The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Hartman.]

Introduction by Ambassador Richard B. Parker

We are this morning inaugurating what I hope will be a long series of interviews with Former Senior officials of the Department of State and the Foreign Affairs Agency. We are opening this morning with Ambassador Arthur Hartman who has just left the embassy in Moscow and who will be retiring in a few days. He will be interviewed by Mr. William Miller of the Committee on U.S. Soviet Relations, a former member of the Senate Foreign Relations staff. With that, I turn you over to Ambassador Hartman and Bill Miller, thank you.

Q: Ambassador Hartman, you've just finished a tour in Moscow and you've decided to end a very distinguished career in the Foreign Service. I wonder if you could look back over that career and begin with why you wanted to go into the Foreign Service in the first place.

HARTMAN: Well I think, you know when you look back over the things that have determined your career over a period of time, you often find that happenstance has more to do with it than any kind of a planned action. I had a father-in-law, a rather conservative gentlemen from Indiana who used to say when asked; I think this was when I was Assistant Secretary, what happened to your son-in-law and where did he get where he got? He would say, "He went to Harvard and turned left." Well that's sort of a joke of the
Midwest, but it also illustrates an attitude of people toward the Foreign Service; this kind of a suspicion that if you are in the Foreign Service that you have been taken over by the foreigners.

I was at the end of the war in India and China in something called the ATC. We were transporting stuff over "The Hump" and I got very interested in that part of the world and indeed it was about the time that General Marshall was going out there to see if he could try and mediate between the forces in China and I followed that very closely. When I got back to Harvard I had already been at Harvard before I got in the army, I really concentrated on foreign affairs and the world much more than I had before. Then along came General Marshall again and he made the commencement address forty years ago this June in which he suggested the Marshall Plan. Well frankly, I heard that address and didn't think very much about it, I remarked on it, but I had already put in my application to go to the Law school.

Before I knew it I was beginning to think about what was going on and the plans for the Marshall Plan and by the end of that first year in Law school I got a call from a friend in Washington. He said, "How would you like to go to Paris?" Well that was a lot more appealing than continuing on in Law school, so I went and David Bruce was my first boss. I was hired as a young economist in the mission to France and I stayed there for between six and seven years and I entered the Foreign Service during that period.

Q: Was this the time of the Monnet Plan and all the great changes in Europe were taking place?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, in the mission to France we had a very unusual group of people; I would say, under David Bruce. We were headed, the team was headed by the treasury attaché who was a very young man who died rather tragically in his early thirties from a heart condition. He was then in his twenties, a brilliant economist and monetarist - monetary theorist and he was the head of our team. Then we had a Foreign Service Officer, Stan Cleveland who was the Foreign Service Representative and then several of us from the Marshall Plan mission.

It was during that period that we actually worked very closely with Jean Monnet because he was head of the plan in France and it was through him that the American foreign assistance was used; and despite the fact that the Fourth republic politicians were going in and out of office, Monnet was always there and kept his money going in the directions that he wanted. Also in 1950; this was the beginning of 1948 when I began there, but in 1950 we helped Monnet. I had a very minor part in that I must say, but David Bruce and Bill Tomlinson, the Treasury attaché had a big part in helping to draft the Schuman Plan Declaration. This was the first proposal for forming a united Europe and we were kind of a team at that point that included some of our distinguished colleagues from Bonn. It was a way of trying to integrate the former occupied territories of Germany into Europe and to once again establish a state in Germany and begin the process of movement away from a war-time organization. That whole period was very exciting right up through 1952 when
the Coal and Steel Community was created. Of course then, we moved on because during this period other things had been happening in the world and we had to look at the defense side of things partially because what had happened in Greece and Turkey, some moves that had been made in Eastern Europe, and finally the invasion of Korea led the American government to think about creating an organization for the purpose of promoting the defense of Europe; NATO.

With it, what would happen to Germany? The French came up with the idea that they did not want them as full members of NATO but perhaps through a European defense organization, they could bring the Germans into this rather large task; they realized that had to as the Germans were right there in the center of a divided Europe.

So I was on the delegation to the European Army Conference, so you see my career sort of melded into the Foreign Service and I left the Marshall Plan which indeed in France was virtually over with in the four years that it was promised in 1952.

Q: How did that take place? Here you were, you're out of Harvard and you're working as Special Assistant to a very distinguished ad hoc group and you're not in the Foreign Service at that point. What was it that made you decide to go into the Foreign Service? Did you, was it a motivation that you had previously that you thought this was something you might like to do or did it happen because you saw the current action in Europe?

HARTMAN: No frankly not, you know a lot of things were going on at this time. You had the regular Foreign Service, you had this sort of ad hoc group of people who came in, some of them at very high levels. At the head of the European unit of the Marshall Plan you had Averell Harriman and Ambassador Katz and people like that, and David Bruce who not only began as Head of the Marshall Plan, but moved over to be Ambassador to France and then he was succeeded by Henry Labouisse and there were just a whole series of people who came in at that time. In a sense, I suppose you could say that the more traditional Foreign Service began to be slightly overwhelmed, and I remember having long discussions with people like Teddy Kellise and others who were in the embassy who belonged to the old Foreign Service who had come in before the war and I think it's fair to say they were probably a little resentful of all these youngsters wandering around dealing in high policy, which we were. In any case, what happened was that with our world responsibilities growing and a feeling that the United States was going to continue to play a role in world affairs, the expansion of the Foreign Service was very much in view.

Along came something called the Wriston Plan and I'm really a "Wristonite." That is I came in; well there were two great waves I guess of people who came into the Foreign Service who had not started with the Foreign Service. In the immediate post-war period there were a lot of people who dealt with German affairs and who had been, whatever they call it, Regional Directors in the occupation and people who had worked in the war effort in Washington. These people were brought into the Foreign Service and that was kind of the first wave that took the Foreign Service beyond its core group.
The second wave occurred in the fifties, the early fifties when people like me and others who had an interest in foreign affairs got a taste of it and they said, "Well maybe I would like to stay in this work."

Q: At that point were you aware of the restructuring that was going on in the World order, not to mention the Foreign Service with Wristonization?

HARTMAN: Well I think we were all aware of it, whether we had correctly assessed what was going on or not is a hard question, one in fact that I have to answer this spring because I've got a speech to make on the fortieth anniversary of Marshall's speech at Harvard which is also my fortieth reunion time; and also I'm reviewing the fourth volume of the Marshall memoirs that are just coming out for the New Republic. You begin to think, "What was this then?" Was this sort of a naivete that suddenly struck a rather naive country in terms of world affairs because really there was this burgeoning of relationships that took place in the post-war period and a lot of people like me who had no great experience in these things came in and began to see what the possibilities were. I must say that what struck me in that period were the international cooperation aspects. I think we were all very idealistic and some remarkable things were happening. Just the very fact that the way the Marshall Plan was put to Europe as a proposal and the way it was picked up by Bevin and others and played back to us, and then the way that the Europeans sat down and organized the response to us. We didn't participate, we had observers there and one of the little fascinating bits of history that I found out when I went as Ambassador to France and was in that house on Forty-one Faubourg St. Honore. A friend of mine from England came there and he said, "You know the last time I was in this house was in 1948," and he said "I was working for Lord Franks who was the head of the British delegation to this European Conference to respond to the United States and its offer of aid." He said, "I can remember working all night in this big room down on the ground floor," where he said "we were stapling together our report because we had to issue it the next day." This was Eric Roll who has now gone on to become head of Wolberry's Bank and a few other things, but he was a figure for many years in the whole movement to create the OEC in Europe, the Economic Cooperation Organization, and finally to bring Britain into the more regularized and governmentalized forms of cooperation in the European community.

Q: Let me take you back to pick up on two points that you've raised already. The first point really is motivation. You were at Harvard, the war takes place and you serve in the Far East - the "Hump" carrying materiel to China and you witness the end of a colonial period, a terrible war with horrible devastation, a breaking of every previous mold; and then you go back to Harvard and finish and the career that seems to be before you is one of looking inward. The legal practice seemed to be what you were headed for, what was your sense of the world at that time as a veteran from the war, a terrible war with horrible experiences and a desire to come home and forget all of that. What was it that drove you out again to look at the world?
HARTMAN: By the way on that, on the latter point I had a very minor part in the war. I got in at 17 and it was virtually at the end of the war when I got over there. So I didn't see any, I wasn't in any of the tough fighting or came back with all kinds of psychological scars. For me it was almost a lark. I spent time in India, I flew from something called DumDum airport to Chungking and Kung Ming. I came home, it was more a sense of adventure I think. The more I sat around that Law school, the less I thought of spending my life doing that kind of thing and when the offer came to go to Paris I jumped at it. I went over there and really - for me I had never really traveled outside the country, I was very young. It was more in the nature of the kind of experience where you could influence events, where you could be a part of history and it seemed so much more important and so much more interesting as a life than the other life which you could have which seemed kind of humdrum to me. I think there is a psychological thing too, you have to look at yourself.

My father was a businessman and I was clearly heading away from what he had done all his life so I think you have to add that in. There is always a personal element in anything like this. We were very close as a family, but the thought of being in that business which was paper making didn't strike me as something that would be very fulfilling, so I was already going toward the law. I was heading away from that and then I guess France was even better and further away.

Q: Did you speak French when you went over there?

HARTMAN: I didn't. I had seven years of Spanish among other things which I never used in the entire Foreign Service. I landed there and sort of learned it on the ground and it was a lot easier than the language where I've just come from; which I also didn't have before I went either. I think basically my career spans the attitudes and reaction of Americans generally because a little later I went from France to Vietnam just after the Geneva Agreements. Here was another experience, seeing that the problems weren't as easy as they seemed to be in Europe. I mean Europe was, I think, treated by Americans as a kind of a test case and it was probably the wrong lesson that we all learned.

Q: What do you mean by that?

HARTMAN: In the sense that there was a devastated Europe, and it needed what America could give. That was hope, enthusiasm, and money. It had the trained, skilled people, it had the basis and experience; it had all of the things that would make that American contribution a successful tool in an effort to rebuild and reinvigorate an industrial area.

Q: It had the ability to use it quickly?

HARTMAN: The ability to use it quickly, political leadership and even in the confused state that some of those places were, there were vigorous people who had experience in the political process. I must say the more I think about this whole history, its that element
of political leadership and skills that those people show that makes situations work or not work and result in disasters or successes.

**Q: Turning to that point about political leadership. When you went to Paris, you were working under the tutelage of a very great Ambassador and skillful one, David Bruce, and there were many others of great insight and intelligence. In a sense you had a leadership that was given to you on the European scene, you didn't have to seek it out to discover it. Was this a difference when you went to Vietnam, that you did not know the landscape or Americans in general did not know the political landscape?**

**HARTMAN:** Well, I would say if you look at the French experience, with the exception of the Foreign Service Officers; I mean people like Woody Wallner who had been practically the last fellow out of our embassy in Paris before the war. When the Vichy government was set up, I think he went from Paris to Vichy and continued operating our mission there. You had that core of people who knew a lot about France and about the politics of France, and people like Martin Herz who was in the political section. All of these people were very intense political animals and they threw themselves into trying to understand Fourth Republic politics which were kind of exciting, but a little bit of the sameness as these parting people turned over.

Then you had us, the sort of technicians on the other side of the house who would approach the problem mainly as an economic one and working again with Monnet through his connections with Schuman and the Quai, and Pinay - the people who were running the economy. We kind of looked at the problem as one of "if you can get economic success, all this politics will work itself out." There was a little tension I would say among the staff in the embassy between those who felt that more attention ought be paid to politics and that the United States ought to have more traditional relationships with France, and those of us who were "activists" saying, "Why don't we back this fellow he's got a good plan," or they want to do something in this ministry, why don't we do that?" Let the politics follow this if its a successful venture, if the infrastructure gets rebuilt, if the coal mines get going. That's going to change the political coloration of those parts of France that may be tending towards Communism or whatever else we were concerned about in those days.

**Q: Describe the embassy when you arrived?**

**HARTMAN:** When I arrived there we were in the old building so to speak; Number Two Avenue Gabriel, I can't remember now who the first DCM was. It could have been Ted Achilles, I'm not sure. There were a whole series of distinguished deputies beginning first with David Bruce, then Douglas Dillon came along, and then Amory Houghton and other Ambassadors came while I was still there and still working in the Marshall Plan mission to France which was in "B" building, the next building up Avenue Gabrielle. We worked as a team primarily because this financial attaché had his big office in the main building, as did the Director of the Marshall Plan mission.

**Q: Was this a country team in the Eisenhower mode?**
HARTMAN: It began to be a country team in the Eisenhower mode, it very much began to be a country team operation and indeed when we got further into the fifties and a military assistance group was established it had all the aspects of a country team. It had military representation, it had economic; the Head of the Marshall Plan mission. In many places, I can't remember now, I think in France as well, the Head of the Marshall Plan mission became the Economic Minister so that there was a complete integration of the embassy staff and the Marshall Plan mission.

Q: So the title in fact matched the power?

HARTMAN: The title matched the power and for awhile they tried it with the Economic Minister separate and there was just dog fighting all the time as he tried to establish his authority and he didn't have any money and of course he didn't have any way of dealing with the French in a position of power where he had nothing to give. So it was always the Marshall Plan mission chief who really had the authority. Of course David Bruce came in under another Ambassador; actually Jefferson Caffery was still Ambassador when I arrived. That was one of the treats of the day if you arrived when he did and watched him being sort of; what do you call it dog-stepped or something by the Marines up the main stair case.

Q: He was an old-style ambassador?

HARTMAN: He was absolutely an old-style Ambassador and I think very uncomfortable with what was going on.

Q: What was the size of the mission? Did you have the sense that the Embassy was groaning at the seams because of the post-war reconstruction?

HARTMAN: It was big, I can't remember how many we had. We were three or four. I started out in the trade division, but there was a finance division, a trade division, there was an overseas territories division with a couple of very interesting people in it who worked with the French despite this sort of basic American anti-colonial feelings, but worked with the French to reestablish ties with their African territories and Vietnamese. The aid programs had a kind of indirect affect until Harry Truman proposed the Point Four program. The idea was that France needed these resources and those countries also needed to be developed and this was a way to do it. We kind of put aside a little bit some of our colonial feelings, although I think the French always felt that we were trying to get them out of these places. It was very tricky for any American to be working the French Overseas Territories Ministry as it was in those days. There was one man particularly; Bert Jolis was head of the division, he later went on to become one of the big diamond merchants of the world in Africa. Joe Sacks was a very unusual young man, he was my age and Joe went into this overseas territories work with a real vigor and got into French bureaucracy so well that years later he was actually working in the Ministry of Overseas Territories when de Gaulle came to power. De Gaulle found out that there was this
American over there, who was actually sort of running the finances of North Africa. Joe was out of there very quickly and went to Oxford and wrote his Ph.D.

There were a lot of experiences like that where things were really quite permeable, and you had Americans working in French ministries and Frenchmen; Robert Marjolin was the head of the office that received the aid and later went on to become the head of the Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe. There were a succession of people who were our interface, and I remember a few years ago when I came as Ambassador to France finding that these people were all head of big banks, my life was much easier as they were old friends. It was really remarkable with the way they as young people also, slightly older than we were because they had been through the war most of them and there careers had been delayed by that as they had been off doing other things. They were a little more mature and I think they treated us as students, useful students because we could produce some money occasionally to do the tasks that they had. Freddy Reinhardt was one of our advisors in Paris and he went as Ambassador to Vietnam and he asked for me to come out there with him.

Q: You had worked closely together?

HARTMAN: We had worked somewhat closely together, he more as an advisor to Eisenhower when he had his first job as Supreme Commander and I was working on the European Army and then later helping to get the Federal Republic into NATO and so I worked very closely with Freddy at that time and he asked me to come out to Vietnam and work in an Economic job and I was in the Embassy, but also in the aid mission there and we had a combined mission. Actually, the Embassy officers were in the aid mission building, we were not in the main embassy downtown in Saigon. My job gradually got on to the area of advising the Central Bank and there were quite a few things going on. They had a negotiation with the French and so I was a little bit on the other side, they were newly independent and also they had to negotiate with the French and therefore we were with Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese governors as well. They were trying to divide up a pot of money that clearly belonged to them. In any case, that was a tremendous change because there I was back in the Far East and I must say my ideas when I was first in the Far East were that drawn from some stories I heard as we flew. After the war we touched down in Hanoi and that was a confusing period when the Nationalist Chinese were coming in there and the French were coming back and there was a lot of suspicion that we were trying to get them out. That was my first brush with that area, I must say I understood very little about it. While I was in Paris I read more about it and it was a time of ferment and the political debates were beginning in France as to what the policy should be.

Q: Is this in reference to their colonial possessions including Vietnam?

HARTMAN: Yes and one of the interesting things at that time is that the socialists were red hot colonialists and I can remember Guy Mollet, one of his governments, a leading socialist, probably took one of the strongest positions against giving greater independence
to Indochina and broke off the negotiations that had been going on in France for the independence of those three areas.

Q: What was the view of the French that you were working with in Paris towards Vietnam, your next assignment?

HARTMAN: I went there just after the Geneva agreements and of course there was a lot of resentment, that Dulles had really twisted arms to get those agreements through then Dulles didn't like the agreement and sort of threw it over. I would say there was a basic suspicion among a great majority of Frenchmen that we were doing them in the eye. I can even remember at the end of my period in France; the French saying "Well you know, yes you have helped us but you've given us only about as much money as we in turn have had to put into Vietnam to keep it from going Communist." We were beginning at that time I think to come into the realities of world politics and some of that was driven home. The history of France's relations with these territories became much more dominant. We, after all, had been dealing with the people who were willing to forget most of that and concentrate on building a modern state in France and felt that these were things that were just going to drag them down and be obligations. That struggle in France didn't straighten out until de Gaulle came to power and finally; although he may have mislead the French people at first, led them out of Algeria.

Q: Describe something of the life of a Diplomat in that time? When you were in Paris, you're as a junior person, but you are in a very heady position. You've got a great job, a very interesting one and you are working at the top. How did you live in Paris?

HARTMAN: We shifted apartments seven times.

Q: Was this before the war?

HARTMAN: This begins when we arrive there. I think my first salary was something like twenty-eight hundred dollars a year and went to thirty-three shortly thereafter. We had a housing allowance, but it was a modest one and France was still; this was 1948 - 1949, there was rationing when I first arrived. Buildings hadn't been rebuilt and it was kind of a mess. So we started off in a one room apartment then we had a child and on to two rooms and so forth. We moved in the six years or so I was in France, I think we moved about seven times, slightly up market each time I would say, even sampling a little bit of country life. We made many French friends, not many I would say personal friends - people we worked with; although kept them as friends over the years, and when I went back as Ambassador they became personal friends. The personal friends that we made at that time were much more in the sort of bowels of society and in the arts. They were young people like ourselves, sometimes in the neighborhoods where we settled.

Q: Some painters and sculptors?

HARTMAN: Yes, things like that and actually one went on to become a big banker, but he was our neighbor in one of the buildings that we lived in. He is probably my oldest and
closest friend, he became head of one of the big banks. That kind of relationship you know. Looking back on my recent experience in the Soviet Union where you come out with well maybe a couple of people that you can say you are acquaintances, or a refusenik or two that you've gotten very fond of and terribly close to. No one in the society is really close to you. In France despite the fact that they have the reputation for standoffishness and cultural pride and all those kinds of things, really we have I think some very fast and close friends.

Q: What was the nature of Diplomatic life for you in Paris at that time? Did you have a strict routine with an old-style Ambassador like Jefferson Caffery?

HARTMAN: Well, I think that was another source of the resentment around; well not resentment, but differentiation. We basically didn't participate in the diplomatic life as such. I think all the time I was working on the economic problems of France as distinct from moving over to the problem of getting Germany into NATO or into a defense organization which started in 1952. All the time just working on France, I don't think I ever went to a diplomatic party. In the ministries that we were dealing with, there wasn't a whole lot of socialization between us, due to the fact that, of course, we were very junior officers. The only exception to this is, of course, David Bruce, who had a great social life and was known. He was a remarkable man. I mean there he was, he could focus on the most mundane kinds of problems in the office and then turn around and go to some big ball out in Versailles dressed up in some eighteenth century costume. He and Evangeline were just absolutely marvelous that way and they were good for us as young people, and I remember this and so does my wife all these years. What we learned from them going to parties at their house, seeing how they entertained, seeing the use they put entertaining to in terms of opening up closed areas of society - getting in contact with people in a much more relaxed way. That stayed with us, although we didn't really use it when we had kind of Left Bank parties in our home. But it was not in anyway a kind of diplomatic life, that was reserved for the people in the "Embassy" who were part of things.

Q: Then you came back as Ambassador?

HARTMAN: I came back as Ambassador quite a number of years later and I had a strange combination of friends, many of them from this sort of left-bank life who used to come and see us and we'd go to see them not with my chauffeur driven car though or I'd be thrown out of the neighborhood. Then we had people who we became friendly with as Ambassadors, quite a different strata of society.

Q: What was the year that you went to Vietnam?

HARTMAN: 1955, in other words just after the Geneva agreements, late '55 early '56 we went to Vietnam.

Q: What was Saigon like at that point?
HARTMAN: Saigon was just a very colonial town, rather like a city in Southern France on the Côte Azure. It was rather sleepy, Ngo Dihn Diem was the President, his wife was active, his sister was active. It was a family kind of organized state, very common in the history of that time. There was a marvelous Frenchman who was a professor at Yale who wrote several books on that period, I can't remember his name right now who really captured the feeling of that society and the depth of it's history.

I think again, Americans in the post-war period as they began to operate in the world had an abysmal sense of history and knowledge of history. I mean I myself, I admit this, and this has only gradually been overcome by a lot of reading. The kind of reading I did in college; of course my college was interrupted - was truncated to say the least because we went three terms a year and I graduated with my class even though I had spent two years in the army. You can imagine how rolled up that was taking five courses, and I think they just wanted us out of there. Vietnam was really a brand new experience.

Q: How big was our embassy at that point?

HARTMAN: At that point it was getting to be quite large because there was already a military advisory group, "Iron" Mike O'Daniel I think was the first leader of that crowd and then there was an economic mission that probably had fifty or sixty people in it - maybe more, there were various groups around the country advising. It was a whole sort of structure that descended on people that accepted aid from us and a lot of resentments, people sort of thought they should get the money and forget the advice or, at least, the kibitzing that came with it.

Q: Who was getting the money and the advice? What was Vietnam at that time?

HARTMAN: Vietnam at that time was an import program of equipment and projects, there was project aid and equipment that came in - we sort of subsidized their import program. Some of this was for consumption goods to kind of keep the population happy, working with the government, others were directed more at real economic development. Here we had to work a lot with the French. The French were still there, they still ran the rubber plantations, they were still the most efficient rice growers and there we were, the Americans, there in the middle of this de-colonization which was still going on. In spite of the fact that the French had left, they were still the dominant influence and of course all the politicians of that period whom we were dealing with were French trained. Some of them were quite remarkable, the governor of the bank was a solid man, a man who had been in the resistance to both France and Japanese incursions into Vietnam, but French trained and his thought processes were really very French. I remember one leader "Tu" who also was French trained, a remarkable man who knew exactly what he was doing but wasn't allowed to do it by President Diem. All of the things that later came about were beginning to become evident, the corruption which was not ever far from that society in it's history, but still much more pronounced - the family kind of relationships that seem to run things. When someone good would come along very often he would get shoved aside because he was too good or too honest and it was discouraging. I was there obviously in
the calmest period, we drove around the country, we drove clear over to Angkor Wat in Cambodia; there was very little difficulty out in the countryside. There was a period of time when there was even hope that maybe some talks would start between the North and the South, there was an International Commission that had an office in town made up of Indians, Canadians, and Poles to carry out - to help carry out the Geneva agreements.

But there were beginnings of trouble you could see, the way that Diem handled some of the sect; you know they have these different sects in the South that were operating in their traditional strongholds. It was very much like a kind of warlord operation. You could begin to see that there were times when this might break out again and what became the Viet Cong; that is the Communist Organization in the south, was beginning to get itself started.

Q: Did you have a sense of Ho Chi Minh's activities and his attraction to the Viet Cong?

HARTMAN: At that moment, not all that much. I think in this period it was a sort of a heady period when people thought that a national government was beginning to take form and of course part of our problems with the French at that time were that we were deliberately encouraging the nationalist aspects of Vietnamese policy as a way of strengthening them. There was always a division between the North and the South and that still exists today I think. There was a lot of resentment too among some people in the South about the Catholic Presidency and the way that the Catholics tried to control all of the other groups.

Q: What was life like in Saigon for you for Donna and your family? Did you have your children there with you?

HARTMAN: Yes, by the time we left Saigon we had four children - two girls were born there and you know, it was a pleasant life.

Q: Compound life?

HARTMAN: Not really, no we were in individual houses spread around the town and we got to know again quite a few French families. The Vietnamese were quite a bit harder to crack though we did keep quite a few friends, some of whom are now in this country. It was clear that we were dealing with an elite and not realizing at that time that in dealing with that elite, we were also separating ourselves from the bulk of the population. Again, going back to something earlier, you could see the absence of a political structure - of people with political experience and all the economic things that you might try to do would just disappear because that political structure wasn't there to receive it; and I think we behaved very naively. I'm not sure that we could have done things much differently other than to leave it all and let it stew in its own juice. The thing that I learned of that time is that you can't just create a political elite. There were a lot of theories formed in that time about how you do this and we had the Michigan State University out there telling us exactly how to create a political elite. In a sense, looking back on the history of
that whole period there were a couple of successes and I think those successes had more to do perhaps with the inherent situation. For example, President Magsaysay in the Philippines. People thought that this could be repeated, just find that strong man and give him your support and sort of let him build the government.

Q: You mean Colonel Lansdale would tell you all about this?

HARTMAN: Colonel Lansdale was an interesting man and had his own theory, and indeed it wasn't just his theory; but the British were applying it in Malaysia and successfully I might say. The difference in Malaysia was that I'm told by experts at that time that the British had the pictures of practically all the dissidents in their society and they could sort of eliminate them one by one, but there was a structure in Malaysia that they could build on. The French, I think, in their colonial areas built French institutions and where a society was prepared to accept a variation of a French institution; I'm thinking of a place like Senegal for instance or the Côte d'Ivoire. It's successful you know, they're willing to have a poet as a leader in Senegal and it fits into that culture. It's not acculturate; its not bringing in something foreign - it fits in there with what existed there naturally. In Vietnam, not so much, although I must say in later times I found some of the North Vietnamese leaders talking in ways that; you could kind of see and trace the French influence even though they were supposedly all good Communists and violently anti-colonialists.

Q: What was the mood in Washington? What kind of audience were you writing reports to? What was the research you were doing?

HARTMAN: Well, you know this is one of the interesting things. I was there through the beginning of 1958, so from 1948 until 1958 my career was entirely outside the country - ten years with no experience in Washington.

Q: So you didn't know who you were writing for?

HARTMAN: I had absolutely not the foggiest idea. I mean we would see these people when they'd come out and General Marshall visited, and Dean Acheson visited when we were in Paris, and then after the election John Foster Dulles came and I met him because we were working so closely with the European army business. General Eisenhower we had known because he was over there as the Supreme Commander, but Washington was just a total puzzle. There was this place called the State Department and there were these others. There was Paul Hoffman, who headed the Washington end of the Marshall Plan, and as I say they would come through from time to time. I would go back as a Junior Officer on home leave or something and they would give me a little consultation, so I, at least, knew where the offices were.

1958 was like a cold shower for me because I arrived back in the then - I don't know what we would call it - but it's before the new State Department had been built and it was the old War Department Building. Remember that Marshall had this Army building built and
that became the State Department. Then before that whole "C" street structure was built, the Office of German Affairs I remember was a temporary sort of a brick building down on "C" street. I remember that our whole area has changed so much, there was the brewery that was over on the hill on the way to Watergate and Watergate was that nice little restaurant that was down there with popovers. There was no "E" Street throughway or anything like that and so it was a much smaller outfit. I came back to be the officer in charge of a part of European integration. In other words, we had in the European bureau, a regional office that dealt with the Coal and Steel Community - in 1958, we were just beginning to talk about a broadening of the European community into a common market, into a Euratom taking the most popular thing that is the building of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Again a Monnet type operation, you take this thing that is very popular and you use it as a way of putting - moving forward your ideas on political organization which was a closer integration of the basic six countries that started the Coal and Steel Community and later tried to put together the European army. In 1958 I came back to that unit and worked very closely with people who were trying to establish a U.S.-European peaceful uses of nuclear energy cooperation. On our side we were using it as a way of promoting European integration; it was not just that we thought it was a good idea to have nuclear electricity producing plants. This was a big kind of spurt in the United States, but that you would use this as a way of encouraging Europe to further integrate and come together. The whole policy of European integration I would say was one that - I mean it was successful; a lot of people look back on it and say "What kind of a monster have you created?" I don't think we created it. It couldn't have been done without the Europeans. In fact, a strong and unified Europe has been basically, I think, in our interests. It's been our largest trading partner, we've had our difficulties with them, but in a security sense that cooperation has been the basis of our foreign policy. It shows great strength now, and has expanded into many more countries and some of the ideas of the founders that it would be more of a political animal haven't come to pass. Europeans do, I think, band together more and it gives them more of a sense of strength and confidence to but against us because we are rather overwhelming. I think that's been another trait of the post-war period. We're elephants that kind of tramp around in the garden, and it's a little hard sometime to stop that. This is particularly true when we get into a military relationship, and I think part of our job over the years has been to be sensitive to that so that we don't stomp out all the things that give strength to a society.

Q: Who were your mentors in Washington when you came back?

HARTMAN: Well, when I came back, Douglas Dillon was at that time the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and he had been the Ambassador in Paris and I had known him. He kind of had under his wing this area of policy that dealt with support for European unification. Mr. Murphy was an Under Secretary and he was an Under Secretary for Political Affairs and he also followed it very closely as did Foster Dulles. Bob Bowie was an advisor to Foster Dulles, Bob Bowie had earlier been an advisor to McCloy in Germany and so when a team was put together to work on bringing Germany into NATO, rearming Germany really, before the idea was to bring them into NATO - Bob Bowie was the representative along with my Chief in Paris in that team with some
people from Washington. It was really McCloy and David Bruce working together, one as the High Commissioner in Germany, and David Bruce as Ambassador in France, who kind of put that whole policy together.

Q: The key question being how much would the other Europeans allow the Germans to rearm?

HARTMAN: Our push was that it had to be done, how it's to be done, you fellows are going to have to work out, but it is going to be done. It has to be done. There is no way to have a NATO defense in Europe with that large gap in the German land mass.

Q: Were you aware of the Soviet sensitivity to all of this? How much did the Soviet factor come into the planning of the German rearmament?

HARTMAN: Oh it was, not in the sense of the sensitivity - it was a response to a challenge. I mean the feeling. I can remember clearly the feeling in 1950 when Korea was invaded. All of us, I think, had the feeling, "Well, Europe is next!" We had absolutely no doubt that the North Koreans were ordered in by Stalin. That was the common assumption, and you know it hasn't much been challenged since. We know a little bit more about North Koreans now, maybe there was a little more complication than just that. It didn't seem to us that if the Soviets had wanted to stop it that they made very much of an effort to stop. It seemed to us to be a major challenge. And again you had tremendous leadership in Europe at that time. It was the time of Adenauer, of Schuman, of De Gasperi, of Spaak in Belgium, of Beck in Luxembourg; I mean even the small countries had great leaders. These people just worked tirelessly to put this thing together. They felt very much under the gun, and there was a real unity. There were a lot of stickers on the wall, "Go home this one, go home that one," but basically, I think the overwhelming majority of people in Europe responded out of fear - it was fear, genuine fear.

In Universities this year, a very common document that is examined and studied rather hard is NSC-68. And as you may recall, that portrayed the Soviets as determined to go to war sometime in the fifties; perhaps the early fifties. Therefore, we had to rearm, and, of course, NATO was one response. The definite conclusion of that document and those who wrote it was that we were in a life and death struggle with this formidable power that had once been an ally. You had many of the figures that we now have on the world scene on opposite sides of the question; for example, George Kennan and Paul Nitze. George Kennan was saying that they had no intention of doing that, however it was necessary to bring Europe together.

The author of the containment policy felt in his later writings anyway that his view had been taken out of context. What he was really talking about was a way to bring the European powers back together to restore their morale, their economic viability, and their political integrity; he did not see the Soviets as likely to attack, and then he leaves the scene. I think he was very much a gadfly in that period. I think the dominant view, and
this is before Dulles' arrival, this is in the time of Acheson - the late forties. This view was definitely that there was a military and security challenge, that some of the understandings that people thought had been made of restraint for the post-war period -- that is, in the Yalta agreements and Potsdam and so forth, that there indeed would be free elections. The hope was that the Soviet Union wouldn't insist on a virtual occupation of Eastern Europe. While many people in the United States wanted an even more forceful putting down of Germany as the reconstruction period started, there were some thoughts that you couldn't rule out reunification. As long as you kept Germany divided, Europe was going to be divided and that was going to be a source of tension. The French were at least of that view if I may say, the French rather liked the idea I think. They never said it because they didn't want to antagonize the Germans, but basically they were happy that Germany was divided.

No. I think that most people felt this way at this time, and this was before the Korean invasion. With the Korean invasion, there was a tremendous effect there. Looking back at what happened in Greece where people felt that this was an effort by the Soviets to arm a group in Greece to take over the country, and Azerbaijan. In other words, that looking again at Communist policy in the post- war period, people felt that the ideology was taking over; that they were going to lead revolutionary groups, that they were going to arm, they were going to feed them, and that there was danger in Europe. There was a feeling that unless this reconstruction of the Western Europe economies, which were after all the strongest economies in the world after the United States, took place in a Democratic atmosphere that there was a real danger that the Communist parties could take over. Some of these were virtual handmaidens of Stalin. They were Stalinist in their orientation, perhaps even more than some of the statements of Soviet government policy. You had a history in a place like France after the war, with a tremendous rivalry between the Maquis resistance groups that were governed by the Communists and the others. In fact, probably the Communists had a better war record along with many others in France than some of the more conservative elements that had been hooked up with the Vichy government and even more collaborationists. So in France there was a split in the society, and we came in with our aid programs basically helping those people who were fighting to keep the Communists from gaining control. I think the leadership of that whole period, and you have to remember that the Christian Democratic movement played a very major role, and Catholics particularly played a very major role in the three main countries.

For example, that is, in Italy where the Christian Democrats were in power the whole time, where France was heavily influenced by this emergence after the war of the MRP movement, the Catholic movement that produced Schuman and others in the leadership and Adenauer, all of whom had this desire to kind of bring things together and it was almost going back to Charlemagne. Charlemagne, it's no mystery today I think that the major prize given to a European for his work in unifying Europe is the Charlemagne prize and it is given in the City of Aachen.

Q: Now that's a very good point. What about the Don Camillo kind of attitude? Do you have any sense of that?
[Edit. note - this refers to the Italian Don Camillo stories by Giovanni Guareschi in which a country priest works with the communist mayor of a village and always gets the better of him - a series of amusing stories placed in the immediate post-war period]

HARTMAN: There was a rejection of that and the formalism of the Church, and indeed the role of the Church during the war. These were people who were reformers out of the Church and who felt their Catholicism very strongly, but wanted to put it to political effect with these higher goals of unifying Europe and breaking down national barriers - but very anti-communist. They felt that Communism was a real challenge.

Q: Was it Stalinism or something else?

HARTMAN: No. Communism was really equated with Stalinism and there was a lot of reason for this. After all, if you looked at what was going on in the Soviet Union at that time and the suppressions that were taking place in Eastern Europe, add in things like the Doctors' plot that came along as Stalin really produced some of his greatest excesses, not the greatest but at least noticeable excesses in that period. He closed down the openness that was beginning to be shown because people were cooperating during the war. The openness absolutely ended and the behavior of their people in these four power meetings that were taking place all during these periods reflected this. One of the things we've sort of forgotten is the rigorous kind of schedule required of the four power meetings. It seems a little strange to us today that the greats of the world would be Foster Dulles and I don't know, I can't remember who was the French Foreign Minister at that time, it was again one of the great Catholic - the man who was always drunk, what was his name Bidault. And from Germany a variety of leaders and Anthony Eden before he became Prime Minister was the Foreign Minister.

The people, the four powers, without the Germans when you are talking about the settlement in Europe, with Molotov at first, then later - much later with Gromyko - that was the structure. Today we think of the big power summit and it's the United States and the Soviet Union. In those days meetings in Paris in the old Palais Rose, I can remember Acheson came there and they met for a month talking about these problems. So that kind of structure has changed a lot, but the main feeling that all of us had and that was general in Europe was this fear, and it was fear of direct invasion. That fear was credible and that's why people took seriously the rearmament effort.

Q: What happened after the death of Stalin in 1953? Internally we know that the Solarian [ed. Solarium?] exercise was called to put into place what the Soviet Union was going to be after Stalin. Was there a change in attitude or the beginnings of a change in attitude?

HARTMAN: Well, the momentum of these moves really didn't change very much. There was no sort of outside, there were trips that people took, Malenkov - I can't remember now what the sequence of time was, but there were these trips around before Khrushchev took power and they began to show themselves more in the world. I think to the Europeans generally it was not a very appealing process. There were a lot of other things
that went on. There were these youth conferences, and that scared the leadership. They get these people over there and the reports would come back from the young people who went relating exactly what was going on, they took over these meetings and sort of beat a lot of propaganda into them. For a while we used to try and send people; in fact, as it turned out, we subsidized a few youth groups from the CIA and elsewhere. Some of our political leaders came through that process and were people who had actually attended these meetings and sort of cut their teeth in politics arguing in those sessions. It was a period when, it's easy to look back on it and kind of rewrite history, but there was a genuine feeling of fear and with some reason. There was a tremendous amount of military force on the other side, a tremendous putting down of any outcroppings of individual liberty or rioting that might have taken place, students expressing their views in any of the Eastern European countries and nothing going on in the Soviet Union until there was a kind of a thaw after Khrushchev.

Q: When he actually took over?

HARTMAN: When he actually took over there was a little thaw at least in the intellectual sense, a little like what you have today which, I hesitate to say, is also reversible. He found it useful at that time to allow that to happen.

Q: Let me take you to 1958 where I interrupted you and took you back to 1953 and a little before. In 1958 Eisenhower is beginning to establish negotiations for arms control; the notion of nuclear weapons being a terrible problem, the Soviets having the weapons, Sputnik, the sense of rapidly advancing military technology.

Eisenhower in his special way is beginning to see that this has to be brought under control. Was there a sense of this in the Department of State?

HARTMAN: Oh, absolutely and indeed I was sort of closely associated with that because working on nuclear energy was one of the initiatives of Eisenhower - that this great resource should be put to peaceful uses. I can remember that I had the job of taking around the head of the European organization which was called Euratom and showing them some of these nuclear developments in the United States. This was also along with some of the people from the Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time the Soviet head of atomic energy was being taken around, Ivan Yelnoff, I think his name was, and so there was very much a kind of parallel thing going on. Toward the end of the fifties there was this attempt to open up to the Soviets to see if we could get them involved in some of these projects.

Q: The bridge work for these initiatives, were they scientists?

HARTMAN: It was officially done, he was being taken around by the Atomic Energy Commission just as I was going around with him to these places.

Q: Was it both political and technical engineering levels?
HARTMAN: Oh absolutely, it was being done for a political purpose. That is using this technology which seemed to be very hot and sexy in terms of politics as a way of cementing a relationship, as a way of building a kind of political bridge. In the late fifties that was happening, that was the time when Khrushchev came for a visit, it was a time when Eisenhower was looking for an area where he could talk to the Soviets, the preparations for the famous summit in Paris which went down the tubes at the Eutotone. Yes, there was a sense that arms negotiations should figure in a relationship with the Soviet Union and that was being discussed at the same time at political levels among the NATO countries. Indeed that was the time you remember, when we began thinking about political consultations at NATO. You see we moved beyond this idea that somehow or other there was a four power directorate, although the French still hankered after that kind of thing. We had moved beyond the period because of the 1954 agreements when we really recognized the official status of the Soviet Union as an occupying power, we gave statehood to West Germany, the Federal Republic of West Germany, and similarly the Soviets gave statehood to East Germany, the GDR. As a result, this four power, that is British, French, American with the Soviets, structure disappeared and when there was a four power anything, it was us meeting with the Germans to discuss the German problem. Indeed that has continued as a forum, and every time we meet in NATO we always have a discussion the night before among the four powers who talk at least a bit about the German problem and then usually move onto other things.

Q: So that's a ritual that still exists?

HARTMAN: It's a ritual that still exists, but the other ritual doesn't exist anymore. There has been no four power meeting.

Q: At the end of the Eisenhower administration with the death of Dulles and the interim Secretary of State Christian Herter, what was the Department like at that point? Dulles was such a compelling, dominant figure of diplomacy.

HARTMAN: Absolutely, I think underrated Eisenhower. In a sense Dulles encouraged this although he did his best I think to kind of look as though the policies were coming from the White House and from the President. He, in the way he presented things, rather underrated the influence of the President, which was very strong on a number of key points.

Q: What were they?

HARTMAN: Well, first of all the allied cooperation. Secondly, a feeling that everything doesn't work. He had a certain skepticism I think about what he was being told on a lot of things. I think the sort of overriding characteristic of Eisenhower was a kind of basic good sense in terms of knowing what the country wanted and what our roots were. That was natural to him, and you've got to ask yourself a question. Here's a man who came up all the way through the military, and yet he managed not to become acculturated if that's a
good description. He really kept his roots in America. He had a sense, which maybe got lost in post Eisenhower presidencies, of what some of the basic values were and of exactly how far political leaders could go. He surrounded himself with some rather remarkable people too. People who kind of fed his ideas in this respect, people like Malcolm Moose, people who kind of put his ideas together, knew the man well enough so that this was not a false picture at all, this was him. His brother Milton Eisenhower helped out too, definitely.


HARTMAN: Well, very little up close. But all that I've read about him and all that I can feel about him in terms of what he was proposing, this was a man who also saw a new kind of structure in the post war period; and coming out of his wartime experience, these close cooperative links, it was natural for him to put forward the kind of system which while not absolutely giving up sovereignty -- at least, recognized that our sovereignty was imperfect.

Q: Let me ask you to speculate a little bit. You talked about Eisenhower's great ability to sense what the American public wanted and his great sensibility, rationality, and common sense. Suppose the President in that period had been a civilian? Suppose that he had been Stevenson for example. Would that have made a significant difference in the nature of our foreign policy, the nature of our diplomatic efforts?

HARTMAN: You know, I don't really think so. I think one of the remarkable things about our policy right up through the present day is that despite the fact that political leaders annunciate different kinds of doctrines, first of all to get the nomination and second to get elected, after a period of anywhere from one to two years they kind of come on to a middle ground and carry forward. This doesn't mean it's always the same common ground, it's kind of shifted as American opinion has shifted and as Americans have had an experience with the world. Thinking back to the times when Nixon was Vice-President to the times when he was President and the kinds of things he said and did about Vietnam later in his presidency. Political leadership doesn't get very far from the sort of shift in mood and opinion in the United States which is very important. Even when they are strong leaders and they're kind of leading the people down the track, there is something that kind of shifts them back and gets them in a line with the mainstream of American thinking. To my mind this is a rather hopeful thing, I believe in democracy and therefore I believe that there is a kind of consensus that builds up through the democratic process on a number of issues. We've got different ground in different areas, but taking the foreign policy area as one, if you don't have that and you try to operate a policy, you've lost.

Q: Let me take you to a question that is related to that. You come back to Washington in 1958 and you haven't lived in Washington. You presumably have no sense of what goes on on the Hill and the other centers of power. You described earlier that the sense of not knowing what was going on in Washington, of who those people were, what those
institutions were that were running foreign policy. So when you come back, what do you find?

HARTMAN: I learn very fast! As a rather young and junior officer, one of my first run-ins was with Admiral Straus who was with the Atomic Energy Commission, and with the Joint Atomic Committee itself on the Hill. Senator Anderson was the powerful chairman at that time and there I was a young officer kind of pushing; as my mentors had told me to do, this idea of cooperation with Europe for political purposes - that is to further the integration of Europe. You had Admiral Straus and the joint committee very much at odds with that policy, thinking that we were giving away the store, that it wasn't worth cooperating with this rather nebulous group in Brussels that didn't stand for anything. Why didn't we keep our cooperation with nation states? They mattered and you could hold them to their obligations. Then later they championed international organizations which didn't have that giving up of sovereignty so there was a conflict between the international organization that got established in Vienna and the European Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris which was a kind of an intergovernmental agreement, and this thing that we were trying to push which was a further growth of the European integration movement, and a movement of these powerful six countries later to be joined by Great Britain in a much more structured political hold. I think all during this period there were a lot of skeptics.

Here there were perhaps differences between the old Foreign Service and some of the new Foreign Service. I think the older generation tended to be much more skeptical about American policy supporting this sort of move toward integration than the people like myself who had sort of come in from different areas. Although there were people like Stan Cleveland, I had mentioned as one of the old Foreign Service Officers, who was very enthusiastic about this policy and pushed it very hard.

Q: What was the life like in Washington at that point? You had come back with your family, what rank were you when you came back in 1958?

HARTMAN: I think I was a four and went back to a five, I think they began splitting classes or something.

Q: Did you live in Northwest?

HARTMAN: Yes, the only smart thing we ever did in our lives. We brought a house in 1958 and we are still in it. That's the other thing, it was kind of an expensive time for us coming back. But looking back on it now, it is nothing like our young officers have to face coming in with the kinds of costs they face today. Literally we brought this very comfortable house for thirty-five thousand dollars, and think of that today with all the inflation that has gone by. As a piece of equity or a piece of obligation that a young officer has to take over, its very difficult coming back to Washington now; I mean more difficult than it was for us at that time. As I say we learned about the Congressional process right away because as young as I was, I was testifying before the Joint
Committee, dealing with the staff and the staff was at that time a very pugnacious crowd who ran their own policy and spoke in the name of the Senators. It was a powerful committee, it literally decided what was to be done; there was no way that the Atomic Energy Commission could decide to do anything without the backing of that committee. That committee also worked very closely with American industry, particularly after the Oppenheimer affair and all of those clashes between scientists, the politicians, and the military - it was a really crucial time.

Q: Was the diplomatic life more evident for you in that period?

HARTMAN: Back in 1958, first of all because we were working with the six countries in Europe and each of the embassies here had a representative who was an expert and the people from Europe would come here and we would entertain them and take them out for visits around the country. Many of the people who came from Europe at that time were people who I had worked with earlier in the European Army negotiations. Herve Alphand was Ambassador here, Herve Alphand was the French representative in NATO and to the European Army Conference, and I had worked very closely with him. Many others had sort of come through life that way from different areas of your career; but the Congressional thing was super-powerful.

The upper reaches of the State Department, as you said, Christian Herter was the sort of interim Secretary of State at the very end, although he resigned just before the change over of authority. A man, who had the status of a career officer was Acting Secretary at the very end, Livingston Merchant. At one point Livingston actually was the senior officer in the Department for a short period.

Q: Did you begin to have relationships with the press?

HARTMAN: Oh definitely. We had relations with the press all the way through because, and again that was perhaps another little source of resentment between the oldsters and the newsters. This was because the press was very much a part of our operation. That is if you were promoting a policy in a more activist role of trying to get governments to do things, the press obviously was a route that you used. David Bruce used to have the press in twice a week just for lunch or sitting around in his office and talking. We got to know the senior press people that way. Then we would work ourselves and they would come to us for answers to questions and certainly the French press in Paris, I got to know many of them at that time.

Q: So you think that's a difference between the old and the new Foreign Service of that time.

HARTMAN: Well, it was in that particular time. We were actively using the press to get across a point of view. As I said, there was a little bit of a split between the kind of activist "this is what we are trying to accomplish thing," and the more reactive "we are reporting on what is going on here" kind of thing. This is what this country is about, and
actually we need both because very often the activists I've seen over the years have acted without a knowledge of history or what is going on and they have knocked their heads against the wall and sometimes gotten us into real trouble. It tended at that point to be a kind of dichotomy. I think today you find in the more rounded officers, much more competence in all these fields, and I think some officers have a reputation for being more activists than others just by the nature of their makeup.

Q: Well what was your next post after Euratom and Regional Affairs?

HARTMAN: Well, the next post was, actually when the Kennedy administration came in. George Ball, who had been an old friend from these days in the European Immigration movement, he was the lawyer for the French government having been hired by Monnet. He was kind of always the unofficial advisor and legal advisor and drafter in some of these activities. [Indeed when the Coal and Steel Community was first formed, one of the ways that Dulles decided, and then Dillon (sic).] Dulles by the way was a financial partner of Monnet on Wall Street in the late twenties. The connections between these men, and, of course, McCoy knew them at that time and the leaders that came through the war had a lot of connections that went back before the war with the leadership in Europe and they used that in the post-war period to kind of get things going again. There was a very close relationship between Foster Dulles and Monnet.

Q: Did George Ball and Foster Dulles have a relationship?

HARTMAN: Well, they sort of knew each other, I think George never had much respect for this kind of Presbyterian way of looking at world problems and sort of moralizing. George was much more of a pragmatist and felt that as a lawyer if you could you should get things down on paper (sic). The way he liked to make policy was to give a speech; we've got to give a speech on that, that was the way he was going to make policy. This was good because it not only made policy within the building, but it made public policy in the sense that it went out to the public that we had to have for support to create a backing for that policy.

Q: The speech had to demonstrate some coherence just to that process of writing.

HARTMAN: Absolutely! Oh yeah, he was a determined man on that. What happened was that in that transition period after Kennedy was elected, they set up a first transition team. I think that was the first instance of a transition team, and I suddenly found myself down in George Ball's law office. I remember once getting a telephone call from Foy Kohler who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs saying to me, "Didn't you used to work for us? What are you doing down there?" I said "Well, Eisenhower has made this new deal with the administration that they can have anybody, anywhere and somebody's called me up and said go down there, so I'm there." So he said, "Well, what about your work over here?" In any case Foy and I got along fine after that, but I then went up to be a Special Assistant to George Ball and stayed on there through 1963 and really George was First Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and then the Under
Secretary and we covered sort of the waterfront. It really was my first experience with the seventh floor of the State Department and the way the whole Department worked and getting the whole Department to be responsive and work with an administration. That was just, I think, just fantastically valuable experience for a Foreign Service Officer. Many of my colleagues sort of think of their job as being strictly Foreign Service and that was sort of above them. It's not so much now - but it used to be. Without that experience there is just no way you could know how foreign policy is really made, and, of course, the relationship with Congress is so important at that point because there is so much that goes on. These were the days also when people were still monitoring telephone calls and that was absolutely a fabulous experience when you would sit there you know as the Special Assistant in the office and Ball would be talking with Kennedy or a Congressman or whatever it was, and you would sort of monitor to see whether anything had to be done. That practice got hit in the head somewhere I think about ten years later and it just isn't done anymore. There were a series of incidents that lead to it's demise, but at that time it was very common for a young officer up there; and I was still young at that time. It was a very heady kind of thing - indirectly getting exposed to a lot of very sharp talk. I think the experience with the Kennedy administration was mainly, for me at least, learning how in a very activist administration, how the top of that building works.

Q: So it's really the ideal post for a junior Foreign Service Officer to be a Special Assistant to one of the principals?

HARTMAN: Absolutely. Without that experience,, and indeed it's not peculiar to our service. You see this in other services with people in the private offices later going on to do other things. You get a view from the top that is just invaluable in your whole career.

Q: Do you think that's a part of the personnel planning of the Department now to have the bright promising officers to study this way?

HARTMAN: There is no personnel planning, let's face it. Things happen more or less, we have a very small service, but it is amazing the lack of ability to plan really. By and large, I think our better officers for certain purposes do get into those jobs. They are the articulate ones, the good writers, people who can be used in positions of that kind and if they don't have it to begin with, sure learn to have political sense, a sense of public relations, and a sense of responsiveness to political leadership regardless of administration. I've served both in a Democratic administration at that level, and when I came back in the late sixties in the Nixon administration at that level. So I saw it from both sides and without that, you can't have a Foreign Service experience anymore. You have got to know Washington as well as know how to deal with foreign governments; at least, if you have any of the top level jobs.

Q: Does that argue for, if there is no orderly, rational personnel system; for a protégé system? In this system the people at the top look at the crop of Foreign Service Officers and say that "He looks promising, I'll bring him along." Is that, in fact, the way that you see it?
HARTMAN: Well, it may happen occasionally that way. What happens, the way that I got in was that I happened to know George Ball and he happened to know me. There were other people we brought into his office he hadn't known before. In other words, we used to sort of scout around and see what the other talents were that he needed. I think that the system does produce good names when these people come in. I think sometimes in the past it's done itself a disservice by putting forward people that they know, or should know are not going to fit, but people soon find out about that in sometimes rather tragic situations when there isn't a fit. I am sure that there are people who are better at Washington and who are better at the job overseas, but at the very top levels you need both kinds of qualities and there's a lot of politics in it, I mean political feeling in operation.

Q: In the Kennedy period you had a situation where Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy, certainly the NSC was distrustful of the Department. How did you work that out?

HARTMAN: It was with great difficulty and only over a period of time. This is another thing that administrations tend to come in with a great distrust of the Foreign Service, automatically - it's in the American culture. Then they begin to put a face on it and see individual performance and they like some of what they see, and they don't like others of what they see. It becomes a differentiated opinion, and it's not just the Foreign Service and they are all bad. I mean Kennedy used to make these outrageous lectures about how slow we were and how unresponsive we were. When you look at the things that actually got produced, or when we got in a crisis who actually was doing the work to solve the problem; it wasn't Arthur Schlesinger over there pounding out his memos, it was people who actually knew something about the situation who were good on their feet, and who were articulate people and who wrote memos well. It is true that to a person in the White House the bureaucracies are sluggish, and you ask for something and the leader tends to want it yesterday, or now at the very latest, because he is impatient and because that's what he's thinking about now. Then particularly if you get back a on the one hand, on the other hand response nothing can be more maddening. The thing that disturbs me as I look back over all the years is that people say "Well you know you're all right, or so and so is all right, but the rest of that place." What they don't realize is that there is no way you can be all right unless you've got something behind you and that there is just a tremendous amount of talent there. Sometimes it doesn't get mobilized properly and it doesn't get used as properly as it should so that it is on top of things and is as responsive as political leadership wants it. There's a danger also in having it too responsive. We've gone off in a lot of wacky ways by people who say "Yes Sir" and head over the cliff, We've had some recent examples of that.

Q: How far down do you think the political appointments should reach if the problem, a perception on the part of White Houses, has been "they're the enemy, we don't know them, we want our own people." Certainly in recent administrations you've had to go down below the Assistant Secretary level, Deputy and sometimes lower than that?
HARTMAN: I think there should not be a rule of thumb, it seems to me a rational process ought to take place. An administration comes in with some policy ideas that they would like to see carried out. I think there ought to be a genuine competition for jobs, that is below the absolute political level of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. The Foreign Service ought to put up its best and then if they are unsatisfied in some way, then they ought to put up theirs and decide at that point, "Alright, we want to have a political person in that office." I don't think they should be forbidden somehow in having jobs below the Assistant Secretary level. I think there's a lot of benefit sometime with the seeding of a bureaucracy with talented people. I don't mean just hiding away some schnook, but getting somebody with real ideas.

I've seen this in administration after administration with guys that have come in from the Universities, or some businessman who comes in and they have a real notion of what they want to do and a freshness and it really gives a boost to the bureaucracy, but just to get some "political control" to have a rule of thumb that you've got to go down to a certain level, I think is crazy. Of course the Ambassadorial appointments, I think are even crazier and I think we've been on a very bad trend. In terms of not just this administration, but previous ones as well in using the ambassadorships as kind of a political plum which has a certain tradition in our country going back to the nineteenth century where they were actually brought and sold. It's one thing to kind of reward a kind of distinguished American whose got something to contribute, or to say that a distinguished American fits in a particular job because you want to convey a certain political message. After all I started under one of the great political Ambassadors, David Bruce who held positions in China, and Britain, and in France, and in Germany, and NATO. He is I think, maybe the greatest diplomatic figure we've ever known, and there have been others like him who have come in and done remarkable jobs and sometimes particularly suited to the kind of situation they were in, Harriman. Others have come in because they want the title, they're friends of the friends and other countries look to them for some statement about what U.S. policies are or what U.S. policies are about and they get nothing, absolutely nothing. Some countries have suffered more than others because they have always thought to have been places you could put people like this in and it wouldn't matter. I think it shows generally an undervaluation of the role of diplomacy and of the role of Ambassadors and diplomatic missions in the culture of America.

Q: Do you think the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its approval of nominations, it has always fallen down (Ambassador agrees), what could it do?

HARTMAN: I don't think it's got the guts to do it, and constitutionally there is a certain problem. There is a bias which I think is a good one in our constitution that the President's appointee should be approved, but I think that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could play a much greater role along the lines of the judicial committee in getting quality people appointed; as the judges are reviewed for example, by the bar association before they are considered and rated. This was started and actually got a little bit formal in the Carter administration, there was a committee that met to review the names of outsiders as well as insiders for jobs and they made a recommendation and the
President could accept it or not. At least it was the beginning of a process that somehow or another I think ought to get picked up again, that seems to me a sensible idea.

_Q: George Ball was something of a troubleshooter when he was Under Secretary. He had any number of very difficult issues, de Gaulle, Cyprus, The Congo. What was your role in the issues?

HARTMAN: It depended on the issue, I was in some and out of others. He had a number of people on his staff, George Springsteen was his principal assistant, he always had a lawyer around - the sort of feeling that lawyers have for other lawyers. George Ball was a great one for dipping down in the administration and putting people down and also encouraging younger people. He had this way as a lawyer of working with individuals. He would stay up all night and he would be clipping out taking a yellow sheet like this and stapling it together and putting a speech together or something like that. He was a joy to work with, a great story teller and vigorous. My God, the energy that man has even today. In any case he was someone to really; and I think a good counterweight to Dean Rusk who really went the other way. He was much more of a man who dealt bureaucratically within the system and he had his own ideas and he liked to deal very privately with the President and establish his relationship that way. I think that was, there were many advantages to both sets of qualities.

_Q: How did they get along. George and Dean?

HARTMAN: I think in the beginning there must have been some resentment, but Dean Rusk was too much of a gentlemen to really show it, but George is too bouncy a fellow to have around without feeling nervous about what he is doing? In the end, great respect - each for the other and a very close working relationship.

_Q: What were the tests of fire for that group?

HARTMAN: Cuba, Cuba. The missile crisis was the number one item. The missile crisis I remember, I was sitting in that outer office and the meetings were going on in George Ball's conference room because they didn't want them in the Secretary's conference room for fear that they would be more visible there. Why I don't know since we had the Attorney General, and McNamara, and the Vice-President sort of wandering in and out. It was plenty visible enough who was meeting in the State Department, but this was in the few days when Jack Kennedy was out of town and didn't want to come back until they had decided what to do because they didn't want to tip the Soviets off until we were ready to, about to respond very vigorously to what we saw. I remember the scariest moment of my career in the State Department was when Dean Rusk poked his head out of the conference room and called me over and said "Alright, there's something called an evacuation plan, would you get it for me." I went and got this thing and we began reading through it and we just couldn't believe it. It had the leaders of our country sort of hopping into these helicopters and going off to someplace in the mountains, and their families to follow with dogs and children; you could just see them on the road somehow with
everybody just gladly going into their helicopter while their family follows. The sort of unrealism (sic) of some of that civilian defense stuff struck us at the time. There was an amusing event at that time too. In the middle of all this very serious stuff, obviously planning things and they brought Dean Acheson in and he was going to go off and brief de Gaulle and what not. Another head pokes out of this room and it's Vice President Johnson, and he said "You know we've been in here eating these sandwiches all day, I'd like a chocolate sundae," so we got him a chocolate sundae.

Q: What was the sense of the Soviet Embassy during the missile crisis?

HARTMAN: I was not on that side of things really. You know Jack McCoy and some of these people who had been discussing things in New York, but really I guess it was Tommy Thompson at that time who was the real advisor on that. Aside from little side conversations with him, I really wasn't focused on that.

Q: What was the degree of respect that people had for Tommy Thompson?

HARTMAN: Oh, great. There just was nothing that was discussed or decided without talking to him, and without getting his view of what the reaction was going to be; and he had a very personal relationship with both Jack Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy both of whom sought his advice.

Q: What was the nature of that personal relationship? How did it come about?

HARTMAN: I think just respect for him as an individual and for the kind of view that he was able to give in area that they all felt was very important. That was the key to his being able to play the role that he did, and indeed Chip Bohlen the same way in other times.

Q: Kennan never really had that did he?

HARTMAN: No, absolutely not. He was never a bureaucratic figure, that is not his bag. He is a marvelous sort of thinker, historian, and position maker; a rather emotional man too I've found. In a bureaucracy he is always a thorn because he has a view, and it may be a view quite different from the one that he had last week, or at least it seems to be. In a bureaucracy that just throws things into a tizzy, I mean people want a little consistency; they want to be able to go in a direction.

Q: So he prophesied and no one hears the prophecy?

HARTMAN: Yes, and he was very unhappy.

Q: What about the relationship between the Department and the NSC? The whole idea of the foreign policy mechanism. How did you coordinate?
HARTMAN: I think the person who felt most strongly that there was occasional real interference was Dean Rusk in that period. I think this tends to be the Secretary of State, below him there are people who try to make the thing work. I've usually been on that team so I'm rather kind of prejudiced.

Q: So its the Special Assistants who make it work?

HARTMAN: It's the Special Assistants or the Assistant Secretaries, but whoever it is you've got this situation to deal with. You can't afford to sort of be standing on ceremony and saying, "dammit we're never going to allow those guys over there to do anything." You have to do something and so you make your alliances and you try where there is a difference of opinion between the Secretary of State and the Head of the NSC to see whether that can be brought together and patched up. You keep your boss informed, but you try to make the system work and when Kissinger was in the White House, that was sort of what went on. I was working for Elliot Richardson at that point and we ran an interdepartmental operation with Kissinger which William Rogers kind of stood above and the result was a lot of tension and it never got straightened out until Henry got over in the State Department.

Q: He had both posts in effect?

HARTMAN: Not really because Brent Scowcroft was a very strong individual and Brent could bring things to his attention and know that he was having them brought to his attention and you would have to take account of them from a Presidential point of view, and Henry respected him for that.

Q: What about relationships with other agencies in this period? I mean you have...

HARTMAN: Well it became much more formalized. The whole idea in the Nixon administration was that you would have these inter-departmental groups. In a sense that was to keep the bureaucracy happy while policy got made elsewhere on certain subjects.

Q: George Ball was the first head of the SIG wasn't he?

HARTMAN: It was started at the end of the Johnson administration, yes. George and then Nick Katzenbach headed this interdepartmental group. Indeed I had by that time been off in London for four years. I was brought back by Nick Katzenbach to run that interdepartmental operation which was essentially coordination with the Pentagon. A lot of it had to do with Vietnam at that point. We say the Pentagon, State and NSC with the so-called non group meeting at the top level with the Secretary of Defense coming over; Walt Rostow coming over to the State Department to meet with Nick and the Secretary occasionally to discuss the sort of guts of Vietnam policy. The other coordination things dealt with the annual preparation of the aid bill and presentations to Congress on economic policy. That went on into the Nixon administration, much more formalized in the Nixon administration, great theory. I can remember an early press conference where I
was a joint presenter with; who is the fellow who later sued Henry who was on the NSC staff, Mort Halperin. Mort and I gave the press conference on how this great system was going to work, and I showed a certain amount of skepticism. I remember that in fact it would work out as planned and Mort went on with the great theorizing of this great structure and how it was going to improve policy making, which I am sure he would never do today. Anyway, it was a kind of fun and a heady period; and there were many agencies involved in foreign affairs, I mean that's been the growth in the whole post-war period.

Q: The life of a Special Assistant where your hours are dictated by your principal, in many cases eighteen hours a day and others I suppose less. What was life like for you? Did you have a heavy schedule of dinners and official functions?

HARTMAN: Official functions vary little when your up on the seventh floor, many more when you're an Assistant Secretary as I was Assistant Secretary for Europe where since the Secretary usually doesn't go to these things, you feel an obligation. When someone gives a dinner, or a visitor comes, a Minister from another country - you have to go. So Assistant Secretaries lives are hell and between the traveling and going to meetings and dealing with all the countries, and doing all the things the Secretary of State does not wish to do as well as serving him; I think it is the hardest job I ever had, but the most fun.

Q: In that period when you were working with George Ball what was the most significant and exciting issue that you worked on?

HARTMAN: You mean in the early sixties. Well I think for me it was operating at the top of the Department in the Kennedy administration.

Q: So it was one event after another?

HARTMAN: Yes, it was one event after another and I must say also some things I didn't like to see; a lot of shooting from the hip, a lot of Special Assistants in the White House and elsewhere coming up with great policies that I didn't think very much of. In a sense George Ball became the great inside man. He really used the institution, whereas everyone else, particularly as policies became more controversial they kind of retreated and did their own thing. He kept a hand on the institution which was very good, although Dean Rusk did too, but Dean kept kind of focused I think on the issues that were of interest to him and the most important issues.

Q: After being Special Assistant to George Ball at the top reaches of the Department's seventh floor, you went to London. Now when did that occur? Was that after the assassination, or before the assassination?

HARTMAN: No before. I was in London at the time of the assassination, I was Head of the Economic section in London.
Q: Who was the Ambassador?

HARTMAN: The Ambassador was David Bruce oddly enough.

Q: Had he asked for you?

HARTMAN: Not really, that was an assignment by the Foreign Service that made sense for everyone. It was in the line of the experience I had. I was not the Economic Minister, I was head of the economic section under the Minister. The Minister was Bill Armstrong and it was fascinating because I had under me the people dealing with the various commodity agreements in London, the coffee agreement that was being negotiated, and rubber, tin and these other things. The debate in Britain, which is why I think people thought of sending me to London, was over Britain's entry into the Common Market which was defeated at first. I can remember when I was working for George Ball, Harold MacMillan sent a message saying that he had made up his mind, he was going to take Britain into the Common Market and he wanted us to know that this was true. Then he and Kennedy met, I think in Bermuda, and had long talks about it and then George Ball sent me to Europe to make sure that his friends; that is the people on the continent, knew that this was the information that we were given and would understand that as far as John Kennedy was concerned and the Administration, they believed MacMillan and believed in his sincerity and believed that we would work with them to try and bring this about. Of course there were many skeptics on the continent beginning with the French. I did my little tour and I went to Brussels and I remember our Ambassador there at the time was Walt Butterworth - very skeptical, and wondering "Why was this young whipper snapper being sent around Europe to talk to these people?"

Q: He was an old-style ambassador?

HARTMAN: Old-style, but new-style in the sense that he was head of our mission to the European Communities and he was a thorough devotee of the policy. He really believed in it and operated in a remarkable way, he looked old-style, he talked old-style, but if you look at his early history in the war he was doing pre-emptive buying in Spain and he was an operator. He was a character and I think one of the men that I liked the most in my whole career as a Foreign Service Officer. Anyway, Walt insisted on coming to Paris with me because I was going to see Monnet there and Jack Tuthill was at that time our representative to, I guess that he was the Economic Minister; anyway he was in Paris and we all went to see Monnet to tell him about this. Monnet immediately saw that this was something that he should take a hand in and try and bring about; that if the top of the British government had made this kind of historic decision, that he should help overcome the fears and skepticism of the French government. Then I went to see the number three man in the Foreign Office who later became their Foreign Minister and Ambassador in Russia and in Germany. He was sort of, I don't recall his name right now, always a very tough negotiator and a through Frenchman. Hidden under him was a kind of Anglophilia, we never really knew because he seemed to be so tough. I remember after I went through my whole explanation to him of the meeting that had taken place, and the message that
we had gotten, and the decision of our government that we would support this; he just shook his head and he said, "You know the trouble with you and the British is that you think you speak the same language." Of course, he spoke perfect English, and for him to tell us this, I wish I could remember his name. He was Governor of the Bank of France later on too. So, going to England was kind of a natural thing and what I did was to encourage some of my friends on the continent to come on over to London to talk at Chatham House; to talk to some of the British who were beginning to be Pro-European. There were a few of them, there was a lot of opposition; of course, it failed in that initial stage. It was earlier than that because actually George Ball and I were in Bonn having lunch with Adenauer when they got word of Devilles Veto; his press conferences in which he said, "Under no circumstances would he allow the British in." So I went there for the second run at the British entry and it was good fun. I met a lot of people, who were still very powerful. Denis Healey is an old friend now, and others who are in the banking area, as I was heavily into economic affairs. Our oldest friend, he was the editor of the Financial Times, he's now in a bank, we still see each other and children have gotten together and that sort of thing. But London was a wonderful experience for me, and I had four years in that capital and it was just terrific.

Q: And your children went to school there?

HARTMAN: Yes, the girls went to a very special girls school which did a lot for them, and the boys went to a Quaker school, a boarding school and enjoyed that to an extent. I don't know what it did for them, broadened their horizons.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about George Ball and de Gaulle? Did you see much of that encounter?

HARTMAN: Well, he was, George was a person who despite his pragmatism also had some feelings about where policy should go and he felt that de Gaulle was so much of a nationalist that he was going to wreck this thing. I think though he had greater admiration later for de Gaulle as a man who could pull together a political scene which was far from being put together and get them out of some things that they had been involved in. George later, I think, was not so much of a European promoter as some of his colleagues.

Bob Schaeftel, for example, who was devoted to the European movement and Bob put that as the highest priority over everything else, and almost exclusive of everything else, and George began to tire of that. As his fields broadened as Under Secretary he got interested in places like The Congo, and Vietnam as a gadfly oppositionist, and into higher politics. This became less of an interesting field for him, it also became less because de Gaulle took the sort of political guts out of the European movement and all the promise that that had shown for what might even have become a kind of a governmental structure, which in a sense it has in some areas in Brussels, it lost some of it's moxie.

Q: What about the Multilateral Force, the M.L.F.?
HARTMAN: The MLF, well, let's see where was I when that came up? I was still in Washington when that was in the formulation period, and I guess I was later in London when it was still being discussed. It was one of those periodic efforts to solve the problem of nuclear linkage between some Europeans who felt the need for the linkage; particularly the real coupling. There, it's sort of funny, you get to middle age and you look around you and you become very conservative, and I felt that there were activists around me, and I can remember thinking of Henry Owen in particular as one of the great activists of that period. Henry has this way of dealing with problems in a totally devoted and directed way to the exclusion of everything else. No matter what else comes along, he picks it up and applies it to bring more pressure to what he wants to do or to head off another force in another direction. I think it got carried too far quite frankly. The whole idea of coupling is that you convince and bring European opinion to believe something, I mean otherwise, we are dealing with shadows so it's something that they've got to believe, and it's something that our country has to be seen to be totally behind. Once you kind of set this thing up and you do it with mirrors it isn't going to work.

Q: This is a very interesting history isn't it? The coupling argument in the form of actual deployments, or proposed deployments, and certainly in the negotiating process?

HARTMAN: I think we will come back to something like this, although not in this form, but the idea that - because I don't think we are going to get rid of all nuclear weapons overnight, but there have to be some somewhere that appear to serve a particular European purpose and not just an American purpose.

Q: This is a very key issue for a country isn't it? How the Europeans see their relationship with the United States, can they trust the Americans to come to their assistance?

HARTMAN: Well, they are schizophrenic and they always will be, and we shouldn't lose patience with that fact. The worst thing it seems to me that could happen on our side is that we would react and say "Why are we keeping all these troops here? These people are so ungrateful."

We've got to remind ourselves that Europe is a very schizophrenic place to live, and we ought to be delighted that it has stuck together and grown as strong as it has over these years in close alliance with us; and be, I think, a little more mature and sympathetic to the problems that European political leadership faces. I think that we are in for some more heavy seas over there as a new generation comes along that doesn't accept a lot of the basis of why you have to have a strong military effort and so forth. Although we did come through the recent missile deployment debate very well. When even the Dutch go along with all of the political problems that they have on nuclear matters.

Q: Are we now asking them to reverse the actions?
HARTMAN: Well, yes, but there is no reason that we have to paint this as a defeat; it's a great victory. There is strength in the alliance, it has restated and re-announced some of the principles so that a new generation now at least understands why we are doing things. The fact that we may have gotten from this an ability to negotiate lower levels of nuclear arms; and indeed maybe the elimination of the whole system, I disagree with Kissinger on this. I think it ought to be painted as a victory and not sort of paint ourselves in the corner and start saying that this is a great defeat.

Q: Let me take you back to Washington. You've been in London for four years and how does this next assignment take place?

HARTMAN: It takes place when somebody goes to Nick Katzenbach and he's looking around for somebody. Basically, the Johnson administration decides that they want to have a more formal process to coordinate things, and they decide to create this coordination staff under the planning staff. I was Deputy Director for Planning and Coordination, but there was a Director for Planning entirely and another staff entirely, including Henry Owen and others who were primarily on the planning side of the job. I had the coordination side which meant that I brought inter-departmental groups together, first at the senior level under Nick Katzenbach, and then geographically kind of running those. I made sure that policy issues were brought up in terms of policy making, and that then the implementation of those policies was reviewed inter-departmentally by these groups. It was a very..., Max Taylor was very much in favor of this; it had a kind of a military ring to it, it was sort of orderly and to a certain extent it worked mainly on the peripheral issues where you had to make a policy on a new issue that had come up before a conference or a regional policy. You got people together and at least you got options presented. On the implementation side of it, at least you were able to call people into account and say "All right now, is this really working?" I don't think it was, it's not the panacea and it's often used I think, the structure is often used to substitute for something that's more basic, basically in difficulty. What was in difficulty at the end of the Johnson administration was the overall policy. No amount of bureaucratic tinkering was going to solve the problem that he faced of lessening opinion in favor of major policy, namely the involvement in Vietnam.

I think we did manage in some peripheral areas to make an improvement in terms of American policy and the presentation of that policy, in the coordination of it, and in the presentation to Congress of some sensible ideas on development assistance and how it ought to be organized. When the Nixon administration came in, Henry was the NSC Chief and he and Elliot Richardson sat down and really developed from this older system in a sense, although they said it was brand new and they gave it a lot of kudos for being innovative as every administration has to as it comes in. It was really an outgrowth of this previous practice. When Elliot was Under Secretary of State, I was brought in. I was no longer running the planning staff, it was a pure coordination job directly under Elliot who was the head of an overall under Secretaries committee that did the coordination and what not, he drew on the planning staff for other things.
Q: So with Elliot at that point was Jonathan Moore?

HARTMAN: Jonathan and a lawyer at various times, different lawyers. Elliot, of course, was a great intellect and fun to work with and indeed he again was the bridge with the White House. This was because William Rogers and Kissinger were just not two minds that kind of linked up and worked well together, and Nixon really didn't want it to work that way. He was a very manipulative fellow and so basically what Kissinger did was to build up a staff and then he used this link with Elliot and this coordination staff to get some of the policy matters ironed out. William Rogers kept rather aloof from this whole process.

Q: Did he lose power and influence as a result?

HARTMAN: Well, not because he was aloof from that process. I think this is the way Nixon wanted it, and he was basically wanting to run the policy out of the White House and this was just a way of kind of keeping control of the bureaucracy.

Q: So the big issues at that point were Vietnam?

HARTMAN: Vietnam certainly, but again in its sensitive aspects it never touched that group. In it's gory details we were there, we had all kinds of studies prepared and the money thing was reviewed, and the military thing was reviewed, but when it came to a particular policy of what you were going to do in Cambodia, or what you were going to do somewhere else it was Kissinger, Laird and Nixon. Elliot because of his intellectual interests also found time to pull out particular policy issues. I remember he took Law of the Sea one time and said "We need a policy on this," so let's do a study and put up the options and get some decisions. It was a magnificent job but politically. I'm afraid it didn't have a chance, but it was a very rational way for the United States to behave in the law of the sea business. Immediately the political forces which we had tried to take account of but which Elliot didn't like in the sort of intellectual way that he looked at the problem, voiced their opposition to the policy.

He had an International Authority that was going to take the monies that were contributed by companies that were going to be developing, for special areas that were going to be kept for the less developed country. It was a great way on paper to bring together countries on a Law of the Sea policy while still keeping the major interests we had, of a security interest of the Navy on short boundaries for most purposes except economic development. So he used the instrument for that kind of thing. So I was there through the period of the time from 1969 through 1972 and then I went as the Deputy in the Mission to the Common Market in Brussels. That was fascinating because there we were in a mission to a budding government with all the problems that it had, with the kind of political leadership at the top with the Commissioners taking a political role. I was there for a year and a half before Henry Kissinger moved over to the State Department and called me back to be the Assistant Secretary.
Q: He called you back? What was his charge to you? What was your job going to be?

HARTMAN: I was to run European affairs and work out a relationship with Hal Sonnenfeldt, who is the counselor who was going to be advising him obviously also on that type of problem and particularly on the Soviet relationship. But Hal and I did work out a reasonable kind of working relationship and we've stayed fast friends although it was a situation where we could have been at each others throats.

Q: Hal's great interests would have been the Soviet Union, how did you handle that?

HARTMAN: It was Soviet but he got a lot into Western European affairs, and we set up a group that he used to meet with and sometime I would meet with him and the group and sometime he would meet alone with the group. I had so much to do and I can remember one particular incident. I had been back and been the Assistant Secretary for a couple of months and somebody wandered into my office and I was preparing testimony or doing something else and half listening to this guy, the management part of the State Department. A month later Turkey went into Cyprus, and I discovered that I had accepted Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece in the European bureau, and it took practically my whole time for the next sixth months. It does show you that you ought to be more careful with bureaucratic decisions. That taught me a lot about politics in this country, I mean I learned more about AHEPA and the Greek-American groups and Senator Sarbanes who was then a Congressman and Brademases who was a Congressman and the difficulties that I had with them and one very emotional moment when the President of Greece said to me, "Can't you control the Greek-Americans." They were putting pressure on him and causing him difficulty in his politics with their rather extreme views on the subject. He was just at wits end one time, he wanted to make some kind of a deal and he was being pressured by Greek-Americans coming over there and saying, "Under no circumstances should you allow this to happen." We got the votes on the Hill.

Q: It was more than the Greek-Americans, they were Cypriots. There was a very powerful Cypriot lobby.

HARTMAN: Of course, the Archbishop was coming from Brooklyn. He was quite a Cypriot. He was a remarkable character, one of the most remarkable men I think I've come across.

Q: Did you sit in any sessions with Makarios?

HARTMAN: Oh yes, and indeed in the period before he came back to Cyprus, we were sent to meet him in London. We had a long meeting with him in the Grosvenor House Hotel and the man was such a master of theater. I can remember he was dressed in full regalia with a large sort of pectoral cross and he conducted me to the elevator, and he put himself so that my last vision of this man would be right in the center as he gave me a blessing as the doors closed. Absolutely amazing man, sort of halfway between scoundrel tactics and really a great politician.
Q: In the Vietnam period, let me take you back just a little bit when you were in the Department at the end of, from 1969 to 1972. What was the problem for Foreign Service Officers at that time about the issue of Vietnam?

HARTMAN: Well, you know they were divided, and it was rather interesting to see it. There were activists on both sides. There were activists in favor of greater involvement, there were activists in favor of "How can we get us out?" There were a series of young fellows, I don't think I should mention names, but who I think didn't really see it in rights or wrongs, or success or failure; but the mechanism fascinated them and the whole process fascinated them. Actually, when I got back first, it seemed to me that they were playing at the game, and I didn't like it because one week they would be fighting hard to support old Westie and the next week they would be out there saying, "This is terrible policy you know, we've got to do something else." It seemed to me that it was the game that they were interested in rather than convictions about what might work, about what might not work. I found that when I first came back, I just couldn't believe it.

Q: It's a difficult problem for the leadership of the Department when you have a controversial issue, an issue that is that divisive. What would your advice be to Foreign Service Officers?

HARTMAN: There is only one thing to do; where you cannot support a policy, you have to resign.

Q: Even at the lower levels?

HARTMAN: If you're working there and that's the only thing you can do and you feel so strongly about it that you can't sort of loyally carry it out, or loyally participate in a process which you are trying to influence.

From time to time Presidents have almost gone mad on the subject of leaks and my feeling is that there hasn't been that much from the Department at the lower levels; although it is true that leaks generally come from the top. There have been a couple of occasions where people have stayed on disapproving of a policy, and I think that is very debilitating and they should get out. If they can accept the fact that they are still working for the administration, get out and get in another job; if they can't accept that get out period. Don't try to stay on and be disloyal! I think that's the worst thing that can happen, but I think that rarely happens in the State Department.

Q: So the kind of decision that was made by Cyrus Vance is the right course at the top?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, and in the end that may cause less of a problem because at least people know where you stand.

Q: After EUR what was the next stage?
HARTMAN: I stayed in EUR into the Carter administration and Cy Vance. I went with Cy to Moscow. I had, by the way, in the Kissinger period, of course, been with him at all his meetings with the Soviets and at the summits of both Nixon and Ford.

Q: That was in the context of the allies.

HARTMAN: Well, it was in the context of actually negotiating with the Soviets; because we covered East Europe and the Soviet Union in European affairs.

Q: You had as a task the problem of informing the allies about what was going on?

HARTMAN: Informing the allies and working with them in certain cases on some of the negotiations, but also with the Soviets on all of the bilateral negotiations, and on the preparations on the Helsinki meeting, for example, of settling the final issues on that.

Q: So you met the top Soviet leadership in that context?

HARTMAN: Yes, that was really my first exposure to the modern top leadership.

Q: How did it strike you? You had seen the great men of Europe, that post-war generation. What did the Soviet leadership look like to you upon close examination?

HARTMAN: Right out of primitive society, it was incredible. I mean to go into the Kremlin being led by these goose-stepping soldiers into the office where Brezhnev was, and the formality of the meetings, and the lectures from Gromyko and occasional bits of humor. Henry was great at pulling that out of people and Brezhnev in a sense used to show off for him, so we got more of that perhaps than was normal.

The whole primitive nature of that society, and, of course, the backwardness of the city. We did get to see the Far East under Ford which not many other people have, although they are now beginning to talk about opening up Vladivostok.

Q: Well, that group of Bolsheviks, you saw the last of the Bolsheviks with Brezhnev and the group around him?

HARTMAN: I'm not sure it's the last of the dedicated Orthodox Communists, but I think you are right, the last of the Bolsheviks.

Q: With all of the shaping influences that seemed to happen for them. Was it a sense of ideas that had frozen in concrete?

HARTMAN: No, not at all because they were playing the game and this was the time when rather serious negotiations were going on in arms control. I arrived on the scene just after SALT-I really because that was done while Henry was still over in the White House.
The beginnings of a framework for SALT-II, carrying out some of these agreements; the Helsinki negotiations, the emphasis on Human Rights.

**Q: You were beginning to see quite a bit of Dobrynin?**

HARTMAN: Yeah, yeah, although as Assistant Secretary he was not fond of coming to see me. He did on a number of occasions, but he had a special relationship with Henry and he wanted to keep it that way. He was treated very favorably, and when I finally got assigned to Moscow, I luckily got an administration that had changed that and I was able to insist on a little more reciprocity for the poor man who was Ambassador in Moscow.

**Q: Where was Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin?**

HARTMAN: In the central building, the Council of Ministers' building, it's a sort of triangular building. I remember they always had a small elevator so Kissinger and one other or two other people, plus the General who was leading us, could get in the elevator. The rest of us would have to dash up these two very long flights of stairs to be up at the room where we left our coats and be able to walk in with Kissinger when he walked into Brezhnev's office.

**Q: When you were Assistant Secretary and working with Henry on the negotiations, was this the period when you mastered the intricacies of arms control, force levels, etc?**

HARTMAN: Well, I was never the principal person. Bill Highland, Sonnenfeldt, people like some of these very bright arms control people that we've had in the past worked on the detailed negotiations obviously with very close linkage to the negotiators themselves. I was sort of peripheral, but in on the discussions and also talking about them at my level with other people, and publicly presenting the results, and publicly presenting the arguments, and talking to the allies about it.

**Q: Who from that period on the Soviet side continued on into your tenure as Ambassador?**

HARTMAN: Well, Gromyko. I remember one of my last calls as I left Moscow was on the President of the country who was now Gromyko. Dobrynin, and he has now come back to Moscow, and I used to see a lot of him there but not in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The man who was Dobrynin's Deputy, Komyenkov who was the Principal U.S. Desk Officer, and a very difficult individual to deal with, but one who I have come to respect and like over the years. He was very bright, and he knows his stuff, although he tends to be very old fashioned in the way he negotiates. Vorontsov, who is now back there as the Deputy Minister and Principal Arms Control Negotiator, was in the Embassy in Washington. I then knew him when I became the Ambassador in France, I saw him once when he was ambassador in India; but he is clearly of the new breed and very much in the sort of Dobrynin model and not in the old Komyenikov or Gromyko model.
Q: How did the assignment to Paris take place?

HARTMAN: Well, I went with Cy Vance to Moscow in March 1977. I was not enthusiastic about the position he was taking there. Les Gelb was on that team along with a number of other people. I felt at the time and we were not told much about the position until we got on the plane. This was one of the interesting things at the time because they were anxious to prevent leaks and so there was a little meeting at the White House and then we were all on a plane, and it was only at that point that I along with Les Gelb and the others who were working even more directly on the policy were informed. I had the feeling that it was such a change from the previous position and that the Soviets were unprepared and that we were going to run into heavy seas. Therefore, it might have been better to continue with the old, just to try and get that nailed down before going onto something else. Well, we got blasted out of the water by Gromyko and I had a feeling that Cy was not totally behind what he was doing. I mean he was kind of ordered to do that out of a meeting that took place with Sprague and others. It was not a good show, but I am fond of pointing out to my Soviet friends that they shot out of the water the position that they took them almost ten years to come around to again, and now accuse us of not giving enough support to: namely deep cuts in strategic forces. So, the objective I had no difficulty with. I think deep cuts was a hell of a lot better than just trying to put caps on the programs that both sides had planned to do in any case. It took us along time to get back to that. With the Soviets it seems to me that you have to have a certain amount of continuity, at least you used to, maybe now you don't. We didn't have it at that point. In any case shortly after that time Cy called me in. I don't know if he was still uncomfortable with me being in EUR and sort of reminding him of old positions or what, anyway he said "How would you like to go to France?" I said "Gee I'd be delighted!" So that was my first Ambassadorial post, Go to France, Why not!

Q: That was his theory, that the best of the Foreign Service should be rewarded?

HARTMAN: I think so and I must say they had an idea of quality. I mean that there were some appointments that were made for political reasons that were not too hot, but as we looked around Europe you had people like Kingman Brewster in London, and for a while Walt Stoessel was in Bonn as a professional, I was in Paris, Dick Gardner was in Rome as a non-professional. At the EEC you had Dean Hinton, at NATO we had another professional and it varied during that period between professionals and non-professionals, but I think always I've had a respect for the quality of the outsiders who were brought in.

Q: How did you find the role of Ambassador? When you were there you were at one of the great posts in the world, at least in Western Europe; beautiful embassy, fascinating country and at the height of your career. Was being an Ambassador as much fun as you had thought?

HARTMAN: Well, it was a lot of fun, but very frustrating from an intellectual point of view and from a policy point of view. This was because as prepared as you are from
having worked in Washington for the fact that ambassadors are really not brought in to
the high policy councils, nor indeed know fully what is going on, and a lot of people try
to get around you; you are not prepared for the actuality of it. I can remember the tussles I
would have with people like Spate who wanted to have his own sort of direct relationship
with somebody in the Elysée and without informing me sometimes, I would get messages
back and forth.

Q: Well does this raise the question of the whole nature of foreign policy? In the post-war
period you were a part of the new Foreign Service as you described. Then with electronic
communication and the ability to fly anywhere in the world faster and faster as we get
new airplanes, the nature of embassies change. You have this anomaly in the distant
parts of the world where the issues are not formal diplomacy but rather what you do in
the bush, or sort of hand-to-hand combat in some places. There is such a range of what
an embassy should be. Can you comment on that?

HARTMAN: It depends on the situation and different people react differently to those
situations. You can end up as Dean Hinton did in San Salvador where he was trying to get
and encourage a kind of democratic process to begin and prepare for an election. Actually
they did, and they had a successful election and someone with good democratic
credentials got it. Well, he was an activist and is, is a man who understands these things
and gets a great kick out of that sort of interplay. I am sure that it was the center of
American policy-making with respect to that country. Then you have your more
traditional embassies, say in Europe, where you may have particular problems.
Occasionally a man, the Ambassador in Bonn, for example, has got a very serious
problem with the negotiating issues around something that the Germans are concerned
about like deployments where both parties have very heavy involvement and are issue
oriented.

So you've got public aspects of dealing with the German public as well as the
government, as well as the opposition on a particular issue. While I was in France, in that
four years there was not much of that. There was a lot of sort of basic handholding, of
keeping Giscard, particularly, from not exercising his royal independence for just the hell of it; but making sure that he understood what the policies were before he made
statements and before he took decisions. There were a lot of cooperative things we did
with the French around the world. One of the real oddities was to watch Jimmy Carter,
who didn't have that many instincts to begin with about involvement in other parts of the
world, working closely with, or his people working closely with, Giscard and his services
and real involvement in some of these countries and helping opposition movements or
helping governments to stay in power. I said earlier the way that administrations shift
back to a kind of centerline position is interesting to watch. Jimmy Carter came in saying
he wasn't going to pay any attention to the Soviets because that had been too long the
preoccupation with our policy, and boom he was back to being preoccupied by them. I
think that the French experience for me was fascinating, first of all to have more time
with my family and to be able to really enjoy life a little bit. Also, the way to influence a
country like France, particularly France and I think also the Soviet Union, is to get into
their intellectual debates and into their intellectual life. So we spent a lot of time
cultivating the intelligentsia in Paris. I think it paid off. I think they had tended over the
years, I won't say I did this - but I certainly encouraged the movement, to be sort of
pathologically left and anti-U.S. By showing an interest in their arts and even their avant-
garde type things, by getting together with the youth more, by bringing in different kinds
of people; I think we made a kind of place for a more favorable setting for the acceptance
of American policies at a time when it was sort of difficult to do. This was because there
was a lot of feeling about the softness at home and this was before the advent of
Mitterrand. Then the other thing, of course, is that it was always the potential of the
Socialists coming to power and you had to kind of keep a hand out there and I knew many
of them from my earlier days and you could see it coming. You always have the problem,
I had a Foreign Service Officer who was working for me, of people wanting to anticipate
this, and getting the regime that's in power; and also wanting to have alternates just for
the sake of alternates and not saying, but there is an American policy interest in the
French having the right views on certain subjects, as there is for example with the British.
I mean the Labor Party now has a view about defense in Europe which is, to say the least,
antagonistic to most of the things that we stand for. So while you continue to maintain
contact with them, you also have to let them know the facts of life, and tell them why you
are opposed to what they are discussing.

Q: How did you work with the desk back here in Washington? Did you have anything to
do with the appointment of who was working on the desk?

HARTMAN: Not really. George Vest was Assistant Secretary for awhile and I think there
was another Assistant Secretary while I was over there. You know, we would talk about
it, work very closely with the desk, work very closely with the Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs. I knew Washington, so I would go back there often enough to kind of
keep my hand in on the policies that I thought counted. I knew the Cabinet Officers quite
well, I remember Jim Schlesinger coming over quite often to discuss energy matters; that
was one of the big issues in that period. Defense cooperation, we did a lot to encourage it,
Al Haig was up in the NATO job, and we worked very closely without a lot of publicity
to bring the French into a much closer defense relationship. Then, of course, you always
have the financial problems and I worked on that. When it comes to financial
cooperation, the French are always varying in their view of whether the dollar is too high
or too low. And that was all fun!

Q: How did you handle Congressional visits?

HARTMAN: There were a lot of visits in addition to the air show when they would all
come over. There were a lot of visits back and forth. The Vice-President came, Jimmy
Carter came; and then you've got all these other meetings that go on like the meeting of
the five or seven summit countries. So there is a lot of contact back and forth and I would
go to those meetings. For example, when we met in Martinique with Giscard and Ford, I
would be present at those meetings. So it's a little bit more of a traditional role, and with a
country like France that is not at the top of our mind, unless there is a very specific problem.

**Q: So you have a little more free run?**

HARTMAN: Absolutely, you have a more free run, and you can do a lot of things -- make speeches. I've made a very critical speech of the position that Giscard had taken after Afghanistan. It's the one time that I kind of intervened in a French political matter, but it was so important to us and he seemed to be taking such a kind of mid-point decision as if France was not part of an alliance, that surprised me. Even in de Gaulle's time, they were part of the alliance; they just weren't part of the structure. So I spoke out and a lot of Giscard's friends thanked me at the time. We got a lot of publicity in France; but that wasn't my purpose. I felt at that point, that's one of the few times that I felt speaking out in a country like France was important. He didn't like it for a while but we still stayed friends. Then, of course, Mitterrand was elected at the end of that period and I knew quite a few of the people around him. I had a friend who introduced me to some of his colleagues, I met Rocard. I had Mitterrand to my house before he came in. So we kept in contact with him and indeed when they got in power, at least on foreign policy issues, they were stronger than Giscard in some respects. This was true certainly of their desire to have a close connection with NATO and their desire to buttress the situation in Germany, toughness on negotiation on nuclear matters because they really believed in the independent deterrent, but a hash of the situation economically at home.

**Q: Was it Regis Debray who was the spokesman?**

HARTMAN: Regis Debray I would never even talk to, I think he was a very sad character. He finally disappeared from the scene. I think he still remains a friend of Mitterrand, but he is one of these intellectual gadflies who may be all right when you're out of power to get some ideas from. But if you have him around anywhere close to you when you're in power, its a real problem. I knew his mother very well who was not at all of his persuasion.

**Q: How did the appointment to Moscow take place? What were the circumstances of that?**

HARTMAN: Well, again, I was just there for the Carter administration really in Paris and the Reagan administration came in and I ,of course, knew Al Haig very well and he said, "I think you better stay on in France. We've got a transition period now with Mitterrand coming in, but eventually we'll have to think about a successor." I don't know what all the considerations were, but I'm sure there were many. The President had a lot of friends, I think, that he was thinking of sending to Paris and Al finally called me back and said, "How would you like to go to Moscow?" I was torn because I was not a Soviet specialist, I did not have the language, but I was very much given to understand that if it didn't go to me, it would probably go to a non-professional. I felt at least I had a lot of experience dealing with the Soviets even though I didn't have the language. I felt very strongly about
not having a language, and I went to some of my old friends, I went to George Kennan, I can remember talking to Foy Kohler, Marty Hillenbrand; a number of the Soviet specialists. I remember asking them, "Should I take this, or is this going to hurt the cause of professionalism?" They all encouraged me to take it and I'm glad I did. I picked up some of the language for social use and obviously for professional use, and we stayed five years; to be sure through three slow deaths of leaders before we got to the interesting period of a new generation coming into power. Intellectually, I think, I found the experience of being Ambassador to the Soviet Union the most challenging thing I've ever done and the most rewarding.

Q: Let me take you through that if I might. You're appointed Ambassador and you have all of these questions if it's the right thing to do, whether you're the right person. You come to the conclusion that you are the best person given the circumstances and you've had a lot of experience on the vital issues of arms control, you know who the players are, you're very familiar with the literature, all the briefings and the various attitudes of our country in the past and so on? You go to Moscow.

HARTMAN: There's a step before I go to Moscow. I talked with Al Haig and with the President to find out what they're after because that to me was important. I mean I've had a lot of feelings that ordinary citizens had of the President and what his views were, and of Al Haig and what his views were.

I knew those perhaps better than I did the President's, but I sort of had doubts as to whether or not given what I had heard, if I could seriously carry forward in what the President wanted. I must say those discussions relieved me. Obviously, the President was more ideologically, had a more ideological bent. What I was assured of in that period was that after an initial period we wanted to get the defenses in a better shape. I agreed with that analysis, I think we had delayed many of the decisions in the seventies, which we should not have in terms of modernizing our forces and not being able to choose. There was no consensus between Congress and the administration as to what particular things should be done, there was no defense policy that was accepted. I felt that that was a necessary basis with which to be dealing with the Soviet Union. Once I was convinced that this was not a totally ideological bent, and you know the "Evil Empire" thing is often pointed to as a low point-high point of the exchange. As a basic principle, it is an evil empire, it does evil things to its own people. I could accept that, what I could not accept was that this would be the sort of language of our discourse with the Soviet Union. I just didn't think as a practical matter that it was going to get us anywhere. Indeed the President didn't think so either and moderated his sort of public usages, although there were a lot of people around him who would have liked him to continue batting away. Since I didn't have the feeling from him that he felt that things could only be done in one way, I thought that this was something I could do with full feeling, that I would be heard and that I would have an influence. Al Haig certainly led me to believe that and indeed during the time that he was there, and later with George Shultz, that I would be an important part of the process. This is again, it's unusual for Ambassadors, but we had developed a means of communication that made that the case.
Q: So that you had direct contact with the Secretary of State and with the President?

HARTMAN: Yes, less with the President. This is not his style of leadership, he doesn't deal on a daily basis with other people and the ones that have immediate responsibility.

Q: So that aspect of contact and the ability to discuss fully and frequently with the Secretary was very appealing to you.

HARTMAN: Not only the Secretary of State, but with the Secretary of Defense, the arms control people, I kept my contacts with all of them.

Q: You were involved in the preparations for START and the other arms control negotiations?

HARTMAN: Yes and Yes, less so in the detailed things rather than the sort of general objective. On detailed negotiating, I think I had an influence on those as well.

Q: What was the date that you arrived in Moscow as Ambassador?

HARTMAN: October of 1981, and its less than a year after the Reagan administration took office.

Q: And one leader is dying?

HARTMAN: One leader is on his way out although I met him several times and he wasn't totally ga-ga, but I remember on one occasion, a November 7th, I can't remember whether it was the first November 7th or whether he was still alive at the second one. Going through the line I said something to him, I guess it was the first one, the last time I had seen him was in Vladivostok, I think. I said that he had very nicely taken us to Vladivostok because the meeting actually took place outside the city limits on the outskirts as it was a closed city. He kept promising us a trip through Vladivostok if we were good and if we reached good agreements. There was a lot of joking back and forth. In any case, he had to kind of be nudged by Gromyko to recall this because he really was just about to turn ga-ga at that point and a kind of sad figure.

Q: When you go to Spaso House at that time, what size embassy do you have?

HARTMAN: Well, there were you know sixty-odd professional officers, another forty or fifty staff, plus the large Soviet staff about which we are hearing so much these days. The basic job in the Soviet Union is to penetrate a closed society, and I used a lot of the experience that I had in France, which in another sense is a closed society, It's closed intellectually sometimes. You have to invent techniques to sort of get at people, they don't want to talk to foreign Ambassadors, they have a funnel through which they like to pass all Americans called the U.S.A.-Canada institute headed by Doctor Arbott. This is a tradition that comes at them from Russian days. Before I went to Moscow, George
Kennan said "Look, you've got a good month off in Maine, get yourself some good nineteenth century memoirs and read those. You'll learn more about Soviet society." He was right!

Q: Were these the memoirs that he had edited?

HARTMAN: No, not the ones that he edited. I got earlier ones, you know people like Coustine, and one remarkable one that he put me on to called "The Memoirs of Lady Londenderry," and it was a description of a trip that she took with her husband who was a General in the Napoleonic Wars and had gone back to visit some of their own friends in Russia and how they were shunned, and how people were suspicious of them. They were handed onto people that the Czar had designated to talk to them, and they were not allowed to see some of their old friends. Well, this is very much the Soviet Union today. They fear foreigners, they fear foreign contact and even with all the glasnost that Gorbachev talks about, he's basically dealing with four-hundred years of a closed society, of a feeling that they are at the mercy of foreigners, that they are weaker than foreigners, that they are inferior to foreigners in many ways; and yet they have a great patriotism and a great closeness to their soil that gives them the backbone to resist all of this.

Q: You used the word penetrate as though it were a military operation?

HARTMAN: Well, it is in a sense. I mean what I did was try to bring people to Spaso House who would be live bait for some of the intellectuals and even some of the party people because they wanted to see them. So I brought over, for example, Murray Feshbock who knew more about their demography than they were willing to admit, and indeed if they had let Murray in there and talked to him very freely in that period and later, they might not have had to rediscover the wheel under Gorbachev because he was already saying that alcohol was their major problem. He was already saying that they were losing young men to this, that many of the problems that they saw in trying to get their economic growth started again were due to basic lack of discipline and alcoholism. Well, we used people like that to sort of get a discussion going with certain elements of the Soviet bureaucracy and society as a way for us to learn more about what they were thinking.

Q: You had 60 officers, you had resources in Washington, and you were familiar with a lot of the writings and scholars, you had consulted and did a lot of reading. How did you ask your embassy to assess the situation for you? You arrive and you are a new boy on the beat and what was it that you asked your embassy to do first?

HARTMAN: We looked at personnel first. I brought in my own Deputy which Ambassadors normally do, an excellent man, who had been in the Soviet Union before, Warren Zimmermann. We had a good staff, at the lower levels excellent people and you know gradually...
Q: Mr. Ambassador, you've just arrived in Moscow and you've had this careful preparation in Washington briefings, you've consulted with former Ambassadors, you've read memoirs, you've gone through intelligence material and the best insights that you can find in the Department, but it's a new place. You have this staff of sixty people and one of the questions I'm sure in your mind is "Tell me what I need to know. How should I go about learning about this place?" How did you do that?

HARTMAN: I had one other thing, I participated in my first meeting with Gromyko at the UN in New York.

Q: Was this before going out to Moscow?

HARTMAN: Yes, before going out to Moscow at the usual UN meetings in September. We had I think tried to build a staff there that had really good qualities. There is a tremendous depth of talent, I think, in the people who had gone into Soviet affairs as a specialty. So we had people who were experts in the internal situation and analysis of the economics and politics of the Soviet Union party organization, and people who were experts on the external aspects of Soviet policy either in arms control or in regional policies. So a lot of the early days I think were spent talking to them and beginning to make initial calls. The Soviets don't allow you to make that many initial calls. You are allowed to deal with the Foreign Ministry, that's fair game; you're allowed to deal with the Cultural Ministry, that's fair game, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. I can see my old friend, who is Head of the Central Bank, Alkimoff. After that I never got to see in all the time I was there the Head of the Plan. I mean I complained to Gromyko about it once and said, "You know this is crazy. An Ambassador can't see the Head of the Plan, what's the matter here?" He said, "Oh I can't believe that's true." And sure enough he apparently leaned on this fellow, and I got a call saying that at four o'clock on a Saturday afternoon I could come around and see him. Well, I happened to have something else to do at that time and I never got another offer, so it was clearly reluctance on his part. Meanwhile, of course, he saw all manner of Americans as they had come through or other Ambassadors from other countries.

Q: What was this, what were they trying to say to you or was this simply the bureaucracy?

HARTMAN: I think this is traditional and it applies to most Ambassadors except those that they are cultivating because they come from a country like India, for example. The Indian Ambassador gets pretty well received. I've since learned in the last year or so that even the East European Ambassadors have troubles.

The Soviets like to deal with those governments through the party apparatus and sometimes Ambassadors are cut out of that. So it's a common problem, and the way we tried to get around it was by bringing delegations in so that we could go in with the delegations that they wanted to see; either of private Americans or public officials to discuss official exchanges or particular negotiations.
Q: This is where two-tracked diplomacy works together?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, it's the only way to work there and through oddities. For example, an old friend of mine that I had met because of my interest in architecture in Paris is Kevin Roach. We invited Kevin in and suddenly found ourselves open to the architectural community. We found some rather remarkable things in the Soviet Union, and we'd bring musicians in and similarly we would get to meet the musicians and artists. We would use Congressmen when they would come, and so otherwise you tend to be thrown onto the Refusenik Community, and the semi-dissident groups. There weren't that many dissidents by the time I got to Moscow. They were either all in the clink or out of the country. Sakharov was already in Gorki although Mrs. Bonner was still in Moscow and we would see her. So we did this, applying all these techniques in addition to the rather regular contact that we would have with the Foreign Ministry on particular negotiations on particular problems. I would regularly see the Foreign Minister, it was Gromyko at that time and later Shevardnadze, to have general discussions with them and I talked with their Deputies from time to time and have general discussions on particular things that I may have been instructed to do. Washington is very bad about getting instructions out and in the end I usually prefer not to have an instruction. The reason that instructions are hard to get out is they have to be cleared. Once you start the clearance process you get the lowest common denominator and it's really bad so I would rather not even start that. By going back to Washington often enough, I know what's on the Secretary's mind. I know what's on the President's mind, I'd get around to other senior people in Washington. Let me alone, let me go in and do my own discussing, unless there is a particular point that they want emphasized in a particular negotiation or a particular regional area. I remember AI sending me back and saying, "I want you in another month or so to go into the Foreign Minister and you emphasize the dangers if they start shipping certain kinds of equipment into Nicaragua." We really hit that very hard. Unfortunately, we didn't make the definition quite broad enough to include helicopters, but high-performance aircraft they have stayed away from. So that kind of thing and then having senior people from Washington come to discuss regional matters, or arms control matters, or whatever gave us the opportunity as an Embassy of getting at more people. The only point of having an Embassy in Moscow is to get at Soviets, and this is something that is very hard to explain here. It's particularly hard to explain here in the kind of paranoid atmosphere of concern about security. This is a closed society, the point of being in Moscow is to do things that you cannot do in Washington.

You can read Izvestia and Pravda in Washington and do all the analysis you want. The reason for being in Moscow is to get the reactions of Soviets, real live Soviets to those articles to see whether there is anything more we can pick up that will give us an indication of what the real trends are, not just what they are saying, but what they believe. It is very difficult to do and you have to find all kinds of strange ways of doing it in this period when we tend to be concerned about security and about what might happen. Indeed things have happened in terms of the spying back and forth. We tend to forget that there is a purpose of being in Moscow and that is to have contact and not to cut ourselves off.
from contact. We always have to weigh that and the security risks with allowing people to have contact. We don't obviously want non-professionals to have this contact, that's the thing we try to prevent.

Q: In the official list of contacts that you were permitted to have or you were able to have, were there any that you were able to develop a close enough personal relationship where you would go to their houses for dinner?

HARTMAN: No. Ambassadors by and large don't get invited officially to anybody's house of an official nature. The houses that we got to are the intellectuals, the artists, the musicians, the refuseniks; the people who are kind of out of phase with the official society. I have never been invited to an apartment of an official. Now some of my officers have occasionally, but very rarely. When the officials want to entertain you, they do it in an official entertainment place or at a restaurant. I suspect that there isn't that much official visiting back and forth among officials; they don't want each other to know the extent of their benefit of the nomenclature system; the access to better goods, or imported goods, they really want to keep that in the family.

Q: What about travel within the Soviet Union?

HARTMAN: Travel I could do as much as I could. I probably should have done more. I got out to the Far East, I got out to Siberia, I got out to Central Asia. My wife actually did more traveling than I did, she went out with diplomatic groups. I always seemed to have somebody in town, and I couldn't go on those trips. I went to Tabriz and Armenia and Leningrad, of course, and Murmansk. I got around, but I really would have liked to have gotten around much more.

Q: If some of these unofficial visitors, some of the scientists or say groups like ours had gone to a Department as sometimes happens, and they had said "Why don't you come along?" Would that have been possible?

HARTMAN: It could have been, but it would have been a big policy issue for them. Normally they just don't want it.

Insofar as they are taking any risk at all, and normally most people get permission to invite not only officials but also non-officials to their apartment, and those that are given permission are trusted and they think there is some good that is going to come out of it. They would not want to get involved with the Ambassador because that raises an added dimension that they probably wouldn't want to get into, and I wouldn't want to subject them to.

Q: So it's a very circumscribed and almost an art form in Ambassadorial roles?

HARTMAN: Yes, but you meet a lot of people. I mean a lot of people came to my house through all of these non-official and official visitors we would have receptions for them,
they would come, we would be able to talk to them. I would visit when visitors came through.

Q: So this is the lifeblood?

HARTMAN: Yes, and again the French experience helped. If I hadn't have had that experience, I think I would have been more at a loss in Moscow as to what to do and how to get engaged enough so that you can have some discussions with Soviets and really get to know better what makes them tick.

Q: How would you assess the various, let me describe them this way: accessible institutions within the Soviet Union. For example, the nexus that seems to provide a lot of opportunity for going to the Soviet Union and conferences and what have you is The Academy of Sciences, generally. Within that, there is the U.S.A. institute and then for the scientists there are many numbers of groups, and for the lawyers there is?

HARTMAN: The Soviets use all of these groups to get at private citizens in other countries mainly for influence, that's what they want to do. The individuals involved in the exchanges are interested in other things, in their professional development. In other words, there is a use of the system by individuals in the system in the Soviet Union for their own purposes. So a man like Velukov, for example, who is one of the leaders of the Academy, he's a physicist and he likes to keep in touch with other physicists so he does his business and he does it very well, but he also wants to keep up his professional interests. The same is true of a number of other scientists. The one area where I, the man I have the least respect for is Zarbotov who seems to me is a maneuverer of the first order who has never done any real independent work himself, and who is a manipulative individual who is the natural enemy of the Ambassador. His job is to keep as much control and contact with Americans in the private exchanges, and even officials. He is the clearinghouse, he is the guy who wants to form their opinion on any particular issue.

My job is to break that hold and so I'm naturally going to be against him and everything that he is doing, and aside from his character, which I can't stand, I spent a lot of time doing that and getting around him, and getting to know his colleagues in the Central Committee, and even getting to know members of his staff better.

Q: Who did you find the most interesting?

HARTMAN: I don't really want to get into that (for security reasons), but there were people that I found genuinely good on their subject and very interesting to talk to. Other institutes like the MMO, which is the World Economy Institute headed now by Primakov, very good, solid intellect, a man who you can deal with on a variety of regional issues as well as economic issues. Other people in the scientific community for a variety of subjects that we have dealt with; people on Atomic Energy, people on environmental problems. All the things that we've had exchanges with the Soviet Union about are there to be developed and bring people over to talk to them. This administration starting out
with sort of a prejudice, well picking up from a Carter policy. I mean Carter, I think made a great mistake. As a sanction for Afghanistan, he shot us in the foot by cutting off cultural exchanges. That is the only reason for having a mission in Moscow is to make contact and to try and open up that closed society, and it's no sanction to the Soviets to participate in their cutting themselves off. It's a sanction against us, and it was wrong. I kind of sympathize with political leaders in this country because the major reaction whenever something happens in the world is "What are you doing?" Even if it's something totally out of control of the American President, the speeches on the Hill are all going to be "What have you done? You just stood there and let this happen!" With the invasion of Afghanistan, well what the hell possible thing could the United States have done to stop that? This was a stupidity on the part of Soviet leadership which they now admit five years later, and our policy has been to make that as difficult for them as possible there and to talk to them about getting out. That was a good policy, but cutting off all of these exchanges was not a good policy; it was done primarily for the American market, not for what it did to the Soviet Union.

Q: So a very helpful adjunct to what an Ambassador has to do is to have vigorous exchange programs and lots of visitors to attract diplomacy?

HARTMAN: Absolutely, absolutely. Also, that with those visitors you should do as much as you can to influence them to have a healthy exchange, that is one that is not controlled by the Soviet Union in which they treat people as though they are objects to send back with their policies. I think that the main thing there is to encourage people to go in for much better preparation before they come, with much more experience and substance and be prepared to discuss real topics. I think one of the most interesting things we could do as a people is to get exchanges going of a non-political nature, that is dealing with topics totally foreign to politics.

We could get dentists together with dentists, and I shouldn't say doctors with doctors because you might end up with this doctor's coalition which I think is kind of, really does not accomplish a purpose. I would much rather have doctors talking to doctors about their professional lives, cardiology rather than ideology, that that would open up a part of Soviet society and have an exchange that in the end would be beneficial. What it would do is introduce new horizons for these very confident scientists and professional people and be very subversive of the Soviet system.

Q: Well what about at the political level, the visits of Congressmen, Senators and staff?

HARTMAN: I think these are good to, but there again with careful preparation. I've just been up on the Hill talking to the Speaker about his trip. They've got to get individual Congressmen up on the issues as much as the Soviets they are going to meet. The members of the Supreme Soviet are often the negotiators for the Soviets, so they know the issues. Our Congressmen don't have that kind of benefit of experience, so they have got to really study and be up on the issues and Tom Foley led a group over there several years ago in which he did that. Members of the group were organized to talk about human
rights, to talk about arms control, to talk about regional problems broken down, and some bilateral issues. So when the Soviets raised these issues they found on the other side of the table a man who had done his homework and it was good. I think that's the way that the Speaker is now going to organize this trip.

*Q:* In tracking the intellectual movement, you've got under Gorbachev what appears to be a significant, even revolutionary departure from the previous groups. You witnessed that and have seen some of the effects. How did you intellectually become aware of that? Did your embassy rediscover it in the journals? Was it a matter of conversations with their contacts? What was the way, how did you see something new?

HARTMAN: Before Gorbachev came to power, we had had through these visitors contact with people like Aganvagian who at that time was in Novosibirsk and studying the economy writing in a journal called *Echo*, his views about how society ought to change. Occasionally we would see that he would be censored and he would tell friends of ours that he was not allowed to express the real views that he had, so there were a whole series of people like that who were advocating certain kinds of change. Gorbachev didn't sort of bring a new era with him. In fact, we're not even sure to this day how new it is, or how much of a change he really favors. The talk began in Andropov's time, the criticism of the kind of stuck in nature (sic) of the Brezhnev era when decisions weren't taken, where the growth rate dropped, where a lot of mistakes were made in handling things like Afghanistan. Some of the young people that we talked to would reveal in their odd crab-like way that they didn't like it and that there were better ways to do these things.

So you could see first of all a necessity for doing something because clearly the Party was not doing its job, and the civilian side of the economy wasn't working. The military side was doing quite well, there was a ferment in the intellectual community they were kind of mad that they weren't allowed to do the kind of things that they wanted to do. We had been reporting on these trends, we had been talking to people. Now we find, or I find that a lot of my job is to kind of caution people not to think that because Mr. Gorbachev looks different, talks differently, and seems a more modern person that he is the greatest performer that has come down the pike. I don't believe he is. I think he is basically a pretty orthodox fellow who has come up through the party structure, who thinks and believes that you can make the Marxist-Leninist system work; and so his first objective is to make it work. He follows I think the Andropov line that the way to do that is to create the new Soviet man and that the perfectibility of man without real material incentives is possible. That's what he's trying to do, although he promises material incentives as well, he can't produce them at the moment. So it is a fascinating period now, and I don't think we have yet seen what the real Gorbachev policy is.

*Q:* How do you think it (the new Soviet policy) should be followed, for our government, for the informed public? What are the best ways to follow Soviet policies?

HARTMAN: I think the best ways are to engage and to have as much going on as possible, to get in touch with as many people as possible, in as many areas as possible.
The last thing I would do would be to make U.S. policy on the basis that we want to help him in some way. I think that one thing that the experience of the last forty years has taught me is that Americans are not very good at having a good enough analysis of another countries situation to know when a policy decision that they take is going to help somebody else. Think of U.S. interests and just play it straight, if it has a beneficial influence then so be it, but don't try to predict what your policies are going to do to be helpful to somebody else. We just don't know enough to do that. With Gorbachev particularly I just don't know him, I disagree strongly with the kind of Steve Colin analysis that we already know the direction he wants to go in and we should be helping him. I don't think we know the direction he wants to go in yet, my own view is that it is a pretty conservative direction. It wants to make the Marxist-Leninist system work, and I have no idea why the United States should help that process since it doesn't believe that it is going to work anyway.

Q: So through as much contact as possible and careful reading of what they say, you were able to gain most of your knowledge?

HARTMAN: Yes, private exchanges and public exchanges. I mean if he really wants to begin to open Soviet society that's totally in our interest; if he's going in a different direction on inspection and verification; we want that, that will build greater confidence. They've got a long way to go.

My favorite story of this is that when you go out of the American dacha just outside of Moscow, and you want to take a walk in the woods and you walk down the road about three-hundred yards, there is a road that goes to the left and another one that goes straight ahead or to the right over into the woods. You can't turn left, there is a militiaman there. I know for a fact because I've looked from the woods on the other side of that road over across, there is nothing, absolutely nothing there that would be abnormal for the sight of a foreign diplomat. Well, in a country that, just outside of Moscow, won't let you walk down a road in the country that has nothing on it; there's no secret installation, there's absolutely nothing there, they've got a long way to go to achieve any kind of openness that would give the outside world confidence that we knew what was going on. So I say work at it, but you are overcoming four-hundred years of Russian history, not just Soviet history.

Q: What about the embassy itself? At some point our government entered into a negotiation with theirs about the embassy itself. How should that be staffed?

HARTMAN: Well, we're now in a situation where the Soviets overdid, that is they brought too many people here who were engaged in straight intelligence work and so we had to cut them back, both in the U.N. and in their mission here. So we're now both of us operating under ceilings, that is we have 225 people in the embassy and they have 225 people here in Washington, and they have a very reduced presence in New York and I think they will meet those limits. What this means is that we will have fewer slots for substantive officers. Because of that 225, we now must use a number of those slots to do
the jobs that the Soviets were doing before and all this winter our officers have been
doing them. Through a very cold winter they have been going out to the airport and
picking up a ton of pouches because we ship a lot of things in by pouch that we don't
want the Soviets to get a hand on; and bringing in the milk from Finland from the station
and a whole series of things that had previously been done by either escorted Soviets or
unescorted Soviets. We're never going to go back to a different system, we will not go
back to a system where we use Soviet employees and that's both because of
Congressional pressures and other pressures here now and incidents like this Marine
incident; and because its just felt that that is a way to build greater security. I have
disputed that in the past saying that going to zero Soviet employees brings in added risks,
you are going to have to bring in young Americans whose ambition is not to be in
Moscow for intellectual reasons to learn more about the society, but it's another place to
make money. These people will be subject to pressures by the Soviets as we've seen with
the Marine cases and eventually somebody will be recruited. Now people say to me that if
you hadn't had Soviets on the site to sort of see who was vulnerable, then these people
wouldn't have been picked up; well that shows a total ignorance of what goes on in
Moscow.

You fire all of the Soviet employees and one of the first ones I fired by the way was the
barber, a wonderful old lady who did nothing but pump the Marines and pump everybody
else as to what was going on, and I fired her early on. Well, Marines need haircuts so they
go off to the hotels and very charming young ladies do the barbering in hotels, so contacts
can be made. There is no substitute for picking mature people who will not get
themselves into these problems and watching them all the time and building systems to
keep these people from getting out of hand. My own view is now, and I've recommended
to my successor that we take the Marines out of Moscow, that we go for a kind of British
system. This system uses retired policemen, retired NCOs, married who come over and
do the guard duty; their wives work so we get two for one under our ceiling, and that this
is what we are going to have to do. We are also going to have to have much more
differentiation, which we have started a number of years ago, about where people can go
on our premises. In other words not every American will be allowed anywhere near the
classified areas; there is no reason for all of them to be there. We've already done that
with the pass system, what we didn't do and what we all feel stabbed in the back is to
think that our Marines would do what they have done there, or apparently have done at
this point.

Q: The new thinking, what is it? This is a very difficult subject and one that many people
have discussed, many people are following carefully, but you've always paid a lot of
attention to intellectual currents, what's happening in painting, what's happening in
various forms of writing, in the theater and so on. What was your appreciation of what
seems to be exciting the Soviets themselves?

HARTMAN: They are very much excited about Gorbachev's movements. It has begun to
affect the artistic community and you're seeing it in play. It is a conscious policy to open
up enough, not completely, to attract the intellectual community. This is not because you
want to see what they are going to produce in terms of what they have already been writing, but I'm sure Gorbachev's purpose is to try and harness the intellectual community to help him accomplish what he wants, which is to modernize that society, to get people motivated to work harder and to do fewer of the things that have been debilitating to that society in the past, but be good Communists. This can be turned on, it can be turned off. Khrushchev did the same thing for a while and then it got turned off. The trouble with a society that is based on the principle of democratic centralism, namely authoritarian, is that it doesn't let loose totally of control; it is not a democratic society. So the poets are unleashed at the moment up to a point. Bella Akmaydulina has had all of her poetry printed now except for one paragraph that they wouldn't put into a page poem that she had written. She wrote out that paragraph for me so that I would have the complete poem. They're just getting around to publishing Dr. Zhivago for God's sake! Another perhaps more important book is going to come out soon by Ribakoff which will be a condemnation of the Stalin period and very well done and he's a great writer; incidentally, also a Jew. He is a Jew who doesn't want to emigrate, he is a member of the established class although a man who wrote a book that's been on the shelf since the seventies, and a vigorous condemnation of the Stalinist period. Movies are coming out now talking about the Stalin period, all that it seems to me is to the good, it should be encouraged, but one should not think that this is a precursor of a change in society that is so great that they are going to move away from some of the Marxist-Leninist principles that got them in trouble in the first place.

Q: That's where the debate is whether your right, or whether some of the outsiders are right?

HARTMAN: You mean debate among the outsiders, there is not much debate among the insiders about that.

Q: There is so much more to talk about in that area. What would you say that looking back on this long and interesting, exciting career; what is the thing that you remember the most with pleasure and a sense of accomplishment? What is the most important thing that you've been involved in?

HARTMAN: I think the association with people is the thing you most remember. This is true with people who come to leadership in Europe particularly. With American leaders both in the Executive Branch and in Congress and private citizens. I mean that's one of the great things I think about being an Ambassador in a kind of crossroad post like Paris or even Moscow, is the kinds of people you get to meet and the contacts you have on a human level. For me I'm sort of political in that sense, I like to engage with people and my wife likes it. We really enjoy that sort of experience. There are a lot of other people who think its a chore, or prefer a more contemplative life, but that for us has been really rewarding.

Q: Is it a career that you urge your children to enter into?
HARTMAN: Well, I never have sort of urged them and none of them have gone into it. We have five children, and they are all in a variety of things. One daughter is working on the Hill now for a Congressman and handles his foreign affairs and arms control matters. With that exception the others are all in either engineering or sciences or a doctor. There is a very great generational change and whether they were turned off in the sixties from considering foreign affairs or whether they had the natural reaction of moving away from the father and wanting to go into something different for whatever reasons they are much more familiar with foreign problems and foreign affairs, they know people. Socially I find them more at ease than some of the younger officers coming in. In other words, they are much more outgoing and engaging and the difficulty that I have with the younger officers is that it is very difficult to get them to do this job of getting out of the embassy and sort of engaging with other people. I don't know whether that's a generational thing in our country, I hope not.

Q: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador!

HARTMAN: Thank you.

End of interview