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   Born in New York City, 1935
   Columbia University – Undergraduate
   Oxford University – scholarship
   Yale University – Masters
   Harvard Business School - MBA
   Entered Foreign Service 1958

International Cooperation Administration (ICA) Washington, DC 1958
   Greece/Turkey/Iran Desk Officer

Tehran, Iran 1959-1961
   Program Economist, USAID

Karachi, Pakistan 1962-1964
   Program Economist, USAID

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris 1965-1967
   Economist

Berlin, Germany 1966-1971
   Economist

Washington, DC 1971-1974
   Director, Office of Development Finance, Economic Bureau

Athens, Greece 1975-1977
   Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs

Washington, DC 1978-1979
   Senior Seminar

Washington, DC 1979-1984
Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and International Scientific Affairs
Coordinator of Population Affairs

Washington, DC 1984-1987
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health and Natural Resources

Washington, DC 1987-1994
Senior Fellow, World Wildlife Fund
Special Advisor to the Secretary General for this United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit)

Cairo, Egypt 1993-1994
Special Advisor to the Secretary General for the International Conference on Population and Development

INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Benedick]

Q: This is an oral history interview with Richard Elliott Benedick. It’s the 31st of August 1999. This is being conducted under the auspices of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Richard, it’s good to be with you. Good morning.

BENEDICK: Good morning.

Q: You entered the Foreign Service, I see, at about the same time I did, which must have been about 1957.

BENEDICK: ‘58.

Q: Tell me what got you interested in the United States Foreign Service and what you did to prepare for it as a career.

BENEDICK: Just immediately preceding that I was in the doctorate program of Harvard Business School. I had a master’s in economics from Yale and was really preparing for a career in international business or international finance. When I got to Harvard Business School and I finished my course work for the MBA the first year, several of the professors sensed that my interests were really broader. They encouraged me then to, rather than taking a second year of the MBA since I already had a master’s previously in economics, enter their doctorate program, which was at that point in a period of flux. So
many things, I think, in a career or a lifetime are luck, sometimes bad but often good luck. They were revamping their doctorate program, which made it a very flexible kind of thing. So I was able to put together my own program basically, which involved courses in the Harvard Law School, in the faculty of economics, the best of the Business School, so I could combine a number of things. I finished that and actually I was one of the youngest people to enter Harvard because I had graduated from college also early, so I was at that point only 22 -- the average entering age of the MBA program is about 28 -- and I had basically finished my doctorate except for the writing of the dissertation. I actually had two mentors. One was Ray Vernon, who at that time and since has achieved great distinction at the Kennedy School of Government; and the other was Lincoln Gordon. Linc had been in and out of government in the Marshall Plan. He later became Ambassador to Brazil and Assistant Secretary of State and, after that, President of Johns Hopkins University. We’re still in contact. I just had lunch with him last week, in fact. He encouraged me to think about, because I wanted to do something in international finance and international affairs as my doctorate, joining the government and going overseas. He suggested I write the dissertation while working. I suppose most people don’t manage, but I’m one of those who actually did write his doctorate dissertation while I had a full-time job, in fact, overseas. I’ll never forget that fall of ’57. Interviewers were coming up anyway to Harvard, so Linc Gordon arranged an interview for me. Because his experience had been in the AID side, I was interviewing for that without really knowing. I didn’t even know the distinction between AID and, let’s say, the strictly diplomatic side when I entered, which will be a story for later on. I really didn’t realize there was that kind of difference. Now, of course, it’s all resolved. Everybody is or is going to be one Foreign Service anyway. So I entered because my work had been in economics and because at that time frankly the Foreign Service was not all that strong on economics. It was only later on that that aspect became so important. So I had an interview and came in ’58 and was promptly sent to Tehran.

**Q:** This was with AID?

**BENEDICK:** With the AID mission, that’s right, as an economist, as a program economist.

**Q:** Let’s back up just one second. You had a master’s in economics from Yale and before that you had gone to Columbia, undergraduate?

**BENEDICK:** That’s right, and I also, in fact, had an Evans’ fellowship to Oxford in between, which I did for metaphysical poetry, which has helped me a lot in my career, 17th century English poetry. But at Columbia I had many courses in economics and constitutional history. I was very interested in history as well as economics.

**Q:** I noticed that Ray Vernon died in the last week.

**BENEDICK:** I missed that.
Q: You did? Well, you'll want to go back, because there was a very nice obituary in both the New York Times, especially in the New York Times, within the last week. I assume you were sent to the AID mission in Tehran with a little bit of training, or did you go almost directly after entry?

BENEDICK: I shouldn’t say that. They had at least a several-week course for entering junior people. I was only 23 at the time and really very green, very inexperienced. Then they had me working as an assistant at the, in those days, GTI -- Greece/Turkey/Iran was the unit -- so I had about seven or eight months working on the desk and I got to know about cables and the issues and so on.

Q: And the desk was in the State Department?

BENEDICK: No, the desk was in a building on Farragut Square.

Q: Part of the State Department? I don’t think it was called AID in those days.

BENEDICK: It was probably called ICA, International Cooperation Administration. That was in the Eisenhower era. I can remember going over for a briefing at State Department -- at that time there was no new State; it was old State -- and the sense of awe one had in walking into that building, the subdued lighting, the carpets. Everything seemed so elegant and distinguished in comparison to these kind jerry-built temporary offices that AID had in some office building downtown. That was the first time I realized, hmmm, there’s something else here. That, of course, influenced a lot of things I did in my career. One of the first people I came in contact there with was Bruce Laingen, who later, as you know, was our chief hostage in Iran a number of years later.

Q: So you went to Tehran in 1959?

BENEDICK: The spring of ‘59 and spent about two and a half years there working in the program office under another person who I’d say became my mentor, Morris Williams, Maury Williams, who became very high. I think he was Deputy Administrator of AID at one time. At that time he was program officer, and then he became head of the International Rural Food Program in Rome. He’s retired from that now. But he played a great influence in forming me in those years. It was a great experience. I learned Farsi. I was very eager and wanted to get into the culture, and I did. Iran at that time was -- probably still is -- a very interesting, very romantic country, even more so then. It was, of course, a developing country with a lot of poverty, but the atmosphere was just... I can still sometimes smell the spices in the bazaar. Down the street where we lived, which was on a hillside, a mountainside -- there’s a high-mountain behind Tehran -- camel caravans would come down with their bells in the morning. It was a very nice introduction. I’d lived overseas before, I don’t think I mentioned the time when I was at Oxford, and I had traveled a couple times in Europe, but that was the first time in the Middle East and I found it very interesting. The work also was very multifaceted. They sent me down to the Central Bank, which was, I think, probably an exaggerated idea. I was supposed to be advising the Central Bank and I was fresh out of business school and the bankers had
their own ways of doing things, so I was learning as much, but we got along. And then back in the mission they had me and another sidekick, another young person, slightly older than I, maybe five or six years of experience. They put us in charge of a local currency project program. This is where the US sold surplus commodities in Iran and got local currencies in return and then turned these currencies back for a project. One of the outstanding things that I remember from that was as we delved into this we found so much padded expenditures i.e., corruption. A lot of the projects were in the provinces as well but there were also ones in Tehran. We started asking questions and poking around, which made us pretty unpopular, including with the American advisors because the American advisors -- now I understand why -- thought maybe we were being too moral. You have to have a certain amount of lubrication for the system, and they didn’t like these two young guys saying, “Here you had 500 tape recorders” -- or whatever it was -- or, “Is this really the price of digging ditches for irrigation? How many man-hours?” and so on. “If you figured it out, it was an outrageous price. You could have it done in New York City for less”; and this kind of thing. But Maury Williams didn’t mind that because it shook up some of the mission people.

Q: So he was supportive of what you were doing?

BENEDICK: Yes, right. The embassy had some projects sometimes. Again I became aware of this distinction between the diplomatic side and, let’s say, the more economic or intelligence side.

Q: Did your questioning and investigation lead to a report, or were there major reforms, or was it more sort of putting people on notice that somebody was watching and aware of what was going on?

BENEDICK: Both. There were reforms, because it wasn’t just that we were acting as inspectors general; we actually had -- I think the function was expanded -- we actually had to approve things. Things were channeled through us for a final sign-off, and we’d send them back if we thought things were too funny. I think, again, it was a maturing experience. Probably we were too over-eager for the game, especially with cultures being so different, but I think we stopped some things that might have been pretty outrageous or might have been really a waste of money.

Q: When you were working with the Central Bank, did you actually have an office in the Central Bank or just go there periodically?

BENEDICK: Yeah, I did. They’d send me things to read, and we’d talk about it. As I say, I can’t really say that I made a contribution there, but I was also learning. I think perhaps, looking back on it, it was just a broad area of fronts, learning about how an embassy works, how an AID mission works, and how to function in a foreign, very foreign, culture, because Iran is really very different. It wasn’t like being in England or France. A significant feature of those two and a half years was that I did actually write my dissertation. I wrote it -- that was again luck -- with the encouragement and support of the AID mission and Maury Williams. I wrote it on an area which was very close to what I
was working on in the AID mission, which was Industrial Finance in Iran. That was the title of the book, “Industrial Finance in Iran.” I had to go anyway in the bazaar. I was dealing with financial aspects, balance of payments, industrialization policy, a lot of the things that I could use for both purposes, or at least there was a certain amount of overlap.

Q: You selected your dissertation topic after you go to Iran?

BENEDICK: Actually not. I changed it somewhat. I was going to write on a new phenomenon on the development scene -- this was 1950s -- industrial development banks, and these were specific banks that were designed to promote both small-scale industry, medium and large-scale industry, bringing in and combining foreign capital, trying to get local capital as well. The World Bank set them up in several countries. At that time there only were a half a dozen. There was one in Turkey, there was one in India, there was one in Pakistan. There was one in Iran called the Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran -- remember, Iran had a big mining sector -- IMDBI, and it had a Dutch president and a German vice president, who became a lifelong friend of mine. I spoke German at that time, and he was kind enough to help me by continuing to speak German with me even though, of course, his English was better than my German. That was another aspect that became important in my career: I developed both my German language and my contacts, because there was a fair amount of German activity in Iran as well. Many Persians also spoke German, especially economists and engineers who had studied in Germany, so I had another point of contact with them. So my research was done in that way, and this was a new phenomenon. Before I left, I was going to do a dissertation on these industrial development banks. Now, when I got to Iran, I had actually done some. I had notes on the ICICI. The Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India was one and the one in Pakistan and the one in Turkey, and I was going to do a comparison of these four banks. As I say, they were quite a new phenomenon in the financial scene. When I got to Iran, I had much more information on the Iran bank, and so I focused then on Iran and put in some information on a comparative basis in one chapter towards the end. To that extent the focus evolved when I was there, but I actually had the topic before I came.

Q: Then what you wrote was approved and you got your doctorate. Was that dissertation published?

BENEDICK: It was published by Harvard University. In fact, the dissertation was something like 700 or 800 pages, and I finished it before I left. I sent it off before I left Iran and then came back to defend it in the summer between Iran and my next post, which was Pakistan. After that, when I had already arrived in Pakistan, they then said if I would shorten it -- I had this new chore while I was in Pakistan -- they would publish it. By that time there were some new developments. Fortunately Williams was still in Tehran, so he arranged a two-month TDY in Iran because he needed some help on something again in the same area. So I could then at the same time get some more reflection and revise and update it. It was fascinating to me, because when I was looking at the Iranian situation -- again knowing Persian helped with that -- I discovered how the
bazaar functions as a financial system. You normally think of bazaar lending as the bazaari sitting on the Oriental rug with the abacus, and that’s really the way it was in those days. For all I know, it may still be that way, and I hope it is, in fact, although it wouldn’t surprise me if they have a computer and stuff as well. But there was this traditional aura, and you normally think that they are giving two days’ loans for 80 percent or something, but there was in point of fact a very active long-term financial market buried in the bazaar. I wrote about that, and that chapter, as a matter of fact, became sort of innovative and was picked up in a couple of journals and published separately from the book as well, taken from the book and published, the bazaar as a financial institution. Again, it was just luck to happen to stumble on that and recognize it as an argument.

Q: This was the period, of course, of the heyday of the Shah.

BENEDICK: It was indeed.

Q: Did you have any general observations on the government of the period?

BENEDICK: Yes, I do. It was the time when the Shah had divorced his (second) wife, Soraya, and married Farah. The reason he divorced was because she couldn’t bear him a son, and that was what they needed, a son. And Farah did have a son, and that happened while I was there. I can tell you that the rejoicing was genuine. I have a feeling about Iran, based on this experience. A lot of people know Iran much better than I do, but I have a feeling that Iran basically liked the institution of a monarchy. The Shah was, of course, corrupt in many ways, and the people around him, and the secret police -- I think they were SADA -- was ruthless, and all of those things are true. But nevertheless the rejoicing about the birth of the crown prince was genuine, and especially the peasants and even the middle class, the lower middle, the shopkeepers. The people who didn’t like him and the people who actually, I believe, connived with these religious fanatics in the revolution were the wealthy, oddly enough, the wealthy landowners. All those people we saw demonstrating during the revolution, the students in England and in the US, these were not poor people; these were the sons of the rich, who were being threatened to be expropriated by the Shah’s white revolution. The Shah finally realized he had everything else and what he wanted was a good place in history and the best way to do it was to effectuate what he called a white revolution. This was somewhat after my time, but you could see the beginning, how the thought was coming, and to really bring Iran into more of, let’s say, constitutional democracy. So the tendency was that the lower down you were on the social scale, the more you responded to that, because they had everything to gain. The classical wealthy landowner whose son or daughter was studying here at Brown or at the University of California and then got in the streets to demonstrate against the Shah, screaming ‘freedom’ and all of this, they were the ones who really liked to keep the peasants in their place and continue their privileged status in society. That was my feeling about Iran. I’ve since got to know many Iranian émigrés from all classes, many middle class, I suppose. There never were so many when I first went. Iran was tremendously exotic when I went there in 1958. Now there are Iranian restaurants and the doctor you have will have an Iranian name, so they become very much a part here and also in across
the continent of Asia and in Europe as well. I have the feeling that what’s happened in Iran with this religious fanaticism is really an aberration in Iranian history, because the Persians throughout history have really been very tolerant. When I was there, for example, there was a large and active Jewish community and a Christian community, Armenians, and the Jews, in fact, you could tell them, physically, their physical appearance, in the streets. If you saw somebody who was relatively pale skinned with blue eyes and curly reddish or blondish-red hair, they were probably Jewish or of Jewish descent, and this went back to Babylonian captivity. The Iran/Iraq rivalries also predate Islam. And the Iranians, the Shahs, in those days gave the Jews, when Nebuchadnezzar kicked them out, he gave them asylum. It was the same as the Armenians, when they had their problems over the years with the Turks, many of them fled to Iran and were welcomed. In fact, when you wanted to buy wine, the Iranians were relatively tolerant. If you wanted to buy wine, you went to special stores and the wine either had a Star of David on it or a cross, because they were being made by Jewish or Armenian vintners, and that was tolerated. They also had the Baha’i community, which was brutally repressed by the Mullahs, but at that time were striving and also accepted. Also something very interesting, the Zardashti, the Zoroastrians, which was the original Iranian religion. I remember how spooky it was coming to some agyaz on the edge of the Dash Lok, the Desert of Luck, a barren desert in this mysterious city with the towers of silence where the dead were placed out on these mud towers maybe four or five stories high outside on the edges of the desert outside of the city which just sort of emerged – it was just a very romantic country, anyway. They were tolerant people, and I think what’s going on now is really very much against the basic Iranian culture.

**Q:** Let me ask you just a little bit sort of at the macro level, general level, about the US AID program in that period. It was primarily what we would call program assistance?

**BENEDICK:** Both program and project. Iran was obviously important to us because of the role as an oil-producing nation. It was a bulwark against communism, because they border on Russia, they border on Azerbaijan on the north and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan on the east and Afghanistan also. So they were in a critical geopolitical situation. So we poured a lot of money into Iran to keep its stability. One of the projects which I remember vividly was training the police and training the Shah’s police force. I remember being out once, out when I just wanted to go and just see a demonstration. This happened later in my life as well. You know, put on old clothes and went out and see what goes on, and I could mingle since I spoke Farsi. It wasn’t against us; it was a demonstration against the government. There were all these people who were communists and other anarchists and extremists, and they were in an ugly mood and they were milling around the city square. All of a sudden from one side in came this phalanx of American-trained police. Usually an Iranian soldier was like something out of -- I don’t know if you remember “Lawrence of Arabia,” the way the Turks looked, sort of shabbily dressed and unshaven and sloppy and not knowing which end of his rifle was up or whatever. All of a sudden out of one side of the square came this phalanx of very tall, well trained, smartly uniformed special police. They came in, and there were obviously American teachers: no violence if at all possible. They divided into columns to sort of divide the people up. The people sort of stood there kind of in awe watching these
formations and sort of falling back. I remember they burst into applause. They had never seen something like that. Then this kind of nasty demonstration fizzled out, and they all were kind of talking to each other and pointing because of this training. I’m not saying that will happen every time, but I saw it happen. So, yes, Iran was important, importing a lot of money. Another interesting thing was that the AID mission was really, I would say, much more important than the embassy at that time, and it was run like that. There were many more people, and there was a provincial office. I think there were maybe 11 or 12 provinces of Iran. Iran is a big country, by the way. Its geographic area is the size of Western Europe, France, Germany, the Low Countries, and Spain and probably Italy combined; it’s a huge country and very far flung, mountain ranges and so on, and deserts. There were 11 or 12 provinces, and each one of those had sitting next to the governor an AID provincial director, US AID provincial director, advising the governor on the development of his province. Now this was not all good, because these satrapies, the US alter-ego governors, felt themselves oftentimes more important than the governor, and certainly they weren’t taking advice from the US ambassador and hardly from the AID mission director. I remember a couple of times I was sent out to the field to visit some of these guys. Some of them were very good and were real soldiers on the front lines, but some of them were arrogant. That was their territory, and they didn’t want some young squirt, some young Foreign Service Officer from Tehran, coming in and even asking questions, because they had their own way of doing things. I remember that vividly. That’s a bygone day; there’s nothing like that now.

Q: Could you say a little bit more about the relationship between the AID mission to the embassy? Did you as part of the AID mission feel quite autonomous, quite independent? Did the mission director feel under the overall policy guidance and direction of the ambassador, or was it really almost two different institutions?

BENEDICK: I had the feeling -- of course, from my place very low down on the totem pole, although they gave me a lot of responsibility -- that AID functioned pretty autonomously in those days. I think that’s right, because there was already a difference. I served subsequently in one other AID mission in Pakistan, and there was a difference. We were much closer to the embassy, and I attended embassy meetings, for example. It wasn’t just because I was any higher up. We were not co-located with the embassy, but we were in very frequent contact with the embassy in Pakistan, whereas in Iran we had a separate building but we were just across the street and I may have been in the embassy building once.

Q: In two and a half years?

BENEDICK: In two and a half years, right. And I really had a sense that the mission director was very autonomous. We had separate cables, a separate cable system. There was great separation.

Q: How about the US military? Were they important in Iran in this period ‘59 to ‘61?
BENEDICK: I know they had been and there were military advisors, but if so, the embassy would have known more about that.

Q: It was something that you were conscious of or aware of daily?

BENEDICK: Right, unlike, for example, when I was in Germany years later. There we were much closer, or in Greece later still. One reason why I don’t think that there was a big presence was -- and I’m just drawing on my recollection -- that there was no PX. Usually where there’s military there would be a PX and there was none. We could order from Frankfurt the things that we needed.

Q: How about a hospital or clinic? The reason I ask that is because my wife was evacuated from Pakistan to Tehran in 1965, and we have a son born in the Armishmeg Hospital in Tehran.

BENEDICK: Yes, Armish is something that brings it back, yeah.

Q: It was a very small clinic, more than a hospital.

BENEDICK: Because also we had a stillborn child born in that hospital, and there was a military doctor, right. But, once again, no PX. That may have been a vestige somehow of an earlier, larger presence, but there was an Armish mission, yeah.

Q: Anything else you want to say, Richard, about your time in Tehran before we gone on?

BENEDICK: I think we’ve gone into it.

Q: Then you went, as you’ve said before, to Pakistan, to Karachi, still with the AID mission. Did you go more or less directly, or was there an interval in between?

BENEDICK: Actually there was an interval of about six months. First of all, I had home leave, which is always a nice occasion to get to know America. My parents by that time had moved back to California, so we had each time on our home leave crossed country, took at least three or four weeks to drive across the country. After that, though, I was supposed to go Taiwan. That was my next assignment, and then something happened and the position was no longer available. So they called me back to Washington until they found something. So I came back to Washington, lived up at the old Cairo Hotel on 16th Street, and again went to the office and was doing odd jobs while they were looking around for another assignment. That’s when, I think, they came up with Thailand and Pakistan. The Pakistan job looked quite interesting, so I took it.

Q: What job was that? Was it again in the program office?

BENEDICK: It was again in the program office but now a couple of notches higher. I had responsibility for, again, industrialization policy and balance of payments analysis. At
that time we were doing five-year projections for AID purposes, five-year projections, and working very closely with the Pakistani Central Bank and with their Planning Commission. Those were the great days when we thought we could develop countries, and the World Bank did too. The World Bank had a mission there as well, and we’d work with them. We were all young economists putting models to work and saying, “When is the take-off going to come?” and “If we just do it here and do it there and do it right.” But, again, I had fascinating contacts there. Some of them have gone on to great things. My colleagues and counterparts there were Mabubel Hock in the Planning Commission, who had also been classmate of mine at Yale Graduate School and he later went on to a senior position in the World Bank and in the UN Development Program. The other was Sartaj Aziz, who later went to Rome with the Food and Agricultural Organization and came back to be a senator. In Pakistan he is currently Foreign Minister. We were all young, in our mid/late 20s. That’s the time when Pakistan was beginning to flirt -- well, I guess they always had this, but more so -- with the Chinese, the idea being ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’.

Q: This was not long after the border flare-up between India and...

BENEDICK: That is right, but before the break-off with Bangladesh. There also had been an India-Pakistan, I think, war before I came. But east Pakistan was still part of Pakistan.

Q: The next war was in ’65, just after you left.

BENEDICK: That’s right, and I believe that’s when... Was it that when Bangladesh, or was there another war, I think, in ‘67?

Q: I think the wars that I can remember were at the time of partition, ’65, ’71, which led to Bangladesh...

BENEDICK: Right, but there were some flurries even before ‘65. I think there had been some skirmishes if not a war.

Q: In Kashmir and so on.

BENEDICK: Yeah, and there was real enmity. Despite the fact that these people, many of them, were educated in America, there was a certain amount of anti-Americanism, resentment really. I remember our big arguments about the Chinese model versus the Western model, and they really wanted to do things very much on the Chinese idea. Of course, they changed their minds later on. But it was a stimulating and exciting time. There were no bad feelings. I remember we would be debating in long hours of the night about what’s the right path for them to take.

Q: The United States had a large AID program.

BENEDICK: We did indeed, right, and again it was very different from Iran. I had a sense of being much closer to the embassy, to being part of our foreign policy, and it was
much more centralized. Karachi, by the way, was the capitol in those days. Before I left they had started to build Islamabad, the new capitol, and the government had many offices, had some offices, moved already to Rawalpindi, which is the established city near the site of the new capitol Islamabad, far in the north.

Q: Did you go to Rawalpindi?

BENEDICK: Yes, I did.

Q: Frequently, or the offices that you dealt with were primarily still in Karachi?

BENEDICK: In Karachi, that’s right.

Q: You were there from ’62 to ’64.

BENEDICK: Right, and I did some field trips, visiting industrial sites. My feeling all through my career wherever I was, later on as well, was to do, naturally, the things you do in the capitol but also to get out of the capitol and to meet people, to meet the people who were really moving things and doing things. So I had a wide circle both among the big industrialists but also getting to meet small industries and getting to know some of their problems and, therefore, what could we do to help them and to help the banks. I mentioned this industrial development bank because I now have my book on Iran and there were a lot of obvious lessons for Pakistan. So I was dealing in that area as well. I can remember some of the trips that I took out in the field visiting a factory making razor blades, making consumer products or making farm machinery with foreign technical assistance.

Q: Did your field trips take you to East Pakistan?

BENEDICK: Actually not, never got to East Pakistan. The mission wanted me then to take a tour and offered me a good promotion to go to Dhaka after my time in Karachi. My interest in those days was to move fast, to get as much experience, and so all of those tours were really only two years. Pakistan was fascinating and interesting, but it was harder for me than Tehran. By that time we had an infant, and health conditions were not great. My wife is German, as you know, and we wanted to get, if possible, back to Europe, so that’s the next chapter. No, I did not get to East Pakistan.

Q: The climate of Karachi is much more severe than Tehran.

BENEDICK: Tehran is actually a pleasant place: hot, dry summers, but bad snow in the winter. I have great memories of people sitting in the streets with their Russian-style samovars over chokhal, which is a hot tea, and in the winter it would snow and so on.

Q: I suppose you got up to Lahore and the Punjab.

BENEDICK: I did indeed.
Q: Drawing on my own experience in Pakistan, which was a little after you were there -- we were there from ‘64 to ‘66 -- in Lahore the Indospace development there were a lot of projects, dams, which were certainly very important in that area. Were you involved with that at all?

BENEDICK: Yes. I should say I wasn’t a primary; there were others. We had a whole division for that kind of thing, but in terms of at least some of the program, how it fit into the larger program, I was part of that process. So, yes, I remember the Indospace development and the big dams going up, Tarjay and the World Bank people coming out. That again was the era of big projects, big money.

Q: With spill-over effects throughout the economy.

BENEDICK: Right. You’ve reminded me of an Iran story -- we’ll have to sort of move this back -- again, perhaps an example of Iranian openness in those days. There was a drought, and they needed food. This was in Iran. I guess there were similar things in Pakistan. We had a lot of chickens that we wanted to donate for sale. The Iranians declined the chickens. We knew they needed them. Why? Well, they didn’t trust it coming from us. They’re Islam and they have certain ways of doing things. Then somebody, whether it was the embassy or I don’t know where on the Iran side, came up with the idea how about if they were kosher chickens. I remember the mullah, the holy men, we had a conference and somebody raised this idea, and they got in a corner and were talking and talking, and they came back and said, “That would be fine, but we have to seal. And, of course, they had somebody from the Jewish community who could understand it. So we cabled back to Washington, and in came these planeloads of kosher chickens. The Iranians loved them. Another little insight.

Q: How important in Pakistan and, I suppose, in Iran in terms of your work with the AID mission was promoting US exports, whether chickens or...? I know in Pakistan, certainly in the days when there was East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, disasters were a very common occurrence, and presumably we helped with disaster relief, whether it was cyclones or drought or floods or whatever. Were you involved with that sort of thing much, and also in terms of promoting US exports?

BENEDICK: Yes. I even had a role as a planner and a coordinator for a relatively minor, $9,000,000, disaster relief program in Pakistan. There I think some of my Harvard Business School experience may have come in. I had to phase-in things. That was very interesting for me and gave me a primary responsibility as a leader of something at a relatively early stage. In terms of export promotion, all of our aid was tied, of course, so that was implicit that anything we did was coming from American contractors or American machinery or American products. But export promotion as such was really the job of the economic counselor on the embassy side, and I didn’t get into that actually until I was myself economic counselor in Athens much later in my career.
Q: I notice in something you wrote that you refer to some work you did in Pakistan which led to import liberalization, lifting of restrictions on commodity imports. Do you want to say something about that?

BENEDICK: That again was a result of my heated discussions with the young economists in the Planning Commission and pointing out to Mabub and others what we had learned at Yale about trade liberalization. Basically, if you opened up, if you loosened your markets, you might be able to get things better and better quality and you have more choice. Of course, implicitly we were hoping that the American exporters would be able to take advantage of this opportunity. I didn’t stay long enough actually -- that was shortly before I left -- to see how that worked out, but we did get the legislation changed, and I was very pleased about that. One other thing in Pakistan, which came back later in my career, which at the time I didn’t realize how important a part it would play in my career, was, as an economist looking at Pakistan and looking at population growth there, I realized that a lot of efforts were being dissipated simply because the population was increasing untrammeled. This was back in 1960, and we had no population policies or programs at that time, helping countries in family planning. In the U.S. you still couldn’t buy condoms in many states, so it was not a very open subject. But in my travels around I was very much impressed with the press of people. Of course, there were still undigested refugees from the partition with India and more and more coming and having more babies, and you could just see them sinking into squalor and filth and misery. I began talking about this around the AID mission. I began complaining loudly to people that we’re ignoring the population factor. Here we are making five-year plans for AID programs and for economic development, and in five years the population of Iran is going to be maybe 20 percent or more and population of the cities even more so, and finally I said I’d like to do something about this. “We’re doing a five-year long-range strategic planning exercise, and there’ll be a big report to Washington. There ought to be a chapter on population.” Maury Williams by that time had come to Pakistan. He had graduated from Iran also and was Deputy Director in Pakistan. He favored this, but there was a lot of opposition because, as I say, population was absolutely not a subject. After all, he was Deputy Director. There were other different division directors, community development, agriculture, education, who had their own fiefdoms and they wanted my support for other things, so they said, “All right, Benedick can write a chapter on population after he’s done the ones he’s responsible for on industrialization policy and balance of payments. If he can make time for population, then we’ll look at it.” So I started poking around, pulled data together and learned that -- you couldn’t get contraceptives at the bazaar or anything -- there was a Swedish mobile van traveling around the country trying to advise people on family planning and giving out condoms basically and advising people. And there were a few enlightened, I discovered, Pakistani industrialists who realized, who saw their workers sinking into poverty, and they then had family planning lectures for them and distributed condoms with their pay cash. There were these islands of enlightenment in a sea of disillusionment out there, of ignorance. But anyway I did my chapter, and coincidentally in Washington at that time in the State Department Richard Gardner was Assistant Secretary for economic affairs, and he saw it and picked that up and he was also very interested. We didn’t know it until later on when we met and then we realized that we had been each in our way doing something to try to
promote a greater awareness of the population issue, which was so critical for economic development. Of course, it wasn’t long before AID did have population assistance programs, and later on I had a partial responsibility for that, but that’s much later. That was an aside aspect of my work there.

**Q:** Was the United States involved with health issues, health programs? That was one of the sectors that we were trying...?

**BENEDICK:** Absolutely, and in point of fact, it was the very success of health programs and foreign aid, not just from the US but from the World Health Organization, from European countries, that actually caused the population problem. You didn’t have a chance for normal transition of falling death rates and falling birth rates as we experience in the West, but you had this sudden drop in death rates, particularly infant mortality, because of the good things we were doing in health, and we were ignoring the fertility side. It wasn’t that people in developing countries were having more babies than before; the fertility remained the same, but the difference between the birth rate and the death rate widened enormously because we came in with 15 years of health programs before we came in with anything on family planning. You know, arguably that caused a lot of the misery that we’re seeing even today, because it’s not something you can stop quickly.

**Q:** Were you involved at all with the Peace Corps? These were the early days of the Peace Corps in Pakistan. Or were they pretty separate and on their own?

**BENEDICK:** I myself was not, again I think possibly because my work was so much on the economic side as opposed to probably the division of community development, which would have been working with the health issues. My work was more on either industry or data and balance of payments and planning.

**Q:** You had said that, in contrast to Tehran, you and the AID mission generally were much closer to the embassy. I wondered to what extent you were involved in such security/political issues or matters at that time as Pakistan and the United States involvement in CENTO or SEATO -- I think Pakistan was involved in both -- or any other observations of the general state of the US/Pakistan relations in that period.

**BENEDICK:** Pakistan had at that time a military government, Ayub Khan, and, in fact, I used to go riding with the Pakistan cavalry on occasion. I had learned actually to ride in Iran. We definitely had military advisors in Pakistan, although, again, no-PX kind of thing, and no hospital either, in contrast to Tehran.

**Q:** In Karachi. In Peshawar, I think, there were both.

**BENEDICK:** Oh, really? They had a PX, too? I remember we visited Peshawar, but I was probably more interested in looking in the antique shops at that point. First of all, I went regularly to embassy staff meetings, which had never happened in Iran, and so felt part of kind of a larger official family, although, again, in these days there were these very strong directors. We may have had provincial directors, but it was much more centralized in
Karachi than had been the case in Iran, where these people were all so inaccessible thousands of miles away. There was, of course, a provincial office in Dhaka for East Pakistan.

Q: There was a pretty good sized one in Lahore, or at least when we got there in ’64.

BENEDICK: That’s right. There was in Lahore as well. I think that was about it. I think there was a very small office with a couple of people in Peshawar and in Hyderabad. I know I visited and some local person was there who could sort of show you around, but it was by no means where you had big missions, big provincial missions, in and around this country. Probably some of them might have been larger than our embassy in Tehran in terms of personnel. But in any event, in Pakistan it was much more of a combined operation, and I felt very comfortable with that. That was also my first exposure to something which again played a very strong role in my subsequent career, which was multilateral diplomacy. I was asked to accompany a delegation which was going to Ankara for a CENTO meeting. CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization, was kind of an equivalent at that time of NATO of Europe, and these were some key countries along the southern tier of Russia: Pakistan, Iran and Iraq and Turkey, and the US and Britain, and there was political, military and economic cooperation helping sustain these governments.

Q: Was the meeting in Ankara the economic committee?

BENEDICK: I believe it was the economic committee, but obviously there always was a political/military aspect. I know I remember seeing people in uniform being called out at the meeting. This I found extremely interesting as a young economist being involved in this kind of an aspect which sort of lifted my horizons a little more. I saw not only the economic/strategic but the political and military strategic aspects of our relationships and also how multilateral diplomacy works where you’re not just dealing on one but where you had a group of countries. I can remember over the four-day meetings, I don’t remember all of the issues, but I can remember there were some hard issues and that we were trying to build alliances, we and the British in our own way but together trying to see which ones we could get on our side on certain issues that we wanted to move. I found that very interesting and very appealing, something new.

Q: You mentioned earlier, Richard, that the capital was in Karachi and later, of course, it shifted to Islamabad, but already at the time you were there some offices had begun to move, some ministries perhaps, initial to Rawalpindi, transition, then to Islamabad. Was that a subject that basically had been decided at the time you were there, or was it still under discussion, under debate, whether to move? I’m sure there was resistance to leaving Karachi, or was there? Do you remember much discussion about that? I’m thinking partly about the Pakistan government but also about the embassy and the AID mission.

BENEDICK: I cannot recall if there was any great discussion or strong feelings about it. If anything, what I do recall is that people said it would be nicer in Islamabad, the
atmosphere, very scenic, the mountains and the climate. As far as the government officials, again I have no feeling that there was a lot of opposition.

Q: That’s my recollection of Pakistan as opposed, say, to Brazil, where people, I think, have always liked Rio more than Brasilia. The idea of being in Brasilia was never terribly popular, whereas I think Karachi was a city that was very overcrowded, before partition had not been a major city as opposed, say, to Lahore, which has always been an important city.

BENEDICK: Yes, exactly.

Q: The climate certainly was better in Islamabad than in Karachi.

BENEDICK: Also, I think the population of Pakistan is so heavily refugees anyway that the core were Punjabis and this is really their country. I think a lot of them felt uncomfortable and not quite at home. So I agree with you. I think there was a sense of the move being a good thing for the country and a good thing for the people involved.

Q: Anything else you want to say about your two years in Karachi from ‘62 to ‘64?

BENEDICK: Only that our first child was born there in the Holy Family Hospital.

Q: It’s certainly relevance to you.

BENEDICK: Yeah, it was relevant also in the sense that, you know, there’s always a question of risk. We’re not Catholics, but the care is simply much better there, no risk to the mother, and how they would react to that, but we discounted that because of just the general... You were not in Karachi, were you?

Q: In Lahore.

BENEDICK: In Lahore, that’s right.

Q: But we were going to have a child in Lahore, but because of the 1965 war that child would up being born in Tehran as a result of the evacuation. After Pakistan you said you had been interested in going back to Europe, and you were able to accomplish that, I think.

BENEDICK: That’s right, and that again merged with my growing interest in multilateral diplomacy. I was then actually seconded by AID to the secretariat of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in Paris. That was for me in many ways an ideal assignment. Again, I had studied French, so language was not a problem. The work would be carrying my field experience in developing countries into this multilateral setting where a lot of the people who were involved did not have that experience. They came from finance ministries. There was a feeling that I could add a dimension. Again, it was a very interesting position because I was dealing with the US
embassy and with the US mission to OECD, each in their own way, but at the same time I was seconded to the secretariat, so I was functioning as an international civil servant. We had some good people in the AID mission. Stanley Freedman was the economic counselor at the embassy, and we had very good support from the mission to the OECD.

Q: And you were seconded by AID.

BENEDICK: I was still from AID, right.

Q: And as a member of the international secretariat of the OECD, were you particularly involved with the Development Assistance Committee?

BENEDICK: That is right, and the chair of the Development Assistance Committee always -- I don’t know if it still is -- was an American. In those days it was Frank Coffin.

Q: And that’s a full-time position?

BENEDICK: Full-time position, yeah. And Willard Thorp, I think, was before him. They were two very good men, had a lot of experience. I think Frank Coffin later became a judge. But they had overseas experience, had been AID mission directors or ambassadors. Again, I felt that I was learning a lot in that process.

Q: And the purpose of the Development Assistance Committee, DAC, essentially was to coordinate among the OECD donor countries in their assistance to developing countries.

BENEDICK: Exactly, and to bring their different experience into a kind of rational framework for... Again, everyone even then still believed in the “economic take-off”, that there were take-offs. One aspect that I got involved in, which at that time was new, was debt restructuring and debt relief, and that was across the board. For example, I was always involved. Each country had to come in. Each donor country once a year was scrutinized by the others, which again I discovered later on in many aspects of, let’s say, international treaties that reporting and transparency is an important factor in achieving compliance or coordination. You don’t have to have Green Berets enforcing treaties usually. Just the very fact that a country has to come in and has to make a presentation, is being questioned by their peers, by the other sovereign states, it’s embarrassing if you’re doing something wrong. I found that countries don’t like for that to happen, and so, if they’re chastised at one meeting, they’ll come back to the next meeting and say, “Here’s what we’ve done.” There was this kind of an examination even including the USA program, and I was part of preparing the secretariat. It was mostly the secretariat that was examining. We were servicing all the parties, of course, but we could often pose questions and influence the discussion. It was a fascinating interaction, a whole new field for me, what goes on in an international meeting, setting the agenda and the background papers and the delegation meetings and the contact groups, but they were negotiated as well. At the end there was a DAC statement on various aspects of policy, and there were also statements on its country views. DAC met, I think, every year formally, but in
between there were meetings just about every month and one country review after another.

**Q:** Were there quite a few other members of the secretariat from different countries doing this sort of work?

**BENEDICK:** There was no secretariat, but I would say in this aspect my boss was a German and there was a British person and a Belgian, Dutch or Belgian, and a Frenchman and an Austrian, and then there were other parts of the... When I think of the DAC, there may have been about eight or nine or 10 professional, I would say, from different countries.

**Q:** The DAC was still fairly new, as I recall. I think it was established at an OECD ministerial meeting in Tokyo, I believe, when I was there. I think it was about 1961, and if that’s right and you were there in ‘64, it was only about three, maybe four, years earlier it had been established, so it was still probably evolving in terms of how it did its work.

**BENEDICK:** Right. Again, the whole aspect of the multilateral interaction was new, interesting, and stimulating.

**Q:** Do you want to say anything more about the work you did or the work that was being done at that time in the area of debt relief and debt consolidation, debt negotiation?

**BENEDICK:** This was something which was a tough negotiation, because the finance ministries of the different countries, including our own people, were not enamored of this and we had to make then the economic bargain and explain just why keeping the screws on would do exactly the wrong thing for both our foreign policy interests in these countries as well as even affecting their ability to repay -- everybody had to view the situation realistically -- and to try to stretch out the maturity or consolidate or do something, maybe some temporary moratorium depending on their particular situation. The result of this was decision by the DAC, then policy recommendation which was negotiated and then became part of the input into each country’s AID program.

**Q:** And was that done in terms of kind of across-the-board relief for developing countries in general or particular developing countries in a special crisis?

**BENEDICK:** It was established on general principles. It wasn’t focused on specific countries. Again, interestingly, a couple of posts later in my career, I was actually then dealing with the specific cases.

**Q:** At this point it was kind of getting started in terms of general principles that should be kept in mind when particular negotiations were conducted.

**BENEDICK:** Exactly, and in those days it was really quite a new idea, because the DAC wasn’t that old. Our big loan programs really started in the late ‘50s or early ‘60s, let’s
say the ‘50s, and now we’re already seeing a pile-up of debt that’s going to cause problems. Debt consolidation was a new element at that time.

Q: I’m sure from the point of view of the US Treasury or other finance ministries there was concern on setting a precedent. Once you open the door, there would be no end.

BENEDICK: Yes. This is always an argument. With a new idea and precedent, you always have to make the case all the more strongly and say you can’t hold the dam forever and this is a way of patching it rather than having it burst.

Q: One of the interesting things I’ve always thought about the US mission to the OECD is that the Treasury Department has really a very important role in the mission as well as generally with the OECD, and I believe the deputy or at least one of the two deputies, maybe even the senior deputy, is always from the Treasury Department. Do you have any recollection or observation about that?

BENEDICK: Yeah. In fact, in those days I think the ambassador was from the Treasury, as I recall. I know in later years it’s been usually a State Department person. I think that may again reflect the evolution of the OECD. The origins were in -- it even had a different name -- the OEEC, European Economic Cooperation, so it was very largely financial. Then the OECD came into all kinds of things. Later on I was sent to OECD meetings on biotechnology and scientific issues in a later stage of my career. So OECD was much more than just a... It had started pretty much as a club of finance ministries, and that was just about the transition. I’m pretty sure the ambassador was from the Treasury.

Q: The ‘D’ in OECD is for Development.

BENEDICK: Well, yes, Development, but I’m wondering if they changed the name.

Q: I think it was as the Marshall Plan really took effect and the payments were liberalized, opened up. I don’t think it was just Europe. I don’t remember exactly when the name changed. I think it was in the late ‘50s, maybe early ‘60s, at a time where then the Development Assistance Committee was established, about the same time, I think, as it changed its name from the OEEC to the OECD.

BENEDICK: Right, and dropped the ‘European’.

Q: Right. Anything else about your time in Paris?

BENEDICK: Well, at this time I had been now in the Foreign Service for almost 10 years, eight/nine years, and I was at that time 30, and this was when I made a serious career reevaluation and said, “Well, if I’m going to go into industry, into international industry, this is the time to do it, but at the same time I like very much the work in the government.” DuPont paid for a trip back to Wilmington, Delaware, and interviewed me, and I had an offer from them. I was looking at some other things, but I was really
weighing it against staying in the government in foreign relations. And that was the point that I decided that, well, fine, I’m very interested in economic development but these other aspects are more intriguing -- as I say, this dichotomy between the AID officers, which are Foreign Service Reserve, and the embassies. So I began to make some inquiries, and Stanley Freedman, the economic counselor at the embassy, said to me, “How about exploring the idea of moving?” I didn’t think this would be such a big deal, but, of course, it was a big deal. I had advanced fairly rapidly in the AID hierarchy and was by this time an R-3 under the old system, which is now 1. Again luck came into it. Germany, a neighboring country, was now entering a serious post-war recession for the first time. The “economic miracle” was over; the neo-Nazis were marching in the streets again; there was unemployment; and there was no economist at the mission. Economics was still a little bit a stepchild in the State Department. The person who was doing economics in the embassy in Bonn was not a real economist, did not have an advanced degree in economics. And along came myself, spoke even at that time fluent German, had a lot of contacts in Germany both from the government and from my OECD days as well. A number of people I knew from the German delegation, worked with, were now back in Bonn and were having influential positions in the economics ministry and the finance ministry, and I think the State Department realized that I could bring something to that job. So I had a number of interviews in Washington. The position was open. The embassy was screaming for somebody, because they had to really -- George McGhee was the ambassador at that time -- get on top for the embassy of what’s happening to the German economy, to speak to the German research institutes and learn more. And there I was, so I got a transfer as an FSR-3, but there was some reluctance. They wanted it to be a 4, but by that time I had two children.

Q: And you were already a 3 with AID, Foreign Service Reserve.

BENEDICK: Right, with the intention that if things worked out, I would transit to an FSO. That would obviously depend on how I did my first two years. This was really again the luck of being in the right place with kind of the right credentials and during an exciting time when you had a chance to show something. I was hardly there for a month or two when McGhee sent me to Berlin, which was suffering even more than the rest of Germany because the Russians were putting the squeeze on again. People were leaving Berlin. The working-age people were leaving and looking for jobs in the West. The youth was mainly radicalized, almost communist, and the population was aging. There were many other people, pensioners, who were forming a larger percent of the population, and it didn’t look good for them. The Russians were waiting for it to sort of fall into their lap.

Q: Were businesses pulling out?

BENEDICK: Businesses were pulling out, yes. So one of my first assignments was to go to Berlin and meet with the Berlin Senat, the governing body -- the Senat actually is the executive, not really a legislating Senate; it’s the governing body -- and try to devise ways in which we could help to support the economy, again through export credits, Export-Import Bank, selected aid, technical advice, technology transfer even in those days. Berlin has also played a very interesting role in my life. As you know, now I spend
about half my time in Berlin. My very first visit to Berlin was the day after the wall was put up in 1961 while on my way back from Tehran. I was staying with relatives of my young wife right on the Bernarastrasse, which is where the wall went up almost overnight. We heard shots in the night, and sometimes we’d walk the next morning and there would be a wreath of flowers where somebody had jumped from a building and had not made it. So Berlin had this real impact for me, and now I was going back as my first assignment with the embassy in Bonn to work on the Berlin assignment. That for me really made a profound impression. That was my work, my work as an economist. Interesting enough, again I worked under the Treasury attaché at that time. There was an economic counselor and there was a Treasury attaché, and then there was this economics analyst position. But the Treasury attaché, I should say, was more a finance person and, again, not an economist as such, really was more finance and banking. Things like business cycle or employment policies or industrialization are not really in the Treasury purview. That’s where an independent voice, or at least a different voice, from the State Department side was needed by the embassy at that time. At the same time I also had to realize I was working for..., that was the first time I was working really for somebody from a different -- except for OECD but that’s a special case -- the first time I was working for somebody from a different government agency.

Q: Who was the Treasury attaché?

BENEDICK: The first was Arthur Blaser, and the second was Ed Hernberg.

Q: Arthur Blaser, I should tell you, was Treasury attaché when I was in Tokyo, and I have very recently interviewed him for the Oral History Program.

BENEDICK: Oh really? How nice. He was very nice. He was a gentleman.

Q: You went there at least partly because and at a time when Germany was undergoing a recession and all those things were happening most pronounced in Berlin. Do things begin to improve? Do you take credit for that?

BENEDICK: No, no credit, but at least I do take credit for reporting on it and analyzing it in a way at a time when maybe it was not obvious. Again, because of the contacts I already had in Germany from my previous experience in Iran and Pakistan and in Paris, it still was a bit of an oddity for an American to really speak comfortably in German and even prefer to speak it. It’s not that big a deal, but I think it certainly opened a lot of doors. So you get referred one to the other. One event that stands out in my mind was that on the evening before the German deutschmark reevaluation was announced, an assistant secretary in the German economics ministry called me up at home to tell me it was happening and to give me all the details, so I could get a telegram in that night, and for a change we beat the New York Times. There are a lot of little things like that along the way. They went out of their way. I found working with Germans very easy and very pleasant. They were very helpful. They really go out of their way.
Q: Were your main sources in the government in Bonn or in Unesbach or Frankfurt or in some of the economic ministries?

BENEDICK: In all of the above, yeah, and also in private banks. One of my good friends from Tehran was at that time working in Cologne, and through him I got to know other people in the private sector. So I really could develop a network. I had to do my quarterly reports on the economy. Later, as a farewell gift, my colleagues, bound them all together in a big volume with a commentary of what had been wrong, but in a very sweet way, in a very nice way. I was very wrong on our balance of payments. I was thinking that the dollar would maintain its value against the deutschmark. I can remember giving speeches defending the dollar in different places. But it was a great experience.

Q: And you were there for five years, from ‘66 to ‘71, but you left before the big crisis in the summer of ‘71, I think, with the dollar.

BENEDICK: That’s right, that’s correct. When I left, the revaluation was I think from 4.20 to 4, or maybe 3.80 marks to the dollar. Now, of course, I’ve gotten as little as 1.35 to the dollar. Now it’s back up to about 1.80. I saw almost no inflation during this. Germany was an easy place to live.

Q: Did you stay in the financial economic reporting position the whole time you were there with the Treasury attaché?

BENEDICK: Yeah, Art Blaser left and Ed Hernberg replaced him. Again, because of the contacts, I would also attend the German political party conferences and could in that way just expand the net of information I could gather. I was there for the last days of Adenauer, and then came Kiesinger, and then Erhard and the grand coalition, and then there was a time of riots in the streets with the parliament opposition which were mainly radicals. I can remember very serious street demonstrations, and you had this uneasy collaboration between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. On the economic side it was agreeing with them, because you had Schiller, the economics minister, STD, and Franz Josef Strauss from Bavaria, Christian Socialist Union, CSU, as the conservative in the finance ministry. I got to know them, I got to know their aides. Again, I consider myself very, very lucky. The other thing -- I don’t know whether it belongs in this as a discussion of career development -- during the interval between the two halves of my total tour in Germany, I then made the application for changing my status. I had served under three ambassadors, George McGhee, Henry Cabot Lodge and then Ken Rush, all of whom in their own way were really super people to work for. So when I came back I had a kind of Foreign Service examination. They wanted to integrate me as an FSO-4 on the ground that an AID FSR-3 is really equivalent to a State Department FSO-4. I was not happy with that and didn’t want to do it. An argument was for two years I had my business card showing me as a Third Secretary of Embassy. Everyone thought I was doing a super job, including the Germans and Americans. And I wanted to go on home leave and come back with new cards saying Second Secretary, so I think that may have had a little... So they gave me this interview. Erland Heginbotham was the chair at the time. He was, I think, at that time the youngest FSO-3 but was still
several years older than I. We had a good interview in Washington during my leave, and it was approved.

Q: And he has a good economic background.

What else should we say about what you were involved with in Germany in these five years? Have we pretty well covered it?

BENEDICK: Obviously Germany was a critical ally to us at that time, and it was on the political side, especially when Rush came in, and John Kornblum, now our ambassador there, was his personal assistant, and that was a critical time in negotiating with the Russians.

Q: Quadripartite Agreement.

BENEDICK: Exactly.

Q: Were you involved at all with that?

BENEDICK: No, not at all. But on the political side, as an aside, there were very interesting things happening.

Q: Is Schmidt a person that you were involved with on the economics side, or had he not yet really come into Bonn?

BENEDICK: No, he had not. It was Schiller and Strauss and, of course, Earhart was the Chancellor and then Willy Brandt. I got to know Willy Brandt. He was elected just the fall before I left.

Q: Did you spend a lot of time in Berlin other than this initial period?

BENEDICK: No, there were a couple more trips, setting up these programs, and, as I say, they did work, and the economy began to recover. The Berlin programs I can take a little bit of credit for.

Q: Do you think those programs made a significant difference, or was it more the international economy and particularly that of the federal government in general that began to lift Berlin a bit?

BENEDICK: Well, I think we could point here maybe to this now in connection with export promotion or investment promotion. We did get American companies. I remember talking to them, and people from the embassy, and bringing them in to the ambassador, to McGhee at that time, to encourage them either not to pull out or even saying here’s opportunities on the Berlin side, not the government and the people there. We offered tax breaks and things like that to encourage people to take advantage of the location and also to guarantee them that we were not going to let them dangle, that there would be the
political support. I guess that was also a risk when the Russians were beginning to rattle their swords. People say, “Why should I invest? There are students in the street. They might go communist, and then we would lose our whole investment.” So there was a combination of economic arguments and the political guarantees that we were giving. I remember several companies then decided they’d either expand or they’d move in and test the water.

Q: You worked closely with the US mission in Berlin? Were they more involved with the political security issues and less on the economic?

BENEDICK: I think that was one of the main reasons why McGhee wanted to have somebody from Bonn. You were on the economic side, weren’t you?

Q: Well, in 1966 I took the 22-week economics course at FSI, so I was just then getting into it in a career way.

BENEDICK: Right, but before that there were very few people who had degrees in economics.

Q: It’s been a chronic problem before, during and probably still. Okay, anything else about Germany?

And where did you go after that as a Foreign Service Officer Class 3?

BENEDICK: Then I had actually my first real Washington assignment, because before that I had only been there as an intern for AID for about, as I say, seven or eight months in 1958-59, and in between home leaves. So that for me was a very hard assignment. First of all, it was my first management assignment that I had an office to direct. Up until then I had people working for me, locals, but I was basically self-standing within a small division, maybe even a two- or three-person division.

Q: In Bonn you were basically a reporting officer, nobody that you were supervising.

BENEDICK: This was a great challenge, and it was more so for a number of other reasons.

Q: What was the position?

BENEDICK: I was a director of the Office of Development Finance in the State Department, in the Economic Bureau, and this then drew, of course, on my AID experience. This was an office that was responsible from the State Department side for our input, for the foreign policy input and coordination of the whole panoply of development assistance institutions. This included all of the multilateral development banks, the World Bank and these new regional development banks which were all quite new in those days, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank; the African Development Bank had just been established; and also with Export Import
Bank, with OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and, of course, with AID, the major bilateral.

Q: And Treasury.

BENEDICK: And that’s the problem now. By the way, OPIC reminds me of something; on the written version I’ll go back to it. When you talked about US promoting investments both in Berlin and in Pakistan, I was working with OPIC, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, in getting these investment guarantees for American companies to invest. It wasn’t just Pakistan but Berlin. Okay, we were the point man for a State Department which in those days was, I should say, relatively weak, certainly on the economic side, and against a Treasury which was riding high under John Connolly. Nixon was President, and Connolly was a buddy of Nixon. It was a very hard position, because it was hard even to get information from them. It was hard to get on a delegation when they were going someplace, or to get my people on a delegation. They treated me, at least when I came in -- you know, I was the new guy on the team, and I was then trying to rely on the opposing line and they were going to run through me every time. That made a profound impression. I had never been in anything like... In the experience I had had in overseas embassies and AID missions, sure, there were rivalries and we’d have personality conflicts sometimes or professional differences, but I had never been exposed to anything like this. Not just from Treasury, but AID itself was sometimes difficult.

Q: On more the bilateral...

BENEDICK: On the bilateral, but that was also part. I had to have some kind of an input into that too. We were doing debt reschedulings, and I was a member of the team going out to examine Pakistan’s or Turkey’s debt,

Q: And basically the Treasury, AID, or whoever, essentially felt they didn’t need this input. They could take into account the national interest. They knew about foreign relations, and they didn’t need any special advice, particularly from somebody who was primarily an economist.

BENEDICK: They regarded me at that time as a Foreign Service generalist; and ‘Why are you messing in ours? Go play in your own sandbox’.

Q: Let me ask one other question about sort of your starting point. To be effective you really needed a lot of support from above, from the Assistant Secretary, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, whoever was your supervisor. Did you get that?

BENEDICK: Not as much as I thought I needed. Again, I wonder in retrospect how much was my personality -- and I think back to Iran when I was so rigid on this corruption issue -- whether I just needed to learn more about how to work in bureaucracy. I think there was some of that, because I found myself often being undercut. I’d make what I thought was a great resistance and put up great arguments as to why something should be, maybe not even on an issue of principle, maybe on an issue of substance, or it may have been
simply ‘No.’’ Then my counterpart in Treasury would bypass me and call up the Deputy Assistant Secretary -- they’d known each other for years, they were buddies -- and so I found myself being undercut. The irony was that I was in that job also for four years and there was then a change. Later in a way I made a reputation as a negotiator later on, but at that point I was really undercut because here I was being too hard apparently and then the new boss said I was giving away, throwing things away. That was only one. He was only there for a short while before I left to go to Athens. Again, it was an issue of debt rescheduling, and I thought I was absolutely alone, I’ll come to that at the end of this tour. I made some compromises which I thought were good ones, and I remember he was critical of that and said in effect, “You sold the store,” but there’s no choice in doing that and I thought we had gotten something in return. In retrospect, it was ironic that the first DAS always thought I was being too rigid, or often thought I was being too rigid, at least in this one episode toward the end when I thought at least by now I know how to compromise, and...

Q: You’d gone too far.

BENEDICK: I’d gone too far. But I learned a lot certainly, and it was again close familiarity with the multilateral banks which came into great use later on, and also with AID because in a subsequent assignment I worked very closely with AID at different levels.

Q: This is the second session of an oral history interview with Richard Benedick. It’s the first of March 2000. I’m Raymond Ewing, and this interview is being conducted under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Oral History Program. Richard, when we finished talking last time, which I think was on the 31st of August 1999 -- it’s been several months -- we were talking about your experience from 1971 to ‘75 as Director of the Office of Development Finance in the Economic Bureau of the State Department, talking about being involved with the World Bank and the Export Import Bank, US assistance programs, and particularly debt rescheduling negotiations. I guess I’d like just to clarify whether you, the State Department, were primarily conducting these negotiations, or where you supporting the Treasury Department, or was it a little bit of both, and how did you manage to establish your credentials with the financial authorities in the Treasury Department?

BENEDICK: Well, the responsibility of the office, as its name implied, Office of Development Finance, was the entire range of financial relationships with developing countries, so this comprised all of the development banks, the multilateral development banks, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Export Import Bank, and US AID for its financial assistance. We were in effect the window of the State Department on these AID programs and financial assistance programs, not just the IMF because the IMF, of course, dealt also with industrialized countries. So we were definitely second fiddle to everyone. Treasury led the delegations to the World Bank and all the fancy bank meetings. USAID led the delegations on other things that concerned development assistance. At that time we had a very strong Treasury Secretary, John Connolly, and they were really feeling
their muscles, and the State Department had to scramble for every position or even for a place on the delegation sometimes, as well as for my input. The only way we could do it was to try to provide some value added, because, once again, the Secretary of State had more... At that time economics was not as important as today within the State Department bureaucracy. It was important but it was still second to the political concerns. Therefore, we were pretty much on our own in our dealings, especially with Treasury, and we had to do it by just trying to find some areas where we could be useful, where there was a regional expertise. For example, my staff member, who was working on the International Development Bank, had a lot of experience in South America and a lot of contacts, and that helped a lot. So it was an uphill fight, especially with Treasury. They were trying to exclude us from delegations. Then we would be representing the regional bureaus in our contacts with Treasury, and there were political concerns that we wanted to have involved in policy formulation, but it was not easy. One thing I personally then got involved very much in was debt rescheduling. That was an important issue and many developing countries required some debt relief. I had had previous experience in that in my previous post when I was seconded to the OECD in Paris. I had worked on some of the first initiatives for debt relief and had written on them from the standpoint of the secretariat of the OECD, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. I can remember one of the most interesting and sensitive negotiations we were involved in and that was with the Allende government in Chile in the Club of Paris, which is now the museum, I think, in Paris. It’s the very fancy offices of the Ministry of Finance in the Louvre, the Palais de Louvre. Our position, of course, was that we should be very hard on Allende and not reschedule the debt, and we were joined in this by the British with the Dutch sort of wavering. At that time it was the European Community. There only were, I think, six countries in the EC. Germany was more inclined to listen to our arguments about being firm, whether for a combination of political reasons because of the left-wing government or simply because we didn’t want to make it easy for other countries to get out in a situation where they really through domestic policies could have improved their financial situation. And because of some of the things that happened with Allende, this was not the case. So I remember one very tough negotiation. On the other side were the Spanish, who for some reason were supporting any South American country that wanted anything. And the French: this was still post-de Gaulle, but still anything the Americans were for, they would be against, and they liked to tweak us on Allende. And there were a few others within the European union, the Italians. So the European Community, whenever they spoke as a voice, they would be speaking in favor of debt relief, and it was basically us and the British who were opposing it. There was one night negotiation -- we were trying to reach a very critical point -- in Paris. I was trying my best to establish very close relations with the Germans, because I spoke German, I had a lot of contacts in Germany. I’d just come from Germany. In fact, I’d been four and a half years in Germany. So I had a lot of contacts in the Foreign Office and elsewhere. The head was a consummate diplomat who spoke fluent Spanish, English and French, and those are the three languages of the Club de Paris, and so he sometimes made his interventions in English and sometimes in French and sometimes in Spanish, and he was a delight. But we reached this thing. It was a Friday night negotiation and it was about 10 or eleven o’clock at night and all of a sudden the French got up and said, “We are going to have an EC caucus.” I think it was after 11 o’clock at night, and all the members of the club who
were not members of the EC would have to leave. So we found ourselves, the US delegation -- the head of it was a Treasury person who didn’t really know what was happening anyway -- while the EC had their caucus -- I think the Treasury people -- with the British and some of the others milling around the corridors, and after a few minutes there was this tremendous excitement. The doors flung open with young French attaches running out screaming into the midnight air. There was tremendous shouting and screaming. What was the problem? Well, since it was an EC caucus, the head of the German delegation insisted on speaking in German, and that upset the whole plans of the French anyway. But I think it was probably the first time or one of the first times that the Germany had felt confident enough -- this was in, I guess, 1973 or ‘74 -- that they’re not going to be always pulled around by the French. It was very interesting.

Q: And then did that lead to a successful coming together on the US position?

BENEDICK: Yes, the Germans then were able to modify the EC position and reach a compromise. So they were running out looking for translators. That was the problem. And, of course, they couldn’t find a translator at that hour, so that then broke the rhythm that the opponents had, and the next day they were able to meet and rationally talk and got something done.

Q: You were involved in some other debt rescheduling negotiations in that period. I have a note saying with Ghana, India and Pakistan. Were there any particular aspects of any of those that ought to be noted?

BENEDICK: Yes, I can remember with those countries I think AID was often playing a leading role, because in those countries there were very large AID programs. Actually we got along much better with the USAID. It wasn’t that much of a conflict of interest. Also, of course, in those days, we were for at least some debt restructuring, not total debt relief.

Q: I guess the difference at least in part was that there was considerable bilateral assistance or bilateral debt from the past that AID would be involved with that would be owed to them as opposed to the Exchange Stabilization Fund or some other.

BENEDICK: Which was more of the case with Chile, right. And then later toward the end of my assignment, we were able to take some delegations where we could demonstrate that we really had an interest. You know, the constellation changed somewhat both in Treasury and the State Department so, for example, toward the end I was leading some delegations to the UNCTAD, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which were dealing not with a specific country but with the broad concept of debt relief.

Q: You were authorized, allowed, to head up US delegations to some UNCTAD meetings because Treasury and AID really weren’t very interested or didn’t think it was very important, or in fact were these meetings of significance, because they were primarily with the developing countries?
BENEDICK: They were primarily with developing countries, right. In any event, my office responsibility was on developing countries. We weren’t doing IMF matters. We had another office in the State Department that had that problem, dealing with federal and IMF. I think it was because they were not specific countries but the whole broad principle, and there State could make a case that these were things that the State Department could balance in different interests. Also, as I hinted, the constellation changed. We had a new Deputy Assistant Secretary in State who was a little stronger in pushing, and I believe I remember on the Treasury side there were corresponding differences that made the cooperation a little bit easier and were more equally balanced.

Q: Do you remember who the new State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary was?

BENEDICK: It was Paul Boeker, who previously, by the way, was my predecessor.

Q: So he was familiar with the substance of these matters.

BENEDICK: And he also was, I think, tougher in a simply bureaucratic sense.

Q: I suppose as far as UNCTAD was concerned, you had to be very careful that anything you agreed to even at the UNCTAD meeting did not represent an obligation, a commitment, on the part of the United States to do a specific thing in another context.

BENEDICK: Yeah, these were more statements -- it was soft law -- statements of principle. “We’d be prepared to consider under these and these circumstances...” Even then I remember being caught just when I was leaving the job and I had my next assignment. In fact, I remember my last thing for ODF was to head a delegation in Geneva on my way to Athens, which was my next assignment. I was still writing the report on the plane when I got in Athens. The first thing I had to do was clear up what I had given away when I was in Geneva. I remember we had some strong discussions and also differences, a lot of differences, but again this is now about 25 years ago and we’re hearing the same things now again.

Q: Okay, is there anything else we ought to say about the assignment as Director of the Office of Development Finance? Or maybe it is time to go to your assignment in Athens. What was your position there? I guess would be my first question. Second, would be: Did you study Greek before you went?

BENEDICK: No, the assignment came up rather quickly. I was counselor of embassy for economic and commercial affairs, and Jack Kubisch was the ambassador. He had been there, I think for about a year. This was in early 1975, and it was at a very critical stage in US-Greek relations. The previous summer Turkey had invaded Cyprus and the relationship between Greece and the United States turned from one of, at least in the public mind, our closest friends to virtual enemies, and the situation was decidedly nasty. What happened there was a new democracy came into power. That is in effect a Christian Democratic, not a left-wing government. The Greek colonels had been overthrown. The right-wing autocratic government had been overthrown after the Turks went into Cyprus.
The US government, which had supported that right-wing Greek government -- Spiro Agnew, the Vice President, who was Greek was very sympathetic. Many of the old friends, family friends, were now in government, colonels, military government, and there was a lot of resentment against the US. This all had been bottled up, but with the added national insult of the Turkish invasion at Cyprus, this all turned on us. Why didn’t the US attack Turkey for their backing of the Turkish Cypriots or, in fact, the Turkish invasion actually? We were caught in the middle and were the scapegoats. And they hadn’t been able to find somebody to head, again symbolic of the weakness of the Department on the economic side in those days. I think I mentioned earlier in this interview how I jumped from Paris to Bonn because we really didn’t have an economist to send there. We had a Treasury economist at the State Department, and they found me because I had economic background and also coincidentally spoke German. And the same thing in a way happened in Athens. Now at a higher level they wanted somebody who could help to design an economic assistance program for Greece to support the new democratic government at the same time as public opinion in Greece had turned very much against us. So I arrived. I was still living in a hotel two blocks from the embassy -- you know that embassy well -- on the great broad boulevard, and it’s a great white marble building. Two weeks after I arrived I was still in the hotel. There was an announcement of a mass demonstration, a protest demonstration, against the Americans, and there was thought it might turn ugly. But carefree as I was in those days, I wanted to see it, so I put on some old clothes and went out into the street, and it was really something. It went on for five or six hours. Tens of thousands -- they estimated a half million -- people crossing, passing up, shouting insults, waving banners and flags, and then it turned ugly. They’d throw these paint bombs, red paint inside a jar, so that after a while the whole embassy looked like blood dripping down this white marble facade. Then they started breaking windows. Then they started throwing fire bombs in. Meanwhile the police came in these little armored cars with tear gas. At one point I found myself surrounded by a group of young toughs, and they were looking at me. I didn’t speak a word of Greek. Our embassy had just needed somebody there fast, and they had already run through four or five candidates, and Kubisch came. He called me up and said, “Can you come?” after we had met at one point. But anyway there I was in the crowd with these toughs. Finally one of them started speaking and said, “Are you American?” The only thing I could think of was to try to pretend that I was German, and I said, “Nein, nein.” Then two of them held me, and they went and got someone named Janos. He came over. He had worked in Germany as a desk worker, and so I had my German language test, which I’m happy to say I passed.

Q: Were the Greeks native Greek?

BENEDICK: There was so much going on around us. We just had a few sentences, and then, “He’s all right, he’s okay.” You asked me about learning Greek, and I really wanted to learn Greek and I fortunately had a tutor coming in an hour a day and I studied a lot on my own because I wanted to learn the language. It was very interesting, and it helped a lot. I did learn the language. I had not a syllable before I came.
Q: You certainly painted an accurate picture of the overall situation. I think it’s certainly fair to say that while we were being attacked by the government for what had happened in ‘74 by the people, they also needed help, and we wanted to give help because in many ways we were comfortable with the new government. We supported democracy being returned to Greece after all those years of the colonels’ dictatorship even though we also gave support for them during that period. How did we go about doing that? The Greeks weren’t sure about our military bases. That was another set of negotiations that was also going on. What kind of a program did we develop? Were you involved in that, and how long did it take to negotiate?

BENEDICK: Well, it didn’t take too long, because we worked fast and our government was willing, and their government also. I should say the enmity that we felt -- and it was really curious, because one of my colleagues, Richard Welch, was actually assassinated in front of his house the day before Christmas eve. So security was a problem, but not from the government. The government was more than correct. They were actually cordial. I had wonderful memories of my dealings with the Minister of Planning and the Governor of the Central Bank. His family had these jewelry shops you see in Palm Beach and Paris and New York. But they were wonderful people, and they were sincere. They wanted to work with us, but they had to protect their flanks somewhat against the left-wing opposition, which later came to power under Papandreou. He was, of course, very much in the picture then as well. It was an extremely interesting time to be in Greece. There was this outpouring of emotion, of culture. Among the people there was a great anti-American... It was very tough. At least I came and saw it. That’s all I knew. I had to work from that. But colleagues who had been in the embassy in 1974 before the invasion said it was like night and day. One day their children would go to school with the Greek buddies and friends, and the next day they were being spat upon by the same kids, because the parents had turned against us. But with the government we had, I think, excellent relations. You mentioned the military bases, because that was how they had to protect their flanks by trying to be tough with us on the bases. We had bases down in Crete, and we had one, of course, right by the airport outside of Athens and others around the country. But I would say that things went uphill rather rapidly, certainly beginning in ‘76, and we also had a new government. Jimmy Carter came into office, and things were more comfortable. There was still a legacy of Agnew even though he was no longer in office, but there was some of that. Of course, they weren’t eligible for AID, but we looked into Export Import Bank, and here I found an ally in Bill Casey, who later went on to be head of the CIA but previous to that had been Undersecretary of State of Economic Affairs when I had been in ODF. I had gotten to know him then and had enjoyed working with him, and now he was head of Export Import Bank and so I used that personal relationship as well. I got him out to Greece, and we gave him the program and showed him around. Ex-Im Bank came up with a big program. And then we had OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, with guarantees to get American businessmen back in, and they were also happy to do it once the government was able to tamp down this kind of popular uprising thing. Businesses don’t like to do business, to invest, in that kind of an atmosphere. We did have a number of issues with American industry and left-wing Greek unions. For example, in Thessaloniki Esso oil refineries there were problems, and I had to go up there and help with some negotiations. So it was
a very multifaceted kind of assignment dealing really with an individual country, whereas a lot of my previous experience had been with OECD and also at ADF had been multilateral.

Q: To what extent were American businesses interested in investing in Greece in that period? Greece was not yet a member of the European Community or Union. It had not applied for membership yet. I don’t know to what extent it was a topic.

BENEDICK: It was. Oddly enough, it was. Of course, it didn’t actually happen until how many years later?

Q: In the ‘80s.

BENEDICK: Yeah, a good decade or more later. But they were already talking about it, and they were proud. Of course, it was a debate. I visited many Greek industrialists, for example, and they really were trying hard and they wanted to be part of Europe and they wanted to be modern. They felt themselves anyway, with their old civilization, they had a lot to contribute. They were, as you know, a very proud people. I remember visiting, for example, a pasta factory north of Athens, and they were so proud because they exported pasta to Italy. Italians were buying their good quality.

Q: At the time you were there, from ‘75 to ‘77, for an American business investor Greece was a pretty small market and had gone through a lot of turbulence, change of government, and so on. Were they coming in? If so, where were they coming from, and why?

BENEDICK: I mentioned the oil refinery. That’s always been a lucrative business in that part of the world. There were some other industries coming in. I think to some extent there were people who were interested in Greece, maybe descendants or had family or other ties and now wanted to come back for that. Yes, it is a small market, but there were places where people could find a niche. I can’t remember the details, but I remember there were some small manufacturing companies, and there was also a feeling that one could use that as a springboard to the Near East, for example to Lebanon.

Q: You mentioned the assassination of one of your embassy colleagues, Richard Welch. After he was killed in December of ‘75, just before Christmas, did that have quite an effect on your ability to move around? Did you have to take a lot of precautions in terms of your residence and going to and from work, or was that more affecting the ambassador and maybe the DCM?

BENEDICK: Well, yes, it certainly affected them a lot. We were next in line, the political counselor and economic counselor. Dick Welch in a way was a special case, because he was the CIA station chief, not covert -- everybody knew what he was doing because Greece was an ally. Definitely everyone analyzed it as being a consequence of that and that these were Cypriots or Greek extremists who had tracked him down. Nevertheless we were, of course, nervous because, when it comes to that, anyone can be a target and
especially if you’re on the country team. I had a marvelous house, by the way, the best house I had in my whole career. Of course, one of our first AID missions in the whole world was under the Point Four program in the Marshall Plan. You know, it’s Greece, Turkey and Iran.

Q: ____________________.

BENEDICK: Right, and the head of the AID mission had this house, and now they’re only residual, from residual funding, but that came under the economic counseling, so the economic counselor inherited that house. It was a marvelous, turn-of-the-century palais, large villa, that had been built for the Archbishop of Greece, Damaskinos. During the war, during the German occupation, the German commanding field marshal was in the house. In fact, from Germany I know his nephew, Shtider, who later became, Shtider Senior, the first commander in chief of NATO after the war, first or second certainly. So he was well known and respected by the allies even though he had been field marshal in Greece. It was not a bitter kind of relationship. There was, for example, a German cemetery in Athens, a German war cemetery which was very well cared for. Anyway, I was telling Shtider about my house. He became also a general. I first met him here in Washington when he was a young captain in the office of the military attaché at the embassy, and then later on over the years we kept in contact. I spend a lot of time now in Berlin, and I discovered a couple of years ago, three or four years ago, that Hans Shtider had been transferred to become the commander of the Berlin garrison of the Bundesrat. We were reminiscing, and I mentioned about my time and he said, “That was where my uncle lived.” It’s a marvelous house with marvelous stairs. At one time the political counselor had been looking at it, because we both arrived at the same time. Of course, he would have had the first choice. There had been a traditional house for the political counselor. Finally his wife said, “Oh no, I don’t really want it. It’s too much.” The other house was more modern, and this was more old fashioned, bay windows and things. It wasn’t even too big. So that was Damaskinos. By the way, when he came back in the Greek civil war, there was still a monarchy and the young prince was too young to rule, so because of the civil war, they all turned then to the Archbishop and made him the Archbishop Regent, so one could say from this house all of Greece was ruled at one point.

Q: In the early post-war period.

BENEDICK: Post-war.

Q: You mentioned before the government of Karamanlis needed to be... One of the factors it had to take into account was the socialist opposition, Andreas Papandreou and his PASOK party (Panhellenic Socialist Movement). I’m just wondering to what extent, if any, you had contacts with either PASOK in general or Papandreou in particular. He was a very well regarded communist, had a lot of experience in American universities, and so on.

BENEDICK: Berkeley in the 1960s.
Q: Especially Berkeley.

BENEDICK: I did not. We had a great country team, Jack Kubisch and Monty Stearns, the DCM...

Q: Who later became ambassador and had served previously in Greece and had fluent Greek.

BENEDICK: That’s right. That was his second of three postings in Greece. No, I must say I had my hands full on the economic side, and Papandreou and the PASOK was really a province of the political side. That was George Barbis, who also spoke fluent Greek.

Q: Whom I’ve interviewed for this program.

BENEDICK: Really? Well, I’m sure he could have given you a lot of insights on that aspect. Mine was more really with the Chamber. There was a Greek-American Chamber of Commerce. A lot of it was retail, not just investment but was retail trade. They were very friendly. They had done business with the Americans for years, and then with the banks. I mentioned Dilotas of the Central Bank and then Andalopolous of the National Bank of Greece, which actually was a private bank. We helped to make, connect, fostered, promoted connections with American financial institutions. It was a period of trying to rebuild traditional relationships, some of which may have been an unsavory reputation, but certainly there were plenty of relationships during the military junta, but then there was that abrupt break with the Turkish invasion, and now we were trying to rebuild them on a more equal basis.

Q: You mentioned that your title was Counselor of Embassy for Economic and Commercial Affairs, and working for you was a commercial attaché. This was before the days of the Foreign Commercial Service. I gather from what you’ve said that you spent a lot of your time in what could be considered commercial affairs, export promotion, working with American businesses and the like. Is that right?

BENEDICK: That’s right. I think it was Dick Jackson. So there was no kind of interagency problem. Hopefully one doesn’t want them anyway, but there wasn’t really, and we were all trying to do the same thing.

Q: Okay, anything else we should say about your period in Greece?

BENEDICK: I think we’ve pretty well covered it. Again, I feel myself lucky to have been in a situation where things were not quite usual. It wasn’t a normal time for Greece, just as my time in Germany had not been a normal time because of the economic recession there and the political overtones. In a way, of course, for a Foreign Service Officer that’s the most challenging. That’s when we have a chance to really experience something and also accomplish something.
Q: I think one can look back on that period, the early period, maybe five years from, say, 1974 to '79, in Greece as really setting the stage or laying the groundwork for all that’s followed. Various things have happened after you were there. PASOK, the socialist party, did come to power. Greece joined the European Union. But the democratic system that was reestablished in 1974/75 is still there and going well.

BENEDICK: My main regret was that I had to cut the posting short. I was only there for two years, because my son, who at that time was 12 or 13, was having a serious learning disability. We tried to bring him out. In fact, I was separated from my wife and she stayed in Washington while I was in Greece. The second summer they came out and we tried to find a school for Andreas. It then became apparent there was no satisfactory schooling solution, so they had to go back, and I stayed another three-quarters year and then asked to be reassigned. Jack Kubisch wasn’t very happy; I wasn’t either, but I felt I had to do it.

Q: And then you came back to the Senior Seminar here at the Foreign Service Institute. I think the Senior Seminar as such has been described multiple times in these interviews, but I think it would be interesting for you to talk about any aspect of it that you want but particularly about your individual research project, which I think was unique.

BENEDICK: I’m sure others have spoken about the Senior Seminar and all the opportunities and the learning experience. All the wonderful trips that we made and the learning experience others have talked about. It changed my career and changed my whole life, that 10-month period, partially because -- you mentioned the research project -- of a tremendous stroke of luck, being in the right place at the right time. In those days we had an unlimited travel budget. One of our members actually went to Samoa to follow up on the Margaret Mead research about coming of age, and we could go anyplace we wanted in the world. There were only two conditions. It had to be a country you had never been in before, and it had to be a subject that one had never dealt with before. So I couldn’t have done the economic subject. I picked Egypt, because I thought Egypt would be just a wonderful place to visit. You had the whole year, the whole first part of the course, to prepare. It was in February/March. I don’t know what it is now, but we had four weeks, free from any responsibility. Part of it was to travel, part of it was for writing, whatever you wanted. At the end of those four weeks you had to turn it in. I decided to do something on the Aswan High Dam and what the ecological and other implications of it were. I thought we really ought to look at -- it wasn’t in any of the literature -- we really ought to look at the effects of the High Dam on the archeological monuments -- that wasn’t the main part of my paper; it was one chapter -- because actually you have a different water situation. Instead of having a big flood part of the year or for a few months, up to three months, and then have dry conditions, now you’re having steady water, in effect the Nile River turning into a canal. I had called around and just by sheer good luck reached an Egyptian professor at the University of Michigan, named Massie. Not only was he an expert on the Nile, but when I told him about my project and I was a Foreign Service Officer and I wanted to make it sort of broad and among other things the archeology but also with the farmers and their power generation and the salinization in the Nile Delta, he said, “Very good. When do you want to do it?” I said, “Sometime in February.” He said, “Well, I’m heading a scientific mission with somebody from the
National Academy of Sciences here in Washington and some other water experts. Would you like to join us?” That was the opportunity of a lifetime, so I traveled with these people from Aswan to Alexandria. They were very kind. They imparted their knowledge. I saw the country like few tourists have, namely part of it crawling underground. Again, they connected me with... The University of Chicago had an archeological mission, and they were just delighted to have somebody from the US government interested in what they were doing. So here I wanted to go out with my camera and take pictures of things, but, “Yes, we’ll have time for that, but first come down. We want to show you what’s happening there with the groundwater rising and the effect on the environment.” We were literally crawling with miners’ helmets and water dripping, so the archeologists were showing me what was happening under the Temple of Karnak when I really wanted to be... But there was time for that. And it was a marvelous experience. I wrote then a monograph. At that time the Senior Seminar always wanted to have their papers published elsewhere, and I believe they didn’t have much luck on that. We were the 20th class. Who was the coordinator at that time? Chris Van Hollen, and he liked it also. We all had to give our presentations to the rest of the Seminar at the end of the year based on our research, so I dressed up in a caftan and I had a tape with Egyptian music and wore sunglasses. There was a picture of me in the State Department bulletin giving the presentation wearing sunglasses with a caftan. But Van Hollen also helped, and we did then eventually get it published by the *Middle East Journal*.

**Q:** The *Middle East Journal* is a quarterly.

**BENEDICK:** My original title was “From Amenhote to Aswan.” I had two main points: one was that it’s not new to interfere and affect, because at this time the environmentalists in the US were making a big uproar about the Aswan and the adverse effects. I wanted to point out that the Egyptians had always been in effect trying to modify or change the so-called natural flow. Amenhote was the first pharaoh who brought about a diversion. He didn’t build a dam, but then later other things happened. So that was the first point, and that the effects of the High Dam, while something to look at, were... It was a trade-off. First of all, it was not new. I used little headings. I found things in Herodotus. I thought I’d go back and look at early history. I found things. Herodotus found salinization in the Nile Delta before there was any High Dam, and he recorded that the fish at the mouth of the Nile, the sardines at the mouth, would disappear for decades at a time. That was one of the complaints, that because the Nile was no longer flowing into the Mediterranean, the fish were being disturbed. So I pointed out that these things happen and that the real reason for the Aswan High dam, the unavoidable necessity to build that, was to get two crops a year, and that was the population problem. So I brought the population problem into the picture of the High Dam, which had not been much emphasized. So really the essay or the monograph, I should say, was really about population pressures forcing Egyptians to do something which would have some inevitable ecological effects, but even those effects could be counterbalanced and had to be traded off against the need to feed the population. That paper caught the attention of Marshall Green, who at that time was coordinator of population affairs, and Tom Pickering, who was the Assistant Secretary for OAS, the Bureau for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and that led to my next assignment.
Q: The only thing that didn’t happen, I guess, is you didn’t get an assignment to Cairo.

BENEDICK: That’s right. Hermann Eilts, I met with Hermann Eilts, our ambassador at that time. Well, now I had in effect my Egyptian experience, and what happened, of course, was that Marshall was getting ready to retire, Marshall Green, and after introducing me to Tom Pickering and after a couple of discussions, they asked me to take over that portfolio as Coordinator of Population Affairs, which is a whole new chapter.

Q: Okay, so in 1979 at the conclusion of the Senior Seminar you became immediately Coordinator of Population Affairs with the rank of ambassador, or was there an intervening...

BENEDICK: Marshall was hitting the mandatory retirement age, and he was going to retire in 1980. I actually entered his office as his understudy in effect in 1978, and it was about six months later -- it wasn’t 1980, it was 1979; I entered in 1978 in the fall...

Q: At the end of the Senior Seminar.

BENEDICK: Right, and with the understanding that I was his understudy, that I would replace him. He was going to retire in early 1979, again coincidentally just about this time of year -- we’re now, as you said, March 1st -- and that’s when he was going to retire. So I came in. It was a very small office, and it was primarily run on Marshall’s prestige as at that time the senior ambassador in the Foreign Service. He had been ambassador in Indonesia and Australia, had been Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, which is where I first knew him. Marshall helped me on a lot of things that we had to do in Asia. Marshall Green is a very impressive figure. Anyway, now, lo and behold, he had voluntarily wanted to finish his career working in this position of Coordinator of Population Affairs. There had been a predecessor, Phil Klaussen, another great man, but Marshall gave it a certain different aura, and to try to impress on foreign policy and on our government and other governments the importance of the population growth factor. This is something, by the way, that I’m still working on 20 years later, and in different ways we can talk about that if we ever get to a section on life after the Foreign Service. But there was Marshall and, as I say, he read the article and talked to me, and he liked the monograph and then wanted me to replace him. I walked into a buzzsaw, because not only was population extremely controversial as an issue even within the administration -- and that was before Reagan -- but it was also within the Foreign Service kind of an afterthought. People, I think, in some senses humored Marshall. He had an office with the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and, of course, Tom Pickering treated him with tremendous respect, which he deserved and earned, but the position as such was, I soon discovered, a very odd one. It was not a traditional Deputy Assistant Secretary position. He had a few people working with him who were mostly cast-offs. His main role, as he had defined it, was giving speeches and talking to US ambassadors before they went overseas giving them a briefing on population factors and lending in effect his authority to the AID program. USAID had a very good program, at
that time $200,000,000, in population, and he would try to support that. He testified before Congress and in effect lent his personal prestige and authority.

Q: But he didn’t run that program.

BENEDICK: There was nothing he was running, no.

Q: He had no authority over it.

BENEDICK: No. But he could travel wherever he wanted, again because of his moral and intellectual authority and the ambassadorial rank, which he made a tremendous contribution. And the population community was a very active NGO community, a number of organizations, some more responsive that others, some of which I became affiliated with and am still working with in a different capacity over the years. Because of the great research work they do now, they’re linking it with environment issues. But I came there and found this sort of odd bureaucratic structure and also in terms of what is the responsibility there. The first thing I had to face was with some people in the environmental community and in Congress: There was at that time a special select Committee on Population in the House headed by Jim Scheuer, Congressman from New York, and they looked at it and said, “Well, Marshall, retiring in six months, approves this fellow? Bene-who? Richard who? Athens, Germany -- what does he know about population?” And I can remember in the first reception there that I attended -- and Marshall took me everywhere; “This is my successor.” Again a person whom I really became very friendly with and who donated money -- now that was to the Committee on National Institute for the Environment -- personally donated. He’s a very wealthy man, and he looked askance. In fact, it was Bob Wallace, the son of Henry Wallace, very aristocratic and very patrician. I remember at this reception talking down his nose and saying, “And what is your background in population?” And, as a matter of fact, I had one, interestingly enough, because when I was in Pakistan in the 1960s, ‘62 to ‘64, with the AID mission, I there became for the first time impressed about population as a factor in economic development. I don’t know if I mentioned this earlier in the interview, but we were working on a five-year development plan for Pakistan, AID plan. I was supposed to do the balance of payments and industrial development economy, and I said, “How can you talk about any of this stuff without building in the population factor?” By the way, the population of Pakistan at that time was 40,000,000 and it’s now about 170,000,000. I said, “We have to build this in. This is impossible.” There was a lot of talking around. Maury Williams, Morris Williams was the Deputy Director and then became the Director. He had been my boss in Iran earlier. They finally sort of graciously said, “Well, all right, Benedick, if you can fit it in after you do your balance of payments chapter, after you do your industrial development, okay, we’ll consider having something on population in our five-year plan.” So I made it a point -- there was almost nothing going on, but there was something. I’ll never forget going up to Lahore and Sialkot visiting industries and so on, and they were including in that itinerary visiting whatever it was in the way of family planning. I found it was very little. The Swedes had a mobile mission, the Swedish government, and some enlightened industrialist had education programs and was giving out condoms, free condoms, in their pay packets. I was able to tell these
people this. By the way, Dick Gardner, Richard Gardner, who at that time was Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs, was also trying to do something on population. So he and I made a link-up which again over the years turned out to be very productive and interesting and helpful. So I did have some good experiences. There was that and then the Congress, Scheuer, said, “We don’t want this guy.” He was writing letters every week -- Cy Vance was Secretary of State -- and said, “Why can’t we get a junior-level Cy Vance to be Coordinator of Population Affairs or somebody who has already a lot of experience, who could go from Marshall Green to somebody who’s never been involved and was not an ambassador?” And so they came up, Pickering with his wonderful idea, and Marshall giving support, to create this position a little differently. So it became a Senate confirmed, ambassador-at-large position. In fact, we were just last week at the Aspen Institute Congressional conference in San Juan, Puerto Rico, chaired by former Senator Dick Clark, and he and I went up together to the confirmation hearing. That was in 1979.

Q: Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

BENEDICK: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, right. He was being appointed. He was no longer Senator. He was being appointed ambassador-at-large for refugee affairs.

Q: This happened after Marshall Green retired about a year after you had started working in the population field.

BENEDICK: About six months. I started in the fall and this happened in March of ‘79.

Q: Did it go smoothly?

BENEDICK: It did. Actually it was interesting. They had first Clark as a former colleague and they had -- at the Helms was ranking minority member and we obviously had very carefully briefing stuff -- and then there was me, each of us individually, and then there was a panel of three State Department for bilateral embassies. Clark had his and then I had mine, and there was questioning, but it went okay. Frank Church was the chair. They’re almost all there, by the way, including Helms. Church then said, “I know that Richard Benedick is traveling to Geneva tonight, has to go to some delegation, and Dick Clark has to leave, so could we have, before we turn to the next panel.” There was silence for a minute, and then the Senator from Nebraska -- I forget his name...

Q: Republican?

BENEDICK: Republican.

Q: Hruska?

BENEDICK: Yes, Hruska, Roman Hruska, who not too long after, I think, died in office. Anyway, he said no. There was kind of a stunned silence, and Church turned to him and
said, “Is that for both? Is your no for one or for both of the nominees?” And then there was a slight pause, and then he said, “Both.” Okay, and we went on. I went off to the airport, got on the plane, and the way that I knew that it turned out all right was the next morning when I arrived in Geneva there was an announcement on the airplane, “Will Ambassador Benedick please identify himself before leaving the plane. There are people to meet him on the tarmac.” In those days they still did things like that. Later the State Department Congressional people said they thought that Hruska had something in for Clark, because Clark was a rather liberal Democrat.

Q: From a neighboring state.

BENEDICK: Iowa. At that point, though, he was embarrassed to really come out. There was a slight hesitation, and so he said, “Both.” There was that element. And eventually I got to know Scheuer and the Committee through his deputy, who now is an officer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in New York. His name is Michael Teitelbaum. People at the State Department said, “Well, meet Benedick at least. Meet him. Go talk to him.” So he said, “I don’t want to meet him, because I’m afraid I might like him. Nothing personal. He may be a perfectly good man. He’s intelligent, he’s done good things, but he’s not the man for this job.”

Q: Because you didn’t have the credentials, the stature. It wasn’t so much that he disagreed with whatever policies the Administration was pursuing or you were pursuing.

BENEDICK: No, no. And Marshall assured him, you know, that he knew me for years, and Pickering, nothing could persuade him. And finally we arranged to meet informally. I remember it was really informally with Mike Teitelbaum, Chief of Staff, sort of in the shadows. Teitelbaum said to be careful, “He doesn’t know I’m meeting you either.” This was done through intermediaries. Then eventually Teitelbaum reported back that he had met me by chance and gotten to know me. And then it worked, at least that side worked. Now with the other as important, so I began to gradually get my credentials in the community, and now I had the title and that helped a lot of things. That began to work. The issue, of course, I found fascinating and important. I had not done anything on it since Pakistan because I had been on more classic economic things. But then the problem was, the real important, was how to deal with AID. I remember calling up the director of the office that was responsible for this $200,000,000 AID program. His name was Ravenhoe. You may even have heard of him because he became kind of a legend as a bull in a china shop. He was passionately devoted to this issue in such a way as to exclude every other shred of common sense. His idea was send helicopters over the jungles and drop condoms all over and, of course, the people would use them, and he was pushing, very motivated, a lot of good things in what he did, but by that point he was beginning to get old and people were beginning to get weary of this because they could see it wasn’t really working as well as he said it would. But I called him up and said, “Well, here I am. I’m the new guy on the block, and I’m going to be helpful to you. How do you feel we can work together?” Already, of course, I had other ideas that I wanted to take a little beyond, that I had to take beyond, Marshall Green’s approach, I didn’t do anything in the State Department to really have an effect, mainly because I couldn’t just
go automatically and meet with heads of state like Marshall Green could. That came, but I had to start something different. Marshall supported everything I did. That friendship also kept very close until, as you know, a couple of years ago when he died the good death on the golf course. Anyway, Marshall was a wonderful friend and mentor.

Q: Well, I guess the sort of immediate question is you were coordinator of population affairs. Who were you coordinating?

BENEDICK: Who was I coordinating? Well, Ray Ravenhoe said, “Yes, I’m glad you called.” First I had to call him back about four times, and he finally deigned to take my call, because he was running a $200,000,000 program and I had an office of three or four misfits, which we then gradually also replaced and I had not to build an empire but I had maybe five or six people who really were motivated and really were not just cast-offs from other bureaus and who really thought they could do something, and that was enough. But Ray said, “I’m glad you called. Yeah, we’re all going to miss Marshall Green very much, but you could really help by making sure that every US ambassador who goes out knows about population. If I’m having problems with any of them, I’ll give you a call and you can then intervene.” This was not exactly what I had expected to hear.

Q: But it was a start.

BENEDICK: It was a start. Well, then I began to work with some people in AID who were under him. To make a long story short, eventually ended up that I was actually heading up the delegation, because they then could see that the prestige of the State Department. I also had then confidence within the State Department. First of all, this was in the last days of the Carter Administration, and we had Pickering, of course. When he was behind you, the Assistant Secretary, that helped enormously. And I made it a point, by the way, to get out very quickly and do some traveling and get my credentials by knowing more on the ground, and then I could come back with anecdotal and with personal experience be able to supplement what I was reading avidly in all the books and papers and articles about the population issue, and that helped. I’d go out not just meeting ministers. I’d say, “I want to go on the road. I want to speak to the religious leaders and to government officials.” And I really traveled all over the world in that first year.

Q: Was there already a United Nations population program at that time?

BENEDICK: Yes, there was. That was the first place where I could make a difference with AID, because AID didn’t like them and, of course, they thought they were competing for funds. Then they realized they had to deal with me because I was championing UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), and, of course, that took some persuasion within State Department, because the IO Bureau, International Organizations, for them UNFPA was kind of an afterthought. It was headed at that time by Rafael Salas, Filipino, Catholic, very dedicated person who was just the right person for that job. I made it a point to become friends with him and to know his staff. One of his staff, Nafis Sadik, who is now the head of the UN Population Fund, a Muslim...
Q: Egyptian?

BENEDICK: Pakistani, woman, gynecologist, medical doctor, and she succeeded Rafael Salas as head, and so I got to know her very well at that time. So with AID it was kind of a mixed thing. I was supporting their programs and trying in every way to help them with our embassies and with testimony in Congress and so on, which again Congress did listen. And State Department would support and help with the regional bureaus.

Q: Were bilateral programs at that point primarily working with governments or were we working through nongovernmental, private, voluntary organizations?

BENEDICK: It was primarily the government, but there was a lot for them to private NGOs. I quickly saw that the private organizations were very much better than the government program, that they were motivated. As I learned more, then -- again the luck -- that apart from the head of the office, other people were cooperating. He was soon replaced, by the way. His time was over, and that helped a lot. So naturally when he was replaced, maybe a year later, his successor then came to me because I was the person who had been around longer and I had built up enough kind of grassroots knowledge that I could talk to him. It wasn’t a strange subject. I had built up a very good relationship with AID up to the administrator. In fact, that was the only way to get around at the time. The office director was the bureau director was the administrator for AID. That was Bennett, who became head of Public Broadcasting.

Q: Doug Bennett.

BENEDICK: Doug Bennett was under Carter, right? I think that’s right. So I got to know him, and then later, what became probably even more important, I actually survived the transition to Reagan, was the only one of the people at the deputy assistant secretary level in that bureau who did. Tom Pickering was sent out to Nigeria, and so on, and all the other deputies left. And that was another chapter; I’m not sure we have time.

Q: I think we should cover that. Is this the time to do it?

BENEDICK: Yes, the transition from a Democratic administration, that was relatively -- they could have done more, but they were certainly more open to foreign aid and to population assistance -- to a avowedly conservative government that created a lot of problems on that score, and I made that transition and that was really an amazing kind of thing.

Q: It would seem to me that, of all of the different areas that the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and International Scientific Affairs covers, US population policy probably made the most significant change, transformation, in the population area than in all those other areas. How come you stayed and everybody else moved on somewhere else?

BENEDICK: They were all telling me, “You’d better go look for another job. Your career’s at stake,” and so on, and the fact that I decided to stay and fight -- I’d only been
there about two years. Reagan came in in ‘81. I had come in in ‘78, but really when I actually took over the position it was ‘79. That’s only two years, and I had a lot of things I still wanted to do. So against everybody’s advice -- and again this is one of these significant points in the career, because that’s what made the next thing possible -- the fact that I stayed on, had the bad experience at the end, but that’s part of the environment, again accident, but if I had gone on to something else, it would never have happened.

Q: So you stayed.

BENEDICK: I stayed, and here’s what happened. We found out who the new Assistant Secretary was going to be, and that was Jim Malone, and Malone was not liked by many of the Foreign Service people because of his role in the Nixon Administration on Law of the Sea. But I was determined to have an open mind and to meet him. So Marshall Green, who was Republican, by the way -- I was independent, I was always an independent -- but Marshall Green didn’t know Malone, but we both agreed that it would be good to call on him. And I remember we did call on him. He also worked in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and at that point he was the head of the transition team for ACDA. ACDA, you remember, Ray, was in the old part of the State Department, the better part, the old building. In fact, the administrator of ACTA, the Director of ACDA, had the old Secretary of State’s office. So once again we were ushered, Marshall Green and I, and there was Jim Malone in this wood-paneled, dimly lit, high-ceilinged, marvelous office of the old State Department building, and I have to say he received us most graciously. He didn’t have to put on any airs, but I mean this whole setting. Marshall and I, knowing that we were in a sense in a very difficult situation because we didn’t know what he thought about population, we made our presentation, and we talked very cordially over tea for about an hour and a half. In fact, I think he canceled another appointment, as I recall. And Marshall’s plea was, you know, to let me stay, and that this was the kind of thing that we had been doing. It turned out that Jim Malone was very much in favor and, in fact, it got him in trouble with his old friends. He not only was in favor of population but he also was okay on the environment, not great in it -- that I learned later. But even at the time I can remember at the staff meeting that he was always fighting Anne Gorsuch in EPA -- I wasn’t responsible for that; I was doing population -- but I can remember that he was fighting the real Neanderthals who had taken over EPA in the early days of the Reagan administration but that Malone was fighting them. So I thank Malone for some things as well. He gave me support, and when it comes up to the most critical point four years down the line, he really did, and I think in a sense he ruined his own foreign affairs career because he was in effect considered to be a protégé of Helms. He was a lawyer, a very bright lawyer actually, and he had done some academic work as well, and personally I found him okay. A lot of my Foreign Service friends really didn’t like him. This kind of stuff probably shouldn’t be in here. But anyway, I found Malone on issues and personally was supportive.

Q: So in this early period of the Reagan Administration, say from ‘81 to ‘83/’84, what you were doing were pretty much continuing without any change.

BENEDICK: Absolutely, and better, better.
**Q: Better in the sense there’s more traffic?**

BENEDICK: And there was even more money, but not without fights, because the first thing that happened was Jim Buckley took over the position of Undersecretary for Scientific and whatever it is Affairs, and that was the Undersecretary that had oversight over the OES Bureau, and the first thing he did was to try to get the AID population program zeroed out. He had hearings, and he called in -- what’s his name -- different academic experts and others in population. Julian Simon, the economist, said population is the great resource and, with all these people born, there are going to be more Beethovens and Einsteins and Mozarts.

**Q: Not a problem to worry about.**

BENEDICK: Not a problem to worry about. More people means more genius and more solutions. As an economist he was arguing to some extent correctly that when things get scarce the price goes up and that stimulates ingenuity and you get substitutes and the price then goes down, and he pointed to a lot of commodities where that has in fact happened. I’d get my experts and we’d be sitting up in Buckley’s office and debate in a kangaroo court. I’d bring in Ansley Coale, the demographer from Princeton, and some of the people from the NGOs and some women’s organizations. He knew what he wanted to do. At that time Alexander Haig was the Secretary of State. It was the very early days of the Reagan Administration, and that was the first challenge I had, the first thing I had to do.

**Q: How did the administrator of AID feel about it?**

BENEDICK: Just about the same. That was Peter McPherson, another good person. He’s now, I think, President of Michigan State University. Peter and I got along very well, and he appreciated my help, and also for population he was for the programs. By that time the kind of population radicals like the Ravenhoes and the scattered condoms were replaced by people who were very solid and wanted to make progress and realized you could do it in different directions. H. L Menken said, “For every difficult problem, there’s a simple solution, and it’s usually wrong.” And they realized that there were no simple solutions to the population problem. So McPherson was supporting his people, and he was appreciative of anything we did in the State Department. He knew that I was fighting like mad to get that program preserved against Buckley’s attempts. He had somebody in OMB who was supporting him on this. He later came to the State Department, but I remember him too. Buckley was really the driving force there. Finally I went around to every Assistant Secretary of State, again supported by Pickering, and got them to write letters to Al Haig as to why the AID population was important in their region and why the AID population program was essential for our foreign policies in the African regions and Latin America and East Asia.

**Q: You said Pickering. Was he still in OES?**
BENEDICK: Pickering was not.

Q: Malone?

BENEDICK: That’s correct, Malone. I’m sorry; that was a mistake. It was Malone who was supporting me with Haig and with the other Assistant Secretaries, many of whom were political appointees.

Q: And the issue specifically was what to request from Congress in terms of the upcoming budget for the population?

BENEDICK: Whether to continue it or to zero. It was zero, the issue was zero. We didn’t need it.

Q: And what was the final outcome?

BENEDICK: Well, unfortunately I was not able to attend that staff meeting, but as Malone and others reported back to me, Buckley made his presentation that we can put this money someplace else and Haig, who had all this support from every economic bureau, INR, the intelligence, and he just leaned back in his chair and kind of laughed and said, “You know, that reminds me of a story. You know that crocodiles eat their young. Do you know why crocodiles eat their young? Because if they didn’t, they’d be up to their ass in baby crocodiles.” And then he turned to the next item on the agenda, and apparently Buckley was furious, just absolutely furious. And, of course, he knew not to complain. So I had to fight for quite a while, and that led to my being, eventually four years later, [inaudible], but that’s the rest of the story.

First, if we do it chronologically, Buckley lost that fight. Then the other thing I did early on in the administration: Bill Casey, formerly expert and formerly State Department Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, then President of the Export Import Bank, now came back in the Reagan Administration as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Again through contacts I learned that the Central Intelligence Agency had a global analysis bureau and that they were doing studies of countries. I said to Malone, “Wouldn’t it be a good idea if we could get” -- Malone knew Casey as well -- “if we could get Bill Casey, get the CIA, to say, well, of we’re looking countries of critical strategic interest to the US -- Pakistan, Kenya we had bases, Central America, Turkey -- what is the impact of rapid population growth? Was it destabilizing.” Well he thought about this. He went up to see Casey, and I’ll never forget that meeting also. Casey, of course, was very gracious and very cordial, and he did, and we got some CIA studies pointing out the importance of population and population growth. But all of these things really helped. The other thing that I was very proud of -- and it could never have been under Carter -- was that we were able to get Ronald Reagan to bring up at G-8 -- you know those G-7 summit meetings -- to bring up the population issue. You know how it is. Part of your victory is to get some language, but it had never happened before. We actually got language in G-7 communiques on the importance of population growth in our development assistance programs. In the first three years of the Reagan Administration we got those in, signed, brought up by Reagan, by his aid, by the
shirt guys. I remember working with the shirt guys on that, because we figured this would give us some publicity.

Q: Let me ask you about one other aspect. You mentioned travel early on as something you did a lot of and you tried to go to villages, and then I think you mentioned meeting with heads of state. What was an example of that? I notice also that at one point you had a private audience with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican. The Vatican obviously is a very important actor in international population policy. Why don’t you say something about, at least one example, of a head of state visit that led to something and maybe also the Vatican audience.

BENEDICK: Two things come to mind on the heads of state. One was we got an invitation when Angier Biddle Duke was ambassador to Morocco and his wife, Robin Duke, was and still is very active in population NGO activities. I had given them the briefing before they went. Again, I remember that they came to the State Department. I had known of Duke but I hadn’t met him. I gave him a briefing with my staff on the importance of population in Morocco. Yes, they were making some progress, but they still... Anyway, one thing led to another, and they got an invitation to address the Royal Academy of Morocco. The Royal Academy of Morocco actually has a lot of the religious and spiritual and other intellectual leaders of Morocco but also is foreign. Senghor was there, for example, the poet, the President from Senegal, and the former President of Greece. What was his name? He was President when I was... Karamanlis was Prime Minister, and then Karamanlis became President, but when Karamanlis was Prime Minister, Konstantinos was President.

Q: I don’t remember.

BENEDICK: He was a short man.

Q: He was a poet too.

BENEDICK: I think so. That’s right, because I remember the King of Morocco then sent in a private jet the royal palace, for a great party, a feast, that night. I was seated next to the former President of Greece and told him about my time in Greece, even able to remember a little bit of Greek, which he found very nice, enough to make it kind of interesting. But that meeting at the Royal Academy was very good, because we could follow up on that, the AID people could follow up, and it did make an impression. I did it in French, by the way. They advised me to do that rather than translation. I remember I was staying over with the Dukes, and the two days before I was walking up and down their garden practicing text in French, making sure that it was okay. Morocco has become one of the better countries in that, and maybe there was some contribution. I really wanted to reach out to the religious leaders in that sense.

Another one was in Bangladesh with Ershad. He was, I think, sincerely interested in population. I had, of course, with me the real expert from the AID people, and they were able to build on that meeting, and the person who got me out there was Jane Coon. She
was ambassador to Bangladesh. They, of course, had made really extremely good progress. I think Ershad really helped. We were with Jane and on the spot and then bringing me in, and I remember I said I had already been to Bangladesh previously. I know you’re coming to this meeting with me so we stopped in Bangladesh. When I said I had been to Bangladesh, my first trips were really as much to try to learn about situations that I could recommend something.

Q: And at that time when you were in Karachi, East Pakistan was part of Pakistan.

BENEDICK: That’s correct, yes, that’s right. As a matter of fact, when I moved from... That’s another aside here. AID wanted me to go to Dhaka to head the program office after I had secured a nice, in a sense, promotion in the AID line, from being whatever I was when I was just a young economist in Karachi, Dhaka, East Pakistan, and I instead pushed to go to Paris for the OECD. I wanted to have that kind of a dimension, and again that then led to everything else. Of course, who knows how it would have turned out the other way, but I was very pleased with the direction that it took.

Now on the Vatican, that was again some controversy, because the population professionals in AID had already written off the Catholic Church, and they said really it was a waste of time, and some of the NGOs as well said it was a waste of time, you’re never going to get anywhere. But I had discovered in some of my travels that there were some very dedicated people in the Catholic community and even in the officialdom, even priests, who were actually promoting family planning. As a typical example, in Sri Lanka I went out in the middle of the jungle where they very proudly wanted to show me that they were having this fair where a bunch of communities were coming together in the big meeting house in one village and were having a family planning fair and mothers were coming in. I came and there was an open pavilion -- you wanted to let the wind in -- with a roof, a big, big building with some walls but also great open spaces, and they had condoms and they had posters hung up and draped over, and they were showing me through. As the wind blew one of the posters aside, I saw a picture of the Virgin Mary behind it. I looked closely and there was a crucifix under that. What is this building? It’s the Monastery of the Brothers of St. something. We talked to them, and they decided that this building was probably the most appropriate. They were all away to the United States on a trip. Ranged from that to promo-promotion. I met in the slums at Lima a Catholic priest who was with the organization that was actually actively involved in family planning. I said I wanted to speak to the Vatican, I wanted to try to talk to the Vatican. Ray, this story will really take a long time. Someday or other I want to write it up, because it started first under Carter when the former mayor of New York City was going out to be his personal representative to the Vatican.

Q: Benson?

BENEDICK: No, no, he’s a Democrat. He was Irish, Bob... But he was a great character. He had been mayor for several terms, and he was a real... And I gave him the population briefing, as I did every ambassador, before he went out, and he said, “Well, that’s terrible. What are we doing? What can I do about it?” This was before Reagan. And I
said, “Well, what you could do is I’d like to meet some people at the Vatican and maybe even eventually the Pope and talk to him about these issues, the same way I talked to you.” He said, “That’s right. That’s what I can do.” So first I got a cable back from him. “Well,” he said, “it’s very sensitive, but what we can do is we’ll try to arrange you come to Rome on other business, try to get some other business, and then maybe we can at the last minute get you an appointment with somebody in the Commission for the Families.”

So we did, and that’s where, again, who played a role? Who was our ambassador to Rome at the time under Jimmy Carter? Richard Gardner, and Gardner, when he learned about this -- Bob, the mayor... (Robert Wagner). So he worked together with Dick Gardner, and they set up something for me with Maury Williams at the World Food Program and the FAO, so I was coming to talk to him about the implications of population growth on agriculture and food consumption, and they called up the day before I arrived and they said, “You know, Ambassador Benedick’s coming to town. He’s working on population growth issues, and if you have somebody in the Commission on the Family...” Okay, to make a long story short -- you can’t make it too short, because it’s so much fun -- I met with this equivalent of an assistant office director, and then he immediately took me to the next higher level while I was still there, and then I met with two people who became quite instrumental. One was a director and he was a bishop, a Chilean bishop, and the other, his assistant, was a French Canadian, and we debated. We actually debated on how important population... By that time I was a couple years in office and I had learned something, and I was being coached in Washington by people at the Catholic University and again another great man whom I’ve met, Frank Murphy, who is now in his 80s, who had attended the Second Vatican Council. In fact, he had written a critique which almost got him defrocked. He was redemptorius and his order helped him. But it’s two people like that I had gotten to know already in Washington that I thought there was hope in the Catholic Church and were encouraging me to do this. People within the Church were encouraging me to do this. So I made those good contacts, and about three months later my secretary got a call from the Nunciature saying someone from the Vatican happened to be in Washington and he had been recommended by the Chilean bishop to maybe have a talk with me. Could I meet with him? It was the mirror image of what I had done. He was very tentative. So this went on over a period of about six or seven months, these kind of meetings. I ended up again another time in Rome, and again another time somebody to Washington. I laid out the case. Also, we were being accused at that time, we the US government and our AID programs, of sponsoring, bribing women to have sterilization or having them sterilized or forcing them to use contraceptives. The other aspect was that the Catholic Church at this time was opening up to natural family planning method. It wasn’t that they were against family planning; they were against condoms, pills. They were against the medical methods, which they called artificial and which I, including myself to the Pope, described as modern methods as opposed to natural family planning. So I at the same time then started to fight with AID to expand our natural family planning program, which they at first disdained because they say it doesn’t work, but then I read up on it and talked to some Catholic people and some other responsible scientists, and they said natural family planning can work for some couples if they are motivated. It’s not impossible, and it does work. So that was my argument with USAID was that it’s a no-lose, a win-win proposition, because we’d be reaching people we otherwise would not reach, and if it works, that’s so much the better.
If it doesn’t work, at least they’ve gotten used to the idea of family planning and they may then go to their local priest and say, “Look, this thing that you said was so great, which we asked for from the USAID program, we did it and it doesn’t work.” So I said, “We have nothing to lose and it’s not a great amount of money involved. Let’s do it.” It may have been by that time Carter was out, because then we had some problems under the Reagan Administration from some of these really right-wing fanatics who were promoting natural family planning but didn’t want to even consider anything else. By that time, meanwhile, relations with the Vatican were improving, and I had then a call that I should go to meet with somebody from Rome in New York. He couldn’t come to Washington, and I had to meet him at the UN in New York. That again was a turning point. I said, “Okay, what’s the address? Where’s the Nunciature in New York?” “No, no, don’t come to the Nunciature.” “Later on,” he said, “he’ll meet you at the United Nations in the big room with the Indonesian tapestry.”

Q: The Delegates’ Lounge?

BENEDICK: It’s not the lounge; it’s outside the Delegates’ Lounge. I realized, of course, that I had been told... The way the Vatican works is kind of a funny business, all these accidental meetings and I happen to be in Rome and they happen to be in Washington. Now I’m meeting this guy at the UN. Then I finally said, “Wait a minute. How will I recognize him?” And there was kind of chuckle on the other end, and he said, “You’ll recognize him.” Here I am standing under the Indonesian tapestry looking around, and in comes this, with the robe and the skullcap, the lilac skullcap.

Q: Cardinal?

BENEDICK: He was an archbishop and he was Italian. Father Philipo. A wonderful, Italian, jolly, learned man, but I was being prepared for these things by the Jesuits. I met the Father General of the Jesuits, who was a wonderful man who was later removed by John Paul II. Something happened in 1984. It happened to me, and it happened to many of my interlocutors in the Vatican. There was a turn. Something happened, and I’ll tell you about that later.

Q: Okay, this is the continuation of the interview under the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training with Richard Benedick. It’s the 20th of June 2000. My name is Raymond Ewing. Richard, when we finished the other day, which I think was several months ago, we were talking about your assignment as Coordinator of Population Affairs with rank of ambassador in the Department of State in Washington, which was from 1979 to 1984. I think you were talking particularly about the very important and not always positive role the Vatican played on international population policy matters. I think you mentioned or were about to talk a little bit about how you came to have an audience with the Pope and what the results of that were.

BENEDICK: Let me start with that, and then I’ll perhaps go into some of the other aspects of the population position, because it really was a very multifaceted kind of responsibility. It was a global responsibility and had to do with our policies on population
assistance, on family planning, maternal and child health, demography include statistics, and also biomedical research, all, of course, in connection with population issues in the developing countries. So I worked very closely not only within the State Department with the Geographic Bureaus but also with the Agency for International Development and, as it turned out, also with the CIA, Central Intelligence Agency. But I’ll get back to that and continue on the Vatican. Early on when I was trying to define the responsibility -- this was basically a new office. My predecessor had been an ambassador, Marshall Green, and it was his last assignment before he retired. As you know, he had been a distinguished ambassador among other places to Indonesia and Australia and also had been Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. He became convinced of the importance of population and took this position as Coordinator of Population Affairs as a way of using his own enormous influence and respect in the Foreign Service to make population a more prominent issue in our foreign policy and in our AID policy, and he used the position, basically on his own prestige, as a bully pulpit, and he would testify before Congress, as I did also later, and brief ambassadors and give speeches generally, making the issue simply more visible and trying to promote it. When I took the position over, being relatively more junior, I saw it as an opportunity for a more activist kind of office and actually expanded the office, got more staff. At that time Tom Pickering was the Assistant Secretary for OES -- that’s the Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs -- and he and Marshall, who remained my mentor on this, both encouraged me to take this more activist role, so I ended up not only testifying before Congress on behalf of our AID program, which was $200,000,000 and more, but also leading delegations to many UN conferences, doing things like addressing the Royal Academy of Morocco, testifying before the Italian Parliament and the European Community Parliament in Brussels, and in general making carrying the issue to the next step beyond where Marshall had left off and becoming quite activist and actually taking over the US delegations that previously might have been headed by AID or by the IO, International Organizations office, in the State Department, but not by an office that was dedicated exclusively to the population policies. Now early on in this position, I became convinced that the role of the Catholic Church and particularly the Vatican could be critical in effecting change throughout the world, not only among Catholics because many Catholic countries in fact, despite the teachings of the Church against family planning, do use modern family planning, especially in developed countries. In fact, the Pope’s own Poland has one of the lowest birth rates and the highest use of contraceptives in the world, and other countries more or less, including even some developing countries, have also, despite the Catholicism, the teachings of Catholicism, have also used family planning as a matter of government policy to try to diminish rapid rates of population growth. But nevertheless many did not, and I felt that if the Church could change its viewpoint, it would also have an effect on other conservative, particularly conservative Islam. I did some studying on it, and I had some very good advice from theologians and Catholic professors at Georgetown University, at Catholic University, later even worldwide, at the Gregorian University in Rome and other places. One thing led to another. And I learned that the Church had actually come very close at the time of the Second Vatican Council under I think it was Pope Paul I to changing that policy and accepting modern methods of family planning. That was rejected, but it was very close.
There were conservative cardinals that finally persuaded the Pope not to do it, but it could have happened at the Second Vatican Council, which was in the 1970s.

Q: John, the XXIII?

BENEDICK: I think it was after John the XXIII. John the XXIII, I think, did not live long enough to call a Vatican Council. I believe it was under Paul I or Paul II.

Q: We can check that.

BENEDICK: Right. But I got to know some wonderful people within the Church who were working on this, who had deep feelings on this issue and who were helping to brief me. In point of fact, as an aside, I think that the Catholic Church will change its views on population growth and on family planning, and when it happens, it will be just like communism. It will happen overnight, and everyone will say, of course, it was inevitable, because there are just so many intelligent, caring people in high positions in the Church who would like to see a change but who can’t because there are others who have different views, who are even higher. But they had evolved somewhat in that they now promoted natural family planning, and I seized that as an opportunity and argued with my colleagues in AID, in USAID, that we should expand our population assistance to include natural methods of family planning. The population professionals all opposed that and said it doesn’t work, doesn’t work as well, and so on. I argued -- and this time I had the weight of the State Department behind me -- as a tactical measure but also I argued that it was a no-lose proposition because we did know that it works for some people, and otherwise we’re reaching people whom we otherwise would not reach, devout Catholic families, and we’d be, if we really were serious about offering, as we always said, a cafeteria approach of contraceptives and different modern methods, we should also offer the natural family planning, which has also become modernized in the sense of a more scientific basis for what a woman should look for and soon, and that it was a no-lose proposition because we’d be reaching people we otherwise didn’t reach. If it worked for them, so much the better; if it didn’t work for them, well, at least they would have gotten used to the idea of planning their family size and they might even go to their local bishop or natural family planning provider and say, “Look, your method doesn’t work. I’m going to try something else.” So I thought there was nothing to lose and a lot to gain. Reluctantly AID accepted that, and it was noticed in the Vatican. I think I may have told you -- I’m not sure whether we covered this last time, Ray -- that one of my responsibilities, which Marshall Green had pioneered -- was to give briefings for all outgoing US ambassadors. If they were going to a developing country, I’d give them a briefing on what the situation as in that country and also worldwide. If they were going to an industrialized country, I would give them a briefing so that they would support us in getting more aid from that country, whether it was Denmark or Germany or France, for the international aid programs in family planning. But as a general rule every ambassador at some point would pass through Marshall Green’s office and then through my office, and I had tailored briefings that I would give them. For some it was ho-hum and they were looking at their watch. For a few, it took; for many, it took. This is still under President Carter; I probably mentioned earlier that I was appointed under President Carter
and then was continued under President Reagan, much to many people’s surprise, because a lot of those positions were, of course, changed at that level. Under Carter, he had appointed as his ambassador to -- that’s right; I remember last time I couldn’t remember his first name; it’s Bob Wagner, Robert Wagner, the mayor of New York... The former mayor of New York was now going to be the President’s representative to the Vatican, and I remember he came in and he was being escorted by a political officer from EUR who didn’t care very much about, didn’t think what I was doing was very important, and he kept looking at his watch, and Wagner was getting more and more interested. It was very funny. He kept asking questions, and this sort of mid-level officer would say, “Oh, Mr. Ambassador, we have to go,” and he’d say, “Just a minute. I want to hear more” -- he had a hoarse voice -- ”Tell me more, tell me more.” So he finally said, “What can I do about it? How can I help?” And I said, “Interesting that you should ask, Mr. Ambassador. If you could help to get me into the Vatican...,” and he said yes, and so the process started, and it was a process that lasted about three years, and it lasted into the next incumbent. After Carter and Wagner left, then came, of course, Reagan, and everyone thought it would be impossible, because the person he appointed to the Vatican was Bill Wilson, also a very devout Catholic but also known as arch conservative. All I can say is I managed to persuade him as well, and he continued what Wagner had begun. And here’s how it was very funny. First, Wagner was all gung-ho and said, “Yes, I’ll go, I’ll see the Pope. I’ll tell him to see you.” Well, of course, that isn’t the way it worked, and he realized it also when he got there. So there was this cautious exchange. He said, “We’re going to have to do it a little different way,” and so we worked out something. I said, “Why don’t we do it that I’m coming to Rome on some other business. If you could then make a contact at some level in the Vatican to say while I’m in Rome if it’s convenient, I could call on him.” So I set up something with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, because that was also of importance to my responsibility, learning about food supplies and future food projections and how that would work out with rising population in different parts of the world. So I had things to do at FAO. He called at just about the last moment at the Vatican and, sure enough, got me an appointment at an office director level in the Commission on the Family. I went and I met the people, and we had a very nice 45-minute talk. I explained that basically we shared the same objectives as the Vatican, which is the betterment of human life and of the family, and we didn’t have abortion in foreign aid programs, and the basic difference was that we used modern methods as opposed to the traditional and natural family planning, which also is modern, but we used medicinal methods. Of course, there was a lot of argument and a lot of debated. I really got to admire and like the people I was dealing with. This was only the first of many meetings, because about three months later -- I have a feeling we’re repeating ourselves -- about three months later from our last session I got a call in my office in Washington from someone in the Vatican who just happened to be in Washington and wondered whether he could come on short notice and see me. So that showed that this original fishing expedition had at least attracted some interest. And this went on in a similar way for about a year, with these reciprocal visits, which became more and more formalized. Each time I went back to Rome, I was getting to a higher level. Finally I was seeing a cardinal, the head of the Commission, an African as a matter of fact. Then the real breakthrough came when I got a call saying could I come to New York and see some really high-ranking Vatican official. I said, “What’s the address of the
papal nuncio?” “No, no, no, he’ll meet you at the United Nations.” I know we’ve done this before, right? No? They said, “He’ll meet you.” I said, “Where?” They said, “In one of the big public rooms, the Indonesian room,” and I said, “Yeah, I remember that. How will I recognize him?” The voice on the phone said, “You’ll recognize him.” So off I go to New York, and I’m standing there waiting, and, of course, walks in this grand figure with the robes and the skullcap and violet colors, and he turns out to be an Italian. We got along very well. We had a nice conversation. Again this measure of the progress, about six months later when I met him again in the United Nations after we had seen each other in Rome and so on, it was in the delegates’ lounge, the north delegates’ lounge, in full public with embraces. So things were spiffy. One of the things that helped at that was that at that time the Church was blasting the United States’ AID program, very severely critical, maintaining that we were encouraging forced sterilization or sterilization without consent. I knew this was not our policy, and I told them this in Rome. I told the people I met in Washington and New York. I said, “I’m not AID, and if AID is doing that, we want to know because they’re doing wrong. We in the State Department should be managing that, and so I’m not going to apologize for AID, for USAID. If we find out there’s wrongdoing, we will prosecute it. And if you allow me to be the ombudsman unofficially, if you can come to me with cases of where women have been sterilized without their consent, we will stop it. We will find out who’s responsible, we will punish them, and it will not be done.” So over the course of the better part of a year, these cases would dribble in, all from Central America, Guatemala, El Salvador and so on, of cases of women who allegedly had been sterilized without their consent. In every case except one we found out that they were fabrications, that somebody thought they would earn some points with their local priest or bishop. There’s a wonderful papal nuncio up on Massachusetts Avenue. They had a wonderful nuncio at that time, also an Italian. His name was Pio Laghi. He was a consummate diplomat who was superb. He was intelligent, human. He is now currently, I think a cardinal. He became a cardinal after he left Washington. So I would go over there about every three months with a dossier of cases, and he was, of course, clued in by the Vatican. We’d sit down in his study and go over them. I would pass them on to him, and he knew that I had a pending request -- by that time Bill Wilson was there under Reagan -- for an audience with the Pope to try to talk to him about these issues. Finally came the time that there was one case, and it was really quite moving. It was the case of a woman who had been sterilized and forms hadn’t been filled out. When she came out of the anesthesia -- I believe this was in El Salvador or Guatemala -- she was actually quite happy about it, but her husband and her mother-in-law complained, and that’s how it got to the Church and that’s how it got to us. Forgive me if I had it slightly differently in the other version, because I can’t remember all the details, but she was about 28 or 29 and had about nine pregnancies starting when she was 13. Several of the children had died, but she still had, I think, at least five living children. The last three or four of her pregnancies, if not more, had been by Caesarean, and when the doctor had her for this fourth of fifth Caesarean in a row to deliver this ninth or tenth child -- he was not an American doctor, by the way; he was a local whatever, Guatemalan or Salvadoran, but paid under an American AID program; that was the connection, but he was not an American -- he made the decision to sterilize her, to tie her fallopian tubes because he saw that her uterus was so thin that one more pregnancy would kill her and leave those children motherless. That was the circumstance. When she awoke, she was
relieved. The husband and the mother-in-law complained. I explained this to Pio Laghi, and he looked at me, looked deeply into my eyes, and said, “I understand, I understand.” He sent it on to the Vatican, and about three months later I had my meeting with the Pope. Meanwhile I had been preparing. As I say, I went to the Gregorian University. I was getting details, you know, what the Pope liked. I met with the Father General of the Jesuits, who was a great Spanish priest. His assistant was an American. He had facilitated this, and I learned all the arguments and what to say and how to formulate it. I can say this now, because he was removed later. It was almost a counter-revolution. I was forced to resign, and all my interlocuters around also were pushed out around the same time, including some who I felt were quite conservative but nevertheless had been open. Something happened in the Vatican around the same time that something was happening here in the US in connection with Reagan’s second election campaign.

Q: The ’84 election.

BENEDICK: The ‘84 election. Anyway, so I had the audience with the Pope. He was extremely cordial. I have a wonderful photo -- I should have brought it along; it won’t go on tape -- because the Pope can make anybody look telegenic

Q: What year was this audience?

BENEDICK: The audience was in early ‘84. I believe it was in early ‘84. It could have been ‘83, but I’m almost sure it was in early ‘84. No, I think it was ‘83. It was probably ‘83, because then after that the far right and the religious right -- I should say some right-wing elements -- became almost hysterical against me and against the office in particular.

Q: Was there a connection in their attitude with you having an audience with the Pope?

BENEDICK: They didn’t like it. No, they thought it was a mistake, because I obviously was doing it through liberal or liberal-thinking people within the Vatican, and these people didn’t like that. In fact, as it turned out, they were behind a number of these alleged cases of US involuntary sterilization. It turned out that there were links with American organizations who were fomenting this in order to discredit the US AID program for family planning in general and also to make us look bad with the Church. Suddenly I came along and was actually reaching out to the Church and making inroads. They much preferred to see the AID program hate the Church and vice versa and the US be aloof from it. But the Pope recognized what we were doing. Incidentally they told at that time I spoke better French. I had been advised to speak French with him. First of all, that would disarm him a little bit. That would surprise him, an American diplomat speaking French, and also he’d be more comfortable and we could have a more comfortable discussion. So that worked. It did surprise him, but he had a sense of humor. Actually we sat for a while, and then he got up and walked back. We were together about 45 minutes, and a lot of it was spent walking, just the two of us, walking up and down together arm in arm. He was holding my arm, but he was not frail, by no means at that time. It was more almost friendly; it was friendly, yes. He appreciated what we had done about natural family planning. One of the arguments that I took, and this was sort of at
the end, was that when I traveled I traveled I went to many of the same countries that he did but I saw different things than what they showed him, and he knew that. I’d get out into the villages, and I told him about some of the anecdotes that I had seen, of course changing countries so he wouldn’t know that there were priests in Sri Lanka -- I think I told this story last time -- who had given their facilities for a family planning fair in the middle of the jungle for these villages. I didn’t tell him which country but that there were people there who were concerned and I also saw a lot of the misery he didn’t see. I said, “We’re trying with natural family planning, but it can’t work in all circumstances, because what do we tell a couple” -- and there’s so much of this in the developing world -- “where the husband and wife are separated. She’s on the farm with the children, and he goes into the city and he only sees her every five or six weeks. How do we... If it’s exactly the right time, it may...” Well, you know, he fell back on natural law, as my interlocutors in the Church had said, that when he’s finally in a corner, he’ll simply say it’s natural law. But I made all the arguments about medical, that we don’t turn down medicine in hospitals, or medical means. There were a lot of very theological arguments, most of which I’ve forgotten, but it was fascinating. There was a nice debate, and then as we were walking, he beckoned and courtier came over in a livery with a cushion on it -- it was really out of a movie -- it was really out of a movie -- and on the cushion was a little tray and on the tray was a little box, and he opened the box and gave me a medal, and then the photographers were there. It was for, I suppose, what we were doing to expand our natural family planning assistance, or to introduce it and then to expand it. The main thing that came out of that, of course -- as we all know, it didn’t change the policy of the Church or of the Pope -- but they at least stopped attacking our AID programs and we had a more civil dialog with them. I think that was something. People had said it would be a waste of time. It didn’t take that much time, and I think in terms of what I learned and the kind of people that I met, it certainly, I felt, contributed to my own personal development as well.

Q: Maybe we should come forward to kind of the end of your time in the Population Coordinator position and the circumstances under which you resigned, and then what did you go on to next? We’re talking about 1984.

BENEDICK: In case we didn’t touch it last time, let me just briefly touch on two other aspects of that job which I thought were particularly fascinating. I’ve talked about the AID aspect in general, testifying and supporting the AID programs, but I also became very interested in biomedical research because I realized that existing contraceptives were really not good enough and that one of the main barriers to couples planning their family size was that the contraceptives were not easy to use and they were not safe or they weren’t considered to be safe or they required too much follow-up or they weren’t reliable. So one of the priorities I made -- I was in that position for four and a half years -- was to really strengthen international cooperation and research in contraceptive development, and we really beefed up... There was an office in the World Health Organization which we really strengthened, and we got the other donor countries to allocate money for contraceptive research, and I worked with some private companies. That again was a very interesting aspect of my career. It led to further work in the environment, because it stimulated my interest in science and scientists because I was meeting these researchers. For example, at that time it was in England that the first in
vitro fertilizations were taking place. That was important, because when you learn about fertilizing, you also learn about ways to prevent fertilization. So I met these doctors. I think one of them got a Nobel Prize later. But they were really extremely interesting people, and I felt very privileged in this Foreign Service position and in this particular job to have met people from the Vatican, high Church people, and now to meet these world-class scientists and researchers, and that held up later in my career and in my post-career life where I became very interested in working on a regular basis with science and scientists. I think that started really in the population and this biomedical research aspect. I never dreamed of it when I started. The other was involving the Central Intelligence Agency in analyses. There’s nothing secret or spooky, but the CIA had a global research division which would do sort of like university-level geographic all kinds of research on countries around the world which could be useful to the intelligence community and to the foreign policy community. At that point the head of the CIA was Bill Casey, whom I had known from his previous time when he was Undersecretary for Economic Affairs in the State Department, and then when he came back as head of the Export Import Bank and I was in Athens and I got him to come to Athens to help in an AID program for the new democracy that had replaced the colonels. Now he was head of CIA, and after some hesitation from the management side of the State Department, I was able to see him personally and to ask him whether he could have his global analysts particularly focusing on the impact of rapid population growth on internal stability, political and economic stability, in some areas of key strategic interest to the United States, like Central America, Egypt, Kenya where we had bases, Pakistan, and so on. He agreed to do these, and these papers came out. They were classified at the time and later became a source of tremendous controversy because again these same far-right groups that I referred to earlier were absolutely incensed that the CIA had been enlisted also. I had survived from Carter and now here I was consorting with the Vatican on friendly terms. Something happened in ‘84 that changed all that, that turned all that around. I mentioned earlier some of my interlocutors from the Vatican suddenly got fired, including the Father General of the Jesuits, or transferred or whatever, retired. I remember a very bright Chilean bishop who had been in the Commission on the Family who I felt had been very conservative -- we used to debate -- but all of a sudden he was out, out in the cold, and it was only his local people took care of him and gave him a bishopric somewhere in the provinces in Chile, and he later did okay. But there was a French Canadian; I couldn’t imagine why they would fire him because he had been even more conservative. The Chilean had been good because he really came from a developing country and he knew the misery. The French Canadian had done a lot of work, but he was very doctrinaire, but he was out too. He used to call me up -- it was pathetic -- and I would take him out to lunch when I was in the State Department and introduced him to some people at Catholic University so he could at least get some kind of a visiting lectureship or something, because his home order and Canada, in Quebec, didn’t take him back and he was sort of freelance. You know, a freelancing priest, what do you do? Eventually I learned, by the way -- a happy ending there -- our friend in Chile -- the French Canadian spoke and spent time in South America -- got him then to come down and work in his mission in Chile. But something happened, and something also happened to me. The attacks became much more bitter and personalized. I’m not sure if I mentioned last time this brochure, this flyer, that was issued with a big headline “Attention Islamic Fundamentalists, the
following people are dangerous for your health,” and there were photographs of the
President of Planned Parenthood Federation, of the Executive Director of the UN
Population Fund, and or one or two others, and of yours truly, along with a biographic
sketch. My biographic sketch allegedly had me conspiring with the Shah of Iran --
remember I had served in Iran as my first post back in the 1950s -- for sterilization
experiments on Iranian women. This is so far out. First of all, we didn’t even have a
family planning or population program until the late ‘60s, certainly not when I was in
Iran. In my job I was there as an economist fresh from Harvard Business School to assist
the Central Bank on statistics and balance of payments and things. Population was
farthest from my mind. Those kind of programs never existed. It was totally made-up
stuff. I went to the friendly State Department -- this was a time when Americans were
being kidnapped right and left; that was about 1982, ‘83, ‘84 -- and the advice I got was to
change my route to work every once in a while so I wouldn’t be so predictable. I said,
“Well, there’s only one street I can come out on, and there are only two or three bridges.”
Newspaper articles began appearing like in the Washington Times -- I think it came into
existence at that time -- that there was this Machiavellian. It really was wonderful to read,
knowing my own impotence within the bureau, having been described as some kind of a
gray eminence manipulating behind the back of President Reagan. Reagan actually had
been very good to us for the first four years, to my issue. Another one of the things I
should mention came up every year at the G-7 -- in those days G-7 had just begun -- the
G-7 Summit meetings. I actually, working through first under Bill Casey when he was in
State and then others, was actually able to get President Reagan to introduce into Summit
meetings a paragraph or a few sentences on the importance of population growth and of
assistance to developing countries for family planning, and this at a time when the
European countries, France and Germany, were not at all that keen. This worked for, I
think, I’ve saved those kind of as badges of honor, at least three or four of the G-7
Summit meetings where we have been able to get in some language in that final
communique getting at that high level. But something happened in the spring of ‘84.
President Reagan was up for reelection, and a lot of these people who were most
interested in stopping these programs were the dedicated bell ringers, the sort of hard
rank and file of the party that goes out and works in an election, although some of us
might have thought he didn’t need them that much. They also were very disappointed in
Reagan, because they had really thought when he came in that he would wipe out
Washington domestically. As I say, it wasn’t in our foreign programs anyway that he
would even clamp down on family planning whatever, and he didn’t. Some of their
proposals at that time, or really proposals of the so-called Reaganauts, were that no
federal research funding in any field should be given to any domestic university which
had a hospital that performed abortions, so all research for anything, nuclear, whatever.
This was the kind of ideas they were coming up with, and Reagan disappointed them, and
so they turned their entire focus in ‘84 on the foreign aid programs. And ‘84 was also,
unluckily for the issue, was also the year of the once-in-a-decade population conference
in Mexico City. I had been engaged in that preparatory process in ‘84, the International
Conference on Population in Mexico City. There had been one in ‘1974 in Bucharest. So
this all came together: the President’s reelection; the Mexico City conference, also in the
summer; and I had been working on the preparations; and there was this drumbeat from --
I don’t like to say right or left -- from this particular wing, from their press and from their
NGOs that I somehow was doing the wrong thing and that I had been fooling the President and not really enacting his policies and so on. They cooked up then in the White House a policy from Mexico City which was so outrageous it would have taken a complete reversal of 20 years of US policy on population. Now the rest of the world, by the way, was coming along, including the developing countries, and we were suddenly coming up and saying, “Not important. Population’s a neutral chapter. Private enterprise alone will do it. We don’t need to worry about population, and you can spend this money more usefully elsewhere.” They called back to head the US delegation to Mexico City Jim Buckley. James Buckley at that time was in Radio Free Europe. He had started out in the State Department as Undersecretary for...

Q: You talked about him before, in the early period.

BENEDICK: And he was trying to zero out the population proposal. Well now, lo and behold, he came back four years later after Shultz had gotten rid of him, came back from Radio Free Europe in Munich in charge of population. That really made it very uncomfortable for me. He made it clear I was not going to go to Mexico City, although I had been representing the US at every one of the preparatory meetings, regionally and in New York, and that I would not be on the delegation. He tried to pack the delegation. We tried to change the policy and we were about a third successful -- ’we’ meaning Peter McPherson, who was the head of AID, of course a Reagan appointee; and Jim Malone, who was the Assistant Secretary for OES, who has a reputation as being extremely right wing, conservative; but on this issue, both on environment later and on population, he was a man of conscience and, I thought, a very reasonable person. We got along well, and we were very quiet, because really the knives were out. This was an issue where people were going to get hurt. But McPherson and I and Malone redrafted the White House position and, with a lot of negotiations, changed it a little bit, not enough, not nearly enough. But it was really spooky, because -- at that time computers were just starting to be used -- one of the interim drafts was leaked, got into a certain Senator’s hands, a right-wing Senator, and then got into the newspapers, while we were working on this draft. Incidentally they later found out who did it. He was in OES. He was a young political appointee who was assisting Malone, and he was going around and taking things off the computers. And then he went to IO and did the same thing and got fired later on, about a year later. So this was really heavy stuff.

Then there was an issue over Israel. I don’t know if this is of interest, but it’s the kind of thing that can happen. At the last prepcon in New York in one of the late night meetings, Iraq or Syria or somebody introduced something -- we were going down these hundreds of resolutions -- a reference to a Geneva Convention, also recalling -- it was a preambulatory kind of -- recalling Geneva, something of this. Flags went up. I had a delegation. I had a political advisor. We held off. They went back and said, “Oh, it’s harmless. It talks about the treatment of prisoners in occupied territories generally. It’s not anti-Israel. We consulted with the Israelis. Fine.” The fear was that if we made a fuss about it, then it could become even more pointed, but as it stood, it was not an anti-Israeli, it was one of these preambular references. Well, this thing became my undoing actually, because when they got down to Mexico City -- I was not going to Mexico City,
I was here; he had even appointed somebody to coordinate from this end so I couldn’t be doing it from here -- then he made a big issue, Buckley in Mexico City, about this point, blew it out of all proportion. Actually one of the newspapers -- it was seen in the New York Times and other places -- said that had inexperience, mismanaged the US preparatory, didn’t realize this when it came up and didn’t see this was a time bomb ticking. People in the State Department and IO and elsewhere were very sympathetic privately, but, as I say, at this point things were very dangerous and nobody really wanted to make a big deal about it. Buckley tried to use this as a pretext for the US not to sign the Mexico City charter. The charter came out, had a lot of things that the US didn’t like, that Buckley didn’t like, from the standpoint of family planning and so on. But everybody was now against him, so he tried to use this as an excuse that the US not sign. He tried to reach Reagan -- this was in the summer of ’84 -- got him out of his daughter’s wedding at one point in California, and Reagan told him to speak to the State Department, and Buckley said, “I don’t want to speak to the State Department. Speak to the National Security Advisor.” Who was that NSC Advisor at that time? Do you happen to remember? He was one of the later... McFarland, Bud McFarland, right. And at that point -- Mike Armacost was Acting Secretary -- they just stuffed it back to Buckley and said, “Nothing doing. You sign. We’re not going to have the US, because of this Geneva reference, being the only one in the world not signing the conference declaration -- not even a treaty.” So Buckley with hate in his eyes, came back and again more nasty articles, so I was in effect forced to resign.

Q: After the conference call. You were still around through the conference even though you didn’t go to it.

BENEDICK: I didn’t do anything, no, no, but it was clear I would have to resign. And then what happened was that then the Department really... As I say, the issue, you couldn’t do anything more than we had done on the issue. McPherson also didn’t last too much longer after that and Malone also not. But Malone then asked me. Looking back on that episode, I was very much down -- and that’s the summer of ‘84, 16 years ago -- but looking back that was another turning point in my life and in my career, and it’s hard to say that it was unlucky because I was lucky. I might have stayed on in population after that. Who knows? Who knows what would have happened? But as it happened, when I resigned, coincidentally a political appointee who was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health and Natural Resources also resigned to go back -- she was a young lawyer -- go back to earning in those days six figures. The position was vacant, and Jim Malone asked me to take it over on a temporary basis. “It would just be the matter of a couple days,” he said, “but I’d like you and it’ll be good for your resume, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, and also we have some office directors there I don’t quite trust and I know you, that you’re responsible and that you’ll at least not go beyond our policies.” Okay. So he said, “But you understand this is only temporary, because the White House. (This position is too important for a Foreign Service Officer; the White House has its candidates, and as soon as that’s decided, we’ll find something else for you or we’ll help you.)” Then a couple of days later -- this is, I think, interesting because it’s a little bit of insight into bureaucracies -- we were all in the Executive suite, all of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries on Population, Environment, Science and Technology, along with
the Assistant Secretary, and all of the offices were identical. Nevertheless I decided to move -- I had a couple of meetings with these office directors -- and they all looked at me as ‘What’s Mr. Pop doing here’ (Population), so I decided to move into the vacant office of the Environment Deputy, identical office. Jim Malone was walking down the corridor, and I was up on a chair nailing a picture, and he said, “Richard, Richard, what are you doing?” I said, “Actually I’m hanging one of my pictures.” He said, “But didn’t I tell you this is only temporary? Do you understand it’s not going to be permanent?” I said, “Yes, of course, but whether it’s for two days or two weeks, if I’m going to be responsible for Environmental Affairs and if I’m dealing with those office directors, I have to be sitting here and not in the Population office.” Yes, he saw that, he saw that. Otherwise they know that I’m on the way out or on the way in and I’m not going to have any authority. Anyway, what happened was -- it was kind of a classic Washington story -- the days turned into weeks, the weeks turned into months. It turned out that there were two -- not one but two -- political people fighting for the job, and they had succeeded in throwing so much mud on each other from their friends this and their friends that, that they were in a stalemate. By that time, before Malone’s days were numbered, he was out and they brought in John Negroponte as Assistant Secretary for OES, again a career Foreign Service Officer, someone whom I had known when he was Consular General in Thessaloniki and I had been at the embassy, and John asked me to stay on. And Shultz agreed. In the course of those four or five months, I had made some decisions, I had led some delegations, and he liked what I was doing.

Q: And the White House didn’t object.

BENEDICK: Well, they didn’t consent. Ray..., the Inspector General -- was it Ray? George Vest...

Q: O’Hara?

BENEDICK: It wasn’t Bill. It must have been George Vest. That’s right.

Q: Inspector General?

BENEDICK: Director General, not Inspector General, the General Director was George Vest. That was before Perkins, or after? Anyway, it was George Vest, it definitely was George Vest. And he asked the White House repeatedly for their consent, again over a period of months. Never any answer. So I was still Acting, heading delegations, negotiating treaties. Finally -- it must have been about a year later in ‘85 and I was then getting into the ozone negotiations, which proved to be really a turning point, not only in my career but in my life, and he said, “Unless we hear from you to the contrary in the next five days, we’re going to drop the ax.” They had to have something. They had to have something on the record. The lawyers said, “Well, that’s enough. You’re telling them you’re going to do it. If they come back, then we can get into discussions.” There was never any answer from the White House. There was nothing. And that’s how I entered the new phase of my life in environmental affairs.
Q: Well, you’ve written a book about negotiation the Montreal protocol on the ozone layer. I don’t think we need to repeat what’s in your book unless you have some special insights that should be recorded here. But maybe you want to talk about some of the other important negotiations that you were involved with.

BENEDICK: Assuming that everybody who’s listening to this tape will read the book...

Q: What is the title of the book?

BENEDICK: It’s called Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Do you have...


BENEDICK: And there’s also a Japanese edition now in 1999. I don’t know if I mentioned it, but just a few months ago McGraw Hill selected Ozone Diplomacy for an anthology of what they call environmental classics of the 20th century, 46 excerpts including things like John Muir; Rachel Carson, Silent Spring; Steven J. Gould; E.O. Wilson. So it turned out...

Q: Okay, you’re talking about the book Ozone Diplomacy

BENEDICK: I was saying that both in the book and in numerous other articles and lectures that I’ve done -- I’ve written almost 100 articles not only on ozone but on science policy generally, and also I’ve lectured very often at universities, industry groups and so on -- it is my feeling that science belongs in modern foreign policy. And I try to write about it in a way which intelligent people, not necessarily scientists, can understand and can even be excited by. In fact, one of the nicest things I learned about Ozone Diplomacy, Harvard told me that it was also being used not only where you’d think it, for environmental courses or for international law, but also being used in some universities in English courses as an example of clear writing about difficult subjects. I was able, while I was in the Department and also after I left, to get a visiting fellow position at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, where I did the research for the book, as well, a lot of the scientific aspects of the book. Most of the research was from my notes and from the documentation of the negotiations. I was very lucky, I think, simply to say that I was in the right place at the right time, with a very difficult treaty. At the time no one would have predicted that it would have been successful. Afterwards in retrospect it looks easy, but that’s only because we know more now. At the time it was really very risky. The science was very uncertain, and that’s basically an important part of our diplomacy now when we’re facing issues such as climate change or biological diversity or desertification or the persistent organic pollutants, the organochlorines, these chemicals, is that the science isn’t necessarily certain. In fact, it’s far from certain, and you’re really balancing long-term risks against short-term costs, and other countries have other political objectives, mostly economic objectives and so there’s a lot of economics involved. But the understanding that science is absolutely basic -- and this has been an area which has
actually been neglected in the State Department even in recent decades. When Tom Pickering was Assistant Secretary for OES, he was successful for a while in reviving it, and then it kind of slipped down. We abolished an office not too long ago that was responsible for science and technology. Other agencies then took the lead, but really it should be in the State Department. I’m happy to see that Madeleine Albright just last month issued the results of a State Department report with her own strong endorsement, a report responding to criticisms and suggestions from the National Academies of Science. And I’ve been involved in this project as well, on the periphery but on both sides. And Dick Smith, in fact, was involved in the State Department, the task force, in drafting that; former principal DAS from the Bureau, from the OES Bureau. It’s something which I feel very strongly about, and I’m happy to see that it’s now endorsed. The rhetoric is good in this report, but now how to implement it with diminished resources and also basically in a community which traditionally has not been -- I’m talking about our Foreign Affairs community -- has not been that interested in science. It’s not as exciting to your average political science graduate, unless there’s a new generation maybe coming up. I detect there may be some of that. But certainly in the 21st century scientific issues are going to be very close to the core of a lot of the things we’re dealing with, not just environment but a lot of the things that we’re dealing with in our international relations.

Q: During you feel during this period from ‘84 to ‘87 that there was support from the higher levels in the State Department for some of the negotiations?

BENEDICK: Absolutely.

Q: Let’s talk about some of the others that you were involved with.

BENEDICK: Well, George Shultz was the Secretary for that period, and he was very interested in these affairs. I personally briefed him a number of times, first on the ozone issue, then on the AIDS epidemic -- that also belongs in this area, and it’s also very much a scientific issue -- and he was very interested in it and supported us. Again, following on my population experience, I helped to establish within the World Health Organization a new office that would be dealing with AIDS, coordinating internationally, because at that point... I remember I spent Thanksgiving of ‘85 preparing for a briefing for the Secretary on that Saturday -- I believe it was on a Saturday, or it might have been on a Monday, but it was the Thanksgiving weekend. I remember spread out on the floor in front of the fireplace reading up on AIDS, which was not the happiest thing to be reading about on Thanksgiving. So we were involved in that, and we started this WHO program. I also led negotiations on biotechnology, which was just coming into its own at that time; on other aid pollution issues dealing with acid rain and sulfur dioxide transmission. There were a number of agencies that were involved. Again, I think it was good that the State Department was in a position to take the leading role, because if you take the scientific or the technical agencies, they know their issues but they don’t know negotiations and it’s hard for them. They don’t have that -- simply it’s a feel. But a State Department person has to also know something about the issue. He’s not going to be an expert, but at least to know the questions to ask and not be turned off by the scientific advice, and I think this is important.
Q: The State Department person can provide a context in terms of our overall foreign policy, our relations on a bilateral and regional basis, but also knowledge of other negotiations that are ongoing that may be in related fields or maybe not related at all but sometimes have overlap.

BENEDICK: There is a certain element of that, but I think it’s also that a good generalist -- again, Pickering was superb in this, and John Negroponte -- can actually bring a dimension. If he reads the science, if he understands, he can bring a dimension which the technical, the scientist... It’s not that they’re better, but he’ll ask some questions which they may not have thought about. It’s the interaction that’s the crucial thing. But there has to be interest on both sides, and I found from my own experience that the scientists are almost all very interested in talking to us. It’s rather been on the Foreign Service side where, either because they’re afraid of it or they’re bored by it, there isn’t that synergy. But when you’ve got that synergy between, let’s say, a good diplomat, a good Foreign Service generalist, and a good and outstanding scientist, that can be a very powerful combination on a delegation.

Q: How were your relations generally with other agencies? Was there constant tugging and to-and-froing going on, or were they looking for leadership in conducting these negotiations that they didn’t really have themselves for reasons you just mentioned?

BENEDICK: I would say that it may have been that I was lucky, but my recollections of my time in the environment position -- I was doing that actually for three years -- it was unlike the Economic Bureau position which was earlier in my career where there was a lot of rivalry and fighting with Treasury. On this one it was very collaborative. Of course, there were differences of opinion and sometimes even personal ones. I remember at one point a high-ranking person at EPA wanted to lead. Actually it was the ozone negotiations, and I was kind of new on the block but I’d done a little bit, I had gotten to know some of the people. And he was older and a very powerful figure, also well connected politically in the Republican Party, and he began really pulling wires that EPA (he) should lead the delegations for these two years or three years of negotiations rather than myself. This is interesting. I got a letter in the mail during the height of this in an EPA envelope, and inside the letter was a photocopy, no signature, no letter. Inside the envelope was a photocopy, and the photocopy was from an obscure section of the Clean Air Act with the section circled, and the section said that on issues dealing with this and this and this, the responsibility for international negotiations was with the Secretary of State. We had all overlooked that. Somebody on this guy’s staff had sent it to me to give us the ammunition that we would head the delegation.

Q: The Clean Air Act reminds me not just of ozone diplomacy but the whole issue of acid rain, cross-border...

BENEDICK: We had negotiations with Canada on the one hand and with Mexico. There it wasn’t so much air as the water pollution. So it was going on on several fronts, and the climate issue was just coming to the fore on the last year of my incumbency. We didn’t
have negotiations on a treaty at all at that point. In 1988 there was a conference. I had left
the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary, but I was still in the State Department on
detail to World Wildlife Fund. In 1988 the Canadian government in collaboration with
WMO, World Meteorological Organization, and the United Nations Environment
Program, convened the first really big conference on climate change in Toronto in 1988,
which led then to everything that followed. It was a meeting that involved government
officials, private researchers, industry, environmental NGOs; and it was a marathon and
really led to everything we saw coming after that. But the one thing I did while I was still
in office in 1987 -- and again it was based on the Montreal experience, on the ozone
experience -- there was a group, WMO, World Meteorological Organization, and UNEC
had convened a group of high-level international scientists, about eight of them, well
know, very eminent scientists, and they convened a series of smaller meetings of
scientists and were then issuing pronouncements on climate change. It was called the
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, the AGGG, Advisory Group on Greenhouse
Gases, greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide or methane which presumably cause a
global warming effect which could change the global climate in general. Global warming
doesn't mean warming all over. It could mean very cold in one area, drought in another
area, but a global change. We’re still learning more about these cycles. In any event, this
was in the ‘80s. These pronouncements were coming out under the aegis of UN, basically
from an eight- or 12-person group, and I felt -- this is ironic here -- I felt very uneasy with
this and looked back at the ozone experience where we had had truly international...
Again, it was WMO and UNEC up there in the letterhead, but it was also our NASA and
NOA, but it was an international group and it was a much broader consensus and I felt
more credible consensus. So I and some others began to suggest that, instead of this
AGGG, we ought to get something analogous to what had been done informally for
ozone. And here something very interesting happened in that summer of ‘87. We were
still preparing for the climactic meeting on ozone, but we were already getting to the
climate. There was no negotiation yet, but we were already looking at the science. The
funny thing that happened was that my -- did we even talk about how they almost fired
me again during the ozone negotiations? That’s important.

Q: Well, unless you’ve covered that thoroughly in your book.

BENEDICK: Well, it’s in there, but let me just say -- yeah, okay, Chapter 4 in the book --
the same people who succeeded in getting me out of population suddenly discovered that
we were going into the ozone at the last stages and that we were getting everything we
wanted. We were getting a very strong ozone treaty, and at the last minute they tried to
reverse our position. There was a series of kangaroo court hearings in which we went
over all the science all over again. Now, this is important. It really raised questions
abroad about what our position would be, and they were saying again there’s that
Benedick again behind the President’s back doing things, he didn’t get clearances on
these position papers. Well, we had gone up to policy level. We hadn’t gotten Cabinet-
level clearances, but we had gotten, you know, Assistant Secretary from Commerce
Department. The main protagonist, Don Hodel, at that time was the Secretary of Energy.
People, if they’re reading this or listening to it, may remember that he came out wearing a
cowboy hat one day and said, “This is all we need to protect us from the ozone layer. Just
put on a broad-brimmed hat and sunscreen, and we don’t need this treaty which is going
to cripple our industry.” This is interesting for several reasons. One was that industry by
that time, while not for a strong treaty, was not against it either, so the ideologues, the
anti-environmental ideologues -- let me characterize them so -- within the -- I hope that
the tape people can slow down, because I’m speaking rather fast; we’ll see -- the
environmental ideologues -- and there were many of them within the Reagan
Administration -- were actually further in their position than even industry. Industry was
more enlightened. They weren’t all there, but they were willing to at least listen to reason.
And these people just didn’t like us to have any treaty at all. So we had this very
exhaustive process going over about three months in the spring and early summer of 1987
with the climactic meeting coming up in Montreal in September, in which they tried (a)
to get the position reversed and (b) to have me fired. Here Shultz, however, came to the
rescue. It wasn’t quite like population. Here he could step in, Shultz and Whitehead, John
Whitehead, his Deputy Secretary, and they defended the position and they defended me,
and we had support from EPA but not elsewhere. Other agencies were indifferent, and it
was Commerce and the Department of Justice. Again, it didn’t matter what ministry they
were in or what department they were in; it was their ideological bent which decided how
they would come out. They said that we didn’t have clearances at the highest level for our
Circular 165, for our negotiating with a 165.

Q: 175.

BENEDICK: 175? Whatever it is, for our negotiating position. I think, looking back,
what happened was that they hadn’t been paying attention. This shows how hard that
treaty was, because when we first entered the negotiation, nobody thought we could get
anywhere near what we were trying for. By the time we reached the halfway point, they
saw that we were going to have a strong treaty, and that’s when they then... Their attitude
first was let them play in their sandbox. Again I describe it in the book. All I can say --
that’s a different chapter of the book -- is that I did a real diplomatic strategy we sat down
and we designed. There were a lot of very interesting aspects, cooperation with the
Russians, with the Japanese, because we had strong opposition from everybody to begin
with. Working behind the scenes with the European Community, with the Germans, for
example, who were more sympathetic to our view, and the Danes, going on, using Voice
of America, USIA. We had this WordNet, and the chief scientist and I would get on. It
was kind of an interactive thing broadcasting all over the world. I remember visiting
Germany and one of my friends said, “See, I was driving on the autobahn, I turned the
radio on, and there you were on the radio.” We did all of this publicity, we had high-level
visits, we had scientific cooperation, what I called in the book “ozone glasnost,” with the
Russians, cooperation between the space agencies at a time when they were very much
against a treaty. Our real opponents in that treaty was the European Union, in particular
the UK and France, which were major producers of these chemicals, and Italy. Later the
UK turned around. Later they all turned around, but it was very difficult. It was a case
book study in negotiations, when you start out and nobody thinks you can do it, and then
you have it with science and the science also gradually evolving and then... Anyway, so
our ideologues discovered a little late in the game that people had built a castle in the
sandbox and they weren’t going to be able to blow it over.
Q: As you say, you have it in the book about the process from the beginning to the end, and the end came in 1987.

BENEDICK: Well, the interesting thing about the Montreal protocol was that it was deliberately designed to be flexible, to be a dynamic process and not a static solution, because the science continued to evolve after 1987 and we had foreseen that. We had built that into the treaty that there had to be periodic assessments of the science and the technology and of the economics and that the treaty could be amended. In fact, it was amended significantly on several conferences of the parties after 1987. So it was the beginning of the end, but the treaty was actually signed in 1987 and entered into force in 1989 and has since been amended several times to strengthen it as more scientific evidence came in. It was originally only, I think, eight compounds were controlled; now it’s over 90.

Q: You did not get fired. You did leave the position, though, shortly after the Montreal protocol was signed.

BENEDICK: That’s right. That had been agreed. That was part of the deal that Negroponte made when he came in, to even have me stay on in an acting basis, was that there would be a political appointment, but it would just see the Montreal negotiations through and that there then would be a political appointee. Now the irony of that was that the political appointee was Bill Nitze, son of Paul Nitze, who did a fine job, but he didn’t last longer than I did. He was fired by John Sununu for being too green basically. So they had to do something with me after 1987. But I was talking about climate, and I want to get back to that point. Based on the Montreal experience in the summer of 1987 -- this is while I’m still in the State Department building and filling that position -- we now wanted to establish an intergovernmental panel on climate change. My allies on this turned out to be the ideologues within the Reagan Administration, and it was the EPA and the green NGOs, the environmental NGOs, didn’t want to see this. We eventually prevailed, and my reasoning was that the greens were afraid that the scientists would be co-opted by governments and that, if governments could appoint them, it would be all politicized. My feeling -- by that time I had gotten to know a lot of scientists -- was that that would be very hard to do and that it might turn out to be the other way around. They’d create this inter-government panel and then the panel would go out in front because they signed it. But it was very interesting. That last little twist was that the people said, “Ah, well, maybe Benedick’s not so bad after all,” the people from the far..., the ideologues. “Let’s definitely set up a government panel, not just government scientists, sort of reporting to the government.” But in point of fact this was doing very interesting work and very needed work.

Q: Over a long period of time.

BENEDICK: Right.
Q: Is there anything else we should say about your time as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment? Health and Natural Resources?

BENEDICK: Well, the health was primarily the AIDS epidemic at that point. There were any number of issues on oceans protection, wildlife, forests, and it was a big operation. I had, I think, three or four offices, and it was going on on a lot of different fronts. So it was very interesting and, as I say, that changed my life. In point of fact, it’s population and environment together, which are also very much interlinked, which have conditioned what happened after I left the State Department.

Q: You left the Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science in 1987. Where did you go from there?

BENEDICK: Well, I was seconded then to World Wildlife Fund. At that time Bill Reilley was the president of World Wildlife Fund, and the idea was that then I would continue to work in environment. I kept very close contact. I’d go every week or so to OES. I would continue to work and I would write on the issues and that I would also do this book. John Negroponte encouraged me very much on the book. And I think I mentioned -- maybe I didn’t -- how adverse things can turn into positive occurrences in a person’s career. I think this is very important to young diplomats and others to realized that when you’re discouraged there may be really a silver lining in the cloud and it may turn out to be quite a big one. One was the whole question on population. If I had not been forced to leave population, I would never have moved on to this next stage, which was even more fascinating and enabled me to continue to work on population issues, that I’m doing now but from a different perspective and more authoritative perspective. The same thing happened with the book. When I left the Department to go to World Wildlife Fund, I had a commission from Foreign Affairs to write an article on the ozone negotiations, which I did. It took about a year because I was doing a lot of other things, speaking engagements and so on. When I submitted the article, it was turned down. The junior editor who had encouraged it was very embarrassed. I think it was Bill Highland who was the editor then. Highland was a Russian specialist on the environment. Allegedly he said, “Gee, we had something on the environment five years ago. We don’t really need to do another one.” This was 1988. This was fortunate, because if that article had been published, I don’t think that a lot of things would have happened to me, good things. I would never have taken the time to write a book, then revise a book. It would not be translated. There was also a Spanish edition in the works. I would have just sort of rested on those laurels, but instead I was stimulated. But that again is a story, because WWF said, “You have enough for more than just a short article. Why don’t you make it a monograph.” That took another year, because more things began happening. As I say, the science was evolving. We got into 1989 and the second conference of parties. The first amendments were coming up in 1990. Obviously it made sense to wait until that happened. So it became a book-length thing, and I was working with the WWF junior editor, and the same thing happened. Finally the editor of WWF, who had been procrastinating, finally said, “I really don’t like the book. I just don’t like it.” I said, “Well, you’re an editor, you’re a junior editor, giving me a lot of useful suggestions.” “I can’t say why I don’t like it. I just don’t. Let me think about it some more, but I just don’t like it.” This was now in
1990, and I was about to do a final section on this conference of parties. Now fortunately I had at some earlier stage had the idea of making this a joint publication of WWF on the environmental side and the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Diplomacy to have kind of both diplomatic and environment. The editor there, Margery Boichel Thompson, who is now down the hall probably here -- at that time she was editor at Georgetown -- she loved the book, and she was very upset that this World Wildlife Fund editor wasn’t even giving any suggestions. I think, looking back, it was because he was used to books about fuzzies and furries and animals and wonderful pictures and so on, and here was a book about diplomacy and about an invisible ozone layer. You couldn’t have a nice photo of the ozone layer. Whatever it was, she said, “I’m going to send the book out,” because she had good contacts in the publishing world, and she said, “It’s not something we usually do, but I’m going to send it to three publishers simultaneously rather than waiting,” because we wanted to move ahead with it. So she sent it to Harvard, Yale, and Oxford University Presses in that summer of 1990, and we ended up with Harvard and Oxford fighting over it. I picked Harvard on the Avis syndrome that number two will try harder, because Oxford, of course, is very big and I would have been one among 30 environmental titles and Harvard really was trying to break in and they said that they’d put a real effort into it. And it’s true. I had a full page with a photo on page five of their catalog, whereas I knew how Oxford would have been. It would have been just on a list. I was very pleased and had a wonderful editor at Harvard. When the book came out, I gave an inscribed copy to this editor at World Wildlife Fund, and I wrote, “To Bob, without whom this never would have happened.” And he laughed; he had a good sense of humor. But again how adversity at one point..., first in Foreign Affairs and then ‘what are we going to do with this manuscript?’

Q: So you were sent to the World Wildlife Fund by the State Department. You continued to be on the State Department payroll. How long did that last?

BENEDICK: For a while, and one of the reasons was that Bill Reilley, who, as I said, had been president of World Wildlife Fund, then moved to become head of EPA. This was under George Bush. That was in 1989, so I had been at WWF for about a year and a half. At the same time the senior vice president from World Wildlife Fund, “Buff” Bohlen, replaced Negroponte as Assistant Secretary for OES. I really didn’t want to go at that point to have a bilateral post, even if I could have gotten through the Senate, and there was some doubt at that point whether -- you know, the enemies meet along the way, and Jesse Helms becoming even more prominent than ever -- it just would have been quixotic to send me up for something. And I was very content to continue to work in environment, and the Department was content, and I had now two people who knew me well, had put me in the State Department in EPA, so I just continued doing what I was doing, which was writing, speaking, participating in conferences. I’d often be called in by the Department or EPA as an outside expert, or by other agencies, foreign governments, although they knew I was still with the State Department, they knew I was kind of betwixt and between. Everyone felt, including myself, that this was a very, kind of fruitful, mutually interesting arrangement in which I could continue to work in an area in which I was getting increasing competence and expertise and international recognition, and at the same time being able to continue exchanges within the State Department. I
wasn’t getting instructions from them. I would run articles by them, but then I didn’t do an op-ed piece in which I’d kick the President, beat up on the President or something. There were differences, as there are within a bureaucracy, but it was also very interesting and, I think, very unusual. It may be another sign for diplomacy, how one can function in a semi-diplomatic setting with contacts within the agencies, and yet basically nobody told me what to do. I’d report regularly back, you know, saying what I’d done, where I had sent copies of my articles, sometimes before, sometimes afterwards. They felt that it was useful. It certainly was for me.

Q: And you stayed there after you retired from the State Department?

BENEDICK: That’s right. I should say that by that time I was doing several things simultaneously. I had this position as a visiting professor in Geneva, and I had a position in Berlin at the East West Economic Academy looking at environmental issues in Eastern Europe, mainly organizing conferences, leading international conferences, seminars, roundtables. For example, when I was in Geneva but also in other contexts, since I knew the people who were involved in these environmental treaty negotiations and since I was myself so convinced of the utility of this technique of a policy dialog in this you take key negotiators and put them in some nice setting, outside Lake Geneva or something or some retreat-like setting, for not more than three days, because you usually can’t get them, but you have a very carefully planned program, agenda, an annotated agenda, questions which you’ve already discussed with many of them beforehand because you want to know what are the key issues, what are the critical issues; and you bring them together with people from outside the governments, not more than 25 or so around a table, and you can get some very fruitful results. I did that for the International Conference on Population and Development, which was begun 10 years after Mexico City, 1994. I did that for the Climate Convention. I did that for the Desertification Convention. I did that for the Desertification Convention. They would tell me in advance what issues, and we’d sit down and work out... For example, on desertification there was the idea of a separate annex for Africa, because it was the African countries that were particularly focusing on this Desertification Convention, and there was a question of were there any international legal precedents. So we called together a panel, an international panel, in Geneva from France, from Africa, from the US, of well-known international lawyers and treaty lawyers together with some of the key people from the secretariat, the chair of the negotiations, who was a Swedish ambassador, some of the people from the negotiations, and discussed over two and a half days based on an agenda that we had previously drawn up, and then wrote a report afterwards, “What are the Legal Ramifications of Regional Annexes.” We did the same thing for financial arrangements for that treaty. I was really merging, bringing my experience to bear for the conventions and now having much more flexibility not being a creature of the State Department.

Q: And not doing it really just as an American, doing it on a much more international multilateral basis.

BENEDICK: It was really fascinating work. And then, I should say, two very important landmarks during this period were in 1990. I was still in the State Department technically,
but I was appointed as a special advisor to Morris Strong, who was the Secretary General for this United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. I had gotten to know him also. This was the famous Earth Summit. It was the biggest international conference ever held up to that time. It led to this Agenda 21, brought together economics and environment and development, and is still living on in many ways as the Commission on Sustainable Development in New York at the UN and so on. And he brought me on as a special advisor, so I attended all of the prepcon meetings and wrote. I actually wrote the atmospheric chapter and helped to negotiate it in Rio in particular. That was between 1990 and 1992, and then just after that in 1993 I was offered a similar role as Special Advisor to the Secretary General for the International Conference on Population and Development, which was held in Cairo in 1994. Again, I knew the people involved, the head of the UN Population Fund, and by that time the Administration had changed again and our population policy had returned to what it had been previously. So now I went not only with the blessings of the Clinton Administration -- Timothy Worth was the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs -- but they also provided financing -- of course, by that time I was now outside of the... -- financing for my travel at least. I guess I was now outside of the Department by 1994. So it actually then enabled the UN to use me in this way, and it was really quite heartwarming because I was then back in population and working with people whom I had known 10 years before, many of whom, especially from foreign countries, didn’t know what had happened to me in the meantime, but they all knew that somehow I had not come to Mexico City. Some people I didn’t even recognize any more said, “Oh, Ambassador Benedick, it’s so good to see you back. What have you been doing?” Everything in between had been environment. They knew that there had been some disgrace or something. I still have met people along the way even after that who had followed me up to that, but because they were in population they didn’t know what happened afterwards. And now I’m doing both, but not exclusively, but I found ways. One of my most recent publications -- the Smithsonian Institution is publishing it here -- is on population and environment in the 21st century. A related version is coming out in Germany by the Association of German Scientists, the equivalent of the AAAS, the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences, the German equivalent. So these two strands have come together. They are very closely related.

Q: Okay, I think we’ve pretty well covered the ground of your career. I don’t know if there’s anything else we should add. Maybe we’ll stop here. Thank you. I really enjoyed this.

BENEDICK: So have I, Ray. Thank you very much. I hope your readers or listeners will as well.

End of interview