The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project  

**MICHAEL CALINGAERT**  

*Interviewed by: Peter Moffat*  
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INTERVIEW

Q: This is the oral history of Michael Calingaert, as taken by Peter Moffat.

Please tell us about how you happened to enter the world of foreign affairs and your early life.

CALINGAERT: I was born and brought up in Detroit, Michigan, in a rather international atmosphere. My father was born in Belgium, emigrated to the US in the '20s, married an American, and always kept a certain European aura around the home. Spoke French at home. I learned French before English, I’ve been told, but forgot a lot in the interim. Even though during the World War II period when we didn’t have that much contact with relatives in Europe, it was very much that kind of atmosphere.

I was always interested in history and international affairs, and this was, perhaps in my own mind, though not that of my parents necessarily the thing that I was intended to do. As I went through college it seemed obvious. I studied history, some political science and economics, but I wasn’t particularly interested in an academic career. As I was approaching the end of college, I really didn’t see any alternatives that interested me.

I went to Swarthmore College -- very good academics -- and it was generally assumed that people who did well would go on to graduate school, certainly in history. I studied history and then some more history, and I didn’t really like that idea.

My only hesitation really was that the early 1950s was the period of McCarthyism, and that was not the atmosphere to entice a lot of people into the foreign service. The one thing I do remember is at some point, probably in my senior year, taking a break at the library and talking to one of my classmates, who was Michael Dukakis. He said, “What are you going to do,” and I answered, well, I thought I would take the foreign service
exam but I wasn’t sure. And he said, “Michael, that’s for you.”

So I decided he probably was right. I didn’t want to go to law school, which seemed to be the other thing that one did under those circumstances, and so I took the exam and ultimately joined the foreign service.

Q: What was your impression as to the likely future of Mr. Dukakis at that point?

CALINGAERT: It was clear that Michael wanted to be the governor of Massachusetts. He had a political career in mind. With that as a goal, he volunteered for the army after college. He didn’t go immediately to law school. He went to Korea for two years instead. I’m sure it was so that he could say he was an army veteran. That was a ticket you had to punch and then into politics, including achieving his ambition to become governor of Massachusetts.

I took the foreign service exam. Actually, it was the first time the so-called new exam was given in June of 1955, which was when I graduated from college. Prior to that, the service had used the old system, a two-and-a-half day written exam for which one normally had to go to cram school, and which clearly required a great deal more knowledge and preparation. And this stemmed from the Wriston Committee report on modernizing and democratizing the foreign service. So it was a one-day written exam, with multiple choice, plus, I think, the last hour was written. There was an essay, as well as a language test. I took that.

Then I had a scholarship to go to Europe for the academic year following graduation. When I learned that I passed the written exam, I wrote to the board of examiners and said, since I was going to Europe in October, I think it was, could I take the oral sooner rather than waiting my turn, and they agreed. So I came down to Washington in September, and it was historical in a sense. It was the first day they gave the oral exam under the new system, and I was the second person to take it. So I may have been the first one ever to pass, but I don’t know and will never know of course.

The oral exam was not too taxing except they started asking me what I would do if I were in the foreign service in certain circumstances. I did not have a clue, if you were a consul and a shipwrecked captain came in and so on. That was not very good. The only thing I do remember is one question they asked which I thought was rather stupid: if you were a British diplomat and were invited to the American Embassy for a July 4th reception, how would you respond and would you have a problem with this because the US had gained independence from Britain. And I said I thought the Brits had gotten over that long ago. Why that question came forth, I don’t know. But they didn’t say whether I passed or not. They did tell me to have a medical exam, and a security check, all of which sounded like good signs. And so then I went to Germany and I studied at the University of Cologne for a year. I had a travel fellowship from Fulbright and a scholarship from the university and spent a year really learning about Germany and seeing what Germany and German student life was about, which didn’t
appeal to me terribly. But it was an interesting experience.

I did that for a year, and then I came back, at which point I said that as of the following summer I would be available if they wanted to have me.

Q: (Recording Break) -- Germany back in 1955-56?

CALINGAERT: It was, of course, 10 years after the end of the war when I was in Cologne, which had been very badly bombed, and one saw the results of that all over. The university -- I had gone, in a sense, to extremes -- was very different from the small college I had attended with 800 students and everyone knew everyone and it was a very informal atmosphere. The German system was very different. I don’t know how many thousands there were, but it was of course terribly impersonal.

Two things, I guess, struck me most. One was the formality amongst students. Unless you really knew them well, everyone used the formal form of address which I found very strange. They were on the whole older because there were many students who had been in the war or had their education delayed by the war, and they tended to be very serious because they wanted to get through with their studies and be done, so there wasn’t much merrymaking.

I was living in a student home which was rather interesting. It was built by the widow of apparently a very distinguished professor of sociology who had taught there, ran afoul of the Nazis who didn’t like sociology, and had him killed during the war; and she lived across the street and built this place.

So it was a smaller atmosphere, about 30 people, but even there it was all very formal unless you had been there quite a while and had met people. There was an office for foreign students of whom there weren’t many, and there was also the America House. It was an American library at the university run by an American professor who had been born in Germany but whose Jewish family left before the war. His daughter had been in college with me, it turns out, and he was running this program. I met a couple of people through that, but in terms of social life, it was pretty grim.

Q: (Recording Break and shift in topics to his first assignment) -- to the Southeast Asian section for biographic information. That’s an interesting assignment, how did it come about?

CALINGAERT: Well, one never knows, and certainly at that stage in one’s career, it was never very clear. Our class was rather small; there was 15 of us at the Foreign Service Institute. About half received overseas assignments. I got Washington which is what I wanted. I don’t think anybody asked me, although I had one interview in another part of the Bureau of Intelligence Research but that was for Western Europe. I think the office was interested in an analyst on Germany. I remember vaguely having had an interview, but whether they checked my German or not, I don’t know. In any case, I gather they weren’t overly impressed.
How I ended up in this other section, I have no idea. I just assumed they needed someone to go there. I certainly had no background whatsoever; yet they put me in a new area, and told me to start doing biographic reporting on this area -- this was the China-Southeast Asia Branch -- I was responsible for Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya, and Singapore.

Q: That was headed by Mr. Boykin, wasn’t it?

CALINGAERT: Sam Boykin was the first of the two division chiefs, yes. But I didn’t see much of Sam actually. I can’t remember what his background was; he may have been one of the people who had been in the civil service and then was “Wristonized”.

Q: I recall he was from the Deep South, but other than that, I can’t remember.

Do you recall any significant work or issues from your time in this section?

CALINGAERT: Well, I remember most of the work was being done for a huge volume on biographies of Chinese communist leaders. At one point we moved our office, and while pulling out files, someone discovered a photograph of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-Lai, and possibly John Service, one of the people who had then gotten into trouble with McCarthy. Whatever it was, it included the top Chinese leadership, and under the circumstances incriminating, but they hung onto it.

Another thing I remember, also related to the move, was a pamphlet that had been put out for American soldiers during World War II. I’m sorry I never kept this thing; I’m sure I could have taken it. It was written by the man -- I think his name is Milton Caniff who wrote Terry and the Pirates.

Q: Milton Caniff, yes.

CALINGAERT: And it was for American soldiers to show the difference between the Chinese and the Japanese. It was all done in this totally propagandistic style. Our Chinese friends were described positively while the low down, vile Japanese have a small big toe (the Chinese is bigger), and their eyes slant more in one direction. I forget the specifics, but even at this point it was really quite hilarious. Other than that, it was a wonderful experience for me to learn about countries that I simply knew nothing about, and we had access to all the intelligence information, all the reporting.

I remember apropos of Singapore that at the time there was a wild radical communist known as Harry Lee whom everyone was afraid of and who was going to gain power. Of course, he was Lee Kuan Yew who subsequently became the great statesman of Southeast Asia. But the head person, I don’t think prime minister was the term, was Lim Yew Hock who was deemed to be a good, honest, right-kind-of-thinking person, but it was clear that the opposition was gaining more and more, and that some day we were going to have to face this radical wild man.
This was the period when Malaya, as it was then known, became independent. I remember reading that Tanku Abdul Rahman was the great figure who for years and years kept it all together. In Cambodia -- this of course predates the debacle of the 1970s, although some of the names surfaced again a few decades later -- Prince, as he was then known, Sihanouk, was very much the central figure.

Q. Presumably long before you left the B.I., you were working on your next assignment. Where did that take you?

CALINGAERT: We didn’t do things like that. We waited to be told, and I knew that my time was up at the end of 1958. One Friday late afternoon I had a call from someone in personnel, and he said can you come see me on Monday. And I said can you tell me something now, I’m sitting down. And he answered you have been assigned to Mogadishu.

I happened to know where Mogadishu was because one of the people who joined the foreign service with me went there on his first tour. It turned out I was replacing him. He had been medically evacuated from there. So I didn’t express great enthusiasm, and he said, well, that was one of your choices. And I said one of my what? And he said, well, one of your choices was northern Africa, and this is in the Office of Northern African Affairs. And I replied, your idea and my geography are obviously quite different. I was thinking of places like Morocco, I was certainly not thinking of Mogadishu, and I was not very pleased about that prospect.

I figured the smart thing to do would be to go and talk to my boss and see if he could help in some way. I went to see the head of the division who was no longer Boykin but I no longer remember his name, and I said, I don’t know if you heard about my assignment. And his words were, “Oh, Mike, I think that’s a wonderful opportunity.” So that ended my very brief effort to see if I could find something that I thought was more interesting than to go to Mogadishu.

So to Mogadishu I did go, and I arrived there the last day of December 1958 and stayed until early spring of 1961, so two and a half years.

I was called consular officer, but in fact it was an overall junior officer position, general factotum, which was more fun. As consular officer, there was not a huge number of American citizens to take care of or visa seekers. It was then a consulate general, because the country was not independent, with a rather small staff, about 10 or 15 people in all. I was the junior of those, and I ended up doing a little bit of everything. I certainly did what consular work there was, but during my time there I did a fair amount of administrative work, I was acting General Services officer for a while; I set up the language program; I did the personnel records; I did a little bit of political reporting; general political and labor reporting; and about the only thing I didn’t do was economic work. I never did any of that.

Q: Well, given the later sad history of Somalia, what can you tell us from those days that
might make all this a little clearer?

CALINGAERT: The situation was that it was a U.N. trusteeship run by the Italians, who had a ten-year mandate from 1950 to 1960. It had been an Italian colony. The British during World War II (in 1942) occupied it, but after the end of the war, the great powers couldn’t figure out quite what to do with it, and the ultimate outcome was this strange arrangement.

So there was a U.N. trusteeship. There were three individuals, the representatives of three countries who were overseeing it. At least one of them was physically stationed in Mogadishu. There was a Filipino, an Egyptian, and I don’t remember the nationality of the third. At one stage, actually, and this was before I was there, the Egyptian was murdered, I think for reasons that were never clear, and probably no one really knew quite why.

But an Italian administration ran the place. The head person, I think he was called Governor General, was an ambassador or possibly a retired ambassador, and the structure was all Italian, but it was all geared toward independence that was clearly to come in 1960; it was the job of the Italians to both keep the place running and to prepare for the day when they would no longer be there.

There were a fair number of Italian civil servants throughout, including the carabinieri that was training the police force, as well as a National Assembly, a Somali Prime Minister -- essentially a political structure, and all this in a very poor country. They exported bananas that were small, tasty, but not very sturdy. The Italians had, I think, a monopoly on the banana trade, though I’m not sure they made money on that.

Also Somalia, at least then, was the number one exporter in the world of myrrh, frankincense, and a third product, which likewise was not in huge demand but mostly which came from there. It’s a barren country. There are two rivers. One of them doesn’t quite get to the ocean, the other one does, and there are little strips of fertile land along the river, but not much, and a nomadic population.

Q: But this whole structure of clans and warlords that have come to plague the world in later years, was that in place, did you detect that sort of thing?

CALINGAERT: It was always in place, yes. You had the tribal structure and the sub-tribes, and that was very much on people’s minds, and it had to be taken into account in dividing up spoils and appointing people. There is no question about that.

Some of this was geographically based but not entirely. In the national parliament, for example, those various groups were represented, and you would know quite clearly and quickly who belonged to which group. At the same time, it was said that the tribal structure itself was fairly democratic. So it wasn’t simply one leader passing on through generations running leadership of the tribe but there was a democratic selection process. So the hope was that given this background, the country would develop some kind of a
sensibly functioning democratic system.

I was there for independence. Independence was July 1, 1960, and I was there until the following May. Of course leading up to it, there was a lot of concern as to whether the country would hold together, would they massacre all the colonists, etc. There were, parenthetically, a lot of the clans who had been there for generations who were very important in the economy, had estates, had plantations, were involved in business, alongside a certain degree of indigenous Somali business.

If you added to that the Arab populations you had people from various countries in the Middle East who had migrated to the area. This was exclusively a Muslim country but Arabs were still viewed as something apart, and perhaps not surprisingly, the Arabs played a fairly important role in the domestic economy. So there was always a concern about what would happen when the Italian flag came down.

It all happened rather uneventfully. The police was very well trained. The carabinieri had really done a very good job with them. The head of the police was a man named Mohammed Abshir, a very impressive guy, very western-oriented. Unfortunately, perhaps from his standpoint too much so -- well-respected and admired as he was in the western community. And there was a good deal of competence and discipline in the police.

The police was divided by clan. He was from one of the main tribes, his deputy was from another. There are four officials at the top really, and there were two that kept moving up in rank as independence approached. I think by the time of independence, there were two lieutenant colonels and two majors. Then -- and I think I was still there -- with independence, they decided they had to have an army on the grounds that an independent country needed one, besides there were still more goodies if there was an army in addition to police. So one colonel stayed with the police, one went to the army, and the same happened with the majors.

One of the majors was Mohammed Said Barre who became the dictator, and I had met him when he was a police major in the north where he was in charge of the Misherkenya area. There was a case -- actually I think a case of mistaken identity -- in which the police picked up an American somewhere, who turned out really not to be an American, which was fine for me, but I met the major. Then he moved down to Mogadishu, and I saw him occasionally. He was friendly, but certainly less westernized than the head of the police and probably the others.

I remember that shortly before I left, perhaps even the night before I left, he invited me to dinner, and he and I had dinner at one of the two hotels the Italians had built before independence on the terrace outside. We had a very nice chat. He was rather harsh on Americans and American policy, and I remember I duly reported this to my DCM. I was rather taken aback because his critique was done in a friendly manner and such terms as: I’m your friend and I want to tell you the problems I see, policies I don’t agree with, and things that you ought to do. Whereas my DCM thought he just doesn’t like us, he is
basically not our friend -- he may have been more right than I was.

The man who was the number two in the police and who became the head of the army, Daud, was a very nice guy. He was really in the shadow of Mohammed Abshir, but a good and decent man, who died not long after of cancer in his 40s, quite young. Mohammed Said Barre then moved up to become head of the army. All this happened after my time there. Then one of the prime ministers was assassinated, and then Said Barre eventually just took over and ran a very dictatorial state.

While I was there, after independence, more countries set up missions. Before independence, for example, just a handful, the French, the British, and the Egyptians had consulates. The Russians came, and that was very bothersome to us. They had a fairly large establishment and all highly secretive. One day a diplomatic note from the Somali government addressed to the Russians came to us, so we of course opened it to have a look before we sent it over, and it was fairly benign.

I remember one day I decided that it was absurd that we did not have a diplomatic list that let everybody know who everybody was, but the Somali government wasn’t very inclined to make one. So I thought, well, why don’t I make one. I went to all of the embassies, and basically said I’m your friendly American third secretary, and I’m making a diplomatic list. If you would please tell me the names of all your officers I’ll compile this, and you will all have a copy.

I went to the Soviet Embassy, and not surprisingly they were very suspicious, but they ultimately gave me all these names, and I brought them all back, and put the list together. The embassy wouldn’t let me give them a copy which I was really quite furious and embarrassed about. My boss said no, no, no, bad guys, etc. So as I remember we never distributed it to anyone, but at least we had a diplomatic list.

Our mission was first a consulate general and automatically became an embassy after independence although there was a snafu that kept our consul general waiting four days before he could present his credentials as ambassador. Then someone left the credentials on the mantelpiece when we went over to present them, but those things happen. But it was all the same personnel, so the man who had been consul general stayed on as ambassador, and what we did was more or less the same as before.

There was a fairly large AID mission and presence there involved in all sorts of areas, such as water management, hides and skins, you name it, trying to develop a very backward country. In terms of numbers, of course, the AID mission far outnumbered the embassy and often gave the embassy some problems. I remember on one occasion USAID had a plane which was taking one of its staff to visit an outlying area. And the pilot happened to be a Swede, got lost and landed in Ethiopia.

Now the Ethiopians and Somalis hate each other. Certainly the Somalis hated the Ethiopians, and I suppose it was mutual. Apparently this particular man whom I remember as a very intelligent, articulate guy, proceeded to give the Ethiopians a hard
time when they didn’t want to hear too many explanations. They were, of course, terribly suspicious about a USAID helicopter coming from Somalia, and there was a certain amount of diplomatic maneuvering required to get him back.

Another occasion, certainly the obverse, involved a fairly elderly man from USAID who was there to promote hides and skins as an industry, and the prime minister came to visit the project. This man was too shy to talk with the prime minister, so here was a great American project, and we completely lost the public relations value because he wouldn’t talk to the prime minister. Some of the people in Mogadishu said it was too bad those two hadn’t reversed roles where the one was caught in Ethiopia and the other met the prime minister.

How effective all of these efforts were, I really don’t know. It was in the days when Congress was taking a careful and certainly other than benign look at the AID program. I remember that the much-to-be-feared Senator Ellender of Louisiana who hated all AID programs came for a visit. The first thing that happened was his plane arrived an hour early. We were literally in the ambassador’s residence getting ourselves mentally prepared for the visit when we heard an airplane overhead. I said, that’s not his, it’s only eleven o’clock, and someone replied, but there is an American insignia on the tail. So we all drove madly to the airport to pick him up. Fortunately he was in a very good mood and didn’t mind not having been met.

But he assembled -- he, of course, wanted to have a briefing with the AID staff, and the director unwisely brought all of his staff in to meet Ellender. So Ellender displaced the ambassador from his chair and took over. He asked, what are these people doing, why do you have all these people? and proceeded to cross-examine everyone, and for the most part they weren’t well prepared to deal with this kind of interrogation.

The Consul General-Ambassador was Andrew Lynch who was, as they say, of the “old generation”, as was his wife, who was formerly British. They were a very redoubtable pair. They had obviously hoped for more in their foreign service career. He apparently had a severe drinking problem somewhat earlier and he had been “exiled” to Bremen as Counsel General which was, from my point of view, amusing because that’s where I subsequently ended up. But his was all a strictly disciplined system, stand up when he entered the room, stand up when he left, come early to parties, leave late, etc.

At one party, there were a lot of toothpicks left on the rug afterward from the canapés, and so when all the guests left he said, “My staff will now pick up the toothpicks” – the sort of thing that happened in those days but not anymore.

But it was a congenial group, and when you are in those small circumstances you got to know people and had a social life of sorts, although I remember one female secretary who was rather attractive who complained. She had served previously in Germany. She said in Germany there were all these things to do but no boys, while here there were boys all over the place, but nothing to do.
I think the saving grace in that regard was that we were on the ocean, and I think that makes a great psychological difference. You just feel less isolated even though there is something like 700 miles of beach and nothing else. One could go hunting for those who liked to hunt, or at least go and look for animals, and there were a couple of watering holes, but that was about it really.

There was obviously a large Italian community, some so-called colonialists, and a lot of government people. So the social center in a sense was the Italian Tennis Club which in addition to tennis had a place to eat and play cards and where I spent a considerable amount of time on the tennis court. That was nice. And the embassy also had a little house on the beach which was literally nothing but a place to change and sit.

It was really quite pleasant, and when you’re young and you get to do all sorts of different things at the embassy, and I found it very interesting and thought it was a great experience. I remember at one point I had to go to Italy for family reasons, and I stopped at the embassy in Rome to see someone who was in the political section and conveyed greetings. I said to him, I’m really glad I’m not assigned here in Rome but in Mogadishu. And I got the most peculiar look from this guy who obviously thought I had become demented in the south of the Sahara. But I still think it was absolutely right in terms of experience and learning far more than being at that point stuck at the low end of the totem pole in a great big impersonal embassy.

*Q: And you also had a more personal reason for being pleased to be there.*

*CALINGAERT:* Yes, I met my wife there. She was Italian. Her father worked for Banco di Napoli, and their system was one of moving people around and they had lived in different places in Italy. At one point the bank wanted volunteers to go to Somalia for three years, and he and his wife thought that would be a nice thing to do. Their high school-aged daughter thought that was the end of the world. She stayed in Italy for one year to finish high school, and then she came down to Mogadishu against her will.

There were a fair number of young people around, young Italians around, so in a social sense it wasn’t too bad, but what do you do for work. She knew a bit of English, but not too much; she knew more French. And I was told or she told me that the then consul, John McGrath, thought that she was very decorative, and she was, and she was hired. When I appeared at the consulate she was there. One thing led to another, and after I had gone to Bremen in 1962 we were married and still are.

The consulate/embassy reporting was fairly -- looking back on it -- I think fairly routine, focusing on what was going on. I don’t think that we felt that there were any important strategic interests at that point. People like to say it’s the horn of Africa, the part that sticks out in the Indian Ocean, and that somehow gives it some strategic importance, but every country in the world arguably has that strategic importance.

So our reporting was aimed at keeping Washington apprised of what was happening and the development of the country toward independence and afterwards; what the parties
were doing and who they were, which would interest just a small number of people --
those who would like to know what is going on in the world. And the economic reporting
such as I remember it, though I wasn’t involved, dealt somewhat with trade and the
economy, but of course in a country like Somalia, there was not a huge amount to say.

Q: Well, looking back on it now, with all the advantages of retrospection, would you have
foreseen in any sense the rocky road that Somalia has traveled since?

CALINGAERT: I guess on the whole not. I think we were all optimistic. We were
unduly optimistic, but we had very little experience elsewhere in Africa to know what
would happen. At times you would say, all these people, they don’t have the experience,
they don’t have the knowledge, etc., it can’t work, but then you’re living there and you
see it function.

One thing I think was very interesting and maybe helped to create this feeling was the
good relationship between the Italians and the Somalis. The Italians were rather free and
easy, and even though the Somalis harbored some bad feelings, it was a very congenial
sort of atmosphere.

I remember that after almost a year spent exclusively in Somalia, I went to Kenya, and
before I went, someone said when you go to Nairobi you will feel the hostility. I said
what do you mean, and he replied, just go, and you will see what I mean. I went, and it
was absolutely true. It can’t be explained, but you walked down the street and if you were
white and the others were black, you could just feel it. This was just before their
independence around the beginning of 1960, and they became independent in 1962. In
Somali the only time I felt uncomfortable was when I went to the main cinema in town,
and saw “Something of Value,” the story of the Mau Maus, and there I was surrounded
by all these dark-skinned people.

But other than that, and even though at one point there was an attack on one or two
Italians leaving the tennis club one evening, which seemed an isolated incident, people
were concerned, and I think there was a curfew at one point. But basically it was all quite
free.

It is important to note that the Somalis are a Hamitic people, so they’re not black African,
and this was always an important point. Even though many of them had very dark skin,
they didn’t have the same features as black Africans. I remember one Somali saying to
me that they liked to send the then Defense Minister, he is now and has been for ages
Prime Minister of British Somaliland, to regional meetings because he looked more
African, but of course we couldn’t tell him that.

The other story I remember is that AID sent a small group of Somalis to Tanzania, then
Tanganyika, for training. They were labor leaders or future labor leaders, and there was
some kind of a program there. They went down there but they returned a few days later.
This was supposed to be a some-months course, and everybody was surprised and a bit
upset and wanted to know what happened. And they said “They treated us just like the
“niggers,” a clear difference.

So different from Africa, yet part of Africa, with strong Muslim, Arab influence, plus this hatred for the Ethiopians with whom they had been fighting over an undefined border since 1896, and Somalis are a nomadic people who keep moving and keep encroaching on that border. And, in fact, the Somalia flag has a blue field and a five-pointed white star, and the five points were the five areas or geographic entities where the Somalis existed. They were also moving into the northern territory of Kenya, which bothered the Kenyans, and I think this has subsequently continued.

Q: And after this you had mostly a “first world career” – including your next assignment to Bremen?

CALINGAERT: The theory was that you were sent to a faraway hardship post like Somalia, and then they would take care of you next time, you would get something nice. Even at that young and tender age, you knew that this was not necessarily the case. This time I learned fairly early on, it seems to me, that I was going to Germany, and I was assigned to Dusseldorf as economic or commercial officer, I don’t remember.

However, I left Somalia later than planned because there was a travel freeze, the government ran out of money, so there was no travel. I got back to the US in the spring or early summer of 1961, and when I went to the department they said, quote, “As you know, your assignment has been changed to Bremen,” and, well, I didn’t know, and I never knew and never found out why this change took place. I wasn’t very happy about it, and in retrospect I was even less happy about it because Dusseldorf, of course, was a major economic center with a lot going on, and I think it would have been a much more interesting and rewarding assignment.

Bremen was on the fringes and was the dullest place I have ever been in, and I haven’t changed that view over the years. I was replacing the economic officer, who didn’t actually leave for three or four months to go to Berlin. The staffing pattern was that there was a consul general and an administrative officer, consular officer, a political officer, an economic officer and a commercial officer. Both the economic and commercial officers were still there when I got there.

In a sense it was all right. He was a very nice guy and we got along terribly well, and it was nice to have a little bit of company. The commercial officer position was abolished within six months and I ended up being economic and commercial officer. The problem was there was very little of substance to do. We had a number of posts in Germany and the U.S. authorities, were loathe to give any of them up. Of course the people in Bremen loved having a consulate because they thought that added tone to the place.

There was a French consulate general, and I suppose a British, but at this point I can’t remember who was there, and a handful of honorary consuls, generally businessmen who had paid for the title and the privilege of representing these countries. Obviously from the start I kept asking why are we here.
There were two answers given, neither of them compelling in my book. One was that this was the post in Germany that we had for the longest period of time. The consulate dated back to the 1790s, even before Germany existed as a unified country, and therefore for some reason it would be very bad to close it. The other one was that closing any post would be taken by the Germans as a sign that we were diminishing our commitment to them. This I remember particularly from the then ambassador, Red Dowling, who said we simply can’t do this.

And I remember that Germans were concerned and I recall talking to a group of young Germans at one point about American policy in Germany, and one of them asking whether aside from your official position, what do you really think, are you really going to defend us. And of course the answer was, yes. And how can you divorce one from the other in the circumstances.

Also we did have a fairly large American military presence at Bremerhaven within the consular district which was reasonably large geographically but did not include many big cities. Hanover, for example, was not part of our district. As I recall there was only 80 kilometers between Hamburg and Bremen which was a city of maybe 500,000-600,000 people; Hamburg had a million and a half and was a major cosmopolitan city where things were happening, and having two separate consulates for these two areas made very little sense.

So what the consulate did was twofold. On the political side there was reporting German reactions or reaction in our counselor district to everything that was going on, both inside Germany and in terms of U.S. policy.

There was a political officer and a German national, a German employee. The German employee was an ex-U-boat captain, Captain Fisher, and Captain Fisher was a wonderful character --

(Recording break) He covered all of the subjects of the day. He would call up provincial political figures, read all the newspapers, and produce despatches of eight and ten pages on a variety of topics. The political officer would oversee this, and I suppose add his or her two cents worth. I suppose there were people in the intelligence community in Washington who had some interest but I don’t think it was terribly pressing.

On the economic side, Bremen provided national reporting on certain economic subjects, mainly tobacco, cotton, and fisheries. We had two employees who were fantastic. One focused on cotton. He did cotton and some other commodity which I forgot. The other one worked particularly on tobacco as well as fisheries. They knew the situation in and out. There was a reporting schedule to be adhered to on the cotton trade, where cotton was imported from and so on, and the economic officer would kind of go along with that and put your name on these wonderful reports so people would think you were really doing well except that over time they knew who was really doing all the work.
Bremen was the port of importation of these commodities or at least the main one, and there was an important cotton exchange in Bremen and a tobacco market, although, there was one in Hamburg as well. I learned about those things. I found it of interest and had some ambition, so rather than simply sit there all day and sign off on someone else’s report, I got out and met people and learned.

But on the whole, the work was uninteresting and the city was very uninteresting. It was very provincial. The old saying was that if your grandparents hadn’t been born in Bremen, you weren’t a real Bremer. And unless - I think it was one of the employees that said unless you’re over 60 and/or have the rank of consul, no one is going to pay any attention to you. So sitting there for two years was really pretty boring.

The first consul general, Harry Lewis, was a very nice man, but not a brilliant officer by any means. His wife was much smarter than he was. He looked good and he really looked like a consul general. He didn’t have much to do; he didn’t do a great deal, and the biggest thing he did in the year and a half we overlapped was he gave a speech.

There was a very old tradition relating to betting on when the ice would break up and the river become navigable down to Bremer which is about 40 miles from the North Sea. He said that this was to be a major address at the ceremony and he and others must have worked on it for weeks but finally his wife wrote the last version. The second or third version was actually pretty good, but the consul gave up after a while saying I think I’ll take this home and work on it, which meant that his wife, Hilda, would do it.

But the whole thing was really boring. When the new consul general, Leo Goodman, came in January 1963, in my second year, he came with the unpleasant mandate of chopping down the consular district and the staff. The Department essentially reduced the size of the consular district removing all of Lower Saxony. About a third of the staff had to be let go, which was all very depressing. I, of course, thought they should have just gotten rid of the whole thing.

In fact the story was interesting. The consulate was, of course, compressed, with the political and economic officer positions combined, which was fine. Fortunately I had been selected for economic training; otherwise I might have been stuck spending four years in Bremen which would have driven me nuts. I think they may have combined consulate and administration as well. But subsequently the staff actually got bigger. We increased our presence in Bremerhof at some point. I don’t remember exactly what the occasion was.

Then they got some territory back, then reduced it again, then had a one-person consulate, with a consul general but no staff. Finally they closed the place, but that process took at least 15 years after I left.

I went back to Bremen - I left in the spring of 1963 and I visited in the spring of 1999 and I looked around, and said to myself, yes, this still looks pretty boring, and a little bit more rundown even than when I was there. I had dinner with two of the employees who had
been there, two of the secretaries. At one point they said, you know, Bremen has become rather provincial. I couldn’t resist saying, “I thought it always was,” and they allowed as, well, maybe it really was.

Q: (Recording break) -- turning point in your career with your assignment in 1963 to the university for economic training.

CALINGAERT: Well, actually that was my wife’s suggestion. I had always assumed that the glory was in being a political officer, and that’s what I was cut out for. After the first economic job in Bremen she said I should apply for university economic training, which I did, and was accepted which was very nice.

The system at the time was that they would send people to a university for an academic year preceded by a refresher course, as they called it, at the Foreign Service Institute for a month or so. Maybe that was my ticket out of Bremen, I don’t know, but in any case, that’s where I went.

Back in Washington there was actually a very good refresher course bringing you up to date at the Foreign Service Institute taught by Warrick Elrod, a very nice man, and I thought it was extremely useful. And then people went off various places. We were jealous of one who had the imagination to get himself assigned to the London School of Economics whereas the rest of us, when asked where we wanted to go said Stanford or Berkeley. My rationale was simply that I had never lived on the west coast, being an east coast person, so why not go somewhere different.

The Department said you shouldn’t go to Stanford because the economics program there is very mathematical and you don’t seem to have much mathematical background, which was an understatement. We went to Berkeley. I tried to get approval to study for credit, but they wouldn’t let me. What it really meant was if the State Department were not involved, you wouldn’t be here as a graduate student because you don’t have enough background or this or that other thing.

So I was a special student. There were two of us actually, Bill Rowe was the other, and we just took courses. Previous students from the State Department had filled in forms, and given their assessment of courses and professors which was rather useful. Otherwise, we were basically on our own there and took three courses each semester.

I found the undergraduate courses quite useful and the graduate courses useless. There was a graduate course in trade. It had no relevance to anything I had ever experienced before or since, whereas the undergraduate courses -- actually upper division courses which could be taken either by undergraduates and majors or at the beginning of the graduate program -- were. On the whole it was certainly a useful experience, though in some ways rather tough. I mean I am glad I did it and that marked me for life, as it were, as a economic officer.

Subsequently the Department set up its own course which I think was much more useful.
I am sure it cost less money, was more focused. That was one of my problems, in fact because when you’re really in that kind of atmosphere, you can end up doing a lot of studying on things that are not terribly relevant to what you will need as a foreign service officer. I think it was only a couple of years afterwards that they changed this. In fact Jack Reinstein, who was then I think at the Foreign Service Institute, came out to Berkeley and talked to us, and he was the one, I think, who recommended what they ultimately did, namely to move the program to Washington.

So that was my year. It was interesting. I have fond memories of Berkeley and California. It was the year before the Berkeley uprising, which took place in ‘65.

Q: Did you detect any symptoms of it?

CALINGAERT: Well, there was an area, the Sather Gate, where all the groups would hang out for whatever the cause they happened to be concerned about. There was repression in some countries – for example, Iran. That was one of the causes.

There was a man who was wonderfully referred to in the school newspaper as a non-university campus personality and he, I’m quite sure, had been a student at one point and then just hung around. He had been arrested for smoking marijuana, so there were demonstrations on his behalf. When he had his trial, he wanted the judge’s permission to give marijuana to all the members of the jury so they could see that this was really harmless. So that was the level of turmoil on campus, let’s say, and no more than that.

Some of the professors were very good and some were not, as happens, but on the whole it was certainly a useful and interesting interlude.

Q: Well, did you get involved during that time with your next assignment?

CALINGAERT: No, the only foreign service thing I did was some recruiting. They asked us if we would be willing to go and talk at various schools. They were quite unhappy because someone in the program the previous year had done some recruiting and then he was himself recruited, and halfway into the year he went to work for IBM; that was not taken very kindly. I think subsequently he tried to get back into the Foreign Service, but to no avail. It was interesting talking to student groups. We went to Los Angeles for three days, and then some places north of Berkeley in the San Francisco area.

Regarding the assignment, I received a phone call at seven o’clock in the morning since Washington was in a later time zone, and they said we have a choice of four posts for you, which do you want. And the four were Vientiane, Washington (the Bureau of European Affairs doing European Community stuff), Kinshasa and Colombo. At that point we had no desire to go back to Washington, although the job certainly sounded good, and of the other places, Colombo, what was then in Ceylon, sounded nice. We had done Africa on the other side, of course, and Vientiane was far away and pretty primitive, so it was rather easy, and I just said “We’ll go to Colombo, thank you,” and they said, “Thank you,” and we went to Colombo.
I hadn’t heard of people getting those kind of choices. One could say those weren’t wonderful choices, but at least there were choices. We learned this close to the end of the academic year which was just as well because once I learned of it I found it much harder to concentrate on schoolwork. It was more, where do we go, when do we go, do we travel by ship, do we stop and visit the in-laws, etc. So none of the studies related to Ceylon, no. And again that was a brand new area for us.

*Q: (Recording break) -- and economic officers at Colombo?*

**CALINGAERT:** The economic officer. This was, again, another small post in the developing world, and there were a couple of political officers and an economic officer, and the usual administrative counselor, USIS (United States Information Service), DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), ambassador. So it was small and self-contained. There may have been a commercial officer before, but I’m not sure.

*Q: And what did your duties amount to?*

**CALINGAERT:** Well, I got there at a rather interesting time because it was shortly after we had terminated our USAID program, and the government had nationalized the oil distribution system. There were then three companies, one British, which was Shell, and then Exxon (Esso) and Mobile (Socony-Vacuum). It was a joint venture of some kind that was also American. Esso was the largest.

Under the terms of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the USAID legislation, if nationalization of American property occurred in a country receiving aid, the aid program would be terminated. And so in the months preceding my arrival all of this had happened. The government said it would do this, we said don’t do it, and then they did it. And we said we’re going to turn off aid -- sorry -- if you expropriate without providing appropriate, fast, effective compensation, and the Ceylonese were dawdling on that.

Of course there were negotiations, and the termination of USAID was delayed by one week because they leaned on our ambassador, Frances Willis, and convinced her that things were really going to move, and she prevailed on the Department. She telephoned the Department. I guess people didn’t do these sorts of things then, and she had to go to the local telephone office to arrange this call in 1964. And the department agreed to wait for a week and see if things happened after a week. Things didn’t really seem to be happening; I think the embassy pleaded for more time, but the Department said no, so aid was cut off.

So relations were not terribly good. The whole saga, the whole cycle, really, between termination of aid and resumption of normal relations took two or three years, and I was certainly very much involved in that.

Part of the work was simply reporting on the economy and what was happening, such as the government budget and measures they were taking. The three main products were tea,
coconut products, and I forget what the third one was. I seem to forget all of my third things. Tea was the big product and the big export earner. So we reported on those.

We also did reporting on the oil industry, this nationalized company that they set up, the National Ceylon Oil Production Company, and we had some interest in selling things to Ceylon. There were two big tenders when I was there. One was for locomotives and one was for a jet aircraft.

Then there was also concern about the port of Colombo because the port was a mess, resulting in shipping delays and surcharges on port fees. There again we went in a cycle. When we got there the surcharge was on and the government wanted it off. There was a constant debate about conditions in the port, the length of delays and what merited a surcharge, with the U.S. government, not being directly a party to it but still having some kind of a say. Finally they improved the situation of the port, the surcharge came off, but shortly before I left it was reimposed, and I said to the ambassador, “I have seen all this, it’s time to go.”

The two tenders were rather interesting. Commercial work as such was fairly routine because it’s not a big country or a big market, but they had a fairly extensive railroad system. They had U.S. General Motors locomotives and it came time to renew to get new locomotives. The U.S. was by far the major producer of locomotives, specifically: GM, GE and ALCO. The three of them accounted for something like three-quarters or 75-80 percent of locomotive production.

But there were other companies there, including Japanese and German, and the tender was fairly large since it was pretty much the whole fleet. What I remember was nobody at the embassy was at all interested except me, and the idea of the ambassador going and talking to somebody in the government about this didn’t occur to anyone and was not part of his job, whereas other embassies were all very actively involved. It was alleged and assumed there was money passing here and there but none on our side, and the end result was that they didn’t buy any American locomotives.

Essentially there was a similar situation with the aircraft. Both Boeing and Douglas were interested. I think it predated McDonald-Douglas. Douglas was interested and there again basically monopolized that part of the market. But the British came in with Trident, tied it in with an aid package, and so the government brought a Trident which, I was told afterwards, was not very economical and which they realized but not in time.

But again I remember some officials saying, where are the Americans? We’re waiting. Whether they meant where are the Americans with their money or just isn’t there more high level interest so we get might some brownie points, I don’t know.

When I arrived, it was, as it turned out, the latter stages of the Bandaranaike government, that was Mrs. Bandaranaike who took over after her husband was murdered. Jim Lowenstein, a former colleague and friend who was there at the time of the assassination, told the story of what happened, namely some Buddhist monks, sort of Buddhist
nationalists, murdered the Prime Minister because they feared he was not sufficiently pro Buddhist and Sinhalese.

Anyway, she was in charge of a fairly leftist government, one not very favorable to the U.S., that was responsible for nationalizing the oil companies. We got there in July, her government lost a vote of confidence in December, so most of my time there the other party, the United National Party led by Senanayake, was in power and it was more conservative and the more pro-American.

(Recording Break) -- more about aid. When I was there, we had what was called residual aid programs. It was under title I of the Act, and involved humanitarian assistance which was not suspended. The main one was the CARE program, so there was a CARE mission there with a CARE director, and I was the one nominally overseeing it. But most of the discussion was how to resolve the issue of the resumption of aid. When the new government came in, the leaders basically decided they had to settle. And although, as I mentioned, it took many months to reach a final agreement, they worked out something that was to the satisfaction of the companies. Although they didn’t come back in, they were paid off in some manner.

Then the question was, how do we restart assistance and what kind of a setup will we have. Rather than send a whole mission, it was decided to send one person. So there was to be an USAID Affairs Officer, and the ambassador kindly said I should do the job since I was knowledgeable, and I had done the work in the interim, but, USAID, you can well imagine, said nothing doing, we have our own qualified people. So, it was a one-person office after that, and I bowed out with a much more limited focus than before.

We also had the Peace Corps toward the end of my time. That was a bit of a mystery. Of course, the leftist government never wanted to see any Peace Corps presence. The UNP government liked the idea and agreed to have a group come from the Peace Corps. The thing that took us aback was the fact that these were basically untrained people. They were all young, idealistic, willing, but they were sent out to do things that they had more or less learned on the fly on the way out, other than teaching English.

I know the ambassador -- and this was the third of my three ambassadors -- was always rather frustrated because I think he could never find out from the Peace Corps director what was happening. Whenever he asked, she would say, “Oh, everything is fine, everything is going wonderfully, wonderfully.” At least during my brief period there, there were no real problems and it seemed to go relatively smooth, although with a certain amount of sniping from the political left.

As I mentioned, I had three ambassadors while I was there. The first one, and this was toward the end of her tour, was Frances Willis, who, I think was the first woman career ambassador. She had been ambassador in a couple of other places, but this was her last post. She had a reputation of being an incredible micro-manager. When I got there, she was coming toward the end, and we got along terribly well.
I remember, apropos of my first ambassador, we would go around in the office without wearing our jacket. I was in her outer office, and she said, “Mike, could you come in, please.” And I said, “Yes, just a minute,” and I rushed back to my office to get my jacket and went in. And I did that because of the response I hoped to get and I did get which was, “You don’t have to put on your jacket to come and see me.”

She had a very nice cartoon on her door indicating that she did have a sense of humor. It showed the office, the darkened office of the president of the company. The cleaning staff was standing outside waiting and inside you saw someone, a man, who was sweeping the floor, and one of the cleaning people said, “Well, at least he ought to let us do that.”

In fact, when I got there, the first thing she said was, what are people saying in Washington. What she meant was: when is this new ambassador coming, and when are they sending me home.

Another thing I did, which I was told was rather daring, was that on the way out from California to post, I stopped in Italy to visit the in-laws, and then we -- we had one child then -- we stopped in Beirut. We were going to spend some time in Beirut, a couple of days in Teheran, and then fly out. We were delayed in reaching -- because of a strike of some airline -- Beirut. When we got there, we stayed at this wonderful hotel, the Phoenicia and we decided we didn’t need to go to Teheran. But because of the plane schedules either we could arrive at post a day earlier or a day later than what we had said. So we asked “Can we come a day later?” And the answer came back, “You decide.” So we decided to come later, and we were told that was not the right answer.

It was also one of the few places where I overlapped with my predecessor, the ambassador had insisted upon that. People seemed to insist upon it occasionally, but it seldom happened. So I had five days with Harry O’Dell which was rather useful.

(Recording Break) -- Frances Willis was obviously very professional, very dedicated, and I found her very nice. She was succeeded by Cecil Lyon who was there for two and a half years or so. Cecil was wonderful. He was a character but in the best sense of the word. Very enthusiastic about everything, probably overly so for Ceylon. Wanted to do things, wanted to help the Ceylonese. But very human, very warm, both he and his wife, Elsie, were warm and kind, and told wonderful stories, many of them on himself.

He and I took a trip once to Gal Oya which was a big hydroelectric project that had been built with USAID money in the ‘50s. It was a huge undertaking, and he and I went up there to look. We flew down and back, spent the night, two nights there actually. They had two rooms at the guest house. One room had air conditioning, and obviously the ambassador took that one, and I took the other. The problem with the one without was that if you opened the windows all the mosquitoes came in, if you closed them, you roasted.

So I got through the night, and the next morning, the ambassador said “How did you sleep?” And I said, “Well, not terribly well,” and I told him. And he said, “Well, tonight
you come and sleep in the bed with me.” Which I did. You know, no hesitation, just sort of a human response.

So he was very enthusiastic, and leaning toward “We must help these people,” also very friendly to the government, very friendly with Mrs. Bandaranaike who slapped him on the knee the first time they met because he was a very charming guy.

He was succeeded by Andrew Corry, who was a very different kind of personality. Andrew had previously been ambassador to Sierra Leone. The story I heard was that the then Ceylonese ambassador in Washington had said, it really would be nice if we had an ambassador that had an “in” at the White House, somebody who had political clout. Andrew Corry was a childhood friend of Mike Mansfield who was then the Senate majority leader, and that’s how that assignment came about. Cecil was not quite bounced out, but it wasn’t quite the end of a normal tour and he was recalled to make room for Andrew Corry which wasn’t terribly nice; and they never really took care of Cecil after that although he had his two embassies.

Corry was a bachelor, had never been married, very quiet, very erudite. I didn’t always understand what he was talking about, but I usually tried to laugh in the right places -- more of a minimalist ambassador. It wasn’t that he didn’t do things, but he didn’t move very much. I still remember him sitting at the desk. One paper would go in his in box and he would do whatever he had to do with it and put it in his out box, and then say, “Dorothy,” and then Dorothy would come in and remove that from his out box.

He also was very famous for his dinner parties. In Ceylon, with the British influence, you would invite people for, I don’t know, eight o’clock or so, spend two hours drinking, which I as a nondrinker usually found pretty tedious, and then sit down to eat around ten o’clock. Well, with Andrew Corry, the invitations were for about seven o’clock followed by quick drinks, and then you would sit down and eat about 7:30. Around nine o’clock he would peer over his glasses and say to his guests, “Well, you must be getting rather tired,” and people would go home. It was not the normal way, and I don’t think it was terribly effective entertaining. But he did see people, and he did seem very informed. He certainly knew what was going on, but it was a much less active and less merry embassy during his time.

Q: For the record, we should ask about the Maldives which, as I understand, were under your embassy.

CALINGAERT: Absolutely. The Maldives came under the jurisdiction of Colombo. We had three accredited officers: the ambassador, the political officer and the economic officer which was me. The first contingent was Ambassador Lyon and the political officer who went to present credentials. They took a fishing boat there, and I gather it was a pretty spartan but interesting. They were also in the company of the U.N. resident representative who was a Russian. A seemingly very capitalist-minded Russian in the 1960s.
After that they decided that we had to make a more official visit. So they got hold of the USS Valcour, the flagship of the Middle East force which consisted of three ships, three converted sea plane tenders. So the ambassador and the political officer and I went down there on the Valcour. This was the proper way to go.

The admiral, of course, wasn’t on board because he was based in the Middle East somewhere. He had a small aircraft. So the ambassador had the admiral’s quarters, and I can’t remember if it was still Jack Eaves or Frank Crawford, but I think it was still Jack Eaves. We stayed in the officers’ quarters. It took 48 hours to sail down there, terribly pleasant, the ambassador did yoga on the deck, stood on his head to everybody’s merriment. On arrival we docked offshore -- there were no ports there, you sort of docked at sea, and we had the admiral’s barge to take us in and out.

The ambassador desperately wanted to take a present to the sultan. He spent a long time trying to squeeze something appropriate out of the U.S. government, and in the end he obtained a boat that was supposed to be used to ferry people among the islands. There are, I think, 2,000 small islands. The biggest island, Malay, where the capital is, is approximately half a mile wide and a mile or mile and a half long, and everything else is smaller. What he ended up with was kind of an oversized lifeboat. I remember the ceremony.

Well, the Maldivians had been led to believe, unfortunately, that they were getting more than what they were really getting. It was not a very good show. We had a reception on board the ship for the Maldivians. Just before the reception, I noticed that the Maldivian flag had been raised upside down by the sailors, so I saved face by getting it put in the right direction. We stayed on board, and it was a pleasant way of going to a very exotic place that was very far away where nothing much was happening, and no one cared particularly.

We went back when Ambassador Corry presented his credentials. Ambassador Corry clearly didn’t want to go, and he wanted to spend minimal time there. So we ended up flying in the aircraft of the air attaché from New Delhi, a DC3. We left in the morning on a four-hour flight and landed on the island that had the air strip which was nearby. We presented credentials, had lunch, got back on the plane and left, which, again, I don’t think the Maldivians were terribly happy about.

Resident on the Maldives Islands was the ambassador or the chargé of the Republic of China, and this poor man -- talk about isolation -- apparently would do slow-motion exercises on his front porch every morning with a mob of people watching. But when we got there, he came to greet us. He was all dressed up, and he had his hat and his suit on, and I fear we didn’t pay too much attention to this poor man, but he didn’t quite fit in with what we were doing.

Our interest was linked to the U.N. I think there really was no other interest. It was a lovely island. We went swimming there in the warm, clear waters, and it was kind of fun. Nothing was going on. One or two government officials seemed to exist, the others not. It
was a very reclusive, closed society anyway. I remember there were no dogs on the island. Muslims don’t like dogs, and I guess they got rid of them.

They had had a rather stormy relationship with the British. The air strip was really a World War II air strip consisting of a type of plate that had been put down in the sand. At one point they dug them up because they got mad at the British. The other thing they did which was rather amusing involved the British resident representative who, whatever his title, had an island which was terribly small. He had this nice residence with trees and the ocean all around. He went home on consultations and returned to find there were no trees. So he had this barren spot in the middle of nowhere. And I guess the Maldivians said, “Trees? Trees? Well, we don’t know about the trees.” Now I spotted the island when I was there, and I asked the Maldivians about it, and they kind of admitted what had happened.

One item of interest concerning the Maldives was the airport, an air strip, which was all the way down south, hundreds of miles away, but it was a refueling point and did have some strategic significance. I tried to convince the Department that since I was accredited to the Maldives and at one point there was no ambassador and no political officer, I should get chargé pay. And they said, no, you have to reside there to get chargé pay, so that failed.

Q: (Recording Break) -- You were happily in a country that later fell apart. Could you tell us whether the stresses and strains were apparent at that time, and if so, to what extent, and were you aware that they might spiral out of control?

CALINGAERT: Not at all. I guess there is a tendency to say the people of the country you’re stationed in are very nice. Well, the Ceylonese were the nicest, sweetest, calmest people you could imagine. We arrived, as I said, at a point in our bilateral relations when things were not good, but you simply did not feel that on a personal level. When you talked to people in the government or elsewhere, they were really all very, very nice and calm people.

You were aware of communal tensions. You had the aboriginal inhabitants, or the first arrivals, then the Singhalese who came from northern India around the 5th century, and superimposed on them much later, as it were, were the Tamils from south India, some couple of centuries ago, and other who came over as indentured laborers or simply as laborers in the 19th century.

So there always was some tension between the latter two, and resentment by the Singhalese that the Tamils had done so well. In fact they had a disproportionate share of top jobs, government positions, and so on, and had, for whatever reasons, worked harder and were more assiduous. Of course it was still the earlier stages of post independence. Ceylon gained independence in 1956, we got there in 1964. The first post-independence government were the traditional conservatives.

Then came Bandaranaik who was more leftist, more Singhalese, more populist, and the
government started putting in more measures, the Sinhala Only Act, as I recall was one of them. This involved more use of the Singhalese language, because English had really been the standard language for everyone and still was spoken by all, but there was more and more encroachment of the Singhalese language egged on in part by the Buddhists, both lay and religious leaders.

So that was the backdrop, but the feeling always was the issue was manageable. This maybe just shows our distance from the realities, but I would say no one ever imagined the kinds of things that subsequently happened would have occurred. You had the army which had virtually nothing to do. The police was not a big presence either. What you saw was kind of a standard democracy. I mean it was very democratic in a sense and has been ever since. There were real free elections with a real alternation of power between the two groups.

Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government fell by one vote. There had been a couple of defections, and then the astrologers on both sides were trying to figure out when was the right time to have the vote of confidence. In any case, the government fell. Then there was an election and the UNP got in.

There were certainly foreign policy issues. The Ceylonese were fairly close to the Chinese. There was a rice-for-rubber trade pact -- rice was the other big product -- which made us nervous. There was a fairly big Chinese presence.

But, you know, when you’re there, you think all these issues are terribly important, that you’re at the center of the world, and you really weren’t, but it was a very pleasant place to be. You did notice, though, that the country hadn’t taken off well since independence. I remember a friend of mine saying when I asked about Singapore, that Singapore is the way Ceylon should be. Both started out with a certain similarity in terms of level of development, but Ceylon certainly had been held back by a very egalitarian sort of government -- a lot of welfare reform and nationalization had taken place, and you could see the effects of that. I mean egalitarian isn’t, I think, the right word, but you never had the feeling of a vast gulf between the poor and the rich.

Q: (Recording break) -- Ceylon, you finally had to come back to the Department?

CALINGAERT: Yes, they caught up with us. Actually we stayed four years in Ceylon which was normally more than anyone ever had. Three years was viewed as plenty, and indeed there was some surprise that we asked to stay for four. I think it was in part to get home leave but also because we found it terribly pleasant and we had a very nice existence.

We were a little apprehensive about coming back to the Department. In fact, we made a small effort to get one more foreign post, but that got nowhere. I remember my DCM saying, you’ve got to go back to Washington, you need it, and so back we went. I was assigned to the Bureau of Economic Affairs.
There again my assignment was changed. Originally I was assigned to the Office of Fuels and Energy which was a four-person office without any particular background requirements, but I was an economic officer. Then when we got back, I was told by the bureau that I would now be a division chief of the Division of Food Policy. I think that was based on the fact that when I had been in Berkeley, I had taken a course on the agricultural policy of the European Community. So there was some rationale, and I guess it was a slightly better position with some supervisory responsibility which wouldn’t have been the case in the other job. So this was a four-person division.

There was somewhat of a misnomer because what we actually did was to follow temperate products, particularly grains, meat, and generally what was going on in Europe with the common agricultural policy.

There were two big issues during that period: one was over meat import policy and the other was the International Grains Agreement. The meat issue had to do with quantities of lamb and beef imported into the U.S., particularly from Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. cattlemen got concerned at the quantities coming in, and legislation was passed to limit, and to set quotas unless we were able to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements, voluntary export agreements. Apart from those two countries, there were also some imports from Central American countries.

So the Department -- and this predated me but not by much -- negotiated agreements, with these countries, making it clear that if the negotiations did not succeed, we would have to impose quotas. We didn’t really want to, and there was a constant struggle to decide what quantities should be allowed in. There was a formula in the legislation set by the Secretary of Agriculture and which divided up the pie in a way that neither Australia or New Zealand was happy with, and then there was a continuing concern that the countries were going to end up shipping more and that we would have to impose the quotas.

One little interesting sidelight to show how the world has changed. At one stage, there was a deadline of December 31, and we had to have something in place by January 1. We negotiated in the Christmas period with Australia and finally got an agreement just before Christmas. Then the Australians said, well, we have to have this ratified by the government. Well, they celebrate Christmas, and was also summertime, of course, and the Australians said it has to go to the deputy prime minister for approval. The deputy prime minister had left Canberra and was going to his farm. His farm was 550 miles away, and he would be incommunicado for two days. And we said you can’t do that, and they said, yes, but we will do it. Finally got a hold of him and sorted that out.

But this was a continuing issue and a rather difficult one to negotiate. You would have, of course, at the same time the interest of those countries, and the regional business in the Department that looked after that interest, so, for example, the Latin America Division, ARA, was always unhappy with what we were doing and tried various ways to get more for their clients than Australia and New Zealand.
There were related problems having to do with meat inspection, and here again -- the U.S. had to certify the health standard of the exporting meat processing plants -- people from the Agricultural Department, the Animal Health Service, I think it was, who would go and inspect plants. There were, of course, problems when they determined that the plants were not following the proper procedures or the animals were not sufficiently healthy.

At one time the Australians decided that blue tongue disease was contained in U.S. cattle, and unless we could certify that they were free of a disease, which had not existed for many years, they would not import our cattle. That was an even trickier issue because in effect, the diplomats had to negotiate on matters which they didn’t know about and had no authority over.

Our guideline was a statement by Secretary Rusk who said the Department will not countenance imports of dirty meat, but there were strong domestic interests to cattlemen as well as statutory requirements to certify certain things. That, incidentally, had become a bigger, longer-term issue with the Europeans involving inspections which still continues.

Regarding grains, our issues were related to our market in the European Community (EC) and the problems caused by its very protectionist system, and at the end of the day, we lost our market there. We also handled rice which was the subject of some international meetings, as well as other commodity groups.

I had my introduction to that area of work when I went to represent the U.S. at the Citrus Fruit Study group meeting of the FAO. Actually it turned out to be the best run meeting of that kind I had ever attended. It was a five-day meeting in Rome. The head of the study group was a very organized Dutchman, and he told us at the beginning exactly what the schedule would be: three days of meeting, a fourth day to write the report, and a fifth to approve the report, and that was precisely what happened.

I think actually that I raised the first issue involving the EC’s agriculture policy on citrus which we objected to. I don’t remember specifically what the policy was, but this was the first occasion in which we raised it, and not surprisingly the Europeans reacted in horror and dismay. I would add parenthetically that our position had not really been cleared with the Department’s Bureau of European Affairs which was rather unhappy about what I did, but I was pretty convinced that this could be U.S. policy, and indeed it would be.

Let me also go back and give some more explanation of our so-called voluntary meat export restraint program. In the early 1960s legislation was passed limiting the quantity of fresh meat that could be imported into the United States. This covered beef, veal, lamb and mutton, but beef was the big one. This was done under pressure from the U.S. cattlemen who felt that domestic beef prices they were unduly depressed because of imports.

What the law provided was that every quarter the Secretary of Agriculture would issue an
estimate of production in the U.S., and based on that, there would be some kind of a
formula limiting the amount of imports.

In 1964 we went to the main exporting countries and said we are getting to the point
where we would have to impose quotas. We indicated we didn’t really want to do that,
and suggested that they voluntarily agree to restrain their exports. I think this was the
first one of these “voluntary restraint programs”. Afterwards we got into it in steel in a
big way as well as with other commodities.

It was very difficult because none of the countries really wanted to put themselves in
such a position, but they didn’t want quotas. We didn’t want quotas either because it went
counter to our GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) obligations, and it went
counter to some undertakings we had taken elsewhere. Of course every country wanted to
higher quotas than we were going to let them get, so we had to divide the pie in some
way.

The major exporters were Australia and New Zealand, and they believed they deserved a
larger share both because of their calculation of what their share had been historically had
been which obviously was calculated to their benefit, and because they strongly
supported us in Vietnam. The other producers were mainly Latin America, Mexico, and
some of the Central Americans countries. Each of them had a valid reason for expecting
or at least wanting the U.S. to treat them better due to our bilateral policy and regional
developments in general.

Then imports from Canada were not covered by this program because the Canadians
claimed it ran counter to their trade policy. Our concern, of course, was that some
countries, Australia, for example, would transship through Canada, and we would have
no control over the amount. Finally, we had the British who, from Northern Ireland,
exported some beef. They, too were not involved in the program, which still kept us fairly
busy.

Another issue had to do with the somewhat arcane subject which was where to talk
internationally about fats and oils.

The U.S. was very interested in soy beans because we’re a huge producer and exporter
and had a very important market in the EC, for example.

So I went to a meeting. It’s hard to believe now we spent two weeks at a meeting in
London on this issue. We actually spent a lot of that time in meetings, arguing, often in
code, over whether the study group was really the appropriate place for such discussions
and what its role was or should be. And at the end of the day, I’m pleased to report that
the forces of good prevailed and the various interested agencies set up a study group.

I mentioned earlier the disputes between the U.S. and the EC over the “common
agriculture policy” (CAP). This was a continuing battle. The Europeans had set CAP up
in the early ‘60s. It was a basically an autarkic system which provided prices to their
farmers for certain commodities, particularly grains, that were higher than the world market price, a fluctuating import levy that would insure that import prices were higher than domestic prices, and then local authorities would buy up any excess production.

It meant over time that the U.S. basically lost its grains market which, as I remember, was about 20 million tons before this came into effect. But it was a key measure for the European Community, a measure aimed at integrating the economies, and it had great political and social significance. It was something the French basically insisted upon.

So in this period, we spent a lot of time attacking the CAP as a policy, saying it was not in conformity with the GATT, and then complaining piecemeal at the various steps they were taking. There was a certain amount of consideration given to what could we do to undermine the CAP to get the Europeans to change their mind. Fairly futile. However, there were some who maintained that CAP was much too expensive for the Europeans, and basically it would fall of its own weight. About four years later they somewhat resolved that point, but not before.

There were other commodities where we had problems. The Europeans had instituted a fairly complicated system protecting domestic tobacco production, and since we’re a big producer and exporter, we were fighting that with measures to increase production and restrict imports.

Again what I remember from then, and this would have been around 1971, was what I thought was the brilliance of the European negotiators. For example, the person who was in charge of agricultural trade policy for some negotiations was brilliant, he gave no quarter, and he put up a sterling defense.

Q: You went to Tokyo next?

CALINGAERT: Yes, I went to Tokyo as economic counselor. The structure there was that of one of the big posts. There was an economic minister who was the number three in the embassy, and under him there was an economic counselor and a commercial counselor. I went with no Japan experience. I had, I think, 14 weeks of Japanese training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) which was just enough to get some feeling of what this language was about, to ask the barest minimum of questions, possibly understand the answer, and read a little bit.

I could read the two alphabets, Katakana and Hiragana. I could read a few of the kanji, the symbols. I was amused because when I left FSI they wrote up a little report, and Mr. Park, the head of instruction said that Mr. Calingaert has been exposed to 85 kanji.

During the three years there I operated at somewhat of a disadvantage. It was the only place we were assigned where we really didn’t know the language or else be in a place where English was so common that you could easily manage. I was always taken aback by the relatively few Japanese who spoke English. I had expected that in a big city like Tokyo, now 30 years after the end of the war, there would be many more English
speakers. Going down the street, for example, if you wanted to ask someone something -- often even in the heart of Tokyo -- it was very hard to find someone with whom you could talk. It also meant that in terms of work you depended on intermediaries or translators.

So you didn’t read the press, you read the press summaries, which was very well done by an embassy staffer who had been doing it for a long time. You spoke to people in the government who spoke English. In the Foreign Office, it was quite good, certainly with the people in both American affairs and economic affairs, there was no real problem. In other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MITI), it was more limited. Again, the people who worked on relations with the U.S. spoke it reasonably well, but when you got farther afield, it was difficult, and higher up, it was even more difficult. So often you were dealing with interpreters.

That was the case in energy which became a bigger issue where we dealt with one or two who spoke pretty good English, but clearly that was a very small minority. Also, there was the continuing problem of the distinction between speaking good English and really understanding, and I was told at one point that when you spoke to somebody who seemed to understand, look clearly in his eyes, and it was always a he, and you’ll see if something is coming through.

The first person I dealt with in the foreign ministry who was the head of the division of North American Economic Affairs, spoke wonderful English. He had spent some time in the U.S. in his youth, possibly a year or so, but he was very good, and he clearly understood it. He would often check on the interpreters which made them very nervous.

For example, when someone went to see the foreign minister, the interpreter was invariably a junior officer who had studied in the U.S., and he would be there with an eagle eye, or if it were a more formal setting, he would have headphones on and listen to the English translation.

There were a number of people who spoke good Japanese and who had been in and out of Japan throughout their career. Even there I was surprised that they had some problems. I remember specifically going to a dinner, men only, of course, with geisha, and a table where you fold your legs under the table, and for some reason I found it particularly tedious. I drove back in the car with the DCM and the political counselor, both of whom were Japan hands, and they both were complaining about the same thing. And I said, “But this is your life, you’ve prepared for this, don’t you really love it all?” And they said, “Well, no, it gets pretty tiresome.”

Q: When you arrived who was the ambassador, DCM, and the economic minister?

CLINGAERT: When I got there the ambassador was Bob Ingersoll, who had not been there terribly long. He was one of the two outstanding ambassadors I worked for in my career. I totaled it up. I worked for 10 ambassadors and two were outstanding, both were non-career. I remember reading his bio in The New York Times when he was named, and I shrugged my shoulders, and said, well, you know, another prominent business person,
so what.

He had been the chairman and CEO of Borg Warner Company which I think was a family company. I discovered later that he really didn’t have much Japan experience. He had been there a few times as a businessman, but that was about it. But he was really wonderful for a number of reasons. It was this intangible of leadership. He really ran and led the embassy. He had a very clear idea, which he imparted, as to what were our goals and what we were trying to achieve. He worked as hard as anyone else. He had a wonderful way with the Japanese.

He followed policy, was stern without being overbearing, and in that kind of society of course you had to be terribly careful; this is true in all societies but certainly the case in Japan. And he had a wonderful way of, in a sense, needling, and saying, “Well, you know, Mr. Tanaka, I don’t quite understand this or that,” when of course he understood perfectly well, but it was a nice way of getting his point across.

He was very good with the media. I heard him on a number of occasions when he was both speaking and doing questions and answers but never really seemed to miss anything. So I think he was excellent.

That was when I got there but he didn’t stay all that long which was really a shame. Kissinger asked him to come back to be Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And it was too bad because that was not really his specialty, but he couldn’t say no, and then subsequently he became Deputy Secretary, and there again I’m not sure how happy or effective he was but I was not involved. I think there is a clear distinction between operating in Washington and operating abroad, and one doesn’t necessarily do one as well as the other. In any case it was about my first year and a half that he was there.

The DCM during the entire time was Tom Shoesmith who was outstanding. He was a Japan hand -- and he was very good. The political counselor -- there were actually two while I was there -- the first was Bill Sherman, also a Japan hand and then Dick Petrie, another Japan hand. Normally the political counselor was someone who had been there a long there.

In our area when I arrived, the economic minister was Lester Edmund. He had been mostly in Europe. I think he had been in Japan once before earlier in his career. Then there were these, as I said co-equals, the commercial counselor and economic counselor. I was terribly amused in looking through the desk I acquired when I got there. Apparently my predecessor and the commercial counselor spent a lot time fighting each other as to who was doing what and who came ahead of whom. There was a wonderful little memo in which the two of them explained to the economic minister why one came before the other, or something similar. But when you’re on the outside, it’s all terribly amusing; but when you’re inside, of course, it’s horribly important. But I got along fine with -- it was Oliver Bongard -- and we did our separate things.
The big issue for us and indeed for the embassy was trade imbalance, and it is amusing to look back and see that not much has changed, the whole discourse, the arguments and counter arguments and pulling out of hair. The only thing that has changed is the magnitude; I think if you just add one zero to what we were talking about, that’s about where we are.

As I remember, the trade imbalance was something like $4 billion a year. At that time, in comparison with our trade and balance elsewhere, that was a big, big figure. It was all related to our efforts to open the Japanese market, the Japanese unwillingness to open up much, and a whole system that internally is different from our own and what we would call inward looking and ingrown with all sorts of ways of keeping foreigners out, but that’s part of that society.

I remember in one unguarded moment talking to a Newsweek correspondent and I blithely quoted something I heard very recently from someone to the effect that if you complained too loudly about what they’re doing, they send a tax collector to check on your records. And sure enough, the comment appeared in the next issue of Newsweek, ascribed to an economic counselor at the embassy without a name. Well, there was only one, and I said, “Oh, my God, this is terrible, what do I do.” And Bill Clark, who was then my deputy and a Japan hand, said what you do is immediately call your counterpart at MITI and apologize profusely. They won’t have seen it because it just came out, but if you apologize, it will be the right gesture.

So I did exactly as he said and he was absolutely right. They didn’t know what I was talking about. They apparently appreciated the gesture, and it was never mentioned again, although what I said I think was probably quite true. But it meant that we had continuing discussions among ourselves and with the Japanese. We had continuing delegations from the U.S., the Trade Representative, who at that time was Bill Eberle, who was constantly out there, he and/or his colleagues, trying to get the Japanese to do something.

There also were a number of high level meetings involving still other people. We had, and I assume still have, periodic cabinet level meetings where at least in theory members of the cabinets of the two countries get together.

When I was there we had what was called the Joint Committee on Economic Affairs and Trade, and during my stay we had 10 U.S. principals who came, including a couple of cabinet officers and a number of subcabinet officers. They stayed for four days which in retrospect was rather astonishing. My task was to be the control officer for all of this, which involved getting all these meetings and all these people organized and all going in the same direction at the same time, and providing proper interpretation. It became a little bit difficult with all sorts of concurrent meetings.

One political officer, I recall, who was a Nisei, second generation, I pulled into service and the first time we had such a delegation, he said, “Look, I am a translator, I am not an interpreter, and I just can’t do it.” Well, we dragged him into service, and he wasn’t very good for precisely those reasons, that even doing consecutive interpretation, his mind just
didn’t function well in that way.

I don’t think I have anything very memorable to report from all these discussions because not a huge amount happened, and it was only subsequently that we worked out different bilateral strategies under certain umbrellas to try to deal with various problems. Agriculture was certainly one area where there were big issues. I mean, it was really quite outrageous where you compare the price of U.S. grapefruit, for example, when it reached the borders of Japan and what they would sell it for retail. Then we got into arguments over the -- well, sanitary conditions, and of course the Japanese were seemingly inventing all sort of reasons why certain things couldn’t happen. Then they had, and presumably to a large extent still have, a very antiquated marketing distribution, retail system where they really protected small stores, making it difficult for to open larger stores. The government has a lot of control over the agricultural market and sought to preserve the mom-and-pop stores.

So simply coming and saying, “Hi, I’m Mike from the States, and I can undercut your distributor by 50 percent,” they weren’t really very interested, they were committed to long-term relationships and that system. And then they did take care of their customers. You went into the department stores, and there were women who did nothing but stand there and bow and say “iashy”, and clean the railing of the escalator that you’re going up and down. The service from an auto repair where -- again I forget the details -- it was rather surprising to an American the extent to which they would go to take care of the customer, but you end up, of course, paying for all that.

So trade and exposure to their markets was clearly the number one issue and probably the number one issue for the embassy as a whole. When I got there in the summer of 1972, it was literally a month after what was called the “reversion of Okinawa”, whereby we gave Okinawa back to the Japanese. So that issue had pretty much died down and the security relationship was ongoing; I don’t remember any major problems there.

A couple of other things I remember. There was a meeting in 1974, a GATT ministerial meeting that led to the start of the so-called Tokyo Trade Round. According to my notes, six cabinet and subcabinet officers came to the meeting. The U.S. delegation was led by the Secretary of the Treasury, George Shultz, and the U.S. Trade Representative, who was Bill Eberle.

What I remember was that once again, I was your friendly control officer, and the two principals, or at least their staffs, never talked to each other before coming to Tokyo. We tried to make a program that was satisfactory to all, but we never got feedback or we got feedback from one and not from the other. So when they arrived I was told -- to no great surprise -- that the program I had submitted was totally unacceptable. And I said, if you guys would talk to each other, we’ll certainly fix it up, and ultimately we did, I don’t know whether it was the two principals who didn’t have time to get together or that their staffs were fighting each other. It was more likely the latter.

It was also the time that Peter Flanigan came to visit. He was then in charge of economic
policy at the White House. He came, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Bill Casey, came, and we set up, among other things, a meeting with the leaders of Keidanren the Japanese umbrella business organization, and in the middle of it there was a phone call for Flanigan, apparently the phone call was from George Shultz saying, “We’re over at the residence and playing tennis, why don’t you come on over.” So Flanigan returned back and said he was terribly sorry, but the Secretary of State had called him to a meeting, and off he went. I was rather outraged at the time.

We did have a lot of discussions with Japan on civil aviation. We had with Japan and with a lot of other countries bilateral agreements regulating civil aviation which were very advantageous to the U.S. Not surprisingly, the U.S. thought there was no need to change anything, and not surprisingly, the Japanese thought there were lots of things needing to be changed. But it meant they put a lot of restrictions on what we could do.

At the time the Tokyo airport was Haneda which was just outside of town, it was a bit like National Airport here. They were trying to build Narita which was out in the middle of nowhere, and my predecessor, when he left, said he was delighted to have left before they opened Narita. I’m happy to report that during my three years there, it was still not open. The government had a big fight in getting land from farmers, and it only opened a few years after I left.

We had problems with capacity on charter flights, as I remember. We also had problems on freight carriers, such as the Flying Tigers. That’s when I met Mrs. Chennault, the Tiger Lady, who as advertised was utterly charming. Plus we had problems in getting permission for U.S. flights to fly from the U.S. to Japan and beyond. But those were all, as I say, ongoing.

The only other issue I would mention was whaling where Japan indulged in whaling and was a member of the International Whaling Commission. At one point there was a meeting of the International Whaling Commission in Tokyo, and they asked me to attend it, presumably it wasn’t deemed sufficiently important to send someone from Washington, and I think my role was basically to sit there.

What I remember from that event was getting a ride from the meeting, to the New Otani Hotel where we were having lunch, by my counterpart from the Soviet Embassy who drove his Soviet car, I forget what it was called, maybe there was only one kind. It looked very much like a 1940 Plymouth which is what I think it really was. He apologized profusely for his crummy car, and I, of course, diplomatically told him it was really splendid.

Regarding the oil crisis, the first oil crisis in ‘73, the Japanese were very worried about this. The Japanese, being almost totally dependent on imported oil, had a continuing stream of tankers going from the Gulf to Japan. Their reaction, of course, was rather different from ours namely they chose to be nice to the Arab oil-producing countries because they depended on them.
One thing I do remember was that at the MITI one could gauge the seriousness of the crisis by checking the thermometer in their office. When things really got bad, it was about 15 degrees centigrade which is just under 60 Fahrenheit, and by the time I left, it had crept back up to the high teens or maybe even 20 degrees.

But they set up a Ministry of Energy, and we had a lot of discussion with them, although again we mainly served as intermediaries in multilateral discussions, and they were involved, of course, with us in setting up their national energy agency.

As I mentioned, Ambassador Ingersoll was there for a bit over a year, and then he was succeeded by Jim Hodgson. There was an 11-month interregnum, as it were, one of these silly things that happen. Hodgson had been a senior person with Lockheed and then the Secretary of Labor, and it was from that position he was named ambassador, with no particular qualifications. I mean he had been a prominent guy, but nothing in particular.

He ran into a problem on the Hill, and the problem was Senator Symington from Missouri, which is where McDonald was, so you had McDonald versus Lockheed, and he decided against sending a former official of Lockheed -- I don’t remember what specifically bothered him, but basically it was the company connection. He simply sat on the nomination, and because of senatorial courtesy, they weren’t able or didn’t try hard to pry it out, so Tom Shoesmith was chargé for, I think, 11 months which meant that we were waiting and waiting. Then he finally came and was there for my last year.

Also, Les Edmund was my boss as economic minister for the first two years, and then it was Bill Culbert who had been economic counselor of our mission to the GATT in Geneva, and that was his area of expertise. He had served also in Japan in an earlier tour.

He came back -- unwillingly, I guess, and he was unhappy -- but he ended up only staying for a year. He had loved Geneva, had a large family and they were there for something like five years; when you go to a place and you’re not happy there, I think it shows. There was one occasion where he basically insulted a former Japanese ambassador to the U.S. over some kind of conference they were working on that was just totally unnecessary and perhaps a reflection of his feelings about the place.

It was too bad because Bill was very good and a very able officer, but he found himself a job back in our mission to GATT, and that’s where he stayed until he retired.

_Q: Well, it seems to me you probably were involved in an institutional divide between those involved in economic relations who would have taken a more international and functional approach and the small army of Japan hands in other areas of the embassy. Did this play out at all during your time?_

_CALINGAERT: Not to a great extent. There was certainly the divide you mentioned. You had essentially the political section, largely with Japan hands and Japan language officers, more inclined certainly to take the view predominant at the moment that we shouldn’t be too hard on the Japanese because we needed them and we needed to worry
about the overall relationship versus the economic people like me, who were more reflective of the economic agencies in the U.S., saying we have to take a hard line, although I think, to be honest, we were more in the middle, seeing both sides as always and trying to round the rough edges on both sides. But I do not remember any big battles within the Embassy.

Q: You continued to go to wonderful places continued with your transfer to Rome in 1975.

CALINGAERT: Yes, well, we were lucky because the job I wanted was held by Mike Ely and he curtailed by a year to his subsequent regret. He was persuaded to come back and take a job in INR in the Department. So the timing was just right, and our ambassador wrote to John Volpe who was ambassador in Rome, both of them had been in the Nixon cabinet together. I think that’s what did it because the Department had another candidate who didn’t speak Italian actually, and I had fluency in Italian which helped.

So in any case, we went there in the summer of 1975, as economic minister, again one of what was then, I think, five posts where we had economic ministers. The ambassador was John Volpe. I regret to report he was one of those in my incompetent category, again reflective of something we seem to do increasingly, which is to name someone with origins in a particular country on two mistaken theories: first is that the locals will think it wonderful that a prodigal son is returning, and, secondly, that the person in question knows something about the country.

In this case it was the fulfillment of the American dream; his father had come to the U.S. very, very poor from the Abruzzo with no education. His son had started with nothing and became a commercial success. He had a construction company in Massachusetts, got into politics, was elected governor three times and then moved into the Nixon cabinet, and was even, I subsequently read, considered as a possible vice presidential candidate. Yes, true.

He was totally out of his depth. It was too bad. He had certainly been involved in let’s say Italian-American circles in the U.S. I don’t know quite in what way or to what extent, but that had certainly been the case. He had no real connections with home, I mean with Italy. The connections were that of the expatriates.

He spoke a fairly incompassible sort of Italian. As one friend of mine put it, it would be as if the Italian ambassador in Washington spoke with a Brooklyn accent. But even then, you can understand a Brooklyn accent. When he tried to speak Italian, people usually didn’t really know what he was talking about.

His response in a sense to everything was to talk about himself and to start every conversation with, “When I was governor of Massachusetts,” which obviously was the high point of his life. At one point I went home and told my wife, “I don’t think he knows who I am.”
I remember once being invited to a lunch at the residence. There were three people in addition to the ambassador and me, including Guido Carli the then governor of the Bank of Italy, which was the most prestigious and efficient institution in the country, and Carli himself, an international figure. We sat down, and I do not exaggerate, the ambassador spoke for the first half hour without interruption about himself, about being governor of Massachusetts, and about his session that morning at the dentist. I thought to myself, Mr. Carli must really be wondering, why is he here, and who this man is who purports to be the American ambassador.

There were a couple of occasions where he performed well. One was at some kind of a symposium. I remember the locale but I don’t remember the subject; yet he spontaneously got up and rebutted a few points, and to my surprise it was really very well done. But other than that, he basically was the type you would tell to do this or that and get out and travel.

The latter seems to be the way to handle -- and there now have been a whole string of them -- political Italian-American ambassadors who don’t know substance and can’t hack it. You say, “Go out and visit the country, show the flag, that’s wonderful.” One of his successors, Peter Secchia, boasted that he has visited every single province of Italy, which is fine and has some marginal benefit. But that is not really what being an Ambassador about.

Volpe did bring with him a staff person who had been with him in Massachusetts, Tom Trimarco, who was very good. He had no real experience abroad, but he was a smart guy, and in a sense he ran interference for the ambassador and he got him pointed in the right direction. He was someone the ambassador would listen to which was very important.

So I would put Volpe in the category of incompetent but benign which is not as bad as incompetent and malicious, and we have had a lot of those. I fortunately have not had to deal with any of those. But he basically stayed out of the way. Again, I have always been surprised in my dealings with political ambassadors from the private sector. They usually have had very little interest in the economic side of embassy work. And he certainly was one of those. No real interest.

Two specific incidents I recall. One was he had a dinner to which he invited all the members of the Italian government, all the cabinet members with their wives. The surprising thing was that the wives didn’t know each other and that Italian politics is such that wives, unlike in the U.S., are simply not part of the process, and some had never even met each other.

The other thing that happened was that the president of the Republic, Giovanni Leone, had a lunch for him. The lunch took place in a fairly small room in the Quirinal Palace, a very nice, fairly informal event, and Leone gave one of his great speeches, basically saying how wonderful it was that the embassy had this son of Italy who came back, who had become American, made a career there, came back, and yet was representing America, wasn’t representing Italy.
That’s the short version, but it was brilliant, and I told some Italian friends afterwards how impressed I was, to which they replied, “Well, look, Leone is a trial lawyer and he is Neapolitan, he has to give a good speech.”

Also, Volpe labored under the misconception that he was irreplaceable and that when Carter was elected he would ask Volpe to remain, which, of course, was utter madness. Tom Trimarco tried to convince him after the election to submit his resignation and not wait around, but he didn’t get the message.

On a Sunday morning in December, I had a phone call at home from Volpe which was totally out of the ordinary, and he said, “I just wanted to let you know that I am resigning as ambassador. It will be publicly announced, but I wanted you to know beforehand.” Well, the next day the newspapers said that Richard Gardner was being named ambassador by President-elect Carter. Volpe got word that this was about to happen, and I guess at that point figured, you can’t fire me, I quit.

He did stay on until the inauguration. One of the things that the Carter administration did was 72 hours after the inauguration was to send Vice President Mondale on a trip to Europe. It had been in the works of course, including to Italy, and the new powers that be said Volpe will not be there. And as I remember, although he had submitted his resignation, he was still formally ambassador, and he went out of town for the two days that Mondale and his staff were there because they just didn’t want him there. Bob Beaudry was then the chargé.

Bob Beaudry was the DCM when I got there, succeeded by Alan Holmes. Bob was very good. Bob had a wonderful breadth of experience. He had done just about everything. He had had a tour in USIA, done economic and political work, probably had done administrative work, more than almost anybody than I can think of.

He didn’t have Italy experience. He told me once a wonderful story that Volpe had selected him for three reasons. The first was that he didn’t speak Italian, the second was that he was short as was Volpe, and I forget the third. But it was clear that Volpe didn’t want to be upstaged. Bob also told me that he had wanted to go to Paris as DCM, and that the person in Paris, I guess it was Sam Gammon, wanted to come to Italy, and each went as it were, the other’s place.

But Bob was very good and sound and had things under control. Not flashy or brilliant or anything, but a pretty good mind. My only question was that he was a very strong Catholic and had a lot of local ties. He spent a lot of time with and worrying about the Vatican which I thought was really not our issue to worry about. He left shortly after Volpe did. Gardner wanted his own DCM, and he brought in Alan Holmes who had served in Rome before, spoke Italian, a brilliant guy, and very good.

One thing about Alan that was interesting. I always assumed that he did a lot of talking to Gardner privately, but when we were in staff meetings, he almost never said anything. So
when there were issues under discussion, he was kind of out of it, and you wondered whether he was on our side, particularly if we were trying to convince the ambassador to do or not to do something. As I said, I liked to believe and I assume that he was making his points privately. But clearly a first rate officer.

In my section I had an economic counselor. I had a very small section, only two or three officers, and then there was a commercial office, a commercial counselor. There was also a trade center in Milan which came under the commercial counselor.

The big issue in Italy was really political and not economic and had been for a long time, namely the issue of the role of the communist party in government. Certainly when I got there, that was the big issue. We had a republican administration that was more conservative and more hard line about keeping the communists out. Some of the discussion in terms of policy was what can we do to encourage the noncommunists, and how do we make sure that the Christian Democrats and whoever else was in government kept the communists out and reduced their role and so on. So a lot revolved around that.

Other issues were largely in a European context. This was during the latter stages of the Tokyo Round. There were a lot of issues; the Italians were not forthcoming on agriculture, and were hard-nosed on agriculture to protect their interests. We did have the occasional visit but much of the reporting centered on Italian views, both on what was going on and on our efforts to persuade them of U.S. views, as we did with other countries in the EC.

Early on when I was in Italy -- the Lockheed scandal involving bribes paid by Lockheed to sell their aircraft erupted in Japan and later Italy after I left Japan -- I had one amusing incident. I had a call from the Foreign Office at the end of the day about 5:30. Both the ambassador and the DCM were out of town, and I was told the foreign minister wanted to talk to me. Of course the motor pool had closed up, so I took a taxi and went to the foreign ministry and was ushered in to see Mr. Forlani who was a very engaging guy, very nice, and he wanted to talk about the latest revelations on Lockheed which related to the president of the republic, Leone.

I knew very little. I had followed the papers but I was not briefed, and we chatted a little bit. Then he telephoned Leone while I was sitting there. And he said, “Ciao, Giovanni, or Johnny, I am here with Calingaert” and then there was a pause when Leone obviously said, “Who in the hell is that?” Anyway, he chatted and explained a few things, and then he started telling him something that was wrong. And I gave him a signal, so he said, hold on a minute, and then I told him something. And he said, “Calingaert sends his regards.” Fortunately I did not get further involved in that.

We did, as in Japan, have issues involving civil aviation, again not dissimilar in that we had a bilateral treaty favorable to the United States, and we had a very restrictive monopoly in Italy which was Alitalia. In fact, I remember the country’s director of civil aviation at one point complaining, saying, I’m not representing Alitalia and at the same time that the people of Alitalia get “x” times my salary, so who do they think they are,
which was refreshing to him.

We did have one problem regarding charters because there was a lot of charter traffic, and they were often restricted in their terms and conditions and numbers. Alitalia was trying to limit other aviation into and out of the country. But those discussions -- we did have some bilaterals with people coming out from the U.S. for discussions --were ongoing and we made some progress in terms of getting more of our flights in.

Energy cooperation was an interesting area and revealed what one individual can really do. There were two officials at the foreign ministry who were outstanding bureaucrats, in the best sense of the term, one was Manny Gervani Minualdo, who worked for the Director General for Economic Affairs; there was a director, a deputy director, and then the next level were called coordinators.

He was the energy coordinator, and he was very capable, very bright, aggressive in terms of promoting and protecting Italian interests. He somehow got Tom Enders, who was then Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Department, to agree to have a bilateral energy working group where we would talk about possible cooperation in research and development.

He parlayed the relationship he had with Enders into an ongoing discussion group which was clearly to Italy’s advantage because there were projects where we could cooperate and they could make use of this kind of relationship. Indeed it continued after, including when I was back in Washington doing energy work among other things, at least for a while.

That leads me to talk about the quality of the bureaucracy in Italy which really was low. And that was too bad. Salaries -- again at least I’m talking about the late 1970s, salaries were low, and the number of people who were really good were few and far between.

The run-of-the-mill individuals I dealt with in the bureaucracy were all fairly unmemorable. In the Foreign Office, the two outstanding ones were Minualdo and Renato Ruggiero. He had served in Brussels, and then he returned back to be coordinator for EC affairs, so I had a lot to do with him. Subsequently, he became Minister of Foreign Trade and Director General of the Trade Organization, really an international class person. And I would put Minualdo in the same category.

Also the people at lower levels in the foreign office were quite good. Ambassador Gardner once took the revolutionary step of inviting to lunch a series of middle level people from the foreign office. These were office directors, in their parlance, and they were fairly young people, in their 30s for the most part. Or late 30s, early 40s, maybe. It was a fairly impressive group. They were a little bit uncomfortable because they were put in the position of coming to something that their bosses would expect or would have expected to attend. But they all did pretty well, and these are pretty much the people who today, 2000, are at the top levels.
My feeling was that you were more likely to encounter at my level, then the old aristocracy, people who dressed well, who had some kind of a defunct title of nobility and so on, which is less so now, although when you go to the Italian Embassy in Washington today, almost everyone is related to someone who has been in the diplomatic service.

The system they have, at least nominally, is very good. They take written exams anonymously, anonymously in the sense that you don’t know who it is. I know that because a friend of mine who had retired from their diplomatic service was put in charge of the examination procedure. He did it very reluctantly, but he did it because his son was in the service, and he thought he better not say no. But he said they were really reading handwritten examination papers by individuals whose names were not on them.

Well, somehow, and that being Italy, the personal factor obviously enters in. The people at the embassy today, I must say, are almost invariably very good, but most all of them have some family connection as well. So I trust that there was some kind of a threshold first, and we’re not presumably seeing the best people in the service here.

As I mentioned with the Carter administration, we had Dick Gardner who came as ambassador. He was my other outstanding ambassador, in some ways the same as Ingersoll, and in some ways different. The main difference was he knew Italy very well. His wife had been born in Italy although grew up in the U.S. They had spent an enormous amount of time in Italy. Dick is and was a very serious, hard working man, he takes everything very seriously.

I still remember the difference between the last staff meeting of Volpe and the first one of Gardner. The last one with Volpe -- nobody will believe me, but I was sitting next to him -- involved him speaking to his staff of 10 or 15 people around the table. He read his remarks which Tom Trimarco had obviously written for him. So here is a man who has had enough personal appeal to be elected governor of Massachusetts three times but who didn’t know how to say good bye to his staff without having someone write it out for him.

And, before I forget, I also remember him at the embassy Christmas gathering. Every year they would light a big tree in the courtyard of the embassy, and the staff would all be invited. I remember one occasion, it was the only one when we were there, that he came and stayed for the event, and he stood around and seemingly had great difficulty in engaging in social chatter with his staff.

So when Gardner appeared, we had the first staff meeting. Gardner had been both a lawyer and a professor at Columbia. We had a 15-minute lecture on our policy toward Italy. He had his yellow pad with had notes on it, and he spoke, and it was wonderful. He explained what the Carter administration’s view was and what they were trying to do. As with Ingersoll, you had a very clear sense of what the mission was, what we were trying to accomplish, what people were doing, what he was doing.
He was a very respected figure, and he really got around very well. He talked to all sorts of people, and he did it in a very systematic and organized fashion so as to become acquainted with and maintain a dialogue with all levels -- not all levels of society, but all sectors of society -- and was very much engaged, involved in the work of the embassy.

**Q: Do you have any other comments about that period that you spent in Italy.**

CALINGAERT: Yes, I would make a few. One was something that we didn’t really spend much time worrying about, maybe rightly, namely the enormous divide between the north and south of Italy, with really very, very different circumstances and different levels of development. Nothing new, it has been going on for a hundred years, but we were very much centrally focused, and one certainly didn’t have a feeling that anything terribly significant was happening in the south. The action, as it were, was more in the north.

Related to that was this question of having consulates around. At the time we had consulates in Trieste, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Naples, Palermo, and the ambassador asked me my views on that. I gave him the answer he didn’t want to hear which was to close half of them. He desperately wanted to reopen Venice, basically for family reasons. That was where his wife was from and loved Venice, and during his tour, I think he spent a fair amount of time fighting the department which simply wasn’t about to get into that. There had been a consulate there but it was closed some years before.

I said it was silly to have a consulate in Trieste. The purpose of Trieste had been for Yugoslavia watchers, and in my opinion, if you wanted to watch, go to Yugoslavia. And both Milan and Turin -- the Agnelli family had lobbied against closing Turin in the Kennedy administration and had won -- and those two cities were near each other, didn’t make any sense. Genoa had been a big shipping port, but we don’t do the kind of shipping work we used to.

It seemed to me and still does that in this day and age you don’t have to be everywhere to provide services to U.S. citizens or to Italians who want to go to the U.S. It would be nice in an ideal world to have people all around who mix and mingle, but in fact our ability to do that is limited, and once you set up a consulate, although that seems to be changing, you need a certain structure that takes more resources.

The post in Trieste consisted of one person; Turin had two people. What I tried to do was to travel and get around, and, again, you don’t get too much tangible from that, but at least you get a better appreciation of the country, and in a country like Italy which is rather decentralized -- the government isn’t, but there is so much going on in different areas -- there is a differentiation.

Another comment I’d like to make is that the political class is fairly unexceptional too, unfortunately, in Italy. The people who go into government work are or end up being very provincial. So I think to a far greater extent than certainly in other major European countries, you have people who really don’t have that much of an optic on the outside
world, who don’t have that much experience, who don’t speak other languages, and
government work, certainly at least then, was very much -- the political side --a big local
game.

You had some people who certainly were around for a long time and in an Italian context
were fairly distinguished, but they were a tired crew even then, and they lasted another 20
years. People like Fanfani who -- you were never quite sure how much you could trust
any of these people. Nonetheless, in terms of U.S. policy, we ended up fairly well, and
you can say officials may not have had a broad outlook, but in terms of U.S. policies, and
I’m not talking only of keeping the communists out, but of supporting the west and
following us on security issues and being forthcoming on putting in missiles and so on,
they did what we liked to have them do.

Regarding their leaders, I was told that D’Alema when he became prime minister a
couple of years ago had either never been to Brussels or had been there only once in his
life, and that was kind of typical. Then, as I said, there was the problem of languages and
very few who could speak Italian, spoke a language other than Italian.

I think that in part explains another thing which is Italy punching below its weight, as it
were, internationally. Italy in the councils of the world and the councils of Europe has
simply not been as big a player as one might have thought in view of its economic
strength, its population, and what not. On a very limited number of issues where they
have an important interest to uphold, they will take a strong position, but they’re often
left in the back seat and don’t play a strong role and are not considered one of the big
plagues. Just looking at the size and economic position of countries, one might think that
the U.S. would deal with France, Germany, UK and Italy on an equal basis, but this has
never been the case.

We have also managed to send, other than Dick Gardner, and later Reggie Bartholomew,
a number of extremely undistinguished people as ambassadors to Italy, which is partly
cause and partly effect, I think. Actually when Secchia was sent there as ambassador, an
Italian friend of mine who was a member of the government and a distinguished guy,
said, who is this person? And I answered that he was a businessman who had been very
useful to Bush in the primary campaign, had delivered the Michigan primary, which was
crucial in the campaign, and this was his reward, and he undoubtedly contributed to the
campaign. He asked, “How much did he contribute?” and I said, “Well, I don’t know,
maybe $200,000.” And he said, “Renting the Villa Taverna, the ambassador’s residence,
for $200,000 for four years, that’s a steal.”

Q: At the time you were doing excellent work because you were brought back for a
prestigious assignment as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and
Food Policy in the Economic Bureau.

CALINGAERT: Well, you can understand that I came somewhat unwillingly having
been curtailed in Rome. As it turned out, the curtailment was about six months, which
wasn’t too bad, but the call I got was just a little bit after three years. Unfortunately, my
predecessor, Steve Bosworth’s process of becoming ambassador took longer rather than shorter which was fine with me.

But it was a kind of a natural progression, I guess, and I was happy to have that and worked for Jules Katz whom I had worked for before. He was the one who called me back. I wasn’t asked, I was told.

So when I came back, I had three offices under me. The Assistant Secretary was Jules Katz, and then there were I guess five deputies, and my area was International Resources and Food Policy. It covered the Office of Fuels and Energy, the Office of International Commodities, and the Office of Food Policy and Programs. The big issue was energy because this was during the second oil crisis, in January of 1979, when I came back. So initially I spent a good 70 percent of my time, I guess, on energy issues.

I spent four years on the job, and what happened after the first year was basically an emasculation, unfortunately. Two things happened. One is that at the end of the Tokyo Round, there was some reshuffling of responsibilities, and USTR (U.S. Trade Representative’s office) took a took a stronger position which was part of a political deal to get the implementing legislation through Congress. While I certainly wasn’t privy to it, I wasn’t sure how aware either Jules or Dick Cooper, the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, were or how hard they fought or cared about this.

But what happened was that the commodity function went from State to USTR, whereas commodity policy had previously been run by State. There was an interagency committee that State chaired, and it took the lead in staffing meetings and setting policy. What USTR obviously argued was that this was really a part of trade policy and they should have the lead.

That occurred, as I remember, in the fall of 1979. At the end of 1979 or toward the end of 1979, Jules Katz retired. He had almost retired a few years earlier as principal deputy, but then Joe Greenwald, who was the Assistant Secretary said, “Jules, you can’t leave, I am leaving,” and he took retirement, and he accepted a job with Bendix in Tokyo. So he said, “Jules, you have to take over.” So Jules stayed on and did that for three years and then finally decided he had had enough.

He was succeeded by Deane Hinton, who had been previously -- immediately previously -- ambassador to the EC in Brussels. Early on, he decided that he was going to split up my functions and that he would make a separate deputy assistant secretaryship for energy. So there would be a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Policy and then that would be divided in a couple of offices, two offices, I guess, and that he would get someone else. And I said, well, why don’t I do that one, and he said, no, no, you stick with the one you have. So obviously I was very unhappy about that.

So I lost my main function, I lost my commodities, and so for the rest of my term, I was dealing with other things that were less visible, less active, less important, or sexy and so on.
Let me just finish up with my role as deputy assistant secretary while we’re at it. Deane didn’t stay terribly long. He was, I guess, really an overseas person and not an internal person. He came early in 1980. He announced that he was going to take six weeks home leave in the summer. He managed to get a good four weeks which was astonishing for anybody in that position. He clearly disliked the long hours and the travel.

Then when the Reagan administration came in, they made a lot of changes and a lot of these changes were basically for changes’ sake. I’m not faulting them and I heard of cases where they said there’s nothing wrong with you -- this is at the assistant secretary level -- or with what you did, but we want to have other people in these positions. But I’m sure that he was happy to get out, and he ended up being ambassador to a hundred countries, I forget which one was next.

Q: Pakistan.

CALINGAERT: But he was also, I thought, not the best person for that kind of job. I found him irascible. Some people found it a nice kind of irascibility. I didn’t like it really; he was rather ill-humored and not very good at dealing with the bureaucracy, although I would add parenthetically I never found myself all that comfortable in Washington as opposed to overseas either.

He was succeeded by Bob Hormats who had been the Deputy Trade Representative, and actually there was an extended period where both Hormats and Hinton were there. That was a bit uncomfortable when Hinton didn’t have an onward assignment yet and was still there, and Hormats moved in and basically started running things.

Bob was very good. He had spent at that point not all that long in government, but he was very active, knew the issues well and was a very good operator. The plan had been that he was going to move up a bit. I guess, after a year or so, they brought in Dick McCormack, more about him in a minute. The idea was he would become Assistant Secretary and Hormats would become Undersecretary, and that Hormats would basically be running things because McCormack was a weak figure.

Bob ran into trouble at the White House, I think. I don’t think it was the Hill, and the problem was which party he was affiliated with, was he with them or was he with us. And having been very senior in various administrations, I guess he didn’t fit clearly enough. He hung on for quite a while, and then finally just said to hell with it and left and went private sector where he has been ever since.

So when I came in, Dick Cooper was the Undersecretary. A Harvard professor, he had been at State in his early years, in the Kennedy years. Brilliant guy. A very good relationship with Treasury. One of the few times I have seen it where you had Tony Solomon as Undersecretary of Treasury, Fred Bergsten as Assistant Secretary, plus Jules Katz and Dick Cooper, and all knew each other from way back, worked extremely well
together, and talked to each other all the time, I think they had a lunch every Thursday, and as smooth a relationship as I guess you could have between State and Treasury.

Cooper was very active, and picked up issues very quickly. He got involved in some of the energy issues early on, specifically commodities. I’ll get back to that later, but he was very incisive and insightful.

Then in the Reagan administration we had Dick McCormack as Assistant Secretary, and Alan Wallace who was Undersecretary. Alan Wallace was a friend of Shultz, an old friend from way back. They went to the University of Chicago together. Wallace was getting along in years but very spry nonetheless, amazingly for his age. Very doctrinaire, very supply side, conservative, free market.

He was very opposed to international grievances on commodities. That was one thing we had lots of discussions on. He was also very taken with the idea of having people working on economic affairs in the Foreign Service who had graduate degrees, that was one of his big things.

He latched on to Alan Larson who is now in that job. He was a very good officer, had a Ph.D. in economics, and I am sure that was one very big plus in terms of his getting the job working for Wallace and then moving up.

McCormack, on the other hand, was a complete failure, the worst person I have ever worked for in 32 years in the foreign service. He was alleged to be a Helms protégé. He had worked for Helms, though what he did was not entirely clear. His field of expertise allegedly was Middle East, but I didn’t know whether he had formerly been in Helms’ office or was some kind of an advisor. It was also never clear to me whether the department took him because they thought that it would help with Helms or whether there was a stronger signal from Helms because I sort of had the sense that Helms’ staff didn’t think much of him either.

His background was very nebulous. He dabbled in this and that and had done some writing. He had run unsuccessfully for Congress from Pennsylvania, I think, at one point. Basically, in my opinion, he brought nothing to the job and he contributed nothing.

He didn’t trust the foreign service certainly. I was told this by a friend who worked with a person who did his daily intelligence briefing and reported back on what McCormack said about foreign service personnel. Totally out of his depth, had no idea what he was doing in the job or what he should do. Provided no leadership, no -- I mean his usual advice was do what you see best. He didn’t back up his staff and basically became a cipher. No one paid any attention to him, and it was clear in the bureaucracy that there was no real Assistant Secretary; so you were on your own or had to find other ways to do your thing.

McCormack’s interests really were political, and he was very doctrinaire in keeping with the Reagan administration. I remember we had a case once where some in the
administration wanted to take the sugar quota away from Nicaragua, and the issue went up to Shultz. That was one of the few times he got involved in substance, and he said absolutely take it away because it was the -- was it the Contras? Were they the good guys or the bad guys?

Q: They were the bad guys.

CALINGAERT: The bad guys. The Contras were there, and therefore take it away. In the bureau we said it’s contrary to our GATT obligations. Under GATT, if you have a quota, you have to do this, that and the other to change it. He didn’t care about that, so the EB recommendation from him went forward saying remove it because the Contras are bad guys, etc.

No mention of GATT, which I thought was simply inexcusable, and there was no reason why he couldn’t say, “Mr. Secretary, you should know that there are GATT obligations, etc; however, nonetheless I think that...” and surprisingly it was the Latin America Bureau headed by Tom Enders who argued that we shouldn’t take the quota away from Nicaragua.

Otherwise he was simply a cipher, unsupportive, and the worst experience I have ever had, and was recognized as such in the bureaucracy and internationally. He ended up becoming the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs which was even more egregious, given that he was involved in some discussions where he was again out of his depth. Someone told me of a meeting where he talked about U.S. policy on something, and the Treasury Assistant Secretary interrupted him and said, “That is not U.S. policy, here is what it is.” So it was an unpleasant interlude.

Q: Well, even with your truncated duties, you must have been involved in some fascinating --

CALINGAERT: Yes, well, energy for one during the first year, as I said, was very active. We worked closely with the Department of Energy (DOE). At the time the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at DOE was a foreign service officer, Harry Bergold, who was on loan there. It was a period of, I guess, quadrupling of oil prices and that was the focus of concern for both agencies.

I would go to international meetings, maybe as often as four times a year, of the consuming countries. The slight aberration was the British who were members but were more producers than consumers. Energy issues were also taken up under the aegis of the G7, at the Economic Summits, where we would talk about cooperation.

There also was one meeting I attended of the Economic Commission on Europe which no one had heard of at the time, one of the UN economic agencies, which held a meeting on energy. It was of mild interest because the Russians were there. It was all the Europeans, I guess, plus the Soviets, who hosted the Olympics in 1980. I remember they had pins they were passing out. This was, of course, before the boycott where it all went down the
tubes. I refused to go to the subsequent meetings because it wasn’t worth my time.

I did do a fair amount of public speaking on energy policy and what we were doing and how some of the countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, were helping. We also had a couple of other issues, one involving Canada, where there was a question of the Trans-Canada Gas Pipeline where we wanted to bring gas down from Alaska through Canada and under what conditions we would bring it in and what route it would take.

It was a very complicated issue. I remember a meeting we had in Ottawa, and there were people from the Energy Department, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and a couple of other agencies. Tom Enders was by then ambassador there, and he was brilliant. He understood all those issues backwards and forwards. We had a working dinner, and he was really masterful. He orchestrated everything, he led all the discussion, and he manipulated everyone and everything. There were some Canadians there who were very, very bright but he basically ran the U.S. show since he was the most capable person. I was mightily impressed. I had known him sort of over the years, and in fact he tried to get me back from Tokyo to be the director of the Office of Trade but that didn’t work.

Another issue we had that was kind of interesting, a political-economic issue, had to do with an agreement with Israel. Part of the Camp David Accord was that Israel would give back the Sinai or the part of the Sinai in which there was oil, and our position was, “We’ll take care of you, don’t make a fuss over this issue, give it back to the Egyptians and we’ll take care of you, we know that you have security problems.” So the day came, it was decided we would have to talk to them about it. And the issue was really a political issue, not an economic issue.

My role was more of a figurehead. It was the Israeli desk or rather the Near East Bureau (NEA) that was running this. So I and the people working for me weren’t terribly concerned. We wanted to maintain certain principles involving energy policy, but basically we went to work out something with the Israelis.

For some reason the desk was not forthcoming in the sense that they didn’t want to give much to the Israelis. What was behind that, I don’t know, but I remember in reading the position paper, I was a bit taken aback because it wasn’t offering them much. I think it was basically saying, if there is a real emergency, come and see us, and we’ll do something.

We had the first session, and the Israeli delegation came, and basically I gave them the pitch, and the Israelis were rather astonished and not very happy, and then we took a break.

I went back to the office and within a half hour, Deane Hinton, the Assistant Secretary called and said, “What in the world have you done with or to the Israelis?” And what had happened, of course, was they got back to the embassy, and complained to the
ambassador. They were outraged. The ambassador called Stu Eizenstat who was Carter’s domestic policy advisor in the White House, and Eizenstat called Hinton, and asked what’s going on, and Hinton didn’t know, and was not very happy.

So I told him, and that was the last of my involvement with that issue, which then became Deane Hinton’s. They went on and negotiated, and he went off and had a trip to Tel Aviv, and they finally sorted something out. I don’t remember quite what it was, but it was one insight at least into the special relationship that Israel has with the United States.

So that was pretty much energy. There were a lot of other things going on. It was a time, at least when I arrived, where we had a fairly active commodities policy and there were a number of international commodities agreements in existence, being negotiated, or about to be negotiated. This was in keeping with the policy of the Carter administration, in other words, during the first of my four years there. It was in some sense under the umbrella of the Common Fund.

The general idea behind the Common Fund was that it was in the interest of both of the producers, largely developing countries, and consumers that we have commodity agreements that would seek to regulate prices, and in one form or another, avoid the swings in prices which were disadvantageous to both sides and to keep prices within some kind of a moderate price range, that would give adequate, if that’s the right term, returns to the producing countries.

There were some longer standing agreements. The sugar agreement had been around for a while, although that was one the U.S. refused to join. We were observers and participated in meetings, but we were not a party to economic provisions. There was a coffee agreement which I inherited, as it were, and I think it had continued in various forms.

What had been negotiated had pricing provisions. The U.S. had agreed to the program, but then the producing countries formed a cartel, an exporting cartel, called Pan Caffe. And we said that’s a no-no, and they responded the provisions don’t state that. And we replied it’s a no-no, and we will not abide by the pricing provisions either. So what I came into was a dispute between producers and consumers. Coffee apparently is the second largest or at least was the second largest, other than oil, commodity traded. I saw that written somewhere, and it may even be true.

So we did not ratify the sugar agreement and we didn’t implement it and that was because we had a sugar import regime which had been in place for decades and allowed sugar to be sold in the U.S. for prices wildly above world price levels, and results in a limited number of producers. The lobbies in the U.S. for beet sugar managed to have sufficient political grip despite at times opposition from the Agriculture Department, believe it or not.

Whereas on coffee, we had this agreement, and I spent a good part of my time working on ways to get the Pan Caffe to disband. Ultimately they disbanded in part because it was a terrible failure. They had lost something like, as I remember, $400 million in trying to
prop up the price, and it didn’t work.

I went to two coffee meetings, the first was in 1979, where we basically concluded nothing, and the second one a bit later where we got them to agree to disband Pan Caffe, and in return we said we agreed to implement the pricing provisions. We provided for coffee to be sold at different price ranges.

I remember the first meeting where we had long sessions, but we’re dealing largely with Latin America so nothing starts on time and all things go late. The first year the last meeting ended at four o’clock in the morning as I remember. The second one was more productive and followed lots of discussions during the year. I had taken a trip down to Columbia to talk to them about it and had a lot of discussions with Brazilians as well -- the two main producers. Eventually, they agreed to disband Pan Caffe and then we signed up.

The Common Fund, as I mentioned in passing, involved the idea that various commodities would all fall under this umbrella, and countries would contribute to a common fund which would then provide the financing for some of the programs. I was never entirely convinced of this, but it was the prevailing view in the administration.

I remember we once did a briefing on the Hill, and it was interesting in that one is supposed to present issues to the Hill in advance so they’re not surprised. On the other hand, if it’s not a real issue, they’re not interested. We talked to them and gave them this long song and dance about the Common Fund, and the staffers kind of shrugged and said, well, what do you want from us. And we indicated we just wanted to inform them. And they said, well, okay, don’t take too much of our time.

I was not convinced it was really going to fly anyway. It was an offshoot of the International Economic forum -- I can’t remember what it was called -- that started during the ‘70s with various meetings. Tom Enders as the Assistant Secretary was very involved with the issue of what we were doing for developing countries, and this was, if not the centerpiece, an important component of that.

We had a tin agreement. Negotiations were underway for a new one, but we didn’t join. We had a lot of problems with tin because we had a big stockpile as part of our overall strategic stockpile. Actually while we were stockpiling tin, it helped to prop up the price. It was deemed necessary for a potential emergency.

But then the bigger the stockpile, the more it was an overhang on the market, and then countries, such as Malaysia, being the main producer, but not the only one, said this is depressing prices and it’s bad. And the question arose of whether to start selling it which further depresses prices or what. The whole tin agreement actually collapsed sometime after that.

During my time, we entered into the International Rubber Agreement which was deemed to be the perfect agreement. There were price ranges with prices being controlled more
by the supply then demand -- with an upper and lower limit that would regulate how much was produced.

We managed to sell this to Congress. I remember I testified before a House subcommittee with Fred Bergsten who was then Assistant Secretary of Treasury. Fred did all the talking because Fred likes to talk, and also it was basically his committee; it was a Treasury subcommittee, so they knew him. After a while he took pity on me and said, maybe Mr. Calingaert can talk to that. I knew more about the subject because I had followed it more closely than he had. But we managed to get that through somehow, and I think that was kind of the high point.

We subsequently got into a couple of other agreements, a jute agreement, a tropical timber agreement, which were fairly minor although important to a limited number of countries -- jute certainly was to South Asia. That was their big thing.

Non-fuels strategic minerals became a big issue with the Reagan administration. There was always concern that certain critical strategic minerals were in short supply in the U.S. and that we depended on unstable countries or on unstable relationships for them. I don’t remember what all the four were, but cobalt was one of them. The countries in question were South Africa and the Soviet Union.

Again with the Cold War mentality of the Reagan administration, they were more likely to foresee problems and these were certainly materials that were very important to the U.S. economy. The question was were we in danger of over dependence or vulnerability, because of our over dependence, and was there a potential supply disruption; if so, what should we be doing about that. So we carried out a study on that issue.

In connection with that issue, I met some of the Reagan appointees at the Interior Department. One in particular, very far right but very amusing, chatted with me about the differences I saw in the previous administration and I made the terribly perceptive remark that it was the difference between night and day, and he said, “No, it is more.”

But that was one of those issues that fizzled out. There was a lot of rhetoric and a lot of concern, and then people kind of decided that maybe things were okay.

I also got involved in the Law of the Sea which again was a political and ideological issue. What happened was that during the Carter administration, my responsibilities included the seabed mining aspects of Law of the Sea negotiations. A separate office then headed by Elliot Richardson, who was a special ambassador, was responsible for negotiating and for coordinating activities in the State Department. I had a couple of people who worked on this issue, and I never paid much attention. I could never drum up the enthusiasm or interest to follow that.

In the fall of 1980, so at the end of the Carter administration, Richardson resigned and left his deputy, George Aldrich, charge running it,. What Richardson had done basically was pick up ongoing negotiations which had been underway for a long time. There had
always been conflicts in the U.S., conflicts among U.S. agencies, with different interests at stake. Part of these involved seabed mining because there are polymetalic nodules down there which are worth a lot if you can get them. And of course the military, especially the Navy, has great interest on freedom of the seas. So there were geopolitical interests.

As I understand it, Richardson took over and basically did a lot of renegotiating. He said, look, if you want the U.S. on board, you have to make a lot of changes and here they are. So he spent as many as three years dragging along a lot of reluctant partners and making a lot of changes. I was told that a number of Western European countries had been ready just to bail out but he convinced them that they had to keep going.

The republicans were strongly opposed to those negotiations, certainly to the seabed mining portion, and with good reason, it seemed to me, because what had developed was something that was the worst product of international lawyers. You have the U.S. legal mentality that everything has to be written down and that you have to provide for every eventuality. So the seabed mining regime they had developed was just a horror, very cumbersome, hard to understand, and was based on a premise that the Reagan administration was totally unprepared for namely that what is at the bottom of the sea belongs to everyone, and is the common heritage, that gave them huge problems. They even had problems with the freedom of passage section that concerned of the Navy. I never really followed that, I don’t know.

But when Richardson resigned, the staff stayed on, and they kept on even after the election, basically with business as usual, which seemed rather shortsighted. In fact, when the Reagan administration came in, they made it clear they were going to change the U.S. policy. The problem was that it took the administration, as any administration, a little while to get themselves organized.

There were meetings of the Law of the Sea Committee twice a year in March at the U.N. and in August in Geneva. The administration, of course, came in late January, and as the date for the March meeting was approaching, business was as usual, but finally on the Saturday before the start of the Monday session at the U.N., there was a big meeting, including representatives from State, and those attending were told everything is going to change.

So they threw out all the people who had been involved and they brought in a new team. I had a telephone call on a Saturday afternoon while I was hosting a birthday party for my youngest son saying you will be negotiating the Seabed Mining Regime, and the meeting starts on Monday at the U.N. Jim Malone will be charge of all this.

Jim Malone had been named Assistant Secretary for OES (Oceans, Environment and International Scientific Affairs). He also was taking over as the negotiator on the Law of the Sea. The problem was that Jim didn’t really have much of a background for any of this. He was a lawyer, a conservative lawyer, but the éminence grise was Leigh Ratiner.
Leigh Ratiner had been dealing with Law of the Sea matters for a long time. He was a rather ambiguous character, knowledgeable, had his points of view, had been in and out of government in different guises. He had been at the Interior Department at one point, disliked by some, not trusted by others, but knowledgeable, and he was the person who Malone very much leaned on.

But he had another person, one of his deputies, Ted Kronmiller. Ted had done a doctorate at Oxford and apparently his PhD thesis, which ran to two volumes, was on the Law of the Sea Treaty, and he had his points of view which did not always conform to Lee’s. Anyway, he and Lee ended up fighting all along as to who was in charge and who was doing what.

So I wandered up, not on Monday but on Tuesday, to New York where the U.S. position -- and this was an eight-week session -- basically was, hold everything, the new boys are in town and we don’t follow what the previous administration had done, and don’t really like this treaty. The message was please tread water while we figure out what we’re going to do.

So it was a rather strange session in New York and it was very badly done. I really had no great problem with the policy of let’s have a look at this treaty which has gotten out of control, and maybe we do or don’t want it. But it was done rather ham-handedly and with too many different people involved. There were a few of the carryovers who had a lot of experience regarding our policy.

So I inherited that in a sense. We didn’t really do much discussing of anything with the other players. We basically said, we’ll talk to you in August when we get to the session in Geneva. There is a whole bureaucracy built up, and all these people salivating at the thought of becoming senior U.N. officials running this operation. Their views certainly didn’t conform to the Reagan administration policy on much of anything.

So there were various meetings, interagency squabbles and ideological people who got into the act. But we never managed to develop a policy statement.

Malone was not up to the job. He was running -- he had two hats, and possibly a third hat, I forget what it was -- OES policy and Law of the Sea. His principal deputy was not very strong, and we had fights. I remember one occasion where the Secretary’s Office instructed us to write a policy paper, and we tried to do it but we failed, and the executive director, Ray Sites, came down from the Secretary’s Office and said, “You know, the Secretary needs this and he needs it now, why can’t we have it now?” “Well, we can’t because we’re fighting.”

So we went off to Geneva for four weeks. That was another boondoggle. They had somehow worked this out that the summer meeting would be in Geneva. We reached the point where we actually agreed, and I was involved, to participate in a review of the main issues on seabed mining.
The head of the overall Law of the Sea negotiations was Tommy Koh from Singapore, who was very good, even though he tried unsuccessfully to get me to join in a seven o’clock morning jog. He subsequently was a candidate to be Secretary General of the U.N. He was very bright and a very capable guy. He organized something where we would go through the provisions, and we would talk about what our problems were. He would ask, “Tell us what’s wrong? If there is something wrong, maybe we can fix it, but if you just say ‘We don’t like this,’ you can’t behave that way,” and he was right. So we did have some kind of a dialogue, and they took some heart from that. But nothing much really happened. Then we were heading up toward the next session in New York. I had lunch with Malone and I said, look, if there is something serious to do, I will do it, but I’m not just going to go and sit in New York as we did last time and do nothing. And he said, well, maybe you can negotiate the price provisions of this agreement. And I said no. If we have overall sea bed mining I will; if not, I’ll stay home.

So I basically spent a year doing Law of the Sea, and then I washed my hands of it, but some of the guys who were working for me continued.

On related matters, I had some discussions with Elliot Richardson during the course of this. I said I don’t see how you’re going to get two-thirds of the Senate to ratify this treaty. Let’s say we get something, but is that ratifiable? He was convinced that it was. And I think he was just deluding himself.

He had the idea that we somehow could work out a deal whereby we would insure U.S. companies that got involved. In other words, if companies made an investment in seabed mining and then due to the operation of the treaty on its structure didn’t get what they expected out of it, we would compensate them in some way. I thought that was totally naive. So that was seabed mining.

We did have a number of agricultural issues. Well, there was the famous grain embargo, another kind of sad tale. At the end of 1979, the Russians invaded Afghanistan, and there was a lot of hand wringing about what do we do.

The White House, I remember Brzezinski, of Polish origin and very interested in Russia, Ukraine and the like, playing a major role. The administration was told by CIA that we could in fact hurt the Russians with a grain embargo. A grain embargo could be operated, and it would hit the Russians hard, and so we announced a grain embargo.

The first mistake was to go down that path. The second was to announce that we were imposing the embargo, that we would not continue business as usual with the Russians despite our long-term grains agreement to supply them with certain quantities, and that we would get other countries to go along with us.

Well, surprise, surprise, the other countries didn’t go along. We organized a meeting shortly after this announcement at the State Department to which we had invited the Canadians, the Argentines, the Australians, and I think there was somebody else. On the way into the meeting, the Canadians informed the Undersecretary of Agriculture that they
really could not agree to this. That was before even getting in the door.

As one of my colleagues put it, the Canadians operate the scavenger policy of exports. If anybody has an embargo, they will leap right in, and that was precisely what happened. So we ended up in a situation where we cut ourselves out of the Soviet market, and other countries moved in, and then we were stuck with that.

It started out as an Afghanistan issue and became a Poland issue. It was repressing Poland, solidarity, and so on, and people literally forgot that it was originally an Afghanistan measure. The Reagan administration came in and didn’t like it, and the question was how do we get out of this thing. The Agriculture Department -- I mean I remember writing a memo to Bob Hormats, the Assistant Secretary, to this effect -- said, new administration, bad policy, let’s just say we’re not getting help, it’s not working, and get out of it.

But it proved to be more difficult than that. The issue really was between those who said we must punish the Soviet Union and others who maintained we have to show the Soviets and the world that we are a reliable supplier, and if we engage in this kind of practice, we’re going to lose markets.

What happened was that George Shultz just decided we were going to end the embargo, and he called in the Soviet ambassador and said we ought to resume our arrangement. He indicated we are prepared to sit down and negotiate that with you, will you find out if your government is willing. He told only the Secretary of Agriculture, the Deputy Secretary and the U.S. Trade Representative, and staff people at State, and that was it. And for two weeks, somehow the rest of the U.S. government didn’t know.

It was a wonderful occasion. A journalist friend of mine got an inkling from the 7th floor of the State Department from someone who blabbered and asked us about it, and we said, “Oh, no, absolutely not.” Somebody high up at the British Embassy called and asked if it were true. I think it was the only time I can remember telling an out and out lie to a diplomatic colleague, who was someone I disliked, a very haughty guy, and I was happy to tell him no.

There were meetings going on which USTR organized where we were discussing what would we do, how would we get out of this, and all the time there were other things going on. The guy at USTR was furious when he found out what had actually happened and what we knew, and I said listen, secrets are secrets. And it would up that either Agriculture or Commerce spread the word and it started to get in the press. But then the Soviets came back after two weeks to Shultz and said, okay, let’s meet.

As a result, we went to Vienna, met in Vienna for five days with a senior person, each from the Trade Representative’s Office and Agriculture. I think it was the Deputy USTR and Undersecretary for International Affairs of Agriculture. It became perfectly clear that both sides agreed totally on what we were supposed to do, and that made for five very pleasant days, with us meeting alternately in our embassy and their embassy and
concluding things in short order.

_Q: You achieved the dream of all FSOs, an assignment in London which was a considerable tribute to your abilities._

CALINGAERT: Well, I didn’t go all that enthusiastically in part because I never considered myself a great Anglophile. I considered myself more, you know, 50-50 on the subject of the British. You’re certainly right, I think that if you took a poll, the plurality would be for London or for England.

The way it came about was a little amusing. What happened was that I was looking for an onward assignment from my tour in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. It was one of the times that Ed Streeter was supposed to leave London as DCM, and on a trip to Europe, I stopped by London and called on the ambassador and told him that I would be delighted to come there and be DCM. And he said, well, Ed Streeter isn’t leaving, which somewhat punctured my presentation. But I said, well, whenever he does, I am interested, and we had a nice chat. This was John Louis.

I returned to Washington, and one week later Louis called me and said the Economic Minister was leaving, and would I be interested in succeeding him. This was Jim Stromayer who unfortunately had cancer and was medically evacuated and subsequently died. So I pondered that for several days. It wasn’t quite what I wanted. It was not particularly a move up in the world. On the other hand, as you say, the Economic Minister in London is pretty nice, and I really needed to get out of EB at that point, so I called back and said yes.

Once that happened, they then opened the assignment up for bidding, so there was a two-week period during which a number of qualified and eager people indicated they would like to go, only to learn that the job had already been taken.

So I went there. Actually I also said I would come under the condition that I would be considered for DCM even though I was there when the time came, but the ambassador was no longer there and that never came to pass.

The Embassy, of course, is a great big embassy. In terms of the economic empire, not all that much bigger, perhaps not even bigger than Rome because Rome also had a large staff.

There were at that time, and I think until at least the late ’80s, only five embassies where there was an Economic Minister, which were Paris, London, Rome, Bonn, and Tokyo, ports deemed to be the most important economic slots, and this dated from the early post World War II days when we had a real economic function in the reconstruction of countries. They wanted, at the time, to have a senior State Department person who had overall control of a lot of other functions.

That became more and more of an anomaly, and then there was an inflation in the title so
that everybody is now a minister. But at that time it was clearly the number three position in the embassy after the DCM. In fact I remember, and this goes back to Rome, that some local people, maybe in London as well, would refer to the DCM as being the political minister, and I was the economic minister. I didn’t dissuade them, but of course that wasn’t really an accurate portrayal.

There were, as I say, a lot of agencies, a lot of officers in the economic function. By my count, it was something like 45 to 50 Americans and 35 to 45 British employees. These were people who worked for various agencies.

So other than the State Department, we had Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Controller of the Currency, Customs, Federal Aviation Administration, and U.S. Travel and Tourism Administration. And since they were no longer under my command, as it were, or direct supervision, the term we usually used was that I would coordinate the activities of all these outfits which essentially meant that the ambassador and DCM would look to me to have some clue as to what these people were doing, who they were, and to be an intermediary or an interface between them and the Ambassador and the DCM.

I viewed it somewhat as concentric circles of different levels of closeness and coordination, and some of the people -- I was never quite sure who they were, I think at least at one time I knew what they were doing -- had very technical functions that had nothing to do with the bilateral relationship between the UK and the U.S., and therefore there wasn’t much for me to do.

Certainly the Controller of the Currency personnel were in that category. They are called National Bank Examiners, and their job was to oversee operations of national American banks operating in the UK and elsewhere. So what did I have to do with that? Well, precious little. When the Controller of the Currency came to London to visit, he came and called on me, and we had a nice chat, and that’s about as far as it went.

Sometimes those agencies liked to have a close relationship or at least deal with me. The Travel and Tourism people were promoting tourism in the U.S., as a wholesaler not a retailer. There were occasions where they wanted to have some visibility, and I remember hosting or appearing at one or two events, and we got the ambassador involved at times as well. They also wanted embassy support because they were perennially in danger of being abolished, and they were almost abolished then, and were subsequently abolished.

As for IRS, my only dealings that I can think of involved going to their office and asking for a little advice on filling out my forms, and they were glad to put me at the head of the line. But that’s as far as it went.

FAA, again, technical, regional function, nice to know who they were, but they didn’t have any particular role to play. We worked fairly closely with Customs. A lot of their work involved export control legislation and activities. They had many dealings and a lot of sensitive issues with the British government. That was a closer relationship, although
for me, it was really not much more than their doing their thing and every once in a long while my knowing what they were doing or talking to them about it.

So the relationship was much more with Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury. Treasury was not particularly close because in the Treasury tradition, they didn’t want State Department or anyone to have anything to do with what they were doing. Their work was with the UK Treasury and the Bank of England, and they were very jealous of guarding that preserve, but I nonetheless got to know some of the senior people including one at the Bank of England through a mutual friend, although I must say I didn’t have much business dealings, more with the UK Treasury, the permanent secretary and one or two of the top people, and clearly our Treasury folks were uncomfortable with that. But that was okay, I really should have dealt with such people to get their viewpoint and know what was going on.

Commerce and Agriculture were closer. Commerce, of course, had been set up separately with Foreign Commercial Service. They did not fall under my supervision, but we worked quite well together, and there were no particular problems. The problems were more likely to come if one or the other was stepping into the other’s preserve, and that didn’t really happen. Actually they asked me a couple of times to preside at functions they had at their -- I don’t know if it was called the Trade Center -- but their center in the embassy. I was happy to do that, and they didn’t get involved in policy particularly, so that was fine.

Agriculture, again a lot of the work was promoting agricultural exports, but also they were involved and dealt very closely with the UK Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF). Agriculture is an area I dealt with for much of my career, and in fact the two agricultural counselors when I was there were both individuals I knew from before.

The appointee as ambassador in London was John Louis, one of the heirs of the S.C. Johnson Company, makers of Johnsons Wax and many other things. I guess he had never really done much work in his entire life. He was a terribly nice, decent, courtly gentleman who unfortunately didn’t really have a clue as to what he was supposed to be doing there. He had given a lot of money to the Republican Party over the years. His connection to the administration was Walter Annenberg.

His first great misfortune was a New Yorker article -- I think the approval process was no particular problem. Beginning a new administration and Congress, it’s not too difficult normally. It had been a tradition for the New Yorker to run a profile of the American ambassador in London shortly after he arrived. Ambassador Louis agreed to this, I’m sure on the recommendation of his staff. I remember having read it at the time, and it was pretty awful. It really made him out to be a babe in the woods, someone who had no idea what he was doing and cut a rather ridiculous figure.

The other great misfortune was that when the Falklands War started, he was not there and he didn’t get back quickly. He was on vacation, I don’t know in Bermuda or Bahamas or some such place, and those of us in the system know that when something like that
happens, you dash back immediately. The fact that you may have had absolutely nothing to do or on the other hand you may have a role to play is totally irrelevant.

My guess is that he was not well served by his DCM, Ed Streeter. I was told that there was some transportation problem -- it was not a place from which it was easy to travel, there was some delay -- but that he didn’t persevere. I can well imagine that Streeter said, “Don’t worry about it, boss, we’ve got it under control.” And in fact Ed Streeter was a first rate professional and could do and did things far, far better than John Louis could have done.

So substantively we were well served, but everyone, certainly in England, was saying where is the U.S. ambassador, here we are in the time of need, and he’s playing golf in some God forsaken place.

I also remember going to a reception and meeting someone there who had met him many years earlier on a hunting trip in Hungary and who said that he had liked the Louises very much and that was why he was at this reception. He said that it was clearly the first time Louis had ever been in a hotel room -- he had only seen suites -- and didn’t quite know how to handle a hotel room. Whether or not this was an apocryphal story, I’m not sure, he was very distinguished, nice looking, soft spoken, and obviously a terribly decent human being.

His wife was more with it. One thing that they got into which often happens in London is they became very impressed with the royals and with the nobility. In the first week or so I was there, I had called The Economist, and I had an introduction from a friend of the editor’s, as a result I was invited to lunch. And I said fine. Shortly thereafter I had a call from the ambassador’s office saying that the ambassador and Mrs. Louis were having a lunch on that very day, and they would like me to come because, they thought I would be very interested in meeting these people.

So I said to myself, well, okay. I went, and it was pretty appalling. It was all of these beautiful people.

Q: Sounds kind of fun.

CALINGAERT: Well, they spent a lot of time discussing a wedding many of them had been in at some castle in Scotland. Totally useless. I have no idea what they did, probably nothing, but this was kind of their milieu, and one in which people who are wealthy and well educated can thrive and find interesting.

Another great social event was the dinner dance for Princess Margaret, a huge event, a hundred people or so, outside, very nice. I never got to meet Princess Margaret. I know she was there. It turned out that at dinner -- we sat at small tables -- I had six or eight people at my table, and one of them was the then lover of Princess Margaret. I had no idea until later somebody told me.
Louis basically operated on that level, but substantively he was not engaged. I arrived in June, and in August he was called back to Washington to have a little chat. I was told that it was Bud McFarland who was then the National Security Advisor who broke the bad news, and I’m not quite sure why it was he, but Louis was told he was out, thanks very much. And so he had a couple of years, but that was it.

Q: Do you think he realized he was not quite up to the substantive demands of the job?

CALINGAERT: I think so, I think so. He was comfortable in the sense of being able to handle himself socially, but I think he realized that he didn’t know the substance, and he leaned very heavily on Ed Streeter. I think he appreciated the help he got from Streeter except, as I say, for his Falklands disaster. So the embassy was basically run by Streeter who, I think, ended up being there about seven years, and Streeter was first rate. He ran that place very well.

John Louis was replaced by Charlie Price. It was a bit of a difficult situation because they had been friends and apparently -- I think Louis was the best man at Price’s second wedding or some such thing. But the word was that the Prices were clearly very different from the Louises, and very ambitious and pushy. There seemed to be some bad blood there, particularly between the wives, as happens more often, I guess.

But Louis again was very gentlemanly. I remember him saying at the staff meeting that you will all like Charlie Price -- he said it is impossible to dislike him. He had been in Brussels as ambassador at the bilateral embassy, had been there since the beginning of the administration, and clearly he and his wife were dying to move up in the world.

He had a business background. He had inherited a candy company, the Price Candy Company, but it was something that was never mentioned. He was always referred to as being a banker from Kansas City, Missouri, and in fact I was rather amused because shortly before he came, we had a telegram from Brussels which was billed as the official biography of Charles Price, but which didn’t mention the candy connection although at one point his secretary showed me the Charles Price Candy that was kept in the safe.

His wife was from the Swanson family, frozen food and other things, and she apparently had the big money. He was doing all right, I think, but she was the one who really was wealthy. I’m quite sure it was a second marriage for both of them. They had one son of their own, a teenager, who was there with them.

They were close to the Reagans. She was very close to Nancy Reagan, that was always emphasized, and I have no reason to believe that was not the case. She claimed she talked to Nancy all the time, that sort of thing. Very personable, outgoing, and the British liked him. I was surprised as I had thought the kind of ambassador that would appeal to the British would be Elliot Richardson, but, in fact, a number of people said he wasn’t very well liked or well thought of there, in part, apparently because he wasn’t very happy at being there, which again I found surprising; whereas I would have thought the British would have considered Price not to be very deep.
But from all accounts, and I remember sitting once next to the Chancellor of the Exchequer at a lunch, and for no apparent reason he said to me, “You know, Charlie Price is really doing a great job,” and that was not an isolated comment. Very good at public relations and getting himself and the U.S. in the public eye in a good way, and sensing the issues and the occasions in which to be public.

For example, while we were there, a bomb was set off by the Irish terrorists in Harrods, and a couple of Americans were injured. He hot-footed it to the hospital with a photographer which was fine.

Regarding the press, he worked hard at it. It wasn’t bad. His public speaking was not good, and the government spent a great deal of money in trying to teach him to be a better public speaker. He was one of those people who in private was really very good, very open and engaging, but in front of an audience was stiff.

He once appeared on the Terry Wogan Show. Terry Wogan was a lighthearted talk show host and I think he was badly advised to do it. He was probably intrigued with the idea of getting major national exposure, but with someone like that, unless you’re really very accomplished, it’s hard to know whether you should try to be funny and one of the guys or be serious. It just didn’t go over. But I think that was more of an aberration.

Q: Did his business and banking background mean that he took a particular interest in your sphere?

CALINGAERT: No, he followed my rule about businessmen ambassadors who are not terribly interested in the economic stuff, but rather the political, the security issues. He had done a lot on security when he was in Brussels. There were issues, I think it was sale of F16s or something similar, which was a big deal, and he was very much involved. When there were issues of importance, he did engage himself, that was certainly the case.

I guess for a long time there was a lot of talk of the special relationship between Britain and the U.S., perhaps more so because of the obvious close ties between Reagan and Thatcher, which was both somewhat surprising and somewhat non-surprising. I always found it surprising in that they were just two very different kinds of people with different ways of thinking, acting, and serving as heads of government. On the other hand, in terms of philosophy, they were very much at one.

You could sense that this was a special kind of relationship on seeing Thatcher greeting Reagan when he arrived on a state visit in 1984, I think it was, and involved lots of communication that didn’t go through the embassy, or at least that I was aware of, and I’ll mention more about this later.

In terms of what I was doing, we had some bilateral issues with the British, plus we had a lot of issues with the European Community and we would then deal bilaterally with the British on these. There was a tendency to view, at least from Washington, the EU through
a British optic and certainly to listen closely to what the British were saying about what was going on and attitudes, and also a feeling more often implicit than explicit that the British would be our helpers. And so when there were thorny issues to sort out, we assumed the British would be on our side, and we could and should count on them to help us. That was of course not quite the case, and very often the British indicated they may have different interests, or that they couldn’t just turn the EC around on a particular issue.

I remember one instance where we had apparently been rather helpful to the British on an issue having to do with U.S. steel imports from the UK. We had helped them out, and people in Washington clearly felt there should be a quid pro quo regarding steel where we were having continuing problems with the EC in terms of their impressions of dumping and subsidies and so on, but we weren’t getting much help from them on that.

I think this was 1986 when we had considerable discussion with the British about what would be involved with the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC. What happened was that the negotiations for their accession were essentially concluded when U.S. agricultural interests woke up to the fact that under the terms of the agreement we would stand to lose our grain market in Spain and that we had a long-standing commitment from Spain to buy a certain quantity of grain which would go by the boards once they joined the EC.

It proved to be very difficult because the negotiations were pretty much wrapped up and when a country joins the EC, joins the customs union, it was very difficult to sort these things out. The British, as I remember, were fairly helpful on that subject.

But we would fairly frequently have visits by senior people from the Trade Representative’s Office and others, talking, consulting with the British -- part of making the rounds, basically, of the European circuit.

One of the issues had to do with Airbus. We were engaged with the Europeans for a number of years over claims and counterclaims about unfair competition as Airbus, can I say, took off. This was a bit of sidelight, but I remember that when Airbus made its first sale in the U.S., it was to Pan Am. They had a reception at the House of Commons to celebrate this. I’m quite sure the Chairman of Pan Am, Ed Acker, was there and the Managing Director of Airbus Industry was there too. I went there representing the ambassador, and when I went through the receiving line, the managing director of Airbus said you should tell your government that we should get an E for export award because 46 percent or whatever the figure of the contents of the Airbus is American.

In any case, the issue really was complaints from Boeing against the government, that four member governments of the consortium involved in Airbus, and the British were one of them, were subsidizing the cost of development. It was all very non-transparent, and they said it was unfair competition. Essentially the response was you have your own form of subsidy which is that you get military contracts and there are spinoffs from that.

But there were negotiations that went on, and at one point we had a visit, there was a
group from the U.S. headed by the Undersecretary of Commerce for International Affairs and the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative. The U.S. Trade Representative was Mike Smith, a former long-time State Department trade negotiator, who was very pugnacious, a brilliant but difficult guy. The Commerce Undersecretary, S. Bruce Smart, who had been a senior executive, if not the CEO, of I think Alcoa or American Can.

The first stop on this trip was the UK, and the first call was on a minister at the Foreign Office. This was the one responsible for -- wait, I’m sorry, it was the Department of Trade and Industry, but there was also a minister in the Parliament named Jeffrey Paddy who was responsible for high tech and related areas.

It was a memorable meeting. We sat down, he welcomed the Americans, and he proceeded to launch into a vicious attack; he was very pugnacious against the U.S. and our policy on this issue and the false claims about Airbus, etc. This went on for about 45 minutes, and then we adjourned. The Undersecretary of Commerce was absolutely floored. He wanted to walk out and go home. He said this was unacceptable behavior, never in business had he heard anybody do anything like this, etc. Even Mike Smith was rather abashed.

It turned out what had happened was Mike Smith had very recently been in London on other issues. He had called at the Foreign Ministry and the Department of Trade and Industry and had not been on his best behavior. He was a bit much, and the British didn’t like it and didn’t consider him very gentlemanly. So they said to themselves, well, this man is coming back and we have to be prepared. In the briefing to the Minister, they said, here are the issues, you should say this, this and this. And then they said, if the U.S. gets out of line, here’s what you ought to do. And he apparently of his own accord decided why wait, let’s go after them, which is what he did. The civil servants were very taken aback. I thought the whole thing rather amusing, and probably good to teach Mike Smith a lesson. I told him afterwards that that’s why that had happened, and he didn’t realize it. But this was an interesting education.

We had some interesting visits. I would also mention that on one occasion during a USTR visit we had a meeting at the Foreign Office. We met at a rather long but narrow table, and after the meeting was over and I returned to my office, the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs of the Foreign Office called me and said, “Mike, I would like to correct a couple of points you have that were wrong in your briefing paper on Paul Shannon, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.” One is that he is not the heir to whatever this family holding was, and I forgot what the other thing was. He had been reading my notes -- my paper upside down. Served me right, served me right.

Those were the main multilateral issues. Bilaterally, we had a series of issues involving energy. The British position was somewhat anomalous because the UK is a major exporter unlike almost all the rest of the developed world. The main problem that we had dealt with the protection they were giving rather quietly in the oil equipment field. They had set up some kind of a system for off-shore equipment procurement.
What they wanted to do was develop a British industry, and they said to themselves, the oil is not going to be there forever because we’re going to take it out of the deep sea, but we don’t want the big companies to come in and take everything over. It was very quietly done under the auspices of the Department of Energy. It was clearly discriminatory, and it involved in large measure ensuring that they got a certain slice of the pie.

I think most of the American companies went along with it, managed to live with the system, but on one occasion Bechtel decided that it wouldn’t. They had bid on something, I think it was a joint venture between Bechtel and Esso -- Esso, Exxon or whatever they were called at that point. They were told more or less directly by the British, “If you want this, take a British partner.” And they said, “That’s not fair, we’re not going to do it.” Shell, I think, had gone the partner route, but Bechtel and Exxon said no.

So they came to us to complain. It seemed fairly clear-cut. What they did -- and found out you just couldn’t do -- was to go public. They wrote a letter to the prime minister and they got some local publicity, and they got the embassy involved. The message pretty much was, if you mess around like this, you’re not going to get anything. We don’t submit to this kind of pressure.

I wrote a letter for the ambassador to the Secretary of State for Energy, Peter Walker, who was a long-time British politician, very able. I thought it was a good letter, but he got a real stinger back. It was a question of the best defense is an offense, and what about the Jones Act of 1920 on U.S. coastal shipping, etc. The ambassador, to his credit, sat down and wrote him a handwritten letter that was very good and conciliatory saying we ought to sit down and talk about this.

Q: Was this Price?

CALINGAERT: This was Price, yes. But essentially nothing much happened.

A second issue that arose early in my tour had to do with violation of U.S. antitrust law by a number of airlines that basically meant “shooting down” Laker Airlines, essentially a conspiracy to run them out of business. The crux of the matter was that what British Airways (BA) had done, was legal in Britain and illegal in the U.S., but they had done it in the U.S. They had gone to meetings in the U.S., which included representatives from four U.S. airlines and two non-U.S. airlines. The outcome was basically to cut the prices until Laker went out of business, which it did, and then jacking them back up.

The British were quite upset about it on the grounds that they felt we were applying extraterritoriality, applying U.S. laws to things that were happening elsewhere, which wasn’t really the case, but it involved an awful lot of discussion both on the issue of extraterritoriality and the specifics of this case.

What apparently happened in the end was we dropped it, and I am convinced that we dropped it because the prime minister went to the president. I was very surprised because
it seemed to be a clear-cut case in which indictments would be issued. My assumption was that under the U.S. legal system, if indictments had to be issued, they would be issued, but they never were.

The only explanation seemed to be tied to the fact that the chairman of BA was Lord King, who was very close to Mrs. Thatcher; although BA had been privatized, it was very much a symbol of Britain, and Mrs. Thatcher didn’t want to see it get dragged into court. Insofar as the British were concerned, they were spared that. So that was interesting.

Another big continuing issue which also involved extraterritoriality was U.S. export controls. That was a much more clear-cut case of our saying that under U.S. laws, you can’t do this, that, or the other, and we will punish people in other countries if they do things that contravene U.S. laws. It was a big issue because there was a lot of contravention of U.S. export control laws, including strategic pieces of equipment going to the Soviet Union and other countries banned under our law.

Customs officers who were working at the embassy spent a lot of time investigating these and working closely with their British counterparts so I think at a working level, it went well, but it was a continuing issue. I remember I was once interviewed on BBC for an evening economic program, and I explained what this was all about.

Interestingly, the biggest thorn in our side was Paddy Ashdown who was a liberal MP (member of Parliament) and very upset about the issue of extraterritoriality. He subsequently became leader of the liberal party, but faced a lot of criticism in the press and in parliament. I forgot what the circumstances were when I was interviewed and tried to explain our position.

I thought I came out of it reasonably unscathed and then watched television that night. They never showed the interview. There was a bigger story, namely purchase of British Leyland trucks by a Dutch firm, DAF, and that was the big story. To his credit, the person who interviewed me called up and apologized. I guess there wasn’t sufficient enough time preserved to show it later. But that was ongoing.

A German who entered Britain on a forged Brazilian passport was picked up by British immigration. In turn I got a frantic call from U.S. Customs telling me of the indicant and that this is someone wanted in the U.S. for all sorts of things, and that clearly we didn’t want the British to let him go. Under their laws however, they couldn’t hold this guy very long; he of course had a high-priced lawyer who was trying to spring him from detention. Our customs officers wanted him held long enough to begin the extradition process and they wanted my help.

The ambassador wasn’t around. I called the secretary of the cabinet but he wasn’t there, so I talked to one of his assistants whom I knew. I explained the story and how important it was and so on. And he said okay. I gather later Customs did get to the ambassador who called someone else, but I would like to take credit for this one. I don’t know what they did, but they held the guy, perhaps stretching legality, but I do think it was a clear case
where they really wanted to be helpful, and it was also in their interest.

They kept this guy, and I remember there were loud complaints from him and his lawyer who tried to convince the court that he should not be extradited and instead should have been released. He ended up getting shipped back to the U.S. and spending several years in a nice prison.

A final story which also relates to the special relationship had to do with the bombing of Libya. There was a two-day period or perhaps a few-day period when the ambassador was on vacation in Antigua. Actually he was renting the house of the former DCM, Ed Streeter. The DCM was not there, nor was he in the country. I don’t remember quite what the circumstances were. I don’t know if I was formally chargé or not.

In any case I was clearly the person in charge. We had a message from Washington saying that the special envoy of the president, Vernon Walters, who was then ambassador to the U.N., was making a quick tour of European capitals to talk to heads of government about the situation in Libya. It was clear that something major was in the works.

And so we were asked to get an appointment for him. This was on Friday morning, I believe, when we got the message. He was coming Saturday. He wanted to see the prime minister first thing Saturday morning, and then dash off to a couple of other capitals. So I called one of the private secretaries to Mrs. Thatcher at Number 10 Downing Street and said I want to come and see him. Since I was calling as chargé, not as economic minister, he said come on over.

So I went to Number 10 Downing Street and was ushered in and told him what this was about since I obviously couldn’t do it on the telephone. He said let me check and see what we can do. He subsequently called back and said the meeting would be at 10:30, I think it was. It was later than what Walters wanted but he said that’s all we can do.

So Walters came in that evening. I went to the opera. When I got home, I had a call saying that Charles Poll, the man at Number 10, wanted to talk to me. I never was able to get hold of him that evening, but I called him the first thing in the morning. He said the prime minister was thinking that given the sensitive nature of this matter that Ambassador Walters should come alone. Well, come alone or bring his staff person, but that you shouldn’t come because you really haven’t been involved in these matters.

So my heart sank. He did say, of course, if Ambassador Walters wanted to have me there, then obviously the prime minister had no objection. So I said to myself, well, this is historic, I’ve got to be there. Anyway, the ambassador is going to want to know what happened, and who is going to tell him.

To backtrack a little bit, we decided, that we really ought to tell the ambassador that this was going on, but how do you communicate with a man who is at some kind of club in Antigua. The only way to communicate apparently was to call the main house. It wasn’t a country club, but it was some kind of a --
Q: The Melorise Club.

CALINGAERT: I don’t know, but I gather it was a separate house, so someone would have to go to his house, knock on the door and say there is a phone call. In any case, we were told that someone had gone down to the house, they had knocked on the door but nobody had answered. I think it was six in the morning, and you can imagine the timid knock of someone who is frightened to death. But there was, I gather, a phone call obviously in the clear, uncoded, indicating he had understood, but that he thought that this was really not worth his while to come all the way back, and it really wasn’t.

So I had breakfast with Ambassador Walters. He had a CIA officer with him who had all the info, and then we trotted over to Number 10 Downing Street, the three of us. The police opened the front door. As we walked in, the policeman said, “Well, I recognize one of you.” And I said “Who is that?” And he said, “You, because you were here yesterday.” So that clearly made my day.

And we were there simply to tell her what we were about to do and did two days later. It was perfectly clear that she was in the know. It was also perfectly clear this was not out of the blue, that there had been prior communications, and this was possibly just a formality. It was also amusing to hear her say she was sorry she couldn’t see him earlier but she was getting her hair done.

She was also concerned that -- this was supposed to be a very private hush-hush meeting but Walters was staying at the Grosvenor House Hotel and had breakfast in the main dining room with me and everyone else and was a hard figure to miss -- and she said we ought to move our cars because the cars had come in the main entrance, and they should have gone around the back. I decided that on a historic event like this, I should say something. So I said, yes, I thought that was important, but it was very likely that people would already see we had been there and would be asking questions.

So that was the meeting. Her main concern, interestingly, was that the actions against Libya be justifiable under the U.N. charter, which was justified under the U.S. charter. Then we dashed off to the airport. Walters had a small military plane and said, “Okay, ready to go to Madrid.” And then the navigator said, “We’re going to Paris.” And he said, “No, no, we’re going to Madrid.” Well, apparently there had been one of those changes of plan but they hadn’t told the navigator, and therefore they had to file a new flight plan and get a slot to get out.

And so with the help of Pan Am, a lot of pushing and cajoling but still a delay, they got off and made their rounds. Then two days later, I had a phone call at five in the morning saying we had bombed Libya. I said I am no longer Chargé, call Ray Sites. And that was the end of that.

Let’s come back to the question about being an Anglophile or not. I was very pleasantly impressed and surprised by the British. I thought that the idea of British stuffiness was
very much overdone. They were often charming, interesting people. With one exception people who had the title of Lord or Sir would never use it in introductions, although you should know and it was kind of expected that you would know. I remember one person who introduced himself as Lord something, and that was rather unusual. But even he was very open, easy to talk to, and easy to deal with.

In a way, it was not very interesting dealing with the British bureaucracy because they were so disciplined. Totally unlike the situation in Washington, you would talk, for example, on an issue -- I would talk to my main contacts in the Foreign Office, in the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Energy -- and they would all know almost immediately what I had said and what I had been told, and I would then get the same response from all of them. So you would see someone the next day, and they would say, “Well, I know you talked to Christopher,” and they would all sing from the same song book.

I would occasionally say to the British that I was, as an American bureaucrat, always impressed by their ability to agree on the party line and so on, and they would invariably say, “You haven’t understood anything.” So apparently there is a lot that goes on behind closed doors among themselves, but you really see very little.

I do remember one occasion where on the front page of the paper there was a statement by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry or Transport, I forget. And my contact at the Foreign Office called me, this was the Undersecretary, and he said, “You should know that what was stated is not HMG policy.” He said, “Don’t tell anybody I told you, but that is not our position, and I recognize it.” Basically the message was, don’t get excited by what this guy said, he was out of line. But that was very unusual and obviously done mainly because he felt confidence in telling me.

The other thing I can think of was when an American who wanted desperately to be president of the World Bank was pressing on all sides as hard as he could without any particular U.S. government support but he couldn’t be ignored, and the British said to me, “This is not acceptable.” It wasn’t in writing but the message was clear, and basically, “Tell your government he can’t do this.” I think the U.S. government recognized it, and he never got the job, but again that was a bit out of character, out of line in terms of their way of behaving.

Q: (Recording Break) -- and London recedes.

CALINGAERT: Well, I had been told gratuitously by the director general of the Foreign Service that I was not supposed to even think about five years in London. It was gratuitous because I always knew it was four years and that was okay. When I left there, the Department and I came to the same conclusion which was that I should have a sabbatical, the reason being that it was the summer of 1987, the year before the presidential election, and there were no particular jobs that I was aiming for.

I didn’t want to become a Deputy Assistant Secretary again, nor did I want to be an
economic minister again. I was not wild about becoming a DCM because I had decided at that stage in life, unless it was a very big embassy with an ambassador for whom I had a great respect, I did not want my role to be making somebody look good and trying to keep somebody out of trouble who I didn’t think really should have been there in the first place. That is perhaps an iconoclastic view. Subsequently, the wife of a DCM in a major post said to me that their quality of life declined considerably when they became DCM. So why not come back and recharge the batteries and think of something to do.

So the arrangement was that I would be a diplomat in residence. Not in the original sense of going to a university somewhere and being a person on campus, which I think is a good idea, but the program really never got very far, in part because not many people wanted to do this or felt they were losing a year in their career and out of the loop, but rather to do some kind of a research study. And they said, you think of what you want to do and we will help you find a place to do it. The program was run by the Foreign Service Institute.

As it turned out, with incredible foresight, I decided I would do a study of what was then called the internal market, now called the single market, of the European Community, what was happening and what it meant for the United States. The person I dealt with at the Foreign Service Institute wisely said I’m sure you want to be in Washington rather than going up to Harvard or somewhere because you would be out of it up there. And I said I would be farther out of it than I was in London because, after all, everybody came through London, but they don’t come through Cambridge.

They first tried to persuade me to do my research at I think it was called the Center for Foreign Affairs which was something fairly recently set up at the Foreign Service Institute. It was meant to be kind of an in-house think tank. They had never had anyone doing any economic work, it had always been political.

I decided that that wasn’t far enough away, but I would be a bit lost sitting out in Rosslyn. So I called the usual suspects in Washington -- I called Brookings, American Enterprise Institute, and I forget, but there seemed to be one or two other places. The deal should have appealed to them because I was being paid, although I think there was no question of getting a grant to the institution, at least for my salary.

What FSI persuaded me to do was to call the National Planning Association (NPA). The NPA had had one or two foreign service officers in the past, and they were eager to renew or continue that tradition. The Department was also nervous about putting anybody at Brookings because they said Senator Helms wouldn’t like it, and Brookings wasn’t making an offer, or at least it was kind of up in the air at that point.

So I called the head of NPA who was Ed Masters, a former foreign service officer, ambassador to Indonesia, and told him what I was about, and he said, come. So I figured even though that was not one of the better known places, why not. It was fine, actually, because they, not only seemed happy to have me, but the organization was made up of business and labor representatives who were very interested in my subject which in turn
gave me an “entre” to part of the U.S. business community providing me U.S. views and business input. In fact, they put together an advisory group of people with whom I would talk, some were really involved and some were not, but at least I did a lot of the interviewing to get U.S. business views. It was fortuitous, as I said, because it was just becoming a big issue.

I selected the topic, interestingly, because I was talking to a friend of mine who had been at the NSC who is really an academic and still teaching at George Washington and I asked him for ideas. He said why don’t you do a study of the development of the single market and its implications for the GATT negotiations. I decided that sounded a little too narrow and the second part sounded less interesting than the first part, so I just discussed the EU.

So people were suddenly becoming aware of, excited about the single market, and I wrote a book during the course of 1988 that explained to an American audience what this was all about, why the Europeans were doing it and what it meant. It was just what everybody wanted to read, and there wasn’t anything else out there.

I was very pleased because in the space of two days after it first came out, the person dealing with the EC at the U.S. Trade Representative’s office and the number two person at the EC delegation here both told me it was a wonderful book.

_Q: Which press?_

CALINGAERT: It was published by National Planning itself. They do publications. Sometimes they contract out to people and sometimes their staff does the writing, but they have a very small staff. This was one that was a blend -- I mean, I was free to them, so they gave me office space and covered expenses, while the State Department paid my salary, and they gave away and sold the book.

It was a time when people were not only interested but there were a lot of concerns about “Fortress Europe”, a lot of self-generated hysteria. But the time timing was perfect, it came out in November of 1988. They did five printings and sold between 10,000 and 12,000 copies of the book. So for a while I was the man of the hour and really one of the first people to get in on the topic.

I did have my comeuppance a few years later in Brussels. I was at a concert waiting in line and met a woman who was also waiting in line who turned out to be a professor from Drew University in New Jersey. Drew had a program in Brussels for a semester, and when I told her who I was, she was all excited about that. We then went in, and there were two stairways leading up into the auditorium with a big space in between, and I heard her going up telling her students, “Do you know who I met? Michael Calingaert.” And I heard this voice say, “Who’s that?” So it was good while it lasted.

This was during 1988. I did a fair number of discussion groups and speeches while waiting to see what was going to happen and did not bid on any jobs because I didn’t see
anything that appealed to me, and didn’t really know what I wanted to do at that stage.

Continued to look on the great outside world, and also had the -- I don’t if it was good fortune or not but at least it was interesting to find that a college classmate of mine was running for president. Michael Dukakis was not only a college classmate but a friend, and I stopped by to see him occasionally in Boston when I was through, and kept in touch. He is the only presidential candidate who has ever said, “Michael, what do you do next?” And my response was, “First we get the right man elected president, and then we’ll see from there.” But I gave him my wish list because I thought one should do that, but when things did not work out, I decided increasingly it was time to depart at age 55 with 30 plus years service.

It turned out that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association which represents U.S. research-based companies was looking for somebody to open an office in Brussels, and there was legislation coming through that was of great interest to the industry. They were not at all convinced the European industry despite a similarity of views and interests, could handle it well, and they had enough at stake to want to open an office. They also wanted to have someone there who knew about the EC and how it worked rather than an industry expert or somebody from industry.

So to make a somewhat long story short, that is how we came together, and I submitted my resignation. I took my retirement papers in the spring of 1989 and have not looked back.

Q: Do you have comments particularly insofar as economic work in the foreign service is concerned? Do you have any thoughts about where it has been and where it should go?

CALINGAERT: I am not sure I have thoughts on the future. It’s more about the past in terms of changes, and I would list a number. One is certainly the availability of information in the public sector, thereby diminishing the need for a lot of what had been done. I was struck a few years ago in talking to the Australian ambassador to Brussels whom actually I think was responsible for three different missions, and he told me that his economic reporting on Belgium consisted of sending in the annual report of the Bank of Belgium with a few comments, a page or so on it, and that seemed to be sufficient.

The U.S. Government may need more than that, but the need for economic reporting, macroeconomic reporting is certainly gone. I think more generally also the people inside the system have an exaggerated view of, if not the importance, the availability of information. I think the typical thing when you leave the service, is, my God, how will I be knowledgeable about what is happening when I can’t read classified cables. In fact, you discover there is a lot of information out there and you don’t really need it.

Also there is a narrowing of needs, and I think this has happened. Again, in Bremen in the early ‘60s, as I think I mentioned, the political reporting was reporting on what opinion makers and leaders in various provincial parts of Germany had to say about policy. Well, who cares? When I was in Rome, you had people who would write long
reports about the intricacies of Italian domestic politics. That is less and less the case.

In fact, I think there is more of a merging of what had been considered political reporting or political work and economic because there is a lot of that, and I view myself as a political economist at this point. I am not a real hard economist, but when you are in the area of public policy, the two do merge.

Also what is very different is the multiplicity of agencies and types of communications. Earlier the ambassador really was running a mission that was under his or her control, and there were things called the domestic agencies which I think simply don’t exist anymore. Very important is the fact that they all have direct communications of various means to their head offices which gives them far greater independence and makes it more difficult to run and operate an embassy.

There also has been a secular change in the role of embassies in promoting commercial interests. When I was in Ceylon in the 1960s, the ambassadors took no interest in the sale of locomotives or the sale of aircraft. That simply wouldn’t be the case anymore in this day and age. I have heard some business people say that it is not really an accurate view in telling certain horror stories, but I think that’s much more of an aberration these days.

One hopeful sign during my career but which I fear has gone back in the other direction has been in the quality and interest of members of congress. When I started out in the ‘50s, you really had congressmen traveling on what clearly were junkets and not being very serious. By the ‘80s, the kinds of people we saw going through London were very good on the whole, high quality, interested. Coming to London often was a rest stop, but then it was billed as a rest stop. However, you certainly had people who were interested in issues and followed issues. From everything I have been told more recently, it has very much turned back in the other direction, which is a vast change.

Some remarks on the department and the foreign service. I think none of this is new, but I will say it anyway. The hierarchical nature of the State Department, and I don’t know what one does about that and how it works differently elsewhere. I do remember in one of my earlier assignments -- I guess the first time I was in the Economic Affairs Bureau -- and I was at the Department of Agriculture talking to the grains expert in the Foreign Agriculture Service. Something big came up, and he picked up the phone and he called the Undersecretary for International Affairs, and he said that he needed to talk to Clarence. And they said, well, he was out to lunch. And he said, “Tell Clarence to call me as soon as he comes back.” And he put the phone down, and he said, “You do that at the State Department.” Well, you don’t do that at the State Department, and I guess nobody has found the way around that although informally on rare occasions it’s done, but it is tough.

The second thing, just to add my voice for the record about the disgrace of most career ambassadors. As I may have mentioned, two of my best ambassadors I have served under --
Q: Of career or non-career?

CALINGAERT: Non-career. I wondered why you looked so startled. The two outstanding ambassadors I worked for were non-career, but there were an awful lot who were not good, and for a great country to send people who are simply unqualified, is just absurd.

I participated once in a briefing for the ambassador’s course which was then run by Dean Brown and Shirley Temple Black. These were all non-career people in the Reagan administration, and it was appalling. It was clear these people had no clue what this was all about, and to name someone to represent our country in another country and then have to start by telling them about the basics is absurd. This was true for all administrations including the Clinton administration the recent ambassadors in Brussels, the EU and Italy were similarly disgraceful. There is no other way around that.

Another thing that always bothered me and bothered a lot of other people is the problem of rating and promoting foreign service officers, the officer evaluation report. I always felt that there should be a forced gradation of some kind and that when you had more than one person working for you at a particular grade, you had to rank them. And even though you realize they’re all the most wonderful people you have ever had to deal with, someone has got to be better than someone else. Similarly, there has to be more of an outside evaluation. The inspectors who at one point did do regular evaluations and then later didn’t, and I don’t know what they ended up with, especially in terms of outside inspectors which I think are the best. I understand they are doing this, but it is fairly recent, namely taking retired foreign service people who don’t have a grudge -- you have to be careful of that, you know -- who were not disappointed that they didn’t become Secretary of State or whatever, and have them say things that is more difficult for insiders to say. And I think that simply has to be done.

And finally, again, not news, the foreign service has certainly changed from the period I was in it and beyond in terms of the esprit de corps. We used to have a feeling that this was something special and that you were making a contribution. It has become much more than a career and more of people looking out for their own interest. Maybe I just didn’t realize this when I was young and it’s not the way the more senior people behaved, but I think it really has changed as society has changed and as the whole nature of handling foreign affairs has as well. So I will end on that note.

End of interview