# US AND USSR RELATIONS

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### Afghanistan

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William W. Lehfeldt</td>
<td>1952-1955</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant, Technical Cooperation Administrative, Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armin H. Meyer</td>
<td>1955-1957</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruce A. Flatin</td>
<td>1957-1959</td>
<td>Political/Economic/Consular officer, Kabul</td>
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<td>William D. Brewer</td>
<td>1962-1965</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, Kabul</td>
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<td>William Piez</td>
<td>1963-1966</td>
<td>Economic/Political Officer, Kabul</td>
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<td>Archer K. Blood</td>
<td>1965-1968</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission, Kabul</td>
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<td>Victor Skiles</td>
<td>1969-1972</td>
<td>Deputy Director, USAID, Kabul</td>
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<td>Arnold Schifferdecker</td>
<td>1970-1972</td>
<td>Political Officer, Kabul</td>
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<td>Bruce A. Flatin</td>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>Political Counselor, Kabul</td>
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<td>James E. Taylor</td>
<td>1977-1980</td>
<td>Political Officer, Kabul</td>
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<td>Rudolf V. Perina</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>Political Officer, Moscow, Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Ernestine S. Heck</td>
<td>1980-1983</td>
<td>State Department; Afghanistan Desk Officer, Washington, DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jon David Glassman</td>
<td>1987-1989</td>
<td>Chargé, Kabul</td>
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### Azerbaijan

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>John P. Harrod</td>
<td>1975-1978</td>
<td>Exhibit Officer, USIS, Moscow</td>
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<td>Michael W. Cotter</td>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>Ambassador, Turkmenistan</td>
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### China

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Edwin Webb Martin</td>
<td>1945-1948</td>
<td>Chinese Language Training, Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing</td>
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<td>1960-1964</td>
<td>Economic Officer, Hong Kong</td>
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</table>
1948-1949  Consular Officer, Hankow
1949-1950  Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
1951-1955  Political Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
1953-1954  Political Advisor to Talks with Chinese, Panmunjom, Korea
1955  Talks with Chinese, Geneva, Switzerland
1961-1964  Political Advisor, Commander in Chief, Pacific
1967-1970  Consul General, Hong Kong

Marshall Green
1956-1960  Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East, Washington, DC
1961-1963  Consul General, Hong Kong
1963-1965  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, Washington, DC
1969-1973  Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC

Herbert Levin
1957-1961  Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute (Washington, DC) and Taiwan
1961-1964  Economic Officer, Hong Kong
1964-1967  Political Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
1967-1970  China Watcher, Tokyo, Japan
1970  Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Washington, DC

Thomas L. Hughes
1963-1969  Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC

Winston Lord
1973-1977  Director, Policy Planning Staff, Washington, DC
Cuba

Clarence S. Boonstra 1943-1945 Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Havana
1955-1958 Economic Counselor, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, Havana


William Lenderking 1959-1960 Rotation Officer, USIA, Havana

Robert M. Sayre 1960-1961 Economic Counselor, Havana

William T. Pryce 1960-1961 Special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, DC

Jordan Thomas Rogers 1961-1963 Reports Officer, Staff Secretariat, Washington, DC

Leonard Meeker 1962 Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State, Washington, DC

Thomas L. Hughes 1963-1969 Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC

John A. Bushnell 1977-1982 Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA, Washington, DC

Rudolf V. Perina 1979-1981 Political Officer, Moscow, Soviet Union

Jon David Glassman 1979-1981 Deputy- US Interests Section, Swiss Embassy, Havana

John J. (Jay) Taylor 1987-1990 Chief - US Interests Section, Havana

Alan H. Flanigan 1990-1993 Chief - US Interests Section, Havana

Czech Republic- Czechoslovakia

Kenneth N. Skoug 1967-1969 Commercial/Economic Officer, Prague

Peter S. Bridges 1971-1974 Chief Political/Economic Officer, Prague

Leonardo M. Williams 1976-1979 Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Prague

Germany
| Name                        | Period 1       | Period 2                                      | Position/Location                           |
|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Karl F. Mautner              | 1945-1958     | 82nd Airborne, Berlin                        |
| Robert R. Bowie             | 1945-1946     | U.S. Military Officer, Germany               |
|                             | 1950-1952     | U.S. Military Officer, Germany               |
| Helmut Sonnenfeldt          | 1946          | U.S. Army, Germany                           |
| Thomas J. Dunnigan          | 1946-1950     | Office of the U.S. Political Advisor, Berlin  |
| John W. McDonald            | 1947-1950     | OMGUS, Berlin                                |
|                             | 1950-1952     | Allied High Commission, Secretariat, Bonn    |
| David E. Mark               | 1949-1951     | Deputy Protocol Officer, Berlin              |
|                             | 1950-1951     | Director of German Affairs, Washington D.C.  |
|                             | 1953-1955     | Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Washington D.C. |
|                             | 1955-1958     | Director of German Affairs, Washington D.C.  |
| Jonathan Dean               | 1949-1951     | Kreis Resident Officer, Limburg              |
|                             | 1952-1956     | Political Officer, Bonn                      |
|                             | 1956-1960     | East German Desk Officer, Washington DC      |
|                             | 1968-1972     | Political Counselor, Bonn                    |
| Frederick H. Sacksteder     | 1950-1951     | Kreis Residence Officer, Wuertemberg-Baden   |
|                             | 1952          | Information Officer, Dusseldorf              |
| William Lloyd Stearman      | 1956-1962     | Press Attaché, Bonn                          |
| Kempton B. Jenkins          | 1958-1960     | Political Officer, Berlin                    |
| Robert Gerald Livingston    | 1958-1960     | Economic-Labor Officer, Hamburg              |
|                             | 1964-1968     | East German Affairs, Berlin                  |
|                             | 1968-1970     | Political Officer, Bonn                      |
Richard W. Boehm 1959  Assistant General Service Officer, Hamburg
1959-1962  Economic Officer, Berlin
Paul M. Cleveland 1962-1964  Staff Assistant to Ambassador, Bonn
Thomas J. Dunnigan 1962-1965  Political Officer, Bonn
Martin Van Heuven 1963-1967  Legal Advisor, Berlin
Bruce W. Clark 1966-1968  Rotation Officer, West Berlin
Halvor C. Ekern 1967-1969  Political/Military Officer, Bonn
1969-1973  Political Advisor, Heidelberg
Richard C. Barkley 1969-1971  German Affairs; Washington DC
1971-1972  Ambassador’s Aide, Bonn
1972-1974  Eastern Affairs Section, Berlin
Albert L. Seligmann 1971-1975  Political Advisor, Berlin
Brandon Grove 1974-1976  Deputy Chief of Mission, East Berlin, GDR
Martin Van Heuven 1978-1981  Political Officer, Bonn
Thomas F. Johnson 1984-1988  Consul/Branch Public Affairs Officer, Frankfurt
Geoffrey W. Chapman 1985-1989  Deputy Political Counselor, Bonn
J. D. Bindenagel 1994-1997  Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn

Hungary
Jordan Thomas Rogers 1954-1958  Economic/Political Officer, Budapest

Israel
William C. Burdett 1948-1950  Vice Consul, Jerusalem
Eugene H. Bird 1955  Israel-Jordan Desk, Washington, DC
1956-1958  Vice Consul, Jerusalem
Michael E. Sterner 1964-1966  Bureau of Near East Affairs, Washington, DC
Edward G. Abington 1972-1975  Political Officer, Tel Aviv
Samuel W. Lewis 1977-1984  Ambassador, Israel
William Andreas Brown 1979-1982  Deputy Chief of Mission, Tel Aviv
Brandon Grove 1980-1983  Consul General, Jerusalem
Phillip C. Wilcox, Jr. 1988-1991  Consul General, Jerusalem
William Andreas Brown 1988-1992  Ambassador, Israel

Korea
David E. Mark 1946-1949  Political Advisor, U.S. Forces, Seoul

Pakistan
David D. Newsom 1947-1950  Information Officer, USIS, Karachi
Maurice Williams 1963-1967  Director, USAID, Karachi
Teresita C. Schaffer 1979-1980  Deputy Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan & Bangladesh, Washington, DC
Ronald I. Spiers 1981-1983  Ambassador, Pakistan
Phyllis E. Oakley 1989-1991  USAID Staff, Islamabad

Poland
Yale Richmond 1958-1961  Cultural Attaché, USIS, Warsaw
Robert B. Morley 1968-1970  General Services/Economic Officer, Warsaw
Roger G. Harrison 1970-1973  Consular Officer, Warsaw

Romania
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas P.H. Dunlop</td>
<td>1974-1976</td>
<td>Romania Desk Officer</td>
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<td>Henry L. Clarke</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
<td>Bucharest</td>
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<td>Willis C. Armstrong</td>
<td>1939-1941</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
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<td>1941-1943</td>
<td>Lend Lease Officer</td>
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<td>1945-1946</td>
<td>Director of Russian Ship Area</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Davis Eugene Boster</td>
<td>1947-1949</td>
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<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
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<td>1959-1961</td>
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<td>Philip H. Valdes</td>
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<td>Emory C. Swank</td>
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<td>William N. Turpin</td>
<td>1956-1958</td>
<td>Consular/Economic Officer</td>
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<td>Alexander Akalovsky</td>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>Interpreter</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Harry G. Barnes, Jr.</td>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>Soviet Desk Officer</td>
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<td>1957-1959</td>
<td>Publications Procurement Officer/Cultural Exchange Officer</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1959-1962 Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC

Robert J. Martens 1956-1958 Political Officer, Moscow

William Watts 1956-1958 Soviet Internal Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC

1960-1961 Russian Language Training, Oberammergau, Germany

1961-1963 Cultural Affairs Officer, Moscow

David E. Mark 1957-1959 Political & Economic Counselor, Moscow

Vladimir I. Toumanoff 1958-1960 Political Officer, Moscow

Gifford D. Malone 1958-1961 Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC

1963-1964 Russian Language Training, Oberammergau, Germany

1964-1966 Administrative Officer, Moscow

1966-1969 Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC

Walter B. Smith, II 1958-1960 U.S.-USSR Exchanges Officer, Moscow

1965-1967 Publications Procurement/Political Officer, Moscow

1969-1979 Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC

Hans N. Tuch 1958-1961 Cultural and Press Attaché, USIS, Moscow

1961-1965 Deputy Director for USSR and Eastern Europe, Washington, DC


1962-1964 Publications/Political Officer, Moscow
1964-1966 Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC

Peter S. Bridges 1962-1964 Assistant General Services Officer/Political Officer, Moscow

Thompson R. Buchanan 1962-1964 Intelligence Research Specialist, Moscow

1968-1970 Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC

1970-1973 Political Counselor, Moscow

Samuel E. Fry, Jr. 1964-1966 Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC

1966-1968 Consular Officer, Moscow


1968-1971 Consular/Political Officer, Moscow

1971-1973 Consular Officer, Leningrad

1973-1974 USIA, Voice of America, USSR Division, Washington, DC

1974-1977 Deputy Director, EUR, Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC

1979-1981 Deputy Assistant Secretary for USSR and Europe, Washington, DC

Thomas M. T. Niles 1965-1967 Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Washington, DC

1967-1968 Russian Institute, Garmisch, Germany

1968-1971 Economic Officer, Moscow

1973-1976 Commercial Officer, Moscow

Jonathan B. Rickert 1966-1968 Staff Aide to the Ambassador, Moscow

William T. Pryce 1966-1968 Publications Procurement Officer, Moscow

Yale Richmond 1966-1967 Russian Language Studies, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC

1967-1969 Counselor for Public Affairs, Moscow

1973-1974 Political Officer, Moscow

John P. Harrod
1969 USIS, Moscow Exhibit, Washington, DC
1969-1970 USIS, Moscow
1975-1978 USIA, Assistant Cultural Attaché/Press Attaché, Moscow

Willis J. Sutter
1973-1975 Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Moscow

Gary L. Matthews
1973-1976 Deputy Principal Officer, Leningrad
1977-1981 Deputy Director, Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC

James E. Taylor
1974-1976 Political Officer, Moscow

Robert. K. Geis
1974 Russian Language Study, Monterrey, California
1974-1978 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Leningrad

Donald B. Kursch
1975-1976 Economic and Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC
1976-1978 US Commercial Office, Moscow
1984-1986 Office of Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC

Malcolm Toon
1976-1979 Ambassador, USSR

William Andreas Brown
1977-1978 Political Counselor, Moscow

Thompson R. Buchanan
1977-1980 Consul General, Leningrad

William P. Kiehl
1977-1978 Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC
1978-1979 Cultural Affairs Officer, Exhibits, Moscow
1979-1980 Press Officer, Moscow

Marshall Brement

Thomas R. Hutson
1978-1980 Consul General, Moscow
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Henry L. Clarke</td>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute</td>
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<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>Economic Counselor, Moscow</td>
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<td>Michael A. Boorstein</td>
<td>1981-1983</td>
<td>Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Moscow</td>
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<td>Warren Zimmerman</td>
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<td>1982-1985</td>
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<td>Richard T. McCormack</td>
<td>1982-1985</td>
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<td>Robert E. McCarthy</td>
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<td>Nadia Tongour</td>
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<td>Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Parker W. Borg</td>
<td>1984-1986</td>
<td>Deputy, Office of Counter Terrorism, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Jane Miller Floyd</td>
<td>1985-1987</td>
<td>General Services Officer, Leningrad</td>
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<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>On-site Inspection Agency Ulan Ude, Soviet Union</td>
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<td>Edward Hurwitz</td>
<td>1986-1988</td>
<td>Consul General, Leningrad</td>
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<td>Political/Military Affairs Officer, Moscow</td>
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<td>G. Philip Hughes</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Executive Secretary, National Security Council, The White House, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>Thomas Macklin, Jr.</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>General Services Officer, Moscow</td>
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<td>Greg Thielmann</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>Chief, Office of Strategic Forces Analysis, INR, Washington, DC</td>
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<td>David M. Schoonover</td>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>Agriculture Minister-Counselor, Moscow</td>
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<td>Joseph R. McGhee</td>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs,</td>
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</table>
Dale V. Slaght 1992-1995  Minister Counselor, Moscow  
Shirley E. Ruedy 1995-1996  Science and Technology Officer, Moscow  
1996-1997  Political Officer, Moscow

**Syria**

John H. Kean 1958-1960  USAID, Officer in Charge of Egypt, Syria (United Arab Republic), and Sudan, Washington DC  
Edward G. Abington 1979-1982  Political Office, Damascus

**US NATO**

Stephen J. Ledogar 1973-1976  Political Officer, Brussels  
David T. Jones 1974-1976  NATO Desk Officer, European Bureau, Washington, DC  
1976-1980  Political Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels  

**Vietnam**
Michael W. Cotter 1970-1971 CORDS, Mekong Delta
Wolfgang J. Lehmann 1973-1974 Consul General, Can Tho

Yugoslavia
Cole Blasier 1951-1954 Consular/Political Officer, Belgrade
Thomas P. H. Dunlop 1963-1965 Political/Consular Affairs, Belgrade

Compiled by Elizabeth Williams

Afghanistan

WILLIAM W. LEHFELEDT
Administrative Assistant, Technical Cooperation Administration
Kabul (1952-1955)

William W. Lehfeldt was born in California on July 13, 1925. He served in the U.S. Army in a specialists role. Upon completion of his tour, Mr. Lehfeldt received a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 1950. He entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Kabul, Bilbao, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Tehran. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 29, 1994.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Afghan government?

LEHFELEDT: Yes I did, partly because I was the only guy in TCA beside the mission director who knew what to do. I wrote up the budgets for those years, I negotiated agreements with the then Minister of Health (later Prime Minister), the Minister of Education. We funded a number of things. I signed for the US government believe it or not. Yes I did have a good deal to do with the senior people.

This was one of the things that upset Ambassador Ward because here I was, a Third Secretary, doing all of these things.
I also represented the mission twice at Mission Directors conferences because Bill Hayes was off on leave. I went to Istanbul for a meeting with Governor Harold Stassen who had then been named by Eisenhower to take over what became the International Cooperation Administration. I represented the Afghan Mission in Athens the following year, 1954.

It was in the Stassen meeting that I first raised, first raised by any mission I believe, the question of what U.S. might to do to counter what was the opening of the Soviet aid efforts around the world. Afghanistan was their first real try at putting on something besides subversion and military threats. They built bakeries, silos and whatnots that everybody could see in Kabul.

I raised the question first in Istanbul in December of 1953. It was considered rather seriously whether or not we should try to compete with similar highly visible projects. The answer was eventually-no. We would not in any way compete. We would keep the level of our aid about where it was and do the things that we thought were most necessary. And that was mostly the AID stance all during those two plus years that I was in Kabul.

Q: Just one last question on that, Bill. How did we view the Soviets? I mean, at this time from the Kabul point of view, what were you getting? Any emanations from your fellow officers or yourself?

LEHFELDT: We used to go to the Soviet embassy for parties. They invited everybody as did the Foreign Ministry and other embassies. The British embassy doctor was our doctor and so on down the line. The Soviets were very suspicious and couldn’t get to know them very well because they were all locked in their compounds. We only saw a few of them at official functions except for the Ambassador who was a charming fellow.

On the more mundane side, on the CIA side, every once in a while a defector would come through that was handled through Kabul. That always gave Mr. Ward a little bit of a heartburn.

Q: That wasn’t part of the old diplomacy.

LEHFELDT: I was there when Stalin died. We didn’t really know what we were going to do in terms of Soviet-Afghan or Soviet-US relations but that was when the Soviets started, really started doing their aid program.

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Ambassador Armin H. Meyer was born in Indiana on June 19, 1914. He received a master's degree from Capital University and a master's degree from Ohio State University. Ambassador Meyer held positions in Beirut, Baghdad, Kabul, and ambassadorships to Lebanon, Iran, and Japan. He was interviewed by Dayton Mak in 1989.

Q: I would assume that the Russians, being neighbors, you had a great deal of tension related to them and what they were doing. Could you go into that a bit?
MEYER: Oh, yes. As I mentioned, when I arrived there the border was closed and it was a field day for the Russians. They were paving the streets. Virtually all of the imports to Afghanistan had to come through Russia. That didn't mean the Russians loved the Afghans, but Daud was a very shrewd fellow. He believed that, living on the border of the Soviet Union, he couldn't thumb his nose at them. For many years, the Afghans had played the "Great Game," pitting off one imperial power against another.

It's very interesting that, when Eisenhower was President, he initiated what was called the Eisenhower Doctrine. He secured a congressional resolution supporting it and appointed Congressman James Richards to head a delegation to visit Middle Eastern countries to determine whether they'd like to be covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Eisenhower Doctrine simply said that the United States would support any country that was threatened by international communism.

By the time this effort of Eisenhower's was initiated, Angus Ward had been replaced by Ambassador Sheldon Mills. Very few countries stood up and said, "Hey, come on over and see us." The Lebanese did. Foreign Minister Charles Malik and President Chamoun were in trouble and they were the first ones to welcome Richards who carried with him the availability of substantial aid funding. Other countries were more negative. He visited some but with meager results. The amazing thing, about which very few Americans are aware, is that the Afghans invited Richards to come to Afghanistan. It was undoubtedly due to Prince Naim, the Foreign Minister, who had been ambassador in Washington and was more oriented toward Western interests than was his brother, who tried to maintain a strict neutrality and was more inclined to play the "Great Game."

In any case, Congressman Richards came to Kabul while I was there. Before going to see Prime Minister Daud, we had a meeting which included Congressman Richards and his State Department advisors, Bill Burdett and Jack Jernegan, as well as Ambassador Mills and his key embassy advisors. During that briefing both the State Department officials said, "Look, there's no way that we can commit American prestige to Afghanistan. We're already overextended by American commitments to Iran. We cannot tell the Afghans we'll support them if they get attacked by the Russians or by international communism." Congressman Richards, with his South Carolina drawl, came forth with the comment, "If I'd a known I couldn't get them covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine, I wouldn't a come here."

Anyhow, we went to see Daud. Daud, the shrewd game player, did not want to make any clear commitments either. So it was a very interesting discussion. We produced a communiqué, which Pashwak and I worked out. Pashwak was one of the chief aides in the Foreign Ministry and a very dynamic fellow who sided more with Daud than Naim. He kept insisting on the word "neutrality." I wasn't too happy about it, but the word was incorporated. In the end, it was probably better that way. When the Eisenhower Doctrine mission left, nobody knew whether Afghanistan was committed or not committed, or whether America was committed or not committed. Sometimes in diplomacy it's better to leave answers fuzzy, and we left that one fuzzy, indeed. But it is very interesting that the Afghans did want to be associated with the Eisenhower Doctrine, however indirectly.
After the Bulganin-Khrushchev departure a debate started as to the appropriate American response. Do we try to compete? Do we pull out? Leon Poullada, for example, said, "Why should we furnish a house that's mortgaged to somebody else?" We finally decided on what we called the beachhead theory. We would maintain our position in Afghanistan with a small amount of new aid. Subsequently, a mission came out to discuss what we might do. In discussions with Prince Daud and his people, we came up with a package which included helping Afghanistan to improve its internal Ariana Airline. The package included a little more work on the Helmand Valley and also some beefing up of Afghan airports.

BRUCE A. FLATIN
Political/Economic/Consular officer
Kabul (1957-1959)

Bruce A. Flatin was born in Minnesota in 1930. He received degrees from the University of Minnesota and from Boston University. After serving in the U.S. Army, Mr. Flatin entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His Foreign Service career included positions in Afghanistan, Germany, Australia, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: What would a political, even an economic officer do? You say it was a BC time, before Christ type situation.

FLATIN: At that time our relationship with Afghanistan had become affected by the Cold War, vis-a-vis Russia. In 1955, Bulganov and Khrushchev had visited Afghanistan and had extended a 100-million-dollar line of credit to the Afghans. By the time I got there we were going into phases of increasing competition with the Russians in the economic development of the country. The private U.S. sector had already been engaged through the efforts of an American firm, Morrison-Knudsen, which had won commercial contracts after World War II to build roads. They later constructed dams; since the Afghan government had exhausted its money building the dams, USAID was asked to assist with irrigation and hydroelectric projects. Therefore, our first AID programs grew out of commercial projects that Morrison-Knudsen had started in the country.

Afghanistan came to be regarded as a sensitive East-West confrontation point between the Soviet Union and America. Pakistan was then, as you recall, very recently independent and there was a bilateral problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pashtunistan issue. Because of our friendly relationship with Pakistan, our attitude towards this issue was carefully observed by both sides.

Q: What were American interests when you were there at that time what was your impression of what we wanted out of this?

FLATIN: Well, we certainly wanted to help the Afghans preserve their independence as a free and sovereign nation, as well as to improve their economic strength. We also hoped to be in a position to encourage a peaceful resolution of Afghanistan's bilateral problems with Pakistan on
the one side, and Iran on the other. We tried to make it very clear to the Soviet Union that we did not in any way intend to represent any threat to them. From the Soviet viewpoint Afghanistan would be sort of like Mexico is to us. At no time did we ever engage in any rhetoric or any action that would lead the suspicious Soviets to suspect that we were using our position there in any way to threaten their position. Because we really would have had difficulty projecting American power into that very distant and isolated landlocked region, and it would have been pointless to create additional problems for the Afghans in their relationship with the Soviets. Incidentally, they had a very good bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union at that time. In fact, after the Soviets took power in the USSR they made a treaty with the Afghans—which was the very first international treaty that they had negotiated.

WILLIAM D. BREWER  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
Kabul (1962-1965)

Ambassador William D. Brewer was born in Connecticut in 1922. He received a B.A. degree from Williams College and an M.A. degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. He served overseas in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, and in Washington, DC as desk officer for Arab Affairs and Country Director for Arabian Peninsular States. He was appointed ambassador to Mauritius in 1970 and Ambassador to Sudan in 1973. Ambassador Brewer was interviewed by Malcolm Thompson in 1988.

Q: Your next overseas assignment was as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

BREWER: Yes, and that was a fascinating assignment because Afghanistan, at that time, was the only non-Communist country in the world that bordered both the Soviet Union and China. And it therefore afforded an interesting vantage point from which to observe, first the relatively good relations between those two Communist countries, and then their rapid deterioration after 1961--'62, I guess it was.

When I went out the key issue in the briefings that I got seemed to be, as far as Washington was concerned, whether the Afghan regime had, in the famous phrase, "passed the point of no return" in its relations with Communist Russia. I took this to mean the question of whether the government in Kabul had so come under the influence of Moscow as to be considered a virtual satellite. Well, on my arrival I found a little to my surprise that the Kabul government was nowhere near being a satellite of the Soviet Union. It was quite true that it paid a good deal of attention to Soviet views as might be expected from a country with a huge common border with one of the two superpowers, but it sought to balance, as far as it could, its relations with the Soviet Union with good relations with the United States. And it seemed to me that our role should be to do what we could to enhance the opportunity of the Afghan authorities to develop this balanced relationship. And Ambassador Steeves, who was a first-rate chief during this period, certainly had the view that an effective bilateral relationship could be continued and even expanded.
At the same time we continued a major AID program which had been going on prior to my arrival because it was manifest that the Afghans needed road development, agricultural development, and various other things at which we were working. These projects were also helpful. They were not, as is sometimes seen, in competition with the Russians. The Russians were also doing the same kind of thing, but they were doing projects in different areas. And the Afghans were rather shrewd in trying to coordinate the two. For example: their number one national roadnet, which forms a "U" from Herat around Kandahar and then up to Kabul; the Afghans had the Russians building the road from Herat to Kandahar and the Americans building the road from Kandahar to Kabul. This gave rise to an interesting exchange which shows that our relations were then not all that bad with the Russians on the spot.

Another aspect of our AID program which I think was particularly helpful in maintaining and developing good relations with the Afghan government was that, even after Pakistan closed the border with Afghanistan, and we had brought all our AID supplies through Pakistan because it was economic, Ambassador Steeves, with our strong support, took the position that we should continue to bring in supplies for the road via Iran even though it was more expensive because the alternative, that is shutting down the project would turn out to be even more expensive because of various claims that all the contractors would have on the US Government. And that furthermore, by keeping the option open for the Afghans, that is not giving them the impression that they were isolated and driven into a corner, the Afghans would be more likely to work out some sort of settlement with the Pakistanis which, of course, was something that we favored.

Well, we had some difficulty convincing Washington of this but in due course we did. And Washington therefore continued its assistance, although I think perhaps at a somewhat reduced level of whatever could be transported across Iran. And within a matter of, I think, two months--I have forgotten now exactly the time schedule here--the Afghans were negotiating with the Pakistanis and the Pakistanis had reopened the border. And I am convinced that if it had not been for that position that we took at the Embassy--I think this is early 1965, maybe late 1964--why the closure of the border would have been much more long lasting and would have had a much more deleterious impact on the total western position in that part of the world.

We found this an extremely encouraging development and supported it as far as we could. And at the time I left I would say that our relations with Afghanistan were really excellent and there was no longer the slightest question of the Afghan government going past the point of no return in its relations with the Soviet Union. This perhaps was illustrated at the time of President Kennedy's assassination because Ambassador Steeves arranged a very impressive memorial service for the late President at his residence, and we invited all the Afghan authorities including the Cabinet. And I was at the gate to greet the senior people arriving, and when the Prime Minister came he said to me, "Would the Ambassador mind if I said a few words during the service?" And I said, "I don't think so. I'll ask him and I'll let you know." And I did, and of course Ambassador Steeves said, "No, there's no objection." So Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf delivered a eulogy for the dead American president at this memorial service. And I think that indicates the fundamental attitude of the Afghan government at that time towards Americans and the United States.
Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.

Q: Well how stood Afghanistan as far as its international relations towards the United States and the Soviet Union?

PIEZ: Well the Afghans juggled their foreign affairs interests and relations with the two major foreign country powers rather smoothly. They had an interesting arrangement relating to Afghan police forces and domestic intelligence. The most sensitive ministry was the Ministry of the Interior which ran the police and kept watch on any political activity. That was a more important mechanism of control than was the Afghan army. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had any foreign aid or contract personnel in that ministry. They all came from West Germany. Afghan police officers were trained only in West Germany. It was an interesting way for the Afghans to handle it.

Q: Well while you were there or by the time you got there were we concerned about whither Afghanistan?

PIEZ: We considered it to be a neutral country but with a pretty strong Communist influence. Their representative at the UN almost always voted on the Soviet side of any issue and was recognized by American political analysts as essentially a kind of stalking horse for the Russians whenever an important issue came up. In Kabul there were communist sympathizers but not many. Ambitious Afghans wanted to qualify for education and training in the U.S. Education in the USSR was not preferred, but Afghans would take that route if nothing better offered. I would say that many of them had been trained, maybe at the university of Wyoming or someplace like that. They had good college degrees. They spoke English well. They were friendly to us. This was particularly true in the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Commerce. USAID advisers were assigned to these ministries and worked there every day. Ministers were quite proud to have them present and would introduce them as “my American adviser.” To what extent they took their American advisers advice was another question.

Q: Well was there, both the Soviets and the Americans were putting a lot of aid in building roads, why wasn’t somebody taking the railroad and building it up from the Khyber Pass up to Kabul?
PIEZ: Well the American aid program actually appropriated money to extend the railroad at least over the border so that goods could pass in sealed railroad cars from the port of Karachi. That would render inspection by Pakistani customs unnecessary. But there was a precondition. Pakistan and Afghanistan had to reach agreement on the conditions for operating the railroad, and they never did. While I was there our AID mission director, I believe his name was Delmas Nucker. Anyway, he put his foot down. He said, “Ok, you have got until the last day of June next year to conclude a transit agreement.” The day came and went without an agreement, so the railroad extension was not built. It was a good idea.

ARCHER K. BLOOD
Deputy Chief of Mission
Kabul, 1965-1968

Archer Blood was born in Illinois in 1923 and received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Virginia in 1943. In addition to Algeria, Mr. Blood served in Greece, Germany, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. He was interviewed in 1989 by Henry Precht.

Q: Did they speak frankly to you about their political views, these Afghans that you met?
We had what we called Soviet-American bashes. About once a month, several American officers would get together with several Russian officers for dinner, a lot of drinking, and bantering back and forth. We would deliberately introduce our junior officers to this one at a time so they could get an idea how clever these guys were and how able they were. Of course, most of the Soviets we were dealing with were KBG types, but they had good sense of humor, very sharp, very sharp. And that was part of our purpose. To let our junior officers know how sharp they were. It was done in an atmosphere of camaraderie and conviviality.

Q: I suppose we had sort of a condominium relationship with them.

BLOOD: No, no. They were the top dog.

Q: Were they?

BLOOD: Oh, yes.

Q: We didn't have sharp diversity of views on Afghanistan, did we?

BLOOD: No, no, we didn't. In fact, one of our AID contract groups was working with the finance ministry and, you know, how they would work. Say, the Russians would aid one sector of the economy, and we would aid a sector so there wouldn't be overlap. And we were working well this way. They built some roads; we built some roads. We helped out, we built one airport; they built some other airports. And they--

Q: But who did this coordination? We didn't sit down with the Russians and work out this--
BLOOD: No, no. The Afghans did the coordination. But with us and with the Russians. We didn't work directly with the Russians on that. But there was, I think, almost a tacit understanding that we accepted the fact that they provided the bulk of all the military aid, more economic aid than any other country, but that our aid gave the Afghans an alternative to sort of complete dependence upon the Soviets.

Q: What were the implications of being top dog to them? What does it mean to them politically? Do they have more access to the king?

BLOOD: Oh, they have more access. It also means that the Afghans wouldn't deliberately antagonize them.

Q: How did they treat them differently from the way we were treated? Any way you can distinguish--

BLOOD: No, I can't. I'm not really--it's hard to say because I never saw any of their dealings, but I don't think that they were--

Q: They weren't given greater preferences and seatings at official functions or anything like that?

BLOOD: Oh, no.

Q: Yes. Nothing obvious.

BLOOD: No. But I think on important issues, say in U.N. votes or action, certainly I think the Afghan government would think very carefully about taking an action that they knew the Soviets wouldn't like.

Q: What attention did Washington pay to Afghanistan at that time?

BLOOD: Well, in aid terms, quite a bit. I remember that there was another cut, I think, a government cut in that period of '65 to '68. I was surprised to see that Kabul was one of the thirty largest posts in the world because of our AID mission. It was a large AID mission. We had a large Peace Corps contingent there. We had a lot of Americans in Afghanistan and a lot of people on contract there. So in terms of economic assistance, you had within--this is before we really got involved in Egypt, of course--you had Jordan and--

Q: Still had a fair program in Iran.

BLOOD: Iran, yes. India. Pakistan was much more important. Jordan was important. India was important. But Afghanistan was up there in the top four or five in NEA.

Q: But--
BLOOD: While there, we had the big Helmand Valley project had been under way for years. It was a large effort.

Q: But did the assistant secretary visit Afghanistan? Who was the assistant secretary at that stage? Was it Luke Battle?

BLOOD: No. Harriman came out on one visit. He was the senior most American I think had came there when I was there. You would get some congressional visits I think largely because looking at the AID program.

But, no, I think from the political sort of leadership in Washington, there wasn't that much concern.

Q: Did you have frictions with the AID mission at that post or was it similar to that--

BLOOD: No, not similar. Relationships were better. The ambassadors were able to exercise their authority over the AID missions.

VICTOR SKILES
Deputy Director, USAID
Kabul (1969-1972)

Victor Skiles was born and raised in Idaho. He graduated from the University of Idaho in 1940. After graduation, his favorite professor helped him obtain a fellowship with the National Institute of Public Affairs. In 1942, he entered the Navy and was stationed in Berlin. His assignment to the military government operation was that of assistant to the head of the Food Distribution. He has also served in Germany, Israel, Afghanistan and Italy. He was interviewed by John Kean on December 4, 1998.

Q: So what was the state of the situation in Afghanistan as you arrived there? How would you generally characterize it? What when you went in there struck you as its main features; the outstanding issues or problems; the things that struck you about the country that were most dramatically different from anything else you might have encountered?

SKILES: In general, I guess you could say it’s different from everywhere else. It’s a country with a singular location and a singular personality. It had repulsed a number of movements in years past, movements designed by outside forces to, in effect, take over the country. In the case of the British, it probably would have been more along the lines of a presence which would enable them to call the shots without being a conquest. Nonetheless that effort had been repulsed by force of arms. It was traditional of those people to accept working relationships and assistance from outside, but in no way to be taken over by outside countries or agencies. It is a tribal country, and while officially a constitutional monarchy, the King was really more of a major chief - the top chief amongst many of them. It was really an undeveloped country in most respects. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been involved in economic aid, the Soviets working mainly but not exclusively in the North and the U.S. in the South. Our technical assistance program was extensive - about 250 people including the contracts.
SKILES: Well, it’s difficult to put this in terms of proportions, but I think we’d always regarded Afghanistan as a pivotal but still a border or marginal area in this regard. Having said that, it’s not all that pivotal unless you take into account the effects on Iran and of Iran; the effects on Pakistan and of Pakistan. I mean, it’s part of a belt. There also is a peculiar arrangement, particularly in the northern part of the country, where the tribes are essentially the same people as those who live on the other side of the river, meaning in that part of the Soviet Union. So there’s a natural attraction for them there. There also was a natural ambition for the Soviets to take this as an easy apple that they could pull into their orbit and the U.S. could not prevent this from happening. Maybe Afghanistan could - but the U.S. couldn’t. This had always been, it seems to me, an element of U.S. policy toward the area. I remember a much earlier period when some factions in the U.S. government had wanted us to get started on a military assistance program out there, but Ambassador Byroade took an entirely different point of view, and one which I think turned out to be the right one, at least over a period of a couple of decades, and that is that his attitude was “no way, this is the worst thing we can do in this situation. Our real role ought to be to steer the Afghans in such a way that the Soviets will not move in, at least not by forces other than persuasion and economic help.” And I think that attitude prevailed during the time that you and I were out there.

ARNOLD SCHIFFERDECKER
Political Officer
Kabul (1970-1972)

Arnold Schifferdecker was born in 1934 and attended the University of Missouri. After service in the US Navy, Schifferdecker joined the Foreign Service in 1964. He served overseas in Turkey, Israel, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Morocco. Schifferdecker also served on the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service. Schifferdecker was interviewed by C. Edward Dillery in 1996.

Q: Were there signs of this happening even while you were there?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Very little. During my time, 1970-72, we saw the interests of our government and the Russians as being compatible in Afghanistan. Afghanistan had occupied the position of a buffer state between British India and expanding Imperialist Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. That status continued in independent India and Pakistan and the Soviet Union. The United States felt that there were no basic incompatibilities between our position in Afghanistan, which was to assist in a modest but responsible way to educate and help the Afghans develop their own country. Whereas the Russians had a larger program, an infrastructure program and military assistance program. We had a very, very small military training program where we trained some of the Afghan officers. But the Russians had a heavy arms supply and training program of a Russian nature and the army ended up being the nucleus for the Russians to move in and take over. And, of course, the infrastructure, the highways, that they built in the north were used to bring tanks into the country from the Soviet Union to take over control of the capital and other major cities in the country.
Q: Our relations with the Soviet Union at that time were kind of on the upswing anyway weren't they, leading toward detente?

SCHIFFERDECKER: Well, it was a period of detente, the period of the Nixon administration when we were signing some of our first strategic arms agreements with the Brezhnev regime and no one felt that Russian interests were threatened by what we were doing in Afghanistan or any other country. There was a large international presence of Germans and United Nations. It was only when the Shah of Iran started courting the Afghan government in the mid-1970s and tried to cut deals to wean the Afghans away from dependence on Russia that the Russians became alarmed. The Russians thought that we, Iran and Pakistan were trying to roll them back--sort of a U.S.-led "plot" against them. In fact, some believe that this was the proximate cause for the Russians to move into Afghanistan 1979, even though Iran was already engulfed in the Khomeini revolution generally, I believe the Russian occupation was mainly opportunistic, that is, they moved in only when the Afghan Communists took over the country but then began to falter and they needed outside help to survive.

Q: Before we leave Kabul, do you have any other incidents or anecdotes about your time in Kabul that you want to report on?

SCHIFFERDECKER: There is one other anecdote I felt proud of being involved in. At that time, of course, the cold war was going strong. We had a Russian defector on our hands who had come into the embassy. Of course, we had a procedure of turning any would-be defector over to the normal interviewing people assigned to the embassy. It was decided by higher authority in Washington that the United States would accept custody of this person and try to get him and his family out of the country because Afghanistan would not itself facilitate the departure of a Russian national to the United States. They did not want to alienate their Soviet friends.

Bruce A. Flatin
Political Counselor
Kabul (1977-1979)

Bruce A. Flatin was born in Minnesota in 1930. He received degrees from the University of Minnesota and from Boston University. After serving in the U.S. Army, Mr. Flatin entered the Foreign Service in 1956. His Foreign Service career included positions in Afghanistan, Germany, Australia, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.

Q: Why were elements of the army on the side of the communists?

FLATIN: Because many army leaders had been trained in the Soviet Union. Going back to the 1950s, you will recall, there was the Eisenhower Doctrine through which we were offering defense support to various countries in the Middle East following the Suez war of 1956. The Afghans were not invited to participate in this. The United States Government, for a number of reasons, had avoided much involvement with the development of the Afghan armed forces. One reason was that Afghanistan was geographically beyond our ability to project power realistically. We also made it clear to the Soviets we did not intend to challenge them in that region. From the viewpoint of the Soviets, Afghanistan would be like Mexico for us; it was right on their southern
border. You will recall, we were very touchy about Mexico when the French went in there during the Civil War.

Also, the Afghans suspected that we would favor the Pakistanis in such regional confrontations as the Pushtunistan dispute to the point where we certainly wouldn't be interested in developing Afghan military strength to deal with Pakistan. We ourselves did not believe it was in our joint interest to be involved with them militarily. The Afghans then decided to use the USSR to a large degree as a place to train Afghan military personnel and obtain military hardware. In fact, they already had MiG-15s when I was there in the 1950s.

JAMES E. TAYLOR
Political Officer
Kabul (1977-1980)

James E. Taylor was born in Oklahoma in 1938. He graduated from the University of Southern California in 1960. He served in the U.S. Air Force form 1961-1965 and entered the Foreign Service in 1965. His career included positions in Iran, Germany, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and Israel. Mr. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 5, 1995.

Q: Could you talk about the Soviet presence and our view of what they were up to and what were American interests in Afghanistan?

TAYLOR: The Soviet activity in Afghanistan was perceived at that time as an effort to maintain the predominant position of influence that behooves a super power in a small country on its borders. This was perceived by the Soviets as a natural thing, that Moscow deserved primary external influence over Afghanistan because of its location and relative size of the two countries. The means by which they did that were basically economic in those days rather than political. It was trade and economic aid. There was a great deal of activity especially in the north where there were large natural gas resources which were Afghanistan's major export at the time. Signs of any kind of subversive political efforts were not there. They simply exerted their influence by being the 800 pound gorilla right next door and Afghanistan had to sort of accept the facts of geography that that was the way it would be. Throughout history the Afghans have done their upmost to avoid dependence on any external power and this was basically directed at both the Russians over the centuries and the British in terms of British India and what eventually became Pakistan. But, within those constraints, the Afghans tried to be as independent as possible and were using us and other Western countries, the Germans had a small operation as counterweights. But basically your major external powers were the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan.

Q: How about with the military? At that point what was the Afghan military like and how did we deal with it?

TAYLOR: We had, I think there were four attachés, Army and Air Force attachés, and a few enlisted men supporting them, so it was about the right size, I suppose. The Afghan military since the fifties had been trained and equipped by the Soviets. Hundreds and thousands of Afghan officers had been taken to the Soviet Union for training in the use of this equipment and
as it turned out, as we learned later, had also been indoctrinated. We had suspected there had been efforts in indoctrination, but we were unaware that the indoctrination had taken hold enough to the extent that it would lead to the coup of 1978 conducted by a bunch of youngish military officers who had been trained and subsequently at the same time indoctrinated by the Soviet Union. We were able to deal basically with the top leadership in the military and had virtually no contact with the younger officers, majors, captains, lieutenant colonels, who actually conducted the coup of 1978 and subsequently rose to positions of command under the new regime. So, we were dealing with the generals in Kabul and some of the major commands who were picked by Daud and would, of course, not have been prone to express negative views of the way things were going and were not likely to mount coups against the fellow who had in fact hand picked them for those particular positions. It is almost a classic example of how things operate in the third world.

Q: Well, this wasn't quite at the height of the Cold War. This was the Carter administration and we were trying to do more business with the Soviets, etc., but did this send up both in Washington and in our embassy, all sorts of communist, Soviet meddling in affairs? Did we realize this was a turning point?

TAYLOR: No, not to the extent that the Soviet invasion 18 months later caused. This particular coup, to the best of my knowledge, didn't set off a lot of alarm bells in Washington simply because Afghanistan is such an isolated, exotic place that it wasn’t a front burner issue for American interests. Therefore, I don't think it had a great impact in Washington or at our embassy in Moscow in terms of, "My gosh, the Soviets have grabbed another country through their surrogates in the Afghan military."

Q: Well, this is, of course, the general conception of what we had learned to live with and accept as detente. You have spheres of influence and you don't mess around. Afghanistan turned to be crucial in the breakup of the Soviet Union. What you are talking about is the first step that led essentially to the Soviet disaster in a way might have been precipitated by Daud making his move against this leftist leadership and they felt if they were going to something they had better do it now or they might not have another chance.

TAYLOR: That's right.

Q: Did you make contact with any of the other embassies to find out if they had any...? In terms of what happened afterwards, there was, of course, a great deal of bilateral US/Soviet tension involved. President Carter made a somewhat unfortunate statement that he felt that this particular development betrayed his trust in the Soviet behavior and policy making. This didn't make him look very presidential, I think. Most people felt that he was surprised at this, and all of us were surprised, but we didn't say, "Gosh, how could you guys do this to me?" Well, at any rate, there was a lot of bilateral tension and a lot of regional tension. The Paks were alarmed and the Indians to some extent were alarmed but they had Pakistan as a buffer between them and the Soviets. There was a lot of speculation as to whether this meant an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to the entire world. Did this mean that the Soviets can deploy force whenever they feel
they have the right to deploy force? There were a lot of security concerns in the region as well as in other areas.

**Q: What about your relations with the new government? What did you do after the invasion?**

TAYLOR: That is a good question, because it was never very clear in my mind what the policy was, but the official policy was that the issue of recognition did not arise. I don't know if this is a known story, but I drafted a report, a cable, and convinced Amstutz to sign off on it, recommending that we break relations, that we close the embassy and withdraw everybody out. There is no legitimacy to this regime and we should have nothing to do with it. It is nothing but an imposed puppet government, imposed by Soviet military force. He signed off on it. Washington didn't buy that, obviously. They didn't want to pursue that policy and we would remain as more or less a listening post...we were not much more than that even before the invasion. We did close down USIA operations, and most everything else. We brought out various people...the econ people, it didn't make much sense to have them there. One consular officer stayed for a while and then we had another officer doing consular work. So, we continued as a listening post. We took the position that we would not deal in any kind of political sense with the new regime. That we would deal with the new regime only on consular and security matters and in effect do the minimum amount of business with the new guys. Only what had to be done such as arranging for the shipment in of supplies for the embassy and asking them for an exit visa for people being transferred out and things of that sort, actually consular and administrative matters. There was never supposed to be any kind of political contact in the political sense.

**Q: Carter had come out fairly strongly. I think he had put undue reliance on personal relations. That there was going to be a whole new ball game with the Soviet Union. If you were honest and above board with the Soviets they would respond in kind. Although he had a National Security Advisor who down to every toe nail detested the Russians per se in Brzezinski... What was your reaction to Carter's reactions that you were getting from news, etc.?**

TAYLOR: Well, that is more or less related to what I said before. His initial reaction was that he felt betrayed. Yes, I think that was probably true. He probably really felt because of his confidence in his ability to deal and establish a personal relationship with someone like Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet leadership and that they couldn't possibly do something that would be detrimental to that relationship. I think because of these statements and initial reaction a lot of people felt that he was unduly naive in thinking that this would play any role in reigning in Soviet tendencies for expansion. So, that was sort of the view of most people who followed these kinds of issues, that this naivety was too naive, if you will, and somehow Brzezinski had not been able to convince him that nations, especially somebody who was as hostile and expansionist as the Soviet Union would not take some actions just because somebody had led the President of the United States to believe they would behave in such a manner. They just viewed events in Afghanistan as far more important to the Soviet Union than they were to the United States and that they had on their borders the right to determine what happened in Afghanistan and play the dominant external role and if Washington didn't like it that was just too bad.

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Political Officer

Moscow, Soviet Union (1979-1981)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the National Security Council, specializing in Soviet issues. From 1998 to 2001 Mr. Perina was US Ambassador to Moldova. Ambassador Perina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006

Q: What was the situation in the Soviet Union in 1979 when you got out there?

PERINA: Well, this was pre-Afghanistan so our relations were still pretty good. Jimmy Carter was the president and he put a great emphasis on human rights issues, but in our overall relations with Moscow there was a lot of interaction, a lot of exchanges and growing commercial relations. The invasion of Czechoslovakia had been forgotten, and the effort to build détente was underway. So it was an expanding bilateral relationship.

In any case, we received word a few days before Christmas that Washington had noticed these strange military movements along the Soviet border with Afghanistan, and we were instructed to go in with a demarche to try to find out what was happening. Bob German delivered the demarche because everybody else was on vacation, and he took me along as the note taker because I had the best Russian in the Political Section. I'll always remember that session. We met with Georgiy Korniyenko, who was First Deputy Foreign Minister. Bob German was a very polite fellow and in a very friendly way he said that we had noticed these apparent military movements on the border, and what is going on? And I remember Korniyenko saying, “There's absolutely nothing going on, and if there were something going on, it should be no subject of concern to the United States.” In other words, he was saying that if something were happening, it was none of our business. So we got this complete brick wall. I wrote up the telegram, and then I think it may have been the next morning or no later than two days after that suddenly we saw in the morning that Afghanistan had been invaded. The Soviets were also justifying it all as helping Afghanistan stave off a coup attempt engineered by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). So it clearly did concern the United States, contrary to what Korniyenko had told us, because there was this effort to implicate us and in fact blame us for the whole thing. It amazed me at how blatantly and unabashedly Korniyenko had lied to Bob German. There was not the slightest effort by the Kremlin to reconcile what they told us before the invasion and what they said publicly after the invasion. Both things were totally in contradiction, and both were lies. It showed me for the first time how unashamedly people can lie in diplomacy.

Q: So what happened in the Embassy after the invasion? Did all the doors shut on you or did you shut all the doors?
PERINA: Well, we were the ones who shut the doors, and it was a very intentional response. Our Ambassador by then was Thomas Watson, and we junior officers rotated sitting in on the morning Country Team meetings. I remember one dramatic staff meeting just a few days after the invasion when Watson came in and said, “We are going to retaliate. We are going to react very, very strongly to this Soviet action. I want from each section chief and agency head a list of things that we can do to the Soviets to show them how outraged we are.” This was at the Country Team meeting. Then he asked right there for people around the table to give him examples of what could be done to retaliate against the Soviets. It was a very tense meeting because he then did call on people around the table. He would go, for example, to the Cultural Attaché, to the USIA person. That person would say, “Well, you know we have a lot of exchanges with the Soviets. We have student exchanges, we have professional exchanges, and so on. We could stop all these but it wouldn't be in our interest to do so because it took us a long time to develop these programs. We would just be punishing the people who are going to have greater exposure to the West. So I would not recommend that we do this.” Then Watson went to the Economics Officer who said, “Well, we're selling a lot of wheat now to the Soviet Union and we could stop selling that. However, there is a lot of Congressional support for these sales. Farm interests want to continue selling wheat. We will get a lot of flack if we stop wheat sales so I recommend against it.” And he went predictably from counselor to counselor and almost everyone told him things that could be done but recommended against doing them. But of course, ultimately, we ended up doing almost all of those things. However, nobody even at that staff meeting suggested boycotting the Moscow Olympics. Nobody thought it would go that far.

I will always remember that staff meeting because it was so predictable how everyone tried to protect his or her bureaucratic turf. However, it was all for naught because the reaction from Jimmy Carter was very, very strong and we ended up doing all of those things and more. When it became clear that this was inevitable then of course certain people in the embassy became tougher than ever on the Soviets. I remember at a later staff meeting, after the decision had been made to boycott the Olympics, one person even suggested that the Embassy staff be instructed not to watch the games on TV. This of course was rejected by Watson as unenforceable and privately ridiculed throughout the Embassy. But it illustrated the mood that developed. The interesting thing was that for the rest of my time in Moscow, even though there were very bad bilateral relations in public, the Soviets never retaliated against the Embassy by shutting doors or cutting off our access. In fact, they always tried to show their desire for getting back to business as usual in private contacts. It was their way of showing that they hoped we would forgive and forget the Afghanistan matter and get back to building détente, which of course they very much wanted.

ERNESTINE S. HECK

State Department; Afghanistan Desk Officer


Ernestine S. Heck was born in Oregon in 1940. She received her bachelor’s degree from Oregon State in 1962. Her career has included positions in Bombay, Saigon, Teheran, Niamey, Katmandu, New Delhi, Colombo, and Madras. Mrs. Heck was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December 1997.
Q: Ernie, we're moving to the time, but you became Afghan desk officer. You were doing it from when to when again?

HECK: Actually I was the Afghan desk officer from the end of May of 1980 till sometime in November of 1982, so it was two and a half years. I had been on leave without pay for three years when my husband was posted in Nepal. In February of 1980 I was brought home on an emergency medical. My father was in the process of dying. I was out in Oregon in late January of 1980, and I received a phone call from Harry Barnes, who was then the Director General of the Foreign Service, who told me that my husband would soon be replaced as ambassador, and would I please stop by Washington and line up a job on my way back to Nepal, and so I did that. I thus learned in late February that I would be going to be the Afghan desk officer. This was at that point about two and a half months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place in December, late December, of 1979. I was in somewhat of a pickle, because in 1980 Nepal was hardly on the information superhighway and there was very little information available, either at the embassy or elsewhere, on Afghanistan. I had been there, of course, and in fact my husband and I happened to be there at the time of the Communist coup that took place in April of '78. We got stuck in the country for a week because the coup had closed everything. But I had no access to any sort of documentation that I needed to, as we say in the Foreign Service, hit the ground running. Of course, Afghanistan by that point, because of the Soviet invasion, was a very big problem on our international plate. We left Nepal in mid-May of that year, and I left my husband and our menagerie, our dogs, in the embassy in New Delhi, where he stayed with the ambassador while I was sent up on my orientation tour. Of course, I could not go into Afghanistan. The Afghans wouldn't give me a visa, because we were very much perceived as an enemy at that point. I spent two weeks in May, when the temperatures are up in the hundreds, in Pakistan along the border at refugee camps and talking to various exiles, talking to the Pakistani government. The United States in that period - this was the end of the Carter Administration - very much counted on Pakistan as a close ally and worked very closely with Pakistan in dealing with Afghanistan, so I talked to a lot of Pakistani government people as well as to the Afghans. I took over the job at the end of May/beginning of June. The desk had always been a rather sleepy desk until 1978 when the Communists, the local-grown Communists, first took over the government, but until that point the desk was a very quiet desk, and the person who served on it was back-up for everything in Pakistan and also in Bangladesh. By 1980 it was more than a full-time job. In fact, it was more like a two-person job, but there was only one person, so the working hours very much were sort of seven to seven every day and on Saturday at least but not on Sunday. At the beginning when it was still the Carter Administration, we were not so deeply involved in trying to counter the Soviet presence. We were more concerned at that point with the political situation in the country. Of course, we wanted the Russians out of Afghanistan, but we were not actively engaged in getting them out in the way that we were later on. My job very quickly became a combination of just hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of briefing papers. The subject went into every single high-level talk that our Secretary of State had, or that the seventh floor had, with other governments, so there was a constant writing of these documents; and the other part, which I found personally very difficult because it touched me so much, was dealing with the refugees. We had, of course, had a very big presence in Afghanistan. We were trying to protect the people who had worked for us, basically for USAID but also for the embassy and USIA. A number of them at least had gotten out. They were trying to get to the United States. They were living in refugee camps. To get them into the country involved documentation that they had in fact worked for us. Well, of course, the records were all out in storage in St. Louis, I believe. It
was very difficult to prove a lot of things that people who had worked with them knew. So I spent an awful lot of time doing things that perhaps I would have done as a consular officer in other incarnations, trying to help people who were in the camps, basically in Pakistan but also elsewhere, or who had gotten as far perhaps as Rome, where the INS was processing them, or those who were caught in the United States, who wanted to stay and, therefore, wanted asylum. The stories were horrendous. The hardships that they underwent were terrific. I found that a good four or five hours a day had to do with taking care of refugee-related problems, either dealing with the Refugee Bureau to give them the sort of information they needed to make the State Department recommendations on these particular cases that they had to weigh in on, or in dealing with the refugees themselves. We had at that point two previous very senior Afghan diplomats who had been ambassadors to the United States here in the country. They took it upon themselves to call me regularly, as did every Afghan who was here, and I fielded things all day long. It was a very frustrating time, because I did want to help them and there was so little I could do. I acted as a facilitator, however, in a number of cases and tried to straighten out the awful problems that they were having with INS. I was very upset to see the way INS operated. I went down to the INS office here in Washington, the regional office for Washington DC, once at the behest of a man who was actually a royal prince from the old royal family, who had been the number two in the embassy here. He had been the deputy chief of mission. He was desperate to regularize himself. This was not in 1980 but a little later. He had been here long enough to apply to start the process of regularizing himself, but they had lost his records. There was a file with his name on it, and it contained the file of a single Vietnamese woman. Nobody could find his papers, and until they could find his papers, he couldn't apply for anything, and until he could apply for something, his kids would never be able to get into college because they would not be able to qualify. It was this sort of thing. In the meantime, he was selling ties somewhere, Brooks Brothers or someplace. I was very upset to see how the records were kept at INS, that they were all in cardboard files lined up on open shelves. There was no modernization there at all. It was very difficult. With the passing of time, particularly after President Reagan took over, our Afghan policy became very much more proactive. Earlier on there had been a lot of trying to focus things through Pakistan. President Zia was not at all happy with the United States at that point for some very AID-related reasons. He called offers that we had made for help peanuts and was generally not helpful, but when Reagan came, things did change and suddenly the United States became an active player. By that I mean the CIA got very much involved.

Q: Was there a certain amount of almost - the term is wrong but - chortling on the part of people within the Administration, State Department or elsewhere that you were getting? We had had our nose bloodied, as you and I both know very much, in Vietnam, and looking at Afghanistan and saying, boy, they're going to get it and come on in, fellows, get immersed in this and you'll really regret it, and aren't we glad you're doing that. Was there any of that feeling?

HECK: Yes, there was. Here again, I think that was particularly evident during the Reagan years among the conservative branch of the Republican administration. There were a number of people who felt that way, who really wanted to teach the Soviets a lesson and sort of pay them back, I guess you might say, for some of their actions in the '70s in Vietnam. I'm sure it was there among the Carter Administration people also. Looking back from a vantage point of 17 years, I think that among the Carter people in the White House and to a certain extent in the State Department, there was more of an interest in the human rights violations aspect of it among the Carter people. But, yes, there was a certain amount of showing the Soviets how things were.
Q: Did you get any feeling? This was happening at the top, but was it reflected down? Jimmy Carter had come in in 1977 with the idea that one essentially can do business with the Soviets, we can reach agreements, and let's not be confrontational and all. The big shock was apparently what happened in Afghanistan. Did you sense any of that being reflected down where you were?

HECK: I think that there was a feeling of betrayal almost by what Brezhnev did by ordering the incursion into Afghanistan, that somehow he was moving ahead on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that this was unfair that the Soviets did it. Brezhnev apparently thought it was going to be an easy in and out, and, of course, he was getting very sick and he didn't have to pick up the pieces. I think that a number of the Soviet people probably felt the same way, that it was unfair going in, that there was no need to go in. When the Soviets first went in, they sent a number of troops who were close by, and that included people from Tajikistan, particularly Tajikistan, and from the other border states which had a large non-Russian ethnic population. A number of these people were reported - now I was not there, but this is the reports that we got - to become quite easily sympathetic to the Afghan position on the Soviet invasion and to begin to question their presence, the Soviet presence, in Afghanistan. There are stories that they also got very interested in the religion and the Soviets then began to withdraw the ethnic non-Russian troops in order to keep the "poison" of Islam from seeping back into the Soviet Union. Whether or not this is true or whether it was just a matter of logistics, it is true that there were more ethnic non-Russians there at the beginning than there were later on. So there was some disagreement even within the Soviet Union of what was happening, but they quickly found out that they had gotten themselves an ungovernable people in a terrain which is very difficult to handle, as the British had found out 150 years before that.

JON DAVID GLASSMAN
Chargé

Mr. Glassman graduated from the University of Southern California and Columbia University. He served in numerous posts including Madrid, Moscow, Havana and Kabul. He was named ambassador to Paraguay in 1991. He was interviewed by Peter Moffat in 1997.

Q: Major change of scene in 1987. When you went to Kabul, that was quite a plum as an assignment.

GLASSMAN: I don’t know if it was a plum. I volunteered to go and was able to study Dari (Afghan Persian) along with Russian for a year. The idea as you know was to report from Kabul on the Soviet intentions. The Soviets had come in, in 1979 - this is eight years later. They had about a hundred twenty thousand troops in Afghanistan, many of them headquartered in the city of Kabul. The United States and the other Western nations maintained embassies there. They were vehicles for reporting what the Soviets were doing and on the success of the Afghan Resistance. The reason the Soviets allowed the Western embassies to remain was their hope that over time the Western powers would recognize that a communist regime was permanent, would normalize relations. That was their gain from all this. We went in there and there were about twenty Americans. We were under fire constantly from the Mujaheddin who were bombarding the city with 60 to 250 ground-to-ground rockets a week. In 1985, the United States had provided the rebels with Stinger surface-to-air missiles. They were taking a healthy toll of Soviet
helicopters and aircraft. There was a very interesting atmosphere in Kabul. The Soviets would be flying in supplies constantly because the road was often interdicted - they would come in all night. All night long this infernal roar as the Russian planes would come in one after another. They had a sort of AWAC observation plane over the city all night long. In the old Ambassador's residence where I lived, I would lock myself into a steel room every night and then we would radio communicate with the Embassy. Electric power was going out all the time as the Mujaheddin would blow up some of the power plants or power lines but these were always restored. When we arrived there, the CIA told us that the Pakistanis were running the operation and the rebels would finally definitely cut out the electric supplies which they never succeeded in doing. One thing we saw in Afghanistan was that frequently the reports which the Pakistani Army Intelligence Service (the ISI) would convey to the American Embassy Islamabad were much more optimistic than the actual results we could see upon the ground. Nonetheless, the Mujaheddin were exercising strong psychological pressure. We would send in the weekly situation report on the war. The way we were able to do this was we would interview, when I say interview, our officers would go out and talk to Afghan storekeepers and also talk to embassy employees. Because the Afghans had an extended family network, we were able to gain on a weekly basis reports of how the war was going in every one of the provinces and cross check them and we would send in an unclassified report which would go to Islamabad and it would be rebroadcast by both the BBC and the Voice of America into Afghanistan. People who were out there fighting would know how the war was going nationally. The British did the same thing and we would coordinate our reports with them every week as we worked with the other NATO representatives.

Q: Could you give us an idea of the size of your mission?

GLASSMAN: Initially 20 people, then we were reduced to ten. As these rockets were coming in, there was obviously fear that Americans would be killed. Sometimes there were some spectacular things happening in the city. Once the Resistance hit the ammunition dump at the airport, a Soviet ammunition dump; we were only a mile away. There was the most incredible explosion you can imagine. Flames going a thousand feet into the air, not smoke but flames, shells exploding and going everywhere. We were all on top of the embassy and the Marines were cheering. I said, “You shouldn’t cheer because they’re going to start hitting us next.”

Washington understood, of course, that our situation was dangerous. It was less dangerous than you might think, however, because the city is six miles wide. So you fire 60 or 250 rockets into the city with kill radius of maybe, say, 30 yards or so and in that six mile-wide city a lot of people will survive. And at no time were any Americans injured while we were there even though we were sitting next to Radio Afghanistan. One occasion I remember we were having dinner in the Chinese Embassy. The Chinese at that point were on our side. We were having dinner for our departing DCM when a rocket hit right next door on the French Embassy. The wife of the Chinese Ambassador leaped to the side of one of our officers but we were fortunate nothing happened. On another occasion, a fight broke out behind the Embassy between the two regime factions. The Afghan Communist troops at the Presidential Palace and their rivals were firing mortars back and forth across the city, just an incredible thing to watch. No one was hurt.

When Bush was elected and was inaugurated, the Soviets had by then signed the Geneva agreement which pledged them to pull out by February 1989. There was fear in Washington that, if we remained, the Mujaheddin would come in and kill all whites including us. Most of us in the
Embassy had beards, which distinguished us from the Russian troops. The Russian troops were only permitted to have mustaches, except for the Spetsnaz, the Russian Green Berets. We had beards to look a little bit different. There was the sense that if the Mujaheddin came in, they would kill all foreigners. So in the meantime, the CIA produced green armbands with the inscription "Allahu Akbar"- God is Great. We were going to wear them, but the Administration got very nervous and finally ordered us to evacuate the post. We were burning all our documents. We arranged for a charter flight from the Afghan communist airline by paying them $10,000. James Baker, the new Secretary of State, said, “It isn’t quick enough.” They wanted us to leave more quickly and sent in an Indian Airline plane. When we said we were going to evacuate, our local employees got very upset because they thought they were going to be possibly killed. So we were instructed by the State Department to pay them six months salary (about $80,000), which we paid them and committed to come back and pay them and which people did over the years.

The embassy has been closed since February 1989. When we left, we moved all these special armored vehicles into the basement (the vehicles had port holes for automatic weapons, gas dispensers). We had metal containers made for everyone's possessions and we took them to the airport to meet this Indian Airline plane that was coming in. At the airport, the Afghan Communists were insulting us, calling us cowards and all kinds of things were happening. Finally we loaded our possessions and got on the plane and, after almost running into a Soviet plane coming in, we got out to India. Just before leaving, I had a ceremony at the monument honoring the deceased Ambassador Dubs who had been killed in a hostage taking incident, and I had an American flag walking out and that picture appeared on the front page of The Washington Post. When we arrived at New Delhi Airport, we were going to have a press conference and Baker sent a message saying he didn’t want a press conference because he didn’t like the photo because it reminded him of Ambassador John Gunther Dean when he had withdrawn from Cambodia carrying an American flag. He said, “It looked like we had surrendered rather than won.” Anyway, we held the press conference. Later, we brought back a flag. We had several flags. One we gave to Baker, which is still in the State Department, to be returned whenever we go back. I also took one out to President Reagan in California, gave him a flag which had flown on the day of the Soviet invasion and the day when we left which coincided with the Soviet troop withdrawal.

Azerbaijan

JOHN P. HARROD

Exhibit Officer, USIS

Moscow (1975-1978)

John Harrod was born in Illinois in 1945, and received his BA from Colgate University. Having entered the Foreign Service in 1969, his positions included Moscow, Kabul, Poznan, Warsaw and Brussels. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 1999.
During this first part, ’75-76, what would you say was the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and how was it reflected, you know, out there beyond Moscow?

HARROD: Okay, a two-edged answer to that. First of all, relations, particularly in the early part of that period, the first half, middle of ’75, were officially quite good because that was when we had the Apollo-Soyuz joint space mission, the so-called in Russian rukopozhat iyev kozmose. That means ‘handshake in space.’ So while our cosmonauts were getting ready for that flying around up there, the official state of relations was supposed to be good. What I discovered was - and this was something that really shaped my view of the Soviet Union... I’d picked it up on my earlier exhibit. I’d picked it up as early as my ’66 grad-school time there, but this one really confirmed it, which is that each one of these cities really had a different character and a different view of things, depending on who the Party bosses were. In ’75, we were in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan when this whole handshake in space business was going on, and we were treated exceptionally well. The ambassador came down to open the exhibit-

Q: The ambassador was-

HARROD: -was Walt Stoessel at the time, and he was received by the Communist Party boss in Azerbaijan, Haidar Aliyev, who has since come back to life as the president of an independent Azerbaijan, but at the time he was the Communist Party boss (former KGB official) and had never - I believe his people told us - received a Western ambassador until Stoessel came down in May of ’75 to cut the ribbon. And that reflected sort of our general reception in Baku. They were exceptionally nice. I had contacts with a number of party officials. I remember one of my discussions with an apparatchik. He asked me how I liked Baku, and I gave him my usual diplomatic bit about how it was a lovely city, and in fact, I had met my wife in Baku on the earlier exhibit, so I said, “I have great fond memories of Baku because it’s where I met my wife, and I’d love to come back some day as the first American consul general perhaps.” And he looked at me, Communist Party official, and he said, “How about the first American ambassador?” Well, I didn’t get a chance to go back as the first American ambassador. Somebody else got that, I think Dick Miles, but to have a Communist Party official drop that little hint was something. Later on in other cities, Minsk being the one I remember particularly, we had some difficulties with the authorities, the security was very tight, but not in Baku. In fact, at one point, one of my Communist Party buddies in Baku asked me if I’d been followed. I said, “I don’t know, if they’re any good I wouldn’t know it, would I?” And he said, “Oh, I guarantee you’re not being followed. You know, we consider you guys friends here.” He’s probably lying through his teeth, but-

Q: You know, I’ve gotten this from other people, even in the most difficult times, saying that when they got out to particularly the Caucasus and Central Asia, a whole different world.

HARROD: But not always a good one. I mean, we had a lot of security problems in Tashkent in both exhibits that I worked on. The Tashkent KGB branch seemed to be a particularly tough one. But Baku was different. Baku was warm and friendly in those days.

Q: These Tatar looking people are having a wonderful time.
HARROD: But there wasn’t much else in Zaporozh’ye, although in a small town like that we had almost regular access to the mayor and Party officials. The two cities where we had the best access of the six, and my job being access, were Baku, where we got everybody in the whole hierarchy all the way up to Mr. Aliyev, and Zaporozh’ye, but the problem in Zaporozh’ye was there wasn’t much of a hierarchy to get up to.

MICHAEL W. COTTER

Ambassador


 Ambassador Michael W. Cotter was born in Wisconsin in 1943. He graduated from Georgetown University in 1965 and received a JD from the University of Michigan in 1968. Postings throughout his career have included Saigon, La Paz, Can Tho, Quito, Ankara, Kinshasa, Santiago, and an ambassadorship to Turkmenistan. Ambassador Cotter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

 Q: Today is the 5th of February 1999. Mike, we are going to talk about oil and oil lines because the main thing about Central Asia has been figuring out how to get the oil out of there. You want to talk about your view, what was happening during your time?

COTTER: Baku is the capital of Azerbaijan, and it sits right on the Caspian. I’m not certain how much of the deposits in Kazakhstan were well known, but certainly soon after independence day, the Kazakhs encouraged foreign companies to come and take a look at them. Turkmenistan, as I said yesterday, has primarily gas, and not so much oil. It doesn’t have so much experience in exploiting oil. I can talk a little bit later how the Turkmen were a little slow getting off the mark. The major international oil companies, as usual on the outlook for new reserves, were very interested, I think, right after independence. I have seen it written and said that U.S. Government policy in this area is motivated by and formed by the oil companies. I think that is not quite accurate. I think what you have is a conjunction of interests. Our interests in the area are fairly clear. Essentially, it is to help to do what we can to ensure the political independence of the countries of the former Soviet Union. The reason for that, obviously, is to prevent or help avoid a re-creation of a Soviet or a Russian Empire that ends up becoming another challenge to us. Obviously, hand-in-hand with political independence goes economic viability. This is a real problem in some of the countries, especially those which must import energy and are energy dependent and which have not found productive activities to replace those that they engaged in during the Soviet Union. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus are all examples of this. So it seems fairly clear, perhaps shortsighted, although I don’t think so, that for those countries that do have an economic resource that can be exploited upon which their economic independence can be based and solidified, it is only reasonable that they would pursue that. When you come to Azerbaijan, I think the oil is the only major resource of any kind they have. Kazakhstan has a number of alternatives, but very clearly oil will be a major part of their economic development. Turkmenistan has cotton, but I don’t think anybody would suggest that a cotton mono-culture
is any better than exploiting a natural resource like gas. So, for those countries that have oil
or gas, it automatically becomes the prime candidate for forging economic strength that will
underlie their political independence. The fact that this coincides with oil companies’ interest
is obvious, but I think it is a mistake to suggest that oil companies drive our policy. I think
U.S. policy would be the same if it were another natural resource. It is true, however, that oil
companies coming into the region then have a significant influence in what the United States
does and how it does it. I think in Kazakhstan, which I can’t speak to directly, but certainly
the oil companies there have been very influential and have good access to the embassy. The
embassy assists them in any way possible, as we would any other company. The same is true
in Azerbaijan, where there is a large number of American oil companies. It is true to a lesser
extent in Turkmenistan, although only UNOCAL and Mobil have been working there. We
work very closely with those companies.

In Soviet days, and still to this day, all pipelines in the Soviet Union, and the markets for
energy resources in the Soviet countries, went essentially from the southern area north and
west. Turkmen gas went north and west. The oil pipelines that existed went through southern
Russia, to Novorossiysk, on the Black Sea, from whence they were exported. Those
pipelines, in most cases, are old and suffer from the general Soviet lack of maintenance and
technology. In any event, they were only developed to export the quantity of oil that the
Soviet Union was planning on exporting. Once there are independent countries, each of
which wants to maximize what it is doing, all of a sudden the need for export capacity goes
up exponentially. We had to negotiate agreements with governments that aren’t very familiar
with this, which took up a lot of time in all of these countries. All of them felt that they were
sitting on great riches, that it was a seller’s market, and that they could extract terms from the
oil companies that would make them wealthy forever. Well, the oil companies didn’t look at
it that way. At the present time, this is incremental oil. The oil companies and western
governments tend to look at Caspian oil as a strategic reserve for, perhaps, sometime in the
21st century. This was obviously not something that the countries in the Caspian liked, since
they are not interested in exploiting a resource in the 21st century. They want to exploit it
today. Nonetheless, there were as you might expect the normal conflicts in negotiating
agreements. We have seen replicated already in Turkmenistan in one case and I think we will
see in some of the other countries, what has happened in other parts of the world. That is, the
first company in an area, particularly with natural resource exploitation, comes in and says,
“Well, nobody has been here before. This is a new market, a very risky market. We need a
return that reflects the risk we are taking.” Then, they negotiate an agreement that gives them
a significant return. Their investment proves out. They get along with the government, and
the second and third companies come in. Well, the risk level has dropped. They are willing to
settle for less return. Well, the government signs on with better terms for those companies
and then looks at the first contract and thinks it was taken advantage of. Then comes an effort
to renegotiate, or simply, flat out break the contract. I have seen this happen in Ecuador. It
happened in Mexico a long time ago, and it has happened in other countries. It happened in
Turkmenistan in the case of an Argentine company, Bridas, which had the gas and some oil
exploration and production agreements with the Turkmen government. The Turkmen reneged
on these and have been in arbitration and court over them for some time. So, the first stage,
which took some time, was negotiating agreements and for these countries to determine how
they were going to go allowing foreign companies in. There is also a lot of jockeying because
some of these projects were quite large, and so involve consortia, rather than single companies.

I should say that there is one other difficulty here that the companies are now wrestling with and that is going to cause a great problem. That is a shortage of oil rigs for offshore work in the Caspian. Parts of the Caspian are very deep, and the Soviets didn’t do any deep water drilling, or did very little. They had only a couple of deep water rigs. These were in Azerbaijan, and I think at this point only one is useable. They had some shallow water rigs, most of which, again, aren’t useable. So, the companies that come in have been forced to figure out how they are going to carry out drilling. Rehabilitating one of these rigs can cost a couple hundred million dollars. Bringing a new rig in is almost impossible because you have to break it up into pieces, and bring it from the Black Sea, up the Don River, to the Volga-Don Canal, and down the Volga River. That may not be feasible. You could build one in the area except the technology and the construction expertise used to build that kind of thing doesn’t exist there. So, companies have had a very hard time meeting their drilling timetables. This is important to them because most of the contracts with the government require the consortium to drill a certain number of test wells within a specified period of time. I think it is fairly clear that a number of the consortia in Azerbaijan are not going to meet their deadlines, and they are going to have to renegotiate, simply because they don’t have rigs that they can use.

China

EDWIN WEBB MARTIN
Chinese Language Training
Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing (1945-1948)
Consular Officer
Hankow (1948-1949)
Economic Officer
Taipei, Taiwan (1949-1950)
Political Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs
Washington, DC (1951-1955)
Political Advisor to Talks with Chinese
Panmunjom, Korea (1953-1954)
Talks with Chinese
Geneva, Switzerland (1955)
Ambassador Edwin Webb Martin was born in India of American parents in 1917. He received his bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College in 1939 and his master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940. He joined the Foreign Service in 1941. His overseas posts include Leopoldville, Peiping, Hankow, Taipei, Rangoon, London, Ankara, and Hong Kong. He was the ambassador to Burma from 1971 to 1973. Ambassador Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 1987 and by William Johnson and Harold Hinton on December 9, 1987.

Q: Was Sun Li-jen actually in command of the defense?

MARTIN: I'm not sure he was in command of the defense, but he had been in Taiwan for some time, and he was responsible for training these troops. I think he was given a good deal of credit for the victory there, whether he was in actual personal command or not.

Another interesting thing that happened -- I'm trying to fish back in my memory -- during that period in Taiwan was a rather ambiguous message which came from the State Department at the end of October, effect, which we were supposed to go to Chiang Kai-shek with, which said, in effect, that we thought that the Nationalists had enough materiel and equipment and so forth on Taiwan to defend the island adequately. As I say, the message was sort of mixed, because, on the one hand, it was the first communication we had sent from Washington to Chiang Kai-shek since he'd retired. It was sort of an acknowledgment that he was the head man, although at that time he had not yet actually reassumed his title. He was really sort of unofficial. This was a formal message to him, and so in a sense, it was a kind of a boost, because here we were saying, "Okay, you're it, and we're going to deal with you." On the other hand, it wasn't a very clear-cut statement of just what we were going to do. [Laughter] It more or less said, "You've got enough materiel here and we have confidence that you're going to defend the place."

Jessup came over. Ambassador Jessup came over. I think it was in January of '50. It was right around in there. He had an interview with Chiang Kai-shek, in which I was present. Chiang did most of the talking. He thought it was a matter of time before Japan went Communist, and Southeast Asia was bound to go the same way. War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was inevitable. Conclusion: the U.S. must support his anti-Communist fight. Our own military estimates were that it was just a matter of time before the Communists would attack Taiwan and that they would be able to conquer it. The earliest estimate, as I recall, was something like March of '50 and all the way up to the spring or summer of '50. March may be a little early, but there was a lot of reporting about the fact that the Communists were massing junks on the Fujian coast.
and things like that. Another indication of what the State Department anticipated, I think I mentioned this in my book, or at least in a footnote in it, was that we evacuated dependents, especially families with children, like mine, and in my case, I was transferred to Rangoon, because we wanted to cut down on the staff in anticipation that there would be an invasion, trouble, and so forth.

MARSHALL GREEN
Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East
Washington, DC (1956-1960)
Consul General
Hong Kong (1961-1963)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East
Washington, DC (1963-1965)
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific

Marshall Green was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale University in 1939. Mr. Green joined the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in Sweden, Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, Indonesia, and Washington, DC.

Finally, a few comments about Secretary Dulles' handling of the crisis. I was deeply impressed by his excellent working relations with President Eisenhower, as well as with his associates in State, Defense, and CIA (headed by his brother, Allen). On several occasions, near the conclusion of meetings in his office, Dulles would pick up the secure phone and tell the President of our conclusions and solicit his comments or, where relevant, his approval. Dulles thus made it clear to all present that he was acting under Eisenhower's orders. That, in turn, strengthened Dulles' position with all his associates.

I was also impressed by the way Dulles took charge of the problem, making it his personal responsibility to work out a peaceful solution, losing many hours of sleep in the process. Yet he sought advice from his associates. I recall how Gerard Smith, at that time Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, used to argue almost instinctively against the emerging consensus of several of our meetings. Dulles seemed to welcome the ensuing debate which helped to fine-hone the final decisions.

Diplomatic biographer Sir Harold Nicholson once wrote that the worst kind of diplomatists are zealots, lawyers and missionaries; and the best kind are humane skeptics.

In his first years as Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles seemed to fall clearly in the first category. He was a dyed-in-the-wool lawyer with a cold-war missionary zeal. For him, countering Soviet aggressive acts gave rise to a new term in diplomacy: "brinkmanship." He
stonily refused to shake the extended hand of Zhou En-lai at Geneva in 1954 -- an insult never forgotten by Zhou. He was also associated in the minds of many of us Foreign Service Officers with Senator McCarthy and his ilk who pilloried the Foreign Service and hounded out of office several of our best China specialists whose only "crime" was the accuracy of their reports out of China during World War II, predicting the decline of the Chinese Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang and the rise of Mao's Communists.

John Foster Dulles may be remembered by history as one of our most zealous, hard-line Secretaries of State, especially in his dealings with Moscow and Peking, but from my vantage point, in the next to last year of his life, he appeared as a man of moderation and reason, an able practitioner of diplomacy as well as of law.

The President showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in our frozen relationship with the PRC. I recall that on our return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at Midway Island in early June 1969, President Nixon invited me to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly two hours we discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was interested in the history of our efforts to achieve some thaw in U.S.-China relations. I also told the President about my recent meeting with the old Gimo on Taiwan, where President Chiang seemed out of touch with reality, at least on the Sino-Soviet dispute which he regarded as a collusive effort by China and Russia to delude and divide the West.

The President stressed that we should try to remove unnecessary irritants in our relations with China, but that we should not do this in a way that would unnecessarily provoke the USSR, or that was designed to exploit Sino-Soviet differences.

Shortly thereafter in late July 1969, I accompanied President Nixon on the Pacific-East Asian phase of his round-the-world trip. I had co-authored with Bob Barnett the so-called "scope-paper" for that phase of his trip, and much of the scope-paper's contents were reflected in Nixon's famous press backgrounder on July 25 at Guam, the first stop of his trip. In the scope-paper I had emphasized the great economic up-surge of East Asian countries and the growing ability of most East Asian countries to assume greater burdens for their own defense. I also said that our general position in East Asia should not be one of trying to solve East Asia's problems but rather of helping East Asia's problem solvers.

The President made several references to China in his backgrounder, including modifications he hoped to see in permitting travel of Americans to China and allowing limited tourist purchase of Chinese products.

But what undoubtedly interested Peking most in the Guam backgrounder was the President's thesis that (a) the U.S. would stand by its treaty commitments, (b) the U.S. would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened any U.S. ally or a nation whose survival we considered vital to our own survival, and (c) the U.S. looked to the country threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense.

The President also left it clear that the U.S. should learn from the experience of Vietnam and not get caught in another comparable situation of "creeping involvement." "I want to be sure that our policies in the future, all over the world...reduce American involvement."
In retrospect, it is fair to assume that these statements of America's role in the world helped set
the stage for the Chinese-American rapprochement that was to occur within two years of the
Nixon Doctrine (I did not attend the President's press backgrounder in a hotel in Guam, but
Nixon told the press that I would answer any questions they might have on the backgrounder.

The President also asked me to brief the large press corps accompanying him at our next two
stops in Manita and Jakarta. This assignment was one I could scarcely handle since I did not
attend the President's meetings with President Marcos or President Suharto. No one from the
State Department was included in these meetings, not even Secretary Rogers or our
Ambassadors.) During 1969, the Administration made a number of statements and moves,
beyond those already mentioned, to create a better climate in U.S. Chinese relations. We publicly
expressed our willingness to renew bilateral talks with the Chinese in Warsaw or elsewhere; and
Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw was authorized by the President to tell his Chinese colleague of
the President's wish to discuss an improvement in relations. All these statements and positions,
including liberalization of American travel and tourist purchases of Chinese products, were
favorably received by the great majority of our newspapers and members of Congress.

Whereas the Chinese early in 1969 had castigated the Nixon Administration in the harshest
terms, Peking attacks moderated in the course of the year. Previously, Chinese representatives
conveyed to a number of foreigners their awareness that U.S. policy toward China was under
review. However they also made it clear that the issue of Taiwan, including U.S. military forces
deployed there, created a major obstacle to any Sino-U.S. rapprochement. We also received
indirect official word from Peking that China appreciated U.S. restraint in not seeking to exploit
the Sino-Soviet dispute and that the U.S. obviously did not see a Sino-Soviet war as being in its
interests.

In late 1969 it was announced that the U.S. would automatically validate passports of persons in
six categories for travel to the PRC. These categories were members of Congress, journalists,
teachers, scholars, medical doctors and Red Cross representatives. On December 19, it was
announced that foreign subsidiaries of American companies would be permitted to sell China
non-strategic items of foreign manufacture, while U.S. companies were permitted to buy or sell
Chinese goods within or between foreign countries but not to import Chinese goods to the U.S.
U.S. tourist purchases of Chinese goods were allowed without limit.

All these and other moves to ease restrictions on U.S. travel and trade with China were instituted
either by our bureau or by the NSC where a Senior Interdepartmental group chaired by my
deputy, Ambassador Winthrop Brown, prepared a policy study for Dr. Kissinger as the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Our bureau was encouraged by the interest shown by the President in all these moves to ease
restrictions on U.S.-Chinese trade and travel, although we were pressing for a complete lifting of
all travel restrictions on Americans desiring to visit China, and on all restrictions on Chinese
bona fide visitors to the U.S. These steps were finally approved by the White House in March
and April of 1971.

In the President's Foreign Policy Message to Congress in February 1970, Mr. Nixon declared
that the U.S. aim was to establish a "more normal and constructive relationship with Communist
China. He asserted that the U.S. had "historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict."

A major reversal of Chinese strategic policy occurred in the period 1969-71, brought on by increasing Chinese nervousness over Soviet intentions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by the rapid build-up of Soviet military power in Siberia, especially in disputed areas along the Chinese frontier, created an atmosphere of war-panic in China. Air raid shelters were built on a massive scale. A CIA estimate of October 1969 placed the chances of a Soviet effort to knock out China's nascent nuclear weapons factories at about 1 in 3. Meanwhile, ever since Khrushchev came on the scene, China had been nervously observing U.S.-Soviet relations and was increasingly concerned that China might face U.S.-Soviet collusion.

It was against this background -- plus the growing influence of Zhou En-lai and the pragmatists -- that President Nixon's initiative was realistically possible of achieving success.

Just a few observations on why the President took this extraordinary initiative on China. Certainly it was out of line with the thinking of many in the Republican party. It also involved a lot of risks -- risks that secret preparations might leak to the press, risks that the highly publicized summit meeting might fail, risks of bad reactions in Japan, Korea, Taiwan or elsewhere. Moreover, he was undertaking this trip at a time when the war in Vietnam was raging and when the U.S. was suffering heavy casualties at the hands of an enemy supported by Peking. Finally, his approach to China could be seen as a bit premature. Why not wait until Mao passed from the scene -- which seemed fairly imminent?

The very fact that the President took all these risks underlines the great importance he attached to a U.S.-China rapprochement. As he said to me on one occasion: "We simply cannot go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the PRC grows in military power." There was a need to move promptly at a time when the Chinese leaders were fearful of a Soviet attack and when we could not allow the Soviet Union to take Sino-U.S. hostility for granted in its policy calculations.

The President also had sound internal political reasons for his China initiative which was widely popular in the U.S., especially in academic, press and other circles critical of our role in the long, bloody, fruitless war in Vietnam. For many months, China took the headlines away from Vietnam. It cast U.S. foreign policy in a positive light during a critical year for the Nixon Administration.

It must be remembered that President Nixon also had a strong sense of the mark he would leave on history. That was evident from my first meeting with him in Jakarta, with all his note-taking and tape-recording of conversations.

China's affirmative response to Nixon's initiatives related overwhelmingly to its fears of Soviet aggressive intentions and of possible Soviet-U.S. collusion against China. But other factors were also undoubtedly involved. One of them was the perceived advantage to Peking in having closer ties between Peking, Washington and Tokyo, both in economic terms and in terms of better ensuring that Japan's military capabilities would remain limited and confined to Japan's self-defense through its defense ties with the United States. This point came through to me loud and clear in a conversation with a top Chinese official in Peking during the Nixon visit. The Chinese
have long memories, and surely one of the most painful of these memories is Japan's harsh occupation of North China and its half-century colonization of Taiwan.

President Nixon failed to recognize Japanese sensitivities in the sudden announcement of his trip to China. For years the Japanese had followed the American lead on China policy, even though they were anxious to get into the Chinese market through early recognition of the Peking government. It had been the nightmare of at least one Japanese prime minister that he would wake up one morning to find the Americans in Peking and the Japanese left in the lurch. It would have been possible to soften the blow to Prime Minister Sato and his government had President Nixon sent a personal emissary like Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who was well known and trusted in Japan, to explain the President's initiative at least a day in advance of its announcement. This would have given the Japanese government time to ready its public response, while underlining our respect for Japan's special interests in this important strategic move. I sensed that both Nixon and Kissinger compared the Japanese leadership unfavorably with the Chinese, seeing the Japanese as preoccupied with economic issues while the Chinese leaders thought in Nixon-Kissinger global strategic terms. It was not until Nixon returned to Washington from China that I learned that his obsession with keeping his China initiative secret was not, as alleged by Nixon, out of consideration for the wishes of the Chinese but for his own.

WINSTON LORD
National Security Council Staff
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Washington, DC (1973-1977)

Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. After serving in Washington and Geneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subsequently served on State's Policy Planning Staff. In 1985 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1989. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenned in 1998.

Q: Today is May 14, 1998. Let's talk first about your impressions of President Nixon, particularly early on in his administration.

LORD: Sure. I had worked for Nixon as a volunteer in the 1960 presidential campaign, as we discussed earlier. I knew his dark side, of course, but also felt that he was very well equipped to be President, particularly as far as foreign policy matters were concerned. Therefore, I went to work for him with considerable enthusiasm, and I was also enthusiastic about Kissinger, his brilliance, and his potential.
Clearly, what Nixon and Kissinger had in mind was first, and as the highest priority, to deal with problems involving the communist world. They wanted to have good relations with our allies and to get to issues like the Middle East. However, the three overriding challenges were to: end the war in Vietnam, open up a new relationship with China, and try to improve the relationship with the Soviet Union. These issues were, of course, interrelated. By improving relations with China and Russia they could put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate, since they were Hanoi's two major patrons. So Nixon had a clear feel for geopolitics. He had a sense, and we will get into greater detail on this, that by opening up to China he would loosen up our diplomacy generally and that he wouldn't have to deal with only Moscow in talking with the communist world.

Nixon obviously had a sense by then, and many Americans were slow to come to this appreciation, that the Sino-Soviet split was real. This became very clear after the clashes on the

Nixon also hoped, and here he put more emphasis than Kissinger ever did on this point, that Russia would help him end the war in Vietnam. During the presidential campaign of 1968 Nixon talked about having a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. He didn't really have a secret plan. I think that his main emphasis was that improving relations with the two communist giants, and particularly the Soviet Union, would help to bring pressure on Hanoi to end the war.

So Nixon's greatest strength was his conceptual approach to foreign policy, his geopolitical feel, and his sense of strategy as he entered office.

Q: So what were you doing at this point? Getting ready for the Nixon trip?

LORD: Yes. Then we had to work out the exact timing of President Nixon's trip to China and how we got ready for it logistically and substantively.

Let me pause and say that the most immediate and the most important impact was with Russia. We'll get back to Russia later, but let me say very quickly that we obviously got the attention of the Russians. As I said earlier, we had not been making much progress with the Russians. They hadn't agreed to holding a summit meeting, the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] were going slowly, the Berlin negotiations were not moving ahead, and we had up's and down's in the two previous years. Basically, we were trying to move, and Soviet-American relations were better than they had been in 1970, when we had several crises at once, but on the whole, we were just treading water.

Then, within weeks, the whole Soviet-American relationship started moving forward. This was very concrete evidence that the opening to China would help us with the Russians, which was one of the purposes of the Kissinger visit to Beijing. Within weeks, or months, the Russians agreed to holding a summit meeting as well, in this case in May, 1972, just a few months after Nixon would go to China. Of course, the Soviets realized that they had miscalculated and that they should have agreed to a summit meeting before the meeting in China was announced. The Soviets were totally caught by surprise. We then made a break through on the Berlin negotiations. I don't remember the dates, but that began moving very quickly, as we moved toward a very significant agreement. We made progress on arms control, so that we set up the SALT-I agreement by the time we got to Moscow in May, 1972. We began to talk with the Soviets about economic and other arrangements. Of all the reactions to the announcement of the Kissinger trip to China, I would say that the most important one by far, of a positive or, indeed,
any nature, was the reaction in Moscow. The most negative impact, of course, was in Japan, where the announcement caused severe embarrassment to the Japanese Government. However, the progress made in relations with the Soviets was very helpful.

It's hard to judge now how nervous this trip made Hanoi. It certainly didn't make the Vietnamese communist leaders immediately flexible. However, we figured that the combination of the announcement of both of these summit meetings was certainly going to put pressure on Hanoi to be more reasonable. We hoped, of course, that this would give an incentive to both Beijing and Moscow to put such pressure on Hanoi.

For example, in Beijing there was an ideological embarrassment in moving ahead with the U.S., which was fighting with their Vietnamese compatriots. We didn't realize fully at the time the extent of the Sino-Vietnamese hostility, either. We assumed at the time that, if they were not like lips and teeth, as they had once likened their relationship, at least the Chinese and Vietnamese communists were friendly. It was awkward for the Chinese to have American troops fighting against their ideological compatriots in Vietnam. Therefore, it was in the Chinese interest to try to get this war behind us.

Similarly in the case of the Russians, it was awkward, while they were trying to improve relations with the United States, to have their friends and allies engaged in a fight with us. In a little while I can get back to the Chinese view of Vietnam and how we dealt with that.

So the most immediate impact, I'd say, was on Japan, Moscow, and, to a certain extent, Hanoi.

Q: During these discussions in China, what was the view of the Chinese of the Soviets at that time? Were they trying to get any information from us or were they saying that we both know that the Soviets are bad people?

LORD: Let's get into some of these other issues. Regarding the Soviets, that clearly was a major theme throughout the Nixon visit to China. Kissinger and Nixon would play on this threat to China and us. They were always a little careful so that, if these remarks were transmitted to Brezhnev, they wouldn't be too embarrassed. They were fairly heavy on the dimensions of the Soviet threat. When we would talk to the Soviets, we would never say negative things about China, but we also would try to improve relations with Russia.

Early on we began briefing the Chinese on our relations with the Soviets. We worked on improving relations with the Russians, but we were also using the Chinese to induce the Russians to improve relations with us. With the Chinese, on the one hand we wanted to reassure them that we weren't being feckless and naive in seeking detente with the Russians. However, on the other hand, we had to spend a certain amount of time letting the Chinese know that we were moving somewhere with the Russians, too, to get them a little excited. So it was a carefully nuanced game here.

Kissinger was always meticulous, and Nixon was on his trip, to brief the Chinese about what our strategy was toward the Soviet Union. Basically, we would say: "Look, we want to improve our relations with Moscow. We don't deny that. They have nuclear weapons, and we don't want to get into a war with them. However, we have no illusions. The Soviets are tough and expansionist. And by the way, they are more of a threat to you than to us, given their geography, history, and capabilities. We don't really trust the Russians, but it's in our national interest to try
to improve our relationship with them on a hard-headed, pragmatic basis. We'll use pressures, but we'll also use some incentives. We know what we're doing." The sub-text to this was: "We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians." Indeed, we had a much more concrete agenda with Moscow than we did with China, where we were just launching a relationship. With Russia we had topics like arms control, Berlin, trade, exchanges, etc. With China it was essentially geopolitical dialogue in the early years.

The Chinese would be flat out in talking about Soviet pressures and threats. I don't know that they even went through the motions of saying that they wanted better relations with the Soviets. They might have, but they would talk about past Soviet perfidy and future concerns. I don't know that they complained that the Soviets did not help them with nuclear weapons, but they certainly referred to the border clashes and continuing Soviet pressures on China. At times, and this was truer in subsequent years, particularly in the mid 1970s, the Chinese would say: "You Americans are getting a little naïve with the Soviets. Detente is really an illusion. You're getting too soft and you're trying to stand on our shoulders to reach the Soviets. You're trying to use us and you're being naïve with the Russians." We got some of that flavor, particularly from Deng Xiaoping later on, but not so much from Mao and Zhou En-lai earlier on, as I recall.

So this was a heavy theme in our talks with China. Then there was the anti-hegemony reference in the Shanghai Communique. We were careful to brief the Chinese on what we were doing with Moscow. For example, after President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, we went to Moscow in May, 1972. Then, in June, 1972, Kissinger, myself, Holdridge, and so on went back to China for two main reasons. One was to debrief the Chinese on the Moscow Summit Meeting and fill them in, which we continually did. Secondly, we tried to get them to help more on Vietnam. Those were the two main reasons. So that was an example.

Through these trips, and more and more as we went along, we briefed the Chinese generally on policy and the status of negotiations with the Russians, always giving them a hard edge twist that we were not naïve and that we would make sure that the Russians did not take advantage of us. We began to share intelligence reports with the Chinese. Often Jon Howe, who was a military aide on the NSC staff, and I would go off and brief the Chinese on Russian troop deployments. We would also give them information on Soviet capabilities, both to show that we were friendly and that we were trying to share information that might be useful to them. And also, frankly, to make the Chinese a little nervous about Soviet intentions.

Q: You were saying that the President had a major decision to make.

LORD: The President had a major decision to make. He was scheduled to go to Moscow in a couple of weeks. The issue was how to respond to this major attack by North Vietnam on South Vietnam.

We had made major progress with the Soviets, and we can talk about this later. The fact of the opening to China made the Russians more reasonable on the issues of arms control, Berlin, economic relations, and so forth. So we were heading for a Summit Meeting which was set up with a lot of major agreements close to conclusion, including those affecting SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, then in the process of negotiation], arms control, and many other
aspects of Soviet-American relations, not to mention the double header of the Summit Meetings in China and in Russia. So we had a lot invested emotionally, intellectually, substantively, and politically looking toward this major advance in relations with the Russians. This had been one of our objectives for several years. Our positions were well established and well prepared. All of this now threatened to go down the tubes at the last minute, because of the proposed bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor.

To his credit, in my view, President Nixon’s position was firm and correct. First of all, as I said, he couldn’t afford to look so weak, and he would do less well with the Russians if he went to Moscow and didn't respond vigorously to their North Vietnamese ally attacking us with Russian arms. He might be regarded as a wimp by the Russians as well as Americans and the world, if he was in Moscow while American soldiers were getting killed with Soviet-made weapons and we were not responding. Secondly, and this is what distinguished Nixon from everybody else, and certainly Kissinger, he boldly predicted that the Russians would not cancel the Summit Meeting. He believed the Russians would go ahead anyway and let the President go to Moscow, looking strong and reacting strongly against the North Vietnamese attacks. He would gain the grudging respect of the Russians and wouldn't lose all of the benefits of the Summit Meeting in the fields of arms control and everything else. So he could have his cake and eat it, too, as the popular saying goes. Even if the Russians canceled the meeting, Nixon felt that it was better not to go to Moscow in view of our goals in Vietnam and international credibility. The worst outcome would be to go to Moscow and not do anything vis-a-vis North Vietnam.

Nixon proved to be prescient, just as he proved that those who were concerned about losing the Summit Meeting were wrong. On this issue Kissinger has to speak for himself. I suspect that Kissinger understood the need for the President to appear to be vigorous in his response on this issue. I also know that Kissinger felt that we might lose the Summit Meeting in Moscow, and he and I agonized over this. Therefore, I think, Kissinger was truly ambivalent on how to deal with this matter. I think that, on balance, he didn't want us to go as far as we did militarily but I don't want to speak for him. Surely he credits Nixon in retrospect for his courageous prescience.

I myself was opposed to the escalation of the air war against North Vietnam, partly because of my moderately dovish stance on carrying the war to North Vietnam. I felt that, above all, we shouldn't lose all of the advantages which we had gained in terms of relations with the Russians - arms control, Berlin, etc. So I was unhappy with this escalation in the air war against North Vietnam. In this respect, I was probably wrong. I was certainly wrong in terms of my estimate of what the Russians would do.

Q: Was the argument made that, since we had made this breakthrough to China, the Russians, that is to say, the Soviets were concerned with our gaining an advantage with the Chinese if the Soviets got huffy in their relations with the U.S.? Almost inadvertently, we were playing the China card.

LORD: A very good point. I'm sure that that's one of the arguments that Nixon made, that the Russians had a stake in this Summit Meeting as well and that they couldn't afford to be one-upped by the Chinese. Fortunately, we had already had our Summit Meeting with the Chinese. I don't know what China would have done in the same situation. They might have canceled the Summit Meeting. However, this happened after the Summit Meeting between the U.S. and
China. Nixon felt that we wouldn't have any respect from the Russians if he went to Moscow looking like a wimp in the face of this North Vietnamese offensive, using Russian arms.

These were Nixon's arguments, including the China dimension, and they showed his really firm, geopolitical grasp of the situation. I still recall flying up to Camp David on a beautiful spring day [Presidential retreat in northern Maryland, near the Pennsylvania border] with Kissinger in a helicopter to work with one of President Nixon's speechwriters on the speech announcing the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor. I was very depressed. Both of us were saying: "All of this effort with the Russians is going to go down the drain." It was a dramatic moment.

So we were able to roll back the North Vietnamese offensive, and the Russians went ahead with the Summit Meeting in Moscow. However, we didn't make any progress in negotiations with the

Q: During these times were you called on to look at how the Chinese might feel about the situation as we sort of played with the Soviets? Were you the person who said: "Well, what do you think that the Chinese will feel about this?"

In the early going with the Russians in 1969-1970 the relationship between the U.S. and Russia didn't make much progress. Indeed, there were some crises. There was a challenge over a potential, Russian submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos]. There was Russian backing for radicals in the Middle East. There were some tensions over Berlin. At the same time, there was the beginning of arms control talks and the emergence of a possibility of holding a summit meeting at some point between Russia and the U.S. This was a mixed bag, but the point is that during the period from 1969 to 1970 we really weren't moving ahead very effectively with the Russians, even though there were talks going on.

Of course, as with respect to most key foreign policy issues, the Russians' key interlocutor was Kissinger, and not the State Department. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Dobrynin, would meet regularly, usually in the Map Room of the White House to conduct private discussions and talks, as part of the conduct of foreign policy out of the Nixon-Kissinger White House, which we talked about before.

So, from the very beginning, there was an effort to try to improve relations with the Russians. We showed them that we would be tough when necessary, as we were in some of these crises that I've mentioned. Also, we were prepared to try to improve relations with Russia, if we could do so. We gave the Russians an incentive to improve relations but showed them that we could be firm if they pressed us on key areas.

Q: It is a puzzling thing. When you reflect on this, you might recall that Nixon was newly installed in office as President. He was showing a certain interest in foreign affairs. You would think that, since this summit meeting was to take place in Moscow, the Russians would have been eager to show that they were a big player. I think that you're right. It was probably some political affair or might have been a problem within the Politburo.

LORD: I'm sure that one possibility was that we indicated that we didn't want a summit meeting just for show, unlike the summit with China where the meeting was the message - reopening relations after 23 years of mutual isolation and hostility. We wanted to have some substantive achievements come out of it. We thought that, central to that, there had to be something on arms
control. It may well have been that the Soviet military leaders, who were rather conservative, didn't like some of the arms control limitations that were being kicked around. Maybe their hesitation about entering into an arms control agreement, which would logically be the central achievement of a summit meeting, slowed things down. It may be that they were holding out and trying to make President Nixon make more concessions, thinking maybe that he was eager for a summit meeting. If they dragged their feet, they might get such concessions immediately near the summit meeting.

The Soviets may have hoped to extract additional concessions from the U.S. in order to get a summit meeting, whether they involved arms control or anything else. I think that is the most likely reason, based on tactical, rather than strategic considerations. I'm sure that the Soviets would have welcomed a summit meeting, particularly in Moscow. They probably figured that by dragging out the process, they would be able to get a more reasonable U.S. position on certain issues. They saw the negotiations leading to a summit meeting as a sort of bargaining chip. I think that is the most reasonable explanation, because the Russians were fairly crude in their negotiating tactics. They had the mentality of rug merchants.

Q: With Kissinger keeping Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin abreast of this, we were just not going to lose in this connection. The Soviets were supplying the North Vietnamese. We could say to the Russians to knock this off and we would knock off what we were doing.

LORD: Absolutely. The constant factor for a couple of years with the Russians was, first of all, what we said wouldn't be all that explicit. It would depend on how you would phrase it. We would make our points primarily in Washington in discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin but also when we went to Moscow and would see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as Soviet President Brezhnev. The basic themes we would follow would be that we were trying honorably to end the Vietnam War, but we were not going to do it dishonorably. We would suggest to the Soviets to advise the North Vietnamese to settle for a military settlement only and that we would not attempt to decide the future of the South Vietnamese, which they would decide for themselves. We would say, furthermore, that it was in the interest of the Russians to get this war behind us so that we wouldn't have this major problem in our bilateral relationship. Certainly, Soviet interest with us in arms control, stability in Europe, and economic cooperation with the U.S. were of much greater importance than sticking with these fanatic friends of the Soviet Union, who were just complicating the situation.

We would make clear to the Soviets that we would not expect them to sell out their friends, the North Vietnamese. However, we expected the Russians, in their own self interest, to pressure the North Vietnamese to be reasonable. We would say that, on this particular occasion, when Hanoi launched its Easter Offensive of 1972, this was outrageous. The Russians knew that we were negotiating with the North Vietnamese in an effort to reach a reasonable settlement. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had undertaken this major offensive. We would also say that furthermore, President Nixon cannot go to Moscow while the Soviet Union is supplying the North Vietnamese with weapons, with which they are killing U.S. troops, without responding vigorously.

Much more attention could now be paid to our allies and other issues. There was a turning to the year of Europe and the strengthening of our trans-Atlantic relations. Clearly, there was going to be more focus on the Middle East than there had been. We could begin to pay more attention to the Western Hemisphere, to economic and energy problems, and to the Third World more
generally, including Africa. All of these matters were in Nixon's and Kissinger's eyes as issues that we could pay much more attention to in the second Nixon term. During the first term, attention was focused on problems of relations with the Communist countries, as well as the Vietnam War, which Nixon felt that he had to settle on what he considered an honorable basis. He wanted to free himself up, not only to deal with domestic debate and distractions, but also to pay greater attention to how we were spending our resources on diplomacy more generally throughout the world.

Detente with the Russians had obviously been more urgent because of the danger coming from the global relationship with the Soviet Union, which was the single, most important issue on which we had to move forward. That was moving ahead, with the summit meeting with the Russians, and so on. Of course, there was also the opening of relations with China, which helped President Nixon on all fronts. This was a dramatic development in and of itself. We also had the impact, for the American people, of easing the Vietnam trauma. Clearly, any settlement of the Vietnam War was going to be less than perfect. It had some dangers in it, and we later saw it unravel for a variety of reasons which I have discussed elsewhere.

Q: At a certain point, the difference was really not significant.

LORD: Even a more modest Soviet nuclear capability would have been a great threat to the United States. Obviously, the Soviet nuclear dimension and their ability to push the envelope internationally was a matter of concern to us. Remember that the Soviet Union had proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, after the Prague Spring. By the way, this was one thing that really concerned the Chinese. In effect, the Brezhnev Doctrine said that the Russians had the right to determine the domestic system of other, socialist countries. That got the attention of the Chinese, along with the border clashes with the Russians along the Sino-Soviet border on the Ussuri River opposite Manchuria.

So, for all of these reasons we all felt that we had to be firm with the Russians, we had to maintain a strong defense, and we needed to exert some pressure in order to get the Russians' attention, given the way they negotiate and their history. Whether they deployed missiles in Cuba during the Kennedy administration, established a submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos], encouraged radical Arabs, or fooled around with the access routes to Berlin, we felt that we had to react strongly to what we regarded as Soviet provocations.

At the same time, I agreed with the Nixon-Kissinger approach that, in addition to firmness, we had to give the Soviets some incentives to develop a better relationship with us. As long as we made clear that the Soviets couldn't push us around, we also had to make clear that we weren't out to dominate Russia or overthrow their regime and that we were prepared to respect them as a major power. We were prepared to have a more normal relationship with Russia, as far as arms control, trade, and other exchanges were concerned. We were also prepared to negotiate with them on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. I think that this combination of incentives and pressures reflected our view of the Russians. We thought that they wouldn't be irrational if we gave them an option that would be more attractive. However, we had to be firm so that they wouldn't be tempted toward adventurism.

Kissinger and Nixon came under attack for appearing to be soft on the Soviets. Their view was that we had to have a closely linked position, whether this involved trying to maintain a strong
defense and intelligence capability, despite attacks from Congress, whether it involved resisting the Soviets in the many crises that I've mentioned, or whether it was just plain, tough negotiations. This above all, we were not soft. But, beyond that, Kissinger and Nixon felt that an all-out confrontation with the Soviets would, of course, be very dangerous in the nuclear age. It could cause strains with our allies, and could cause some problems domestically. We felt that if we were ever going to have a major confrontation with the Russians, we had to have demonstrated to the American people, the Congress, and other countries around the world that we had tried to be more reasonable and had tried to have a more normal relationship with the Russians. We needed to demonstrate that this confrontation was forced upon us by unrelenting Soviet adventurism, as opposed to our prematurely going into dangerous confrontations. Such confrontations would not only be dangerous; we might not have the necessary allied and domestic support because we had not tried to follow a more flexible approach.

I'm sure that Nixon and Kissinger would argue that they recognized that the Soviets were not all that strong. The Soviets were certainly dangerous, but, over the long haul, we sought to buy time and wear them down by pursuing a policy of containment of Russia and also seeking better relations with them. Over time, Nixon and Kissinger believed, the Soviet system would collapse or erode, as George Kennan himself had suggested in his famous article in "Foreign Affairs" magazine in the late 1940s. He used the pseudonym of "X" for the article.

By far the most exhaustive rationale for detente and review of the record in U.S.-Soviet relations was provided in the summer of 1974. Together with the experts I worked very hard on what was basically a White Paper, and background for congressional hearings. It was a very eloquent document, but received very little attention because Watergate was coming to a climax.

Nixon and Kissinger felt that Senator Jackson, the neo-conservatives, and others, shared the strategic approach of containing the Russians, which they all agreed upon. But Nixon and Kissinger felt that the tactics of Senator Jackson and others were ill-considered, were overly confrontational, and could provoke a crisis and lose domestic support. They felt that it was necessary to play for the long run by being reasonable as well as firm at the same time. Kissinger felt that Jackson and his staff, e.g., Richard Perle, working with allies like Schlesinger and Rumsfeld, kept undermining our Soviet policy. In one example their attacks on arms control agreements being worked out with the Soviets in Vladivostok in November 1974 sunk them. By the time Kissinger got back to Washington, after visiting China, the debate was lost.

Part of the trouble that Kissinger ran into in the field of foreign affairs during the years of the Ford administration was his underestimation of the desire of our people and Congress to reflect values in our foreign policy. Fairly or unfairly, the American people aren't used to the concept of the balance of power or the European approach to diplomacy anyway, which Kissinger thrived on as an historian, and to this day remains his basic view of the world. The American people and Congress felt that there had to be a human component, that other countries' domestic systems were relevant, and that human rights was a subject to which we had to pay attention. Therefore, Kissinger encountered criticism from the Right that we weren't doing enough to bring about change in the Soviet domestic system of government, even as the Left was saying that we were being too tough in trying to affect Soviet external behavior. The Left too was concerned about human rights. So Kissinger was attacked from both ends of the political spectrum, as I mentioned before, diluting this combination of sticks and carrots. That's why detente ran into considerable trouble.
Cuba

CLARENCE S. BOONSTRA
Assistant Agricultural Attaché
Havana (1943-1945)

Economic Counselor, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
Havana (1955-1958)

Clarence A. Boonstra was born in Grand Rapids, Michigan on January 5, 1914. He attended Michigan State University and proceeded to obtain a Ph. D. in Agricultural Economics from Louisiana State University. He began work in the USDA but moved to the Foreign Service in 1946. He has since served in Havana, Manila, Lima, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Washington, Mexico City and was Ambassador to Costa Rica. He retired in 1974. Mr. Boonstra was interviewed in 1989 by Mr. Donald Barnes.

Q: That's also very interesting, too. There are those apologists for Castro who say that we drove him into the arms of communism. That he originally set out to be a democratic reformer. Do you attach any credence to that?

BOONSTRA: Well, State Department arranged a meeting with Vice President Nixon because President Eisenhower would not receive him. Many of Castro's first cabinet had been friends of mine, particularly Felipe Pazos and Lopez Fresquet, in positions such as Minister of Finance, Head of Central Bank, etc. They were up in Washington with him and saw a great deal of them while they were in the United States. I was then in charge of East Coast Affairs, thus I had nothing technically to do with Cuba. I did see Castro enough to have a number of personal conversations with him. Also, of course, I had observed him during my time in Cuba during the six months after he landed in the Sierra Maestra and heard a great deal about him from his friends as well as from the opposition. My own belief is that Fidel Castro displayed a considerable amount of Marxist influence. I don't consider that he necessarily felt terribly deeply about it but his outlook on the world was clearly marked by Marxist influence as we know from his presence in Bogota and so forth. But in the limited contact that I had with him, and in the opinions of people like Felipe Pazos and Lopez Fresquet and other first members of the cabinet, it was more their feeling and it's my feeling that he looked over the world and made a conscious choice that his prospects for attaining and holding power in Cuba were better through the Soviet approach. Also, the one point which Castro made to me and which he made to Felipe Pazos and to Rufo Lopez Fresquet and others was that he would not be dissuaded from expropriation of American property. He was willing to consider partial compensation only in bonds having no real cash payoff, highly prejudicial to US investors. While Castro was in the Sierra Maestra
Felipe Pazos was with him there. Felipe sent me a long letter wanting to know just what the American views were on this. After consultation with the State Department, we replied saying that we would insist absolutely on adequate, proper, and just compensation. Later I learned that Castro then told Felipe, that's one point we can never compromise and never will. Thus, there was no way of really working closely if we couldn't get past that point. This was more important to us in those days than were the political aspects of Castro's alliance with the Soviet Union. The important thing to me from my perspective is that here was no compromise possible, either between Fidel Castro and the United States. Thus, he probably had no route to go other than to the Soviet Union. I think it was really more a practical choice than a strong sense of ideology. I don't really believe that Fidel had too much ideology other than gaining and holding power.

MICHAEL H. NEWLIN
United Nations Affairs
Washington, DC (1958-1963)

Ambassador Newlin was born in North Carolina and was raised there and in the Panama canal zone. After graduating from Harvard he joined the Foreign Service in 1952 and was posted to Frankfort, Oslo, Paris, Kinshasa and Jerusalem, where served as Consul General. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Newlin served in several high level positions dealing with the United Nations and its agencies and NATO. He served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1981 to 1985 and as US representative to the United Nations Agencies in Vienna., 1988-1991. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

NEWLIN: The most exciting thing that happened while I was in UNP was the Cuban missile crisis. Some of us were called in on a Saturday afternoon. Sisco wanted to know where, we had a young man named White, where his files were. So we had to go and find his safe and files. We were then dismissed. We surmised it is either Cuba or he was working on Honduras. Well it turned out of course it was Cuba. So when we finally got to the denouement of this big Security Council meeting with Adlai there, Cleveland was of course on top of all of the things. He said, “The OAS (Organization of American States) is meeting this afternoon.” We had a resolution there condemning the installation of the missiles in Cuba, calling on the Soviets to remove them. Cleveland sent a member of our United National political affairs over to be at the OAS for the vote. We were all in Cleveland’s office that evening glued to the television. The telephone rang and it was JFK. He said, “Harlan, the OAS just voted in our favor unanimously except for Cuba. We have got to get this up to New York right away.” So Cleveland said, “Mr. President, if you will look at your TV screen, you will see Joe Sisco handing a note to Adlai with the vote.” Now I call that completed staff work. If there ever was completed staff work that was it. One of the big advantages I remember is I got to go up to New York for brief periods and then also I got to go up for one whole assembly. For some reason I had items that Adlai was interested in, and so to show you what a wonderful person he was.

NEWLIN: Some years later Khrushchev told Rusk that he had talked to many West European leaders and all of them said they were not prepared to fight if the Soviets took West Berlin. Rusk
replied, “Well, you much recon with the fact that the Americans would be foolish enough to do so. Perhaps it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev was asked during a press conference if he believed the U.S. was a paper tiger. He replied, “Maybe so, but the tiger has thermonuclear teeth.”

Incidentally, I do have something I think I should add about the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, because this happened years later when I was on a mission to Moscow. It was at a luncheon and the Russian that I was sitting next to had been an aide to Khrushchev. They were down I think in Yalta. The subject came up of American intercontinental ballistic missiles in Turkey right across the Black Sea. Just maybe less than 200 miles, Minuteman. My luncheon companion who was there said Khrushchev declared, “Well if the Americans have nuclear missiles that close to the Soviet Union, then I want Nuclear missiles in Cuba close to the United States.” That was when he gave orders to do that. As a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Russians removed their missiles from Cuba. Secretly Kennedy committed to remove our missiles from Turkey which was done after a time.

WILLIAM LENDERKING

Rotation Officer, USIA

Havana (1959-1960)

A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the US Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the US Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where held senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

But in retrospect I think Ambassador Bonsal was slow to recognize just how far Fidel Castro was prepared to go and that he was not really interested in good relations with us, except totally on his own terms. In short, I think from the beginning Fidel was convinced he could never carry out his revolution unless Cuba’s close ties with the U.S. were broken. He later said he’d always been a communist and forged a close relationship with the Soviets, replacing Cuba’s dependency on the U.S. with one on the Soviet Union. But in his radical student days and in the early period of his rule, Castro was never a committed Marxist-Leninist and merely used the rhetoric and the socialist model as guideposts for his very personalist policies.

ROBERT M. SAYRE

Economic Counselor

Havana (1960-1961)

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre became interested in the U.S. Foreign Service after serving for four years in the U.S. Army
during World War II. He began his career at the State Department in 1949. Ambassador Sayre held positions in Peru and Cuba, and ambassadorships to Uruguay, Panama, and Brazil. He was interviewed in 1995 by Thomas Dunnigan.

Q: Did we have any reason to believe that the Soviet Union was shipping missiles to Cuba?

SAYRE: At the time, I don't really think they were. I think this happened just a little bit after. But we knew that the Soviet Union was heavily involved--the Cubans worked out an agreement with the Soviet Union while we were there. One of the things that I tried to persuade the Department of State to do in order to disrupt what was going on was to embargo all sugar from Cuba. We were buying 3 million tons annually of sugar from Cuba. But it didn't, wouldn't do it. After Cuba worked out a sugar agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States finally embargoed sugar from Cuba in 1961.

WILLIAM T. PRYCE
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Washington, DC (1960-1961)

Born in California and raised in Pennsylvania, Mr. Pryce was educated at Wesleyan University and the Fletcher School of Tufts University. After service in the US Navy he worked briefly for the Department of Commerce before joining the Foreign Service in 1958. Though primarily a Latin America specialist, Mr. Pryce also served in Moscow. His Latin America assignments include Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, Bolivia and Honduras, where he was Ambassador from 1992-1996. Ambassador Pryce was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: Today is the 16th of October, 1997. Let's start talking about the Bay of Pigs. Again you were doing what?

PRYCE: At that point I was a special assistant to the assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs in the State Department, Thomas Mann. I must say it was a unique position because Secretary Mann wanted to have a staff assistant in all his meetings and so he insisted that I get clearances to attend meetings that he had with the CIA, with Defense and others without holds barred. As a result I was involved in the meetings that were leading up to the Bay of Pigs. There was a very detailed plan developed by the CIA involving an invasion of Cuba from Nicaragua and Guatemala originally. The overall plan was to first destroy Castro’s air fields by having planes take off from a couple of places, and bomb the air fields, bomb Castro’s planes on the ground so that the invasion could then take place.

Mr. Mann felt this was not a viable program and he opposed it inside the circles of the government. He wrote a memo to Secretary Rusk showing why this plan wasn’t the right one. He became very unpopular of course with the Agency because there was tremendous pressure frankly. We had built up this huge apparatus that President Kennedy was handed and there were hundreds of people, perhaps thousands of people, ready to go on this invasion and it would be
very difficult to call it off. Mann had two fundamental points. One that it probably wouldn’t succeed. It would have great difficulty succeeding without U.S. involvement and that the U.S. should not be involved but that if we did become involved, we should see it through and we should be prepared to use U.S. troops to make it succeed.

He then proposed an alternative plan; if something had to be done we should try to use the OAS. It was a very interesting time because there were people that felt this plan would not succeed. Another fascinating thing was that this was a covert plan which was bandied about in The New York Times for probably a month before the invasion took place.

Q: Well Stevenson was considered by this new thrusting group, activists, to be soft.

PRYCE: I guess it was a question of plausible denial. What I remember very clearly was that one of the premises was that the Agency had at least one or two, several I think, Cuban pilots that were supposed to take off from the air field, then turn around and bomb it, and then fly off to other places, so the story that this was a Cuban operation would have some plausibility. Of course that never happened and I don’t know if that was ever a serious possibility or not but it was touted as a possibility. The decision was made to go ahead and go without the people from Cuba so I think maybe they had a plane that had been in Cuba at one point. I’m recalling now that Stevenson was very much embarrassed in the UN because he made statements which later turned out to be not correct. I also remember that what had happened is that the initial raids did not achieve their purpose, they were only partially successful, but the decision then was to go ahead anyway.

I would like to mention one thing that I think has come out lately but not always. There were a lot of stories around that at the last minute President Kennedy held back the participation of U.S. forces. My recollection is that that clearly was not the case. President Kennedy at all times made very clear at all discussions that I heard about and certainly in the other discussions, that there was to be no U.S. involvement. This was one of the things that Mann was saying, that if we do this we shouldn’t fail but it was very clear that the president made up his mind ahead of time that there would be no U.S. participation.

What happened was when the invasion was in trouble, the president did relent to the point of allowing an air cover to cover the beachhead at the Bay of Pigs so that the people there would not be pounded by Cuban air. An air cover was authorized but never a U.S. attack. I’ve heard pilots talk about it, I was up there and we were ready to go. I think that probably lower in the chain of command maybe our U.S. military wanted to go but there was never, to my knowledge, ever, any thought that U.S. forces would be directly involved. President Kennedy never called anybody off. He basically refused to have involvement as he always said he would.

Q: It’s a little bit like 1914 when everybody mobilized and the Germans said we’ve got to invade France rather than fight the Russians. The whole thing got caught up in military plans.

PRYCE: Clearly the president was fully briefed but there was a certain pressure to go forward with the plan.

JORDAN THOMAS ROGERS
Reports Officer, Staff Secretariat
Mr. Rogers was born in South Carolina and raised in North Carolina. After graduating from the University of North Carolina, he served with the United States Air Force in WWII. Entering the Foreign Service in 1946, he served at a variety of foreign posts in Europe, Latin America and Asia, primarily as Economic and Political Officer. His final overseas post was Rawalpindi, Pakistan, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. In Washington, Mr. Rogers was assigned to the Department’s Staff Secretariat, to the Department of Defense as Foreign Affairs Officer and finally as Economic Officer in the Department’s Latin America Bureau.

I was there during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which of course, and very properly, had everyone on pins and needles. There were several channels then in use between Washington and Moscow, one from Washington to the US Embassy in Moscow, and the other through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. One night when I was on the late shift (we were then running 24/7, as the saying is now), we had an urgent message for the Soviets to be delivered to the Soviet Embassy. Well, our regular messenger was gone, and since I was about to leave, I said I’d run it over. I was driving our second car, a beaten up old black Ford, about twenty years old, and I’ve always wondered what the FBI thought when this old wreck pulled up about 3 a.m. in front of the Soviet Embassy and some joker gets out and goes to the front door with a big envelope in his hands.

Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, I was taken out once for a tour of the facility where certain people would be taken in the event of a nuclear attack, to keep the government functioning. That was rasher scary, in particular the concept that if you were at work when it happened and were on the “go” list, you went, leaving your family to fend for themselves. I had an aunt in North Carolina who sent us a key, but how Sarah could have managed if I had been at work, or even how we both would have managed, thank goodness we’ll never know.

LEONARD MEEKER
Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State

Ambassador Leonard Meeker was born in New Jersey in 1916. He graduated from Amherst College in 1937 and received his law degree from Harvard University. After serving in the army in World War II, he worked for the Departments of Treasury and Justice before joining the Department of State in 1946. Ambassador Meeker was interviewed by Robert Martens in 1989.

Q: When did you first learn of the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba?

MEEKER: Very late on the afternoon of Thursday, October 18, 1962, Secretary Dean Rusk asked me to come to his office. When I arrived, he told me that photo reconnaissance showed the presence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, and said that it appeared that the Soviets were shortly going to equip them with nuclear armed missiles. I asked a couple of questions. First, whether it was quite clear and definite from the photography that these conclusions were correct. Secondly, whether, if the missiles, in fact, were there and remained operational, they would, indeed,
become a security threat to the United States. His answer to both questions was "Yes." He asked me to develop a legal analysis of the situation, focusing on the steps which the United States might take in order to secure the removal of the sites, the missiles, and, if present, the warheads from Cuba.

Q: What did your memorandum to Secretary Rusk state concerning the steps open to the United States and international law?

MEEKER: There was not a lot of time to work on this because Mr. Rusk wanted a memorandum by 7:00 that evening, only a little more than four and a half hours away. He also asked me to work on it alone, without disclosing to anyone else or consulting anyone else about the subject.

So I went back to my office and got out some treaties, including the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the United Nations charter. I began to think about--and then to write--a legal memorandum on the subject. What I concluded and put into the memorandum was that, under the Rio Treaty, the council of the Organization of American States could be convoked as an organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty, and could, under that treaty, recommend to members of the OAS that they take appropriate measures to remove a threat to the peace of America, if they found such a threat to exist.

There is another provision in the Rio Treaty which provides for action by the organization and its members if an armed attack occurs against a member of the inter-American community. It did not seem to me that any armed attack had occurred by any country against any other and, for that reason, I did not rely upon the provisions dealing with armed attack, but rather, on a later provision of the treaty which provides for consultation and recommendation in the event the organ of consultation should find the existence of a threat to the peace of America. I said, "I thought that the council could reasonably conclude that the placement of nuclear armed missiles in Cuba--not only near the United States, but near many other members of the OAS--did indeed constitute a threat to the peace of America within the meaning of the Rio Treaty."

Under the treaty, the organ of consultation has the right to recommend measures to member states, to be taken in such a case. The recommendation requires a two-thirds vote. It is not binding upon members. It merely authorizes them to take action which is recommended by the organ of consultation. It was necessary, also, to relate this whole subject to the United Nations charter, because the United Nations charter contains provisions prohibiting the use of force against any country in contravention of international law. There is an exception in the case of armed attack, but I did not conclude that this was such a case.

The charter also has another exception, and that exception is for action taken by a regional organization. Indeed, the provisions of the UN charter on regional organizations in chapter eight were designed and tailored specifically to take account of the existence of the inter-American system. So it seemed to me that a very good argument could be made that, if the council of the OAS recommended even military measures to remove what we characterized as a threat to the peace of America, this, indeed, would be consistent with the UN charter, because it would be the action of a regional organization recognized as legitimate in chapter eight of the charter.
Q: Secretary Rusk, you said, requested this memorandum by 7:00 on the evening of October 18. Can you tell us what took place the following morning, then, in the Department of State?

MEEKER: I took the memorandum to Mr. Rusk that evening about 7:00. The next morning, around 8:30 or 8:45, George Ball, then Under Secretary of State, convoked a meeting in his office to discuss the whole problem of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. One of the subjects, which we naturally discussed, was military measures to prevent the introduction of any more Soviet material by sea into Cuba. Some of the participants who were there, naturally, said, "This was a blockade and the United States should declare a blockade of Cuba, and then enforce it with our Navy." I suggested that this was not really the best terminology, because a blockade implies the existence of a state of war. The United States had not declared war against either Cuba or the Soviet Union, and certainly would not wish to do so. In order to avoid any implication of a state of war from the imposition of measures which we described as blockade, I thought we should adopt different terminology.

I was remembering, then, the speech given by Franklin Roosevelt decades before, in which he had spoken of quarantining the aggressor. So I suggested as an alternative to blockade the term "defensive quarantine." It seemed to me that if we were to take military measures involving our Navy to prevent the arrival of any more war material in Cuba, we would do best to describe it as a defensive quarantine--a measure that was defensive in character and which did not imply the existence of a state of war between anyone.

Q: I believe that, later that morning, an Ex-Comm meeting took place--that is, on the morning of October 19. Could you indicate who attended that meeting and what took place there?

MEEKER: About 9:00, on the morning of October 19th, the group which had been meeting in Under Secretary Ball's office moved across the hall to the conference room, where Ex-Comm was to meet. Those present were Secretary Rusk; Under Secretary Ball; Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson; Assistant Secretary Edward Martin; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; the Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric; and Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Defense Department, Paul Nitze; General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Attorney General Robert Kennedy; Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach; CIA Director John McCone; Ray Cline, also of the CIA; McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Theodore Sorensen, speech writer for President Kennedy; and Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State.

Q: Can you go on, then, to tell us what took place at that meeting?

MEEKER: The meeting began with Secretary Rusk asking Alexis Johnson if he was ready to lay a program before the group, a program of proposed action. Alex Johnson said that he was not ready to do that. Then there followed a briefing on the basis of photographic intelligence presented by a CIA representative, Arthur Lundahl.

After this, Mr. McCone asked Ray Cline to give the most recent intelligence estimate conclusions of the US Intelligence Board. Mr. Cline did this on the basis of three papers which
were then distributed to the group. In his presentation, he covered the question of what the state of construction was at the missile sites, and what was believed to be the probable development at those sites, with the arrival of missiles and possibly war heads later.

Mr. Rusk then said he thought there ought to be some exposition of the legal framework to surround any possible military measures by the United States. He was about to ask me to do that, when Attorney General Kennedy signaled and said Mr. Katzenbach will do that. So Nick Katzenbach, at that point, expressed the view that the President had ample constitutional and statutory authority to take any needed military measures. He thought a declaration of war was unnecessary, and from the standpoint of international law, Mr. Katzenbach thought US action would be justified on the principle of self-defense.

I said I did not think a declaration of war would improve our position, but would, indeed, impair it, and that, furthermore, if we were going to engage in measures which we could describe as a defensive quarantine of Cuba, involving the use of force, we would need to relate this to the provisions and obligations of the United Nations charter. It did not seem to me that the situation in Cuba constituted armed attack by any country against another, and that we needed to consider it on another basis. I said, "I also did not think that one could simply say that any action to be taken by the United States was justifiable, if we said it was self-defense." I reviewed the provisions of the Rio Treaty and of the UN charter and laid forth the analysis which I had expressed in the memorandum to Secretary Rusk.

There was then a discussion as to whether the necessary votes would be obtainable in the Organization of American States. Mr. Rusk asked Ed Martin, the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, to give his estimate about this. Mr. Martin said he thought the US could immediately secure the vote of 14 out of the then 20 members functioning in the OAS. He thought that within 24 hours we could raise that majority up to 17, or maybe even 18 or 19. He was hopeful in regard to Ecuador and Chile, and believed there was a good chance of getting Mexico.

At this point, Attorney General Kennedy said, "The President would be placed in an impossible position if we went to the OAS and failed to get the necessary votes, or if there were a delay." He asked if we could be perfectly sure of the outcome before seeking OAS concurrence. Mr. Martin said he hated to guarantee anything, but he had a lot of confidence about this. You could not go to the American Republics in advance without loss of security, but he felt that a last minute approach by US Ambassadors to heads of state laying the situation on the line would produce the votes. Attorney General Kennedy once again expressed his great concern at the possibility of some slip if this course were to be followed.

Then there was a discussion which covered a meeting held the night before with the President. One participant looked back on that meeting and believed it had arrived at a tentative conclusion to institute a blockade, and thought the President had been satisfied at the consensus, which was seemingly arrived at among his advisors. General Taylor quickly indicated that he had not concurred, and that the Joint Chiefs had reserved their position. McBundy said he had reflected a great deal upon the situation in the course of a sleepless night. He doubted whether the strategy group was serving the President as well as it might, if it merely recommended a blockade. He
had spoken with the President this morning, and he felt there was further work to be done. A blockade would not remove the missiles. Its effects were uncertain and, in any event, would be slow to be felt. Something more would be needed to get the missiles out of Cuba. This would be made more difficult by the prior publicity of a blockade, and the consequent pressures from the United Nations for a negotiated settlement. An air strike would be quick and would take out the bases in a clean surgical operation. He favored decisive action with its advantages of surprise and confronting the world with fait accompli.

There was then discussion of this general subject as to which line of action ought to be pursued. Mr. Rusk asked Mr. Acheson for his views. Acheson said Khrushchev had presented the United States with a direct challenge. We were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we got to a showdown, the better. He favored cleaning the missile bases out decisively with an air strike. "There was something else to remember," he said. "This wasn't just another instance of Soviet missiles aimed at the United States. Here they were in the hands of a madman whose actions would be perfectly irresponsible. The usual restraints operating on the Soviets would not apply. We better act, and act quickly."

As far as questions of international law might be involved, Mr. Acheson agreed with Mr. Katzenbach's position that self-defense was an entirely sufficient justification. But if there were going to be imported a qualification or requirement of approval by the OAS, as apparently suggested by Mr. Meeker, he could not go along with that. Secretary Dillon said he agreed there should be a quick air strike. Mr. McCone was of the same opinion.

General Taylor said that a decision now to impose a blockade was a decision to abandon the possibility of an air strike. A strike would be feasible for only a few more days. After that, the missiles would be operational. Thus, it was now or never for an air strike. He favored such a strike. If this were to take place Sunday morning, a decision would have to be made at once, so that the necessary preparations could be ordered. For a Monday morning strike, a decision would have to be reached tomorrow—meaning Saturday—because 48 hours' notice was required.

Secretary McNamara said that he would give orders for the necessary military dispositions, so that if the decision were for a strike, the Air Force would be ready. He did not, however, advocate an air strike. He favored the alternative, a blockade. Under Secretary George Ball said he was a waiver between the two courses of action.

At this point, Attorney General Kennedy said, with a grin on his face, that he too had had a talk with the President, indeed, very recently, only this morning. It seemed to him three main possibilities. One was to do nothing—that would be unthinkable. Another was an air strike. The third was a blockade. He thought it would be very, very difficult, indeed, for the President if the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor, and with all the implications that this would have for us, and whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions. Thousands of Cubans would be killed without warning and a lot of Russians too. He favored action to make known unmistakably the seriousness of US determination to get the missiles out of Cuba. But he felt the action should allow the Soviets some room for maneuver, to pull back from their over extended position in Cuba.
Mac Bundy, addressing himself to the Attorney General, said this was all very well, but a blockade would not eliminate the bases; an air strike would.

I then asked, at this point, "Who would be expected to be the government of Cuba, after an air strike? Would it be anyone other than Castro? If not, would anything be solved, and would we not be in a worse situation than before?"

After a pause, Ed Martin replied that, of course, a good deal might be different after a strike, and Castro might be toppled in its aftermath. Others expressed the view that we might have to proceed with an invasion after an air strike. Still another suggestion was that US armed forces seize the base areas alone, in order to eliminate the missiles. Secretary McNamara thought this a very unattractive kind of undertaking, from the military point of view.

Toward 1:00, Secretary Rusk said he thought this group could not make the decision as to what was to be done. This was for the President, in consultation with his constitutional advisors, presumably meaning Cabinet members and the Joint Chiefs. The Secretary thought the group's duty was to present to the President for his consideration fully staffed out alternatives. So two working groups ought to be formed, one to work out the blockade alternative and the other to work out the air strike. Alex Johnson was designated to head the first of those, and Mac Bundy the second. Mr. Johnson was to have with him Ambassador Thompson, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Martin, Mr. Nitze, and myself. Mac Bundy was to have Secretary Dillon, Mr. Acheson, and General Taylor. Mr. McCone was asked to serve with the air strike group, but begged off on the ground that his position and duties on the US Intelligence Board made it undesirable for him to participate in a policy working group. Mr. Katzenbach was detailed to the Johnson group, later visiting the Bundy group to observe and possibly serve there as devil's advocate.

Ted Sorensen commented that he thought he had absorbed enough to start on the draft of a speech for the President. There was some inconclusive discussion on the timing of such a speech, on the danger of leaks before then, and on the proper time for meeting with the President once more, in view of his current Western campaign trip.

Before the whole group dispersed, Ambassador Thompson said, "The Soviets attached importance to questions of legality, and we should be able to present a strong legal case."

Attorney General Kennedy, as he was about to leave the room, said he thought there was ample basis for a blockade.

I said, "Yes, that's so, provided the organ of consultation under the Rio Treaty adopted an appropriate resolution."

The Attorney General then said, "That's all political, it's not legal." On leaving the room he said to Nick Katzenbach, half humorously, "Remember now, you're working for me."
These two groups met separately until about 4:00. They then reconvened and were joined once more by the cabinet officers, who had been away during the earlier part of the afternoon. The Johnson group scenario, which was more nearly complete and was ready earlier, was discussed first. Numerous criticisms were advanced. Some were answered—others led to changes. There was again a discussion of timing, now in relation to a presidential radio address. Ed Martin thought Sunday might be too early, as it would be virtually impossible to get to the Latin American heads of state on Sunday. Ambassador Thompson made the point that 24 hours must be allowed to elapse between announcement of a blockade and enforcement, so as to give the Soviet government time to get instructions to their ship captains. About two hours were spent on the Johnson scenario.

Then, at 6:00, the Bundy approach was taken up, its author saying "It's been much more fun for us up to this point, since we have had a chance to poke holes in the blockade plan. Now the roles will be reversed." Not much more than a half-hour was spent on the Bundy air strike scenario.

More than once during the afternoon, Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the US would have to pay a price to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. He thought we would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey, and we would probably have to pay more besides.

At different times the possibility of nuclear conflict breaking out was referred to. The point was made that once the Cuban missile installations were complete and operational, a new strategic situation would exist, with the United States more directly and immediately under the gun than ever before. A striking Soviet military push in the Western hemisphere would have succeeded and become effective. The clock could not be turned back. Things would never be the same again. During this discussion, Attorney General Kennedy said, "In looking forward into the future, it would be better for our children and grandchildren, if we decided to face the Soviet threat. Stand up to it and eliminate it now. The circumstances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavorable. The risks will be greater. The chances of success less good."

Secretary Rusk, toward the end of the afternoon, stated his approach to the problem in this way, "The US needed to move so that a planned action would be followed by a pause, in which the great powers could step back from the break, and have time to consider and work out a solution, rather than be drawn inexorably from one action to another, and escalate into general nuclear war." The implication of his statement, although he did not say this expressly, was that he favored blockade rather than air strike.

In the course of the afternoon discussion, the military representatives, especially Secretary McNamara, came to expressing the view that an air strike could be made sometime after Sunday, if a blockade did not produce results as to the missile bases in Cuba. Attorney General Kennedy took particular note of this shift in the Defense Department view, and toward the end of the day, made clear that he firmly favored blockade as the first step. Other steps, subsequently, were not precluded and could be considered. He thought it was now pretty clear what the decision should be.

Around 6:30, Adlai Stevenson, who had come from New York, arrived at the meeting and was asked by Secretary Rusk if he had some views on the question of what to do.
MEEKER: At that time, Adlai Stevenson was United States representative to the United Nations. When he was asked what his views were, and specifically whether he favored a blockade, he answered affirmatively. He went on to say, "We must look beyond the particular immediate action of a blockade. We need to develop a plan for a solution to the problem, elements for negotiation designed to settle the current crisis in a stable and satisfactory way, and enable us to move forward on wider problems." He was working on some ideas for a settlement. One possibility would be the demilitarization of Cuba under effective international supervision, perhaps accompanied by neutralization of the island under international guarantees and with UN observers to monitor compliance.

Once again, there was some discussion of when another meeting with the President should be held. It was generally agreed that the President should continue on his trip until Sunday morning. He would be reachable by telephone prior to that time. In fact, the President's trip was cut short, with the press being informed that he had a bad cold and was returning to Washington.

Q: When the President did deliver the speech, then, on the evening of 22 October, could you indicate what the final course was, that was announced?

MEEKER: The course announced was that quarantine measures would be adopted and would be enforced from a time that was set in the speech. The time was set back about a day and a half, following Tommy Thompson's strong suggestion that there should be some time allowed to elapse between announcement of the measures and enforcement of them by the US Navy. In fact, any enforcement would later postpone a little bit longer, and instead of beginning Wednesday, was delayed, by President Kennedy's own decision, until Thursday. In fact, no such measures were ever taken. Tommy Thompson had feted out the great necessity of giving the Soviets time, not only in which to reflect on what course they would follow in response to the President's speech and announcement, but also practical time within which to communicate new orders to ship captains, since various Soviet vessels were on route to Cuba at that time. They were seen by US air and naval reconnaissance approaching Cuba.

He also had pointed out something else which seemed to me always of great importance. He said, "If the US were to begin enforcing the quarantine by actually shooting at a Soviet vessel, and if the vessel were damaged, sunk, or personnel on board were killed or wounded, a whole new situation would arise, far more serious because, at that point, was not involved simply a Soviet attempt to install nuclear missiles in the Western hemisphere, but actual armed conflict between the US and the USSR. The Soviets would consider that their prestige and honor were at stake. At that point, one could not predict what the Soviet response would be, or how the whole affair would end."

It always seemed to me that Thompson's advice was exceedingly sound. It was based on very long experience in the Soviet Union, knowledge of the Soviet government on how it works, understanding of the Russian mind, and that his counsel was very important in persuading President Kennedy to move with greatest care and to achieve his intended objectives with minimal risk.
Q: We’re now fairly deep into the crisis. Could you tell us what your role was from Tuesday, the 23rd of October, through the following Friday, the 26th of October?

MEEKER: I went to New York—either Monday night or Tuesday morning—to be present there to assist the US delegation in presenting the case to the Security Council, and I spent the remaining days of that week in New York. I tried to help Governor Stevenson, and also talked with representatives of a number of other countries that were members of the council. The effort was focused, as you might expect in such a case, on what legal grounds the United States had for taking measures of force to remove the missile bases from Cuba. Not only the Latin American countries, which are traditionally very concerned with questions of international law that any issue of intervention might arise, but other countries as well wanted to be convinced that, in fact, the United States had a good legal case, and that they could properly turn aside and defeat the Soviet argument— which was that the United States was violating the charter of international law by announcing and preparing to take measures against Soviet shipping on the high seas.

During the next few days, I circulated a memorandum in New York to delegations on that subject, and they were largely satisfied, I think, of the legal basis on which we were proceeding. It was essentially the Soviet veto, which prevented the Security Council from taking any action in favor of the US draft resolution. Friday night, since the proceedings in the council had come to an end—or at a dead end, in fact—I returned to Washington, and was there during the next couple of days while the final dénouement of the crisis took place.

Q: I believe that was on October 28th, wasn’t it? What took place, then, on the 27th of October at the State Department?

MEEKER: The 27th was, in many ways, a crucial day. That morning there began arriving from Moscow a message from Khrushchev to the President—a message which gave all the signs of having been written by Khrushchev, himself, and which appeared to concede that the USSR would unconditionally remove the missiles from Cuba.

After the arrival of this message, there came another one, which appeared to be much more institutional and bureaucratic— and which people believed must have come out of the Politburo, or the Foreign Ministry, or both—which, in effect, said that the missiles could be removed, but subject to certain conditions, as to actions which the US would have to take. There was, naturally, discussion within the government, at that time, as to whether Khrushchev was losing control of the situation, and how to respond in the face of these two somewhat different messages. The decision that was made was simply to act as if only message number one had been received. A reply was sent out which specifically and expressly accepted what the Soviets had said in what appeared to be the Khrushchev personal message, and the other one was ignored.

A couple of other things were happening at about this time. On Friday night, Robert Kennedy had had a meeting with the Soviet ambassador, and in that meeting he apparently indicated that the US would agree to the withdrawal of US missiles in Turkey. But this could not be announced publicly at the time of the settling of the Cuban missile crisis. He just wanted that to be understood as something that the US would do, but that it could not acknowledge at the time.
Also on Friday night--this was not known until long afterward--Dean Rusk received a call from President Kennedy, in which President Kennedy asked him to arrange for a proposal to be made by U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, that the missiles be withdrawn from Cuba, and that also the US missiles be withdrawn from Turkey. Many years later, in fact, in early 1988, Dean Rusk disclosed that, in response to this request from the President, he spoke with Andrew Cordier, who was then Under Secretary of the United Nations, in order to lay the groundwork for such an appeal by the secretary general. However, because the crisis was, in fact, settled bilaterally through exchanges of messages between Washington and Moscow, the U Thant proposal was never floated, and indeed was not known until Mr. Rusk disclosed it in a letter.

Q: Why do you think Khrushchev--or perhaps I should say the Soviet government, since the Politburo was obviously involved--moved to put nuclear missiles in Cuba in the first place?

MEEKER: It always seemed to me, that this was quite directly connected with the US attempted invasion of Cuba in April, 1961 at the Bay of Pigs. At that time, the US sought to overthrow Castro with an invasion to be mounted by Cuban exiles who had been training in Nicaragua. The plan had been initiated during the Eisenhower Administration. It was still alive, and very much under consideration when President Kennedy took office. The plan evidently underwent changes in the early months of 1961, and earlier ideas for US military participation or US military support of the invasion seemed to have been dropped, on the ground that the United States did not want to seem to be directly involved in this invasion, but hoped that it could be carried out successfully as a Cuban exile enterprise.

In addition, I suspect that the Soviets knew of other efforts on the part of the US, or at least possible plans to eliminate Castro through assassination. They felt that perhaps the best way to protect Castro and the communist experiment in Cuba was to put some military might there.

It could also have been still another element. Khrushchev was a man who was disposed to make bold moves. He might have thought that at a time when the US preponderance in nuclear missiles was considerable, he would be able to even up the balance, to some extent, by placing intermediate range missiles very near to the United States coast, so that the Soviets would have that sort of weapon targeted on US cities and not have simply intercontinental ballistic missiles some thousands of miles away. I suspect all of those elements probably entered in to what was indeed a rash venture.

Q: I think there was another aspect too, and that was that the Sino-Soviet dispute had broken out and reopened in 1960. By this time, through '61 and '62, the dispute had come into full bloom, and the central core of the dispute was that the Chinese at that time felt that a much more vigorous line was necessary in dealing with the Third World. They were accusing the Soviet Union of being soft on capitalism, so to speak, and the Soviets were making efforts to, while on the one hand, say that the Chinese were going too far--they were overly optimistic. On the other hand, it kind of proved their own fidelity to the cause, and their macho nature, you might say, by taking vigorous steps in those areas that were described by them as being a more vital concern, namely, the relationship between the West and East at the core level, you might say.
MEEKER: Well, that's an interesting element, yes.

Q: *In mentioning the Cuban missile crisis, you mentioned the build up of the Bay of Pigs episode as a preliminary step in that direction. Did you have any involvement in the decision to do that?*

MEEKER: This was a subject of intense discussion and debate within the State Department in late March of 1961 and the early days of April. At that time, Chester Bowles, who was Under Secretary of State, was very concerned when he learned of the proposal to invade Cuba, and convened a series of meetings in his office at which both Abe Chayes and I were present, also Tom Hughes and some others. And out of those meetings came a series of memoranda addressed by Chester Bowles to President Kennedy objecting to the proposal for an invasion, pointing out various disadvantages of it and urging that the whole plan be dropped.

I remember one morning fairly late in a series of meetings, when Dean Rusk looked into the conference room where Mr. Bowles was having one of these meetings, and said, "If you are preparing another memorandum on Cuba, the President has said he really doesn't want to hear about that subject anymore." We, at that point, desisted from sending any further memoranda, and, indeed, I think no more meetings were held.

On the Thursday before the Monday invasion of the Bay of Pigs, I guess we were aware in the State Department that the invasion was going to take place, quite imminently, within a matter of a very few days. I thought that, perhaps, I should make one more effort on this subject. I called up Walt Rostow over in the White House, who was Deputy Assistant for National Security. I asked if I could come to see him. I went over there and said essentially two things, "The US role in organizing an invasion of Cuba by exiles was clearly a violation of our international obligations. Furthermore, the whole plan was of such a nature that it seemed bound to fail for lack of US military participation. And if this plan were proceeded with, the US would be in the worst possible position of taking an action which the world would regard as lawless, and also engaging in a monumental failure."

Walt said that he himself was not working on Cuba--that his main concentration was on Vietnam--but Mac Bundy was the person that dealt with Cuba. He could assure me that Mac and the President had been over this very carefully, and that things were well in hand, and that I should return to the State Department and deal with legal problems. [Laughter]

Q: *Well, to go back to the Cuban missile crisis, which we were speaking of most of the time. Do you have any thoughts on how the Kennedy Administration treated their success in securing the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba?*

MEEKER: President Kennedy had very definite views about this. He understood that an important moment in history had passed. The US had secured its objective of removing the missiles from Cuba. He was also very concerned not to seem to crow over the victory, not to make matters more difficult for Khrushchev, or to appear to humiliate the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world, any more than the facts already made it appear humiliated. He gave directions all down the line that people in the US government were to treat this as a very serious international crisis, which had been settled through careful, thoughtful negotiation. He wanted no
one to boast or brag that the US had threatened its nuclear power against the Soviet Union, and had forced the USSR to bow to the American will.

I think it was really this experience which, for the first time, began to motivate Jack Kennedy to feel that something needed to be done to arrange for a better and more stable relationship between the US and USSR. I think he saw very clearly what could happen if a crisis got out of control, if nuclear weapons were to be used, and if a general nuclear exchange were to take place. He was the father of young children. I think he thought of what would happen to them, and to the world, if there were a nuclear war. It always seemed to me that this was the beginning, for him, of a process of thought which led to his speech at American University in June of 1963, and which led, also, to his pursuing the idea of the nuclear test ban treaty, which was concluded later that summer.

Q: I was rather struck by the fact, particularly in the earlier stages that you described, that a great deal of work was being conducted in the Department of State. Besides yourself, a number of other players from the State Department were there, including Alex Johnson and Llewellyn Thompson, and Martin, of course. Do you have any comments on the degree to which the Department of State as an institution was involved in the decision making process? Obviously, the final decision was the President's. The main players are all mentioned, that is, the Cabinet heads, but there did seem to be a fair amount of institution involvement.

MEEKER: I think the State Department as an institution was, indeed, central in the management of this crisis. A great deal of the work was done there. Meetings were held in the Department, and Department officers prepared positions, papers, and draft messages. It seemed to me, over all, that the US government functioned exceedingly well during those difficult days. The representatives of other agencies, particularly Defense, were participants but, at that time, somewhat less centrally involved than the State Department. Later, when military measures were prepared and ordered, the Defense Department was very active, indeed.

It seemed to me that the government, as a whole, performed exceedingly well throughout the Cuban missile crisis. Security was, indeed, tight. There were no leaks between the early part of the crisis which, you might say, dated from about Monday, October 12th or Tuesday, the 13th. There were no leaks between that time and the President's speech. Indeed, very few people were informed about what was going on or what was being considered. Many of those people were, indeed, State Department people. I think the whole effort was managed efficiently and with great care, and, indeed, you would have to say, with as much wisdom as human beings could muster.

THOMAS L. HUGHES  
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research  

Mr. Hughes was born and raised in Minnesota and was educated at Carleton College, Oxford University and Yale University. After service with the US Air Force he worked on Capitol Hill and became active in Democratic Party politics. He later joined the Department of State, first as Assistant to Under Secretary
Chester Bowles and subsequently as Deputy Director, then as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he served during the event filled period 1961 to 1969. His assignments brought him in close contact with the major political figures of that era. His final government assignment was to Embassy London as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.

Q: How much contact did you have at the upper echelons of the foreign service? Was there much effort on Bowles’ part to reach out, or were things in such a state that it was the political appointees at the top who were in charge?

The Bay of Pigs, the earliest disaster of the new administration, was produced and executed without foreign service participation. Neither Hilsman nor the INR bureau played any role in that mismanaged enterprise. In its wake, there was common agreement in State, however, that INR was the logical place for a more active liaison with CIA and defense intelligence (DIA).

Throughout the 1960’s, Cuba remained an obsession for US policy, and INR’s analysis on Cuban subjects illustrated another bureaucratic advantage we had inside the State Department. Since we combined worldwide capacities within a single bureau, we enjoyed a built-in capability for cross-regional analysis. INR was conveniently able to bring divergent perspectives together in analyzing the Cuban-Soviet relationship, the motivations of Cuban foreign policy, Castro’s third world connections, Cuba’s involvement in the Angolan rebel movement, etc. Critics who have examined the INR analytical product on Cuba for the 1960 decade have concluded that INR’s analysis stands out as particularly noteworthy. (See, for example, “Conflicting Missions” by Piero Gleijeses, University of North Carolina Press, 2002.)

JOHN A. BUSHNELL
Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA

Mr. Bushnell was born in New York State and educated at Yale University and McMurray College. An Economic Specialist, he served primarily in senior level positions at Latin American posts, including Bogota, Santo Domingo, San Jose and Buenos Aires, dealing primarily with Economic and International Trade issues. An assignment to the Staff of the National Security Council was followed by tours as Deputy Chief of Mission at Buenos Aires, Chargé d’Affaires at Panama City, and subsequently as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Bushnell was the recipient of several awards for outstanding service. Mr. Bushnell was interviewed by John Harter in 1997.

Q: What do you recall of the Soviet brigade of troops in Cuba in 1978 or 1979?

BUSHNELL: When I arrived in ARA, there was disagreement on how to look at the Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The Soviets had a large intelligence operation near Cienfuegos, Cuba, and there were Soviet troops stationed in that area. The troops engaged in active maneuvers to maintain combat readiness. Most troops were rotated back to Russia as a unit each year. Some argued these troops were just there to protect the intelligence operation and its sensitive
equipment. Or one could look at this Soviet unit as a brigade there to help to defend Cuba, presumably from the United States. Most of the discussion on this issue was before I arrived. When I was briefed, I said it was a false choice; the troops served both missions although it appeared to me the Russian forces did fewer joint exercises with the Cubans than I would have expected if they were planning a joint defensive action. I had DOD compare the frequency of joint Russian/Cuban exercises with the frequency of similar US/South Korean exercises. There was not a conclusive difference. I suggested the Russian brigade probably also had a third function as a trip-wire to involve the Soviets in Cuba’s defense against an attack from the U.S. while deterring any US attack because there would be Soviet casualties. I don’t recall any operational debate about the Russian brigade; attacking Cuba was the furthest thing from the mind of the Carter Administration, which was dead against any military action in Latin America.

RUDOLF V. PERINA
Political Officer
Moscow, Soviet Union (1979-1981)

Ambassador Perina was born in Czechoslovakia when that country was under communist control. He escaped with his family to Morocco, then Switzerland and finally the United States. The ambassador was educated at the University of Chicago and Columbia University. Entering the Foreign Service in 1974, Mr. Perina specialized in Military-Political Affairs at posts abroad, including Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna and Belgrade. In Washington he served on the National Security Council, specializing in Soviet issues. From 1998 to 2001 Mr. Perina was US Ambassador to Moldova. Ambassador Perina was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

Q: I do but give us the background.

PERINA: Well, in the fall of 1979 there were suddenly intelligence reports that the Soviet Union had stationed a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba— not missiles, not nuclear weapons or anything like that but just that there was a Soviet brigade in Cuba. It became public and there was a big outcry, particularly in Congress. The Embassy was asked to do a demarche on this and to find out what was going on. Again, it was Bob German, the Political Counselor, who delivered the demarche, and again he took me along as the note taker. As I recall, we met with Viktor Komplektov, who was a senior figure, the head of the Americas Department in the Foreign Ministry. The demarche again hit a complete stonewall, except this time the Soviets at least did not lie—they just would not answer. Their position was that what the Soviets had in Cuba was their business and not ours. They did not deny that there was a brigade, but neither did they admit it. Then when Bob German kept pushing, Komplektov asked, “Are you saying that we do not have the right to put Soviet troops into Cuba? Are you denying the Soviet right to do this?” Bob very effectively dodged the question but after the meeting we had a long discussion in the Political Section which revealed that we really were not sure of the answer. The problem was that we did not really know what deals were struck during and after the Cuban missile crisis about what could and couldn’t be done in Cuba by the Soviets. In fact, even the desk in the State Department could not give us a straight answer. Some people were saying that there were agreements made by Kissinger years after the Cuban missile crisis that were very closely held,
and no one seemed to be sure what they entailed. We never did get a clear answer from Washington, and I am not certain that our Soviet interlocutor knew the answer. Komplektov may have been bluffing with his rhetorical question and betting that we would be uncertain of our answer.

JON DAVID GLASSMAN
Deputy - US Interests Section

Ambassador Jon David Glassman studied International Relations at the University of Southern California. He then attended Columbia University and received a Masters degree in Russian Studies. Mr. Glassman entered the Foreign Service in 1968. He has served in Madrid, Moscow, Havana, Kabul, and was ambassador to Paraguay. He was interviewed in 1997 by Peter Moffat.

Q: How would you characterize the Soviet approach at that time - did they try to take advantage?

GLASSMAN: They not only tried to take advantage because they felt that somehow they had been confronted; remember in the Carter administration we had the pulling and tugging between Brzezinski with a very hardline policy and Vance on the other side. Vance continued to be influenced by Shulman. So, we had the constant pulling and tugging. On strategic arms, Brzezinski had pushed hard for deep cuts. The Soviets read it as an effort of some influential American circles to confront them. So they began over time to see that Vance and Shulman, who they felt were more sympathetic, were getting the worst of the distribution of power in Washington. So they became more confrontational. More opportunities were presenting themselves in the Third World. The U.S.-Soviet/Cuban surrogate state struggle in Nicaragua had been going on for some time. Nicaragua began to fall apart. The Cubans were drawing in the Russians then, if not materially, at least spiritually. The idea began to spread in Moscow that there were more opportunities out there in the Third World, that the United States was not providing them the trade benefits they thought they would get through detente because of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (conditioning MFN treatment on Jewish emigration). The arms control situation was in a sort of holding pattern because of Carter's attempt to get the deep reductions first, so Soviets began to see the Third World as a place of advantage and this in turn led to further confrontations.

Q: Anything you can add to the fascination with Castro?

I remember when we first arrived in Havana, we talked to the Somalis. The Somalis were very close to the Cubans and the Russians. All of a sudden the roles were reversed. The Cuban leadership, Castro's entourage, told me that what happened was Castro was fascinated by the Ethiopian revolutionary leader Mengistu. Castro saw him as a man who wore a military uniform, a revolutionary like Castro himself. Castro convinced the Soviets to shift their bets. Whether this is true or self serving is not clear. But what is evident, is that the prospect for normalization with the United States was there; the Americans opened up in Havana. But three months later the
Americans, Cubans and Russians are at each others' throat. Despite the fact that we had dangled all this business about lifting the embargo, and the influx of Cuban visitors from the so-called Cuban community (the Cuban exiles in Miami) which created an inflow of foreign exchange immediately, Castro threw this all to the winds. Whether the Soviets told him to do this, or whether he convinced the Soviets to do this, it’s hard to know. But what we do know is that, in December 1977, after we moved in, there was a change in the tone of our relationship with Cuba. After Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, the Carter administration could no longer be dangling the prospect of embargo lifting there. The Cubans, for their part, began to clamp down on our contacts. Pending appointment requests started to build up and by the time I left Cuba in 1979, I had 45-50 outstanding appointment requests which had not been granted. They were really tightening up on us. So to pursue our tasks there, we began meeting more and more with the Soviets and Eastern Europeans and talked about their economic ties with Cuba. But the tone with the Cubans turned to confrontation and Castro had precipitated this. While this was going on in Ethiopia, Castro was also putting money, goods into the support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. At the end of my tour, I had a meeting with Osmany Cienfuegos, a member of the Cuban Communist party Politburo at the time and very close to Castro. He said, “You know, you have seen our hand in Nicaragua and you’re going to see it again soon in El Salvador and Guatemala.” He was telling the truth, of course. That was the next phase in the confrontation.

Q: Given your background in Soviet affairs, did you have contacts with the Russians and how many of them were there?

GLASSMAN: Basically our contacts were with the Soviet embassy and economic mission but there were a lot more Russians there. On one occasion, we had a visit from the Moiseyev Ballet. They brought in people from the Lourdes monitoring station where they monitored U.S. communications. They had filled up the auditorium, over 10,000 Russians were there. We essentially discovered after we left a so-called Soviet Brigade. We found the Russians had had a Soviet Brigade in Cuba since after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

JOHN J. (JAY) TAYLOR
Chief - US Interests Section
Havana (1987-1990)

John J. Taylor was born in Arkansas and attended Vanderbilt University before joining the US Marine Corps and eventually the Foreign Service. Overseas Taylor served in Ghana, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, South Africa and Cuba. He also served in INR, the NSC, as the deputy assistant secretary for intelligence coordination and as the chief of mission in Cuba. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: How did you see Cuba in 1987?

The Cubans and we approached all of these questions in the context of the important changes taking place in world politics. By 1987, Gorbachev had been in power a couple of years. Perestroika and Glasnost were actually being implemented, and contrary to the neocon view were real, far-reaching reforms. Freedom of speech was making astounding gains in the Soviet
Union. A powerful process of change seemed underway. At the same time, relations between the U.S. and the USSR appeared to be on a brand new course. It was possible that Soviets could soon decide to withdraw from Afghanistan. In October 1986 at Reykjavik, Iceland, Reagan and Gorbachev - to the dismay of some of their respective staffs (i.e., Richard Pearle) - had almost agreed to eliminate ALL nuclear weapons! Gorbachev and Raisa were now expected in New York in December. They would receive a stirring embrace by the American people enthralled by the prospect of not just peace with the mighty Soviet Union but actual friendship.

Castro was very astute - perhaps the most astute and clever of all the communist dictators. He understood the dynamics of what was happening in world affairs. The changing circumstances, I thought, could possibly give him a new perspective and new interests and priorities regarding Central America, Angola, relations with the U.S., and possibly even human rights. If the Soviet Union and the United States were to continue down the path of détente, Castro would be isolated and in a difficult situation regarding Angola and Central America. After all, he probably could not keep his army more than a few weeks in Angola without Soviet support. Apparently influenced by people like Carlos Aldana, the Politburo’s chief ideologist, Castro, I believed, had decided he must try to get on board the détente boat. In other words, Castro most likely did not want to destroy the existing ties with the United States, as the Cuban desk in ARA and Elliot Abrams thought, but rather he felt compelled by a changing world to seek his own improvement of relations with the United States. I said all this in a series of cables to ARA, mostly OI, exdis, or nodis. This would have been in September, October, and November 1987.

Prior to my arrival in Havana, Castro had told Nelson Rockefeller’s daughter that Cuba would be interested in participating in the negotiations that were on going between South Africa and Angola brokered by the United States. Rockefeller’s daughter took the message back to George Shultz who relayed it to Elliot Abrams. The African Bureau was never informed. In early October, I sent in a long cable assessing the key issue of Angola. In my report, I suggested that Castro had important incentives to try to settle the Angolan crisis. Pressures existed as well. For one, the Soviets were not interested in having one of their client states interfere with their rapprochement with the U.S. Gorbachev wanted to solve the Angolan issue for financial as well as political reasons. Castro was dependent on Soviet support to retain his forces there. The Cuban people were also becoming unhappy with the long deployment of Cuban men and women to that far away country. The troops had been there for more than ten years and they suffered a low level but steady rate of casualties.

**Q: Before you talked about Cuba and Central America? What was happening at this stage.**

**TAYLOR:** Early in my tour, in several cables I wondered if Castro in his efforts to accommodate to the shifting sands of global politics might also be willing to change his policies in Central America as he had in Africa. Aldana, Alarcon, and Ambassador Petrov claimed that Castro was well aware of the changing currents in Central America. For one thing, Gorbachev, in his pursuit of détente, wanted an end to US-Soviet tensions in that area as he had in Africa. Thus, Castro, we were told, wanted to play a positive role in Central America as he was then doing in Angola. Cuba, they claimed, was no longer providing arms or training to the FMLF in El Salvador and would not do so in the future. Moreover, they insisted their government also understood that for the foreseeable future a communist regime would not be the best solution for Nicaragua. Yes, they asserted, this meant Cuba could accept an electoral victory in Nicaragua by a non-
Sandinista party. These assertions, if true - a big “if” - meant that our objectives regarding Cuba’s policies and actions in Central America had to a large extent already been achieved.

Q: In 1989, events in Eastern Europe raised the possibility that some of the communist regimes could collapse. What was the view about Castro’s position at that time?

TAYLOR: For 30 years, the exile community had believed Castro was on the verge of collapse and the Abrams proto-neocons also adopted this assumption as one of the foundations of their policy. The Ochoa affair and the collapse of the Berlin Wall led to intense pressure on USINT to predict the near-term, if not imminent, collapse of the Castro government. Some in Washington and Miami argued strenuously that the execution of Ochoa and three of his co-defendants was a sign of deep, irreversible splits in the regime that were certain to worsen and steadily weaken to the point of rupture. (Some also argued that - even if the splits didn't exist prior to the trial - the execution would cause them.) The likely loss of Soviet subsidies was also cited as nearly certain to aggravate popular suffering, instigate widespread protests, and - especially if the state apparatus overreacted in a repressive manner - lead to the regime's downfall.

Q: One of the interesting aspects of our Cuban policy is that the threat it posed paled in comparison to the Soviets, but nevertheless we were much tougher on Cuba than we were on the USSR. I wonder whether had we been a little more forthcoming, we might have had a different situation today. Did you see it that way?

TAYLOR: The way I answered visitors who asked that question was to say that inconsistency is rampant in foreign policy as in other aspects of human affairs. It is a habit not limited to little minds. Different circumstances bring about entirely different priorities. Because the Soviet threat was huge, dealing with Moscow was of the highest priority. And of course enormous differences existed in the pulling and tugging of U.S. domestic politics on the two issues - dealing with the Soviet Union and dealing Cuba.

ALAN H. FLANIGAN

Chief – US Interests Section

Havana (1990-1993)

Alan Flanigan was born in Indiana in 1938. He graduated from Tufts University in 1960 and served in the U.S. Navy from 1960 to 1966 as a lieutenant. After entering the Foreign Service in 1966, his assignments abroad have included Lima, Izmir, Ankara and Lisbon, with an ambassadorship to El Salvador.

Q: Even though it seemed pretty threatening at the time.

FLANIGAN: It seemed pretty threatening at the time, but one thing I'm pretty sure nobody knew in the United States until this meeting in 1992, was that the Soviet general who was tactical commander in Cuba said he had been authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons if he so decided. We were particularly shocked because a U.S military commander in a like circumstance never would have been given such authorization. Of course the Soviet general did not exercise his alleged authorization, and even if he had, the result would not necessarily have been a major
nuclear exchange. The nuclear missiles he had were very limited in range. They could not have threatened targets in the U.S. They could have blown up a ship for example. In the end they didn't use them. Castro said he wanted them to, and wished they had.

Czech Republic- Czechoslovakia

KENNETH N. SKOUG

Commercial/Economic Officer

Prague (1967-1969)

Kenneth N. Skoug was born in North Dakota in 1931. He attended both Columbia College and George Washington University. His career included positions in Germany, Mexico, Prague, Moscow, and Venezuela. Mr. Skoug was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in August 2000.

Q: He was very proud of having opened up Bratislava.

SKOUG: Yes, because he'd been in Bratislava before. But he was not willing to carry the heavy load because the heavy load, if he wanted a claims agreement, wasn't in negotiating with the Czechs so much as it was negotiating with the creditors and Congress. The creditors wanted substantial settlements. And that didn't change. As a matter of fact, that was tough. It was a general tendency, by the way, of the Dubcek government to keep the United States at arm's length because as the Soviet dissatisfaction and the East German-Polish dissatisfaction with events in Czechoslovakia began to rise, the Czechs saw keeping the United States at a distance a way to demonstrate to the Russians that they were loyal. The were not going the way of the Hungarians by any means. They would stand with the Warsaw Pact. There was never any question that they would be loyal to their obligations. And so they sort of welcomed a hard, formal relationship with the United States - no visiting trade mission, for example. They made that clear to me in February. "As long as the gold/claims issue remains, forget about having any trade mission here." Well, we didn't have a trade mission there, but we did send managers. We were able to work around it, but on anything that would catch public attention they wanted to be negative. Of course, they were top aid givers to the North Vietnamese, which didn't help, either; at the time, of course, the Vietnamese War was at a height, and next to the Russians and the Chinese, the Czechs were providing about as much help to the North Vietnamese as anyone. There was a major demonstration at the U.S. Embassy that went on for two days in the spring of 1968, in which a Vietnamese student tore down the American flag from the embassy and they kept the embassy hermetically sealed for two days. The Czechs permitted that. They thought that would be good news in Moscow, at a time when they were beginning to have bad relations, which made it more difficult for us to be helpful to the Czechs, not that we had been very able to help them much anyway.
Q: Did the ambassador sort of say, "Look, this is a developing situation, and while we wish them well, we could just louse things up if we get too close." Were we sort of deliberately keeping back ourselves, or did it just happen because that's the way the Czechs were?

So in a way the Czech situation got in the way of this. Rusk himself did not want, never wanted the situation heated up. He resisted any effort to publicly make a stand, and he was supported by most of the top people in the Department - not all of them, but most of them - who said that it would be better just to talk to the Russians quietly. They only did it once. Rusk had one meeting with Dobrynin where he warned them very gently that it would harm our relationship, that is, the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if the Soviets did anything untoward towards the Czechs. And of course Dobrynin said, "We have no intention of doing anything like that." That was it. That was all. As a matter of fact, Rusk was quite indignant when questioned in public about this. "We have not raised this with the Russians." "Have you raised such an issue?" "No, we have not raised it with the Russians."

Q: How did you feel about responses? You mentioned that neither Rusk nor Johnson had responded adequately when they heard that something was going to happen. How about later, some hours later and all?

SKOUG: The main concern was damage control. Messages went out saying that this should not lead to any problems in international bodies where we were talking to the Russians about disarmament or something. In other words, they didn't want this complication to interfere with other things going on. It was not a good show. The only one who did anything was George Ball, who was our representative to the United Nations. He gave it to the Russians, but with a lot of humor. In fact, Dobrynin complained about Ball's remarks as not in the spirit of U.S.-Soviet relations and so forth. He's the only one who made the Russians squirm a little. Rusk even emphasized in his meetings with foreign diplomats that we had had our problems with the Czechs under Dubcek and we were just taking this position to show the way we would support any small country. This cool attitude was his reaction to the Czechoslovak government’s attempt to curry favor with the Russians by being tough with us. They did nothing to seek our sympathy. They didn’t think they were going to be invaded. They didn’t think they needed us. If we were going to be of any help, they said we could give them back their gold. That was essentially their position. But our rather limp reaction, of course, overlooked the fact that there were millions of Czechs who were going to suffer from Soviet action. It wasn't just Dubcek and a few people around him who were going to suffer: it was the Czechoslovak population, which lost everything in the invasion. But there was never an American statement about it, or any other Western country, for that matter. We'll see when we go into the subject on Germany, that the Germans didn't react any better. Our first concern was that the Germans not overreact, make sure the Germans don't put anybody near the border. The whole thing was damage control. NATO through embassies in NATO countries was warned not to let this heat things up. It was business as usual.

Q: He was very proud of having opened up Bratislava.

SKOUG: Yes, because he'd been in Bratislava before. But he was not willing to carry the heavy load because the heavy load, if he wanted a claims agreement, wasn't in negotiating with the Czechs so much as it was negotiating with the creditors and Congress. The creditors wanted substantial settlements. And that didn’t change. As a matter of fact, that was tough. It was a
general tendency, by the way, of the Dubcek government to keep the United States at arm's length because as the Soviet dissatisfaction and the East German-Polish dissatisfaction with events in Czechoslovakia began to rise, the Czechs saw keeping the United States at a distance a way to demonstrate to the Russians that they were loyal. The were not going the way of the Hungarians by any means. They would stand with the Warsaw Pact. There was never any question that they would be loyal to their obligations. And so they sort of welcomed a hard, formal relationship with the United States - no visiting trade mission, for example. They made that clear to me in February. "As long as the gold/claims issue remains, forget about having any trade mission here." Well, we didn't have a trade mission there, but we did send managers. We were able to work around it, but on anything that would catch public attention they wanted to be negative. Of course, they were top aid givers to the North Vietnamese, which didn't help, either; at the time, of course, the Vietnamese War was at a height, and next to the Russians and the Chinese, the Czechs were providing about as much help to the North Vietnamese as anyone. There was a major demonstration at the U.S. Embassy that went on for two days in the spring of 1968, in which a Vietnamese student tore down the American flag from the embassy and they kept the embassy hermetically sealed for two days. The Czechs permitted that. They thought that would be good news in Moscow, at a time when they were beginning to have bad relations, which made it more difficult for us to be helpful to the Czechs, not that we had been very able to help them much anyway.

PETER S. BRIDGES
Chief Political/Economic Officer
Prague (1971-1974)

Peter S. Bridges was born in New Orleans in 1932 and educated at Dartmouth and Columbia. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His career included posts in Panama City, Oberammergau, Moscow, Rome and Prague and he was named ambassador to Somalia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: Were we careful within our mission to not stir up the Czechs because we’re not going to do anything? There’s sort of a lesson from 1956 where we were probably a little too eager to push the Hungarians.

BRIDGES: Certainly we had no intent to try to stir up the Czechs and they probably wouldn’t have believed us if we had tried to. An interesting thing happened. The Secretary of State was William Rogers and the National Security Advisor was Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger was clearly in command, running the relationship with the Soviet Union, the relationship with China, and he wasn’t necessarily wasn’t using the State Department and the Foreign Service and the Secretary of State. I recall very well that Kissinger had gone to Moscow without Ambassador Jacob Beam, our ambassador to the Soviet Union, even knowing that Kissinger was there dealing with Soviet leaders. Rogers, we heard, was trying to carve a small niche for himself. Kissinger had the Soviet relationship, but he left Mr. Rogers the relationship with the Eastern Europeans which was not too important for the U.S. The initial meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Helsinki. While that meeting was going on, we were told that the Secretary of State was going to visit Prague on his way home. That was a little surprising to us because NATO had more or less agreed that after the Soviet invasion, foreign ministers of
NATO would not visit Prague, and none had. And now here comes the American foreign minister. Well, we followed orders, we told the Czechs and they were really pleased because it looked like the NATO embargo on visits was ended. Mr. Rogers got to see the president and the prime minister and the secretary general of the party; they pulled out all the stops, it was great fun. The foreign minister, Bohuslav Chnoupek, hosted a great party for Rogers in a Prague wine cellar. After the wine party my wife and I went back to the ambassador’s residence, where Mr. Rogers was staying. It was spring and we sat out in the garden, just Ambassador and Mrs. Sherer and Secretary Rogers and my wife and me. Bud Sherer’s wife, Carroll Sherer, was and is an extremely sharp, sophisticated, fine woman. Her husband was a fine ambassador; I think Carroll Sherer could have potentially been a better one. She’s a marvelous woman. And she started asking William Rogers about this visit. And he finally said, “Well, the President didn’t really want me to come but I just thought I should.” And so he had, causing other NATO countries to wonder. He went back to Washington and it was several weeks later that his resignation was announced. Whether Kissinger used this as the last piece of evidence he needed to use with Mr. Nixon to get rid of him - and to replace him as Secretary of State - I don’t know.

Germany

KARL F. MAUTNER

82nd Airborne

Berlin (1945-1958)

_Karl Mautner was born in Vienna, Austria in 1915. He attended school there and entered the Army in 1935. During the Nazi occupation of Austria, Mr. Mautner lived in Hungary with relatives until 1940, when he emigrated to the U.S. He applied for U.S. citizenship the day after he arrived, and was immediately drafted into the U.S. Army. He has also served in the Sudan and various other posts in the Department of State. Mr. Mautner was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1993._

Q: _The autobahn going through the Soviet zone of Germany?_

MAUTNER: Yes. Then they would arbitrarily stop vehicles in the middle of the autobahn. Car travel became more and more unpleasant.

On top of that, the Soviet claimed the bridge over the Elbe at Magdeburg had to be repaired, and closed it to auto traffic. (By the way, that bridge had been built by the U.S. Army engineers toward the end of the war and was still in use until the 1970s.)

Q: _That was the one bridge on the autobahn that was absolutely essential to get to the west._

MAUTNER: Yes. Later on came incidents with the allied trains. The Soviets demanded the right to inspect them and we refused. After going back and forth on this, the Soviets would relax a little bit and let some trains through but kept coming back.
Q: But both of these on the rail and in regard to the road, these were in violation of the four-power agreements?

MAUTNER: Where were they, the four-power agreements? Apparently there weren't any really, because the only detailed written agreement about access was for air traffic where the Air Traffic Committee of the Control Council agreed to three air corridors and a twenty-two mile circle around the air traffic Control Center of Berlin.

Q: Yes, I think the rail and road arrangements were bilateral agreements between military commanders to assure access when we took over Berlin.

MAUTNER: Yes, the arrangements for access were never made formal agreements because General Clay somewhat defensively claimed later that he understood that it was a matter of word of honor and self-understood. He said that the right was implied by the fact that we were in Berlin.

Q: Now, there were these transport problems in getting into Berlin, but was it not the currency conversion actually that triggered the blockade?

MAUTNER: I think it was in a way true, although the Russian commandant, General Kotikov, walked out of a Kommandatura meeting before the currency reform and before the actual beginning of the blockade. If I am not mistaken, it was the 20th of June. That was an endless Kommandatura meeting, lasting sixteen hours or so. Howley got tired and turned the meeting over to his deputy, Colonel Babcock, and Kotikov seized on this as an insult and said, "If the Americans don't cooperate, I'll walk out," and left. That was the end of the four-power Kommandatura. Of course, talks about possible currency reform were already going on, but more on the Control Council level.

Q: You mean they could come from east Germany, the Soviet zone, right into West Berlin?

MAUTNER: They could come from the eastern zone into East Berlin, get on the S-bahn and come over. There were occasional attempts to stop them on the part of the east police, but in general there was a fairly free flow into West Berlin. At times there were great masses coming in whenever the pressure increased. With the political pressure for example to increase the work norms in the factories, and other hardships, collectivization of the farms, more people came out of the east and flowed into the west. West Berlin established refugee camps. People were screened to determine whether they were really refugees and then usually flown out to West Germany because they couldn't travel on the autobahn which was controlled by the east. That thing built up to the very high degree in early 1953 when again the pressure on the part of the eastern communists had increased. They needed higher production. They increased the production norms and didn't increase the rations pay or anything else. That culminated in a big blow-up on June 16 and 17 when the East German workers, especially in the Hennigsdorf steel plant north of Berlin went on strike. They marched into East Berlin, demonstrated there vigorously. As Russian tanks moved in, they threw rocks at them. It was quite a show. Eventually of course it was quashed with brute force. We now know several hundred died. The demonstration extended into various localities in the eastern zone, such as Magdeburg. The 17th of June 1953 is also one of the landmarks of some importance. In fact, in West Germany it became a holiday, although the revolt was put down. Now, we had very interesting allied
reactions on that. They were not terribly good, because there were some officials perturbed because the Germans revolted against an allied power.

Q: Even though it was the Russians?

MAUTNER: Even though it was the Soviets against whom the workers rebelled.

Q: Was this reflected in the attitude of Americans, French, or British in Berlin?

AUTNER: Yes. At the commandants level where there were relatively new people, it was reflected in reactions like, "Got to be careful that we don't have a revolt spilling over into our part of the city." It was not a very nice situation. It was also made more difficult because Mayor Reuter happened to be out of town on that day. He was at an international Social Democratic rally in Austria and it became an urgent matter to get him back to Berlin as quickly as possible because the acting Mayor was an FDP man, Dr. Conrad, an inadequate substitute, indeed.

ROBERT R. BOWIE
U.S. Military Officer
Germany (1945-1946)
U.S. Military Officer
Germany (1950-1952)

A university professor and senior level public servant, Dr. Bowie was educated at Princeton and Harvard Universities. He practiced law in Baltimore before entering the U.S. Army, where he served from 1942 to 1946. After the end of World War II he served in Germany as Deputy Military Governor. His service with the US government included Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Counselor of the Department of State and Director of Policy Planning for the State Department. He was also Professor at Harvard University. Dr. Bowie was interviewed by Robert Gerald Livingston, Philipp Gassert, Richard Immerman, Paul Steege, Charles Stuart Kennedy and a public audience at the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC on February 19, 2008

Q-Steege: [to Immerman] Did you want to follow up on that? [Immerman shakes his head]. The question I’d just ask, so, in 1953 the uprising in East Germany and, what has come to light since 1989 certainly is the ways in which it was not just in East Berlin but across all of East Germany, in hundreds of towns, and that this really was a massive scale—was that something that was known to you and to the Eisenhower administration at the time, this massive scale of the uprising, and, does that matter, or not? Was that a transformative moment, in terms of understanding either Germany or as a way of understanding the global strategic situation in which the United States found itself?

BOWIE: Well, this was obviously something which was a very great concern because of two reasons: 1) the Eisenhower campaign had been urging more attention to the liberation of Eastern Europe, and Dulles was particularly eager to do this, to appeal to the votes which would be attracted by the idea of the liberation of Eastern Europe. And one time during the campaign he
made a speech which was rather strong about how it was going to get these people free, and Eisenhower called him and said, Look, you’re perfectly free to argue for our concern about Eastern Europe, but you must say always that any liberation would be by peaceful means. So, I mean, Eisenhower had no question about this. He was not going to have any idea that the United States was going to use force to get freedom for East Europe. One of the other basic tenets of Eisenhower was that a nuclear war would be an absolute suicidal disaster for both sides, and that therefore one of his key purposes was to see to it that our effort to contain the Soviets not lead to the possibility of direct conflict between the forces, because he felt that if you had a real conflict between the two, it would almost surely escalate, and be highly likely to go on until it got up into using nuclear weapons. And, as I say, he thought that would be suicidal for both sides. He was absolutely convinced that by threatening retaliation he could deter the Soviets from using nuclear weapons and even from a large-scale attack. Earlier, when it was discovered that the Soviets surprisingly had developed nuclear weapons much sooner than expected, Truman had approved NSC 68. This was an analysis of what this implied and concluded that when they got an adequate inventory of nuclear weapons (by 1954), they would be tempted to use them to annihilate the United States. And Eisenhower rejected this and was convinced that we could deter the Soviet Union if we made them understand the consequences of any such event. Nevertheless, he was fearful that if their regime or empire was really threatened, then it might very well cause the happening of military conflict.

Q-Livingston: Could I ask, Bob, at this point, what about the intermediate stage? What were Eisenhower’s views, your own views, about covert action operations such as Frank Wisner and others were running against Eastern Europe?

BWIE: Under Truman, the CIA with the cooperation of the Policy Planning Staff led by Kennan had carried on a number of covert actions with respect to Eastern Europe. They dropped agents into Eastern Europe and similar activities with the purpose of trying to create trouble. By the end of the Truman administration, the CIA wrote a report saying—contrary to what had been the premise—that we don’t have the instruments and we don’t have the means of carrying out any such covert actions effectively, and it was foolish to keep on doing them. Eisenhower’s attitude was consistent with what I have said. He didn’t see any sense in using such covert activities; he didn’t think they would work. At the same time, he was quite prepared to use covert action on our side of the line where he felt that governments were being subverted, and so, in various places, he did use these, and sometimes it was rather doubtful wisdom, but nevertheless, that was fundamentally his policy. So he wasn’t opposed to using covert action, but he didn’t believe it was a useful way to deal directly with the Soviets, but it was a way to deal with the threat of Soviet subversion on our side of the line. (pause) Is that it?

HELMUT SONNENFELDT
US Army
Germany (1946)

Helmut Sonnenfeldt was born in Berlin in 1926. He served in the US Army in Germany during World War II and later attended Johns Hopkins University and the School of Advanced International Studies. He joined the State Department in 1952 and later worked with the NSC, returning to the State Department in 1974
as the Counselor of the Department of State. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July 2000.

Q: Well, now, Kissinger becomes an important figure later on. Henry Kissinger and you were of similar background. Did he have any kind of reputation or anything that you heard, or was he just another one of the -

SONNENFELDT: In the Army? Kissinger?

Q: Yes, yes.

SONNENFELDT: I really don’t know, but Kraemer noticed him. I guess Kraemer also, at some point, brought him to the attention of General Bowling, who much later became G2, Intelligence Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, after the war.

I was assigned to the northeastern part of Hessen. I met Henry Kissinger maybe once, briefly, at Oberammergau when I was still there in the school; and then maybe a few more times when I visited there. I can’t remember when Henry returned to the States, probably sometime in late 1945 or early ‘46.

Then, as I said, beginning in early 1946, U.S. forces began to shift focus, not away from the continuing German functions we had, but toward Communists and Soviets. Things became dicier and dicier in our general relations with the Soviets, but also more specifically on German issues. I was assigned to an area of Hessen that was right up against the Soviet Occupation Zone. So what military we had left there were more alert about who was coming across from the East. Until that time, we had relied on Communists to tell us who the bad Nazis were. I think in some instances these Communists had come back from hiding or from concentration camps, and they were given some interim jobs in the local German administration that we and the Military Government people were starting to set up. That practice was gradually discontinued because it was assumed that they were working with and for the Soviets.

Then Kraemer wanted once more to try to get me, after I was discharged from the Army, to be assigned as a civilian to the Oberammergau Intelligence School. But the administrative people there said that, because I didn’t have a college degree, they couldn’t really pay me what I should be getting in that job. That would have been more than I made as a special agent of the CIC; but anyway, it just didn’t seem to work out. I left Germany in the early fall of 1946, and I was demobilized very soon after that.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN

Office of the U.S. Political Advisor

Berlin (1946-1950)

Thomas Dunnigan was born and raised in Ohio. He attended John Carroll University, and after graduation served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1946. Mr. Dunnigan served in London, Manila, the Executive Secretariat, the National War College, Bonn, the Hague, Copenhagen,
Tel Aviv, and with the Organization of American States. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.

We maintained, outwardly at least, that Berlin was a four-power city and that we, as a member of the occupying powers, could go anywhere we wanted within the city. We could not go outside the city into the Soviet zone except on one road that linked us to the West. That was the autobahn that went through Helmstedt. There was also a train line. We could go by train either to Frankfurt or to Bremerhaven, but we could not go outside the city in any other direction. But we deliberately went into the Soviet sector of Berlin, as it was called, frequently. In fact, they had the best opera there. We would drive around, just to be seen, in American cars and so forth. We didn't want the Soviets to say they had sort of shut us out of there, or frightened us out. In those days you could take the subway or the elevated train across. There was no problem, just right in the city.

It began to get a little dicey in April of 1948. The Soviets had walked out of the Control Council, the main governing body for governing Germany. Marshal Sadolovsky had walked out at the end of March 1948 over a dispute, as I recall, about currency reform, because the Soviets didn't want any. The Western powers had said, "Look, nothing will ever get this country off its back unless they have a solid currency." Well, there was a to-do about that, and Sadolovsky walked out and never came back.

Then about four weeks later a British plane coming into Berlin was, as I recall, shot down by the Soviets, who said it had strayed out of the air corridor (which was nonsense) and crashed. This told us they were ready to play hardball. They stopped the trains from Helmstedt around that period, on the pretext that the bridge across the River Elbe needed repair and would be closed for some time. So the noose was tightening. We still had the autobahn to drive back and forth; but they could have at any time said an autobahn bridge needed repair.

I think it was on the 21st of June that we declared currency reform for West Germany and West Berlin. The Soviets then declared a blockade on the 24th, and we started the airlift on the 26th.

We didn't know whether we would succeed. We didn't know how long the blockade would last. We kept getting reports from Ambassador Bedell Smith in Moscow. He would have conversations with Soviet officials, including Stalin, about this, and Stalin would sort of grunt or nod and say, yes, he thought something could be worked out, but, you know, it never was.

Dependents who were there (and I didn't have any at that time) were offered an opportunity to leave. Very few left; most wanted to stay. They wanted to ride it out and not leave the Soviets with the feeling that they had forced us out.

The situation didn't get questionable until the fall. The airlift worked fairly well in the early months, and there had been enough supplies there to last, but it soon became evident that the two great needs over the winter were going to be coal and potatoes. So the planes began to bring those in.

We started out using C-47s. While they were state of the art in some ways in those days, they weren't very big. Later, within a few months, we began to get C-54s -- from two engine to four. General Tunnel, a lieutenant general in the Air Force, was brought from the States and put in charge of the airlift; he commandeered almost every C-54 in the world and brought it to
Frankfurt. So, with the C-54s, we could bring a lot more in. Still, we had to feed a city of two and a half million people, and it wasn't at all sure whether we could make it through the winter.

The worst time of all came in November, because, for about ten days in a row, there was heavy fog and planes couldn't get in. We didn't have the sophisticated radar or landing-guidance equipment we have now; it was very primitive. And also, most of the time, we were using Tempelhof Airport, which is right in the city of Berlin and wasn't really built for very large planes. It took some skill. Later, we built a new airport with the French and the British, Tegal Airport, a much larger airport. But that wasn't completed until February or March. So, in November, we were still using Tempelhof, in our sector, and Gatow, a smaller airport, in the British sector, and the British were bringing in their share of material, too. Now the feeling was that if that fog had persisted for another month or so, we might have been done in.

But, fortunately, after about ten days, it lifted enough for the planes to start getting back in. And it was amazing to see them come and go -- land, unload, and be gone in ninety seconds -- incredible!

The airlift certainly solidified our relations with the Germans in Berlin, because there was a feeling: we are all in this together. We, as occupiers, lived much better than they did. We still were getting PX supplies, although when electricity went off, as it did, we didn't have any electricity, things of that nature. We were given five gallons, as I recall, of gasoline a month for our cars; so everybody was car-pooling when they used a car in those days. I had a bicycle along with my car, and I used that a great deal during the blockade. It got to be a stick-it-out thing, everybody saying, "By God, we are just not going to let them do this to us!" And we did it.

We were always aware of a military threat. The Soviets, in my recollection, never particularly threatened that. They didn't threaten to come in. There didn't seem to be any large movement of their forces that would indicate they were planning something. All three powers had garrisons in Berlin, small, they would have been overrun, but it would have been a pretty stiff fight for a few days. And the Germans would have sabotaged everything the Soviets did anyhow; they hated them at the time.

It solidified our relations with the West Germans. For instance, in the airlift, all of the manual labor was being done by Germans at the airport, unloading that coal, unloading the potatoes, telling the plane when it could move out again. All of that was done by them, and pretty soon the spirit of cooperation replaced that of sort of occupier-occupied. It was very good in that respect.

We still went into the Soviet sector. They never stopped us. They had thrown the city government of all Berlin out of East Berlin, but we wouldn't let them stop us going there. Although, just because of the lack of gasoline, we probably never went there as often. We could go by subway, though -- when the subway worked, but, again, there were power shortages.

The East Germans, of course, were not directly affected by the blockade. Their level of subsistence had been perhaps close to that of the West Berliners before the blockade -- bad for both of them really.

But with the introduction of the new currency reform in West Berlin, prices meant something. Items began to have value again. West Germans had things that East Germans could only
admire. So gradually, gradually there became a cleft between the two that grew wider over the years and ended, as we know now, with tearing the Wall down.

Robert Murphy worked, of course, extremely closely with General Clay, who was the military governor, and he was a most kind and considerate chief to the junior officers. As I recall, he did not hold staff meetings that included everybody, but we would hear from others what he wanted, and things like this. I am a great admirer of Murphy, and I think he did a splendid job there. We know, because I could read the telegrams, that he was cautioning firmness in regard to the blockade. General Clay, of course, had wanted us to send an armored unit up the autobahn to shoot our way in when the Soviets stopped our land transit. Murphy seemed to go along with that, but I don't think he was completely sold on the idea, because he realized the dangers.

The truth of the matter was that we had little military in those days. We had gutted this wonderful force we had had in 1945. We had occupation troops in Germany. Most of the combat troops had long since been discharged from the Army. We had a force that was called a constabulary in West Germany, and it wasn't until the Korean War, a year after the end of the blockade, that we began to build up our forces again. Clay and Murphy were well aware of our weakness in that regard.

JOHN W. McDONALD

OMGUS

Berlin (1947-1950)
Allied High Commission, Secretariat

Bonn (1950-1952)

John McDonald was born in Coblenz, Germany in 1922. He attended the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign earning an undergraduate degree in Political Science. His career took him to Germany, France, Turkey, and Egypt. He held a number of roving ambassadorial assignments. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997

Q: It was the wirtschaftswunde (economic miracle) and also the Soviet living. Could you explain about the currency reform, because this is a very critical thing and how did it affect you?

MCDONALD: Remember I said before that the Reichsmark was worthless, and that this was a barter cigarette economy. That continued until 1948. In spite of the Marshall Plan speech, and beginnings of preparations, things had not really started to arrive at all.

The U.S. had long planned for a currency reform. The Soviets had opposed it. Finally the U.S. insisted. The U.S. had printed all of the bank notes in Deutschmark in the United States, and it was a major operation to get this money all across all of Germany simultaneously. The Soviets decided they did not want to participate and they developed and had their own currency. But that triggered the breakup of the Occupation and triggered the conflict over Berlin and triggered the
withdrawal of the Soviets from the ACC and the creating of East Germany. It was a very dramatic point in time.

Nobody really expected that at the moment. But it transformed the German economy. They converted the Reichsmarks to Deutschmarks at 10 to one, but everybody started out - and this is something very few people recognize - everybody in West Germany, it was now West Germany, June 1948, was given 40 Deutschmarks, that's all. Regardless of how many Reichsmarks they had, how much insurance, it was all converted and they only got 40 marks. So everybody on that day had exactly the same sum of money to start with. That is pretty dramatic, pretty dramatic. And it worked.

DAVID E. MARK
Deputy Protocol Officer
Berlin (1949-1951)

Ambassador David E. Mark graduated from Columbia University in 1943. Shortly after completing a year of law school, he was drafted into the U.S. Army. Near the end of World War II, Ambassador Mark joined the Foreign Service. He served in Korea, Romania, Switzerland, Burundi, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Henry Precht on July 28, 1989.

Q: So where did you go, your next career turn?

MARK: Well, I had applied for Soviet language and area training, and when I got back to Washington, they said to me, "Well, we don't have any room for you in that right now. We'll keep your application on file. We do have some other area training that you could go into."

I said, "Well, what do you mean?"

And they said, "We'd like to sign you up for Arab language and area training." Well, although I'm not a practicing Jew, I'm nevertheless of Jewish background, so I said that I didn't think that that would prove to be very useful for the Foreign Service. Besides, I was interested in the Soviet side. So they said, "Okay. Just wait for that and go on to your next assignment, which is Berlin."

Now, before I got to Berlin, everyone arrived through Frankfurt in those days.

Q: This was in --

MARK: This was in approximately August or September -- well, maybe it was July 1949. I was informed in Frankfurt that I was not going to Berlin after all, that a new government was going to be formed in West Germany. Our military headquarters would be moving to Frankfurt from West Berlin and, therefore, I should stay in Frankfurt. And I was given a sort of ignominious job as the deputy protocol officer of the new U.S. High Commission under John McCloy that was taking over from the military government.

The protocol officer dealt with all of the diplomatic or quasi diplomatic missions of all the other countries in Germany -- which missions were still nominally attached to our military command. Protocol dealt with all of those, except, of course, the other Allies: British, French, and Soviet.
And it was a boring routine job at a time when a lot of interesting things were going on. So this was the first time really of unhappiness in my career, because, by this time, my pay had gone up from $3,278 to $3,500 a year, and I was feeling pretty good. And as a matter of fact, I'd even gotten a promotion from grade FSO-6 to grade FSO-5 in the scale of those days.

So I started politicking within the protocol and High Commission offices to get to Berlin anyway. I mean, Berlin just seemed a lot more interesting. And I did succeed in getting shifted out of Frankfurt after a couple of months there to Berlin at the end of September 1949. My boss there was the senior Foreign Service officer left behind in Berlin, Eric Wendelin, and he said, "Well, David, you speak German, don't you?" not knowing that I had flunked German in the Foreign Service entrance exam.

And I answered, "Well, I've been brushing up on it and doing my best to get it back into shape." And he said, "Okay. Your first job" -- this was very early October -- "is to keep up with what goes on in East Germany." They were about to launch a government, too, to counterbalance our regime in Bonn. He added, "As a matter of fact, it's been announced that Wilhelm Pieck" -- who became the first president of the German Democratic Republic -- "is going to make a speech on the air, and you listen to it and take notes and find out what he means."

I said, "God, do you think my German's up to that?"

He said, "We'll see." So I did, and, of course, it was the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic, with a declaration of eternal loyalty to Moscow. As it turned out, my German was adequate, not brilliant, but adequate at the time.

A little unit was formed in our office with a more senior officer named John Holt in charge, who was a German specialist; and this little unit was given the task of watching East Germany in some detail. Amazingly, nobody had been doing that in detail for about a year and a half. The U.S. military had started out watching East Germany in 1945 in a non-military sense, that is, what politics the Soviets were dictating there, and the army had continued this through '47 but had let it fizzle out during the airlift. Thus, we were really behind in our base of knowledge.

We didn't know very much about the political undercurrents there in which the Soviets had forced the old Social Democrats to combine with the Communist Party in a subordinate role; that is, Moscow had formed what's called the SED, Socialist Unity Party, but that is still the Communist Party of East Germany. Many other changes had been taking place as the Soviets imposed totalitarian hegemony on whatever political life was allowed in East Germany. So we had a very substantial job of catch-up to carry out in this little unit.

Q: And you were attached to the High Commissioner's office in Bonn? That was your formal status?

MARK: Well, no. There was a branch of the High Commissioner's office in Berlin under Eric Wendelin. As a matter of fact, Berlin and Bonn were in theory co-equal branches under High Commissioner McCloy, because the occupation regime -- and there still formally is an occupation regime to this day (1989) -- remained located in Berlin. So McCloy came up there; he had a house up there. There were meetings there. There were still some significant contacts in those years with the Soviet side. Indeed, there were a couple of occupation institutions that were maintained, I believe are still maintained (1989), such as the Air Safety Center in Berlin.
There were a couple of other things that survived all the clashes, and we still had -- they've lately been revived much more, of course -- the military liaison groups. I mean, the U.S. had its military people in Potsdam, in East Germany. They worked out of West Berlin. Likewise, we were assigned to the High Commissioner's office in Berlin. We tried to keep up with what went on in the East, and in those days it was relatively easy because there was no Berlin Wall, and people moved back and forth across the border, and we had all kinds of visitors from East Germany, people in church groups, Christian Democrats who were being forced more and more to the wall in those days, although a rump, sort of pro-Soviet Christian Democratic Party was allowed to continue tenuously. I even had the pleasure of working on these East-West issues with Willy Brandt, later Chancellor of Germany in Bonn who was then the editor of Berlin's Socialist Democratic Party newspaper.

Q: But you could travel without impediment anywhere in East Germany?

MARK: No. We could travel anywhere in East Berlin. For East Germany, we needed special Soviet passes, and I only received one twice during the year and a half that I was there, and they were both to visit the Leipzig trade fair. The Leipzig fair was to be the commercial showcase of East Germany to the world; and the Soviets were anxious to push East German industry, of course, as a foretaste of communism's quality potential. So people were allowed to go there to see how the German Democratic Republic was recovering from war devastation and from Soviet reparations dismantling, which had been very extensive.

We were able to get permits to go just for the several days that the fair took place, but I did get glimpses of East Germany in that way, and at other times, while traveling between Berlin and the West on the one approved superhighway, "autobahn," for which we didn't need permission. That was all regulated by the understandings reached after the blockade had ended in 1949. Again, I was in Berlin when the North Koreans attacked the South Koreans; and, of course, people immediately wondered whether there was going to be an analogy in Europe to this. For all of a week, I guess, I was lionized as the one person around who knew that Korea existed and had some ideas on the subject. And I must say that I took a pretty alarmist view of things at the moment.

I didn't distinguish the Korean situation from the German, but just felt that the Soviets were, you might say, feeling their way to world domination, and indeed probably had similar ideas toward Europe. Because it was at this time that NATO had been formed, and indeed that the first talk had begun about some kind of West German armed force, which ought to be recreated, so that West Germany would somehow be within NATO. That didn't happen until 1955. We had to run through the whole episode of the West European Defense Community, which the French finally killed in 1954. But the Soviets could see the way things were trending, and they had such superiority in ground forces in Europe at that time, much more even than now (1989). We, in our demobilization, had denuded our forces in Western Europe. The British were exhausted; the Belgians, Dutch, French and others didn't amount to very much militarily then, so the vulnerability of Western Europe was even greater. I didn't know it at the time, but the Russians probably did, that our whole nuclear arsenal, not the just tested first hydrogen bomb, but just nuclear weapons, was minuscule. I mean that, by the time of 1948 came around, we had just a bare handful of nuclear weapons. It was probably better by 1950, but not very substantial even then, and the Russians were certainly aware of that, more or less.
**Q: Did it ever occur to you that the Russians themselves might feel under threat from the West?**

MARK: Oh, I'm sure they did. I mean, the Russians have felt that all along. We were the first with nuclear weapons; we were clearly supporting their enemies, that is anti-communist forces, in all the states which they considered to be in their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. We supported anti-communist Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanians -- well, there weren't many of those, but some -- Bulgarians, less so, Yugoslavs, whatever, so that our anti-Moscow intentions were very clear in those areas. And the Russians felt that this was their security buffer zone, and we weren't willing to accept it.

Sure, I guess so, and that was all the more reason why in 1950, at this time when they invaded South Korea, I thought that they would use their military superiority, or be very tempted to do so, to just sweep to the Atlantic -- which they could justify as pre-emption. They would take whatever losses came from a few American nuclear weapon strikes inside the Soviet Union that we landed there, but then they would be masters of all of Europe. And I'm sure it was a very tense period. People in Washington must have been thinking the same thing. I remember that we even had several sessions with General Taylor, Maxwell Taylor, the later Army chief of staff, Kennedy's military advisor who played a very prominent role in our Vietnam military efforts, who was the commandant in Berlin at the time. He was a most impressive man, with a huge grasp of world politics and strategy and tactics, and so, our sessions with him led up to a paper that John Holt and I wrote setting out the dangers for Europe of possible Soviet aggressive moves and what we might expect. We sent that think piece out, it was distributed to other U.S. embassies and produced a good bit of flack, I must say.

**Q: What do you mean? People didn't take your perception of the dangers seriously?**

MARK: I don't know whether they took it seriously, but they thought that we were exaggerating Soviet willingness to engage in this sort of aggression. And obviously we were, because that invasion in Europe never took place. I don't know how seriously the Soviets ever contemplated it. When we get to "super-glasnost" after Gorbachev, enough of the Soviet archives may be opened so that we learn about such things, but we're not at that point yet (1989).

There's really, I guess, only one thing worth talking about in those years regarding East Germany before I left Berlin, and that is the German reunification issue. The German reunification issue is being talked about again nowadays (1989), but it was sort of quiescent between about 1955, when the West Germans reconstituted an army within NATO, and, let's say, 1987, or some period like that. People didn't talk about it. It was just considered out of the question.

But it wasn't out of the question in the 1950 to 1955 period because, for those years, the debate was going on in Europe about the West European Defense Community, and about a new West German army, and about a possible future role for West Germany in NATO. Throughout, the Soviets were using all of their efforts to disrupt U.S. plans, not just with Communist forces, which were pretty strong in France and Italy at the time, but even with people who were anti-communist, but had grave doubts about rearming Germany under any circumstances and under the guise of any controls that the Allies might set up.

The debate went on for a long time, and the Soviets encouraged people to think -- and Germans to think -- that if they only did not cooperate with the West, with the Allies, and stayed neutral,
why there would be a possibility of German reunification; and we saw this campaign pretty clearly way back in 1950. So we started, in our little unit, to prepare our outline for German reunification, for the democratic reunification of Germany, but detailing under what circumstances, in what ambience, with what framework, with what sort of elections, with what kind of government to be formed, and so forth and so on.

This document was finished about the end of 1950 and we put it into U.S. Government channels. It actually emerged with very little change, I believe in 1952, and this happened at that time -- I was not in Germany then -- because it was suitable for the propaganda war that was being carried on in a heightened tone in 1952 about those issues that were so fateful for Germany.

Q: What was your perception of the attitude of Germans -- East Germans, Berliners -- toward the Soviet-American conflict at that time?

MARK: The Berliners, of course, had just been rescued from the airlift, I mean, by the airlift. They had just lived through this challenging period, so you couldn't have found a more pro-American population anywhere outside of the United States, and it remained that way for many years. I mean, that's why Kennedy got, you know, this resounding reception when he said in 1963, "Ich bin ein Berliner." The Wall had gone up by then, but the population was strongly pro-Western, pro-American. And, of course, until the Wall, people had been fleeing East Germany by the tens of thousands and settling in the West; this showed what they generally felt.

East Germany, even by then, had begun losing population. East Germany, I think, started out with 18 million people in 1949, and by the time the Berlin Wall went up in mid-1961, it was somewhere around 16 and a half or 17 million. So I think that statistic shows the general attitudes toward the Soviet Union, not that there weren't many pro-Soviet people too. I mean, you can always get some minority to support a totalitarian or communist regime out of ideology or careerism or mistaken self-interest.

But anyway, I got notice, to my surprise and pleasure, about February 1951 that I had been selected for Soviet-area training and language training. I had begun a night course in Russian at the local Army school in Berlin and hadn't gotten very far, which led me to wonder whether I could. I mean, it looked so tough as a language, but, nevertheless, when the notice came that I'd been selected, I happily went trundling off to Washington and started that course in March 1951 for four very intensive months of study in Washington.

JACQUES J. REINSTEIN

Acting Chief: Division of German Economic Affairs

Washington, DC (1949-1950)

Director of German Affairs

Washington, DC (1955-1959)

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,

Washington, DC (1953-1955)
Jacques Reinstein was born in 1911 in Savannah, Georgia. He attended the University of Basel, Switzerland, the Alliance Francaise, Paris, Georgetown University, and American University. He then joined the Department of State in 1936 as an Economic Analyst and Assistant to the Secretary of State. After a long career in the Department of State, he was sent to France as Minister Counselor for Economic Affairs. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2001.

Q: Oh this is the one between Eisenhower and Bulganin and Khrushchev and Eden and so forth?

REINSTEIN: Yes. And somehow or other I didn’t get on that delegation. The one meeting I did not attend and so I don’t really have a very good feel of what transpired at the meeting except that there was a disposition I think on both sides, which we’d had before in Paris in 1947, a recognition that we were living with a dangerous situation and that it could get out of hand, with absolutely terrible consequences for parts of the world. In ‘49, at the end of the Palais Rose meeting, we did come up with what was known as a Modus vivendi. It was written down in the final communiqué as a recognition that we weren’t able to reach an agreement. We were too far apart.

The Geneva meeting grew out of the fact that we had successfully worked out a solution of the problem of German rearmament in the west. The initiative, I think, for having a meeting came from the Soviets. Let me back up here to get my dates straight. Geneva was when?

Q: In ‘55.

REINSTEIN: The Soviets I think having found out that they were unable to block the lengthy process that we’d been engaged in – let me go back just a moment and talk about the Paris agreement of ‘49. There was a final which recognized that we couldn’t reach agreement, but we agreed that we would try to avoid making the situation more difficult. The Soviets ratted on that. They ratted on that in two ways. One of them was that they proceeded to arm the East Germans. At that stage, of course, well, we were talking about German contributions to the European army but the thing wasn’t going anywhere very fast. I don’t know what caused them to decide to build up a significant East German force. I guess maybe they figured they better have something in case the European army went through. The other thing was the Korean War. The Korean War changed everything. That was really what gave the strong impetus to the eventual rearmament of Germany and Germany joining NATO, because the Europeans were scared to death of what the Soviets would do in Europe. The only deterrent we had was the economic one.

At some stage the Soviets apparently came to the conclusion that it would be desirable for them to have an easier relationship with the West and they did two things. They gave us the Austrian treaty, which really involved the complete surrender of the positions they had been hanging onto for about ten years. The two things were linked because we had a three power meeting and at some point they began bringing Adenauer in and telling him what was going on, but they didn’t do that right away [laughs]. There was a meeting in Paris at which the – it must’ve been the spring of ’55 – three western powers gave the final instructions to the negotiators in Vienna on the Austrian treaty, and they agreed to accept the summit meeting with the Soviets at Geneva;
and those two things were settled in the same meeting one Sunday afternoon that spring. I think that reflects what was happening on the Soviet side, at any rate. They felt they better have a more comfortable relationship with us.

I can’t recall seeing minutes of the meetings in Geneva. I never got a good, full briefing of what went on there. They apparently knocked around various ideas of things that you might do because I remember at some later stage – and this is one of the things I worked on in this time period – Foster Dulles said to me one time, “You know there was an idea that they talked about in Geneva that I thought had some promise and I’m sorry we never tried to see whether we could do anything about it.” That was an agreement on the redeployment of our forces in Europe to get them away from facing each other; an agreement on the deployment of forces. I said to him, “Mr. Secretary, would you like me to try my hand at seeing what I can do about this?” and he said, “Yes, go ahead. But leave me out of it.” “Leave me out of it. Don’t mention me.”

So I carried on a rather complicated negotiation which started off with us and the Germans. We had to talk with the Benelux countries, and the Italians at that point got rather annoyed with the fact that they were being left out of major discussions that they thought they should be in on. We had two committees: one which was just the three western powers and the Germans, and then a NATO committee which included the Benelux and the Italians; and I sat on both those committees. At that point we still had forces in France. We still had our French bases. So that gave us depth and a possibility of taking some of our forces and moving them to France, but relying very heavily on our French airbases, which were very important.

Q: Oh yes! Molotov was there in Berlin in the winter of ’54 – February, March. Check that out. I know some people who were there at the meeting and they’ve told me about it.

REINSTEIN: I was up to my neck in these matters and I would’ve been there if there had been a meeting, but there wasn’t a meeting. At that point we were struggling to try and see if the EDC treaty could somehow be brought through and the last thing in the world we wanted to do was to have that complicated by meetings with the…

Q: Well this was before that treaty failed, I believe. The treaty failed in the summer of ’54 and this was held in February and March. However, I don’t want to distract you from 1955.

REINSTEIN: I don’t remember it.

What I was saying was I thought it was a great mistake to have this meeting in Berlin because the origins of the meeting stemming from Geneva really gave you a broader approach to the whole set of issues confronting us and the Soviets, and by holding it in Germany it focused the meeting really on Germany, to the exclusion of these other subjects; and the German problem was not a soluble problem, certainly not by itself. If it was going to be dealt with by agreement, you have to have a broad set of understandings that would get involved in disarmament and things of that kind. Incidentally I had not mentioned disarmament. But the disarmament discussions were also a part of the picture that we were dealing with. At some point along there our principal negotiator was Henry Wallace. Wallace used to call me in at various times and consult with me about what German reactions were likely to be to various positions that he was thinking of taking. So I was in and out of the disarmament picture. When you worked on
Germany, you worked on everything practically, except the Far East [laughs]. We even got into that sometimes by backwards. I’ll tell you a story about that at some other point.

One of the things you asked me was where were the meetings. We wanted to have them in the Allied Control Council and the Soviets wouldn’t agree to that so we wound up with a compromise in which one day we would meet in the Allied Control Council and the next day we would meet at the Soviet headquarters, alternating. One of the unfortunate aspects of this was that at the beginning of the meeting they directed the discussions more at influencing German opinion than carrying on serious negotiations. They got the negotiations off on the wrong foot at the very beginning and it was nothing but a propaganda exercise on both sides. It was really interesting though because what happened was that gradually they forgot about trying to influence German opinion and got down to arguing about what’s the best way of dealing with the Germans, who are very difficult, unreliable people, and who could get you into a lot of trouble if you don’t deal with them properly.

An awful lot was between Mr. Dulles on our side and Mr. Molotov, who had returned to power, on the Soviet side. I can remember Dulles saying in response to the Soviet proposal, “What you are trying to persuade us to do is what we tried out in 1919 and it didn’t work and it got us into trouble. What we’re proposing is not to try to control the Germans, but to make the Germans part of the solution so basically they’ve got an interest in the continuation of what we work out, and not an incentive to try and get rid of it.” And that was really what the argument boiled down to and it didn’t come out anywhere and the negotiation failed. The idea of having some broad negotiations still had life and for the next couple of years there was a continuing dialogue that went on between basically the U.S., in consultation with the British and the French, and the Soviets.

In spite of the breakdown in confidence, at some stage – I can’t remember exactly when it was – we began carrying on exploratory conversations with the Soviets. I think I remember mainly the Americans took the lead, clearing with the British and the French. We had a tripartite committee in Washington in which we cleared our positions, but a lot of the basic work was done really by the Americans. The negotiations were extremely complex. I was on the coordinating committee in Washington and this went on for so long that after I went to Paris I wound up on a subcommittee. We sat in Paris and were still working on these poor problems [laughs].

We lived, of course, always under the threat of some kind of action by the Soviets against Berlin. The Soviets would try and fuss with our trucks; they would try to fuss with the passengers on the troop trains. We went through a long process where they insisted that we provide them with a list of all the people on the train. One of the issues was whether the American train commander would get off the train and go to a table where the Soviets sat, and we finally gave in on that. It was something that went on almost every night. What happened was you would get interference with the train one day; the next day the three military would consult and they would talk to the three embassies in Bonn and then at the end of this they would come up with a proposal.

JONATHAN DEAN
Kreis Resident Officer
Limburg (1949-1951)
Political Officer
Bonn (1952-1956)
East German Desk Officer
Washington DC (1956-1960)
Political Counselor
Bonn (1968-1972)

Jonathan Dean was born in 1924 in New York. He attended Harvard College and Columbia University and served in the Canadian and US Armies in World War II. His Foreign Service career took him to Germany, in which he was very much involved, Czechoslovakia, and Katanga. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: At the time that you were on the German desk, one of the threats that hung over everyone that the Soviets used all the time was that they were going to sign a peace treaty with East Germany.

DEAN: That’s what Khrushchev did threaten in the ‘61 crisis.

Q: But prior to that, that had also been a threat hadn’t it?

DEAN: Yes, sure.

Q: Why was that of concern to us?

DEAN: That was of acute concern because the fear was that the East Germans, who were regarded as unrestrained, adventurous and without the restraint which the possibility of nuclear war gave the American-Soviet relationship, would pull some stunt like cutting off access to Berlin. It would then put both the Soviet Union and the United States at loggerheads with one another and possibly cause a conflict. That’s why we viewed possible East German control with great concern.

Q: How did we view the East German government which was then under Walter Ulbricht? How did we view him and his government at that time?

DEAN: We regarded them as creatures of the Soviet system but also as people that wanted to build up their own status. Their intelligence activities in West Germany were beginning to be revealed and of course they were enormous, extending into the chancellor’s office at the time of Willy Brandt. Every week there was a new secretary from the German NATO delegation who was compromised by some East German gigolo sent over by Marcus Wolfe.

Q: It did seem that the East Germans were providing the female secretarial staff of NATO with comforts that...

DEAN: That was Marcus Wolfe’s policy and it’s showing in his memoirs these days. I met him in a conference in Berlin. He is a very tall affable fellow.
Q: What was your impression or analysis of the East German government as far as their subservience to the Soviets? Was it complete or was there an independent streak that was showing at all at that time?

DEAN: Very rarely, they would act independently. It later transpired when we were doing the Berlin negotiations they acted plenty independent so there was a good deal of this action going on below the surface that we didn’t see at that time in terms of trying to get their own status, and so forth. Of course actually each of these Warsaw Pact members was very vigorously trying to do that, Ceausescu most ostentatiously in Romania.

Q: I would imagine that the fall of 1956 and the Hungarian revolution was very much on our minds, wasn’t it, as far as we’d been accused of overstimulating the revolutionaries in Hungary and then letting them down, so this was a factor?

DEAN: Indeed it was. In 1956 I happened to be a guest of the German minister, Albrecht von Kessel, here in Washington, on the day of the Suez invasion. His guests were Walter Lippman and Lady Barbara Salt, minister at the British embassy. Lippman lit into Lady Barbara for carrying out this invasion and confusing international opinion at the very time when this very serious Russian invasion of Hungary was going on. I must say that I and others felt absolutely awful about our inactivity at that time and about the killing that went on. Yes, I had Hungary in mind.

Q: How did this hit Germany and our mission when this happened? Was it sort of expected?

DEAN: I think, as the behavior of Franz Joseph Strauss indicated, the Pact invasion was a classic example of Russian behavior. Dubcek had gone into the Prague Spring and had developed a remarkable flexibility in the country which I had served in several years before, which was then the prototype of the last redoubt of Stalinism under Novotny. So yes, it was a remarkable operation and fortunately there were not many casualties and there wasn’t much physical resistance by the Czechs. The Russians carried it out and they had symbolic participation of East Germany and various other of their Warsaw Pact allies who must have felt badly about this, because it could happen to them and many sympathized with the Dubcek policy.

Q: I would have imagined that in many ways, although it was a great tragedy for the Czechs and really for the world, at the same time from your perspective in Bonn it made things easier to a certain extent because we didn’t want the Germans to get too far in their Ostpolitik or whatever.

DEAN: That was just cranking up.

Q: So this in a way kept them in line and you can say, see what happens?

DEAN: It did answer our critics in the United States of the American troop presence in Germany. It did confirm the continuing Cold War and the need for American military presence in Europe. But it didn’t hold down the German thinking on the need for change from the Cold War line.

My first interview in the Foreign Ministry was with Ulrich Sahm, who was the head of their political department. He told me of the German interest that something be done to deal with the short-range Soviet nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe. As you know this was the time
when the SALT talks were supposed to begin and had to be postponed by President Johnson because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Germans felt that we didn’t take into consideration their security concerns in the preparations to negotiate reduction of strategic weapons aimed at the United States. This concern went on and on and played a role in German thinking, until it finally culminated in the great missile confrontation with the Pershing II’s and the SS-20s in the early ‘80s.

It was just the version of that time of the continuing German malaise about American nuclear and defense protection vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which was a characteristic of the relationship – protection is good, but is it reliable? Can you really trust another country with final responsibility for your own security? It was a very deep problem and remained such throughout the Cold War. It was a recurrent theme in German-American relations together with the other theme which you’ve mentioned already -- German neutralism or whether Germany would be a reliable ally or not. This time the distrust was on the side of the U.S. These two factors – U.S. nuclear protection and German unity – were the two main factors in the German-American relationship. German unification was always believed by Americans to be the lever by which the Soviet Union could affect the loyalty of Germany and bring it over on its side. That theme of the German Ostpolitik came up in full force after Czechoslovakia, which many Germans regarded as the last paroxysm of Soviet imperialism.

Willy Brandt was the German foreign minister at that time and in December of 1968 he raised the issue in the so-called Bonn Group at the NATO. NATO foreign ministers gather once a year, at least, at the actual foreign minister level. Those having responsibility for Germany, that is the United States, Britain and France, together with Germany, formed the so-called Bonn Group in Bonn, usually staffed by the political counselors, unless a high-level issue was involved. The Bonn Group foreign ministers, the four-powers, met on the edge of the annual NATO meetings and reviewed the situation. This was, shall we say, the core directorate of the Cold War of the Western states in the Cold War.

In that meeting, Brandt raised the possibility of negotiating on Berlin. The other ministers were quite skeptical. Brandt insisted that this would be possible. As it happened, his chief assistant, Egon Bahr, had extensive discussions with a Soviet representative in East Berlin about this issue and they apparently had indicated that they were willing to make a deal on Berlin. Anyhow, Brandt’s proposal gestated for another year or so before it really became a prominent issue. Bahr’s contacts with the Soviet Union were known to the U.S. and were a source of distrust for the Ostpolitik.

The Bonn Group on the operating level consisted of the political counselors of the British, French and U.S. embassies and the deputy political director of the Auswärtiges Amt, most of the time an official Gunther van Well, who was later German ambassador to the UN and to Washington. He was a very gifted interpreter of German policy. This man kept the allies more or less satisfied during the most intense and revolutionary period of the Ostpolitik by giving them his interpretation, his version, of what was going on and explaining to them each move in advance.

Q: In ‘72 when you arrived on the scene, what was the status of the MBFR talks?
DEAN: They didn’t exist. We started up an interagency group in Washington, developed a position, and then started to talk inside NATO about what we should do. The talks were encouraged by a statement by Brezhnev in Tbilisi that in this issue of force reductions we “should taste the wine.” That encouraged the Western countries to move ahead. This was the period of the first SALT talks, as you know. The Germans were quite intent that if there was going to be a military detente or any form of disarmament between the United States and Russia on the strategic level, that they too should benefit and that there should be also a conventional force reduction. They were the chief instigators on the NATO side, together with the smaller NATO countries, Netherlands and Belgium. They wanted force reductions and they wanted to be part of detente if it was going to take place.

This was the first NATO alliance negotiation with the Warsaw Pact and it started off rather badly. Donald Rumsfeld was our NATO representative at that time. I went over to NATO to present preliminary Washington views on the Western negotiating position for discussion in the Alliance. We had tentatively agreed with the Russians that we could meet in Vienna. This caused a great furor among the NATO ambassadors, because NATO had decided that the venue of the negotiation should be Geneva. The Soviet Union had proposed that the venue should be Vienna. I personally thought Vienna would be better than Geneva because the Austrian government could do better by us than the Swiss government for these talks. The Austrian chancellor was trying to build up, as he later explained to us, an Austrian involvement in the outside world and prevent provincialism. He went out of his way to be a very constructive host to these negotiations. Anyhow, we tentatively said it could be in Vienna and this caused enormous reaction from the NATO ambassadors. They said this was our first negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that it had been inaugurated by NATO’s defeat over the venue.

Q: *There was the beginning of what was known as the Helsinki Accords at this time too.*

DEAN: That was parallel.

Q: *Because these things became far more important later than I think anybody realized at the time on either side, I was wondering what was the attitude towards them from the people who were negotiating which sounded like much more of the big game effort?*

DEAN: That’s right. For the U.S., the force reductions were the main thing and the administration was not willing to go ahead with Helsinki and “detente,” a word later forbidden by President Ford, unless the Soviets gave us dates for the beginning of the force reduction talks. Brezhnev turned out to be considerably more interested in the Helsinki talks, which in his view were supposed to lead to the political acceptance by Western countries of the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact governments, than he was in the force reduction talks. Even though he had encouraged Helsinki to begin, I think that was all just part of reestablishing his credibility after this invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians were more interested in that subject, and the U.S. was more interested in the force reductions, not as a route to doing anything, but in terms of the seriousness of the negotiations.

Q: *I don’t know but let’s do it. By the way the Johnson administration is still in power at this point.*

DEAN: Yes, August of ‘68.
Q: You were saying December ’68.

DEAN: December was the meeting in Brussels, that’s correct. There the British, French and U.S. foreign ministers expressed polite interest but some skepticism and did not agree immediately. The next several months were taken with back and forth debate among the foreign ministers and the embassy in Berlin over whether there should be negotiations on this subject. Our officials in Berlin, David Klein, our minister there, and others (and I think this view was shared by the British and French missions in Berlin), thought it was inadvisable to negotiate on Berlin with the Soviets. They considered the status of Berlin as having been built up with great difficulty, detail by detail, over the Cold War years and they thought that fiddling with it might leave us worse off at the end and taking this intricate mechanism under debate might actually undermine the rights and responsibilities of the Allied position in Berlin, which they considered precarious. They had been operating for years on the strength of willpower and feared that the situation could get a lot worse for everyone in maintaining this four power status.

In actuality, the Soviet Union and the GDR had in practice completely taken over East Berlin and ignored the four power status of the city. They had continued to crack down periodically on civilian access to the city, most notably of course during the Khrushchev period when he threatened to turn the responsibility for Berlin over to East Germany. That was regarded as a genuine threat by most Western observers because they believed that East Germany would not have the restraint, knowledge of the situation and the shared nuclear Armageddon prospects that the Soviet Union had in this respect. I and others argued that we should proceed to this negotiation. The Soviet Union after its invasion of Czechoslovakia was making strenuous efforts to reestablish itself internationally and was pushing for the beginning of the CSCE talks. To me the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a demonstration of Soviet expansionism but of a determination to hold to the status quo.

Q: William Rogers came on as secretary of State but more importantly you had Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger who had very strong policy projections there. Were you finding yourself melding with these? Where did you feel at that very early stage in the Nixon administration?

DEAN: As I have commented, there was very considerable resistance and suspicion in the administration of the Germans, particularly Willy Brandt, the foreign minister. There was still a big coalition with CDU chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. There was great suspicion in Washington of the Social Democrats and Willy Brandt’s chief advisor Egon Bahr. Beyond that, was the real problem of Germany as I think it was seen by American officials right from the division of Germany on. Germany was so vital to the security of Europe that the main U.S. fear was that someone would take it away. Their fear, articulated in many different ways, essentially was that the Soviet Union would play on the German desire for unification and in some way with devilish skill neutralize Germany, break up the Western military coalition and open Western Europe to communist political or military penetration. This concern was based on a low opinion of the common sense of the German people derived from World War II, but now focused particularly on the Social Democrats, who had made the most consistent efforts to do something about the division of the country. The concern also extended to Free Democrats like Thomas Dehler, who broke ranks and occasionally proposed things which we regarded as unsafe. Kissinger and Nixon wanted to keep full control over the development of relations of the Soviet Union in their hands, and not in any sense let it slip into the hands of the Germans.
Q: On the Berlin side, from your perspective at the embassy and your staff and all, what was your view of reopening negotiations?

DEAN: The embassy argued for it. I mentioned that I believed that the Soviet Union had placed itself in the East-West context in a somewhat vulnerable situation and should be made to pay off with specific concessions. We did not know at that point that Brandt had actually felt out the terrain in detail and that his forecasts that something could be done were very well founded. Egon Bahr had been dealing with Soviet officials on the Berlin issue, and that process continued. In a way, since the Russians had decided to do business on Berlin, although we did not know this, our debate was with our own authorities. Second, our feeling was that even the Christian Democrats were moving in that direction, although more slowly, and that logically the Germans did not know least, as Kissinger might have put it, but rather, best in terms of their own interests and what they wanted to do. As the Ostpolitik was developed still further by Brandt and put into operation as he took power in ‘69, my feeling was that we should go with the flow and not attempt to resist and hold back. We should not try to prevent the process because our capacity to do so was uncertain and the effort to do so would alienate us from the Germans and thus in effect deprive us to some extent of our influence over events.

Q: What do you think sort of broke this suspicion or at least removed enough of it so that things began to progress for this German treaty?

DEAN: Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969 and the administration had to pay attention to what he was suggesting. The Soviet Union was making many efforts to hold a conference on security and cooperation in Europe in Helsinki, which did start in ’72. As I look back on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, developments there had frightened them and above all they wanted to consolidate the Warsaw Pact system. We wanted them to pay a price in Berlin as they later did in Helsinki, where they traded Western oversight of human rights for acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. We at the embassy were pushing for a Berlin agreement to use Western leverage to improve our own situation in Berlin, and that was true of the British and French. Later on we did agree to the Helsinki talks. Third, the United States did adopt the idea that there should be MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) talks with the Russians. These did take place starting in 1972.

The basic idea at this point on both sides was to make the division of Europe, of Germany and Berlin, more livable and less dangerous. This again was a German desire which Brandt had brought NATO. The feeling was shared by other European NATO members, but none more than Germany which was on the dividing line between East and West, that if there is going to be East-West U.S. Soviet negotiation over nuclear reductions, Germany and European NATO partners must benefit through a reduction of the immense conventional confrontation in Europe. NATO finally did take up this idea that there should be MBFR talks. So a Berlin settlement, Helsinki and MBFR talks were all part of an overall package as far as the NATO countries were concerned.

Q: How did it progress as far as your role in the Berlin talks?

DEAN: Ultimately it was decided first by the four governments and then backed by NATO, that the Berlin talks should take place. The ambassadors of the four wartime allies, the three western ambassadors and Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov were going to be the negotiators. Since the
Bonn Group teams, the one dealing with Berlin access, Berlin issues, all-German issues, were right there with the Western ambassadors at their embassies, the three political counselors were in effect co-opted to be the negotiators and deputies for the ambassadors. This outcome was received with some annoyance by our colleagues in Berlin and that tension continued all the way through the talks right up to the end.

FREDERICK H. SACKSTEDER

Kreis Residence Officer

Wuertemberg-Baden (1950-1951)

Information Officer

Dusseldorf (1952)

Frederick H. Sacksteder was born in New York in 1924. He received his bachelor’s degree at Amherst College and served in the US Navy during World War II. His career included positions in Germany, France, Spain, Tunisia, and Mexico. Mr. Sacksteder was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: In 1950, the Korean War broke out, the Berlin air-lift had come and gone, Czechoslovakia had been taken over by a “putsch,” so the Cold War was in full swing.

SACKSTEDER: Yes, indeed! I had been in Bruchsal just a month or so, when North Korea invaded the south. We were well aware that if the Soviets decided to capitalize on the situation in the Far East, the U.S. and our Allies were far from capable of stopping a ground invasion through the so-called “Fulda Gap.” We made as many advance preparations as we could: putting up a reserve of gasoline in jerry cans, packing essentials, including food, and determining evacuation routes and safe-havens. I had an additional concern.

Q: Were anti-communist efforts pretty strong in what you were doing?

SACKSTEDER: Yes. The communists in Kreis Bruchsal were few, and they were largely known to the local authorities, so that they were more a nuisance than a danger, and they did not do much more than to occasionally scribble some slogans on walls, to the great annoyance and disgust of the population. “Ami Go Home” was their favorite.

Q: Did you have any other functions as Kreis Resident Officers?

SACKSTEDER: We should discuss our role as “Committing Magistrate” for the High Commission court system. We functioned as a grand jury would in the U.S., i.e. deciding whether to indict the accused of a violation of High Commission law, and whether to hold an indicted person for trial, or grant bail. Possession of firearms was one such violation, and, in my experience, the most frequent. Most of the accused were also guilty of poaching, and were vigorously pursued by the German police and Forest Service authorities. We also had jurisdiction over all cases involving refugees, and I had two sizeable refugee camps in my area. Jurisdiction over such cases had been retained by the High Commission on the plausible grounds that such persons might not receive fair treatment in the German courts. However, it was not a very
burdensome task. If a trial was to take place, this would, in the case of Bruchsal, be at the High Commission Court in Karlsruhe, before American judges.

Q: I would like your impression that with the American occupation forces, and I’m talking really about the civilian bureaucracy, that there would be a tendency to have those who had sort of been left over from the war to be really rather second rate. I don’t know whether this is true or not but when you have a large bureaucracy built up, those people who really didn’t have anything to go back to in the States, I mean the KROs are different things because these are aspiring Foreign Service officers who are on the make you might say, as opposed to the sort of bureaucracy that had developed around the large...

SACKSTEDER: Unfortunately that was true and this is what united us, the KROs, both at the Land level, the state level, and for all of the American zone. Incidentally we also met periodically, usually about every nine months or so, at Frankfurt. All the KROs would meet for two or three days and hash over problems with the High Commissioner and his senior staff. There was a good deal of sympathy for our point of view but at the time there was still this large bureaucracy who kept bringing up projects: “we have to do more for youths, we have to do more here, more there, more for women.” All of this was great but give us the resources. That wasn’t there because the resources were concentrated at the federal and at the state level. The KROs had staff. As I mentioned, I had a staff of 12 people in my office including projectionists, a so-called interpreter who I didn’t use because he didn’t interpret, he said what he wanted to say which I discovered very quickly. I had a women’s affairs specialist, a youth’s affairs specialist, a political advisor. We also would be grinding out reports especially prior to and after elections doing the kind of work a political officer does in an embassy or consulate.

WILLIAM LLOYD STEARMAN
Press Attaché
Bonn (1956-1962)

Dr. William Lloyd Stearman was born in Wichita, Kansas. He attended high school in Burlingame, California and entered the V-12 program of the U.S. Navy Air Corps. He received a bachelor’s degree in math from the University of California in 1943 and attended graduate school at Columbia University. His Foreign Service career included positions in Austria and Germany. Dr. Stearman was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 15, 1993.

Q: The Geneva Conference was when?

STEARMAN: May-July, 1959. We believed in the missile gap and that gave the Soviets an enormous leverage over us. We felt that we needed five years to close the gap, which, in the end, turned out to be non-existent, but at the time we really believed in it. That was the first time I understood what strategic weapons were all about. They are diplomatic blue chips. When we felt strategically inferior, we were knuckling under to a disastrous degree. It was just our great fortune that, through a misunderstanding, Khrushchev was invited to Camp David. Eisenhower was really ticked off, but it was too late to do anything about it. That saved us, because if the
Soviets had accepted our last proposal on Berlin, which would have seriously undermined all of the existing Four Power arrangements, and which was limited to five years, because we thought it would take five years to close the missile gap, it would have been the beginning of the end of Berlin. Our proposal amounted to a sellout, a most disgraceful sellout. I was extremely unhappy; although I said nothing. One can keep things quiet only so long before they get out. I believe that even those who knew about our awful last proposal didn't realize how detrimental it was to German interests, so I had to be very careful in handling this. It was a very trying period.

The German media had some extremely good people. Bonn was always a correspondent's paradise because there were so few secrets. The German government simply was not good at keeping secrets; so things were fairly open.

Q: Did you find the German correspondent was a different type than say the French correspondent or some of the others?

STEARMAN: I would say they were less politicized at that time. They later became more politicized. Most of them were pro-American. Remember, we are talking 1956-62, a really trying period in which Germans were subjected to a lot of strain, particularly after the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin of November 27, 1958. That forced us into the summit meeting in Geneva in order to defuse this threat which was putting a lot of pressure on the Germans. They were really dependent on us; they needed us badly and I think that was reflected throughout much of the press.

Q: Wasn't the main question that the Germans were always asking, "Are you with us?" Both Kennedy and Eisenhower got a little tired of Adenauer's looking at them and saying, "Are you going to be there when the chips are down?"

STEARMAN: They had to be reassured constantly and I must say, at times, they had some reason to question our staunch support; however, by and large I believe our record was pretty credible there and stands up well under retrospect.

Q: Did you have a hard time during the U-2 crisis?

STEARMAN: The U-2 was shot down May 1, 1960. That is an interesting event. I would like to dwell a little bit on that because this is another thing I got involved in.

Q: You might explain what it was.

STEARMAN: I will back up a little bit and pick up things at the end of the Geneva Conference which ended with us on the verge of selling out. We had Khrushchev coming over in September, 1959 and meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David. Eisenhower was taking a very soft position on Berlin because he apparently also believed in the missile gap. You remember the old question the French were asking in 1939: "Mourir pour Danzig?" We don't want to die for Danzig. Well, this was "Mourir pour Berlin," we don't want to die for Berliners. At that time we thought the USSR could blow us away with intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, as it turned out, they actually didn't have.

Anyway, Eisenhower took a very weak position on Berlin, best demonstrated at a press conference held in Washington after the Camp David meeting in which he would make no
guarantees at all that the United States would protect Berlin. He also said that the situation in Berlin was "abnormal," which is what Khrushchev had been calling it all along. It was very disheartening.

Well, what happened is this: our U-2 flights, which, starting in 1956, began covering the Soviet Union, couldn't detect any ICBMs. The Soviets, as it turned out, didn't like their first generation ICBM which was the SS6 Sapperwood. Although they had the capability of building a large number of them, they decided instead to build an improved next generation of ICBMs.

I believe we got some human and other intelligence in January, 1960 which finally led us to conclude that we didn't have a serious strategic problem. The Soviets had a few more ICBMs than we, but we had the overall strategic advantage, if anything. At worse it was a standoff. At this point, our public position on Berlin started to change and harden, first in speeches by Vice President Nixon and Chris Herter, who was our Secretary of State, and finally, by Douglas Dillon, then Under Secretary of State who, on March 25, 1960, made a very tough statement on Berlin -- totally different from what Eisenhower had told Khrushchev. On April 27, when Eisenhower was asked about Berlin and he said that Douglas Dillon had completely covered his administration's position.

The summit meeting was due to take place on May 18, 1960 in Paris. Khrushchev knew that he wasn't going to achieve anything there, since our position on Berlin had changed almost 180 degrees. He knew he was going to come out of that meeting empty handed. When the U-2 was shot down on May 1, it was a godsend to Khrushchev. That gave him the perfect excuse to really torpedo the meeting which he did by insisting that all responsible for the U-2 flights be punished. This, of course, would have to include the Commander-in-Chief, Eisenhower, although Khrushchev didn't go that far.

Well, I was with our delegation at that meeting -- going to all of these meetings was the great part of my job. We had one preliminary meeting with Khrushchev in which he blustered all of his demands. That was the only meeting we had. The summit was in effect, then called off. I liked this development -- partly because we had done all these nice briefing papers for Eisenhower, but it was rumored that while flying up from Delhi, he had been reading westerns instead of our papers. You could only give Eisenhower one page on anything, he wouldn't read much more. He would, however, sit through hours of dog and pony show briefings, but he just wouldn't read much. I feared he might not be too well prepared for the summit.

Anyway that whole conference broke up, and Khrushchev gave one of the biggest press conferences in history. Remember the old Palais Chaillot with a kind of temporary huge conference hall? There must have been 3000 correspondents sitting in that hall. Khrushchev was up on the podium with his Defense Minister, Malinovsky wearing a chest full of medals. I was sitting in the hall with the German contingent of about 40, ten or so of whom were from the Foreign Office. Finally some of the German correspondents started to heckle Khrushchev. We were sitting more than a third back from the front of this huge hall. Suddenly Khrushchev stopped and pointed down at us. He said, "We buried you at Stalingrad and we will bury you again." Silence, no more heckling. The Germans were frozen. At any rate, Khrushchev got himself off the hook at Paris. He was in a very tough position as far as the rest of the Politburo was concerned. I think this was one of several things, including the Cuban mess up, that eventually got him eased out.
Q: Why don't we just finish up the German thing and then end this session. You were there with three different ambassadors, James B. Conant (1955-57), David Bruce (1957-59), and then back to your former Austrian colleague, Walter C. Dowling, (1959-1963). Could you describe from your perspective how they operated and their effectiveness?

STEARMAN: They were totally different people. Conant being the great academic, president of Harvard. First, it was a very large operation, a High Commission when he took over. The whole complex, built to house the operation at that time down in Bad Godesberg, which was right on the Rhine, was so big that it now houses not only our chancery but two German ministries. It was an enormous complex which gradually got smaller and smaller. The nature of the mission was changing from the end of the occupation by the handing over more and more power to the Germans and returning to more of an embassy operation. It was never like any other embassy because of the unique position and role in Germany.

I wasn't there very long under Conant. We had David K. E. Bruce who was the only role model that I ever owned up to having. He was a remarkable man. Extremely effective, with a wonderful command of the English language. The telegrams which he sent back to the Department were priceless. I got along with him particularly well because I used to go shooting and fishing with him. He was great at both. The best wing shot I have ever seen in my life, and a great fly fisherman. That impressed me. But also, he knew everybody you could think of. We would be out having a drink at the tailgate of a station wagon after one of our outings and he would talk casually about everybody you had ever heard of. He was in substance very, very good. As you know he was not really a career professional. He had been a Foreign Service officer, a consular officer, I believe, when he was younger; however, he was one of the most skillful professionals I ever worked for. He certainly held all the jobs. He was Ambassador to France, to England, China, the Marshall Plan, etc. You name it and he has done it.

Q: Did you get any feel how he felt about the Eisenhower administration and how they were dealing with things?

STEARMAN: Sometimes he didn't take things seriously. This brings up a little anecdote. At one point an instruction went out to all the missions that ambassadors were not to get new Cadillacs but, instead, ones used by cabinet officers. Bruce sent back this great telegram which said, "In days of yore ambassador's were made to do with cast off courtesans and I guess now they have to make do with cast off Cadillacs. If that be the case, then I want Engine Charlie's cast-off."

Q: Engine Charlie was the Secretary of Defense who had come from General Motors, hence the nickname.

STEARMAN: This is typical of the kind of telegrams he would send back. Ludwig Erhard, the German Economic Minister, was due to eventually succeed Adenauer, but was kept in his place by Adenauer until then. At one time Bruce sent back a telegram saying, "Adenauer apparently is not satisfied just to make Erhard eat crow, he wants to make crow his permanent diet." That is typical of the many great telegrams he would send back. Colorful but skilled. He was very sophisticated.

You know, Red Dowling, who was DCM when I was down in Vienna, was a reasonably competent officer, but not in Bruce's league. Bruce was in a class all by himself. He was simply
outstanding. I was always flattered that he used to drop in to see me when he was in the
Department. I greatly admired him and I don't admire very many people after all these years. I
really can not find a major flaw in the man; even though everyone is flawed to some extent. He
once gave a talk to the Embassy Women’s Club in Bad Godesberg about diplomacy. He said,
"They say diplomats are sent abroad to lie for their country, but that is a mistake. A diplomat
should never, never be caught in a lie. That ruins your credibility and effectiveness. I am not,
however, talking about all the little lies that we have to tell every day; after all you have to lie to
live." And he was absolutely right in that sense, and I have never forgotten, "you have to lie to
live."

KEMPTON B. JENKINS

Political Officer

Berlin (1958-1960)

Kempton B. Jenkins was born in Florida in 1946. He attended the Navy Officers
Training Program at Bowling Green in Ohio and studied at the graduate schools
of George Washington University and Harvard University. Mr. Jenkins’ Foreign
Service career included positions in Germany, Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela.
He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 23, 1995.

JENKINS: The Berlin experience quickly became even more exciting as in October of 1959, the
East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, in a speech, announced that the legal basis of Western
presence in Berlin had expired. The chief of our division, the late Howard Trivers, a superb
scholar of German history, quickly picked up on the Ulbricht speech, and we began a series of
messages back to Washington, sounding the alarm bell that the Soviets clearly were in the
process of launching an attack upon our basic legal right to remain in Berlin. Crisis after crisis
cascaded from that time. East Germans began to substitute for Soviet officers at checkpoints in
an effort to force us to recognize their sovereignty and the division of Germany. Harassment of
our convoys in the Berlin corridor increased regularly. The elevated train system, which ran
throughout the city in one of the anachronisms of the otherwise divided Berlin was maintained in
East Berlin. The S-Bahn, as they were called, began to appear in West Berlin with flags of the
so-called East German Democratic Republic on them. This led to action on our part to stop the
trains and remove the East German flags before they could proceed. Guards at the checkpoints in
the presence of the Soviet officials would attempt to stamp East German visas into our passports.
While these may seem petty, they were all part of clearly calculated policy to "salami-slice" the
Western presence in Berlin.

Underlying this decision and the timing of the effort was the fact that the Soviet-sponsored
regime in East Germany was a complete failure in governing its section of Germany. Living
standards dropped as living standards in the West rose. The refugee flow from East Germany
through Berlin to West Germany steadily increased until it reached a flood in 1959. It became
increasingly apparent to us that the Soviets had to act to stop the depopulation of East Germany
if they were not to lose total control over one of the gems of their empire.

The desperateness of their situation was dramatized by the particularly severe rate of departure
by qualified doctors from East Germany. One of the things which I undertook in our political
section was to monitor the refugee flow and attempt to compile statistics on the flow of doctors. I was helped in this by the opportunity to interview doctors who were living in West Berlin and by the presence of a fiancee of the New York Times representative David Binder in East Berlin's top hospital. David shared this information with me as I shared with him our views of political significance of this flow. There were states in the Soviet zone of Germany which in fact were virtually without doctors. You can imagine the psychological impact on the population to see all their doctors leave. In a desperate effort the Soviets even began to import Vietnamese and Bulgarian doctors as an emergency measure, which had an even more dramatic negative effect on the East German population.

While we concentrated on alerting Washington to the dramatic changes we saw unfolding in our exposed position in Berlin, we also tried to stay on top of attitudes in West Berlin and in the East German population in every way possible in addition to monitoring the flight of doctors. Together with my British colleague, the late James Bennett, and my French colleague, Xavier De Nazelle, we would attend open air district political communist rallies in the parks in East Berlin where we witnessed the population attacking party spokesmen for the dramatic deterioration of the situation and the contrast between their situation and the steadily rising standard of living in West.

On one occasion, when James and I walked into an outdoor restaurant where the local party was holding such a rally, the security goons who always tailed us as we went into East Berlin stepped to the dais where an East German party leader was speaking, with a note. He read it, stopped and said, "I understand that we are honored by the presence of representatives of the U.S. and British missions tonight. I wonder if they would like to come forth and contribute to our conversation?" It was indeed tempting, but "exercising uncharacteristic restraint," James and I decided it was better to sit tight, drink our beer and wait for the program to go on than to take this unsolicited opportunity to present Western views to an audience, which probably would have led to our being physically thrown out!

The freedom to move in East Berlin after going through a checkpoint, even though we were followed, led to several very interesting experiences. When Khrushchev came to Berlin to speak to reiterate his ultimatum and turn up the heat on our presence in West Berlin, he spoke at an open air gathering of tens of thousands in Alexander Platz. Once again, James and I had driven through the checkpoint and then taken to foot to walk to where the rally was going to occur. There were East German police everywhere, questioning the right of people to participate. We feigned ignorance of German and kept emphasizing that we were there from the United States and England to witness this historic event. We finally had worked our way to within a few hundred yards of the platform from where Khrushchev would speak when a particularly hostile police guard stopped us cold and said "no one may pass beyond this point without special identification." Sort of as a lark, James and I took out our PX cards and held them up to the man who to our astonishment displayed the traditional German respect for documents and without understanding what he was observing, waved us through. The result was that we stood in the second row right in front of Khrushchev and observed the interplay between Ulbricht and other officials on the platform as Khrushchev spoke. Khrushchev was a dramatic and even theatrical speaker. His voice was shrill and threatening as he denounced the Western presence in Berlin as illegal and declared that we had six months to depart or take the consequences. The nervous
excitement of his East German minion on the dais with Khrushchev was palpable. Needless to say, this made for interesting reporting telegrams back to Washington.

Perhaps the most dramatic confrontation of this period occurred slightly later when East German guards, in an effort to force our acknowledgment of the so-called German Democratic Republic and its sovereignty over West Berlin, instead of just harassing our army convoys, actually seized one on the autobahn. Since each of these convoys was equipped with a radio, we received word in the mission almost immediately. The convoy leader reported that instead of just being delayed, the East Germans were in the process of taking possession of our six-truck convoy. General Hamlet instructed the officer in charge of the convoy to sit fast in the truck and refuse to leave, which they did. The East Germans stood on the running boards outside the truck, but did not attempt to use force to evict the American soldiers who were driving them. This deadlock continued for several hours. Meanwhile, General Hamlet and Minister Al Lightner were on the phone to Washington and Bonn as were their French and British colleagues.

From where we sat in Berlin, this was clearly one more desperate effort by Moscow to frighten us out of our rightful position in West Berlin. In Washington, the situation quickly created near panic and anxiety that general war could erupt over such an incident. General Hamlet called together the mission team and we debated for a short time what to do. Meanwhile the call of nature was having a predictable effect on the beleaguered American soldiers in the trucks and it was clear that they could not hold out indefinitely. Abandoning the trucks would constitute the first acceptance by the West of the suggestion that we did not have a full legal right not only to be in West Berlin, but to transverse the autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin to sustain our presence there. It was decided that Findley Burns, who was the number three man in the U.S. mission, a career diplomat, should go to Karlshorst at Soviet headquarters with two military officers and a Russian-American enlisted man, as an interpreter, to present a demarche to the Soviets: If the trucks were not released within two hours, we would use force to retrieve them. And, bless his courage, while Washington continued to debate nervously, General Hamlet instructed our tank units to load up with live ammunition, start their motors, begin to assemble to drive down the autobahn to free the U.S. convoy. This action, arming the tanks with live ammunition and moving them out of their assembly point toward the autobahn was, of course, closely observed and reported on by Moscow spies who monitored all of our military activities in Berlin constantly. Faced with the threat of the use of force, the Soviets backed down, the trucks were released and the convoy continued. Subsequently, we filed a very strong protest with Karlshorst, in Moscow, and with the Soviet embassy in Washington warning them against such irresponsible and dangerous activity in the future. For the time being, our point had been made. The Russians had to allow for the possibility that we might actually risk war in order to maintain our rights. It was this perception which was central to our ability to remain in Berlin over subsequent years until in fact the wall eventually came down.

Throughout the two years we were in Berlin, there was an uneasy relationship between the mission, Bonn and more so Washington and as well between our British and French colleagues and their respective foreign offices at home. We were convinced almost viscerally that the name of the game in Berlin was willpower. If the Soviets we felt were persuaded that we could be threatened and forced out of Berlin or that we would lose our determination for the long pull they could by salami slice tactics wear away our rights and our determination to maintain our position. The net result if they were successful would have been the permanent advance of the
border Soviet empire and help persuade our allies that our commitment to Europe would not stand the test of time. We saw several policy debates in Washington particularly when John Foster Dulles was the Secretary which led us to believe that the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Berlin was in question. Dulles, an astute corporate lawyer, seemed to be seeking always a legal means of reducing our engagement and eventually extricating ourselves from "an indefensible position." When the Kennedy Administration arrived, we began to feel this same unease even though the indications we were receiving were clothed in more liberal and internationalist tone the statements by White House officials including those closest to Kennedy persuaded us that the Kennedy Administration was even more dedicated to extricating the United States from our commitment in Berlin than Dulles had been. We felt that somehow our strong consistent political reporting was simply being ignored by the White House and those around him who, as so often is the case in the last 50 years, tended to ignore the State Department experts and rely on the brilliance of White House staff who were frequently under-informed about real conditions. Cleverness seemed to rate a higher priority than reliability. One of the tactics which we evolved almost by happenstance to deal with this was to develop our own channels of communication. In my case, I built a very close friendship with Dr. Otto Frei, a highly respected Berlin reporter for the equally highly respected NZZ, a Swiss newspaper which is probably the most respected paper in Europe even today. Among other things the NZZ we knew was read first thing every morning by Germany's Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Thus while we might have trouble persuading our own government in Washington to stand tough occasionally and our British colleagues were wringing their hands over the waffling nature of the then British government. (This was before Lord Hume became foreign minister.) Then the French were never quite certain where de Gaulle was standing (although it was usually very solid and very helpful), we were able by working with Otto Frei to communicate our views about developments in Berlin directly to the German Chancellor. This may seem a bit irreverent if not worse but in fact we of course did not divulge classified information while we did engage in mutual discussions with Frei about our assessment of Soviet and East German intentions and activities and in return received from Frei very impressive and timely assessments of the attitudes in West Berlin and among Western correspondents. The net result of this was that when a four power discussion would take place on how to deal with the latest salami slice initiative by Moscow, Adenauer would always be up to speed on our view and assessments of those actions and vigorously defend standing fast in the face of the Soviet threat. This was heady stuff. We of course kept our direct superiors informed of the discussions we had with Frei but basically it was in many ways the most effective communications channel that we had.

One of the great luxuries of living in Berlin in addition to the excellent restaurants and the very hospitable and friendly population and first class cultural activities was the existence of two top flight tennis clubs. As a tennis enthusiast, I always tried to actively participate in a tennis club at each of my assignments and throughout my German assignments this was a very successful way both with an unusual slice of German society. In Berlin I joined the Rot -- Weiss Tennis Club and became a member of the club team with whom I journeyed to Western Germany to play matches against other teams. We became close friends, the members of the team and I had the pleasure of regular tennis at one of the premiere tennis clubs in Europe.

Earlier I had done this in Munich, Hannover and Hamburg. In Hannover where (the club rank list had) the top members began with Baron Von Cramm and included three other Davis Cup historic players, I landed at number eight. I always had to explain that there was a tremendous gap in
quality between number four and number five and even between seven and eight, but nonetheless I was on the ladder with four famous German players. There, too, we had great fun traveling to matches against other clubs and had the pleasure of playing on first class facilities.

I also knew a lot of people in the British intelligence section because they were all dealing with East Germany and I was a source of information for them, and they for me. Oddly enough, there was a famous British turncoat whom we knew, and whom we once entertained in our house, James Blake.

Blake was caught, arrested, jailed in England, and then spirited out by KGB agents from the jail. He went off to Moscow, and wrote a book. It was a famous case because like Burgess and McLean, he came from this highly structured society where if you were not in, you were out. The story goes that because his mother was Lebanese or something, he was not socially accepted. He suffered from this at university and in society. He had a very nice British wife, who was a friend of my wife's. He was a handsome fellow, wore a military uniform, but he was really working for Sandy Goshen, the head of British intelligence in Berlin. Blake caused the death of dozens of covert agents in East Germany by identifying or "fingering them" to Soviet authorities. (*No Other Choice by Geo. Blake, Simon & Schuster - 1990)

Our best friend in Berlin, was a British captain in the tank corps who went on to become the Queen's military advisor, Major General, Sir Michael Palmer. Mike and I have remained close friends, we visit back and forth, our children are friends, and his youngest son is my God-son. My God-son was a major in charge of a tank unit in "the desert rats" in the Gulf War. His regiment is the same regiment his father was in, which is the same regiment his great grandfather was in, so it goes way back. So we had a great exposure to regimental life, and liked that a lot.

We also had a lot of friends in Berlin among young Berlin lawyers. The city was so pro-American. When we received orders to go to Moscow, and we went out to the stores we always encountered a warm reception. I took an old Harris tweed overcoat in to see if I could get a fur lining for it, to wear in Moscow. I walked in to this tailor whom I had dealt with but didn't know particularly, told him that I had been posted to Moscow, etc., and I wondered if I could have a rabbit skin lining. He said, "Absolutely." He did a beautiful job and when I went to pay for it...it was going to cost $100, a lot of money in those days...he refused to accept payment. He said, "You have defended my city. You're going to Moscow to continue to defend my city, it's my contribution." And my wife went in to get some jewelry, and the same thing happened to her. When people learned that we were going to Moscow, and they had known what we were doing in Berlin, they refused to accept payment. They were right, we were all "saving Berlin."

Q: Oh, absolutely. Did you deal with the Soviets at all yourself?

JENKINS: Yes, particularly in Potsdam, which was the headquarters of the Soviet armed forces in Germany. We would go to meetings there and negotiate over people such as soldiers who would wander across the border. Findley Burns, the Mission Counselor, was the lead negotiator.

I was also involved with the Russians in various things such as the air traffic control disputes which reoccurred regularly. The Soviets were always trying to lower the air corridor, harass our planes. We also had social events with them.
However, once Khrushchev delivered his ultimatum, it became deadly serious and there was no more joking, no more socializing. With the exception of the tanks and the convoy, they were all obvious harassment. They tried to use our trips through the check-point to take our passport and stamp an East German visa in it which would be a sort of recognition of East German sovereignty over all Berlin. So we refused to show our passports. Washington, always seeking to defuse or compromise confrontations insisted that we hold our passports up to the window, so we had to do that. We in Berlin never wanted to give them an inch.

Q: How about with our military? Using military to put pressure on is probably the most inexact weapon I can think of, because they're not very good at this.

JENKINS: They don't like to do it.

ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON
Economic-Labor Officer
Hamburg (1958-1960)
East German Affairs
Berlin (1964-1968)
Political Officer
Bonn (1968-1970)

Council on Foreign Relations: East Germany Study Group

Robert Gerald Livingston was born and raised in New York City. Prior to attending Harvard University and the University of Zurich, he served in the US Army during World War II. He entered the Foreign Service in 1956 and held a number of posts including Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: In ’64, could you describe what was the situation with Germany when you arrived.

LIVINGSTON: There was still, three years later, the echoes of the crisis of ’58 to ’61 that ended more or less with the building of the Wall. You still had the feeling that everything you did was monitored on an hourly basis by Washington and that this was still potentially the flash point of East-West confrontation. Soon after I got there in June of 1964, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the GDR which, more or less, in our interpretation (those of us in the Eastern Affairs Division headed by Frank Meehan, who was an old Soviet hand), put an end to the uncertainties, which made it clear that the Soviet Union was signing on to the status quo and was not going to try to change it. You got the feeling, you know, that the Soviets, prompted by the East Germans, otherwise might try to make a grab for East Berlin.
Q: When you say the status quo, what had been the concern?

LIVINGSTON: The concern had been, as the Kennedy tapes during the Cuban Missile Crisis show now, how, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis which was the Fall of ’62, the feeling had very much been that Berlin and Cuba were tied together, that Khrushchev was using the Cuban Missile Crisis to force us out of Berlin or, if we reacted in a hard line, this is what the tapes show, with some sort of a strike against Cuba that Khrushchev might respond with an attack on West Berlin. Of course, we were very clear that this was militarily not to be held, that it was very vulnerable. There was still a feeling that was very much - though it diminished as time went along - of the beleaguered city, the outpost of freedom and all that business. It could all be traced back to the Berlin Blockade.

Q: In Berlin itself, when you arrived in ’64, what was the spirit? Was it a mission?

LIVINGSTON: It was called a mission, a U.S. mission. Basically, it was a military mission. In theory and, I think, in international law, the city was still under occupation status. We rather emphasized that because we also emphasized, against the facts on the ground, that this was a four-power city and that, even though there was a wall, we had access - we being the American occupying authority - to East Berlin on the basis of so-called four-power rights, and we did not have to deal with the East Germans. One of the sort of hang-ups, big hang-ups, was, “Do not have any dealings with the East Germans.” That would tend to undermine this four-power, I wouldn’t say fiction, but certainly only a de facto status. And I remember riding over to East Berlin with the then ambassador, who was the chief of mission in Berlin when he came to Berlin since he was the heir to the position of the military governor of Germany and the heir to the position of the high commissioner of Germany. We were riding over to East Berlin with George McGhee and his wife and daughter in their limousine and the East German guard came up to us and McGhee pulled out his passport, and I said, “Put that damn passport back.”

Q: Well, were you able to sample the feeling of the Germans in West Berlin at the time?

LIVINGSTON: Well, that wasn’t part of my duties. I mean, we obviously had acquaintances. I think, generally, one did have the feeling that, even then, I mean this is all hindsight, that the city was drained and that the people that remained were second-raters. Brandt, by that time, had left. He had already been candidate for chancellor once. German industry had left, of course, right after the war. The city existed on subsidies from Bonn. There was a great deal of artificiality about the situation. The people who were there, even lots of my friends, and who wanted to get ahead in their careers left Berlin and went down to the Federal Republic and made their careers there. Even though they may have been Berlin patriots and swore they would come back and even though the Parliament went through this routine of holding committee meetings in Berlin from time to time still you had a feeling that it was a lot of bravado and a lot of Chamber of Commerce hype but beneath it the city was not in too good shape.

Q: How about our mission? Was there concern among you and others who were dealing with this at the political level about the ultimate survival of Berlin, of West Berlin?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I don’t know. I guess my perspective was too narrow then and I wasn’t concerned with West Berlin. One of the interesting things with a large mission was that you had a lot of interaction with the military. This was very much in the tradition, which even dates back
to the Second World War, of political-military affairs and a big effort to maintain cordial relations with the military. You had the feeling that the U.S. Army sent some of their very good people. There was a commandant of Berlin, who was an Army major general. By the time I got there, they were no longer destined for four star rank, so it was clear the Army wasn’t sending their very best people. I still think there was a feeling that the Russians might try to grab this one day. An interesting aspect of it was that you were involved in a lot of details of city administration, you know, and concerned with public safety and working with the Berlin police and things like that. I wasn’t but my colleagues were.

Q: Let’s talk about how you dealt with your area of competence which was both East Berlin and East Germany.

LIVINGSTON: In theory, yes, but in point of fact, it was for us still the heyday of Kremlinology, which by that time was much less used in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe where you could get around, because of our attitude that, ”We don’t have any dealings with these guys, these East Germans.” There was very little official contact with the East Germans. So it was Kremlinology in the sense that we spent a lot of time reading the East German newspapers. The only operative work we did, basically, was in relation to Americans who had been arrested in the GDR and there we dealt through German lawyers to get them out. Frank Meehan started that. He was involved already in the Abel -Powers exchange which I think was ’62.

Q: This was Colonel…

LIVINGSTON: Abel, the Soviet spy and Gary Powers, the man they shot down…

Q: The U-2 incident.

LIVINGSTON: …and they were exchanged on the Glienicker Bruecke, the bridge that ran from West Berlin to Potsdam. That was one of the first of several exchanges. Frank was one of the first people involved in that. We got involved then with an East German lawyer who had been cleared by the East German government and was working with the East German government to handle these exchanges and handle prisoner exchanges. When a young American would get thrown in jail, his family would hire a lawyer over here, and they would come over and he’d deal with the East Germans. So we were kind of facilitators when we dealt with one West Berlin and one East Berlin lawyer. Subsequently, one of them became quite famous actually. This East German had a monopoly on prisoner exchanges.

Q: Well, I would have thought it would have been a difficult job and sort of frustrating to be,,, at least the Kremlinologists in the Soviet Union could talk to officials one way or another there and here you are looking... it’s almost like being inside North Korea, and not being able to talk to anyone.

LIVINGSTON: It was rather hard but Berlin is a very pleasant city so you had plenty of diversions. That did change, and I guess I was the person that sort of fell into it. I don’t know how it happened. I started by 1966 or 1967, meeting fairly regularly with a man who made it clear that he was sort of the confidant of the Minister-President of East Germany, Willi Stoph. We met periodically every two weeks, every 10 days or whatever for a chat about politics and economics and this and that in the Opera Cafe Unter den Linden in East Berlin. I’d write a report and he’d get back and he’d write a report. It’s sort of curious. I just received a letter three days
ago from the archives of the East German secret police files that I have a file of 160 pages and
that I can now come over and look at it, so I’m sort of curious what this guy wrote about me
(laughter).

Q: It does sort of sound “spy vs. spy.”

LIVINGSTON: Well, the Agency, the CIA, was very big in Berlin. They had operations going
over there, at least they liked you to think they had operations going. We did go a lot to the
theater in East Berlin and try to follow the intellectual world. We could meet and did meet with
intellectuals and writers to the degree they it wasn’t dangerous for them. I guess, in retrospect, I
wish I’d done much more of that. I did have a very good friend who was a leading actor at the
Brecht Company, you know, and we used to see him and his wife quite regularly. Jeanne, my
wife, and I used to go over. He was this kind of a “golden boy.” We used to go touring on the
lakes. We occasionally got out of East Berlin on those lakes that are on the borderline, you know,
and in retrospect, I suppose we could have done a lot more. We were conscious we were being
watched. This was partly my experience from Yugoslavia. You didn’t want to endanger
somebody by being too pushy. So I sort of took the attitude that they would let us know if it was
any danger for them. A couple of times that did happen, and we didn’t see the people again. I
really felt, maybe exaggeratedly, I didn’t want to endanger anybody by having contact with a
person who might get in trouble with the authorities.

Q: Were you getting the feeling that the people in East Berlin were pretty well informed about
what was happening in West Berlin?

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes, sure, because there was radio and television throughout the entire
existence of the GDR. Television became fairly widespread in the late 1950s. The East Germans
were incredibly well informed about what was going on in West Germany and in the West
because they saw West German television and they heard West German radio. We had this radio
in the American sector, RIAS, which was, I guess, an American-owned radio station and rather
important at the time of the 1953 uprising. By broadcasting factual bulletins about what was
going, RIAS let the people in Magdeburg know that there were people on the streets in Berlin
and people in Leipzig know people were on the streets in Magdeburg and so on.

Q: Did you ever have to be concerned about being set up?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I was a little nervous about that but one’s attitude was, “If you’re going to
get in trouble, don’t talk to an East German, demand a Russian.” There were a number of people
before me who, if not cowboy-like, were at least daring fellows. One had a girlfriend in Warsaw,
who in effect did what he wanted to do. He’d drive down to Warsaw from Berlin through the
GDR.

Q: Were you allowed to do that?

LIVINGSTON: No, theoretically not, and I guess he was showing his passport to the East
Germans. We went back and forth to Berlin. If you didn’t go by air from West Germany, which
the East Germans didn’t control, you went by Army train. There was this great Army train every
night. It was still the Cold War, a little bit this James Bond type of stuff and, as I say, the Agency
was very present in Berlin. Berlin was, during the Cold War along with Vienna, THE spy capital.
They had all kinds of operations against each other, the western and eastern spy organizations.
Q: Were you getting anything useful from the Agency?

LIVINGSTON: Well, I must say, I always had the feeling, having been in that type of work earlier, that you didn’t see everything, not by a long shot. I must say that what I was permitted to see was not very enlightening, as a general rule, but they certainly had a lot of operations. That may have been bureaucratic. We talked to a lot of West Germans who were working on the GDR, and the SPD had had a big net in East Germany right down to the wall and even after the Wall. I already then had the feeling, which I subsequently found out was so, there was a hell of a lot more going on between the two Germanies than we knew about or that the West Germans were telling us about. We did have regular meetings with the West Germans who ran the so-called inter-zonal trade operation. How much they confided in us I don’t know, but it was a regular meeting to impart information. It was once a month or so about how trade between the two Germanies which still had the sort of quaint occupation status name of “inter-zonal trade.

Q: Were you watching the economic side of East Germany?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, we had one guy. This was the heyday, as you know. The large, overstaffed mission in Eastern affairs. Working on the GDR, we had four maybe five people. We had Frank Meehan. We had William Woessner. We had Richard Smyser and we had one or two other people from time to time so we had four or five people all the time working on East Germany.

Q: And, at the same time, you really weren’t able to talk to anybody.

LIVINGSTON: Well, I mean we did talk to some people. We talked to West Germans who were working on the GDR, the newspapers, men who had contacts with some East Germans. Generally, I tended to stick with intellectuals, because we thought they had a little bit of *carte blanche* to talk to foreigners. There were then some opera singers who had permission to sing in the West. The great German theater, the Brecht Company, was still stronger than subsequently. Even then it was becoming somewhat routine but it was still quite creative. Then there was the jewel in the East German crown, which was the comic opera “Felsenstein.” We went to a lot of performances there. Basically, we thought this was a West German problem. We didn’t want to get ahead of the West Germans. We didn’t recognize East Germany until well after the West Germans and after the British and the French. We always were in the wake of the Federal Republic, believing, “This is important to the West Germans. It’s not important to us, particularly.” There was some minor American interest but even there not a helluva lot.

Q: I think one of the scenarios that I used to hear around this time and really for the next 30 years or so, was that something might happen in East Germany whether it be riots or something, the West Germans might get involved and then all of a sudden we’d have World War III.

LIVINGSTON: Well, yes, looking back on it maybe it was stupidity, but I never thought that that was very much of a real possibility. I think that was colored a good deal by the 1953 uprising and then, of course, there was the ’56 revolutions in Hungary and Poland. But by my time, I don’t think we ever operated on the premise that there was going to be an East German uprising.

Q: Were you able, or was it your responsibility for looking at East Germany as country dealing with other countries because East Germany had a rather aggressive stance?
LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes, sure. We followed that through the paper. I should say one other quote “source,” though, I would really put with some question marks, was a military one. There was a military mission in Potsdam which was a vestige of the four-power occupation of Germany. There was British one, a French one, and an American one in the GDR. And there was a Soviet one in each of the former Western zones, a Soviet one in Baden-Baden, a Soviet one in Moenchengladbach, I think, and a Soviet one in, maybe, Heidelberg in the former American zone. They were kind of authorized spies. They traveled around in uniform. It was kind of a cops and robbers game. They’d try to observe some Soviet military units wherever they could. Sometimes they’d get caught and get into trouble. It was headed by a colonel, usually a Russian-speaking colonel, and five or six fellows from military intelligence. They went all over East Germany. There were forbidden areas, but they went all over in their jeeps. We used to meet with them fairly often and talk about East Germany. Then, of course, there were analysts at RIAS, the radio station in the American sector, because, of course, their job was to broadcast to East Germany. Also, they had some sources, and we’d talk to them. So, we didn’t have much if any contact with official East Germans, and not too much with East German non-officials. We never got out of East Berlin, which was another big drawback. We did have indirectly other sources than the newspapers, and we did follow the diplomatic activities there.

Q: I was going to say the diplomatic activities, the East Germans had made quite a name for themselves. I’m not sure if it was this time or a little later about setting up some secret police activities to support some rather nasty people.

LIVINGSTON: Oh, yes. Germans are good policemen right down to the present day and their main objective right down to the very end was to gain international recognition outside the Warsaw Pact. The West German response was the so-called Hallstein Doctrine which said that they would break relations with any country that recognized East Germany. Then, they started making exceptions when they started founding trade missions in East Europe.

Q: Right.

LIVINGSTON: They started making more exceptions. And they finally - I can’t remember when it was - the East Germans achieved some breakthroughs in Egypt and elsewhere and they gradually expanded their diplomatic presence. They were quite active in the Third World. Most of West German aid to the Third World, it was then called the Third World, had one aim in mind and that was to prevent other countries from recognizing the GDR. India used that very effectively against West Germany and got a lot more aid than they probably otherwise would have gotten. East German aid was technical aid, since they didn’t have any money. Among the technical aid they provided was aid to the police in South Yemen, and in a number of other countries, I’m not sure which ones they were, but East Germans were there all right. And they gave, as time went along, training to Palestinians.

Q: What was the general feeling about the East German economy at that time?

LIVINGSTON: Again, I think we exaggerated but we thought that they were much stronger than they evidently were, you know. That was partly, I think, because we compared them to the Soviet Union. Most of the people who worked on the GDR came out of a Soviet specialty in the Foreign Service. Meehan was a good example. I think they tended sub-consciously to compare East Germany to the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. By that
comparison, the East Germans were considerably ahead, you know, and I think that distorted our views right down to the end. It distorted the views of the West Germans, too. In retrospect, the West Germans were not good analysts of East Germany, they were poor analysts of East Germany.

Q: Was there concern about East German espionage within elements of the West German government while you were there?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I think one did have the feeling that it was fairly easy to penetrate. I know the Agency felt that way. You’d talk to Agency people about the West German government, particularly the Social Democrats. There was in 1963, maybe, something like that, one well known case of an SPD Bundestag deputy who was an agent for the Czechs and there have been several since. There’s a guy that they just sentenced recently on the basis of materials uncovered subsequently in the GDR. I think there was a tendency to not fully trust them, the Social Democrats. There was also concern, I think, that the East Germans had penetrations of the U.S. Mission among the local employees. There were a lot of Agency-sponsored organizations, Committee for Free-Jurists or something like that, which, during the ‘50s and on into the ‘60s up until the Wall, put a spoke in their wheel, but even beyond, which had been actively working in East Germany, though not carrying on sabotage, gathering information and helping people to escape and that sort of stuff. So, such groups were a prime target for intelligence. A lot of that continued afterwards. There was a lot of intelligence work going on.

Q: During this time, were there any particular incidents that come to mind, of tensions or problems?

LIVINGSTON: We were mostly concerned with the prisoners, American prisoners, you know, and there were some colorful episodes with colorful prisoners, people would get out of jail, and so on. I guess the other thing we were watching, although the people that worked on West Berlin were watching it more, were the beginnings of the effort by the Social Democrats, who were, of course, in the government in Berlin, to initiate contacts with East Germany. When the Wall went up, they initiated what they called a policy of small steps, passes for Christmas visits and so on. I think we were uneasy about that.

I do remember when Kiesinger came in, in 1966, when Erhard fell and they constituted the “grand coalition,” i.e. the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats. We also had the Berlin Document Center, which was a hot potato because it had a large number of Nazi files. There was quite an effort to find out whether Kiesinger had been a member of the Nazi Party, which he had, and whether he’d been any more than that. I remember a friend of mine who was a reporter for the Washington Post, who, in effect, offered me a bribe if I could go in there and discover if Kiesinger had been an SS man or something.

Q: Who was the mayor of West Berlin when you were there?

LIVINGSTON: I think Brandt was mayor down to just when I got there. I think it was then Klaus Schutz, but I couldn’t absolutely swear to that.

Q: He wasn’t a major figure, then, was he?
LIVINGSTON: No, Brandt was the last major figure. Then he left. All talent was drained away, because if you wanted to make a career, you couldn’t make a career in Berlin. And when it was no longer in the public eye, I think, it was kind of a pain in the neck to the Bonn government in lots of ways. Right down to the present day the quality of the political talent in Berlin is still second-rate, even third-rate.

RICHARD W. BOEHM

Assistant General Services Officer

Hamburg (1959)

Economic Officer

Berlin (1959-1962)

Richard W. Boehm was born in New York, New York in 1926. He received a bachelor’s degree from Adelphi college in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1956. Mr. Boehm served in Japan, Germany, Luxembourg, Turkey, Thailand, Nepal, Cyprus, and Oman. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 27, 1994.

Our authority was limited to West Berlin. However, at the time I got there, we had full access to East Berlin. Once in a while, when you crossed into East Berlin, an East German cop would try to control you. You would take the usual position, "Sorry, no, I don't do that. Just look at my license plates." And eventually we would get into East Berlin. This happened on a sporadic basis and was obviously done with Soviet approval. We had access to East Berlin and would go over there often. There were great museums, and the great theaters and opera houses were all in East Berlin -- right near the sector border. So we went over to East Berlin quite often.

We didn't deal with the East Berlin authorities. We sought to deal with the Soviets only, because we wanted to keep responsibility for East Berlin firmly on them. So we didn't deal with the East German authorities. However, we had a whole section in the Berlin Mission, called Eastern Affairs, which covered and reported on what was going on in East Berlin, including the German aspect of East Berlin. But the Eastern Affairs Section didn't deal officially with any East Germans. We wanted to keep the Soviets in the forefront and prevent them from doing what they were obviously trying to do, which was to disengage and force us to deal with the East German authorities. At that point maintaining our position in Berlin was certainly a holding operation. We didn't recognize East Germany at the time, of course. Our position was to prevent East German recognition and to reject and rebut the East German claim that Berlin was the capital of the German Democratic Republic, as they called it.

Of course, eventually we came to recognize the GDR. We opened an Embassy in East Berlin in the 1970's, but at the time I was in Berlin the whole idea was to make it clear that we did not accept the East German Government. We did not recognize it and we didn't accept any limitations on the rights we had acquired under the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. This agreement
was the settlement reached at the end of World War II, which established the whole structure of Berlin and the Allied military government. So we tried very hard to preserve that position.

The ultimate objective, of course, was German reunification which we felt at the time -- as it turned out to be the case later on -- would mean that West Germany would be the model that would be followed, not East Germany. The Soviets, of course, were trying to do precisely the opposite, to freeze the situation, leaving a separate East Germany as a state.

What we had in the Economic Section, of which I was the junior member, was Inter-Zonal Trade, as it was called. That is, trade between West and East Germany. This heavily favored East Germany. It was kind of a bribe that the West Germans paid to the East Germans, in return for the East Germans letting people out of East Germany and not hassling people. It was structured to favor the East Germans and to prevent things like the airlift from having to be resumed. We wanted to prevent another blockade from taking place, by making inter-zonal trade attractive to the East Germans. The West Germans, of course, had also accumulated vast supplies which were stored in West Berlin, against the possibility of the resumption of a blockade. All of that came under the scrutiny of the Economic Section of our Berlin Mission [USBER], of which I was a part. The inter-zonal trade question involved regular meetings between West German and East German representatives. It was almost the only official contact between West and East Germany, so it was used for all kinds of other purposes as well. We sometimes would ask the West German representative at these meetings to feel out the East Germans about one thing or another. So it was a very active and interesting kind of job.

West Germany, of course, was doing very well. You had Ludwig Ehrhard, who was Minister of Economic Affairs of West Germany. Konrad Adenauer was Federal German Chancellor at the time. It was the time of the West German *wirtschaftswunder*, or economic miracle. West Germany was burgeoning.

East Germany was probably doing somewhat the same by Eastern European or Soviet Bloc standards. It was the most advanced country in the East Bloc, but in comparison with West Germany it was a slum. It looked pretty bad. At the time I was in Berlin, we couldn't travel anywhere in East Germany. We could only go to East Berlin. So we couldn't go and eyeball the situation in East Germany for ourselves. Once in a while -- once a year -- at the time of the Leipzig Fair in East Germany, some of the people from the Western missions in Berlin were allowed to go to Leipzig, to the fair. They could see what they could see as they went. Some Western businessmen also went, so obviously you couldn't keep a country like that completely hidden from outside scrutiny. But we couldn't give it the kind of examination that we would like to have done. However, it was very clear that East Germany was lagging way behind West Germany, though it was well ahead of the rest of the East Bloc.

Then came the US elections of 1960. I think that our concern in the foreign affairs field, especially with regard to a long-standing problem like Berlin, is that when a new administration enters office, you are going to be dealing with a whole new group of people. This especially applies to a change of political party, not just a change in administration. Almost everybody is replaced. You are dealing with a new administration, a new President, new Secretary of State, new everybody. Your concern is that there's going to be a long indoctrination process involved. You wonder, will they listen or won't they? How much background will they have on this
situation, on which to base their policy decisions? We had all of these concerns with President Kennedy and would have had them with anybody else.

We had that concern, because Berlin was always either on the negotiating table or hovering around the edges of it. We wanted to make sure that the situation was fully understood and appreciated by the Kennedy people coming in. I'm not sure that it was. We wanted to get everybody to come and visit, brief them on the spot, and look at it. We tried for years to get Walter Lippmann to go to Berlin. He never would go. He said that he didn't want the kind of emotional involvement that the administration wanted to get him into. He said that he wanted to remain detached and objective. That was his view. He never would go. But we tried to get everyone to come and look at the situation.

Of course, with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles the situation was very clear. Eleanor Dulles, by the way, was very much involved. I had occasion to escort Eleanor Dulles sometimes, when she would come to Berlin. She did run her own show. She didn't try to conceal her last name. In fact, she was married, and Dulles was not her married name. She called herself Eleanor Dulles, so the fact that she was John Foster's little sister or big sister -- I'm not sure which -- was no secret. Eleanor had been very much involved in German affairs. There had been a separate bureau, at one point, which dealt exclusively with German affairs. Eleanor was a major player in that. Again, because she was the Secretary of State's sister, she had even more impact that she would have had otherwise. I think that her role had been shrinking a bit by the time I knew her. Her main function in Washington in the Berlin context, in the Bureau of German Affairs, and later in the Office of German Affairs, which became part of the Bureau of European Affairs, was the revival and stimulation of the Berlin economy. She had money and grants to hand out. Her trips to Berlin were primarily in the context of funding various kinds of activities -- cultural activities, and one, huge project costing millions of dollars, a new hospital for West Berlin. It was U.S. and German money. We put in some and then the Germans put in some. We put in a lot. It was a big grant. This project involved a brand new teaching hospital. I suppose that the Germans had a lot of voice in it, but Eleanor Dulles had a lot of clout, too. When she really wanted something, she tended to get it. I would go with her to these long meetings with the Germans, as the construction of the hospital was proceeding. The Germans and she disagreed on certain things that should or shouldn't be there. I can recall spending an entire morning, listening to Eleanor Dulles and the then president of the Berlin House of Representatives, a plumber by the name of Willi Henneberg, arguing. Eleanor wanted the nurses' rooms to have bathtubs. Willi thought that this was an unnecessary luxury and they could damn well settle for showers.

But the question of the plumbing in the nurses' quarters became an issue that took up almost an entire day to argue out. Henneberg said, "Look, if we give the nurses this facility, every other nurse in Berlin is going to want it in every other hospital, and we just haven't got the money to provide it." Eleanor Dulles said, "This is to be a model, a teaching hospital. Damn it, they will have the bathtubs." Well, they got the bathtubs. That was the kind of thing that Eleanor was doing.

She was treated very well by the Berliners and was given red carpet treatment. She was an interesting figure. I lost complete touch with her when I left the Economic Section. I was in that job for only a year and then moved on to a different job in Berlin.
The new head of the Mission, Allan Lightner, wanted a staff aide and wanted me in this job. I was 29 when I joined the Foreign Service. By this time I was in my mid-30's, and the idea of being a staff aide didn't appeal to me. But I had to take the job, so I took it.

I did that for a year and then moved on to the Political Section, where I had always wanted to be. I spent the last year or year and one-half in the Political Section in Berlin, which was the place to be. In the Political Section I was called the Access Officer. The Access Officer watched over the Autobahn, the air corridors, the movement between West Berlin and West Germany and between East and West Berlin. So I handled all aspects of the whole thing. The Autobahn crisis and the air corridor crisis were all mine. I moved into the Political Section just before the crisis involving construction of the Berlin Wall.

Access was a constant problem. It was more than a full-time job. The military can do things whose significance they do not always appreciate, but which represent a concession. Or you have some of these people -- like me and my family, for example -- coming in for the first time on the Autobahn. I had been briefed and did the right thing. If I hadn't been briefed, I might have handed this East German cop my passport, and he might have tried to put a stamp in it, which was, of course, a big no-no. So, we did have problems of naivete and the word not getting around. You could have a U. S. military convoy leader agreeing to let the Soviets count the number of men in the back of the truck. We would only drop the tailgate. They could count from outside, but we didn't get our men out of the truck, and they couldn't go in and check them.

When mistakes were made, we didn't accept the notion that that would establish some kind of precedent. The Soviets would try that on us. They would say, "Well, your guy did this yesterday. What are you making such a fuss about?" We took the view that a mistake made by a subordinate or unwary person didn't change the rules, and we weren't going to accept mistakes as precedents. But you would have holdups. You would have delays and obstacles. You would have convoys sitting for eight hours on the Autobahn because the Soviets were trying to create problems or were trying to use the East Germans.

I can probably tell this story because it happened a long time ago. It must have been 35 years ago. We had some large vehicles going up and down the Autobahn. At one point the Soviets allowed the East Germans to set up baffles, or a series of barriers, so that only relatively small vehicles could weave their way through. The larger vehicles would get stuck there. Then there would be an incident. The East Germans wanted to prove something. An idea which I had permission to try out was to get a very large vehicle, a low-boy, as they were called, a vehicle with a big flatbed loaded with girders. As it would try to maneuver, it would knock these baffles out of the way. As I said, I got permission to try it out. Our military agreed to it. They loaded up the low-boy with girders. It did what it was supposed to do. It knocked the baffles out of the way. It went on down the Autobahn, and nobody stopped it. So we got away with it. The Soviets were furious about that, by the way.

More often than not we would protest. We were protesting all of the time. There was a Four-Power structure of POLAD's, or Political Advisers. They would go over and talk to their Soviet counterparts at Karlshorst, which is where the Soviets headquarters were, just outside Berlin. They would try to negotiate an end to difficulties of that kind. But the Soviets were becoming tougher and tougher.
Of course, there were times when, I think, there were genuine misunderstandings, when a low-ranking Soviet military type would go beyond the point where his masters wanted him to go. That kind of thing could generally be settled. The Soviets would never admit that they had made a mistake, but they would stop doing what they had been doing. In general, the Soviet attitude was hardening. It was getting harder and harder. The Soviets were trying to prevent us from meeting with them. They wouldn't be in their offices, or our man couldn't get into their headquarters because it was closed. They wanted us to back away. They wanted to force us to talk to the East Germans. But when it came to a real crunch, when something got out of hand, the Soviets would be available. They would make themselves available, and you could talk to them. When these issues threatened to become very serious, the Soviets tended to stop. The issues tended to go away. I was convinced that the Soviets had a limit, beyond which they didn't want to go. We assumed that Moscow was calling the shots. The East Germans probably had some leeway, within limits set by the Soviets. When the Soviets wanted to turn up the heat, they would do it, using either their own people or the East Germans. Very often, they would do this directly. For example, the question of Allied flights in the air corridors. The Soviets themselves -- this had nothing to do with the East Germans -- would say, "You can't use flight levels 10 or 12 or whatever." This meant 10,000 or 12,000 feet. The air corridors were divided up into flight levels. The Soviets would try to bar us from using certain flight levels, whereas under the Potsdam Agreement and related agreements, we simply notified them of where and when we would be flying. The air corridors had been set aside for our use. When we had a flight coming or going, we would notify an organization known as the Berlin Air Safety Center, a four-power body staffed by Air Force people from the three Western Allies and the Soviets, which had its offices in the Allied Control Council building in West Berlin. They would pass these notifications around. The notification would say that we were going to have a flight at such and such a flight level on such and such a date and what have you.

The East Germans weren't involved in that. However, once in a while the Soviets would hand the notifications back, saying, "No, we are going to have some flights crossing the corridor at certain levels, and you can't use that level." Then we would say, "Well, you can't do that. These are our corridors and our altitude levels, and we can use whatever we want." However, a rule of reason would apply. If, in fact, the Soviets had a legitimate reason or problem of some kind, we could change the flight level. The system worked fairly well.

The question, also, of flights within the Berlin Control Zone would be at issue, because any flights coming into Berlin -- or going out of Berlin, for that matter -- would fly over Berlin. Tempelhof Airport, for example, was right in the middle of the city. So you had these Allied military flights coming right in over Berlin at low altitudes. That raised other issues, such as noise, for example. You had special rules for helicopters. We took the position that helicopters could fly anywhere within the Berlin Control Zone; that is, the air space above the city. At times, the Soviets would say, "No, they can't. They can't fly below a certain altitude." We couldn't accept that. What happened on one occasion was that a low-flying U. S. helicopter was hit by a metal bolt. The pilot actually saw somebody shoot it at him with a slingshot. This was very alarming, because it isn't very hard to bring down a helicopter. You hit a rotor with that bolt, and down goes the helicopter. So there was that kind of problem. We had constant alarums and excursions of all kinds.
I think that we were always aware that an American soldier could also cause some mischief. It could go one way or the other. Either a low-ranking, subordinate American or, at times, somebody a little more senior, who would go too far in accommodating the Soviets or, all on his own, would decide to try a little probe of some kind. We took that possibility into account. We didn't always assume that everything that happened was a Soviet plot. We recognized that things could happen through our own fault, as they did, at times.

Let me now turn to the Berlin Wall crisis. From my perspective -- and I think that I said this in a book, though not my book. It was by a man named Catudal, an historian who wrote a book on the Berlin Wall crisis. He got in touch with me, and with a number of others who had been in Berlin at the time. I talked to him off the record. He left my name out of the text but put it in his footnotes. He quoted me by name on this, so it is in print already.

In the summer of 1961 -- I think that it was in mid to late July -- President Kennedy gave a speech or made a statement on Berlin. It seemed to me at the time that in that statement he unmistakably made a sharp distinction between the extent to which we were committed to West Berlin and Berlin as a whole. Up to that time we had always taken the position that we made no such distinction, although in practical terms, we made this distinction every day. However, formally speaking and as a matter of policy, we made no such distinction. We said that the four sectors of Berlin were set up entirely for administrative convenience but have no political significance. We said that all of the Allies have rights in all of Berlin.

At that time, in July, 1961, Kennedy took a different position. He said that West Berlin was what we were really committed to. That left East Berlin out in the cold. There was a mild shock in Berlin, but it didn't seem to hit the press. It seemed to me that it wasn't recognized as the major departure from previous policy which, in fact, it was. I am convinced that it attracted the attention of Moscow, where they pored over every word. I think it was deliberate change in US policy. I think that Kennedy was preparing the ground to avoid making a huge, life and death issue out of East Berlin. You can have your own view as to whether that was right or wrong, but in fact I think that was taken by the Soviets as a signal that we weren't going to go to the mat with them on East Berlin. The Berlin Wall began to go up in the following month. Also, Kennedy and Khrushchev had already met in Vienna a few months earlier. From my point of view that meeting was a disaster because Kennedy didn't come out as forcefully as one would have liked. We later came to think of Kennedy as the hero of Berlin because of his appearance in Berlin after the Wall went up and his statement that "I am a Berliner." At the time of the Vienna meeting with Khrushchev and in the speech he made in July, 1961, it seemed to me that he wasn't taking a very strong position.

After the Berlin Wall went up, Kennedy called up the US military reserves. It was part of the Wall crisis.

In Berlin, until the wall went up, you had large numbers of people called border crossers. They lived in one side of Berlin and worked on the other side. Primarily, they lived in East Berlin and worked in West Berlin. There also were people who lived in West Berlin and worked in East Berlin, but there was a smaller number of these. That was a legal arrangement. They could go back and forth on the subway. There had always been a trickle of refugees coming into West Berlin. Suddenly, the whole situation swelled, and the border crossers simply stayed in West
Berlin I am not sure what it was that brought on this migration at that particular time and I have always wondered about it. There was a theory at the time that the refugees knew that something was up. They somehow sensed that the wall was going to go up and they wanted to do something. They wanted to get out of East Berlin while they still could. That seems to be perfectly plausible. They were reading the tea leaves, just as we were.

There were rising tension because of the flood of refugees. Of course, that was an everyday involvement for us and our wives, who were working at the refugee camps, feeding people, giving them blankets, and so forth. Refugees were pouring in in large numbers, and the refugee camp at Marienfelde filled up. They were eventually taken to West Germany.

We thought that the East Germans would have to stop this refugee flow. I don't think that we anticipated -- I didn't, anyway -- that they were going to build the wall. I didn't see them as physically building a wall, although there were people who thought that they might do that. We all felt that they had to take some measures to stop this flow. The most likely measure would be to prevent people going from East Germany into East Berlin. They were going through. They would go to East Berlin and then to West Berlin. I haven't got a breakdown on this, but perhaps a majority of those who were coming into West Berlin were not East Berliners, as such, but were from elsewhere in East Germany. So we had an idea that they might close that border, and they had more or less taken some steps in that direction. If you were an East German, you had to have a permit to go into East Berlin from elsewhere in East Germany. It seemed more likely that they would cut that off. In fact, they ended up building the wall.

When the wall went up I was on vacation in Bavaria. I had taken my wife and children to Bavaria. I heard on the news that something was going on in Berlin -- the wall, or something else was happening at the border with the Soviet sector. I cut short my vacation. We went back to Berlin. Depending on how you define the wall, we probably got there two days after construction of the wall started. It didn't start as a wall, as far as I was concerned. It initially consisted of rolls of accordion barbed wire. Then they replaced that with kind of a flimsy cement block structure. It was worked on over a long period of time, before it became the full-fledged wall.

On the day after I got back to Berlin we had a meeting at the U.S. Mission. It was decided that we ought to probe to see how the Soviets were playing the Allied access rights. I think that we had recognized the fact that we really couldn't control what was done with Germans going back and forth to and from East Berlin. We wanted to see whether Allied rights of access would be respected, probably as a way of finding out what they the Soviets were up to or what they were trying to do.

Another officer from the Mission and I were instructed to make probes. There were eight or 10 places along the sector border where you could go back and forth to East Berlin. So we took an official Mission car with U. S. military plates on it and went to each of these places to see if we could get into East Berlin. We found that we were able to get through at some places but not at others. We then proceeded to analyze the situation. We thought that instructions had been issued to stop all Allied cars, but not all of the checkpoints had yet been plugged in. Eventually, of course, access boiled down to Checkpoint Charlie. Everything else was closed, but they never actually and totally cut off Allied access to East Berlin. I was able to go back there years later, when the wall was coming down. I got a couple of pieces of it.
So the question became, “There they are. They are building this wall”. You could see that. What should we do about it? This was where the Mission in Berlin and Washington disagreed on how strong our reaction should be. I think that Washington more or less took the view that unless Allied access were totally cut, our public, propaganda reaction could be large scale, but our physical reaction would be muted. In Berlin many took the view that we should just push our way through the wall and that the Soviets would collapse like a house of cards. Well, it was impossible to get Washington to agree to try that, so it never was put to the test. Kennedy's earlier statement had accepted the fact that East Berlin was gone, in effect. As long as we had a shred, a less than total cutoff of Allied access, we could accept it. So we ended up accepting it.

There were all of those terrible incidents, of course, of East Berliners throwing themselves out of windows and landing on the pavement in West Berlin because the sector border happened to be the wall of a house or an apartment building. The people living in a given building were in East Berlin. However, once they were out of the window, the sidewalk below was West Berlin. They would try to get out that way until all of those windows were bricked up. It was a very strange and tragic situation.

I wouldn't say that there was a sharp difference between the US military and the civilians. Very often, the civilians talked tougher than the military. I have seen this everywhere, including at war games at the National War College. The military are the ones who actually have to do it. They tend to say, "Well, wait a minute." They look at the balance of forces and at what was actually going to happen, whereas the civilians are ready to say, "Go ahead and do it." I wouldn't say that the military in Berlin were particularly bellicose in the way they looked at the situation. I think that they were waiting for political instructions. If they had been ordered to send a tank or something like that, pushing through the barbed wire, they would have done it. But I don't think that they were eager to do it. They were prepared to do what they were told to do, but they weren't beating the war drums. I think that they recognized that if it came to a real fight, they were going to take an awful licking in Berlin. They knew the realities of tank warfare. They tend to be realistic about such things.

I felt disheartened by the fact that Kennedy, in effect, had laid the groundwork for this. Washington calls the shots. They make the policy. I felt -- and I am convinced now that I was right -- that the Kennedy administration decided not to make a fight for East Berlin. That being the case, there you were. Looking at things from a practical point of view, the wall was right on the sectoral border -- and I am talking about inches. Well, first of all, you couldn't knock down the wall initially. It was made up of barbed wire. You could push it back but you couldn't knock it down. Then, when a wall went up, suppose you knock it down, and they build the wall 50 yards farther back in East Berlin. Do you knock it down then? What are the legal aspects? It looked to me like a sticky wicket, given the fact that Washington clearly wasn't prepared to make a major issue of it. Our hands were kind of tied.

People in Washington were scared to death. We were not. I wasn't and I don't think that my colleagues were, either. We were right in Berlin. I don't think that we could visualize the Soviets or, for that matter, Washington, starting a war. I couldn't see Washington doing anything unless West Berlin were attacked. I couldn't see the Soviets doing that in West Berlin. On the contrary, having taken this step -- or having allowed the East Germans to take this step -- of starting to build this wall, they didn't want to do anything else.
Kennedy sent a battle group under then Colonel Glover Johns, belting down the Autobahn into Berlin to show our resolve. They were met at the West Berlin by then Vice President Johnson. It was a morale question, I think. It was not a matter of intimidating the Soviets but of bolstering the morale of the West Berliners. And it worked. Their morale was bolstered. Of course, Kennedy followed it up, before too long, by sending Gen. Lucius Clay, the former military governor who had saved Berlin during the Blockade by arranging for the airlift. Kennedy sent Clay as a personal representative of the President to West Berlin. These measures did, in fact, restore the morale of West Berliners. I don't think that they scared the Soviets. They did show the Soviets that, perhaps, they should cool it.

I don't think the Berliners were ready to go to war. They were dismayed, of course, but they were waiting to see what the Allies would do. They hoped that the Allies would take a strong position but at the same time I don't think that they wanted the Allies to start fighting. They would be the first to suffer and they knew that. I think that they were worried about their own security, primarily, and those worries were eased and allayed by these measures that I have just referred to: the sending of the battle group and Lucius Clay. There was no mass exodus from West Berlin.

Everybody was dismayed by the human consequences of the wall; that is the inability of the East Germans and East Berliners to come to the West.

After the construction of the wall, we had an Autobahn crisis and an air corridor crisis.

The Autobahn crisis was basically just more of the same. It involved hassling and harassment of U.S. military convoys on the Autobahn. After the initial shock of the wall began to subside, the Soviets again wanted to turn up the heat and isolate West Berlin, or make it feel isolated. A convoy would be stopped, so that they could lower the tailgate and count the number of people inside. They wanted a roster of names of the people in the trucks, but we wouldn't provide that, and there were very frequent and constant delays. The Soviets would say, "You can only send convoys with less than 10 vehicles in them." So we would send one with 15 vehicles. Then it would go to the checkpoint, and the Soviets would hold it up. They would sit there for a while, and then the Soviets would allow them to go through. The Soviets always backed off from those things eventually. They were just playing around and hassling the convoys, trying to create a psychology of concern and feelings of isolation and fragility about the situation in West Berlin.

The air corridor crisis was more serious. By that time Gen. Lucius Clay had arrived. The whole Clay episode was extraordinarily interesting. As I recall it, Clay had visited West Berlin at the time of the sending of the battle group. Then Vice President Lyndon Johnson arrived in Berlin just in time to greet the battle group. His timing was beautiful. He had come from Helsinki, as I recall it. Was it Johnson -- or maybe it was Bobby Kennedy -- who had Lucius Clay with him? Everybody was going to Berlin. It might have been Bobby Kennedy, but I can't recall. Clay was not the principal visitor -- whether he was with Johnson or Bobby Kennedy, I can't remember -- but to West Berliners, Clay was the main event. When the visitors would appear on a balcony of the Rathaus -- City Hall -- the crowd would be yelling, "Clay, Clay," not Bobby or anybody else. The star visitor -- whether Vice President Johnson or Bobby Kennedy -- brought back to Washington a report of Clay's enormously high standing with the Berliners. President Kennedy decided that it would be a good idea to send Clay to Berlin again to bolster morale. But the President misjudged or underestimated his man. Clay didn't regard himself as a figurehead who
was going to bolster morale. He regarded himself as a decision-maker who was somehow going to push the Soviets back. He was a proponent of strong measures which culminated in the famous tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie.

Clay was a very strong man. He had a gaze that would shoot right through you. He was an imposing figure. His presence there was confusing to everybody, because he didn't have any counterparts. There was no British, French, or Russian Clay. The Soviets managed to drag out of mothballs Marshal Konev, who had been, I think, military governor of East Germany at the time Clay had been his U.S. counterpart in West Germany. Konev was sent back to East Germany as a sort of Soviet answer to Clay. They had one meeting, as I recall, at Potsdam. Nothing came of it, and it didn't settle anything.

Clay's position was that of Special Representative of President Kennedy, but no one knew how to fit him into the Berlin structure -- the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin or the Allied Control Council, whose headquarters was in Berlin but which consisted ex officio of the American, British, and French ambassadors in Bonn and the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin. He didn't fit into any of these niches. At the same time everybody knew that he was very important and that he had a direct line to President Kennedy, although he didn't have separate communications. He used U.S. Mission communications facilities. His messages had to be released for transmission by the assistant chief of the Mission, as the senior State Department representative was called.

That is something I should have discussed before. The Berlin structure was that the U.S. military commander was the United States Commandant in Berlin, and the senior State Department representative was the deputy commandant. Then you had the Mission's structure in which the Ambassador in Bonn was chief of mission in Berlin. The senior State Department representative was assistant chief of mission.

Clay's telegrams had to be approved by the senior State Department representative in Berlin. But basically that was a rubber stamp. The only thing was that it enabled the senior State Department officer to read what Clay was saying. If he didn't like it, he had the opportunity to go to see Clay and say, "Of course, if you want to send this, we will send it, but I wonder if you would listen to my thoughts on it," and try to get Clay to change it. Sometimes this function fell to me. As I said, Clay was a very imposing figure who wouldn't hesitate to say, "What kind of wimp are you? Are you a commie or something?" But if you stood up to him, he would listen. Sometimes, I found that if I said, "Look, this is the way I see it. If we do this, here's what is going to happen. If we do what you are recommending, here is what's going to happen," he would listen and very often make the changes I wanted. But you had to stand up to him, and he was a very intimidating person.

So, as I said, he was there, and everybody knew that he was important, but nobody knew quite what to do with him. He was taking a strong position. One night Allan Lightner, the senior State Department officer at the time, and his wife, were going to attend the opera in East Berlin. On the way into East Berlin they were stopped by East German cops. They had passed through the American military police at Checkpoint Charlie but hadn't been able to get all the way through to the other side. They were in a kind of No Man's Land. They were stuck there. Lightner wouldn't give them his passport, and the East Germans wouldn't let him go. Eventually, they persuaded Mrs. Lightner to come back out, and Lightner sat there. Eventually, he came back out. Then we decided to do it again. We decided that we would have him go in again, this time escorted by
armed U.S. military personnel in jeeps and all of that. There was an enormous American lieutenant, Lt. Pilchuck, about 10 feet high and eight feet wide. We had him standing in a jeep, cradling a gun. Lightner then got through.

Gen. Clay's idea was to force the Soviets to get involved in this matter because it had all been East German up to that point. That is, stopping Lightner, fooling around with him, holding him, and all that sort of thing. So he began to escalate the issue, beyond armed escort. He sent tanks up to Checkpoint Charlie, which was then just a little shack. I was down there that day when our tanks came. They were old M-48's. However, an M-48 in a narrow street can make quite an impression. They came racing up to the sector border, and Soviet tanks showed up on the other side. That was what Clay wanted. He wanted to get the Soviets to acknowledge their responsibilities.

It all eventually subsided. We came out ahead on that, and we were able to go back and forth. The Soviets backed off. This is my recollection of it.

Then the air corridor crisis came along. President Kennedy was famous at that time as the Berlin Desk Officer. Everybody knew that Kennedy was calling all the day-to-day, working level shots. Frank Cash was the number two in the Office of Berlin Affairs. Martin Hillenbrand was then the director of the Office, and Frank was his deputy. Frank called me up in Berlin. I was Access Officer, so I was the one to call. Frank said, "Thought is being given" -- and I knew he meant that President Kennedy was giving this matter the thought -- "to suspending our flights to Berlin." They had been flying passenger flights. Pan Am had been given the charter for the Berlin flights. And the British and French also had their airlines flying in and out of Berlin. Soviet aircraft were cutting in close to these aircraft to stop the traffic. The Soviets were making threatening noises and were dropping what is called chaff or window anti-radar device, like Christmas tinsel in the air corridors to upset the radar. So Kennedy was thinking of stopping the flights. We didn't want to. We were convinced that the Soviets did not want to bring down Allied civilian aircraft or, for that matter, Allied military aircraft. Suspending the traffic would really have been a serious blow to West Berlin, because that was the lifeline. You can cut the Autobahn any time, but the only way you could cut the air corridor is by shooting down an airplane. We were convinced that the Soviets wouldn't do that. So this lifeline had to be kept open.

**PAUL M. CLEVELAND**

**Staff Assistant to Ambassador**

**Bonn (1962-1964)**

*Paul M. Cleveland was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1931 and raised in New York and Washington, DC. He received a bachelor's degree in English from Yale University in 1953. Afterward, he entered the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Cleveland's Foreign Service career included positions in Australia, Germany, Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia. He was interviewed by Thomas Stern on October 20, 1995.*

The Embassy in Bonn was huge -- 900 Americans, 600 Germans. The Americans all lived in Plittersdorf -- the "Golden Ghetto." We liked that; the apartments were spacious and it was a great place for kids. It did cut us off from the German community, which disappointed me. I had
hoped to become fluent in German and to become thoroughly acquainted with Germany. Living was easy -- an American school, a club, a commissary, a protected environment -- but it was not entirely satisfactory from a professional point of view. We did become acquainted with some Germans because my staff assistant job required some contacts with the Foreign Office and the Chancellor's Office primarily on administrative and protocol issues. That brought me into contact with a number of German officials, with whom we then socialized. There were also a few Germans who actually lived in Plittersdorf, with whom we became acquainted.

As was true in most European capitals, there was a circle of junior officers from all embassies who used to socialize together. In fact, a couple of them had been in Canberra during our time there. One of our acquaintances was David Cornwall, a junior officer in the British Embassy, who later became known as John LeCarre. Unbeknownst to me at least, he was then writing "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold". He was fascinating and a delightful dinner companion, who told brilliant stories in three languages.

But then the situation changed very rapidly. In early May, 1963, George McGhee arrived to succeed Dowling. He had been the Counselor and then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Department. He apparently was fired by Kennedy, but Dean Rusk, who had been the Assistant Secretary for FE when McGhee was his counterpart for NEA, saved McGhee by sending him to Bonn as Ambassador. The story as I heard it told was that Rusk went to Kennedy and said that he would like to keep McGhee in the Department, to which the President agreed as long as it was not in Washington. So McGhee was given his choice of Ambassadorial assignments and chose Germany. At the time, Dowling was in a New York hospital undergoing surgery. He was told while laying in his hospital bed that he had been relieved of his duties as Ambassador to Germany. Dowling never came back to Bonn, so I never worked as his aide.

McGhee arrived in Bonn only a few months after I did. As I said, I was to replace Lee in the Spring of 1963. But President Kennedy decided to make a trip to Germany -- the Germans at the time were somewhat depressed about their circumstances and we were worried about our relationships. The Berlin Wall had been put up and the Soviets were interfering with our access to Berlin. Essentially, Kennedy decided to go to Germany and run what we would characterize in the US as a "political campaign" to try to bolster German morale. McGhee knew of these plans when he arrived in May 1963 and decided almost immediately that Lee could not leave until after the Kennedy visit. Lee was put in charge of the "State Dinner." He spent several months just doing that -- every day, all day. It was unbelievable the amount of time that went into that dinner! I moved to the Ambassador's office about the same time that McGhee arrived and Alan and I shared that small office thereafter with me doing the staff aide work and he the dinner. I think Alan's efforts were a good illustration of the meticulousness and care that went into President Kennedy's trip. I believe that that Kennedy trip changed entirely the nature of Presidential trips and became the model for subsequent Presidential trips to all overseas locations. I am not sure it was a change for the better for anybody!

McGhee's and my relationship was a disaster from the beginning. I had never met him before he came to Bonn. The whole McGhee family came to Bonn -- Cecile and kids. My first real experience with the new Ambassador was on "Credential Presentation" Day. I arrived at the Residence with a batch of papers which Brewster Morris had told me to have ready for the Ambassador. McGhee took one look at them and said that they were not the right ones. In fact, they weren't. The party was to leave the Residence in about five minutes. I jumped in my little
Volkswagen, dashed to the Embassy and back in six minutes. But George was already fuming, even though I got him the credentials in time for him to make his presentation. When I say "fuming" I should have said "exploded". That was the first explosion which was followed by many others in the succeeding 13 months I worked for him. He never threw objects at me or anyone else, at least in my presence. But he was mercurial. As a junior officer, I was just thunder-struck by this man. No one had even treated me as McGhee did. I well remember one time when McGhee literally was pulling his hair as he sat down at his desk. Once having taken his chair, he took four pencils which were on his desk and broke each, one by one. I don't remember the object of his outrage, but when he was mad -- which happened much too frequently -- he was really mad.

Many years later, at a wedding, I ran into Marty Hillenbrand. We talked about George a little bit; I admitted that I had not perhaps performed as well as I might have, but Marty told me that many had had the same experience. I said that I had tried to satisfy him as best as I could, but I never was able to please him. Marty then said: "You know, he was a megalomaniac." I told him that I hadn't known that, but that I could certainly testify that he behaved as one.

George was not happy with me, even though he kept me around for 13 months. My recollection of those unhappy days was that things were constantly going wrong. For example, at his request, I would arrange a trip to Munich for him that aborted. (That was one of my principal tasks; he went on 52 trips during the 13 months I worked for him). Of course, I could always count on weather being bad on the day he was scheduled to travel or some other equally uncontrollable event. No matter what we did, there were always glitches of one kind or another. I had two protocol assistants working for me and we still could barely keep up with McGhee's travel demands.

He also ran a hotel at the Residence; guests were continually coming and going which added to our work-load. McGhee's secretary was an old hand in the Foreign Service and very experienced in placing blame on someone else -- usually me. Of course, with the volume of activities that McGhee generated, the law of averages would suggest that something would go wrong. He never remembered all the things that were done right; he only raged at the mishaps. The trips to Berlin were always a peril; there was a constant debate whether whatever went wrong was Bill Ryerson's fault -- he was stationed in Berlin -- or mine. I would be the first to admit that we did make mistakes at times, but very often McGhee's fury was just unwarranted.

I remember one time when McGhee returned from a two week trip, during which all had gone remarkably smoothly. He had gone through the Mediterranean with his entire family. On his return, he exploded in my office because we had rented a Volkswagen bus; I guess that was not good enough for George McGhee although I don't know what else could have accommodated all the passengers that were with him. Usually, I did not go on the trips with him, for which I was eternally thankful. I did accompany him when he went to Berlin, but I could barely afford that much time away from the office. We were a busy group just keeping up with McGhee, keeping late hours every evening and weekends as well.

McGhee's son was picked up once for a drug violation. It ran as a story in the "Stars and Stripes" -- the Army newspaper. George was fit to be tied and called the CINC trying to get the editor fired. He was indeed a megalomaniac.
Toward the end of my 13 months' "survival course", Dan Shore and the New York Times correspondent Art Olsen, took me aside at a party we were all attending. They interviewed me for 20 minutes or more about George McGhee and my relationship with him. In essence, I told them how he terrorized the staff -- people like Coburn Kidd who was a very fine officer. George in fact ended Coburn's career. I remember Coburn coming into my office one day, accusing me of doing something. In fact, he had his facts entirely wrong and Coburn went away, somewhat mollified as far as I could see. But Coburn was lashing out at me because McGhee had lashed out at him. I was not the only one that McGhee would go after. He was unhappy with everybody, but since I was physically the closest to him, I took more than my share of George's eruptions. I was almost physically ill by the time the 13 months were up. I worried all the time; I did not do well. George wrote a devastating efficiency report on me that almost ended my career.

There are several lessons that I learned from my experiences with George. The first and most important was the absolute necessity to treat your staff as human beings. McGhee's ravings and rantings were not very effective communication and certainly he was not a leadership model. I told my wife that if I ever had anyone working for me, I prayed that I would never behave like McGhee did.

I did think that George was a "big time" operator -- after all he had been an Under Secretary of State which for a junior officer was rather awesome. He was a stickler for good writing. One day, Dick Vine, who was the deputy chief of the Political Section, delivered a draft message to McGhee. The Ambassador took it with him in his car and I happen to be along watching McGhee breaking his lead pencils as he worked furiously on the Vine draft, muttering all the time, he couldn't understand how a senior foreign service officer could write so poorly. Years later, I told Vine of that experience; he was not very fond of McGhee anyway and that episode certainly did not bring forth any exclamations of approval.

As I said, McGhee traveled a lot and was highly visible in Germany. At Christmas time, he would send out hundreds of cards to German friends and acquaintances. He ran his ambassadorship as a public relations firm, which I think was probably quite impressive to those who were out of range of his daily outbursts. He did last for five years in Germany; I am not sure what the Germans thought of him after his departure, but he certainly was a highly visible and active ambassador while he was there. He only learned a few German phrases, but he was seen in every corner of West Germany and Berlin. He also had lots of visitors; Jean Monnet once came to see him -- they were, I believe, old friends. I don't know about his relationship with Adenauer or Erhardt. Frankly, I was so inundated with the minutiae of running McGhee's office that I didn't have time for many observations. But as I said there was no question that McGhee operated at the highest levels of the German and American governments.

In the background of our relationships with the Germans, was always the specter of Soviet interference in our linkages to West Berlin and in Germany in general. They were very unpredictable. Sometimes, for example, they would permit us to enter East Berlin on the subway. But I tried it once with Bill Ryerson and we were turned back. So I never got to East Berlin. The same unevenness of policy existed on the Autobahns; sometimes we would get through without any problems; on others, we would be harassed. There were constant disputes with the Soviets about minutiae of travel to Berlin across East Germany -- flags on trains, etc. The situation was certainly better than it was during the airlift, but we were always quite wary of the Soviets; we never knew whether they would try to shut us out of Berlin again. The Kennedy speech in 1963
in Berlin was in part intended to warn the Soviets about our resolution and it was quite effective; the picture of the President of the United States standing against the hated wall and pledging his solidarity with the citizens of that city must have made a deep impression on the Soviets.

The Kennedy visit took place in the summer, 1963. He stopped at Cologne first, where he visited the Cathedral. I remember that the head of the White House Communications detail -- an Army major -- had set up telephones in the Cathedral. I asked whether it was true that a phone had been placed in the pew behind the President. He told me that it was only half true; in fact, two phones had been placed there. In fact, all of Germany was wired with White House telephones. That was just further evidence of the major effort that was undertaken to support that Presidential trip. I don't believe that there were very many substantive issues to be discussed between the President and the Chancellor. The trip was primarily a campaign such as an American candidate engages in every four years in the US. Kennedy was there to win "the hearts and minds" of the German people and to boost their morale. So all the preparations were comparable to a campaign swing, only on a much larger and grandiose scale. It was just extraordinary. Every detail of Kennedy's appearances were discussed at great length; all the scenarios were elaborately worked out -- all intended to make the best possible impression that could be staged.

"Ich bin ein Berliner" -- the famous remark that Kennedy made in Berlin -- was the culmination of his visit to Germany and was so designed. A million Germans in the Rathaus Square heard him and it was certainly the pinnacle of a very successful public relations trip.

The advance work, as I said, was meticulous. The advance party and that group that came with Kennedy was large, and I think this was the first Presidential visit on that scale and that subsequent ones became increasingly demanding and refined. The Reagan visit to Korea, which I managed for the Embassy many years later, was on a grand scale, but the Kennedy trip to Germany became the model for subsequent Presidential forays. All of the Kennedy stops went through "dry runs" to insure a minimum potential for inadvertent mistakes. I understand the Kennedy political campaign became the model for subsequent domestic political campaigns; in the same way, his trip to Germany set the standards for subsequent Presidential foreign visits. I can remember Reagan's advance team members telling me in 1983(?) that Kennedy had redefined Presidential visits.

The guide for the press for the German trip was 250 pages long. It was very detailed, with each event described, second by second. I had a chance to personally observe Kennedy in action. I was in the anteroom for that dinner that Alan Lee spent so much time arranging. I saw Kennedy sitting in his special chair which was intended to ease his back problems. Unfortunately, I did not go to Berlin to hear his famous speech. I saw McGeorge Bundy, Richard Goodwin and other staff members. I got into the middle of a McGeorge Bundy-Goodwin spat because I happened to be the carrier of a speech draft that was being shuttled between the two. I delivered the speech to Goodwin, who took one brief glance at it and threw it into the wastepaper basket with an expletive.

We managed to see a good deal of Germany in our two years there. I had been there before in the Air Force. Quincy Lundsen, an A-100 classmate who was in the Economic Section, and his wife and the Clevelanders used to spend most weekends castle-hopping and sightseeing.
The physical change between my two tours in Germany was obvious. During my first tour, there was still evidence in downtown Munich of air raids. (The German mark then (1956) was still at an exchange rate that enabled me as a first lieutenant to live better than all but a few Germans. We lived well even on our modest salary.) But by 1956-57, the Germans were already hard at work reconstructing their country. I remember traveling down to Munich on the train from Bremerhaven during the middle of the night and observing Germans rebuilding their houses under flashlight. They had worked all day and then returned home to fix their war torn houses. By the time I came to Germany the second time, there was very little war destruction still evident. The German standard of living was still modest, but their spirits were high. They were convivial and slowly but surely they were making progress. In the early 1960s, I was very interested in car racing and therefore saw the Nürbergring races.

As I have stated, the Germans were as concerned as we were about the Soviets. I don't remember that any of us thought that WW III was about to break out or that we experienced any major crisis as arose during the airlift or the construction of the Wall. But I think here was always an underlying concern about what the Soviets might do, accompanied by a determination to stand fast against any encroachments of the rights spelled out by international treaties. There was a lot of "steadfastness," and I think everybody was wary of possible "salami" tactics -- i.e. cutting back on treaty rights, however small, here and there. We and the Germans had the sense that we would stand together and be firm.

McGhee, as I said, spoke little if any German. But I did not interpret for him. He used either the interpreter of the official with whom he was speaking or someone from the Political Section, where we had some excellent German speaking officers. I myself continued to study German every day for an hour. I used it when I traveled through the country. I could go to an all-German party and socialize in German; I could certainly understand 75-80% even when the conversations went beyond the "small talk." If I had had an opportunity to use it in my official duties, I probably would have learned a lot more. For some reason or other, I could never read it as well as I could speak it; I used to read the "Frankfurter Allgemeine", one of Germany's leading newspapers. I read that more than others because I seemed to find it simpler in its writing style. This was all for my own benefit however, not for the Ambassador. I worked primarily on his trip schedules, visits, etc. and supervised the two protocol secretaries. That was enough!

I think it was less than a year after I arrived that Adenauer retired. My most vivid memory of the "Old Man" was one night when I tried to cross the Rhine on a ferry. Adenauer lived across the river from Bonn and had to cross it on a ferry. When he went back and forth, of course, he was always escorted by a police escort -- both motorcycles and cars. This entourage getting on one of those ferries was quite impressive. As I remember it, by the time the Chancellor and his escorts got on, there wasn't room for the rest of us; we had to wait for the next one. I thought: Well, he deserves all that. A great man, der Alte.

In closing, I should say that I enjoyed my two years in Germany, but it was a painful job experience in which I did not perform as well as I had hoped to, although circumstances were not quite propitious. I did not leave a very good impression on the Washington staff. Elwood Williams, who was the "father" of the "German club" was not very helpful when it came to helping me with my next assignment. I think by the end of my two years, Williams was anxious to have me replaced and found Peter Semler, a college classmate, to become McGhee's special
assistant. Peter was the second of five officers who served as McGhee's aides in the five years he was Ambassador in Bonn.

Some years later, George McGhee hosted a party at his house in Georgetown to which he invited all of his former Embassy staffers. I felt rather badly because I accepted and actually went; I should have refused; but I was too polite, I guess. But I did see all my successors and many of my colleagues from the Bonn days.

**THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN**

**Political Officer**

**Bonn (1962-1965)**

*Thomas J. Dunnigan was born in Ohio in 1921. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. He received a bachelor’s degree from John Carroll University in 1943, and a master’s degree from Harvard University in 1946. In 1946, Mr. Dunnigan entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, Great Britain, the Philippines, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark, Israel, and the Organization of the American States. Mr. Dunnigan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

We saw the Soviet threat in military terms. There was no question they had large forces in Eastern Europe, and they had also built-up the East German army to where it was a rather sizable and, we thought, fairly potent force. So there was no question in our minds that it was there. Now those were days when we still had the backlash of Stalin. I mean, that whole era. We were not going to take any chances was the feeling. There was little dialogue. Kennedy did start it and did get the nuclear non-proliferation agreement signed and the limits on underground testing treaty finally signed, which were real breakthroughs in those days.

But the relations with the Soviets were cold. Our ambassadors would call on the Soviet ambassador in East Germany when they were there, in their capacity not as ambassador to East Germany, which we didn't recognize, but in their capacity as the representative to the Control Commission for Germany, since the ambassadors were given those titles. But, aside from that, there was little dialogue back and forth, and that didn't happen until much later when Willy Brandt became prime minister and launched his Eastern policy.

By this time, NATO was a fairly solid organization. One of the major crises we had when I was doing political-military affairs, and it was a big one, was a fear in Washington, not shared by our Embassy in Bonn, I must say, but I sensed it before I left, that if we did not do something to provide the Germans with nuclear weapons, they were going to get them on their own. Franz Joseph Strauss was defense minister, and, while he was a brilliant man, we didn't entirely trust his instincts that he was a nationalist. So this is why we came up with ideas like the multilateral force, which our navy abhorred in part because it was have required international crews, mixed-man crews on merchant ships. And some talk of having it on submarines, too, but that proved almost impossible. Merchant ships which would just cruise around aimlessly until needed and then launch their missiles.
I well remember, we were trying to sell this in NATO and were having a difficult time. We knew we had to get the big ones on our side. Harold MacMillan, as I recall, went along because he wanted other things from us. The French were not playing. So we needed the Germans. And George Ball, who by this time was under secretary, was sent over to persuade the Germans. It was in January of 1963. We had a day-long meeting with Adenauer; I was along on that. At the end, the Chancellor said, in translation, "Mr Secretary, my military people tell me this is not a good idea. But if your President wants it, we will go along," Which is all we could hope for. We put that in the bank, in a sense, went back to the Ambassador's residence, and there, which was now about five-thirty or quarter to six at night, Mr. Ball received a message containing the speech that de Gaulle had made that day in which he had blackballed Britain from the Economic Community. Well, Ball reddened and just about went through the roof. He was the supreme Europeanist, and this was a direct slap at him. And there were reporters present; the Ambassador had invited a group of people over for a drink to meet Ball. He said, as I recall, pretty much on the record, what he thought about de Gaulle for doing that He was livid about it. So, on the one hand, you had the good news from Adenauer and, on the other, the bad news from de Gaulle at the same time.

I was quite hopeful about democratic development in Germany. Most of those we dealt with at that stage were veterans of World War II. They remembered it vividly. They had had much more combat experience than almost all of our people. They certainly didn't want another war. They had no sympathy for the Soviets and no truck with them. Maybe some sympathy, yes, but not for their system of life and certainly not to have it imposed on Germany.

Now Adenauer was a democrat in an authoritarian way. I mean, yes, he had elections and they were free elections, and he had a Parliament and it was a free Parliament, but he had been raised in a strict authoritarian tradition himself, and he was already in his early eighties, I guess, at that time, so he could see no other way than, you know, when father decides, the children should behave.

But that is not out of keeping, I don't think, with German tradition in many ways. It has nothing to do with political democracy the way we understand it. Their behavior patterns at times are different.

We were constantly getting reports about, running into, hearing about, and seeing little splinter neo-Nazi group coming up, which on certain issues in certain regions would gain some thousands of votes. And we knew that there were unreconstructed and unrepentant Nazis there. They were largely not in positions of political power. Now it is true, they were getting into positions of economic power in the business world, where they were not forbidden, and things of that nature. There were a few of them in the Parliament, but very few basically of what we would call the "wrong" types. All in all, I would mark it as hopeful.

I was there under two ambassadors: Walter Dowling and George McGhee. One year with Dowling and two with McGhee. They were quite different. Dowling was the consummate traditional diplomat. McGhee was boisterous, almost rambunctious, at times, brilliant at others. Hard working, dedicated. A man of a thousand ideas. Loyal to his staff. Quite effective, I think, with the Germans. A man who spoke all over Germany all the time, touched every issue, dodged none. Put forth the American view quite, quite well. He couldn't stand a situation of quiet when
nothing was going on. Something had to be going on. I don't know if I could explain that very well, but that was the feeling: "What's the old man up to now? What's he doing now?"

"Well, he's cooking up something."

For instance, for a long time, he had behind him in his office a speaker going all the time reciting German grammar. He thought, you know, subliminally he could pick it up even though he was talking to you. He would say, "Now, Kennedy, what are we going to do about this? Hadn't we better go see so and so? Maybe I ought to write a letter to the President about this." Meanwhile, the German grammar played in the background. But that eventually stopped.

The German bureaucracy I dealt with was competent, in almost all cases. I saw two different sides of them. The first year and a half, when I was in dealing in political-military affairs, I dealt a good with the beamte, the civil servant side, because we were dealing with problems relating to American forces.

I will never forget the first day I arrived in Bonn. I was told by my staff that morning, "You've got to chair a meeting this afternoon."

I said, "Chair a meeting? I am just here."

"Oh, no, this meeting has been set up for a long time."

I said, "What is the subject?"

And they said, "The subject is Sewer Duties in Kaisersbaumen."

I said, "What do I know about that?"

And they said, "Well, we will help you."

The question was: How much should the American forces (which were very large in that area) have to pay for use of the sewer system?

So I found myself that afternoon chairing a meeting; I was flanked by our legal advisor, and my advisor on German affairs on these subjects, and a couple of other people, but I sweat through an afternoon...

But the German beamte you met in that sort of situation were very much the old-style, almost Prussian, type, you know. Correct. They knew their dossiers. They had answers for most of your arguments -- not all, but most of them. Humor was not their long suit by any means.

Now it was different when I would go to the Foreign Office to talk about issues. There, you would meet types that I would say were a bit suave or equally well educated, but who had been abroad in many cases and had a broader prospect. They saw things from a little different angle. They were very anxious, it seemed, to be friendly with American and British diplomats and others, to show that they were good partners in the Western world. This was quite important to them.

MARTEN VAN HEUVEN
LEGAL ADVISOR

BERLIN (1963-1967)


Q: What was the political situation when you arrived in '63? What was American presence and how were we dealing with it?

VAN HEUVEN: The political situation was that everybody still vividly remembered the recent blockade and the airlift, and also the visit of President Kennedy.

Q: '48.

VAN HEUVEN: Everybody remembered the “Ich bin ein Berliner” phrase spoken by Kennedy at the Rathaus. Two-thirds of Berlin was under western allied administration and the remaining one-third under Soviet administration. The western part was surrounded by the wall, not just dividing the city, but around the whole city.

Q: And the wall was a new phenomenon.

VAN HEUVEN: Yes. It had gone up in ’61. But it extended entirely around West Berlin. We were sitting in the middle of a large number of well-trained and –equipped Soviet divisions, 100 miles from Helmstedt and the border with West Germany; we were exposed. Even though there was an American, French, and British military presence in Berlin, the total allied garrison was less than 10,000. Our part of it was probably 6,000. We had four battalions and a tank unit. We were basically there as hostages. But you could also look at us as guarantors of Berlin’s freedom. That’s how the Berliners saw us. The threat was a Soviet threat. The East Germans were a nuisance factor. It could be considerable. It was not a threat to us. But the Soviets were. The city was cut off from western Germany. Berliners could not get in or out except with permission. They could fly in and out on one of the allied airlines. With a lot of hassle some of them could go on the ground. But it meant submission to all sorts of controls. So for all practical purposes, most Berliners were trapped in the town. The saying at the time was that one out of every third Berliner was a widow over 65. Berlin continued to exist because of heavy financial support by Bonn. So Bonn paid for Berlin and the allies defended it. That was how Berlin lived.

In a strategic sense, Berlin was the crucible of the Cold War. It was the point where the Soviets exercised pressure. They had done it with the blockade. They did it on more than one occasion later on. I went through several mini blockades. Within months after my arrival, an American military column was denied entry into Berlin at Babelsberg. The U.S. Army Berlin command sent a support column out. The Soviets permitted it to go through but we held the column in place. I have aerial photographs, taken by an Army helicopter, of these two allied columns, and of Soviet APCs blocking the way. Meanwhile, the U.S. command and the rest of us were down in a bunker. We were in direct contact with the White House. A Berlin crisis in those days meant potential war. Everybody was conscious of that. That’s probably one of the reasons it never happened. But you could never be sure. The Soviets had imposed the notorious Berlin blockade.
Something like that could happen again. You really felt that you were in the eye of the storm. It created strong bonds of kinship among the officers who were assigned to the U.S. Mission. That is particularly true for the State personnel who were my colleagues. When you have an external enemy you depend on each other. And we had the interesting challenge of administering an occupied city. We ran the American sector. The French and British ran theirs. Obviously, we weren’t staffing every administrative position with allied personnel. In that sense the city was really run by Germans. But it ran under allied authority. So the public safety officer, a mid-level Foreign Service officer, directed the police in the U.S. sector. The Senator for Justice was subject to my direction. It was an exotic situation, but it worked.

Q: I’ve talked to somebody who was in Berlin in ’61 when the Kennedy administration came in. They were very nervous because people on the Kennedy staff were talking about, “Well, maybe we can work something out here” and the feeling was they might give away more than was justified trying to make a deal with this. But I think their spine got stiffened after a while. Did you pick up any of that initial concern about the Kennedy administration?

VAN HEUVEN: No, I did not. I arrived after the “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech. With that, the President squarely put himself behind the freedom of the city. Every Berliner understood it that way. The whole world had heard it. The issue of unconditional American support for the city was settled in as black and white as you can settle anything. For any of us to have done anything to undercut this understanding would have affected our strategic position in the world.

Q: From what I gather, the legal side of things was extremely important because you had the Soviets trying to change the rules and get us to give away a little here. How far do you let down the back of your truck? All sorts of things. All of this was based on a legal code or at least a code of practice. It was almost a theology.

VAN HEUVEN: These issues were my day-to-day bread and butter. It wasn’t just tailgates. Every procedure had been worked out and agreed, either tacitly or through accepted custom. The Quadripartite Agreements of 1944 provided the basic legal framework. They were embellished later on by other agreements. When the Soviets took East Berlin out of the Quadripartite administration machinery run by the Kommandatura, the Kommandatura remained as just a western operation. But everything - crossing into East Berlin and letting the Russian soldiers into West Berlin, the process of running the military trains, the procedures for road access through Helmstedt, the administration of air access through the air corridors, the operation of Spandau prison - was governed by an intricate system of habits that had solidified into accepted practice. Any change, no matter how small, always raised the question “What is the other side up to?”

Q: What were you doing? Were you screening everything? Was this your responsibility?

VAN HEUVEN: My responsibility ran in a different direction from that of my political colleagues. One of them dealt full time with the group of issues relating to the air corridors. They were our lifeline. There were notification procedures for each flight. Permission would be granted for each flight, but with conditions. One had to do with the altitude at which we could fly. These flights were bumpy because we couldn’t go over 10,000 feet. The weather in northern Germany below 10,000 feet is often lousy, with much wind and no visibility. The Soviets wouldn’t guarantee flight safety above 10,000 feet. Another political officer handled Autobahn access issues and military train issues. My role had to do with the fact that we were in authority,
and that anything that the Berlin authorities did had to have our imprimatur. This involved several activities. First of all, in the most routine way, the Berliners liked to think of themselves as part of the Federal Republic. That was not part of the allied legal way of thinking. To us Berlin was occupied territory, and whatever transpired in the Federal Republic did not apply to Berlin. Thus, Berliners wanted legislation identical to what was valid in the Federal Republic. What they would do, and what we allowed them to do, was to adopt by a Berlin law verbatim whatever the federal law was. But before that could go into effect in Berlin the allies had to give their approval by formal letter or order. The legal advisers of three western missions exercised that authority. We reviewed every piece of legislation of the Berlin House of Representatives that was taking over federal legislation. And when we did not like parts of that, we excluded those parts from application in Berlin. For instance, we allowed Berlin to take over only a small part of the federal air traffic law, because only the allies had air traffic rights in Berlin, and the Germans had none. We were not about to let them have any authority in an area that touched security. So Berliners could not fly helicopters in Berlin, nor fixed wing aircraft. That would have been too dicey anyway. The allied lawyers had staffs that went over proposed legislation, each in their own missions. I had two German lawyers working for me. But I was the person who would then caucus with my two allied colleagues, and we would agree on the text of a Berlin Kommandatura letter or a Berlin Kommandatura order that would approve or disapprove the adoption of legislation equivalent to the federal legislation. In addition, the allies could and did issue their own legislation, Berlin Kommandatura Orders or BKOs, thus exercising legislative authority. I also had to sign off on every request by the Berlin judiciary to handle any case involving allied property or personnel. That was about 30 a day. I would sign my name that often every working day, giving the Senator of Justice permission for the German authorities to proceed or not. So the lawyers administered a whole routine administration. I worked very closely with two British and two French legal colleagues in the course of my four years. Going through an intensive process like that made us close. There was another role that legal advisers in each mission had, although I can’t speak for the British and French. This was the role of advising the minister, who was the top State Department officer, and the Commandant as to the limits of their authority in the U.S. sector. On occasion, I had to remind them that the Constitution applied, that there were certain things that they could not do, such as taking people into custody without representation, or closing off areas, or exercising allied authority on the Reichsbahn railway tracks in the U.S. sector. That was a dicey role. Here I was, an FSR-4, equivalent to lieutenant colonel, and I was basically telling two-star superiors that they could not legally take action they wanted to take for political reasons. To exercise the function of legal advice initially required an enormous amount of work to understand in detail the entire allied legal structure and content. It required a fair amount of political judgment as to what laws to apply and not. The French, British, and U.S. legal activities had a large degree of autonomy. I cannot recall any case where the minister or the commandant overrode me on a major matter on which I had given advice.

Q: A tricky place. I think all of us felt if World War III was going to start, it was going to start there. Who were the ministers, American civilians, and the commandants?

VAN HEUVEN: The top U.S. representative in Berlin was George McGhee. He was the ambassador in the Federal Republic of Germany. He resided in Bonn, though there was a residence for his use in Berlin. You remember, John McCloy went out with the title of High Commissioner, not as ambassador.
Q: I was in Frankfurt and we had the HICOG building there.

VAN HEUVEN: Precisely. I remember the building. The second in command in Berlin was a U.S. major general. In my time there were two - Major General James Polk and Major General Franklin. Each sector had its general. Third in line was the deputy commandant, who was also the resident top diplomat. That was the minister in each sector. In my time, the post was held by Arch Calhoun and Brewster Morris. I don’t remember all the names of the French and British sides, but I do recall the British commandant, Major General Peel Yates, who was always accompanied by his cocker spaniel. Some of the generals would tend to read into politics a lot. Others stuck to military matters. There were different styles in which the three sectors were run. The French maintained by far the most reserved and hostile attitude toward the Germans. We probably were at the other end of the spectrum. The British were somewhere in between, but the British took no nonsense from the Germans. We had a slot in the political section occupied by an officer whose job it was to do the liaison at the Rathaus, where the elected representatives of Berlin were located, and which was headquarters of the mayor, Willy Brandt. In my time, the slot was filled, first, by Lucian Heichler and then, by Brandon Grove. That is how we interfaced with the German political process in Berlin. When I came to Berlin in ’63, the sense of allied dominance was still pervasive. In our minds, we still lived in the wake of the world war. We were there because we defeated the Germans and occupied Berlin. In my role that was the kernel of the situation. We had occupation rights. They were pretty absolute. But 20 years later, the balance had swung and we were no longer exercising those rights the way we had before. We were letting the Germans do far more than we did in the early ’60s or in the late ’50s. But when I was there in the ’60s I was, unlike Lucian and Brandon, who were part of the vanguard of officers who were already learning to do the political interface with the German democratic process.

Just recently I became aware of the fact that, in the classified part of his efficiency report, which the rated officer could not see at the time, a colleague of mine, who was the labor officer in Berlin and who therefore had to deal with the labor unions, found that his supervisor had put in there as a criticism that he had too much contact with the Germans. In retrospect, this was an astonishing comment to make. But this is illustrative of the fact that the mindset in the U.S. Mission was that you had to keep your reserve with the Germans and keep them in check. When I returned to Germany 15 years later, this attitude had wholly changed.

Q: Who was the mayor when you arrived in ’63?

VAN HEUVEN: It was Willy Brandt, who was even then already well known, though he had not yet made an international mark in terms of his efforts to reach across the line that divided Germany and to build bridges.

Q: Ostpolitik.

VAN HEUVEN: Brandt started a process of what was called “Passierscheine.” He worked out with the East German authorities a process whereby West Berlin citizens could make Christmas visits across the wall. My memory is not good on the details. We didn’t recognize the East German authorities in East Berlin and stuck to the theory that the Soviets were responsible for their Sector. So if anything happened to us or our personnel in East Berlin, we would talk only to the Soviets. We would cross Checkpoint Charlie and refuse to show our documents to East
German guards. We kept the windows of our cars up. Eventually, we would just open the passport and show the East Germans the title page, but we would not hand them any document. We would absolutely refuse to have them touch our documents or put any markings in it. Of course, they tried very hard to do so because that would then be represented as constituting legitimization of their regime. Our view was that the Soviets were responsible for the Soviet Sector of Berlin, just as we were responsible for our part of it.

We could go to East Berlin under the Quadripartite Agreements and we were never denied access to do so. We had to run this gauntlet of administrative obstacles and basically keep a stiff upper lip and stick to our procedures. Every time the East Germans did something to us, a complaint would go to the Soviets. Conversely, the Soviets had the right to come into West Berlin and they did so. They drove their vehicles and their soldiers around West Berlin. Of course, they had to come to West Berlin because of their role at Spandau, which was in the British Sector. Spandau is another story because that was another one of my responsibilities.

Q: Talk about it. What was Spandau and who was there? What were our problems?

VAN HEUVEN: Spandau was a huge prison complex built in the mid-nineteenth century that housed three prisoners: Speer, von Schirach, and Hess. It was one of the two remaining Quadripartite operations after the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura. One was the allied air control system. The other was the prison. There were four governors of the prison. They ran the place, each with their set of wardens who pulled duty the way wardens do in a prison. The exterior guard was mounted each month by allied and Russian troops in a determined succession. The U.S. always had December. We always took it from the Russians, who had it in November. We handed it over to the British, who always had it in January. They had to devote pretty much of a company of soldiers to man all the watchtowers and the exterior guard. They basically stood guard. In a way there wasn’t much to do about these prisoners because there was a certain routine. But on occasion there were issues. One was when von Schirach developed eye problems and needed surgery which could not be performed in the prison. So he had to be taken out of prison. That required Moscow’s approval, which eventually was forthcoming. There were repeated allied attempts, in my days and subsequently, by the allies to close the place and let Hess out after the other two were released. That always ran into a Soviet roadblock. But the whole business of running that prison and agreeing on the regime had plenty of administrative angles that did require the attention of the U.S. prison governor, who was a lieutenant colonel and who reported to me. My role was not to get involved in those details, but to be aware of them. But I did get involved directly as the action officer whenever something unusual had to happen, like taking von Schirach out, or when the time came to release the other two and leaving Hess in there. It was a midnight operation. It was sort of eerie.

Q: Could you talk about that? Why was it done in that manner?

VAN HEUVEN: Well, the expiration of the sentence was at midnight. I believe on September 30, 1966. It became a major press event. Spandau prison was in the British sector, so the British had the chore of maintaining the law and order there. They kept tight control. The Soviets refused to let the two prisoners out a minute earlier. But there was the whole issue of how do you let these men walk out? Hand them their stuff back, put them in transportation, and get them out of Berlin. When Hess was there, his uniform and other artifacts were kept in the prison. There was also still an old guillotine in the prison, from the Nazi days. There was always the risk that
wardens or somebody would make off with stuff in the prison and sell it as souvenirs. In my
time, I dealt with two U.S. prison directors there, Lieutenant Colonel Blake and another
lieutenant colonel who later sold his story for publication, against the rules. The Army never
went after him for that. His name was Eugene Bird. It was on Gene Bird’s watch, in American
month, that Hess committed suicide, something that should never have been allowed to happen.
There was always a risk that someone would make private gain out of this very odd relic of the
war. I would go into the prison every American month to go along with the American doctor. We
had that responsibility for our month. I would not talk with the prisoners but I would know where
they were, see their condition, inspect their cell. I was never tempted to conduct conversations
with any of them. Hess was pretty much of a recluse and probably wouldn’t have talked anyway.
Von Schirach was a cantankerous man. Speer, on the other hand, was a nice person, but I didn’t
see it as my role to engage Speer in historical discussion. He was a prisoner. My role was to see
that the prison was run right. There was an officers mess in the building next to the prison. The
directors, who met daily, ate there. Once a week, they would invite guests. I think it was on
Thursdays. I could always come out and have lunch. But it was the prison director’s prerogative
and mine to invite guests to come out on Thursdays. So in American months we would have
chicken or steak. In Russian months we would have the Russian food and in the French months
the French would come up with French food. It was all cooked by the same German cooks. It
was not haute cuisine but it was pretty different from month to month. It was also the only place
where allied personnel could meet with live Russians in Berlin. Outside of Berlin, on the other
side of the Glienecke Bridge in Karlshorst, was located the headquarters of a Group Soviet
Forces in Germany. The allied military missions had their headquarters there. That was the other
place where we had a military interface with the Russians. We had contact also at the air control
center, but this was basically an air controller operation. But there was always the possibility that
someone could use Spandau as a place to have a political discussion with the Soviets. Typically,
they would bring out uniformed folks from Karlshorst. On occasion there would be a civilian and
then the puzzle was, who is he, why is he here, what does he want? Most of the time guests
would just come out and meet 20 or so people at lunch and for some quadripartite conviviality in
a rather forced atmosphere. There was always plenty to drink on those occasions. I guess nearly
10% of my time in my four Berlin years went into the issues related to the administration of
Spandau.

Q: You say toward the end we were trying to close it down. What was the Soviet attitude and
why?

VAN HEUVEN: Ours was very simple. We thought that a lifelong sentence for Hess was no
longer realistic given the way the world had moved.

I have to guess at why the Soviets would never agree to release Hess. What they said was that
they suffered so many casualties during World War II at the hand of the Germans that this type
of action was simply out of the question. Moscow stuck to this position right until the end. We
tried to revive this issue from time to time, but it never got anywhere. It was not going to be a
major point on any Soviet-western agenda such as it was in those days. If there was an agenda, it
had more important issues than that. No U.S. administration was going to spend political capital
on it. But it seemed the right thing to do, so there was never any opposition in London, Paris, or
Washington. We did not consult the Germans in Bonn beforehand, though we kept them
informed. So they were aware of what was going on. But the German government was not in a position to even express an opinion about what the allies did with Hess.

*Q: You were there when Kennedy was assassinated?*

VAN HEUVEN: Yes.

*Q: How did that play?*

VAN HEUVEN: I remember it vividly. The Berlin Bar Association had their annual dinner. I was an honored guest. It was an idiosyncratic situation, because here were all these senior lawyers, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, and here I was, the U.S. legal adviser half the age of most of them, but still in a way for them the key person in the room. We had just started. There was music and it was going to be a nice evening, although I have to say that even nice evenings in Berlin in those days could be pretty dour and heavy. This was a town that was still pockmarked by the war. A lot of destroyed buildings had not been reconstructed. Berlin suffered from a fairly heavy climate, both physical climate and a psychological climate. Levity was not part of the Berlin life in those days at all. It was mostly serious stuff all around. But a good party meant at least adequate food, although it was not by today’s standards very good, and plenty to drink if you wanted. Well, the news came. The music stopped. The dinner did not take place. Then there was an eerie silence that night when the candles appeared all through town. It was a horrible weekend - because then there was Oswald and his assassination. It was a surreal thing. And then came the burial, and it was just at Thanksgiving time. It was an awful period for everybody.

**BRUCE W. CLARK**

*Rotation Officer*

*West Berlin (1966-1968)*

*Bruce W. Clark was born in Los Angeles, California in 1941. He attended Claremont Men’s College from 1958 to 1959 before transferring to Stanford University, where he received his BA in 1962. He also served in the U.S. Army Reserve before joining the Foreign Service in 1966. His career has included positions in countries such as Germany, Vietnam, Belgium, and Saudi Arabia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 2002.*

*Q: Was there a lot of tension in Berlin at that time, being in the heart of East Germany and all that?*

CLARK: I don’t think so, or at least I didn’t feel it. There was a lot of interest in Berlin, which was still considered a possible flashpoint in East-West relations, but I think the hot point had passed. Things had settled down. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission was still doing it’s thing, snooping around East Germany and East Berlin, driving into Russian formations and going into sensitive areas closed to the public. There was a lot of spying on each other, but the Mission wasn’t in any day-to-day crisis mode or anything like that.
Q: Did you get involved in interesting episodes, you know, like a G.I. doing the wrong thing or other critical situations? Did you get involved in any of the liaison or dealings with the Soviets?

CLARK: No, that was all taken care of by Sol Polansky, who headed the Eastern Affairs section. He was the guy who did all the things with the Soviets.

Q: Did you have friends or acquaintances in the German population?

CLARK: Yes, I met a few young Germans that I would see from time to time, and through another American FSO, I met a young East German and his friends whom I used to visit from time to time in East Berlin. He later became a doctor in East Germany.

Q: Was the Free University a major center of political activity among young people?

CLARK: I roll my eyes. And how! Of course, the U.S. Mission backed up to the Free University, and the Free University was a hotbed of student unrest. The Berkeley of Europe, I think, while I was there. And all the unrest was brought to a head when the Shah of Iran visited in June 1967. At the time, I was the Mission’s protocol officer, so I got to greet him at the airport. I remember escorting our consul general, Alice Clements, to a formal, command performance of an opera in the Shah’s honor. As I approached the Opera House, I heard all this yelling and I thought they were all applauding the arrival of the Shah. But they weren’t. Eggs and rocks were flying through the air. I ran to get into the opera while the police were flailing their batons to keep the mob at bay. I think that’s when the police killed a young man, Benno Ohnesorg. And that led to two years of unrest, if not more. All sorts of demonstrations and violence followed. It was a very bad period in West Berlin’s history.

Q: Well, did we feel that students had ties to the East Germans or was this unrest more or less tied to student unrest in the United States and elsewhere, and of course in France?

CLARK: Well, yes, 1968, the year of great student unrest in Germany and France was coming. There was a lot of unrest everywhere, I think, over the war in Vietnam, over the corruption and repression in Iran, and over the old-fashioned, unresponsive faculties and teaching methods in the universities. The Shah, however, already had a huge number of detractors in Germany because of his lavish lifestyle, repressive government and brutal police. What were they called? The SAVAK?

Q: SAVAK.

CLARK: SAVAK. There was a lot of criticism of him anyway, especially in magazines like Der Spiegel, for being a repressive ruler who exploited his people while living lavishly.

Q: Were you close to the Shah when these demonstrations went on?

CLARK: No. I met him at the airport, but the worst demonstration occurred later when the Shah was entering the opera.

Q: By that I mean, were you with him in the car?

CLARK: Oh, no, no. Once he was greeted at the airport by the protocol officers of the three Allied missions, he was escorted by West Berlin’s protocol chief in a big motorcade. In the
Opera House I sat nowhere near him. He and his party sat in the imperial box or whatever you want to call it.

Q: While you were there in the Foreign Service, were you picking up any of the American unrest from Vietnam?

CLARK: We were certainly aware of the anti-Vietnam demonstrations in America and Europe and of the critical coverage in the press. But with the Wall and a very repressive Communist state a few miles away, I wasn’t very sympathetic to the criticism of our policy in Vietnam.

Q: It was my understanding that for a long time there was practically a theology about West Berlin and what one could do and not do. Everyone had to be very careful not to do anything that could undermine our rights in Berlin or give the Soviets or East Germans an opening to exploit. Our relations and contacts with the Soviets and East Germans were done by the numbers, so to speak, and watched very closely.

CLARK: Oh, yes. You had to be especially careful whenever you traveled in or out - or to or from - the Soviet Sector. You had to be careful how you did it, what documents you had, what documents to show or not show, which guards you spoke to, and whether the guards were allowed to look inside your car or trunk. There were all sorts of things like that.

Q: Were you married at the time?

CLARK: No.

Q: Did you get any feeling for the political life in Germany? For example, who was the mayor of West Berlin at the time?

CLARK: Heinrich Al bertz. Willy Brandt had already gone to Bonn several years earlier.

Q: Did West Berlin or West German politics intrude much in what was going on?

CLARK: Not in my world. I really didn’t follow Berlin politics very much. The central concerns were the student demonstrations and whether they were going to somehow open Berlin up to Soviet or East German meddling.

Q: From the people you were talking to, was there concern that the student demonstrations might catch on to other elements of society? Trade unions, the intellectuals or something like that, or did they seem to be kind of isolated?

CLARK: I think there was some concern that they could spread. Other people thought not. They thought that the average German worker or citizen was not impressed by these students and violent demonstrations. Student demonstrations are almost a rite of passage in a lot of European countries. But the ones in Berlin were pretty violent.

Q: Why was that?

CLARK: Berlin was particularly attractive to student radicals because it had two major universities, a lot of students, and a long history of tolerating alternative movements and lifestyles. In addition, the FRG subsidized the cost of living in West Berlin and exempted West
Berliners from military service. This made it a magnet for anti-government and protesters. But even today there seems to me to be a peculiar tolerance among many young Germans for those who like an opportunity to trash streets and break windows and cause a big fuss.

Q: Were there any spectacular escapes or attempts to break over the Wall when you were there?

CLARK: Attempts to escape were common. I don’t recall any particularly spectacular escapes or attempts, but it seems to me that while I was there one group escaped through an extensive tunnel.

Q: Was everyone in the Mission very careful not to get involved in trying to get people out from East Germany?

CLARK: Absolutely. We weren’t even supposed to take letters back and forth for fear that it might somehow be a plot to involve the United States or one of its diplomats and create a problem.

Q: Was there a feeling that, as a single man, the Soviets might set up traps, you know honey traps with girls and things like this, in order to involve you in a compromising situation that they could exploit?

CLARK: Well, I socialized mainly with members of the U.S. Mission and other diplomats, so I don’t know. I suppose if you were a serviceman who went out to bars, etc., in the areas frequented by U.S. Army types you might well find yourself targeted by some young woman. But that was not much of a problem in diplomatic circles as far as I knew.

Q: Was the diplomatic life and work there with the French, British and Germans and all, pretty interesting?

CLARK: Just as in the American mission, it seemed that the other missions had an awful lot of bright young people. My counterpart in the British mission became the British ambassador in Bonn and later Washington. Anyway, he rose very fast to the top levels of the British foreign service. I think a lot of foreign services sent some of their brightest people to Berlin. At the time, Berlin and Yugoslavia were two areas that got a lot of attention in the Department.

Q: Yes, I was in Yugoslavia from ’62 to ’67 with Larry Eagleburger, David Anderson and Jim Bullenstein, I mean I never ran across such a bright group later in the Foreign Service. Did being in Berlin entice you to change your specialty or geographic area??

CLARK: Not my preference for political work. But I changed from being interested in Latin America to being interested in Europe because when I went on vacation and saw other parts of Europe, I really liked it.

HALVOR C. EKERN

Political/Military Officer

Bonn (1967-1969)

Political Advisor
Heidelberg (1969-1973)

Halvor C. Ekern was born in Montana in 1917. He served in the U.S. Army from 1941-1947, reaching the rank of colonel. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947. Mr. Ekern served in Austria, Iceland, Sierra Leone, Germany, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.

EKERN: In Bonn, I was called the political/military affairs counselor. We had Ambassador George McGhee followed by Henry Cabot Lodge. It was probably the most intense atmosphere of any Embassy in the world because that was the center of things. It wasn't London, Paris, or Moscow; it was Bonn where the world looked. Fortunately we had some good people. Jimmy Sutherland was Counselor for Political Affairs; Marty Hillenbrand was DCM. Sutherland had some very good officers. Sutherland was one of the finest men I have ever met. Later he went up to the UN. I thought Ron Spiers took his place, but I am not dead sure of that.

It was a tough spot. We worked long hours, weekends, holidays, etc. It consisted of mostly feeding information to Washington about things that were happening there and policy matters. Whither NATO? What was the German future? Heavily defense oriented because that is where we faced the Soviets. The actual telegrams that went out were about quite a variety of everything, I am talking about the political section. There was the ABM treaties; Nuclear Proliferation treaties; all of those affairs that were current at the time; Germany's positions on NATO affairs, Our liaison with our mission to NATO was very close.

Our attitude -- with which I couldn't quarrel -- was that reunification for Germany was something that might happen long after our life time. That was the universal position. I don't know a single soothsayer who foresaw what has recently occurred. There was the question as to whether the East Germans would fight very hard for the Soviets if they came. That was a big question mark.

The American Embassy in Bonn even today is about to fall down. It is a temporary building. We couldn't even do a paint job without arousing comment that we had given up on East Germany and were not going back to Berlin. It was a very touchy thing.

During my period there, our attitude toward West Germany was that they were our loyal allies, our most loyal allies. I guess Willy Brandt did some things that caused us to fuss a little, but at the level of the Laender and the military, they were our loyal allies. I am surprised that they jumped through the hoop as often as we required them to do. They would bend over backwards to be loyal. I don't know of any conspiracy against us. There may have been some political elements toying with a less obsequiousness, but they were not a factor. Cooperation was 100 percent.

The Soviet threat certainly was very real. There weren't very many people who downgraded it. It was there. The tanks and soldiers were right there. During the Czech crisis in 1968, there were 25 divisions moved and we didn't know whether they were going to stop at the German border. That was the first time I really got talked to by the German Foreign Office. It was before they actually moved; we knew they were coming, and the State Secretary called Sutherland and myself over and he said, "You tell your Generals not one soldier will move forward." They didn't ask us; they told us. They were so concerned that there might be an imagined provocation that would cause the Soviets to cross the border. So I got General Polk on the phone and said, "General, you are
not supposed to move any of your soldiers at all." He swallowed hard because he certainly didn't want to go down in history as the general whose troops were overrun in their barracks. In the event only one officer disobeyed and that was a German Commander who pushed his troops out to where he might be able to defend himself. He was relieved later. So the "threat" was considered very real.

As I remember it, our friendly CIA covered both sides of the street. One day they said that the Soviets could come, they next that they won't come, etc. The military intelligence was that they knew they were there and moving. The one person whose telegram was correct was from Thompson in Moscow. He said they will move. Up until then, the general consensus was that they were bluffing about moving into Czechoslovakia.

They did move, but didn't cross the border. We believed they could have. The distance between the Soviets and Rhine at that point was about 70 miles, so you had to take it very seriously. At the border, reconnaissance was up there, you stayed up all night and the commander kept ordering "You be ready wherever you are." But we weathered that all right.

I was in Bonn for a little while Lodge was Ambassador before I moved to Heidelberg. He was entirely different from George McGhee. He was not losing much sleep over the job. He was thoroughly relaxed. Made a good TV appearance and that was what we needed. He came into the Embassy after he had had his coffee, etc. I think this was his last act. He had seen the whole course. He was not prepared to get too uptight over this.

I moved to Heidelberg where I served for four years as POLAD, political adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army there. It was Headquarters, CINCEUR and Seventh Army. My first Commander-in-Chief was General Polk; the second was two years with General Mike Davis.

The POLAD did pretty much whatever he wanted. First of all, he had to keep the General completely current about the political situation around him -- the German Army, the British and all. I did at least a weekly updating. I got all the pertinent cables sent down from Bonn.

Secondly, he had to bring about good relations with the Laender where his troops were.

This we accomplished by setting up briefings for the Minister-Presidents and their cabinets. Having the Commander-in-Chief visit them, to get to know each well. The problems were pretty enormous. Germany is about the size of Oregon and has a population at that time of about 61 million. So every square meter of land was needed for something. We had large chunks of it there for troop training, barracks, etc. There was a push all the time -- some of them could get acrimonious -- because some development was needed and our barracks sat right in the middle of the area. Having barracks in the middle of town was an understandable nuisance to the Germans. We also requisitioned good houses for our senior officers. We were under pressure to turn some of these back. But we operated under a Status of Forces Agreement and the Germans were reasonable. When it came to the crunch they were fair and we tried to be fair and work the problems out. And they never did get up into the diplomatic levels to speak of.

That was the internal scene. Then we tried to get the Commander-in-Chief to visit the Defense Ministers and hopefully the Prime Ministers of the Low Countries, France, etc. so he would be known.
General Polk and Davis certainly were sophisticated on political issues. But there were officers beneath them who had a lot to learn. In fact I told the Commander-in-Chief when I went there that I would not tolerate any officer here calling the State Department a bunch of striped pants bastards. But I also told Bonn that I would not tolerate any of them talking about those brass hats in Heidelberg. So that was settled. I said to the Embassy that there are things that we do in Heidelberg that I am not at liberty to tell them about even thought the Department paid my salary. So I had, I think, the complete confidence of the Commander-in-Chief and that helped a lot. He was always willing and anxious to listen to what role he had in this German frontier state.

Vietnam had a major impact on our military in Germany. General Polk had only one captain in command of a company; all the rest were lieutenants. He was stripped of senior non-commissioned officers. This was a period, the late sixties, with all the turmoil of racial and drug problems. He had a hell of a job. It was a draftee army. So he had a real problem with discipline, which he handled to the best of his ability. But everything was drained off to Vietnam including his ammunition, gasoline. It was hard to get his forces to Grafenwohr and training grounds like that. The Germans were rioting in the streets. They had some bombings in Heidelberg at the Headquarters. They would march pass by the thousands in front of the Headquarters. But by keeping their cool and just doing their jobs all the commanders did a good job.

The Soviet Army was, of course, probably the number one objective for the intelligence people, particularly military intelligence, which was supposed to find out who their opponent was and how he was equipped. They used all the resources they could. Human and signal intelligence, etc. And they kept track of movements. I think they had a reasonable picture despite some of the shortcomings in the Soviet Army and particularly the East German and Czech Army. They had to view it as a real threat, so they kept track of the armored vehicles, what kind they had, the aircraft, etc. I would say they were pretty up to date on it.

I don't think there were any doubts about the Soviet Army concerning obeying orders. The real question was how far would the East Germans go? Would they shoot fellow Germans? The question was never fully answered. It was debated forever. The same as to what the Czechs, the Hungarians, etc. would do. We didn't put them down as much of a threat as the Soviets. In fact, we always thought if the Soviets were successful in going right to the Atlantic, the East Germans, Hungarians would come in for a piece of the action. But if they met resistance, there would be some defections.

There was the big debate about the use of nuclear weapons. NATO's question about the first use of nukes and our position was "Yes, before we surrendered we would use nukes." So I think our Commanders-in-Chief felt they would be able to give the Soviets a hell of a fight although we would be outnumbered. It certainly wouldn't have been a walkover. They would have held them east of the Rhine for quite a long time. Our worry was more on the northern flank because the British forces were weaker there. Thank God we all felt the Germans were on our side. They are good soldiers. To this day they have fine troops, I am sure. I knew all the 3 and 4-star generals in the German Army. I went on maneuvers with them. The Dutch, I don't know about them. The French were good soldiers.

There was this political division with de Gaulle, but at the military level we had good cooperation. I visited the French Headquarters both the Second Corps in Germany and the First
Army in Starkburg frequently. I told the State Department that they would fight. Why do we need to revise the NATO Treaty? I told that to Ron Spiers.

RICHARD C. BARKLEY
Aide to Ambassador Rush
Bonn (1971-1972)
Political Officer, Eastern Affairs Section
Berlin (1972-1974)

Ambassador Richard C. Barkley was born on December 23, 1932 in Illinois. He attended Michigan State College, where he received his BA in 1954, and Wayne State University, where he received his MA in 1958. He served in the US Army overseas from 1955-1957 as a 1rst lieutenant. His career has included positions in Finland, the Dominican Republic, Norway, South Africa, Turkey, and Germany. Ambassador Barkley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 12, 2003.

Q: When you arrived there in ’71, how were German-American relations?

BARKLEY: Well this was the time, of course, that the Willy Brandt government come into effect. U.S. relations towards Willy Brandt, and the Social Democrats generally had been somewhat skeptical regarding their foreign policy intentions. But it turned out that actually this was at the same time there was somewhat of a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, a certain effort to reach out to the Soviets and try to negotiate something. Of course it all tied in with Vietnam. The Brandt government came up with a rather new and novel idea which was entirely different than previous West German positions. It was basically a rapprochement with central Europe. The concept was not only to negotiate an improved relationship within Berlin, but also to work out what they called a general eastern policy whereby they would also recognize for the first time the existence of East Germany within the concept of two states-one nation. They also wanted to solidify the boundaries between Poland and Germany which has always been a problem because there are revanchist groups in the FRG that wanted to reclaim German lands far into Poland and of course into East Prussia. So it was a time actually of a great deal of movement. It turns out that German policy and American policy met quite tidily together at that time. It was one of those fortuitous moments I think where things could be done that couldn’t have been done probably a year or two years previously.

Q: Well while you were at the embassy, did you pick up any concern that Brandt’s aussenpolitik and our trying to open up détente and all of this was maybe going to endanger our position in Germany and all?

BARKLEY: Oh of course. One of the major concerns all along is Germany might be induced to have a go it alone policy. The elements in the Social Democratic Party that had always been there, certain intellectual elements, indeed promoted the idea of a neutral Germany, which of course was a nightmare for NATO. Western policy was based on keeping West Germany anchored in the West. Willy Brandt didn’t have that same devotion to the anchor to the west as
we did although Adenauer certainly he was anti communist and had a long history and career in that front. But there was always somehow a feeling in certain circles in the west that Social Democracy was full of fuzzy thinkers, and that indeed they never fully understood what the Russians were about.

Q: I was wondering whether you were hearing within the political section and elsewhere muttering within the ranks.

BARKLEY: Oh absolutely. Well it was not only muttering within the ranks, but also muttering within the ranks of the German government too. A number of people, out of protest for the eastern policy, resigned from the German foreign service. There was, I think, a sense of skepticism, because people couldn’t see how we could improve our relationship within Berlin and within Germany as a whole by doing this. In fact it turns out that we could. But that had much more to do with the inherent weaknesses in the socialist camp than probably any furtive design.

Q: Did you get up to Berlin?

BARKLEY: Oh constantly. I traveled with the ambassador, and of course, all the negotiations took place in Berlin. And because of the unique status of Berlin being under four power rights and responsibilities, we always had to fly up with military aircraft. We could have gone I suppose with civilian aircraft but we didn’t. So there were always logistical problems. That was part of my responsibility to make sure things went of smoothly.

Q: How about the train. Did the ambassador still use that, his train.

BARKLEY: Yes, the train was still there. The ambassador tended not to use it. For one thing it was not an overnight ride. The minister in Berlin occasionally used it, but it was basically the Berlin Commandant’s train. The commandant, within the status of Berlin is something I think that is now increasingly difficult for people to understand. But the fact that after WWII Germany was divided as you know into four military occupation zones with the British, the French, and the Americans in the west and the Russians in the east. That was replicated in Berlin under the general belief that anybody who controlled Berlin would control all of Germany. And of course Berlin was in the center of the Russian zone, before it became East Germany. They could foreclose our operations which they tried to do in 1948 during the time of the Berlin Airlift.

Q: Did you find yourself up against in Berlin, there were people in the foreign service who do nothing but deal with Berlin. I mean there was almost like a religious right of how you dealt with things including how far a tailgate could be let down. You know all sorts of things, and the feeling was that if you gave away anything, the Soviets wee nibbling away all the time. I mean you must not have been looked upon with great pleasure.

BARKLEY: Well at that time as you may recall Stuart, there was a group known as the old German hands. They were people who had multiple tours in Germany, who understood the unique complexity of the place with East and West Germany and Berlin. At the time (1970-’71) that I entered German affairs, it was the heyday of the old German hands. It turns out that even during this negotiation, they were all in place, names like Jonathan Dean and David Klein and Jim Sutherland and Martin Hillenbrand and Russell Fessenden and all these people who had spent their entire careers defining the quality and limits of our relationship with Germany. On the
other hand there were in Russia, the old Russian hands who did the same thing. And of course there was a constant sort of engagement of those two groups in trying to understand what was really going on. The only thing is I would say is both of them had their feet planted firmly on the ground as to Russian intentions. Nonetheless, when you started to tinker with previous arrangements that had been there, even if it led to an improvement, which in fact it did, there is always some fear that we would be taken for a ride.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Soviet negotiations during this time?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. The Soviet negotiator whose name was Abrasimov, was a rather randy but very sly figure. He obviously was closely tied in with the politburo and the ruling elite. They knew precisely what they were doing. And of course like in most negotiations of this sort, the Russians would usually just sit there and say Nyet as we tried to find different kinds of formulas to make sure that our procedures were honored and that they would be promoted in the future. Certainly the driving force of that whole negotiation was Jonathan Dean. “Jock” Dean was just a dynamo and kept at it and kept at it. The negotiations went on several years before they were finally agreed to.

Q: You were the ambassador’s aide the whole time…

BARKLEY: The one year I was there. Now the ambassador departed towards the end of my tour in 1972. He was assigned or promoted I guess you could say to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So in the spring of 1972, after the negotiations had been almost wrapped up, and would indeed be wrapped up very quickly, he departed. He was replaced by Martin Hillenbrand. I was there through that transition, but I realized I could not be aide for one ambassador and then be aide for another. Besides, ambassador aide jobs are usually one year jobs. You don’t want more than that. I had established good personal relations with David Klein in Berlin. He asked me to come to Berlin and work in the mission which I did.

Q: So you were in Berlin from ’72 to ’74. What was your job?

BARKLEY: I was in the eastern affairs section which was a section that basically monitored what was going on in East Germany. The section had a section head and three officers, actually four officers. Two of them were CIA, however. Three of them were real State Department officers. I was in charge of the domestic political scene in East Germany. Peter Swers was in charge of East German foreign relations. Felix Bloch who became famous later on, was in charge of economic developments in East Germany.

Q: Did you find a different atmosphere in Berlin, in the mission in Berlin than our embassy in Bonn?

BARKLEY: Oh yes, there is always somewhat of a different perspective sitting in Berlin where you think the world revolves around the status of Berlin rather than in Bonn where there were infinitely broader issues to address. It depended of course very much on who the principal officers were at that time. David Klein was a very highly regarded officer in West Berlin. He was the minister in West Berlin. The status of West Berlin was unique in all of the foreign service in that indeed we were actually stationed in an American occupation zone. The ambassador was not only responsible for West Germany but also Berlin. In that role, the commandant in Berlin was
his immediate deputy, but he was a military officer. Most ambassadors insisted that all of the political decisions there be in the hands of the minister in Berlin.

Q: Well now, looking at the East German internal thing, how was it in this ’72 to ’74 period? What was going on there?

BARKLEY: Well, when I arrived in 1972, Erich Honecker was at that time the first secretary of the communist party and for all intents and purposes the dictator, the head of the East German government. He had replaced Walter Ulbricht. Ulbricht was a real toady of the Russians, an old line communist, as indeed was Honecker. Honecker came up through the youth movement which seemed to be one of the natural progressions forward in Soviet style politics. Honecker and his wife were of course, dedicated communists. But at the same time they were looking for position and stature that they didn’t have before because they were the new comers on the block at that time. Of course there is no question that Honecker himself was intrigued by the fact that eastern policy would give him a position on the world stage that he never had before. Above all things of course, recognition by major western powers, which he had been striving for his entire life as indeed had most of the East Germans. The idea was that they were trying to create then two individual, particularly distinct, Germanys. So at that time he was particularly curious, and there was a certain opening toward the United States. Now as the officer in charge of domestic affairs in East Germany in the United States, we did not have relations with East Germany at that time. That would flow from the successful completion of the Berlin agreements. And so I was there at a time when certain segments of their government were eager to establish relations. I on the other, was prohibited of establishing direct relations, so there was sort of a coy movement with lower level contacts back and forth. Of course in East Germany everything was state controlled, but there were some units that were more like think tanks. I was also permitted to meet with people from the university etc. They made a number of people available to me. I was the first officer probably ever in Berlin to have that level of semi-official access.

Q: This is tape three, side one with Dick Barkley. Were you able to meet with German officials at a Bierstube and things like that.

BARKLEY: You mean East German officials?

Q: East German officials.

BARKLEY: Yes, actually. We worked out a different series of relations. We would actually meet in the offices of their think tanks, but most often we would go to lunch. We had to go to lunch primarily in East Berlin because many of them had difficulty going west. As I established these relations, however, I recall after about a year, I asked them to come over and have dinner at my home, in West Berlin, and I was astonished that they came. As a matter of fact, David Klein decided this was too irresistible, that he would attend too. So we sat around and we had one of those broad political conversations the Germans love to have. We had rather lengthy and rather fascinating discussions at that time. The question of course was are there any levels of independent thinking on the part of the Germans that would separate them, make them distinct from the Russians. The answer was not a hell of a lot but some. It was actually an interesting time, and some of the people I got to know very well ended up in the higher echelons of the East German government. I was able to re-warm this relationship some ten years later. They were indeed people who were sort of on the intellectual fast track in East Germany, to the extent that
there was such a group. Many of them were particularly interested in the United States. They had only seen the United States from a distance. Most of them were enormously curious. After all we were the super power of the west. Several of them went on then to become members of the East German embassy in Washington when it opened up there. So these were people outside the foreign office per-se, but obviously connected to it.

Q: Well now, just to get the time frame right. When did we recognize East Germany and set up an embassy there?


Q: Were you all on both sides getting ready for this?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. So it was a very active group preparing for the establishment of relations. The whole question really did come down to where we were going to place our embassy and what the status of that embassy would be. As we always recognized East Berlin was not an integral part of East Germany, but the Soviet sector of Berlin, there was a lot of resistance to putting the embassy in Berlin. Some people thought it should go to Potsdam. In fact the administrative capital of East Germany was East Berlin. So we bit the bullet on that. The French and the British had already moved smartly ahead of us to establish their embassies. As they say, both France and England loved Germany so much they were glad there were two of them. We were much more reluctant. One main question is what would we call our embassy? It could not be our embassy in Berlin because that would imply that Berlin was part of East Germany. So we just called it Embassy Berlin. Then came the question of finding an adequate embassy building, and I was tasked with that job. The theory was, and it was certainly one I shared (and helped formulate) is the United States as the superpower of the world, could not establish an American embassy and try to hide. We knew we couldn’t compete with the Russians, who had a huge embassy in Berlin, but, we wanted something that was the next best, if you will. So we were able to finally secure a building in downtown Berlin which still actually houses the American embassy in a unified Germany. It was a building that had been built prior to the war. It was quite a lovely building on the Neustadtische Kirch Strasse. It had until that time part of the East German labor movement called Haus Des Handwerks, which is the craft guild house. When it came time for us to get a building, they tried to give us a whole bunch of junk. I remember looking at the building and asking what was wrong with that one, and they said, “It doesn’t belong to us.” I recall my conversation with Volker Laetsch who was the guy in charge of the East German side of the negotiations. I said, “It all belongs to you. You are a communist country.” “No, no, we are only on the way to communism,” he replied. “Well,” I said, “Why don’t you let the United States government help you along, and you just confiscate that building and give it to us.” About a week later he came back and said, “Were you serious?” Now I was somewhat of course, beyond my pay grade, but, I said, “Yes, I think we are.” Sure enough they offered the building. Joan Clark came over with the experts from Washington and looked it over, and that indeed became our chancery.

ALBERT L. SELIGMANN
Political Advisor
Berlin (1971-1975)
Albert Seligmann was born and raised in New York City where he also attended Columbia University’s School of International Affairs. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955 after serving in the US Army during World War II. His career included posts in Japan, Thailand, and Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: When you got there in 1971, was it understood by mutual consent that because of the negotiations that were going on, this was not a particular period of testing on the part of the Soviet forces and the allied forces?

SELIGMANN: Not in the sense of risking a major crisis, but there was a certain amount of testing. We still played all kinds of games. For example, we still had our military mission based in Potsdam outside of Berlin in East Germany, just as the Soviets had a military mission based in Frankfurt - we would rotate our people in and out of West Berlin, where they were quartered and they would stay at the Mission house in Potsdam for a week or so at a time. The four missions (the British and French had their own) were supposedly free to move around the respective host countries and observe, but they were not free to go into classified military installations. Both sides being in the intelligence business, however, they tested the limits. For example, when an American major attached to our mission was found too close to some air facility, he was returned to us trussed up like a pig on a pole. That's demeaning and embarrassing. He shouldn't have been where he was, but that was the game. They knew it, we knew it, and this sort of thing went on.

You had occasional testing of air-corridor procedures, or the nightly duty train to Frankfurt would be halted in East Germany for an hour or two, but, again, no major incidents while I was there. Part of the political section's bailiwick was the BASC (Berlin Air Safety Center), which functioned day-in, day-out, and was one of a few vestiges of Soviet presence in West Berlin. Three Allied and a Soviet air controller sat around a table in the old Allied Command Authority building, the only active office in that sprawling, otherwise ghost-like edifice. They handed cards back and forth noting departures and arrivals from the four airfields serving greater Berlin so that you didn't have collisions. That functioned well, even though the Soviets from time to time would scrawl on a card that they could not guarantee air safety, e.g., if they objected to some expansion of air service by the allied carriers that operated the only civilian air services in West Berlin - or they might announce the closing of an air corridor for maneuvers, which we would protest and ignore. As I indicated, these threats were not consummated on my watch. You still had Spandau prison, down to one prisoner, Rudolph Hess, who regrettably (for the sake of historians) wouldn't talk about what his wartime mission to Britain was all about, at least until released. The Soviets would not agree to that (presumably to keep this bit of a West Berlin perk going) and Hess died without divulging the story. The allied powers, including the Russians, each furnished a team of prison wardens and each month alternated a company of military guards. It was the custom to have the changing-of-the-guard ceremony followed by a party hosted by the outgoing side. Our parties got smaller and smaller, but the Russian party remained lavish with endless drinking designed to immobilize the attendees for the rest of the afternoon. The Soviet's would invite a long list of military and civilians from each of the allied missions, but we scaled down our attendance until we had a token representation: the legal advisors, responsible for the political side of Spandau and one or two others to keep him company. I went to one party for the experience, but refused to go to any more.

Q: Who was the head of the mission while you were there?
SELIGMANN: David Klein, a German hand who had also served in Moscow. He has published a book the Berlin Agreement which I should have read but have not. I thought Dave was a remarkable man, feisty but understanding of the underlying issues. He was a guardian of non-erosion if you will, of existing rights and was not going to see them whittled away, especially at the expense of the West Berliners. In the negotiation he stood up to American officials at various levels who were so enamored of the concept of Ostpolitik that they tended to get impatient with arguments over language or seeming minutiae that they saw as holding up progress. He felt correctly that if you were not careful, you could lose in the details some of the improvements you were trying to achieve.

Q: Well, I think there was the feeling by some, that behind Henry Kissinger's maneuverings and all there was a general feeling because he was a creature of the Vietnam, you know, pulling out of there at the time, essentially that the United States' commitment abroad including Germany was diminishing, and in a way it was almost a pessimistic thing that the United States didn't have an unlimited amount of time to be around so we better cut a deal while we could. I don't know if that was concern or was this felt at all?

SELIGMANN: It may well have been looked at that way. I saw it more as his desire to be a hero and the author, the achiever of Ostpolitik, and therefore let's not bother with all of this trivial detail. What does it matter anyway. For example, toward the very end of the negotiation, he made a trip to Moscow. Without consulting anybody he signed off on a joint communiqué in which he let the Soviets slip in a reference to some point on which we had struggled for weeks to pin the Soviets down on language, in effect reversing what had been achieved. My memory is fuzzy on the details, but it may have had to do with the strengthening of ties between West Berlin and the FRG. We were appalled and eventually retrieved the situation, but he just did not see any need for this sort of “haggling.”

Q. Who was the chancellor of Germany at the time?

SELIGMANN: Willy Brandt. Ostpolitik is a phrase associated in the first place with Willy Brandt.

Q: What was the feeling that you were getting from your colleagues about Willy Brandt?

SELIGMANN: I think many German conservatives felt there was a little bit of what I was just talking about in Willy Brandt, in that he wanted to get on with the job and get Ostpolitik on the road, but even if they argued he should take a stronger stance, I don't think anyone felt he was seriously going to sacrifice Berlin interests.

Q: Of course he had been mayor of Berlin and he had stood firm at that job.

SELIGMANN: True, although some might have argued he was tainted by a Bonn perspective in which West Berlin was perhaps a smaller part of the picture.

Q: Well, there is always the accusation that the United States in its diplomacy wants a quick fix and quick results, and sometimes we can be led down the garden path a bit because we lack the patience to hang on. I suppose this is a concern.
SELIGMANN: By and large we stood more steadfast than the British were inclined to. The French in turn could be pretty stubborn about making any concessions to the Soviets. Everyone had their own motives. After all the French-German relationship was something special, as was the British-German relationship. We were in a sense more dispassionate about some of this. So there was a lot of interplay there on many matters.

Q: What was your impression of let's say the British representation and working with them.

SELIGMANN: At my level it was very good. I had excellent relationships with my successive counterparts, whom I found for the most part like-minded. At some levels it was more difficult. As acting political advisor I had gone to Bonn to attend a meeting of the “Bonn Group,” created by the three allied embassies to mastermind the negotiations. I no longer remember the subject, but we emerged from the meeting with some matter pending that had to be referred back to our respective capitals. I know we in the Berlin Mission were not entirely enthralled by the recommendation. On the plane back to Tempelhof, Teddy Jackson, the British Polad, started to tell me that when I got back I would have to get off a telegram saying XYZ. Aware that this was not likely to be what Dave Klein would recommend, I ignored the fact that he outranked me, turned to him, recalling John Quincy Adams’s famous quote, and said, “You know, I am not a cockboat in the wake of a British man 'o war." So we had that kind of interplay. By the way, one of the unique features of Berlin was you had a very open, frank, occasionally caustic channel of communication known as “IBs” or Inner Berlin messages. These were encrypted telegrams,, just like those sent to Washington, except they were exchanged among counterparts in the three allied missions and didn't go outside of Berlin. I hope some of these will be open reading if they are not already because they provide unvarnished, sometimes humorous insights into relations among the allies.

Q: What about dealing with the French?

SELIGMANN: We had nicknames for some of our more obstreperous colleagues, but my counterpart was fine. I had no problems; he was easy to deal with. There were others who were not. The minister as I recall was a very good and easy man. The political advisor was difficult.

Q: Well, it is just that so often basic policy, the French you know by our light seemed to deliberately go out of their way to take a different course. Taking something like Berlin, this was not a place to play around.

SELIGMANN: They didn't play around but they made life needlessly complicated. You sometimes had the feeling that the French would not agree to something just because the British and Americans agreed to it.

Q: How would you operate, I mean you, yourself? What were you doing? What would almost a typical day be?

SELIGMANN: There was a good deal of variety built into the job by virtue of the broad range of responsibilities of the individual members of the political section. Especially where the allies could not agree among themselves or where there was a problem with German counterparts, the deputy political advisors often attempted to resolve problems at their level. This made for a full agenda, especially when the U.S. was in the chair every third month. I might be asked by our Senat liaison officer to intervene with a higher ranking Senat official, short of what would be the
equivalent of the mayor or deputy mayor. On the military side, I worked closely with key staff officers and the brigade commander - the commandant’s office was just down the hall, so there was a good bit of easy, informal interplay. We had a full reporting load with the usual editing and review responsibilities. Despite the peculiar structure of the mission and the absence of a normal diplomatic corps in Berlin, in order to reinforce the status of West Berlin, we encouraged as much foreign representation as possible in the form of allied “military missions” that had been maintained by some countries since the end of World War II, or consulates - this often meant trying to persuade these representations not to close down. The FRG foreign ministry had a representative with the rank of ambassador in Berlin. The minister would see him, but others of us would talk to him too, socialize at parties and what not. You did everything you would do in a normal political section except you were preoccupied with these very special conditions.

Once the Quadripartite Agreement was signed in September 1971, the pace of work picked up considerably, inasmuch as it would not go into effect until the crucial inner-German agreements were finalized, specifying the many modalities required for implementation. This meant daily close consultation with the Senat, which of course, was working closely with Bonn on the negotiations. In addition to facilitating transportation between West Berlin and the FRG and visits by West Berliners to East Berlin, there were also some minor territorial adjustments to be made. It also meant working together with political advisor, Buck Borg, on negotiations with the Russians on arrangements for the establishment of the consulate general and commercial offices they were permitted to set up by terms of the agreement.

Q: I would think that there would be I mean sort of you know, we might do the normal diplomatic things, but in a way you were all on a team. I am talking about Germans, French. I mean you had it was much more collegial than just sort of separate powers dealing with each other.

SELMANN: Absolutely. The basic objectives, after all, were the same. By the same token, there were nuances. Here were the four powers negotiating a Berlin agreement that we all felt would lead at least to mutual recognition of the two Germanies. While unification seemed a long way down the road, we pledged allegiance to it on the allied side - I don't think the Russians ever did. I used to quip, and I think there is still some truth in this, that probably with the possible exception of the United States none of the other parties involved, meaning the French, the British, and the Russians really wanted it I wasn't sure about ourselves.

Q: At one time I remember you know, we had two very firm policies. One was the unification of Germany and the other was the unification of Korea, and the question was I think, the longer we can keep them apart the better. I mean these were two tigers that we didn't particularly want to let loose.

SELMANN: Yes. I think we were ambivalent on the subject. I am not sure about the others.

Q: Did you have much dealing with your Soviet counterpart?

SELMANN: Quite a bit, yes. I had more later on in my tour when I was moved up to be the political advisor. At that point I dealt with the Soviet political advisor, but I did see my counterpart, his deputy fairly often. As is so often the case, he was a KGB man and therefore much more cosmopolitan, pleasant and easier to deal with than some of the career diplomats. The Soviets would turn it on and off. You might have very easy relations for a time, and then
they would try to make a point by tightening up and making life tough; if not causing an
incident, at least taking advantage of one. Incidents happened all the time and it was how you
managed them. You could do so smoothly at a low level or you could escalate them and make it
difficult. It was almost like football. They would put in their offensive team or their defensive
team. At one time, they sent back to Berlin as their political advisor an old German hand - I can't
remember his name anymore - who had a reputation for being extremely nasty and tough. They
did it to make a point.

Q: In the normal relations with Berlin at that time the whole thing with its apparatus besides the
negotiations were sort of going on in a way over your head, was it a pretty static time? I mean it
was none of the or was there any great testing or...

SELIGMANN: Not so much military testing - I mentioned the occasional probing of allied rights
in the air and land corridors - as legal testing. Apart from improving conditions for the West
Berliners and easing communication, a major purpose of the Berlin Agreement was to put an end
to challenges to the status of West Berlin. The Soviets, for example, often objected to the
application of FRG laws or treaties to West Berlin, even though special procedures had been
followed for allied approval to assure there was no intrusion on certain reserved areas, such as air
rights. These challenges always had to be answered or you would risk acquiescing in a Soviet or
GDR position by default. Once the inner-German agreements were in place and the final
protocol activating the Berlin agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers in the spring of
1972, there was still a breaking-in period before everything ran smoothly, but by and large it
worked well.

There was a less tangible area that we and the Berliners were much concerned about, that is the
future of the city. As long as Berlin was a focal point of cold-war tension, the Berliners were
assured full attention from the western allies. They were also the recipients of a variety of
subsidies from the FRG. Also, for a time, thanks in large part to the presence of Siemens, Berlin
was still the largest industrial city in West Germany. But not much investment was coming into
West Berlin, it was an artificial situation, and people worried whether the agreement wouldn’t
result in the city being neglected or forgotten in the greater scheme of things. There were ideas
that West Berlin should become an East-West trade center, a concept that never materialized.
There was also much emphasis on the city’s cultural assets: theater, museums, the Philharmonie
and our own RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) orchestra, which was first rate. Aspen
Institute, after the agreement, established a branch conference center in Berlin, headed by Shep
Stone, a prominent old Berlin hand. So there was much interest and support for all of these
cultural activities, backed by Dave Klein’s personal engagement. Let's see, what was the other
part of your question?

Q: Well, I was wondering, most of this was in a way was a fairly normal period, not one of great
testing on the part of particularly the Soviets trying to close down highways or change things
around.

SELIGMANN: Occasionally the American duty train, which had run every single night since
1945 or whenever this started between Frankfort and Berlin would be held up. (The French and
British had their own duty trains: the former running once a week to Strasbourg, and the latter
during the daytime on a short run to Braunschweig or New Brunswick, i.e., Checkpoint Alpha,
but ours was by all odds the most important.) Once in awhile they would stop that. The train
would stop at the checkpoints on the GDR border where it was boarded by the Soviets, who occasionally held it up on one pretext or another. Then tensions would flare up and our operation center would alert the Mission duty officer. Usually the train rolled on before too long, but if it was delayed an hour or more we might protest to the Soviets at the working level. At least while I was there, such incidents never escalated. In the air corridors, the Soviets might alert us to maneuvers by their air force, which we protested, noting that we held them accountable for air safety. They might then follow up with some “near misses,” but, again, while I was there, not so near as to become major incidents. (In earlier times there had been much more serious incidents.)

You also had the question of exfiltration, GIs smuggling East Germans out of East Berlin in their cars. The East Germans and Soviets knew this was going on and we did our best to discourage it, making it clear that such activity would be the end of anybody's career, because the GIs were doing this for the most part, not for humanitarian purposes but for money. Once when I was political advisor, the Soviet political advisor called on me, a bit unusual to begin with, bringing along an album of pictures showing a car with U.S. military plates being stopped by East German police in East Berlin just short of Checkpoint Charlie; the trunk being opened; and an East German “escapee” being found. It was pretty clear the whole operation was a setup. This being a don’t-roil-the-waters period, the Soviet Polad was considerate of our embarrassment; did not thump the table; and made his protest more in sorrow than in anger, but they held the GI concerned. As tension built up while we demanded his release admitting no wrong-doing, the boy's father flew in from Hong Kong. Our general policy was to contain an incident; try to iron it out at the lowest possible level, starting with protocol officers; and move up the line only as required. Of course, we kept the embassy in Bonn and, if necessary, Washington informed each step of the way, but as long as they were satisfied with what we were doing, they did not micromanage incidents. In this instance following repeated representations, the culprit was released after two or three days.

Q: How about the Berlin Wall per se. I mean were there escapes around there? Were things pretty well sealed up in East Germany when you were there?

SELMANN: They were never totally sealed. Once in awhile there would be a spectacular escape into West Berlin of some sort, by balloon, or underwater across the demarcation line where it was a waterway, but that sort of thing had become more and more difficult. Escapes across the GDR’s non-wall boundaries were marginally easier. One of the interesting things in the Berlin agreement was that by inadvertence, when they divvied up Berlin into the four sectors, we did not immediately occupy Steinstucken, a little island village geographically detached from the rest of Berlin but administratively part of the American sector. Later we caught up with this lapse and helicoptered an MP detachment there to signify we regarded it as part of West Berlin. Subsequently, arrangements were made so that the postman, doctors, certain tradespeople, etc., could travel back and forth with special permits. The Berlin agreement provided for a corridor of access, which turned into a road-width extension of the wall.

BRANDON GROVE
Deputy Chief of Mission
East Berlin, GDR (1974-1976)
Brandon Grove Jr. was born in Chicago in 1929 and lived in Hamburg, Germany at the time of Hitler's rise to power. Before Germany invaded Poland, his father was transferred to Holland and later to Madrid in 1940. He attended Fordham University and later Bard College and Princeton University. His Foreign Service career took him to such places as the Ivory Coast, India, West Berlin, and Jerusalem as well as an ambassadorship to Zaire. Ambassador Grove was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1994.

On issues of policy and the bilateral relationship, Cooper did not intend to go further with the East Germans than Washington was willing to accept. But he had differences with State over tactics. Cooper did not appreciate guidance on how he should carry out his instructions. He felt tactics were his business, and I supported this view. Our relations with the State Department and embassy in the West German capital of Bonn were unavoidably sensitive and complicated. There was in Washington a certain awe of the politically prominent and respected Cooper, and concern that we in East Berlin might stray from the well trodden paths of Allied practices with initiatives of our own and cause trouble. As Cooper's deputy and the ranking foreign service officer, I felt the breath of Washington on the back of my neck more than anyone else. Because we had no serious substantive differences within the US government over East Germany, it was fairly easy to keep our embassy on a steady course.

The Western Allies, West Germans, and ourselves worked closely on Berlin issues. It was Bonn that carried the major share of dealing with the East Germans. Their interests were more numerous and immediate than anyone else's. This placed great importance on staying in close touch with our West German colleagues in Berlin, so we could give Washington well founded reporting on what they thought and did. Had there been malevolence, personal jealousies, lack of competence in any of the Allied embassies, or in the West German mission in East Berlin, we would have had serious problems. None of this happened.

The years of 1972 through 1979 were the Cold War's period of detente, or easing of tensions between the United States and Soviet Union. Detente occurred because it suited the interests of both powers at the same time. This thaw in the Cold War did not diminish any underlying antagonisms, but permitted a change in the quality of relations on the surface, as well as progress toward peace. Detente was the product of Kissinger's thinking, put into practice by Brezhnev and Nixon. It provided the Soviet economy a respite from defense spending and allowed its regime to focus on issues elsewhere, as in China and, to its eventual regret, Afghanistan. In East Berlin, the Soviets replaced Walter Ulbricht, an opponent of detente, by Erich Honecker in 1971.

Detente produced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the initially controversial Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) whose Final Act was signed in Helsinki in August of 1975. This agreement legitimized the post-war boundaries of Eastern Europe, but permitted a formal monitoring of the human rights of people in the region with benefits to us the Soviets had not anticipated and the West exploited. In their communiqué at the end of a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels in December, 1974 the ministers specified that success of detente in Europe was linked to implementation the 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
The joint space flight Apollo-Soyuz, in which spacecraft from the two superpowers docked in outer space in July, 1975 symbolized the benefits of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Berlin, where US and Soviet forces stood toe to toe, functioned as a barometer in the relationship. It came naturally to us who served there during detente to reflect and reinforce this newly changed atmosphere in our statements and diplomatic relationships.

The East German regime found itself left out of this process. They were not actors in detente, but spectators who must have felt uneasy about a shift in Cold War politics that warmed relations, at least superficially, between their protectors and ourselves. It is not too much to say that during this period Soviet Ambassador Piotr Abrasimov in East Berlin permitted a few visible rays of light to fall between himself and the GDR's party general secretary Erich Honecker. Abrasimov, for example, greeted Cooper warmly at public receptions, holding up the receiving line for all to notice.

Nowhere was diplomacy more intricate. With ourselves, the Soviets, and the GDR's leadership at each of three corners, diplomacy in Berlin was a continuing, subtly balanced process of triangulation. US interests had been driven by global considerations in the Cold War, our quadripartite treaty obligations, ties to our Western Allies and NATO, and the primacy of our relations with Bonn. The Soviets shared Cold War and treaty responsibilities, but had created the German Democratic Republic as a pseudo-sovereign, puppet entity in their zone of occupation, thereby greatly complicating the picture. The GDR's corner in the triangle was a largely powerless place for a pawn between the two antagonists, and a protégé of one of them. The regime, Berlin's diplomats, and even the general population watched with fascination as this temporary Cold War rapprochement between the two giants played itself out on the world scene and, more immediately, in the confrontational setting of Berlin itself. What would this lead to?

Ambassador Piotr Abrasimov had been assigned to East Berlin for more than ten years and was proud of the fact that he spoke no German. When we began to see him socially in 1974, he did not conceal his unhappiness at being kept so long in Berlin. He did not respect or like Germans, as his asides in conversation soon made obvious. This reflected a Soviet attitude Abrasimov, in the spirit of detente and social conviviality, felt he could impart to us, believing that as allies against the Germans in World War II, we would agree. We did not, but didn't say so. Triangulation, again.

Abrasimov and Cooper went out of their ways to develop a cordial relationship, and this proved quite easy to do. Cooper was not a naturally effusive person, but he and Abrasimov, also not effusive, soon warmed to each other. The Soviet deputy chief of mission was Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet foreign minister, who was posted to East Berlin shortly before my arrival. He was my counterpart in many discussions.

The Abrasimovs began to invite the Coopers, the Groves, and the Gromykos, Anatoly and Valya, to their residence for dinner. These were held in the private quarters upstairs, which were far more intimate than the cavernous and formal areas below. The furnishings bore a flavor of late 19th century European elegance in a faded, gilded, overstuffed way. Russians favored this style, which probably seemed imperial to them. Huge paintings from the school of Socialist Realism hung incongruously from the walls. Their building, covering an entire city block, served as
chancery and residence, and was of post-war construction. It had an intimidating exterior meant to underscore the authority of its occupants to one and all.

The Abrasimovs lived comfortably, as did the Gromykos. They had efficient household staffs, and all the food and liquor from West Berlin they might want. Dishes at their dinners were excellent, and the meals were served in elaborate courses, in the Russian fashion. Caviar seemed to come out of buckets. Their hospitality was generous and sincere. Kissinger allegedly said in Moscow, "I will do anything for caviar!" a weakness I have always understood.

The most festive occasion was the Abrasimovs' invitation to a dinner celebrating the Apollo-Soyuz docking in space on the day after the event itself, in mid-July of 1975. Eight of us sat down to a colorfully decorated table that might have been prepared for a birthday party, but here the theme was outer space and spacecrafts, not an easy one for the embassy's staff to grapple with. After all, how best to represent space? Anatoly Gromyko proposed we sign and exchange the typed menu cards, and we cheerfully did so. There was a hollow ring at times to the toasts and joviality, because the basic strains in US-Soviet relations, among them the Berlin wall a few meters away, remained unchanged, something we all recognized. Nevertheless, the corniness of the decorations and pride of our hosts in them, the elaborate plans to please American guests, were touching. Our moments of forced gaiety reminded me of well meant efforts to cheer up a sick patient. If occasionally our voices were too loud, these were the benefits and contradictions of detente.

I particularly recall Cooper's explanation of our 1976 elections to Abrasimov. We were at dinner one night during which the conversation turned to these elections. Cooper sat back and described the US and our democratic processes with great eloquence. In his soft voice and personal way, he talked about Somerset, Kentucky, where he was born, his experiences there as a judge, the political life and concerns of near-poor Pulaski County. He described elements of the 1976 elections: the personalities involved, the issues being debated. Abrasimov was captivated. He obviously had never heard a lucid explanation of our political system from someone deeply versed in that system. It was an extraordinary moment of outreach by Cooper. Abrasimov made no attempt to change the subject, but sat as engrossed as we all were around the table. It was a moving experience because Cooper found words that reached the souls of his listeners, among them three proud Americans.

This is what a good ambassador can do to explain his country, particularly in circumstances as difficult as East Berlin at the time. After a few halfhearted comparisons, Abrasimov gave up trying to praise the Soviet system. It was not that Cooper had made a convert of him; he hadn't. Rather, Abrasimov and even Gromyko had gained new insights and respect for the US in ways they had not expected.

We usually reported on such social affairs to Washington, although I doubt there is a record of this particular evening. None of us foresaw the consequences for communism in the late 1980s. We had few expectations of even modest change in that system. But there is always the first step in a long journey, and the change in tenor of our relationships in East Berlin during detente gave us small hope for a better future. Murderous incidents at the wall did not decrease; the US-Soviet relationship did not blossom into lasting friendship. But it was clear to us that Abrasimov had

Gromyko and I had a bantering relationship. He was a vain man, a Marxist ideologue conscious of his status as the son of the foreign minister. He was also loquacious, pompous, and a braggart. Anatoly was not so secret an admirer of the US: he regularly wore cowboy boots, which amazed me. Valya Gromyko was glamorous and westernized. She was his second wife, and had an engaging streak of rebelliousness. Valya liked to go to West Berlin occasionally with my wife, whose origins were Russian, to look at the latest fashions and buy perfume. She was flirtatious and a smooth dancer. I liked her.

Anatoly was not a person I could feel close to or trust. On occasion, we invited the Gromykos to our garden to grill hamburgers. When out of sight of his Soviet colleagues, Anatoly fancied himself an expatriate from, say, Chevy Chase, Maryland. He strutted around in his boots and loud sport shirts and spoke with an exaggerated American accent, believing himself to be truly one of the boys. He had a lot of exposure to the US and the western world, although nominally an expert on African affairs. There were always unstated limits to the closeness of our relationship. I saw Anatoly briefly a year after Berlin, on a trip to Moscow where he was director of the Soviet Africa Institute. I called on him at his office and brought a small present for Valya. Anatoly did not invite me to his home. We no longer had the give-and-take we developed in East Berlin, which was not surprising, based, as it was, on the convenience and opportunities of the moment.

**MARTEN VAN HEUVEN**

**Political Officer**

**Bonn (1978-1981)**

*Marten Van Heuven was born in the Netherlands in 1932. He received his BA and LLB from Yale University and his MIA from Columbia University. His positions abroad included Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn and Geneva. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on January 31, 2003.*

Q: Could you talk about the American-German relationship when you arrived in ’78? This is the Carter period still.

VAN HEUVEN: Going from The Hague to Bonn entailed a radical shifting of gears on my part. A little over a hundred miles is not a great distance, but the difference between the political worlds of The Hague and Bonn were vast. The optic in The Hague was narrow, somewhat inward looking. You could discuss till the cows came home the ins and outs of Dutch politics. Bonn brought me back to major issues of Europe on peace and security. From The Hague, the Soviet Union was light years away. In Bonn, the Soviet Union was almost in your living room. In Bonn, you were thinking about divided Germany, about European peace and security, and about how to deal with Soviet communism in Germany and beyond. Bonn was a wholly different setting and required a wholly different way of thinking. The American role in Germany and the American equities in Germany were comparable to the ones that I was familiar with in the Netherlands, though on a different scale. Most of the U.S. forces in Europe were stationed in
Germany. We had to worry about Berlin. We needed to keep a close eye on whether the German SPD would continue on the track of full support of the Atlantic alliance and partnership with the U.S. - although at the time partnership was not the word - or whether the latent tendency represented by certain people in the SPD to strike a deal with the East and neutralize Germany in exchange for reunification would gain the upper hand. It was not in our interest to see such an evolution. Later on, Dick Smyser and I spent a good bit of our time as political counselors watching carefully for indications that perhaps German policy might again go in a fundamentally different direction from the one that we had come to expect and rely on. Such a turn of policy was an option at the end of the war, until Adenauer made the choice between being neutral in the middle or being part of the West. That was the strategic backdrop against which virtually all our activities in Bonn, certainly mine, were taking place.

Q: The introduction of the SS20 was really designed to foster getting Germany to say “Let’s stop being a target and get out of the whole thing by being neutral,” wasn’t it? Wasn’t this where the whole SS20 pressure was put?

VAN HEUVEN: The SS20 issue brought to life again the old argument as to where Germany ought to be. We could anticipate that the Germans would do the right thing, but you could not be sure about that. So, whenever Egan Bahr, a foreign policy adviser to Brandt-

Q: He was sort of a Kissinger.

VAN HEUVEN: Well, he was Kissingerian in the sense that he was a realpolitiker and he understood how Germany might get what it wanted for itself in terms of dealing with this giant of the East, and also somehow with the Western powers, and the United States in particular. But the issue of the basic orientation of Germany was not seen in the same way by all Germans. On the side of the Christian Democrats, who were not in power at the time that I was in Bonn, there would have been little danger of Germany sliding away from the Western alliance. The combination of the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats looked reasonably sure. Certainly, with a man like Genscher from the Free Democrats as foreign minister, there seemed to be little danger of Germany going “neutral.” But with people like Bahr around, you could never be sure who was whispering what into whose ear. I don’t think Bahr had much influence on Schmidt. But he had a considerable influence on Brandt. Brandt was still alive. He had won a Nobel Peace Prize. These people had influence. They had their own contacts with the Soviets, the ability to make things happen. So, there were a lot of balls to keep your eye on in our embassy. Besides this and the nuclear defense issues, we were coping with the issue of the conditions under which U.S. forces were stationed in Germany. We felt that they needed better conditions, better barracks. The German barracks were better then ours. We were looking to the Germans for a large amount of the money to sustain our forces. I was personally saddled with a lot of those issues that involved difficult negotiations with the Defense Department and the German defense ministry, as well as with German politicians. Klaus von Dohnanyi, an SPD politician, had been put in charge of this whole issue by the chancellor’s office. His people were not always very helpful. They needed to interface with the Bundestag. In the end, it didn’t matter that much, but at the time this was a big ticket item and it was a big money ticket item.

Q: What were some of the political developments between the U.S. and Germany?
VAN HEUVEN: We faced the issue of Afghanistan. The Soviets had invaded Afghanistan. The Carter administration’s reaction, among other things, was to take the United States out of the Olympics scheduled for Moscow. We campaigned to persuade our friends to do likewise. We leaned heavily on the Germans to stay out of Moscow. We also leaned heavily on virtually everybody else. We were only partially successful. But it caused a gnashing of teeth that the U.S. was politicizing the Olympics. Our stock answer was that it wasn’t we who started politicizing it; if the Soviets had behaved themselves this problem would not exist. It was an unsatisfactory discussion. In the end, the American position, while I’m sure morally correct in the view of many, was not a very useful one as a matter of practical politics. It led to disappointment on the part of a great many athletes who had hoped to compete and, because of the inevitable passage of time, before the next Olympics, saw their last chance disappear.

Q: Where did the Germans fall on this? Did they go?

VAN HEUVEN: They did not. Schmidt felt that Germany had to support its American ally. This was a tough decision, because the British and French sent their athletes to Moscow.

Q: Was Germany beginning to assert itself within the European Community? Did you sense a change in Germany as far as here is this big power which has been keeping quite quiet over the years? Did you see a development there of beginning to play a bigger role on the world’s stage? Those are things that we might pick up next time.

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Today is March 14, 2003. We laid out a few things that you might want to comment on

VAN HEUVEN: I’ve had a chance to collect my memory in a somewhat more organized fashion. First, a personal observation about coming to the job in Bonn. At that point, it was clear to me that Germany had moved a long way, from the position of a defeated power, as I saw it from my vantage point in Berlin in the mid-’60s, to a major European country that was playing a growing role inside Europe and was beginning to make itself felt. The change was personified in the personality of Chancellor Schmidt, a knowledgeable, articulate, proud, and at times acerbic man who did not tolerate fools gladly and who, though he spoke perfect English, made it a habit of speaking to his visitors in German, which caused no problem for Ambassador Stoessel or those of us who were there around him. But I recall one day where the then relatively junior Senator Biden came to call and insisted on an appointment, and Schmidt played hard to get because he was chancellor and this was just one of many senators. When Biden did get the appointment there had to be an interpreter because Schmidt used German.

Before we get into details, I want to sketch the setting for the exercise of my job as political counselor. In 1978, there had been under way, for a decade or more, a process of detente, not just between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This rapprochement was set in motion by the American University speech of Kennedy in 1963. The governing mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, was also focused on improving relations. So we were at the beginning of some sort of coming together, in spite of the division of Germany. In the decade that followed, German attempts - particularly with mostly West German initiatives - to straddle the divide and pick up contacts and start to try and repair, despite the division, the fabric of relationships were well under way. The detente process took place both on a global scale as well as an inter-German scale. Washington officially
favored the inter-German discourse, but at the same time it was mistrustful that perhaps too much might be given away. The process also was not entirely transparent to us. So a considerable amount of activity and interest on our part was directed at being sure that we knew, if not all the details, then at least the main lines of what the West Germans were up to with the East Germans, and what the West Germans were up to with Moscow. This process of detente when I arrived in Bonn in ‘78 was actually about to run its course. It was coming to an end because of the Soviet plan to deploy SS20s, which would change the nuclear balance of power within Europe that deeply concerned Schmidt.

The Carter administration was slow in picking up this change in German attitude. The Carter administration, in fact, was somewhat bifurcated. Secretary Vance was in favor of detente and easier relations with the Soviet Union. The national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was mistrustful of the Soviet Union and he was not initially a friend of detente. He saw its downside. And his suspicions of anything that the Germans and the Russians might do were greater. These two views, existing within the administration, posed a problem for Schmidt. In the event, not getting much of a hearing in official Washington, Schmidt went public with his concerns in a speech in the middle of the Carter administration. From then on, the issue also became one for the Carter White House, namely, how to respond to this new threat by the Soviets. I might say, parenthetically, that it seemed that at the time even the Soviets had several views. Brezhnev was probably softer on Germany and on U.S. relations than Gromyko, who had been a hardliner throughout. But at that point Brezhnev was physically and in other respects close to the end of his tenure, so we were dealing with a Moscow that was speaking several voices and presenting different faces. Be that as it may, the SS20 issue was a difficult one. It brought into play the desire of those who were still interested in detente, both in Washington and in Bonn, against those who thought that this was upsetting the balance of power and needed a response. Ultimately, the NATO alliance managed with U.S. leadership and the participation of the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Britain, to adopt a plan for the stationing of Pershings and GLCMs, which were cruise missiles with a shorter range which could put Moscow at risk. That in turn scared the Russians and that in turn led - way beyond my time in Bonn - to the deal that eliminated the Soviet threat. The SS20 issue was a difficult one for Schmidt. In the end, it produced a lot of domestic opposition to this decision on the part of his own party and the Greens, who were growing at the time. Ultimately, it was one of the reasons that led to his unseating by Helmut Kohl.

Q: Were you in Germany when the SS20s were introduced?

VAN HEUVEN: The SS20s were introduced on the other side by the Russians and they were being deployed.

Q: It was seen from our embassy in Bonn and throughout Europe as, this was a change in the whole thing. As soon as the SS20s were introduced, was this portrayed by the Soviets and others as changing the balance of power in Europe?

VAN HEUVEN: It was more of a gradual process. There is still speculation on what might have been the Soviet motives. It may have had less to do with specific policy with respect to the balance with Germany. It might have been viewed by them as just a regular weapons upgrade. It might have been seen by them as a general beefing up of the nuclear part of their forces. Whatever it was, the arrival of these weapons threatened to change the strategic balance within
Europe. The global balance of power of course had already changed somewhat and everybody had got used to it. The Soviets had a major intercontinental nuclear capacity, as did we. Of course, on the ground the Soviets had huge superiority in conventional forces. Western strategy was that our nuclear forces would offset that conventional superiority and produce certain balance. But when the Soviets started introducing nuclear weapons that pretty much could cover all of Western Europe, and we did not have all that much in our arsenal in Europe to respond; it was regarded as a change in the balance. The Schmidt speech at the IISS triggered the debate on that.

Q: How about the neutron bomb episode and Carter-Schmidt on that?

VAN HEUVEN: The neutron bomb decision was another event that caused difficulties between Carter and Schmidt. The idea of the bomb had been around for a while. The wish of the U.S. Army to proceed with it became controversial after the documents that treated this subject were leaked to the press. A number of Europeans, including some Americans, also recoiled in horror at what some in Europe called “the capitalist weapon,” because it killed people and did not damage things. It was regarded by a lot of people as something basically dangerous and unsettling, and so it was controversial. Schmidt put his political equities on the line to support the Carter White House in favor of the neutron bomb. So, when the President suddenly, and without warning, canceled the weapon, Schmidt felt that he had been stabbed in the back. The episode confirmed his view of Carter as an unreliable person. So, the relationship between those two deteriorated further.

NELSON C. LEDSKY

Minister/Deputy Commandant

West Berlin (1981-1985)

Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department’ Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

Q: While holding out for these vestiges, were we beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel, i.e., an end to an arrangement that had been in effect for forty years? Could you see any signs that “normalization” was foreseeable?

LEDSKY: It is a hard question. I don’t think that in the mid-1980s anyone had any idea how the Berlin situation or the German one in general would be resolved. None of us had any idea when or how the allied responsibilities for Berlin would end and how the functions that we were still controlling might be terminated. I don’t think, in fact, that much thought was being given in Berlin, Bonn, Washington, London, or Paris to how to end the occupation. There may be people
who today will take credit for having thought and seen the eventual outcome, but if they did in fact exist, we certainly never heard of them.

There were discussions about specific functions. I mentioned Spandau, which was an obvious issue as the prison population decreased from half a dozen to three and then one. Obviously, the idea of closing Spandau was considered at various times. Some worried about what might happen if Hess died: would we continue to maintain the prison, which then would have held no one. So there were discussions about individual functions, but no one that I am aware of was tackling the larger question of a final solution to a divided city and two Germanies. We had no answer to this fundamental issue and that is why I felt very strongly that our vestigial responsibilities had to be maintained, lest our bargaining power be completely or essentially eroded.

I should add that at least on the U.S. side, there was a recognition that change would take place sometime. Nobody knew how to bring the fissure to a close, but we all knew that it would. I thought that the occupation would end at some point and that somehow the Wall would come down. I didn’t know when or how; neither did anyone else, but we were certain that major changes would occur. There was no question that the Wall was arbitrary, capricious, and artificial. It was not only inhumane, but it was also clearly a barrier that could not be permanent. It separated a city which historically had been one entity; it was grotesque and a symbol of dictatorial power and would eventually be torn down. No one was sufficiently prescient to even suggest a possible scenario for its demise. I think most people did not see any change in the short and medium time frames; and therefore, no one was planning for that eventuality.

Q: You have mentioned the missile issue on several occasions. Tell us more about that.

LEDSKY: This not a Berlin-centered issue. We were really tangential. The question being debated was whether to place medium-range missiles in the center of Europe, i.e., West Germany. Most Germans were against it. NATO, pushed by the U.S., insisted that it be done. The Americans believed that the missiles would serve as a deterrent, particularly since the Soviets had placed similar weaponry in some Eastern European Warsaw-Pact countries. They were targeted on West Germany. The issue became a major political controversy among the German political parties. It got to be seen as a test of West German adherence to the western alliance because NATO – pushed by the U.S. – wanted it. In the final analysis, the West German government stood by the alliance. I think that in Berlin, the population was overwhelming opposed to it. We had major anti-missile demonstrations while I served in Berlin. It was “Down with the rockets” or “Down with the Americans”. The demonstrators were quite vocal about their anti-Americanism. I spent a lot of time on the stump defending our position, as did a number of my staff members.

Q: Did this anti-Americanism become more virulent during your four years in Berlin?

LEDSKY: I would say so. There was an increasing animus during my tour, certainly if compared to earlier periods. It was largely related to the missile issue. It was not sparked by anything we did in Berlin. Berliners, like most West Germans, were just opposed to the deployment of missiles on their territory. They felt that Ronald Reagan was leading the U.S. in the wrong direction. On the other hand, Berlin had been and increasingly became the center of left-wing
attitudes. The Berlin Social Democrats were quite far to the left and anti-American. Berlin University was the center of student radicalism – had been and was in the mid 1980s.

I should add that although, as I said, anti-Americanism was quite strong during my tour, by the end of it, it began to subside. It reached its peak in the 1982-83 period. During the first Reagan visit, we were very concerned about presidential security and large demonstrations. By the summer of 1985, the missile debate was over; they were going to be deployed onto West German territory. Furthermore, the conservatives had made a major come-back in Berlin; Weizsacker was elected as mayor. The Social Democrats were essentially replaced in office; their influence waned considerably.

I should also mention that the new city administration was instrumental in raising the level of services to the Berliners. When I first arrived, there was a major problem with squatters. While it was never completely solved during my tour, by 1985 it had been alleviated considerably and solutions were being developed.

Q: You saw the Soviet representatives periodically. What were your impressions?

LEDSKY: I was able to establish and maintain a good relationship with the DCM of the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, as well as with one or two others staffers in that embassy. We held a series of meetings between our ambassador, Arthur Burns, and the Soviet ambassador to the GDR – there were a couple of them during my tour. The Soviets were much more accommodating by 1985 than they had been in 1981, or since the Berlin blockade. In general, they were very friendly. They did not act menacingly at all; they seemed to be trying their best to be cooperative. They appeared to be almost as concerned about their client state, the GDR, as they were about the west. They showed considerable worry about the nature of the GDR regime; it did not seem to be working up to their expectations. They worried that the East Germans would find the west increasingly appealing. They also indicated a hope that the U.S. and the USSR return to their WW II alliance.

were concerned about and strongly opposed to the deployment of the medium-range missiles, but that did not affect my personal relationships with Soviet officials. I think others in Berlin had the same experience. The mid-1980s was a period of increasing U.S.-USSR cooperation, i.e., detente.

Q: How would you describe your relations with the embassy in Bonn?

LEDSKY: Actually, I think our relationship with Bonn was quite good. There were several “Nelson Ledskys” in Bonn, i.e., officers who followed Berlin affairs as I had done seven years earlier. Ambassador Arthur Burns followed Berlin affairs closely, as did DCM Bill Western and the political counselors. Of course, as had been true historically, there was some tension between the embassy and the Berlin mission. Burns had a steep learning curve regarding Berlin. He did know the long history that had preceded his arrival and I am sure was puzzled by some of the practices that had developed or the necessity for keeping them going, as I have discussed earlier. He was very perceptive; his thought processes were direct and unambiguous. That undoubtedly created intellectual problems for him; I am sure that he never fully understood why the allies were continuing practices that he probably viewed as passé. He would challenge me and our staff on many issues; we may not have satisfied him with our answers every time, but we had a good
relationship. He was not only a good ambassador; he was also a wonderful person and we got along extremely well. I almost came to enjoy the Saturday morning seminars, which he would hold when he came to Berlin. These were serious sessions with Burns posing a lot of tough issues. He would come about once a month and stay for a few days.

As I said, I don’t think he ever fully understood what we were trying to achieve in Berlin. However, he was very interested in his position in the city. When we told him what his functions were in this quadripartite setting, he began to be attached to it. He was anxious to meet with the Soviet ambassador; he wanted to drive around East Berlin; he wanted to host social events in East Berlin, in part to meet GDR representatives. He was not too happy to have an American embassy in East Berlin, even though his jurisdiction did not overlap with that of our ambassador to the GDR. He always defended our Berlin practices and policies in any dispute with our embassy in East Berlin. The concept that he had a role to play in East Berlin appealed to him. There were times when we had to caution him to pull back in disputes with Ambassador Ridgway. In truth, I don’t think there was much love lost between the two.

Our relationship with Bonn was actually quite good. I would visit the embassy periodically, seeing the ambassador, the DCM, the political counselor and staff. That was a change from earlier years, when a visit to Bonn by our minister in Berlin was a rare thing. But Burns, for example, wanted me to attend his monthly staff meeting; I could not do that every time, but I did try to get to Bonn at least once every two months and sometimes more frequently than that. I think it is fair to say that I was probably closer to the Bonn embassy than most, if not all, of my predecessors. They did go to the embassy, but not as frequently as I did. As I mentioned before, the mission’s expenses, except the salaries of the Americans, were paid by the Germans under an “occupation costs” budget. As a result, my travels were at no cost to the American taxpayers. So, as the embassy’s budget became more limited, my travel to Bonn was an obvious way to accomplish a necessary task at no charge to that budget. That principle soon applied also to conferences that were being held around West Germany. The ambassador or the DCM would send me because it saved the embassy money. This whole budget process was one of the many anomalies which had developed after WWII, when the “occupation costs” theory was implemented.

Q: It was the only situation in the world in which an ambassador and the embassy’s administrative staff controlled expenditures made by a U.S. military establishment.

Do you have any final thoughts on your tour as U.S. Minister in Berlin?

LEDISKY: Let me say that I instituted a couple of new processes in Berlin, which were unique and unprecedented. For one, I tried to establish and maintain good relations with Berlin’s representatives in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, the two chambers of the German Parliament. These were elected officials and as the 1980s progressed, it became evident that the Berlin representatives were becoming powers in West Germany political circles. That was a new development and spurred me to initiate and maintain good relationships with these people. I think I succeeded in that with members of both parties, the SDP and CDU, during my four years in Berlin.

I think I also established a relationship with Weizsacker, who was the mayor of Berlin when I got to Berlin, and who eventually became the president of the FRG. We got along extremely
well, in part because I was willing to stand up to him and in part because he was very pro-American and very much attuned to the Republican party’s approaches to policies and politics. The two of us traveled to Washington on a couple of occasions while he was the mayor; we made the rounds of the political arena. I don’t think any of my predecessors did that with the mayors who were in office during their tours as ministers.

We established an American businessmen’s group in Berlin to promote U.S. investments and business activities in the city. In fact, the American business community had begun to retreat from Berlin starting in the early 1980s. More and more of the American firms had replaced their American leadership with Germans and several of them had left Berlin completely. So, I spent a lot of time working with American businessmen to reverse these trends and to expand their presence in the city. We founded a U.S. business council to assist in these efforts. Many of the members were Germans working for American companies. We worked hard on encouraging further American investments in the city. Ford built new facilities. Gillette, which had had a presence in the early 1960s, renewed and enlarged its presence. I think these efforts had a lasting impact; they made sense – economically for the companies and politically for us. The city cooperated readily with us; it had always had a practice of extending subsidies to foreign companies investing in Berlin. Over time, in some cases, that meant maintaining a minimal company presence in Berlin to take advantage of the subsidy, but to move many of the operations out of the city, where the costs were lower. That is what we tried to reverse – that trend – so that American companies would stay and expand their operations in Berlin.

That is another example of the challenges that our office in Berlin faced, which would not arise in any other subsidiary post. Berlin was unique. I felt that it was important to keep and, hopefully, enlarge an American economic presence in Berlin to support our position in the city, both from the American business community and the Germans. In fact, it was the American business community, both in the U.S. and in West Germany that would often take up our cause and defend the U.S. position on Berlin issues.

Q: What was the Berlin situation in 1981 because this was always a city of tension between East and West?

PERINA: The situation calmed considerably after the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971, which to a large degree stabilized the way the four allies interacted. There were still big differences in our interpretations of the Agreement and the status of Berlin, however. The whole theology of Berlin was extremely complicated. For example, we considered East Berlin still the Soviet zone of occupied Berlin. However, the Soviets had accepted it as part of the GDR (German Democratic Republic) and the capital of East Germany. So we had completely different views on the status of East Berlin, which had real consequences for actions in many areas. For example, when we traveled to East Berlin, we always insisted on being checked by Soviet officials, not by East German officials, because we did not recognize East German sovereignty in East Berlin. If we had any problems in East Berlin, we complained to the Soviets and not to the East Germans. The GDR officials, on the other hand, wanted to make the point that this was now their capital, the capital of the GDR. So a complicated procedure was developed as a type of modus vivendi for dealing with all these differing viewpoints. Thus, when we crossed from West to East Berlin via Checkpoint Charlie, we would have these cards that we would show through the car window to GDR guards, but we would always keep the windows closed and not speak with the guards. If
there were any problems, we complained to the Soviets. The East Germans came to accept this but were always pushing the envelope in one way or another. These kinds of practical arrangements were developed to cope in practical ways with all the contradictions of the situation. Berlin was full of this kind of theology.

There were similarly complex procedures related to road corridors to West Germany and the air corridors for air traffic. But by and large, the major crises of Berlin had passed by 1981. It was still probably the city with more espionage going on per square mile than in any other city in Europe simply because it was so easy for each of the four occupying powers—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the UK and France—as well as the East and West Germans to spy on one another. Each of the occupying powers had virtual sovereignty in their sector so they could do anything: control the police, control the phone network, build radio towers, etc. They were basically the law. So there was a lot of eavesdropping, everybody listening to everybody else and so on. But overall, the situation was stable compared to years past.

Q: You were there from 1981 to 1985?

PERINA: Yes, for four years. I had two different jobs in that period. The first was called the Protocol Officer job but it was actually the job of being the liaison with the Soviets on Berlin matters. This made sense because I had just come from Moscow, knew Russian and so on. I had a counterpart in the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin who dealt with me on Berlin matters. But I did not deal with the East Germans in any way because we had by that time opened a U.S. Embassy in East Berlin. Since we saw East Berlin as the Soviet sector of occupied Berlin and not as the capital of the GDR, the phrase we used was to say that our Embassy was “to the GDR but not in the GDR.” Obviously, there was a lot of convoluted theology here but it brought stability to the city and to the relationship between the two Germanys. And it was not just the U.S. that compromised but the Soviets and East Germans had to as well. A lot of their practical actions were also inconsistent with the positions of principle they espoused.

Q: What sorts of issues did you talk about with the Soviets?

PERINA: We would talk about all issues that came up related to Berlin. The Soviets really had an inconsistency to deal with because they wanted to have their cake and eat it also. They wanted to support the position of their ally the GDR but also still be regarded as one of four occupying powers of Berlin that had special privileges in West Berlin, such as access, a role in quadripartite discussions and so on. So they supported the GDR publicly but not always privately. A lot of things I talked about with my Soviet counterpart consisted of problems caused by the GDR—impeding our access to East Berlin via Checkpoint Charlie, causing problems through new restrictions on the air or road corridors to West Berlin and so on. The Soviets would usually say that it was none of their business and that we had to talk to the GDR, but then they would go ahead and help resolve the problem by bringing the East Germans into line. It was a continual tug of war. There was also another category of problems I dealt with, and those were problems caused by the Soviets in West Berlin. We recognized privileged Soviet access to West Berlin because this stemmed from our interpretation of Berlin’s status and we wanted the same privileges in East Berlin but of course we kept a close watch on them when they came. The problems that arose varied from drunken Soviet soldiers getting into bar fights to clear cases of
attempted espionage by Soviet personnel from East Berlin. I remember one instance where I had to call my counterpart in the middle of the night, and we expelled two Soviet military officers for attempted espionage. They were caught red-handed trying to buy information from U.S. military personnel. In these cases, we would turn them over to Soviet authorities with a protest, and the Soviets would give a pro forma protest in return. We would not arrest them because we did recognize a type of diplomatic immunity for all occupying powers in all of Berlin, so we just kicked them out of the Western sectors. Toward the end of my time, we had another kind of incident—Polish hijackings of aircraft to West Berlin. They became a favorite way for Poles to escape from Poland, and we must have had six or seven toward the end of my Berlin tour.

Q: Was this a result of martial law in Poland?

PERINA: Yes, the country was moving toward martial law, and a lot of Poles were trying to get out because they saw a big crackdown coming. One of the favorite ways to escape was to hijack a plane and fly to West Berlin where they would land at Tempelhof airport and become our responsibility because it was in the U.S. sector. The distance from Poland to West Berlin was very short, and for Poles it was the closest thing to reaching American custody and protection. We had a number of these, mostly commercial airliners from LOT but also private planes, crop dusters and so on. We soon had a set routine of dealing with them. We would hold the crew and passengers overnight and question them, giving everyone the option of staying in the West or returning to Poland. We made a point of always punishing the hijacker or hijackers because we didn't want to condone hijacking, but they were handed over to German courts and often received fairly light sentences, though these did usually include imprisonment. There was an internal debate we had after the first hijacking on whether the hijackers should be tried by us, by the Americans, in courts that we establish. This was consistent with our position on the rights of the occupying powers but in practice promised to be extremely complicated. We would have had to set up a court, fly in judges, and so on. In the end, we decided it was easier to hand the hijackers over to the Germans for punishment. But the punishment was light enough that hijackers kept coming, and the Polish authorities were very frustrated by their inability to stop this. They started putting undercover air marshals on LOT flights, sometimes several on a flight, and usually the air marshals themselves were very tempted to stay in the West, if only because they were in big trouble for allowing the hijacking to happen.

There were many emotional experiences at these all-night sessions with people who suddenly found themselves in the West and faced the unexpected decision of whether to stay or go back to Poland. These were ordinary Poles who happened to be on the airplane but once they were in our sector, they knew that if they chose to stay we would allow them to do so. Sometimes you could see families debating through the night what to do because it was clearly a momentous life decision. Quite a few chose to stay, though I do not have the statistics. This was primarily on the commercial flights that came in. We also had some hijackings by people who would take crop dusters or similar small aircraft and just fly out. One fellow got an old plane somewhere, painted red stars on it so that it wouldn't be shot down, and used a roadmap to find Berlin, flying just several hundred feet above the road. The ingenuity was amazing.

One interesting thing in my dealings with the Soviets that I forgot to mention consisted of visits to their Embassy in East Berlin. The Embassy was and remains still this huge building on the
famous avenue Unter den Linden. Once my Soviet counterpart gave me a tour of the building, starting with an enormous marble staircase in the lobby. He asked me: “Do you know where that marble comes from?” I said, “No.” He said, “Well, that is marble that Hitler was taking to Moscow to build a monument celebrating his victory over the Soviet Union. We brought it back here and made it into the staircase of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.” I don't know if that's an apocryphal story or not. It sounds apocryphal, but it’s also very Soviet. There was also a chair in a reception room on the second floor where some visitors were taken. It was an old leather chair, and he told me to sit in it and asked, “Do you know what chair that is?” And I said, “No.” He said, “Well, that was Hitler's favorite chair from the Reichskanzlei.” I mean, a lot of people would not be proud to have Hitler's chair or to put you into Hitler's chair but clearly the Soviets took pride in this, an ever present reminder of how they had beaten the Nazis.

Q: Did you get any sense from the diplomats you dealt with that things were beginning to loosen up in the Soviet Union?

PERINA: Not really, and the developments in Poland suggested the opposite. But one thing that I began to perceive and that really became apparent in my next assignment at NATO was how very scared the Soviets were becoming of American technological know-how, and particularly of SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). This was about the time that SDI was coming into the news as part of Reagan's plan to make nuclear weapons obsolete. It was, of course, very controversial, with much debate on whether it was really possible to build a shield against nuclear attack that would take away the threat of nuclear war. But I can tell you that the Soviets I dealt with took it very seriously and seemed very concerned about getting into a high-tech competition with the United States. The glory of the Sputnik was long past, the computer age was beginning, and the Soviets sensed that they were very far behind. They also realized that their strength as a world power came from possession of nuclear weapons, and not from their GDP or anything else. Without the clout of nuclear weapons, they would be in big trouble, and they realized this. Already in Berlin my Soviet counterpart would turn social conversations to SDI and try to argue why the U.S. should abandon the effort. Since neither of us had any responsibility for this issue, it was clear to me that his comments came from generic talking points that all Soviet diplomats had been instructed to use whenever possible.

This was, of course, within the context of the big debate in Germany about NATO deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons (INF) to counter the SS-20 missiles deployed by the Soviets. It was a huge controversy during my time in Germany because there was much European opposition. When President Reagan visited Berlin while I was there, we had huge demonstrations against him by Germans opposed to INF deployment. So these nuclear issues were very much on the table during this period, and while East-West relations were stable in Berlin, there was a lot of tension in the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Q: Did you have problems with American soldiers getting loose in the Eastern zone and getting into trouble?

PERINA: Well there were incidents like this, but fewer than one would imagine because of fairly strict regulations on U.S. soldiers going to East Berlin. I don’t recall any specific protests from the Soviets of this nature. By and large, our military was quite disciplined and responsible, and
there were far more opportunities to get into trouble in West Berlin without the need to cross into the East.

Q: Who was the American Ambassador at this time?

PERINA: It was Arthur Burns, our Ambassador in Bonn. He had two hats. He was our Ambassador to the FRG in Bonn, but he was also the head of the U.S. Mission to West Berlin. So he also had two Soviet counterparts—the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn and the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin on Berlin issues. There was a tradition that every six months there was a lunch on Berlin issues between the U.S. Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador. Because I was the working-level liaison to the Soviets on these issues, and because I knew Russian, I was asked shortly after my arrival to serve as the U.S. interpreter at one such lunch, and I ended up doing it for my entire time in Berlin. In fact, once I was even asked to fly to Bonn and interpret at a lunch that Ambassador Burns had with his Russian counterpart in Bonn. But usually I interpreted at the Berlin lunches, which alternated between East and West Berlin. The way it worked was that both Ambassadors brought an interpreter, and the Russian fellow interpreted English into Russian and I did Russian into English. This was easiest for both of us because neither I nor the Russian, I think, were professional interpreters. But it worked well and allowed me to participate at all the lunches.

The first Soviet Ambassador for whom I interpreted was Piotr Abrassimov, who was a Berlin institution. He was a very senior Soviet Ambassador, an expert on Berlin who had negotiated the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement. After he departed, he was replaced in East Berlin by Vyacheslav Kochemasov, a less influential Ambassador for whom I also interpreted at these lunches. The lunches were fun to do, although I learned that interpreters rarely get a chance to eat and should not even try. The amazing thing about the lunches, however, was how little substance was actually discussed between the two Ambassadors. To be sure, there were always a few points that we wanted Arthur Burns to raise, and the Soviets would have their counterpoints if we raised our points, but by and large the lunches were social events. This was perhaps a reflection of how stable the situation around Berlin had become.

THOMAS F. JOHNSON
Consul/Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Frankfurt (1984-1988)

Born in Illinois and raised in the Mid-West and New York State, Thomas of Johnson entered the Foreign Service in 1967. He served in Paraguay, Germany, Liberia, Mexico, and Singapore. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

A bomb in the parking lot of the base headquarters at Rhein-Main Airbase killed two and injured several. The device completely demolished a car and dug a hole a foot deep in the macadam. I spend most of that day shepherding TV camera teams through the blast area.
During the mid-80s wounded Afghans were flown to Rhein Main Air Base and treated in German hospitals. I would have liked to have publicized the humanitarian relief effort which our Air Force supported, however it was decided to keep a low profile on the operation. In retrospect, I wish we had gone public on the plight of the wounded Afghans.

One morning an officer at Rhein Main Air Base called me with the startling news, “We have found poisonous gas on base.”

“I will be right out,” I replied.

“Don’t hurry, its German gas,” he chimed in cheerfully.

“That’s worse,” I continued. “I am on my way.”

“Take your time it has probably been here since 1918,” he said reassuringly.

“1918?” I asked now totally confused.

It seems that at the end of the First World War some German soldiers did not want to be bothered with the paperwork of turning in a quantity of artillery shells containing mustard gas and so they buried it at the edge of their base which once occupied land that later was part of the Rhein Main Air Base. Nearly 70 years later the shells had corroded sufficiently to allow enough gas to escape that someone noticed the smell and the dead grass. The Consulate General and the Air Force decided that the gas was still German property and thus the Bundeswehr was called in to remove it along with contaminated soil. Only a short article appeared in the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. Had the US Army taken the lead in digging up the shells, it is likely that some German reporters would have falsely linked the gas to our stores of aging chemical weapons.

While we are on the subject of poisonous gas, in 1987 or ’88 the United States and Soviet Union finally agreed to destroy their chemical weapons. German peace activists had been campaigning for years for the US to get its chemical weapons out of Germany. As I recall, nearly all the shells and bombs were stored at a depot outside Fischbach, a town in the western Rheinland-Pfalz. Because of both technical and logistical problems poisonous gas was no longer regarded by our military planners as a very useful military option. Many of the warheads were older than the GIs assigned to fire them. Like nuclear weapons systems, chemical weapons were more a political tool than a military weapon. When we secretly removed the chemical weapons from Fischbach, the Germans were dismayed that the US Army announced the closure of the facility and job cuts among German staff. Fischbach was so typical of our civil-military relations in the FRG. The Germans wanted our forces to vacate facilities, particularly those in the town centers, and yet maintain the same level of employment of the German work force. In 1985 the US military was the second largest employer in West Germany. Only the bloated bureaucracy of the Bundespost (postal system) handed out more paychecks.

During my tenure in Frankfurt I helped our military deal with journalists covering the release of several groups of hostages from the Middle East, including a cruise ship and some commercial flights. The Rhein Main Air Base and the Consulate General worked out a well-rehearsed scenario for moving hostages and the press while balancing the right of the hostages to privacy and the right of the media to coverage. In most cases USAF buses moved the hostages to military
hospitals in either Wiesbaden or Frankfurt. Late one dreary night I was standing with a group of reporters waiting for plane to come with several former hostages when I heard a report say to no one in particular, “Being a foreign correspondent is like being a maitre d’ in a fine restaurant. You get to meet so many famous people under such humiliating circumstances.”

Washington of course got involved in receiving and processing the hostages. The response teams from State and Department of Defense included a brash Public Affairs Advisor who I crossed swords with on several occasions. While acknowledging the legitimate role of Washington in dealing with the press, I was not about to give up my role as the public affairs representative of USIA Germany.

On February 11, 1986 the Soviet dissident Anatoly Sharansky walked across the Glienicke Bridge from Potsdam to West Berlin to freedom. Ambassador Richard Burt met him half way across the span and led him to a limo which sped him to a waiting aircraft that flew him to Rhein Main Air Base, where he was reunited with his wife. Although I don’t believe we told the press, the release was actually a prisoner swap: one Russian dissident for two Czech spies. The venerable Frank Meehan, our ambassador in East Berlin, was instrumental in making arrangements for the swap. The Czech spies Karl and Hanna Koecher, naturalized US citizens, had been flown to Rhein Main Air Base the day and before were being held in the base stockade (jail) until Sharansky landed in Frankfurt. Karl had been a translator and analyst at the CIA. Hanna had been his very willing assistant in the conspiracy. At the last minute Hanna, indignant regarding the quality of her accommodations on base, balked. Bill Bodde, who was not about to let anyone ruin the swap, was ready with Plan B. He had the consular officer, whose role it was to take the oaths from the spies renouncing their US citizenship, place a call to a prominent attorney in East Berlin who spoke to Hanna convincingly. (Italics mine) According to Bill, the Czechs “meekly renounced their citizenship.”

Q: Did the media know about the swap?

JOHNSON: I don’t know. Swaps were almost routine during the cold war, so had they gotten wind of it, I doubt it would have been much of a story. Anatoly Sharansky was such an important figure that the release of the Czechs was a tiny footnote to a very dramatic story.

Q: What was your impression of the level of political sophistication among your military counterparts?

JOHNSON: As I think I said earlier in the interview, Army and Air Force officers were very cautious in dealing with political issues. Most of the flag grade officers (generals) had attended a civilian graduate school or the National War College, which exposed them to geo-political problems in a substantive manner. LTG Sam Wetzel was the V Corps commander when I arrived in Frankfurt. Wetzel spoke fair German and had excellent contacts in Frankfurt. He was replaced by Colin Powell, who had just served for several years as Deputy National Security Advisor to the President. I attended Powell’s change of command ceremony at V Corps HQ. Powell opened his remarks with a short pep talk to the troops and then he said, “Now I would like to say a few words to our German hosts.” He spoke for about ten or fifteen minutes in excellent German. I was sitting between the mayors of Giessen and Marburg, both of whom were greatly impressed by Powell’s command of German and the sincerity of his remarks. Unfortunately after about six months at V Corps, Powell was recalled to the White House. When he left Frankfurt he told Bill
Bodde and me that he thought his military career was over. Of course he got his fourth star while he was Reagan’s last National Security Adviser. When he became Secretary of State he brought to that position a genuine concern for the welfare of his subordinates.

Incidentally in 2004 I was talking to Secretary Powell in the State Department and I reminded him of his change of command ceremony in Frankfurt. I asked him if he still spoke German. He replied that he regretted that he had been so busy in the intervening years that his command of the language had deteriorated badly.

**Q: How about the Air Force officers?**

**JOHNSON:** The highest ranking Air Force officers in the consular district were colonels. They were very competent and eager to work with us at the Consulate General. Overall the Air Force had fewer problems with the Germans than the Army.

**Q: Why?**

**JOHNSON:** There were many reasons. The Air Force had fewer facilities and none of their bases were in cities, although some, such as Wiesbaden and Frankfurt, were on the outskirts of major cities. Except for low flying airplanes, Germans had few complaints about the USAF. On the other hand, slow moving Army convoys often disrupted highway traffic. Soldiers were much more likely to get into trouble with the police than airmen. Maneuvers caused considerable damage to farm land and roads.

Sometimes the Army would do dumb things. For example, every time there was a ceremony on the lawn of V Corps HQ, the Army fired off 75 mm pack howitzers which rattled the windows of German apartments all around the base and set off car alarms. I suggested that the Army reduce the noise by cutting back on the amount of gun powder in blank shells. No, I was informed, tradition called for a loud report.

If I may return to aircraft noise one day I was driving along a winding country road in the Pfalz when I had a premonition of an emergency. Just as I gripped the steering wheel of my car, two fighter bombers roared over me literally at treetop level. My window was open and I swear I could feel the exhaust. I pulled off the road. I was shaking. German villages were routinely subjected to simulated attacks by US, German and Canadian fighter bombers. It was a price that Germans paid for being in the front line of the cold war.

**Q: Did the advent of simulators lessen the intrusiveness of the military on the civilian population?**

**JOHNSON:** Good question. Yes and no. I think what simulators did was to increase the amount of realistic training that could be accomplished indoors more than diminish training outdoors. For example, pilots continued to fly low level missions along Germany’s roads and valleys while at the same time spending additional hours in flight simulators. Tankers honed their skills between live firing exercises on simulators. The percentage of tankers who qualified as “expert” increased by more than 50% thanks to the practice on simulators. Pilots told me they were more confident flyers and more accurate bombers because of the time they spent on simulators. Many of the younger soldiers and flyers grew up on computer games, which allowed them to readily adapt to simulator training.
Q: Did the German and American military public affairs officers cooperate well?

JOHNSON: The Germans PAOs were very eager to work with their US counterparts and the Americans were equally intent on collaborating with the Germans. Because of the lack of language training provided the American officers, the dialogue was almost always carried out in English. I organized quarterly meetings at the Amerika Haus of German and American military public affairs officers. The Consul General, embassy officers and political scientists spoke at the gathering to which I also invited German Army Jugendoffiziere (Youth Officers) who specialized in community outreach to youthful audiences. Most Jugendoffiziere were first lieutenants and captains. I developed a very cordial relationship with the Jugendoffiziere and often invited them to programs at the Amerika Haus and to social occasions at my home.

Before we leave the subject of civil-military affairs, I want to state that it was a great pleasure to work with the US and German officers. In retrospect I think it is clear that the US armed forces and our allies successfully deterred the Soviets from temptation to embark on military expansion. Meanwhile the political and economic system, upon which the Soviet Union and the other East Block nations was based, decayed until the USSR collapsed and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. I don’t want to sound hawkish- quite the contrary. I believe in the long run, I contend ideals and not weaponry determined the outcome of the Cold War.

Q: What was the press like?

JOHNSON: Germany had two state owned television networks. One was in Mainz, which was very near Frankfurt. I had good access to it because I was friends with an anchorman of an evening TV newscasts. We had studied journalism at the same time at the Free University. Through him I was able to get the network to participate in a number of USIA WorldNets, a major coup for the Agency. My work with the network also reunited me with a friend from Prague, who had left his homeland in 1968 and had become a successful producer of documentaries.

Germany’s leading conservative newspaper was the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ) and the country’s most influential left of center newspaper was the Frankfurter Rundschau, so I spent a lot of time with both of them. The head of the America desk at the Frankfurter Allgemeine, and I continue to be very good friends. He’s now in Berlin where he is a senior editor for a German radio network. The conservative tabloid Bildzeitung and the left of center Rundschau were printed on the same presses.

Germans sometimes complained that the FAZ, particularly the economic reporting, was tedious. An editor told me that the publisher of the New York Times had stormed into the office of one the daily’s columnists and declared, “I have read your piece five times and I still don’t understand it.”

The learned journalist looked up from his desk and said, “I wrote that column for six people and you are not one of them.”

“The same can occasionally be said for our writing at the FAZ,” remarked the editor.

I developed excellent ties to Hessen Radio (HR), which incidentally was housed in a suspiciously round building, which had been constructed after WW II to house the Bundestag,
the German parliament. However Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war chancellor, vetoed Frankfurt, a bastion of the Social Democrats, as the capital. He did not want to give up his rose garden nor be too far from Cologne where he had been Lord Mayor before being ousted by the Nazis, thus the quiet university town of Bonn became West Germany’s capital.

One of the senior reporters at Hessen Radio became a close friend. He was active in the American Field Service student exchange program and founded the partnership between Hessen and Wisconsin. On a couple of occasions I participated in a call-in show devoted to US-German relations. I think I was the only USIA officer to take part in call-in programs, which could be very contentious. On more than one occasion I had to respond creatively to questions regarding our military presence, for example, “Why do convoys move so slowly?” Unfortunately none of our Army or Air Force public affairs officers I knew had sufficient German to go on live radio.

Speaking of civil-military relations, Hessen Radio was located directly next to AFN Frankfurt. The two organizations worked very harmoniously with one another. For example, when HR needed a piece of music from AFN Frankfurt’s vast record library, AFN would play the work at given time so HR could record it for its collection. Copyright law forbid AFN from simply making a copy for HR. The German station did a lot of favors for AFN, including building sets for its TV news studio.

Q: Could Germans watch AFN TV?

JOHNSON: Not unless they had the right equipment which few of them did. I am no technician, but there was something about the antenna and perhaps AFN was using NTSC while Germans use the PAL system. We got AFN TV at our home on cable but our TV could receive both PAL and NTSC. Weekday evenings I watched the opening monologue of Johnny Carson Show. Carson’s jokes told me what was important in the United States.

Your question regarding German viewing habits raises a ticklish matter concerning the piracy of American TV programs by the German networks. Remember the hit series “Dallas”? Well, the Germans picked up the programs from AFN TV and broadcast them without dubbing to audiences across the FRG. The owners of the rights to that series threatened to stop providing it to AFN unless the Germans stopped pirating the shows. The ambassador came to Frankfurt and we met with top German officials and German network ceased airing the programs in English. Guess who got a spate of angry letters from German viewers? I responded candidly and explained that the practice by the German networks of taping “Dallas” off AFN has been a violation of copyright law. Fortunately most Germans respect law.

Speaking of German respect for law, I was told by a security expert that the reason USAREUR delayed putting up barriers in front of its headquarters in Heidelberg was that the street directly opposite the entrance was one way and no German terrorist would think of driving the wrong way a one-way street. I suspect that the story was apocryphal, but I learned a long time ago that a tale does not have to be factual to be true.

Q: Did you do much public speaking while you were in Frankfurt?

JOHNSON: I spoke to many German military audiences on US-Soviet relations. Sometimes I was accompanied by my Program Manager Horst Richter, who talked on the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI. I defended US policy in Central America in presentations to several audiences.
don’t think I made much headway against the widespread rejection among Germans of our stand in El Salvador and Nicaragua. I gave numerous lectures on barriers to understanding between Germany and the United States, presentations that were directed to student audiences and German-American clubs. I talked on several occasions on German cultural influences on the United States and US influences on German culture. I believe I gave more lectures than any USIA officer.

One memorable audience was the officers of the famed Sixth Panzer Division, Field Marshal Rommel’s old unit. Following the dinner and the Q and A, the commanding officer asked me if there was anything he could do for me. I responded that I would like to ride in a Leopard II tank. He replied that he would do better than that and asked me to be ready at 6:00 a.m. By early afternoon I was a certified tank driver. Accompanied by a fearless instructor, I took the steel monster full speed through mud holes and over barriers. Unfortunately there was no place on base to fire the machine gun or the 120 mm smooth bore cannon. I couldn’t believe I was getting paid to have so much fun.

Q: What was the most persistent prejudice German hold concerning the United States?

JOHNSON: That we are “kulturlos” (uncultured.) Look at the American television programs and films export. Germans tend to have an elitist view of culture and look down on popular culture. On the other hand, Germans who have spent much time in the United States know the quality of our orchestras, schools of fine art, book stores, public radio and public television. German visitors are also impressed with our better wines and our micro-breweries. In the last analysis, I think that Germans share with their neighbors a “eurosnobism” which is the last defense of the old world which fears that it is growing obsolete. Germans also link their fear of the effects globalization may have on their standard of living. They, I believe, wrongly consider the United States to be in the vanguard of this threat.

Although Germany is one of the most modern nations in the world, I found it very interesting how fearful many Germans are of technology. I took an assistant with me to a meeting with a senior official in the teachers’ union to discuss a program on utilizing computers in education. USIA Washington was ready to provide a noted expert on the subject. The union official turned us down flat. His reason: “Computers cost jobs.” My assistant and I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry.

Q: In the mid-1980s did Germans still discuss World War II with you in casual conversation?

JOHNSON: Not much. While I missed the exchanges, I was very grateful that Germans rarely voiced a lament that I often heard in the 1960s and 70s, i.e. that the United States should have made a separate peace with Berlin to fight a common foe: the Soviet Union. I found it absolutely exasperating that Germans imagined that the Americans and British could ever have considered joining forces even with a Germany that had rid itself of the Nazis to fight the Russians, who had lost 20 million soldiers and civilians. Once at a reception in Mainz several conservative businessmen raised the old charge that the US had been short-sighted not to have grasped the golden opportunity to check the Red Army before it occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. I responded that such a pact would have been morally repugnant and politically impossible. I added that as much as I admired the courage of the members of the 20th of July conspiracy to kill Hitler, in the long run it was fortunate that they failed, because the western
allies would not made a separate peace with them had they been successful in taking the reins of power. I reminded the men of the “stab in the back” lie that the Nazis and reactionaries had used during the Weimar Republic to explain away Germany’s defeat in World War I. I challenged them to imagine how much harder it would have been for Germans to have established a democracy after World War II had Churchill and Roosevelt refused to negotiate a separate peace with a German government, which presumably would have had Field Marshal Rommel as chancellor.

GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN
Deputy Political Counselor
Bonn (1985-1989)

Geoffrey Chapman was born in England and raised in England and Boston. He became a naturalized American citizen in 1957 and attended Bowdoin College and Princeton. He later entered the Foreign Service in 1971 and served in Germany, the USSR, and England. He also held several positions within the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: Strategic Defense Initiative.

CHAPMAN: Yes, the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Europeans and the Germans in particular were just not convinced about its validity, viewing it not as a defensive move but rather an effort to gain superiority over the Soviet Union, effectively ratcheting tensions up even further. I myself was not a strong believer in SDI but obviously I had to go out there and defend the policy and argue for it, sometimes in solid left wing environments. But even in those environments the discourse was always at a fairly rational level. There was little in the way of invective, vituperation, or insults. It was all very much on an intellectual plane. My experiences with the right wing in Germany were somewhat different. During my second, third and fourth years in Bonn, when I was deputy counselor, I worked closely with Dobbins and Burt on international security issues. We had umpteen visits by Paul Nitze and other major administration officials who came to consult with the Germans on arms control -- Mike Glitman, who was in charge of the INF component of the negotiations, and John Tower, who was head of the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) strategic side of the negotiations. I ended up doing a lot of speechwriting for Burt on international security topics. This was tough assignment initially, but after a while I got to learn his style and to anticipate his needs and thoughts. There were definitely some rough angles in U.S.-Germany relations at that time, a lot of this irritation stemming from what we saw as efforts by the foreign ministry and Genscher personally to take what we thought was too much of an equidistant position vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union. Germany was, after all, a NATO ally, and the expectation on our side was that they would support us and work with us rather than trying to set themselves up as sort of a third entity midway between the United States and the Soviet Union. This rubbed a lot of people the wrong way.

Q: What about, how about Kohl? Where did he fit in this?

CHAPMAN: Kohl was instinctively more pro-American than Genscher, but Genscher really ran the show in foreign policy. It was intriguing to watch as Washington, thinking that the U.S.
model of a powerful White House/NSC role in foreign policy applied to Germany, would send somebody over to see Helmut Kohl and more or less ask him to bring Genscher into line. But the German cabinet system did not work that way. The answer was never satisfactory: Kohl would go on talking and talking but you’d never get a very clear line out of him. There was no chancellery apparatus that was any way as powerful as the NSC apparatus. The chancellery foreign policy staff consisted mainly of diplomats seconded from the Foreign Ministry whose careers largely depended on Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

**Q:** Well did, how did, while you were there, how did the confrontation work out as far as, you know, intermediate missiles? I mean, was it more or less, reach an equilibrium or something or were- during the four years you were there, were there lots of demonstrations?

**CHAPMAN:** U.S.-Soviet relations certainly improved considerably during the second half of the ‘80s, coinciding with my time in Bonn. There were summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev, and the INF treaty was concluded. Improvements in superpower relations made for far fewer disagreements between us and the Germans, who were very happy to see progress on INF in particular. With the zero option adopted in the INF agreement, this meant that the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles would disappear from German soil, thus ending the political difficulties that deployment had caused for the Kohl administration.

The zero option originated, incidentally, with the Pentagon and personally with Richard Perle, who was generally seen as somewhat to the right of Genghis Khan. It was purely a political ploy from the start. The Defense Department essentially wanted to remove any pressure from the Europeans and others to adopt a more forthcoming arms control posture so they pressed for adoption of the most forthcoming arms control posture imaginable -- elimination of the weapons on both sides. But they reasoned that the Soviets would never accept zero, which meant that our INF deployments could go ahead as planned. You would think that the Europeans would accept the zero option as it would eliminate the Soviet threat and cancel out deployments on European soil. But they opposed it on the grounds that it was non-negotiable; the Soviets, they claimed, would never accept zero. So the German position for many years was that we should try to negotiate reductions down to a minimum level sufficient to deter Soviet use of the SS-20; but that a zero option was not serious.

**Q:** When we’re talking about the zero option we’re talking about the intermediate ones, not the intercontinental.

**CHAPMAN:** Yes, right. But even with the elimination of this class of missiles, the Germans still had concerns about the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. Clearly the SS-20s were their primary concern, but even with their elimination the Germans, given their geographical position, were uniquely vulnerable within the Alliance to shorter range Soviet missiles forward deployed in Eastern Europe. So they put on a strong push for reducing or eliminating what were called short-range nuclear weapons concomitant with acceptance of zero to zero in intermediate range forces. Again this was area where there was a major asymmetry between the Soviets and NATO, in that we had very few of these shorter range systems -- some older LANCE systems that went back I think to the late ‘60s or early ‘70s but nothing that was modern and in the quantities the Soviets had in Eastern Europe.
Q: Were we concerned during this period you were there with someone under the push of Genscher of Germany making a deal and sort of opting out of NATO to be neutral and getting closer ties with East Germany or anything like that?

CHAPMAN: I don’t think we had any concern at that time about Germany opting out of NATO as such. That was never seen to be really in the cards. I think there was a bit of concern about the Germans adopting more of a neutral stance. As I mentioned, one of their hopes was to try and set themselves up as sort of a third force between the Soviet Union and the United States and positioned to help the two superpowers come together for the benefit of all humanity. We were concerned when the Germans adopted this tack rather than behaving as we hoped they would as stalwart members of the Western Alliance. This ran the risk, as we saw it, of Germany adopting a more neutralist position on the issues.

As to ties between West and East Germany, this gets into the reunification question which, while historically ever-present, was starting to come to the fore in the last year or so that I was in Bonn. The long-held West German position on reunification, going back to the time of Brandt and Schmidt and Egon Bahr, was that this was a long-term process that in many ways depended less on overt moves to improve ties with the East German regime than on trying to open up the GDR and to build up people-to-people ties, to construct a network of ties between the two states in the expectation that, together with a new generation in East Germany, this would bring about different political culture more attuned to the West and accustomed to dealing with the West. This went back to the slogan of “change through coming together” as coined by Brandt and Bahr: the Quadripartite Agreement and the follow-on agreements between West Germany and East Germany and between West Berlin and the GDR fitted very much into this Brandt-Bahr concept. Increased visits between Germans on both sides of the divide and increased cultural exchanges would serve to help build up this whole network of ties. This continued to be the basic German approach through to the time of Kohl and Genscher. If you asked the average politically-aware German in the spring of 1989 for his views on reunification, he would have replied that this was still a desirable goal that German politicians should keep in mind, but that it was something for the distant future and would not be achieved in his lifetime. At that point in time people had actually dropped the “re-” and were talking about unification rather than reunification, recognizing that the two parts of the country had been separated for so long and had grown apart, so that you couldn’t really speak of just bringing them back together again -- they were two different entities that had to be merged in a more complex process. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that the Kohl government handled unification too much as a reunification, in the belief that the two parts of the country would easily meld back together again, and not enough as a unification, implying a more long-term and thought-out process in which the real differences between the two parts would have been taken fully into account.

Vernon Walters, who succeeded Rick Burt as ambassador in the spring of ’89, was much taken by the whole unification issue upon his arrival. So he asked the political section to do an in-depth analysis of thinking in the Germany body politic on the issue. Basically we came back with much the same answer that I’ve just described, that people were talking about it and saw it as a desirable goal but a long-term one that was not going to be achieved in their lifetimes. Walters thought somewhat differently, sensing that more rapid change was in the offing. And of course he was proved right. A couple of years later I asked Walters why he was so far ahead of the rest of us in the spring of ’89. He told me that he had been encouraged to believe that German
unification would soon be a real possibility as a consequence of the Soviet decision to pull out of Afghanistan and to cease propping up the communist regime there. He had felt that this decision had immediate implications for Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, in the sense that, once a decision had been taken to let one communist regime fail, it would be harder politically to prop up deteriorating communist regimes elsewhere. With the political and societal ferment brewing in 1989, serious challenges were bound to come soon to communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Putting down such challenges might require substantial application of Soviet military force and would probably be a dubious proposition anyway; and it would go directly counter to Gorbachev’s policy of engagement and cooperation with the West and with what he was trying to achieve domestically.

Q: What about, I mean as just recently having been a Soviet hand, what were you, how are you seeing the Gorbachev thing? Were you seeing that, you know, we’ve got to get ready for real changes or how were you doing, what you were getting?

CHAPMAN: I continued to follow events in the Soviet Union fairly closely for at least two or three years after I left Moscow. My sense was that in the ’85-’86, early ’87 timeframe Gorbachev was continuing to build his strength within the party and the bureaucratic apparatus and to put his stamp on Soviet society and policy; but there were fairly clear indications that he was not having his own way entirely, that there was a fair amount of internal opposition within the party to what he was trying to do. His opponents feared that any opening up of the society would jeopardize their and the party’s dominant position, that it would be very hard to put a stop to reform when things went too far. I think a bit of caution on our part was justified at the time. Although perestroika and glasnost were the watchwords of the moment, and the Soviets were taking a more pragmatic and cooperative tack internationally, this did not mean that Gorbachev’s ultimate success was assured or that U.S. and Soviet goals in international affairs were converging. The hardliners in Moscow could still influence policy. Their sway diminished as the years went by, but the events of 1990 proved that there was still life in them. Moreover, even in the late 80’s Gorbachev’s foreign policy aims were by no means identical with our own.

J. D. BINDENAGEL
Deputy Chief of Mission
East Berlin, GDR (1989-1990)

Born and raised in South Dakota, Ambassador Bindenagle attended the University of South Dakota and the University of Illinois and entered the Foreign Service in 1975. He served in Korea and held several posts in Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

We watched the TV, we saw those first people go through the Wall. We saw the lights come on in the neighborhood, we spent several hours talking, coordinating, it seemed to be going peacefully. I got a couple of hours of sleep, woke up my kids because they had to go to school. I put them put Annamarie, my daughter in the car with two other kids with some trepidation. I decided to drive behind them in my personal car to the same Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint. When we arrived, there were people everywhere at seven o’clock in the morning. There were people going back and forth, and yet they were very nice. They saw the red diplomatic license
plate that indicated a diplomatic car that carried Annamarie, they moved aside and let her through. As she drove off through the Bornholmerstrasse into West Berlin, I said to myself: “Well, there she goes. Will I see her again? What’s going on here?”

Shortly afterward, the GDR announced that their visa requirement, which had not been imposed overnight, would be required as of eight o’clock in the morning. I stayed at the checkpoint watching people coming back and forth. About 20 minutes to eight, there was a huge influx of people coming down the street to try to get across into West Berlin before the eight o’clock deadline for visas. When eight o’clock came the people were still everywhere, and in order to avoid a confrontation, the visa requirement time was moved to noon.

I went to the office, went through all of the activities we were doing. At noon the deadline was moved to Monday, and for us, the Berlin Wall had, as we had reported earlier, become irrelevant. The Wall had not only become irrelevant, the East German government had become irrelevant. They lost the authority of government to do basic things like issue visas. They had no control over that crucial aspect of their authority. The Soviets didn’t intervene. We thought they would do something. They were clearly taken by surprise as East German government was taken by surprise what had occurred.

But that wasn’t the end of the story. For weeks I tried to figure out who gave the order, why did they do this? We asked guards, we asked individuals, nobody had seemed to have given an order. I had been at Bornholmerstrasse, a checkpoint that was on a bridge over the S-Bahn train tracks and it had two or three police barracks in it. Driving across the checkpoint, I had seen that these barracks were filled with soldiers with rifles. I’d seen fire-hoses laid out next to these barracks in preparation to spray against people. The hoses were used on people as we saw on television at the Brandenburg Gate. I couldn’t figure out what was happening. A couple of months later, Jean and I were over having coffee with some of the people from the church where we were, and we were talking about his story. One of them got up and said, “Would you like to know what happened?” I said, “Of course, I want to know, I can’t figure this out.” This person went and got his East German identification card, which is a billfold-like picture passport. I opened it up and on one side there is a picture and on the other side is his name and date of birth. On the picture the guard at Bornholmerstrasse, where this person had been that night, had stamped across the picture an exit visa, making the ID invalid. He was thrown out! They expelled the first hundred or so people who were standing there that I had seen there that night. They threw them out and were intending to close the gate area to avoid a confrontation. Getting rid of the first demonstrators by expulsion was an expedient solution. But what went wrong?

What went wrong was on the other side of the street when they got through the gate was this guy with the camera. The camera team was from Spiegel Television I learned later, in fact several years later in Hamburg. I was telling the same story when Steven Aust of Spiegel stopped me before I said what I have just said and told me, “Would you like to know what happened,” and I said “Yes.” He told the same story. His TV crew was waiting on the other side, they filmed these people, they didn’t asked if they were expelled, they just filmed them. But then they went back after having collected these films and interviewed he guards and some of the people and had found that these people were indeed expelled.

The beauty of the multi-media world that we live in, the only thing that was in public domain was all these people were free. That’s why all the lights came on in the neighborhood, because
they saw on television all these people were going and they got up and took the only chance they had for freedom. They knew the GDR would not give them visas, and decided to go on their own. when the visa requirement gave them the window. They poured into West Berlin, thinking it was over, that was the only chance they were getting. People were driving from miles outside Berlin to get there in time to go across because they thought it was the only chance in their life they would have to go to Berlin. And it was because the television only reported what they had seen and not the facts, and good that they didn’t in this case.

[Note: I would like to add my written recollections on the night the Berlin Wall fell, as contained in a speech I delivered at the University of Notre Dame on the Tenth Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall.]

*The Fall of the Berlin Wall, Heroes of Bornholmerstrasse November 9, 1989*

*The Birth of the Berlin Republic*

A speech by Ambassador J.D. Bindenagel

Former Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic

Thank you, Professor Wegs, for the invitation to speak at the Nanovic Center for European Affairs. It is a rare pleasure for a practitioner of diplomacy to step back from the intense pressure of instant analysis and reflect on some of the implications of today’s politics on the ideas that shape our lives.

The major conflict of ideas that has shaped my career was the East-West confrontation between capitalism and communism. In fact, I have spent a majority of my professional career defending freedom from the communist threat. The symbolic vortex of that conflict was at the Fulda Gap in Germany, where a million soldiers from NATO were lined up against a million soldiers from the Warsaw Pact ready to destroy the world. I myself was an infantry officer in Wuerzburg, Germany, near the Fulda Gap, this main Soviet invasion route across Central Europe.

Recently, a friend of mine, Major General Bruce Scott, recounted his briefing to newly commissioned army officers in this post-cold war world. General Scott was somewhat uncertain whether these new officers knew about the significance of the Fulda Gap, or even whether they knew if the Fulda Gap existed. When he voiced his concern in his briefing, a young lieutenant responded that he had just returned from a visit to Fulda, Germany, where they had built a new shopping center and he could assure the General that there was a Gap there. He had shopped there himself. How times have changed.

The division of Germany, Europe and the world into two fundamentally opposed ideologies prepared to destroy the world seems so distant, but the fear-filled emotion of the division of Europe in the Cold War has left lasting legacy for us. The division of Berlin, symbolized by the Berlin Wall, was for us a deeply terrorizing reminder of man’s inhumanity to man.

During the first year of the Berlin Wall more than 50 people died trying to escape the communist paradise. On August 17, 1962, 18-year-old East Berliner Peter Fechter tried to escape near Checkpoint Charlie. As he climbed the Wall, his own East German border guards shot him. For hours he lay helpless and unattended at the foot of the Berlin Wall while he bled to death. The
worldwide rejoicing at the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 was easily understood everywhere as an end to this affront to the dignity of human beings everywhere. Throughout its 28-year existence, the Berlin Wall divided, but did not conquer the spirit of the Germans in the German Democratic Republic. The end of the Berlin Wall brought a new, reborn Germany – the Berlin Republic – dedicated to human dignity, founded in democratic institutions of the Bonn Republic and the democratic revolution in East Germany.

I was the deputy American ambassador in East Berlin when the Berlin Wall was breached. Later I was country director for Germany in the State Department and then deputy and acting American Ambassador in the Berlin Republic. The question most asked over the past decade was and is; “What is the Berlin Republic?” The following question was inevitably; “What does this new Germany, the Berlin Republic, mean to the United States?”

Although the revolution of 1989 was the last act in the cold war, no hot war ensued. Now the Berlin Republic has begun to take its rightful place in Europe; recently Chancellor Schroeder described it as a major European power. Germany has undoubtedly become a major European power deploying its military forces in combat alongside its NATO allies for the first time since World War II and modernizing its economy to compete globally. I would like to explore with you today my observations on the Berlin Republic and its implications for German-American relations.

The future of our relations with Germany depends on our shared values, our shared interests and our common solutions to issues in European security, economic reform and global issues.

Founding Myths of the Berlin Republic

In order to analyze these issues, I would like to turn to some of the founding myths of the Berlin Republic.

The political culture inherited by the Berlin Republic is one of continuity and discontinuity. The Federal Republic’s Basic law, created fifty years ago, embodies the country’s continuity in democratic institutions from the Bonn Republic. The Democratic Revolution of 1989 led to the democratic government in 1990 that ended the German Democratic Republic and swept away most of the East German institutions – political, social and economic – only the political party of the East, the re-christened Socialist Unity Party, now the Party of Democratic Socialism, has remained.

The common commitment to core values of freedom, as demonstrated by the 1989 Revolutionary movement decrying the GDR Travel Law and the respect for human dignity, in remembrance of those who died in the Holocaust, embodied in Article I of the Basic Law and captured in the motto “Nie Wieder Auschwitz” unite the halves of the formerly divided county.

Democratic institutions legitimized by popular sovereignty in the March 18, 1990 election in the GDR that gave a mandate for German unity and in the September, 1998 election in the Berlin Republic that defeated a sitting government for the first time in contemporary German history.
Belief in the Social Market Economy that formed the basis for the transfer of wealth, at an annual rate of $100 billion per year, from the western to the eastern states to fund unfunded social security, unemployment compensation, retraining programs and infrastructure.

Shared History with the United States

The United States shares with the Berlin Republic common commitments to freedom, the respect for human dignity, democratic institutions and belief in the market economy. We also share contemporary history.

Beginning with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes Speech of Hope in Stuttgart in 1946 which offered Germany a place in the community of nations again, the United States stood up to defend Berlin from Soviet attack beginning with the Berlin Airlift in 1948. On June 17, 1953 the East Germans rebelled against their Soviet occupiers and their effort for freedom was brutally crushed. After the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, it became a symbol for our troubled times.

President John F. Kennedy won our hearts and those of the Germans when he said that free men everywhere would be proud to say that they were “‘Berliner.”’ For ten years we negotiated with the Soviets to create stability in Berlin and Germany, eventually signing the Quadripartite Agreement in 1972. In the 1980s we deployed Pershing missiles to defend Germany and Europe against the Soviet SS-20 rockets that were aimed at Germany. By 1987 President Reagan called on President Gorbachev, in the spirit of Glasnost and Perestroika to “Tear down this Wall.” Just two years later the Germans in the GDR did just that in the Democratic Revolution of 1989. Americans and Germans shared this history of Berlin and the fight for freedom.

We also lived up to our promises. It was American support for German unification that was the key element in completing the East German’s peaceful, democratic revolution. We negotiated the 2+4 Agreement with the two Germanies and “Victorious Powers” of the Second World War, and on October 3, 1990 helped to bring the three parts of Germany together - the Federal Republic’s forty-year-old democracy, the freedom-seeking East Germans and Berlin - to create a peaceful, democratic Germany in the heart of Europe. The Berlin Republic was born. And with the new Berlin Republic has come an enlarged NATO and many economic challenges; its new members can hope to enjoy some of the same freedom, peace and prosperity found in the Berlin Republic today.

The Heroes of Bornholmerstrasse – November 9, 1989

Let me share with you one anecdote that captures the spirit of freedom on the 1989 Revolution. I was a fortunate eyewitness when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down (Ich war dabei) twenty-eight years after the East German leader Walter Ulbricht erected this hated symbol of communism and division. I was the deputy American ambassador in East Berlin reporting on that democratic revolution that would bring down the Berlin Wall, help end the cold war and create a new order, in which Germany emerged once again united, sovereign and strong.

Throughout the year 1989, dramatic events stirred a new sense of freedom in the world and challenged the cold war. Soviet President Gorbachev began his Glasnost and Perestroika experiment. Students in China demonstrated for democracy on Tiananmen Square and were brutally crushed by communist tanks. In the two Germanies 2 million soldiers still stood face-to-face across the Berlin Wall ready for war.
On the night of November 9, 1989, the entire world held its breath waiting for the Soviet tanks to roll and crush the German revolutionaries as they had done in 1953. Although the Soviet tanks did not roll out, revolution has changed our world.

The United States throughout the Cold War preached self-determination in an effort to promote democracy movements and stationed millions of American soldiers in West Germany to deter a communist attack. East Europeans had repeatedly tried and failed to find freedom and break the yoke of communist rule. Despite failed attempts in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1980, in the summer of 1989 the Central Europeans tried again.

At the American Embassy in East Berlin, we knew that the Red Army’s response with its million Soviet and East German soldiers deployed along the German-German border would determine the success or failure of this new democratic revolution. A Washington Post editorial in August that year reminded us that if the Soviet Union intervened anywhere in Europe to protect its interests, it would do so in East Germany.

Nevertheless, some East Germans wanted their freedom and sovereignty and were willing to demand some of their rights guaranteed in the Helsinki Final Act signed by their communist leader, Erich Honecker. These brave souls sought freedom to travel and abolishing the East German travel law became the symbolic cry for political freedom during their revolution. They knew the words of President John Kennedy, that free men everywhere would be proud to call themselves Berliners, and they knew President Ronald Reagan’s challenge to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. They were testing that strong bond of common destiny in our commitment to the dignity of man, the rule of law, and freedom.

Events in the revolution were breathtaking. Tens of thousands of GDR citizens had fled to the West and a million more were seeking to emigrate. Demonstrations by thousands of demonstrators in the streets of Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin threatened the government and by October 18 had led to the ouster of German Communist leader Erich Honecker. The new GDR leader, Egon Krenz, was also a communist and desperately needed to establish control of the government and win support of the people. We knew events could unravel the stability of the cold war and our embassy reported on November 6 that the GDR Politburo was changing the despised Travel Law and predicted hopefully that if such changes continued, the Berlin Wall would become “irrelevant.”

Based on our embassy’s reporting, President George Bush was told in his November 9 morning briefing by his intelligence briefer, that the GDR had opened possibilities for freer travel for its citizens and that the Berlin Wall might as a result become “irrelevant,” the very description used by the American Embassy’s Political Counselor Jon Greenwald report. Now was the time to determine whether this revolution fit the definition. I had never lived through a revolution and only knew the textbook definition. I was about to experience it very personally.

While, as Timothy Garten Ash has noted, a century was defeated at the polls, I believe that it was the democratic revolution that spread from Solidarity to the Kremlin and ended communism in Europe. It is in the aftermath of the end of the cold war that I have found the comments of Ralph Waldo Emerson about the American Revolution to capture the new dynamic of European politics at the end of the Millennium. He said, “If there is any one period one would desire to be born in,
is it not the Age of Revolution, when the old and new stand side-by-side, when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope, when the historic glories of the old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new?”

It Began as Any Normal Day in the Revolution

Events during that Thursday in November were calm; President Gorbachev had ended his visit in honor of the fortieth anniversary of East Germany with a warning about the dramatic events in East Germany saying, “Those who come too late will be punished by history.” Little did we know that history was about to overtake us.

That same evening in Berlin I attended Aspen Institute Berlin Director David Anderson’s reception for his new deputy, Hildegard Boucsein, with the mayors of East and West Berlin, the Allied Military Commanders, East German spy-swapping lawyer Wolfgang Vogel and many others. We were an unsuspecting group of insiders. What was about to happen at the Berlin Wall later on November 9, 1989 would be a surprise to us all.

At the end of the reception, East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, who had negotiated the freedom of Soviet dissident Sharansky and earlier the U-2 pilot downed over Russia, Gary Powers, asked me for a ride to West Berlin where he had parked his car. Of course I was pleased to offer him a lift and to seek his assessment of the East German reaction to the changes in November 6 GDR Travel Law that had been rejected by thousands of demonstrators throughout the country. Vogel as Honecker’s lawyer was most likely to know the GDR’s next steps.

A few months earlier when U.S. Ambassador Richard Barkley and I visited Vogel at his modest home on the Titi Lake, he told us that the Hungarians would likely allow several hundred East Germans in Hungary escape to the West. The Hungarians had dramatically cut down the barbed wire fence along their border in May. Indeed, the Hungarian border was viewed as an escape hatch from the communist bloc and cutting down the fence launched a flood of refugees in late summer. The Hungarians were about to honor their new commitment to a UN convention on refugees and to ignore their obligations under the Warsaw Pact to return East Germans to the GDR. Vogel would surely clue me in on Politburo thinking about how to respond to the revolutionaries’ demands for the right to travel freely.

On our way to the downtown West Berlin’s heart on the Ku’dam, Vogel told me that the GDR attorney’s collegium had met November 7-8 and proposed additional changes to the GDR Travel Law. Vogel thought the new changes, not yet announced, would satisfy East Germans’ demand for more freedom of travel.

Back at the American Embassy

As I drove into East Berlin around seven-thirty, the acrid smell of sulfur from East Germany’s brown coal met me. It was a knowing feeling that the smell brought to my nostrils; the smell clung everywhere, in my clothes surrounding the buildings. The smell of brown coal gave the whole of East Germany that sinister, dreary appearance that had become so familiar.

I went directly to the embassy where I found a greatly excited political section. They were stunned by East German government spokesman Guenther Schabowski’s statement on television. He had told the world that the Politburo agreed to more changes in the Travel Law and East
Germans could get visitor visas quickly (in kurzem) for travel to the West from their local “People’s Police” and the GDR would open a new processing center to handle emigration cases immediately.

Although beyond anything we could have imagined, Schabowski’s oral statement was open to widely varying interpretation. NBC anchorman, Tom Brokaw, who attended the Schabowski briefing, asked if this meant the Berlin Wall was open; Schabowski reportedly said; “Yes.” He rushed to the western side of the Brandenburg Gate to announce to the world that the Berlin Wall was open. The East Germans heard; “Travel to the West is possible immediately.” The revolution, once remarkably controlled, with its Monday night demonstrations in Leipzig and Dresden, seemed to be spinning out of control.

We sent one embassy political officer, Heather Troutman, directly to Checkpoint Charlie and another, Imre Lipping, to the GDR press center to get the text of the statement. While we were hunting down the travel law text, the first East Germans, attempting to cross without visas, were sent back home by the guards at Checkpoint Charlie who told them to first get visas. It seemed to us that the GDR guards could keep things under control, while the new procedures were being worked out.

With the text of the announced freedom to travel and emigrate in hand, we translated it and cabled it to Washington. I telephoned the White House Situation Room and State Department Operations Center to make sure they had the report and to alert them to the latest developments. Then I called Ambassador Barkley and the American Minister in West Berlin Harry Gilmore, and we diplomats shared our quick assessment of the Politburo announcement. We thought the East Germans would get their visas and then head to West Berlin. Little did we know how quickly the East Germans would test the will of the border police to let them leave and return.

After assuring ourselves that we had reporting officers in place to follow events and had reported the latest news, I headed home to the near-in East Berlin suburb of Pankow around 10:00 PM. As I drove up Schönhauserallee in East Berlin I was surprised to see so many East German, plasticized pressed-wood Trabant automobiles seemingly abandoned near the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint crossing over the S-Bahn train into West Berlin. At the end of the street near the checkpoint, I saw dozens of Germans standing at the barrier and shouting at the guards defending the crossing.

I knew the crossing well. I crossed it regularly; my children crossed there daily to attend the German-American John F. Kennedy Schule in Zehlendorf, West Berlin. Inside the crossing were barracks filled with armed border police. Fire hoses, like those used later at the Brandenburg Gate were carefully laid out in readiness to repel any wall jumpers. Across the checkpoint safely in the West, the bright lights of a TV camera crew, was poised on the bridge ready to instantaneously transmit pictures of this confrontation at the bridge around the world.

I hurried through the last few blocks to get home quickly. Inside, I turned on the television to see which pictures were being beamed at the East Germans from the camera I had seen. My wife Jean rushed in to the TV room worried I would wake our children. I explained the latest events and how our worry seemed to be turning into excitement as we witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall. I called Ambassador Barkley, Jon Greenwald our political counselor and Harry Gilmore in West Berlin. We knew events would soon envelop us.
The Berlin Wall Falls

Within minutes the Berlin Wall was breached. First, a wave of East Berliners came through the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint signaling freedom for all East Germans. They streamed across and their pictures were flashed around the world. They were free! But I had a sinking feeling. Did they have visas? What happened to the visa requirement? Who was in charge? *

A few hours later, around 6:30 A.M., I followed my third-grade daughter Annamarie’s school van to Bornholmerstrasse on her way through the crowd to school in the West. Her van moved into the masses of people now streaming in both directions. Seeing the red diplomatic license plate, the people stepped aside to let her through. I stood there watching my child disappear into the West with some uncertainty of her fate. My son Carl was to follow in less than an hour.

GDR radio announced that visas were required to travel as of 8:00 am on November 10. I stayed at Bornholmerstrasse and as the hour approached the crowd grew larger and pressed against the checkpoint as panic spread. The fear of being shut in, of having missed the chance to see West Berlin before the GDR shut the gate, was palatable. Shortly before that appointed hour, that deadline was moved to noon. Later, the deadline was revised to Monday. However, by Monday the Krenz government had lost its legitimacy and its authority; the people had demanded and won their freedom. Power and authority had passed from the SED government to the people, who were now in charge. No one knew what would happen next.

No-mans-land and the Death Strip

We were all caught in the blurring pictures of the revolutionary video stuck on fast-forward. Events in those hours overwhelmed us with a mixture of anxiety, euphoria and hope for the future.

When our children, Annamarie and Carl, returned from the John F. Kennedy Schule in West Berlin, my wife, Jean, and I decided that we, too, would test the new openness of the Berlin Wall. We ventured down to the Wall at Eberswalderstrasse, where the buildings were in the East and the sidewalk was in West Berlin, and where terrible scenes of desperate people jumping to their freedom or death [took place] in 1961 when the Wall was built.

The “Bausoldaten,” soldiers on construction duty, were deconstructing the Berlin Wall at Eberswalderstrasse. They had already taken several three-meter tall, one-meter wide sections out of the Wall by the time we arrived. Lined up in front of this gaping hole were hundreds of East Germans dutifully waiting for the East German Volkspolizei to issue them visas in accordance with the November 9 Schabowski statement.

We had our diplomatic identity cards and proceeded to enter the no-mans-land through the new crossing point. As we, accompanied by our dog Willi, stepped into the eerie space between East and West, seven-year-old Carl exclaimed; “There are two walls.” Indeed, at the end of the no-mans-land stood towering above us was the whitewashed wall on the western side.

We crossed into West Berlin with numerous East Germans and were greeted with cheering West Berliners and a sense of time suspension. Disoriented, we found a playground for our children where they played while Jean and I tried to absorb the strangeness of standing in West Berlin amid so many East Germans. Unification had just happened among the Germans and we were
witnessing the mixture of two conflicting systems separated for two generations. Berlin had become an East German city overnight.

After getting our personal bearings we turned back toward East Berlin and stepped back into the death strip on our way home. As we entered the forbidden zone an East German guard who blocked our way and demanded our passports approached us. When we produced our East German Diplomatic identity cards, he rejected them saying that the crossing was only for citizens of the German Democratic Republic. We argued that we, too, lived in East Germany despite the fact that it seemed incredible that any Westerner would voluntarily lived in that communist country. After some heated dialogue, we were allowed to pass. Stepping back into East Berlin was like wandering into the twilight zone, the country had disappeared, and a revolution swept away the Berlin Wall and would soon sweep away the very existence of East Germany itself.

The End of East Germany

I knew East Germany’s days were limited. Only intervention by the Soviets could prolong its agony. President Gorbachev risked Perestroika and Glasnost in Russia if he chose to intervene militarily in the GDR; he would lose East Germany if he did not. We had no idea of the next steps or how the revolution would play out.

While the world was caught up in the euphoria of the pictures at the Brandenburg Gate, President Bush instructed us that there would be no dancing on the Wall. The East Germans had won some freedom, but the revolution had unleashed the forces of history contained by the cold war.

Meeting with Gorbachev six months later, Gorbachev told President Bush that Germany could decide whether or not to join NATO. In the intervening months the greatest diplomatic venture since World War II was undertaken with the greatest skill. Germany, with the vision and skillful leadership of the American President and Chancellor Kohl, was unified and this millennium may end in peace with Europe whole and free.

Postscript

There is a postscript to this story that I would also like to share. I felt there were some unanswered questions about those first wall jumpers at Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint. Did they have visas? Just what did those guards with the hoses and rifles do to defend the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989? A few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Jean and I were having coffee with the Uwe Gerson family, friends from our local East German church. Among the guests were East Germans that had been among those at Bornholmerstrasse that night.

As we recounted this story, one of them asked if we knew what actually happened to the first freedom-seekers who burst into the lights of the Spiegel TV cameras and changed the course of history. Of course we did not and were intrigued to hear a first-hand account. Herr Gerson’s brother took out his GDR identification card, a paper passport with a photograph on one side and his name typed on the other. Across the picture was a GDR exit visa stamp. A stamp that actually invalidated the I.D. card. It hit us. The first people crossing into the lights of the TV camera* had been expelled! The GDR had tried to save itself from its discontented citizens by throwing the rascals out of the country. Be gone you revolutionaries, they must have said. The
last laugh was on those guards. The television pictures of people held back by a hated system fleeing into freedom were too powerful to resist. The heroes of Bornholmerstrasse had taken their fate in their own hands. East Germany fell to the irrepressible human desire for freedom.

The pictures were enough to rouse other East Germans from their sleep and head for the Berlin Wall. The numbers soon overwhelmed the guards and the East German government’s implementation of its exit visa requirement was delayed and delayed. Meanwhile the Germans in the GDR continued their revolution and took ownership of their country.

* Note: The Spiegel TV crew filming the East Germans great escape only reported the first Germans to flee were free. Steven Aust, editor of the Spiegel told me in October 1996 that he had sent that crew to film the crossing and had later interviewed the guards who let the people into West Berlin. He confirmed that the first to cross into the West had been expelled by the East German guards.

Conclusion

American support for German unification allowed the East German’s peaceful, democratic revolution success. On October 3, 1990, they would join with the Federal Republic’s forty-year-old democracy to create a peaceful, democratic Germany in the heart of Europe. The Berlin Republic was born.

Since then it is clear that the Berlin Republic, now under SPD Chancellor Schroeder, has accepted the responsibilities accruing to a major European power in providing security in southeaster Europe. The bombing war in Kosovo was also a seminal event in German politics. Along with the United States, Germany chose to lead our effort to stop the human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing that had echoes of Nazi atrocities. In fact, the elevation of human rights as a basis for armed intervention in violation of the sanctity of sovereignty will have lasting effect on political relations for the next Millennium. Some have argued that the intervention in Kosovo signaled the end, not of the cold war, but of the Westphalian Peace that has governed international relations for centuries.

In Germany the Kosovo decision is deeply rooted in the new political culture of the Berlin Republic. Not only must war not emanate from German soil, but as Foreign Minister Fischer has reminded us: „Nie Wieder Auschwitz“ is the motto that takes precedence over the sanctity of sovereignty. This political commitment to human rights is deeply embedded in the German „Basic Law“ in its respect for human dignity and is undoubtedly a founding myth of the Berlin Republic.

Along with the New Berlin Republic, the political world has changed fundamentally. The Soviet Union was swept away in revolution in 1991. NATO has enlarged its membership; NATO has intervened militarily with Bundeswehr forces to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Former Warsaw Pact members can hope to enjoy some of the same freedom, peace and prosperity found in the Berlin Republic today. Europe has adopted the EURO as its unified currency.

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Q: While this revolution was going on, particularly at the early stages, this was a time when the mobs were building up, over a period of time these demonstrations and all, the scenario, all of us
who were in the Foreign Service and anyone else who I brought it up with, this was going to happen, it was going to build up, there was going to be an explosion, the East Germans have been trying to get out, the government will try to stop them, the West Germans, with or without our consent are not going to let this happen, they are going to maybe storm in or something like that, and the Soviets were come in and World War III. So you are sitting there, watching what in our old scenario was World War III beginning to develop and the end of civilization as we know it. What were you reporting back? Were we just sort of reporting, and was there anything come from Washington, or were we looking at Soviet tanks and East German tanks, what was the Embassy.

Hungary

JORDAN THOMAS ROGERS
Economic/Political Officer
Budapest (1954-1958)

Mr. Rogers was born in South Carolina and raised in North Carolina. After graduating from the University of North Carolina, he served with the United States Air Force in WWII. Entering the Foreign Service in 1946, he served at a variety of foreign posts in Europe, Latin America and Asia, primarily as Economic and Political Officer. His final overseas post was Rawalpindi, Pakistan, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission. In Washington, Mr. Rogers was assigned to the Department’s Staff Secretariat, to the Department of Defense as Foreign Affairs Officer and finally as Economic Officer in the Department’s Latin America Bureau.

Q: Now what was the effect in Hungary of President Eisenhower’s denunciation of the Soviet use of force?

ROGERS: You mean the effect on the Hungarian

Q: On the Hungarian people.

ROGERS: I’m not sure most of them knew about it. We were constantly being appealed to for help by Hungarians, sort of a generic term but I think most of them were hoping that somebody like Hammarskjöld would suddenly appear in Budapest. We were hoping the same thing and we made the great mistake of supposing that this sort of action was under serious consideration in the UN. I don’t think it was. But the Hungarians were always looking to us for help but without being very specific as to what that help really would constitute. A group, maybe it was two-three people, came to my house and spoke to my wife once and read her a long statement she then read over the telephone to a secretary, in which they were appealing to the UN to engineer some sort of truce, is my recollection. But I’m sure most people were not in a position to think through what the West was able to do, whether it was able physically to send in military troops, which would have been a very difficult, complicated and dangerous action, even if they were readily available. I have met military persons since then who were stationed in Germany and were
placed on alert, but I think any military action on our part to assist the Hungarians would have run a direct risk of war with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Austria was a neutralized country and to have attempted to ignore that would have opened up a whole array of other problems.

Now what also did, which has drawn down a good bit of criticism, was to assure the USSR that the US had no desire to make Hungary a member of NATO or to become a military ally of the US. Many have thought that this in effect gave the USSR a free pass to do what they wished in Hungary.

One idea which to me is fascinating, and which came from Henry Kissinger, and perhaps others, was that Eisenhower should have called on George Kennan and other eminent Kremlinologists to have recommended ways in which the US could have acted to bring pressure on the USSR to have permitted Hungary to leave the Soviet bloc and to in effect follow the course that Yugoslavia had taken.

Q: As you know, Tom, better than I, a lot of people say that the U.S. sent the wrong signals to the Hungarian people, through our broadcasts over Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America and left the impression that we were going to do more than we actually did. Did you in the legation have that feeling, too, or not?

ROGERS: I don’t know that I can speak for the legation. I felt that way but on the other hand I also tend to think that the main driving force which was exercised by the West and by the United States was the fact that we existed as a free society and without our having to broadcast that. I believe Secretary Dulles, when he was talking about a rollback, a rollback that would involve some physical action, went too far. Certainly, he did not intend to imply that if an uprising should occur that the US would support it militarily. But clearly, many Hungarians inferred that much more support would be forthcoming than in fact materialized. But as I’ve said, no one anticipated what would develop. I don’t believe the legation ever, I don’t remember us ever going to Washington and saying, “Cool it!”, I don’t think we were ever asked in advance to comment on Secretary Dulles’ speeches. It’s not often a minister will take it upon himself to cable the Secretary and say, “Bud, you did the wrong thing!”

Q: At that time, Secretary Dulles was also having a, was in the hospital.

ROGERS: That was immediately, yes, but he’d been sending these signals for some time, much earlier.

Q: Oh, the rollback, that went back to the early part of his administration. Now at one point, I gather, the Soviets prevented the U.S. diplomatic dependents from leaving. Did that affect you at all?

ROGERS: You mean the convoy?

Q: Yes.

ROGERS: Yes, of course it did, because my family was involved in that. As you probably know, what happened was that the new minister, Tom Wailes, came in. The day before he came in, we had made the decision ourselves, I guess through Spencer Barnes, that all the families would leave. This was based on the widespread and increasing reports that Soviet forces were
reentering Hungary. A convoy was made up. One or maybe two men with them. I believe a
finance officer and maybe Dan Sprecher, who was then the economic officer, went with them.
They had their families there, too. But then the convoy reached the border and was turned back
by Russian soldiers. That was quite an unnerving experience for them, because it was in a heavy
snowstorm and they had driven up to the border and then they had to drive back. But at that time,
that same day, the new minister had come in from Vienna. We had sent Brice Meeker up in the
minister’s car, the limousine, to pick him up and bring him back. The convoy arrived back at the
legation around eleven o’clock. The minister had come in I think in the late afternoon. He had
passed the convoy en route and someone said to me he’d gotten out and spoken to them. They
arrived at eleven o’clock, as I believe is described in Bob Clark’s memorandum, the minister
called a meeting for midnight and decided then that the convoy would leave again the next
morning, early, with husbands. The husbands would go to the border with their families and send
them across and then they would come back. In the meantime, we had gone to the Russian
embassy in Budapest and gotten assurances.

Q: This was all at night?

ROGERS: This was, must have been the late afternoon, because we knew, by telephone, that
they were coming back. And so we had gotten assurances from the Russian embassy that they
could go through.

Q: So, it worked out that way, then?

ROGERS: Not quite. Well, the next morning they went back, with husbands. I went with my
family. We got to the border. I had the document in Russian, My memory says it was a Russian
document, prepared by the Russian embassy. I’m not sure. It may have been a document that we
prepared. How we were able to type it in Russian I’m not sure. But I had a document in Russian
with red seals on it and when we got to the border there was a Soviet soldier with a machine gun
out there in front of us. So I get out, waving this document and he squats down beside the
machine gun.. I waved the document at him and he waves me back. And I walk on towards him
and he kneels down beside his machine gun. I accept that argument and go back to the car!

In the meantime, Dan Sprecher, who had been in the first convoy, had been in contact with a
school there. I don’t know exactly how that happened. So much was going on, you didn’t pick up
all the details. And they were willing to put us up. So we went, this was a substantial number, not
only of Americans but of some people from other legations and some Red Cross people and
newspaper people and a goodly crowd of probably 70 people and they were able to put us up.
Not only that, but they fed us! But we came under Russian guard, with Russian soldiers around
the school, for a while. A dispatch to the Department was prepared in Vienna by Bob Clark
which gives more details on the entire experience, and I’m attaching a copy. It states that some
70 people were housed (and fed) in he school with an additional 50 in a hospital and another
school.

The dispatch does not report, since it happened later, that sometime in the spring of 1957 several
Legation representatives (I participated, but I don’t remember who else) visited the school to
thank them for their assistance and to make a financial donation. I don’t remember whether the
money was raised locally or included official funds.
William C. Burdett was born in Tennessee in 1920. He entered the Foreign Service in 1941 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. His career in the Foreign Service included posts in Iraq, Israel, Turkey, Great Britain, and Malawi. Ambassador Burdett was interviewed by Richard Nethercutt in 1988.

Q: From Jerusalem I judge that you were subsequently involved in the Mid-East crisis involving the Suez Canal. Could you please explain your involvement there?

Burdett: From Iran I was transferred to the Department and assigned to the Office of Near Eastern Affairs and then the Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs. President Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 marked the failure of an ambitious program of Secretary Dulles intended to seal off the area from "international communism". To contain Soviet expansion, Mr. Dulles adopted a policy of impartiality in the Arab-Israel problem and set about creating a Middle East Defense arrangement. I participated in developing a detailed proposal for a comprehensive Middle East settlement. We thought Israel obtained word of our plans (Israeli intelligence on our planning was "remarkable" indicating inside leaks), found them distasteful, and deliberately adopted policies including aggressive border raids, to make it politically difficult for Nasser to move towards an accommodation. At the same time Israel's supporters in Congress blocked the provision of military aid. In 1955 Nasser reached the conclusion that he could not count upon the United States to restrain Israel politically. He also concluded that the U.S. would not meet his requests for military assistance sufficient to enable him to protect Egypt from Israeli aggression. Nasser decided to turn to the Soviet Union for military assistance. Increasingly he adopted a non-aligned anti-Western stance.

The deterioration in relations was rapid. In the summer of 1956 we replied negatively to the Egyptian demand for a "yes" or "no" answer on an outstanding offer to finance the Aswan Dam. Nasser used this in part as a pretext for nationalizing the Suez Canal. A mighty scramble then ensued to find ways to assure the continued international use of the canal and to provide the British and French a face saving alternative to the use of force to regain control of the canal. Two major conferences were held in London. Nasser in effect rejected the proposals coming from those conferences. In late summer of 1956 the British and French military preparations were well publicized. However, we thought these were in the nature of bargaining postures and contingency planning. The actual decision of Britain, France and Israel to attack the Suez Canal caught us by surprise. We made a last minute effort to forestall the attack unsuccessfully.

The Administration was then confronted with an "agonizing reappraisal". President Eisenhower decided that we had no alternative but to oppose the British, French and the Israelis.
EUGENE H. BIRD
Israel-Jordan Desk
Washington, DC (1955)
Vice Consul
Jerusalem (1956-1958)

Eugene H. Bird was born in Spokane, Washington in 1925. He was in the U.S. Navy from 1943 to 1948. He attended the University of Washington, receiving a B.S. degree in 1948 and a M.A. degree in 1952. Mr. Bird's overseas career included posts in Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and India. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1994.

Q: You were new to the scene as you dealt with Israeli affairs but you had a fresher eye on this sort of thing. Were you keeping American domestic politics in mind? Normally, in the Foreign Service we are supposed to call things as we see them in American geopolitical or international terms and let the domestic politicians sort it out. But you couldn't do that in this case. Is that right?

BIRD: We would try, but it's like the old adage that "War is an extension of diplomacy." Or you can look at it in the opposite way, that "Diplomacy is an extension of war." It seems to me that in our foreign policy we'll always have a certain tension on this subject. How much influence should ethnic groups--and after all America is nothing but a collection of ethnic groups--have on our foreign policy? How much influence should Russians [in the United States] now have on our policy towards Yeltsin? How much influence should Swedes have on our policy toward Sweden? Obviously, it is very modest. At one point it was clearly very important in United States foreign policy. The Mexican community or the Japanese on the West Coast--how much influence should they have had on preventing the internment of [racial Japanese] in 1941-42 [just after Pearl Harbor]? Well, the answer is that, because of the open nature of American politics and the American debate on American domestic politics, the Poles should have their say on our relations with Poland. Polish Americans should have their say. Jewish-Americans should have their say on our relations with Israel. But the [political] tactics may get to the point where there is real fear in people's minds and voices and so on, as there has been in only two instances that I know of.

Q: What was the situation in Jerusalem in the summer of 1956?

BIRD: Well, [John Foster] Dulles was Secretary of State. He'd made a couple of visits to the Middle East by that time, trying to work on the problem of Arab-Israeli relations. A very socialist-oriented Egyptian regime had just made its first agreement with the Soviets to provide arms in the Middle East. As a result, there was a newly-developing relationship between the United States and Israel to "balance" those arms shipments to Egypt. Syria immediately became a client of the "Czechoslovak" arms industry also--which was really the Soviet arms industry. This development was generally viewed as a prelude to war. In fact, I told my wife before I left
Washington in May, "I don't think that you're ever going to get to Jerusalem because I expect a war to start even before you can come in late June or early July."

It didn't happen quite that way, but all during the summer of 1956 we were "Cassandras" in a sense. We were all predicting war and were trying to report, I suppose, and do everything that we could do, at whatever level we were operating, somehow to prevent that war from happening. The reason for the war, of course, was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians. In fact, the Eden Government [in the U. K.] and the French Government [under Guy Mollet of the French Socialist Party] were working very closely with the Israelis. We knew this. There was a buildup [of troops and supplies] on Cyprus. By September the level of insults between the Egyptians, on the one hand, and Paris and London, on the other, was pretty high. However, the Egyptians really didn't want a war to happen. They were trying to use the United States to try to prevent that war from happening.

I think that Secretary Dulles, in effect, was "washing his hands" of the whole affair, quite frankly. We had a political reporting officer at the Embassy [in Tel Aviv]. I think that he was probably associated with the CIA. He was Hungarian Jewish in background. He had some very good friends in Israel. He managed to find out the exact date [of the beginning of the Israeli involvement] about a week ahead of time. He sent that date in to Washington. He had to send it on the "back channel" [through the CIA] because the Ambassador didn't believe him. Things like that were happening.

MICHAEL E. STERNER

Bureau of Near East Affairs

Washington, DC (1964-1966)

Ambassador Michael E. Sterner was born in New York in 1920. He received a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University. He served in the U.S. Army prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1951. Ambassador Sterner served in Aden, Beirut, Cairo, Washington, DC, and was ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. He was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: The Strait of Aqaba was where they were getting their oil?

STERNER: Exactly. I can't tell you exactly what percentage but over the years about 60 to 70 percent of Israeli oil requirements came from Iran and certainly all that oil was coming into Elat. We were seized with trying to get the Egyptians to stand down and to think of various face-saving ways where it might be possible to prevent the conflict. We were, of course, worried about the implications of a conflict. No one at the time that this thing was brewing had any assurance that the Israelis could win this war in six days time. The Egyptians seemed very confident and for all we knew could give the Israelis some real trouble; we saw emerging out of that a very serious possibility of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the Soviets being committed to Egypt at that time and ourselves to the Israelis. Even if we did not have such a confrontation, we saw the possibility of regional conflict unraveling our interests in much of the Arab world. So this was a really serious crisis for the United States. We of course had intensive diplomacy with the
Egyptians but not to much avail. However, the Egyptians claimed that on the eve of the war, one of their top people, Zakaria Mohieddine was on his way here and had the Israelis not attacked might have defused the crisis. I tend to disbelieve this thesis because Nasser was too committed in the eyes of his own people and the eyes of the Arab world to the course of action he had taken. I think he wanted a conflict.

Q: Well, how did the October '73 War play out from your perspective? How did we react to it and what were you doing at this time?

STERNER: Well, again, I happened to be back -- I mean, I was still back. It was six years later, or whatever, from the '67 war and I was still in the Department. This time I was a couple of notches up the line. But there I was setting up another Task Force. This was a much more interesting, difficult and of course less decisive war. To Kissinger's credit he saw about midway through the conflict that there were major diplomatic opportunities that could be seized, if you could bring this conflict to an end in a way that preserved those diplomatic opportunities. And he charged in. He had just moved over from the National Security position to the State Department as Secretary, so he was in a position to do that. He had all those loyal folks over at the White House still working for him in effect. Brent Scowcroft had been there as his Deputy, and saw eye-to-eye with him on most issues. And now he had all this machinery he could mobilize as he saw fit within the State Department. He negotiated the terms for a cease fire with the Soviets that set the stage for negotiations. He fought the Israelis down when they wanted to persist in the war so as to complete the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army in the Sinai. He knew if that whole army was captured or destroyed the Egyptians would be so humiliated and so defeated that it would detract from post-war diplomatic opportunities. And in this case the Israelis backed down. In essence, the war ended on a no-victor, no-loser note which was important for what transpired. Kissinger got talks going at Kilometer 101 in Sinai, which led to a more stable cease fire. Then talks began under U.S.-Soviet auspices in Geneva. The Soviets were then firmly moved out of the picture and Kissinger took over the negotiations himself. He achieved three agreements: the first Sinai agreement, the agreement for disengagement on the Syrian front, and finally the Sinai II agreement for a further stage of withdrawal. So it was a notable achievement. But with the Sinai II agreement the potential for further progress along these lines was exhausted. You could not carry this slice-of-territory for slice-of-peace concept any further. The Sinai II agreement was a victory but it had its costs for American policy in the form of an ill-considered undertaking never to deal with the PLO which plagued our policy for the next ten years. Kissinger agreed to that. The Israelis got very tough -- said they were not going to agree to the Sinai agreement without this assurance and he ended up giving them that. And then I went off to the United Arab Emirates at about this point.

ARTHUR R. DAY

Consul General

Jerusalem (1972-1975)

Arthur R. Day was born and raised in New Jersey. He served in the U.S. Naval Air Corps during World War II. Upon completion of his military service, Mr. Day received a master’s degree from Chicago University. His Foreign Service career
included positions at the Palestine Desk, the National War College, United Nations Affairs, and in Japan. Mr. Day was interviewed by John A. McKesson in 1990.

Q: What did CCD stand for?

DAY: Conference for ? No one ever remembered what CCD stood for. It was a subordinate UN body to negotiate arms control on a less than full UN membership basis. It began with fifteen, then moved up to eighteen, then became at some point twenty-one. The interesting thing about it was, I thought, it was under the chairmanship of the US and Soviets and it worked quite well, oddly enough, partially because on arms control, especially at that level (this was not strategic arms control, these were things like the nuclear proliferation treaty which had been negotiated just before I got into that business, the treaty to ban biological weapons, the treaty to ban mass destruction weapons on the seabed) on these somewhat subordinate issues we and the Soviets found ourselves often on the same side as opposed to the Third World non-nuclear powers. Consequently the joint management of that body worked quite well and we, on the American side, and our counterparts on the Russian side, became quite close associates, friends to some extent, people I have followed over the years and met in other places. It showed what we are now seeing on a much larger scale, where the interests are now common, how we and the Soviets could work together quite effectively. They had some first class diplomats, quite as good as we certainly, and they and we together ran a relatively tight ship.

EDWARD G. ABINGTON

Political Officer

Tel Aviv (1972-1975)

Mr. Abington was born in Texas into a US military family and was raised in military posts in the US and abroad. An Arabic language officer and specialist in Near East Affairs, he describes his experience dealing with Israel-Arab hostilities and general regional problems while serving as Political Officer at Embassies Tel Aviv and Damascus. In his postings at the State Department in Washington, he also dealt with Near East matters. Mr. Abington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Did you find yourself feeling the affects of the political realities in the U.S. of particularly the pro-Israeli elements? Or was this an undercurrent that everybody understood?

ABINGTON: It seemed to me that it was not so much an issue. The bigger issue was the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Kissinger was Secretary of State. We were allied with the Israelis while the Soviets were allied with Egypt and Syria. We tended to look at matters much more in a Cold War framework than in terms of a pro-Israeli U.S. policy. That was the intellectual framework that Henry Kissinger laid out while Secretary of State. Of course, this whole dynamic changed with the 1973 war.

Q: Those are attack planes.
ABINGTON: Yes, although the Phantom jet was used both for air superiority and ground support. The Israelis desperately needed certain spare parts that could be flown in with these aircraft. They needed certain kinds of ammunition, particularly armor piercing tank ammunition which came in. The U.S. flew in a few APCs and tanks but that was more of a symbolic gesture. It received a lot of publicity both in Israel and internationally. Of course, there was the international dimension to the support of the United States. Kissinger and Nixon framed this issue in a Cold War-U.S.-Soviet framework. They felt that it was essential that the U.S. stand behind its ally in the region, Israel, while the Soviet Union was supporting Syria and Egypt. So, the symbolism of the U.S. sending APCs and tanks to Israel by air was important as a sign of U.S. commitment, but the impact upon the Israeli military was non-existent. It was during this period... I have to emphasize that the show was really run out of Washington by Kissinger, who worked hard during this period to bring about a cease-fire, a very delicate task because the Egyptians and the Syrians initially resisted a cease-fire because they were advancing. The Israelis wanted one. The tide started to turn first in the Sinai. General Ariel Sharon played a key role in the tank battles that took place down in the Sinai. There was one particular tank battle at a place called the Chinese Farm, so called because there is a Chinese agricultural project there, which was one of the largest tank battles in history. It was a decisive battle from the Israeli point of view. They blunted the Egyptian attack in the Sinai. They moved to secure a foothold on the other side of the Suez Canal. They gradually expanded that foothold and surrounded and put at risk the Egyptian Third Army, a very sizeable force. Having gained control of the battlefield in the Sinai, the Israelis turned their attention to the Golan. In the Golan, the fiercest tank battles took place. It was over a very small territorial unit, which made it even fiercer. The Syrians came very, very close to breaking the Israeli lines and to bringing their tanks down from the Golan Heights into northern Israel and very close to seizing a key bridge across a river down in the Hula Valley, which would have been very devastating for the Israelis if that had taken place. But the ability to control the battlefield in the Sinai allowed the Israelis to shift armor up to the Golan. Israelis also gradually gained air superiority in both the Sinai and the Golan. It allowed the Israelis to hold on to the Golan Heights. But it was a close call for the Israelis in the Golan.

Q: After a cease-fire came into existence, what were we seeing in Israel?

ABINGTON: One has to recall that the cease-fire came about as a result of Kissinger’s negotiations with the Soviets. Kissinger went to Moscow and worked out the details of a cease-fire acceptable to both sides and a Security Council resolution, 338, which called for a cease-fire and for a political settlement. The Israelis’ feeling was mixed. On the one hand, they had really been bloodied very badly with very serious casualties, the worst since 1948 when Israel became independent, the worst casualties of any conflict, and they had been badly damaged by the Egyptians and the Syrians both in terms of people killed and wounded as well as equipment destroyed. On the other hand, I think that the Israelis at this point had really put the Egyptians under tremendous pressure. Some elements of the IDF and the political establishment thought that Israel should continue fighting against Egypt to destroy the Egyptian Third Army and to push the Egyptians out of the Bar Lev Line and out of the Sinai. But then this became wrapped up in power politics and in Cold War politics. The Soviet Union made it clear that an Israeli military move against Egyptian forces along the lines I just described would meet some unspecified Soviet response. This led to a tremendous amount of international tension. It caused President Nixon to increase the overall readiness of U.S. military forces around the world to a much higher stage. And it raised concern that the conflict, particularly the Egyptian-Israeli
conflict, could lead to U.S.-Soviet military involvement. As a result, the stakes increased tremendously. Because of that, Kissinger and Nixon made it quite clear to the Israeli leadership that there had to be a cease-fire. There were assurances from Kissinger that the U.S. would be very mindful of Israeli security requirements and concerns. I think that that had been clearly demonstrated by the support both political and military that the U.S. had given Israel with the outbreak of the conflict. There was a clear commitment that there would be additional U.S. military assistance to Israel and there would be an expedited resupply of military equipment to make up for the losses that the Israelis had suffered. So, Israel accepted the cease-fire somewhat but not too reluctantly. Kissinger flew from Moscow to Tel Aviv and it was a six to eight-hour stop to brief the Israelis. Then he went on to Cairo to meet with President Sadat and to brief him as well. That was the 22nd or 23rd of October. The fighting stopped, although there were sporadic outbreaks, particularly in the Sinai or in Egypt proper across the canal, where there continued to be periodic low level fighting. The Egyptian Third Army, which at that point had been totally surrounded… The Israelis kept up their military pressure and this continued to be a real flashpoint. The United States had to work out resupply arrangements and put some serious pressure on the Israelis to allow food and fuel and so forth to go to the Egyptian Third Army. Sadat was absolutely concerned that the Israelis would try to destroy the Third Army. He was appealing for Soviet and American help to keep that from happening. Kissinger and others realized the seriousness of that situation and pressed Israel very hard not to take further action against the Third Army.

SAMUEL W. LEWIS
Ambassador
Israel (1977-1984)

Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis was born in Texas on October 1, 1930. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University. His career included positions in Naples, Florence, Rio de Janeiro, Kabul, and an ambassadorship to Israel. Ambassador Lewis was interviewed by Peter Jessup on August 9, 1988.

Q: Were there any people in the American embassy or American friends that you had who knew Begin at all?

That first month or two was filled with trying to understand the way the complicated Israeli political scene works, meeting as many politicians as I could possibly encounter. There were lots of occasions, presenting my credentials to the President Katzir, calling on Foreign Minister Allon formally. He was still in office at that time, and he was still in a very grungy mood about the elections. He was blaming Jimmy Carter for not having been more cooperative on some arms sales issues to Israel during the period of the campaign and undermining Labor's traditional argument that the Labor Party knew how to work with the United States and that Begin would destroy U.S.-Israeli relations. He was really quite upset. He lectured me for about an hour on the topic of the United States and all of the mistakes that Carter had made and how dreadful the outcome of the election would be for the U.S. and Israel both.
Some months later, after he had long since cooled down, in a reflective moment he admitted to me that Labor had beaten itself. It certainly wasn't the Americans that had done them in. But he still contended that the U.S. policies during that spring, the first months of the Carter Administration had cost Labor two or three or four seats maybe. But since they lost overwhelmingly by ten or fifteen seats, it was clear that Labor's downfall was the final act in a long, slow decline that they'd been going through ever since the end of the Yom Kippur war, corruption, the resignation of Rabin, and a general sense of tired blood that the party demonstrated by that time in dealing with Israel's problems.

Q: Was he as persuasive in personal conversation as was as a parliamentarian?

The month of September and early October was a period of high drama because the Soviet Union was very much interested in participating in the international conference -- the Administration had concluded that it was important and necessary to include them as co-conveners as had been the case of the first Geneva Conference in 1973. Vance had negotiated very secretively with the Russians about a statement of principles upon which the conference would be convened. The statement was general enough so that all parties could accept as a basis for the conference. It had been Carter's original thought that he would be able to get Begin's and others' agreement to such a statement. It didn't happen during the Begin visit, but Vance went ahead and ultimately did achieve an agreement with the Soviets on a joint USSR-US declaration in September, 1977. Then suddenly it became known by the Israelis that this agreement had been reached. They were outraged and particularly Begin. There was a great deal of boiling up of emotions in Jerusalem. The statement became public in Washington through a leak. It was the season when various leaders go to New York for the UN General Assembly meeting -- that is when Secretaries of State spend long periods of time in New York meeting all the foreign visitors. Dayan was coming to the General Assembly to represent Israel in the general political debate. He was very concerned by the impact on Begin that the joint US-Soviet declaration made and the implications that we and the Russians were conspiring behind Israel's back to sell them out. That is the way Begin and many Israelis interpreted our efforts. They had never been informed about our negotiations with the Russians though we were in daily contact with Israel both in Jerusalem and in Washington.

Q: Didn't you comment that they were aware of the events?

LEWIS: We now know in retrospect that they were pretty well informed about the PLO negotiations, which aborted. But as far as I know, they didn't have any warning about the US-USSR talks. Anyway, it certainly seemed to come as a shock to them. Dayan, who was highly regarded by Vance and Carter and who was viewed as a moderating influence on Begin and someone with whom we could work in a diplomatic fashion more easily than Begin (because of the latter's rhetorical and legalistic style) had some long meetings in New York with Vance and eventually got Vance to agree to something that was to become known as "the US-Israeli working paper". This was a sort of modification of the joint US-USSR statement -- it was an agreed interpretation by the US and Israel of the meaning of that statement. It was reassuring to the Israelis. Of course, this "working paper" immediately also became public.

Q: Not on purpose?
LEWIS: Not officially, anyway. But I think the leaks were certainly deliberate. Actually, I believe that when Dayan informed Begin of the agreement he had reached with Vance, Begin was quite upset with him. He felt that Dayan had not been tough enough and had not gone far enough. He wanted the US-USSR agreement canceled. But Dayan stood by his guns and ultimately Begin acquiesced, but this episode did cause a fair amount of bad blood between them. This was the first of a number of situations that developed in the next two years in which Dayan, determined to avoid collapse of the negotiation, would on his own go work out some arrangement or some formulation which he would then insist Begin accept. Begin didn't like that; he would have preferred to keep the strings in his own hands. Yet he needed Dayan very badly and perhaps in his heart-of-hearts, he wanted the results that Dayan was trying to achieve. But these situations created an increasing distrust of Dayan's free wheeling and independence. Ultimately, this was one of the issues that led to Dayan's resignation in 1979.

The public release of that "working paper" apparently had a very negative effect on a number of other Arab states, which had been pleased with the US-USSR statement, and particularly on Sadat. There is real disagreement on Sadat's view of this period. Hermann Eilts, then Ambassador to Egypt, gives one well informed view. Some of the Israelis have a very different view based on things Sadat said to them after he came to Jerusalem and they were in direct touch. A number of the Israeli participants in these events -- Dayan, Weizman, Begin -- became convinced, after they finally met Sadat months later and they had discussed what had occurred during this period and what led him to make his decision, that it was the signing of the US-USSR agreement that became the most important trigger to Sadat's decision to take a new direction towards dealing directly with the Israelis. Sadat felt that having kicked the Russians out of Egypt and having put a lot of confidence in Carter, he was suddenly confronted by having the Russians back in the middle of the diplomatic equation. He did not relish that. Hermann Eilts says that he does not think this version of history is correct. He thinks that, in fact, initially the Egyptians' reaction to the joint statement was quite favorable. They thought it would set a good framework for the international conference, but it was the issue of the "working paper" two or three days later which brought Sadat up short, for he interpreted that paper to signify that Israel's weight in Washington was so strong that they would be able to turn Carter around rather readily. This left the Egyptians believing that relying on the US and the Soviet Union to achieve Egypt's objectives was not such a wise move. In view of the demonstration of Israel's diplomatic strength in Washington, Sadat decided to deal directly with the Israelis and to get to the heart of the argument. I don't know which of these theories are right, but most experts and historians who have written about this period agree with Eilts on his view of events. But there is some evidence to support the Israeli theory. Sadat did not relish the idea of having the Russians play a central role for he knew that they were close to the Syrians and the PLO and they didn't care much for him after he had thrown them out of the country. To have them as a central player may have been disadvantageous to Egypt's interest as contrasted to the interests of other Arab states.

During Haig's visit, on April 5 he met for the first time with the whole Israeli Cabinet. First Haig and I met with Begin in his small private office, which was standard practice. In the meantime, the Cabinet was assembling in a conference room next door. This room is identical to the Cabinet room which is right above it. That meeting was fascinating; Haig gave the whole Israeli Cabinet the philosophy of the new Reagan administration. The Secretary was very sympathetic to Israel; he had greatly admired its military forces and had many Israeli friends from his previous government services. So he was regarded very sympathetically in Israel. Moreover, the
new administration had begun with a view of the Middle East quite different from Carter. It saw the region almost exclusively through Cold War lenses. So while concerned about the Israeli-Arab problem, it viewed that situation as essentially a side show; Israel was our ally while many Arab countries were allied with the Soviets. Carter had addressed the conflict as a *sui generis* problem which was only in small part influenced by the USSR-US competition. Certainly, in the early part of the Reagan administration, the President and the Secretary and others viewed the Middle East through an entirely different set of prisms. Syria was clearly seen as a Soviet ally or satellite. That influenced U.S. views on Lebanon and the Syrian role in that country and led Haig to view the Lebanese situation in the same way that Begin did. They both saw bad Syria beating up on the poor downtrodden Maronite Christians, with the Soviet Union in the background trying to humiliate Israel, a U.S. ally. Haig, during his visit, said publicly in a press conference that a strong Israel could play a strong role against the threat of the Soviet Union and its many surrogates. That was music to Begin's ears; he saw the Reagan administration as the kind of U.S. administration that Israel had been seeking for a long time. It did not regard Israel just as a bother or a ward or a client, but it viewed Israel as a genuine ally against the Soviet threat. Begin saw the Soviet threat in the same way.

Q: You have alluded to the severe depression that Begin experienced. Tell us more about that.

Earlier in the speech, I had also made a reference to Reagan when he became President and the situation existing at the time, which was not well received by the Reagan White House. I said: "One of the big problems that occurred in 1981 was that President Carter was defeated and then President Sadat was shot. That meant that two of the three men who had invested so much in making Camp David succeed were no longer players. Moreover, in our case, President Reagan came in with no personal stake in the success of his predecessor's administration and with a rather different view of the world, which I understand was described this morning by Professor Spiegel (Steve Spiegel had given a talk to the same group in the morning describing the differences between the Carter and Reagan's policies in the Middle East). I think it is quite relevant that the Reagan administration looked at the Middle East differently than the Carter administration. It looked at it in more "East-West" terms, needing more strategic alliances against the Soviets. They never repudiated Camp David. While the new administration had less than a fervent emotional commitment to complete the process, they certainly adopted it and increasingly, as time passed, they saw the virtues of not allowing it to die". That reference to Reagan's "less emotional commitment" to Camp David was picked up and condensed in a couple of the wire stories to read "U.S. Ambassador says that Reagan had less interest in the peace process", which isn't what I said. However, the real problem with the speech was the one sentence: "The timing was abysmal, the tactics were worse and the outcome, so far, nil." That was a wonderful piece of rhetoric that came out of my mouth spontaneously. I had not thought of it before, but it suddenly came forth as I was desperately trying to finish my remarks to head off to Jerusalem.

Q: I would like to turn for a moment to the group of observers that were stationed in the Sinai passes. You mentioned earlier the unfortunate demise of the head of that unit, Ray Hunt. I would like to know a little more about that program, how it got started and how it operated.

LEWIS: That operation was called the "Multi-National Force and Observers" (MFO). They idea rose from the stalemate that had occurred in the Security Council after the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. As we drafted that treaty, it was understood that the Israeli would insist that
an international force be placed in the buffer zone once they had withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula. They also insisted that, unlike the UN Peace-keeping Force that existed in Sinai between 1956 and 1967 (UNEF II) and which was withdrawn suddenly at Nasser's insistence, this new force had to be in the Sinai with a firm guarantee that it could not be withdrawn unless both Israel and Egypt agreed. As we drafted the peace treaty, we included a provision providing for a multi-national force of UN peace-keepers. But we were very much aware that the Soviets opposed the Camp David initiative and did not play any role whatsoever in that effort. We thought it very likely that they would veto in the Security Council any proposal to establish such a force. Nevertheless, the treaty calls for a UN peace-keeping force. Because we thought it highly unlikely that the Security Council would approve this provision, we drafted side letters for Carter to provide to Begin and Sadat, assuring them that the U.S. would see to the provision of a multi-national force outside the UN framework, if the Security Council could or would not approve it. As we suspected, the treaty, although widely approved by many countries, never received approval by the UN. That was one of the UN derelictions that have annoyed me since Camp David. The Soviets made it eminently clear that if any resolution relating to the peace treaty were brought before the Security Council, they would veto it. The US, for reasons that I then and now believe were quite erroneous, didn't challenge the Soviets. I always thought it would have been much better to table a resolution of support for the peace treaty, including a mandate for a peace-keeping force, and leave it up to the Soviets to exercise their veto against a very popular agreement. They would have had to accept an international onus for their veto, but the US government decided not to force the issue. So the peace treaty never had a UN blessing until many years later.

Upon signing of the treaty, we started to form a peace-keeping force, outside the UN framework, as we had promised to do. We decided to use a UN force as a model, but to use a somewhat different structure. Michael Sterner, then Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA, was assigned to lead the negotiations between the three major countries involved: Israel, Egypt and the US. He was supposed to come up with a formula for a multinational force which would satisfy the requirements spelled out in the peace treaty and which would satisfy the Israelis who were the ones that were insisting on a force. Egypt really didn't want a force in Sinai, but Israel would not have signed the treaty without it.

WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN
Deputy Chief of Mission
Tel Aviv, Israel (1979-1982)

Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the “Holloway Program” which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as
well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.

Q: A question while you're on that subject. Did you find yourself having to work out of trying to equate your experience, particularly in the Soviet Union and in Far Eastern countries? I've seen people come to posts with a pre-set idea of how things are done. It sometimes takes a while almost to unlearn those instincts and develop new ones.

BROWN: The situation in the Middle East, as various of your contributors have pointed out, has always been very intense. During this time it was at a peak of that intensity and was to remain so during my period of service in Israel. You really didn't have time to consider the baggage that you might be carrying. You just worked at the situation, day and night.

Let's go back to my Soviet experience. You could argue that my Soviet experience had some relevance to my service in the Middle East. However, I was fascinated by Ambassador Sam Lewis' account of the argument over the issue of the Geneva Peace Conference proposal, which was a Carter initiative which surfaced in 1977. This led to a U.S.-Soviet bilateral declaration in September, 1977. As Ambassador Sam Lewis points out, Secretary of State Vance had negotiated with the Soviets very secretly to produce that bilateral declaration. I must add that this was done so secretly that, despite my being Political Counselor in Moscow, I had no idea that this effort was going on, until it was announced. I don't recall any role of mine whatsoever in any aspect of those negotiations.

The Israelis, of course, were outraged because, they felt that this negotiation was conducted behind their backs. Ambassador Sam Lewis notes that, to this day, I guess, there remains a real disagreement as to what Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's true feelings were on this issue. Ambassador Lewis says that Hermann Eilts, at that time our Ambassador to Egypt, thought that, initially, Sadat liked the idea of the U.S.-Soviet joint statement, with its clear implication that an international conference on the Middle East would be held. However, the Egyptians reportedly then became upset when they became aware of the U.S.-Israeli working paper, which put a gloss on it and which aroused Egyptian fears that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin would somehow be able to manipulate President Carter at the expense of Egyptian President Sadat.

In any event, by the end of September, 1977, the very month when that bilateral declaration was made, the chances of a Middle East conference had just about evaporated, although President Carter continued to push the idea until President Sadat suddenly went off to Jerusalem in November, 1977. This trip by President Sadat came as a bombshell for the Carter administration. You may recall my previous account of the trip by Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Phil Habib to Moscow to try to persuade Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet leaders that this was a surprise for us. Gromyko, in his usual biting, sarcastic manner, said to Phil Habib: “Mr. Habib, I can barely restrain myself from laughing in your face.”

BRANDON H. GROVE Jr.

Consul General

Jerusalem (1980-1983)
Ambassador Brandon Grove Jr. was born in Chicago in 1929 and lived in Hamburg, Germany at the time of Hitler’s rise to power. Before Germany invaded Poland, his father was transferred to Holland and later to Madrid in 1940. He attended Fordham University and later Bard College and Princeton University. His Foreign Service career took him to such places as the Ivory Coast, India, West Berlin, and Jerusalem as well as an ambassadorship to Zaire.

The fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed, and Syria and the PLO had therefore lost its support, made the decisive difference. With Cold War competition over, Russia and the United States saw their interests beginning to converge and joined forces in the Middle East. The Madrid Conference broke the downward spiral in Arab-Israeli relations, although beyond its symbolism in post-Cold War realignments, it amounted to little more than a new format for old problems. In the Middle East, however, formats matter. The struggles between Israelis and Palestinians are not in the main religious, but secular. They are about land, water, security, dignity, and freedom in its many forms. Whose land, today, is the West Bank and Gaza, and whose city is Jerusalem? By what rights--biblical, historical, conquest, deed, use or occupation--do these lands belong to Arabs or Jews?

Progress toward peace was made under the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles, signed on the White House lawn one hot September day by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, soon to be assassinated as Sadat had been, and PLO President Yasser Arafat. The accords had been reached without US participation or knowledge. At the White House ceremony on the lawn, I watched these former adversaries hesitate--and then shake hands, and I joined in the emotional ovation. With President Clinton standing in the middle, as Carter had stood with Begin and Sadat, the scene rekindled a fragile flame of hope.

PHILLIP C. WILCOX, JR.
Consul General

Phillip C. Wilcox, Jr. was born in Colorado in 1937. He received his bachelor’s degree from Williams College in 1958 and then immediately after received his law degree from Stanford University in 1961. After graduation he went and taught in Sierra Leone from 1961-1963. During his Foreign Service career he had positions in Laos, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Washington D.C., and Jerusalem. Mr. Wilcox was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1998.

Q: Was there a let down, a disappointment. Iraq collapsed rather quickly. I mean there was supposed to be this great battle, and it turned out that the Iraqis didn't stand up to the allied forces at all, although Saddam Hussein maintained it so. I would have thought that you would on the part of the people in East Jerusalem and the West bank had invested quite a lot of emotional capital in this. Did you see a let down?

WILCOX: There was deep despair. There had been this euphoria, an unrealistic view that somehow the Arab world, the Islamic world would rally to Saddam Hussein. The U.S. victory created a sense of disappointment, and political defeat. By that time the Intifada, which had caused great suffering, was faltering, and it was clear that the Israelis would not yield to the
Palestinians. Israeli repression, economic restrictions, various forms of collective punishment had been effective in blunting the Intifada. Intermecine rivalries among the Palestinians also played a part. And radical Palestinian groups began killing other Palestinians for political reasons, and to settle scores. It was an ugly business. The early sense of hope and euphoria had faded. So, at the end of the Gulf War, whereas the Intifada had inspired a sense of sort of hope and confidence earlier, this spirit was replaced by disillusionment.

It was at this time that Bush administration recognized the opportunity which the victory of the U.S. in the Gulf and the fall of the Soviet Union offered for a resurrection of the peace process. Bush and Baker seized the moment, using the greatly enhanced power of the U.S. and the favorable new geo-political situation to launch a new peace initiative, and they did so in a very determined way.

Q: What was your impression of Secretary Baker's engagement, and this was really his first time. I mean we had the collapse of the Soviet Union which was enough on anyone's plate, and in a way he was sort of dragged in to this thing by the Gulf War.

WILCOX: The collapse of the Soviet Union was as you say a factor in emerging American supremacy, and it greatly enhanced our diplomatic leverage in dealing with the Middle East where the Soviets were no longer a factor on behalf of the radical Arabs.

WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN

Ambassador

Israel (1988-1992)

Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the “Holloway Program” which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.

Q: Then this involves the nuclear capability of the weapons system.

Shortly thereafter there was a U.S. request for a responsible Israeli to go and see Dennis Ross and Secretary of State Baker quietly. Dan Meridor was a brilliant young minister in the Shamir Government from a prestigious Likud-Herut family. Meridor nominally went to Washington for some other purpose but came back with a letter from Baker containing three, basic questions that were to set the scene for subsequent discussions. They were: 1) Was Israel willing to seek a permanent solution to Arab-Israeli problems, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, that is, embodying the concept of exchanging territory for peace? 2) Was Israel willing to attend a regional conference to be co-hosted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union was
still nominally intact, but by now it was very much weakened. 3) Would the Israelis agree to a moderate-sized, Palestinian Delegation to consist of seven members or so which would not include people from East Jerusalem nor deportees? That harks back to the earlier 1989-90 debate on what kind of Palestinian the Israelis would be willing to deal with.

Those three questions were what the Israeli Government was now faced with. The answers were expected to be “Yes or No.” Understandably, the Israelis were divided among themselves. Remember that Prime Minister Shamir had now brought into the government some ultra-Right types, including representatives of Tsomet, headed by Raful Eyetan, former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, and “Moledet,” which had either two or three members in the Knesset [Israeli Parliament]. Moledet's leader was Ze'evi, whose solution for dealing with the Palestinian Arabs was to transfer them elsewhere. That is, send them to Jordan or wherever. Those groups vociferously denounced this whole idea, from the very beginning, as a sellout which would lead to perdition.

Korea

DAVID E. MARK
Political Advisor, U.S. Forces
Seoul (1946-1949)

Ambassador David E. Mark graduated from Columbia University in 1943. Shortly after completing a year of their law school, he was drafted into the U.S. Army. Ambassador Mark has also served in Korea, Germany, Romania, Switzerland, Burundi, and various other post at the State Department in Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Henry Precht on July 28, 1989.

MARK: There was a day, probably around November, maybe late October, in 1946 when we were all notified where we were going, and I was told that I was going to Seoul, Korea. And I said, "Oh, my God. I'll never learn that language."

And someone, who, I guess, had looked into it, said to me, "Don't worry. They have an alphabet." Well, it's true. The Korean language does have an alphabet, which now is used much more than it ever was in those days. But basically it is an East Asian language, structurally, syntactically very close to Japanese but with a totally different vocabulary.

I was in a little two-man Office of the Political Advisor to the Commanding General of U.S. forces in Korea; I was to be the second man. I didn't know it at the time I left. There was a third man, a captain in the Army who had been loaned to the Office because he had been a Foreign Service auxiliary at an earlier point and who later on became a Foreign Service officer himself -- I think ending up as our consul in Perth, Australia many years later.

But in any case, my chief was William Langdon, who was one of the real old-time heroes of the Japanese language service; he had served at various posts in Japan and even in China during the war at one point. I think he was, until the Japanese came in, Consul General at Mukden. But, in
any case, at this point he was in Korea and trying to influence the course of Korean politics, which was difficult because our military was in control and it was not particularly interested in the subtleties of Korean politics. They were much more concerned about the fact that the Soviet Union had occupied the northern half of the country.

We were installed in what had been the Consul General's house. Seoul had been one of the consulates general under Tokyo before the war, and we had a nice compound in the center of the city with a lovely old-style house that I believe is still used by the American ambassador, plus a little office down near the gate to the compound. That is not used as an office now. There is now a big embassy building up on the main boulevard. But in 1946 we were the only diplomatic establishment -- just the two of us. The head of the Office did high politics and told me about them. I began to learn. I was engaged in everything else, which included a little bit of administration, such as it was. We had one very faithful, loyal Korean employee, who had held out even during the war under a lot of pressure by the Japanese. There was a good bit of consular work from people trying to emigrate to the United States -- in those days under the Oriental Exclusion Act. No Koreans could hope to go as immigrants, but there were a lot of white Russians and others in Korea at the time.

Indeed, that got me into a most traumatic personal incident. One white Russian lady, maybe in her late twenties at the time, wanted to emigrate to the States and was trying to get on the quota which existed for non-Orientals who were born in Korea. That quota was substantially open, and she brought me some documents indicating her birth in Korea. But, evidently, a female rival of hers said, "Well, that's not true. Like the rest of us, she was born in China."

I didn't know what to do about this since the documents were inconclusive, and I thought, as an ex-lawyer, that the best thing to do was to bring both of them together in my office and have them confront each other, which I did. The shouting deteriorated to the point where one of them fainted dead away on the floor, so I decided that was not a proper tactic to use.

I also began to get into a little bit of what is now USIA work, but all of this was peripheral, as I say, to learning about what seemed to be the most interesting, namely the politics of the occupation and how the State Department and my boss, Bill Langdon, were really trying to prevent a right-wing victory among the Korean groups as we moved toward independence which occurred in August 1948.

The military's first interest, as I said, was the Soviet Union and their forces, and second was our efforts to create a unified government for Korea, North and South. I think it was the December 1945 meeting of the British, French, American, and Soviet foreign ministers that had laid down a plan for a joint commission on Korea. The joint commission, American and Soviet, was to meet either in Seoul or Pusan, or both, to try to work out a unified government for the country under some form of very tenuous, unspecified trusteeship that was to be operated by the two superpowers. The trusteeship was to cover the whole country, because it was to be a unified regime. The problems of convening the joint commission were fairly serious, but that actually happened in 1946 at some point.

In any event, the problem was that, in order to form a united Korean regime, we had to consult with various Korean groups. The Soviets immediately laid down a condition that consultation should only take place with those Korean groups which supported the Allied plan, including the
indefinite trusteeship of Korea. There was a very small Soviet liaison office in Seoul, because
that was to be the headquarters for the joint commission. Well, in any case, the thing broke down
essentially, because all of the South Korean groups -- virtually all of the South Korean groups,
particularly those on the right, and therefore favored by the Americans -- were against
trusteeship. They said, "We want to become an independent country, and we don't want to have
the United States and the Soviet Union telling us what to do after we become independent." And
the Soviets, as I said, indicated that you couldn't deal with such people because they weren't
accepting the plan laid out by the Allies. So the thing broke down.

Nevertheless, the American-Soviet negotiations continued to try to get the thing started again.
And, I think early in 1947, they agreed on a new formula that was going to get around this
difficulty. The formula had some words that did not allow the rightist groups in the South to
express what they felt about trusteeship, but did say that they were adhering to an understanding
reached by the Soviet and American governments, thereby leaving unclear just how they felt
about trusteeship, even though everyone knew that they were against it.

The next meeting of the Soviets and the Americans in the joint commission, which took place in
the spring of 1947, these groups began testifying before the joint commission as to what their
aspirations were for Korea and how they hoped a government would be set up. But the Soviets
immediately began challenging them again saying, "Well, deep down in your hearts you are still
against the trusteeship agreement." And, although we tried to work out modifications of the
formula, the thing definitively broke down at that point.

Of course, the Soviets had been developing the North along their lines very assiduously from the
beginning, and they even set up a provisional government there in February 1946. When we
arrived in Korea in September 1945, the Japanese were still there and had been there for three or
four weeks after the surrender of Japan. The Koreans, in the meantime, or some Koreans, had
begun to form groups of one sort or another to fill the political vacuum.

The most prominent group was, as it turned out, a sort of center-left grouping that had formed
something called People's Committees, and the People's Committees in different places added up
to some sort of central authority. It was very amorphous, tenuous, but, nevertheless, when our
military came in, it immediately disliked the name People's Committees because that was what
the Soviets were implanting in Eastern Europe, and it sounded suspiciously as if these were
communist entities.

Now, the People's Committees existed in the North, too. The Soviets found them when they got
there. What the Soviets did was to keep the People's Committees, but purge them of all of the
non-communist elements. What we did in the South was to argue against the legitimacy of these
groups, and we gradually forced them to dissolve or forced them to transform themselves into a
political party of some name, while we set up a government which essentially used the sort of
structure that the Japanese had had. We, in contrast to the Soviets did not purge these groups of
anti-Western elements because we made the political groups become a party, rather than keep
them on as a semblance of a government or authorities. As I said we set up authorities along the
structure that the Japanese had left behind.

When the second round of the US-USSR joint commission failed in the summer of 1947, it was
clear that Washington wanted to get some indigenous authority established in our part of Korea.
So we then began moving toward legitimizing elections that could be held in the South to create a South Korean government. Indeed, we even got a U.N. resolution passed. The idea of going to a separate government in South Korea had a little independent evolutionary history as the alternative left over when the idea of creating a joint government for the North and South collapsed.

Of course, all through this period we were debating in Washington about whether we should maintain a long-term interest in Korea. This was argued out in what was the predecessor of the National Security Council, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and the decision was made not to include Korea in our security periphery. And I believe it was later in 1947 that Dean Acheson made a speech in which he clearly indicated that the mainland, including Korea -- all parts of it -- was not going to be in effect defended within our security perimeters. But, of course, Korea soon came to be part of our general strategic of our interest zones in the Far East. The idea of not including Korea within our security perimeter made it all the more urgent that we at least leave South Korea with some kind of independent government, independent regime.

We had already had so many disappointments in Europe that were much more prominent in the minds of policy makers in Washington that the idea of a third round in Korea seemed most unpromising. Besides, the Berlin Airlift started. In other words, the blockade of Berlin started in the summer of 1947, and therefore the idea of collaborating with the Soviets became even more remote.

In early 1949, we in the Embassy had no sense that an invasion from the North was a real danger. We had had this one episode in October 1948, but nobody could know that this was part, or maybe a feeler, for a larger effort. In retrospect it's easy to see why. The Cold War was heating up all over. The Berlin Airlift was going on. The Soviets were facing the problem of how to deal with our airlift. In Europe they clearly did not want to start a war over it, and ultimately passed messages in March or April 1949 indicating they wanted a face-saving way out, which came in the summer of 1949. They had lost face by it. But clearly they were thinking of other places in which they could show that they were able to conduct a cold war and indeed gain successes.

Korea must have been a great temptation, particularly after we had announced our intention to pull out and had excluded it from our security perimeter, without even voicing any words of conditionality or contingency in that regard. They had built up a force in the North -- an indigenous force that was much better than the one in the South and had active Soviet Red Army backing. The North is about half the population size of the South, but that wasn't very important because it had mobilized a large part of the population and had equipped it well. We had not done that in the South. The South was not a totalitarian state. The government was authoritarian to be sure, but there were still dissident elements in the South. The North probably felt that it had latent support among groups that had originally been pro-trade union, pro-general strike, pro-communist, and therefore they may have expected a major Southern uprising. Objectively, the North could not have had basis to fear that it would be invaded from the South. But rhetorically, yes. The Syngman Rhee government was totally hostile to the North. Kim Il Sung, the venerable leader who is still there, had already made his appearance. The talk in the South was, of course, that this was a usurping communist government and in the North that the ambitions of the South were very clear. But objectively speaking, the South forces were not ready and the United States was still present.
I should say that the Soviet army pulled out of North Korea, I believe, in 1948, but it had, in its several years there, built up this very strong force which was a lot stronger than the South. I don't remember what the Soviets may have said about their security backing for the North Korean regime. We were well aware of Soviet supplying military advisors, if not de facto commanders, down even to the company level in the North Korean forces. There was not a Chinese role at the time, because the Chinese had just concluded their own civil war in 1949, but the Soviets and Chinese were cooperating at the time. The frontier in the North was a friendly frontier for the Chinese, but they had their hands full with their own problems.

Pakistan

DAVID D. NEWSOM
Information Officer, USIS
Karachi (1947-1950)

David D. Newsom was born in California in 1918. He graduated from the University of California in 1938 and from Columbia University in 1940. He served overseas in the U.S. Navy from 1942 to 1946 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. He served in many countries including Pakistan, Iraq, the United Kingdom, Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 17, 1991.

Q: Later our relationship with Pakistan became a very political one because we used it as a balance to India in a Cold War context. You were there at the beginning. What was our attitude towards Pakistan and India at the time?

NEWSOM: The attitudes of the Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi reflected the views of their respective "clients". When we got together, the conversation was as argumentative as the discussions between the two countries. Tom Simons, who was the INR man in Karachi, had an academic background and was a specialist in South Asia. He conducted basic research. He had done similar work in Calcutta and therefore had a more balanced view than the partisans. But he was the exception. The rest of us thought that there was justification for partition in light of the persecution that the Muslims had encountered, but we were of course under the intense emotional barrage of the Muslims refugees who had fled from India.

The relations between Pakistan and the US in those years were difficult because of the public perception in this country, primarily of Gandhi and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder and first President of Pakistan. I remember having to deal with the American press covering Jinnah's death in September, 1948. When Gandhi was assassinated, the American papers were of course filled with highly laudatory comments. When Jinnah died, he was seen as austere, inflexible and a man who had done great damage to India by his insistence of partition. That attitude was not the official attitude, but this view was reflected in the American press -- The New York Times, The Herald Tribune and the other newspapers that we used to receive at the time. Our personal relationship with government officials were good. Washington's attitude was that given the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and given the Azerbaijani
events occurring near by, it was in our interest to build good relations with the new state of Pakistan.

My reference to the Azerbaijani events concerns an effort made in 1947 to create an independent republic of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran, with Soviet support. This would dismembered part of Iran. George Allen, then our ambassador in Tehran, took a very firm position, supported by Washington, that the US would not tolerate such action and we gave the Iranians moral support to squash that drive towards independence. That was one of the first thrusts and counter-thrusts of the Cold War. So Washington had those events very much in mind as we developed our policy toward Pakistan.

We were just at the beginning of our aid efforts. Truman's Inaugural speech, which launched the Point IV program -- a program of technical assistance -- together with our experience from the Greek-Turkish aid programs and the Marshall Plan, was the beginning of our world-wide assistance efforts. Pakistan was an early recipient of economic assistance and attention. While I was in Karachi, negotiations with Harvard University had begun. This contract was to collect a team of economists to review Pakistan's situation and to develop an economic strategy. West Pakistan was a potentially rich area, but partition had disrupted economic development and had changed a lot of the potential. There were also problems with the economic viability and prospects of East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh. So the US was one of the first Western powers to take an interest in Pakistan's economic future. I was not directly involved and don't remember all the details, but Pakistan was certainly one of the early recipients of US assistance in the Third World.

Q: The US was a country still in its segregation period. Did our treatment of the blacks get much Pakistan media attention?

NEWSOM: I don't remember that as being a major issue. We were dealing primarily with questions about US support for Israel, the US identification with colonial powers and the perception of a US more sympathetic to India than to Pakistan. Even the USSR's policies were not a major issue at the time.

Pakistan emerged as very sensitive to any comments around the world, including the US, about Islam. That was of course natural in light of its roots. Pakistan was the first country to try to awaken a Pan-Islamic fervor in the world. They sent Chabri Kalakusiman on a mission to other Muslim countries in 1948 to try to create a Pan-Islamic movement which did not have a particularly anti-American cast.

Q: How was the Pakistan press during the late 40's? Was it open or as in many other parts of the country, was it "for sale" to the highest bidders?

NEWSOM: I think it was a good press. We had good relationships with it. In contrast to the problems I faced in Iraq later, it was a very satisfying experience. Haltap Hussein, the editor of the leading newspaper in Karachi, Dawn, and I became good friends. We didn't always see eye-to-eye and he would occasionally write bitter editorials critical of US actions, but our relationship was not affected. We would periodically be able to place some of our material in Pakistani newspaper. In those years, the press had not become as venal as it may have become later, certainly in other countries.
Q: Later our relationship with Pakistan became a very political one because we used it as a balance to India in a Cold War context. You were there at the beginning. What was our attitude towards Pakistan and India at the time?

NEWSOM: The attitudes of the Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi reflected the views of their respective "clients". When we got together, the conversation was as argumentative as the discussions between the two countries. Tom Simons, who was the INR man in Karachi, had an academic background and was a specialist in South Asia. He conducted basic research. He had done similar work in Calcutta and therefore had a more balanced view than the partisans. But he was the exception. The rest of us thought that there was justification for partition in light of the persecution that the Muslims had encountered, but we were of course under the intense emotional barrage of the Muslims refugees who had fled from India.

The relations between Pakistan and the US in those years were difficult because of the public perception in this country, primarily of Gandhi and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder and first President of Pakistan. I remember having to deal with the American press covering Jinnah's death in September, 1948. When Gandhi was assassinated, the American papers were of course filled with highly laudatory comments. When Jinnah died, he was seen as austere, inflexible and a man who had done great damage to India by his insistence of partition. That attitude was not the official attitude, but this view was reflected in the American press -- *The New York Times,* *The Herald Tribune* and the other newspapers that we used to receive at the time. Our personal relationship with government officials were good. Washington's attitude was that given the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and given the Azerbaijani events occurring near by, it was in our interest to build good relations with the new state of Pakistan.

My reference to the Azerbaijani events concerns an effort made in 1947 to create an independent republic of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran, with Soviet support. This would dismembered part of Iran. George Allen, then our ambassador in Tehran, took a very firm position, supported by Washington, that the US would not tolerate such action and we gave the Iranians moral support to squash that drive towards independence. That was one of the first thrusts and counter-thrusts of the Cold War. So Washington had those events very much in mind as we developed our policy toward Pakistan.

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MAURICE WILLIAMS
Maurice Williams was born in Canada in 1920. At the age of five, Williams and his family moved to Kansas City, Missouri. After graduating high school in 1939, Williams attended Northwestern University. He was drafted into the army before being able to finish at Northwestern, but only to receive his Master’s Degree in 1949. Upon graduation, Williams had accepted a position with the State Department in Washington. He has served in Iran and Pakistan. The interview was conducted by W. Haven North on May 15, 1996.

Q: Was there a lot of resistance on the government's part or were they more or less party to it?

WILLIAMS: There was often resistance to change in the middle level of the bureaucracy. They were used to doing things in a very administratively controlled way, and change could be threatening to the sense of bureaucratic stability. It could also threaten patronage and the corruption involved in administrative controls. Implementation was often tough going. Progress was possible with the support of senior leadership; and we had the resources to help reduce the risks of reforms.

One of the most notable reforms we achieved in cooperation with the government was to liberalize the import regime. It was government controlled through import licenses and there was a lot of inefficiency and corruption in it. Import licenses were worth money and they were often traded as political favors.

In negotiations AID agreed to provide substantial additional program commodity import assistance as imports were shifted to an import license auction system and domestic agricultural price controls were lifted. PL 480 food imports would stabilize prices for consumers even as farmers gained incentives for increased production. And Pakistan was able to expand imports of essential raw materials in a market allocation system through auction of available foreign exchange. This not only reduced corruption but provided essential raw materials to the private sector. We provided several hundred million dollars of program loan support for that purpose.

It was a fairly significant reform, and we got a lot of credit in Washington from the development and academic communities. I mention the academic community because AID at that time drew heavily on the professional advice of academicians. I was called to Washington periodically for a review of the aid program to Pakistan, and Dave Bell as AID Administrator would be flanked by professors like Ed Mason, Gus Ranis and Hollis Chenery as principal advisors. Chenery at the time was at Harvard University, and would later become an AID Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program.

Q: Some of the greats of the development era.

WILLIAMS: Some of the greats who had made real contribution to development. And they were impressed with our progress in liberalizing the import regime as a support for private sector development. A freer import system favored industrial entrepreneurs who were emerging from the merchant class. We even did some initial planning for a stock market to help mobilize private capital.
Q: Was there much of a private sector then?

WILLIAMS: There were a number of wealthy families in Pakistan and a manufacturing sector developed initially in the processing of agricultural products, including cotton and jute textiles, as well as import substitution of consumer goods. An entrepreneurial class of talented merchants had migrated from Bombay and there was investment in many small machine and metal working shops as well as commercial ventures in banking and construction in the major cities. Manufacturing from an initial low level base was increasing at the rate of 15-20 per cent annually. A major constraint was raw material imports. So there was the potential for a vigorous private sector which needed encouragement and support. And commercial interests in private sector development had a major advocate in Minister of Finance Shoaib.

In 1963 the Pakistan Mission in Pakistan received an outstanding performance award from AID. It was an award to the entire Mission from Dave Bell as Administrator, and one that pleased us immensely.

In the ensuing period, there were increasing tensions between Pakistan and India, tensions which greatly complicated U.S. policy in the region. Pakistan as a member of CENTO had received substantial military assistance from the United States. India as a non-aligned country had received arms from the Soviet Union. President Kennedy's Administration had shifted aid policy from military security to large-scale economic development assistance for both India and Pakistan. Now, however, the Soviet Union was stepping-up the level of its aid to India in both armaments and industrial plants, and the U.S. was increasingly sympathetic to shaping the aid program to India as a counter to Soviet influence, both in terms of industrial plants and even selective military assistance.

In the view of the Pakistan Government these developments threatened to upset the military balance in the subcontinent. Pakistan sought U.S. aid for advanced armaments and a steel plant to match what the Soviet were providing India; however the Kennedy Administration was not prepared to meet these requests. Underlying the increasing tensions in the subcontinent was the unresolved Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India.

While the U.S. Government accepted India's non-alignment in the Cold War, it found the new posture of non-alignment by Pakistan totally unacceptable. President Johnson found particularly irritating Pakistan's criticism of U.S. military engagement in Vietnam.

In early 1965 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Walter McConaughy, was instructed to convey this message to President Ayub Khan. In order to underline the seriousness with which the U.S. viewed the matter, our Ambassador was further instructed to inform President Ayub that pending satisfactory assurances, the U.S. was suspending its economic assistance to Pakistan and postponing that year's scheduled meeting of the World Bank led-donor consortium for Pakistan.

TERESITA C. SCHAFFER
Deputy Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, & Bangladesh
Washington, DC (1979-1980)
Ambassador Schaffer was born in New York and later educated in France. She received her undergraduate degree from Bryn Mawr College and joined the Foreign Service. Her Foreign Service career took her to Israel, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Ambassador Schaffer was interviewed by Thomas Stern in September 1998.

SCHAFFER: Our major issue with Pakistan concerned their nuclear program. That was followed by the spillover from the USSR invasion of Afghanistan. Those two problem areas had a major effect on our bilateral economic relationship. Just before I started to work in PAB, the U.S. had, for the second time, cut off assistance to Pakistan because of its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. Pakistan has had a long history of economic challenges -- particularly the balance-of-payments problem. We kept pretty close track of that problem.

Over the course of the Fall of 1978, Afghanistan had been through a succession of crises. A Communist government had already taken over; it was not a very cohesive institution because of internal tensions. In December 1979, one Communist leader was assassinated and replaced by another. A few weeks later, on Christmas Day, came the Soviet invasion. For about two weeks prior, we were receiving lost of information about Soviet military build-up along the Afghan border. I think it was clear to all that something was about to happen. We held a series of discussions in rapid succession with the Pakistani Foreign Minister -- one before the invasion and two soon after. As it happened, Bob Peck was away for Christmas, leaving me in charge of PAB. At the highest level of our government, options for our response were being considered. One step that was taken was to dispatch Clark Clifford to New Delhi to brief the Indians on what was going on in Afghanistan and our thoughts about events there. Howie went along and I am sure you will find reference to that trip in his oral history. Clifford and he were the total delegation.

The second set of meetings, a few weeks later, followed roughly the same format as the first one, except that the Pakistani delegation was headed by Ambassador Yakub Khan, who was one of the most remarkable officials in the government. He is still around, even though he is getting on in years. He had been a general, and had then served as ambassador to almost every major country, including the U.S. and the USSR -- which was the position he held when he was assigned to head this delegation. He is one of the most articulate, urbane and sophisticated people I have ever encountered. In 1979, the Ambassador was at the top of his game. Mike Hornblow was asked to meet Yakub Khan at the airport and then to drive him into the Department’s parking lot in the basement. That was an effort to avoid as much press attention as possible. Mike had a particularly disreputable looking yellow VW at the time; it served well as a cover for the Pakistani.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we made frantic efforts to restore aid to Pakistan, which had been suspended in the summer under the non proliferation bans then in place. At one point, I remember my phone ringing at 5:25 p.m. from the Secretariat; I as being asked to submit a memo by the end of the day to the Seventh Floor outlining what an assistance program to Pakistan might consist of, assuming that a $200 million appropriation was forthcoming. I called the former deputy director of our AID mission in Pakistan -- he was working in Washington in AID. I suggested to him that the whole amount be spent on fertilizer. He suggested that half of
the amount be devoted to roads; he told me that those funds too would be readily disbursed; that was good enough for me and I included a road construction program in my memorandum. It took us about fifteen minutes to spend $200 million -- which was about the length of time it took me to type the memo. Of course, this was not real money; we had both the opposition Congress as well as Pakistani rejection of our offer.

RONALD I. SPIERS
Ambassador
Pakistan (1981-1983)

Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers was born in New Jersey in 1925. He received his bachelor's degree from Dartmouth College in 1948. He received a master's degree from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. After serving in the Navy and a five year tenure with the Atomic Energy Commission, he entered the State Department and served in many high-level positions.

Q: What were our interests in Pakistan?

SPIERS: There were different theories about that. I used to have arguments with Zia about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We all agreed that we had to make it as difficult for the Soviets in Afghanistan as possible. Zia's view was that the invasion of his neighbor was the beginning of another traditional Soviet expansionary effort to gain access to the Arabian Sea. That view was shared by our military. Zia foresaw a Soviet effort to take over Baluchistan -- a province of Pakistan. He had countless meetings with Congressional visitors, Cabinet members and other U.S. dignitaries, most often in his modest little house, which had been the home of the Army Chief of Staff (He never moved to the Presidential residence). He would display a map, on which he super-imposed a red area, which was the part of Asia occupied by the Soviets. He would then discuss how Pakistan was being squeezed between India and the Soviet Union. He really believed this strategic view of the world and was genuinely concerned with the "red horde" knocking on his door. He also believed that India would attack him one day; I never accepted that, just as I didn't believe that Pakistan was waiting to attack India.

I told Zia that I was convinced that it was important to stop the Soviets in Afghanistan, even though I did not necessarily accept his theory of the Soviet's larger intent. In my mind, the Soviets were essentially improvisors and didn't have any grandiose world plan. They were paranoid and that meant that they would never have enough security. That paranoia would always be a justification to broaden their security perimeter; they viewed such a policy as a defensive one. I thought that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan because Hafizullah Amin was so contravening Afghan Islamic sensitivities that the Soviets were concerned about having another Iran on their border. That would have created major political pressures in the Central Asian Soviet Republics which might have threatened the whole union. I therefore viewed the invasion as quasi-defensive or preemptive. They wanted to overthrow Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal, who they viewed as less of a problem. That is what I believed the Soviet rationale was; I did not believe that they were really interested in annexing Afghanistan. At the same time, I thought that there would be a good chance that if the Soviets were successful in
Afghanistan, they would be tempted to look at Baluchistan as a necessary buffer and become a threat to Pakistan. That made me a strong proponent of assistance to the Mujahideen. That became one of my principal responsibilities in Pakistan. All of our efforts to help the Pakistani to help the Mujahideen was handled in Islamabad by the CIA Station Chief and myself. Casey visited Pakistan on several occasions clandestinely. He, the Station Chief and I would meet with Zia and his Inter-Services Intelligence group commander, unbeknownst to the Pakistani Foreign Office. Casey would usually be accompanied by one of his Washington staff, Chuck Cogan or Claire George. That small group would meet and dine at Zia's residence. The daily liaison was handled by the Station Chief. I urged maximum assistance to the Afghan "Freedom" fighters because I thought it was important that the Soviets be stopped before they got any other ideas.

Q: You are saying that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed our relationship with Pakistan.

SPIERS: Right. It was an interesting period because while we were on the same side of the Afghan issue, we did have major differences on the nuclear issue. So we were drawn together on one issue and apart on another. The Afghan issue took precedence. Our problem was to contain Pakistan's nuclear development efforts without losing Pakistani support for our efforts in Afghanistan. Now, that situation is changed because the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, eliminating that problem; that brings the focus of U.S.-Pakistani relationship more to the nuclear issue. That is the reason this relationship is going downhill again.

PHYLLIS E. OAKLEY

USAID Staff

Islamabad (1989-1991)

Ambassador Phyllis Oakley was born in Omaha in 1934 and graduated from Northwestern. She entered the foreign service in 1957 but was forced to resign in 1958 when she married Robert Oakley. She accompanied her husband to his postings in Sudan, Ivory Coast, France and Lebanon. She was reinstated as a foreign service officer in 1974 and has held a number of high-level State Department positions. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Talk a little if you will about what changes were taking in the American psyche out in the area as we moved from supporting a rebellion to trying to put a government together?

OAKLEY: As I said, Pakistani policy had been to keep control of the divided Afghan leadership and we went along with it - we couldn’t change it and our object was to inflict damage on the Soviets. When the Soviets left, Pakistan reverted to traditional views on Afghanistan; it was extremely concerned about the revival of the movement which had supported an independent Pashtunistan that would have incorporated large parts of the North-West Frontier Provinces and the eastern part of Afghanistan, also populated by Pashtun tribes. The Pakistanis did not want this to happen. The Pakistan grand strategy was always to have Afghanistan closely allied to it if not under its control, in order to achieve “strategic depth” in its continued rivalry with India. A lot of people would say today, given modern weapons including nuclear ones, the concept of
“strategic depth” has long outlived its usefulness. It is like the Golan Heights on Israel’s borders - what appeared to be a strategic requirement some years ago has been made obsolete by modern military capabilities.

I think that there were games being played and activities that we didn’t pay enough attention to. When we look now at the activities of certain Arabs who were sent on jihad, sometimes to Afghanistan just to get them out of their own countries (especially from Saudi Arabia, where they were perceived to be a danger to the regime), we can see that they were more dangerous than we had thought. So the whole picture was quite muddled. The problems created by the Afghan leaders didn’t help. The “seven dwarfs,” as some people called them, simply could not come together and agree to form a unity government. And the United States simply wasn’t very interested politically after the Soviets left. We did walk away.

I have given this era considerable thought; I didn’t, and don’t, have access to CIA secret operations and therefore can not have a complete picture. I have some suspicions about the Agency’s activities, but no documentary evidence. Nevertheless, I think we might have played our cards on the Afghan issue differently and might have thereby had a chance to build something in Afghanistan that might not have been subject to the stresses and divisions that it subsequently had to face. I admit that nothing was ever sure in Afghanistan. The conventional wisdom fell short, that Najibullah would fall quickly and the mujahadeen would easily take over.

Q: One of the criticisms of the Afghan leaders that I have heard was that they sat in Pakistan far behind the fighting and were not with their men, not to mention leading their men.

OAKLEY: I think that Hekmatyar actually did lead his fighters. Some of the others - Sayyaf, Mojeddedi, Gailani - were older and were not expected to lead the charge. In any case, these were political and not military leaders. I think the early decision to support all seven leaders and not to coalesce behind one overall leader was erroneous. I understand the motivation; Pakistan and the U.S. in the early 1980s felt that if a single leader were chosen - or forced on the others - the whole resistance movement might well have collapsed. Furthermore, there was a theory that a diverse opposition with multiple leaders would be much harder for the Soviets to defeat.

Poland

YALE RICHMOND

Cultural Attaché, USIS

Warsaw (1958-1961)

Yale Richmond was born in Massachusetts in 1923. He received a bachelor’s degree in 1943 from Boston College, thereafter he joined the Army from 1943-1946. He then receives a master’s degree from Syracuse. His career included positions in Germany, Austria, Russia, Poland, and Laos. Mr. Richmond was interviewed in June 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.
Q: Were there any difficult periods in international relations where Poland got involved between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

RICHMOND: No, only slightly during the Vietnam War when the Polish press had to support the Soviet position and oppose the Vietnam War and they had a couple of symbolic demonstrations in front of the embassy. Poland leaked like a sieve. Anything they planned, we knew about it right away. Through one source, we knew they were going to plan a “spontaneous” demonstration in front of the embassy, so we battened down our hatches and shut all our shutters and waited to see what would happen. I noticed that a car from Polish television with a camera man pulled up across the street, so I went out and said in Polish, “Excuse me, but what time does the spontaneous demonstration start?” He told me the exact time? I went back in and we knew when it was going to start. It was just a pro forma demonstration.

Q: You left there when?

RICHMOND: Just after Thanksgiving in 1961 and went to Vienna.

ROGER G. HARRISON
Consular Officer

Ambassador Harrison was born and raised in California. He was educated at San Jose State and Claremont Colleges, Oxford University and Freie University in Berlin. Entering the Foreign Service in 1967, Ambassador Harrison served in London, Manila, Warsaw, Manila and Tel Aviv before being named US Ambassador to the Kingdom of Jordan, where he served from 1990 to 1993. He also had postings in Washington, primarily dealing with Political/Military Affairs. Ambassador Harrison was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: I think that of course, this is the great question really is that we tended to build these countries up to be much more than they were. This is one reason why I think we really weren’t predicting the collapse of the Soviet Union, you know to say; well it’s probably got another few years. It wasn’t a countdown of when is this going to collapse. It seemed like it would go on forever and always be a menace.

HARRISON: Of course, the Reagan administration for its own reasons was trying to build up the Soviets as a military rival in the early 1980s and you may remember the pamphlet Soviet military power to prove that we were on the defense. The Reagan administration was interesting. We were a power behaving as if it were an underdog somehow as if it were a revolutionary power that had, or was at a disadvantage internationally just as the United States was emerging as overwhelmingly the powerful country economically and politically in the world and militarily, too. It led to some silly things that we did and I hope we have gone through that period now. So, what we did, we, political officers would go out and see these people all the same kind of group. Yurgi Rubon was a guy that I saw. He was a writer of politics that was again seen by the
embassy as writing things between the lines which were commenting on things which could be commented on iconoclastically. I had a writer named Daniel Pesant who was especially interesting because he was Jewish. Oh, by the way, that was a fascinating thing I did in the political section: I was the religious officer. I would go over and talk to the people at the office of the cardinal about how the Church was operating. The church was by all odds the most interesting social organization in the country and the most independent and very strong then because it was seen by the population as the one place that was not controlled by the party. They were constantly dicing the party about things like church permits and that was the big issue for them in those days. You had to get a permit to go to church. They didn’t have enough churches. The government wanted to restrict the number they could build, wanted to restrict the number of priests they could train. They were trying to harass them administratively around the edges and all kinds of different ways without attacking them directly. The Church was exercising a good deal of independence and trying to preserve it by not resisting the government. There was a very interesting contest that I was able to not participate in because the last thing the church wanted was the United States as an ally in this struggle, but which I could see going on. The other job I had which was interesting was trying to trace the Jewish community in Warsaw, which had been reduced to fewer people than were necessary for a minyan. What had happened because of Lubens Poles I had had a Jewish cast, anti-Semitism and anti-Luben or anti-Soviet became identified you could attack the Lubens Poles by being anti-Semitic and therefore, anti-Semitics had a new vogue in Poland. In the late ‘50s and ‘60’s as a national strain broke out, nationalism and anti-Semitism, which of course in Poland are always closely associated and were again. There was another purge of Jews from the party as a result of this and as a result of a power struggle in the party. So, the Jews lost jobs and a lot of people who were Jewish ceased to try to be identified as Jewish. I mean every effort to erase any tinge of that identification -- with the result that by the time I was out looking for Jews in Warsaw there weren’t enough for me. There was a synagogue. The politics of that were interesting, too. The American Jewish community was interested in the remnants of the Polish Jewish community because it had been the main fodder for the Holocaust, of course. Therefore, we were attentive and the Polish government therefore was reluctant to eradicate all signs of the old Jewish community from Warsaw although the ghetto had been largely blasted to pieces by the Russians when they had allowed the Germans, where the Germans had done physical work, the Russians had sat across while it was being done. So, it was all cleared away and all these heartless, soulless, concrete apartment houses had been built, but the synagogue, the central one had been allowed to remain. The new grid of streets of was different from the old grid and so the synagogue was sitting on a 30 degree angle on an empty block between all these terrible socialist apartment houses all around it and there it was, I went there to visit periodically. There was a guy who was a caretaker there, a Jew who supplemented his income by making matzoh and he was the one who told me that there wasn’t a minyan in town anymore.

ROBERT B. MORLEY

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary Desk Officer

Washington DC (1971-1973)

Robert B. Morley was born in Massachusetts in 1935. He received his BA from Central College, Iowa. After joining the State Department in 1962, he served in
Norway, Barbados, Warsaw, Caracas, and Quito. Mr. Morley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: What was the economic situation in this '71 to '73 period in Poland?

MORLEY: The economic situation for Poland in those years was difficult. The Polish government was searching for a way to improve the domestic economic situation and not alienate the Soviets, which still dominated the country. In 1970, the Gomulka government had fallen and a new government under Gierek had taken over. They were searching for a way to increase trade and financial interaction with the West within parameters which they understood to be set by the Soviets. The United States wanted to encourage this trend. So, what we were working on in those days was Polish access to Export-Import Bank credits, access for Polish maritime vessels to U.S. ports, a general reduction on restrictions on travel within Poland for American diplomats and within the United States for Polish diplomats. We were looking to take advantage of the thrust of Polish policy to improve our relationship with Poland and thus, at the margin, reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union. We always considered Poland to be the most important of the Eastern European countries. What happened there could influence the future of all of Eastern Europe.

Q: Here you are, a newly minted economic officer with this course under your belt. You're dealing with the problems of Poland. Poland is in the embrace of Marxist Soviet Union. In a way, does economics make sense in dealing with a Marxist society?

MORLEY: If targets of opportunity arrived, we felt we should take advantage of it. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, we believed, had both frightened the Poles and made them, at the margin, more willing to deal with the United States.

Q: This was in August of '68.

MORLEY: Yes, August of ’68, I think. After that event, the Eastern Europeans generally and the Poles specifically became cautious about reform because they had the example of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Soviets seemed to be willing to tolerate a modicum of reform to avoid new crises. After the initial freeze on relations described earlier, we embarked on a slow, gradual policy of reassuring the Soviets on the political and military front, while at the same time taking initiatives to foster reforms. Whether we thought it would work or not, I don't think there was a real consensus. There was a consensus that it was worth trying.

Our policy was an open one. There were times when the Polish-American community got involved and there were times when Congress was pushing us first one way and then another way. The extension of Export-Import Bank facilities to Poland required a broad consensus. It was a long process within the government and included consultations with the Congress of the United States. I don't recall whether it actually required special legislation, but I don’t think so.

Q: What about the Polish-American community? What did they want?

MORLEY: The Polish-American community wanted to improve the lot of the Polish people, while understanding that the political relationship between Moscow and Warsaw was not something they were in much of a position to affect. They thought there were things that the United States could do. So they supported aid programs in Poland for the Krakow Children's
Hospital, which developed very important programs for the health care of children. They supported the extension of Export-Import Bank facilities to Poland. They supported more trade with Poland. They supported anything that they thought would impact positively on the daily life of the Polish people. There is a very strong bond between Poland and the United States. Large Polish communities exist in a number of cities in the United States. These people are articulate and they are organized and they worked hard toward these goals of improving the lot of the Polish people.

Q: Did you ever find yourself and your fellow people dealing with focusing on Poland caught between wanting to keep the Soviets down as much as possible from having too strong an economy and, on the other hand, trying to be nice to Poland? Did that ever come in conflict?

MORLEY: I don’t believe we thought there was a conflict. The Soviet Union’s economy drew strength from its Eastern European “satellites.” They achieved this by dominating the region politically. If the Polish economy were to grow stronger, it could only do so with increased economic ties to the West. Stronger ties to the West implied increased Western influence and therefore diminishing Soviet influence over time.

At the same time, the Poles knew what the limits of their policy were. They would not embark on anything Moscow opposed. The Poles tried to give as little in return as possible for an initiative such as Ex-Im Bank facilities for Poland. We, of course, tried to get some concessions from them.

One of the things that we did during that period of time was negotiate a travel agreement with Poland. Shortly after I left the Office of European Affairs, LOT, the national carrier of Poland, began flying directly to the United States. I think they flew initially to Chicago and to New York. This was considered to be another way to improve relationships between the United States and Poland in a way that did not directly conflict with their political allegiance to the Soviet Union. So, there were a number of initiatives that were undertaken during my period in the Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary desk that served this goal. All of these initiatives were pretty much supported by the Polish-American community, although there were some protests in Chicago over the LOT flights.

Q: Were the Poles careful not to let their secret service play around in the United States?

MORLEY: Yes, they were. I do not recall any problem of this sort coming to our attention. The Poles were clearly putting their best foot forward during this period. They wanted very much to get American economic assistance because they perceived a real need to upgrade their industry, especially their heavy industry (shipbuilding, steel, textiles, etc.) and they couldn't get the resources from the Soviets. So, that's why they were interested in U.S. Ex-Im Bank credits. We in turn were trying to get certain concessions from them in the event we arrived at a mutually agreeable agreement. They got their credits. Within two years, they were at the ceiling of the credit limit imposed by the Ex-Im Bank, and once again the economy began to stagnate.

Q: Was Solidarity or anything like that, any dissident movements, that were apparent during this time?
MORLEY: There were no significant dissident movements that had a visible impact on Soviet policy or were big enough to be making the news. But both the Polish and, I believe, the Soviet governments were concerned about further Polish unrest.

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**Romania**

**THOMAS P.H. DUNLOP**

Romania Desk Officer


Mr. Dunlop was born in Washington, D.C. and raised in North Carolina. He was educated at Yale University and the University of Berlin. After serving in the US Air Force, he entered the Foreign Service in 1960. His foreign assignments took him to Saigon and Seoul in the Far East and to Belgrade and Zagreb in Eastern Europe. In Washington, he also dealt primarily with matters concerning Romania and Korea. Mr. Dunlop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Today is August 23, 1996. Harry, you were country desk officer for Romania from when to when?

DUNLOP: For two years, from the summer of 1974 to the summer of 1976.

Q: Obviously, you'd been away from Eastern European affairs for some time. When you arrived on the Romanian desk and read and talked yourself into the job, how did you see the situation? What were your getting from what other people reported on the situation in Romania and American relations with Romania?

DUNLOP: This was an interesting time to be dealing with Romania, because Romania was high on the list of priorities in Eastern Europe of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and of President Nixon. This was the time when President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger had proclaimed the policy of "differentiation." This meant treating each of the Eastern European "satellites" of the Soviet Union, not simply as a function of their being "satellites" but in terms of their behavior regarding specific policies and situations.

Very early on, in our dealings with the Eastern European countries, our relations with Poland, for example, had assumed a separate character. I understand that that was due, at least to some extent, to the very active participation and activity of the Polish community in the United States. The Polish community in the United States was extremely well organized. It was apparently not split into factions, as were so many of other immigrant communities in the United States. The Polish community had a lot of representation in Congress. Their view had always been that Poland should not be treated as just an extension of the Soviet Union, however bad Poland's government was and however miserably it had treated its people. They felt that Poland was still Poland, and the United States should look at it as such.

For a variety of reasons, I think most of them good reasons, we had done that. However, for the rest of the Eastern European bloc, and here, of course, we're talking about East Germany [the
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Albania was a special case, almost from the beginning. Until President Nixon assumed office, we had tended to treat these Eastern European countries as members of the Warsaw Pact and as countries in which Soviet influence was predominant. We looked at them through that perspective only.

President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger had a different view of these Eastern European countries. They were looking for ways to exploit what they believed must be differences between these countries and the Soviet Union. They found that opportunity in Romania. So, after Poland, Romania was sort of a "show case" of "differentiation." That made the Romanian desk an interesting assignment.

Q: Later on things fell apart in Romania and were put back together on a different basis. However, during your time on the Romanian desk President Ceausescu, the dictator of Romania, was certainly portrayed as a pretty nasty and evil person. When you arrived on the Romanian desk, what kind of reporting were you getting about him?

DUNLOP: Ceausescu was a thoroughly miserable human being. His wife and his son were just as bad. It was a terrible family despotism. Ceausescu was extremely autocratic and suspicious. He treated his subordinates in much the same way that Stalin did. He watched them like a hawk. Any time that anyone showed signs of having an independent power base, he would bring them down. The Romanian secret police, called the "Securitate," was as ever-present and obnoxious as the secret police anywhere else in the Soviet orbit. I think that these were all things that were clearly understood in Washington. However, it was Ceausescu's behavior in the foreign policy field which distinguished him from other Eastern European leaders. For example, Ceausescu never allowed Soviet soldiers to be stationed in Romania. This was not because the Soviets were happy not to have them there. They would have preferred to have Soviet forces in Romania, at least to secure lines of communication to their forces in Hungary. However, Ceausescu argued that Romanian national sovereignty and national interest would not permit allowing Soviet forces to be stationed in Romania. He also did not allow Romanian soldiers to participate in Warsaw Pact exercises outside of Romania. This created a situation in which, seen from the purely military balance of power, Romania was, perhaps, more of a "minus" factor for the Soviet Union's military presence in Central Europe than a "plus." That was something that we wanted to promote.

Ceausescu also recognized Israel early on, the only Eastern European state to do so. Ceausescu adopted a relatively favorable policy toward Jewish emigration, which occupied a lot of our time and attention. Romanian policy in this regard was very selfish and self-centered. Basically, Ceausescu "sold" Jewish people to Israel, as he "sold" German nationals or people with a German, ethnic background to the West Germans. However, he at least allowed them to leave Romania. This made our relationship with Romania very high on the list of priorities for the leadership of the Jewish community in the United States.

We had a "waiver" under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for Romania alone. I think, among the other Eastern European countries. On further reflection, I guess that Poland had the same waiver. We used to refer to it as the "Jackson" amendment more than anything else, as I recall it. The waiver of Romania under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment made it possible to pass legislation extending "Most Favored Nation" [MFN] trading status to Romania. This waiver made it possible for us to certify that there was an improvement taking place in Romania's treatment of
emigration. Every year we had to do a "body count," if you will, or a "head count" of emigration. Charts were kept. We were continually making representations to the Romanians that, if they wanted to keep their "MFN" status, we would have to certify by June 30, under this law, if I'm not mistaken, that Romania continued to make progress on emigration. We told them that we were looking at the statistics on emigration. If they weren't good enough, we would urge them to be more flexible.

So we had this policy of "differentiation." I was just a cog in all of that, but I had an interesting place to observe it.

Q: Was the idea implicit that we didn't want to jeopardize Romanian behavior by offering military assistance, or anything like that?

DUNLOP: I don't think that we ever seriously considered developing any kind of surreptitious military relationship with Romania or intelligence exchange, although I'll talk about one thing that happened. It didn't go quite that far, although it was in that general area. We didn't go into any kind of strategic planning with Romania. We didn't try to make them a "closet" member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. I don't think that we felt we could do that without the Soviets knowing about it. I was of the opinion, anyway, that Ceausescu was sufficiently obnoxious to the Russians that they must have been keeping a "black book" on him and some day, if they got around to it or if they saw the opportunity, he would pay the price for his behavior toward Moscow. I don't think that we wanted to push that situation further than it would allow.

However, in such things as cultural and scientific exchanges we managed to reach an agreement with the Romanians, although I'm not sure that it was ever implemented, that would have permitted Westinghouse to build a nuclear power plant in Romania as an example of peaceful uses of nuclear power. We were very interested in that. We helped the Romanians in some other scientific ways that we felt were not necessarily going to contribute to their military power. We tried to help them get coal from the US

Just before I had arrived on the Romanian desk in 1974, Romania had had a very bad series of floods. I guess that they were due to an early melt of the snows in the mountains, or something like that. When I came to the Romanian desk, we had just started discussing a relatively sophisticated flood warning system with the Romanians. I don't think that it would really have been all of that sophisticated, but we had an idea of setting up some kind of computerized and automated water level monitoring system.

The one area where we engaged in some security cooperation with Romania involved one of the less agreeable things that I did as a country desk officer. This involved airline safety, and particularly security measures aimed at preventing hijackings of aircraft. The 1970's were a period of very frequent hijackings. The Romanians had a national airline called "TAROM" [Romanian Air Transportation Company]. I don't remember ever hearing about a Romanian airliner being hijacked, although aircraft of other countries, including American aircraft, were hijacked. The Romanians wanted to send a group of airline and airport security people to the United States to consult with us and pick up whatever they could to help them. We agreed to consult with them.
I remember arranging the program for these Romanian officials. There were four or five people involved in this group, including a couple of generals. We got in touch with the US Secret Service in making these arrangements. The Secret Service was helpful in arranging for some time to brief the Romanians in an UNCLASSIFIED way about some of the things that we were doing regarding "high tech" detection of bombs and so forth. Also, we dealt with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and the US Marshals program. At that time armed, US marshals were riding in civilian clothes on a random basis on American airlines. Their task was to deter hijacking. They had developed a variety of pistol ammunition which was more like a little shotgun shell than anything else. If it was fired inside an airplane at somebody, it would certainly be very discouraging to them but was not supposed to go through the frame of the aircraft and be destructive. So we showed the Romanians that kind of equipment.

What I didn't like about this was that the security officers who came off the Romanian aircraft were all "knuckle draggers." They were all real thugs. It was personally distasteful to me to deal with them. However, I did, and, I suppose, there was an American interest served in doing so. I learned one thing. If you want to put a bomb in a locker at Washington National Airport, don't put it at ground level. Put it in an upper level locker, because the "sniffer" dogs will not climb ladders and sniff the upper level lockers. [Laughter]

Q: Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State at this time. This was one of the areas where he was following his grand, global scheme of exploiting weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc. Were all of you under pressure to come up with "positive actions" to make the Romanians happy with our relationship with them?

DUNLOP: The answer is "Yes." However, on the other side of that coin the Ambassador to Romania at that time was Harry Barnes. He was, perhaps, one of the most distinguished career Ambassadors that we have had. Harry Barnes was a whole library of ideas and energy, although, clearly, the people on the Seventh Floor [where the offices of the Secretary of State and of his principal assistants were located] who were looking out for Secretary Kissinger's policies on Romania would also have been looking for a lot of things to consider. In any case, Harry Barnes provided lots of ideas.

As I look back on it, I didn't disagree with this policy of "differentiation" toward the countries of Eastern Europe. I think that this was the right policy, although we had to swallow some of our gorge in dealing with these thugs. However, we also pushed the door of our relationship with Romania unnaturally wide open. There were things going on which were uncomfortable to us, to the degree that, after Kissinger left office as Secretary of State, the door swung partly closed, at least to some extent. While I don't think that we ever totally abandoned the policy of "differentiation" with regard to Romania, I don't think that it received the same emphasis or policy priority after Kissinger left office as Secretary of State.

Kissinger made Helmut Sonnenfeldt, an old associate of his from the NSC [National Security Council], the Counselor of the Department of State during this period of time. He then told Helmut Sonnenfeldt to be his watchdog for "differentiation." That was one of Sonnenfeldt's specially assigned tasks. What that meant for us was that we had to deal with another layer in the bureaucracy up above us. I always had to clear everything with Sonnenfeldt's office. This, of course, would not have been a natural way of doing business for a country desk officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs.
This worked very much to the detriment of the influence of the DAS, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who was at least nominally in charge of Eastern European Affairs and who should, in fact, have been our immediate, operational boss. Instead, the DAS found himself bypassed frequently, which made him unhappy. Perhaps it was not appropriate, bureaucratically. There was another channel of authority, the "real" channel of authority, which was not what it looked like on paper, and that ran from Sonnenfeldt's office to mine. Usually, this is not a good idea, although in this case I think that this system worked pretty well. I tried to ease the EUR front office irritation and insecurity where I could. I don't think that policy implementation was particularly hampered by it, but it was an irritant and one of the many reasons why Kissinger's stewardship of the Department of State was so deeply resented by so many people. This was just a small part of it, but it was one which I observed.

I was always able to deal pretty well with Sonnenfeldt's office because the guy in his office who was concerned with Romanian affairs was a good friend of mine, and we just worked things out. However, it didn't make my bosses in EE [Office of Eastern European Affairs] or the DAS for EE very happy. I had no choice. I would get a call from Sonnenfeldt's office and would be told to come up and talk about something. I couldn't say "No."

Q: Even in the confines of the Embassy secure "conference room," was anybody at the Embassy talking about what would happen if the Soviets moved against Yugoslavia? I'm not talking about "war plans." I'm talking about the Embassy thought that we could do in such a case.

DUNLOP: We had three areas of concern. One was the obvious and always present "Emergency Evacuation" [E&E] plan. This plan is always supposed to be high up on an Ambassador's priority list and usually, I think, is. We had a very interesting kind of commentary from the US military in Europe on the E&E plan. To me this was the first time that our military had ever done this. Let me explain this a bit.

The commander of US forces in Europe wears at least two "hats." He is the commander of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe] as the NATO Supreme Commander, SACEUR. He is a four-star general. Gen Al Haig held this position, among others, and Gen Galvin has just completed his tour of duty in this position. He sits in Brussels with his NATO "hat" on and is Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe [SACEUR]. He is also commander of all American forces in Europe as Commander in Chief of US Forces in Europe [CINCEUR]. In that latter capacity he has "US only" responsibilities. For example, he and his staff assist in making arrangements for the emergency evacuation of Embassy personnel and other US nationals whenever necessary and wherever his authority runs. His authority includes Yugoslavia, in his capacity as CINCEUR.

At this time the POLAD [Political Adviser] to CINCEUR was a Foreign Service Officer named Al Francis, whom I had met, liked, and respected very much in Vietnam. Al wanted CINCEUR's responsibility for emergency escape and evacuation in his area of responsibility to be reflected in some detailed operational planning and some particularly useful, personal contacts. So Al Francis toured all of the posts for which CINCEUR had emergency escape and evacuation responsibilities. He didn't get to all of these posts, because CINCEUR's authority went all the way to South Africa and South Asia. However, Al visited all of our Balkan posts, including Yugoslavia.
He brought with him a standard form, which we filled out, containing our own E&E plan but also things which we went out and surveyed, like the closest helicopter landing pad to the American School in Belgrade. I thought that it was a very good idea to think seriously in those terms. Incidentally, there was no helicopter landing pad near the American School! [Laughter] But we did that kind of planning, anyway.

Plans of that kind always receive additional attention when tensions in the area increase. However, they were already receiving added attention, to some degree, because of Al Francis' interest on behalf of CINCEUR.

Then there was actual "war planning." The Embassy in Belgrade had little to do with that. However, under Ambassador Eagleburger we instituted something which the Yugoslavs had resisted. We arranged to increase the number of US Navy ship visits to Yugoslav ports. The US Navy never has enough ports for such visits to allow its crews to get off their ships. That is, to escape the confines of their ships and have a run ashore. The Navy is always looking for ports to make ship calls. The sailors know that, if they misbehave ashore on their first visit, they're not going to be able to go ashore again while assigned to the Mediterranean area. The Navy really puts a lot of effort into making sure that these port visits are agreeable for the people being visited, as well as for the crews of the ships involved. The Navy does a superb job in handling these visits. I have no criticism of these arrangements. You can't keep every sailor's pants zipped, but my goodness, the Navy does a good job of handling these visits.

We knew that if, for example, we had a US Navy cruiser visiting the port of Split, Yugoslavia, the people of that town would just swarm onto it and love it. The sailors would behave themselves, would have money to spend, and it would be a good thing. So we increased US Navy port visits.

The Yugoslavs had made an agreement with the Soviets which we didn't like much, to overhaul a couple of old, combatant vessels down at one of the underused, Yugoslav shipyards. I think that it was Kotor [a port in Montenegro]. We didn't like that because we didn't think that it fit in with the idea of non-alignment, which Yugoslavia proclaimed so stridently. We saw a difference between recreational visit for American sailors and logistical support for the Soviet Navy. Ambassador Eagleburger said, "Well, if you're going to do that, so are we." After much pushing and tugging the Yugoslavs said, "All right, where are your old minesweepers?" The US Navy didn't want any part of this! We didn't have any old minesweepers, although the Navy saw the utility of the principle, allowing ships repaired in Yugoslavia.

However, we increased our "presence" in Yugoslav ports to some degree through more ship visits. We also had an unfortunate overflight of Yugoslav territory by US fighter aircraft by error, but that was all handled all right.

From the political point of view I don't think that we ever felt that the temperature had risen to the point where the Yugoslavs must have felt that it had, say, in 1956, at the time of the Hungarian uprising or the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact nations in 1968.

Soviet Union/Russia
Willis C. Armstrong was born in 1912 in New York. He received a bachelor’s degree from Swarthmore College and a master’s degree from Columbia University. His career in the Foreign Service emphasized economic affairs and included posts in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The following are excerpts from Armstrong’s interviews with Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1988 and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Q: You arrived at a very dramatic time, just before the war.

ARMSTRONG: Yes. You can check the dates, but the British-French military mission had gone there, I think a little before I was there, or maybe it happened while I was there. That was late spring, early summer. I was there when the German rapprochement with the Russians came, and I was there, of course, when the war began.

You wanted to know about American relations with the USSR. I’d say they were formal, not particularly friendly. The Stalin regime was never friendly with anybody. Being a foreigner in Moscow meant being ostracized by the local population, not because of anything that might happen to the foreigner, but because the local population was frightened. The Russians had just gone through their major purges in 1937-38, and a very substantial chunk of the elite had disappeared. If you ever did meet any Russians, you could tell that times were very strained. The Russians were kept pretty much in ignorance about what was going on in the world, if you could judge by what was available in the press.

My job in the embassy was to read the press. My first job was being night duty clerk. I did that from about August ‘39 until about the following March. I did some reading and research, but mostly I was on duty in the office from 6:30 at night until 9:00 in the morning. I had a bed in the office, in the code room. We had a rather primitive code room and rather primitive communication facilities. So throughout the first stage of hostilities in Europe and throughout the Russian-Finnish war, I didn’t get a great deal of sleep.
Ambassador Davis Eugene Boster was born in Ohio in 1920. He received a bachelor’s degree from Mt. Union College. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1942-1947 and subsequently entered the Foreign Service. Ambassador Boster’s career included positions in the Soviet Union, Germany, Mexico, Poland, and Bangladesh, and an ambassadorship to Guatemala. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 20, 1989.

Q: After the blockade and the airlift started, did the Embassy look for signs of hostility?

BOSTER: I am sure that the Ambassador and the DCM and the military Attachés undoubtedly would have had indicators in mind in watching the scene, but to say that all of us in the Embassy, particularly at the junior levels, were always on watch, would be to magnify our responsibilities and our daily concerns too much.

Q: Were you aware of horror stories about Stalin or was the Embassy looking for the positive side of the Russian experience?

BOSTER: I don’t think there was a better side to look at. But there was no war psychosis in the Embassy. The Air Attaché statement was an exception, although others may have had it in back of their minds as a possible eventuality.

Q: Were you and others trying to turn the United States’ perception around? The U.S. after all had gone out of its way to paint the Soviet Union in rosy colors during and right after the War and then in the late 1940s the realities were setting in. Did you have the feeling that the Embassy had to let Washington understand that the situation in 1949 was the real picture.

BOSTER: That was certainly true. We were trying to bring home to the State Department and the general public that circumstances had changed. Kennan’s famous article appeared in “Foreign Affairs” at about this time and that was a fundamental part of the re-education of America. We were contributing our part to that perception of the “real world”.

Q: We are now talking about the 1959-61 period. How did you view the internal situation in the USSR?

BOSTER: During that period, Khrushchev came to the United States. I was lucky enough to be included in a lunch for Khrushchev. I remember meeting him then. In general terms, the Soviet Union was still a large black hole as far as our perceptions were concerned. Khrushchev was a rather stimulating, new figure in that black hole. To some degree he was now and then encouraging. There was considerable interest in what he might actually mean for the Soviets. He was not a normal head of the government. His condemnation of Stalin indicated that there might
be some hope for new relations. The amazing Gorbachev is more understandable to us after having watched Khrushchev. He has far eclipsed anything Khrushchev did, but the latter did make some signs of taking a more realistic view of things.

PHILIP H. VALDES

Administrative/Political Officer

Moscow (1952-1954)

Political Officer

Moscow (1953-1954)

Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, DC (1955-1958)

Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs

Washington, DC (1961-1964)

Philip H. Valdes was born in New York in 1921. He received a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included positions in China, Korea, the Soviet Union, Germany, France, and Thailand. Mr. Valdes was interviewed by William Knight on July 11, 1994.

Q: Was there anything about your work or living conditions there -- that really surprised you and that you remember, particularly for that period [1952-1954] -- either in the sense of your preconceptions or your ideas about the U.S.-Russian relationship at the time?

VALDES: I would say that the first time I was there [1952-1954] I wasn’t really very much surprised by anything, except the friendliness of Russians that you did meet by accident. That surprised me a little bit because, as I said, it was at the height of the Cold War. We were being denounced for “germ warfare” [in North Korea] and everything else that the Soviets could think of. The Russians that we would meet believed some of these charges but some of them they didn’t believe. In any case, they usually were quite friendly, when we did meet them. This wasn’t always the case, but it was often enough the case that I was surprised.

Q: What were you in that structure?

VALDES: I was in multilateral affairs. During my last year of that assignment to Washington, 1963-1964, I was in charge of multilateral affairs. What I handled particularly was disarmament matters having to do with the Soviets. When I took charge of multilateral affairs, I was involved in Berlin matters.

Q: Were your contacts primarily in other areas of the U.S. Government on those issues or with the Russians themselves in the Soviet Embassy?
Q: In addition to attendance of Politburo members at the July reception in 1955, were there other indications in your relationships with the Russians that a new era had begun? Do you recall other significant events?

SWANK: Let me make the point that few of us mistook the “thaw” for genuine friendship with the West. Soviet actions reflected the conviction of the new leaders that the country could exploit its potential as a great power only by moving out of Stalinist isolation. In unguarded moments they even articulated this motivation, as when Khrushchev announced to a startled U.S.: “We will bury you!”

My following assignment was as an analyst (1955-1957) in State’s Division of Research and Intelligence for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Its chief was Boris Klosson, a civil servant (later an FSO) specializing in the Soviet field, and my immediate boss was Frank Siscoe, Chief of the External Branch. Because of the recent summit and innovations in Soviet behavior, there was intense high-level interest in Soviet affairs. Klosson briefed Secretary Dulles weekly on Soviet developments. The Director of CIA was Allan Dulles, John Foster’s brother, and this amity at the top was reflected in close working relationships between State and CIA personnel. My job in State was to write about the accelerating Soviet economic and military aid “offensive” and Soviet efforts to coordinate and develop the economies of the Warsaw Pact nations. I also served as a staffer of the Watch Committee, an interagency group in the Pentagon which had access to all the intelligence available to the U.S. on the U.S.S.R. The Committee produced a highly classified weekly document circulated to the heads of concerned departments and agencies in which it assessed Soviet capabilities and intentions in crises that could lead to involvement of U.S. forces. The period was rife with crises, including the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

I was promoted to Chief of the External Branch in 1957 and anticipated spending another year or two in Washington. I enjoyed being privy to special intelligence (although since retirement I
have found that one can be remarkably well informed with access to the multiple unclassified sources that are available), and I developed a much crisper writing style and improved analytical skills on the job.

*Q: Were there occasions in which the American intelligence establishment was caught out -- that is, failed to see developing trends -- that you would like to recall?*

SWANK: No one forecast that the revolution in Hungary would develop in so dramatic a fashion. But the coverage of what was happening in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was excellent. The problem there was that no one could read Soviet intentions. We had not penetrated the Politburo.

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SWANK: My second tour in Moscow lasted from June 1967 to May 1969. After two years in Laos, I was sufficiently disenchanted with the situation in Southeast Asia to write Ambassador Foy Kohler requesting he consider me for the position of his deputy in Moscow. I explained that I was anxious to reestablish my connections with Soviet affairs after a series of assignments elsewhere. Foy approved my assignment but was in the meantime reassigned himself to Washington. The new ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson, graciously accepted me as his DCM although he was not well acquainted with me. Tommy Thompson’s second tour as Ambassador in Moscow -- he had served there with distinction from 1957 to 1962 -- was a disappointment to him. He had been persuaded by President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, somewhat against his better judgment, I always believed, to return to Moscow. He was troubled by a stomach ulcer that sapped his vigor and resilience. But the main cause of his depression was boredom. He no longer had the entree to the Kremlin he had enjoyed with Khrushchev, the Brezhnev regime proving to be both dull and impenetrable. Serious external distractions also weighed against progress in bilateral relations, notably the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The favorite preoccupation of all Soviet watchers was to speculate whether an invasion would take place. Tommy confided to me his personal doubt that Brezhnev would be able to stomach Dubcek for long, but he nonetheless decided that he might as well take a deserved vacation from Moscow. He was absent in August when the invasion took place. As Chargé d’Affaires I adhered to the NATO-agreed policy of abstaining from contacts with the Soviet Foreign Ministry and of suspending bilateral programs -- the extent of the sanctions the West was prepared to impose. Within two to three months, normal contacts were resumed.

The framework agreement on construction of new chanceries and residential quarters for the Soviets in Washington and U.S. personnel in Moscow was negotiated in this period. Many of my visits with Georgi Kornienko, then Director of the American Section of the Foreign Ministry, dealt with the principles which were to govern construction in Moscow. An agreement was signed on May 16, 1969, just before I left Moscow. Almost 20 years later, the Embassy offices are still unoccupied in Washington and Moscow because of overriding security problems that have emerged over the intervening years.

I suppose I am more philosophical than incensed about this development. I have the impression from media coverage of the problems that some U.S. officials may be looking for perfect security for our buildings in the U.S.S.R. Perfect security is an illusion. We will always have to proceed on the assumption that new technological breakthroughs will occur and that Soviet
efforts to penetrate our mission will be unremitting. Our ultimate security rests less on
technology than on the loyalty, common sense, and disciplined discretion of our officials in
Moscow.

Q: Your second tour in Moscow, like your first, lasted two years. Is that customary?

SWANK: For junior officers, yes. For senior officers there is greater discretion. Meg and I had
hoped to remain a third year, particularly since we had known and worked with Jake (Jacob D.)
Beam (who replaced Tommy Thompson in March 1969) in Djakarta. But as soon as he arrived in
Moscow, Jake informed me I was to return to Washington to become a Deputy Assistant
Secretary in European Affairs with responsibilities for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

May I offer at this point some reflections on U.S.-Soviet relations? They are based on almost 40
years of observation and study, including the decade since my retirement. I have several points to
make.

First, it is highly important that State maintain a corps of Russian-speaking specialists with
service in the U.S.S.R. Comparable English-speaking Soviet specialists on the United States are,
I believe, more numerous than ours and better trained in English than our men and women are in
Russian. They also tend to remain in their American specialization longer than our officers in
Soviet specialization. If anything, our corps of Russian-speaking specialists needs to be
expanded.

Second, as promising as the Gorbachev reforms appear, it is prudent to recall the cyclical nature
of both Russian and Soviet history -- repression - relaxation - repression. The record of other
than centralized autocratic rule in Russia is nonexistent up to this point, and overmuch
decentralization could threaten the cohesion of the Soviet empire, just about the only empire still
extant. For these reasons, we should welcome glasnost and perestroika but retain some
skepticism as to their durability and their impact on Soviet society. I am among those who hope
for an eventual evolution of the Soviet nation into a country we can live more comfortably with
than we do now. But it is bound to be a long and tortured process. We must be patiently hopeful.

Third, having expressed this skepticism based on history and experience, I must also note with
optimism signs that we may now be at the beginning of the end of the Cold War. There is some
prospect that the new Soviet leadership perceives limits to the utility of a continuing over-
allocation of resources to military purposes. As early as 1955 I remember asking myself why in a
society still so poor so many resources went to the military. Since then the U.S.S.R. has reached
rough military parity with the U.S. and is by far the strongest nation in Eurasia. There is no
longer any legitimate Soviet military concern other than avoiding the disintegration of the
empire. Perhaps Gorbachev perceives this and is ready to negotiate some reduction not only of
nuclear but also conventional forces. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan also
bespeaks a new realism in Soviet policies.

Fourth, experience suggests that Americans need patience, prudence, and steadiness in dealing
with the Soviet Union. We and our political system are not overly endowed with these qualities.
Maintenance of military parity between West and East is essential as the Soviet Union goes
through its transition to an undisclosed future. Both potential adversaries have been kept prudent
by the perception of mutually assured destruction (MAD), and MAD will surely continue to be the governing strategy over the next generation, even if nuclear arsenals are reduced and even if a limited strategic defense is achieved. So we need a Soviet policy for the long haul, one based on the concept of an uneasy, half-truce between us.

WILLIAM N. TURPIN
Consular/Economic Officer
Moscow (1956-1958)

William Turpin was born and raised in Georgia. He attended Dartmouth College, Mercer University, and Oxford University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and received his first post as a Kreis officer in 1950. He went on to serve in Munich, Belgrade, Moscow, and The Hague. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: What was the state, in 56, of relations with the United States.

TURPIN: Well, remember this was just after the 20th party congress and Khrushchev’s secret speech and all that. I didn’t have anything much to do with the government’s relations. We were carefully, unlike Yugoslavia where you could go where you wanted and talk to who you pleased, it was very, very difficult to do that on any continuing basis in the Soviet Union. I had this terribly frustrated feeling the whole time I was there that here, within a half mile of here, were people that know the answers to all the questions that I would like to ask, like how do you run this planning system.

ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY
Interpreter
Washington, DC (1956-1960)

Mr. Akalovsky was born in Yugoslavia (Croatia) and educated at Yugoslav, Heidelberg and Georgetown Universities. Entering the United States in 1949, he worked as language Instructor at the US Army Language School before joining the Department of State in 1956 as translator/interpreter. In 1960 he was posted to Geneva, Switzerland, where he served until 1964 as Political Chief with ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He subsequently served as Political Officer at the US Embassy in Moscow from 1965 to 1960. Mr. Akalovsky was interviewed in 2000 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: After, was there a feeling that relations were a little bit better?

AKALOVSKY: Yes, hope, I’m not sure there was a feeling, but there was hope. Then came the U-2. Eisenhower was invited to come to the Soviet Union. It was supposed to be in June and then Khrushchev cancelled the invitation after the U-2 incident.

Q: And Eisenhower was in Paris.
AKALOVSKY: I was there too with him then.

Q: What were you doing?

AKALOVSKY: The Bordeaux Summit.

Q: Had anything started at that summit?

AKALOVSKY: Started? It was just the opposite. The summit had been scheduled before the U-2 incident, primarily at Harold Macmillan’s insistence.

Q: Prime Minister of Great Britain.

AKALOVSKY: Yes. He very much wanted the summit because he was desperately trying to get the test ban done, and he thought the summit could resolve this issue. Of course the U-2 incident occurred when we came to Paris, and de Gaulle was sitting there in front of the big fireplace in a regal posture like this, you know, presiding over the whole thing. Here was de Gaulle for example, Khrushchev was sitting on his left, Nixon on his right, and Eisenhower facing on the other side of the table. Khrushchev was flanked by his defense minister and Gromyko. On our side, we had Herter and that was it. Only five people were allowed to be part of the delegation. Dick Walters, then Colonel. He was seated behind Eisenhower, and I was sitting behind Herter. And Chip Bohlen got in the room as note taker, and he was seated at a small table in the back. And the same kind of arrangement for the British, and the Soviets. De Gaulle spoke first, and then Khrushchev gave a fiery speech lambasting the United States for intruding upon their territory and stuff like that. And then Eisenhower’s turn came. Eisenhower’s face got redder and redder as Khrushchev gave his speech. Eisenhower understood French, spoke it very well, and according to protocol he was first interpreted in the language of the host country. So French came first and Dick Walters did that. But Eisenhower read the first paragraph of the text and stopped. Dick and I both had the text in front of us so we could pay attention. Dick is a delightful fellow, you should talk to him, he has thousands of delightful stories... he wrote a book of these.

HARRY G. BARNES, JR.

Soviet Desk Officer

Washington, DC (1956-1957)

Publications Procurement Officer/Cultural Exchange Officer

Moscow (1957-1959)

Soviet Desk Officer

Washington, DC (1959-1962)

Ambassador Barnes was born in Minnesota and raised in Minnesota and New York. He was educated at Amherst College and Columbia University. After service in the US Army in World War II, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted in 1950 to Bombay, India. His other foreign posts include Prague,
Q: This was I think in October of ’62. With the exchange program, how did you see things developing? Did you feel it was making sense?

BARNES: I would have to say I was probably prejudiced, having worked with some of the first exchange groups and having seen the visible impact, be they artists or composers or students. I thought this was a very good area for the U.S. to focus on and try to expand. My sense of Soviet exchanges, Soviet citizens coming to the U.S., was much more indirect, even though I was working on the exchanges part time when I was on the Soviet desk. I didn’t have the opportunity usually to spend much time with the Soviet visitors, so I would have to qualify my judgment perhaps a little bit that way. Both because I thought that they were in themselves beneficial for the United States and also because I thought it was worthwhile trying to take advantage of whatever slight evidence there might be or slight movement there might be in the Soviet Union to open up. I remain very much a partisan.

WALLACE W. LITTELL

Distributor, America Illustrated

Moscow (1956-1958)

Counselor for Public Affairs

Moscow (1979-1983)

Wallace W. Littell was born in Meadville, Pennsylvania in 1922 and he was raised in Iowa. He graduated from the College of Iowa in 1947 and later received a master’s degree in Russian history from the Russian Institute at Columbia University. In addition, he was a graduate fellow at Heidelberg University in Germany. Mr. Littell’s career in the Foreign Service included positions in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Germany. He was interviewed by Robert Martens on October 1, 1992.

Q: Let me ask, perhaps in concluding this Russian part, unless you have anything more to say, that looking back philosophically, you’ve been a witness to enormous change over a period of four decades basically, to what degree do you think the exchange program contributed to the course of developments -- the liberalization of Soviet society, the opening up, and any comments you might have on that process?

LITTELL: There’s no question in my mind but what our exchanges across the years, and our information operations, played a role in this. However, I realistically think it was things like the secret speech and the...

Q: ...internal developments.
LITTELL: The internal developments which then were supplemented by the things we did. It enabled people to participate in the exchanges, or to come and see an American exhibit, or perhaps if they were fortunate, get to an American concert, or have contact with a guide at an exhibit, and talk to him or her. This type of thing, I think, was important and it opened their eyes very much to, not only what was going on in the United States and the western world, but also to how strongly their internal situation contrasted, and how unfavorably it contrasted with the situation in the United States and the west, which built more internal pressures for change. I think too, a point that I’ve made before, the Soviet effort to control these programs once they had admitted them, was completely counterproductive, because once they had admitted them to the Soviet Union, even though you couldn’t get a ticket maybe, or couldn’t get to something, or couldn’t subscribe to a publication, it was legal. Therefore you used every avenue possible to get access to it, and they weren’t afraid to come to American things the way they were in the ‘50s, in our day there together. And also it was counterproductive, because if the Soviets tried to control it as much as they did, and limit it to tried and true Party members or trustworthy people, then it must be a true picture, there must be something to it. The Soviet people came out with a more positive picture of the United States and the west than would have been the case otherwise.

ROBERT J. MARTENS

Political Officer

Moscow (1956-1958)

Robert J. Martens was born in Missouri in 1925. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Southern California and served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Italy, the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Burma, Romania, and Sweden. Mr. Martens was interviewed in September 1991 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: What was the situation as you saw it at that time in the Soviet Union?

MARTENS: This was the height of the Cold War. This was a period when there was almost no contact between East and West. The Iron Curtain atmosphere of that period was something that is unimaginable nowadays, or would have been unimaginable in 1965 or even 1960. There were no tourists going to the Soviet Union. There were no outsiders of any kind. The only people there were the embassy, which was very small, and a few correspondents who were -- a great many of whom were married to Russians, and had been stuck there since the beginning of World War II. So you had this sense of going into the total unknown. I remember as we flew from an airport in East Germany into the Soviet Union, thinking, “God, what am I getting into?” We were buzzed by Soviet fighter planes who made sweeps at us as we began to enter Soviet air space somewhere over Poland. So you were sort of awed by this as you came in, but after you were there a while, of course, you realized that all societies are alike in some ways -- human beings still eat, breathe air, sleep, live in houses, etc.

So the awesomeness began to recede. I had much the same feeling when I crossed the Rhine in Germany in World War II. That was at the time when Winston Churchill made his famous statement about “Allied troops now entering the dark sink of Iniquity.” But later you began to see Germans in the villages we went through as human beings living ordinary lives. And so you
concluded that things were perhaps not as different as you thought even though you also understood that all this ghastliness of Nazism had gone on at the same time. That’s the way it was in the Soviet Union, a realization that this was a terrible society but one still inhabited by human beings that one could understand and hopefully relate to.

In the two years there that followed, however, the atmosphere in Moscow was difficult indeed. One had no contacts of any real depth with the Soviet population. People were scared to death. You also didn’t want to have any second meetings with anybody because they very likely would be in serious trouble as a result. The sense that you got from reading the press -- and I had to read an enormous number of Soviet newspapers every day -- was one of total conformity. I began to travel, and you had to apply, I should say, two weeks in advance, if I remember correctly, to go anywhere outside the 25 mile, or 40 kilometer limit, around Moscow. You had to ask permission and wait for about two weeks to see whether you got permission or not. Frequently you would be denied, but at other times, perhaps with changes in the schedule, you would get an itinerary approved. I got so I was applying for travel all the time -- as soon as I got back from one trip, I would put in for another one. So I ended up with a tremendous amount of travel. I spent four months out of my last year outside of Moscow. And the reason I mention this is that, once you were outside of Moscow, while it was still a closed society, you found you were able to have much more contact with people, and rather often have the most enormously interesting conversations.

One experience that I frequently cite as an example, to illustrate the degree to which I thought the Soviet population was opposed to the system even then, was a trip I took out to Siberia on the TransSiberian Railroad. Two and a half days elapsed before we reached our first stop off point at a small city named Petropavlovsk in northern Kazakhstan. I got in a kind of debate with a fellow in my compartment; there were three Russians in the compartment with me, four persons to a compartment being common on Russian trains. The conversation started out in a rather non-ideological way, but it became ideological because this fellow had just graduated from Moscow University in “Political Economy”, which meant Marxism-Leninism, and if what I was saying were true, he had to feel that his education was basically false and worthless. So he turned defensive and argued the party line. After a while people from all over the train began to stand around in the corridor and listen in on the conversation, and when I got off two and a half days later in Petropavlovsk in Kazakhstan the entire train -- most of the train -- huge numbers of people, escorted me, all of us crawling across three or four lines of parked boxcars during a half hour stop for them. The message was clear, they were demonstrating that they agreed with me rather than with this fellow’s party line. This was not because of my eloquence, but rather because they saw an opportunity to demonstrate what they really thought without committing themselves to speech.

Those kinds of things happened with great frequency. But on every trip, almost, that I went on, every now and then you’d have a fascinating insight into the depth of disbelief, and discontent in Soviet society. So much so that when I left -- my last year had been spent on Soviet internal developments, my first year had been spent on Soviet external matters -- my swan song was to write about a 25-30 page piece on the degree of popular discontent with the system. I did not get that out because a more senior officer -- a very good officer, by the way and a person I had tremendous respect and like for and who was not able to do much travel because of his job -- took an opposite approach. He had been reading the Soviet newspapers like I had all the time in
Moscow, and just could not believe that there was that much discontent. So he wrote a despatch, as we called them in those days, that took an opposite position from mine, and he put excerpts of my piece which had not gone out, in an annex as a dissenting viewpoint. I must say that now that things have developed the way they have in the Soviet Union, I think back on what I had said then, and believe that events have proven that the discontent I had described was there all through the years. It’s not just a recent phenomenon, but it’s something that permeated the society all through those years.

**Q: This was...Khrushchev the whole time?**

**MARTENS:** Khrushchev was there; his power was not complete. I arrived in September 1956, that was about six months after the 20th Party Congress, which initiated a kind of liberalizing period. That liberalizing period closed down by the time I arrived because of the Hungarian revolution that occurred in October, because of the Suez crisis which had started opening up in September and reached its culmination in October. I did the first report, incidentally, on the “Polish October” that brought Gomulka to power against Soviet opposition by analyzing a revealing article in Izvestia the day before. You could tell that something very extreme was happening in Poland. This is what led to the downfall of the hard-nosed previous regime, and the accession of Gomulka. This was followed almost immediately by the Hungarian revolution on which I did the reporting, by the way, from the Soviet side of that, mainly from the newspapers. So it was a very hard nosed regime. The disbelief in Marxism-Leninism, and the failure of the system had not developed to what it was years later. Khrushchev himself felt the system was on the ascendancy even before, he, several years later, made his famous statement when he got to the United States about “we’ll bury you,” and he meant their system would outlast ours, and that was inherent in everything he was saying. He was also talking about catching up and surpassing the United States in the production of meat, milk, and butter which became a great slogan of that time.

There’s a tendency now to think of that period as one of great openness and liberalism. It was not at all. It was a period in which you could not have contact with anybody. We embassy officers were followed outside of Moscow by enormous hordes of KGB tails; I’ve been followed by as many as 20 tails at one time. Fear was endemic throughout the society. It was a period in which the threat to the United States and its democratic ideals was enormous throughout the world. So I disagree completely with the kind of revisionist view that the Cold War was all our fault somehow. It was not. It was necessary to stand up to the advance of communism in that period. I was very liberal in those days on U.S. domestic issues, incidentally. But my experience in the Soviet Union probably turned me in a more conservative direction. One saw first hand how rotten that system was, and how it had to be opposed.

**WILLIAM WATTS**

*Soviet Internal Affairs, Office of Intelligence and Research*

*Washington, DC (1956-1958)*

*Russian Language Training*

*Oberammergau, Germany (1960-1961)*
Cultural Affairs Officer
Moscow (1961-1963)

William Watts was born in 1930 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor’s degree from Syracuse University and a master’s degree from Harvard University’s Russian Regional Studies Program. He served in the U.S. Air Force from 1951-1954. Mr. Watts’ Foreign Service career included positions in Korea, the Soviet Union, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 7, 1995.

Q: Can we talk about the missile crisis (October 1962) which was over in Cuba but this was probably the most dangerous point of the whole Cold War period?

WATTS: Yes, I think it probably was. Events were developing at the UN, Adlai Stevenson showing those pictures of the missiles, and there were missile carrying ships on the way and we were scouting them like crazy. The tension increased day by day. A letter came into the embassy that I was not aware of, the first letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy. That was sent off to Washington. Then, about Tuesday of that week, a second letter was sent over from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Ambassador Kohler with instructions that this letter was to be totally secret and sent top priority...our equivalent of FLASH, which we used very, very rarely. Kohler gave this letter, it was about two pages long, to four of us and said, “Here, translate this.” We had to go up to the secure room in the embassy, which was located on the top floor and was an enclosure inside a room that you went into, shut the door and turned on air pumps. I am not quite sure why we did this since the letter came from Khrushchev, but we did.

The interesting part was that each of us when we got part way through our translations sort of looked up stunned. This letter was intemperate. I recall, and this may now be memory playing tricks with me, in the segment that I translated at one point it was saying, “Kennedy, ti sukina-sin.” In any event, this was an intemperate letter by any stretch of the imagination.

We took this back down and gave it to Kohler, who was impatiently waiting for it. He knew it had to be something important. He read it...we used to kid about Kohler being the whistler because when he got a little nervous he would start to whistle...this time he went into a full symphony. I will never forget when he said two things. “Gentlemen, you may not discuss the contents of this letter with anybody including your wives.” And then as he turned to go in and write his cover note, he said, “I think this may mean war.” When your ambassador in Moscow says that, that sort of shakes you up.

Well, the message went off. I later was told that in the ExComm meeting, when the second letter was being discussed, and there were various accounts of what happened, but the account I got was via Chip Bohlen who was there. There were lots of different things thrown out as to what to do. Kennedy then turned to Thompson, this was dealing with the second letter and what it meant, and he said, “Well, gentlemen, you are the two top experts on this, I want your advice.” This had been agreed before that he was going to turn to them. So, Bohlen opened this discussion, as I understand the meeting, and said, “Mr. President, we have discussed this at great length and are at complete agreement with what Ambassador Thompson is going to say. He is the senior of the
two of us, and speaks for both of us.” Thompson, according to this account I got, said, “Mr. President, you never received the second letter. Quite frankly we have read this over and over and we can’t tell whether Khrushchev might have been drunk, might have had somebody with a gun at his head, there may have been a coup underway, we just don’t know. But, whatever it is, if you respond to the second letter, whoever is the cause of that letter is on the hook. They are now committed and we don’t know how you deal with that. The first letter you can deal with, it calls for two things -- removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, which were obsolescent anyway, and essentially a no invasion pledge which is no big deal as we weren’t planning to invade anyhow.” I was told that President Kennedy said, “Gentlemen, that is why we need career diplomats who know their stuff. Well done.”

I told this the other day to a friend of mine, Luke Battle, and he said, “Yes, I had heard about the unanswered second letter and the way I heard it was that somebody said that ‘an unanswered letter is a letter that is answered.’” In any event, the thing that was intriguing about this...we didn’t know about this yet as it occurred in Washington...and I had been invited to go out to Paris and give a lecture at the NATO Defense College which I can done periodically. Because of my wandering around the Soviet Union I gave them a picture of what was happening there that was quite different. I was leaving Friday to go out. I went to Kohler and said, “Mr. Ambassador, given what is going on, should I cancel the Paris trip?” He said, “No, no, we are going to act as if nothing is wrong. They know you are going and if you cancel it is a signal of something. We are not going to give any hints of any kind.” So, I left, got on the plane and felt like a real shit in a way. I might have been going out and they are all dead. I got into Paris and stayed with my wife’s parents who were then in Paris. In the meantime I hadn’t told her. I took a taxi and went to the apartment and came into the door and Brantz, my then father-in-law, said, “Did you hear the news?” I said, “No.” He said, “The ships just turned around.” They had just heard that news and that was when it was over. That was really high drama.

About a week or ten days later...I did not keep a diary which in retrospect I regret...we had a reception at Spaso House, the ambassador’s residence. I can’t remember what the occasion was, but the guest for the occasion was a pretty big deal. We expected absolutely nobody from the Soviet leadership to show up, we figured they would send...at the most Gromyko might come in for a minute or two. But, then the whole shebang marched in, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Gromyko, Malinovsky, they were all there. Everybody was completely startled. It was obviously some kind of statement. How that was interpreted back in Washington, I don’t know. And they were all being...Khrushchev as usual was bubbling around. Finally I went to Kohler and said, “Ambassador Kohler, wouldn’t it be interesting to see what Rodion Malinovsky, the minister of defense, might say if I mentioned the second letter to him -- just to see how he would react?” Kohler said, “Okay, once. You can make a reference to the second letter, once and no more. Don’t follow it up. If he starts asking questions about it, just say you don’t know anything about it; just that there was one. Get out of it immediately. Just drop it in a sentence and leave it at that.”

I went over to Malinovsky, who was a caricature of a Soviet general. He was square with medals that went from his shoulders to his waist. You could just see he didn’t want to be there. He was obviously there under command orders; they were making a show of amity. We chatted a little bit and then I said, “What do you think about the second letter?” He just froze. He stared at me for what seemed like hours but was maybe five seconds. Then in this deep voice he said, “Now I
can believe in God” and turned around and walked out. Obviously what he realized was that we did get it and didn’t respond to it and that it may have averted war. It was an amazing thing.

DAVID E. MARK

Political & Economic Counselor

Moscow (1957-1959)

Ambassador David E. Mark graduated from Columbia University in 1943. Shortly after completing a year of law school, he was drafted into the U.S. Army. Near the end of World War II, Ambassador Mark joined the Foreign Service. He served in Korea, Romania, Switzerland, Burundi, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Henry Precht on July 28, 1989.

Q: You had never done economic work before?

MARK: No, I had never done economic work. We had ten people in the section including me, and two of them sort of worked on economic matters, to the extent that one could amidst Soviet statistical secrecy. There's nothing I can add to the history of the Khrushchev era that I participated in. I worked for a tremendously able ambassador, Llewellyn Thompson--"Tommy" Thompson. This was the first of his two ambassadorial tours there. He had an easy working relationship with Khrushchev, whom he often saw informally.

It was a time of great change there. Not as much as now with Gorbachev, but since we were much closer to the Stalin era, it seemed like a lot. Moscow was scrubbed of any anti-American posters that I had remembered from 1952. We were able to speak to many more people.

We also had weekly meetings with counterparts from many embassies of NATO allies to exchange specific information and insights. From these many sources and from some contacts during rail and automobile trips in Russia, I came to the conclusion that the Soviet dictatorship was too strongly entrenched to be overturned. This conclusion, of course, would have great significance, if true, for U.S. objectives during the Cold War confrontation. I wrote a long essay on this matter in 1958, and Ambassador Thompson sent it on to Washington with an introduction of his own saying that matters were not as hopeless for a pro-Western outcome as I was predicting. I wanted to rebut his argumentation, but he said that I was being impolite to a superior. So that my addition never went in. I couldn't foresee the Gorbachev era 30 years later, but I wish that Ambassador Thompson were still alive to experience it as a validation of his relative optimism.

Regarding automobile trips, I was the first non-military American to get a driver's license. Nowadays it's done reciprocally. Soviets get them in Washington and we get them in Moscow, but I had to go through the whole exam business.

I was excused from just one thing that Soviet drivers had to do and that's to pass a mechanic's test for repairing the car. But I had to take a big physical exam and then I had to learn all the rules and regulations. There they don't have signs--they didn't then at least--have signs on the streets saying, "Parking Two Hours," or "No Parking," or whatnot. You just learned all the rules,
that within ten meters of such and such a lamppost or whatever, one doesn't park. Or when you have double trolley tracks, you can't do certain things about turning left. There was a large book of rules, and I had to study, study, study because you were tested via a sort of a little gaming board, moving cars around, and then you got a road test in addition. And so, as I say, I was the first American to get a license and I had my own car over there.

I don't know--I guess we can say it; enough time has passed, about 30 years. Some things can be declassified. But one day before I went to Moscow the--I guess he was still deputy assistant secretary--Jake Beam, who was soon to become ambassador to Poland, called me in and said, "David, the CIA would like you to support them a bit when you're in Moscow."

And I said, "Well, what do you mean?"

He said, "Well, they don't have anybody in Moscow."

Q: People so distrusting of communism or fearful of the Russian power?

MARK: Or not wanting to reduce the United States to seem a mere coequal instead of a greater and better nation. You know, if you sign an agreement in which you pledge not to do what they're also pledging not to do, you give them legitimacy as coequals, and these people didn't want to give that status to the Soviet Union. They also thought, there were a lot of people who still thought, we could gain supremacy if we kept on testing. You know, we had more technology and we had more resources.

It's this old idea that has come up again in the Reagan years of spending them into bankruptcy. We have succeeded more or less in doing that, but we've done it to ourselves almost as badly in the course of it, so that's the irony of the thing. But in any case, there were those factors there in the 1960s.

And yet there were other people who were for disarmament, people like Ambassador Gerald Smith, who was already involved in those days and for years after, ultimately as head of the Arms Control and the Disarmament Agency, a Republican serving in all kinds of administrations. I mean these people believe that disarmament is one of the means by which we would gradually reach a Soviet-American entente, or at least an understanding about live and let live. And of course they were urging this in the Khrushchev era, so there was then already some reason to think that evolutionary possibilities existed.

Q: Did you get the sense that there was a similar division on the Russian side?

MARK: Not on those issues, and the Russians were extremely difficult to fathom then. We were only tentatively starting at that time what is now standard practice at disarmament conferences. It began for us in '62 when we merged the nuclear test ban into the new 18-nation disarmament conference. And the new aspect was that, after each meeting of the 3 nation test ban subcommittee, the sides would get together informally and just exchange notes, exchange remarks on the meeting, or sometimes use it as an occasion to talk informally about what might be going on in the other's capital. That began in 1962 and is, as I say, now standard practice,
which led to the hit Broadway nuclear disarmament play, "A Walk in the Woods," that sort of thing.

But it had not happened before mid-1962. Before then, at most, we had lunch together every now and then, of which more later. There was also for me another incident. But the Russians were extremely tight-lipped about things. The only hint we got was that there might be a fight in Moscow about whether they should resume nuclear testing. Because the Soviets, when they went into this conference in 1959, had declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and we had not. I mean, we came to stop testing later, but we didn't declare it officially. So we went on testing in 1959, and then we did get into a short moratorium. But then we said that we were going to come out of the moratorium soon, whereas the Russians were still stuck with their earlier unilateral moratorium; and they obviously were uncomfortable militarily with this one-sided hiatus. We got a sort of threat from them--"Well, if the U.S. doesn't come around, and if the U.S. reserves the right to resume testing, then the Soviets would have to resume testing, and so forth." I mean, they finally did resume in--just to jump ahead--in September, I think, September 1, 1961, but this issue was clearly a problem for them within the delegation.

Also, there was some problem with their scientists. We got into such trouble in 1959 about how to distinguish seismic tests, which were natural events versus to distinguish natural events, that we decided to have another conference of scientists (there had been one in 1958). Indeed, we had a couple of them on different technical issues. And their scientists came to Geneva and clearly they were willing to say certain things about the difficulty of verification with instruments alone; and therefore they implied that one would need on-site inspections, but in saying this, they were deviating from the official line. So much so that after one of these scientific meetings, when there had been a joint U.S.-Soviet declaration by the two teams of scientists, the Soviet government repudiated its own scientists officially at one of our political meetings. So that was another sign of some intra-Soviet disagreement, but that was not on the political side; that was on the scientific side.

Also, we did have the impression that the Soviet delegation took the lead at times in pressing Moscow to agree to adopt a certain position. It wasn't that they were taking sides. They were being creative in proposing ways around impasses with the U.S. and UK. We did feel that happen from time to time. But to get back to the American point of view, there were those differences, and the differences centered most visibly, though not uniquely, on this question of how many on-site inspections per year would be enough. And people in Washington in 1959 generally agreed that ten were probably as much as we needed to ask for, but they said, "Well, but look. We're in a negotiating business with the Russians, so you can't ask for ten because you'll never end up with ten. Let's ask for 20." So they asked for 20. And, of course, once they asked for 20, 20 became a sacred number, supposedly reflecting technical necessity. Everyone forgot, if they ever knew, that 20 had been put in there purely for bargaining purposes, but it became the "scientifically valid" number that the U.S. would need for its security.

Well, of course, there was nothing scientific about any of these numbers, even ten. It was just a value judgment about how intrusive you had to be to keep the Soviets honest, and there were some Americans who thought you really didn't need inspections at all, because you had photographic satellites soon that replaced the U-2. I mean, we had the first, I think, KH-4
satellites, not long after that, and though they weren't as refined as some of the later ones in terms of distinguishing objects on the ground, they certainly could tell about nuclear test preparations. Plus, as I mentioned seismology told us a good bit.

We said that, after all, you don't have to be 100% sure that the Russians had not tested. All you have to do is create a situation that would prove frightfully embarrassing for them before world opinion if they were ever caught red-handed. And you could create such a situation just by your seismic monitoring and a few on-site inspections. That would be enough. The Russians wouldn't dare cheat, particularly when you kept your powder dry, i.e. you kept yourself ready to resume testing whenever they cheated. Indeed, that was one of the conditions that the Joint Chiefs later forced us to append to the ratification protocol in the Senate, that we keep our powder dry, keep our nuclear laboratories going, be ready to test at a moment's notice.

So, anyway, toward the end of the--I guess it was in 1959 that we came to 20--December 1959--this demand for 20 inspections, and that, of course, became a hang-up for all the remaining period of the negotiations, this inflated number. There were lots of other issues that developed, and I can say with all modesty that you can find this recounted ad nauseam in my book on the subject, which is one of only two serious full-length books on the test ban. [Laughter] There other one was written by a law professor at, I think, either Michigan State or the University of Michigan; and I've been told by objective outsiders, who have read both, that if you want to really know what that conference was all about, you must read both books, that each by itself is not as good as taking them together. And I'm sure that very few people ever will so read or ever have done so.

VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF

Political Officer

Moscow (1958-1960)

Vladimir Toumanoff was born in Constantinople in 1923 to Russian parents. He attended Harvard University and joined the Foreign Service in 1950. He served in several posts including Germany, Iceland, Moscow, and Canada. He was interviewed by William D. Morgan in 1999.

Q: Even though you know it's trash and done for an irritation?

TOUMANOFF: Right, our standing instructions were to read, translate and send to the Department any Note from the Soviet Government. This was just a calculated annoyance, a form of mild harassment.

Q: Anti-religious, perhaps.

TOUMANOFF: Well, perhaps so, but I read or translated several of those, and I never found one that had anything other than the very, very familiar kind of stuff that you read a week or two weeks earlier in an editorial in some newspaper. We didn't retaliate in kind, perhaps because the U.S. set a higher value on diplomatic notes than the Soviets, and didn't want to cheapen ours.
I should go back and talk about what travel was like. It was rather exceptional on several counts.

One had to do with the change in U.S.-Soviet relations during the period of my tour in Moscow, that is 1958-1960. About the time I arrived in Moscow there was some minor problem going on, I think it was over Berlin, but I'm not sure. In any case relations were a little strained, and standard anti-American propaganda was raised to match. Whatever was the problem, it ended quickly. And then, quite rapidly, the great Khrushchev thaw came into effect, and relations improved markedly. A number of exchange agreements were negotiated, (remind me to tell you about one such) including arrangements for the great American exhibition, and for the exchange of visits by Khrushchev and Eisenhower. "Peace and Friendship" and "The Spirit of Camp David" became the new, overwhelming Soviet propaganda slogans. All that has been thoroughly documented in books and articles. What is not so well known is that the bars against contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners, particularly Americans, including American diplomats, suddenly came tumbling down. They didn't vanish by explicit direction from Moscow. They vanished more by the radical change in the atmospherics, the suddenly favorable propaganda treatment of the United States. The Soviet public, which for some half century had been starved of contact with foreigners, with the West and most especially the U.S., by every means up to and including mortal threat, simply stampeded out of the corral.

In my travels and in Moscow, I met many Russians and other Soviet citizens, mostly by chance, and even developed a few genuine friends. A couple of perhaps important observations. One is that in all these random contacts not once did I encounter anger, antagonism or hostility toward the U.S. On the contrary, in spite of the intense efforts by the Communist Party and Soviet Government since at least 1900 to alienate the population from America, there was profound skepticism about the official image ("we know they lie to us"), great hunger for reliable information, eager curiosity about all aspects of America, and a vast reservoir of admiration and good will. Almost frighteningly so: Firstly because much of the admiration tended to be exaggerated in wishful contrast to their own brutally hard half-century; and secondly I heard often enough, and in unlikely places busily fixing up, cleaning up, and painting, "Maybe your President Eisenhower will come here on his visit. If he does we will give him a welcome such as no Soviet leader has ever had!" If I was hearing this often, the KGB must have been picking it up in spades. I'm persuaded that Khrushchev's anti-Stalin liberalization, and this turn towards the U.S. resulted in a widespread Public reaction which was read by Soviet authorities as a dangerously spreading loss of control. Unless contained and reversed, I think they feared, correctly, that it could accelerate and grow to torch them, the Party, and the nation. That fear, I believe, contributed to the Soviet extreme reaction to the U-2 incident, and ultimately (together with much else) to Khrushchev's fall and the Brezhnevite clamp down at home and in Eastern Europe. That may seem to some a very long bow for me to draw. But I would cite in support of my view the invasion of Czechoslovakia as prompted in large part by fear of domestic contagion from the "Prague Spring," as well as the later spontaneous collapse of Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

Q: And had to be in Russian.

TOUMANOFF: Right. After I'd gone to the first or second of these I realized that Thompson had established a truly almost unbelievable degree of confidence and trust with this extraordinary personality called Khrushchev. I am convinced that when Thompson finally left Moscow - this was after I had left - Khrushchev lost one of probably the only two people in the entire Soviet
Union whom Khrushchev totally trusted. The other being his wife, Nina Petrovna. With Thompson I think he knew he would not be deceived, not be lied to, and that he would get accurate, thoughtful information and opinion - that Thompson genuinely represented the United States Government, the President, and that he had the President's confidence and was the epitome of what an ambassador should be. But to have this happen in the Soviet Union was perfectly extraordinary. Eileen and I came to know Nina Petrovna a little, and she was marvelous. I'm sure that she kept Khrushchev sane, because she was so intelligent, so down-to-earth, so straightforward and so genuine.

Q: And knew the system.

TOUMANOFF: And, well, yes, I'm sure she knew the system, but she did not strike me as manipulative. Just the opposite. I think she must have been emotionally and morally a tower of strength for him. There was no falseness; there was no artificiality; but intelligence and thoughtfulness and acuity. The same was true of Thompson.

Q: Thompson recognized this and therefore could use this quality of his to-

TOUMANOFF: Well, I don't think he could be anything else, it came so naturally to him to have that kind of integrity, presence, acuity, perception, thoughtfulness, accuracy. It did work. I mean, he recognized the nature of the relationship, and he valued it, as did Khrushchev. Now let me tell you of an episode which demonstrated this relationship and, incidentally, why I was not troubled in Moscow by entrapments or police harassment, or anything of the kind. You will recall that when we began these interviews, I said that my Russian ancestry was prominent, privileged, and titled aristocracy, that my father was, his final rank was colonel, in the Imperial Guard, which was a very elite group, close to the Tsar. Obviously, my father fought on the side of the White Russian armies during the Civil War, was an adamant opponent of the Revolution and the Bolsheviks, and in the United States actively and publicly opposed recognition of the USSR. To such an extent was he an enemy of the Bolsheviks that they put a very large price on his head and on the heads of the entire family. My mother, who graduated from the law faculty at Moscow University, was equally dedicated and equally able, intelligent, and skillful in her opposition to the Communists. The Bolsheviks captured my father several times during the revolution and civil war, and on each occasion he broke out of captivity, and even engineered the escape of a prominent General. He was anathema to the Bolsheviks, and, as his son, I was not sure (a) whether the Soviets would let me into the country, even on a diplomatic passport, or (b) what might happen to me after I got there.

Q: But if Khrushchev had been... Maybe that's why he fell, Vlad!

TOUMANOFF: No, many things contributed to his fall. Only one of which, I think, was his turn to the West, and the United States in particular. There are many excellent books written about his rule and fall. Very briefly, let me comment on only one element. Khrushchev launched the Berlin crisis in 1958 amid extravagant missile rattling and threats. That terrified the Soviet population with the prospect of atomic war. Then suddenly he turned to "Peace and Friendship," "The Spirit of Camp David," and an exchange of visits with Eisenhower. The prospect of a visit by Ike, the wartime hero and ally, the epitome of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in an agonizing, mortal struggle, was such a relief from the prevailing fear of war that the Soviet population simply stampeded out of control in their enthusiasm and eagerness to show their gratitude, love for Ike, and yearning
for peace with America. All else that coincided with Khrushchev's domestic thaw following his anti-Stalin speech. I think the Kremlin's organs of control were terrified at its increasing loss, and held him to be responsible.

Incidentally, I saw Khrushchev before and after his very successful 1959 trip from coast to coast in the U.S. and there was a real change in him. He had never seen the United States, he had no conception. Remember, his formal education ended with grammar school, about the fourth grade I think. After that the only education he had was in Communist Party training facilities which gave him a crudely warped picture. So he had no conceivable notion of what the United States was like. He knew little of Western Europe and nearly nothing of the rest of the world. Eastern Europe after the War and Stalinist rule was not altogether different from the USSR. So he was handicapped in dealing on the world scene, and you could tell that he felt himself handicapped when he was talking to Thompson. Somehow he would say things or talk on assumptions about the U.S. and other parts of the world which were simply not so, Party cant. Part of the conversations with Thompson, whom he respected for his knowledge and objectivity, were almost educational, a kind of reality check of his images induced by Communist mythology and propaganda, especially his notions of the United States.

Q: -would have been removed.

TOUMANOFF: -perhaps even packed off to the Gulag. But to my mind Khrushchev was venting on his Ambassador his own frustrating realization how superior and mighty was the American society. Well informed on U.S. military and technological superiority, he was unprepared for our phenominal living standard and the scale and efficiency of our national infrastructure. He had already launched his ill-conceived and badly executed "virgin lands" corn campaign, hoping that Garst-like farms would solve his agricultural problem. He promptly ordered supermarkets. At the same time the U.S. challenge spurred his national pride, his genuine patriotism, and his drive for reform with slogans like "overtake and surpass" America. Ultimately, in his impatience he tried to divide the Soviet Communist Party into urban and rural branches to set against each other in an effort to move that glacial apparatus. Small wonder he was deposed.

I think for the moment that's enough about Thompson and Khrushchev. Let me tell you a couple of quick insights on other leadership in the Soviet Union. One was Brezhnev and the other one was Mikoyan.

In 1959 there was the usual 4th of July large reception at Spaso House, the Ambassador's residence, and as this was a time of "Peace and Friendship" a few members of the Politburo and other high Soviet officials came. On this occasion I saw Brezhnev standing alone and looking uncomfortable. So I went over, introduced myself, welcomed him, and invited him to the buffet and drinks table. He refused, bluntly. I asked if I could bring him some refreshment, "No," looking like he suspected poison. I tried to engage him in conversation, small talk, to make him more comfortable. As I recall it was a beautiful summer day, vacation time, so I asked if he had been able to enjoy some leave. He said "No," looking as though I was prying into secrets. I asked if he had been to Spaso before, thinking to tell him a bit about its history. He did not reply. Very plainly he was not interested in small talk and continued to look and feel enormously uncomfortable and awkward. At that moment a Soviet official in a slightly rumpled suit came
over to talk to him, whom Brezhnev obviously knew. Brezhnev pounced on him scolding violently for being slightly unshaven. An attempt to explain that he had been working late was cut off in mid-syllable. Brezhnev went on belaboring savagely for so shaming the USSR before Americans by his uncultured behavior, and banished the poor man, fiercely ordering him home to shave. The man cringed under the onslaught and practically ran out the door. Embarrassed to witness so blatant a display of inferiority complex, I had moved off, and I stayed away from Brezhnev, probably making matters worse. I probably should have suggested we have a shot of vodka and forget the incident. But I was in mild shock at this revelation of another, major cultural obstacle, at the top of Soviet power, to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Q: Beautiful. That's a nice story to end on the personalities of the leadership of the Soviet Union.

TOUMANOFF: As we're in it already, let's go on about the July 23 - August 3, 1959 Nixon visit and tour in the USSR, the occasion for the famous "kitchen" debate.

In part, it was a kind of test run for the President's planned visit in 1960, his return visit for that of Khrushchev to the U.S. which was to take place later in the summer of 1959. In part it was a demonstration of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. In part it was necessary international experience for Vice President Nixon. And finally it was part of Nixon's presidential election campaign. It quickly became evident that this last was Nixon's overwhelming primary concern. For him it was first and foremost a public relations exercise. He was on stage (as in the "kitchen" debate). Not only did he and the delegation monitor U.S. and Soviet press coverage intensely, but press briefings were of the essence.

I was not involved in the following episode, but I was quietly told by some who were. So this is hearsay. Back in Moscow, at the end of Nixon's country tour, there were three days of negotiations. By agreement they were to be confidential, no publicity. On the evening of the first day (8-hour time difference) U.S. news media carried reports about the talks, favorable to Mr. Nixon. The Soviets complained, confidentially. The second day there were more such reports. The Soviets complained again. On the third day it became evident to some of our participants that the Soviets had lost trust in Nixon and the negotiations, and talked accordingly.

If the above account is true, that Soviet experience came on top of Nixon's reputation, established earlier in his public career, of being harshly anti-Soviet, and for behavior which gave him the sobriquet of "Tricky Dick". I'm unaware of any evidence that such a sacrifice of trust, if true, affected U.S.-Soviet relations during his presidency. But it wouldn't have helped.

Q: But the coverage may have helped him get elected, and that was more important.

TOUMANOFF: The famous "Kitchen" debate at the American Exhibition in Moscow (which, incidentally, Nixon opened during his visit) in which Nixon and Khrushchev publicly harangued each other, served the same purpose. Our press reported that Nixon not only proved he could stand up to the Soviets, he bested Khrushchev in their contention. But Yes, you're right. If he lost the election, trust or no it wouldn't matter. Some more about the visit.

This one is more about the United States and President Eisenhower. At some stage, when the Nixon visit was being planned, President Eisenhower asked his brother Milton Eisenhower to join the group, and he agreed and came. I was lucky enough to be assigned to be Milton Eisenhower's escort officer and interpreter, and kind of guide for all of the trip outside of
Moscow. Milton Eisenhower was a very thoughtful, very kind, very intelligent and perceptive man. Now while I did help and interpret occasionally for some of the other members on the voyage, essentially I made that trip with Milton Eisenhower. As a consequence I had a fascinating and easy time. That was a great relief, because there was often a huge mob, and noise, of correspondents, security types, delegation members, local Soviet officials, interpreters and other people surrounding Nixon. In the press toes were stamped, shoes were destroyed, people's clothes were torn, it was dangerous to stumble. A mob scene when he toured a factory or other installation. Milton Eisenhower and I would let the mob go through ahead of us and come along behind, sometimes alone, sometimes with one Soviet official detailed to escort the President's brother.

GIFFORD D. MALONE

Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, DC (1958-1961)

Russian Language Training

Oberammergau, Germany (1963-1964)

Administrative Officer

Moscow (1964-1966)

Soviet Affairs Desk, Bureau of European Affairs

Washington, DC (1966-1969)

Gifford Malone was born in Richmond, Virginia in 1930. He received his bachelor’s degree from Princeton University and his master’s from Columbia University. He served in the US army from 1953-1956. His career with the Foreign Service included assignments in Poland and the Soviet Union. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in December of 1991.

Q: In this period of 1966-69, from your vantage point in Washington what were the most consuming elements of the American-Soviet relationship?

MALONE: Well, you recall it was a period not long after Khrushchev had been put aside by his colleagues in the Kremlin and Brezhnev had come in. It was a time when the Soviet leadership was consolidating its position. It was the period of the Vietnam War so that was a point of major discord between the Soviets and the United States. Although it was not as serious a point of discord as you might have thought by reading the Soviet press. In other words, Pravda and Izvestia were filled with denunciations of the United States every day, but normal diplomatic relations went on. I wouldn’t say that US-Soviet relations were particularly damaged by that, but it was always there in the background.

What we were trying to do really was to sort of continue to try to open things up a little in the Soviet Union. For example, during the period I was in SOV we were negotiating a consular agreement with the Soviets. We didn’t have a consular agreement. That took a lot of doing.
Negotiations with the Soviets always take a lot of time, but setting some rules for what happens to Americans who are tossed in jail in the Soviet Union, etc. was felt to be a first step. We regarded it as something useful and important.

Interestingly enough, it is hard to believe it these days, there was a lot of opposition in the United States to signing that treaty or any treaty with the Soviet Union. I used to go out on speaking tours quite a lot in those days and people would say, “How can you sign a treaty with the Soviets? How can you trust them?” I would say, “Well, you can’t always trust them, but in this case you have an agreement where there are obligations on both sides and if one side doesn’t live up to it, the other side knows it instantly and can do something about it or take retaliatory actions.” So that was something that we would do.

Q: Did you as a professional who had served in the Soviet Union have any concern on your part that by our pounding the drums of anti-Sovietness and all that we may have been impeding our ability to deal with this superpower because we had painted everything so black that it was difficult to convince the elements of the American public that we could deal with these people?

MALONE: I don’t think so. Some of that may be true. It is very hard obviously for people who are not professional diplomats and not thinking about foreign affairs to recognize that you can deal with an unfriendly country which really is a threat to you. It is possible at the same time to have more or less normal diplomatic relations in some other ways.

Some of the feeling on the part of the public is due to what you suggest. But by and large the Soviet record had been so terrible from the end of the Second World War on that it was simply hard for people to understand how you could also go ahead and sign these agreements with them. In that sense, although I don’t think you could accuse a single person in SOV of being a dove, we probably seemed to some of these people in the American community as being soft on the Soviets.

One group that would not have agreed with that at that time were a lot of the Vietnam War protesters who...it was sort of an automatic carryover from their opposition to the war...began to think that the North Koreans and North Vietnamese are okay...hard to believe but they said that...and therefore everything we have been told about the Soviets is too. So it was really the beginning of the revisionist history in the United States starting with very young people.

WALTER B. SMITH, II

U.S.-USSR Exchanges Program Officer

Moscow (1959)

Publications Procurement/Political Officer

Moscow (1965-1967)

Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Walter B. Smith, II was born in Providence, Rhode Island on December 10, 1929. He received a bachelor’s degree from Princeton University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1951-1953. Mr. Smith’s career in the Foreign Service included positions in Germany, Israel, Poland, and the Soviet Union. He was interviewed in 1988 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

SMITH: ...My first assignment, because I had studied the Russian language, was to what was, in effect, the U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Staff, handling scientific, cultural, and academic exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. The exchange program was only a year or two old at that time. Details of these exchanges were negotiated by the Director of the Staff with a Minister in the Soviet Embassy in Washington on a weekly basis. I was the note-taker for these meetings. I had been in the Foreign Service for a grand total of three months when I started doing this. It was very heady stuff. Also, there was a Special Assistant to the Secretary, Ambassador “Wild Bill” Lacy, who was in charge of so-called “East-West Contacts.” He would meet with “Smiling Mike” Menshikov, then Soviet Ambassador to the United States, from time to time. And Ambassador Lacy used me as his note-taker. So this was very exciting, indeed. Scarcely a year after I entered the Foreign Service, USIA [United States Information Agency] and the Department of Commerce were setting up what was to be the American National Exhibition in Moscow. They suddenly realized that they could not handle it all. They sent an SOS to the Department of State, and three young, bushy-tailed Foreign Service officers, having some knowledge of Russian, myself included, were sent to Moscow in the summer of 1959.

Q: Before we get to that, how did we view the exchange program? Wasn’t it a major concern of ours that we’d be sending real exchange people, and they’d be sending over KGB agents?

SMITH: That is exactly what it was. There was enormous, well-intended, but naive interest in the United States in the exchange program. The main role of our little staff, among other things, was to obtain some kind of reciprocity in return for giving the Soviets a free intelligence and propaganda ride inside the United States. We tried to make sure that Americans could be exposed, to some extent, to the public inside the Soviet Union. Another and not so unimportant role was to play “Dutch Boy with Finger in the Dyke” with their favorite points of attack, trying to keep Americans -- radio stations in Minnesota, if you will -- from falling prey to alleged “people to people” ploys, which were part of the Soviet system. The Soviets were forever trying to “end run” the U.S. federal government and set up so-called exchange arrangements directly with well-intended but rather ill-informed American groups. With absolutely no authority we did head off at the pass a lot of these initiatives. That is what the exchange operation was from the Washington end.

Q: Why did the Soviets let you get away with this?

SMITH: Letting us buy books was the price that they paid to be able to travel around the United States, buying books in the United States. They were already overwhelmed with information about the United States, but somehow they thought that they needed more. Therefore, I gather that they thought that their book buying operation was as important to them as ours was to us. In terms of the availability of the information, our operation was infinitely more important for our purposes than theirs could possibly have been to them. theirs was also economic and
technological espionage, not just political and military. They did not have much that we did not know how to do better, but it was important to them, and, therefore, they allowed us to do this.

At the end of six months I was assigned to the Political Section to follow Soviet relations with Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East -- all three combined. Subsequently, the Embassy peeled these off and had separate individuals doing it. There was one person handling African relations because the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State at the time had a lot of money and was quite new, because independent Africa was new. The Bureau of African Affairs funded its own “slot,” so to speak, in the Political Section [in the Embassy in Moscow]. There was one person handling East Asia, who was usually a “China hand.” There was one person handling Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. I think that he belonged to “another agency” [i.e., CIA], which stands to reason. Then everything else was piled together on my platter, which made my job very, very interesting, because I maintained contact with Latin American, West European, and Middle Eastern diplomats in Moscow. At the time the Middle Eastern crisis was heating up. This was the summer and fall of 1966. The 1967 War was coming...

Q: Yes, in June, 1967...

SMITH: The Soviets were meddling and behaving very irresponsibly and, because we duly reported this and Washington already sensed this, a great deal of misguided U.S. suspicion built up, in my judgment, about the unreliability of the Soviets in any respect, as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned. That June war in 1967 “scared the pants” off the Soviets. People do not realize how close that war came to turning into World War III. It was a very, very tense time.

That war is a very interesting thing, in my opinion, in terms of the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations, because our “little friend,” Israel, clobbered what looked to be the large and powerful armed forces of neighboring Arab states, which, with the exception of Jordan, were totally armed by the Soviet Union. So U.S. made arms smashed Soviet made arms, with a tremendous difference in odds, in terms of sheer numbers. But, in fact, the Soviets played it well. We were declared *persona non grata* in every single Arab capital except Saudi Arabia and a couple of other countries. We had a tough time regaining the confidence of the Arabs because they chose to blame us for the Israeli success.

Q: From your point of view, what did you see in those secret Soviet-American talks on the Middle East? What were the major points and how did they develop?

SMITH: In light of the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict since then, the points at issue seem ludicrous, but, based on the history of the question up to that time, they were not so funny. The Soviets were twisting the arm of the Egyptians, in particular. The Soviets cleared their position with the Egyptians each step of the way. We gave the Israelis only a general idea of what we were up to. We did not clear our position with the Israelis. I guess we thought that that would create too big a row. We were going to have a showdown with the Israelis when and if we ever got to the point of what we considered a balanced or tentative arrangement with the Soviets. We knew, from intelligence that I cannot go into -- incontrovertible intelligence -- that the Soviets were twisting the Egyptians’ arm. Since I still had an INR “portfolio,” I was able to have access to certain rarified intelligence. It was just fascinating to me to see what the Soviets were doing.
They were moving very slowly, playing “hard ball” with the Egyptians -- but they were moving. And so were we.

Then the “deep penetration raids” began after the first U.S. “Phantom” jets [F-4 fighters] arrived in Israel, in September 1969. To our dismay the Israelis began using these planes to do “dare-devil” things across the Suez Canal. By October 1969 they were bombing targets around Cairo, if you remember.

Q: The “war of attrition...”

SMITH: Yes, indeed, and the windows were rattling in the American School in Cairo. We complained to the Israelis, and they said, “Move your school.” They were not about to stop bombing Cairo for our convenience. I guess, in retrospect, that I can understand that, but it sounded a little arrogant at the time.

After that the Soviets introduced Soviet pilots because the Egyptians were being humiliated. Gradually, Soviet planes began pushing the Israeli air campaign back. The United States was so upset by this, in late 1969, that we broke off the U.S.-Soviet talks. We knew that this was something that meant more to them than it did to us, at least potentially. So, I suppose, we figured that this was a way of showing them how angry we were at what they were doing in Egypt. You can hardly blame them for what they were doing in Egypt. If you reverse the situation -- if the Soviets had been the “sponsor” of Israel and we had been the “sponsor” of Egypt -- you know perfectly well that there would have been U.S. pilots in there. So it was really the pot calling the kettle black, I thought. It was foolish of us to break off the talks. The Soviets resisted doing anything to help the Egyptians until Nasser blew the whistle on them. Nasser died in September, 1970!

There was an interplay between the situation on the ground in the area, which the Israelis really provoked, and our ability to continue any kind of dialogue with the Soviets. So, of course, anything the Soviets had to say, starting in 1970, was suspect, and instead of making any further effort with the Soviets, we launched what became known as the “Jarring Initiative,” which the Israelis made sure would fail, and which did by March or April 1970. At that point Joe Sisco, who had an extraordinarily fertile imagination, dreamt up the so-called “Proximity Talks.” He tried to get an Israeli and Egyptian to sit on different floors in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. He was going to run back and forth [between them]. The effort to organize the “Proximity Talks” continued through 1970 and 1971 and gradually sputtered out after the change of administrations in 1972, with Henry Kissinger’s arrival on the scene as Secretary of State.

HANS N. TUCH

Cultural and Press Attaché, USIS

Moscow (1958-1961)

Deputy Director for USSR and Eastern Europe, USIS

Washington, DC (1961-1965)
Hans N. Tuch was born in Germany in 1924. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Kansas City and a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1945. Mr. Tuch’s career in the Foreign Service included positions in the Soviet Union, Germany, and Brazil. The following excerpts are from Mr. Tuch’s interviews with Benis Frank, Cliff Groce, and G. Lewis Schmidt conducted in 1988.

Q: And also that’s the time before the agricultural attachés and all the other agencies in government.

TUCH: I count the agricultural attaché as part of the 14 substantive officers. But we had, for instance, an ambassador, we had a deputy chief of mission, minister of the embassy. We had no counselors. We had one first secretary, politico-economic, sort of almost like the British system, a chancery head. He was a chancery head. And the rest of us were second secretaries. We were all working stiffs -- the political section, the economic section, agricultural section, and the publications procurement officer, one officer who bought books for the whole U.S. Government, who just did nothing but go around Moscow buying books at bookstores. I helped him, because he helped me. His name was Harry Barnes, who’s now ambassador to Chile. He and I did share the cultural and press relations work. It was too much to do for one person, so he helped me, and I helped him buy books. But at any rate, it was a very tight, very small, very collegial type of embassy in those days. Everybody knew everybody, and everybody worked for the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission, who was sort of the executive officer, by the name of “Dick” Richard Davis. Not Davies, but Davis.

It was, from my point of view, an ideal situation working for an ambassador who recognized -- and here we come back to the public diplomacy angle -- who recognized that in a situation in which we functioned, the cultural and press relations work was the most substantive activity that an embassy could do. Obviously, we read the papers and reported on political areas, economic developments, agriculture developments, but he saw that the only people who really got out to talk to people were the people who did public affairs work. There was, at that time, only one -- myself.

He was terribly supportive about the cultural affairs work. For instance, say you had a delegation of American composers there, and you wanted to have a party. Well, you knew that the Soviet officials would not come to your apartment to be with these American composers. But they may come to the residence. The ambassador’s house was open to any kind of a party or reception or get-together, where we all felt that the Soviet officials and maybe even some composers and musicians might come to the Spaso house, the ambassador’s official residence, but they wouldn’t come to my place. He was very, very supportive of this, and he, having been in the Soviet Union during World War II, in the 1940s, knew a lot of the -- at that time, younger, creative people, ballet dancers, opera singers from the early Forties, who now were fairly old and many of them retired, but he knew them, and they would come sometimes to his place. Therefore, he provided the opening that was so important for us.

Why it was interesting for me to be in the Soviet Union during that period of time. The relationship, from its nadir, took an upward turn with the election of President Kennedy, and the release of the RB-47 pilots, who had been another sort of semi-spy plane, who had been shot
down in Murmansk, in the ocean, had been shot down, something that was really not much talked about. But that’s another story, because there’s an interesting anecdote, too, about the release of these two pilots.

But anyway, I think Khrushchev wanted to make a gesture vis-a-vis Kennedy, and by releasing these guys, it had been a sore point in our relationship, and the relationship took an up-turn until the Bay of Pigs invasion. Then even worse, it took the real down-turn again after the meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy in July 1961 in Vienna, where Kennedy got his real first taste of what it was like to negotiate or to relate or to be up against the Soviet Union in the form of Nikita Khrushchev. As a matter of fact, there was one interesting anecdote. I wasn’t there. I was in Moscow still. But when Tommy Thompson, who had gone to Vienna to be with the President, came back, we asked him how things went, and he said, “You know, after the first day of the meetings, of the relationship, the President turned to me and says, ‘Ambassador Thompson, now I understand why you want to get out of the Soviet Union so badly.’” [Laughter] At any rate, it took a down-turn again, and that is really when I left Moscow.

The other interesting point to mention about the whole assignment, my three years in Moscow, I was the first American embassy officer to serve more than two years after World War II. There was a hard and fast rule by the Department of State that you could not serve longer than two years in Moscow, a rule that Tommy Thompson had tried to break for a number of years, because he felt that some people didn’t become useful to the embassy until they’d been there for about two years. And so he negotiated with George Allen, who was at that time the Director of USIA, who was also, of course, a State Department officer, career Foreign Service officer, on whether he could assign me for a third year. He did that without asking me. Then when George Allen said yes, he called me in and said, “I would like to keep you for a third year.” Well, I felt so flattered by being asked anything by Tommy Thompson, that I immediately said yes, and only then realized I should really talk this over with my wife first, because the assignment in Moscow, professionally, probably one of the most interesting assignments one could have, the roughness or the really bad part of the assignment was more on the wife and the children than it was on the officer, because the officer had the interesting political developments to contend with, whereas the wife only had the hardships to contend with.

WILLIAM D. MORGAN

Russian Language and Area Studies
Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC and
Columbia University, New York, New York (1960-1962)

Publications/Political Officer
Moscow (1962-1964)
Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs
Washington, DC (1964-1966)
William D. Morgan was born in Rochester, New York in 1925. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester and did graduate work at the University of Maryland. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943-1946. His Foreign Service career included positions in the United Kingdom (England), the Soviet Union, Lebanon, France, Canada, and Washington, DC. Mr. Morgan interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1988 and Lester Sadlow in 1995.

Q: Tell us about the office and how it was set up. Some of our readers may not be so familiar with the State Department. What exactly is a “country desk”? You might think of people sitting around a table who were the greatest experts in the world on a given subject.

MORGAN: Well, we were. That’s characteristic of the State Department. It still has “tables of experts.” However, the real answer to your question is that the Department of State, to put it very simply, is basically cut into two parts. One is composed of “functional” bureaus, and the other is geographic bureaus. The functional bureaus include consular, intelligence, economic, political-military, administration, general services, and so on. Those are all “functional” areas. They are big offices. They have “desks”, let’s call them offices, where the specialists of varying degrees work. They are a combination of Civil Service employees and Foreign Service Officers and staff. The same is true of the geographic bureaus, which have both civil service and Foreign Service Officers. They are very much intermingled. However, the functional bureaus largely deal with their [particular] function. The Consular Bureau, for example, has to carry out the laws dealing with consular affairs -- visas, the protection of Americans [overseas], and passports.

The geographic bureaus cover the world, which is broken down into geographic areas: Europe and Canada, East Asia, South Asia, the Near East and North Africa, South of the Sahara Africa, and Latin America. Those are the geographic bureaus. Within each one of these geographic bureaus are subordinate offices, sometimes called desks if the office is confined to one country. SOV is part of the Bureau of European Affairs, although it also covers that part of the former Soviet Union, now mostly Russia, which extends into Asia. In fact, responsibility for Moscow is assigned to the European Bureau. Canada was under the European Bureau, but finally, the Canadians “got their independence” and the Bureau of European Affairs became the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. Within the European Bureau there are many desks. SOV had about 12 officers assigned there, plus eight or so support staff, including secretaries and clerical help. We focused on the Soviet Union, which in turn was broken down into three parts within the Office of Soviet Affairs. First was Soviet Bilateral Affairs, to which I was assigned. It dealt only with U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in all of their dimensions. Another section was Soviet Multilateral Affairs, which dealt with U.S.S.R.-third country or international organizations such as NATO, UN affairs and how they affected the U.S. interests. Soviet-U.S. economic issues was the third element of SOV and was a very small office consisting of two or three officers. This is not to be confused with the Economic Bureau of the Department!. Yes, they all worked together, but this was a specialized area within SOV, the Soviet “desk.” It focused largely on Soviet agricultural and economic affairs. In my Soviet Bilateral Affairs section I was deputy to Carroll Woods, the director. We had two other, more junior officers, neither of whom had served in the Soviet Union. Also was Virginia James, about whom I spoke above and, as a Civil Service employee, had served in SOV for many, many years. She largely followed issues with a need for continuity, like people in jail, for example.
In turn, to go on with your question, we divided responsibility for specific aspects of our bilateral relations among the three or four officers in SOV. Carroll Woods, as the Office Director, was involved in all of issues and some topics he was especially interested or qualified in. As one of the three Office Directors in SOV, he reported to the head of the Soviet “desk,” who was, my first year, David Henry. Mac Toon succeeded him. There was also a Deputy Director. They took care of the larger problems that related to the Soviet Union, many of which started with us subordinates or at least were tracked on a routine basis until they escalated to the bosses, including the White House. I have read with great interest of recent efforts to “de-layer” -- remove supervisory personnel -- the bureaucracy. It’s not easy, as you naturally report through your own channels to bosses of more authority, and hopefully more skills and knowledge. There were numerous such layers at that time. Nevertheless, I reported to Carroll Woods, period. Once in a while I would find myself taking guidance or direction directly from Toon or Henry or even from an Assistant Secretary of State -- although that was most extraordinary. The structure was very “layered.”

Finally, there were my specific “areas of competence”, as we called them. Whether I was really “competent” or not didn’t matter; the desk called them that. They included maritime, military and general consular affairs. I also followed the activities of those “Spying” Soviet diplomats as they maneuvered around our society. I looked into such things as violations of their travel status. Another responsibility of mine was the control of travel by Soviet diplomats in the U. S.. This was a result of the Soviets’ restricting our travel and access the Soviet Union. I did the same thing against them, in “retaliation”. I made sure that in the case of any diplomatic note which came from the Soviet Embassy to the State Department, advising of the travel plans of Soviet diplomats, that the local authorities in whatever state knew that they were coming there and what they were coming for. And I “made note of” and advised them in writing when they violated the approved itinerary. That was a “black mark” against them.

Q: Can you remember one, specific incident? What does that mean and how did it reach your desk?

MORGAN: Let’s say that it happened near Murmansk, out on the high seas, where there are more Soviet than American ships. We have an American submarine, and there is a Soviet submarine operating nearby. Or an American cruiser or destroyer. A Soviet flotilla is coming out from Soviet territorial waters and into the high seas, off Norway. The first thing you know an American cruiser is passing a Soviet cruiser, six yards apart. Or they scrape each other or back into each other. They are “playing games” on the high seas and at some speed. This was happening -- and still happens. It’s a way -- I should not go on any further in characterizing this behavior. But it was trouble, because you had to back your way through “non-apologies,” through “who saw it first,” through “intensive examinations,” through things that took an awful lot of time for just one, simple thing. From one Navy to another Navy. And no lessons learned whatsoever, nor victories claimed.

The big thing with the Navy, with the Coast Guard, in part, and with the Canadian Government, because it sometimes happened in Canadian territorial waters, transit through the “Northwest Passage,” for example, in the area of pack ice, and sometimes under the ice. The Navy made an annual or maybe semi-annual trip through the Northwest Passage. Some of the trip was by submarine under the ice. A lot of it was by cruisers through the pack ice, preceded by icebreakers. It was our Navy’s way of asserting our “rights.” We did not accept Canadian claim
of national waters or said all navies have the right of transit from one national territory to another. This basically is international naval law and what keeps lawyers in business. The high seas are anyone’s territory. There was a big question regarding the Dardanelles Strait, which flows into the Mediterranean Sea, and other, similar issues, involving international waters. Who proves that they are international waters? The fleets of the various nations. That’s where we got into trouble. Sometimes it involved the Canadians. They said that the Northwest Passage is in their territory, and we have to ask their permission to pass through it. The Soviets would go through, our Navy would go through, and we would find ourselves involved in encounters and disputes -- sometimes caused by “provocative acts” on our part or on their part. In some cases these were accidental. Some of these incidents were tragic, in which some people lost their lives.

But naval tradition was also the basis for one of the nicer aspects of bilateral Soviet-American relations. Let me now switch 180 degrees. When one sailor is in trouble, another sailor helps. It doesn’t matter what country it is. If there is an accident on the high seas, a ship of another Navy will come to the rescue. I’ve seen some cases of the Soviet Navy helping the American Navy.

As an outgrowth of the Navy and other U.S. agencies, I remember case of exceptional cooperation. When I was in SOV I got very much involved in a program which the Soviets wanted. It first came up when I was on a trip to Siberia and visited the Far North. The topic is “permafrost.” -- permanently frozen earth just inches under the surface. The Soviets had an excellent Permafrost Institute in Yakutsk up near the Arctic Circle. I spent a day there with the director and staff. We had some undertakings with Canada, especially since we adjoined territorially in the frozen north. With the Soviets, who joined in with Canada and the U.S. some wonderful things developed -- testing permafrost conditions and exchanging information. That was one of the more positive things that happened with the USSR back in the days of the Cold War.

Contact with the Coast Guard was really the area where most of my time with maritime affairs was spent. This involved Soviet ships coming, either by request or by accident, into American ports. There were far fewer American ships going into Soviet ports, in part because the USSR doesn’t have the number or types of ports that we do. Soviet ports are located in a very limited area along the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic and Black Seas. We had some problems with the Black Sea when American ships tried to get to Soviet ports. Actually, some of the Soviet ships had accidents or problems off our coasts and they needed to be rescued or assisted. But all of that needed our permission -- literally, my agreement.

We had one official from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury who was responsible for Coast Guard affairs. We had some stressful moments. I guess that I “excited” him, particularly when I had to raise a problem with him in the middle of the night, such as Treasury’s ok for a Soviet ship to come into New York. Usually, under such extreme conditions, such a request involved an accident to the ship’s engines or something like that. In other cases it was deliberate -- they were merely testing us. Finally, in some cases, it was simply a “formal” request.

We in State were always looking for ways to try to improve Soviet-American relationships. Sometimes, there were little things like these maritime issues which were symbolic and which both sides, down into the two system, wanted. That is, the U. S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Maritime fleets and counterparts. There were a lot of forces out there that weren’t trying to find
ways to show us as enemies but, rather, how we might relieve some of the tensions that existed between the two superpowers.

This often involved working within the Soviet system of bureaucratic controls. We knew that if we could “eat away” at rigid, “knee jerk” reactions to Cold War antagonisms it would eventually produce a more relaxed relationship, detente, if I may use the exact term. It would be better to keep working at this tactic: the visitor exchanges program, for example. By the way, the Soviets had -- how shall we say it -- ideological reasons to support such exchange agreements. They were ideological in the sense of showing the Soviet Union as a country rich in cultural affairs such as music, opera, ballet, literature...and highly competitive in scientific research and accomplishments. It was rewarding to see some of our military colleagues -- certainly maritime - - recognize that it was in our national interest to strive to reduce tensions and sources of disagreement.

PETER S. BRIDGES
Assistant General Services Officer/Political Officer
Moscow (1962-1964)

*Ambassador Bridges was born in New Orleans and raised in Chicago. He attended Dartmouth College and Columbia University and served in the US Army in France. He entered the Foreign Service in 1957 and held positions in Panama, Moscow, Italy, and served as Ambassador to Somalia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.*

Q: How did the Cuban Missile Crisis hit you? What happened over there?

BRIDGES: I don’t remember the first news we had, but of course we heard about it very quickly in October. It was worse. We understood the danger, but it was only two years later when we came back the United States, in 1964, that we understood for the first time how scared people had been in the United States. The difference was the media; the American media had been scaring the people, and of course the Soviet media was not scaring the Soviet people because there was no advantage to them doing so. Our mood was, I would say, one of concern. As assistant GSO I was not privy to all the communications to and from the Department, but the ambassador generally informed us as to what was going on. There were a couple of funny incidents. One Saturday, my wife and I - we were told to stay inside the compound, so that there wouldn’t be some kind of provocation - I said to my wife, “Let’s leave the kids with a sitter and go for a walk.” So we went for a long walk through town and were coming back down the Garden Ring on which the embassy sat. About a mile short of the embassy, I said, “Look, there’s no traffic on the Garden Ring,” which is a very wide boulevard. We couldn’t quite figure that out, but we got towards the embassy and we could see there was a crowd in the street outside the embassy. So we began to understand what was going on. I’d seen a real mob in Panama; this was a contrived mob. The Soviets had gotten together, I suppose, two or three hundred factory workers, God knows who they were, and made placards saying “Hands off Cuba” and “Down with Imperialism” and so forth and so on. The incensed demonstrators were standing in the streets holding up their placards but not doing anything, but they would occasionally be told to chant some slogan and so they would. There was a line of sawhorses between the mob and the
sidewalk and the people were all carefully behind the sawhorses. So Mary Jane and I walked up the sidewalk and looked at the so-called mob on the left, and the policemen. We walked into the embassy and at this point we found that the DCM had said staff should go to the upper floors just in case they started throwing rocks at the windows and things like that. We lived on the eighth floor, so we went upstairs, and soon enough - maybe they had been waiting for the two of us to get back inside - the demonstrators were given the signal and they threw some ink bottles and a few rocks at some windows and did some minor damage. But it was such a contrast between the real mob in Panama and these demonstrators.

THOMPSON R. BUCHANAN

Intelligence Research Specialist

Moscow (1962-1964)

Soviet Affairs

Washington, DC (1968-1970)

Political Counselor

Moscow (1970-1973)

Thompson R. Buchanan was born in Beverly Hills, California in 1924. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1943-1946. Mr. Buchanan’s Foreign Service career included positions in Germany, France, Russia, Burundi, Gabon, and Norway. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 15, 1996.

Q: From the desk, how did we view the Soviet Union during this 1968-70 period?

BUCHANAN: As an assertive, muscular and somewhat unpredictable power. The proclamations of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, in connection with Moscow’s invasion of Czechoslovakia, whereby the Soviets asserted their right to intervene wherever a Communist regime was threatened, introduced an element of increased tension into East-West relations. We felt that we must demonstrate that we were not going to be pushed around whether in Berlin or elsewhere. But we were also concerned to probe and determine what agreements we could reach with the Soviets that were of mutual benefit. I was head, at the time, of the Bilateral Section in EUR/SOV. The travel program whereby we monitored the travel of Soviet officials in the US, authorizing travel on a strict reciprocity basis, depending on who was allowed to travel in Moscow, and what difficulties they encountered. I inherited the program whereby our two sides exchanged chancery sites and agreed on the terms of construction. There is a general impression that the State Department gave away the store in allowing the Soviets to build their new chancery on Mount Alto on Wisconsin Avenue. I learned that this was a distortion of what happened. In fact, the Soviets had tried to purchase two other estates, Tregarin and Bonnie Brae, before agreeing to Mount Alto. In each case, neighbors objected strongly to having a Soviet Embassy nearby. It was finally agreed that we needed to find federal property, over which we had full control, if any exchange was to take place. The only obviously suitable federal property was the old Veterans hospital on Mt. Alto. Initially there was little understanding among diplomats on
either side, I suspect, of the intelligence value of being on high ground. Eventually, of course, Soviet technical experts doubtless reassured their diplomatic colleagues that they had made a good deal, and we, on our side, realized that we had made a mistake. If Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson had been briefed about the potential of radio intercepts in Moscow, he might not have so cavalierly rejected Stalin’s offer of some 15 acres of land on Lenin Hills, but he thought at the time that Stalin was trying to isolate the Americans, away from the center of town. We ended up, therefore, with a property next to our old embassy on Tchaikovsky Prospekt, which was dominated by higher buildings all around. The Soviets then rejected our request to build a chancery building thirteen stories high, and we had to compromise with eight stories.

I recall being very much concerned with the issue of security in constructing our new embassy. My thought was to try to have everything built off site in Denmark, Germany or in the United States. But our hands were tied because the head of the Federal Buildings Organization (FBO) had been basically nominated by Wayne Hayes, who headed the Appropriations Committee in Congress. Hayes had been told years before that the embassy would cost $36 million, and no one had had the guts to tell him that that figure was totally unrealistic, particularly if we tried to build much of the embassy off site. To some extent, therefore, concern to try to keep our budget somewhere within the projected figure took priority over concern for security. But we were also arrogant in our belief that we could take care of any “bugs” that the Soviets planted during the construction phase. After all, we were technically more advanced!

A major issue was who should be allowed to carry out the actual construction. We insisted that we should be allowed to bring in our own workmen, and do most of the construction ourselves in Moscow. The Soviets argued that this was “humiliating,” that they were perfectly competent to do the construction for us. I recall the present Russian Ambassador to Washington, Vorontsov, who was then Deputy Chief of Mission, saying to me: “But Mr. Buchanan, why should you object? After all, we don’t insist that Cubans build our embassy here. We are prepared to let your construction people build our embassy. I can assure you that your FBI is no less clever than our KGB.” Well, actually I don’t think it would have made any great difference even if all my plans had materialized, because none of us foresaw the skill with which the Soviets introduced listening devices into the great steel girders, which we would probably have considered much too expensive to import.

SAMUEL E. FRY, JR.

Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs

Washington, DC (1964-1966)

Consular Officer

Moscow (1966-1968)

Samuel E. Fry, Jr. was born in New York, New York in 1934. He received a bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth College in 1956 and then spent a year as a Dartmouth Fellow at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. He served in the U.S. Army in Germany in 1958-1959. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Norway, Finland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. This interview was conducted on January 26, 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.
Q: While you were on the Soviet desk, what were you absorbing from those who were dealing with the Soviet Union as professionals at the time?

FRY: I think that what I was absorbing was that there were two elements you always had to take into account in dealing with the Soviet Union. The first was that you had to follow the shield that the administration wanted to put on its activities. You didn't want to look like you were coddling communists--there was still a lot of that pressure. On the other hand we were involved in the day to day operations of trying to manage a relationship between two increasingly armed superpowers. You simply could not start each day by saying, "What can I do today to weaken communism?" What you started your day with was, "What can I do to solve this problem? How can we get this eighty-year old Jewish woman out of the Soviet Union for medical treatment that her brother is willing to pay for in New York? How can we get the Bolshoi Ballet out this time more simply, for a tour?" In all of those things it was the human problems, it was the day to day mechanics of managing a relationship.

What I learned from people who were later Chiefs of Mission--Foy Kohler, Spike Dubs who was Ambassador to Afghanistan and was subsequently assassinated, and many other senior officials at that time--was that you don't carry any Cold War emotions or any other personal beliefs into the relationship that you are building on a professional diplomatic level with your counterparts. You do your business, you do it professionally, you don't raise your voice. I heard Richard Harding Davis, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary, call in a Soviet diplomat to complain about a border incident or something in Berlin and give him very harsh words in a very dignified, civilized, soft-spoken voice. He realized, and then I learned, that the tone of your voice with your counterpart over the table has nothing to do with how things come out, or how problems are solved or not solved. What it can do is to arouse human antagonisms which may simply cloud the real issues; you don't want that so you don't do it.

I learned that making your point very clearly, so there is absolutely no doubt on the other side as to precisely why you called them in, was the whole point, and shouting did no good. Also, as in all diplomatic relations, there were those on the military or intelligence side who welcomed confrontations with the Soviet Union. They saw it as an opportunity for their work or for disruption of the system. That was not necessarily compatible with what you were trying to do, not that you would stand in the way of it. So there would be times when reciprocity ruled. If an American's tire was slashed in Moscow, for whatever reason, you can bet that a Soviet tire would be slashed in Arlington, in Bethesda, on 16th Street, or wherever, about a week later. And vice versa. Even if it was a hoodlum with no connection to anybody in America it would wind up with some poor Foreign Service officer having to buy a new Goodyear out in Moscow. So reciprocity was the name of the game and the order of the day. If I allowed a Soviet diplomat a waiver to go to San Francisco to talk with someone there it was only done with the understanding that an American would be allowed to go to a closed area.

The closed areas in the United States and the closed areas in the Soviet Union were monitored very carefully and they were part and parcel of the relationship. It occupied a lot of time. The Soviets actually began their closed areas program, that is areas denied to foreigners for any reason except on a very special waiver, long before we did. We tried to negotiate out of it, but they wouldn't so we just began one. I had a map in my office, and a map at home in case I was
called there, and a list of cities that were especially closed--under no circumstances would waivers be granted. I had rings around New York, rings around Washington, where they couldn't go beyond. If a policeman called the State Department and said, "I arrested this guy for speeding in Chapaqua, New York [sixty-five miles from New York City], what do I do with him?" then we had one on them and they would have to let one of our guys off when they caught him outside the ring in Moscow. It is minutiae like that that actually took up a lot of time on the desk.

Q: You served in Moscow from 1966 through 1968. What was the situation there when you arrived?

FRY: In a curious way, we were allowed to do things then that subsequently we were not allowed to do. I will tell you a quick story. When I went to Europe from New York in the summer of 1966, my wife and I took the United States, landed in Le Havre and drove--I had my Ford Fairlane which had been specially built for Russian roads, special springs and so on -- through Scandinavia, stopping in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, and on to Leningrad where we stayed for three days over Soviet Naval Day. I had a movie camera -- I had never signed in at the Embassy, I was going strictly on my visa, the Soviets gave me permission to drive in, the Embassy gave me permission to drive in -- and went up along the Neva River and filmed the whole review of the Soviet fleet and the newest cruiser, the head of the Soviet Navy coming across in his launch; I took pictures of the crowd, people waving at me. Then we went to Novgorod, stayed overnight in a hotel there and did all the tourism there. Finally we drove through Kalinin, which might have been a bit closed because it was industrial, had almost no surveillance that I recall, got to the Embassy in Moscow, parked the car and went in and introduced myself and that was the way I started my work. Several years after that our side would never have allowed you to drive a car in and not check in with the Embassy first as they would have feared a provocation or something like that.

In any case, I began work immediately in the consular section and my wife began work, as a contract employee with USIA, in the downstairs cultural section which adjoined the consular section and used the same waiting room. That was where the library was. Mainly Africans students and foreign students came in to use our materials. Very few Russians were allowed in because the militia wouldn’t let them pass the gate.

The embassy situation was very correct but you were very much aware of the heavy hand -- the militia outside the Embassy, the concern that your Russian nationals were working both sides as they probably had to. On the other hand, the professionalism of the consular staff, that is the Russians -- they were all women, there were four and later five when I was there, headed by a woman named Mary Litvenienko, famous to a whole generation of Foreign Service Officers -- was excellent and so cooperative and helpful. We weren’t handling anything in the consular section that was particularly sensitive, so the working environment with our Russian colleagues was excellent. I became devoted to them, and showed them movies when the Embassy was closed on Wednesday afternoon. They never came to my house, but when I left they gave me a little chit on a commission store, which is like our second-hand store, and said, “Go there and give this to the woman.” That is all they told me. When I went there I was given a beautiful samovar that they had arranged to give me which I still have.

We were talking before about businesslike relations as opposed to the Cold War hysteria. My message from those trials was that the Russians were telling us to tell our tourists to be very
careful, and to obey Soviet laws whatever they thought of them. That is why they let us see and hear what the Intourist women had recorded. They didn’t do this by chance; they wanted us to know that they were following people very carefully. So we put into our brochure, “You don’t joke about the Soviet system. You can discuss your country honestly, you can be a normal American. In the Soviet Union you do not take souvenirs from your hotel room, you do not take towels, you do not take bronze bears that turn out to be by a famous sculptor. You toe the mark, however painful it might be. The Soviets do not look on these things as shenanigans; it is hooliganism and its a crime and you may be arrested.” You didn’t want to scare the bejesus out of people who were coming in to have a nice tour and most of the people were no problem. On the other hand when you started getting younger people coming over on language exchange programs you really had to give them a hard briefing.

ROBERT L. BARRY

EUR, Soviet Union Affairs
Washington, DC (1965-1967)
Consular/Political Officer
Moscow (1968-1971)
Consular Officer
Leningrad (1971-1973)
USIA, Voice of America, USSR Division
Washington, DC (1973-1974)
Deputy Director, EUR, Soviet Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary for USSR and Europe

Ambassador Barry was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He attended Dartmouth College, Oxford University, St. Anthony’s College, and Columbia. He served in the US Navy and entered the Foreign Service in 1962. He served in Yugoslavia, the USSR, Sweden, and Indonesia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Could you just explain to somebody who is not maybe familiar the language? When you say bilateral relations? What is that as compared to what is not bilateral?

BARRY: The Office of Soviet Affairs was divided in that time to four different sections. There was one office director. Then there were bilateral relations which had to do essentially with the strictly relationships between the U.S. and the USSR. It dealt with consular matters; it dealt with things like property. It dealt with things like bilateral negotiations on a consular convention
which is one of the things that I worked on later on. In essence, anything that only had two parties involved, the U.S. and the USSR. There was a multilateral section, which dealt with things like arms control and the international conferences which the USSR, and the U.S. were concerned. The multilateral section worked on UN issues, so that section was actually involved in the broad range of political issues. There was an economic section which dealt with trade and trade relationships and the various kinds of restrictions on U.S. trade with the USSR and there was a cultural affairs or exchanges section which was what handled the things like people to people exchanges, the international research exchanges for Fulbrights and helped to regulate the two way flow of scientific and technical change and all that.

Q: Were people still moaning over why the Soviets didn’t play along or something. I mean to have a new administration, a new Secretary of State that rebuffed sort of publicly right at the beginning, a damn fool way to start off an administration in terms of sort of a certain amount of good will?

BARRY: This was a year into the administration and the initial steps had not been very promising. The Soviets have always been more comfortable with republicans than with democrats. The emphasis during the campaign and the emphasis during the early days of the administration and the persona of Brzezinski I don’t think promised very much to the Soviets. It’s also clear from reading Dobrynin’s memoirs that at that stage in particular the machinery of the Soviet Union was pretty much on automatic pilot. Nothing happened without the politburo endorsing it whereas Brezhnev was in a state of physical decline, the people who had a lot to say were people like Gromyko and Ustinov and they were not very they were disappointed in the failure of detente as they saw it and the state of the U.S. Soviet relations had been going down in the Nixon period. The Soviets still did think that Watergate was basically the accomplishment of the enemies of detente and they couldn’t understand how a thing as trivial could have caused the downfall of the Nixon presidency.

Q: It wasn’t on your watch, but obviously you were sitting there I mean meeting with them. What was the feeling in ‘79 when you came in, why did the promising period of detente under Kissinger and all had fallen this way?

BARRY: I think first and foremost the two sides have different expectations from the idea of detente. The Soviets felt that this was a commitment to geopolitical parity, that the Russians would be full partners. The two superpowers in the world, that there was a commitment to the whole arms control area to parity in all kinds of weapons, the Russians and their development of weapons systems and the deployment of the SS-20 missiles in Europe we saw as decoupling, as decoupling the U.S. from Europe. It was this whole thing combined with in ‘79 in Afghanistan, which was very much seen by Brzezinski as the crisis of the drive of the Soviet Union toward the Persian Gulf towards Pakistan in the south. We had at that point considerable debate about what to do about the invasion of Afghanistan. I remember one of the rather heated discussions on arming the mujahedeen and the release of Stinger missiles and the idea that once you have let these things out of the box you’d never get them back in again. Of course, I was just reading a commentary by Brzezinski again who was asked about the wisdom of this in light of such events and he still says that the result of the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was actually the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From our point of view, we saw many people on our side saw the issue of peaceful coexistence as a method by which what’s mine is mine and what’s yours can be negotiated. So, that whole concept I think had been signed up by Kissinger on this
agreement for the prevention of war was very much under attack by people who felt that signing up to this declaration was an unwise decision at best.

Q: When you got there in ’79 was there a feeling we were going to try to repair relations or I mean on the State Department’s side where the Brzezinski and the National Security Council the Brzezinski group was almost moving in a different direction?

BARRY: I don’t think it was that stark. I think that on individual issues, particularly arms control issues because to a large degree the compass of the U.S. Soviet relations had increasingly been linked to the strategic arms limitations talks. I think our goal was to try to get the strategic arms agreement behind us, ratified, and then to move on in this and other arms control areas. I think that we realized the depth of irritation of the Soviet leadership didn’t want public engagement of the president in some of these human rights issues. But, it wasn’t that they wanted to destroy U.S. Soviet relations and we wanted to build them up. I think we placed more value on keeping a steady course in the relations and trying to proceed based upon what had been accomplished before. Of course a substantial amount of my time was spent on Eastern Europe. That was a little different in the sense that this was not Marshal Shulman’s area. There was a lot going on around Eastern Europe at that time and I made a couple of trips out there. Yugoslavia was important post at that time. Larry Eagleburger was the ambassador. There were a number of bilateral issues. This was a time when the relationship with Czechoslovakia was very bad because they were still under the post Prague spring period. I’d say I spent half of my time on Eastern Europe things.

THOMAS M. T. NILES
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Washington, DC (1965-1967)
Russian Institute
Garmisch, Germany (1967-1968)
Economic Officer
Moscow (1968-1971)
Commercial Officer
Moscow (1973-1976)

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and master’s from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.

Q: What were the interests in your particular field?
NILES: Overall, it was a difficult time in US-Soviet relations. The Vietnam War was heating up. Soviet Union had a new leadership, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny, who had overthrown Khrushchev in October 1964. Ambassador Foy Kohler was in Moscow. He had replaced Ambassador Thompson in 1963. Ambassador Thompson was on the 7th floor as Ambassador-at-Large. But, in any event, we were trying to develop a better relationship with the Soviet Union, although we recognized that major progress was unlikely. We were interested in developing a dialogue with the Soviets to try to reduce bilateral tensions that as well as those that arose from our contacts with the Soviet Union in other parts of the world. We had basic stability in Europe. From the time of the Hungarian revolution onward, from say, November 1956, onward, the situation in Europe was relatively stable. Of course, we had the Czech events in 1968 to look forward to, and there were periodic Berlin crises. But, overall, at that time, Europe was fairly stable. The Middle East was an area of great US/Soviet tension, highlighted by the six-day war in June 1967. We had the problem of Cuba, and the southeast Asian problem was really moving seriously out of control. We wanted to try to minimize the possibilities of collisions with the Soviet Union, and we were looking at the possibilities of reducing and avoiding problems.

We had had one breakthrough in the summer of 1963. Ambassador Harriman negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) eliminating nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the seas. In 1964, we sold the Soviet Union a substantial amount of wheat for the first time since the end of Lend-Lease in 1945. People were beginning, for the first time since 1945, to think about trade with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1965, a Commission was set up to study the possibilities of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was headed by a guy named G. Erwin Miller, who was the CEO of the Cummins Engine Company in Columbus, Indiana. The Miller Commission studied the U.S./Soviet trade possibilities in all its aspects. They came to the unremarkable conclusion that within limits, trade in “peaceful non-strategic goods” would be beneficial to the United States. Our tiny office had responsibility in the State Department for efforts designed to encourage “peaceful, non-strategic trade” between United States and Soviet Union. There was no thought at that time of MFN.

Q: MFN meaning?

NILES: Most-Favored-Nation treatment. There was no thought of opening up export credits. There was no thought of trying to reach a settlement of the Lend-Lease, which we did in 1973. We were interested in expanding our relationship in a measured and careful way with the Soviet Union, including in the economic area. While I was on the Soviet desk, which was through June of 1967, we took a few, relatively minor steps ahead, one of which was the signature in the spring of 1967 of a bilateral civil aviation agreement. Marshall Loginov, who was head of Aeroflot and Minister of Civil Aviation, came to the United States and signed the Civil Aviation Agreement. He also signed, at the same time, the Agreement on new Chancery Sites in Moscow and Washington under which we leased the Mount Alto site to the Soviets. There are a lot of misunderstandings about that latter Agreement.

In the fall of 1972, we signed the so-called “Conditions of Construction” Agreement, negotiated by Boris Klosson. The negotiations of that Agreement were very difficult and the Agreement itself became very controversial when we got into the problems over Soviet bugging of our new chancery building. Essentially, we gave into the Soviet demand that they would do the basic work on our chancery, and we would do the so-called “finishing work.” That is how the Soviets
were able to wire the chancery for sound by building into the pre-stressed concrete beams a network of listening devices were connected like a Lego set. I can’t otherwise describe it. Where they came together, the reinforcing bars were part of the system. The reinforcing bars all came together in some way, and made the frame of this building an enormous antenna. That was a key agreement. But the exchange of property agreement was signed in the spring of 1967. Loginov signed it only because he happened to be in Washington to sign the Civil Aviation Agreement.

Q: Was the thought that there might be a sudden thrust against Europe or something like that? Was the feeling that this was pretty well settled, unless there was some peculiar crisis?

NILES: We did not consider the likelihood of war between the United States and the Soviet Union to be high. But, we did not exclude the possibility. We also considered that to be something which we should devote all of our efforts to avoid. So, when I worked on U.S./Soviet economic relations from 1965 to 1967 in EUR/SOV, one thing that I did have in mind was to try to find ways in which we could reduce in a small way the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. We wanted to build, somehow, better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, not because we had any illusions about the nature of the Soviet system, or Soviet intentions toward the United States, or anything like that. We had no illusions, but we felt, rightly or wrongly, that to the extent we could establish a slightly better relationship, build small bridges (this was the time of bridge building), foot bridges perhaps, it would reduce the possibility of a military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. We believed this would have, and I think we were right, catastrophic consequences for everybody. That was our credo, deterrence and defense, but do what we can to find small areas of accommodation between the two countries to try to build greater confidence and to reduce, even further, the likelihood of a conflict, which we already considered to be somewhere between improbable and unlikely. But it was not impossible. That was the problem. We worked with our allies. Not so much we in Soviet affairs, but the NATO guys, EUR/RPM, George Springsteen, Secretary Leddy, Ambassador Stoessel, worked closely with the NATO allies on these doctrinal issues. By and large, our NATO allies agreed with this. It lead to the acceptance at the December 1967 NATO foreign ministers meeting of the Harmel Report, which formally codified, if you will, the two-pillar policy: Detente and Deterrence, or Detente and Defense. Maintain a strong defense, for deterrent purposes, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but seek detente. Up until December 1967, we had not uses the word “detente” as much as the Europeans did.

Q: When you arrived there in July 1968, what was the situation both internally, in the Soviet Union and also American relations?

NILES: Well, first in the embassy, our ambassador was Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who had gone to Moscow at the beginning of January 1967, replacing Ambassador Kohler. He returned to Moscow reluctantly, without great enthusiasm. He had served in Moscow already as ambassador for four years in the Khrushchev era, from 1957 to 1961. He was not in the best of health but was subjected to President Johnson’s persuasive powers. I took him, his wife Jane, their two daughters, and their boxer dog to Union Station and put them on the train to New York. It was around January 5, 1967. They got on the Pennsylvania Railroad parlor car to go to New York, where they picked up the SS United States for the trip to Europe. In any case, when I got to Moscow, Ambassador Thompson was the Ambassador and Colby Swank was the DCM. The Political Counselor was David Klein, who was on his way out to head the Mission in Berlin. The Economic Counselor for whom I worked was Ralph Lindstrom. It was a relatively small
embassy at that time. Everybody there was, in a way, a Soviet specialist, even in the Administrative Section. This didn’t include the administrative counselor, although you could make that point, even for him. For example, the number two man in the Administrative Section the first year was Mike Joyce, who ultimately came back to serve as DCM in Moscow in the late 1980s. He was replaced in 1969 by Stape Roy, who came from Garmisch. Thus the junior administrative officer in Moscow from 1969 to 1970 is now our only serving Career Ambassador, Stape Roy. I mention this just to point out that we had an exceptionally talented embassy staff in Moscow at that time, beginning with Ambassador Thompson and the DCM, Colby Swank, who subsequently served as Ambassador in Phnom Penh during the height of the war in Cambodia. There were some really top-flight people all the way through the Embassy. Everybody out there was really deeply committed to the Post and wanted to be there in the strongest way. It certainly was true in my case. I really wanted to be there.

Q: Here, you have people who really want to be there. They have learned the language and the culture. They are really committed. At the same time, this is not a friendly country, not a friendly system.

NILES: That was part of the attraction. We were at the heart of the enemy. We felt that. At least I felt that. I hated the Soviet system, but I had great affection for the people and the country, and a great interest in the culture and the history. Being in Moscow, for me at that time, was an extraordinary opportunity. You asked about U.S./Soviet relations. When I got out there, U.S./Soviet relations were obviously tense, but in certain areas, there were signs of progress. For example, shortly after I got there, we opened the direct air service: PanAm and Aeroflot, New York/Moscow. Juan Tripp and Herold Gray, who were the Chairman and President, respectively, of PanAm came out on the first flight. They brought this great entourage of luminaries with them, including Art Buchwald and his wife. He wrote some very funny articles from Moscow about his experiences on the PanAm plane and in Moscow. He was terribly funny at all these receptions. We had endless receptions for Harold Gray and Juan Tripp. We didn’t realize it at the time, but we also had an agreement, secretly reached between the two governments to begin the SALT negotiations on the August 30, 1968 in Geneva. The negotiator was to have been, at least at the beginning, Ambassador Thompson. We knew Ambassador Thompson was going to Switzerland at the end of August because he was making his travel arrangements. He was taking his wife, and it was styled as a vacation. Then, of course, on August 20/21, 1968, came the Soviet Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the end of the Prague Spring. There was naturally a very strong reaction in the West. Among the steps we took was to cancel the SALT negotiations, that were to begin at the end of August. So, Ambassador Thompson didn’t take his trip. It was easy to explain. Almost no one on the Embassy staff knew the real reason for the Ambassador’s plan to visit Switzerland, so it was easy to explain the cancellations. We were told that because of heightened tensions, the Ambassador could not take his vacation. That seemed logical to everybody. After August 21, we entered a deep freeze period, which lasted through the late spring of 1969, when things began to loosen up. Then, in November 1969, the SALT negotiations finally began in Geneva, but with Ambassador Gerard Smith, not Ambassador Thompson, as our negotiator.

JONATHAN B. RICKERT

Staff Aide to the Ambassador
Moscow (1966-1968)

Jonathan Rickert was born and raised in Washington, DC and educated at Princeton and Yale Universities. After service in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1963, serving tours in both Washington and abroad. His foreign posts include London, Moscow, Port au Spain, Sofia and Bucharest, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. In his Washington assignments Mr. Rickert dealt primarily with Eastern and Central European Affairs. Mr. Rickert was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: What would you say about the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations in this period that you were there?

RICKERT: It was difficult because of primarily Vietnam. Llewellyn Thompson had been sent to Moscow – I would have to say, by all appearances, somewhat against his will by President Johnson – to negotiate an _____ treaty. Thompson was extraordinarily closed-mouthed on that. I knew nothing of what was going on with those negotiations, as was appropriate. I had no need to know. But that’s what he spent his time doing on those afternoons when he was away from the office. But the cloud of Vietnam hung over everything. And then, of course, in August 1968, there was another event in Prague which complicated things from our side. So, I wouldn’t say that relations were openly hostile, but there was a considerable reserve. I would speculate that the fairly new Soviet leadership, which was Kosygin and Brezhnev at that time, also was still consolidating itself. There was still some movement and jockeying and being a leader in the Soviet Union was not a job with a guaranteed tenure. So, there may be that there was some absorption and seeing where the chips would fall there as well. Eventually Brezhnev ended up being the unchallenged leader and remained so for a number of years, but in the late 60s it wasn’t quite so clear yet.

WILLIAM T. PRYCE
Publications Procurement Officer

Moscow (1966-1968)

Born in California and raised in Pennsylvania, Mr. Pryce was educated at Wesleyan University and the Fletcher School of Tufts University. After service in the US Navy he worked briefly for the Department of Commerce before joining the Foreign Service in 1958. Though primarily a Latin America specialist, Mr. Pryce also served in Moscow. His Latin America assignments include Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, Bolivia and Honduras, where he was Ambassador from 1992-1996. Ambassador Pryce was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You left there in ‘68, what was your feeling about whither the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations? You had seen the monster, you had seen the elephant, what did you think about it?
PRYCE: I thought that obviously, one, it was still the other power. I remember feeling that it was a very challenging experience. It was very difficult because you really couldn’t penetrate very deeply into society. It was very difficult to do your job and to understand and interpret what was going on because it was so restrictive. A lot of the reporting that we did was out of the press. We would put interpretations on it but it was really hard to get good intelligence from your Soviet contacts. I think to answer your question more directly, it was a feeling that this is our major adversary and we want to continue to understand as much as we can about it. I was surprised, I must admit as most people were, with the implosion of the Soviet Union. I thought that was going to be 30 years away. I thought it would happen but never so quickly.

YALE RICHMOND
Russian Language Studies, Foreign Language Institute
Washington, DC (1966-1967)
Counselor for Public Affairs
Moscow (1967-1969)

Yale Richmond was born in Massachusetts in 1923. He received a bachelor’s degree in 1943 from Boston College, thereafter he joined the Army from 1943-1946. He then received a master’s degree from Syracuse. His career included positions in Germany, Austria, Russia, Poland, and Laos. Mr. Richmond was interviewed in June 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Looking at that time, how were relations when you arrived there in ’67?

RICHMOND: Bad. Vietnam was heating up. Vietnam was a constant problem during those years.

Q: This was the last part of the Johnson administration.

RICHMOND: Yes. Vietnam was really creating problems. Then there was a meeting of the Communist Party organization which took a very hard line against the United States. It was very difficult for us to do anything. Then came August 20, 1968: the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which further set back U.S.-Soviet relations and they did not recover until Nixon was elected and came into office in January ’69 and turned over a new leaf. The Soviets turned over a new leaf, too. That was the beginnings of detente.

Q: Let’s talk about this. How did you find dealing with the Soviet press or did one deal with the Soviet press?

RICHMOND: I didn’t. We had very little contact with them. They had nothing to do with us. By agreement between the 2 governments, they limited the number of correspondents in each other’s country to 26. They were the ones who were trying to report on what was going on in Moscow. But we were often a source of their information. The ambassador would hold a Friday afternoon
session with the American correspondents in his office. I attended that. He would discuss what was going on in the Soviet Union that he thought they should know.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN
INR, Soviet Policy
Washington, DC (1968-1970)
Political Officer
Moscow (1973-1975)
Policy Planning
Washington, DC (1975-1977)

Warren Zimmerman was born and raised in Philadelphia, PA. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale in 1956 and attended Kings College, Cambridge as a Fulbright Scholar. He served briefly in the U.S. Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1961. Ambassador Zimmerman’s career included positions in Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Geneva, and Vienna. He was the ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989-1992. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 10, 1996.

Q: One of the things that is often overlooked particularly in these days of tight budgets and talking about do we need embassies and all, there is a tendency to think that our diplomats do nothing but report like reporters and say you can see it on TV. I mean there is the other side of conveying information, talking which maybe in the Soviet Union isn’t as important. Could you talk a bit about that side.

ZIMMERMANN: Yes. I mean we had a series of great ambassadors in the Soviet Union during the Cold war period. I think by far the best and this may come as a surprise to you was Tommy Thompson. I never worked with him, but this was a man who was twice ambassador to the Soviet Union. He spent many years there, and managed to adhere really through the pores a really fine sense of how the Russians would behave at any given situation. He was able to use that knowledge probably to save the possibility of a major conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis.

Q: And he happened to be there and available.

ZIMMERMANN: He was actually in Washington in 1962. Kennedy brought him into the Excon, this small group of people that were working. Everything Thompson said turned out to be right. Thompson said, “If you put a blockade outside Cuba, the Russian ships will turn back because they are so secretive that they don’t want to be searched.” We did, and they did. He was right on that. He said, “Khrushchev will not agree to take the missiles out unless you make some sort of agreement on taking our missiles out of Turkey.” And he was right on that. Thompson would not have had that seat of the pants knowledge had he not spent all those years in the Soviet Union. I think it is a perfect example of how on the job work and training in a man who is intuitively brilliant as Tommy Thompson was, could produce enormous dividends for our national security.
JOHN P. HARROD
USIS, Moscow Exhibit
Washington, DC (1969)
USIS, Moscow Exhibit
Moscow (1969-1970)
USIA, Assistant Cultural Attaché/ Press Attaché
Moscow (1975-1978)

John Harrod was born in Illinois in 1945, and received his BA from Colgate University. Having entered the Foreign Service in 1969, his positions included Moscow, Kabul, Poznan, Warsaw and Brussels. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 1999.

Q: What, during this essentially ‘69-70 period you were with this exhibit, what as you saw it was the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States?

HARROD: Not very good at that particular time. ‘69-70 was a rather tough period because of Vietnam largely. Relations were not good. Being an exhibit we were a little bit exempt from that. People would ask us, you know, difficult questions about relations, but because we were not official representatives of the embassy, per se, they probably cut us a little more slack. But it was not a particularly good period, particularly when we would do things like bomb Haiphong Harbor and a Russian ship might sustain a little bit of damage, then people would get on our case. So it was a little bit tense. When I was back on the other exhibit that I worked on in ’75, that was a period of the Apollo-Soyuz link-up, and relations were a lot better then.

WILLIS J. SUTTER
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS
Moscow (1973-1975)

Willis J. Sutter was born in New Jersey in 1936. He received a bachelor’s degree from St. Joseph’s College and a master’s degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1954-1957. Mr. Sutter entered the Foreign Service in 1966. His career included positions in Thailand, the Soviet Union, Laos, Zaire, and Mauritania. Mr. Sutter was interviewed by Jack O’Brien in 1988.

Q: So, what year did you go to Moscow?

SUTTER: I went in 1973. June of 1973. Just as the ice was breaking. This was at the height of detente basically. I think President Nixon had been there in 1972 to sign whatever agreements it was that he signed with the Soviets. That made a great difference in the working atmosphere in Moscow. My predecessor had a very difficult time getting into see the Soviet officials. I had almost no trouble whatsoever in getting to talk with them. The difference was not our
personalities. The difference was the Soviets had been told that things were relaxed and that they ought to work a little more closely with us.

Q: Did working conditions change after Nixon’s resignation?

SUTTER: They changed a lot shortly after I left, because of the worsening of relations between ourselves and the Soviets. Yes, things got worse after Nixon left. That is for sure. I am not sure there is a real close cause and effect relationship there. I recall talking to colleagues after I left and they had much harder times getting in to see their contacts than I had. People were beginning to be harassed again by the KGB. People, that is, who had close contacts with the Soviets.

I was harassed twice myself by the KGB, because I had a very close friend -- not close friend, but a good acquaintance -- who was a well known dissident in Georgia -- Tbilisi. Whenever I went to Tbilisi on business, I would always see this particular person. The KGB did not like that very much. They would come to my hotel room at eight o’clock in the morning and say that the hotel administrator wanted to talk to me.

I knew very well who the hotel administrator was. I went to this little room and there would be this “administrator” sitting up at a little dais, almost as though he were a judge. He was flanked by people on his left and right. There would be one chair in front of his desk. He would ask me to sit down. In this particular occasion, I had spent all night out with my Georgian friend. He said, “We noticed you were not in your room last night. Where were you?” He said, “We know you speak Russian.” I said, in Russian, “I do.” They had a translator there, because I knew the person who was the translator. I said, “I see you have an English translator here and I would prefer to speak in English.” He agreed to that.

Then he said, in Russian, very roughly, “We noticed you were not in your room last night. Where were you?” I said in English, “That is none of your fucking business!” I watched very carefully as the translator translated. He translated what I said exactly. With that, the so called administrator softened his tone.

He said they were very concerned about my welfare, because something could have happened to me and, of course, they were responsible to the authorities in Moscow for my well being while I was in Tbilisi, etc., etc., etc. I said, “I do not know what could have happened to me, because there are no hooligans in Tbilisi, as you know. So what could have possibly have happened to me?” I said, “What happened was, my friend and I were drinking a lot and I know that the laws against drinking and driving are very severe. I insisted that he not drive me back to the hotel that night, but that I stay in his apartment instead. That is what I did.” With that, I got up and left.

GARY L. MATTHEWS

Deputy Principal Officer

Leningrad (1973-1976)

Deputy Director, Soviet Affairs

Gary L. Matthews was born in Missouri in 1938. He received a bachelor’s degree from Drury College in 1960, a master’s degree from Oklahoma State University in 1961, Columbia University in 1969, and a master’s degree in international affairs. He served in the U.S. Army from 1955-1958 and joined the Foreign Service in 1961. His career included positions in Germany, Poland, Vietnam, Malta, and Washington, DC. Mr. Matthews was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.

Q: Did you find that there was almost a natural fit between the National Security Council with Brzezinski who was highly suspicious of the Russians, Soviets as plain Russians, and the European Bureau Soviet affairs which had been watching this crackdown, and didn’t really think pleasant thoughts about the Soviets, certainly at this period. Did you find that you were almost in a certain alliance against other forces that were trying to make it sound better, had a more rosy view, or not?

MATTHEWS: We certainly worked congenially with our colleagues at the National Security Council, and I knew all the Soviet specialists there at the time, and we cleared things back and forth. Cy Vance was Secretary of State, and as I mentioned Marshall Shulman was his special advisor on Soviet affairs. And Marshall had been certainly among those who felt that we could craft, we could shape, a more constructive US-Soviet relationship by giving it more centrality. I think he was certainly right on giving it more centrality, but it often suffered from either too much attention, or too little attention, and has not had the consistency that it deserved, especially during the more confrontational dangerous period when you needed a lot of centrality in my view. But again, it’s the pattern of Soviet behavior, certainly their invasion of Afghanistan in December of ‘79, which worsened relations.

Q: How did that hit us? I mean, just prior to, and when it happened, what was our analysis, and how were we reacting?

MATTHEWS: Things had been deteriorating, of course, in Afghanistan for a good while going back to the beginning of ‘79, with, of course, Spike Dubs’ assassination, and before that with the coups and the plotting, etc. that the KGB was very directly involved in. When the actual invasion was mounted that was not just the straw that broke the camel’s back, that was a whole heap of firewood that landed on the camel. That wrote the finish, absolutely finish, to any and all attempts to create, or recreate -- whatever verb you want to use -- a more productive, cooperative US-Soviet relationship. Thereafter for the remainder of 1980 up through the election -- through the end of the Carter administration -- there were almost no cooperative, and few pleasant components of the US-Soviet relationship. That behavior, their invasion, was seen as confirmation, corroboration of, if you will, the evil empire, which by the way was a perception that existed well before President Reagan’s coining of that phrase after he had become president.

Q: Before we go to the reactions from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, something I don’t believe we’ve covered would be the June 1979 US-Soviet summit held in Vienna. Could you talk about that?

MATTHEWS: ...between Soviet leader Brezhnev and President Carter. Throughout 1978 and intensively into early 1979, the US and Soviet negotiators had been working very intensively on the SALT II strategic arms limitations treaty number two agreement which dealt with a number
of thorny issues concerning strategic weaponry of both sides. All of this negotiation took place against the background of what we’d been talking about which is a downward spiral in the overall relationship. This is very important that we come to this because it always seemed to me then, as it certainly has always seemed to me since, that when we were talking about those who said we should negotiate more with the Soviet Union, that we should be less harsh, should encourage their doves, etc, that almost all of them turned instinctively, and solely, if I may add, to arms control as the little engine that could pull the rest of the US-Soviet relationship. I always believed then that was a flawed view. It was the tail trying to wag a dog when the dog was becoming much too large. And, in fact, it does seem to me that was the problem. There were good reasons on both sides why the SALT II treaty was seen as important and that we carried forward, came to the agreement, and had the summit meeting to ratify it, but the subsequent virtual total crash of overall US-Soviet relations proved the point that no amount of arms control, including an important treaty on strategic arms, could carry the otherwise decaying corpse, to put it starkly, of the overall US-Soviet relationship. All that said, I wanted to make that point.

The process leading up to the actual summit was very intensive. I was charged to work on it together with Bob Barry, who was the deputy assistant secretary in the European Bureau responsible for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We were negotiating the joint declaration, communiqué or whatever you want to call it, which would be signed by the two chiefs of state, Brezhnev as head of the Soviet Union, Carter as our president, that would reflect the summit results. So that was worked back and forth very carefully, each word with a magnifying glass, etc. And it became evident as we got actively into that undertaking in late ‘78, particularly early ‘79, with all the other negative things happening in the relationship, that this communiqué, this joint declaration, was going to be not very much. In other words, I think the original thought had been that it would have mentioned lots of initiatives agreed by the two presidents, that we will cooperate more in this area, we will do more in that. But by the time in Washington, where we were doing this, we came to the agreed text, as I recall, it was not changed even in one word once the illustrious ones convened in Vienna and blessed it. It was basically just a short communiqué, joint declaration, that did little more than take note of the signing of the SALT II treaty.

I remember vividly that we tried to get the Soviet side to agree to a statement in the joint declaration that neither side strives for military superiority. The Soviet side refused. This was the subject of a lot of to-ing and fro-ing back and forth and the Soviets were not comfortable putting this into the document. So that’s yet another indication of what we’re talking about here. The actual summit meeting, which I attended coming over on Air Force One with the president, as usual the large accompanying party, was certainly in the history of US-Soviet summitry I imagine the most bizarre in several respects. Brezhnev, who of course was not doing well in general anyway, was in a very down period. Our intelligence people assumed that he was not always himself, obviously taking a lot of medication. There were several bizarre instances. But one of them was, at the official dinner, and I can’t remember if it was the Soviets hosting it at their place, or President Carter hosting it at our ambassador’s residence in Vienna. Whatever the cuisine, the food that was actually being served, Brezhnev would take his fork laboriously, raise up whatever it was, and more often than not the fork would go into the side of his cheek, and you can imagine what was lacking in terms of the repartee back and forth. Basically he had to have Foreign Minister Gromyko at his shoulder and other aides answering for him more often than not. That was the great summit of Vienna in 1979.
LOUISE TAYLOR  
Cultural and Information Officer, USIS  
Moscow (1974-1976)

Ms. Taylor was born and raised in Illinois and educated at Wellesley College, George Washington University and Boston University. After joining the Foreign Service of USIA, Ms. Taylor served in Washington and abroad in the field of Cultural and Information. Her foreign posts include Moscow, Kabul, Tel Aviv and Rabat. She also served in Washington as USIA Desk Officer for Afghanistan/Pakistan and as Policy Officer for Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States. Ms. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.

Q: What was the situation with America versus the Soviet Union at that point? What was life like there?

TAYLOR: America versus the Soviet Union in the ‘70s was probably the best time to be in Moscow. It was the height of détente. It was the Kissinger years. Kissinger was out there at least once a month, sometimes even more. There was a full blown bilateral cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which allowed us to do a lot of things. Although you could not travel as an individual throughout the country, because of the fact that we had this umbrella agreement, particularly in USIA, we were able to travel a great deal. I accompanied the Robert Joffrey Ballet, my old stomping ground. They came under the cultural agreement. I accompanied the St. Paul Chamber Orchestra to Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi. I don’t think I could have gotten there easily because our travel was so limited and restricted. I accompanied the New York Jazz Repertory Company to Rostoff on the Don. And a number of other places by virtue of the fact that we had a vehicle that allowed us officially to be our cover, to travel. If you just wanted to apply as a couple or as a group of friends to go visit someplace, the Soviet authorities would most normally turn you down. So, that two year period, which by the late ‘70s was completely marred and turned around by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, really was a flourishing period of relationships between us.

Also, I found, of all the posts I’ve been in, that was the best post for third country interaction. My husband was the Middle East watcher in the Political Section. We had wonderful relationships with representatives of Arab countries there that we would not have had in other countries. Everybody turned to everyone else because there was no information coming out of the Soviets, so you had to use your contacts. We had Egyptian, Syrian, Indian, and a lot of Western European friends. We just all bonded together. This created a wonderful third country international community that for us also existed in Afghanistan but less so in the other countries we’ve been in. The environment was difficult because it was hard to get appointments with Soviets. But at the same time, everybody was in it together and you had a lot to learn from your colleagues in other embassies. I don’t remember talking as much in my entire life as I did for the two years we were in Moscow. There was just so much to be learned. Every day was a new experience. Every day, they’d throw something different at you.

ROBERT K. GEIS
GEIS: In 1974, I was selected, after lobbying for the job, for the new branch public affairs officer position in the recently established consulate general in Leningrad. As a result of the policy of detente with the USSR, this consulate had been opened. So I started doing graduate work in Russian and Soviet affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and also a course at George Washington University. Then, in the summer of 1974, we packed up and moved to Monterey, California, to learn Russian. This was to be a year course at the well-known Defense Language Institute in Monterey. Ours was an experiment based on the notion that was prevalent in USIA and in the State Department at that time than the training out at Monterey was better that the training at FSI, and while it was delightful to be in Monterey for a year, the DLI experience, as far as I’m concerned, was a mistake. We were a group of three USI officers with our wives and we were given a separate class and teachers, but we were being taught within a rigid system created for the army’s needs for surveillance training, and thus emphasizing comprehension with little attention paid to conversation, and we had to constantly fight to get conversational training and to get away from the highly specialized military vocabulary. In other words, we learned such things as how to say “barbed wire entanglement,” which we didn’t expect to be using an awful lot while we were in Leningrad. However, we did get through the course, but to the best of my knowledge, after our complaints, this experiment was never repeated.

So we were off to Leningrad. It’s hard for me to summarize briefly four years in that brooding and sinister yet beautiful and exhilarating Russian land. We were lucky to be in Leningrad, one of the great planned cities, whose grandeur remained even if somewhat tarnished, lucky also to be in an apartment in the heart of old St. Petersburg and not in a complex for foreigners, as many of our colleagues were, particularly in Moscow. We were two blocks away from the old Winter Palace, now the Hermitage, and one could not help but become a devotee of this great city, of its history, and its culture. At this time, U.S.-Soviet relations witnessed the heyday and the beginning of decline of detente. Shortly after my arrival, the Apollo-Soyuz docking experiment took place, and the Russians played this event to the hilt as proof of their technical equivalence with the U.S. They used the image of the docking of the space ships as a parallel with the 1945 meeting of the Russian and U.S. troops in Germany. And it was interesting, and my contacts in the Soviet media at the time were surprisingly friendly, emphasizing this remembrance of the war and our meeting and our being allies in the war. In fact, more than at any other time, particularly the media contacts were friendliest. The Cosmonauts and the Astronauts later visited Leningrad, with much fanfare, and I was involved in the first of many escort duties over the years.
Our educational and cultural exchanges were very active at this time, under a bilateral agreement between the two countries. We worked with the infamous Goskoncert, which is the Soviet State Concert Bureau. I was involved in implementing our exchange program, not only for Leningrad but also for the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I came to know Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, their capitals, and their stalwart people very well. These republics were permitted a bit more cultural freedom of action by the Soviets, so that American touring groups often were scheduled there. I was, in fact, one of the few more senior officers who was permitted by the U.S. Government to visit these republics. Our consul general in Leningrad, for example, was not allowed to visit since we deemed that such a visit would come too close to recognizing the incorporation of the formerly independent republics into the USSR. At the time of my arrival, one of the more unique exchanges was in progress. It was the first Soviet-American film co-production. And at that time I met and assisted the director George Cukor and several of his stellar cast members, including Elizabeth Taylor, Cicely Tyson, Jane Fonda. Fonda was also in the cast, and I made a pointed effort to be cool toward her for her Vietnam activities. She thought the Russians would welcome her with open arms, which proved not to be the case. They apparently didn’t like this radical, even if she was pro-North Vietnam. As it turned out, unfortunately, The Blue Bird, the film, was a resounding flop in the U.S. and was duly christened by the critics as “The Blue Turkey.”

Leningrad at that point was selected for one of our major East-West exhibits. This was called “Technology in the American Home.” It was in January of 1976, and we worked at that time with some old friends from USIA’s Exhibit Division, but we also entertained them and their language guides who’d come over for the exhibit at the consulate’s dacha on the outskirts of Leningrad. Like the villa in Romania, the dacha was a wonderful retreat from the Leningrad routine, both for cross-country skiing in the winter and for water sports out in the Gulf of Finland in the summer. But back to this exhibit. I wanted to mention that they were truly effective propaganda vehicles, well worth every cent we every spent on them.

DONALD B. KURSCH

Economic and Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute

Washington, DC (1975-1976)

US Commercial Office

Moscow (1976-1978)

Office of Soviet Affairs


Donald B. Kursch was born in New York in 1942. He graduated from Harvard University in 1964 and served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1964 to 1965. His assignments abroad after entering the Foreign Service in 1966 included Zurich, Budapest, Moscow, Frankfurt, Bonn and Brussels. Mr. Kursch was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.
Q: When you went out there in ’76, what was the state in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

KURSCH: Well, there had been hope for an improved bilateral relationship when we signed these agreements in 1973. Then you had the Helsinki Accords, that were signed in 1975. Nixon and Brezhnev had exchanged visits. I think that there had been hope for an overall increase in contacts. On the Soviet side, there was the desire for greater trade and technological exchanges. We were hoping to increase our export markets. The Soviets believed that they could isolate increased trade and scientific contacts from other elements, such as cultural exchanges and other infectious elements from the West. But, there had been some disappointment because of our inability to deliver Most Favored Nation trading status to the Soviets, which had been promised in 1973. As you will recall, we also had the question of Soviet immigration policies, particularly the problems particularly with Jewish immigration and the link between that and Most Favored Nation treatment. During the time I was there, I would say disappointment began to set in, although it got worse after I left.

MALCOLM TOON
Ambassador
USSR (1976-1979)

Ambassador Malcolm Toon was born in New York in 1916. He received a bachelor’s degree from Tufts College and a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1942-1946. His career in the Foreign Service included ambassadorships to Israel, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. Ambassador Toon was interviewed by Dr. Henry E Mattox on June 9, 1989.

Q: By the time you got there in ’76, detente of previous years had pretty well collapsed anyway, had it not? Perhaps in the final days of the Vietnam War.

TOON: Well, certainly, we did not have the sort of chummy relationship that had existed between the Nixon-Kissinger team on our side and the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgormey group on the other side. But if you mean by detente a continuing dialogue with the Soviets, a continuing attempt on the part of both sides to bring about increased stability in our relationship, I think detente continued. And after all, we did, during my years in Moscow, negotiate the SALT II treaty, which, of course, was never ratified, primarily because of Soviet misbehavior. I would think that down through the Ford and Carter years we had a relationship which I think is absolutely essential in Moscow. That is, a relationship which would provide for a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union primarily to make sure that they don’t make a mistake in judgment and get our two countries in a position of military confrontation, which in my view would inevitably result in a nuclear exchange and the end of civilization.

Now we did have that sort of relationship under Ford and Carter when I served as ambassador, but not the sort of chummy relationship that existed under Nixon-Kissinger, which I think, frankly, was misguided. The problem with the relationship when Nixon and Kissinger were in office was that detente was oversold to the American public. I think Henry Kissinger today would admit this. The idea got across to our fellow Americans that, we were dealing with a
basically changed Soviet Union. That was not the case at all. So what happened was, I think, a much more sensible and sensitive assessment of the Soviet threat in the Ford-Carter years than we had under toward the end of the Nixon-Kissinger regime.

Q: I am not, even by implication, trying to be critical of your stewardship. I am raising it because detente really, as I think of it anyway, is an aura, an atmosphere, a feeling. It was chummy, as you said, at one time. It became less chummy. Now it is chummy in spades again. What is your opinion, now in 1989, of the Soviets?

TOON: Well, I would agree it became chummy in spades again under Mr. Reagan. I think Mr. Reagan never really understood what was going on. Gorbachev was on top of Reagan at all the summit conferences, and I think, frankly, most of us who know something about the Soviet problem were very uneasy with Mr. Reagan at the helm in dealing one-on-one with Gorbachev.

Now I don’t feel that way with George Bush. I’ve known George Bush for many years. I know that this is a guy that does his homework well. He doesn’t have laid-back weekends at Camp David the way Mr. Reagan did. He doesn’t spend his evenings watching class-B movies. He is a very serious guy. Therefore, I feel reasonably confident -- don’t misunderstand me -- I don’t agree with many one-on-one meetings with the Soviet leadership, but I am not uneasy about Mr. Bush meeting with Gorbachev. I think we probably have a safer relationship now. I would hope we would not revert to the sort of chummy relationship that we had under Mr. Reagan.

WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN

Political Counselor

Moscow (1977-1978)

Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the “Holloway Program” which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.

Q: I’ve always thought that it was an article of faith with American policymakers: “Don't let the Soviets into negotiations over the Middle East.” It sounds as if you were up against a new administration with a different view. When you were sitting around and having a drink after work, was there concern about the new, Carter administration and its backbone in dealing with the Soviets?

BROWN: Speaking personally, I was very concerned. You have to bear in mind that I didn't have all of the facts at hand, but you didn't have to be a rocket scientist to perceive that the Soviets were out to extend their influence as far and wide as they could. The Soviet Navy, while no match for ours, was nevertheless becoming a blue water Navy, able to operate on the high seas. Their submarine force, with its nuclear capabilities, was a subject of very serious concern.
The Soviets were putting out newer and better missiles of greater accuracy, with longer range and much greater, destructive power.

The Soviet Navy had become involved in various escapades, as we saw them, in Nicaragua and other places. They had an ideology and a propaganda apparatus which made it very clear that they intended to overtake us. They were dedicated, if you will, to the eventual destruction of capitalism, as they termed it. They were trying to undermine us at every turn. Of course, we reciprocated. It was a real contest. I remember summing things up in a kind of annual wrap-up, listing Soviet efforts in the African, Latin American and Asian situations at the time. The situation looked pretty menacing and pretty discouraging to many other people. I tried to put myself in the position of a diplomat from a Third World country, given our efforts in Vietnam and our own self-flagellation. As against that, I mentioned in this review that Soviet society was increasingly corrupt. Apart from the facade as far as showcase, Moscow-Leningrad imagery was concerned, the Soviet Union had deep economic problems and great inefficiency. One wondered at what cost this great colossus was maintaining itself. However, I did not have the feeling that the Soviets would be so involved in their internal concerns that they would no longer be an external threat to the U.S.

That takes me back to a conversation I had with Mark Garrison, who had been instrumental in arranging for my assignment to the embassy in Moscow. Mark later left the Foreign Service. He had been DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] under Ambassador Watson, the IBM [International Business Machines] executive. Mark should have been appointed Ambassador somewhere. He had an outstanding background and a tremendous grasp of Russia, including Russian history and the Russian language. The Soviet Union had been his career. He was a very dedicated, serious person. In about 1974 or 1975 I called on Mark when he was Political Counselor in Moscow. I told him that I realized that I was out of the mainstream of the Foreign Service. Here I was on detail to Russell Train, Administrator of EPA, running the US-Soviet Environmental Agreement. I said, however, that in that capacity I got to see places in the Soviet Union that he would never get to. So I said to him: “Let me ask you. As I talk with the military attaches here in Embassy Moscow, they sure don't see a process of serious detente or decay in the Soviet Union.” Mark said, “Well, the Soviet Union faces a lot of problems, and one hopes that they will focus themselves and address their internal problems, so that they won't pose the same threat and problems to their neighbors and to our interests, externally.” I said, “Good luck!” I had no idea that I myself would be involved in these issues not too long thereafter. I just didn't believe that the Soviet Union was headed for a breakup.

Nonetheless, it was a very disturbing situation. The Soviet Union became involved in Afghanistan...

THOMPSON R. BUCHANAN

Consul General

Leningrad (1977-1980)

Thompson R. Buchanan was born in Beverly Hills, California in 1924. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1943-1946. Mr. Buchanan’s Foreign Service career included positions in
Germany, France, Russia, Burundi, Gabon, and Norway. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 15, 1996.

Q: You left there in the summer of 1980. By the end of the 80s the Soviet Union was in the process of dissolving. What did you think about whither the Soviet Union at the time you left?

BUCHANAN: At the time I left I was quite disturbed about the thrust of our policy. I thought it had gotten too negative and shortsighted. I wrote a very long two-part cable regarding our policy toward the USSR as I had watched it evolve over the years. Marshall Shulman, who was then I recall Under Secretary for Political Affairs, described my cable as “sort of useful,” obviously concerned by its implied criticism of administration policy.

Q: The Carter Administration had gone in with great ideas of how sweetness and light would open up the Soviets and then had been hit in the face and it was almost like a lover rejected and turned things around too far.

BUCHANAN : Let’s see, when did I send that? Yes, it was before I left Leningrad because my deputy had to finish getting it out after I had already left.

In any case, many people liked it and my neighbor, Chalmer Roberts of the Washington Post, somehow heard about it and said I should write it up. In any case, I ended up writing an article for Foreign Policy called “The Real Russia,” (which was not my title and one I didn’t like), which came out in the spring of 1982.

I argued in the article that “detente” was a more subversive policy against the Soviets than a crude hard line. I wrote at the time out of concern that an ideologue like Romanov might come to power, who would seize on a hard-line American policy as justification for his own internal crackdown. In the longer term, I did postulate that reform might come to Russia, as it had historically, not as the result of any mass movement but as the result of the efforts of a reforming Tsar. But I certainly did not anticipate in the article that this reforming Tsar would come so soon, in the form of Gorbachev. It was Gorbachev’s ill-conceived program for reforming a system, which he understood was increasingly unable to compete on the world scale, that destroyed the Soviet system. Reagan’s military buildup did not bring down the Soviet Union, but it was seen by Gorbachev, I believe, as “objectively” helpful to his efforts to argue with his hardliners that the USSR could not compete with the US and required a quite different approach in Central Europe. Gorbachev apparently hoped to persuade the West that “We are no devils bent on aggression, but a civilized state with which you can negotiate in safety.” Shevardnadze claimed to have understood that the policies of concession and perestroika would lead to the unraveling of the Soviet empire. But Gorbachev apparently dreamed, like Khrushchev before him, that he could reform the Communist Party and revitalize the USSR and its alliance system, without fatally undermining the whole communist structure. History can only bless him for his huge miscalculation.

If I was unhappy about the trend of our policy toward Russia, I was equally unhappy with the trend in the Foreign Service itself. It no longer seemed the career service that I had been so proud to serve. I was admittedly influenced in my feeling by a nasty personnel quarrel at the consulate. Our GSO had organized a vendetta against the Administrative Officer, dividing the consulate into factions. In an earlier era, I would have sent the couple home, when it was clear that they
would not control their feelings. But I was concerned that defending myself against a grievance suit from a minority woman would lead to endless litigation, and a drain on my time and energy. I should have simply soldiered on, knocking heads together, and forcing people to behave civilly to each other. Unwisely, I informed the EUR Executive Director, who visited Leningrad, of the problem. He concluded after talking to the parties that the GSO should be moved to other work. I was pleased to use her as an economist, but this required permission from the Director General. I accordingly “made waves,” reflecting on my ability to manage personnel. The next thing I knew, the Director of Personnel, Bob Brewster, announced that he was coming to Leningrad on Sunday. Saturday night I got a call from the airport where Brewster was mad as a hatter because he had not been met. At the time I was giving a reception to which he refused to come. I showed him the incoming cable proving that it was his mistake, but he never had the manners or courage to apologize. If Brewster had had Eastern European experience, he would have known that there were always morale problems, particularly with non-Russian speaking members of the staff, and I had acquired a particularly cantankerous lady in place of her delightful predecessor. This was further proof to him that something was wrong. He could not understand how this could be, since he acknowledged that Nancy and I apparently went out of our way to do things for the staff. In my perhaps glamorized memory of the old Foreign Service in Moscow, officers did their duty without whining and complaining.

John Ausland, the former DCM in Norway, had tried to persuade me that I should have retired many years earlier, that I would quickly earn more in retirement than I was working. The fact that I had been frozen at the Class I level for years made the idea of retirement even more attractive. That, and an idea I had to write the history of the American diplomats and residents of St. Petersburg before the revolution. So when it was clear that there were no posts opening up in the foreseeable future, I applied for retirement in June 1981. At the time, I was doing research on Soviet policy in Africa at the National Defense University. In retrospect, I made a mistake. Not only was the salary ceiling broken shortly after my retirement, which would have helped my pension, but I was not really ready to retire. Impatience has always been a failing. That summer after retirement I got a message, while in Europe, asking if I wished to do some work on what they called Soviet “active measures” in Africa for INR. Active measures means political warfare. As a result, for several years, I did studies for INR, which were always very highly classified because they were based usually on CIA reporting of what the Soviets were doing in the way of political warfare in Africa. After several studies of Soviet behavior in various African states, I undertook to analyze the 60 or so Soviet officials, who had been sent as Ambassadors to Africa. What was their background? Why were they selected? How many of them were Communist Party officials in disgrace? The assignment of the number two in the KGB to Ouagadougou, for example, was hardly a promotion. Some Soviets were clearly Africanists in their Soviet foreign service, but others were clearly in political trouble. Certain key posts...Ethiopia, perhaps Algeria and Angola were reserved for trusted Party officials, usually with Central Committee status. This work as a WAE (when actually employed) kept up my security clearance and involved me, at least indirectly, in Soviet affairs.

I became more directly involved with Soviet affairs in 1986, outside the INR context. You will recall the flap over the Marine guard, Sergeant Lonetree, who supposedly allowed the KGB in Moscow to enter our Chancery building. This issue contributed to the decision to get rid of all our Soviet employees. Gene Boster, an old Moscow hand, and I were brought back to assess the potential damage of this suspected security leak. We read files for three months to determine
what the Soviets might have read if they had had entry to our files, and finally we were sent to Moscow, and in my case on to Leningrad, to make the same assessment there with the Embassy and consulate files. We concluded that the worst damage would have been what they might have overheard if they had managed to put a bug in the secure “box.” But the more that I looked at the likelihood that the KGB actually entered the Chancery, the more unlikely it seemed. I tended to agree with the analysis of some retired CIA “beltway bandits,” who had briefed us before our departure, that the KGB would have needed to neutralize probably three, not two guards, to be sure they could enter without being caught. Of all the hours that Lonetree was on duty with his suspected accomplice, they were only together on duty a total of 8 hours. Burned by the Walker case, Naval Intelligence was apparently just too eager to demonstrate that it was “vigilant” and eventually concluded that no entry had taken place. Their mistake bought me a new Honda and a trip to Moscow, so I could not complain.

WILLIAM P. KIEHL

Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute
Washington, DC (1977-1978)
Cultural Affairs Officer, Exhibits
Moscow (1978-1979)
Press Officer
Moscow (1979-1980)
Soviet Union Desk Office

William P. Kiehl was born in Pennsylvania in 1945. He received a BS from the University of Scranton in 1967 and an MA from the University of Virginia in 1970. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1970, he was posted in Belgrade, Zagreb, Colombo, Moscow, Prague, Helsinki, London and Bangkok. Mr. Kiehl was interviewed in 2003 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: This period, while you were on this tour, ’78 to ’79, how would you describe the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States?

KIEHL: At that time, of course, relations were warming. If you recall, there was the Carter-Brezhnev embrace in Vienna, in fact, a kiss on both cheeks, which, however distasteful it was to some people, nevertheless indicated that the Russians and Americans were trying to come to some terms on things. All in all, the overall relationship was on the upswing throughout that entire period, although it wasn’t particularly reflected by our work on the exhibit. You have to understand that those exhibits were negotiated with a lot of blood, sweat, and toil over many years. They first of them was the famous Kitchen Debate in ’59, the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate, and so on. That exhibit had 70 American guides with it. It was only in one city, but it was there, I think, for three or four months.
Then eventually they became traveling exhibits, usually six cities over the course of a year, with about 25 to 30 Russian-speaking American guides and staff, usually one American embassy officer attached to the exhibit as the protocol officer for the exhibit, that was the job I had. There were a couple of exhibit specialists, who actually ran the exhibit, there was an exhibit director, a deputy director, who was usually a pretty good Russian-speaker, who had had previous exhibit experience, a couple of technicians to help, getting the sound system and the lights and the video and all that to work. It was a pretty complicated undertaking, and in fact, in smaller places, where there wasn’t a large exhibition hall, the guides, under instruction from these technicians, would build a geodesic dome, a Bucky Fuller geodesic dome, with Mylar fabric over it, and the exhibit would be put into that. It was a pretty complicated technological, or technical, undertaking. These technicians were usually out of the regional exhibits office in Vienna. They traveled on all the exhibits.

MARSHALL BREMENT

Soviet Desk, National Security Council, White House


Ambassador Marshall Brement was born in New York in 1932. He received a bachelor’s degree from Brooklyn College and a master’s degree from the University of Maryland. He served in the U.S. Air Force from 1952-1955. Ambassador Brement’s career in the Foreign Service included positions in Hong Kong, Moscow, Singapore, Djakarta, and Saigon, and an ambassadorship to Iceland. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on April 11, 1990.

Q: But what in your field, Soviet affairs which was obviously the keystone, what was Carter interested in?

BREMENT: My own criticism of Carter is that he didn’t have a grand design. Brzezinski did. But Carter didn’t. I don’t think he had a world view of the Soviets. And I don’t think he was after anything. He had a clear short term view of what he wanted from the Soviets. He wanted certain things. He wanted the SALT agreement. Arms control was a good thing, according to Carter, and therefore we should move ahead with the SALT II agreement. But the Soviets throughout the period were doing things that should have evoked a much sharper response from the President, from the State Department, but did not. That in my view was very unfortunate.

Q: Obviously the war in Afghanistan was the big one, you arrived there...

BREMENT: I arrived there before Afghanistan. I arrived there just in time for the Soviet brigade in Cuba mini-crisis, which everyone has forgotten now.

Q: That was a non-crisis really, wasn’t it?

BREMENT: It should have been a non-crisis. But it was a crisis.

Q: Would you explain what that was?

BREMENT: Essentially the U.S. government went public with the allegation that the Soviets introduced a brigade into Cuba, and that this brigade indeed had to be removed because this act
contravened certain gentlemen’s agreements between us. And several Senators indicated that if this brigade was not removed, they would not ratify the SALT II treaty, which was a cornerstone of Carter’s foreign policy. So the aim of the government was to try and get the Soviets to remove the brigade. The unfortunate fact was that the Soviets had not introduced a new brigade at all. They had had that brigade there for twenty years ever since the Cuban missile crisis. But the United States government simply forgot about it. We didn’t know it was there.

Q: You were looking around, these were think sessions, or what do you do? How to be beastly to the Russians?

BREMENT: Well, for instance, in December of 1980, when we thought they were going to invade Poland, as soon as something like this happens you think about every possible contingency and you make a list of thirty things that the President can do, which includes various military deployments, demarches, speeches at the UN, and so forth, but only very few had any teeth, would make any difference. And indeed when we thought about Afghanistan, we knew the things that were available right away. It didn’t take any great imagination because you really can’t come up with new ideas that have not been thought of before. A grain embargo was one thing. So we stopped selling grain to the Soviets and tried to get others to join us in an embargo to express international displeasure. We were singularly unsuccessful in doing that. Then we boycotted the Moscow Olympics. And indeed we put great pressure on various people to do that as well, to Helmut Schmidt’s great displeasure. He claims that Warren Christopher had told him when he went through Europe that the United States was not going to boycott the Olympics and so Schmidt announced that the Germans wouldn’t boycott them. And then he was told that we would. It made him feel very uncomfortable with the U.S. government. Of course Schmidt hated Brzezinski, and felt great contempt for Jimmy Carter.

Q: This was almost visceral would you say?

BREMENT: Visceral, yes.

THOMAS R. HUTSON
Consul General
Moscow (1978-1980)

Thomas R. Hutson was born in Nebraska in 1939. After receiving his bachelor’s degree from the University of Nebraska in 1962 he served in the US Army from 1962-1967. His career has included positions in Teheran, Belgrade, Winnipeg, Moscow, Lagos, Taipei, Belgrade, Bishkek, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Mr. Hutson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1999.

Q: What was your impression of the Soviet Union when you arrived? What was the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1978?

HUTSON: I had learned to have a great fondness for the “Great Russian Soul.” I got largely from the White Russians with whom I had studied in Monterey. I had learned all the old Russian songs, etc. So I really was looking forward to my tour in Moscow. I had considerable sympathy for the people - not the system. I was immediately struck by the system. I changed my views in a
hurry from someone who thought that eventually the system would change drastically to one who came to believe that the system had been terminated. It could never change enough. I agreed with Reagan’s description of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” I saw so many people who had been adversely affected by the system. Of course, that is the nature of a consular office; it sees many more dissatisfied people than any other embassy section.

The embassy was a “zoo.” We did not manage the work; it managed us. During my tour, we witnessed the greatest emigration of Russian Jews in history. It was arranged by the Dutch, who set up a route through Rome and Vienna which eventually brought many of the emigrants to the U.S. In 1979, there were 50,000 Jewish emigrants. What is not well known is that in the same year, 10,000 Armenians also left the Soviet Union. Included were a number of “undesirables” that the Soviet authorities added to the flow.

It was also the year in which the seven Pentecostal Christians took refuge in the basement of the embassy. President Carter had given specific approval to giving this group political asylum. There were also three Armenians with them. Ambassador Toon called me and told me that he did not want any more refugees in the embassy. He was one of the best ambassadors I ever worked for. So we managed to get the three Armenians out. I worked assiduously to find another “home” for the Pentecostal Christians. That took five years! (Long after I had left).

Q: What did you try to do to get them out of the country?

HUTSON: I talked to them to try to convince them to leave. I talked and talked and talked to them. We negotiated with the Soviets who maintained that these were Soviet citizens and therefore subject to Soviet laws. They gave us no assurances not to prosecute. They would not tell us whether the Christians had violated any Soviet laws, which gave us concern. This group turned out to be a major work-load. We had two staffers who essentially spent all of their time taking care of them; they were also responsible for answering the large volume of mail that we received about the Pentecostals; the letters came from all over the world and were unanimously supporting them. I had been exposed to Pentecostal Christians in other parts of the world. They are essentially strong believers in their faith; the ones who took refuge in the embassy had literally walked across the Soviet Union and managed to slip by the Soviet militiamen guarding the embassy. And they refused to leave the embassy to return to their country. They were convinced that anyone who entered their room - and there were many who wanted to help and talk to them - had been sent by God to help them. So they trusted all their visitors. We had other devout believers who came from the U.S. to see them. Among the seven were three teen age daughters. We even heard that some of these people might try to impregnate them so that the children could be born on U.S. territory and therefore be able to claim American citizenship. That, some thought, would have increased the humanitarian rationale for letting them emigrate.

Then of course we had major attention from the press. I remember one time when Dan Fisher, the correspondent for Los Angeles Times wrote a scurrilous piece suggesting that we had deprived the Pentecostals of a Christmas tree and toilet paper. We did try to prevent these people from receiving items that might be considered illegal or contraband by the Soviets. They didn’t have diplomatic privileges so that we tried to stick by the rules as much as we could. But the newspaper article was completely false and even though I was very friendly with Dan, I told him that I thought he had done a terrible thing.
So these people were a major work-load for the embassy. Toon, whom as I said, I greatly respected, used to vent periodically and insist that I get the Pentecostals out of the embassy. He used to say, “This is my embassy. Get them out of there!” I would then go to talk to them, without avail. Toon was replaced by Thomas J. Watson, Jr. - the retired chairman of IBM - ; he spent a lot of time with the Pentecostals talking to them, unlike Toon who didn’t want to see them. He did agree to meet with them on a couple of occasions. Also to no avail I must say that their stay in the embassy was quite an educational experience for me. After I left the Foreign Service, I moved to Texas. There I ran into one of the organizations who criticized us the most for the way we handled the Pentecostals. It was called “Christ for the Nations Institute,” headquartered in Dallas. The Vashchenkos and Chymykalovs have a worldwide following, particularly in Switzerland and the UK. During the 1978-83 period, they wanted to know why we cooperated with those God-hating heathens - the Soviets. They suggested we put the seven into diplomatic pouches and fly them out that way. So when I was living in Houston, I called the executive director of this organization - a woman by the name of Freda Lindsay. I called her in 1982 on the fourth anniversary of their asylum which this organization was celebrating. Ms. Lindsay invited me to come to Dallas; she said she would give me three minutes to speak in their celebration program.

She didn’t realize that I was a former gospel singer. I had also done a fair amount of preaching in my life. So I took 33 minutes. I may not have spoken “in tongues” but they did tape my sermon and sent me a copy. I have never let anyone else listen to it; it was so far out of my normal speech that it would almost unrecognizable. But since this is my oral history, I will mention that episode. It was a unique experience.

Q: When you arrived in 1978, what did you conclude about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations?

HUTSON: That was the number issue on the U.S. agenda. I remember Senator Baker visiting Moscow; he was heading a very large CODEL. They were interested in assessing prospects for the SALT treaties. I should mention an interesting aspect of this visit. One of the members of the delegation was Senator Jacob Javits of New York. He was a brilliant man. He was part of the delegation, but didn’t travel with it. He came in his own private plane. I was the nominal control officer, although the real “control” officer was Armand Hammer, the head of Occidental Oil. All the details of the visit were handled by Hammer personally. I used to call him frequently to check and get his approval on every move the delegation might make. One of the meetings was with Yevgenii Primakov who was then heading an economic research think tank. I remember Javits commenting during the meeting that he thought that someday the Soviet Union would have to deal with international economic and financial institutions, perhaps to seek their assistance. He told Primakov that the Soviets better figure out how they would approach those institutions. I was reminded of that comment when later Prime Minister Primakov was flying to the U.S. to seek the assistance of the IMF. He never got here because in mid-flight he had to return to Moscow because we started the idiotic bombing of Yugoslavia.

The relationship between the two countries was as good as it could be. Brezhnev was still in charge. I will never forget the first Marine ball that we attended. It was held in Spaso House. It was attended by at least a thousand people. Soviets came and one could feel the warmth of detente, despite some tensions. A Marine colonel, the assistant naval attaché, was at odds with the ambassador. He was a great supporter of the Pentecostals. In fact, on my own, I had taken him privately into the “tank” - the secure conference room in the embassy - to talk to him about
the issue. He was giving information to British Pentecostal organizations in England which he would not give to the embassy. He was obviously conflicted by his faith and his official duties. I told him that and suggested that he decide where his loyalties laid. His wife went after me during the Reagan administration in an attempt to blemish my record. I heard that she lobbied against me having a political appointment I the Regan Administration because I allegedly tried to defend the State Department in the Pentecostal affair. So we had this tension at the Marine ball which was obvious when the ambassador and this senior Marine colonel met at the ball.

I think the colonel, as well as others, thought that through our actions we were pushing for the emigration of Soviet Jewry, but didn’t really care about the Christians. He kept pointing out what we had done for the Jews and asking why we weren’t doing more for the Pentecostals. That was the tension. I think for a U.S. military officer not to share information with his own embassy which he will share with representatives of foreign governments id a little beyond the pale.

NELSON C. LEDSKY

Special Assistant for Moscow Olympics


Ambassador Ledsky was born in Cleveland, Ohio and was educated at Case Western Reserve University and Columbia University. After serving in the US Army, he joined the Foreign Service in 1957, serving in Georgetown, Guyana; Enugu, Nigeria; Bonn and Berlin, Germany and in the State Department in Washington. In his various assignments he was closely involved in matters concerning the status of Berlin and West Germany as well as on the persistent Greece-Turkey conflict over Cyprus. Among his other assignments, the Ambassador served on the Department’ Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Ledsky was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2003.

Q: We are now in 1980. You became the special assistant to the secretary for the Olympics. Had you had a predecessor?

LEDSKY: As far as I know, I was the first. I think there may have been some officers who were given some responsibilities for previous Olympics, but I don’t believe that any single officer was ever previously designated as the Department’s focal point. My role in 1980 was a new one for the Department.

In late 1979 or early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. looked for actions it could take to express its distaste for Soviet action. I believe that the British and Canadians first suggested that one effective action that could be taken would be for countries to refuse to participate in the Moscow Olympic games, scheduled for the summer of 1980. The Soviets had devoted much time and attention to making these games a shining example of the prowess of its regime. It was the first time that the Soviet Union or its predecessor regimes had ever been awarded the Olympics and it was going to make it the event of the century. It was, I believe, the conclusion of the British and Canadians that little could be done to reverse the invasion, but they
believed that a symbolic act of displeasure was in order and that by not participating in the Olympics we could show that displeasure in a meaningful way.

The British essentially sold this idea to President Carter, who was also looking for public actions to express American disapproval of the Afghanistan invasion. We had only come up with such minor irritants, as a wheat embargo which was bitterly opposed by mid-western farmers. Around the turn of the year 1980, there was an exchange among the British, Canadian and U.S. governments which led to their agreeing to a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The three governments also pledged to try to get other governments to join the boycott. There were a number of letters exchanged by the three governments at the time. The Department was asked by the White House – Lloyd Cutler, the legal advisor – to coordinate efforts to have other countries join the boycott. The secretary, Cutler and Christopher met and agreed that the Department should take the leadership in coordinating the U.S. government’s boycott. This was about January, 1980.

In January, I was called to Christopher’s office. I had tentatively been selected to be nominated as our ambassador to Uganda. I had told Dick Moose that I would be interested in an ambassadorial assignment, but not Uganda because of my wife’s health condition. Since H knew that I was about to be reassigned, it had selected Walt Cutler, who had been in Iran, to replace me. So I was out on a limb. I any case, Christopher asked me to undertake the Olympic boycott coordinator’s role. I said “yes” somewhat reluctantly, since I thought I would be going to an ambassadorial post overseas. Christopher was very understanding; he understood my dilemma and I think appreciated that I agreed to undertake the coordinator’s role. We both may have thought that by the end of the summer of 1980, I would find another acceptable assignment and this coordinator role was just a temporary bridge. I think they all thought that Carter would be re-elected and that an ambassadorial position could be found for me.

So I called on Lloyd Cutler, who had assigned Joe Onek of his staff, to this work. I knew nothing about the subject matter. I knew very little about Olympic sport events. I knew nothing about boycotts. Christopher’s request came as a bolt out of the clear blue sky. I knew that the Olympics would be held, but that was about the extent of my knowledge of the whole subject.

Eventually, someone reached the decision that my office would be part of the Secretariat. I would be assigned four or five people and my main role would be to co-ordinate with the British and the Canadians to implement the boycott. I don’t think anyone in early 1980 knew what had to be done. The job description still had to be written. We quickly discovered that our first task was to convince the U.S. Olympic Coordinating Committee to agree with the government’s boycott policy. President Carter did not have the authority to deny American athletes participation in Olympics. We had to convince the Committee that it should support the boycott.

We also had to convince the British and Canadians to bar their athletes from participating in the Olympics. That was also a tough task because the British Olympic Committee was entirely independent, as was its Canadian counterpart, both in a similar way to ours. As we began to work on this facet of the boycott, I soon found out that the opposition was very strong and that our policy was about to fail for lack of support from the athletes. In addition, the Canadian government fell and was replaced by a new one, which had not agreed to join the boycott. The British government, previously headed by Callaghan, fell in late 1979 and had been replaced by the new administration of Margaret Thatcher. So, the trio of countries that had agreed to the
boycott, all of a sudden shrank to one by early 1980. The British essentially took the position that its Olympic Committee was independent and not subject to governmental direction. They said that if we wanted to try to convince their Committee we were welcome to come to Great Britain to give it a try. The Thatcher government really did not want to get involved.

The new Canadian government, led by Pierre Trudeau, was completely opposed to the boycott, primarily for commercial reasons, that is the sale of Canadian wheat to the Soviets. So, at the start of 1980, there were considerable doubts about President Carter’s policy. Many thought that we should lift the boycott and participate in the Olympics. By this time, the whole issue was in the public domain because the exchange of letters among the three pro-boycott nations had been released to the media.

I spent most of January and February working with Lloyd Cutler and Onek. At some point, Vice President Mondale became involved, so I spent much of my time with White House staffs. No one else in the Department, including Christopher, seemed very anxious to becoming involved. I was essentially left holding the bag. In early 1980, we drew up a work plan. We sent demarches to many countries – to the Europeans, to Latin American countries, and to African countries. We told these countries that we believed that it was very important that the unlawful Soviet invasion of Afghanistan be publicized and we thought that a boycott of the Olympics would do that. We said we hoped that the games would be canceled, or their importance minimized, if enough countries stayed away. The demarches took different forms.

There were some reactions to the demarches that were disturbing. A number of governments said that they would support us. I am not sure that all demarches were welcomed. For example, the Romanians, Liberians and the Chinese said they would join the boycott. The last even pledged to mount a campaign in the Third World to build support; that was not totally welcomed in Washington. The Chinese kept their promise, but were not really very effective. I maintained a dialogue with their embassy in Washington during the spring and summer.

Lloyd Cutler and I took a few trips to Europe in spring and summer of 1980. Our first focus was on Great Britain, where we wanted the Thatcher government to return to the Callaghan policies in support of the boycott. We talked to a number of British sports federations. We spent some time in Geneva talking to the International Olympics Committee, which was most interested in what we were doing. We suggested that the Committee select an alternative venue to Moscow. We also tried to get the Committee or some of the federations to support and participate in the boycott. We were not successful.

In the course of our trips to Europe, we met with a number of delegations, which were affiliated with the IOC. We met with a Korean delegation, which we did convince to join the boycott. We met with the Germans and received Helmut Schmidt’s agreement to talk to the German federation to join the boycott. We met with the Egyptians, who then joined the boycott. We conducted these efforts during the spring and summer and we had some successes. By the time the Olympics opened in Moscow, about sixty countries had joined the boycott.

I remember that one of our first fiascos was the dispatch of Mohammed Ali around the world to speak in favor of the boycott. That was not my idea. We got various bureaus involved in preparing for this presidential envoy. We brought Ali to the Seventh floor to explain to him what his trip was all about. That was a challenge in itself because he really wasn’t sure where
Afghanistan was or why the U.S. government was so upset. We hoped that he would be effective. The trip was supposed to begin in Nigeria and then move on to a few other African countries and then on to India – four or five places that we had picked which seemed targets of opportunity.

I will not forget what happened in Nigeria. There, Ali, instead of dissuading the Nigerians from participating in the Olympics, was convinced by the Nigerians that Carter’s policy was wrong and that the U.S. athletes should go to Moscow. So, it was back to the drawing board. Dick Moose and I got on the phone to talk to Ali’s State escort officer. The trip had been well publicized; it would have been very difficult to cancel. So we told the State officer to continue on the trip, but to try to convince Ali before the next stop that the embargo was the right policy. We had to keep going on the trip. On the next stop, Ali met some Chinese diplomats, who turned him around again and convinced him that an embargo was the right course, that the Soviets were the most evil people in the world and that all people of color should stand against the USSR. It was during this period, that not only did the Chinese convince Ali that a boycott was correct, but they also offered to come to Washington to develop a joint plan, which would give the Chinese the leading role in Africa in bringing those countries to join the boycott.

Ali then went to India, where he was again subjected to arguments in favor of participation and was finally won over to that point of view – again. The Indians convinced Ali that the Moscow Olympics was too important an event to be boycotted, and that furthermore, our stand opposing the invasion of Afghanistan was all wrong. By the time Ali returned to the U.S., he was thoroughly confused. He reported back to us on his trip and then went on his way. We did not use him again! However, I should note that Nigeria and India and some other countries decided in the final analysis not to participate.

Lloyd Cutler and I then began to work on the Olympic Committee, which, by the way, we discovered is made up of a couple of dozen independent fiefdoms, each representing a different sport. The Olympic Committee was really a federation.

We began to mount a media campaign, stressing the importance of the boycott as a strong gesture of our disapproval of the Soviet’s actions in Afghanistan. We took our case to the country, trying to marshal as much public support as we could. I spent a lot of time with the media and appeared on TV on a couple of occasions. Lloyd Cutler made a lot of public appearances. I spent some time on the Hill, although I don’t remember Congress playing a very active role on this issue. There may have been a couple of resolutions passed, but I don’t think they were consequential.

I went to Tennessee to talk to the Track and Field Association. I went to other meetings with several sports federations. We ran into very stiff resistance. I don’t remember a single federation which at the beginning of the effort supported the boycott. Every one wanted to participate.

Onek and I flew to Chicago during this period to meet with the Track and Field federation leadership. We also met with the Diving federation and the Swimming group. They all opposed the boycott. Their stand was essentially that the U.S. position was a political one – a sign of disapproval of Soviet actions, and that they were in the sports business – which had no relationship to sports. Their athletes had been training for four years; some had spent the previous three years in Colorado Springs devoting 100% of their time to training. They felt it
was not fair of the U.S. government to ask for such sacrifices from a group of people who had nothing to do with politics. I vividly remember the head of the U.S. field hockey federation coming to see me in Washington to explain that her young women had worked hard for four years to overcome a losing record in international competitions. They were now ready and this was their one chance to correct the record. Our position was that all of these athletes were American citizens first and had to support their president and country in this public display of disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Slowly but surely, I think, we made some headway with these federations.

We continued our efforts in the U.S. until April or May, 1980, in preparation for a trip that Vice President Mondale, Lloyd Cutler and I took to Colorado Springs to address the U.S. Olympic Committee and to meet with representatives of all American federations. Mondale asked all of the federations not to send their athletes to Moscow. This lobbying effort lasted four or five days with our meeting with each of the many sports federations. Mondale met with Bill Simon, a well known Republican, who was the head of the Olympic Committee. He did not have a very high regard of Carter or any Democrat, for that matter. In the end, we were successful. The Olympic Committee did vote at the time not to send any teams to Moscow. I must say that I was not very confident that we would win that vote. I was pleasantly surprised when the vote went our way. I think it was sheer patriotism that swung the vote.

We flew back in one of the government’s small jets. It was a happy trip home. It was a big triumph. Then we discovered, after our return, that the Committee’s vote did not bind the individual federations. It was no doubt a significant vote, but there could well have been some slippage in the participation in the Olympics. And in fact, a few U.S. teams did participate surreptitiously, a fact that has been forgotten. So, we did not have a complete boycott. But the vote of the U.S. Olympic Committee allowed us to go back to countries, which up to that time had rejected the boycott notion.

I think, in the final analysis, from our point of view and that of the Soviets, the Olympics were a disaster. NBC withdrew its sponsorship and the Soviets lost $75 million right there. There was no coverage in the U.S. of the Olympics. Those games were not a reflection of the world’s athletic prowess because, although many countries participated, most of the ones with the top notch athletes (Japan, Pakistan, Korea, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, all Arab countries, most German teams, a few British teams, and Romania) did not.. It was not a world competition and therefore became less than significant in the annals of Olympic sports. I must say that the Germans complained bitterly, blaming Carter for all sorts of mischief.

I think that even if we did not get 100% participation in the boycott (and no one thought that we would) our efforts were successful in the international political arena. There was wide condemnation of the Soviet invasion. Even in countries which participated, there was considerable support for our stand.

I should mention that we also became promoters of some sports events in the U.S., in part to allow those athletes that had trained for so long and so hard the opportunity to display their competence. My staff and I became promoters of track and field events, which were held in Philadelphia as the “Liberty Games.” This was a deal I worked out with the Track and Field federation, which wanted a venue for their athletes. These games were held in the fall of 1980 and were an international event. We financed the travel of about thirty foreign teams to go to
Philadelphia. The Track and Field federation did most of the organizing work, but we were the ones who made the arrangements for the foreign participants.

Then we were involved in an international boxing tournament in Kenya. Some 20-30 countries participated in that. That was our sop to the Kenyans for their participation in the boycott. It was also our payment to the U.S. Boxing federation for its cooperation. So there were some substitute events organized in the fall and winter of 1980 for the Moscow non-participants. By the end of the year, we closed down our operations and my stint as the U.S. Olympics Boycott coordinator came to an end. To this day, I am probably still one of the leaders of the “to be avoided” list of the U.S. Olympic Committee and its sport federations.

Of course, on the negative side, our boycott had no impact on Soviet policy in Afghanistan. They did not withdraw or change their Afghan policy at all. But as I said before, our world-wide efforts and our boycott did highlight the Soviet’s nefarious actions. We did get a lot of editorial support, which reflected the mood of the American people after they had a chance to consider the issue. I think that helped the Olympic Committee reach its decision, which, as I said earlier, was really an act of patriotism.

This whole episode has been written up in several books, most of them written by people involved in the Olympic movement. They were mostly negative about our policy and efforts. The conclusion drawn by many of these writers was that American athletes were made to suffer because of the ineptness of the U.S. government in expressing its displeasure with Soviet policy. The athletes were made to suffer because the U.S. government could not stop the invasion of Afghanistan through more traditional means. I, of course, argued that a boycott was a perfectly legitimate and powerful expression of disapproval. I don’t think we had many other means in 1980 to show our disapproval of Soviet action. It did send an important signal to the Soviets; it did influence world opinion and turned much of it against the Soviets. I think that embargoes are useful foreign policy tools. I know that many disagree, but I think that in the case of these Olympics, it did have a desired effect. It was a symbolic embargo, different from that which we usually impose, but I think it was a good decision by President Carter. There was a tit-for-tat with the Soviets boycotting the Los Angeles games in 1984, but that didn’t have nearly the same effect.

I must admit that I came away with some skepticism about the whole international Olympic movement. It is not an entirely above-board operation, with bureaucratic politics within the movement playing a very large role. I am sorry that we were not totally successful; had it been, it would really have sent a powerful message to the Soviets. That is not to say that what we did accomplish was not noted in Moscow; in fact, the Russians have never forgotten the boycott. I think it did demoralize the Soviet public and brought home to it what the world thought of their government’s actions in Afghanistan. The boycott was not totally effective – some nations participated. At the beginning, we had a number of aspirations: first, that the games be moved from the USSR by the International Olympics Committee (IOC) in response to the Soviet violation of international law. I guess that was aiming too high, although the IOC had the power to do so if it had been sensitive enough to the Soviet transgression; it was not. Mr. Samaranch, who ran the IOC, used to be his country’s ambassador to Moscow and we believed was in fact on the Soviets’ payroll, as has been exposed in recent times.
Once the IOC decided to proceed with the Olympics in Moscow, we fell back on our second, our backup aspiration to get the world’s major countries to join the boycott. There, I would estimate we were 60-70% successful. I never expected that the East Germans would join the boycott and they were an international sports powerhouse. As I mentioned earlier, at the beginning, the British and the Canadians did join the boycott; but, with their change of governments, we lost both of them. That hurt. This shifting scene made our calculations of success a moving target during 1980. We really did not know until the very beginning of the Olympics how successful or unsuccessful we would be. It was clear that a 100% success was not possible and with the loss of the British and Canadians our hopes were lowered.

I think it is fair to say that as a government, we really had no idea what we were getting into at the beginning of 1980. We didn’t know much if anything about how the sports world is organized. We learned a lot as we went along. We didn’t know what our task was or how we could reach our goal. At the beginning, we worked on the assumption that if a U.S. president said that U.S. Olympic teams did not participate, that would be the end of that. It didn’t take us too long to understand that in some matters, such as the Olympics, the U.S. government was impotent to enforce its decisions on a private group or groups. We rapidly faced a situation where the U.S. government had to sell its policies to its citizens, or key groups of its citizens. I certainly learned a lot in those few early months, as I think Lloyd Cutler and Warren Christopher and many others also did.

I should add that when we started in early 1980 to work on the boycott of the summer games in Moscow, we were hosting the Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. We, of course, did not want anything to happen to those games. They had to be successful. That limited the scope of what we could do considerably for several months. We could not do anything which would jeopardize the success of the Lake Placid event.

Another sub-text to this history was the financial consequences of a boycott. That was fully understood in the U.S. government. We knew that missing the Olympics would cost federations considerable financial support from sponsors. I think the U.S. Olympic Committee and its various sponsors probably broke even at the Lake Placid games, or perhaps there was a small loss because winter games can apparently be money losers if they are not well attended and not well organized. We believed that our boycott of the Moscow Olympics would lose considerable income to the Soviets, particularly if we could minimize the number of Western attendees. I believe that in the final analysis, the Soviets did lose a lot of money – millions. They had invested huge amounts in preparing for the Olympics – setting up villages for the visiting athletes, building and refurbishing stadiums, and building media facilities – all of the requirements that are demanded by the IOC (just as the Greeks are doing now for this summer’s games). We knew that if we could keep visitors and athletes away from Moscow in 1980, it would be a major financial blow to the Soviets. I think we were successful in meeting that goal.

HENRY L. CLARKE

Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute


Economic Counselor
Moscow (1982-1985)

Ambassador Clarke was born in Georgia in 1941. He attended Dartmouth College and enlisted in the US Army. He later entered Harvard University and then entered the Foreign Service. His career included positions in Germany, Nigeria, Romania, the USSR, and Israel. He was later appointed Ambassador to Uzbekistan. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.

Q: You left there in ‘85. What was your impression of whither the Soviet Union and its relationship with the United States?

CLARKE: That was really fascinating. I was tired because it had been three hard years. But I felt I was leaving at the wrong time. We were all interested in what Gorbachev was going to do. I think I can speak in the collective on this because it was more or less an understanding within the embassy. We thought that because Gorbachev had studied agriculture – he’d been first secretary in Stavropol and had experimented with economic enterprises and what not, on a reformist basis there, and therefore knew something about agriculture – he had to know what was going on. We assumed that he would leave the international and military situation that he received more or less in place. Let the old guard continue to have the assurance of Soviet might, but meanwhile turn his attention to the domestic economy outside the military sector and try to reform it. That was the theory but it was not based on a conversation with Gorbachev and indeed if Gorbachev had signaled what he wanted to do before he became general secretary, it’s my view he never would have become general secretary. So we didn’t discover it either. His fellow politburo bureau members didn’t know what he was going to do. But I knew that all our predictions were off before I got home from Moscow.

I traveled east from Moscow and spent a few days traveling in China with my family. When we got to Honolulu, I picked up a newspaper and found that he’d appointed Shevardnadze as foreign minister and Gromyko was going to become president. I immediately knew this was way off the scale of anything we’d predicted while I was there. Although Gromyko was said to have supported this move and there was still the lingering possibility that somehow as president he could still run the Polit Bureau, he would still be in charge of a lot of things in foreign policy. We now know that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, as you might expect, knew each other from before and there was a whole new agenda in foreign relations going on. He appointed, maybe before I left, and this was a little puzzling to us, Likachev to be in charge of agriculture. He was widely understood to be a conservative hard liner, which seemed to suggest that his first moves were not going to be in agriculture. So when Perestroika came, it was not a particularly agriculturally oriented move.

But I was sure there was going to be big changes in foreign policy. I remember visiting in California on home leave and being invited to give a little talk to my father-in-law’s service club in town. For what it was worth, I predicted that there would be a fairly significant change in foreign affairs. I wasn’t exactly sure what it was, but probably it would involve a new relationship between the U.S. and USSR.

MICHAEL A. BOORSTEIN
Soviet Desk Officer

Washington, DC (1981-1983)

Mr. Boorstein was born in Washington, DC and was raised in that area. He was educated at Beloit College, the University of Colorado, Harvard University and the University of Turku in Finland. Entering the Foreign Service in 1970, Mr. Boorstein specialized in administration and personnel, serving in Palermo, Rome, Ottawa, Warsaw Curacao, Moscow and Beijing. In addition, Mr. Boorstein played a major role in the planning and construction of US embassies in Moscow and Beijing and in the renovation of consulates and embassies throughout the globe. He spoke six foreign languages. Mr. Boorstein was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

BOORSTEIN: The job I had in the State Department was the first full-time Washington assignment that I had and it was unusual as an administrative officer because I was a desk officer in the Office of Soviet Union affairs. I was attracted to the job because I was ready to try something different and a lot of my administrative colleagues were counseling me against it, saying "you're going to make a mistake, its going to hurt your career, you're going to be out of the mainstream." I said, "thank you for your advice, but I want to do this," and I did and I'm really happy that I did.

Q: You did this from when to when?

BOORSTEIN: August of 1981 to July of 1983, so just about two years. The office director at the time was Tom Simons. The office of Soviet Union affairs was probably the largest country desk directorate in the whole Department of State. We had four divisions. There was the office of bilateral relations. There was the office of multilateral relations. There was the office of economic affairs and the office of science, technology and cultural exchanges and that was the office that I was in. My boss for the first year was Ed Hurwitz who has been retired for quite a while, but he was Charge' in Kabul towards the end of his career. He was consul general in Leningrad. He was a real Soviet hand. I was probably the second ranking officer and there were two other junior officers.

Q: Did you have a piece of the action?

BOORSTEIN: Yes I was going to say that you have to sort of look at the backdrop of U.S. Soviet relations in the summer of 1981 in late 1979, was it ’79?

Q: December.

BOORSTEIN: December of?

Q: ’79.

BOORSTEIN: December of ’79, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The relations got very chilly. I talked about the closing down of our effort to open up a consulate in Kiev. Among the
sanctions that President Carter imposed was that he basically ratcheted down with that order the array of formal bilateral science and technology and cultural agreements between the U.S. and the USSR to barely survival level. We didn't want to abrogate any of those agreements, but we didn’t want to use them as a vehicle that would run counter to our effort to show our displeasure across the board to the Soviets’ action against Afghanistan. There was a whole array of these agreements that had been developed and signed after the Second World War, primarily in the ‘50s, the umbrella agreement of science and technology exchanges and under that there were whole other agreements for cooperation in space, health, primarily heart. You know, Michael DeBakey the guy who did the first artificial heart was honorary chairman of the USSR joint commission on heart research. There was an agreement on housing, an agreement on transportation, an agreement on the environment, a whole array of things that were government-to-government agreements and the office that I was in was in charge of monitoring and supporting and backstopping those agreements and the activities that stemmed from them. When they operated in a very robust fashion, they sort of had a life of their own. Constantly delegations were going back and forth for different meetings and discussions and workshops and joint research and whatever. After the invasion of Afghanistan there was a requirement that any time a delegation was proposed either by the U.S. or was invited by the Soviet Union to go over to the USSR or the U.S. counterparts invited a Soviet delegation to come over, it had to have White House approval. I spent most of my tour writing these memos from the Department to the NSC. They were known as Bremer-Clarks because they went from Jerry Bremer who was the executive secretary to Clark who I guess was the national security advisor at the time. I learned a whole new style of drafting. I don’t believe any of the proposed trips in either direction were ever turned down, but nonetheless it was a bureaucratic impediment that needed to be done for the sake of showing the Soviet government that they just couldn’t take these things for granted. It was a fascinating tour in that I went all over Washington to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Transportation, National Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, NASA. I had contacts in all of these places that I worked with on a daily basis. One of the more interesting aspects of that assignment was the controversy surrounding a high energy electromagnet that had been loaned to the Soviet Institute of High Energy Physics in the mid 1970s and that magnet, multi, multi ton thing, probably the size of this room that we’re in which is what about eight by sixteen or twenty.

ROBERT E. MCCARTHY

Public Affairs Officer, USIS

Moscow (1981-1983)

Mr. McCarthy was born in Canada and raised in New York City. He was educated at Fordham University, City College of New York and American University. After service in the US Army and studies in Paris, he joined the Foreign Service in 1973. His assignment in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs was the beginning of a career dealing primarily with Public and Cultural Affairs with USIA. His overseas assignments as Public Affairs and/or Cultural Affairs Officer were in Belgrade, Moscow (twice), Montenegro, Leningrad and Budapest. His Washington assignments also concerned USIA programs. Mr.
Q: What was the status would you say of the Soviet-American relations in 1981?

McCarthY: Very tense. The Soviets had gone into Afghanistan in December of 1979. This was the time NATO was preparing to put cruise missiles and Pershing intermediate range nuclear missiles into Europe to counter the Soviet SS-20s. And a couple of years later there was the KAL airliner shootdown over Kamchatka. So it was a tense time. As far as our day-to-day activities, that is the activities of USIA were concerned, the cultural exchange agreement, which governed U.S.-USSR exchanges had lapsed because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We did not want to renew those negotiations and accord the Soviets the respect and additional status that that would have meant. That put a crimp in a lot of what we did. Up until that time, we had sent large exhibits to the Soviet Union. They had Russian-speaking guides and reached otherwise inaccessible (except for short-wave broadcasts) areas of the Soviet Union. Exhibits would open up for six weeks or so. They would show an aspect of American life, and then the guides would answer questions about everything American. It was a way to get our message out. We had major performing arts groups coming through: Alvin Ailey, the Chicago Symphony, etc. They would play to packed houses; All of these activities gave the lie to the Soviet caricature of American society that was constantly portrayed in the Soviet media.

In 1981 those activities were not possible, because they required Soviet cooperation to book those groups into halls, etc. So what we tried to do was continue to get our message out, but use other means. The ambassador at that time, Ambassador Hartman, made Spaso House, the ambassador’s residence, available as an ersatz cultural center. And we would do events there, nonstop. The ambassador just opened his residence completely. There was a special fund, private donations maintained by the State Department that was used to defray some of the costs. Large groups and small groups performed at Spaso. We would have invitations sent out to the elite, the creative intelligentsia. Sometimes people with political clout would come too, although they generally tried to boycott those events at that particular time.

WARREN ZIMMERMAN

Deputy Chief of Mission

Moscow (1981-1984)

Warren Zimmerman was born and raised in Philadelphia, PA. He received a bachelor’s degree from Yale in 1956 and attended Kings College, Cambridge as a Fulbright Scholar. He served briefly in the U.S. Army before entering the Foreign Service in 1961. Ambassador Zimmerman’s career included positions in Caracas, Belgrade, Moscow, Paris, Madrid, Geneva, and Vienna. He was the ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989-1992. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 10, 1996.

Q: Did you feel that you were as sometimes embassies do having to fight fires on both your rear and your front? In other words you were dealing with the Soviets who were difficult, and then you had the new Reagan administration. The Reagan administration changed over the years as most do, became more subtle in how it approached problems, but you had the brand new Reagan
administration, the NSC, the White House particularly. Did you feel they were unhelpful, or was it a problem?

ZIMMERMANN: Well the NSC was absolutely terrible in the sense that it took a bad relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union, two countries which after all were capable of destroying each other, took this bad relationship and made it worse on purpose. Richard Pipes for example, who was the Soviet expert, a fine historian of Russian history from Harvard, he would take drafts of letters from Reagan to Brezhnev and sharpen them so as to put in insults, the kind of language that the Soviets would immediately take to be insulting. Something that no head of state should ever do. Of course that would infuriate the Soviets and we would end up with a kind of a non existent relationship. The State Department was not like that. You had people in the State Department who were pragmatists. Larry Eagleburger who at that point was undersecretary for political affairs, and was Hartman’s major interlocutor, understood the need to keep a relationship going, and most of all George Shultz. When he became Secretary of State, he had a clear view that we had to maintain a relationship with the Soviet Union. He worked very hard on Reagan using whatever tools he had to move Reagan toward a more cooperative relationship with Moscow. Shultz worked with Mike Deaver who was a public relations guy but was very close to Mrs. Reagan who had doubts about the tough policy because she did not want her husband to go down in history as the man who messed up relations with the Soviet Union. So, she was a factor for a better relationship. Deaver fed that, and Shultz in the State Department was working in that direction. Finally, we got by 1983 to a situation where we were able to make a number of small agreements with the Soviets. They didn’t amount to much individually. Collectively they didn’t amount to much either but at least there were elements of cooperation that were going on. Things were beginning to pick up. Then you got the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner sometime in the spring or summer of 1983, and that knocked everything back.

Q: What was the role of Dobrynin who had been for so many years the Soviet ambassador in the United States? I mean in the old days he and Kissinger bypassed everybody it seemed. Was he a spent factor by this time?

ZIMMERMANN: No, I don’t think he was a spent factor, but I think he was a very negative one. In the embassy we did not share the view that Dobrynin was the liberal or in the reforming wing of the Soviet communist party, that he was a reliable interlocutor. Our sense of Dobrynin was that he was an opportunist, he would tell his bosses what they wanted to hear. He would make things up occasionally to put himself in a better light. WE had one piece of actual evidence of this because Hartman had a meeting with Gromyko, and the meeting had to do with a subject, I don’t remember what it was, on which there had been a meeting in Washington the day before between Gromyko and Secretary Shultz. Between Dobrynin and Secretary Shultz. We had our reporting cable, almost a verbatim cable from that meeting, and Gromyko had his. There was nothing in common with the cables. It was clear that Dobrynin who rarely took a note taker anyway into meetings just distorted what had gone on, where we had a pretty near verbatim account. I don’t know whether Gromyko felt that this was helpful to him or not.

Q: It’s scary really.

ZIMMERMANN: It’s scary. There was one other example from Dobrynin which comes from 1985. This was a meeting which I did not attend but it was during the first Reagan-Gorbachev
summit in Geneva. Hartman was there and told me the story that Gorbachev led off with a totally erroneous misperceived view of the United States, that it was run by the Jews and the industrial capitalists and so forth. He turned to Dobrynin and Dobrynin reinforced that view. Dobrynin had lived in the United States for nearly two decades, for over a decade, over two decades, and knew the United States very well. He knew that was wrong, but he was not prepared to move Gorbachev away from this very erroneous view, even gently. In fact, he reinforced it; he stoked it. Now I will say I have read Dobrynin’s memoirs carefully. I use them in my teaching. I think it is a very important book. It rings true mostly in the various things he describes, so the reflective Dobrynin is maybe a bit better than the operational Dobrynin, but the operational Dobrynin had no fans in the American embassy. There is another thing I should say out of fairness. We resented the fact that Dobrynin had terrific access in Washington whereas our Ambassador had very little access in Moscow.

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

Ambassador

USSR (1981-1984)

Ambassador Arthur Hartman was born in New York, New York in 1926. He received a bachelor’s degree from Harvard University. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in France, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom (England), and an ambassadorship to the Soviet Union. This interview was conducted by Bill Miller on May 31, 1989.

Q: How do you think it (the new Soviet policy) should be followed, for our government, for the informed public? What are the best ways to follow Soviet policies?

HARTMAN: I think the best ways are to engage and to have as much going on as possible, to get in touch with as many people as possible, in as many areas as possible. The last thing I would do would be to make U.S. policy on the basis that we want to help him in some way. I think that one thing that the experience of the last forty years has taught me is that Americans are not very good at having a good enough analysis of another countries situation to know when a policy decision that they take is going to help somebody else. Think of U.S. interests and just play it straight, if it has a beneficial influence then so be it, but don’t try to predict what your policies are going to do to be helpful to somebody else. We just don’t know enough to do that. With Gorbachev particularly I just don’t know him, I disagree strongly with the kind of Steve Colin analysis that we already know the direction he wants to go in and we should be helping him. I don’t think we know the direction he wants to go in yet, my own view is that it is a pretty conservative direction; it wants to make the Marxist-Leninist system work and I have no idea why the United States should help that process, since it doesn’t believe that it is going to work anyway.

GEOFFREY W. CHAPMAN

Political Officer

Moscow (1982-1985)
Geoffrey Chapman was born in England and raised in England and Boston. He became a naturalized American citizen in 1957 and attended Bowdoin College and Princeton. He later entered the Foreign Service in 1971 and served in Germany, the USSR, and England. He also held several positions within the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: And then you went where? To Moscow?

CHAPMAN: To Moscow, yes.

Q: How would you describe the state of our relations with the Soviets the summer of ’82 when you got there?

CHAPMAN: Relations were not as bad as they became a little later on. We were engaged with the Soviet bilaterally, and various arms control negotiations were in progress. Still, there was obviously a lot of tension. Afghanistan was still a major sticking point so it was not a very easy relationship. It was a difficult time for an American diplomat working in Moscow. We were dealing a closed society, and our ability to make professional contacts and to produce useful information were necessarily limited. During my first year in Moscow I served as the publications procurement officer, which was a great job in many ways because it got me to travel throughout the Soviet Union. There were of course extensive travel restrictions imposed by the Soviets, but we could travel to fairly large areas of the Russian Republic and Ukraine and to the capitals of the other constituent republics of the Soviet Union. In my three years in Moscow I traveled to all 15 republics at least once -- in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltics -- as well as fairly extensively in Russia itself. Basically the job involved working for the agency in Langley trying to come up with all kinds of publications that are not normally available outside of the Soviet Union that might give them a better picture on what’s going on there.

Q: Well was there any thought at the time among you or your colleagues about the ability of this empire to hold together? I mean, were we seeing this as, you know, stretching on into the far future?

CHAPMAN: I think that really nobody foresaw in 1985 that within five or six years the Soviet Union would be gone. I think we saw it mellowing, modifying itself, perhaps introducing elements of a free market economy. I don’t think we foresaw any sort of change in political structure, any change in the role of or dominance of the communist party. And I don’t think we foresaw any breakup of the country.

Q: What about with the Reagan administration there and Ronald Reagan had come in from the right wing of the Republican party and was making remarks, you know, sort of off the campaign trail and all, you know, about confrontation with the Soviet Union, was this a difficult period to sort of explain to Soviet types or among ourselves at the embassy that, you know, I mean, did we feel we were on an overly confrontational course with the Soviet Union or what?

CHAPMAN: Well the phrase that really raised Soviet hackles was the term evil empire. To my recollection Reagan had uttered the phrase before I got to the Soviet Union so I wasn’t in a position to gauge the immediate impact of it. Certainly amongst Soviet officialdom and the
contacts we had there was strong opposition to what was seen as an effort by the Reagan administration simply to build up American military might and to ignore any dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing mutual threats and tensions. When I was out in the provinces people would ask me about this or that Reagan administration policy and challenge me to justify it. But it was not unusual to come across people who had a certain admiration for the United States. There was a dichotomy in many ordinary Soviets’ minds between the American people and the American government: an admiration of and respect for Americans, for our way of life, for our entertainment industry, for the resilience and output of our economy, but a lack of understanding of – indeed outright opposition to -- what the Reagan administration was up to. Relations were by no means smooth during my first year in Moscow, but they turned considerably worse after the shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in September 1983.

The shootdown brought about a real freeze that didn’t start to thaw until March of 1985 when we resumed arms control negotiations in Geneva. But during those eighteen months contacts were even more difficult than they had been before, and it was very difficult to get any sense of what was going on behind the scenes in the society and the party and the government. Although preparations for the resumption of arms control negotiations were in progress during Chernenko’s watch, the coming of Gorbachev brought a sense of greater hope for U.S.-Soviet relations. There was a feeling that things were getting back onto a more even keel. But still I heard plenty of criticism of Reagan administration policies during the spring of 1985 -- the military build-up, the strategic defense initiative, the deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe where they could reach Soviet soil.

RICHARD T. MCCORMACK

Assistant Secretary for Economics and Business Affairs/Under Secretary

Washington, DC (1982-1985)

After attending Georgetown University, Mr. Richard T. McCormack assumed a multitude of administrative roles for the Nixon Administration in addition to serving under Governor William Scranton of Pennsylvania and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Mr. McCormack’s career also included positions as the US Ambassador to the Organization of American States as well as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Ambassador McCormack was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: Let’s talk about trade with the Soviet Union or their satellites. Let’s say you want to sell a powerful computer. Some in Congress are all for it; the Pentagon is all against it, and the State Department ends up in the middle trying to figure out what to do. Did you find yourself running into that?

McCORMACK: Yes, occasionally. You just have to try to make the decisions based on the criteria I mentioned before. What is in the broad interest of the United States? Is this, in fact, a piece of technology that is unique and militarily relevant? Is it something that you can buy off the shelf somewhere else? Are you just gratuitously denying an American company the opportunity to export something that can and will be bought from somebody else? Is COCOM still a meaningful operation and if not how can we make it meaningful? (We, in fact,
strengthened COCOM in the course of the time I was there, and it contributed to the growing strains on the Soviet economy.)

Q: Were you there during the Toshiba business, the super quiet submarine propellers sold to Russia?

McCORMACK: Yes. Very often Japanese business interests were trying to make a buck, just like Austrian, Swiss, German, French and everybody else. If they thought they could sneak a piece of valuable technology through the system without getting picked up by the COCOM enforcers, sometimes they would do that. Sometimes one had to deal with violators in a firm way. There was one time before I came into office, during the Carter administration, where one particular company abroad wanted to sell a highly advanced submersible illegally to the Soviet Union. There was difficulty in stopping the sale in time. A covert operation was therefore mounted to puncture and weaken the vehicle on the shipping dock so that when it was eventually delivered and used, it was only used once. That was all Cold War stuff.

Q: How was our relationship with the growing European Union during this time? In many ways, talking about how we developed Japan after the war, the European Union was considered a bright star of our policy. But were we beginning to get worried about this?

McCORMACK: No. We had our innumerable little commercial competitions such as the one between Airbus and Boeing. We didn’t like the fact that they were subsidizing Airbus, and they didn’t like the fact that our defense contracts, they thought, were subsidizing Boeing. So we hacked away at each other a bit on those issues. The issue that caused the main strain with the Europeans was an issue that I was not involved with: the deployment of nuclear armed missiles, Pershing missiles and things like that, to counter the growing Soviet nuclear buildup aimed at neutralizing Western Europe.

ROBERT E. MCCARTHY
Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Leningrad (1983-1984)

Mr. McCarthy was born in Canada and raised in New York City. He was educated at Fordham University, City College of New York and American University. After service in the US Army and studies in Paris, he joined the Foreign Service in 1973. His assignment in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs was the beginning of a career dealing primarily with Public and Cultural Affairs with USIA. His overseas assignments as Public Affairs and/or Cultural Affairs Officer were in Belgrade, Moscow (twice), Montenegro, Leningrad and Budapest. His Washington assignments also concerned USIA programs. Mr. McCarthy served as Diplomat in Residence at Georgetown University 1995-1996. Mr. McCarthy was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2003.

Q: At the time... this was a time of sort of almost the last gasp of the Soviet Union. Correct me if I’m wrong, but as I see it, the last gasp of the Soviet Union trying to make a major push toward the West with these intermediate-range rockets and all, trying to split essentially Europe off from
the United States. In the Soviet Union, was there concern that this thing might get out of hand, or was this just another part of the old game that had been played for years?

McCARTHY: You mean concern on the part of the...

Q: Yourselves, and also was this affecting, were you reading this into the Soviet populace?

McCARTHY: They certainly were more worried. The people who you associated with before were worried about conflict. Yes. So it did have an impact. And then every American visitor got a dose of this to bring back... People were genuinely nervous. This was a time of last gasps. You know, Brezhnev died, and the city closed down. There were lines of people going through the street. An army division was mobilized. And then you had Andropov for a while, and he died, and then you had Chernenko. I left before he died, but he was already, as you said in the “last gasp” phase. Last gasp is an appropriate term, since he had emphysema and he could hardly breathe when he speaking in public.

Q: I think it was Ronald Reagan who made the remark saying, “Why don’t you have better contact with the Soviets?” “Well, they keep dying on us.” [laughter]

McCARTHY: [laughter] The time of funerals.

Q: When Brezhnev went, was there concern? He’d been around a long time.

McCARTHY: It wasn’t like the accounts you read of Stalin’s death - despair, panic. When Brezhnev died, there were long lines of people to go into that trade union hall and observe the body lying in state. It was a major production. I was there for quite some time, since there was press coverage and we were working with the American press. There was also extensive television coverage…speeches…the actual burial.. But I don’t recall any real concern.

Q: Well, you spent, what, three years in the Soviet Union?

McCARTHY: Right.

NADIA TONGOUR
Soviet Desk Officer

Washington, DC (1983-1985)

Nadia Tongour was born in Turkey and raised in South Carolina. She was educated at William and Mary and Stanford Universities and taught at several colleges before joining the Foreign Service in 1980. Primarily a Political Officer, her Washington assignments were in the fields of Soviet and Soviet bloc Affairs as well as Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Her foreign assignments include Brazil, Barbados and St. George’s Grenada, where she was Principal Officer. Ms. Tongour was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: What was the situation in the Soviet Union? I mean, how would you describe relations at that time?
TONGOUR: Relations were cool (even icy at times) and references such as the "Evil Empire" didn't help. At the same time, it was a period of flux, even opportunity, wherein Foreign Service Officer, such as our Office Director Tom Simons and the staff as a whole, looked for ways to melt the ice, if you will. This set the stage for the "that" that would occur a few years late, with Reagan-Gorbachev.

Q: But Gorbachev- we were still going through the Andropov, Chernenko; I mean, leaders were dying.

TONGOUR: That is right. What I mean by setting the stage is that there were people in the U.G. Government focusing on how and when to get beyond the horrible time when I said set the stage, there were people already thinking, in the U.S. Government, about how and when and how to get beyond the seemingly horrible relations of the day. And of course, arms control issues that were very much uppermost in the minds of our leadership, as I am sure they were Soviet priorities as well. Other hot button issues included the broad range of human rights and dissident concerns, including a variety of non-religious dissident cases, which I personally did not handle.

Q: Did you get any feel for the White House, the National Security Council dealing with this? I mean, was there- was this still the period where sort of President Reagan and his group, he came out of the pretty far right of the Republican Party and obviously extremely suspicious of the Soviet Union; was that still prevailing or were things beginning to change? Did you get any feel for this?

TONGOUR: I definitely got the feeling that they were still very, very conservative. But at the same time, folks on the Soviet Desk and elsewhere in the bureaucracy were furiously writing all sorts of briefing papers and memos aimed at chipping away at the ice and looking for ways to open up the dialog and the minds of those in charge.

Q: Well, when you are dealing with religion, did Islam, ______________ of the Central Asian area and all, did that play any role in what you were thinking at the time or was it pretty much-

TONGOUR: To start with, there were several of us working on various aspects of the dissidents issue. In general, we gave little thought at that point to questions related to Islam. Later when I returned for a second tour on the Soviet Desk, this was a much more significant variable. But that was later, and while during this period there was an officer in our section that focused more on regional minorities, I concentrated more on the Pentecostals and other minority religious sects out in Siberia and the Far East. .

Q: Okay. What were some of the things you were seeing being done during this period?

TONGOUR: Well, this was the start of the budding Reagan/Gorbachev relationship to be sure, but there were many factors that led to this, including some negative developments, such as the mistreatment of the American journalist Danilov in Moscow and continuing problems related to the whole arms race. But on the personal front, from the outset we had to figure out exactly what my role in the Front Office was to be. The Assistant Secretary herself was brand new, and initially it was far from clear what I would be doing. Over time, I became essentially a clearinghouse for papers that were passed to the Staff Assistants and intended for her -- the doorkeeper of sorts, but there was also a secretary to do that. Some parts of my work were substantive but much of it was in that gray zone, and I lacked a clearly defined portfolio of my
own. I attended many meetings and got to hear the views of both the Assistant Secretary and her interlocutors and in turn acquire a better grasp of our own policies. But, I have to admit, I had lots of questions regarding whether I had a real role or was simply moving papers around. In other words, did I have any significant contribution to make? Not really, but then again, that is the way a Special or Executive Assistant is supposed to function.

Q: But you are the fly on the wall.

TONGOUR: The fly on the wall that hears and learns a lot. And in that period our relationship with the Soviet Union shifted from being one might say fairly dark to considerably lighter. But from my perspective one of the most interesting aspects of the job related to travel because when the Assistant Secretary traveled, I traveled as well. When Secretary Shultz traveled to Europe, so did Ridgway, and therefore, so did I. And when it came time for the G-8, which happened to be in Tokyo that year, Shultz traveled to Japan, and she went along, as did I. There were definitely some fantastic trips and the opportunity to witness the dynamics among the key players. As you well know, George Shultz was very well respected by members of the Foreign Service for many reasons, not the least of which was his manner of dealing with subordinates, especially when compared to some of his predecessors and successors. Several examples come to mind. While I was still on the Soviet Desk, Office Director Tom Simons invited him to our Christmas party, an event that was actually renown in the building for having caviar. Apparently, none of the working level offices had up to that point ever invited him to such a party; yet he came. Flying on the Secretary's plane was also interesting. On each flight he would make a point of walking down the aisle and talking to everyone at least briefly. There was someone on his staff who seemed to keep track of the birthdays of members of the traveling party and advise him accordingly so that he could acknowledge the person. It happened to me once during a trip to Athens. We were all at some reception and at some point he came over to me and said "I understand you have a big day today." These little touches were endearing and much appreciated particularly in a bureaucratic environment where such gestures tend to be infrequent.

Q: Did you pick up on the part of Ridgeway or others or even yourself, you know, a bit of nervousness about Ronald Reagan, that he might get overly enthusiastic about Gorbachev? You know, I mean, you are sort of the handlers and your principle might get too far off the reservation.

TONGOUR: Well, you have to understand that no one wanted to be mistaken for a Pollyanna or jeopardize U.S. interests. But relations had been bad for so long that we were caught up in the hope for real improvements. Things evolve; circumstances and attitudes change but certainly at that moment we hoped for the best. Of course, there was the concern that if we were overly optimistic or enthusiastic, at the first setback, when something went wrong, there might be a tendency for the pendulum to swing to the other extreme. There was that concern; yet, overall, we were cautiously optimistic.

Q: Was RPM a brake on this?

TONGOUR: Probably. You know, it is really hard after all these years to recall exactly who was for what and when let's say RPM was more focused on the nuts and bolts, the military and nuclear hardware available and what we did or did not need, as were other government agencies. Certainly, they concentrated more on weaponry and broader political-military issues. That said, I
don't want to make it sound as though SOV or any other office consisted of misguided optimists, not at all -- simply that their orientations were a bit different.

PARKER W. BORG
Deputy, Office of Counter Terrorism

*Ambassador Borg was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Dartmouth College and Cornell University. In 1965, after a tour with the Peace Corps in the Philippines, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. During his career he served in Vietnam and Zaire, and in the State Department in senior positions concerning Vietnam, West Africa and Counter Terrorism. He served as US Ambassador to Mali (1981-1984) and to Iceland from 1993 to 1996. Ambassador Borg was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.*

Q: Today is the seventh of October 2002. Parker, in 1985 you were going out to combat terrorism. What was the job?

BORG: It was 1984, it was the summer of 1984, and Bob Oakley had asked me to come back and work with him as his deputy in the Office of Counterterrorism. I knew little about the job. I arrived in August before he arrived. The office was then headed by Ambassador Robert Sayre, and I worked with him for the first couple of weeks before Bob Oakley arrived, but I do recall that the very first weekend that I got there, something like August 24th, there was a hijacking, and that would be the pattern of the way things would be for the duration of the next two years that I worked in that office. There seemed to be hijackings or terrorist incidents almost continuously.

Q: When you say a hijacking, did you gear up if it was a hijacking of a Russian, or at this time a Soviet, plane by Chechynan people? Or was this only ones that concerned us?

BORG: We were concerned about hijackings especially if they were American aircraft or, secondarily, if there were Americans aboard the aircraft and, in a third position, if they were the aircraft of a friendly government where we might have some kind of other relationship.

Q: These things change. In this ’84 to ’86 period, what constituted in our definition ‘terrorism’?

BORG: Well, the number of incidents increased dramatically about 1983-84, and the predominant view when we came into the office was that there was a very close Russian connection behind most terrorism around the world. Clair Sterling had written a book which tied the Russians to the assassination of the Pope...

Q: The attempted assassination.

BORG: ...excuse me, the attempted assassination - and pointed out that most of the Palestinian groups had had training that was supported by countries that were supported by the Soviet Union, that East Germany provided haven for terrorist groups and that, if you looked carefully at
every single terrorist group, you could find a Russian connection. I guess, in addition, there were all of the leftist guerilla groups in Europe, the Red Army faction...

_Q: Bader Meinhof._

BORG: ...Bader Meinhof gang. All of them, Italy, France, Belgium, Japan, they all had leftist terrorist groups. Bob in particular felt that this was not correct, that the correct way to look at terrorism was that there were individual causes in each one of the countries that had led people to become terrorists and that in the Middle East it was very dangerous to try and tie the Soviet Union to all the different terrorist-related activities, and that in Western Europe there may have been leftist groups but there was no clear evidence that the Soviet Union was in fact supporting what they were doing, that they seemed often to be independent operators who were pursuing their own leftist agenda.

_Q: Now, in a way, given the time period, this would have been rather unpopular in the power structure._

BORG: We suspected that it would be but, in fact, by declining to emphasize a Russian connection and focusing on the local groups that were behind the different incidents and seeking programs to combat the terrorist problem individually within each country, we essentially went beyond the simplistic notion that there was a Soviet connection. There was another issue that was going on at the same time and that was, because of the considered threat to Americans, there was a commission that had been set up in mid-1984 that became known as the Inman Commission that looked at diplomatic security outside the United States and what do we need to do to beef up the protection of American diplomats overseas. This quickly got confused with the whole question of counterterrorism, and we had to fight a bureaucratic battle to stay separate from the new diplomatic security office. We argued that diplomatic security was essential to protect American embassies and American government personnel overseas but that was not our issue. Our issue was the broad question of terrorism as a policy and the way it impacted on our foreign relations and the way it affected American citizens in general, not just the American official community. It took us a while to convince people that this was a separate issue, but eventually we were able to keep ourselves separate from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We were originally, for the first year or so, operating under the Deputy Under Secretary for Management - I guess he was called the Deputy Under Secretary for Management at the time. After about a year the office was changed from being MCT to being SCT. We became an adjunct to the Secretary’s office.

_Q: Diplomatic security, was this the normal bureaucratic tug-and-pull of trying to expand its horizons, do you think, or was it just a misperception?_

BORG: The Inman Commission created a vast new bureaucracy which greatly expanded what the activities of what had previously had a different name - it wasn’t Diplomatic Security - and there was a great augmentation of personnel brought into the organization. Diplomatic security officers were assigned to posts throughout the world, standards were created for what embassies needed to be like, and there was a tremendous emphasis on protecting the American diplomatic presence outside the United States. It was much more a question for us of maintaining our identity and maintaining the policy issue, that this was not a part of protecting American diplomatic personnel. That was the purpose, that was their program and they should do it. We
did not feel that the Diplomatic Security people should be the ones dealing with foreign governments when it came to general terrorist issues, that this was a clear and separate issue which would have gotten lost in diplomatic security.

Q: In a way, I can see you had two customers, clients, or people you went after. One would be the intelligence people within the United States, the CIA, the FBI, INR and the military, to feed you information, but the other one would be foreign governments, particularly the police powers or their investigative powers. Let’s talk about the overseas operation first. What were you doing?

BORG: Overseas we were, for the first year or so, responding to terrorist incidents as they occurred and participating on almost a weekly basis in task forces back in Washington where we were attempting to resolve these crises. There were the individual crises, individual terrorist incidents, the various hijackings that took place; and the second type of crisis was the continuing presence of hostages in Lebanon, and an organization known as Hezbollah kept taking Americans in Beirut and holding them hostage. This was an issue that was there when we started in the office and was there when I left the office. It was a continuing high-profile and very difficult issue that we spent an awful lot of time on. This goes back to your original question of how were embassies organized. I’m trying to think if we had a counterterrorism coordinator. I don’t think so, because if there was an incident, then the ambassador and the DCM and everybody became involved, and when there wasn’t an incident, we were focused somewhere else. So it wasn’t the sort of thing where there was a continuing problem. The bureaucratics in Washington were far more complicated. We first had to sort out our relationship with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and between ourselves and the different regional bureaus as to who took the lead when something occurred outside the United States. The third level was the relationship with the CIA and military. I think that it came to a draw within the Department, because we were quite successful at dealing with the CIA and the military and the FBI in bringing everything under a common umbrella over the course of the time that we were working in the office. Once it was established that we were separate from DS, we went to Ambassador Spiers’ daily meetings where we talked about security, but there was rarely a question again of what was our issue and what was their issue. Essentially that was resolved. When there was a hijacking or something of that nature and a task force was established, there was always the issue of were we in charge of it or was the regional bureau going to be in charge. The way it worked out, for the most part, was that, since the Middle Eastern Bureau had so much experience and so many people who had worked these issues, we had sort of a co-equal relationship with them when there was an incident, but when it was one of the other regions in the Department, we had the expertise and the region didn’t, so they deferred to us.

JANE MILLER FLOYD

General Services Officer

Leningrad (1985-1987)

On-site Inspection Agency


Jane Miller Floyd was born in Washington in 1954. She received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington. She joined the Foreign Service in
Mrs. Floyd was interviewed on December 6, 2004 by Charles S. Kennedy

Q: You were in Leningrad from 85 to 87. I think this might be a good place to stop. And I’ll put at the end where we’ll pick it up. We’ll talk about your time as a GSO in Leningrad. 85 to 87.

Q: Today is the 16th of December 2004. You were in Leningrad 85 to 87. What was the status of American relations with the Soviets?

FLOYD: As with any good relationship, it had its ups and downs. The most notable series of events was the cascading expulsion of diplomatic employees. It began with U.S. objection to the size of the Soviet, Ukrainian and Belarusian missions to the UN. We asked them to reduce the size. They did not. Therefore the State Department declared a number of them PNG and asked them to leave the United States.

In retaliation for that, the Soviets designated a smaller number of American diplomats in the former Soviet Union as PNG and they left. Then we kicked a few more out from the UN. And in the interesting twist, the Soviets next action was the withdrawal all Soviet local employees. Because the Soviet government is who provided our FSNs, they were able in one fell swoop, in one sweet evening, to cause all of our FSNs to cease working for the consulate, and the embassy for that matter.

Q: Hadn’t some of this taken place anyway because of the Sergeant Lonetree business?

FLOYD: It is highly likely that that was mixed up in there someplace and certainly the mission in the Soviet Union had re-looked its security requirements. But what the Soviets did was took away drivers and cooks, and translators and ticket arrangers. They took everybody.

Q: How did we respond to that?

FLOYD: We initially had a remarkable group of people who pitched in and did an amazing number of things, including consul generals who shoveled snow from their own residence steps. But what we eventually did was went to an American contractor, PAE, Pacific Architects and Engineers, to provide us with support personnel. For years it had been clear that X Americans, one American, could do the work of four FSNs, or that sort of proportion. And that was somewhat the rate with which we were able to get the money to then hire cleared American contractors to do those jobs. It took several months – I would have to go back and check. I’m going to say six to eight months. – before the first PAE employee got to Leningrad.

EDWARD HURWITZ
Consul General
Leningrad (1986-1988)

Edward Hurwitz was born in New York in 1931. He received his bachelor’s degree from Cornell University in 1952. After serving in the US Army from 1953-1955 he entered the Foreign Service in 1956. During his career he had positions in Moscow, Seoul, Washington D.C., Afghanistan, Leningrad, and an
Ambassadorship to Kyrgyzstan. Ambassador Hurwitz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in August 1996.

Q: Did you feel there was a lack of will on the part of the authorities for sitting on these people?

HURWITZ: No, no. It was clear that the Soviets had made a conscious decision to let this go forward. And as Gorbachev sort of defined what he was doing, it became clear that this was very conscious, and I think on his part quite calculated. He wanted to instill life into the system and he realized you can’t do this by fear from above. You have to bubble up from the bottom. I believe he realized you are not going to get to where you want to go without having people be creative. Without having people bring to the public’s attention issues that have to be solved. Basically the Party is not interested in solving a lot of issues, they want to let things go as they are. People are watching their own goodies, their own perks, and don’t want to rock the boat. This means you are just going to fall further and further backward. He realized you have to let these problems come to the fore before you can deal with them. This process continued.

Q: Were you beginning to see an either disquiet or concern among the Soviet intellectuals by the growth of easier communications within the West, with word processing, faxes, etc.? It was rapidly changing how people do things in the Western world.

HURWITZ: It wasn’t specifically put on those terms, but there was a growing realization that they were falling further and further behind. Just before I went out I read a report done by a group of academics from the Academy of Sciences, social scientists, and they were very much aware of how much the Soviets were falling behind in terms of ideas. And this, of course, is one of the things that helped bring everything down. The Soviets realized that to go forward you had to plug into the West, you couldn’t keep computers out. People would get them one way or another. The trend was not to keep things tamped down like they had for decades, but if they wanted to move forward they would just have to open up. They had no choice. The late-’80s were the beginning of this.

Q: During this time, 1986-88, which was towards the end of the Reagan administration, had you sensed a change in the administration’s attitude towards the Soviet Union at all?

HURWITZ: I think Reagan sort of moved from evil empire to a fairly businesslike approach to the Soviets. I think he started, and certainly Bush carried out, a policy which I thought was very sound. That is not to jump on the Soviets at every turn, let Gorbachev develop in the way he wants to, because basically that is in our interest. As you recall, Bush took a lot of heat later that Gorbachev hadn’t supported the break up of the Soviet Union fast enough. Leaping into something like that and saying, “Hurrah, go to it!” would have been dangerous I think. It could have created some concerns within the Soviet Union that what was happening was only playing into the hands of the West.

GREG THIELMANN

Russian Language Training, FSI

Political/Military Affairs Officer

Moscow (1988-1990)

Mr. Thielmann was born and raised in Iowa and was educated at Grinnell College and Princeton University. A specialist in Political-Military Affairs, he held a number of positions dealing with such matters as Strategic Proliferation, Arms Control and Missile Programs. He also served abroad at several posts in the capacity of Political Officer and Consular Officer. His last position was Chief, Office of Analysis for Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Mr. Thielmann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004

Q: Well, what was the, in ’88 when you got there, what was the sort of Soviet-American situation?

THIELMANN: It was a fascinating time to be there because in general our relations were improving with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was in charge. He was sort of solidifying his power base at the time, much less tentative than when he first took over in nineteen, as head of the Communist Party in 1985. It was, in 1988 the CIA was still fighting a rearguard action to say that Gorbachev was just like all the others. There was nothing new here. He was just a little bit smarter. Our evidence on the ground from Moscow I think showed a different picture that there were a lot of very encouraging and interesting things going on in the Soviet Union. I was right in the middle of one of the most promising changes in Soviet arms control policy.

Q: You’re job, what was your job?

THIELMANN: My job, I was the political section’s political military affairs officer. So interestingly that portfolio for a number of years before had been handled by one person. It was handled by one person when I was there. Although during the time when I was there, there was also a new office opening up to run the new arms control implementation functions of having inspectors coming into the Soviet Union and everything. So they had several people on that staff, but it was still one person to engage the Soviets on arms control matters to report on what Soviet thinking was both official thinking and in the institutes that wrote on policy and from which some of the ideas derived. It was an overwhelmingly heavy burden. I mean, early on when I arrived there I said we’ve got to have at least two officers here to take advantage of the new opportunities that were opening up. Because it was only shortly before I arrived that if the embassy political officer wanted to make a demarche on his counterpart on the Soviet foreign ministry, you would write a letter, say what you wanted to talk about, send it over and then wait for days or weeks for a response. There were all kinds of other meetings that you would arrange with similar difficulty or you couldn’t arrange them at all. But during that two years that I was there, everything opened up. I mean, when I was there, it was much like in the arms control it was much like serving in a western European embassy. I would call up the phone, ask to talk with my Soviet foreign ministry counterpart, request a meeting, often get it the same day, walk down the street, go into the office and conduct business.

Q: I mean there’s a story that I’ve heard from several sources at some of these arms control meetings between the Soviets and the United States that we would say well, we understand that
you have so many war heads and you have this and that. The Soviet military would sort of get white and basically go over and say, “look, our people, these civilians over here, aren’t cleared to have this information” even though we had gotten it. They weren’t passing it on. So my question is how well plugged into the Soviet military affairs were your counterparts in the foreign ministry?

THIELMANN: This evolved over time. It’s certainly true that it was frustrating from the point of view of a military specialist at the State Department because we knew so much more about both our own military force posture and the Soviet military force posture than our Soviet diplomatic counterparts did. So in a lot of ways it was the military that was the more interesting to talk to about these issues. Yet there is a big cultural divide there. The Soviet military did not feel comfortable talking to American diplomats for the most part. They felt much more comfortable talking to their U.S. military counterparts. So we were going through a period of time when one could actually talk with a relative degree of quality from a same general vantage point talking to one of the members of the institutes like Alexei or Bartov, one of the defense specialists.

Q: What role did the military attachés play? Were you both working on the same thing or how did that work?

THIELMANN: It actually worked very well in Embassy Moscow. I served enough that I’ve seen that defense attachés sometimes don’t work very well with their political section counterparts. The embassy in Moscow at least during my two year window seemed to get some of the most impressive officers. There were two generals who were head of the defense unit in Moscow when I was there, first General Rock and then General Gavin, very different kind of individuals with different kinds of strengths but both very impressive representatives of the military who had good contacts, who were respected by their Soviet counterparts and who would have access to a different kind of things than we would have access to. So once we gained mutual respect, I thought it was a very smooth working relationship in which we both sort of specialized even though the overall subject matter was very similar. We both specialized in making our own individual contributions, and I think I feel pretty good about reporting coming out of Embassy Moscow on the Defense side and the State Department side during that period.

Q: My impression of that period is “trust but verify,” Things were really changing in attitude. But the whole idea is okay, but we’ll go out there and take a look on the ground. I think this would be very difficult for Soviet officials to adjust to.

THIELMANN: Very difficult. It was a completely different way of life for them. I mean, they were much more indoctrinated with secrecy and secrecy from their own society. I mean the spending amounts, none of those things were anyone’s business except the Soviet military. That meant that when later on, when the Duma was introduced, it was an enormous hurdle to get over the idea that members of Congress should know something about what the Soviet military wanted to do or actually fund it. That was really revolutionary.

Q: Well, when you arrived there in 1988, was there any feeling about what would happen in the end of 1989? I mean, the Berlin Wall going and essentially the Soviet bloc falling apart. Was anybody saying oh boy, they’re on the brink? What were you getting?
THIELMANN: I think Ambassador Matlock was probably a better authority on this because of his senior position and the kind of correspondence he would have with the top level of the State Department and his being privy to meetings with high level Soviet figures. Not all of that stuff was transparent to us at the time as I’ve seen from reading some of the things Matlock has written since. I would have to say in general that we did not have a sense of imminent collapse. We had a sense that very important, very significant changes were taking place and that there was some tectonic shifts going on, and I was amazed at the time. I remember being amazed contemporaneously at the kind of things that Shevardnadze would say as Soviet foreign minister. I mean he would say things, he would kind of ridicule the notion, which was really the official Soviet propaganda line, that the NATO countries were looking for opportunities to invade the Soviet Union. I mean, he would more or less say, “Why would they want to do that? There’s nothing we have here for them.” He would talk fairly openly about the disaster represented by Afghanistan and the deployment of SS-20 missiles as being things which showed the bankruptcy of the Soviet decision making process. Well, this was incredibly sharp and open criticism. This would be quite sharp for a democratic society let alone the kind of the Soviet society represented. So all that was actually going on at the time, and I think a lot of us were saying that because of all that there were more real opportunities here for making arrangements with and dealing differently with the Soviet Union then we had before. I don’t think very many people envisioned the speed with which this would happen and what happened in Eastern Europe in the couple months leading up to the fall of the wall. One can certainly point to memos and other things being done only months before the fall of the wall to document that feeling that this really did come out of the blue.

Q: Was there a feeling of comfort with President Reagan at the end of his time and a feeling that here is a man who’d come out of the quite far right in the American political spectrum dealing with the Soviet Union. I’m talking about among you officers there and all that. How did you feel about all this?

THIELMANN: Well, just speaking personally, I mean I was disconcerted from early on at how little interest Reagan had in the details of defense and foreign policy. So I saw him as representing a profound sort of bottomless pit of ignorance which left me feeling very insecure. The thing that made me feel much more calm about Reagan—-and I think this extended to many of my colleagues—-was that, once he did develop a personal relationship with Gorbachev, after his own demonization of the Soviets as simply being part of an evil empire and as some sort of broodish automatons as part of this Soviet monolith or whatever, Reagan himself developed a different mental image of his negotiating partners. That made a big difference because one got the feeling that now this Administration at the highest level actually wanted to establish a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, whereas before it seemed like the administration wanted only to intimidate and vanquish this country. So I think the IMF agreement, the signing of that agreement, and the personal relationship that Reagan and Gorbachev developed made everyone feel a little safer and a little more hopeful about the future directions of policy.

Q: Well, now the foreign ministry of any country usually consists of more sophisticated people particularly in a totalitarian, closed society like the Soviets because they’ve had to deal with the outside. Did you find sort of a relaxation and kind of a sense of fun and enjoyment of doing the job there among your equivalents in the Foreign Ministry?
THIELMANN: I really did. That was one of the most pleasant and satisfying parts of the job. Obviously in the back of my mind was the knowledge about the great divide between the Soviet Union and America. The ideological hostility, the sort of the zero sum notion about U.S.-Soviet relations and all of that very heavy Cold War baggage was in the back of my mind. So it was a special thrill when you thought that you were actually connecting with a Soviet diplomat and that together you were actually advancing the relationship in a way that would benefit both countries and third parties. That was really among the most satisfying parts of my career. I had the good fortune to be dealing with a portfolio that allowed me to engage with some of the most Americanized of all the Soviet diplomats, people who had been engaged with the United States and arms control negotiations previously, some of whom who had served in the United States. Those who had both a good command of English but also -- I wouldn't want to overstate this -- a more western way of thinking than some of the other diplomats. So I actually went through that time with close contacts with, well, people like Pavel Polischenko the bald-headed face you would see as Gorbachev’s interpreter everywhere he went.

Q: How did the events of 1989, because this was a cumulative thing, hit you from the vantage point of Moscow. I mean, was this sort of something, you understood that things were happening. I mean this was going to be a year that would shape the world more or less. Were you understanding the significance of it all?

THIELMANN: I think -- and again my specific beat was arms control and not sort of what was going on in Eastern Europe -- but I think as those unusual events occurred in Czechoslovakia and Germany, we certainly took note and this is very significant. But even then one or two months beforehand the breaching of the Berlin Wall came as a real shock. I remember getting a call from my wife in my office in our splendid isolation. Of course we didn’t have CNN. Only the Soviet foreign ministry had CNN. My wife said something like the Berlin Wall is falling, but there were people crossing over on the wall and it was so electrifying. It was just an incredible piece of news, and then to see the way it played out from the Moscow point of view was also fascinating. I think that month after that was one of the most interesting of my career because for one thing the political officer who was responsible for following German-Soviet relations was gone. I was his backup. So I was the one who went around to the people in the Soviet foreign ministry who were responsible for relations with East Germany. I would go to events where the East German military attachés were invited to our defense attachés. There were good contacts with the Germany embassy, which I maintained. So to see that from all these different perspectives of people whose countries were not only intimately affected by all this but whose lives were intimately affected. I mean, East German diplomat or an East German general officer -- I mean these people -- their lives as they had known it were coming to an end. So it was an incredible perspective. Then also to realize, again no particular insight here, but to realize how worried the British and the French were about unification. I mean the three parties that seemed to be the most worried were our World War Two partners. The Soviet government, the British and the French were deeply worried about what this would mean. To get that sort of firsthand kind of emotional impression about that -- this is something that I think was very important that we reported at the time, to get a sense of how the Soviet people were much less worried than the Soviet government about the consequences of unification. I mean one would have thought from an American perspective that this nation so traumatized by the German invasion and Nazi atrocities would rise as one in opposition and fear to seeing a unified Germany. But I think for us from a Moscow perspective it was much more the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the highest and
oldest levels of the government -- they were the ones who were panicky. My counterparts of my age and others who grew up in the post-World War Two era, they were not traumatized by a united Germany. A lot of these people had seen Germans too, post-World War Two Germans. The images of Germany as the evil empire were already significantly altered by the reality before the fall of the Wall.

Q: Leading up to this time was there any occasion where things were beginning to get wobbly to use a term. Were you, was there concern that maybe the Soviets would move into East Germany because it’s really a matter of, will the Soviets move or won’t they?

THIELMANN: I think there was definitely real concern about that. That’s one of the things, which I think made everyone’s pulse go up a little bit. There were huge numbers of Soviet troops in place. There was always the possibility of some unscripted incident occurring between the German population and Soviet troops. Looking back on it, that was something we were very lucky about. All of those hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers heavily armed, sitting surrounded by not so friendly populations and all these countries of Eastern Europe, and we managed to escape the whole thing with not only no incidents, but the Soviet Army withdrew on schedule. I mean that’s an amazing thing. So I think we remained tense for quite a while after the fall of the wall.

Q: Well, were we looking at the Baltic States? Was this also a place that was a concern to us? I mean what was happening there?

THIELMANN: As I remember at the time we weren’t quite as concerned about the Baltic States as we became later because the Soviet Union was still intact at that time. The Baltics were fairly well integrated into the Soviet Union -- I mean integrated in a sense that an awful lot of Russians lived there. An awful lot of powerful Soviets would have vacation plans in the Baltic. Even at that time it was still hard to imagine the Baltics becoming independent countries when the Berlin Wall fell. I had a trip to Riga, Latvia in my last few months. I think this would have been the summer of 1990. A couple of things came out of that experience. One is just to be reminded again that Latvia was a very different kind of place than the Soviet Union. I mean the manicured lawns, the art deco architecture of the city, the overall Hanseatic League flavor of the city that remained after all this time was so palpable that I remember thinking at the time that with economic opening that whether this country was independent or not, this was going to be the kind of place which exploits the opening and takes advantage of new possibilities here much faster than other places. But to my memory I don’t think even at the time I left in 1990, that we were looking at the Baltic States as soon to be independent.

G. PHILIP HUGHES

Executive Secretary, National Security Council


Ambassador Hughes was born and raised in Ohio and educated at the University of Dayton, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Harvard University. His career with the US Government included service at the senior level with the Congressional Budget Office, the Departments of State and Commerce, and the White House, where he served two tours with the National Security Council. In
1990 he was named US Ambassador to Barbados, where he served until 1993. Ambassador Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: We will come to the developments during this time that you were with the NSC later. One thing that always strikes me is when you have a president who is very conversant with foreign affairs, and the head of the NSC and his deputy director are conversant with this, that you don’t use the staffs as much. This is all fine but there is always something that is going to come out of left field and they really don’t know the territory. Problems will show that sort of in an open discussion somebody will say but this isn’t going to work in Ouagadougou or something like that. Did you see any cases where the President and Scowcroft would head off in one direction and yet you or somebody was trying to say wait a minute, this is fine but what you’re doing won’t work because of the situation in such and such a country?

HUGHES: I guess I could think of a couple of examples in the direction that you’re referring to. I am not thinking so much as country specific examples as I am thinking of issue examples. Maybe I should say a little bit more about Brent and Bob as a team then this point will make more sense. Brent Scowcroft clearly has been around the national security world so long that in a sense he is what in cricket terms is called a good all-rounder. He clearly has greater depth of expertise in certain areas, or had at that time, than in others. He was profoundly steeped in military affairs, arms control, strategic questions, NATO issues, east-west security issues, Russia as I mentioned. Those were mostly Bob Gates’ areas of strength as well. Neither of them was probably terrifically deeply expert in Africa, or Latin America. They probably had shared considerable expertise in the problems of the Middle East since we had been grappling with these for decades and they were always front burner issues. But I suspect that neither of them was particularly deeply expert in any of the functional areas of activity that came up from UN issues, to international environment issues, to export control issues, things of that sort that I had worked on.

In fact one of the ways that their areas of strength and some of the areas where they may have been not so strong showed up was in the National Security Decision Directorate Number One that the President issued on something like the first day that he was in office. It set up the NSC structure as he intended it to function and established a number of what we used to call senior inter-agency groups. Those groups were basically on every region of the world plus arms control and disarmament.

There were a whole number of inter-agency groups that functioned in the past and that needed to function in the future because we needed a mechanism to handle them. No provision had been set up for an inter-agency mechanism to adjudicate export control matters or to adjudicate international organization or environment, or drugs, terrorism, or those kinds of issues. I persuaded by a memo working with the other parts of the NSC staff that were responsible for those areas and noticed that all of a sudden the inter-agency mechanisms that had existed before to adjudicate their problems disappeared. We put up a recommendation to Brent that another directorate be established that would set up several additional committees to deal with these functional areas that perhaps Bob and Brent didn’t have clearly in mind when they started out. He eventually approved that and I gathered suggestions from around the staff and wrote that particular decision directorate. It went out in I forget what number it was, maybe it was 12 or maybe it was 11. That was how we rounded out the inter-agency process.
When it came to an issue like what the President should do with respect to the Brazil environment problem or the Rio Conference which came later of course in the administration, or what posture the President should take on various international environmental initiatives, my perception was that the NSC front office tended to not take a view on this. They tended to want to let that issue go because it wasn’t front and center in their scheme of things. As a result the action tended to be driven by parts of the administration that were mostly vested in that agenda, particularly Riley in the EPA. They tended to want to chart a much more, if you would, liberal or environmentalist oriented course than some of the conservatives who were either in the administration or in the Republican fraction on Capitol Hill. What ended up happening was, on for example many international environmental issues, the position of the administration was sort of pulled along by the environmentally sensitive elements of the administration. The NSC didn’t play much of a role in this even though it may have concerned an international conference undertaking. The position that would be sort of heading toward the president would end up getting headed off by John Sununu, who was more of, if you would, an ideologically centered figure in the administration. He was Bush’s Chief of Staff. He’d short stop that issue. That may be partly also an artifact of not having an NSC staff with people on it who had ideological or conservative ideological moorings. They were more policy professionals, national security gurus. That’s an example.

Another example of a different sort is more in the personnel area. Latin America had been an explosive, contentious issue between Congress and the presidency over Central America. When Bob Pastorino was recruited from the NSC staff by the former deputy National Security Advisor John Negroponte, who was designated to be ambassador to Mexico, to go down to Mexico as his DCM, the question became who would become the head NSC guy on Latin America? Brent and Bob Gates didn’t seem to have particularly strong views about this. My impression was that they didn’t have an Arnie Cantor or a Bob Blackwill specifically in mind and they were looking for ideas. Various candidates were proposed. One candidate that surfaced was someone who actually had a political background, or a campaign background, but he proved unacceptable to Bernie Aronson, who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the time. They almost got a candidate, then the position was sort of left hanging.

Then I got a call from my director of administration telling me that Bob Gates had called her, not me, (this will give you an idea a little bit of how the staff worked) to say that she should put on the NSC roster the name of a particular officer from the State Department who was going to be the new senior director for Latin American Affairs. I assumed that this was a nomination of the Foreign Service or that somehow Brent after talking to Larry Eagleburger, or someone from the State Department putting it up through Larry Eagleburger to Brent, had said that this would be a good idea. At my next meeting with Bob Gates I said “I understand that this person is going to come on board. You realize that there will probably be a problem with this.” He said “no, I don’t know what you’re talking about.” Then I told him what little I knew about this officer, and I didn’t know very much at that time but I knew enough. This officer had a very difficult relationship with a number of the conservative senators and congressmen on Capitol Hill who were deeply involved in Latin American issues. It would be sending at a minimum a signal to them that we were sort of turning sharply left in our Latin America policy or Central America policy, that it was not going to be run by rock ribbed conservatives and so forth as in the past. This was not Jose Serrano or Constantine Menges. It was not the sort of people who had been running this part of the NSC in the past.
Bob didn’t profess very much concern about it, but within about 48 hours my phone rang as I was sitting at my desk, informing me to take this officer off the rolls. He never actually arrived in the compound. What I understood subsequently had happened was that as soon as word filtered around, and it does filter around in this town, that he was going to come to the NSC staff, Senator Helms and perhaps others called Sununu, not Scowcroft. At least I understood that they called Sununu, not Scowcroft. They basically raised hell about it. He got so hot that the preferment was canceled.

There was then a quest for a new person. The new person that was finally settled on was someone who had credentials. This was one of the few times that I ever saw a semi-politically motivated choice of an NSC staff senior professional in that period. He had some credentials and some credence with Helms and the very conservative Republicans in Congress. That officer came on board and was there for about four months.

Q: The problem is that the world is not a tidy place so that if you are really interested in one thing there is always an outbreak coming from somewhere else. Anyway, during this year that you were there, what were the major national security issues?

HUGHES: The first major issue if you would that came up was that there was of course to begin with the reviews of our policy. We did a policy review on practically every major substantive area of the world and every functional issue.

Regarding the relationship with the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was in power. There was a period of change; glasnost and perestroika were going on and new leaders like Yeltsin were starting to emerge. The President and Brent Scowcroft were trying to define what should be our relationship and what should be our posture towards the Soviet Union. One of the early decisions of the Bush Administration was to have a kind of pause in the relationship with Moscow while we did an assessment. At a recent conference on the Bush presidency, Gorbachev actually spoke about this and said that he was surprised. He expected when George Bush was elected the pace of rapprochement and of working together with the U.S., interacting with the Soviet Union and with his efforts to bring about change, would pick up. In fact he was surprised he said and disappointed that there was this pause in our relationship while we did this review for 60 or so days.

Once the review was done there were a series of initiatives toward the Soviet Union. One was the offer of an Open Skies Agreement, another was the offer of an early meeting with Gorbachev and it was arranged for, as I recall, November in the Mediterranean. The idea was having it on board ships on nobody’s territory, not on land. Bush had a naval background so they thought this was kind of interesting with a Russian ship and a U.S. ship doing trade visits and so forth. It didn’t work out that way in the end but it sounded interesting. The relationship with Russia was one key issue.

The Middle East was a perennial issue and we almost have to sort of go line by line through where we were in the Middle East peace then. Shamir was in office and the Bush Administration had clearly decided that it wanted to advance the process of Middle East peace substantively. They saw the Israeli government, then a Likud government, as being one of the major impediments to further peace progress, in particularly the settlements policy. In Shamir’s earliest visit to the White House, Bush pressed Shamir, as I understand, to desist settlement activity
which was creating a fait accompli. At least I think the administration regarded it as creating a fait accompli on the grounds of just complicating the possibility of a peace settlement. I understand in his meeting with the President, Shamir said things that were taken to mean yes we will cease and desist, and he didn’t. Bush felt betrayed and double-crossed by Shamir, and that colored the relationship from there and led the administration to actually do some very courageous things to try to pressure Israel to stop the settlements process and to engage in serious peace efforts with its neighbors.

Central America was a significant issue but it tended to be partly because of personnel turbulence in the NSC, partly because of the way that Brent, the President and Baker wanted to handle it. More of the initiative shifted over to the State Department under Bernie Aronson to craft a sort of a way out of our dilemma over Contra aid and Nicaragua. Hence was crafted the set of meetings that led to the Esquipulas Agreement and that led to the holding of elections in Nicaragua which turned out to be free and which turned out to produce a non-Sandinista victory.

Along the way the administration faced a series of if you would, crises or opportunities. Probably the first major one was Panama. I am trying to remember the exact sequence of this, whether Panama came first or the Philippines came first. The Philippines imbroglio or crisis as I recall came in August if I am not mistaken. It certainly came at a time when the President was away. It was largely managed by the Deputies Committee involved under Gates, meeting in the White House situation room. We received word that a coup was under way against Cory Aquino. We received a request from the Philippine government to intervene somehow and stop the coup makers. Deliberations were organized very quickly in the White House Situation Room among the deputies. Decisions were recommended to the president that we couldn’t intervene directly but what we could do was basically keep the Philippine Air Force on the ground by flying CAP over Manila which would be a demonstration of support for Cory Aquino. It wouldn’t be belligerent. It would keep the Philippine Air Force on the ground and therefore kind of confine the resources available to the coup makers. It proved to be an extremely wise decision. The coup failed, Cory Aquino remained in office, and for the remainder of her term was forever, of course, in our debt.

We went through a couple of episodes with Panama. A major issue was what to do about Noriega. It was blatant drugs trafficking. It was clear that he was an unsavory character. He had promised elections, held them and then disrespected the results. The candidates were brutalized in the streets and very ugly public ways. At one stage we were actually in the middle of preparing for a White House arrival ceremony, I can’t recall for which dignitary, when information arrived in the Sit Room. It was actually an appeal from some officers in Panama for assistance because they were in the process of having a coup. We received a little bit of advanced information about this earlier as I recall, that such a thing might happen and these officers were mounting a coup.

The question was what to do? They didn’t actually ask for assistance as I recall. They just told us what they were doing. We scrambled around. I spent most of my time making sure that this arrival ceremony actually occurred believe it or not, because without any longer someone responsible for protocol functions in the White House, those things fell to me to do. I was trying to juggle two things. Making sure that the Sit Room kept information flowing to the NSC staff members, Brent and the President about what was happening in Panama, while we set up this ceremonial function. The coup quickly collapsed. It became clear that the coup wasn’t going to
succeed. It was not the opportune time to intervene. I think from that episode, the administration began then looking for what would be the next opportunity to intervene. I think it probably put on the mind set that we would not want to miss the next opportunity to somehow get Noriega out of the way. That was my impression.

That opportunity came several months later, as I recall in September or October, when Noriega’s troops began a campaign of increasing harassment against Americans in Panama. They picked up a sailor and his wife. They beat up the guy in front of his wife and threatened his wife with rape or something. This story got to Mr. Bush and he was very livid about it, very clearly. It was almost a metaphor for his experience at the prep school where he saw some boys beating up on some underclassman and as a respected and physically strong upperclassman, he got them off of him. He said that we’re not going to take this. We are not going to have our people in this kind of jeopardy. So there were a series of deputy meetings and National Security Council meetings that led in very rapid order within a few days to the intervention in Panama. Again a major issue that we faced.

Another issue that we faced is the whole issue of counter-narcotics strategy. The President, from the days of heading the south Florida task force and the National Narcotics Board interdiction system when he was Vice President, clearly wanted to do something about the drugs problem in Latin America. The drugs law enforcement agencies working with the NSC staff under the office of the drug policy czar, Bill Bennett, developed an approach, a strategy to focus on the kingpins of the Latin America drug trade. Bush decided that one of the things that could be done to give impetus to this effort was to propose a four presidents’ summit in Colombia. It was a very brave thing to do, to go to Colombia.

He actually went to Cartagena, one of the places that was sort of safe in Colombia, to the Colombian President’s summer house there on the bay. He went down for a one day summit with the presidents of Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, as I recall. No, maybe it was just Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. Out of that grew, among other things, the Andean Trade Preference Act, sort of a decision directorate that there would be a multi-pronged attack on the drugs trading which would include an enhanced interdiction effort, a kingpin enforcement strategy, pressures on the governments to do as much eradication as possible, and economic incentives to try to give the countries other economic outlets beyond illicit drugs. Hence the birth of the Andean Trade Preference Act.

THOMAS MACKLIN, JR.
General Services Officer
Moscow (1989-1991)

*Thomas Macklin Jr. was born in Fort Worth, Texas in October of 1935. He attended San Diego State University and majored in political science, later receiving a masters degree in history. He entered the Foreign Service in 1965 and took his first post as a Consular Officer in Amsterdam. His career took him to The Hague, Vietnam, Barbados, Israel, Russia, and Italy as well as several posts within the State Department. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in September 2000.*
Q: Today is November 27, 2000. You’re off to Moscow. You were there from ’89 to when?

MACKLIN: ’91.

Q: Let’s compare and contrast Moscow to when you were there previously, which was ’83-’85. What was the situation from your perspective?

MACKLIN: From ’83-’85, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at one of its low points. When I arrived in ’83, it was Andropov as Secretary General of the Party and the Korean airliner incident had happened and there was the business with the missiles in Europe. When Andropov died and Chernenko came in, it was no better. Soviets were afraid to talk to you, really afraid. There were a handful of dissidents who would talk to the embassy people, but it was generally thought that half of them were there for the KGB. The government was not cooperative. There was no access to the public at large. The political section spent a lot of their time wading through these long polemic editorials hoping to find some nuance phrase that they could use to report a change in Soviet policy. So, it was pretty basic Cold War stuff with dirty tricks occasionally and a lot of snooping.

In ’89 when we went back, Gorbachev had been in power for several years. He had been promoting his policy of glasnost [openness or candor]. What he wanted was to correct the problems with communism. They had a centralized economy, a government that made all the decisions, and the government because of corruption and because the system had basically broken down, didn’t get the kind of information he needed. The government from the provinces, people reported what they thought the next hire rung of the bureaucracy wanted to hear. There was an emphasis on production quotas without regard to other factors such as pollution or ecology or the per unit price. So, the system had basically stopped functioning somewhere under Brezhnev. So, what Gorbachev wanted to do was he wanted candor within the Soviet system. He wanted production managers to talk about their real problems. He didn’t want people hamstrung with production quotas which were unrealistic or which were self-defeating in the long run. He wanted to make qualitative improvements in the way people lived. He recognized that the Soviet Union basically hadn’t been able to provide the means for people to enjoy life. The health system was no good. There were just problems in every base of life. So, he opened it up, allowed and encouraged criticism, but the problem was that the whole system had gotten so corrupt and so inefficient and people were so cynical that once the complaints started to come in, it was difficult to channel them. There were so many complaints, the government couldn’t deal with them. They really couldn’t deal with open economic problems with other countries and with the West. So, on one hand, the government couldn’t deal with the magnitude of the problem and as the people saw that the government wasn’t really responding to anything, they became more cynical. So, it got worse rather than better. At the same time, the hard line wing of the Party felt very strongly that what was needed was more discipline, to reign people in. The West and the U.S. were offering strong incentives to open up the economy to outsiders and to open up the media to outside sources. So, whereas in the early ‘80s, there was nothing in the papers that wasn’t controlled, there was a newspaper called Orgin Yolk, which was a youth journal which occasionally let people write letters to the editor that were kind of honest. But that was it and it was very controlled.

When I got there in ’89, people were writing letters into “Literaturnaya Gazeta” asking things like, “How can I establish a Swiss bank account?” The newspaper would answer them. So, as
people began to find out what it was really like on the outside, they became more interested in change. So, there were two main themes during that second tour. One is, the government and the people in the Soviet Union wanted to change. On the other hand, the U.S. embassy was still smarting from the whole business with Lonetree and was over concerned over security. So, you had on one hand a government which is finally opening up and you can meet people and security- (end of tape)

GREG THIELMANN
Chief, Office of Strategic Forces Analysis, INR
Washington, DC (1990-1993)

Mr. Thielmann was born and raised in Iowa and was educated at Grinnell College and Princeton University. A specialist in Political-Military Affairs, he held a number of positions dealing with such matters as Strategic Proliferation, Arms Control and Missile Programs. He also served abroad at several posts in the capacity of Political Officer and Consular Officer. His last position was Chief, Office of Analysis for Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Mr. Thielmann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004

Today is March 14th, 2005. Greg, how did you find the atmosphere of INR at that time. Were people listening? In general, what was your impression?

THIELMANN: I had a very favorable impression of INR, once I was inside it. I remember having had occasional contact with INR from the policy bureau perspective. I remember at the time they were obviously the keeper of secrets and had some interesting information, and they were capable people in it, but I did not really appreciate what a resource it was until I was inside it. Then I realized that for example the department had a chair in the intelligence community when the fifteen agencies or some subset of them got together to decide on a national assessment or some lower order of intelligence community proclamation. The State Department was there to put in its interpretation. One of the things that I had not appreciated until I got into INR was that there were very few entities in the intelligence community that did not have what I would call a kind of institutional bias which sort of skewed their assessments. All of the entities of the intelligence community have institutional biases I believe, including INR, but some of them seemed to pose a real threat to doing things that would, let’s say, cast a dim light on their own agencies policy proclivities. If I can just put that another way, in the State Department it really did not matter if our analysis was critical of current U.S. foreign policy. This was little understood outside the INR, but certainly inside the building I quickly came to realize that the leadership of the intelligence bureau would fiercely protect the intellectual integrity of the line analysts. So an analyst didn’t really have to worry about a judgement or a conclusion that would embarrass the others in the building or elsewhere in the U.S. government. The job was about as objective as one could imagine inside a government context. You obviously had to worry about people continuing to listen to you, and, if you got to be such a nag or if your tone was too snide and everything, you might turn off the kind of policy consumers that you wanted to pay attention to your product. But it was really refreshing to realize how academic in a sense INR was. You were expected to be on top of your product and to use evidence intelligently. But you were
encouraged to use your judgement, make a leap when necessary as long as you made clear that this was a guess and that you reported accurately on what the confidence level was based on the evidence available. But it was quickly apparently to me that this was the kind of place where one could go home satisfied in the evening because you had done the best job you could given the evidence available to help policymakers understand what we knew from existing information. Much to my surprise I found out that, in many ways, that was more satisfying than being a cog in the policy machine and very often supporting policy with which you had serious reservations. Although broad of course as the implementer of policy you would also have a heavy responsibility to report what the foreigners thought of the policy or what the situation was in a foreign country. So being an objective reporter of facts had its own satisfaction. But I found that for me personally it was very satisfying to have a few layers between me as an analyst and the Secretary of State, the highest level consumer, and to be in that role of controlling the end result of your output much more than you did as a policy player.

Q: Well, let's talk now about 1990 to '93 and your job was on the military side. I mean this had to be a fascinating time because we're talking about the rapid demise of the Soviet Union, all sorts of weapons up for grabs and everything else. Talk about your job.

THIELMANN: I was acting division chief because I didn’t have the foreign service rank that fitted the position at the time. That job had been one of the most important in INR because it was trying to monitor and analyze Soviet strategic forces, which obviously were the large existential threat to the United States. It was also the office that worried about providing the relevant intelligence on that subject which would be used by those negotiating the strategic offensive arms treaties, the SALT treaties and then the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) treaties. So that was kind of the traditional main focus of the job, worrying about Chinese forces obviously and other countries that had nuclear weapons as well. It was overwhelmingly Soviet military power. Once the Soviet Union fell, one little dimension of the job really bloomed. The traditional efforts to look at the reliability of the command and control structures and how operationally orders to attack would’ve been conveyed to the missile forces. All of that which was before a very small subset of the job became much more important as the Soviet Union broke up into a number of different states including Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, each one of which hosted significant numbers of Soviet strategic forces. So that first tour in INR corresponded with this very delicate period of the U.S. working very hard in a number of ways to try to insure that these four countries with nuclear weapons transitioned to only one country with nuclear weapons. Or to put it another way, the Soviet control over the nuclear weapons would morph into a Russian control over nuclear weapons and Minsk, Kiev and Alma-Ata did not end up having their own nuclear forces bequeathed to them because of the breakup. It was particularly sensitive in the case of Ukraine because Ukraine more than the others had some of the largest and most sophisticated missile assembly plants, had a lot of indigenous expertise on how to make both the delivery vehicles and also the nuclear weapons.

So the Ukrainians had some real choices for keeping some of those nuclear weapons. What actually would have happened if they had continued along that path or if they had seriously pursued that path, we don’t know. Obviously the Russians were very intent on them not having those options, but it was a real concern. There were a number of scenarios that were seriously considered that would have featured war between Ukraine and Russia. Most of those scenarios I
think we thought were unrealistic, but that they were even seriously discussed showed what a real crisis this was and what a delicate period of time it was.

Q: Well, in a sort of peculiar way we and the Russians were both on the same side, weren’t we?

THIELMANN: It was a very curious form of cooperation because we shared an interest with the Russians in ensuring that Russia maintained control over all those nuclear forces. In some respects we rooted for the safe transit of nuclear weapons from these other countries back to Russia so they could then be put online aimed at the United States. There was certainly some irony in that, but it was considered a far worse outcome if we had new independent centers of power that might also have targeted their weapons at the United States. So part of the irony also was that, as much as we wanted Russia to maintain control of the weapons, we genuinely wanted Ukraine to evolve in a western direction and to reanimate some of the traditions that were really alive in Ukraine as a European country. It was much more oriented toward the U.S. than the more Asian-oriented heartland of the Soviet Union was. So we were trying to encourage that. We were trying to get Ukraine to see itself as a country that would be benefited much more by pursuing a German or a Japanese model of obviously being capable of having nuclear weapons but, by pursuing a non-nuclear path, could find a better way to reintegrate itself into the western economy.

Q: Well, how did you find dealing with particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA on this particular issue? I mean were there any problems or divergences?

THIELMANN: There were certainly some divergences and, while my memory is not terribly sharp on this, I think in general I would like to say we were a little bit more sophisticated in the scenarios that we used. Some of those probably from the Defense Department side of things put more credence in the outbreak of war between Ukraine and, Russia, and when we thought through those scenarios, it just seemed extremely unlikely. I mean for one thing there were so many Russians living in Ukraine. The eastern part of Ukraine was basically ethnic Russian. It just got kind of incredible to think about any scenario in which you would have one of these countries lobbying nuclear weapons at another. So I think, to put it neutrally, it was because we were closer to a more sophisticated analysis of the internal dynamics of Soviet society and the new emerging societies that we weighed the likelihood of those scenarios a little bit differently. One of the other things that I remember about this era is that we received some very valuable human intelligence from some of our foreign allies. Without going into too much detail, I was impressed at the quality of information of one of our special partners in intelligence. They had presumably at much lower cost were providing better human intelligence, more critical useful human intelligence than our own U.S. agencies.

Q: Well, did you feel that this was self-censorship on the part of the intelligence community of saying, oh God if we do this it’s sure to leak and it’s sure to bring all hell on the Israeli lobby and Friends of Israel will be all over us? In other words this was not somebody from up above doing it. Where did you feel it was coming from?

THIELMANN: I really felt it was self-censorship. Now I wasn’t maybe high enough in the hierarchy. Maybe it was more direct than that, but I think it was political savvy -- senior intelligence officials thinking this is a problem we don’t want to have. We don’t want the pro-
Israeli lobby coming down hard on the U.S. government because of something that we did here so let’s just not talk about it.

Q: Yes. It really is amazing. Well, what about China? How did we view China at that time, ’90 to ’93?

THIELMANN: What I remember about that era is that it was so difficult for the intelligence community to not use our own model of strategic forces development in thinking about the Chinese. So what I remember from that era was how strong the other agencies pushed in their analytical product for the assumption that China would have many more strategic nuclear weapons within some number of years, that they would have multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles on each of those missiles and that they would be telling policymakers the Chinese are basically going to take off. One of the reasons I remember that so strongly was because I was uncomfortable at the time since we had seen a history of the Chinese being very modest in their nuclear weapons programs. I mean they acquired nuclear weapons, and then they increased their capabilities at a very slow rate. It was nothing like either the U.S. or the Soviet development pattern -- kind of exponential increases in warheads. I remember at the time feeling that I didn’t really have enough time as an analyst of Chinese strategic forces to really pound the table too hard on this issue. I remember being skeptical, but these memories came back to me several years later when I reentered the picture and found that lo and behold the Chinese hadn’t done any of those things that the majority of the intelligence community seemed comfortable in predicting. But they were still at that same low level of strategic missiles that could threaten the United States.

DAVID M. SCHOONOVER
Agriculture Minister-Counselor
Moscow (1990-1994)

David M. Schoonover was born and raised in Illinois. He received a bachelor’s and master’s degree in Agriculture Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He joined the Foreign Service in 1984. He served in Beijing, Moscow and Seoul. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.

Q: Would you talk a bit about what was the situation when you got there in 1990.

SCHOONOVER: I found it changed in terms of the social and political dimension and very similar in terms of the physical dimension. Going back to Moscow in 1990, frankly, it looked about the same as it had back in 1967 when I left there the previous time. However, it was a much more open environment. Gorbachev had been in power for about five years, as I recall, at the beginning of 1990, and people would talk with us; people were talking and discussing with each other. I’d been there only a month or so and there was a huge demonstration. There were people marching through the streets of Moscow. You never would have seen anything like that in the earlier years. In earlier years, it was a very tightly controlled police state, and there was no doubt about it. People were scared to death to talk to foreigners back in the ‘60’s. It was very different when I went back in 1990.

Q: But it was still the Soviet Union.
SCHOONOVER: And Gorbachev was still the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and that’s how he was the dominant official at the beginning of 1990. That changed drastically during the four and a half years that I was there.

Q: From our perspective...your perspective... as Agricultural Minister-Counselor then, were we concerned in doing something in this '90, '94 period and doing something about the environmental damage from an agricultural point of view or was this something we were reporting on and just feeling well, the more they ruin things, the better the market for our stuff is?

SCHOONOVER: I wouldn’t say that. The work of the Agricultural Counselor typically was not so much on environmental matters. We had a Science Counselor and a Science officer in the Embassy, who generally had more responsibility for reporting on relations in the environmental area. The Agricultural Office was more involved with trade and less with technical assistance programs. That’s just the way the U.S. bureaucracy divides up its functions. However, in the case of Russia, when the Soviet Union finally did collapse at the end of 1991, the U.S. Agriculture Department, using its appropriated funds, did undertake technical assistance activities with Russia through our office at the Embassy, and we ended up with some rather extensive programs. I don’t recall any of our projects precisely on the environmental consequences around the Aral Sea. That’s a major disaster. I wouldn’t begin to say how one goes about correcting that disaster once you’ve created it. But in terms of generally trying to be of assistance with technical assistance programs, our office did get quite heavily involved in the first post-Soviet years. And that’s really more of an exception to the rule than the standard Agricultural Office activity, because in most countries, the Department of Agriculture, through the Embassy Agricultural Office, is involved primarily with agricultural trade promotion.

Maybe I should wrap up ‘91, and then jump on ahead, to Russia primarily. The attempted coup was in August. In October U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ed Madigan brought a large delegation of government and private sector agribusiness officials to the Soviet Union. At that point, the Soviet ministries were practically non-functional, but we managed to put together a program that included visits also to Ukraine, as well as Russia. I believe the situation then was entirely too chaotic to conduct very successful meetings, although it always pays to get in on the ground floor, and perhaps the visit was useful for providing a better perspective to the Americans on the delegation. As ministry staff could no longer assist as well as before, we found ourselves calling directly for senior appointments. One of my assistants soon was on a first-name basis with Gorbachev’s appointment secretary, calling him not only at the office, but also at his dacha—a heady experience, I would think, for a first-tour officer. By December the Soviet Union had collapsed. The flag went down on the Kremlin, as I recall, on Christmas, and we were engaged in relations with Russia, then, at that point. We had a lot of things that had to be worked out. We had continued to have a credit guarantee program with the Soviet Union. I particularly remember the last credit guarantee agreement we concluded with the Soviet Union. USDA had wanted to change a few words in one of the agreement provisions, but owing to a communications problem, we didn’t get this information until after the agreement was signed. As I recall, the Ambassador and a Soviet Minister or Deputy Prime Minister had signed the agreement, and when I returned to the office I received the message to change it. Those are the kinds of things that can spoil the end of the day, or disrupt a quiet evening. I had to call in a few chits from Soviet acquaintances, especially as the change appeared to be slightly less favorable to their
interests, but in the course of about four hours, we were able to substitute a page in the agreement with the revised language, with the concurrence of the Deputy Prime Minister, and all old copies were destroyed. One doesn’t want to have this kind of misunderstanding too often.

Anyway, we had this agreement that had been announced shortly before the Soviet Union collapsed, and all of a sudden we didn’t have a Soviet Union to deal with. It was for substantial amounts, as I recall. We’re talking about a billion dollars worth of trade, or something like that, and we didn’t have a country to deal with. So, that was one occasion where we invited all of the republic representatives to get together and, as I recall now, almost all of them signed the agreement. We made up an agreement that simply carried-over the Soviet agreement to the republics. We had to allocate it, and I think they were able to work amongst themselves and come up with some way of allocating the amounts. I’ve forgotten a few of the details at this point, but I recall that we were successful in making the transfer to them. Ukraine decided to opt out which left a strange situation because they weren’t going to get their share unless they signed on. I recall that I made a trip to Ukraine and met with their Grain Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and explained the situation more carefully that they weren’t going to be getting U.S. grain on credit unless they decided to sign the same agreement with all of the others. The situation lasted a few months, but eventually they decided to join in, too. So there was a period for a few months where all of the former Soviet Union republics, but Ukraine, were party to this grain credit agreement, and Ukraine was left out. I should note that the Baltic Republics already were on a separate track, and not party to this agreement. Anyway, there were a lot of things like that to work out in those early days.

Not long after that, USDA began some Food Aid programs with Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union. They had gone into default on the credit programs. There was a period when payments were sort of erratic, and then payments just stopped. They simply couldn’t keep them up. And we went into a different mode—food aid. The first food aid had already begun at the very end of 1991, just about the same time as the Soviet Union collapsed. But this was something the Defense Department had carried out, and it was meal equivalents, I forget what they called...

Q: Did you still have the feeling at this point that Russia/Soviet Union the economy is essentially collapsing, but getting ready to revive in a new form? This was very much a very difficult transitional stage, or was that a way to characterize it?

SCHOONOVER: This was a fascinating period. As far as the first part, the collapse of the Soviet Union, no one could have predicted precisely what was going to happen, I think. Certain things happened that triggered the actual collapse. You could see the problems. You could see the failures of the centrally planned system, the way they were trying to carry out things, but certain things had to happen, and the attempted coup in August of 1991 and related developments led to the actual date of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The ferment that went on then in trying to establish new systems was tremendous, and it was very difficult to try and comprehend everything that was going on. There were so many factions and schisms, and movements and activities. In an established country, one works with the government, one has knowledge of certain groups in society and culture, and one has a pretty good feel for what is going on in the country. You can keep up contacts with a set number of people whom you know. In the early year or two of Russia, I’d say that was pretty hard to do. We did the best we could, we had our contacts, but the government contacts often weren’t necessarily all that good in being able to tell
us what was going on. We tried to stay in touch with different research centers, different groups in society, business contacts and so forth. We did stay in touch with the government, both the legislature and the executive organs, and with farm organizations and different people, but it was a very fluid time during that period. We tried both through our direct programs and through the NGO programs to identify those people who looked like they would be influencing policy in the years ahead. Sometimes that was successful and sometimes it wasn’t. I can give you one example, and I’ll go back to the exchange programs and how one of these activities was successful for us, in the very early months of Russia. We sent a Cochran Program team to the United States from the Agrarian Reform Institute, which was working on land reform issues and land legislation. About a month after they came back, the head of the team became the Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. So, this made a tremendous contact for us to have picked him out in advance, not knowing that this was in the offing. I doubt that he knew it himself at the time, but it gave us tremendous access to higher levels in the Ministry of Agriculture. I should mention one other thing that just occurred to me, concerning the way we were working with them during the early post-Soviet years. We had a U.S. policy advisor assigned directly in the Ministry of Agriculture on the Minister’s staff. He was not from the U.S. Government, but from a U.S. university, and financed by the U.S. Government. He was there for about a year, I believe, I can’t remember precisely, working with the Russians in those early years. He tried to be a sounding board and to give some advice and recommendations, and reactions to proposed policies. A policy advisor in a position like that has mixed results, I would say. The Minister, obviously, is not going to turn to the American advisor all the time for his advice, but I think he did sometimes. I think he had a staff person who worked quite well with our policy advisor, and they had a good relationship. And that person in turn could influence the Minister. But in that kind of a situation, I don’t think the Minister wants to be seen as always turning to the American policy advisor, and particularly in Russia, it was quite a new experience. But just the fact that we were able to do that showed how drastically things had changed from just a year or so earlier. By the way, we also placed a policy adviser in the Ministry of Agriculture in Kazakhstan.

JOSEPH R. MCGHEE

Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs


Joseph R. McGhee was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He attended Yale and Columbia University and entered the Foreign Service in 1975. He served in Rome, Prague, Panama City, and Bonn. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.

Q: You left this hot spot in June of ‘91. Where did you go?

McGHEE: I went to be one of the deputy directors in what was then EUR-SOV, office of Soviet Affairs. It was still the Soviet Union then.

Q: When did the Soviet Union cease to be the Soviet Union?

McGHEE: Just a few months after I got there. I arrived in that job early in July. I had to come over there early because the President was traveling to Moscow for a state visit with Gorbachev.
At that point the main sort of tangible results that were expected were a series of cooperative agreements in the transport field and in developing low income housing and things like this.

The office of Soviet Affairs actually had five deputy directors: a senior deputy director who was John Tefft and then one for internal issues, one for external policy, one for economics and trade, and one for all the stuff that nobody else wanted to do. That last one was mine. They needed someone there at that time to supervise the finalizing of all these agreements that were going to be signed: there was one on space, academic exchanges. It was quite a long process. These things all had to be prepared in English and Russian and then the text had to be justified, compared and we had to make sure they all said the same thing in both languages.

It was a long process but we got the President off. He made his visit and it went off fairly well as I recall. The President came back and then after that Gorbachev went off on vacation to Yalta in the Crimea. He was seized down there during a coup attempt. This was in about August.

Q: So really you were just brand new on board?

McGHEE: That’s right. There was a task force and so for three days or so everything was very touch and go as to whether this coup was going to succeed and whether Gorbachev was going to be hauled off and imprisoned or worse. Yeltsin was on a tank out in front of the so-called Parliament or white house and all of this. My job was running the task force during this period.

Q: What was the atmosphere? In the first place was there any indication from your perspective before it happened, was there any tip-off or any concern, and then what was our reaction when it unfolded?

McGHEE: Our immediate reaction was surprise and dismay. There was real difficulty getting a handle on it initially because it was not very clear who was in charge. I don’t think it was even clear to the coup plotters who was in charge. We didn’t have an ambassador there at the time. I believe that Matlock had left and Jim Collins was charge. He was in contact with some of the people involved in the coup by phone but in particular, of course, he was in contact with Yeltsin. At a certain point there was a phone call from the President backing Yeltsin and the notion of democratization. Yeltsin at the time was I believe Prime Minister or President, I don’t recall quite what his title was, of the Russian Federation within the Soviet Union but he really took charge and of course the coup collapsed. People came out in the street, if not in support of Gorbachev, at least in opposition to the coup.

Of course Gorbachev didn’t fall right away. He came back to Moscow and was still President and head of the Communist Party for a time but it was clear that his credibility was really fatally undermined by these events. Gradually over the next couple of months, he gave way to Yeltsin. It was in this process also that various component parts of the old Soviet Union began to fall off.

Q: While you were on the task force was it more again a watching brief? Was there anything we felt that we could do?

McGHEE: Watching was a huge part of it plus we were scrambling around to stop various agencies from dispatching people off to Moscow helter-skelter. Our embassy there had its hands full. We had an open line around the clock with the embassy. Rosemary Forsyth who was my deputy on my shift of the task force was on the line virtually constantly. She was a real asset
because she had just arrived back from Moscow so she knew everybody including who did what in the embassy so she could yell down the phone, get me so and so.

The other thing was keeping the White House, the secretary, and everyone involved closely informed on what exactly was taking place in Moscow and getting instructions to Jim Collins in a rapid and organized manner. Obviously we tried to get everything we could out by cable but there were times when events were unfolding so quickly that this all had to be done over the phone.

The other thing was press. There was a huge amount of press attention, obviously, and attention to the U.S. reaction. There was a real need to ride herd on the Department to keep people from talking through their hats. There was a lot of contact with the White House and the situation room there. It was very busy and it was very fast. Three days and that was the end of it.

Q: Here you had been dealing with one crisis and next thing you knew you were dealing with another one and you were trying to pick up information. You had Gorbachev, and then Yeltsin was coming up and we had sort of put our cards on Gorbachev. Was there concern about Yeltsin when you arrived because he had been portrayed at one time as sort of almost a clown or a drunk or something like that or did this change?

McGHEE: He has been variously portrayed as a drunk off and on, that was no secret. He had been mayor of Moscow and at one point rather close to Gorbachev but Gorbachev had unloaded him earlier that year or the latter part of the year before. Yeltsin had gone to this position in the Russian Republic government where he had a much lower profile but nevertheless he did come to the States earlier in that year in 1991. He was not invited to the White House or at least he didn’t see the President and that of course was taken as something of a snub. So there was this concern there that Yeltsin would be hostile, if not towards the U.S., at least towards the administration that was in charge at the time. In fact none of that panned out and if Yeltsin had been prone to pursue some kind of a vendetta it was just the speed with which events unfolded that precluded him from doing anything but trying to make the right decision which by and large he did.

Q: While you were on the task force did you pretty much sort out information that was coming in and getting it to the right people and to make sure our press office was saying the right thing?

McGHEE: That’s it, yes.

Q: Was the CIA contributing much to this process?

McGHEE: Yes the CIA did contribute information at various times on who was where and what they were doing. There was plenty of information available. It wasn’t particularly information that was of great help to us on the task force and it was always information of that kind where unless you know what the source is, the information itself is devalued. Of course we never knew what the source was so it was very difficult to tell in the confusion whether they had it right or partially right, and what parts were right and what parts were wrong. They did have some pretty good information that proved to be quite correct on who was where and what was going on.

Q: Did we seem to have a fairly good fix that the coup was not going to be a fait accompli; that it might not work?
McGHEE: It became clear fairly early on that there was going to be opposition in spite of the fact that there were some uniforms among the coup plotters. They had not done the spade work in terms of assuring that the key military units especially those around Moscow, were aboard for something like this. As it became clearer that not all of the military was prepared to accept that and that there was going to be at least some resistance from the population at large as well, then it became increasingly clear that the coup plotters were in trouble. This developed I would say in the first 24 to 36 hours that the extent of the coup plotters problems became increasingly evident.

Q: After the coup was settled what was your job after the task force was over?

McGHEE: My job remained essentially what it had been which was the deputy director in charge of all the things no one else wanted to do. Part of that was the consular function. We had a visa operation in EUR-SOV that was run by a senior civil servant, Gladys Boluda and I supervised that although it meant essentially doing whatever Gladys told me to do.

Another thing was this question of exchanges. Lots and lots of NGOs, non-governmental organizations, and also government agencies, NASA, NOA, Department of Transportation, Department of Agriculture, you name it every agency that had anything going on in the Soviet Union wanted to get someone in there and start making connections with the new people if there were going to be new people etc., etc. We had to hold all of them off for a couple of weeks while things got back to normal in Moscow.

Basically we then had to establish some sort of control over the follow-on business because as countries started to drop out of the Soviet Union (the Baltic states, the Caucasus, the Stans, Ukraine, Belarus) they began to hold these referenda on the future for all of these countries and of course there was a real land rush to get in on the ground floor with all of these newly independent states. We had to make decisions about embassies, were we going to open them, how big are they going to be, etc., etc. Then we had to somehow maintain some control over this process of suddenly multiplying all of these cooperative projects that all of these agencies had, as to how they were going to go into these newly independent states and ensuring that it was done in an organized manner, to begin in a big way on the ground floor with these new countries but we also wanted to maintain some control over who was doing what and ensuring that in the rush to get out there that we didn’t tread all over the Russians toes for example.

One of the things that I did was to oversee the EUR-SOV’s participation in the process of identifying and implementing aid or assistance, sort of a presumptive new Marshall Plan for the former Soviet Union. Another was getting ready to send new embassies out to all of the new independent countries which was a long and convoluted process and it involved congress and getting money. The administration, by which I mean James Baker, had foolishly, in my view, made a pledge to congress that he was going to staff all of these new missions, there were 15 of them, without requesting a single more additional position or any more money. He was going to find it all somewhere out there. Congress was perfectly willing to authorize virtually anything we needed and I thought at the time when I was dealing with them on this, that we should take what we could get while we could get it.

ROBERT S. STRAUSS
Ambassador
Ambassador Strauss was born and raised in Texas and educated at the University of Texas. After a stint as Field Agent with the FBI, he formed his own law firm in Dallas, where he became engaged in Democratic Party politics, eventually becoming Chairman of the Party. This brought him in close contact with both Democrat and Republican leaders and Presidents, who sought his advice and used his talents in Trade Negotiations and Middle Peace Negotiations. In 1991 President George Bush, a Republican, appointed him Ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he served until 1992. Ambassador Strauss was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.

Q: When the military and other groups tried to oust Gorbachev.

STRAUSS: Tried their best, exactly. In fact they took him physically. I guess he was in his home on the Black Sea there when they took over the home and stayed a house prisoner of theirs. So the phone rang. We were out for dinner with our tutor as a matter of fact. When we got back the phone was ringing. It was the White House calling saying that this coup had taken place. The President wanted me over there the next day, to leave the next morning. It was 9:00 at night I guess, when the phone rang in California, so midnight here. It was Brent Scowcroft who said the President wants you to come in tomorrow and stop and pick up Jim Baker, Secretary of State Baker who is fishing in Wyoming or Montana. I forget which. They can pick him up and bring you all back here, and you can get the last briefing and get sworn in. I had been sworn in, I had already been confirmed by the Senate.

Q: I assumed there was no problem there.

STRAUSS: I had no problem at all. So we did that, but Helen didn’t go over. I went over without her, and stayed about five or six or seven days. About that time the baby was born. I rushed back home to be with my daughter when she had her child, and stayed there a couple of days. Then Helen and I went back together. A funny story happened when we went back. We got there, and of course tanks were in the street. We flew overnight to get there, and then the drive in the morning, worn out. It was a sight, bombs everywhere, tanks still in the street, Gorbachev still in captivity. They call house arrest captivity, and he did. I remember I went straight to the embassy and met with the staff. Jim Collins was out there, my deputy. I hadn’t known him before, but he was very highly recommended by everyone. I had just met him; I had no experience with him. They suggested that rather than stay at the residence for the ambassador I ought to stay in the compound at Collins’ house which I did. We started to work. The first thing that happened when I got there, Collins said to me, “The staff is here. They have been waiting. They are waiting for instructions and advice. The White House has called, and they are waiting for your impressions.” I thought to myself this is a nice start for a fellow who doesn’t know anything about Russia and even less about the Soviet Union. I said to somebody there, Collins I think, I said, “Why don’t you see, I am sure we won’t reach him, but why don’t you see if you can get through on the phone system and we can get Ambassador Dobrynin.” Who you are going to call, and he was the longest serving ambassador to this country, represents the Soviet Union and was a key player I think. As a matter of fact, I think Ambassador Dobrynin had much to do with keeping Russia, the Soviet Union and the U.S. from coming to grips with each other. It was the kind of communication they our presidents had with the Soviet Union through Dobrynin who told each
side what they need to hear to keep them from each other’s throats. I’ll be damned if two minutes later, you rarely get anybody on the phone in those days when you tried because the system wouldn’t work, and the phone books, but I’ll be damned if in two minutes they didn’t have Anatoly Dobrynin on the phone.

Q: By that time Dobrynin had moved. He was part of the Politburo at that time.

STRAUSS: Yes he moved back. He had given up his ambassadorship to this country. He was very close to the government but not in it. I said, “Anatoly,” and he started laughing, sort of chuckled the way he did. “I thought I would hear from you, and I am glad to hear from you. What can I do for you?” I said, “Anatoly, I have got to tell our government, give our government some advice on how to play this thing. You know, I don’t have to tell you, I am going to have to get that good advice based on other people’s judgment better than mine. I would like to know what you think I ought to do.” He said, “Bob, the best thing to do is do nothing. I think in 48 hours this coup will all be over. It has no leadership. What little leadership it has, they are petrified and drugged.” He just was very critical of the whole thing. He said, “I think the best thing you can do is nothing.” That made more sense to me than anything. I went up and told Jim Collins that. He said, “I think he is exactly right.” That is what we did. I called and talked to Jim Baker as I recall. It could have been Brent Scowcroft. I think Baker had gone back out on his vacation, maybe he hadn’t. Anyway I called either Baker or Scowcroft or both. I remember talking to Scowcroft. I had a long relationship already, and gave him that advice, the best thing to do is nothing. He approved course B. The best advice I could give him, don’t say anything; don’t do anything. Let it play out.

Q: Well this is like the three ton elephant. If you start tramping around you often do more harm than good.

STRAUSS: Oh yes, no question about it.

Q: I would like to go back just a bit. When you got together, I mean here is a coup. You go to the White house. What was the impression? What was the mood and the analysis that you were getting from the people in the White House about what the hell was happening and what did this mean?

STRAUSS: They obviously were terribly concerned about it, and the best advice they had was that these people simply despised Gorbachev and his reforms, and would do their utmost to get rid of him. But they had serious doubts that they would end up successful, be a successful coup. As a matter of fact, that very day while we were talking, a group of people were going down and thought they could get access to Gorbachev to talk with him, people representing various institutions in the government including several ambassadors, a couple of ambassadors from foreign countries. I was to go. I hadn’t been there, but I was on their list to fly down and see him. Jim Collins was to go, my deputy in my place. But there was - consternation is not a strong enough term. There was no panic. George Bush was very calm about it, very cool about it.

Q: Did you get the feeling that this was a, I mean obviously you knew most of the players, but did you have the feeling that here was a, in foreign affairs here was a White House with a president that really understood situations, when to let go and when not to. I mean you know, in other words, a White House that was comfortable with the crisis.
STRAUSS: Yes, I guess I would agree, that is right.

Q: I don’t want to put words in your mouth.

STRAUSS: I think that is right. I think George Bush was, generally speaking, comfortable. You see, this was the second year of his presidency and going into his third year really. He was comfortable, and he had good people. Jim Baker he had tremendous confidence in. They both had confidence in Larry Eagleburger, the Secretary of State and the deputy secretary respectively. Brent Scowcroft had a world of experience and sophistication. So he had a first rate team at that time.

Q: Well now, during this time, I mean this is before you went out. There had been people in the White House, kind of within the staff who tended to put their money on Gorbachev and in doing so, this is a staff problem often sort of denigrating Yeltsin and all that. Were you picking up any of this?

STRAUSS: No question there was a great deal of that there. There were people in the Bush administration at the highest levels who did not want him to have anything to do with Boris Yeltsin. As a matter of fact after I was appointed, and before I served, went over to start my service, Yeltsin came to town. They didn’t want him to see the president. They were concerned it would send Gorbachev. As a matter of fact Yeltsin couldn’t even get in to, he was going in a space bowl in Houston. They couldn’t get him permission to do that. You could drive in off the highway. If he had just driven in off the highway and not asked, he would have been fine, but he asked, and they turned him down. I had to call Brent Scowcroft. He said, “I’ll take care of that. That is dumb.” He arranged for it. So that was the time...

Q: I mean this often picks up in a lower level. Policy can sometimes be affected by people who are just closing doors and all that.

STRAUSS: Oh, not sometimes; frequently I would say, more often than that sometimes, no question about that. There was a negative reaction to Yeltsin from top to bottom, just sort of a left wing radical. You remember there was the press saying at the time, they began to say that Bush was staying with Gorbachev too long because Gorbachev is already beginning to get in trouble. Just about the time I arrived Gorbachev was getting into trouble, so it was just beginning that. There was no big story yet.

Q: I am just wondering, you are looking at this when you arrived there, was there a sense of God, I mean this whole structure that we have dealt with for the past 50 years or so was coming apart, or was this looked upon as well this is one of these glitches, and we are going to end up coming back to sort of the old Soviet-American relationship?

STRAUSS: I don’t think there was any question in anybody’s mind that it was going to be very tough to hold the Soviet Union together. There was a general feeling that Gorbachev’s time was limited. There was criticism in this country that Bush was staying with Gorbachev too long, too close to him and trying to conduct personal diplomacy instead of nation diplomacy. Those were the kinds of things that were going around. I guess I saw Gorbachev every couple of days, which was amazing. No other ambassador did. I did for two reasons. The primary reason was I represented the United States of America. The second reason was he liked me. We got along; we spoke the same language. I came nowhere near a peer of his, but well a person of stature in his
own country, and he treated me that way. As Bush said to me at the time he sent me over there, “I am sending you over there for a particular reason, to establish the kind of relationship, warm with Gorbachev, that he needs - that he talks straight to you and you talk straight to him, and that if he speaks to you, he is speaking to me. That is what I need desperately.” He said, “We have had an ambassador over there who is a splendid ambassador, but he will never have the kind of personal relationship with Gorbachev that you will have.” Of course he was a fine ambassador who preceded me, a career man who knew more about the Soviet Union in his little finger than I knew in my whole body, but he wasn’t a particularly personable fellow in terms of relationship. Jack Matlock was his name. I don’t know him very well. Whenever I saw him he was always courteous, and I was too. A disappointment came up. I called him. Of course, I had no background over there. I said, “You know my wife really doesn’t know anything about this job. The call is to see what we need to take over there, sheets, food? What are the demands made on her?” He said, “Well my wife is very busy now and doesn’t like, she is busy with her photography. I will have her call.” I said, “Fine.” She didn’t call, and I called him again in Russia a few weeks later. He said, “I have talked to her, but she just doesn’t have time. She is tied up with the fact that we are going to be moving in a month or so, and she has a lot of her photography that is taking a big part of her time.” I thought to myself this is the nuttiest thing I have ever heard. She never talked to my wife or me.

Today is February 26, 2003. Mr. Ambassador, let’s talk. First, would you like to talk about dealing with the political establishment in the United States because you know, most of these senators and congressmen had sucked off the teat of anti-communism for years? Russia was a great whipping boy and all this. Was this a problem for you?

STRAUSS: No question the statement you just made is 100% correct. But let me lead into this whole thing by backing up just a bit from the statements I just made about coming back to this country. To put it in proper context, while I considered myself to be more agile and sophisticated than the foreign service when it came to solving political problems in the foreign policy area with the hill, I also had enough sense to know that while I had uniquely splendid skills in that area, I did not have skills in foreign policy generally, and certainly not in Soviet Union affairs. I was hesitant as I think I said earlier in this tape some hours ago that President Bush sent me over there. His argument was, he had two or three arguments when I was hesitant about going initially. One was that he needed someone, when I was telling him I didn’t know the issues, he needed someone with a background in Russian affairs. He said, “No, you are wrong. I need someone who for one can establish a real relationship with Gorbachev, because he needs someone on the ground. Most of these things we can help with from here, but the personal relationship I need with Gorbachev, you can establish for me and for this country. That will be your strength. And the fact that you understand the political process, that we won’t get anything done over there, we are going to have to have some legislative support. There is no support for it right now to amount to anything.” So that was kind of the setting in which I went over there. The truth of the matter is, simply stated is that President Bush was right. I was a non-traditional ambassador to the Soviet Union, and yet all the voids I had and all the negatives I had in that area, I had some unique strengths in areas that he thought needed attention, better attention than he could get with just another diplomat. So that is the setting for all this. I knew that people steeped in U.S.-Russian, U.S.-Soviet affairs wondered how in the hell he could turn it over to a rank amateur, or turn the embassy over to a rank amateur. The answer to that is very simple. He had some priorities where I had unique skills. Furthermore he knew that he could get good help
for me. One of the things he did, for example, was assure me when I said that I would need the absolutely best number two man you have got, he said, “I will give you the best we have.” That is Jim Collins who succeeded me later on with one person in between as ambassador and probably knows more about those affairs than anybody in the country. So with Jim Collins’ help I did pretty well. Collins has in his office now, he has a picture with his hair dark. Now it is about the color of yours which is very grey. When I said, “Collins, is that your high school picture you have there with that dark hair?” He said to me recently his answer was, “No that was my dark hair before I met you, before you arrived in Moscow.”

Q: Well I have talked to him and am going to get in contact with him in April. Now, what about this Congress? I mean who were some of the players and what did we want, what did George Bush want out of Congress, and who did you see were the key people you had to deal with and the problem people?

STRAUSS: George Bush knew, he felt like he didn’t have any money to spend in that part of the world. As a matter of fact he and Brent Scowcroft who was the National Security Advisor both said to me, “One of the primary reasons for you going over there, Bob, is as a signal that we really give a damn about this country, because we are not going to be able to prove it with aid. We are not going to have an aid program of any consequence, nor did they really try for one I might add. But he said, “This had to signal people in Europe and around the world. Most of the leaders of the world you have met and done some business with over the years. They know I wouldn’t send you over there, and you wouldn’t go unless you thought you could do something. This sends the right signal that we care and we are going to be involved with you. I get more out of the signal this sends.” I think it was Scowcroft once who said, “We will get more out of the signal by sending you over there and you going if you don’t do another damn thing. It will be positive.” So this was the kind of climate we were operating. Now keep in mind, my primary concern on the day I went over there was to first help stabilize the Gorbachev government. But even more important was to get our hands on the nukes, and get them gathered up. We had, I must say with practically no help from me, because Nunn and Lugar didn’t need it, we had the Nunn and Lugar legislation.

Q: Well now back to, when Gorbachev came back shortly thereafter, the coup went down. you were sort of sent over at the time to establish good relations with Gorbachev. What was the feeling that you were getting from the people in your own sense? That Gorbachev was a finished figure or were you kind of waiting for him to come back?

STRAUSS: I think people thought generally that Gorbachev was in the twilight. By that I mean maybe he had two years or maybe three years, maybe a year. I don’t think anyone dreamt that his fall would come as quick as it did. There is no question that that is what was thought. I thought he would last longer than he did, as did my administration that I was working for, the Republican administration. I remember when I spoke before this large crowd of people at the memorial service there two or three days after. I think we have discussed that already. I remember, I think I have it in our notes here. If not just put it in. When I said to President Gorbachev when he greeted me behind that sound truck or that truck they were using for a platform there. I remember when I said, “I would like to speak; I have a message from the President of the United States.” He said, “You speak? Why would you speak?” I said, “Mr. President, I can’t think of anything more important to you and the people of the Soviet Union and the world than a message to you delivered to you by your ambassador, by Bush’s ambassador, a message from President Bush
saying that the United States is behind you. That would be the thrust of my remarks.” You could see a light turn on in Gorbachev’s confused head then because he was terribly confused still from the captivity. I guess it was the next day or two days after that. You could see in his eyes a light going on. He said, “You will speak right before me.” So that was the climate there. We really were worried about getting him. We wanted to be sure that he got re-established as head of that government. That was the first concern. But did he think he was going to last forever, no. Did we think we would lose him in six months, no.

Q: As a political observer, one reason why often professional politicians or people who are quasi professional - I don’t know what you would call yourself - are better observers and able to deal with politicians better than say foreign service people who you know, this isn’t their world. They report on it, but were you watching, looking at signs of change in the Russian system. Gorbachev is back; Yeltsin had performed splendidly at the time of the coup. How were you observing this power business, and what did it hold for us?

STRAUSS: You could see that Yeltsin, it was a very hard hand to play. Keep in mind that two months before this, two or three months before this at the most...

President Bush strolled in the office informally, preplanned, of course, where he could shake hands with Yeltsin, then head of the Republic of Russia, not head of the Soviet Union of course, and greet him but not be caught with him. The press reported he went to the White House and saw Scowcroft, not that he went to the White House and had a visit with the President. President Bush, obviously properly, was concerned that if he met with him it sent a wrong signal to Yeltsin, to Gorbachev, because they were already jockeying for position. This is long before the coup. After the coup that jockeying became, instead of nuance, became open. Yeltsin started pushing and pushing for power. President Bush, of course, was concerned about that, his people were. They hadn’t really established a relationship with Yeltsin. Jim Baker did a good job when he first went over and dealt with him the first time. He was Secretary of State when he went over. Yeltsin liked him almost from the get go. Yeltsin heard good things about Jim Baker, I believe, because I saw Yeltsin regularly, and it didn’t take Baker long to show that he was even better than I was suggesting to Yeltsin. He handled it extremely well.

Q: How, I mean you arrived; you already talked to Gorbachev. We are concerned about the Yeltsin-Gorbachev relationship. Gorbachev was sort of our boy you might say. But when you arrived, how did you establish relations with Yeltsin, and how did that develop?

STRAUSS: Very loosely and very casually. I did not really have a relationship of any consequence with Yeltsin until he came to authority. I couldn’t do that. We couldn’t get involved in that game going on between the two of them, so the only thing I could do is nod in Yeltsin’s direction from time to time. I was openly, and we were openly pro Gorbachev knowing that his days were limited. Keep in mind this coup was in August, and by Christmas of that same year Gorbachev had resigned. The new Soviet Union was in the process of breaking up.

Q: When all this was going on, I mean at the time things were going through this massive change, what were you getting from your Russian experts at the embassy, Soviet experts, about what brought about this? Was it economics; was it American star wars pressure; was it ineptness of the government? I mean what was bringing about this change? I mean what was the conventional wisdom?
STRAUSS: Well all those things you mentioned had something to do with it, but it was a combination of all those things. If the truth be known, the internal pressure on the communist party, brought by Boris Yeltsin was what caused that more than anything else. Now obviously Reagan’s, everything he spent on dealing with the Russians in a military way had to make them discouraged and make them ready to give up to get a way out of that thing. But the differences you recall between Yeltsin and Gorbachev was that Gorbachev thought, incorrectly, that he could reform this government within the framework of the communist party. Yeltsin thought he had to get rid of the communist reform. That is the reason he had to get rid of Gorbachev. He was driven by that, and he was driven also by his own ambition which was to be head of that government. He accomplished both of them. I think there was a place for each within their own time. My judgment is that history will make him one of the prime movers of change in the world in the century.

Q: What happened when the embassy was faced with the dissolution of the evil empire using Ronald Reagan’s terms, in ’91/’92. What was this doing to you?

STRAUSS: Gorbachev and I always had a very comfortable relationship. I saw him in an average week several times. I don’t know of another ambassador that saw him once a month, but the U.S. ambassador has a different role, particularly one that he was comfortable with and he knew the President of the United States was comfortable with who sent him over there. So he and I would talk about his problems with considerable frankness. His problems with the government, his problems with accomplishing anything. We talked also about his political problems to some lesser extent. He wasn’t totally candid with me there, nor I with him. We talked with some frankness about it. You have to remember that 60 days, 90 days after I got there, he was in deep political trouble. Yeltsin pushed him. Every time he tried to have a meeting - Yeltsin standing up and denouncing him before his own people and that sort of thing. That crowded him pretty darn hard. Their relationship became terrible. Before I left Russia, when I went around to say my good-byes to the various people I worked with and the various agencies, I saved him for the last. I even saw President Yeltsin to say good-bye before I saw Gorbachev. I saved him for last. I had tried to tell him the importance the world would place on the two of them establishing some kind of relationship. That he had a responsibility as being the senior statesman of the two to reach out and repair that relationship even more than Yeltsin did because of how well he was known throughout the world, respected throughout the world. But I had no luck, and the last visit I had with him I went in and I told his interpreter, who was a nice man I forget his name, has a mustache.

Q: A bald head, a mustache, he appeared all the time.

STRAUSS: Yes, real nice man. He had interpreted for me for so many hours, both in this country as well as in Russia and the Soviet Union generally, that he and I had a good relationship. I went in to see Gorbachev for that last meeting. He was working for Gorbachev then, not for the Russian government. I said, “Now, I have got an hour that I can spend with the President, maybe a little more. But what I want you to do is see that I get ten minutes without him interrupting me, if you can do that in your role as interpreter. Let me make my speech to him, because I have never been blunt with him as I am going to be today. There is a great deal riding on it.” He said he understood. I said, “Just don’t let him interrupt me.” He said he wouldn’t and he didn’t. After I had been there for about an hour I said to the President, former president, “Mr. President, I have taken a lot of your time in this good-bye and I have listened with great interest to everything you
had to say.” He was going through a litany of problems he had, problems he had dealing with Yeltsin, how bad Yeltsin has treated him. With some justification I might add. I said, “Now let me, I want to talk to you and I have arranged with your interpreter that he is going to let me speak for five uninterrupted minutes with you,” because Gorbachev was great for interrupting in the middle of everything. I wound up and started telling him that he and Yeltsin having this kind of fight was a luxury neither one of them could afford and the world couldn’t afford, and the Russian people couldn’t afford. If he had any sense of responsibility and fully understood how the world looked up to him and his place in the world which gave him that responsibility, that he would go the last mile to cure his problems with Yeltsin. He was so nervous that he had a big leather chair he sat in. I could hear his finger nails. His hands were on each side of that big leather chair, the arms there. He was scratching that leather with his fingernails so loud that I could hear it clearly, and it was driving me crazy while I was talking. He was that intense over it. But when I finished that long speech, about five or six or seven uninterrupted minutes, I ended up by saying, “Now Mr. President, I have had my say, and I couldn’t be more sincere. I feel strongly that I am speaking as my government would wish me to speak. I hope you forgive me having said all that, I am ready to have you throw my ass out of your office if that would make you feel better.” I laughed and he laughed and got up and smiled and put his arms around me and kissed me on the cheek and said, “I would never throw your ass out of my office, and I appreciate what you said. But just so you will understand this, I can’t tell you everything, but you just don’t understand what the situation is. You can’t because you have to be in my position to understand that.” I said, “I am sorry, but I hope you will think about it.” He said, “I will.” That ended it, and then I left.

Q: While this power struggle was going on, were you getting from your colleagues and from your own observation at your embassy and from others, watching the bureaucracy which was so important a nomenklatura, beginning to move towards? Was this an apparent, I assume this was a struggle within the apparatus?

STRAUSS: Yes. Well, at the bureaucratic level you didn’t see that, at the lower bureaucratic level at all. At the top of course, you did see that. There were a few people that were strong cronies of Gorbachev who you just didn’t see anymore. In their place you saw Yeltsin’s people. On the other hand, the young man who was sort of a chief of protocol for Gorbachev stayed right on with Yeltsin. I was surprised when I went over there the first time after Yeltsin took over to find him doing the same thing that he had done for Gorbachev. Interestingly he became a friend of mine. I helped him get a job when the previous head of the UN, the Egyptian, Boutros Boutros-Ghali came to Russia just before I left. I said, “There is a young man over here who works at the Russian headquarters. I know you have got a few Russian spots at the UN. If you can get him a job. He has got a young wife and a young daughter. He deserves better than the kind of a job he has here. He will serve you well at the UN.” Butros put his name down and said, “I’ll take care of it.” I thought he never would. I swear I got back here, 30 days after he left from being there I heard from my young friend that he had been offered a job at the UN. He is still there. I heard from him this past week that now he is going to get transferred to Geneva. He is still with the UN, so things have a way of working out now and then.

DALE V. SLAGHT

Minister Counselor
Moscow (1992-1995)

Mr. Slaght was born in Oregon in 1943. After serving in various capacities on Capitol Hill and in the Department of Commerce, he joined the State Department under the Commerce-State Exchange Program. As expert in commercial and trade policy, Mr. Slaght had assignments as Commercial Attaché and Ministry Counselor at US Embassies and Consulates in Uruguay, Panama, Germany, Canada, Soviet Union and Mexico. He also served as Mexico Desk Officer at the Department of Commerce. Mr. Slaght attained the rank of Career Minister. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: You were in Moscow in what, '92? And until when?

SLAGHT: Till the summer of '95. I arrived the summer of '92, and I left the summer of '95.

Q: What was the state of relations between the United States and...we’re talking about Soviet Russia, weren’t we?

SLAGHT: Yes. That was a big disappoint to me, because when I was assigned the position, of course, I was assigned to the USSR which included Russia and all the other republics, and when I got there, I was in Russia alone, so I missed having responsibility for very interesting places I would have liked to have visited. Ukraine I did go to, but I never got to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in particular.

Relations were pretty good. Yeltsin was in charge of the government. There was a pretty good understanding between our two governments. The Vice-President met every six months with the Russian Prime Minister.

Q: Al Gore.

SLAGHT: That’s right, Al Gore. He met with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin every six months either in Moscow or in Washington. We had the leadership of the House, both sides of the House, come every Easter, and the commercial side was very busy. U.S. firms, maybe not unreasonably after the wall came down in the early ‘90s, believed there were billions to be made in Russia, either through the use of Russian human or natural resources in the country. Russia is a highly educated society: Metallurgists and scientists and mathematicians and computer programmers and, of course, they have oil and gas and diamonds and uranium and titanium out the kazoo. So many U.S. firms saw this as an opportunity to get in early and get in big and make mega bucks. Well, I think only the firms with the deepest pockets made it, and I don’t think they made the mega bucks over there. Maybe in the long term they will, but they found working in Russia very, very difficult. The rules, this is a state that had not had any capitalist experience, and the rules of operating were constantly changing, the personalities changed, and, of course, these guys looked to the U.S. Embassy for guidance on what to do and whom to see and what to say, and we were almost as much in the dark as they were. They called on us. They called the ambassador if the U.S. rep was a CEO, and we did our best to guide them. They’d tell us they’d go into meetings with the minister of this or the vice-minister of that and halfway through he conversation, the Russian official would take off his official government hat and put on his private sector hat, and he says my brother-in-law or my brother is in business out there or up there in Siberia, and he can take care of this problem if you’d work a deal with him. And we had
the issue with foreign corruption. We had to deal with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that prohibits U.S. firms from doing things that other nations can do in terms of greasing the skids with government officials on contracts or things to be done. The relations between the two countries were pretty good at the time, but the pressure on us and the demands on us were considerable. I worked regularly six days a week and sometimes I was in on Sunday afternoons. Very stressful. Then we lost holidays because we’d have Presidents visit us, or Congressional delegations or my own secretary. Very stressful time.

Ambassador Strauss, Robert Strauss, was ambassador when I first arrived. He’s a wonderful man. Very interesting, full of anecdotes which he shares with staff. We had a very good relationship. He regaled us once when he made his first call on the KGB. The new head of the intelligence service renamed brought to the meeting a little bag. In the bag, which he gave to Ambassador Strauss, were all the kinds of listening devices that had been implanted in the concrete walls of the embassy building that had been constructed in the end of the ‘80s and now stood as a vacant, unused facility on the embassy compound because we found out subsequently that it was bugged. Strauss was very supportive of the commercial operation. Anything he could do to help, he would do. Then we had a little bit of time with chargé Collins -- Jim Collins was the chargé before Tom Pickering came. Collins was an excellent chargé, and he was the ambassador after Pickering left. A good man, years in that part of the world, knew the Russian language well. A good man, we got along very well. We lived just two doors down from each other on the compound. A good man.

And then Tom Pickering came. Tom, of course, has a great reputation in the Service. We did some things with him that were useful. The business community was new, of course, not very large, but very interested in having contact with the embassy, so I organized regular once a month breakfast briefing, in my house that Ambassador Pickering would come to and brief the key business leaders about what was going on. I helped establish an American Chamber of Commerce in Russia while I was there and got a real nice award on my departure for that activity. Pickering reminds me of an anecdote that’s worth telling. Toward the eighteenth month of my tour there, I hadn’t been out of Moscow, I hadn’t been out of Russia. Traveled all over Russia, but never out of Russia, and I really needed to get out with my family. So we decided we would go on a cruise over Christmas, we would go home to the States, go over to Miami, get on a boat, and just be served. Out of the winters in Moscow and the lousy service in the system there. So I made these arrangements in the summer and then hoped circumstances would allow me to leave. Well, the closer we got to December, the more talk there was about Secretary Brown bringing a mission over here to Moscow. I knew his staff well. He had been there once before.

RALPH H. RUEDY
Deputy Public Affairs Officer
Moscow (1995-1997)

Ralph Ruedy was born and raised in Iowa. Between receiving his bachelor’s degree from Iowa State University and his master’s from Duke University, he spent five years serving in the U.S. Navy in Vietnam. Mr. Ruedy joined USIA in
1974. His overseas posts include East Berlin, Dusseldorf, Bonn, and Moscow. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.

Q: What about Americans in Russia, exchange professors, not tourists but others who were coming with NGOs and all that. What was your impression of their impact?

RUEDY: Generally speaking very, very positive. We had a number of people who were working with NGOs that were helping to administer our exchange programs. They call it American Councils because they continue to be active in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Of course if you are a teacher of Russian in Ukraine or a teacher of Russian in Kazakhstan that doesn’t win you many points so they had kind of reinvented themselves and done that very successfully. But Actor had a lot of young people in different locations across Russia. They were helping us open our American corners and recruiting for our Muskie program and youth exchange programs. IREX had people out in the field. The American Peace Corps was active. We had a number of Peace Corps volunteers and others, academic types. There were a couple of universities that were trying to launch university partnerships with different Russian universities. I was in general impressed with the effort that they were making and also the success that they were having and the reception that they got among the Russians. I was surprised there wasn’t more of a residue of suspicion among the Russians but the Russians were pretty open to it.

Q: I’ve always felt that the Russians and the Americans really have quite dissimilar but at the same time kind of similar histories. As types they seem to get along pretty well wouldn’t you say?

RUEDY: I’ve often thought of that: that maybe both the Russians and the Americans define ourselves in terms of the great centers of European culture, but not really. We feel that we have a separate, unique identity and a unique dynamism and energy and a soul or whatever that these Europeans don’t have any more.

Syria

JOHN H. KEAN

USAID, Officer in Charge of Egypt, Syria (United Arab Republic) and Sudan

Washington DC (1958-1960)

John H. Kean was born in Saskatchewan, Canada in 1921. He attended George Washington University, receiving an A.B. degree in 1943 and a M.A. degree in 1947. Mr. Kean worked in the Department of Commerce from 1943 to 1952, whence he joined the Foreign Service. Mr. Kean's overseas career included posts in Turkey, Egypt, Ghana, and Swaziland. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1994.

Q: What was the scale of our program at that time?
KEAN: Well, it was next to zero in the summer of 1958. We were feeling our way back into a new relationship with Egypt as anyone knowing the time period would be aware. Not only had the Suez war interrupted our relationship but the Suez war grew out of the U.S. decision not to finance the high dam at Aswan.

Q: The Suez war grew out of that decision?

KEAN: Yes, the Suez war was indirectly, at least, in part if not in large part, a result of the western decision, U.K., U.S. and World Bank decision not to finance the high dam because Egypt, in 1955, decided, to a degree, to throw in its lot with the Soviets and in September 1955 sign the Czech arms deal in which they bought massive quantities of Czech and (and to a lesser degree Soviet) military equipment and began to negotiate with the Soviets for the financing and construction of the high dam at Aswan. So the whole western relationship with Egypt (which had been quite active in the period after the 1952 revolution though strained at the same time), had to be rebuilt. The strain, of course, derived from the Cold War as well as the U.S. relationship with Israel. Egypt, as an Arab country, resented the tremendous support that was being extended to Israel. So it was a break of massive proportions in 1956 which was only being slowly healed as we began to try to rebuild a relationship with Egypt for broad geopolitical reasons even though it was fairly clear that Nasser had thrown in his lot to a very substantial degree with the Soviets by entering into the arms deal. Now, the U.S. had had a quite substantial and very broad-based technical assistance program in Egypt from the period 1952-1956.

One of the major undertakings that the U.S. had entered into during that period was to set up a project in 1953 as a binational fund which was unique for the Near East. It was called the Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service, EARIS. That went forward in the planning and early development stages for reclamation of a fairly substantial chunk of land, several hundred fedans or acres in the lower delta next to Alexandria, which was being reclaimed from Lake Mariyut and two smaller pieces of land out in the Fayoum Depression, south and west of Cairo. The model for this administrative structure was borrowed from Latin America. At least nominally, the Ambassador (for the U.S.) and the Egyptian Minister of Agriculture were the co-directors of this joint fund. The work on the reclamation activity, which that program was designed to carry out, had been drastically slowed down but hadn't fully stopped during the period of the Suez war and the following year and a half when the U.S. no longer had a Mission there and for some period didn't have diplomatic representation in Cairo. The first thing that was done was to revive that program and resume the suspended activity for which funds were already in place. This was a fairly easy thing to do. So that was the first activity that was undertaken as assistance resumed.

The Mission was opened with a few key personnel in mid-1958 under the direction of Ross Whitman (who was also Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs.) To reactivate EARIS a small staff, which initially included Horace Holmes ("Mr. Point Four" from India) was sent to Cairo. He and Paul Kime and Al Lackey and a secretary were sent as the people to administer the revival of this activity. It was in early 1959 when that group went to Egypt and opened up this technical assistance activity. The land reclamation part was pretty largely in the hands of the Egyptians and had gone forward during the hiatus. We didn't have technical people there primarily concerned with reclamation. They were mainly focused on planning for the
resettlement component of the program, which meant the design of villages, the development of the village facilities and the services that should be provided and working out the concepts that would underlie this resettlement process. The resettlement really means bringing people from other villages in the delta to settle this new land.

Q: Why were they doing that?

KEAN: There was steadily growing pressure on, and demand for, land as population increased. The Government was anxious to show that it was meeting that need and the U.S. found it politically desirable to cooperate. A large block of funds was committed to this project in 1953 as the last act in Egypt of the Point Four program before it was consolidated into FOA. Lake Mariyut was one of the best areas for reclamation in the country. It was at the level of the Nile, not up on a bench land, and it was an area that had been flooded. Lake Mariyut was the area that was being drained for reclamation, and somewhat fortuitously it turned out that this was some of the best land around. It had a great deal of calcareous material from the sea bed that had been there before the delta was built up and with a certain amount of leaching to get the salt and alkali out of the land, it turned out that it was very rich. So it was a very fortunate place to undertake this program and it did well in future times as people got onto that land.

Q: Was this because of overpopulation or did people have to move for other reasons?

KEAN: Well, the key issue in Egypt, of course, is land. The rapidly growing population already meant too many people per acre to productively employ them in agriculture and there were few alternatives. People were therefore selected from some of the most crowded villages in the delta. Young families were the preferred group for the resettlement. This was the next step.

There's a lot of fiction in the whole notion of the joint fund arrangement. The Egyptians regarded EARIS as their project. They thought of this jointness as strictly window-dressing. As far as they were concerned, we were welcome to come and meddle in their business to the extent of providing technical assistance but the rest of it, the joint jurisdiction was something they never acknowledged de facto, even though they acknowledged it de jure: but "we went through the motions". We occasionally held these formal meetings between the Ambassador and the Minister to ratify something or sign an agreement but the ordinary day-to-day activities were carried on by the Mission Director. As the Mission was opened, the Economic Counselor of the Embassy was made the Mission Director, so you had it integrated at the head between the Embassy and the Mission, and that's the way it existed for quite a long time there all the way through all of my association with Egypt which then ran for nearly eight years.

So we are beginning something which is a major chunk of my career. Except for a period of seven months when I was in Pakistan in 1960 to early '61, I was in some measure associated with and concerned with Egypt either in Washington or in Cairo for the whole period from 1958 to 1966. There were periods when my major attention was focused on other things and I was only partially concerned with Egypt. Nevertheless, during all of that period except for the time in Pakistan I had some reason to be concerned with Egypt. As I said, I visited the Sudan in 1959 for about six weeks and then spent ten days in Egypt and had some opportunity to become
acquainted on the ground with the situation in both of those countries. I did not go to Syria at that
time because we really didn't have anything going there.

Over the next 16 or so months, while I was working on Egypt in Washington, we continued to
gradually expand the program. A presentation was made in Washington late in 1958 about a set
of things we might undertake to do in Egypt. That was included in the Congressional
Presentation for the 1960 fiscal year and so with the beginning of fiscal 1960 we began to
expand and increase our involvement. This was a response to the gradually thawing political
relations between the countries and a deliberate effort to try to expand our relationships with
Egypt. This was a counterbalance to the expanding Soviet involvement there. With the beginning
of construction of the high dam in 1958 the Soviet presence became very significant. Throughout
my whole time of involvement we were in a sort of head-to-head struggle against the Russian
penetration of Egypt. It wasn't as direct as I've seen it in other countries (e.g. Afghanistan) but it
was still intense. Clearly the U.S. and the Soviet Union were striving for influence there and so
our involvement reflected that.

Our activities in the first year or two included EARIS and a few other activities but mainly the
beginning of a program in the western desert to explore the feasibility of large-scale development
of deep wells in the oases of the western desert (Karga, Dakhla and Farafara). From ancient
times these oases had been a site of civilization. There is evidence that at one point there were as
many as a million people living out there. They depended on shallow wells, but President Nasser
had the conviction that there was a potential for large scale development again using deep-well
water. So we sent a USGS team out there to drill test wells to determine the feasibility of
development along those lines. That program went on for several years, and later when I was
living in Egypt we continued to be deeply involved in that program. It proved to be not such a
potential bonanza, although there was a lot of fossil water there which had been deposited
day by geologic eons ago and under artesian pressure. Once the wells were punched, the water
would begin spouting fifty feet into the air, but within a year or so the level of pressure declined.
Then you would have to sink a slotted tube in the ground and install a pump to continue to draw
water. Obviously there was a very slow rate of recharge and you would end up with an inverted
cone of the water table in this geological formation where the inflow to the point of the well was
relatively slow. You had only a limited supply of water that would not last indefinitely into the
future. If pumped at a high rate, you would pretty soon exhaust the supply. Hence, it wasn't
going to be a place to settle large numbers of people. That would have been great news for Egypt
to have a place to resettle its growing population that was doubling every 23 years and rapidly
outrunning the resources of the Nile River and the Nile Valley.

We also put in place a more general agricultural program which aimed to support the Ministry of
Agriculture in providing improved research and extension systems. This was not a new activity.
There had been similar programs before the 1956 expulsion of the Mission, but I think it's fair to
say that the Egyptians were somewhat reluctant participants in this program. They weren't really
ready to acknowledge that foreigners had a lot to teach them. They felt that they already had a
high-yielding agricultural system. It was a system that had evolved over a period of many
decades. They knew how to run it, it was highly dependent on the irrigation system and the
system of crop rotation which had also evolved over many decades.
We did send people abroad for training and that had its political as well as its development dimension in terms of having an ever-larger pool of people in that country who had western connections. From the time of the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt on through the 19th century and then with the British and to some extent with French and Germans there was a lot of western orientation and western culture and western ties in Egypt, but they had an ambivalent feeling: "Yes, we are sort of western, but we are not really western; we're really Arabs, Muslims, middle Easterners; we're really people who have our own culture and our own future and we are not sure we want to be associated with these people who are too close to Israel anyway." That was basically the nature of the attitude that existed and formed the tenuous basis of our relationship.

EDWARD G. ABINGTON

Political Office

Damascus (1979-1982)

Mr. Abington was born in Texas into a US military family and was raised in military posts in the US and abroad. An Arabic language officer and specialist in Near East Affairs, he describes his experience dealing with Israel-Arab hostilities and general regional problems while serving as Political Officer at Embassies Tel Aviv and Damascus. In his postings at the State Department in Washington, he also dealt with Near East matters. Mr. Abington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

ABINGTON: The first two years I was there, it was Talcott Seelye. Then from ’81 to ’82 it was Bob Paganelli. Seelye was summoned by Khaddam. I was head of the political section, so I always went along as notetaker and wrote all the cables. Khaddam produced a couple of walkie talkies made by Motorola and said that these walkie talkies had been recovered from the bodies of a couple of Muslim Brotherhood types and he cited this as proof that the United States was involved in aiding the Muslim Brotherhood. I remember Seelye denying it but said that he would send these walkie talkies back to Washington, the information on them and so forth, and we would try to get to the bottom of it. Of course, the Syrian suspicion was heightened because we had a ban on the export of any kind of sensitive equipment to Syria. I can recall that the Syrians had asked for Motorola walkie talkies that they wanted to use for the Syrian presidential guard. It was a major decision whether or not to approve the export license of these Motorola radios to the Syrians even though it was for presidential security. So, one can understand the suspicion of the Syrians. If they wanted these Motorola radios and we were making such a big deal out of it and at the same time they found these Motorola radios on the bodies of Muslim Brotherhood, they concluded that somehow the United States was involved.

Q: It was probably an off the shelf item.

ABINGTON: I think that’s what it turned out to be, an off the shelf item that had been smuggled into Lebanon and used as communication devices for these Brotherhood types.
ABINGTON: Let me get there first. There was kind of a mounting crisis. In early 1981, there was serious concern after the Reagan administration had taken over that the Syrian government was about to invade Jordan. Relations between Assad and Hussein had deteriorated considerably over the course of the previous year because of a really deep-seated Syrian suspicion that somehow the Hashemite government was aiding the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, I suspected that they were aiding them as well. Jordanian intelligence is very good. There certainly was a pretty fair amount of evidence that senior Muslim Brotherhood people were headquartered in Amman, and I just cannot believe that the Jordanian intelligence didn’t know they were there. Now, was Jordanian intelligence turning a blind eye or actively helping them? I don’t know. But Assad made some very threatening military moves with armored divisions toward the Jordanian border. I can remember writing a telegram. We had been notified by the Near East Bureau that the Reagan administration was increasingly concerned about what was going on. I remember writing an analysis which we sent in very high precedent to Washington. I was told there was a National Security Council meeting going on and the analysis was that these were threatening moves by Assad to try to put pressure on Hussein because of his belief that the Jordanians were helping the Muslim Brotherhood but that Assad was a very cautious person and knew that if he were to actually make a threatening move against Jordan it would inevitably lead to an Israeli military action. At the time, Begin was the prime minister and Sharon was the defense minister. It was our assessment that Assad was not going to invade Jordan but was merely trying to carry on a war of nerves and threaten the Jordanians. But given his cautiousness he would not actually send troops into Jordan and reminding people that in 1970 it was Assad’s predecessor who actually sent tanks across the border that led to the coup that brought Assad to power. This was very important because one of the options being looked at – and being recommended by some of the ideologues in the State Department – was that the U.S. should carry out air strikes against Syria not only to protect Jordan but indirectly to send a message to the Soviets that the United States would not tolerate Soviet surrogates, which Syrian was looked upon as, threatening America’s friends in the region. It was people like Rick Burt and Paul Wolfowitz who were advocating the use of U.S. air strikes against Syria.

Q: This was very early in the Reagan administration when the anti-Soviet/anti-communist force was there, before reality began to dilute it.

ABINGTON: It was before reality started, but it could have been very dangerous. These people were really ideologues. You didn’t have a very strong group of people in place at the time. Cap Weinberger was strong. But you had Dick Allen as the national security advisor. He was very weak. You had Al Haig as Secretary of State, who was kind of wacko. You had Rick Burt. You had Paul Wolfowitz. Real hardliners.

Q: Richard Perle was in there, too.

ABINGTON: Richard Perle was at the Defense Department. Today it’s kind of hard to imagine that the Reagan administration seriously considered this option but they were looking at it. The cable that I did really helped convince people that it was not as big a crisis as it appeared.
Meanwhile, the Israelis were egging us on. The Israelis were providing us intelligence in their assessment that Syria was seriously considering invading Jordan. But Begin and Sharon had their own agenda. They wanted to whack the Syrians in order to get at the Palestinians. I saw this throughout the period. As I was reading the telegrams from the defense attaches in Tel Aviv and Ambassador Sam Lewis’ talks with the Israelis, I felt that the Israelis were giving us a very one-sided, biased assessment of Syria and Syrian intentions and that they had their own agenda very much at work. But you see this frequently. Washington was predisposed to listen to the Israelis. Assad was viewed as hostile to American interests. He certainly had no defenders in Washington at the time, still doesn’t. But this lack of understanding of what was really going on and the predilection to credit Israeli assessments much more than was warranted, that was 20 years ago and we still see it today.

**Q: What happened after this crisis?**

ABINGTON: We had an excellent military attaché who was on the road all the time. He was an Army lieutenant colonel. He was first rate, spoke Arabic very well. He must have worked 80 hours a week. He and his assistant attaché, an enlisted man, were on the road all the time checking out military deployments. He had a fantastic collection of the military flashes that are painted on the rear ends of vehicles so that you know what unit they are. His reporting was terrific in terms of tracking the movement of Syrian military units. He would be up in the middle of the night driving around, darting in and out of convoys. I really felt that the Israelis... His reporting was shared with the Israelis and the Israelis - I saw this on several occasions – would say that they had an informant who alleged that the Syrians were doing a, b, and c. One specific incident had to do with the deployment of SCUD missiles. I know that we in the embassy in Damascus felt that this was a crock - the CIA station chief, the military attaché, myself – because it didn’t make sense what the Israelis were alleging in terms of deployment of SCUD missiles. This guy went out in the middle of the night at some danger to himself because Syrians were not friendly and he confirmed that – and he was instructed to do so by Washington, by DIA – the SCUD missiles had not been deployed. It was our assessment that the Israelis were using these fabricated sources or maybe they were using signal intelligence and getting us to check it out. So, we were sort of playing their game. But after the initial deployment, through his checking out the situation on the ground... In fact, this was before satellite technology really developed to the point where we had real time intelligence from the satellites. The observation of military attaches was very important. This was true in Syria and it was certainly true in Israel. The Israelis were doing things and it was our military attaches who would see what was happening on the ground that gave us the heads up on various things. The Jordanian border calmed down, but these assassinations were still going on. It was during the spring or summer of 1981 that this section of Hamas, the old section of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, really rose up against the government forces in the area. Hafez El-Assad in consultation with the Alaoui military leaders – and the Alaoui were in all the key military positions, the intelligence units, the special forces, a group called the Defense Forces which was headed by Assad’s brother and was deployed in the Damascus area to defend the Alaoui regime – they decided that they had had enough of this uprising, of these assassinations. One has to keep in mind that it was very much targeted against Alaouis. There were many Alaoui officials who were assassinated because they were Alaoui. There had been these brutal car bombings. The government decided that it was going to crush the situation once and for all. Assad’s brother, Rifaat El-Assad, deployed the Defense Forces equipped with T-72 tanks to Hamas, closed off the area, went in and just leveled this area where
the Muslim Brotherhood was holed up. It was a civilian area. Basically, they shelled it and then they brought in bulldozers and just bulldozed the whole thing. No one knows how many people were killed. I know that it’s become the common wisdom that 10,000 were killed. In fact, I don’t think anyone really knows. But the Syrians sealed off the area. No one could get in or out for about a week until it was over. That really broke the back of the Muslim Brotherhood. There were assassinations, a few bombings, after that. In fact, once when I was going from where the embassy was to a meeting with some Australian colleagues in an area west of Beirut in a suburb called Mezzay, a bomb blew up about 50 yards from my car. It was incredibly frightening because it was a bomb on one of these three-wheel Suzuki vans. The Syrian security people immediately came out and started stopping cars. There was a car in front of me, a white Peugeot. There were three people in it. They panicked and they just were yelled at by the security people to stop. They kept going. This must have been 10-15 yards from me. The security people just opened up with AK-47s and killed all three people in the car. And they turned around and started pointing their guns at me. I was in a little Volkswagen Rabbit and stopped, held my hands in the air, and kept shouting in Arabic that I was a diplomat. They came over and looked at me and told me to get out of there. I haven’t been frightened that much many times. You could see how this terrorism really had the regime on edge.

US NATO

CHARLES ANTHONY GILLESPIE
Administrative and Security Officer, US Mission to NATO
Brussels (1967-1968)

Charles Anthony Gillespie Jr., was born in Long Beach, California in March, 1935. He graduated from UCLA in 1958 with a bachelor’s degree in psychology. Following a six year term with the U.S. Army, he entered the Foreign Service in 1965 and was nominated by President Reagan as Ambassador to Colombia in 1985. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to the Philippines, Indonesia, Belgium, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Chile.

Q: What did you think of the intelligence people from the Soviet bloc countries? What were some of the threats and actions taken? They must have had to beef up their operation, too. When they learned of this NATO move, they probably had to send a whole bunch of people down to deal with this.

GILLESPIE: Yes. At the time we thought that they saw this, both on the basis of our speculation, as well as something more than speculation, as a tremendous opportunity. We were all quite convinced of this. NATO Headquarters is a very complex organization, leaving aside our U.S. Mission to NATO and our own Embassy. It was complex then and is even more so today, I believe. NATO has what is called an international staff. That staff consists of nationals of member states of NATO who are seconded by their governments or are employed directly by NATO, with the approval of the respective governments. John Abidian, for example, the head of NATO Security, retained all of his U.S. Government employment rights but had been, in effect,
seconded by the U.S. Government to this organization. We do the same thing with the United Nations and other international organizations.

I suspect that there were about 1,000 - and maybe more - NATO employees in Paris who were French nationals or nationals of third countries employed by NATO as an organization. They had no direct connection with their own, national governments. We knew that not all of those employees would move to Belgium when NATO Headquarters moved. That meant that there would be an employment boom in Brussels for the Belgians. So this was not only going to strain the employment market, because these positions were at white collar level, clerical type people, semi-professional or professional. There were also all kinds of custodial employees, janitors, cleaners, and people like that. As we knew that the Eastern Bloc intelligence services used a blanket approach, as they had when I was in Germany with U.S. Army Intelligence eight years earlier, we figured that they would try to penetrate the NATO Headquarters staff by recruiting Belgians and others to be employees of the headquarters organization and to do all of the things that low-level, intelligence agents do. For example, spotting people for recruitment, keeping track of people's movements, trying to pick up documents, learning the procedures, and doing all of those kinds of things. This would then allow the higher level recruiters or planners to figure out how they were going to penetrate or obtain top level secrets - including, in the case of NATO, real military secrets.

We might make a short digression here. Diplomatic secrets are something of an oxymoron. Secrecy in the world of diplomacy is a very transitory thing. A secret lasts until you want to make it public, hopefully under your own control. However, military secrets, including plans for a weapon and "what will you do if" kind of thing, are all supposed to be safeguarded. I think that those were some of the principal targets of the Eastern Bloc intelligence services.

So our concern was, first, how would NATO Headquarters be effective? The U.S. tended to take a paternalistic, or at least avuncular view, of an organization like NATO. We did not want to see NATO secrets compromised. We did not want to see problems of that kind. We knew that the Eastern Bloc intelligence organizations would be very actively engaged in trying to penetrate NATO. Every indication was that they were doing exactly that. The Soviet Trade Mission just a couple of doors down from our Embassy was increasing in size. There were indications that agents were entering Belgium under non-official cover. My contacts among the Belgians were concerned about this problem, some of them quite vocally worried that Belgians were going to become involved in this kind of thing. This meant that there had to be a lot of security checks made and a lot of care exercised. In the security process there isn't a whole lot that you can do, after a certain point, to maintain security.

GILLESPIE: NATO developed into a political and military alliance. Certainly, in that sense you could underscore the political aspects of certain things. So this was a very exciting time.

Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, DCM George Vest, and Robert Ellsworth. I'm trying to think of whom else I dealt with. We had a change of administrations with the election of President Nixon, and Democrats were out. Bob Schaetzel replaced John Tuthill at USEC [U.S. Mission to the European Community], and John Eisenhower replaced Ridgeway Knight as Ambassador to Belgium. Some career people were moved. An officer named Timothy Stanley, who happened to be one of the heirs of the Stanley Tool empire, was the Embassy's Minister of Defense Affairs. George Wilson, a political appointee, had been assigned as Minister of Political Affairs. When I
got to NATO, Wilson was replaced, interestingly enough, by Larry Eagleburger, later Deputy Secretary and then Secretary of State in the Bush administration. We had a whole raft of people who, I later learned, had very good reputations in European Affairs, Arms Control, and Disarmament. Raymond Garthoff, a true expert in U.S.-Soviet relations, was the Counselor for Political-Military Affairs when the NATO Mission came up to Brussels. Ray Garthoff was a free spirit in every sense of the word. Intellectually, he stretched the boundaries all of the time. He was not a drinker or anything else in a negative sense. However, he would regularly challenge the Ambassador and do all kinds of thing - often with a nice touch.

MARTEN VAN HEUVEN

Legal Advisor, US Mission to NATO

Brussels (1967-1970)


Q: What was the status of arms control when you arrived on that scene?

VAN HEUVEN: The U.S. was just beginning a long discussion with the Soviets on arms control. It was then called SALT. Gerard Smith was the U.S. rep. The negotiations were in different places but eventually there was a pattern where most of it happened in Helsinki. It was staffed by a complex delegation representing State, DOD, the Joint Chiefs, the White House, and people from Energy. Since what was at stake were nuclear weapons, each of these demands of the delegation had individual channels back to their principals in Washington, not an unusual pattern for large and sensitive undertakings of this sort. Ray Garthoff, my immediate boss, became the exec of that delegation. He came from State. His druthers were strongly in favor of the route that SALT eventually took toward START and agreed reductions by treaty. There were also bodies of opinion in Washington that were opposed to this whole idea. And so it was a tough and pretty contentious field to be working in. The big problems were generally your own people, not so much the Soviets. For the first few years the discussions did not much more than establish a basic common vocabulary between the Soviets and the Americans. This was necessary because there had never been such a discussion, nor was there a vocabulary with commonly understood terms. Each bureaucracy had produced its own thinking about nuclear weapons and its nomenclature. It was necessary to start merging these terms so that when you used a term everybody would understand what was meant by it. This became a highly esoteric exercise. In the end it was also of course a political thing. It meant a major step toward working things out with the Soviets even though they were still regarded as our enemy number one. I was the junior man on the totem pole in the group of three at NATO who worked these issues. I once crossed the Atlantic in military aircraft sent to pick him up in Brussels. In due course we established a pattern of briefings to keep our allies in NATO informed of these discussions. The reward for that effort always came in the form of the NATO communiqué at the meeting of the foreign ministers, when there would be a paragraph about these negotiations. You can go back to the NATO communiqués and, if you string them together, you can get a picture of how these talks were
going. At the same time, we were negotiating in Geneva in the so-called CCD, the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, which at that time I think was an 18-country body, on a number of other issues. One was CW [chemical warfare]. Another was biological warfare. Still another was nuclear test ban. There were other subjects like cutoff of the production of fissile materials, but no treaty ever came out of that. But the kernel for later treaties were already there, and there was activity. Not all NATO countries were involved in the CCD, but representatives from allied countries at the CCD would come to Brussels and brief the NATO Council. And the NATO Council would also express views other than talks in the communiqués. The process worked in terms of getting the whole West used to the notion that the way to deal with these issues was through negotiation and treaties. That indeed was what was going on. It meant that I had to pay a great deal of attention to the cable traffic from all capitals on these issues. I had to read through the extremely lengthy reports of all the sessions in Geneva and be familiar with them. And it meant that I became part of a coterie of diplomatic colleagues on other delegations whose job was identical to mine. So I became part of a new fraternity - totally different from the civil emergency planning fraternity - and one that was very busy with major issues between East and West.

Q: You were there at pretty much the beginning of this whole process. Was there a feeling that something was going to happen? Did you feel that this was a political maneuver to keep talking while the old standoff continued

VAN HEUVEN: Pretty much the former and not the latter. I think those of us at NATO who were involved in it, right up to the ambassador Harlan Cleveland and, later, Ambassador Bob Ellsworth, who succeeded Harlan when Nixon became president - felt that this was the future. This was the way to go. We could deal with these issues in this way. We were not yet at the point at which we arrived many years later, and are in a way still now, at which people say agreements aren’t worth the paper they’re written on, that you can’t verify them anyway, so what’s the use? We operated with a sophisticated sense that verification would not always be foolproof. In fact, it was usually one of the last things we discussed when the treaty started taking form. But to get the basic principles down in treaty form and blessed by the United Nations was a long step forward toward setting rules that provided a yardstick for behavior by major nuclear weapons states and other states. That was regarded as a good thing, just as earlier my experience with human rights had been that converting the Declaration of Human Rights into treaty form didn’t mean that people would all of a sudden stop torturing or stop misbehaving, but at least there would be a global standard that conduct could be measured against and a statement of what that conduct ought to be. That was a basic philosophy behind arms control. On a narrower but strategic level, the discussion with the Russians on nuclear weapons was thought to be a promising way to mitigating the danger of nuclear war.

Q: How did you find the Soviet delegation to these talks?

VAN HEUVEN: I was not at Helsinki and I was not in Geneva and there were no Russians at NATO, so I can’t answer that question.

Q: Speaking of Soviets, you were with NATO in August of ’68 when the Warsaw Pact moved in on Czechoslovakia. Did that send shockwaves into NATO?
VAN HEUVEN: It certainly did. It happened in the summer, in August, the way all European crises seem to happen in Europe in summer. We had been conducting a simulation exercise in the Situation Center with those of the staff who were not on holiday. Then this event occurred. I remember Harlan sending a cable - Harlan was at post - referring to the fact that the NATO ambassadors were on the beaches. Then for about a day and a half, we ran the exercise in the mornings and the real thing in the afternoon. Then we dropped the exercise and concentrated on the real thing. It was a traumatic event. It required strong U.S. leadership, which Washington provided and was executed masterfully by Cleveland with his colleagues. Those of us who watched it had a sense - was at that point still in Emergency Planning, but obviously I could watch - that here was somebody running the show at NATO who knew how to do it with a sense of confidence. On the other hand, it raised the old question that had been around ever since John Foster Dulles, namely, at what point does the West do something about these horrible situations that are within reach? The answer was nothing, but to express this outrage and take care of the refugees.

THOMAS M. T. NILES
Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO
Brussels (1971-1973)

Ambassador Thomas M. T. Niles was born in Kentucky in 1939. He received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard University and master’s from the University of Kentucky. Upon entering the Foreign Service in 1962, he was positioned in Belgrade, Garmisch, Moscow and Brussels, and also served as the Ambassador to Canada and later to Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 5, 1998.

Q: To me, it sounds like, this wasn’t his thing. In other words, he wasn’t in control. You kind of wonder if the role of ego...

NILES: Well, I don’t know that it was ego. I think he thought it was a waste of effort that wouldn’t ever amount to anything. In addition, he had some really legitimate concerns. The US and the USSR had signed SALT I in May 1972. SALT II negotiations had begun. This was really important. There is no question that in terms of international peace and stability, in the short-term at least, SALT II was much more important than getting this European security process under way. Ultimately, I think CSCE turned out to be of great importance. But, also, there is no question that SALT was important. So when Dobrynin came to Kissinger and said, “My guys are going crazy because of what your representatives are doing in Helsinki. It is going to have negative impact on the SALT negotiations,” Kissinger had good reason to be concerned. In the end, all the implied Soviet threats to abandon the SALT process turned out to be so much hot air. They weren’t going to walk away from the SALT talks because it was in their interest to have SALT II.

Q: Well, maybe we ought to stop at this point. I will put down here that we have talked, at some length, about your time with NATO on the Helsinki accords. I would like to talk to you a bit about what else you were doing, besides this, the next time. Also, about both Helsinki things and the role of the French. I think this is always interesting.
Today is August the 4th 1998. Tom, first, why don’t we stick with the Helsinki accords when the French were involved. What was their perspective, their approach to these?

NILES: France had a unique approach to CSCE among the 14 NATO Allies. During the 1960s, they were much more positive than the other Allies toward proposals for a European Security Conference, which was originally a Soviet, or Warsaw pact, proposal. This became NATO policy at the December 1967 Ministerial when the so-called “Harmel Report” - “Detente and Defence” - was adopted. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 put a hold on any developments in East-West relations. But by the fall of 1969, we were really back into it again. The French position was always somewhat different from that of the other allies. They were more positive toward CSCE and less enthusiastic about working with the other allies to develop a common position on CSCE. They were ready to discuss CSCE bilaterally with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern Europeans and less inclined to put conditions on holding a CSCE. There was one exception to that which was very important to the French position in Europe. They agreed fully with us, the British and the Germans that a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was a precondition for the CSCE. Of course, that was different for France because their position as one of the occupying powers in Germany and in Berlin was a key part of their claim to great power status.

So, the French agreed with us on that particular condition. Once we were at the Helsinki preparatory talks, which began in December 1972, the French were extremely difficult on matters of coordination at the site in Helsinki itself. In fact, they consistently refused to participate in meetings in the NATO caucus there, insisting that the CSCE was no a “bloc-to-bloc” negotiation. They would coordinate positions at NATO Headquarters. In Helsinki, they did meet regularly with their European Community colleagues. They were very active in developing what came to be known as European Political Cooperation, which began with a focus on CSCE in 1970. So, it was difficult with the French. NATO coordination with them could only take place at NATO headquarters, and to the extent we coordinated with the French in Helsinki, it tended to be bilateral. George Vest, or one of the other members of the delegation, would talk with our French counterparts. It wasn’t so much that the French disagreed with us on the substance of CSCE. It was really much more on the form. At the heart of the French position was the fear that the United States would somehow dominate the action. They claimed not to like the idea that CSCE could become a bloc-to-bloc negotiation, which it really wasn’t, because one of the most important things about CSCE, was the role of the European neutrals, who as I said emerged for the first time in a security-related negotiation.

Q: Tom, you mentioned something that never occurred to me. I have done hundreds of these interviews. Berlin has come up many times. While the French seem to deviate all over the place with us, we were always having problems with the French. I guess the French were maybe always having problems with us. I never heard it mentioned with Berlin. It seems as though on Berlin, the Soviets were never able to use the French as a wedge in Berlin related issues.

NILES: No, as a general rule, they were not able to do that, although they tried constantly to do so. The French were generally good partners as far as responsibility for “Berlin and Germany as a whole” was concerned. The Soviets would try on all sorts of ploys, but they were never able to get the French to play what would be considered a typical French role in the Berlin context. I
think the reason is very clear. France’s position in Berlin and as one of the four powers involved with questions about “Berlin and Germany as a whole” was an important component of its international, its great power standing. Why is France a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council? Today, you can ask that question quite logically. But in 1945, France was one of the victorious powers, and their occupation rights in Berlin were a key part of that position. So, Berlin issues were always watched very, very carefully at the Quai d’Orsay. Although we would disagree from time to time on some tactic, I cannot remember disagreements on substance with the French on Berlin issues, and it was, relatively speaking, quite easy to work with them in that context. I cannot recall occasions, for example, in the Quadripartite Negotiations on Berlin, which successfully concluded in September 1971 and opened the way to the convening of the multilateral talks in Helsinki in December of 1972, when the French really left the reservation. They could be difficult, but on Berlin issues, they were good partners. The other key condition that we set for beginning the CSCE preparatory talks was agreement to begin the MBFR negotiations. The French didn’t like that because they didn’t participate in MBFR

Q: Could you explain what that is?

NILES: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. For the United States, certainly for Secretary Kissinger, or then-National Security Advisor, Kissinger, CSCE was not a prime objective. This was not something that he was inclined to see as very useful from the United States point of view. I think he saw MBFR as a more useful mechanism to advance our security interests because it could, if we were successful, address some of the disparities in force levels that caused us anxiety, particularly the overwhelming advantage that the Soviet Union appeared to have, and probably did have, in armored forces, particularly in the central area along the frontier between the two states in Germany. Where we at USNATO differed with Kissinger was that we believed CSCE could also help. The United States objective in MBFR, by the way, which was adopted by NATO, was to reach agreement with the Soviets on what we called a “mixed package,” under which we would trade off reductions in United States tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for withdrawals of Soviet tanks. We never reached such agreement, but developments took care of both the preponderance of Soviet tanks and the United States tactical nuclear stockpile in Western Europe. That was our objective at the time in 1971/1972, at least at the U.S. Mission to NATO. The French refused to participate in MBFR, reflecting the fact that they were not part of NATO integrated military structure and claimed not to believe, in principle, in what they called “bloc-to-bloc negotiations.” They deeply resented the fact that the United States was successful in getting the other allies to agree that convening the MBFR talks was a precondition for convening the preparatory talks on CSCE. As I recall, it was only in July or August 1972 that Kissinger was able to secure a Soviet agreement to convene the MBFR talks. That removed the last impediment to beginning CSCE preparatory talks, which opened in Helsinki in December 1972. George Vest was named head of our Delegation and was replaced as DCM at USNATO by Eugene McCauliffe, who until then had been the Political Advisor (POLAD) at SHAPE in Mons.

Q: I would have thought that would have been a peculiar thing, because your NATO was much more than a bunch of troops sitting there, as you say, political, economic and all. At the same time, you are having this new organization (not new, but it is changing all the time). It was called the European Union, at that time, or what was it called?

NILES: Well, after 1967 it was called the European Community.
Q: *It had other members, but how did these two organizations exist?*

NILES: Coexist. They coexisted somewhat warily, I would say, rather like two dogs that meet while they are out walking, smell each other, and circle each other. When I got to NATO, the six were in the process of expanding, first 10, and then back to nine, when the Norwegians decided in a December 1972 referendum not to join the EC. At about that time, specifically in 1970, the European Community began the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC began, interesting enough, in connection with preparations for CSCE. That was the subject on which senior officials of the Foreign Ministries of the six original partners began to meet regularly. Gradually, the consultations spread out to encompass a wide range of political issues. From the very beginning, the appearance of EPC and its concentration on preparations for a possible European Security Conference (CSCE) created a delicate situation because as far as the United States was concerned, NATO was the place where we should conduct those consultations. The French, in particular, essentially hate NATO and insisted that the EPC was the place where this work would be done. Eventually, we were able to come up with a series of pragmatic compromises that maintained Western unity. Perhaps the most remarkable compromise of all occurred in the fall of 1972, just before the Helsinki Preparatory Talks began around December 1, 1972.

Both NATO and the EPC had been working on CSCE preparations, and the Belgian Delegation at NATO was the formal link between the two. We at USNATO had developed a very extensive set of proposals for CSCE - issues papers, as we called them - and by and large they were acceptable to the other Allies, including the EC members. But because of the French position, we could simply approve these papers in NATO. In the French view, that approach suffered two fatal flaws: it gave primacy to NATO, which they hated; and the papers had been largely done by the United States, which they also hated. By October 1972, when we had agreed to begin the Helsinki Talks around December 1, the question came up of how the Allies would reach formal agreement on this great mass of material, which included what became the Western proposals for in the four CSCE issue areas: 1) principles of interstate relations and confidence-building measures (CBMs); 2) human rights, or humanitarian issues as they came to be called; 3) economic issues; and, 4) the possibility of some “permanent machinery.” As I said, most of the basis work on those “issue papers” had been done in the U.S. Mission to NATO with contributions from other Delegations. But, overwhelmingly, it was our product. It was not a U.S. government product because Washington basically wasn’t involved. EUR/ RPM was consulted from time to time and cleared the papers. But, basically, the papers were all drafted and in our Mission. As I said, Leo Reddy and Jim Goodby were the principal authors. Leo must have drafted as many as 20 papers. The question arose as to how were going to reach agreement among the Allies on those papers given the fact that the EPC, consisting of the original six members plus the four applicants (UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) were also working separately on the same papers. In the end, we worked out an agreement under which the NATO “issues papers” were passed to the EPC via the Belgian Delegation to NATO, approved en bloc by the EPC, passed back to NATO by the Belgians and approved by the NATO Council around November 15, 1972. All of this procedure, I repeat, was developed solely to satisfy the French position which was based on a profound dislike of NATO and of the United States, at least in so far as we were an actor in European affairs.
In any case, in December 1972 the CSCE Preparatory Talks began in Helsinki. George Vest left his position as DCM at USNATO and was replaced by Eugene V. McCauliffe, who had been the POLAD at SHAPE. Leo Reddy and I alternated as members of George’s team in Helsinki, which also included an officer from Embassy Moscow, either Mark Garrison or Stape Roy, an officer from EUR/RPM (Arva Floyd) and an officer from ACDA. Theoretically, the head of our delegation was our Ambassador to Finland, at that time a former Governor of Nebraska Val Petersen. He was generally harmless. The Finnish MFA provided the secretariat, and several of the members were old friends from the Finnish Embassy in Moscow, Matti Hekkanen and Arto Mansala, both of whom subsequently became very senior Finnish diplomats.

It was a fascinating experience, particularly for elements such as the interaction of the two German states and the tentative steps by the other members of the Warsaw Pact to assert some small hints of independence from the USSR. It was also, as I noted, a very sensitive exercise in Alliance management, in particular the relationship between NATO and the European Community. George Vest handled that with real skill. But again, even recognizing that Irish neutrality might have been a small problem, the real obstacle to fruitful coordination in Helsinki was France. The French would not participate in NATO caucus meetings in Helsinki, although they would discuss the same issues at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

We concluded the talks around June 5, 1973 with agreement on the “Blue Book,” which was essentially an annotated agenda for formal negotiations which began in Geneva that fall. I went back to USNATO, and learned to my surprise that the Department had decided to send me back to Moscow after little more than two years away.

Q: Why did that happen?

NILES: The period of so-called *detente* between the US and the USSR led to a major increase in the size of Embassy Moscow, and they simply did not have enough people with Moscow experience and Russian language skills to staff it. The needed me, or so they said, to head the new Commercial Office, which was located outside the Embassy and was assigned the task of promoting US-Soviet trade.

The remainder of my time at USNATO coincided with Ambassador Rumsfeld’s first months at USNATO. He left the sinking ship of the Nixon Administration in March of 1973 and came to USNATO as Ambassador. It was his first real exposure to national security policy, but he was a very quick study and did a very good job as Ambassador. He was particularly adept in my time with him during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 when we went to DEFCOM III and may well have been on the brink of a war with the USSR in the Middle East. That required a great deal of careful management at NATO, and I thought Ambassador Rumsfeld handled it very well. He was a tough boss, but it could be fun to work with him. I introduced him to squash while we were in Brussels. He was a fierce competitor.

**STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR**

Political Officer

**Brussels (1973-1976)**

Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO
Brussels (1981-1987)

Ambassador Stephen Ledogar was born in New York in 1929, and received his BA from Fordham University. He served overseas in the US Navy from 1949-1952. Ledogar entered the Foreign Service in 1959 and was posted in Montreal, Milan, Quang Tri Province, Saigon, Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He was Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 1, 2000.

Q: In a way, the Soviets started the thing by introducing the missiles.

LEDOGAR: That’s right, but they wanted to try to say, “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” They tried to prevent NATO’s counter-deployment. But they were unsuccessful.

Just to set the context, recall that the INF negotiations began in Geneva in November, 1981. Paul Nitze headed the U.S. negotiating team and Mike Glitman, my predecessor as DCM at U.S. NATO, was chosen as his deputy. In early summer of 1982 the famous “walk-in-the-woods” took place in the countryside near St. Cergue, Switzerland, 15 or 20 miles north of Geneva. Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, alone on a stroll, worked out a tentative INF compromise on their own personal responsibility, and each undertook to propose the idea to their authorities. I don’t know whether Moscow or Washington hated the idea more, but as I recall, the Soviet Ambassador was the first to say that the trial balloon didn’t fly at home. In November 1983 when deployment of U.S. INF missiles began in Germany, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks in Geneva. It was not until March 1985 that the new, and eventually successful, round of INF talks started again in Geneva. By this time Glitman was chief U.S. negotiator, and he brought home the bacon.

Let me just touch upon an indirect role that I played in the NATO two-track, or dual-track, Euromissile episode. As I mentioned, the INF consultations within the Alliance had two tracks, the hardware track called the NATO “High Level Group” (HLG), and the arms control track called the “Special Group” or the “Special Consultative Group” (SCG). National representatives to these groups were high level officials from capitals who came together periodically at NATO, where they would consult in an exploratory fashion, each representative speaking not necessarily on behalf of his government, but with knowledge of the general direction of his government’s thinking on INF. Both groups were chaired by Americans, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy for the HLG (most of the time this was Richard Perle), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs for the SCG (most of the time this was Rick Burt).

While these officials traveled to Brussels with small groups of experts from capitals, the essential business of each meeting took place not at the formal meeting itself, but at a dinner at my residence for heads of delegation. In addition to spreading out a fine meal for the 16 to 18 of us in the dining room around one big table, (my wife and the household staff saw to this behind the scenes), it was my job to chair the meetings as a host, recognizing those who wanted to talk, making sure that everyone had a chance to speak, and, as diplomatically as possible, squelching side comments or conversations. These heads of delegation dinners, and my wife and I put on perhaps 50 or 60 of them over a six-year period, developed a protocol of their own. The USG sprang for a special dining room table, as long and wide as my dining room and space for waiters allowed. We sat with me in the middle on one side, facing a mirror behind the opposite side, which helped me see everyone easily, and the American chairman of the Group sat opposite me as co-host. The representatives of the five INF basing countries were assigned on a rotational
basis to the places of honor at each side of the two hosts. Others were rotated from month to month around the other seats “below the salt.” From time to time, especially in the SCG, the heads of delegations would have a special guest like Mike Glitman, our INF negotiator from Geneva. I needed to have a solid grasp of the details of the INF issues but it was not my job to speak to substance, rather it was to create the atmosphere so that others could. Needless to say, there were extensive physical and electronic security measures in place at my residence for these meetings. But here we’ve gotten ahead of ourselves talking about the two-track decision. Let’s go back.

Q: Were you feeling the pressure or concern about things such as withdrawing troops from NATO and so on? Was this a sword that was hanging over all of you all the time?

LEDOGAR: Yes, it was. It found many expressions. Many Americans were instinctively opposed to the U.S. continuing to bear such a heavy burden so long after World War II with 300-some odd thousand U.S. troops and so many billions of dollars per year to defend Europe. Why weren’t the Europeans doing more themselves? That issue was constantly before us. We were constantly having to respond as best we could to questions about continued U.S. presence in Europe. The standard response was that since we perceived that the threat to our national interests originated with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, we’d much rather confront that threat far from our shores rather than have our troops back here in North America where in the event of WWIII, we would have to fight our way back onto the Continent yet a third time this century.

Then when you asked about how much it was costing us, I can remember at one point the answer that was given in congressional testimony was, “Well, Senator, our bill for our commitment to NATO is either $3 billion or $4 billion or $9 billion, depending upon how you count.” That was a perfectly defensible answer. What do you count? Do you count all the supply tail of deployed forces back at Fort Bragg, for example? Do you count all the support structure that’s there in Germany, but which is backup so we can deploy forces all through the Middle East in the event of an extra-NATO crisis? There were so many different questions that needed to be answered before you could begin to answer the question as to what NATO cost us. That was a constant theme. We were proactive in congressional relations about U.S. troop levels in Europe when we were at our best. Certainly under Abshire we were. We would say, “Senator, you come on out to NATO. We’ll give you a thorough exposure to the issues, walk the terrain, and talk to some of our allies” and so forth. Our objective was to get them to begin to appreciate the realities, not to change their minds.

That proved to be a very important approach in the arms control negotiations. Once the U.S. got to sit down with the Soviet Union in Geneva on SALT and START and INF, we then started in Vienna with the Conventional Talks in Europe. Paul Nitze, who had left the INF talks in the hands of Glitman to finish them off, stayed back in Washington as a special advisor to the Secretary of State on arms control matters. He made a special point of encouraging the Senate to appoint from its membership arms control observers. These folks at Paul’s urging would take periodic trips to Geneva and stop by Vienna on the way just to be kept exposed and up to speed with what was going on. In the meantime, key staffers were given cables and kept current with developments in the negotiations. It was sometimes a hell of a drag in terms of timing, when the Senate Arms Control observers arrived on short notice, but when it came to earning support and, more importantly, consent to treaty ratification, it really paid off.
Q: I’d like to probe the feeling about nuclear weapons. To the layman, you look upon Europe and tactical nuclear weapons seem to be a complete oxymoron. How can something be tactical and be nuclear? How did you approach it and as you went on this thing, did you change? How did you feel about what people were talking about?

JONES: That is a marvelously complex subject with all of the iterations that you suggest. How did I personally feel about it? I felt that the weapons could be used. I did not feel that the use of one nuclear weapon or even substantial numbers of nuclear weapons meant that there was without any question going to be a world annihilation. I felt that nuclear weapons in Europe were absolutely necessary for us to be able to hold off the threat of a Soviet attack. There was a complex NATO European working group going on here as to where and how a war could or might be fought and under what circumstances. I remember the very first NATO nuclear-oriented meeting I attended. I was still ignorant about some of this. At the same time, we were urging an increase in European conventional force capabilities. There was a three percent plan in which we were steadily pushing the Europeans to increase conventional capabilities across a wide spectrum of weaponry and of capabilities. Only one element of this spectrum was improved nuclear weapons and improved nuclear capability. But the question that I raised in effect was, “Why are you Europeans so resistant to increasing conventional capabilities?” I will never forget a German response that said, “We have no interest in making Europe safe for conventional war.” They had been there. They had done that. They wanted – or at least this group of Germans representing that government at that time – very clearly wanted it understood that there would be a nuclear war if there was a war. They did not want a situation in which they were going to be forced into an extended conventional slugger match with the Russians. As a result, we had elaborate scenarios as to what would happen under which conventional circumstances. We did not believe that we would be able to hold for an extended period of time with conventional weapons. Then the question would come as to what type of a nuclear scenario you would use? I bought into this. In honesty, I still think it not only would have worked but did work. We did indeed convince the Russians that if there was going to be a war it would end by being a nuclear war, that we would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. I don’t think we would have hesitated. We would have thought, but we wouldn’t have hesitated. We would rather have gone to nuclear weapons than to have lost Europe as a result of a fight with the Soviets. We just weren’t going to lose Europe. We had convinced ourselves and the Europeans that a loss of Europe to the Soviets...
would mean a very, very isolated America and eventually our loss as well, that we would end by losing our own freedom and security if European freedom and security were lost. As we were not willing to expend the financing or the social commitment to build conventional forces to a level that we thought we would be able to stave off a Soviet attack, we depended as well on nuclear weapons to do so.

At the same time, there were doubters. There were a set of European doubters as well. This was a question of whether our use of nuclear weapons would result in heavier strikes by the Soviets in which case the argument was that we would only lose the war faster if we resorted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons within Europe. This was an argument that, happily, was never resolved by real testing. But it was an ongoing, persistent argument.

Q: I would imagine that the neutron bomb, enhanced tactical weapon, became a hallmark of the Carter administration. Could you talk about that? Explain what the issue was and particularly with Helmut Schmidt and how we were seen at your level.

JONES: In many respects, this was something that I was involved in from the very beginning. I was involved in it to a degree on the Washington side. It was something in which I was engaged throughout my NATO career and in which I followed on and which was one of the major strands of my entire Foreign Service career. It goes back to the question of nuclear weapons being one aspect of NATO’s modernization program. It is part of the entire three percent real increase in budget and improvement of NATO’s defensive capabilities. One element of this effort was tactical nuclear force modernization, “TNF modernization.” There was a full range of discussion of what was needed, how it was needed, and under what circumstances it was to be used. Part of it was based on the problem that we foresaw of using aircraft as the major delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. These aircraft were vulnerable in certain ways. We had dual capable aircraft which theoretically delivered conventional weaponry during the conventional battle but were also being reserved for the potential of delivering nuclear weapons. There was a conceptual problem. You were going to use all of your aircraft to fight the war on the conventional basis. But you assumed you were going to be losing aircraft and losing ground during the conventional war. You had to reserve in your mind and plans a certain number of aircraft for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. What would happen at the juncture when the war itself was raging and perhaps even in the balance but you had drawn down your conventional aircraft, your dual capable aircraft, to the point in which you only had enough left to give your nuclear strikes? Would you then have to pull all of those aircraft out of the battle in order to prepare them for using nuclear weapons? At the same time, it would mean that the conventional war that was perhaps at a tip point was now going to be lost, forcing you to go nuclear. At the same time, was this the type of signal that you would end by giving to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces that your aircraft had now been withdrawn, so you were about to go nuclear? Would that preempt nuclear strikes on their part to avoid getting a nuclear hit from us? This was a very serious conceptual problem. At the same time, we were reluctant to go through the political and military upgrading of our tactical nuclear missile force in Europe. This was at the time when the Soviets were beginning to deploy SS-20s. The deployment of Soviet SS-20s was seen and viewed as an increasingly serious threat by the Europeans, particularly by the Germans. They were saying, “We have to have a response to this. We have to have an American response to balance the Soviet missiles.” Otherwise, the Soviets might come to the conclusion that the Americans would be willing to sacrifice existing forces in Europe to preserve the United States from any nuclear
strikes while only if the United States deployed nuclear weapons in Europe would we be able to threaten the Soviets appropriately with intermediate range weaponry that would assure that if a war started there wouldn’t be a “burnt space between two green spaces.” Well, our first response was essentially a political-military reaction rather than a political reaction. Our first reaction was that our existing strategic forces and nuclear forces in Europe were more than enough to counter the increase in Soviet intermediate range nuclear weapons and their SS-20 deployments. We were hypothesizing at that point that the SS-20s might be just a replacement for their SS-4s and 5s, which were obsolete by that time for a number of technical reasons. They were much more vulnerable than the 20s would be. The 20s were mobile, the 20s had multiple warheads, the 20s were solid fueled or better fueled, all of these aspects that made the 20s a clear modernization. We sent a couple of high powered briefing teams to NATO in the late summer of ’76 in an attempt to convince the Europeans that our strategic systems, our SSBNs, submarine based ballistic missiles, which were nuclear submarines that were actually allocated to SACEUR, were sufficient NATO responses, committed dedicated forces to counter the SS-20s. We thought we had convinced them. We seriously thought that we had convinced them. Until Helmut Schmidt spoke in London. I can’t remember the date of it. He forced us to conclude on a political level that the force deployment that we had, our current strategic forces, were not sufficient to respond to the new SS-20 deployment. So, we then got into and began discussions on both a military and a political level with the Europeans. What became the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Groups began to meet and work out a question of how we would respond.

JACK MENDELSOHN
Political-Military Officer, US Mission to NATO
Brussels (1977-1979)

Dr. Jack Mendelsohn was born in California in 1934. He received his Bachelor’s Degree from Dartmouth College and his Master’s from the University of Chicago. His foreign assignments include Port-au-Prince, Warsaw and Brussels. Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed him on February 12, 1997.

Q: One of the issues I am thinking of at that time, and maybe it wasn’t your thing, was the so-called neutron bomb. Another was the SS-20 and those things. From your perspective and you’re watching the operation, how did we deal with those and other issues?

MENDELSOHN: I don’t remember the neutron bomb thing. I know the story. When did we decide not to deploy it? Was it ’76?

Q: It couldn’t have been because Carter was elected in ’76 and didn’t serve until ’77 and it was Carter…I suspect it was right in the middle of your time there. He got what’s his name…Schmidt, Helmut Schmidt, out on a limb and then pulled it back.

One of the people I’ve interviewed is Vlad Lehovic, and Vlad was saying he could hardly wait to get back and vote against Carter after that, he was so mad.
MENDELSOHN: I cannot remember that well enough to make any good comments. I do remember the SS-20 very well.

Q: All right. Could you talk about that, what are we talking about? What were the responses that you saw within our delegation and in dealing with others?

MENDELSOHN: Well, what we are talking about is that during the late ‘70s the Russians began to deploy a new intermediate range missile targeted on Europe and NATO countries, the SS-20 with three warheads. This was replacing the SS-5s and 6s, I guess it was, the previous, rather clunky intermediate range missiles that the Russians had.

Schmidt had basically ticked off a debate when he argued that as a result of the SALT Treaties, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were at a strategic standoff. That neither side was likely to use those weapons against the other side because it meant the destruction of both of the major countries. So that left, in Schmidt’s analytic framework, that left a kind of a lower level confrontation in Europe between the Russian threat or the Soviet threat to Europe and the NATO and U.S. response to that threat.

He thought it was unlikely in the SALT environment that the U.S. would use its strategic forces to defend Europe, therefore it had to have intermediate range nuclear forces, tactical nuclear weapons, to respond to the Russian-Soviet tactical threat or intermediate range nuclear threat. And as that threat was being modernized, then the question arose did the United States or NATO in general, NATO countries, need to upgrade their tactical nuclear weapon response to this Russian-Soviet SS-20 modernization?

Now what’s interesting, and I remember this very well. The initial response of the USG, United States Government, was that there was no increase or real substantive qualitative change in the threat. The SS-20 was a modernization; it was replacing the 5s and 6s. We had thousands, at that time somewhere between 7,200 and 7,500 tactical nuclear weapons on NATO’s side. These were still available and would remain available to counter whatever the Russians… Soviets… I’ve actually trained myself very well and I don’t say Soviets anymore and now it’s hard to remember to say that… to counter whatever the Soviets were up to.

I remember. I believe it was in the fall/winter, ’77, ’78, when I first got to NATO. I got there in the summer of ’77. Les Gelb, who was the head of PM, led a briefing team of U.S. Government officials to brief NATO to show them how we had more than adequate tactical nuclear weapons forces available to respond to whatever the Russians were up to. So the initial U.S. response to this SS-20 threat was, hey, we’ve got thousands of tactics. We’ve even got some on submarines, which are nominally strategic but which are dedicated to NATO. We’ve got all the French and British forces. We’ve got all the other artillery shells, bombs, aircraft carrier launch stuff from the Mediterranean and elsewhere. We’ve got more than enough stuff to handle any nuclear weapons threat, or any conventional attack that would call for a flexible response and that you might think wouldn’t involve our strategic forces, we’ve got options coming out of our ears. I believed that and I still do. That it was the right thing to do and the right way to go.

I was in NATO, not in Washington, but somewhere between the fall/winter of ’77 and ’78 and, I guess, ’78, somewhere between that briefing and the middle of 1978 we changed our minds. The U.S. changed its mind. At the time, my recollection is under the pressure of the Germans who I
think miss-analyzed the situation. There was a lot of pressure from the German military that we had to have a response to the SS-20. We decided that we were going to get NATO to agree to accept deployment of an upgraded Pershing missile, Pershing II, and a new cruise missile that we had been touting for some decades. It was certainly since the early 70s that the cruise missile was sort of the weapon of the future, a new cruise missile that would also have a nuclear warhead.

I cannot now remember. It was going to be some…I’ll make this up…it was going to be some 400 odd cruise missiles and some 200 odd Pershing II's we are talking. NATO decided that somewhere between 400 and 600 warheads would be required, not to redress the threat but to continue the deterrent capabilities. There was some fancy language to justify this. And that decision was taken…I cannot now remember, but I think it was taken in ’78 or actually in ’79. It was worked up to after the decision was made somewhere in ’78 that we were not going to argue with our Allies, that we had more than enough. We were going to buy their concerns and then get NATO to agree to accept about 600 warheads.

Basically that decision was made in ’79, and I left in the middle of ’79. The Russians, of course, were absolutely livid about this. They thought this was an upgrading of the threat facing them. We argued that it was a response, or one of the arguments was that it was a response to the upgrading of the threat facing us. Between ’79 and ’83, we were in a very bad patch with the Russians; I would say probably the worst patch that we have had in the Cold War. Starting with the invasion in December of ’79 by the Russians of Afghanistan, and ending in 1983 when we began to deploy these missiles that had been decided, intermediate range cruise and Pershing missiles. We deployed them, I think in November of ’83 at which point the Russians broke off negotiations with us on arms control in Geneva across the board and didn’t come back until ’85, after Gorbachev came in.

We had, meanwhile, some major political changes in the U.S. Reagan was elected and he had a much harder line vis-a-vis the Russians, and of course Brezhnev was on his last legs in ’79, succeeded by Chernenko and Andropov, also on their last legs when they were elected. So the ’79 to ’83 period was really a pretty dreary one. But all of this in sort of, if you will, the mid to late ’70s. We were moving, when I was at NATO, towards deployment of these intermediate range systems.

**MAYNARD WAYNE GLITMAN**

**Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO**

**Brussels (1977-1981)**

Ambassador Maynard Wayne Glitman was born in Illinois in 1933. He received his BA from the University of Illinois and his MA from Fletcher School of Law and diplomacy MA, and served in the U.S. Army in 1957. His postings abroad include Nassau, Ottawa, Paris, Brussels, Geneva and Vienna, and served as the ambassador to Belgium. James S. Pacy interviewed the ambassador on April 24, 2001

Q: Where there quite a few congressional visits to NATO while you were there?
GLITMAN: Yes. And I think I may have mentioned earlier that, when they came to Paris when we were there, we had a fair number of visits there and part of it was work but part of it was not. I’d say it was part work and part other stuff. When they came to NATO, they came to work. They came to learn about the organization, how things were proceeding at that time, they had specific questions to ask. Obviously it was of importance to us that they came away from NATO with a correct view of the organization. Its flaws as well as its qualities. And how they might be able to keep it working properly and in America’s interest. There were lots of visits and I think by and large, as I said, these were serious visits.

There are a couple of other aspects of this that I would like to mention at this juncture. First, I think it is useful to know who was in charge of the HLG and the SCG during this period leading up to this important decision of December 1979. Dave McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, headed up the U.S. team going to the HLG. And Reginald Bartholomew, I don’t know precisely what position Reggie was holding at that time, but he headed up the SCG team. Both of them did a superb job. Indeed, we were very fortunate throughout the period of negotiations beginning with this period, this lead up to the ’79 decision and continuing until the ratification. The people who represented and chaired the meeting for the U.S. side of the HLG and the SCG were all superb. Each one of them had their special qualities and it just seemed that the right person, with the right qualities, was in the right job at the right time. That was, to give those two people credit for having brought that decision to fruition.

The decision itself merits a little more discussion. I pointed out that it became the basis for the U.S. negotiating position. It had several principles which we carried with us into the negotiations and which we would not and did not abandon. Among these, perhaps, was that we made clear that any future limitations on U.S. systems, principally designed for theater missions, should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. In other words, no unilateral disarmament. Limitations on U.S. and Soviet long range theater nuclear system should be negotiated bilaterally, we said in the SALT-3 framework in a step-by-step approach. There was no SALT-3, but the key here was that it would be a bilateral negotiation between us and the Soviets. That also remained part of the process. A very important issue. The immediate objective of negotiations should be establishment of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet land based, long range theater nuclear missile systems and what we were doing here was defining what systems we believe we should be negotiating on. You will note that aircraft are excluded and anything that has to do with ship-based systems would also be excluded from the negotiation. And we stuck with that principle throughout the negotiation. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights, and that was the key crucial principle. The Soviets had a lot more systems at the beginning of the negotiations than we did. And one of their constant themes was “We have to reduce more to get down to a low number.” And our counter to that was, “It doesn’t matter who has to reduce how much of what. There should be no bonus for having produced more and going first. What really matters is, we end up at an equal number for the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” In addition, we talked about adequate verifiability and we made verification a very important principle for us throughout the negotiation. Those were really the basic guidelines if you will, that the American negotiators took into the negotiations. I think we can say without any doubt that at the end of the negotiations all of those principles were found in the treaty, all of those were maintained. And
the fact that they came out of this process of consultation strengthened our hand enormously, in insisting upon these principles forming the backbone of the treaty itself.

While we had these principles and a strong agreement within the alliance, we could not move forward to negotiate, unless we had a negotiating partner. Unfortunately, in December of 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. That put a whole new light on the prospects of negotiating with them. I should have added that we also made a move on MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiation, in December of '79, to try to give some impetus to that negotiation which dealt with conventional weapons in Europe. That negotiation, the prospect of an INF negotiation both looking good as we came off the December 12 decision, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put them both in sort of a cold storage for a while. We continued to try to persuade the Soviets to respond to our initiative, to see if they would come to the table; throughout 1980, even with the Afghan thing in the background. But it really wasn’t until Helmut Schmidt, German Chancellor visited Moscow in fall of 1980 that the Soviets began to show interest, began to hint that there could be some negotiation. I think it is important to note that it was the German Chancellor’s visit that acted as a catalyst for the Soviet response. Germany was crucial in the entire INF picture. Soviets spent a lot of time and effort to try to persuade elements of the German public to take a friendlier view towards them, and more negative views toward NATO. It was a form of battleground in a way for people’s support. We’ll see in the end that the ballot box was more important than the people out in the streets. But the Soviets at this point were not persuaded of that yet. We’ll see that eventually they did become persuaded.

In any case, following Schmidt’s discussion with Brezhnev, it took a while but eventually the US and the Soviet Union agreed to preliminary talks, talks about talks, which would involve INF, or Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, systems and they agreed to begin in Geneva in October of 1980. These talks only lasted for a month. We had an election, as you may recall at this point. But they did cover a good deal of ground. I went back and read all the memorandums on their conversations, verbatim text from both sides that were exchanged, in preparation for going to Geneva. Anything that we had to cover for the rest of the negotiation came up at these preliminary talks, so they were useful in helping define where the sides positions were to start with. Of course, after only a month we couldn’t get too much further along.

As I said, there was an election, and Ronald Reagan became the president of the U.S. The change of administration, of course, meant a new look at all policies, which is a normal thing in the U.S., and among the issues that came up for a new look was the INF issues and whether there should or should not be negotiations. There was indeed some question, whether there would be negotiations. There were some in the administration, who were opposed to the negotiations. But in the end, the decision was made to move forward and to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union. It took another year after the election, before those negotiations did begin. But they would be a major element of the rest of my career.

Vietnam
Q: Did you get any feel for relations with the CIA, for example, in the Embassy?

COTTER: No. In the field, you worked some together. I must say, I don’t recall any experience with the Phoenix program, in my district. We had CIA people in the province but not the district. The Intel people were Lieutenants in the Army. I think relations with the CIA were okay, except that the CIA was again like everyone else, interested in, not necessarily what was going on, but what we had determined we wanted to go on. My feeling is that our effort in Vietnam would have been very successful. We lost the war not in Vietnam, but back here in the States. By the time I got back in 1973, this was very obvious. That was two years before we left, but we had already started cutting back significantly on the assistance we were giving the Vietnamese. One of the hardest things I ever had to do in the Foreign Service was one of the things we ended up doing back there during my second stint, was in essence, telling the Vietnamese who were accusing us of abandoning them, “No we aren’t. I am here as actual, physical proof that we aren’t abandoning you.” Of course, we were abandoning them. For instance, in 1971 the Vietnamese fired off 105 millimeter rounds every evening. That didn’t happen in 1973. Well, maybe, you say, because the place was pacified, but I think the reason was because there was no longer a steady supply of shells. The Vietnamese had to account much better for expendable items than we did. They weren’t going to use up shells that weren’t going to be replaced. When the war ended, it wasn’t a bunch of rag, tag, cousins in black pajamas that came down the pike, it was the North Vietnamese Army driving Soviet tanks. In fact, the Russians supplied that force. At that time, we had stopped supplying the South Vietnamese, essentially. We lost the war because people in the United States were not willing to see it through. The government hadn’t articulated the reasons for it, or whatever, or the press had misplayed it. Now, again, we are now at a time in history when it is easy to sit with hindsight, after Vietnam and the Cold War, and look back on the inevitability of various things. I’m not certain whether the war itself created as much suffering for the Vietnamese people as what happened to the South after they were taken over by the North. In many ways, not only reeducation of individuals, but simply the reorientation of what, frankly, is very free, economy-oriented people. The Vietnamese, at least the South Vietnamese could not have taken very well to whatever form of collectivization was forced on them. How that turns out, I’m not certain. I think we had good and laudable goals, if we had had the ability to articulate it back here and carry it through, it would have been
worthwhile. We would have saved Cambodia imaginable suffering. We would have saved the Laotians significant suffering, and we certainly would have saved the South Vietnamese significant suffering, which was due, to a significant part, to us having lost interest in that adventure.

ROBERT H. NOOTER
Assistant Administrator, USAID

Robert H. Nooter was raised in St. Louis, Missouri. He attended one semester at Purdue, joined the Marines during WW II and was assigned to a V-12 Unit. However, he graduated from the University of California with a B.S. in Industrial Engineering in 1947. He was called back into the Marines in 1951 to fight in the Korean War. In 1961, he attended courses at the Harvard Business School. He became interested in government service during the Kennedy Administration, and international affairs during his service in the military. He also served in Liberia and Uruguay. He was interviewed by W. Haven North on January 6, 1996.

Q: Did you have any meeting with Kissinger or any dealings with...?

Q: There was the issue there of having economic assistance and development assistance in the same country, and people were very upset because development assistance, I think, was being used in Vietnam for purposes that were not development. I've forgotten the issue now but...

NOOTER: My view at that time, and I remember saying this in staff meeting, was that 80% of the support for the foreign aid program was for cold war reasons and 20% was for humanitarian reasons. And if you had to rely on the humanitarian alone, if you want to use that term for the purest kind of development assistance, you would get about 20% of the funds you would get if there was a communist threat in the world. I remember believing that at that time and I am inclined to think that it was true.

But now what has been interesting to me, as things have developed now with the breakup of the Soviet Union and so on, is that in a sense aid has become more ensconced in our thinking than it was in 1970 because I think in spite of the fact that the aid budgets are being cut, there is a recognition that there is a U.S. role providing foreign assistance even in spite of the absence of a communist threat. And this support is somewhat larger than I would have anticipated 25 years ago. We haven't seen this fully played out yet. We don't know what it will look like in 5 years or 10 years.

What I'm saying is that the support even for the development assistance part of the program was based on political reasons to a fairly large extent anyway. It was just that Supporting Assistance was more directly related to a situation that was politically important than the average situation in the developing world.

Q: Well, we'll come back to that later. I think the specific point, and I can't remember precisely...did you ever meet with Senator Fulbright?
NOOTER: Oh yes, many times.

Q: Was the view that economic assistance particularly was getting us in situations where we had then to get more and more involved, and that therefore certain legislative restrictions or processes were starting to be built in, limiting where we could provide this Supporting Assistance, and you couldn't have it in the same country where there was development assistance and so on. Because there was something at the time trying to use Supporting Assistance in a way that he thought was contrary to what Congress' intent -- I can't remember the issue?

NOOTER: Yes, I do remember that but I don't think that was very broadly accepted except by Fulbright himself. What did happen was that before Vietnam, aid was something that liberals would support and conservatives would be against. And out of Vietnam did come liberal antagonism in some quarters to foreign involvement of almost any kind, including development assistance. For example, you had Fulbright, who had been a person inclined to support foreign aid, who turned against it, and then he became an ally of the conservatives who were willing to cut aid for traditionally conservative reasons. But I don't think the Fulbright view that aid would tend to get the U.S. involved in foreign entanglements was one that was broadly accepted. Certainly it was not by other aid supporters such as Hubert Humphrey or even people like Senators Stennis, Percy, Javits or Aiken.

Q: Well we can come back to that. We've covered a lot. (end of tape.)

NOOTER: In 1974 the Agency reorganized again. The AID management found Supporting Assistance was spreading to different regions in the world, and it was thought of as not very efficient to have this all managed from a single Bureau. I must say that I got a lot of sympathy in the years that I was managing the programs in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. It was kind of a running joke that one person would be burdened with all of these hot spots. But in fact it was all quite fascinating.

WOLFGANG J. LEHMANN
Consul General
Can Tho (1973-1974)
Deputy Chief of Mission
Saigon (1974-1975)

Wolfgang J. Lehmann was born in Germany in 1921. He joined the Department of State in 1949 and served in Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Vietnam. He was interviewed by Robert Martens in 1988.

Q: Wolf Lehmann went to Vietnam in June 1973, initially as Consul General in the city of Can Tho, which is located in the Mekong Delta. He then went to Saigon in March 1974 as Deputy Chief of Mission to Ambassador Graham Martin. For frequent periods he was Charge d'Affaires during that 13 months or so prior to the final fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975.
This period from the time that Mr. Lehmann arrived in Vietnam was one in which support for the war in the United States was declining. We were getting into the beginning of the second Nixon Administration. Watergate was opening severe wounds in the American body politic.

As time went on and as public support for the war declined, the difficulty of gaining material support from Congress for the South Vietnamese Government was increasing drastically, as well. This was a time, of course, when there were no American military forces in the country. These had long been withdrawn. This was a period when it was still hoped that somehow the South Vietnamese Government would be able to maintain its independence from the communist North Vietnam.

With that background, I believe we are in a position to begin the interview.

There were many opinions as to why South Vietnam -- that is, the Republic of Vietnam -- ceased to exist at the end of April 1975. Some people claim that the fate of Vietnam was sealed from the very moment that the Paris agreements were signed in December 1972 over the strong objections of President Thieu, and that all that really remained was the so-called decent interval before the end. Do you agree with that view?

LEHMANN: I think the Paris accords were severely deficient in several respects, but I don't agree that with the signing of the accords the end was preordained to be what it eventually came to be at the end of April 1975.

The agreement was, indeed, deficient, in certainly two major respects, the most important of which was that it allowed the North Vietnamese Army to remain in South Vietnam.

Another deficiency was the fiction that there existed something called the PRG, the People's Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and that we accepted the notion that this fictitious entity was a legitimate party to the Paris agreements. That, incidentally, is why we at the embassy, whenever we had to refer to the PRG, we always put it in quotes. We never let it stand on its own as we would for the DRV, which was the formal official title of North Vietnam.

Hanoi certainly considered the Paris accords to be a victory for them and publicly said so after the fall of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, I don't believe that the end was inevitable. Everything depended on whether the United States and South Vietnam were able and willing -- and I want to underscore "willing" -- and primarily the United States, would insist that the agreement be carried out as written.

It was particularly important that the United States show willingness to back up that insistence with some sort of force if that should become necessary. That would not necessarily have meant the re-introduction of American ground forces, but certainly the possible reintroduction of American air power was a factor in the background. Of course, that did not come to be.

Immediately after the Paris agreements went into effect, Congress, at the initiative of Senator Church, prohibited the reintroduction of U.S. combat forces into Vietnam. That bit of Congressional myopia -- or worse -- left us very little leverage to insist that Hanoi honor the terms of the agreement. In fact, our aid to the Republic of Vietnam, both military and economic, was progressively reduced very soon after the agreements came into effect, and U.S.
intervention, of course, became increasingly remote as a political crisis developed in Washington, a crisis that eventually led to the Nixon resignation.

Q: I believe that, on the other hand, Soviet and Chinese aid was continuing, or at least Soviet aid. Could you comment on the extent of that support and the contrast between that flow of communist aid to North Vietnam and the decrease in aid by the United States to the Republic of South Vietnam?

LEHMANN: Both Soviet and Chinese, especially Soviet aid, was continuing at a very heavy pace. The agreement had a provision in it that both sides could replace military items -- ammunition, hardware etc. -- on a one-for-one basis in South Vietnam. We never did that, because we never had adequate budgetary facilities to actually replace military items lost by the South Vietnamese during that sort of lower-intensity period of conflict that went on in 1973 and 1974. Moreover, the restriction did not apply to North Vietnam.

There was absolutely no way of ensuring the other side's compliance with that particular provision. It was simply disregarded. Hanoi did not permit the ICCS -- the International Commission for Control and Supervision -- to exercise its authority in that regard even if it had wanted to. Hanoi did not agree to the requirement, also stipulated in the Paris agreements, that there should be established certain entry points through which this one-for-one replacement of ammunition and other military items would be monitored. So these were never established, except on our side.

Q: And take advantage of this situation?

LEHMANN: Hanoi's decision was based on its evaluation of the political situation in the United States. They concluded, that given the political situation in Washington resulting from the Watergate crisis, the United States would not effectively intervene. At the embassy in Saigon, in a message that I sent to Washington as Charge at the time, on August 13, 1974, we said that what had been happening in Washington -- primarily in the form of the drastic reduction of military assistance to South Vietnam -- would lead to a political decision by Hanoi to make an all out military effort to conquer the South. And we were quite correct in that estimate.

Q: You certainly were.

LEHMANN: As far as we were able to ascertain, the decision must have been made in early September of 1974. Subsequently, General Dung, in his account called The Great Spring Victory, confirmed publicly after the end of the war that the decision was made about that time and was ratified by a meeting of the Political Bureau and the Central Military Party Committee in North Vietnam in early October. So the full scenario which led to the political decision by Hanoi in early fall 1974 to make an all out military effort in early 1975 was precipitated by the political crisis in the United States in the summer of 1974.

Q: Was there any reaction to your message?

LEHMANN: No, nor, being cynical did I really expect any. Our message began with a summarized assessment of the military situation we were in because of the reduction in the DAV Program. General John Murray, who was the Defense Attaché at the time, worked out that part for me and sent it in in greater detail to the Pentagon. On the technical side there were some
interesting points, including the fact that we thought the Vietnam program was being double charged for the procurement of F-5 aircraft for the Vietnamese Air Force and that the American military services had a habit of charging large amounts of the appropriation to overhead costs, usually designated as PCH and T -- which stands for packing, crating, handling and transportation -- leaving little for guns, bullets and training. But, the really important part of the message was that what Congress was doing was to signal to Hanoi that it could proceed with a military option to win the war and that the United States did not have the will to stand in its way.

Q: You mentioned that there was a conference in Hanoi during which the decision was ratified to enter into an all-out offensive against the South and try to complete the conquest. Did you find any further confirmation of that as time went on?

LEHMANN: We did, but only after General Dung published the piece I referred to before. That account includes a very interesting statement on how important Hanoi's appraisal of the political situation in Washington was in its decision-making process. It's a very revealing statement. He says, "The internal contradictions of the U.S. administration and among political parties had intensified. The Watergate scandal had seriously affected the entire United States and precipitated the resignation of an extremely reactionary President -- Nixon. The United States faced economic recession, mounting inflation, serious unemployment and an oil crisis. Also, the U.S. allies were not on good terms with the United States. U.S. AID to the Saigon puppet administration was decreasing." Then he goes on to say -- and quotes from the resolution that was adopted by that particular conference, which says, "Having already withdrawn from the South, the United States could hardly jump back in, and no matter how it might intervene, it would be unable to save the Saigon administration from collapse."

There are numerous other references in this account illustrating just how decisively the political crisis in the U.S. figured in the North Vietnamese decision-making process.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, I suppose, China was continuing to supply the North Vietnamese forces at a very high rate, in spite of the fall-off in support by the United States. Can you talk a little bit about the Soviet role more generally, in addition to the supply issue? Did the Soviet Union have an effect on the North Vietnamese decision-making process, for example?

LEHMANN: Oh, it certainly did. I don't think there is any question about that. There was historical precedent for that. In the spring of 1972, about a week before the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive kicked off in an earlier phase of the war, a large Soviet mission, headed by the then-Soviet Deputy Defense Minister, Mr. Vapiski, visited Hanoi. They played a role in the decision on that particular operation. There was a repeat of that in 1974, when the Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff, General Kulikov, who later became the Warsaw Pact commander in Europe headed a very large mission to Hanoi about a week or so before Christmas 1974. That followed an earlier trip by a big North Vietnamese military delegation to Moscow in November. Now, Kulikov didn't come to Hanoi to sing Christmas carols in the streets of the city, a phrase, incidentally, I put into a cable I sent at the time on that particular event. It was obvious that Kulikov came to Hanoi with that delegation to wrap up final details regarding the decision to proceed with the offensive which had reached the point of no return, and to wrap up arrangements for Soviet military assistance and support of the operation.
It is ironical that these events should be taking place at about the very time that President Ford and Secretary Kissinger met with the Russians at Vladivostok, in November, at about the time when the North Vietnamese military delegation visited Moscow and about a month before Kulikov reciprocated the visit with his delegation to Hanoi. One of the things that has always troubled me is that the word "Vietnam" was not mentioned by anybody at the Vladivostok summit meeting.

Yugoslavia

COLE BLASIER
Consular/Political Officer
Belgrade, Yugoslavia (1951-1954)

Cole Blasier attended the University of Illinois and Columbia University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served in a number of posts including Yugoslavia, Germany, and the USSR.

Q: Well, we may be getting ahead of ourselves. When you entered the Foreign Service, your first post was Belgrade.

BLASIER: Yes. In preparation for Belgrade I was assigned to the Foreign Service Institute and Serbo-Croatian language training. My knowledge of Russian helped with Serbian.

At that time, January 1952, Yugoslavia was one of the most strategically important countries in Europe and in the middle of the Soviet-American confrontation in the Cold War. Tito openly challenged Stalin's leadership of the international Communist movement.

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, once allies, were involved intermittently in sporadic armed skirmishes along Yugoslavia's eastern borders. Stalin had lost a hoped for a window on western Europe and the Adriatic and faced an upstart political model threatening his control of communist countries in Eastern Europe.

Tito had to defend his borders and, potentially, the whole country from Soviet Bloc hostility, even attack. In 1952 he had not yet firmed up relations with the United States and other Great Powers and had territorial and political rivalries with his neighbors, Italy and Greece.

Our main job in Belgrade was strategic, to keep Yugoslavia and Tito from returning to the Soviet bloc. There was vocal opposition to this policy in the United States by minorities, partly on the grounds that Tito had a bloody record in consolidating his power, and that he was and remained a staunch communist. One of our jobs in the Embassy was to monitor Tito's foreign relations with respect to negotiations with foreign governments and their domestic repercussions.

The Ambassador and senior members of the Embassy did the monitoring, but negotiations tended to be conducted through Washington or by special envoys. I followed them quite closely,
and my assignment was to report Yugoslav reactions, especially as shown in the local press or through contacts with foreign embassies. My most interesting work, however, was to report on Yugoslav domestic politics.

In order to refurbish his credentials as a Communist, symbolize his repudiation of Stalinism, and strengthen his hold on the country long term, Tito reorganized the nation's political and economic structure as a new form of Communism. We followed this with great, if sometimes skeptical, interest. The specifics included assigning the Communist Party with a mainly "educational" role (it was mostly window dressing), the decollectivization of agriculture (a form of partial privatization), and the establishment of workers' councils (workers "management" of industry) - all an anathema to Stalinism.

Q: What was the opposition to U.S. policy about?

BLASIER: Some of the opposition had been defeated by Tito in a civil war. They had their own axes to grind. They used Tito's communism as a reason why we shouldn't support him. It was a pattern which we have also seen with respect to immigrants from other countries, where they hope to shape U.S. policy towards a surviving dictator. That happened with Cuba and elsewhere.

Q: How did you defend U.S. collaboration with Tito?

BLASIER: By the time of our arrival in Belgrade, Congress was appropriating funds to support Tito and collaboration with the Tito regime was beginning. Our policy was defended as an important way to contain Stalin. Many of us accepted that because even though Tito was a Communist and a ruthless dictator, he represented the best opportunity we had to split the international communist movement. Yugoslavia blocked the southwestern expansion of the Soviet bloc and Soviet access to the Adriatic.

Tito was more accessible to westerners than Stalin, less paranoid, able to delegate, and more flexible. Yugoslavs were less fearful and suppressed than the Soviet peoples, even after Stalin's death. The Soviet and Yugoslav communists were not the same breed of cat. Yet we had to live with the fact that Tito exploited his people, consistently overriding opposition and living like a king in a poverty stricken country.

Q: No doubt your graduate studies of Communist countries and your face to face experience with Yugoslavs in the consulate caused the post management to co-opt you into political work.

BLASIER: Yes, my work on Communists in Chile, Cuba, and Eastern Europe. Also I had studied Yugoslav issues with Professor Mosely at Columbia, a leading specialist on the USSR and Yugoslavia who participated in the wartime negotiations over Europe and Trieste. My experience helped me get the opportunity to work with Ambassador George Allen. It was his talents as an ambassador and as a person, that drew me to him - not his knowledge of communism. He was a colorful, warm, broad-minded person, an excellent diplomat who didn't fit the usually misinformed stereotypes.

And his deputy, Jake Beam, was a perceptive observer and a genial colleague. He gave his whole life to the service and was rewarded by many ambassadorships. Much later Henry Kissinger humiliated him by a high level visit to Moscow without informing Ambassador Beam in advance of his visit. Beam found out through the Russians. In his memoirs Kissinger expressed regret and
said that he never visited Moscow again without having our ambassador participate in the meetings.

My knowledge of Serbian, useful within about six months of our arrival, was important for the political section and elsewhere. At one point, the station chief relied on me to make or take lengthy telephone calls with one of his sources, and on which my immediate superior, Turner Cameron, frowned. I was approached no more.

Q: When Stalin died, what was the reaction? What did the Yugoslavs do?

BLASIER: This was big news for everybody, especially the Yugoslavs. They were glad not to have to deal with Stalin any more, but they were uneasy about what might come later.

THOMAS P. H. DUNLOP
Political/Consular Affairs
Belgrade (1963-1965)

Thomas P.H. Dunlop was born in Washington, DC in 1934. He graduated from Yale University in 1956 and served in the U.S. Air Force overseas from 1957 to 1960. In the Foreign Service, Mr. Dunlop served in many overseas posts including Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and Korea. He also served in the State Department in Washington. He was interviewed on July 12th, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: How about on international events? During the time that we were in Yugoslavia, Africa was very much a subject of attention on the world scene, although the normal Yugoslav couldn't have cared less about it. References to Africa were one way that they could show that they were "at one" with the international communist movement.

For four or five years, starting in the mid 1950's, the United States and the Soviet Union had been involved in very difficult negotiations over a nuclear test ban treaty. At various points the US and the Soviet Union were not too far apart but then the differences seemed to grow, and so forth. However, in 1962, just before your and my arrival in Yugoslavia, the US and the Soviet Union had reached a self-imposed, generally agreed upon "moratorium" on atmospheric nuclear tests. This was not the result of a treaty, but was the result of a public understanding that, at least for the time being, we and they would not conduct large nuclear tests in the atmosphere. In 1962 Tito hosted the Non-Aligned Conference, which appeared to be a big deal, attended by all of these high "Mukity Mucks." Some not so high "Mukity Mucks" came charging into Belgrade to present themselves to the world as parts of this "new way." For reasons that, certainly, I don't understand, Khrushchev chose this time to break the moratorium on nuclear testing with the largest ever hydrogen bomb explosion. It was several times larger than the largest bomb that we had ever exploded. Furthermore, the Soviets exploded this bomb in the Arctic, an area which they had not previously used for nuclear testing. This raised all kinds of questions of nuclear fallout and pollution.

However, the Non Aligned Countries didn't open their mouths about this. They expressed no criticism whatsoever of the Soviet explosion. This absolutely infuriated Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, President John F. Kennedy, and the whole Washington establishment. This cast a shadow over our relations with Yugoslavia during all the years that I was there. It was Tito's choice not to refer to the nuclear explosion. He didn't have to ignore that. Tito could have spoken out if he had wished. However, he wasn't going to do it as the only non-aligned leader to do so, and none of the others chose to say anything about this Soviet nuclear explosion. We thought that Tito should have made a statement, but he didn't do it. This really annoyed our people back in Washington.

RONALD J. NEITZKE
Consular Officer
Belgrade (1975-1978)

Ronald Neitzke was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Sts Thomas College, the University of Minnesota and Johns Hopkins University (SAIS). Entering the Foreign Service in 1971 he served in Oslo before studying Servo-Croatian, the beginning of his career as specialist in East European Affairs. In Washington, Mr. Neitzke served on the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department and was Country Director for Czech and Albanian Affairs. In London he was Deputy Political Counselor, and in Zagreb he served as Deputy Chief of Mission during the conflicts of the split-up of Yugoslavia. He also had several assignments in Washington in the personnel field. Mr. Neitzke was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.

Q: How would you describe American policy there? And Soviet policy?

NEITZKE: I recall sessions in the FSI area studies course in which Yugoslavia was described as one of the three or four most likely areas which, if mishandled, could spark a third World War or a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Handling Yugoslavia correctly meant as vigilant observation and analysis as possible and doing all we could, in every sphere of bilateral activity, economic, cultural, military, and so on, to move them closer to our side, so that when Tito died the odds would be greater that Yugoslavia would not fall back into the bloc, and that the Soviets would not be tempted to overplay their hand. That often meant in practice tolerating unhelpful Yugoslav behavior on a range of mainly multilateral issues while doing what we could to mitigate the harm.

So there were tensions, but there was also a clear sense that the game was ours to lose, that we were on top in the tug of war with the Soviets. The Soviets, for their part, were also active, probing everywhere, including on military sales and military cooperation.

I should add, however, in contrast to the wildly exaggerated claims of Russian-Serbian brotherhood based on their shared Orthodox faith that were heard in the 1990s, one never heard that in the 1970s in the context of U.S.-Soviet competition in Yugoslavia. Never. We knew that in their internal contingency planning the Yugoslavs paid far more heed to the possibility of a Warsaw Pact intervention after Tito’s passing than they did to any potential Western military
threat. Of course, none of this was spoken of openly. At the same time, as I mentioned, they were a thorn in our side on a whole host of issues.

Q: What sort of issues?

NEITZKE: Hot button multilateral issues, such as Zionism as racism, Puerto Rico, Korea, Angola, the Horn of Africa. They would vote with the nonaligned against Israel in the UN. They would cozy up to the Cubans; Castro was another dominant player in the NAM. The Cubans, of course, with Soviet aid, were reaching out militarily to try to tip the balance in the Soviets’ favor in Third World trouble spots. And then there were the larger, more sensitive bilateral bones of contention, such as the Yugoslavs’ belief that we coddled dangerous anti-Yugoslav émigrés and hijackers – Croatian nationalists in the U.S. executed a hijacking in 1976, for example -- and our awareness that Yugoslav security forces sometimes killed anti-Yugoslav émigrés and that they had allowed terrorists to transit their country. So there was plenty to worry about.