Meanwhile, there was a great deal of Japanese pressure on us to "do something" about the Ryukyus.

Now the issue of the reversion of the Ryukyus was very complex. First of all, their strategic importance has to be underlined strongly. These are a chain of islands, Okinawa being the most important one. It is located off the East China Sea, right in the middle of this whole series of islands looping down from southern Japan. It couldn't be more critically located. More than that, Okinawa is a large island, large enough to accommodate Japanese farmers and city residents, as well as a lot of American installations. We had a problem with the administration there. It wasn't just like a big US military base. There was a large Okinawan population to deal with. Increasingly, there was a great deal of sentiment, mostly among the Okinawans, regarding their future reversion status. Going back to the Peace Treaty with Japan of 1951, the Ryukyus had been placed temporarily under American administration. However, their ultimate sovereignty was vested in Japan. So it was simply a question of when the Ryukyus were going to revert to Japanese control.

In the State Department we thought--and certainly the Embassy in Tokyo did too--that it was critically important to move rapidly on the Ryukyus. Things were beginning to go "sour" in both the Ryukyus and Japan. We needed to move in a timely fashion, bearing in mind that we had a deadline of 1970 [for the renewal of the Security Treaty of 1960]. So we entered into talks about the reversion of the Ryukyus with the Japanese in Tokyo and Washington.

The big question was this. We had major bases in the Ryukyus that were of critical importance in the support of any operation that we might have to conduct in Southeast Asia--or China or Korea, for that matter in support of our commitment. If the Ryukyus reverted to Japan, we would have to have bases in the Ryukyus on a continuing basis. We would also have to have ready access to those bases and the ability to use them when critically necessary. Our allies and friends in embattled Southeast Asia, Korea and Taiwan were concerned over their dependence on our basis in Japan, for Japan always had a tendency of being rather pacifistic, and might deny us the use of those bases at a critical moment. So we had to meet that concern in any communiqué with Japan on reversion.

We finally got Japan to agree on language in the Joint Communiqué (on the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan) which stated that Korea was vital to the security of Japan and the United States; and that the security of Taiwan was more important. Once we got agreement on that language, then things began to fall pretty much into place. So we and the Japanese were able to declare in November [1969], that the Ryukyus would revert to Japan in 1972. We needed the time between 1969 and 1972 to complete an enormous amount of housekeeping and bookkeeping duties so as to turn the administration over to Japan.
As you know, the drafting of most communiqués always precedes agreements and visits. They are not done afterwards. The communiqué had been agreed to long before Prime Minister Sato came to Washington. When Sato come to Washington, there was a press conference, at which he made a statement which, in essence, said that Japan recognized the critical importance of the Ryukyus to the United States in discharging its security missions. Of course, it is a basic principle of our Navy and of our military never to confirm or deny the presence of any particular weapons systems such as nuclear. So we couldn't confirm or deny this. Instead, there was an acceptable Japanese-US "understanding," that the issue had been worked out in satisfactory fashion for the Japanese.

The Ryukyu issue has been discussed at some length in "The Right Hand of Power," by U. Alexis Johnson. I really don't have much to add to that. You will recall that he pointed out [in the book] that there was a long, sad story of Japanese inattention to the Ryukyus. There were a lot of bitter feelings in the Ryukyus about the Japanese at that time--bitter feelings that Japan has subsequently been at pains to allay.

Q: Protesting about things that happened before World War II.

GREEN: Yes. The people of the Ryukyus felt like "second class citizens" and all of that. So that was another issue which had to be straightened out. In other words, there had to be assurances by the Japanese that they were going to treat the Ryukyus "the right way." Of course, the Japanese had a reason for giving such assurances, because the international spotlight was right on them. I never had any doubt that the Japanese would treat the Ryukyus properly.

We had to have extended talks and discussions in Tokyo and Washington over the actual reversion of the Ryukyus. The financial arrangements were "sticky," because the United States felt that we were giving up an awful lot of property and we already had constructed many buildings, roads, utilities, etc. The Japanese finally did come through fairly handsomely on payments to the United States for materiel, buildings, and so forth which we had left to the people of the Ryukyus.

It was a complex negotiation, involving just about every department of our government. I was the chairman of the task force in our government, dealing with all of these financial and other issues.

Q: Could you discuss your experience in dealing with the US Department of Defense, at your level, on the issue of reversion of the Ryukyus?

GREEN: Yes, I can. I think that I may have mentioned to you, on previous occasions, Stu, that I consider that the Department of Defense has come a long way over the past 10 years or so, in terms of understanding diplomatic and strategic issues. There isn't the kind of "gulf" separating military from State Department thinking which may have existed at one
time. When you were dealing with Generals like Curtis Lemay, of course it was difficult. His solutions started with 15 kiloton nuclear bombs and went up from there. State Department solutions involve no kilotons, if we can help it. Furthermore, we have tried to think in long range, political terms. I think that once we got that point through to the military, they understood it very well and were strong supporters of this approach. As I said, I thought that Admiral Arleigh Burke and various CINCPACs were superb as "sailor statesmen." They talked the same language that we did. Setting up all these political advisers throughout the world also helped. Then there are the war colleges, which have helped. The United States, I think, has done more than any other country--possibly Britain has done as much, I don't know, but certainly the US has done more than the countries that I have dealt with--to try to instill a common understanding by civil and military leaders of national goals and purposes and how to achieve them.

We have had problems. When it comes down to dollars and cents and particular issues, yes, there have been lots and lots of problems which we have had to iron out. However, regarding major issues, as you "kick them upstairs," you begin to find more and more opportunities to resolve them.

Q: Is there any other area that we should cover on Japan before we move to Australia?

GREEN: Yes, there is one other area that I would like to mention. I think that I began to mention it during the last session that we had, Stu. That is, relations between the ROK and Japan.

Q: The ROK means the Republic of Korea.

GREEN: The Republic of Korea and Japan. Of course, this now looms rather significantly in terms of North Korea developing nuclear weapons and what concerns this can create in Japan. Clearly, one of the advantages that Japan saw in our security relationship was the fact that we had a military presence in South Korea. In other words, we had American troops standing between Japan and its potential enemies--North Korea, communist China, the Soviet Union. Throughout my years as Assistant Secretary and as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Regional Planning Adviser before that, I and others in State and Defense had worked very hard for the retention of American forces in Korea. We still have them there today. The reason we have them today has as much to do with Japan as with South Korea. If we didn't have those forces there, the Japanese would be far more concerned and worried about whether they were putting their necks out too far by being allied with the United States.

There has also been the long-standing problem of feuding in Japan among the 750,000 Koreans residing there, with sharp lines drawn between those supporting North Korea and those supporting South Korea. Obviously the pro-North Korean crowd gave Japan the most concern because of their links with the communists in Asia as well as with disappointed youth in Japan. And of course, all Koreans whether in Japan or Korea harbored long memories of harsh Japanese rule in Korea earlier in the century.
US policy in this situation has been to urge the fair treatment of all Koreans in Japan and the development of much closer relations between Japan and South Korea.

In 1972 we heard the news that the North Koreans had made an overture to the South Koreans, suggesting talks leading to the reunification of Korea. Obviously, this idea was one which we welcomed, although we greatly distrusted North Korea's motives. Sure enough, the North Koreans were making a "grandstand play." They wanted to go for some kind of political union [between the two Korea's], or something like that. They were asking for those things which they knew the South couldn't give. They also knew that the South had a lot of students who, for a long time, have been very anxious to have relations with North Korea. There were a lot of people in South Korea who wanted to visit their friends and relatives in North Korea.

The positions of South Korea, the United States, and Japan had always been, "Let's work toward eventual reunification. Let's have more exchanges. Let's develop a degree of mutual trust that will then enable us to move into the political realm." The very fact that the North Koreans wanted to move immediately into the political realm indicated quite clearly that they were trying to upset South Korea. What we knew--although we didn't say this--was that the North Koreans were basically trying to get the South Koreans to agree to reunification under terms which provided that the United States would withdraw its forces from South Korea. We knew that this would be anathema to the Japanese, as well as to ourselves and to the South Koreans. And maybe even to the Chinese, by the way.

So we had to play this game very delicately. In 1972 I made a trip to South Korea. I had talks with President Park Chung Hee, as well as with Kim Chong Pil, the Prime Minister, Kim Yong Shik, the Foreign Minister, and Lee Hu Rak, the head of their CIA who was in contact with North Korea about these matters. We went into some detail about them. I found that the South Koreans' thinking was about the same as ours. When I went to Japan I reassured the Japanese about the talks I had had in South Korea. So I was able to help calm down what could have been a rather dangerous situation--at least, politically dangerous.

I mention that because, as it turned out, Japan and South Korea did develop good trading relationships. In essence, what happened was that Japan's success in moving away from labor intensive industries into the high tech field meant that Japan's labor intensive industrial field was left for other Asians to occupy. The South Koreans then moved into shipbuilding and textiles. Eventually, they moved out of that, and those activities shifted on to other countries, such as Indonesia, for example. This was the beginning of a train of events where the Japanese were able to help the South Koreans, and the South Koreans, in turn, were able to help other countries. This was all part of the regional interdependence that we were hoping to encourage.

There is one other major development in 1972 relating to Japan. That is, that Japan normalized its relations with China in September, 1972. Preceding that in June we had a
meeting with the Japanese in Hawaii. President Nixon, Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, Alex Johnson, and I flew out in the President's plane to the Kuilima Hotel, which is on the other side of Oahu from Waikiki Beach. There we had a two-day conference with the Japanese, led by the new Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka.

I remember that on the plane going out to Honolulu, Alex Johnson, Rogers, Kissinger, and I were quite concerned that, since it was known that Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka was going to go to Peking to normalize relations, the Japanese were in a rather weak bargaining position. Tanaka had to deliver on his promise to the Japanese people that he would normalize relations with China during his trip to Peking in September, 1972. This was a situation the Chinese could exploit. We knew little about Tanaka. He hadn't had any advanced education and was a newcomer in the international field. We were rather concerned that China would come up with terms and demands which were going to make it very difficult for Taiwan and the United States. It could be rather shattering for our relationship with Japan if Japan were to accede to such demands.

These matters were discussed on the plane going out to Hawaii. It was really quite interesting, because I remember that President Nixon seemed less concerned about Tanaka's trip to China than did the rest of us. He was right. Those were not problems, as it turned out.

When Prime Minister Tanaka went to Peking a couple of months later to normalize relations, the Chinese were very considerate and reasonable. No demands were made of the Japanese to terminate any of their commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan, for example, with respect to airlines, sea routes, telecommunications of any kind, or cultural contacts. All that China demanded was that there should be a Japanese Embassy in Peking and not in Taipei. So the Japanese actually did get to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China before we did. During the normalization process Peking made it very clear that it welcomed good relations with Japan, good relations with the United States, and good relations between the United States and Japan. Here we had three countries, all of whom had been at war with each other at some point during the previous half century now at peace, representing the world's most powerful country (the US), the world's most populous country (China) and the world's most economically dynamic nation (Japan).

Q: You mentioned that you were the "regional man" in the State Department. You were looking for good relations between the various countries. Now I'm looking at this matter almost from the Foreign Service point of view. At Chiefs of Mission meetings, did you find the usual parochialism, localitis, or what have you from the various ambassadors or their deputies? Did you have to urge them to play a more cooperative role?

GREEN: No. The only flare up I recall between two of our members where parochialism was involved, occurred at our Chiefs of Mission meeting near Manila in 1971. I have already given you an account of this memorable exchange between our Ambassadors to Korea (Bill Porter) and to Japan (Armin Meyer).
Our Ambassadors are our officials generally, whether in Washington or the field, reflected an awareness of US overall interests and were not given to parochialism, for it was and is basic to US policy that our friends and allies harmonize their relationships as far as possible. Much of our efforts have been directed towards furthering that goal.

Here I should add that our Chiefs of Mission conferences, usually annual affairs in pleasant places like Baguio (the Philippines), Hong Kong or Tokyo, were also attended by representatives of the Defense Department (CINCPAC), AID (Agency for International Development), USIS and a few other agencies.

Q: Before we leave the subject of Japan, I wonder if you could comment on how you felt that Japan operated in the rest of the world. It has become a very important country economically. The Japanese don't seem to have the "clout" or influence that the United States has. In a way, it doesn't seem that Japan will move in that direction outside of the field of economics. Do you have any views on that?

GREEN: As far as military affairs are concerned, Japan is bound by its constitution. More than that, it is bound by its own fears of involvement in a war. The effects of World War II were traumatic, as far as the Japanese were concerned. In my opinion, the chances of their going "militaristic" are very low, indeed. They are all the more reliant on the United States, because their whole position in the world is based upon commerce--access to raw materials and markets. The United States is the best guarantor of that--far better than the United Nations itself. And the Japanese know that. It is a fundamental "plus" in our relationship as long as we are a reliable ally, standing firm against threats to Japan and the US, such as are now implicit in the potential development of nuclear war capabilities by North Korea.

Now I will not get into US-Japan trade issues, but it must be emphasized that in the realms of trade, economics, technology and science, the Japanese are fully as powerful as the US. Its role in third world development assistance is highly laudable.

Where Japan is weak and, in terms of its size and power, too ineffectual on the world scene relative to its failure to be adequately involved in global strategies, political and social issues.

Finally, let me emphasize the supervening importance of the US-Japanese relationship in the years ahead--and the consequent need for greater American understanding of the Japanese people and their culture.

In our relations with Japan, we have discovered that it is very hard for the Japanese to make up their minds, very hard for them to reach a consensus. They are consensus builders. We're not. We can have Republicans come to town and, overnight, we have new US programs and policies. It's all too fast. But in Japan such things take a long, long time. So that if we're looking for quick answers and quick results, as we often do as a world
leader—we try to "sign people up"—we find the Japanese lagging behind. Because of their political processes, they operate that way. Almost all democratic countries do that—much more than we do. So it takes some time for Japan to make up its mind. And sometimes we get impatient. That's one difficulty.

Another difficulty, of course, is in the whole field of trade and the way their system works. The Japanese are far better organized than we are. They save a great deal more than we do. A lot of the things that we do badly, they do well, and vice versa. I've often thought that the best solution for Japan and the United States is for each to be more like the other. Americans could save more and plan further ahead, the way the Japanese do, to place greater emphasis on education and family unity, more circumspect, more cautious, and certainly to think more in terms of the interests of society, rather than just those of the individual. We would do better if we did that.

For their part the Japanese would do better if they thought more in terms of other races, the need to harmonize with other peoples of different backgrounds, to relax and enjoy life more, spending more on housing, infrastructure and the good things in life. Also if they strove to play a more constructive role across a wider range of the world agenda. These are the things that the Japanese should do.

I believe the Japanese have always rather envied the United States for its wide open spaces and its free spirit. We have to remember that Japan has always lived on a few, rocky islands off the shores of Asia—far away from the rest of the world with which it has commercial links. Its whole history, its topography, its geography, its outlook are different. So we are "the odd couple" which simply has to get along.

The most important long-term investment we can make toward improving US-Japanese understanding is for Americans to know a lot more about the Japanese, their language and culture than we do today.

I accordingly inaugurated in 1988, with the help of my wife, the Marshall Green Fund, managed by the Japan-American Society of Washington, DC of which I was President at that time. This Fund supports programs encouraging the study of Japanese language and of Japanese area studies deeply at the high school level. Originally the program operated only in the Washington area; now it is nationwide, providing incentive awards to students and teachers as well as videotapes, Japanese encyclopedias and dictionaries. The Fund also finances with the help of Mobil Corp. an annual "Japan Bowl" competition among high schools in terms of language proficiency and general knowledge about Japanese policies, history and culture. Nineteen teams competed in the Japan Bowl" in 1995 held at the George Mason University.

Q: Well, shall we turn to Australia for a bit?

GREEN: I wasn't prepared to talk about Australia, but I will.
Q: You were in Australia [as Ambassador] from when to when?

GREEN: I was there from 1973 to 1975--the middle of 1973 to the middle of 1975. About two years there.

Q: Could you explain how you got that assignment?

GREEN: It was one of those assignments--and about the only one that I got--which I worked out for myself. I was Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the time and was more or less in a position to get the next job that I wanted. There were two countries that were "open" in our area for Ambassadors; the Philippines or Australia. Bill Sullivan, my deputy, had been head of the Vietnam task force, and was very close to Henry Kissinger. He had traveled with him, particularly during those frenetic moments before the Paris Peace Conference, in January, 1973. So Bill Sullivan enjoyed great "clout" over at the White House. He could get pretty much what he wanted.

Since I was his superior, and since both of us were looking for new jobs well removed from the war in Indochina, I said, "Bill, you see a lot of Henry Kissinger on your trips down there [to Key Biscayne, Florida, to meet with President Nixon]. You and I have been in this job for four years now, and it's time we got out. I know there are two key jobs now about to open in the bureau, Australia and the Philippines. I also know that you want Australia. Well, so do I and I'm older and I'm your senior. So please feel free to accept the Philippines." So on one of his trips down to Florida, they really settled this matter. Of course, they had to talk to the President. I think that the President was only too glad to have me go to Australia.

Now, the reason why he was glad to have me go to Australia was not so much that Australia was a wonderful place. I've liked the Australians and always have. It had nothing to do with that. It had to do with the fact that our relations with Australia suddenly had plummeted when the Australian Labor Party [the ALP] came into power after being in the opposition for about 23 years. During all of those years, when the ALP was out of power and when the Liberal Party, in coalition with the Country Party--more or less the "conservatives"--ran the government, the Liberal-Country government campaigned on the basis of its close ties with the United States. In other words, they claimed, "We are the parties that have the friendship of the United States." One of the campaign slogans of the Liberal-Country coalition had been, "All the way with LBJ"--that is, with President Johnson. LBJ loved Australia. He always thought that Australia was the next, rectangular state West of El Paso and treated it that way.

In late 1972 there was a change in the government, and Labor came to power for the first time in more than 20 years. Labor was influential in getting Australia out of the war in Vietnam, which, I think, President Nixon took amiss. The idea that our great, staunch ally suddenly had "opted out" of the war, largely due to the influence of the Labor Party, which was now the governing party, [was less than agreeable to the President]. When the Labor Party came to power, some of its ministers began to make some very nasty
statements about American foreign policy, Vietnam, and all the rest of it. There were the same anti-Vietnam feelings in Australia that we had in our country.

Q: Wasn't there a relationship between their Labor Party and the left wing of the Labour Party in Great Britain? They had some of the same "class attitudes" and so forth.

GREEN: There was a "left" and a "right" in the Australian Labor Party. There were some left wingers, but there were also people whose views were politically almost the same as those of the outgoing, Liberal Party.

What we didn't know in Washington was that some of the statements that were being made by Labor cabinet ministers, which were outrageous, were not officially endorsed by the government as such. Cabinet ministers of the Australian Labor Party--this was not true of cabinet ministers of the Liberal and Country Parties--were considered to be speaking officially only when discussing matters within their own portfolios. So the statements by ministers like Cairns, Connor and Cameron criticizing the US, Nixon and our policies in Vietnam were "non-official" and not to be taken seriously by the US. But we took it as an official expression of what the government felt. I should have known better, but we in Washington were uninformed on that point since it had never come up before, Labor being out of power for so long.

The White House was absolutely incensed. Nixon then left instructions that nobody at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above could speak to any Australian officials in Washington or elsewhere. This made it very difficult for me because one of my closest friends was Jim Plimsoll, who was the Australian Ambassador to Washington and later was the Australian Ambassador to Moscow. He was also a real authority on the United Nations. We consulted with him quite a bit on the "Chirep" issue, as we called the Chinese representation question. He was enormously helpful. The idea of cutting off communications was foolish. I went to Secretary of State Rogers and said, "Mr. Secretary, I cannot do this." He said, "Well, you do just what you think you have to do. I don't think there will be any problems." So I had meetings with Jim at his house, where we talked over things. I kept him apprized, and so forth.

Q: Did you let him know about this unhappiness [in the White House]?

GREEN: Yes, of course. He knew all about it. By the way, Ambassador Plimsoll told me that in Australia they also had problems around the beginning of the year. That's their summer. He said, "That's our silly season. People make all kinds of asinine remarks." He said, "Your silly season is the reverse of ours," occurring during August when everyone's off on vacation, physically and mentally.

True enough. The beginning of the year is the serious season in Washington. There is the State of the Union speech, the economic message of the President, and all that. Here were Australian cabinet ministers coming in with irresponsible remarks. Nixon was absolutely furious.
Anyhow, Nixon called me up and asked me to be Ambassador to Australia. He said, "Normally, Marshall, I wouldn't send you to a place like Australia, but right now it is critically important. I think that you're the man for it." I said, "Thank you, Mr. President. I will do my very best. I really welcome this assignment." So I got it despite all of the nasty things Nixon had said behind my back--and he "fired" me a couple of times. Basically we always maintained a friendship that lasted right through to his death. When I was about to go to Australia, I happened to be walking with the President from a White House luncheon toward his oval office. President Nixon suddenly expostulated: "Marshall, I can't stand that...." And he used some expletives to describe Prime Minister Whitlam, which was a strange kind of parting instruction to get from your President.

So I arrived in Australia against this background. Meanwhile, the Australian trade unions had declared a boycott on handling any American vessels coming to Australia. Acting on his own Teddy Gleason slapped a counter-boycott against loading or unloading any Australian vessels in American east coast ports.

*Q: Ted Gleason is the president of the International Longshoremen's Union in the United States.*

GREEN: Yes, on the East coast. Since Australian exports to the United States were mostly perishable cargo--we are talking about meat, dairy products, and things like that--non-serving Australian vessels was a far more serious situation. Anyway, that eventually brought the Australians back to their senses.

So, when I arrived in Australia, it was against all of this background. But the very fact that I had been an Assistant Secretary of State and a career man, going to Australia, was regarded by Prime Minister Whitlam as such a feather in his cap that he played it for all it was worth. There were statements that came out in the press that at last America realized that Australia was important and that, at last, Australia has a career man as American Ambassador. I was the first career man assigned as Ambassador to Australia in a long, long time.

*Q: Also, you were a career man coming from the top position in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

GREEN: So Whitlam played this up for all it was worth. The first press conference I had was a very difficult one because the issue [of Whitlam's proposed visit to the US] had risen in the press. Prime Minister Whitlam was going to go to England to a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers by way of Washington. He wanted to pay a call on the President. So I relayed his wishes to Washington and got an answer, "Hell, no." I sent a telegram back and said that the refusal of the President to receive Prime Minister Whitlam would be a very serious blow to Australia-American relations.
Meanwhile, I got in touch with opposition leaders, who had been good friends of the United States for all of these years. I asked them for their views on the matter of Whitlam's reception in Washington. Some of them communicated their views without my asking for them. I know that Billy Snedden [Liberal Party leader] and other opposition leaders at that time came in loud and strong that if President Nixon refused to meet the Prime Minister of Australia, that would be considered such an insult to all Australians that they--the conservatives--would suffer more than the Australian Labor Party because the conservatives were known to be our friends. I got that message to Washington, resulting in a decision that Whitlam be received.

Whitlam did go to Washington. I went back to the US with him. I saw Henry Kissinger beforehand. We talked about some of the practical issues that had come up. I said that I hoped that the President would be his usual, gracious self. Kissinger said, "Don't worry, the President will handle it just fine." So Whitlam had a good meeting with President Nixon. There were a lot of trade issues that we had to discuss. At the end of the meeting I accompanied Whitlam and Nixon down to the South Portico of the White House and saw him off in his car. As we were standing there, waving Whitlam off, Nixon turned to me and said, "You know, he's quite a guy," which is as close as the President came to paying him a compliment. So that bad beginning happened to have a good end.

During my time in Australia I guess that my principal task was one of trying to redefine our relationship, which had been too much a dominant US relationship, with the United States telling Australia what to do. The whole question of consultation was involved. And by consultation I did not mean merely advance notice but really consulting. This became a really important issue. We failed on occasion to do it, and it caused a real blowup in Australia. For example, we announced our intention to develop a submarine base in the middle of the Indian Ocean and didn't give Australia advance notice. This is the kind of thing they flared up about.

Q: You're referring to the defense facility at Diego Garcia.

GREEN: Yes. By the way, there was an interesting story about Diego Garcia. We got a circular telegram to all of our posts in the Indian Ocean littoral, asking them to report on how the respective host governments felt about our base at Diego Garcia. I saw Prime Minister Whitlam on frequent occasions. He was a very close friend. He told me how Australia felt about it, and his reaction was generally upbeat; and we got copies of telegrams to Washington from Ambassador Moynihan in India, and from other American Embassies. There was a one-line telegram from Dave Osborn, who was our Ambassador to Burma. He said, "As far as the Burmese are concerned, Diego Garcia is just another damned Cuban cigar." That was probably the most accurate of all of the mission reports to Washington.

Quite apart from the usual trade problems, we had some difficulties regarding our bases in Australia. We had these highly secret "facilities," especially West of Alice Springs [Northern Territory] and Nurunga [South Australia], and also at Northwest Cape [West
Australia], where we had a naval facility, basically a communications center for our submarines in that part of the world. It transmitted signals underwater for long distances [Extremely Low Frequency--ELF--messages]. The use of our other bases and what our bases were doing were always difficult questions to handle, because we have not stated publicly, even to this day, the precise functions of the facilities we had at Alice Springs and Nurunga. That was one problem.

The other problem was that earlier we allowed American Congressmen to visit these bases but didn't let Australian Parliamentarians do so. By the time I arrived in Australia, Dick Sneider, who had meanwhile moved back to Washington to be Deputy Assistant Secretary, was enormously helpful to me. He had been my deputy in Washington. He helped to work out arrangements with the Australians regarding Congressional and Parliamentary visits. In other words, we allowed members of Parliament and of Congress to visit the facilities at Alice Springs and Nurunga. We didn't tell them all about it. They saw the facilities, but they didn't know everything about these highly classified bases.

The top leaders in Australia were privy to the mission of these facilities. Prime Minister Whitlam knew about them. However, I don't think that Whitlam ever fully understood, until near the end of my stay in Australia, why these facilities were so important for world peace. When he did understand this, he turned around from being more or less a "reluctant" ally to being an "enthusiastic" ally on this operation.

We worked these problems out. We had some difficulties because Whitlam's deputy [Jim Cairns] was one of the people who had been critical about our base facilities. The question arose of whether he would be informed. Normally, because of his job, he would be. However, it turned out that he didn't want to be informed. So that solved that problem.

We had a lot of issues that related to things of this nature. By and large, it was a question of redefining our relationship. I gave many speeches in Australia, all over the place. We had our own aircraft available which belonged to CINCPAC and was used by CINCPAC for ferrying personnel and members of our otherwise inaccessible bases in Central Australia and the Northwest Cape. But when the sizeable Convair Metropolitan was not in use by CINCPAC, it was made available to me, and I used it often to get all around Australia as well as to make trips to remote areas in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Nauru to which I was also accredited. The plane also enabled me to accept countless speaking engagements in many towns and cities of Australia. A typical such engagement involved arrival at noon for a city hall reception, followed by an afternoon of golf in which my plane pilot colonel and I challenged the local talent, followed by a gala dinner and speech and then spending the night at the home of an Australian friend in that area. Anyway, I gave many speeches--close to a hundred--and made many friends.

Q: It was good for your golf game, too.

GREEN: It did a lot for my golf game. The Australians love golf. They have 69 golf courses within 30 miles of the center of Canberra, to show you how culturally advanced
they are. So I had a great time in Australia and I think that we successfully redefined our relationship.

As I had frequent occasion to say: the US and Australia, though enjoying many ties of friendship and common interests in world affairs, still retain their independent roles in the world. Neither of us should look for a locked-step relationship, for such a rigid relationship could only snap in the winds of controversy. Today our relationship must be both friendly and flexible, based on common values, and quite frequent consultations, and true equality.

May I just say one other thing about Australia, because it is something that most people probably don't realize. That is, the importance of the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Coral Sea victory...

Q: This was back in May, 1942.

GREEN: May, 1942. This was a critical moment in Australian history. You must remember that Australia has never been invaded and has never had a revolution or civil war. The only time that they nearly were attacked and occupied was when the Japanese were poised to occupy Australia [in 1942], and the Battle of the Coral Sea turned this around. This had a tremendous impact on Australia. So they had a Coral Sea Week. When I was there, a well-known American like Defense Secretary Cap Weinberger and Mrs. Weinberger would come down and spend a week going around Australia. These sentimental contacts were all-important in our relationship, contributing to the depth and warmth. The fact that Australia hadn't had the revolutionary and civil war experiences which we have had as a nation left them a bit more vulnerable to tides of opinion.

I think that the American relationship was always very central in Australia, and that I left it that way. I might say, though, that the left wing of the Australian Labor Party did give me some problems. There was one man in particular, Senator William Brown, from the State of Victoria, who charged that I was the principal CIA agent in the Western Pacific and that I was in Australia to "undermine" the country, and so forth. These charges attracted a good deal of prominence. Prime Minister Whitlam, of course, rejected them. Then Senator Brown said that on July 4, [1974], he was going to say all that he knew about this. He had a big meeting in Melbourne, Victoria. Thousands of people jammed the streets. He climbed to the podium and then said nothing that he hadn't said before. People just turned away and said, "This guy is a crumb." I was very high profile when I was in Australia and was very much at the center of press attention, because of the fact that we had sent...

Q: Because we had sent, not necessarily political "hacks," but they had been friends of the President. Australia was regarded as a nice place to send "political people."

GREEN: On one occasion I went back to the US on leave and found that the Australian Ambassador to the United States, whose name was Snow, had been in Washington for six
months and hadn't called on Kissinger. I went to Henry and said, "You've got to receive the Australian Ambassador. After all, Prime Minister Whitlam receives me all the time." Henry said, "Well, if you say so, Marshall, I will." So I set up a meeting and was sitting in Kissinger's outer office with the Australian Ambassador, waiting to go in. Ambassador Snow said, "You know, I've been asked by my government to invite the President or Henry Kissinger or both to visit our country. We've had no visits from the President for some time. We used to have them all the time. People are beginning to wonder. So if I invite the President or Henry Kissinger, what do you think his reply will be?" I said, "As far as Henry is concerned, he'll probably say that if he has any business in Antarctica, he'll be glad to stop off in Australia on his way down there or coming back." Well, damn it, that was exactly what Henry said when Ambassador Snow invited him to visit Australia. I told Henry this as the minister left the room. Henry then said to me, "Go down and turn that man off. He's going to report this." So I rushed down and caught Ambassador Snow's limousine by the handle, just as he was leaving. I said, "Look, Henry was just being amusing. Of course, he's honored to be invited," and so forth. But Henry never went to Australia.

Q: Well, shall we stop at this point? Do you think that you have left anything out?

GREEN: Okay.

Q: Unless there is something else. You can always add, you know, to your remarks.

GREEN: Well, there are so many things about Australia that I would like to say. Let's leave it at that. The main things I've said just now. My stay in Australia was a period of redefining our relationship.

Q: This is an interview with Ambassador Marshall Green, concerning his period as population coordinator at the Department of State between 1975 and 1979.

Mr. Ambassador, we've had numerous interviews, but this interview is devoted to your time in something which is beyond the normal concept of a traditional diplomat, which you certainly were. How did you move to this position of population coordinator in the Department of State?

GREEN: Stu, all my life, as far as I can recollect, in my thinking and studies I've been interested in population-related issues, what you might call demographic pressures and how they affect nations and lives of individuals. I felt, having served in six posts in East Asia and the Pacific, and six posts in Washington related to that area, I had felt that inadequate attention was being paid to this very fundamental problem. Quite clearly, population pressures had a great deal to do with poverty, malnutrition, the inability of countries to save enough in order to develop. In other words, they had to spend so much money on infrastructure to provide for rapidly expanding populations, that nothing was left over for development. I felt that it had a direct bearing on environmental degradation, which was of increasing concern.
All these things I felt, but it wasn't until I was assigned as ambassador to Indonesia that I felt so strongly about it in terms of the problems that Indonesia faced.

Q: When were you in Indonesia?

GREEN: I was ambassador to Indonesia from 1965 to 1969. During that time, there was an abortive coup by the communists, which was put down, and it ridded the country of negative, rather hostile forces, of which Sukarno was the leader, in which the Communists were the principal participants. It was replaced by a sane and sensible government headed by General Suharto, who became president, and still is president of the country.

Shortly after the aborted coup, I was in touch with Suharto, but only indirectly. It wasn't until May 1966, which was nine months later after the coup, that I had my first meeting with Suharto. He called me to his offices. That was the only time that I ever went to his office; all subsequent meetings were in his home. But that time I went to his office. I didn't know what he was going to raise with me. The first substantive subject that he raised was in regard to population. In effect, he asked me for $500 million, US, grant or loan, to help transport the excess population from the island of Java, on which at that time there were about 60 million people--today there are over 100 million people--on an island the size of the state of New York, to transport them to what they called the outer islands, and resettle them there--Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, New Guinea, and other islands in Indonesia, which consists of 3,000 islands. In other words, to vent the surplus population in Java onto outlying islands.

I was appalled by this idea of trying to move masses of people from Javanese, setting and culture to outer islands, because I knew from my own experience that this kind of thing just doesn't work. We had tried it at the request of the Japanese in the case of Okinawa at one time, when we were dealing with the occupation of Japan. So I told General Suharto, "This is a very difficult problem. Even if the Queen Mary (the largest passenger liner at that time) were to leave the island of Java every day, loaded down with people, it couldn't take care of the natural increase in population in that one day on Java." That was the proportion of the problem, quite apart from the fact that trying to resettle in other islands entailed all kinds of difficulties and expenses. I alluded to the fact that quite clearly, a population stabilization program on the island of Java was the first step and the most important step to take. He agreed with that.

Because I was so interested, I had already been in touch with people in the family-planning field in Jakarta. They were mostly ladies in Jakarta whose husbands had some stature and position in the government or in private industry. I told President Suharto about the family-planning organizations in Java that I knew about, and suggested that this might be the first step I hoped they would take, and that I thought our government would be very supportive of efforts they would take in this field, and I certainly would report our conversation to our government.
That was the first of many, many meetings that I had with President Suharto on population over the next quarter century including in retirement. Shortly after that conversation in 1966, Indonesia began what turned out to be one of the world's most effective population programs. I like to think that I had something to do with helping to inspire and give encouragement to the program. It was a humane program and it's been an effective program.

Shortly after this conversation with Suharto, he invited me out to the rice harvesting ceremonies. This would have been roughly in August of 1966. He invited me out to the opening of the rice harvesting ceremonies in western Java, not far from Jakarta. I drove out there with him and his wife and quite a large retinue. Meanwhile, all the villagers along the northern plains of Java were coming out as villages to harvest the rice in the adjoining paddy fields. It was a very colorful occasion. As far as eye could see, villagers were moving to the fields under flags.

But the thing that arrested my attention was the fact that each one of the harvesters, including President Suharto and myself, were given a little knife called an aniani knife. We tied that around the middle finger, and each blade of rice was cut separately. This was done by everyone. I said, "Why don't you use scythes and sickles? It would be much more efficient." President Suharto told me that if they did that, they would throw tens of thousands of people out of work. To stretch out the work and make everybody involved, required that they harvest the rice this way. Similarly, they were not using mechanical pounders for the rice. They were all doing it by hand pounding. This involved something like 50,000 jobs. So merely to spread the work out, they were using these very labor-inefficient methods.

You could see right away that if a country was going to progress, it had to move into modern technology, but modern technology would throw hundreds of thousands of people out of work, tearing the social fabric of the country apart, and might lead to revolutions. Therefore, you could see right away how pressures of population entailed these results.

On another occasion, I had word from the Minister of Health that they had an outbreak of bubonic plague in central Java, that this was a very dangerous situation, that they had to move in right away, otherwise bubonic plague, unattended, does progress into the second stage known as pneumonic plague, which is the same as Black Death, which decimated Europe at one time. Therefore, you had to move very rapidly against bubonic plague in these situations.

He asked me if the American government could help. I immediately wired Washington, suggested that the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta be contacted to see if they could send out some doctors right away.

If you can believe it, within 48 hours of that telephone call, there were in Indonesia 14 American doctors. Maybe I'm exaggerating, but it certainly was no more than 72 hours that we had a U. S. team there.
I joined the Minister of Health in visiting these doctors at work in central Java, where they had to trap rats, comb the hair of the dead rats for the ticks, and make a serum out of the dead ticks to inoculate the people, which they did with the help of a lot of technicians and medical support. I stayed with those doctors for a day or two, and I saw the utter poverty in which people were living in the rural areas infected by this plague. I saw sheer poverty. I saw masses of children. I saw the limited opportunities that those children had, and the limited space in which they could grow things as farmers. It made a deep impression on me.

That's why, 8 years later, when I was ambassador to Australia, I decided that I wanted to get involved in the population field full time. That led up to a decision to part company with traditional diplomacy and get involved in a field in which American diplomats and other diplomats had rarely ventured, and where the participation of diplomacy, it seemed to me, was very important if you were going to have an effective attack on a problem that involved government leaders, their representatives abroad, and many more disciplines than appeared to be involved in dealing with this problem at that time.

Q: We're now talking about 1975?

GREEN: Yes. This would have been almost ten years after that first meeting with Suharto. Meanwhile, I'd been ambassador to Indonesia for four years and Assistant Secretary of State for four years under Nixon, and then I was assigned to Australia as ambassador. It was while I was there that I realized that my days in the State Department were numbered, that I wanted to be involved in something important, of lasting value, to which I was deeply committed, not just in my remaining years in the State Department, but in the years of retirement. So that had something to do with the decision, but there were other reasons for doing so, too.

Q: What were they?

GREEN: One was a personal reason. My wife and I wanted to get back to Washington. Our youngest son needed parental help and guidance, and we felt we had to get back there. That was certainly one reason. The other reason, of course, was the one I've already mentioned, which was the compelling interest that I had in this issue and the feeling that there were not the right levels of attention being given the problem. It was too exclusively in the hands of doctors and demographers and family-planning experts. So that was the decision that I made. Then I began to sound out the Department as to whether I could get a job in this field while I was still in Australia.

Q: Where did population matters rest within the American Government, particularly the State Department at that point?

GREEN: Within the State Department, population was in the hands of a population advisor to the Secretary of State. It had been Bob Barnett, who had worked with Dean
Rusk, who was extremely interested in this subject. Then Phil Claxton had taken over as population advisor, working more and more within the confines of the bureaucracy and less in the kind of position that Bob Barnett had at one time, where he was dealing directly with a Secretary of State who was keenly interested in this subject. Phil Claxton was very dedicated, highly knowledgeable, and had considerable influence on this subject within our government.

As to the government departments that were principally involved, obviously the State Department was involved, but particularly AID. AID at that time had program money running around $100 million a year that was devoted essentially to population, family-planning-related activities. That money was going into programs that were being conducted partly by governments, but also partly by non-governmental organizations. So a lot of the money was going to either the United Nations or to private organizations, and maybe less than half was going directly to governments in support of their programs.

AID felt that this was their province, their concern. The State Department, in the person of Phil Claxton, felt that it was something broader than that. Therefore, when I was assigned to Washington in this field, for the first time someone of ambassadorial rank was going to be involved in this issue. Therefore, I wrote to Hugh Appling, who at that time was a Foreign Service officer working as deputy to the director of the Foreign Service, and he was also deputy head of personnel, I wrote to him my hope that first of all, I wanted to be in population work, but secondly, to be influential, I should have direct access to the top, and I thought being special advisor to the Secretary of State would be the optimum, and/or being ambassador-at-large, dealing with population-related issues.

Meanwhile, I hadn't realized this was going on in Washington, but Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State in the Ford Administration, wanted to reorganize the State Department to get rid of all special advisors. I think he was bothered by their having direct access to his office. He wanted to have all these special kinds of advisors--labor or whatever--assigned to a bureau, and it would be only the top of that bureau who would have access to his office and would come to his meetings.

Population, meanwhile, had been, you might say, downgraded while I was still in Australia, to being administratively under the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, and Science (OES) who at that time was Dixie Lee Ray, who later became governor of the state of Washington.

Q: And not considered a very effective person.

GREEN: She was not effective in that job. She was an able nuclear scientist, by the way, and her interests were in that field. Things like oceans and environment and population, which were also in her bureau, were not matters of particular interest to her. She was very jealous about having anybody on her staff that didn't speak through her to the Secretary.
So when I learned this, I became rather dissuaded from going ahead with this assignment. But meanwhile, there was an NSC paper that was being prepared, basically directed towards the World Population Conference in 1974, but never completed in time for that conference. The World Population Conference was to bring together, for the first time, leaders, at least at the ministerial level, of all 136 countries that existed in the world at that time, in Bucharest. Our delegation was headed by William Draper, who had a great deal of clout and political support. The private organizations that were represented at the meeting were headed by John D. Rockefeller III. So we had at that time a delegation of considerable clout that was deeply concerned with world population problems and knowledgeable about them.

There was being concurrently developed in the National Security Council a paper known as NSDM 200, that outlined what our policies were going to be. This was largely to ensure the correlation of all government activities toward a single policy. This policy, like any other NSC policy, called for an NSDM which was really how the policy was going to be executed, and how it was going to be supervised, to ensure that it was being properly implemented. This was being left in the hands of the deputy secretary's committee.

Every government department had an under secretary or deputy secretary who was a member of this committee. It was headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, at that time Bob Ingersoll, who had, by the way, succeeded me as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs several years earlier, and was a close friend of mine. So I realized that this was an opportunity, since Bob Ingersoll wrote me a letter that he would name me as being the Coordinator for Population and as being the man in charge of ensuring that the government carried out this NSC policy. Eventually, it was called NSDM 314.

So on those grounds, I came back to Washington. You might say administratively I was under Dixie Lee Ray as the Assistant Secretary for OES, but functionally, in terms of the great majority of my work, I was directly under the Deputy Secretary of State and in charge of an NSC interagency task force on world population issues that was set up to ensure the execution of this National Security Council policy. It was in that capacity that I really operated. But of course, it gave rise to a lot of problems.

Q: Why don't we talk a little about the problems, and then we'll go on. Sometimes this can be very important. How interested was Henry Kissinger in this? World population problems is something that's a decades-long business. Anybody dealing with this is not going to gain much fame by putting their political capital on the line for something of this nature.

GREEN: Stu, I think you've answered the question to some extent. People like Henry Kissinger recognized that this was a very fundamental problem and that corrective measures should be taken, but they did not see this as being one of their principal functions, because they had so many other more immediate problems. It's an unwritten rule in all governmental bureaucracies that the short-term and procedural take precedence over the long-term and substantive.
No problem on the world's agenda is more long-range and substantive than population. Furthermore, trying to limit population growth is a highly sensitive subject. It tends to embroil you with the Catholic Church or to embroil you with other groups. Therefore, it is a little bit risky to get too far in front in this particular issue. Furthermore, the problem takes many, many years to get anywhere. It's a very intractable problem. It's a problem where government direction has only limited effect. Basically, you're asking that people make a decision to have fewer children, and that's something that the US Government has rather limited means of promoting, bearing in mind that these are decisions that are taken in shacks and shanties and farmhouses all around the developing world. You're also dealing with different cultures and different attitudes.

So it's a very complex, difficult, long-range problem that, quite understandably, does not engage the attention of leaders, unless those leaders are very much motivated by doing that which in the long run is going to be best for mankind. If they have a long-range view, are selfless, highly principled and highly motivated, then you can expect that they are going to be attentive to this issue and are going to give you support. Unfortunately, we did not have those kinds of leaders in Washington when I was working on this subject. There were people that were interested, but I'm simply saying that you didn't find that in the White House; you didn't find that at the top levels of the State Department.

Q: One of the attributes, supposedly, of a professional Foreign Service officer is that he or she can look at a culture, figure out where the centers of power are, and then how to use those and approach those in order to get something done. It's a foreign culture, but you're coming back, and the same skill should apply. You understand what the situation is within, actually, any government, the concern, but at the same time, the lack of feeling of having any accomplishment or reward for political leaders. Looking at this in 1965, did you analyze the situation and figure out how your approach was going to be in order to get something done?

GREEN: When I took over the job, I had very little idea of how I was going to tackle the problem. I first had to learn a lot more about it, so that my first three months, you might say, were problems of very intense self-education. In the process of education, I learned that the people I was working with in AID, especially the population office in AID, were headed by a man who saw the issue in very narrow, family-planning terms, and who was promoting the idea that spreading the use and acceptance of contraceptives would be adequate in dealing with this problem.

The very first trip that I took in 1976 around the world to deal with population problems, I was completely disabused of ideas that were being promoted especially by Dr. Ravenholt, who was the head of AID's population office. He was a man to reckon with. He was very able and dynamic; he had a strong personality, a rather domineering personality. He had contacts on the Hill, and he had many people in the private organizations dealing with these issues who were beholden to him. He wielded power. I found myself immediately in a kind of clash with him, because what I was saying, in
effect, is I didn't believe that the approach that he was advocating and taking was going to be anywhere near adequate, that family planning was good in itself in terms of ensuring that every child was a wanted child, but in terms of dealing with world population pressures that we were interested in in the State Department as well as in governments of other countries, family planning was simply not enough.

I found, for example, on a trip around the world, that in talking with specialists in this field, especially cultural anthropologists and economists in different countries, that they took a very different view from what AID took in Washington. They saw this in terms that I saw it.

When I got to Bangladesh in early 1976, which Henry Kissinger had only recently visited, he hadn't even mentioned the population problem at all, although everybody knew this was the number-one problem in Bangladesh. The government had said so, but he didn't bring it up yet he told the press afterwards that he thought Bangladesh was a "demographic basket-case."

So when I went to Bangladesh, I found that AID had promoted, and was still promoting, what they called a contraceptive inundation program. This was a program, backed with US money, that spread pills and condoms all over the country, and enlisted the support of the Bangladesh Government, through all local agencies of the government, in disseminating pills and condoms to men and women all over the countryside. Then they advertised the fact that 29% of the people were now using contraceptives. This had been introduced about a year earlier. By the time I got there, there were already clear indications that it had been a complete waste—if not complete, nearly complete waste—of effort and money.

I came across the same thing in Pakistan.

Q: *This was done by basically comparing birth statistics before and after the program?*

GREEN: No, it was not even that, because you didn't have that kind of data. It was simply based on how many people were using contraceptives. These were known as "user rates" or "contraceptive prevalence rates."

Q: *How would you know?*

GREEN: You'd only find out by making samplings of various places, by going around. They had family-planning workers, and they could find that out. They could find out whether So-and-so was using contraceptives or not. That was relatively easy to establish. But what you couldn't establish was the continued use of it. So that you had to wait a while. All I'm saying is that initially they were probably correct, that 29% of the people were using contraceptives. But within a year, it was back to 4% or 5%, which it was before the program was even launched. Maybe it was one or two points higher, but not
much higher. It wasn't worth all the effort and money. It was not the right way to go at the problem, anyway.

When I got to Pakistan, I still, of course, had the rank of ambassador, and I was fairly well known in Asia. Our ambassadors always gave me great support. When I got to Pakistan, I was invited by the government to address their national council dealing with population programs. All the ministers involved—health, education, labor, and local governments and so forth—were there plus the prime minister. With my relatively new acquaintance with the problem, I was hesitant to speak. I didn't criticize their program, although I was inwardly critical. I didn't think they were doing anywhere near enough. They were approaching it the wrong way, and they were using AID's counsel, which I thought would never yield the results we sought or they sought. So what I did was I talked about Indonesia's program. I knew a lot about that program. Indonesia was a fellow Moslem country. My talk went over very well, to the point where Pakistan did send a delegation to Indonesia later on to see how they were doing. That is another question. But this was simply my initial impression.

When I came back to Washington, I met with the head of AID and some of his principal lieutenants, and I told them how I felt about our programs! Of course, this put me in direct conflict with the family-planning sections of AID, headed by Ravenholt. I was to be wrestling with that problem almost all during my years in the State Department. But increasingly, I found I had the support of people at the top of AID, especially Assistant Administrator Fred Pinkham, but I was still running up against resistance at lower levels.

Q: Was the resistance one that you feel was philosophy, or were you breaking somebody's rice bowl? Was it a more quantifiable way–number of condoms distributed?

GREEN: You're getting into a rather key question here. When NSC 200 had been drawn up originally and when NSDM 314 emerged from this and was agreed upon in November of 1975, AID had been strongly urging that the administrator of AID be named as the chief implementing officer of the policy. Since AID managed all USG money that was dealing with population, and since they had people in the field all over the world that were dealing with this kind of problem, they had a good claim to being coordinator of NSDM 314 implementation.

But Phil Claxton and Bob Ingersoll and others in the State Department weighed in against this line of thinking, on the grounds that population was a broader concern than just development; it was also a matter of broad socio-political-strategic concern to governments. Hence, you had to have somebody at a high diplomatic level to be coordinator. That was their argument, which eventually won the day. That's why I eventually was named to the job.

But it left a legacy of competitiveness and some antagonism that I had to contend with all the time. Obviously, I had to use diplomacy in dealing with AID. This was a very critical aspect of my job.
Q: Our real diplomacy takes place either within an embassy or within the State Department, rather than abroad.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: Abroad, it's easy. It's internally where it's not.

GREEN: I have often said that being an FSO in the field is fine. It requires the skills of smooth talk and urbanity and of reconciling differences in a harmonious way. But when you come to Washington, an FSO has got to be an "FSOB," because there he's really got to deal with all the other so-and-sos in other government departments, and that calls for skills that are quite different. It still calls for diplomacy, but a rather different kind of diplomacy.

Anyway, this did require a great deal of expenditure of efforts simply to smooth feathers down and to get things done, and to get the cooperation of people down the line.

On my task force that was dealing with the execution of this policy, we had an AID representative, and it usually was the assistant administrator in charge of health, population, refugee, and other work. He was on my committee. I might say I always enjoyed good support from him. Most of the time it was Fred Pinkham, who later devoted his retirement years full-time to population, finally as the president of the Population Crisis Committee.

I found that in other government departments that were on my committee, I had particularly good support from Chris Herter, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary in OES charged with environment, but population he saw as very much involved in environment. As a matter of fact, the very first speech I ever gave on population, when I was ambassador in Australia, was called "Population," which related population to environmental concerns. So I had in Chris Herter a very intelligent and able officer, who was the son of a former Secretary of State. He was my right-hand man in this committee.

Also I had on the committee representatives from CIA. CIA had a geographic branch that dealt with these kinds of problems, and they were highly knowledgeable and very supportive. They saw the problems exactly as I saw it, so I found their representative to be enormously helpful. CIA sometimes prepared background papers that were of use to our committee.

I also had very close connections with the Department of Agriculture, because the Department of Agriculture was in charge, obviously, with world food problems, and food and population at that time was considered to be the critical nexus. We had a subcommittee in my committee that dealt full-time with food and population. I was chairman of that, too. By the way, I came to see the population food issue as less and less of an immediate concern as compared to population and employment, population and
poverty, population and environment, population and overcrowded cities which were breeding a great deal of rising but dashed expectations and, therefore, political unrest. These were the connections, particularly the last, that I became more and more concerned with. To go back to this interagency task force, we also had on it representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those were two different representatives. They were very supportive, because I found that our military reflected the views of General Maxwell Taylor. He had been a very outspoken proponent of population programs in the world, had had a great deal of impact upon the thinking of the military. Also I had representatives of the National Science Foundation. They were also supportive. They saw this problem, too, very much the way I did. We also had the Department of Labor and Bureau of the Census. The White House had a representative there, Hal Horan, who was very helpful to me. So basically, we had a like-minded group, and we were molded into an effective functioning organization.

By the way, this interagency task force on world population became known later on as the NSC ad hoc group, of which I was the chairman. Our principal function was preparing an annual report. The annual report related back to this basic NSC policy, NSDM 200, and showed what was being done in its implementation. It also critiqued the programs of other countries, what were effective and what were not effective. What would be most effective? It therefore called upon the talents of many, many people, because we almost always got annual telegrams from ambassadors around the world in response to our circular telegram, telling us what they thought would be most effective in their country. So we drew upon the whole diplomatic community. We had excellent support from the Foreign Service and from the assistant secretaries in the different State Department bureaus. So we had a great deal of inside information from our own sources. (N.B. The inter-agency committee was dissolved shortly after I retired in 1979.)

Q: Did you find any dispute on how to go about dealing with this, you might say from the birth-control-device group? I'm speaking from the Foreign Service apparatus, that the way to do this was practically saturate countries with birth-control devices or to take a broader look or not. Was this a divisive problem, or was this mainly between you and AID?

GREEN: It was not really a divisive problem insofar as the State Department-Foreign Service diplomatic personnel were concerned, particularly our ambassadors in the field. They saw this problem very much the way I did. Our problem really was with the population officials in AID who were handling this problem on a full-time basis and had a great deal of political clout, because they also commanded a lot of money. We didn't. They were giving the money to non-governmental organizations. A great deal of money was spent that way. They were also giving money to the United Nations Fund for Population Activity. They had a great deal of influence, therefore, with that key United Nations agency.

So we in State were operating without any kind of money but we did have the prestige of the US Government, and I tried to make it clear, when I was talking to other
governments, that their ability to conduct effective, humane population programs would have considerable impact on the thinking of leaders in Washington and those in Congress and in the administration who determined aid allocations. I could say this. Whether or not it was true was another thing, because it was hard to say to what extent their effective dealing with this problem did, in fact, relate to the amount of money they got from the United States Government. I tried to make that connection, and I certainly gave the impression that there was a connection, but whether in fact it was true or not was something else again, because, as you know, aid allocations are very round-about complex business. When we put in a basic aid request for a country, almost two years elapses before it comes out the other end of the pipeline. You're dealing with an extremely complex mechanism when you're talking about AID. It was not a pleasant experience having to deal with funding issues and not having command over the funds that Congress was allocating.

To go back to your earlier question, I think that when it came to other government departments in our government, when it came to our Foreign Service and our mission directors, including AID mission directors in the field, they saw the problem much more in the way I did. When I say "I" did, most of us in the State Department saw it this way.

When I first took over this job in 1975, within two months of my assuming office, I sent out a circular telegram to all of our ambassadors in the developing world--that is, in Asia, Africa, Latin America--where this problem was rampant. It was not, of course, in Europe and North America or Japan. But in these developing countries, where population was exploding, I solicited our ambassadors views on a number of questions: How serious did they see this problem? What did they think would be most effective in dealing with it? Any recommendations?

The responses that we got to this first circular were impressive, because they made it very clear that our ambassadors and their staffs saw population as contributing in a major way to problems of poverty, unemployment, and unrest in the countries where they were stationed. They did not see it simply as a food and nutrition issue, but they saw it as a very fundamental problem that needed to be addressed, yet where very limited corrective action was being taken. Anything the United States could do to promote interest and support for population programs in their countries would be of great help.

Q: Before I ask about how we operated overseas on this problem, there are a couple of other places in the domestic equation--Congress, church groups, Catholics, of course, but other church groups, and the president. How did they impact on your operation?

GREEN: I didn't feel that President Ford (unlike President Carter) or most people on the White House staff in 1976 were interested or concerned on this issue, for the very obvious reason that it had no political benefits. In fact, it had certain political risks to get too much involved. By the way, we were not bothered at that time by the abortion issue. That was later on to be a terrible menace. But at that time, that was not the issue.
Family planning did have strong resistance, obviously, from the Vatican, even though we had reliable information that the use of modern contraception by Catholics in this country was almost as widespread as it was amongst Protestants. But the Vatican, nevertheless, had a very strident view on this thing. This was well known, and politicians didn't want to get involved in it, if for that reason only.

As to the NSC staff. Brent Scowcroft and Zbig Brzezinski were supportive, although they didn't do much about it. Hal Horan of the NSC was on my task force, and, as I said, was helpful.

Secretary of State Kissinger understood the importance of the problem, but he wasn't prepared to put his time and reputation on the line in pursuing it, though he wasn't going to in any way try to undermine my efforts. When I did call on Henry Kissinger one time, he was about to go to Africa. There was going to be a meeting of the Organization of African States that he was going to address in Nairobi. When I called on him, he said, "Marshall, I will do anything you tell me to at this conference on the subject. I recognize its importance. Just give me the talking points, and I'll take them up."

So I went back to my office and prepared talking points for him to make publicly and privately. The latter included the idea that we would judge countries' performance in terms of whether they were addressing this fundamental issue or not.

I have no way of knowing to what extent he carried out that latter, but I doubt he did anything. He did include in his public remarks certain allusions to the population problem and the need for addressing the issue. However, it was very muted. I don't think it had much impact. He wasn't particularly prepared to do anything about it; he just saw it as another damn problem that somebody else would have to handle.

As a matter of fact, when I was in Rio de Janeiro and I talked to our consul general there--I had known him for some time--he told me that Henry Kissinger and he had had a conversation about me, in which Henry had said he didn't understand why I had thrown away a promising future by getting involved in population issues. So that shows you, I think, pretty well what he felt about me and the problem. Later on, Secretary Cy Vance and President Carter were supportive but they were deeply preoccupied with issues of immediate concern like Cuba, Panama and Iran.

Q: But to some extent, benign neglect of something allows you a certain amount of freedom to operate. It's much better than having much attention from the Secretary of State.

GREEN: Except that my job was very much concerned with trying to get leaders interested, and if our Secretary of State and our President indicated no real interest in this thing, except of a pro forma nature, this immediately translated into a lessening of interest on the part of other countries at top levels. My power and my influence were related to the degree to which my leaders saw this as an important problem.
Q: And your feeling was?

GREEN: There was not the degree of interest that had been reflected, let's say, by Dean Rusk, who considered this to be a very important problem. Or even by LBJ, who saw increasingly this to be a very important problem, who was very interested, anyway, in conditions of poverty wherever they existed in the world. So was Hubert Humphrey who had a big heart.

It was also a very important issue in terms of women and women's rights. This brings me back, of course, to the substance of the problem: what do you do about it?

Q: Could we talk about the other group, Congress?

GREEN: On the Hill, there were certain senators who were interested, but not very, on whom I called to talk about this thing. But again, they were thinking largely in terms of aid funding, whether or not we should put more money into it. Of course, I was talking to that. But I did find a great deal of interest in the House of Representatives. There were about 30 or 40 congressmen and congresswomen who saw this as a very important issue. Probably Jim Schever of New York and Tony Bielen of California were the most active, but there were others who were equally interested and concerned. They did hold hearings in 1978 on population, where I was a principal witness, and where they had a lot of good witnesses from all over. I'm saying, in other words, that Congress was interested, and especially a certain group of representatives, roughly 40, who saw this as a major problem and who were keenly interested. I talked to them quite often and had very close connections, particularly with Jim Schever.

I remember talking one time to a group of 20 congressmen at lunch, in which I was the guest of a congressman from California. I spoke very rapidly for about 20 minutes about the magnitude of the problem. Not one congressman left the room. Now, this is interesting, because I've done a great deal of briefings in other connections on the Hill, and congressmen wandered in and out. But here, they all stayed, including some known critics of the program. But they remained. So I really felt that if we could only get through to these people.

I remember Father Drennan, for example, who, after all, was a Jesuit priest, but was very understanding.

Q: He was a member of the House of Representatives.

GREEN: He was very interested. So I felt that the potential on the Hill was strong. I might say that in subsequent years, that the interest on the part of the House of Representatives was probably stronger than it was in the administration, and that's true today. They repeatedly put more money into population for AID than the administration was asking for.
By the way, as these congressmen fanned out around the developing world, they began to understand this to be a very fundamental problem that needed to be addressed.

Q: Did you make a point of telling your Foreign Service colleagues, "Get them out to see some of the problems"? Because a congressman is somewhat under the leash of whoever is escorting him around.

GREEN: That's correct.

Q: You can either take him to a slum or you can take him to a golf course.

GREEN: For one thing, we used to brief--or at least the State Department would give a briefing--to the congressional group before it went out, and population would always be included in it. But more importantly, the ambassadors were supportive. What you suggested just now was indeed incorporated in our instructions to the field, and I'm sure that they exercised it since most felt the same way themselves.

One other thing about Congress. That was the Government Accounting Office, which, as you know, is a branch of Congress. I found that in the Government Accounting Office, there was particularly strong interest in what we were doing. One time I was invited to address all of the officers at GAO. Later the GAO began to critique government programs in terms of their attention or lack of attention to this problem.

Q: You took this job in 1975. One could almost say this was when the women's movement, whatever you want to call it, was really coming into real flower and power at that time within the United States. Did this have an effect on your operation or not?

GREEN: Very much so. We found that most women's organizations were interested. This was not a women's-lib issue. This was an issue of women's status and rights, and this brings us to the fundamental question, which we haven't really talked much about, of what one does to try to improve motivation for smaller families. What does one do about it?

Q: That's the big question.

GREEN: That's the big issue. It was set forth at the world population plan of action that emerged from World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, this document that was approved by the consensus of all 136 nations there, with the exception of Communist China and the Vatican. Curious exceptions, bearing in mind they had totally different views. Those were the only two that didn't agree to this world population plan of action that called for direct interventions and indirect interventions. The direct interventions were basically family planning, later-age marriages, especially for women, and breast-feeding, because that has the effect of spacing children automatically. Then it went in for what they call indirect interventions. This called for improving the economies of
countries, because when countries begin to move ahead, when people have more money and better education and so forth, then there's almost an automatic tendency for fertility rates to decline.

But the most effective indirect intervention measure was improving the status and rights of women. There's almost a direct correlation—you might say an inverse proportion—between women's education and fertility rates. The higher the level of women's literacy, the lower the level of fertility. This is known as the Zorpa principle. Improving the status and rights of women was something we should do anyway. It was unassailable, indeed sacrosanct, something nobody could openly oppose. Hence, this would probably be the most effective single step that we could take.

I chaired a small group that was unrelated to this interagency task force. It just emerged ad hoc, consisting largely of women in the State Department, but also from AID and from USIS, which was very keen on this issue. The group was started in 1977. We met maybe every two or three months. I was sort of the chairman of the group. There emerged from our work a worldwide directive that instructed our ambassadors with regard to what they should do in terms of advancing the status and rights of women in the countries to which they were assigned. The way we did this was, first of all, asking the ambassadors their advice as to what would be most effective. So the directive we eventually sent out to them was based upon their own recommendations. Thus, we avoided a lot of pitfalls, because there are some countries where you have to be very careful. It also made the ambassadors feel that they were the architects of the policies they were executing. This was diplomacy at its best.

Q: We're talking about the very heart of diplomacy, and that is to get away from the tendency of management, "A" versus "B" type of management. "A" type management is when everything comes from the top down. So we tell every ambassador in every country, "You have to do this and so," which in a lot of countries really doesn't work and is disregarded or done poorly, or else it's counterproductive, instead of saying, "What should we do?" In a way, this was somewhat going against the trend, which was to come up with an absolute answer or what have you from the State Department.

GREEN: This, I think, is the way we should proceed more often than we have. As an ambassador in the field, I had come to appreciate the merits of this approach, especially on a sensitive issue. Otherwise, one's tendency is to criticize or to grumble.

When we got these answers back, we spent a great deal of time winnowing them all out. Some of the advice was conflicting. A few ambassadors took a disdainful view about getting involved in women's rights at all anywhere. So we then came up with a directive to the field based upon all these replies. That directive was written in 1978, and we got the signatures of almost all the government departments, including the White House, that were involved. It still was hung up at the top level of the State Department.
When I was retired from the State Department in early 1979, this directive still hadn't gone out. But meanwhile, I'd been named consultant on population, and in that capacity I came back to the Department and attended these meetings. We completed the document, and Under Secretary Dave Newsom was helpful to me in getting Secretary Vance's signature on the directive and sending it to all our posts abroad. I feel that that was one of our greatest accomplishments: enlisting the support of our ambassadors worldwide in promoting the status of rights in women, not simply on the grounds of population issues, by the way, but on higher grounds than just that. This is something we should do anyway.

By the way, this is true of almost all the effective indirect measures to deal with population growth: almost all of the indirect interventions are things that we should do anyway. In other words, lowering infant mortality rates in the long run is going to be very effective, because many people have a lot of children simply because they expect most of them to die. If you could lower mortality rates, then the thinking of people begins to change. So these are the kinds of things—women's rights, lowering infant mortality rates, raising education—those are the three fundamental social programs that we were promoting, and they all had the indirect effect of reducing fertility rates.

Q: I want to start talking about our policy overseas. Maybe I'm getting overly tangled within Washington. Of course, for any program to work, it depends on the relationship there. Then we'll move overseas. In 1977, a new administration came in—President Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State—with a more human-rights (at least on the surface, anyway), caring more about the situation in the world than of the previous Nixon and Ford Administrations, it would appear. Did you notice a difference?

GREEN: Yes, I did. I noticed that there was more propensity on the part of the new administration to be involved in these kinds of issues—women's rights, education, child welfare, be it at home or abroad. There was also a shift in Congress to be much more supportive of population programs on the grounds that they addressed the problem of women and children all around the world, women who were suffering from repeated childbirth and wasted health and early death, and children who died at an early age. These were all results of excessive fertility rates—partly, anyway. Therefore, the administration was concerned about this. However, the administration was particularly concerned about human rights. You'd say offhand that human rights would be a supportive concept to what we were doing.

Q: It would seem to be.

GREEN: It would seem to be, but, in effect, it was not altogether so. I found myself, for example, having to work with Pat Derian, who was in charge of human rights in the State Department, which meanwhile had become a bureau. It seemed to me that she and all the groups that she was dealing with should make family planning and women's status number-one concerns, but they did not. I read a number of her speeches; they never mentioned this word "population" or the fact that so many women were poor, powerless,
and pregnant. Her associates seemed to be oblivious to the realities of the great world outside. They were thinking of it very much in terms of problems of this country.

The other thing was that in talking about human rights, they never talked about human responsibilities. What we, in essence, should be urging was that people and societies should act in a responsible way: that couples should only have those children that they could bring up and feed properly and give a proper education to. We should be talking about emulating countries that were most successful in dealing with population programs, countries like those in East Asia that had the most successful programs, because in those countries there was a strong sense of responsibility!

In other words, human rights in our country had come to overshadow human responsibilities. That was the wrong message. The right message is to combine the two: human rights depend upon human responsibility, and vice versa.

_Q: As you say this, something occurs to me that I'm seeing the effect of, and that is that the liberal movement in the United States, which I would call the Jimmy Carter movement and the civil liberties union and all this, gives so much emphasis to rights, that responsibility does not seem to play as much a role. The problem is that you can see some of the fabric of society coming apart because of the emphasis on rights, rather than on responsibility. Do you think maybe this permeated this?

GREEN: Of course it did. It was in all our speeches. It was known as being the "battle cry of the new administration." I think it had a very sapping effect on a lot of things that we were seeking to do around the world. I used to talk to Pat Derian about this, I spoke to others about it, but in the climate of Washington at that time, it was not a very popular message.

Just think of it this way. You're a father and you have a son and a daughter. Do you call them into the library to remind them of their rights, or do you call them into the library to remind them of their responsibilities? If you remind them of their rights, what kind of children do they turn out to be if you don't also recommend that they think about responsibilities? They turn out to be permissive, self-indulgent. In a way, we see this in our own country. We're seeing this as a sapping of the moral fiber of nations not to have their young people imbued with a sense of responsibility.

_Q: We're seeing this very much. My wife is a schoolteacher, and she sees this very much in the high schools. This is a problem, more emphasis on rights than on responsibilities.

Also, do you think there's this other factor that we've mentioned before, that, after all, the new administration comes in, you can do something maybe to get people immediately to stop torturing other people in other countries, but the long-term results of population control won't be seen by the next five administrations? Do you think, as politicians, this was also a problem, that there was no immediate benefit?
GREEN: For one thing, we did antagonize a lot of governments with our annual reports on their performance on human rights. At the same time, our widely circulated report could be a stinging rebuke to what they were doing. It was resented, obviously, far more than they would dare express. It also was seen as having some impact upon our aid-giving. Let's bear in mind that when we're talking about population programs, it involves a very strong sense of responsibility on the part of local governments, villages, and people. If our message to the world is one of rights rather than responsibilities, it could be a very dangerous message. And I think it had that effect.

This doesn't mean that we shouldn't pursue human rights, but I'm simply saying it should be weighed. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. You cannot have rights without responsibilities. Rights are only possible because people act in a responsible way. If you act irresponsibly, eventually the rights will bring a country down. So that our message should have been that balance. This is what I kept weighing in with Pat Derian and with the administration, and I just didn't seem to get anywhere. They'd agree with me, but they wouldn't do anything about it. This thing became sort of a power of its own.

Q: Were we talking from a position of strength in the United States, in our underdeveloped areas, you might call them, the poor people? Were we doing enough in population control so you could say, "Look, we've got this under control. You can do something about it"?

GREEN: There again, we were in an unfortunate position. First of all, the world population plan of action called upon all countries that had any kinds of population problems to have a population program. We didn't have one. We don't have one to this day. Therefore, for us to preach to other countries that they should have a program, and we didn't have one of our own, was a bit thick. A bit difficult.

Yes, we do have population problems in this country. Try to park a car, you know you have population problems. But our gridlocked cities and congested highways, the difficulties in disposing of waste, environmental deterioration, the smog that is now enveloping our cities, they all attest to the fact that we have population-related problems. That we did not have a population program that addressed these things sort of weakened our position. But you must remember, also, that at that time in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was a very dominant influence in the world. We were by far the largest donor of aid in those days. Therefore, what we did and thought and acted on made a great deal of difference.

Today it isn't so much so. We're now, relative to the rest of the world, not that powerful. Therefore, our position and recommendations are not given that much currency. So things have changed. But at that time, particularly in the 1960s and the early 1970s, it made a great deal of difference.

Q: We're talking about 1975-79. We've talked about the elements in the United States, supportive and divisive. But what did you do in getting the world to talk about this?
GREEN: There was one thing to continue doing, which we had been doing, and that was putting money into population support programs, either directly or indirectly through nongovernmental organizations to help other countries. We could also consult and participate in, international conferences. I went to many of these international conferences, and I was the head of the US delegation to the Population Commission, which met every two years in the United Nations. So we worked with the United Nations. I had meetings about every two months with Bob McNamara, who was head of the World Bank, who was very supportive of population, had written and made strong speeches about the importance of this issue. I found the IMF and the Council of Economic Advisors to the President, shared our kind of thinking.

The real problem gets us into an extensive field, which is a very important one, and not enough attention has been paid to it. That is, what can you do that isn't already being done that is going to be effective in reducing population growth? We've only talked in generalities so far. In my travels, it became clearer and clearer to me that leaders of countries recognized the gravity of this issue, but there was very little evidence that they were personally involved in doing something about it, for reasons that are quite obvious. They, therefore, left this problem in the hands of the minister of health.

I went to any number of African countries where this problem was handled by the minister of health. Ministers of health are not interested in limiting population. On the contrary, they try to bring children into this world healthy, they try to keep the mothers healthy, so maternal child care becomes their principal concern as it relates to this problem. But in terms of trying to reduce fertility rates, they are not interested. If anything, they're interested in the other side of the ledger.

When I would go to these African countries, this repeated itself again and again. I found the minister of health either totally disinterested or hostile to population-control programs, if you want to call it that; "population stabilization" is a little better. Reducing fertility is another way. I found that they were either not interested or hostile, but I found on their staff that there was almost always a woman who was in charge of MCH, maternal child health. They were supportive, because they could see what repeated childbearing was doing to women and to the wasted health of children, and they were very concerned about child spacing and trying to have lower total fertility rates. That brought us back again to this whole question: Did these women have any power? No, they had almost no power, although it was beginning to take effect.

So I began to realize that in these countries, if you were going to get anywhere, one of the things that had to be done was not just the status and rights of women, but that women's organizations, particularly at the village level, should be promoted, supported, advanced. This had all the desirable results that related back to the Carter policy—human rights, women having control of their bodies, of having better prospects for health for themselves and their children. Therefore, that was going to be, at least for Washington, politically acceptable.
I also found in some of the countries that there were rudimentary organizations of women, even at the marketing-women levels in West Africa. Therefore, we should be using our ambassadors and their staffs, the United Nations, and other organizations to give support to women’s organizations. I was just getting deeply involved in this, by the way, when I retired from the State Department. This became more and more a revealed truth to me, that this was one of the ways you could get more effective action in dealing with the problems.

Clearly, what was needed was not to have population put in the hands of the ministers of health, but rather, if anything, put in the hands of the minister of economic planning, or better still, in terms of an interministerial body that was directly answerable to the president of that country or the prime minister, whoever was the number-one power. The top leader should be personally interested. He should have the right organization under him that would be interministerial, because when you're dealing with this problem, as you yourself just mentioned, education is a very important thing. Therefore, the minister of education has to be involved. Obviously, the minister of health has to be involved. The minister of labor is critically important. The minister in charge of local government organizations--we call them the Secretary of Interior, I suppose--but the minister that was in charge of local governments is very important. Of course, the Council of Economic Advisors or the equivalent of that, the minister of the treasury, if you call it that, those people have to be involved.

Anybody who is dealing with economic planning or dealing with the treasury immediately saw the importance of this problem, because these countries were having to use so much of their foreign exchange and of their scarce revenue simply to build more schools and hospitals and houses, and supply more food for their rapidly growing populations. Almost all of their scarce savings were going into infrastructure. Rapid population growth was a dead weight on economic advancement; nothing was left over for development. The only way to get development funds was to borrow money abroad, which they had to pay back. So in effect, population was contributing to the increased indebtedness of these countries, which is now strangling them. Yet if you try to remove and reduce government expenditures and remove subsidies, you're going to have riots, as in Venezuela right now and in Cairo in the past.

The problem was understandable to these leaders, but they didn't have the drive and organization. I often cited the Indonesian model for countries to follow in organizing themselves.

Q: Indonesia has that equivalent?

GREEN: That's right. It has what they call the BKKBN, which is the population family-planning council that has representatives of the ministers of all relevant departments and heads up directly to Suharto, who is deeply committed and interested. So in the
beginning, when I was dealing with this problem, I was focusing upon organization at the
top, and tried to promote an Indonesian type of solution.

What was happening was that the governments were not that interested, and they were not
able to exercise enough influence in the context of their huge, slow-moving
bureaucracies, and of their rather distant relationships with local governments to get these
things going at the grass roots in the villages. So I moved my thinking from focus upon
what could be done at the central government level, which was quite clear, which nobody
would dispute, to how you were going to translate that into effective action at the village
level. I came essentially to the conclusion that . . .[End Tape I, Side 2. Begin Tape II, Side
1]

Q: Mr. Ambassador, when the tape ended, you were saying your focus had changed from
at the top head of the government level to dealing with this problem more at the village
level.

GREEN: Yes. The reason I said that is that these governments change with alarming
frequency, and, to be successful, government programs have to carry on year after year for
a long period of time, without interruption, without reversing the course too much.
Sometimes you have to change policy, but it has to be a sustained effort.

On the other hand, people, of course, come and go. They only live for so long and they're
only interested for so long, so what is permanent in this whole structure, then, is only the
village or the community in general. It might be in the cities, too, because they have a
permanence.

Q: The real problem is getting to be cities, isn't it?

GREEN: That's right. I want to come to that, because when I started with this problem,
most of the population in these developing countries was on the farms, but in the last ten
years, there's been a tremendous surge towards the cities. Therefore, the problem becomes
much more focused on what you can do in the cities. When I was dealing with this thing,
the preponderant populations were in rural areas, and people were being forced off the
farms by the fragmentation of land holdings and also by the attractions of the cities, and
they were beginning to flood into the cities.

So the problem, as you suggest, began to change. But to go back, you still want to keep
the people on the farms, to the extent possible, and prevent this enormous surge to
overcrowded cities. So therefore, population programs have to be rooted to the maximum
extent possible in village life. Furthermore, people are going to be most receptive and
supportive of programs that take place within their own visible horizons that improve
conditions of life in their own villages. In other words, it has to be commended to them in
terms of their own self-interest.
You've got to be able to demonstrate to somebody in a village why it's going to be better to them if they can limit family size. This can be done. Quite clearly, the fragmentation of land holdings and forcing people off the land is something that people don't like. They're seeing all their younger people now going into the cities, and more and more farming is left in the hands of the very old and the very young and the women. So if you can show why it's in the interest of the village, and you can show why it's worth their while, why it pays off to have smaller families, then I think you're beginning to make some real headway on the problem. At least so it would seem to be in theory.

The difficulty, again, with villages is that you have to have somebody in that village who is sufficiently interested and knowledgeable who is going to take the lead and carry some weight with the villagers. You have to have some kind of enlightened spirit, you might say. If you look around the world, India is a very good example of it. You'll find population programs are effective in certain blocks. Blocks have about 110,000 people in them. It almost always turns out that, where a block's program is successful, there's some guiding spirit in that particular block who is concerned and has natural leadership qualities, and he takes the thing under control.

One of the advantages of a village approach is the idea of development from the grass roots upward, rather than the trickle-down theory, putting a lot of money in big ticket projects that will eventually benefit the people down the line. The trickle-down approach had already been discredited pretty much by the time I was involved in population. I found there was a good deal more interest in AID when there was a grass-roots upward kind of approach to development. You come across a number of villages where this is really working, because you have that guiding spirit. When you don't have that guiding spirit, it doesn't work and you can't create it. So that becomes a limitation on what you really achieve that way.

So having gone through years in tramping through villages, slum areas, and things like that, seeing where it works and where it doesn't work, I came increasingly to the conclusion that the village approach is going to work in those countries where you already have a strong village structure, which you have in Indonesia. But where you have a weak structure, for example, as in Pakistan and Bangladesh and parts of India, that approach fails.

Q: We're talking about social pressure.

GREEN: Yes. For example, in Indonesia, you found that the village chief is keenly interested, because he knows the man up the line is keenly interested. Eventually, Suharto was interested. Also the military are very interested, and they're all beholden to the military. So when you have that power at the top, people down the line pay more attention.

Also, in Indonesia you found that the wives in the village formed wives' clubs and there was a great deal of peer pressure on everybody to keep down family size. They had to
report what they were doing, the number of fertilities, and you found a lot of these
villages would set up their own voluntary quotas of who was going to have how many
children, the kind of thing done in China on a draconian basis but was being done on a
voluntary basis in Indonesia in many of these villages.

So where you have a strong feeling of community, that approach is going to be
successful, particularly if it's married into a kind of incentive program, where if that
village achieves a certain lowering of fertility rates, it gets higher priority in terms of
government-support programs. I suggested to a number of governments that they should
put up a big billboard in the village, saying, "If we bring down our fertility rates in this
village, the government will award us by whatever we in the village most want, within the
means of the government." That could be the building of a mosque, for example, or of a
road, or of a rice milling plant. In Egypt, rewards took the form of bee farms because an
apiary was a way of extra income, and people wanted it. However, such projects failed in
Egypt due to various factors.

So these ideas of how to introduce incentives at the village level were of great interest to
me. In Bangladesh and Thailand there were small banking concerns or a small village
banker who would extend small loans at very low rates to those who practiced family
planning or limited family size.

Q: Had you developed the equivalent of a sort of think tank, where bright young people
were using the powers of the American Government, the embassies and all, to come up
with ideas, and then you'd filter these out and propose them?

GREEN: Curiously, the embassies had very little understanding of what I'm talking about.
They had very little contact with villages. You found possibly more in Africa than you did
in other places.

Q: Probably because of the localities. In a capital, you deal with a ruling class who don't
have a problem, for the most part.

GREEN: There was another thing in Africa that we had introduced, and that was a kind of
ambassadorial fund, where the ambassador had up to $25,000 a year that he could use as
he wished. Many of them were using the fund to tie in with the village, because it gave
ambassadors the excuse to go out to that village and to see it at close hand, and then give
them something.

I spoke to many of our ambassadors and tried to get them to get into population family-
planning health projects, which they did. In Africa, they were in many ways closer to the
people, even though the governments of those countries in Africa were not very close to
the people. They weren't very close to the tribal groups. They were seen as sort of "out
there." African governments had closer connections with capitals of other countries than
with their own people. There was a kind of isolation. But we had a lot of good
ambassadors who wanted to get out among the people. Many on our staffs were really
dedicated, and it was a pleasure working with them and talking with them.

Q: Could you describe worst and best cases, examples you had in your time?

GREEN: I knew East Asia best, of course, of all the parts of the world, and this was the
area of the world where the programs were most successful. It goes back, basically, to a
very strong Confucian ethic of responsibility which I spoke about before, of dedication
to family, dedication to community, dedication to nation. Strong family system, strong
village system, and so forth. So the programs we are talking about worked best in East
Asia. Not everywhere. In the Philippines, it was with rather indifferent results. The
Vatican bore much of a responsibility for the failure of some of these programs. Not that
the barrio priests were opposed; they were supportive. But the cardinal and others at the
top generally were weighing in against the program, especially the Opus Dei as an
organization began to become more and more influential.

Q: Opus Dei is sort of a militant arm.

GREEN: That's right. It's a right-wing Catholic activist group.

Q: It started in Spain.

GREEN: Each one of these countries involves quite a long story. I was deeply involved in
the population program in the Philippines. I had many meetings with President Marcos
and his wife, who basically were quite supportive.

Let me just say, in general, the programs worked best in East Asia for the reasons that I
mention right now, plus the fact that they were beginning to make very rapid economic
progress. There's no question that economic progress does have a favorable impact on the
problem. Korea is a very good example of that, and Taiwan. Both of them brought their
fertility rate down, largely because of economic breakthroughs. But you're not going to
have economic breakthroughs when rampant growth of population denies the capacity of
country to progress economically.

There was some progress also in Latin America, especially in South America. Mexico
was beginning to make some in-roads into this problem. The glaring exception, where no
real progress was made, was in Central America. That was a matter of great concern to
our ambassadors. As a matter of fact, our ambassador in San Salvador sent in a telegram
in 1976 reflecting the views of the country team that I found one of the most perceptive
analyses of a country that I've ever seen, in which population was identified as the major
basic problem in the country, where it had been responsible for the "Soccer" War with
Honduras back in the 1960s, but where they pointed out how population was causing an
increasing polarization of society between the very wealthy and the very poor, and that
this was inevitably going to bring about an internal clash of momentous proportions.
The countries where there was least progress was Africa and various parts of the Middle East and South Asia. In other words, there was a kind of band that ran all the way across the globe from Burma on the east, all the way to Senegal on the west, where population programs were not working for one reason or another. There were exceptions, and, as I say, there were certain states in India that were making progress, especially Kerala in the south, and Sri Lanka was making some. There were some exceptions, but by and large, those countries had the highest fertility rates and they were making the least in-roads in this problem, and population growth threatened those countries the most. I might add that our interests were deeply engaged, especially in the Middle East, in a worsening of social and socio-political conditions in those countries.

I increasingly used the strategic argument for reducing population growth, drawing on arguments which General Max Taylor had made in speeches. But, it was a delicate issue to raise, because you didn't want people to think you were advocating it for strategic reasons of interest to the U. S. Basically, the interests of all of mankind are tied up in what happens in programs in any one country. This was especially true in the Middle East where the United States and other countries had a major strategic stake, but where population was threatening the stability of most Middle East countries.

Look at the report prepared by the George Ball Presidential Commission just after our hostages were seized.

George Ball, in his report to the President, identified population as being one of the basic causes of the unrest prevalent in Iran, pointing out how people swarming in the slums of South Tehran, in particular, became a restive, frustrated force that was very amenable to extremist voices and to the Ayatollah's clarion call. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt were all countries where the United States had a major strategic interest and where population threatened to undermine the stability of those countries. Egypt was a splendid case in point, and while I was still in that job in the State Department, I made about three trips to Egypt. Since that time I've made several more. I've been in direct touch with Sadat, when he was still alive, and with Mubarak. I have made presentations before the Supreme Council of Egypt and before the Cabinet. I found that they were increasingly concerned about population growth, especially Mubarak, but where they found it very difficult to handle effectively.

Q: Is the problem religion?

GREEN: Religion is a major problem. Mubarak's up against the fundamentalist Islamic groups. The last conversation I had with Sadat was after I left the State Department. This was the year of his assassination in 1981. Six months before that, I had a meeting with him in his home in Cairo and his wife was there. We talked about the population problems. I put on a micro-computer presentation. At the end, we started talking about overcrowded Cairo. He was talking about the breakdown of parental disciplines and how children wandering around loose in the streets were being proselytized by the extremist groups. The last remark he made to me on that point—in fact, the last words he ever
mentioned to me–was, "It's an absolute nightmare, Mr. Ambassador." Six months later he was assassinated by these same urban terror gangs.

So it was clear that countries in which we had a major strategic stake were being threatened from within. We could put all the amount of weaponry and train all the military we want--and we put a lot of money into Iran and tried to help--and what happens? If they go down the drain, they can turn out to be hostile forces.

Q: Egypt certainly comes to mind, doesn't it?

GREEN: Yes.

Q: In order to balance off Israel, we have loaded Egypt down, but have not really made any real progress with the population. We're talking now in 1989.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: Let's talk about modalities. How did you go about this? Let's take Egypt. What did we try to do there from your point of view? You look at Egypt, you see a target. What do you do about it?

GREEN: When I visited Egypt the first time in 1978 on population business, the Egyptian Government had just come under sharp criticism from the World Bank for its failure to address this problem. Bob McNamara was all for limiting World Bank loans until they addressed this issue. He really wanted to put the arm on them to address the problem. Otherwise, it was just money down the drain.

When I went to Egypt, I ran into several problems. I'm very glad you brought this example to mind, because in essence, they reflect the problems that I ran into almost everywhere. The first thing that I ran into was an American ambassador who made the observation: "Marshall, you know, until they settle this problem in the Middle East (basically the problem of divided Palestine), you can't expect the Egyptians ever to address this issue." And he meant it.

I said, "But they're never going to solve that problem. Do you mean to say population issues will meanwhile be neglected?"

He said, "I'm afraid that's the reality."

I went back to the hotel that night, and I couldn't sleep, I was so churned up over that conversation. I knew there was truth in what he said, but if that was going to be the attitude of our ambassador and of the government, what hope was there that we could really do anything in a country like Egypt?
So the following day, he introduced me to the number-two man in the government, the head of their whole economic steering group. I think he had the title of deputy prime minister. I found him to be, on the other hand, rather supportive of doing something about it, and he recognized the gravity, because he was an economist. But the ambassador, Hermann Eilts, a very bright fellow, very able, had this view. He thought it would be helpful to me to meet the Grand Sheik of Alazar. That was the big university in Cairo, but he was also regarded as sort of the spiritual leader of Islam.

_Q: He's certainly of the Sunni faith._

GREEN: That's right. They have a Department of Islamic Studies in the university that is very important in the Moslem world. He suggested I meet with him, and that arrangement was made through the deputy prime minister. I met with him, and it was one of the most frustrating meetings I've ever been to in my life. First of all, it took place in a great, large hall, in which we sat off in a corner, and we were all lined up in a row: Ambassador Eilts, I, the Grand Sheik, and his interpreter.

_Q: This is the medjlis, which is the way almost all business is conducted in the Middle East._

GREEN: This was my first exposure to it. I made my little pitch, and then the Grand Sheik said, "No, we don't have a population problem. You don't understand us here. We have all this land. As you arrived, you observed that Egypt's population is compressed in this narrow Nile Valley, but we have far more land. It's untenanted. We can fill it up. We can make the desert bloom!"

I said, "It was my understanding, Your Excellency, that making the desert bloom has been a very intensive effort on the part of the Egyptian Government, with vast amounts of foreign assistance, and you haven't been able to do very much. You've expanded your crop lands along the banks of the Nile about as far as you can go. Any additional hectare brought into cultivation is going to cost enormous amounts of money. It's just not going to be effective."

"Ah," he said, "no, no, no, Mr. Ambassador. You're wrong. We can make the desert bloom if we just work hard enough and we get enough assistance." He was absolutely obdurate at that point. I never got any further with him on that subject.

I left that meeting very, very depressed about the mentality of some of these spiritual leaders of the Moslem world. I was dealing with very different leaders, you might say, from the Indonesian leaders, who were Moslems and who saw the problem in a very realistic light. In other words, you're dealing with very different mentalities. It isn't the fact that they're Moslems; it's the fact that they're traditionalists and they're extremists, and you're dealing with a kind of religious fervor.

_Q: One doesn't have to go much farther than the head of the Catholic Church._
GREEN: That's right. So I rather despaired at that first meeting. I also found that there was a great problem in the Egyptian Government that reflected a little bit the problem that I had with AID. It was the fact that the minister of health was totally uninterested in any kind of motivational programs, whereas the man who was in charge of the population program of Egypt wasn't interested in family planning and was totally interested in things like women's rights and the oblique, indirect long-term approach. They were absolutely deadlocked. They had no communication, no common program, although they were setting up, while I was there, a new Supreme Council on Population. So there were the beginnings of trying to bring this thing together, but it was very, very frustrating.

In the case of Egypt, you have the encapsulation of the types of problems where you have our ambassador and leaders who have got to settle other problems before they get to population and where religious focus have an enormous amount of power.

Q: We're talking about the seven blind men and the elephant. One is seeing the problem as a problem of Palestine; the other is seeing the problem of the Nile. Each one is seeing one small part, rather than looking at the whole thing.

GREEN: But to go back to Egypt, in retirement I did go out to Egypt four or five times at the request of the government. I put on presentations to the Supreme Council with all the important ministers there, plus Mrs. Sadat. The following year I put on a presentation to President and Mrs. Sadat, and also to members of their legislature.

Two years later, after Sadat was assassinated and Mubarak became president, at his request I went out and had one of the most satisfying meetings I've ever had in my life. There I met with Mubarak, with all the leading members of his Cabinet, with about 14 of the governors, and with leading members of the press.

In this huge gathering, I put on a presentation that had been carefully worked out, and was called a RAPID presentation. That's an acronym for a type of presentation in which, using the latest in microcomputer technology, you present, projected onto TV screens, the adverse impact of population on the ability of the country to realize its development goals, be it in terms of agriculture production, or of balance of payments, or of urban planning, or school and hospital construction costs.

So you're able to present to them, using their own statistics and projections, how totally unrealizable those plans are, given population projections. Then you showed that if they moved to an average three-child family--they had four or five then--how much more realizable these would be, but they would still be terrible disasters, whereas if they moved to a two-child family by the year 2000, then a lot of these things could be resolved.

So I put on this presentation with a very able assistant, Tom Golliher of the Futures Group, and it made a great impression, at the end of which Mubarak said, "Mr. Ambassador, you have made a very impressive presentation and one, I am sure, that we
will all take to heart." They asked for the comments of people around the table. One of the ministers--I've forgotten which one--used the old argument about making the deserts bloom. "We have enough land," he said. "We should send out people. Americans developed the West. We should move out into the deserts and do the same."

Mubarak said, very dryly, as dry as the desert, "Mr. Minister, I suggest you be the first one to go." They all roared with laughter. At that moment, Mubarak won my heart. I thought, "Here is a man who has a good sense of humor, who, at the same time, is preaching the right gospel."

Since then, the population program, although it made a major advance for a short time, eventually collapsed, or at least I don't believe it's made much progress since then. I haven't been out to Egypt for about four years now, so all I'm saying is hearsay. Egypt hasn't made the progress that one would have hoped, even though the president is deeply committed and interested. I'm afraid it goes right back to what Hermann Eilts said to me once, and which I rejected (and, unfortunately, there's a great deal of truth in it) that until Egypt can resolve basic Middle East strategic issues, population is not going to be given the front and center attention it deserves.

Q: You mentioned before that in dealing with population, abortion had not become an issue. Today in 1989, we have had three elections on which abortion has been almost a bugaboo. Particularly with the Reagan Administration, and the Bush Administration now in its second month, is this a fake issue, or has this inhibited? Is this a problem? I'm speaking about the time you were dealing with this problem.

GREEN: When I was dealing with this problem, abortion was not a problem. I very carefully stayed away from it. I knew the sensitivities about it. I knew it would impair the effectiveness of my presentations. I made many speeches, by the way, all over our country and around the world. I attended many conferences. I always stayed away from the subject of abortion. When it arose, I just said, "Obviously we all want to prevent abortion from occurring, and therefore family planning is important, because it lessens its occurrence." But beyond that, I didn't get involved in the ethics and the ethical issues and questions of when does life first occur. That I stayed away from. Also, it wasn't much of an issue.

Abortion became an issue during the Reagan Administration, a very major issue. It was whomped up by Right to Life extremists and the Right to Life group was one of these single-issue groups whose votes would be solely conditioned upon what the Reagan Administration did in terms of denouncing and making abortion illegal. Therefore, they commanded enormous disproportionate power, because that's the only issue on which they judged their votes. So the Republican Party and the Democrats, to some extent, were wooing these Right to Life groups, and therefore adopted the anti-abortion position of those groups. They were also under a great deal of pressure not just from the Catholic Church, but, unfortunately, from a great deal of the Evangelistic groups which had a
similar view. There was a kind of religious union on this issue between most evangelical groups and the Roman Catholic Church.

1984 was a critical year. I'm now talking about a period that occurred after I left the State Department, but where, as I have said, I've been deeply involved for the last nine or ten years outside of the State Department in dealing with these issues, in some ways more effectively, not being in the government. I've been able to do things that I couldn't otherwise do.

In 1984, we had the second World Conference on Population that took place in Mexico City. The position that we were to take at this conference became a matter of great moment in Washington. I was a director of an advocacy group known as the Population Crisis Committee, which has about 35 full-time staffers. It's a well-known organization and has influence on the Hill. We do a great deal of lobbying for AID on population on the Hill. We still do, and I'm still an active member of it. Accompanied by General William Westmoreland, a fellow Population Crisis Committee director, I called on Westmoreland's close friend, James Baker. James Baker, at that time, was the President's number one assistant, along with Meese. We were concerned about the position to be taken by the American delegation at Mexico City, because we already had rumors that the Right to Lifers were having a great deal of influence on White House policy, and possibly on the appointment of the head of our delegation.

So we went to the White House, had a meeting with Jim Baker. I made my presentation. I thought it was effective; Bill Westmoreland thought so; and Jim Baker indicated as much. He put me in touch with Jim Cicconi, who was his special assistant, and still, I think, has considerable clout with Mr. Baker. We argued that the head of our delegation to the World Population Conference should be young William Draper, at that time head of the Ex-Im Bank, and who had a great deal of influence in the Republican Party and was a very able man. We got the impression that Jim Baker agreed; he certainly indicated that. The next morning, Westmoreland had breakfast with Ed Meese. I wasn't there. I didn't know Ed Meese. But Ed Meese also indicated that our position would be given serious consideration and probable support. We also met with the head of B.O.B. and so forth.

As it turned out, the position that we thought they had adopted was reversed. We don't know who reversed it or why it was reversed; probably someone even closer to the President than Baker or Meese.

So when it came time for the delegation to be named, it wasn't Draper. It wasn't Surgeon General Koop. We thought it might be, and we thought he was too anti-abortionist to be reflective of our position, so we had opposed him, which is regrettable. They settled on a former senator from New York, who, in fact, was my next-door neighbor here for a number of years. This former senator who headed our delegation was Senator James Buckley.

Q: Was he Catholic?
GREEN: Yes, he was an ardent supporter of the Vatican. But, when I knew him during the Nixon Administration, we never talked about that, because that's when I was assistant secretary. On this issue, he took an uncompromising position and ordered the preparation of a paper for the Mexico City conference by the White House staff, not by the State Department or AID.

The government at that time was very much under the influence not only of Right-to-Lifers, but also by a certain professor, Julian Simon, who had written a book called The Ultimate Resource, the "ultimate resource" being people. He had the theory that the more people in the world, the better it was for the economy of the world. It was a totally specious argument, but anyway, it had a great deal of support in the administration, because it was saying the kinds of things the administration liked, and that was more of a laissez faire approach, that governments in these countries were very poorly organized, and that until they straightened out their organization, there wasn't much they could do about these issues, and that the biggest drag on development in the world was mismanagement. It wasn't population; population was just incidental. Therefore, population basically was a neutral issue, one that didn't really deserve much attention.

Our delegation adopted this position which caused agony within the administration and on the Hill. They had two sets of hearings with regard to this draft position that we were to take to Mexico City. I testified at both of them and so did other members of our organization. We knocked it very hard, and I think we had basically a very sympathetic hearing, because the committee hearing was mostly attended by representatives who believed in population programs.

Before our delegation went to Mexico City, Buckley left off the delegation my successor, Dick Benedick, who was very able, knowledgeable, and articulate. They left him off the delegation, which was a terrible slap at all we'd been doing in the State Department. Buckley had on the delegation from AID an American black (he was on the delegation basically for that reason) who was opposed to population programs. Therefore, even though Bill Draper was a member of the delegation, the delegation was heavily weighted in favor of those supporting the Buckley position.

The position that we took at Mexico City astounded the delegates. They thought the United States was going to return once again as leader of efforts worldwide to deal with this issue and be supportive. On the contrary, Buckley stunned the conference with negative talk about population being a neutral issue, neither this nor that, and what was wrong was mismanagement, thereby really criticizing all the countries there. It was an absolute disaster. An absolute disaster, from which we've never recovered--never recovered.

One of the worst things about that conference was that, aside from what I've said, including the effective dismissal of my successor Dick Benedick, Buckley did something that was almost unique in diplomatic annals of singling out a country for criticism. He
criticized the population program in China on the grounds of its being coercive. He went on to announce that the United States was considering withdrawing its support from both the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, to which we had been giving upwards of $30 million a year, and to the International Planned Parenthood Federation, IPPF, to which we had been giving about $17 million a year for population programs, on the grounds that both of those international organizations, one a public government organization, the other a private organization, were helping to fund programs in China and that China's programs, by definition, were coercive, and we would therefore not have any part or parcel with programs that were coercive. Therefore, we were considering withdrawal of funds, which we eventually did.

[End Tape II, Side 1. Begin Tape II, Side 2]

GREEN: We were talking about the Mexico City conference, and especially what Buckley, the head of our delegation, had to say criticizing China's population program. It did, in fact, result in the United States withdrawing its support from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities and from the IPPF.

In withdrawing those funds, we in the Population Crisis Committee felt, a feeling generally shared in most governments and non-governmental organizations, that our action, taken in the name of opposition to abortion, would, in fact, result in far more abortions occurring, because the denial of $47 million a year, roughly, from population programs, almost all of which went into contraception of one type or another, meant that there would be that much less available in the way of avoiding unwanted births, and there would be that much more incidence of abortion. We estimated that there probably would be upwards of 500,000 more abortions a year as a result of the Reagan Administration's policies than would have otherwise have occurred.

Q: I hate to sound partisan in this, but isn't this much more for show, really?

GREEN: Of course, for political reasons. The Right to Life groupers were single-issue voters in this country, that the world suffers for it.

Q: Looking on this with some perspective of five years away from that, the Reagan Administration has gone, although some are back in there. Can you think of any of the forces within the White House that you feel were behind this? You said Meese and Baker were.

GREEN: One of the people who was obviously against this was Senator Helms and all of his henchmen, and he had people as advisors in the White House. Faith Whittlesey, who is Mrs. Reagan's personal advisor, was closely tied in with the Helms group. I think she wielded a great deal of influence. So I think it comes down to something that happened behind the scenes, and I can well imagine what did happen. I just don't want to say how it happened. It was a disaster of the first order for anybody who was in this field. We have not yet recovered from it.
Meanwhile, Congress did continue to vote funds for population programs, but there were more and more constraints placed upon recipients of our funds. There was more and more concern that our funds not be used in any way, directly or indirectly, in any program that had any kind of undue influence on women to accept contraception. What is undue influence?

One of the things that they ruled out was any kind of incentive programs or disincentive programs. To me, this was a very serious blow. Clearly, one of the things that has to be done--and I mentioned this earlier on--is to make reducing family size worth the while of people who did so, bearing in mind that having large families is seen not just as rooted in tradition, but as being possibly the wise economic decision to make.

Q: It's a form of social insurance.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: Having children to take care of you in your old age.

GREEN: That's right.

Q: And work your farm.

GREEN: Also working on the farms, you did need a lot of children. Or if you were a fisherman, you wanted to have a son, at least two sons, who could man your ship. So whatever it was, children were seen as an asset.

In a country like Egypt--and this is a point I neglected to point out earlier on, but it's a very important one--children can get jobs more easily than their parents. Children get very low-paying jobs. They can pick the boll weevils off of cotton, they also can shine shoes and run errands, and they can do all kinds of things at very low cost. If you're a very poor family, having four or five kids running around doing these kinds of things can be seen as an asset.

Furthermore, all bread in Egypt is sold at four cents a pound which is way below cost. It's heavily subsidized. Therefore, the economic penalties of having a child are very low, bread being obviously a major component. There are also transportation and other kinds of subsidies. Therefore, you don't pay much for children, and children can bring in an economic return. A further complication, going back to this four cents a pound for bread, is the fact that Egypt is becoming more and more dependent upon imported grains and bread, essentially, wheat, and less and less productive of their own. Subsidized imported grains obviously discourages farmers; they can't grow wheat or whatever in Egypt at competitive cost. Therefore, they abandon the farms. You find agriculture being neglected.
There's one final point that I want to make here that's a terribly important point. I made this point when I first took over the job. One of our aid directors had made the observation in congressional testimony that nobody paid much attention to, but it was a very important point. This was Bill Gaud. This was in 1976. Bill Gaud pointed out that the United States Government is spending 14 times as much money on aid programs that have the effect of lowering death rates, basically food and nutritional programs, as it is spending on programs that has the effect of reducing fertility rates. Therefore, our aid program was having the unfortunate total impact of aggravating the problem through reducing death rates and increasing longevity.

Certainly we don't want to increase mortality rates; we want to lower them. We want to do everything we can to improve health and lower mortality rates. But if that is our purpose, then we are all the more to balance the ledgers in these countries by helping them reduce fertility rates. We should be putting much more muscle and money and effort and counsel into this type of program.

Q: In 1979, you left. How did you feel about what you had accomplished at that point?

GREEN: Well, I was not very satisfied. I was satisfied that I'd made the decision, yes. I had sacrificed a good deal in doing it. While I was still in the position of Population Coordinator, I had been offered the assistant secretaryship of two bureaus, as well as ambassador to two countries, one of which, Japan, I almost got, but which was given to somebody else, Mike Mansfield, for reasons I'd rather not go into right now. Of course, Mike has done a magnificent job, so I'm not regretting it in terms of our country's interest. But naturally, to me that would have been something that I would have taken. That would have been the only job of those offered to me that I would have readily taken, giving up work in the population field. It was that important to me, population. The other interest in my life, of course, has been Japan and China, and our relationship with those countries.

But I left with some regrets, but also with some feelings of reward that I at least had contributed to a better understanding of the magnitude of this problem and the kinds of things that were necessary to do if you were going to effectively cope with it. I felt that I had contributed to greater awareness in our government and other governments in population issues, as seen by leaders and diplomats and not just by health officials, doctors, demographers, and family planners. Those disciplines were already aware of what the problem was, but they saw it from their own professional viewpoints.

I was trying to look at it from the totality viewpoint, the point of view of how a leader and a citizen of tomorrow would see this problem, of what we'd done today about it, and feeling that we were stewards of this world during our lifetime, and we were supposed to leave the world a better place for our children. Neglect of this issue, to me, was an admission that we had not carried out our stewardship properly. I felt that this is something which should weigh on the conscience of all people who were concerned with the future of this world and of the well being of their children and grandchildren. I felt
that we were much too short-ranged in our viewpoint. I could understand why it was so, but it was regrettable.

Did we have any capability to plan and work for the future? Could any long-range programs ever really be carried out by any country in this world? I wasn't sure. I remember, in that regard, that Albert Schweitzer had once said, "We are losing the capability to foresee and forestall. We will end by destroying the earth." I think, in a way, that's what's happening right now. We have been unable to foresee and forestall, especially with regard to population and environment. "Population" is the key problem we've neglected.

*Q: Maybe we can foresee, but we're not doing anything about it.*

GREEN: By way of conclusion, may I say what kinds of things can be done that are not being done, that lie within the realm of possibility, given all of the kinds of mental makeup of leaders that I've experienced. I think that in the developing world, the problems of population have got to be related to things that work, that are possible, that they should be tied in with what we see as trends in the thinking and the capabilities of this world.

We know that we're living in an age of revolution in communications. We now have earth satellites. We now have television in homes. There's a great capability there for projecting programs and video cassettes and things like that, of getting the message out. But the message should be directed at why it is in the interest of individuals to have a smaller family.

What can be shown on these video cassettes in most of these countries is that if you have one healthy child who can earn good money, you can have much more in the way of social security protection in your old age than if you have a lot of children who are all weak or can make no money. If you could raise one child--you could make stories of these things--one child who has enough in the way of support, for good education and vocational training (including for a job overseas), he is going to be able to remit money to you.

*Q: You've got to say "he/she."*

GREEN: Yes. He or she will be able to remit money to you that is going to be far beyond anything you could expect from a lot of uneducated children. The very fact that you have a lot of children in the developing world means that none of them are going to be able to have that opportunity and advantage.

What I'm saying, basically, is to try to tie in your message with what is going to be in their interest to do. Another thing that you can do is that in every government there are huge numbers of government workers--the railroads and aviation industry, the Army, and in the bureaucracy. All those people are on government payrolls, and you surely have
some kind of access to them and some ways of influencing them. There's no reason in the
world why governments cannot reward those couples that have a family of the size that
the state wants. This is not penalizing couples. It is rewarding those attentive to the needs
of their societies.

This is already being done in a number of industries in India. I found that in Rajasthan
state, which is one of the most progressive states in India, a number of the textile plants,
about 14 of them, I think, are now using this kind of incentive of giving an extra amount
of salary to workers that limit the size of their family. As long as it's limited, they
continue to receive a bonus. This is designed to be an offset to having those two or three
sons that people count on. This, again, gets at the real roots of the problem.

I am a strong advocate of that type of a program, but I must say it's not being done widely.
I would like to spend more time on this particular aspect of the problem.

The third thing is that I would begin to put my family-planning resources more and more
into the cities. You mentioned this earlier on, and you were right, because in the cities,
there is no need for large families. You don't have farms requiring a lot of kids. Secondly,
excessive numbers of youths can be a disaster for that city in terms of providing essential
services and in terms of dangers they pose to the government through restiveness,
unemployment, and so forth. Everybody in the city has an interest in seeing that the size
of that city is kept down. The principal reason for urban overcrowding is not migration to
the city these days; it is the natural increase in the cities.

By the way, the people coming to the cities are mostly young people in their fertility
years. So you'll find that urban fertility rates sometimes are higher than in the adjoining
countryside.

Since people in urban areas want smaller families, there's much more of a natural demand
in cities for modern family planning. You're going to find higher user rates in cities and
more success stories. People in the rural areas tend to follow the example of the cities. If
the cities are making out with smaller families, this message is telegraphed to the
countryside.

I remember reading the report of one kid who went back to his hometown in Gambia. He
had been in the university in Bathurst. He went back to his home folks there, and he
began to be the sort of local seer as to what everybody should do. It was a very interesting
report. This I've seen repeated elsewhere. So the message begins to spread out from these
young educated people to their home folks, that this is the way of the future.

Greater use must be made of all of the means that we now have at our command:
government structures, women's rights and education, a revolution in communications,
new job opportunities, incentives and rewards to bring down excessive population growth
rates.
Q: Mr. Ambassador, this has been a fascinating look at an operation that is obviously vital and of the essence, as far as where we're going in the world today. I appreciate you sharing your experiences. Thank you.

GREEN: You're welcome, Stu.

End of interview