Q: Today is the 29th of December, 1998. This is an interview with Warren Clark, Ambassador, and it’s being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I’m Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, I’d like to start at the beginning. Could you tell me something about when and where you were born and something about your family, your mother and father?

CLARK: Sure, I was born and brought up in a suburb of New York called Bronxville, which is a very nice comfortable suburb where everybody’s pretty much the same, and I think one of the big influences in my life was that at the age of 13 I was sent off to a boarding school. That was an eye-opener because there were kids there from all over: the country, and there were foreign kids and there were kids from New York City and from the Midwest and other places. That was sort of the beginning of being aware that there were other things out there. I went to Williams College because my father and a lot of other family members had been there.

Q: I want to move back first. You were born when, now?

CLARK: November 1936.

Q: All right, and could you describe your mother and father, what they were doing in that time.

CLARK: Sure. My father was a securities analyst, an investment counselor with a firm on Wall Street, and my mother was basically a homemaker, a housekeeper. I have an older sister who is nine years older than I am. My father commuted every day to work and my mother took care of the family.

Q: Well, in Bronxville, what sort of schooling did you have?

CLARK: I went to the public school for nursery school and then kindergarten through eighth grade, and it was in eighth grade that I went off to school.

Q: In elementary school, what were the things that interested you the most?
CLARK: Well, as I look back on it, I had a very good elementary education. They took us off to museums in New York. I remember seeing the Metropolitan Museum. I was very excited by the Hayden Planetarium and astronomy and meteorites and that sort of thing. I was very strong, as I look back on it, on what we would think of as extracurricular things: music—the high school did Gilbert and Sullivan every year, so the elementary school learned the songs. It was a rather rich elementary education.

Q: How about reading? In the early stages, what sort of books were you reading?

CLARK: Well, I recall I read a lot. We had a very good children’s library there. One of my favorites in grade school was Doctor Doolittle. There was a great series of Doctor Doolittle books.

Q: Hugh Lofting.

CLARK: That’s right. I loved that.

Q: Were there any teachers that particularly impressed you?

CLARK: I had excellent teachers. There was a woman in fourth and fifth grade whose name was Miss Crewly, and a woman in sixth and seventh whose name was Margaret MacPherson Brown. I can remember we did “Hansel and Gretel.” We sang the songs for “Hansel and Gretel.” And they were the ones who organized these expeditions for kids, going off to the city to see things.

Q: You went away to prep school for essentially high school?

CLARK: Yes, for four years.

Q: Where did you go?

CLARK: It’s called Hotchkiss. It’s up in Lakeville, Connecticut.

Q: Can you talk about the atmosphere, the ambience, of Hotchkiss in those days?

CLARK: This is the 1950’s, of course, from 1950 to ’54. It was very, I guess you could say old-school and conservative, in that there was a dominant headmaster, whose name was George Van Sanford, who sort of set the tone and the atmosphere of the whole place. It was, looking back on it, quite paternalistic. Of course, there were no girls; it was just boys. The academics were very rigorous. We had classes five and a half days a week; that is, we had classes on a Saturday morning. We had chapel every day and twice on Sundays; that is, eight times a week.

Q: How about again, what studies grabbed you?

CLARK: Well, I think that was kind of the beginning of my interest in history and world
affairs. I mentioned there were kids there from a much more diverse background. I had a very good course in European history. My upper-med year—that’s the junior year—with a guy named Barry, I liked that a lot. We had a medieval history course that was very good; it was very strong on medieval art as well as politics. So a lot of seeds were planted, I think, at that time. I also began to get politically conscious, I guess. This was the early ’50’s, and I remember the investigation of Robert Oppenheimer, for example, by whatever Congressional group it was. I was interested in that, interested enough to write and get the transcripts of the hearings. So I was beginning to become more aware of the world.

Q: Politically I would assume that the students there were more conservative than my classmates were.

CLARK: Probably their parents were. I’m not sure the kids were, as is often the case. They were a bunch of rambunctious boys who loved to get into trouble and have fun, so I think probably most of those kids were not politically conscious. I suppose generally affluent, they came from conservative backgrounds, but by no means were they all raised conservatively. There was a strong intellectual atmosphere. One of my classmates’ fathers was a book editor in New York who edited the first Thomas Wolfe. Not the Tom Wolfe of today, but the Thomas Wolfe who wrote the novels back in the 1930’s.

Q: He’s a figure of his own. I think Thomas Wolfe’s editor was—

CLARK: His name was Aswell. My friend’s name was Duncan Aswell. I’m not sure what his father’s name was, but something Aswell. Actually, not in Look Homeward, Angel, which is Thomas Wolfe’s most famous novel, but in some of the other novels he dedicates or expresses appreciation to this other Aswell. The father of another classmate and good friend of mine was the editor of Life Magazine. My biggest passion in school actually was photography. So at the age of 16 or 17 you had asked me, I probably would have told you that my ambition was to be a photojournalist working for Life Magazine or something like that, again sort of showing an interest in politics and world affairs. At the time, you know, it was the end of the Korean War, and I was very interested in some of the dramatic photographs that were being made.

Q: David Duncan.

CLARK: David Douglas Duncan, yes. Through my friend, I worked briefly for some Life photographers as an assistant in New York, going to the Academy Awards in 1954, I guess it was, when Audrey Hepburn won the award for best actress in Roman Holiday. That was with a photographer named Leonard McCon. I also worked on a Broadway Show called The Golden Apple with a photographer named Cornell Capa, who is the brother of Robert Capa, a famous photographer of the ‘40’s, and a friend of Ernest Hemingway. These were terribly glamorous people to me, as you can imagine.

Q: Oh, yes. You graduated from Hotchkiss when?
CLARK: ’54.

Q: What put you up in the nether world of the Berkshires up in Williams?

CLARK: Well, my father had grown up in Springfield, Massachusetts, and he’d gone to Williams. His brother went to Williams, and then my cousin, and, it turned out, my brother-in-law had gone there, so I was a big legacy to Williams.

Q: So you were there from ’54 to ’58?

CLARK: Right.

Q: What were you taking there?

CLARK: Well, I took a lot of political science, but I got a D the first semester of my sophomore year in political science. They wouldn’t let me major in political science, so I ended up majoring in English. I took some other political science courses. I had a difficult time growing up. I had a sort of a bumpy adolescence, and my sophomore year I almost flunked out. That was when I got the D in political science. So the last years were a lot easier. I sort of grew up a little bit. I ended up majoring in English, and by the time I graduated, I really didn’t have a clear idea what I wanted to do in life, in terms of a career. I think I knew I didn’t want to work in New York. I did not want to work on Wall Street, but I didn’t know exactly what it was I wanted to do.

Q: Well, an awful lot of Williams people ended up being bankers and brokers. This seemed to me. I’m class of ’50 Williams, and I went to some of my reunions and there were not so many bankers in my life as I met there. How about the fraternity system? Was that still in existence?

CLARK: It was, and that was an element of my disastrous sophomore year. My father and uncle and all these people I described were members of a particular fraternity there, and when I was there they had rushing sophomore year, not freshman year. I was not rushed—I was not tapped, or whatever the word is—for that fraternity. So I was upset, and felt unhappy and rejected and so forth. That was part of my social problems at Williams. Looking back on it, I don’t blame myself completely for how difficult that period was, although it might have been difficult for me anyplace. But in Williams, as you know, having been there, it’s a rather, certainly in those days, small community, and if you don’t fit in or you feel you don’t fit in, there are not an awful lot of alternatives. I thought later, “Golly, if I’d gone to a bigger place, a university, there would have been a broader range of people, or you could go out on the sidewalk and do something.”

Q: That’s very interesting. I’ve never quite put it that way, but I didn’t feel I belonged either. I mean, kids of a certain age, and I didn’t know then too well, I was in a fraternity and all that, but I didn’t have the money or the contacts and things like that. Anyway, it’s not my happiest period, I think. What about any of the teachers?
CLARK: I had some wonderful teachers at Williams. There was a French teacher, Jack Sabacaw, who was very nice to me. There was an absolutely super English teacher, Don Gifford, who was just an inspiring teacher. He had such a clear knowledge of a complicated novel, a Dickens novel, that he could make it simple by the way he would organize it. I think that’s when I got a much clearer idea about how you can take information and knowledge and then organize it into some sort of coherent structure. I began to get a much clearer idea of that as an undergraduate there from these very good teachers.

Q: Also I think something that all of us benefited from, particularly for joining the Foreign Service is the ability to write.

CLARK: Yes, so an English major is pretty good in that area.

Q: Were there any political winds that were blowing in ’57, 58 that sort of grabbed you or the student body?

CLARK: Well, I would say I still was not really terribly politicized. I was interested in things like the Suez War in 1956, which of course coincided with the Hungarian Uprising. I was still an aspiring, or at least an active, photographer in those days, for the newspaper and the yearbook, and I had visions of myself in the streets of Budapest or in Gaza or something like that, taking dramatic war pictures. But I was not terribly pro or con or indignant or not indignant about the McCarthy period and other domestic political issues of the day.

Q: Did diplomacy, the Foreign Service, intrude at all on the scene while you were there?

CLARK: Not directly. I had a girlfriend—again, part of my disastrous sophomore year—a wonderful woman, and she was the first one who mentioned the Foreign Service to me as an interesting career. She was, I think, thinking about herself and what would she do, and she mentioned the Foreign Service as an interesting career. As I look back on it, and this is a theme that continued, although it began to rapidly diminish, as you will appreciate, it was an elitist atmosphere that the Foreign Service had. I think before the Second World War many Foreign Service officers had independent incomes. It was sort of something that the sons of wealthy men did to have an interesting career. I think she was thinking of it in those terms: that well, you don’t have to worry about money, so if you do it, you’ll have an interesting career in diplomacy. I’m sure that’s an unfair characterization of her view, but that was an element, I think, of what was mentioned to me. I had another friend after that, Bill Edgar, who later did come in the Foreign Service, who mentioned it to me. So when I graduated, I’d heard about the Foreign Service, but I hadn’t really focused on it very much.

Q: I think, at least in my time, it was just starting up, and a significant number of my class ended up being recruited by the CIA in the early ’50’s, much more than the Foreign Service. I was wondering whether the CIA—Helms was a Williams graduate—and was part of the . . . I mean, was the CIA something that counted as—
CLARK: Yes, I think the president of Williams, Phinney Baxter, had some connection with CIA. I had interviewed with the CIA for a job and was preliminarily accepted. They had a program in those days where you spent two years in the Air Force, doing basic training. Subsequently you were still in the military, but you were really working for CIA, and that was a way of getting people into the CIA. But after having gotten a letter saying, “Yes, we’ll now proceed to the next stage,” I got another letter—this is now the spring of my senior year—saying, “oops, sorry, no thanks, we’ve decided not to pursue this.” And I never knew why all of a sudden they pulled back, but I have a guess, which is that when I was at Hotchkiss I mentioned that I was interested in the Oppenheimer security case. This was my junior year at Hotchkiss. I thought at one point, in a schoolboyish way, it would be amusing to send the headmaster a subscription to The Daily Worker, the Communist newspaper in New York. So I wrote to The Daily Worker, and I said, “What are your subscription rates.” And they sent me back saying, “Oh, fine, here are our subscription rates.” End of story. Not end of story. I’m sure my name was picked up at the time and bumped up years later on their computers as having written to The Daily Worker in New York. So, anyway, I did not have a career with the CIA.

Q: But you graduated in ’58, and what was the military draft situation in those days?

CLARK: The situation was that the draft existed, but not everybody went in. You had a 50-50 chance of being drafted or not being drafted. In my own situation, as I mentioned, I didn’t really know what I wanted to do next. I was presented with a very immediate situation, which was that my girlfriend was pregnant. So I was happy to marry her—I was very happy—but clearly I had to do something really quickly. We graduated in June; I was married, I guess, two weeks later to Alice, who was at Vassar. Less than a month after that, I got a letter from the navy, to which I had applied, accepting me into OCS. So in August of ’58, I went to OCS in Newport, Rhode Island, and I was commissioned in December of ’58.

Q: You were in the navy from ’58 to when?

CLARK: Got out in June in ’62, so it was about four years.

Q: When you were in the navy, what sort of specialty did you have?

CLARK: Well, the navy had a big impact on my development because more or less through a series of accidents, I ended up at a naval air station in Morocco. It was called NAS-Port Lyautey in a town called Kenitra. I ended up writing country studies on the Middle East: political and economic analysis of what was happening in the countries in the Middle East. The unit I was attached to was part of the staff of the commander in chief of the Sixth Fleet, US Naval Forces Europe, which included the Sixth Fleet. There were about a hundred people in this unit making, basically, target folders for the Sixth Fleet. But in 1958, which was only a year before I arrived, the navy had landed the marines in Lebanon. The commanders in the Sixth Fleet realized they didn’t know much about what was happening in Lebanon. In kind of simplistic terms, who were the good
guys, who were the bad guys, what’s happening in Lebanese politics, how is Egypt bearing or not bearing on what happens in Lebanon, what about Nuri al-Said and later Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq, and how was that bearing on the whole situation? So they felt that they’d better find out more about the politics of the Middle East. So they put together a unit with three, later four, officers to do political analysis and briefings of admirals and staffs on this political situation in the Middle East, not target folders but politics. Well the first head of this unit was a lieutenant JG named Tom Pickering.

Q: Who’s now number two in the—

CLARK: —now number two in the Department of State.

Q: And who’s been ambassador to just about any country you can name.

CLARK: About four different countries, including the UN.

Q: Including the Soviet Union, or Russia.

CLARK: That’s right. And he was succeeded by Bill Zartman, who became a lifelong friend of mine, who is now professor at SAIS here in Washington, and the godfather of my son. I overlapped a little bit with Bill, and then Bill was succeeded by another lifelong friend of mine, Gary Sick, who ended up with a Ph.D. from Columbia and who wrote two books on the Iranian crisis

Q: Yes, he was the authority on Iran during the crisis.

CLARK: That’s right, and he’s still very active in New York at Columbia doing Persian Gulf stuff. And then I was in charge of the unit after Gary. So it was an excellent education. We did a lot of writing. We did a lot of public speaking, in the sense of briefing admirals and staff, and traveled around the Mediterranean a little bit. So for a young man, you know, 22, 23, 24 years old, this was a pretty heady experience.

Q: Where were you getting your information? For example, the idea in 1959 of writing in succinct form, who were the good guys and who were the bad guys in Lebanon? It’s sublime. I mean this is something that has never been resolved, still isn’t resolved. How were you getting information?

CLARK: I have to admit one of our best sources of information was The Economist. We had the advantage that we’d read The Economist, which is a weekly, and most of the people we were briefing had not.

Q: Oh, absolutely.

CLARK: So we had an edge up on them in that way. Of course, The Economist is unclassified. The CIA in those days had sort of a basic Baedeker’s tour guide for the world.
Q: National Intelligence Summary—

CLARK: —Summary, or something like that, and I used it. Well, they had a whole series of things. One was sort of your encyclopedia, and they had situational things, and so we had a big classified library, so we had access to all that classified stuff. As time went on we also got daily intelligence reports, first from the director of Naval Intelligence and later from DIA. DIA was created in that period, so we got two reports: one from DIA and the other from ONR. We had CIA IRs (information reports) coming in and Naval IRs coming in, so we had a hodgepodge of sources of information, some of them pretty good and some of them, you know, sort of too detailed.

Q: I would have thought it would have been difficult for all of you, as young officers, at your age, to really have any real appreciation of political matters. You know, it takes a while to kind of experience things—if you read about it and put it together, but to sort of understand what’s important and what isn’t and all that.

CLARK: Well, I suppose we were immature in many ways, but Bill Zartman, who was head of the office when I arrived, had a Ph.D. in political science from Yale, and so he certainly had a very strong academic background. There was the other guy there, Leon Martell, who had an MA in Russian studies from Columbia. I did not have any graduate training at that point. So there were people who already had strong intellectual background in some ways.

Q: How did you find your group fit with the various military commanders and the people you’d be talking to? Did they seem to absorb what you were giving them?

CLARK: They seemed to be very grateful for what we had to say. You very quickly learned, however, that when you were briefing an admiral and his staff, it was very important to be interesting and to be, if possible, even amusing. If in the process of being interesting you imparted some important information that was a plus, but that wasn’t really necessary. What was really necessary was to be a good speaker and to be able to put together a story in an interesting way. And so if you were good, you learned how to do that.

Q: I imagine your star was Gamal Abdel Nasser.

CLARK: Yes, well, Karim Qasim, too.

Q: Oh, Karim Qasim, since his demise on TV—he was executed on TV, wasn’t he, as I recall?

CLARK: Possibly.

Q: But anyway, do you recall what our reading was on Nasser in those days?
CLARK: Nasser was mostly a bad guy because of the Czech arms deal in 1955 and then the Suez crisis in 1956, although we had intervened against the British and French in that intervention. Nasser was looked on with a great deal of suspicion because of his connection with the Soviets. He accepted Soviet arms and he had MiGs and so on. Of course, his relations with the Russians went up and down, like his relations with us went up and down. But the main crisis had been July 14, 1958 when the king of Iraq was assassinated and Qasim took over. The next day the United Arab Republic was announced between Egypt and Syria, and there was a sudden change in the political constellations in the Middle East. We didn’t really understand what was going on very clearly, but there was a clear understanding that neither side was in our camp. There weren’t any really good friends of the United States, except possibly the Christians in Lebanon, who said they were our friends. And so I think Nasser was looked on with a great deal of suspicion.

Q: How about the situation in Morocco? You were in Morocco, but were you involved or thinking about Morocco?

CLARK: A great deal, because we were living there, and so the political situation there affected us. There was a king who was really quite conservative, although when I first arrived the king was Mohamed V, who was the George Washington of Morocco, and had led Morocco to independence. He was sort of “above politics,” an enormous paternal figure around whom everyone rallied. We arrived in Morocco in October of ’59. The king died, I think it was in February of ’60. He was succeeded by his son, then Moulay Hassan, now Hassan II, who was about 30 or 32 years old. He had a reputation as a playboy. So the question was, would young Hal turn into Henry V? And he did, but people were wondering about it at the time. One of his prime ministers, a guy named Ibrahim, was really very much on the liberal end of things: a nationalist who wanted to get rid of American bases. So of course that made us a little uncomfortable since we had one Naval Air Station and three Air Force bases with B-47s and a lot of communications sites. On the other hand, the prime minister had very little independent political power. The parliament had almost no power at all. But generally the domestic political situation was smooth. There were a bunch of hiccups, as you remember, back in the ’70s with the attempted assassinations of the king and people trying to shoot down his airplane. But during the period when we were living there, ’59 to ’62, things were generally pretty quiet. The first big event that happened when I was there was the earthquake in Agadir, a sudden disaster; about 10,000 people were killed. This was great opportunity, in a way, for the US to show its support and friendship for the Moroccans. So after a period of time, just tons of equipment, supplies, field hospitals, and so forth materialized in Agadir. I was part of that because I could speak French. I was immediately recruited, along with my friend Gary Sick, to be an interpreter for that operation.

Q: How did that work? I mean, what was your impression of the relief effort for Agadir?

CLARK: Well, it was just enormously impressive to me as a young man who had never really seen military forces doing their thing. The earthquake took place, as I remember, on a Monday night. There was a very small French naval air station in Agadir, with a
very small runway, like 2000 feet. So the French, who were there immediately, were evacuating people who were badly injured. On Tuesday, I guess, the decision was made that we would send forces to Morocco from Germany. And that’s when I arrived. Beginning Wednesday night, the first C-130 came in from Rhineland, Germany, and every hour for the next three days a C-130 landed at Agadir. And I’ll always remember the first one, because a C-130—today it doesn’t look terribly big, compared to other things, but in those days it was an enormous airplane—had three stories. You have to climb up three ladders to get to the pilot’s cockpit, and the bay is just enormous. You can put tanks and trucks in it and so forth. And this airplane flew loaded with stuff. We saw it circling in, because we had very few lights. We could see it circling around and making sure, yes, this was the airport where it was supposed to land, and I tell you, it was very short. The C-130 comes down, and of course it hits the ground at 102 miles an hour. It hits the ground and rolls about a thousand feet, and it’s still going 100 miles an hour. You think, “Oh, my gosh, it’s going to crash.” They have these reverse thrusters, and somebody threw a switch and it reverse-thrust, and it looked as though the airplane had hit an arresting gear on an aircraft carrier. Just ch-ch-ch-choo, it stopped like that, within 500 feet. The people inside must have been thrown forward on their seat belts. It taxied around to where we were in the hangar. Down comes the back and out rolls a complete field hospital, all packed up in nice little neat cartons. So they unroll that, and we push it off into the hangar. The motors never stop; they keep on going. Then 20 minutes later, up goes the ramp again, and the airplane turns around and taxis, and it’s gone, takes off. After a day, after 24 deliveries like that, we had a field hospital, we had a water purification unit, we had—I don’t know—10,000 tents, 10,000 blankets—I mean we had the wherewithal for a small city. And I remember, after two or three days and no sleep, sitting down rather wearily in a hangar, and a doctor who was there said, “Be kind of careful, you’re sitting on about a million dollars of morphine.” It was stuff for combat, so you had morphine, you had all these things for basically a combat field hospital situation.

Well, I was impressed. I think the Moroccans were impressed. And as I say, it was really the first time I saw the military doing its thing. It was rather awesome.

Q: How did we look upon the French in those days? Algeria was still stirring. I think the French were still there, weren’t they, in Morocco?

CLARK: Well, Morocco had become politically independent in ’56, but the war was still raging in Algeria. The Algerian War didn’t end until ’62. All the time I was in Morocco, there was a lot of tension along the border between Morocco and Algeria. The French would be chasing Algerian nationalists who would jump across the border into Morocco. The French said they had rights of hot pursuit. So it was guerilla warfare. It was low-intensity guerilla warfare, but nevertheless it was going on. One day Gary Sick and I went to Oran to look at some US naval stores. There’s a naval base in Oran. An awesome experience, because the facility at Oran was built by the French as an atomic-bomb-proof command post. We went four floors down into rock and through some passageways and there was an enormous command post, where we met the commander of the French Mediterranean fleet. We paid a courtesy call on him, and then we went off to inspect the munitions. But flying away from Oran, we could see farmhouses burning. While life was
going on more or less normally in Oran, which looked very much like a French city—there was a mural there in the port that was 10 feet high, with letters saying ICI, C’EST LA FRANCE. —the French were holding on for dear life. You knew it was doomed.

But in Morocco, in contrast, the French had built—hard to believe, because we enjoyed it so much—they built a magnificent infrastructure. They had excellent roads. They had excellent restaurants, as you would imagine, very good hotels. Morocco was, and still is, a tourist destination. The climate was salubrious: the winters were mild and the summer wasn’t too hot. We were right on the beach. There we were in our early 20s, with families, living three or four times as well as we would have if we were back here in the United States, with a Moroccan lady to help your wife with the children and do your household work and so forth. It was an extraordinary plunge into an entirely different and new world. I remember remarking at the time, in a somewhat uncomfortable way, that one began to see the blessings of colonialism. One lived very well in a colonial atmosphere where you have a dual economy; you have one kind of income in contrast to everybody else’s income. There were still, as I recall, about 50,000 French people, maybe more, maybe 80,000 people, in Morocco at the time, many of whom were civil servants running the customs and other sorts of things. They were, of course, phasing out and winding down, but there we were, three years after independence, and there were still a great many French civil servants running the show. And a big French population of retired people because the cost of living was lower; lots of widows living there modestly. But in our town there was a French marché. In every town in Morocco, almost every town, there were two towns. There was the Moroccan town and there was the French town next to each other.

Q: Did you have any contact with our embassy?

CLARK: A little bit, yes. We got copies of airgrams from the embassy, not telegrams. I think a fellow named Ness was the chargé and signed a lot of stuff. The ambassador was Charles Yost, who was ambassador during part of that time. I never met him. We went down to Rabat frequently to meet the naval attaché and exchange stuff with him. But as naval intelligence people up in Kenitra we didn’t see an awful lot of the embassy people.

Q: How about Franco in those days? When you were looking around, how did we view Franco?

CLARK: Franco, in the late ‘50’s, had gone through a big transformation. I’m not at all an expert, but I think around 1950 we had launched a big support program of economic reform in Spain This coincided with the building of US bases: the naval base in Rota, Spain; the Air Force base at Torrejón, outside of Madrid. There was another one in Zaragoza, and other facilities up and down the coast in places like Valencia. So there was a big US military and naval presence in Spain, and I think Franco was looked upon as anticomunist and therefore someone who was “not bad.” I think the fascist overtones had been forgotten or changed, or he’d grown out of them, or something. As I look back on it, Spain in those days was going through the beginnings of its rapid economic transformation. I understand that Spanish exports in 1950 were lower than they were in
1935. Spain just was stopped for about 15 years, but by the mid-’50’s it was beginning slowly to start up again. We drove across Spain a couple of times. You could see that happening. It was a very interesting time in Spain.

Q: Was Malta a problem during your time there?

CLARK: Malta was a problem. Dom Mintoff was there. We read about that in The Economist a lot, as you would imagine, being British. I never got to Malta during that period. It was a big British base, but the American Sixth Fleet did not use it a lot. So Malta itself did not loom very large. We went in and out of Naples a good deal, because there was a big US naval presence there; we went to Zaragoza; in Sicily there was a Naval Air Station, so we went in and out of Sicily. And Toulon, of course—the Sixth Fleet commander’s cruiser was based in Toulon. So there was a lot of naval activity in the Western Mediterranean, and I would fly out and brief people. The Sixth Fleet got to the Eastern Mediterranean now and then, but not very often. Once while I was there a carrier got to Dubrovnik, I think, and Split, but there was always a desire to get to Beirut. I don’t think they got to Beirut, but that’s one thing that motivated me later, I think, in the beginning of my Foreign Service career, to get to Beirut.

Q: What about Yugoslavia? How did you find Yugoslavia, do you remember, at that time?

CLARK: Again, this is only second or third hand. I think Yugoslavia was looked on with mixed feelings, but generally positive. That is, Tito had stood up to Stalin, he had left the Comintern, and he was following an independent path. I guess there was a certain amount of discomfort about Third World neutralism. After Bandung, which was in 1955, Nasser, Tito, Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Nehru were part of this axis, saying, “a pox on both your houses, we’re neither East nor West.” That was difficult for a lot of Americans to understand. Communism was seen as some sort of moral evil, and you either were part of it or against it. So I think we didn’t understand neutralism in those days, but at the same time, we realized that Tito was not in the pocket of the Soviets, and so that was okay. This played a role in our war games because the Sixth Fleet, after all, had contingency plans. And what was a contingency? Well, a contingency was an invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union. If you look at a map, what would happen? I mean, where would tanks go? Of course, Germany would have been a big battlefield, but one of the ways they would have gone was down into the Mediterranean, and if the Soviets wanted to get to the Mediterranean, one of the ways they would have gone is through northern Yugoslavia.

Q: The Ljubljana Gap.

CLARK: You know about it. And one of our big targets was the Ljubljana Gap. So the guys who were out there in the other room making target folders were always getting up-to-date aerial photography on the Ljubljana Gap. Well, years ago—I mean, like, five years ago, eight years ago—I found myself in Ljubljana, and I had arranged, because I had a lady friend, saying, “You might want to see what it looks like from the ground
thirty years later.”

Q: It never struck me as being a very viable way to go, but you have to have a gap somewhere, and you have to have a reason for putting tanks down there, for whatever reason. How did we look upon Israel at that time? Was it an ally, as a problem, as a what?

CLARK: I think my perception of attitudes toward Israel is that they’ve changed a good deal since the ‘50’s. On the one hand, Israel’s security was important, but we were also getting a lot of information coming from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and indeed from Egypt, which was giving a more sympathetic Arab view on the problem. And I remember one of my friends at the time saying, “I’m not anti-Jewish; I’m anti-Zionist.” I think that reflected the attitude of a number of people, maybe also in the Foreign Service -- although I’m talking about the time when I was in the Navy -- that had a lot of reservations about the State of Israel as a political entity creating problems in the Middle East.

Q: ’58 to ’62—I was wondering what was the spirit of the election of 1960 and the election of John Kennedy. Did that touch any nerves in the young people, because it did in the campuses? But in the Navy—

CLARK: We were sufficiently removed from the campus fevers that the election of Kennedy did not have an electrifying effect. Maybe it did to people who were more politicized or to people who were older than I was, but it seemed to have very little impact on my world of the Navy and living overseas, and everything seemed to continue pretty much as it had, in terms of our activities and our life. So, I recall some people talking about being pro or con, or about this or that policy of Kennedy’s, but not in a major way.

Q: Did you find yourself, your group, sort of looking at oil and the importance of oil? Was this a theme?

CLARK: It was a theme, and it bore on what I mentioned previously about attitudes towards Israel, but not a lot. I mean, one was talking about so many millions of barrels a day, or tons, or whatever it was coming out of the Persian Gulf, but I think, in fact, the United States in those days was less dependent on Eastern Hemisphere oil than it later became. So the Persian Gulf oil: Saudi Arabian oil that was also coming to the Mediterranean by pipeline and Iraqi oil was important for Europe. It was important for our allies, less directly to us.

Q: What about the British, the British Navy and all? Was that a factor?

CLARK: Almost not at all. I don’t know why, maybe it was the Suez disaster in 1956, I never remember seeing a British naval ship; I never knew any British naval officers; they never came to visit us in our base. The French did, of course, because it was a joint base with the French. As I mentioned, we didn’t stop in Malta. So I had almost no
consciousness of the British presence in the Mediterranean. I guess indirectly we heard about it in Cyprus, because, of course, the British had a big base in Cyprus. FBIS was based in Cyprus, and FBIS was very important.

**Q:** The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which is sort of the preeminent source of information.

CLARK: And transcribing radio broadcasts, and especially later, when I was desk officer for Libya, of course, that was a very important source of information.

**Q:** Libya at that time—oil and gas were just beginning, and King Idris was still in power.

CLARK: Yes, Idris was there until '69, actually. I stopped in Libya at Wheelus Air Force Base very briefly and talked to the Air Force air intelligence people there. We had a very large presence, a US Air Force base. The king was very much in charge. Oil was just starting up and was becoming a factor, but had not yet become a really big factor. It would turn out to be sweet oil, meaning it had a light sulfur content, and that had advantages for certain markets, especially our market. This was long before the crises in '73, where I was very active.

**Q:** Did you stay in Morocco until you left the Navy in '62?

CLARK: Yes.

**Q:** Were you and your wife sitting down plotting any plans or anything, about what to do?

CLARK: Yes, indeed. While I was there—while I was in the Navy but had not yet gotten to Morocco—I guess I had decided to take the Foreign Service Exam, and so I was reading a book on American history. I took the written exam at the American Embassy in Rabat in 1960 and passed that. Then my commander very kindly decided I needed some consultations in London, at SIGES NAVIRE, the commander of the US Naval Forces in Europe, at the time which coincided with the itinerant interview team for the oral exam for the Foreign Service. So I went to London and took the oral exam there in the old American Embassy, which is across Grosvenor Square from where it is now, and passed that. So by the time I got out of the Navy, I was already lined up for the Foreign Service.

**Q:** Do you recall any of the types of questions at all from the oral exam?

CLARK: Oh, yes.

**Q:** It's interesting to see what the focus was. What sort of things were you getting?

CLARK: It was the usual good cop, bad cop, neutral cop. The neutral cop, I thought, asked me a very interesting opening question. He said, “Now Mr. Clark, I see that you come from this very comfortable suburb of New York, you went to boarding school, you
went to this very good college in Massachusetts: do you think you’ll be comfortable dealing with a wide variety of people who come from different backgrounds?” And I said, “Oh, yes, I do that right now in the Navy.” I certainly blew that one away, but I thought it was an interesting sort of caution about elitism and not taking people for granted and not taking things for granted. And he said, “Oh, yes, yes.” Obviously that was the end of it, but he was pushing a little bit on that point. The good cop asked me about oil in North Africa, and I did well on that one because I had been reading my *Economist* and knew about oil in Libya. I even knew it was low-sulfured. The tough cop asked me about Gary Powers, because Gary Powers had just been shot down in his U-2 over the Soviet Union, and, well, what would you have done? How would you react, you know, if you had to explain this to another government? That sort of thing. So he pushed in the knife and twisted it a little bit trying to get me to comment on that. But those were kind of the three areas in the questioning that I remember.

**Q:** Did you sort of come back and enter the Foreign Service?

CLARK: No, having been in the Navy for almost four years and done all this briefing, you know, when you’re 22 years old, you know everything. By the time I was 25, it was beginning to dawn on me that I might not know everything. So I decided, well, if I can, I want to go to graduate school before I go into the Foreign Service. So the State Department said, okay, we’ll give you another year. And so I went to SAIS, here in town.

**Q:** SAIS being?

CLARK: The School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. In those days they had a small building up on Florida Avenue. While I was there, they moved from Florida Avenue to the current building on Massachusetts Avenue. In those days it was basically sort of an area studies graduate school giving MAs for people who were going to work for international business, international banking, international civil servants like the World Bank, and Foreign Service people. I’d say a minority, actually, went on to the Foreign Service, but it certainly was giving you an academic framework for thinking about a lot of foreign policy issues.

**Q:** What was your concentration during that year?

CLARK: Well, I had a mixed concentration. I guess I thought on the one hand I should focus on the Middle East, because I had studied that. I took some wonderful courses with a guy named Najib Keddouri on Muslim institutions and other Middle East studies courses. I decided I did not want to take Arabic or to have a real concentration in the Middle East, so I took French, because they had a very strong language requirement, and then also took Western European economics, that is, the economy of Western Europe, and economic problems in developing countries, with a guy named Frank, who was a wonderful teacher.

And a funny thing happened. I found I really liked economics. While I was in the Navy I spent a summer in Washington going through a naval air intelligence school, and I had
taken Economics 1-2, basic principles of economics, and a course on international trade and finance. So I had a little bit of economics from that, and my father-in-law is an economist. At the time he was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors in the White House, so I was getting a lot of economic talk from him. Whereas as an adolescent I had shied away from New York and Wall Street, which was my father, on the whole it turned out I liked economics a lot, and I was able to talk to my father-in-law about it in a way that was not as difficult for me to talk to my father. I took these courses, and then at SAIS I decided, gee, what I really want to do is study academic economics. But by that time I was married, had two children, and I had a Foreign Service career waiting for me, so my major at SAIS was kind of split between the Middle East and Europe and between politics and economics.

So then I went into Foreign Service the following summer—that would have been the summer of ’63—and took the A-100 course. I said my first choice was a small French-speaking post in Africa. I figured I was a shoo-in for Conakry. But in 1963 they had just filled all those because those posts had just opened up in 1960 and ’61. My second choice was a post in the Middle East. So they said, okay, we’ll send you to the Middle East, but since you only have French—and I’d passed the Foreign Service French—they said, we’ll teach you Arabic.” So I was in Washington for another year studying Arabic. During that year, I kept on at SAIS, sort of nights and weekends. I finished the requirements for the MA, which is basically a year and a half or two year program, although I flunked the French test. So after all that work, I didn’t get an MA—then—from SAIS; I got it later.

In the spring of ’64, with my almost MA and my six months of Arabic, we went off finally to the Middle East. The Foreign Service, the State Department, in its wisdom said, well, your wife’s about to have another child. You’re going to Aleppo. Aleppo was our first post. I was picked to be vice-consul in Aleppo. But they said, people don’t have babies in Aleppo (a city of half a million people—no babies), so we’ll give you some more Arabic in Beirut, for three months, while your wife has a baby.

So we got there in May, and our daughter, Hope, was born in August. In late August we arrived in Aleppo, Syria.

Q: I’d like to go back a bit. You said in the summer of ’63 you came into the basic officer course, the A-100 course. Can you characterize or give a feel of the group that you came in with?

CLARK: It included USIA officers. There may have been one or two CIA people there too, although I don’t recall that specifically. There were about 30 of us, 20 or 30. There were a goodly number of women, especially on the USIA side, maybe just on the USIA side. There were excellent lecturers on subjects like culture shock and how you’re carrying around your culture in your head and you don’t realize it, and you come to another culture and you suffer those kinds of things. Basically I looked upon it as a couple of months where you didn’t have to sweat too much, and you were sort of getting acculturated and acclimatized to the State Department bureaucracy and so forth. Of
course, I’d already been in the Navy bureaucracy, so the whole thing was not entirely new to me, whereas it was, I’m sure, to some other people.

Q: Well, you were in Beirut, that would have been, those four months, in ’64.

CLARK: Right, May to August.

Q: In the first place, how was your Arabic?

CLARK: I’d already had six months here in Washington, but it was just spoken Arabic. So I was at the stage where you start to read it. But because I was only going to be there a few months, they didn’t really start me on the reading program. Basically I’m illiterate in Arabic, but by that time I could get along fairly well day-to-day: “how are you” sort of conversations. When I left here I guess I was a 1+, something like that. I think by the end of two years in Aleppo giving Visa interviews in Arabic and shopping in Arabic and doing all that stuff, I probably was a 2 or a 2+ in spoken Arabic.

Q: In ’64 was Lebanon pretty quiet?

CLARK: Lebanon was very quiet. It was a gorgeous place. It was culturally interesting, very diverse. It was a little scary because they would have a national holiday when somebody had been elected president, and they would think it was a wonderful opportunity to shoot guns up in the air. That was scary, and people knew that there were all these political factions and there was unrest. The Druze felt that they had been disadvantaged, or something. But none of it burst to the surface, so things on the surface were quite quiet. We went down the coast to Sidon and Tyre. We couldn’t go below Tyre because you were too close to the Israeli border. But the Israeli border was generally quiet too. There wasn’t the situation there is now, where there are sort of weekly exchanges of fire across the border. You couldn’t travel in the southernmost part of Lebanon. There’s a nice Crusader castle in Marjayoun. We were not supposed to go to Marjayoun because you could look down from this crusader castle onto Israeli territory, near what used to be Lake Hula. But except for that, you could travel anywhere in Lebanon. We went several times to the Bekaa Valley, and we went up to Tripoli and up to Arz, which is the Cedars of Lebanon. It was the summertime and we always liked going up in the mountains whenever we could because it was cool. We began to love the food and the beer and the hummus and the wine and wara’ ’enab and all the rest of the good food. So it was very pleasant living from that point of view.

Q: Well, you were in Aleppo from when to when?

CLARK: August ’64 to June ’66.

Q: What was the situation in Syria when you went there?

CLARK: The UAR had broken up in ’63.
Q: This is the United Arab Republic. It was one of these manifestations of [inaudible] and the Middle East. I mean, nothing really comes of it, but—

CLARK: There’s a story about the formation of the UAR that I heard and I like to tell, and it’s about Syrian politics. Syria is a country whose border, after all, was created by the French and the British after the First World War, and it includes a lot of minorities. You’ve got the Alawites in the mountains along the Mediterranean; you have big Turkish and Armenian minorities in the North. You’ve got a big desert in the center, and you’ve got a Kurdish population along the Euphrates, up by the Turkish and Iraqi borders. And the internal communications were not very good. The politics in Damascus were Russian, I mean, things didn’t work very well. All during the 1950s you had coups about every two years. The story one Syrian told me was that in 1956 you’d had the invasion of Suez, and Syria didn’t like this. Of course, all the Arabs had felt humiliated by the losses in ’48 and ’56 at the hands of the Israelis, and there were very strong centrifugal forces, forces of factions pulling away. At the time, in the mid-’50s, there was a very strong communist faction in Syria. There was the Baath Party, which had sort of romantic 1930s French socialist ideas. And there were some people in 1957 who thought Syria should just give up trying to be a country, trying to be a unified country. They could give the north to Turkey and give parts of the Euphrates to Iraq and other parts to Lebanon or Jordan and just sort of stop being a country. Well, its a joke, but it’s a joke because there’s something behind it: that there were these problems of national unity. So when the crisis came in July of 1958, Syria practically threw itself at Egypt and said, “Take us.” And in the name of Arab unity and this wonderful ideal and the very strong feeling through historical and religious factors and the inability to rule themselves, the Syrians sort of said to Nasser, “Take us.” And so Nasser did. I could say he probably didn’t have any choice. That lasted about four years. The usual things came unglued. They dissolved the Union. When we got there, Syria had been an independent country, again, for about two years. The dictator of the day was Amin al-Hafez, a military man, and in general things were quiet during most of that period. The politics, as I say, remained pretty bad, but Syria, like other countries I’ve been in—Nigeria comes to mind—is a country that works pretty well at the local level. Municipalities work pretty well, families, plans work pretty well, villages work pretty well. So even though the national government was crashing around having all sorts of problems, life went on in the cities and the villages.

There was a terribly wrenching situation, where a Syrian was hanged for being a CIA spy, so there was a lot of tension politically between the US and Syria during this period. The ambassador most of that time was a Ridgway Knight. His wife was Belgian. There was a lot of very difficult political tension between the US and Syria—in Damascus. But we were in Aleppo, and Damascus was 150 miles away, and they didn’t care much what happened in Damascus. Yes there was a problem with Israel, and the terrible things, but it didn’t affect them directly in this sense. So that on a personal level, we found the Syrians wonderful, warm, friendly, hospitable, and very pleasant.

Q: Who was your consul general then?

CLARK: John R. Barrow, who was always called Ralph. He was later consul general in
Islamabad, I think—some place in Pakistan. Ralph had been in Baghdad and was desk officer for Egypt. We left in ’66; he was there in ’67, when they burned the place down in the big ’67 War. There were four officers. There was the consul general; there was the consul, who was a wonderful fellow, George Lane, who did the commercial work. I was the vice-consul, and I did all the consular work, immigrant visas, non-immigrant visas. I was also youth. I was also culture. I was information. I talked to the USIA guy all the time in Damascus. I was the bonne-à-tout-faire for all the other kinds of dogs and cats that the consul would bring in. Then there was a CIA fellow. I think he also had the title of consul. There was a secretary, our communicator, the CIA communicator, and that was it. It was a very small outfit.

Q: What type of work were you doing? You say you have consular work, but I assume that there is a fairly substantial Syrian community in the United States, isn’t there?

CLARK: Yes, and in a way, that was difficult, or heartbreaking. They had in those days these very strict immigration laws. Whereas there’s a Syrian community in the United States, there’s an even bigger Armenian community. Armenians had fled in large numbers from Turkey after the First World War. Many of them had ended up in northern Syria and Aleppo. Their children had gone, one way or another, to the United States and at this point, in the mid-’60’s, were bank presidents and corporate executives who wanted their mother or their grandmother to come live with them in California or Detroit. But I knew perfectly well that they probably were not going to come back to Syria, so I would follow the law and say, “Well, of course, but you have to get an immigrant visa,” and there was at the time a very long waiting list for immigrant visas. So that was a difficult part of the job, but it was good, it was a maturing kind of experience.

Q: Well, did you get hit every time you turned around with how come you all are so supportive of Israel, or was that something that just wasn’t a matter of immediate concern?

CLARK: It came up all the time, and being young and without details or experience, I would want to talk about it. Older people in the embassy in Damascus would say, “oh, just duck the subject, just try not to talk about it,” but I was willing to talk about it. In Northern Syria it was less of a burning issue than it was in Damascus. Sometimes it wouldn’t come up at all or sometimes we would agree not to worry about it. So I think Syrians did feel that we really had been very supportive of people they considered to be their enemies.

Q: What about the allegations made against the Foreign Services, usually fostered by the Israeli disinformation service and all, that the Foreign Service is too partial to the Arab cause? Did you see any manifestations of this?

CLARK: Well, I’ve thought about that a good deal. I think that if you live in a culture for a decade or more of your life, and you study the language and the culture, you’re going to develop some sympathies with that culture and that point of view. Of course, we, living in the Middle East, are presented with the issue in a way that people living in this country
are not, usually. So I think it’s not terribly surprising that a lot of Foreign Service people would have the reputation as being sympathetic with Arabs, or the Arab point of view, because, in fact, they were aware of an Arab point of view to a degree that most Americans were not and are not. At the same time, I think that there’s been, as I alluded earlier, an enormous change and development in the attitudes of Americans in general, of the Foreign Service itself, in their reading and their attitudes and their feelings towards the Arab-Israeli problem.

Q: You are in a way fortunate to have left just before all hell broke loose in '67.

CLARK: Let me mention one other thing about being vice consul in Aleppo. Being as isolated as we were, you’re happy to see visitors. “Howdy, Stranger,” is a word of welcome. I remember there was some star or some Fulbright person coming through, and we invited him to dinner, just because it was an American face, and you didn’t see that many of them up there. He was a nice fellow, a political scientist, and in the way of political scientists in the ‘60’s, he was a behavioralist. What behavioralists do is they have lists of questions they go through. What’s your name? Your father’s name? What do you do? And so forth and so on. Well, he had just come from spending several weeks in a village in northern Syria, and—mind you, this is 1965, let’s say—it turns out that another American political scientist had done the same thing in the same village ten years earlier—back in 1954, let’s say—and the guy who we met was astonished and astounded by what had happened. For example, he said, the guy in 1954 would ask anybody in the village, “What would you like your son to be when your son grows up?” And the answer, of course, “Why, of course, a farmer like me. What else is there to be, except a farmer, like me?” Maybe five percent or 10 per cent would say, well, a muezzin would be nice, or if he was the guy who chanted the prayers in the mosque, or a religious leader or some sort of eminent person. This guy, in 1964, went to the same village, asked the same question. Something like 60 per cent said ra‘is al-jumhuriya, ‘president of the republic.’ They wanted their son to grow up to be president of Syria! Wow, this scientist was really excited. He said, “There's been a tremendous change here in people’s values and attitudes.” What had happened in that ten years was that the Alawites, from that part of Syria, had taken over the government. The government was now dominated by the Alawite minority, which included the region of Syria which included this village, so that people all of a sudden knew people who knew people who knew somebody who was very important in Damascus.

Well, I told this story to a political officer in Damascus. He yawned, you know, ho-hum. My read from Aleppo of the embassy in Damascus was that the political people were very wrapped up in cabinet changes, and who had spent six months on a trip to the Soviet Union or something, but they had no idea—and, worse, they had no interest—in what was really happening in Syria. With Nasser, under the United Arab Republic, land reform had taken place. There was this fellow who worked in the consulate. He would talk about how many villages his father owned. This guy, quote, owned an entire valley, which might have included twelve villages, and he owned all of that valley and all of those villages, and he collected taxes from everybody. He got services from all those people. This was a real feudal economy. By 1965 all that had changed. Well, that has a big
political repercussion, and my perception from Aleppo was that the embassy didn’t know and didn’t have much access to that kind of information, and so it didn’t get on our radar screen very much; whereas, being up there, I thought it was kind of interesting.

Q: This, of course, is all from views that I found when I was consul general in Naples. I found that our embassy in Rome spent an awful lot of time looking at minute percentages of change in the political life there, and then we would get something down, “Find out what they think about this down in Naples.” And the people in Naples, you know, it’s all home, you know, who gives a damn? Well, you left there in ’66. What were you thinking about doing? Were you beginning to focus? This is your first real time—

CLARK: While I was at SAIS I had decided that I really liked economics, and I was asked whether I would like to go back to the Arabic Language School in Beirut and finish the 21-month program, since I’d only had about eight months, and I said no. I didn’t want to spend the next 20 years of my career mostly in the Middle East. I wanted to do economics work, and I thought the place to get into economics was Western Europe. They said okay, and by my great good fortune, guess what: I was assigned to do economic work in Western Europe. I was the one-man economic-commercial section in Luxembourg, from ’66 to ’68, so that was the beginning of my exposure there.

Q: When you were looking at Luxembourg, were you looking at the overall economics? Luxembourg later became much more of a seat of the European Union and all that.

CLARK: Luxembourg’s a very small place. It’s got a population of a couple of hundred thousand people. But in those days it was the headquarters of the Coal and Steel Community, which still existed, and the European Court of Justice, which was small but starting. And it was the Secretariat of the European Parliament. So there already were some European institutions there. Indeed, one of the values, I think, of that embassy in Luxembourg was to get another viewpoint on European issues. I would go off and I would talk to the minister of the economy or somebody in the prime minister’s office about the latest meeting of the EU commissioners on this or that subject and get some information about who said what and get their perspective on what was going on. Then the Luxembourg government was, and still is, very friendly, very pro-American. They didn’t worry too much about their world empires like the French and the British, or even the Belgians. So it was a very good listening post.

Q: Very accessible, too. No matter what your rank, they were accessible.

CLARK: Yes, they didn’t stand on protocol. Again, because it’s so small, people are quite informal.

Q: But it’s so often been a social embassy, as far as somebody who is often a lady whose husband has made a lot of money and then died or is kind of retired is usually the person who gets tagged as being the ambassador. Not always. Who was the ambassador when you were there?
CLARK: I had two ambassadors. The first was Patricia Roberts Harris, who was a very distinguished lady. She was one of the seconds of the nomination of LBJ in Atlantic City in 1964, and she later was Dean of the Law School of Howard University, and an attorney.

Q: She was African-American and was very prominent here in Washington.

CLARK: You know, as you’re suggesting, the job of US ambassador to Luxembourg can be viewed as mostly protocol and mostly good will, mostly PR, mostly giving dinner parties. As an FSO, I don’t sell that short; I think it’s an important role. The second ambassador while I was there was a businessman from Boston who had been a friend of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, McCormick. His name was George Feldman. So I thought both Ambassador Patricia Roberts Harris and George Feldman did a good job in that kind of role.

Q: I was wondering about Patricia Harris. I’ve never met the lady. She’s now deceased. I’ve heard that she could be a very difficult person. Was this—

CLARK: I think the DCM bore the brunt of that. A career FSO was her DCM, and there were three or four other of us underneath them, and I think she would get impatient with him sometimes. I think she was a little nervous because she hadn’t done this kind of thing before, and when things didn’t happen quick, quick, quick, right on schedule or on time, she would put some pressure on the DCM. But I was, as I said, one layer or two layers down, and so I didn’t get that very much.

Q: I think also at the time there was a problem that this was not a very highly sought post for DCM’s, so they often did not get the most practiced DCM’s, or at least ones who were able to deal with political appointees as well as one maybe at a larger post or something.

CLARK: Well, Richard Boehm was the DCM when I was there, and he ended up ambassador in Cyprus and someplace else, I guess it was Muscat and Oman. So Dick did fine in terms of his career.

Q: George Feldman had been ambassador to Malta before.

CLARK: That’s right.

Q: Sort of from the economic point of view, what were the words of wisdom that you were getting about whither the European Union and all that? I mean, how did we feel about this economic entity back in those days?

CLARK: I think the European Union was looked upon as a big investment opportunity for the United States, because all of a sudden, instead of being six markets, it was going to be one market, and that was the period, you may remember, there was this book called, *Le défi américain*, by Servan-Schreiber—
Q: The American Challenge.

CLARK: The American Challenge, about how Americans were coming with their financial power, borrowing Eurodollars in Europe and turning around and using the money to buy or invest in industries in Europe. So the picture was of America using European money to buy European firms for Americans to own. Well, I’m sure there was something to that. Luxembourg was important—I was the economic-commercial guy—too because it was a burgeoning financial center. One of the ways of launching bond issues was to get a holding company in Luxembourg and do it through that for tax reasons. That was one thing I was reporting on a lot.

Q: How were the bankers there? One always thinks of the Swiss bankers, who, particularly in those days, were very close-mouthed and very difficult to deal with. Luxembourg was sort of the same structure, but a different attitude, wasn’t it?

CLARK: Very different attitude. The Luxembourgers are quite informal. The bankers I had contact with were extremely friendly. They would talk to you about whatever was going on. I’m sure there would be certain commercial subjects that would be confidential, but I was never delving into any financial details of any transactions, so that didn’t pose any problems for them. I remember a banker named Kofranzen, who was extremely friendly. The Luxembourgers are just a much more approachable group of people than the Swiss.

Q: Were we trying to locate mob money or anything like that at that point?

CLARK: There was not a lot of that. The Fund of Funds was around in those days, sort of a mutual fund made up of mutual funds. Kornblum—Bernard Kornblum. The SEC didn’t think much of him, and eventually, I think, Americans, even Americans overseas, were told they could not invest in the Fund of Funds. So there was a certain amount of that kind of financial hanky-panky or stuff that people disapproved of. Luxembourg was a place for holding companies for people for various tax reasons. But it was not the big center for “hot” capital.

Q: This is Tape 2, Side 1, with Warren Clark.

CLARK: We didn’t hear a lot of stories about hot money. There were complaints from the French, because the stories were that the French would park their money in Luxembourg to avoid French taxes. But they might as well park it in Switzerland too, I suppose.

Q: I don’t know if it was exactly at this time, but Monaco was sort of raising itself up as being a place to be able to stick your money, and de Gaulle practically declared war on Monaco. Were you at all—

CLARK: Those kinds of things happened every now and then. The French would try to
strong-arm the Luxembourgers on some particular issue. Radio Luxembourg was another issue, because Radio Luxembourg is commercial and France had no commercial radio in those days, or television was coming on rapidly. So all of a sudden, here was this commercial source, with French advertisers, not in France, and the French were worried about not being able to control that.

Q: Were these things we kind of watched without taking stands?

CLARK: The American taxpayer—God bless them—paid me a certain amount of money for a long time to learn a lot about things and to analyze and report about things, but I wasn’t doing an awful lot about those things. I mean, on the growth of capital markets in Europe or disputes between France and Luxembourg. These were interesting. I suppose, intrinsically, they had an interest to the US Treasury Department and the people who were trying to develop European capital markets; but I was a reporter during much of this time. I wasn’t terribly active in shaping events, in that sense.

Q: You left when in ’68?


Q: I was wondering because June of ’68 was a very interesting month, particularly since you were—it wasn’t just in France. It was particularly in France, but it was one of those times when things sort of bowled over—Rudi the Red, the student revolt and all, May and June. Did anything like that—

CLARK: Yes, everybody was affected by it. Everybody knew about it; Luxembourgers had sons and daughters who were studying in Paris. They were worried about “Irish confetti,” and there were other things. Yes, we were there all during May, when the uprising took place in Paris, and people were very concerned about it and watching and reading about it and so forth. Luxembourg itself was very quiet. Nothing much went on, but when we got back here—it was in early June, I think, like maybe the first week of June—there were machine guns on the steps of the US Capitol. Abernathy’s poor people were encamped down on the Mall, Sixteenth Street was not burning, but it was still smoking and smoldering. So the aftermath of ’68 was still very evident here in Washington.

Q: What did you come back to? I mean, what were you going to do?

CLARK: I came back to the FSI 21-week course, whatever it was, in economics. I was there from roughly June to December of ’68, studying economics.

Q: This course was quite famous at the time, a very quick fix in economics was supposed to bring sort of economics-illiterate FSO’s to be able to at least understand decent business economics rather than theoretical. How did you find the course?

CLARK: It was very good. It was very helpful to me. Of course, I had already had a
certain amount of economics at Georgetown, undergraduate courses, and I’d had some
more economics at SAIS, but there were a lot of gaps in my knowledge—and still are—
so that six-month course filled in a lot of those gaps and got me used to thinking more in
terms of economics. It also taught me calculus. I had escaped calculus all that time, and I
was 31 years old. I thought I was going to die learning calculus, but I did, at least grasp
enough to get along, and I can still do a little bit of calculus, differential more than
integral. So it was a good experience. Also it got me up to speed, and when I graduated
from that course—I was a glutton for punishment—I kept on and started taking graduate
courses in economics at Georgetown, beginning the following semester in the spring of
’69. I ended up as a candidate for an MA, and I eventually got an MA in economics from
Georgetown.

Q: What was your job after you finished the six-month course?

CLARK: December of ’68 I went to work in the Economic Bureau in the Office of Fuels
and Energy. In those days it was E/FSE.

Q: You were doing that from when to when?

CLARK: December ’68 to June of ’71. Two and a half years.

Q: How did we look at fuels at that time? We’d gone through the ’67 War. The Suez
Canal was blocked. What was the situation?

CLARK: What happened during that period was that in September ’69, Qadhafi took
over in Libya. There was a coup in September ’69, and so from December ’68 to the fall
of ’69, I was learning what the oil business was all about. The head of the office was a
wonderful guy who still is a friend, Jim Akins, later ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Jim had
the world divided up. Under him I was doing the Middle East. So there I was with an
Arabic background, an economics background, bringing it together about Middle East oil.
And Qadhafi very quickly started to provoke a confrontation with the US oil companies
in Libya. Up until that time, the price of oil in the world was set by seven oil companies,
five of which were American, plus one British, one French, called the “Seven Sisters,”
which had enormous concessions in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, et cetera—like,
the concession included the whole country. There were such large concessions and such
small numbers of companies they could control the price. In Libya the situation was
different. Libya came along in the ‘60’s, just as I was coming into the Foreign Service.
They gave small concessions to a number of different companies with very firm
relinquishment requirements. So they had to invest in exploration fast and find oil fast,
because they had to give back maybe two-thirds of their territory after, let’s say, five
years. So they had a very strong incentive to find oil, and they did. They found a lot of
oil, and companies that found the oil were so-called independent companies, many of
them, which were not part of the “Seven Sisters.” You had Occidental Petroleum; there
was E. Bunker Hunt, the Texas oil man; Standard Oil of Indiana. A number of other
independent oil companies were very active. As you correctly described it, in the ’69-’70
period, the Suez Canal was closed. It had been filled up with sunken ships during the ’67
war with Israel and had not been reopened. There also was a pipeline across Saudi Arabia.

**Q: Tapline.**

CLARK: Tapline—to Sidon in Lebanon. That had been cut by a bulldozer I think in the spring of ’68 or the spring of ’69. A person described as the “Lawrence of Aramco” cut this pipeline, which was pushing through 20,000 barrels a day. A pipeline from Kirkuk and Mosul had been blown up, from Syria and Lebanon to Tartus and Tripoli had been blown up during the ’67 War. So the only way to get a barrel of oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe was all the way around Africa, unless you had oil in Libya. The price of oil, which remember was set by these seven companies, was set in the Persian Gulf. Now the distance from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam, where the big refining center is, was six times the round-trip distance from Rotterdam to Tripoli, Libya. Benghazi is the big oil center there in Libya. So transportation costs were much less, which meant that the companies with oil in Libya were able to sell it in Rotterdam for the same price that companies that had oil from the Persian Gulf sold it for in Rotterdam, but their transport costs were a lot lower. As you might expect, the profits were enormous, and the companies with production in Libya were making money hand over fist, like there was no tomorrow. And so they were producing oil as fast as they could, because on every barrel of oil you could make six times as much—or many times more money—than you could producing oil from the Persian Gulf. So Libyan production came along very fast, and Qadhafi said, in September of 1970, “If you don’t increase the posted price of oil,” which is the price on which taxes and big revenues come from, “I’ll shut you down. You’ll not be able to produce any oil in Libya.” So Jim Akins said to me, “Warren, do some arithmetic. How many tankers are there to bring oil from the Persian Gulf around Africa to Rotterdam to meet the demand of the Europeans?” It turned out there were not enough tankers to bring enough oil fast enough from the Persian Gulf to Rotterdam to meet demand. This meant that had Qadhafi shut down production in Libya, Europe would have had to draw down on its oil stocks and ultimately, in the worst case scenario, might have had government rationing. So I told that to Jim. Of course, he had probably figured this out for himself anyway, intuitively. In September of 1970 there was a meeting in New York with the CEO’s of each of the Seven Sisters, and the question facing them was: What do we do about Libya? And the independent oil companies, Occidental and Bunker Hunt and Conoco, had already caved in to Libya and had agreed to an increase in their posted price. And the question was: Were BP and Texaco and Sunoco, who were part of the Seven Sisters, going to give in and agree to an increase in the posted price to Qadhafi? So they said they wanted to come down and talk to the State Department. That was a Friday afternoon. We set up a meeting chaired by U. Alexis Johnson, the undersecretary for political affairs. He was on one side of the table and with him were: my boss, Jim Akins, who was head of FSE—he was the guy who knew everything—and his boss, Phil Trezise, who was assistant secretary for economic affairs; and then Joe Sisco, who was assistant secretary for the Near East, and other assistant and undersecretary level people. On the other side of the table from Johnson was John J. McCloy, who was the attorney for the Seven Sisters. On either side of him were the CEOs of the seven largest oil companies in the world. On the wall behind them were the
mere presidents of the Middle East operations of Esso and Mobil and Texaco and
Chevron and Gulf. And I was nothing. So the question came down to: Would the State
Department ask the Europeans to essentially go on rationing in order to protect the
sanctity of contracts held by American oil companies? The answer was no. In other
words, we would not take up the political cudgels for the oil companies with the
Europeans and risk shutting down production in Libya, which would risk shutting down
the wheels of industry in Europe.

So they said okay, and the next day two guys got on an airplane to Libya and agreed to an
increase in the posted price of oil on the part of BP and Texaco and Chevron. Well, when
that happened, it was an earthquake, because Qadhafi had broken the “monopoly on
price”, as we say. When that happened, the Shah of Iran immediately said, “Well, they’ve
increased the price there; now you’ve got to increase the price here.” So da da da da da,
more negotiations, they increased the posted price in the Persian Gulf. Then Qadhafi
says, Well, you increased the price . . . So they had a cross-ruff going. Royal Arabian
crude, f.o.b. the Persian Gulf, in the spring of ’69, was $1.85. By the middle of ’72 it was
up around $5, so it more than doubled, roughly tripled. And that laid the framework for
the crisis. That was the crack in the dam that led to the crisis in ’73, with the Middle East
war, in which the posted price of oil briefly got up, in the late ’70’s, to nearly $40 a
barrel, briefly. Of course, it’s now back down to less than $10 a barrel. But it was that
negotiation that was the lever that led to the sudden change in energy prices.

Q: From your point of view and listening to Akins and all, when the State Department
said, no, we’re not going to do this, what was the driving force? I mean, were they
looking economically, or were they looking politically, or how would you say?

CLARK: Well, first of all, that decision was taken by Johnson, because he was the
undersecretary for political affairs. And it was taken on the basis of politics. It was taken
on how much are we willing to take on politically with the Western Europeans, and it
was Johnson’s decision that, whatever other fish we were frying with NATO and the
European Union and other people, we were not going to take that one on, and so he
decided not to do it.

Q: Were we getting any input from Shell, which is British-Dutch?

CLARK: Yes, they were there.

Q: I mean, was it sort of up to the United States whether to lead this charge? Because,
really, the Europeans were being asked to ration—I would have thought it would have
been a European decision.

CLARK: One of the consequences of having won the Second World War was that the US
oil companies ended up dominating production in the world and in the Persian Gulf. Thus
the British were there with BP and BP/Shell, which is both Dutch and British. CFP sort of
limped along as a half-sister member of the club. But Standard of New Jersey, which was
Esso and Exxon, Standard Oil of NY, which was Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, and Socal—that’s
five American companies—dominated the world market, and they were the ones who could make or break decisions of that kind. And incidentally, the CEOs of BP and Shell were at that meeting with John McCloy.

Q: So were they making a strong pitch, or did you have a feeling that they knew what the answer was and they were coming to show that they had tried?

CLARK: Good question, very good question. They made their presentation. They told their story, but now that you’ve asked me, it didn’t sound as though they were ready to fall on their swords. That is, they could have said or could have indicated, well, if you won’t agree we’ll appeal to the White House, to Congress, to the European Union, to I don’t know who else. There was no appeal beyond U. Alexis Johnson.

Q: How was Akins as a boss?

CLARK: Well, I’m very prejudiced because I like him a lot. I thought he was wonderful. He’s a controversial person.

Q: That’s the term often used for him. I don’t know.

CLARK: Jim was essentially fired by Kissinger over, I think, policy differences but also personality differences. And there are stories about that, and I wasn’t there, so I don’t have any first-hand information about it.

Q: Well, basically the thing is that Akins would not agree to let Kissinger deal with the Saudis in Saudi Arabia when he was the ambassador without Akins being present.

CLARK: That was an important element. That was not the only element, but that was an important element.

Q: What was the spirit in the office of fuels and energy.

CLARK: It later became a very large office because energy became such an important part of our policies, but at the time it was very small. There was Jim Akins, myself, and two other guys, one of whom was Walt Whelan, and so it was a very small, high-morale group. We all got along together very well, and we all had lots of things to do, and we were dealing with matters of consequence, and we were being taken to lunch by oil companies in those days. They could still do that. I don’t know whether it’s kosher any more. So it was a very good time.

Q: How did your office fit within the Economic Bureau? You’re sort of newcomers on the block, in a way, people who have been used to dealing with other matters for a long time, tariffs, trade, balance of trade, and all, fuels and so on.

CLARK: They mostly let us alone, and the hierarchy—Jim Akins was the office director then; he reported to Jules Katz, who was the DAS, who reported to Phil Trezise, who was
the assistant secretary—but Katz and Trezise both admired and liked Akins, I think, and gave him the lead. They could have taken it away from him, but they didn’t.

**Q:** Were you all preparing for the doomsday, which happened in ’73, but you left in ’71, but I mean, were you drawing up doomsday plans at this point?

**CLARK:** No, I don’t think we saw, or at least I didn’t see, that far ahead. I think Jim did pretty quickly, and he published an article in *Foreign Affairs* or *Foreign Policy*—I don’t know exactly—but no, I didn’t foresee the crunch coming in ’73.

**Q:** What were our calculations about, say, Nigeria and Venezuela and Indonesia and other areas that weren’t the Middle East but oil producers? Were those pretty much bit players?

**CLARK:** Yes, in the oil industry, the prices were set elsewhere. That is, it’s a world industry; it’s a commodity which is basically fungible—a barrel here is basically the same as a barrel of oil there, with some minor differences, like sulfur and wax. Historically, the price was set in the US Gulf Coast, Port Arthur, in the ’30s and ’40s; then it was set in the Persian Gulf; and then it got set by Qadhafi and the Shah of Iran, and then by OPEC. So Venezuela played an important role in the founding of OPEC, back in 1960. In fact, I think they actually founded it. They said, okay, let’s all get together and talk. But it took Qadhafi and the Shah and the crisis in ’69 and ’73 to put it into effect.

**Q:** Were you getting much input on the personality of Qadhafi or on what was happening in Iran and all when you were doing analysis of this?

**CLARK:** Oh, yes. We were getting a lot of material on the Shah, a lot of material on Qadhafi and their ministers. Sheikh Ahmed Yamani in Saudi Arabia was a very important player. And Jim met most of these people himself, including Yamani, whom he knew quite well.

**Q:** Was Tariki also there? I can’t remember.

**CLARK:** Yes.

**Q:** What about Saudi Arabia. They were sort of keeping a low profile but would follow along with the rest of the people, or where were they?

**CLARK:** Yes, they were not in the leaders of the pack in terms of energy policy at that time. I think later they were leaders, in that, in effect, they were supporting the US view that energy prices shouldn’t rises too far too fast, because it would disrupt Western economies, and that could be in the long term against the interest of Saudi Arabia and of the energy exporters. So in fact, I think, in the mid-’70’s, Saudi Arabia was threatening to increase production in order to drive down the price if OPEC pushed too hard in driving the price up too fast.
Q: Was anybody looking after the interests of, let’s say, the Third World? You know, I mean, these prices were important to the Europeans and the United States and all, but frankly, we could foot the bill. But this could have been devastating, or was devastating, to a great majority of the population around the world. Was anybody concerned with this?

CLARK: I came in at the end of that issue when I was at the UN. What happened was that, indeed, you’re absolutely correct. The non-oil-exporting Third World countries started to complain vociferously. They first turned to the oil-exporting countries of the Third World and said help us, give us a discount, give us aid, give us whatever to help us with this terrible problem. Saudi Arabia did have enormous foreign aid funds, which you can always look on as *danegeld*, in other words, buying people’s silence, buying people to go away and shut up, but other countries were unwilling to pay *danegeld* and to have big aid programs. So the non-oil-exporters tried to organize something in the UN on energy. And the Algerians, who were, after all, oil exporters, very cleverly turned this around. They said, yes, we will discuss oil prices provided the industrialized countries discuss the international monetary system and the international trading system, and the hegemony of the IMF and the World Bank, these other countries that impinge on all of us Third World countries, both oil exporters and non-oil exporters. So the Algerians, in my view, rather cleverly turned the argument away from themselves onto a big mushy something-or-other which, in 1979, was called “the global negotiations.” And there was a resolution in the General Assembly which, for reasons that escape me, the Carter Administration voted in favor of, with a lot of reservations, to launch global investigations. And when I got to New York in 1981, one of my first jobs—I was the deputy for ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council—in effect, was to put that to sleep as quietly as possible.

Q: You left in ’71. Where’d you go in ’71?

CLARK: In ’71, I became Desk officer for Libya in the AFN.

Q: That should be very interesting. You were Desk officer from when to when?

CLARK: ’71 to ’73.

Q: All right, we’ll pick it up at that point.

CLARK: Okay, good. Thank you.

Q: Today is the 30th of December, 1998. Warren, when you took over the Libyan Desk in 1971, how did we see Libya, Qadhafi, and the whole thing?

CLARK: I think I was recruited for the job really because of my oil background. I had been doing Middle East oil for a couple of years, and so I knew that situation, and I think the Bureau saw that a knowledge of oil was important for that job. In fact, during a lot of
that time, there were oil negotiations going on. I think the coup in 1969 in Libya had
come as a shock to a lot of people, perhaps most people. We had had excellent relations
with the king and the former government; now here was this radical, Qadhafi, in charge,
and nobody knew exactly where he was coming from or what he was doing. And things
just progressively got from bad to worse. During the period I was Desk officer things
deteriorated considerably. The ambassador in Tripoli was Joe Palmer, who had switched
jobs with David Newsom. Newsom had been the ambassador; Palmer had been the
assistant secretary for Africa. And they switched just before the coup.

Q: I interviewed somebody who had served in Yemen who said he went out of his way to
assure Palmer that he was due for a very cushy job and that there was no possibility,
given the bureaucracy and all, that there would be any trouble in Libya.

CLARK: Right. Well, in retrospect there were storm clouds, but a lot of people didn’t see
them. Indeed, Joe Palmer had gone out to Tripoli in the spring or the summer of ’69, to
what looked like a very friendly government, with a lot of American interests, including
Wheelus Air Force Base. He’d only been there a month or two when the coup took place.
So things were winding down; the decision had already been taken to close Wheelus air
force Base, and that had almost been completed. And so it was kind of a hold-on-as-best-
one-can situation. There were a number of incidents during this period. We had these
electronic surveillance aircraft that flew 50 miles or more off the coast, and Qadhafi went
after one of them one day and tried to shoot it down. And this C-130 got away, but it
created a bit of a kafuffle. And it was not too long after that another C-130 went
through the same general region, 50 miles off the coast, escorted by a couple of fighter
planes. And when the Libyans went after it again, there was a tussle, and they shot down
some of the Libyan planes. After that, there were no incidents.

Q: By this time, what was our intelligence community saying? What were you getting
about Who was this guy Qadhafi and what makes him tick?

CLARK: As a desk officer—and I’m sure most desk officers have had this experience—
an enormous amount of paper crosses your desk every day, cables from the embassy and
intelligence reports and other things, and sometimes special intelligence. And you do get
the impression that if you don’t read this piece of paper, nobody’s going to read the piece
of paper, because there’s so much. So you very quickly develop a triage and how to get
through that in-basket exercise real, real fast. In the process, I think you know, after a
while, more about your client, your host government, probably, than anybody else, or you
should know more than anybody else, in the government. I could see things getting from
bad to worse with Libya and with Qadhafi at that time. There were a number of things
going on. One had to do with military sales. We had sold the previous régime, the royalist
régime, some C-130’s.

Q: These are transport planes.

CLARK: Big ones.
Q: Four-engine planes.

CLARK: Big, four-engine turboprop transport planes. They were wonderful for carrying lots of anything you want to carry around from one place to another. Well, because I’d been reading the sources, I knew that Qadhafi had been using these C-130s for all kinds of nefarious purposes. And there was a question coming up about delivery of more C-130s, because they had contracted for a larger number than had already been delivered. And there was also the question of delivering fighter aircraft, which also had been ordered by the previous régime, but not delivered. And during most of the time I was Desk officer, there was a long stall going on about delivering the aircraft, both the fighter and the transport aircraft, and I remember one meeting that I came upon by accident. There was an effort on the part of the Italians to sell helicopters to Qadhafi, and the American ambassador was back from Rome and was pushing very hard with the political-military people to approve the sale of these helicopters. And I came to the meeting like the bad fairy bearing the bad news that Qadhafi was someone not to be trusted and we would be very reluctant to see more military equipment going to him. Mind you, this is in the early days of Qadhafi—this is ‘71–’73—and I think it was not as clear to many people just how nefarious he was. But there surely was very strong pressure from the military sales people to approve sales of things to Libya.

Q: When you say nefarious activities, one looks at Libya and he’s got an interesting border—Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt—was he playing around there, or was he extending his reach, or have you got to that point yet?

CLARK: He had extended his reach beyond his neighbors, in terms of delivering arms. He was running arms to rebel régimes in various places.

Q: Why?

CLARK: I think Qadhafi came to power as a young man—I think he was about 30 years old—smarting from his perception of Arab humiliations—first in the Arab-Israeli situation, secondly by having a foreign power with big base rights in Libya. He was a nationalist, and took up the Arab nationalist ideology and cause. That tended to be, of course, not only anti-Israeli, in the sense of supporting any terrorist group or any other kind of group that was to try to do in Israel, but also supporting rebel groups that were struggling against perhaps duly constituted governments which were friendly to the United States or friendly to the Western powers. There were dissident groups in a number of countries that Qadhafi was supporting.

Q: What kind of advisors did Qadhafi have? I mean, were there éminences grises, or whatever it is, around him who had, say, dissident Syrians, Egyptians, Saudis, or what have you. Did we get up on that?

CLARK: There was no clear foreign power that had an inside track advising him in very broad ways. He did have Egyptian pilots who came in to fly his fighter planes for him, for example, and he did have Soviet assistance of one kind or another after a while. And
we knew in general who his primary advisers were on oil policy and other things. But they were Libyans. There was no kind of Soviet or Egyptian or other kind of éminence grise that was sort of pulling the strings behind the scenes, at least that I was aware of.

Q: Was there the equivalent to a Tariki or a Yamani, sort of an oil minister, because this is a pretty complicated subject, and you kind of need somebody of this nature.

CLARK: Yes, there was, and Qadhafi was a political person—he was not an economic or commercial person—and his oil minister was Abdessalam Jalloud, and Jalloud was the guy who negotiated with the oil companies. Mind you, these were all very young men who had had very little experience. And I know that they were nationalists, but beyond that they didn’t have necessarily a very excellent picture of what they were going to do or how they were going to do it. And I remember during the oil negotiations, when I was in my previous job in FSE, some oil guys saying, well, they’re going to go off on this airplane and see Jalloud, and when they walked in the room they had no idea what Jalloud was going to say. And the estimate was Jalloud didn’t know what he was going to say either until he walked into the room. And so it was a bit of a seat-of-the-pants operation, but it was a seat-of-the-pants with enormous consequences. We were talking about billions of dollars of revenue that were being affected, not only in Libya, but Libya was affecting other countries. The world oil market was being affected by these young, ambitious, and not very experienced young men.

Q: While you were there did the CIA seem to have any sort of fix on what was happening there, or were they as cut off as you?

CLARK: I think you’d have to say—and I’ve never studied this, and I wasn’t really on the inside when it happened, but from what I’ve heard people say—they missed the coup in ’69, which was, of course, the big watershed event. Now some people did see warning signs. Ambassador Newsom said he saw warning signs, and indeed he had warned, I think, some people in Libya about excessive conspicuous consumption and other kinds of activities that were undermining the legitimacy of the old régime. But nobody had Qadhafi identified ahead of time as a plotter or a potential person that was going to turn into the kind of role he had.

Q: Well, during this ’71 to ’73 period, were we seeing Qadhafi as a tool of the Soviet Union, or at least a willing collaborator, or how were we seeing him?

CLARK: I think we were seeing him as a dangerous, unpredictable, independent Arab nationalist operator who would work with the Soviets if it was in his interest, work with Egyptians if it was in his interest, confront us or mollify us depending on how he saw the cards that day; but he was someone, because of the oil and, in the beginning, because of the base rights, who had enormous influence and power. But I think he was seen as a maverick and someone—especially after they tried to shoot down some of our planes—a very dangerous person, who had to be treated carefully and contained as best we could.

Q: While you were there, Nasser died, didn’t he?
CLARK: Yes, he had died, I would say, around 1970.

Q: Just, really, before you came back. Sadat came in, but Sadat was considered sort of a lightweight at that time, wasn’t he?

CLARK: I think he was just getting his feet on the ground. This, of course, was before the Camp David accords and before the ’73 War. And I think Sadat and Egyptians were treating Qadhafi carefully. He was a powerful neighbor. A number of old-régime Libyans fled to Egypt and were residents in Cairo, and this was widely known, but they were kind of neutralized, and that was not a big source of tension. But I think that the fact that Qadhafi was—or it was thought that he might be—supporting the Arab Brotherhood people or others of questionable loyalty to the Egyptian régime was a cause of concern for the Egyptians. They did loan Egyptian pilots, and Libya was so wealthy—and it had a very small population, a not very well educated, at all, population—so Libya was a big source of employment for a lot of people, including Egyptians, but also including Yugoslavians.

Q: How about East Germans? Had they gotten in there? They got in later on into the security, but I was wondering if they were.

CLARK: Not noticeably that I recall during the ’71-’73 period.

Q: Well, now, ’71 to ’73 was sort of the high time of the NSC advisor Henry Kissinger and Nixon. Did the Nixon Kissinger duo focus on this, or was this pretty much left to the State Department?

CLARK: No, there was not a lot of interaction—at least that I was aware of—with the NSC or the White House on Libya and these kinds of questions. I think the ball was being carried mostly by David Newsom, who was the assistant secretary, and the office director, Jim Blake, had been Newsom’s DCM in Tripoli, so they worked very closely.

Q: They knew the area.

CLARK: Yes.

Q: I would have thought, particularly in this period, that there would have been consideration of launching a strike against them, I mean, after all, for shooting the planes 50 miles out. That’s above and beyond the normal disputed territory shooting, and Libya being not a very powerful country, I would have thought there would have been temptation on our part to say, well, let’s go in and get ’em.

CLARK: Well, there was a raid, but it came 15 years later. We did shoot down the Libyan planes that came after our C-130 at that point. I think it was still so sensitive, so important—it was still producing three million barrels a day of oil—that we didn’t want to go further with a confrontation than we thought was necessary.
**Q:** In dealing with something like this, when one hears the word oil, the other word one often hears is fungible. I mean, once a barrel of oil gets outside the state boundaries, it can go anywhere to be used anyplace. Was that more or less what was happening, I mean that, okay, he could be raising all sorts of hell, but the oil was coming out?

**CLARK:** No. He still wielded a lot of power and influence in the oil industry because of the situation that prevailed back in ‘69 and ’70. The Suez Canal was closed; the pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean were closed, and Europe was still dependent on Libyan oil as late as ’73, in that there were not enough tankers to make up the difference by bringing the oil around Africa. But that was, of course, changing rapidly—tankers were being built, and bigger and bigger tankers were being built, and indeed tankers were so big they couldn’t go through the Suez Canal even if it was open—and so that advantage rapidly disappeared during this 1970’s. But in this period, ’71-’73, Qadhafi still had enormous power over the market for oil, just because of his location and the shortage of transportation.

**Q:** Were you working at that time with Jim Akins, or had Akins moved on?

**CLARK:** Jim moved on after I left. He went to the NSC, I guess, maybe in ’72, and then he went as ambassador to Saudi Arabia—I’m not exactly sure of the dates, but probably—’73 or ’74. So Jim was around but I was not working with him frequently.

**Q:** In your work, how did you find the Libyan representation in Washington?

**CLARK:** Almost nonexistent. They had an ambassador who hardly ever appeared and hardly ever said anything. There was a number two fellow, who was young and who would answer the telephone now and then, and every once in a while when we wanted to protest something, he was the guy that we could get to come in to receive the protest note. But their embassy and their foreign office was pretty much non-functioning in terms of day-to-day working on diplomatic relationship.

**Q:** What about Americans in Libya?

**CLARK:** There was one interesting sideline on the embassy. The Libyans did have a number of students studying atomic energy in the United States, and after they took a shot at our C-130, we were making an assessment of Qadhafi and we decided it was probably not really a great idea to have a lot of Libyans studying atomic physics in the United States. Their embassy grumbled about that, that we were not extending the visas of the Libyan students in the United States.

**Q:** Well, we had really for a long time, despite the lack of really good relations, an extraordinary number of Libyans studying in the United States.

**CLARK:** Yes, because there was a lot of money from oil, and so forth, and so there were a lot of Libyans here.
Q: In the ’71 to ’73 period, did we feel Qadhafi was pretty well in the seat of power, or were looking to say maybe another group will knock him off or something?

CLARK: There may well have been some wishful thinking that somebody else might come along or there might be some restoration of the monarchy, but I think realistically nobody thought that there was any viable opposition. The monarch was pretty much discredited as being corrupt in many ways and not very effective in many ways and certainly out of tune with the kind of Arab nationalism that was being stirred up by Qadhafi.

Q: As we talk right now, Qadhafi is still in power, and it’s 30 years since he took over. So it’s always interesting to see how we observed it at the time.

CLARK: He’s one of the longer-lasting heads of state, isn’t he? Fidel Castro’s still around, too.

Q: Yes. How did we see him as far as Africa goes? Was he playing around in Sub-Saharan Africa at that point?

CLARK: He was beginning to play around in Africa. There were dissident groups in Chad, and he was beginning to cast his eye south of the Sahara. He wasn’t doing an awful lot yet; of course, later on he did a great deal. But he revived a claim to territory in Chad. There was some dispute back in the 1930s about drawing a line across the desert between what was then French Equatorial Africa and the Italian colony of Libya, and the line got changed at one point, and he challenged that. And so international lawyers scurried around and prepared briefs, and the geographer of the State Department prepared a piece of paper, and everybody concluded that he had no claim, or a very, very weak claim. But that sort of laid the groundwork, later on, for what was basically his invasion of Chad, or at least northern Chad. So things were beginning, and it started with this picking at this legal issue.

Q: Were there any other areas that we should cover during this time of Libya?

CLARK: I guess I can’t think of any.

Q: Americans in trouble?

CLARK: Oh, yes, there was an interesting incident. Of course, we must have been closed, and most Americans were leaving or had left except for people in the oil sector. They had found it more difficult to renew their visas, but there were still quite a few. But while I was Desk officer some evangelical Christians crossed the border from Tunisia, and they were picked up handing out leaflets, trying to convert people to Christianity, or at least there were a lot of leaflets in their car. And they were very straightforward about it. They were evangelicals; they were out to convert Muslims to Christianity. So, of course, that was anathema to the Libyans, and they threw them in jail. So that period
lasted, I guess, about six months, and we tried to spring them from jail. And actually, the period when they were in jail coincided with a visit that I made to Tripoli. I was in touch with their parents back here in the US, so I carried messages from their parents. It was quite poignant because one of the missionaries was married, and his wife had had a child while he was in jail. So I brought the happy news to him that he had a child and everybody was well. And then the Libyans finally relented and kicked them out of the country. But that kind of thing happened.

Q: Was there much media attention to that, or was focused on?

CLARK: When I was desk officer, Newsweek did a cover story on Qadhafi, and I think The New York Times Sunday magazine had a cover story on Qadhafi. He was beginning to be visible on people’s radar screens as a maverick, as somebody who was supporting opposition groups or terrorist groups. So, yes, the publicity was beginning at that time.

Q: Were you feeling any influence on how we were looking at it from pro-Israeli groups in the United States because of his terrorist anti-Israeli activities?

CLARK: There was not a lot of direct lobbying of me as the Desk officer by Israeli groups. I think it was very clear after a while that he would support almost any terrorist who would do something against Israel. His rhetoric was totally unambiguous about his desire to eliminate the State of Israel, so that, of course, was something we firmly opposed and tried to scotch his assistance and so forth. So there probably wasn’t an awful lot for an Israeli lobby to do, in the sense that we should have agreed that this was a bad thing and should be stopped in any way it could be stopped.

Q: Well, then you left in ’73, and whither?

CLARK: Harvard University. You remember I had said that I had decided I had a real desire to get into good solid academic economics. By this time, by ’73, I had completed the work for an MA in economics at Georgetown, sort of working nights and weekends. I also had completed the MA at SAIS, by finishing my French language requirement. So I had two MA’s, but I was still an eager beaver, and I wanted to play at least briefly in the big time of academic economics. So the State Department kindly gave me one of these wonderful years where you go to university and you basically take and do what you want to do. And I was attached to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and the requirements there were very broad. Take a certain number of courses and write some papers. But, in fact, I pretended I was a first-year Ph.D. candidate in economics, so I was taking the basic theory and quantitative methods and trade theory and that kind of stuff that a first-year Ph.D. candidate would be taking at Harvard. And it was an exhilarating experience and also a humbling experience. I found out that notwithstanding my MA from Georgetown there were other colleagues of mine that were vastly better prepared than I was, especially in quantitative methods, not only calculus but mathematical economics and statistics. And so I found myself struggling with some of those courses. As a consequence, I cut back second semester. I completed the courses, but I cut back and took other courses that were less rigorous, perhaps, in a quantitative way. One of
them included a course called value theory. It was a course in Marxist economics, taught by two charming fellows, Sam Bowles and Herb Gettis, who went from Harvard to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. It was a very lively kind of course and discussion. I found that the economists that I dealt with and the Foreign Service people who dealt with economic issues really didn’t have a good grasp of Marxist economics. They’d never been taught, really taught, Marxist economics except in economic history or something like that. And when you are talking to a French economist, or even a British or a German economist, they are coming from a background that is steeped in Marxist analysis and a Marxist way of thinking—class conflict is taken for granted, the economic motivation of groups and individuals is taken for granted, struggles over shares of income between capital and labor is taken for granted. In my subsequent work I was doing a lot of stuff with the OECD in Paris, which is just the industrialized countries, but it’s full of these guys who’ve had a very good grounding in Marxist economics. So I found it very valuable later on that I took this course, as well as finding the people who gave it quite charming.

Q: Well, did you find there was a problem in taking Marxist economics, because I would think as an American, I mean, you can’t help but see things through the American prism, and the European prism being, for whatever reason—I mean, class conflict makes more sense than it does in the American context because, well, I mean people keep expanding because of the lack of being constrained.

CLARK: Well, we have a lot more social mobility, economic mobility to toss up and down.

Q: Yes, that really louses up the whole idea. I would think it would be very difficult to listen to this without saying, gee, that’s a bunch of bullshit, because, from our perspective, where from the European perspective it might make sense.

CLARK: Well, I think you’ve touched on something, which is there’s a reason why Europeans pay more attention to Marxist analysis than we do. I think I looked on it from a classical sort of Foreign Service point of view, that if I’m going to explain the United States to them, or if I’m going to explain them to the United States, I have to understand both perspectives. I have to be able to, on the one hand, evangelize, if you will, for, let us say, market economics, while understanding and answering the challenges to that that come from European economists—just as I would feel I needed to interpret where the Europeans were coming from in explaining something to somebody at the Fed or the Treasury or whatever. So I felt rather comfortable. Indeed, I kind of liked the idea of being able to speak two languages, in effect, and translating between them. And I thought that that gave me an insight into what was going on that I would not have had if I had only been working in one kind of paradigm.

Q: Well, I’m trying to capture the spirit of the times. We’re talking about ’73-74. Would Marxist economics—I mean, you have at that time the example of the Soviet Union particularly, but also China and some others, which supposedly were working on Marxist economic principles, but whatever it was it was a disaster—did there seem to be a split
between, say, this is the real Marxist economics working here, those guys over there in the Soviet Union are running a completely different show, or was there sympathy for what was going on?

CLARK: I think probably the lines were blurred. I think certainly there’s a distinction between the political-military interests of the Soviet Union and some sort of economic ideology of the Soviet Union. But remember, this period, ‘73-74, was kind of the end of the most radical time in the United States, and the fact that I was getting this course from these two guys was for a reason. It was because they had come to maturity in the ‘60s, when there were very strong social protests, political protests, especially by young people in the United States who were challenging The System and The Establishment. So for not my generation, but for people who were 15 or 20 years younger than I, maybe even 10 years younger than I, Marxists analysis seemed to explain a lot of what was going on in the ‘60s. They thought it helped explain the Vietnam War, the civil rights movements, and so forth. Now I think a lot of other people could just as very quickly say, oh, that’s ridiculous, you can’t say that we were in Vietnam because of economic motivations—

Q: It’s kind of hard to come up with that one.

CLARK: —but that’s not to say that there weren’t a lot of American intellectuals, young intellectuals, who were seduced or captured in a way by this kind of analysis, the way they were in the 1930s in the midst of the Depression, when Marxism seemed to provide explanation to a crisis that was difficult to explain otherwise. Vietnam was difficult to explain to a lot of people. It was difficult to understand how we ended up there in the way we did. You had this group, which quickly did not get tenure at Harvard and ended up at another university, who were sort of intrigued. But as I think the contradictions of communism, not to mention Marxism, became more and more apparent in the ‘70s and, of course, in the 1980s, they had to shift their ground and look for other kinds of things. They never called it Marxist economics directly, because that was kind of a taboo. It was called radical political economy and things like that, but it was based on Marxism. I thought then that when I would hear a European talking I could understand better where the European was coming from, what intellectual tradition he was coming from when he was saying the things he said.

Q: It is interesting how ideology seems to play such a small part within the American body politic, I mean well-defined ideology rather than saying, well, I’m a conservative or a liberal. I mean, Marxism and all that doesn’t seem to strike the same chord in the United States that it does in Europe.

CLARK: I think there are reasons for that. I think part of it is that Marxist analysis is basically a static analysis. European economies and European societies for many generations were not terribly dynamic in terms of social mobility, economic mobility, economic growth, and whatever, whereas our society, of course, is extremely dynamic, socially, economically, so that this kind of ideology plays less of a role, given our different kind of history.
Q: Well, did you find yourself at all, being a little older and having been around the block and dealing with oil problems and American problems and all, coming at this with a little different eye than the normal students coming up through the academic ladder?

CLARK: Well, there’s no doubt I brought to my year in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a lot of experience that other people didn’t have. I didn’t come, let’s say, with very strong economic ideological baggage, but I had a lot of fun because in the fall of ’73 the war broke out in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs.

Q: The October War.

CLARK: The October War, the Yom Kippur War. And there was a briefing at the Baker Library at the Business School, and they asked me and a professor at MIT named Maury Edelman, whom I knew, to be on a panel to discuss the implications for oil of the war in the Middle East. This was right at the beginning of the big shoot-up of oil prices and gas lines and so forth. So that was fun and exciting. That led to my leading a study group at the Institute for Politics at Harvard on the Middle East and Middle East politics. I found I enjoyed teaching and leading seminars and that kind of stuff, which, curiously, I’ve ended up doing in different ways since. So in fact, I was giving as well as receiving, and that I found very enjoyable.

Q: Well, in ’74 you finished up your sabbatical year. Whither?

CLARK: From there I went back to Washington, and from ’74 to ‘76 I was the macroeconomic person in EUR/RPE. EUR/RPE is the regional office for political-economic affairs in the European Bureau. It’s a large office, and in that office there’s a job that deals with macroeconomic policies predominantly in the OECD. There is a committee called the Economic Policy Committee in the OECD that deals with economic forecasts for each member country, including the United States, and the OECD as a whole has committees on balance of payments and prices. And so I was doing the macroeconomic forecasts.

Q: As somebody who got a D- in economics at Williams, before your time, by Kenneth Gordon—he gave me a D- and I stayed clear of that after. He later became economic advisor to Eisenhower. But anyway, would you explain for me and maybe for some of the readers of this what you mean when you say “macroeconomics.”

CLARK: What’s happening to the economy as a whole, in terms of GNP, for example, which you could look on as national income, the different components of GNP or national income, what’s happening in large aggregates such as investment, consumption, government spending; and you can break that down also into what’s happening in prices, although with prices you start to be getting into microeconomics. And monetary policy is an important element of macroeconomics, that is, what’s the policy towards interest rates, the rates of growth, the money supply, accessibility of credit, and those kinds of things?

Q: This period, ’74 to ’76, the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of ’73 and all, hit gas
prices, particularly in Europe. This must have been almost a major preoccupation, that is what the gas crisis was doing to them.

CLARK: Well, it was not only what the gas crisis was doing. Very soon, after I started this job, because of the sudden increase in energy prices, we had a recession. We had a very sharp downturn of economic activity beginning in ’74. Again, this was not called very accurately. You may remember that President Ford, because Nixon had resigned, had a brief policy called “Whip Inflation Now” (WIN), which was to restrain demand and restrain prices. Well, that quickly died when it was realized that the economy was in a free fall down, and the government would turn around very quickly, encouraging people to spend and consume. And so because it was a turning point in the economy and a recession, that made it a very, very interesting time to be looking at macroeconomics.

Alan Greenspan at the time was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and in my job I was dealing with CEA, the Council of Economic Advisors at the White House, and the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve, which has an enormous amount of intellectual capital, very smart, very skilled people, working on macroeconomic issues as components of US monetary policy. And so I was putting together those elements from those sources for presentation at the OECD in Paris on the outlook for the US economy and comments on what other countries were doing. There was a recession not only in the US, but really in most of the OECD countries. The OECD is an advisory group; you can’t order anybody to do anything, but it’s a place where economists and central bankers can get together and say, well, the ecology was, yes, I’m having a recession, you’re having a recession, and we’re going to be able to help each other get out of it if we simultaneously reflate, in the sense of increasing government spending or decreasing interest rates. And so that’s the kind of discussions that were going on in that period.

Q: Were the economists of Western Europe coming to the same conclusions that, say, American economists were coming to of what to do and how to do it, or were they coming at it at a different angle?

CLARK: I think there was broad agreement on the sources of the problem, a sudden dramatic rise in energy prices which amounts to an enormous tax on the economy so that all of a sudden there’s less money left over to do everything else, to buy other things. Because demand for energy is kind of inelastic, meaning you’ve got to have a certain amount of heat to get through the winter, if you’ve got to pay four times as much for heat, then there’s less money left over to buy clothes and fruits and vegetables, so the clothing and fruits and vegetable people suffered. There was, however, a certain game that went on, which is that while I have a recession my GNP is down by two percentage points, but your economy is only down by one percentage point. And my inflation is terrible; I’m running a six per-cent inflation rate. But your inflation rate’s not so bad; you’re only running a three per cent inflation rate. So you’re better off than I am, so you should do more than I can do to reflate. In other words, you have more margin, you have more room, to pump up the economy, to pump up the money supply, which will then encourage my exports to you, which will help me come out of my recession. And since I’m in a deeper hole than you are, we’re going to come up to the surface closer together.
Well, that’s the kind of argument that a country that was doing poorly would make. Of course, a country that was doing better would use a reverse kind of argument. Well, you know, we don’t want to make inflation worse, there’s not the need to . . .

Q: Well, I wonder, could we talk a bit about the various countries as you saw them in ’74 to ’76, how from our perspective they responded in any cases that you might think. Let’s start with the French and the Germans, the Italians, British.

CLARK: Right. During this period, Germany generally was doing better than everybody else in that their recession was not as deep, their inflation rates were not quite so bad. Of course, the Europeans had already restrained demand on energy by having very much higher energy prices to begin with, by having higher taxes than we did. So we were encouraging the Germans to reflate and help us. And they were resisting that kind of pressure. So that was one of the factors that was going on. The European Union itself had a lot of internal problems of coordinating policies among and between each other. In this period there was a lot of, I guess, intellectual interest—although governments were responding—but it was the beginning of the movement towards seeing whether they could develop common money for the European Union, for what was then called the Common Market. And I think it very clearly became evident that the answer was no. Yes, there were conceptually a lot of advantages to having a single currency in the EC countries, but the disparity was so great in rates of inflation, in government deficits, in rates of economic growth, indeed in traditions, that not only could you not have a common currency, you couldn’t even have a very meaningful convergence of exchange rates. And this was a period when they were trying to coordinate exchange rates or at least, if not fix exchange rates, at least keep them within a band. You had an outer band at one point and an inner band, and you had something briefly that was called “the snake within the tunnel.” This turned out to be too hard for the French, in particular, and the Italians, to stay within these guidelines, so then they widened the band to make it easier for them. But while this kind of struggle was going on and experience was being learned, which I think was probably a necessary phase to go through, indeed they failed in a number of different ways, but that experience was useful as time went on. In fact, the economies became more integrated, and policies began to converge to much greater degrees such that by a few years ago they could announce, yes, they were going to have a goal of monetary union. And of course, that’s going to happen in 24 hours, December 31st, tomorrow night.

Q: As you were doing this you were within the European Bureau, which included the Soviet Union. The Soviets, of course, both by their controlled economy and the fact that they had large reserves of oil, were somewhat protected, really, from the problem. Was there any look at the Soviets and saying, well, these people can take care of this? In a way, we’re in a weaker position than the Soviets are, as we’re looking at it. I wonder what the spirit of the times was.

CLARK: No, I think there may have been times in the world’s history when some people thought that the kind of autarchy that the Soviets had or the kind of system that the Soviets had insulated them from business cycles or from sudden disruptions like the oil
crisis. But I think it was pretty evident to anybody who looked at it for more than five minutes that the Soviet Union was in terrible shape and not doing very well economically. This was the period, I think, of the end of Brezhnev and the beginning of some of those followers.

Q: Brezhnev was still going until around ’81.

CLARK: Was he going till ’81? In any case, my perception was there was not a lot of talk about how better off the Soviet Union was, how superior their system was, or things like that. I think there may have been Marxists in Scandinavia or something who thought that, or perhaps in Western Europe, but you didn’t hear that kind of talk much in the OECD, for example.

Q: Were the French sort of odd-man-out as you were dealing with this? They often are, I was just wondering.

CLARK: France had a very different tradition of economic policy than Germany, for example, or the US or the UK. They tended to run large government deficits, they tended to tolerate higher degrees of inflation in an effort to grease the wheels to keep up employment. And were very comfortable with the whole idea of government intervention in the economy, much more than we or the UK was and to some extent even than Germany. So yes, France was coming at a lot of these policies from a very different perspective. They justified them by saying they were achieving social goals—that kind of stuff—rather than purely economic goals, social goals like full employment. But the difference is that the tensions, while noticeable, really didn’t present insurmountable problems. France was a big, complicated, industrialized country dealing with basically the same issues. I think the tensions that are created by étatisme, to use that old-fashioned phrase, that is, state control of the economy, however, were not as clear then as they have become since then with globalization and the increase of competition, which has meant that large-scale subsidies of the kinds the French and to some degree the Germans took part in was harder and harder to sustain against market forces.

Q: Was agriculture a major problem as you were dealing with this?

CLARK: Agriculture has always been an major problem, but it’s always been treated separately. They had their own committees, and they had their own agricultural gurus. That was something I myself did not get involved in very much. There were agricultural specialists, a specialist, I think, in EUR/RPE. There was a lot going on between us and the European Commission in Brussels, as I think there were many agricultural committees in the OECD, but I didn’t get involved in that much.

Q: What was your feeling about the—by that time it was the Ford Administration, with Kissinger as Secretary of State. What was your feeling about its focus, responsiveness to the problems of this inflation or recession, as compared to, say, the other European countries?
CLARK: Well, there was a curious phenomenon about Kissinger himself. The joke was that Kissinger would agree to go to some meeting, some international meeting, and Kissinger always had to have a bold new initiative to announce at the meeting. So the word would come down, okay, think up a “BNI,” a Bold New Initiative, that the Secretary can announce. And you know, FBU was a pretty large bureau and had a lot of pretty high-powered people and economists in it, so we were frequently asked to draft speeches or parts of speeches or first drafts of speeches, and so on. And it was because of this kind of pressure to come up with something that every now and then an initiative would actually get created that probably wouldn’t have gotten created otherwise. IFAD—you mentioned agriculture—was created in this period, International Fund for Agricultural Development. It’s in the FAO in Rome. IFAD was one of Kissinger’s answers about how to get all of this money, this billions of dollars that was flowing into OPEC, and particularly to Saudi Arabia, how to get it recycled into developing countries. And so IFAD was set up—we asked the Saudis to finance it, and they mostly did—to channel money to poor developing countries to help with their agriculture. It was done through the FAO in Rome. Well, that was the result, I am told, in part, of the need to come up with a new idea because the Secretary was giving a speech. And it’s still around, I think, IFAD is still around, so it was successful.

Q: I was reading an interview of Bob Oakley, who was in the NSC at the time, and he talks about this one getting started almost on the plane flying to Rome. Were there any other major issues or problems that you found yourself dealing with?

CLARK: In the early and mid-‘70’s, it was very difficult to find Japanese diplomats who could speak good English, even intelligible English. I mean, they were there; they were OECD members; they would make interventions; but it was very difficult to understand. And the working languages are French and English, so they had to speak in either French or English. And sometimes they’d get a special interpreter, but 10 years later, when I was at the UN, they all spoke English. There had been that much of a transformation.

Q: What about Japan? I would have thought at this point, Japan being more dependent on oil than almost anyone else, would have been in quite a state trying to deal with the situation.

CLARK: I’m sure they were. When I was doing OECD, again, there was another person, another group of people that were dealing with energy issues per se. So I wasn’t dealing with them on that particular thing. But yes, Japan must have been very hard hit by then with the oil crisis.

Q: Were you seeing the OECD as becoming more of the unit, as you were hitting this thing over a period of time? Were you seeing what might be considered a relatively constant growth in its ability to function?

CLARK: Yes, I think the OECD has changed reasonably successfully with the times. It started out in the 1950s as a sort of extension of the Marshall Plan. It was really set up and run by the United States to encourage the Europeans to talk to each other and
coordinate. Then it got expanded when it became the OECD. It has since been expanded to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, for special things. I went to a meeting just before I left the State Department on telecommunications development in Hungary.

Q: This is Tape 3, Side 1, with Warren Clark.

CLARK: Sometimes it’s useful for the government itself to get a recommendation from an international group, Gee, you really ought to be thinking about this, and that helps that government with its parliament, or whatever. Sometimes it’s a way for a group of governments to create some gentle pressure on another government or group of governments to move in a certain direction. There was always hand-wringing about deficits and those kinds of things. But I think the OECD has proved itself to be very valuable. Now that the EU is expanding further and now that these candidates for membership such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia—I think that that kind of quasi-seminar, quasi-information exchange, quasi-confrontation—people have to get up in front of the OECD and defend themselves—why are you following this policy? That itself creates a certain amount of pressure on a government, if they know they’re going to have to justify their actions—not an awful lot, they’re still sovereign nations, but every little bit helps.

Q: In what you were working on in macroeconomics, did the action of our Congress play any role?

CLARK: Not an awful lot. There was and is the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, which looks at many of these same issues; but generally speaking Congressmen did not attend OECD meetings and in my experience there was not an awful lot of interaction between either Congressmen or Congressional staff and us on these OECD issues.

Q: Well, then, you left there in ’76.

CLARK: Yes.

Q: Whither?

CLARK: Well, ’76 was a year of crisis in my life. About three things came together all at the same time. One was with this pursuit of economics I have been describing to you I had not been paying enough attention to my family, and so my marriage was in a very bad situation. The second was when I came back from Harvard I continued on as a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University, and I came to the conclusion that I couldn’t keep that up. It was too much pressure, and my family was suffering too much. And on top of that, I had no onward assignment. My two years was up in RPE in the summer of ’76, and I had no onward assignment, so I was over-complement for about six months. Almost from the beginning, there was a job that I was told “might be” and then “would be” and then “definitely would be” created, and then I would be put in it, in Canada, in Ottawa, because there was desire for more reporting on the Canadian economy. And so in January of ’77, I moved to Ottawa, and within a few months I was detailed to the Treasury
Department and became the Treasury representative and financial attaché in the embassy responsible for macroeconomic reporting on the Canadian economy. And then I recruited an FSO, a wonderful economist, Paul McGonagle, to come and work for me, and in time a third officer came from the Treasury Department. And there was a Treasury secretary and a local Canadian woman I trained as a statistician. So within about six months or a year I had my first empire.

Q: And you were doing this ’77 to—

CLARK: —’81. So I was running a small office in the embassy of three officers and two staff, doing economic and financial reporting on Canada.

Q: How did this impact on your family?

CLARK: Well, I think by the time I left to go to Canada, it was understood it was a separation, and in fact, despite some efforts at reconciliation, we were finally legally divorced in ’79.

Q: I’m not trying to get overly personal—this is personal—but the Foreign Service takes quite a toll, I think, on families, would you say in your personal experience?

CLARK: Yes, and I wouldn’t blame that all on the institution, but I think Foreign Service officers as a group tend to be very competitive, tend to be workaholics, tend to think that their value is measured by their promotions and jobs and those kinds of things. It’s easy in the Foreign Service to lose your balance in that area. And of course, moving around and living abroad just adds an added strain on that kind of thing, not to mention the changing times in the ’60s and ‘70s, when women started justifiably playing a much larger role in the workforce and so forth.

Q: Well, let’s go to ’77 to ’81. What was the political situation in Canada as observed from your vantage point, and then we’ll go to the economic situation?

CLARK: Canada was struggling then, as it is struggling now, with issues of national unity. A separatist government had been elected in Quebec in November of 1976, just a month and a half before I arrived in Ottawa. People were concerned: was this serious, was this not serious, or what would it mean for the Canadian economy, what would it mean for the US if, in fact, Canada split apart? And so one of my early tasks was to spend a certain amount of time in Quebec—Montreal and Quebec City—to get a feel for what was going on in the economy there. But Canadian unity is one of these sort of perennial issues that never seems to get resolved, and maybe never will get completely resolved. About the time I left, in 1980, there was a big election in which the separatists lost, so separatism was put back for a while, but then of course it came back about 10 years later, and it’s come back again now.

Q: Who was our ambassador during this, or ambassadors. This would have been in the beginning, basically, of the Carter Administration.
CLARK: The ambassador when I arrived was Tom Enders, who had been there not that long. I think Tom arrived in maybe the middle of ’76 or early in ’76, so he had been there a year, perhaps less than a year. The DCM was a guy named Bob Duemling. Tom Enders, who is deceased now, he and his wife were very kind to me. They were supportive of this job I had with the Treasury Department, and Tom himself, as you may know, is a fierce economist.

Q: Yes.

CLARK: Well, first of all, he was a formidable intellect, period. Apart from his very broad intellect, he was a very strong economist, and so he himself was keenly interested in things like economic reporting, not only the macro but in what was happening in places like Quebec. So he was very supportive. But I think also, before Tom came in ’76, the embassy had a reputation of being a little bit sleepy. People kind of did their thing in a kind of routine way, and everybody kind of reported to their separate agencies back in Washington. Tom came in with a lot of energy and a lot of ambition and wanted to do things. I guess I was part of that process, and some of the people who had been there before were a little bit concerned that their nice, quite life was being challenged. But I think that was probably, on balance, kind of healthy.

Q: How long was the Ambassador there?

CLARK: I think probably until ’79. The ambassador the last year or two I was there was Ken Curtis, who had been governor of Maine, who was a Democrat, of course, and who was an extremely nice person but not as interested in the details as Enders had been. Enders, incidentally, had been there not because he was a Democrat, it occurred, but because he had been a protégé of Kissinger’s. And in fact, it may have been before the elections in ’76, under Ford, that Tom was appointed.

Q: You were essentially the Treasury representative.

CLARK: Yes.

Q: How did this marriage work out? Treasury is not that enamored with the Department of State in many ways—they have their own last to deal with and they have formidable expertise and all that and Canada being so close—how did this marriage work?

CLARK: Well, you’re absolutely right. They do have their own interests and their own way of doing things that are quite different from the State Department’s. Indeed, there is often a lot of tension between the State Department and the Treasury over economic and financial issues. I’ve compressed the story a little bit. There was a struggle over the creation of this position in the embassy. The Treasury Department has a fixed number of positions overseas in embassies, and they wanted to have a position in Ottawa because they wanted more reporting from Ottawa. And the State Department—this was Joan Clark in M—took the position, fine, you can have a position in Ottawa if you take it away
from one of the other places in the world, London, Paris, Bonn, Tokyo, Mexico City, where you also have Treasury attachés. So Treasury didn’t want to do that, but they very much wanted a position in Ottawa, so I was the political compromise. And there was a treaty between the undersecretary of State and the undersecretary of Treasury in which it was agreed to have a Treasury position filled by an FSO, and that was me.

I was already used to the Treasury culture a little bit because of my job in the OECD. I didn’t find it difficult at all dealing with the Treasury people. I came to Washington frequently and consulted with them, and I think I was giving them what they wanted in terms of reporting from Canada. So I think overall it worked out reasonably well. However, I was replaced by a Treasury officer, not a State Department officer.

Q: Was Trudeau prime minister at the time?

CLARK: Yes, and Margaret Trudeau was his wife, at the beginning.

Q: Oh, yes. How was Trudeau and—you might also put on the social side—the Trudeaus? How were they viewed from the embassy perspective?

CLARK: Trudeau was a brilliant intellectual. He traveled a great deal. I think by the time I got there, in early ’77, their marriage had already deteriorated or perhaps they were already separated, and that was sad, and it was clear that that hadn’t worked out. I think there’s this funny relationship between the US and Canada. The Canadians were always asking, what do you think about this or that that’s happening in Canada? What do you think about Quebec separatism? What do you think about a host of different kinds of issues? And the truth of the matter was that nine times out of ten most Americans know nothing about Canada, whereas the Canadians knew everything about the United States. If you look at television, there were five channels. There was the CBC and then there were the four US networks, including PBS, and so they knew intimately what the President had done that day because they were seeing it on television. Of course, the CBC was dutifully reporting what was happening in Ottawa, but nobody in the US was looking at that. So Americans mostly didn’t know what was happening there. There also was the disparity in size situation, that the United States sneezes and Canada gets pneumonia—that kind of situation. It’s quite asymmetrical in terms of the economic relationship. A small recession in the US can have a big impact on the Canadian auto industry, for example, which was centered in Ontario. So there were always kind of trade issues, but more than that there was the, kind of, “Do you really love us” issue. Do you really care about us? Are you interested in what we are doing? So our job in the embassy was to, of course, reassure people as much as we could that we were interested in what was going on. Still, as time went on and the better I got to know Canadians the more differences I saw between Canadian values and attitudes and so forth than those in the United States. It’s a much more conservative country. Their traditions are really quite different. They never had a Wild West frontier the way we did in the United States, so the whole “Turner thesis” idea does not apply in Canada. And the loyalists left for Canada after the American Revolution. So it’s a very different, more conservative, but kindly place. I mean, Canadians are just wonderful people; they’re not as nasty and aggressive
as Americans.

Q: What about some of the issues? Let’s take the one that obviously jumps to mind. The Quebec separatist issue was sort of on the front burner when you were there. What was our macro-analysis of, if it happened, what would this mean to the United States, what was in it or against it for the US?

CLARK: I think that the bottom line was that it was viewed as quite undesirable from a United States perspective. You can say, well, it wouldn’t necessarily have that big impact on trade or investment, but it would have completely dislocated Canada. You’ve got the Maritime Provinces—Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island—east of Quebec, which would somehow have to communicate with the rest of Canada.

Q: A little like Bangladesh and Pakistan.

CLARK: Yes, exactly. So if Quebec separated, what then? Would the Maritime Provinces want to join New England, for example? Would British Columbia want to join Washington and Oregon? Canada, the cliché is, is a triumph of politics over Geography. It’s a country that should work north-south, but it doesn’t; it has to work east-west. And you’ve got this enormous space in the middle of Canada, over the Great Lakes, called the “Canadian Shield”—everybody talks about it, it’s granite—where nothing grows. There’s almost no population except for a teeny place like Thunder Bay. Until the early 20th century there was really no transportation across Canada until they built the railroad, and that was done only late and at enormous expense and for political reasons, to unify the country. And as you travel across Canada, you’re very much reminded about the United States. The Plains States look very similar, the Mountain States look very similar, the West Coast is kooky, just the way the West Coast is kooky in the United States.

So Quebec’s separation would have all kinds of unforeseen consequences, which, I think, from our point of view was not desirable to test what they might be.

Q: Well, at that time, Quebec had not shucked itself of the rule of the Catholic Church and all that, or how did that—

CLARK: It was beginning to. There was something called the “White Revolution” in Quebec in the early 1960’s, in which the Province of Quebec took over public education. It’s hard to believe, but until 1961, all education in Quebec was run by the Church. The Catholic Church is still very prominent in education, but at least now, since the early ’60’s, there was increasing secularism and increasing provincial control over education. But still, schools are divided often between Protestants and Catholics. The Church also was accused—whether justifiably or not—of reinforcing a lack of interest in higher education and business, that the Church was there to save souls and went along, all through the 19th century and even well into the 20th century, with kind of a dual economy in Quebec; you had a few Englishmen who were running the place, the lumber operations, the mining operations and the hydroelectric operations, and you had the French Québécois, who were there doing the work, as the phrase has it, “cutting the wood
and hauling the water.” The First and Second World Wars had an impact on that, but with the White Revolution in the early ‘60s, that began to change very rapidly. I think you can see the Quebec separatist movement, in fact, as a reaction to that, that is, a reaction to the—here we go again—class differences between the Anglophones, who were the managers and the professional class, and the Francophones, who were mostly the blue-collar and working class in Quebec, up until a few generations ago.

Q: Were you seeing, particularly looking at it from the economic perspective, a change, I mean, the beginning of the—I don’t know what you want to call it—Anglo flight, moving out, with economic overtones and all that?

CLARK: Yes. Montreal used to be the financial capital and banking center of Canada. Today it’s Toronto, and that transformation has been in the last 20 years. It may have been starting earlier, but it certainly was greatly accelerated in the late ‘70s by the advent of a separatist government in Montreal. There were sections of Montreal that were—maybe still are—almost exclusively Anglophone, and many of those prominent professional-class families moved from Montreal to Toronto or elsewhere in Ontario during that period in the late ‘70s. There was a series of militant governments that put in very stringent regulations on things like language. You couldn’t have signs in English. Sometimes it was rather amusing, because stop is a perfectly good word in French for a stop sign, when you come to an intersection, but in the French of Quebec, the word is arrête, which the French would never use—the French use stop. But for Quebec you had to use arrête, so okay, it says ARRETE. So there were these language laws, which I think were more a nuisance than anything else. But this was all part, I think, of this political resentment of having, in the perception of some people, been kept down as working class and that language played an important role in that.

I was myself astonished, I guess is not too strong a word, at how Anglophones, especially in Toronto, would look down on Francophones. In Canada, in my experience, at least with some people, speaking French was a lower-class thing to do. But of course, I had been raised to think that French was a very classy language, and where you went on fancy vacations to Europe or in fancy restaurants you spoke French, whereas in Canada it was quite the reverse. French meant you were in the kitchen washing the dishes, something like that.

Q: In Ottawa this is still pervasive.

CLARK: Well, I wouldn’t say it was pervasive. I think it’s changed a great deal. I think it’s changed a lot since I’ve been there.

Q: Yes, but we’re talking about ’77 to ’81.

CLARK: There was this attitude that French speakers were working class.

Q: During the ’77 to ’81 period, was there concern, or was it just sort of a reporting thing about this was happening in another country, this Anglo movement away from
Montreal? Did that cause us any concern, or was it just their business?

CLARK: I think it was seen mostly as their business. Separatism itself was a cause of concern, and nationalist laws of one kind or another that would impact on US investment or US-owned industries was a source of concern. This wasn’t limited to Quebec. I remember there was a Canadian edition of *Time Magazine*, and it was the biggest-selling weekly news magazine in Canada. And the Canadian Government decided there should be a Canadian news magazine—there was, but nobody read it—and so they decreed that there could no longer be a Canadian edition of US magazines. You could buy *Time Magazine* in Canada, but it was the same *Time Magazine* that you bought in New York. In other words, it didn’t have Canadian advertising, it didn’t have Canadian stories the way the Canadian edition did. And this greatly helped *Maclean’s*, which was the other Canadian weekly news magazine. Well, we fussed about that and complained about that. So those kinds of issues were coming up. There was always tension over the Auto Pact. That was another important element of our bilateral relationship. Since way back in the ‘60’s, maybe before, there had been, in effect, free trade in autos and auto parts between the US and Canada. This was in part because there was enormous US investment in parts and auto assembly plants in southern Ontario, and this was seen to be good for everybody, division of labor and so forth. But as soon as the trade would start to be too much in one direction or another, you’d start to get protests, either from the US Congress or from the Canadian Parliament, that the Auto Pact was out of balance. And when we were there the Canadians were complaining that the Auto Pact was out of balance, that American auto manufacturers were investing in the US and not proportionally in Canada and so forth. So those were issues we had to deal with.

Q: What about power? Trudeau at some point, I think, started trying to limit power sources, oil, electricity, and all, to Canada, or something like this. Was that an issue at all while you were there?

CLARK: A little bit. I think, in part, there was concern—again this as perhaps a nationalist political concern—that why was Canada building enormous hydroelectric projects in Northern Quebec which might have environmental damage and all kinds of things in order to export electricity to New York? But I think after people thought about it a while it turned out they were making a good deal of money by exporting electricity to New York, and they were not about to give up that kind of income, provided they were the right kind of contracts. There was an old fixed-price contract between Newfoundland and Ontario. This had nothing to do with the United States directly, but Ontario in the 1970s was still paying the same price as had been fixed back in the early 1950s for electricity coming from the Churchill Falls power plant, which meant that Hydro-Quebec was turning around and selling it for many times that amount to people in New York, who were consuming it. And the men from Newfoundland didn’t like that, but there wasn’t too much they could do.

Hydro—which is the Canadian word for electricity—is an enormous industry, and it’s a path to power. René Lévesque, who is the Prime Minister of Quebec, was the head of Hydro-Quebec before he became Prime Minister. Canada struggles with defining itself in
a way that it’s different from the United States—and different from Britain.

Q: I’ve often heard that in Canada the main thing is that it’s not the United States.

CLARK: It’s hard to define yourself by something you’re not. In fact, Canada is a kind of hybrid between the US and the UK in many ways. Of course, that’s changing now because of immigration from other countries. Canadians would like to have struggled to create a Canadian identity that was something positive but not US and not British or English. And Trudeau, for a while, had a policy that was called The Third Way, and he was going to encourage trade and investment to and from countries other than the United States. Well, fine, but it didn’t go too far.

Q: Those are the trade lines, and it’s hard to drive a truck off to Brazil.

CLARK: In fact, nowadays, there’s quite a bit of Japanese investment in British Columbia, and I’m sure there’s EU investment in eastern Canada too, but I’m afraid, for better or for worse, we’re kind of stuck in the same bed, and it’s hard to get out.

Q: Were we working to increase American investment in Canada, I mean, during this time that you were there?

CLARK: Well, certainly encouraging US investment was always kind of a goal, was always something we were there to promote in various ways, protect in various ways, through laws or regulations or protesting discrimination—that kind of stuff. And in fact, there is enormous American investment in Canada. Most of the hydro-projects, which cost billions of dollars, were financed in the United States, much of them through the US bond markets, but it’s US institutions that hold those bonds, so there’s a very large US financial stake in Canada.

Q: What was your job mainly? You talked about the macro, but what were some of the specifics that you would be involved in, other than the reporting, of course?

CLARK: One of those was economic forecasting. We were supposed to come up with quarterly forecasts for the economy, what was going to happen to GNP and inflation and so forth. There was a lot of interest in the exchange rate between the Canadian dollar and the US dollar, which was squarely affected by interest rates, or vice versa, interest rates affected the exchange rates. And the Canadian dollar during this time was gradually declining, because Canadian competitiveness was gradually declining with the United States. So we were reporting that and influences on interest rates and monetary exchange rates. Part of it included large-scale financing, the plans of the various provinces for hydros to float bond issues in the United States. One of the very curious things at the time was part of the Canadian desire to differentiate themselves from the United States so they decided to borrow money outside the US, to borrow it in yen in Japan or in Deutschmark in Germany, or they could borrow it in Euro-dollars too. I remember in Halifax, back in the early ’70’s, they built a bridge across the harbor and financed it with a Deutschmark bond issue, and they put up a toll across it to pay for it, 25 cents to get across the bridge.
Well, between 1971 and 1981, the Deutschmark more than doubled in value vis-à-vis the Canadian dollar, so you had to have twice as many Canadian dollars to pay off the same debt in Deutschmarks. They had to increase the toll on the bridge. Well, that’s sort of a bizarre example, but it shows how exchange rates can effect real-world consequences to a province or, in this case, a municipality.

Q: Were there any probes on either side? I’m talking about a trade agreement, like a North American trade agreement.

CLARK: Nothing quite that broad yet. There were these sectoral agreements. There was the Auto Pact. There was electric power. There was the special problem, what do you do about culture and media kind of thing. And there were special agricultural agreements, and forestry was a big subject also. So the focus was in these different sectoral arrangements, and people every now and then would talk in very broad terms about a North American free-trade association, but not much and not very seriously. This is really before. The time had not yet come for that.

Q: Acid rain?

CLARK: Acid rain is a big issue. We accused them, they accused us of air pollution. It turns out the largest single source for acid rain is the chimney of a nickel refining mill in I think it’s Kitchener, Ontario, run by INCO. But in fact, in a macro way, most of the acid rain is generated in the Ohio valley by steel mills, and it floats north and east, and a lot of that, or at least some of that, comes into Canada. So yes, it became an issue, and yes, we all agreed it was a terrible thing and, yes, we ought to do something about it, but of course, the game was “Who pays and how much?” to do it. But I think there was broad support, both in Canada in the US, just from domestic political reasons, to cut back on sources of air pollution, so that we just sort of did it, or we were going to do it, anyway, in the Ohio Valley. I think the fact that there was pressure from Canada probably increased the motivation to do it, but I think the primary motivation probably in both cases was domestic politics, not international politics.

Q: Did you get involved in this—I’m not sure it’s the right term—intellectual dispute? I mean the TV, newspapers, magazines and all, the idea of trying to keep Canada pure and Canadian and our overlapping of advertisements, publications and all that. Did that affect the macroeconomic concerns?

CLARK: No, not really. I mean, it was an ongoing theme, we were aware of it. There was a station in Bellingham, Washington, a television transmission station which broadcasts to Vancouver and has Vancouver advertising on it, but it’s based in the State of Washington. So that was a source of a bit of tension, and there was a very strong concern in Canada about cultural hegemony and the Americans being aggressive and commercial while we Canadians are kind of virtuous. There’s a Scandinavian streak in Canadians of a sort of morality, a sort of “We’re a little more moral about these things than you are.”

Q: Was there much in the way of Canadian broadcasting? I mean, were they able to sort
of try to fill in the gap? In other words, they’d say you shouldn’t be using your hegemony over us, but that means somebody should be doing it. Or were there just gaps—if we didn’t do it, nobody would do certain things?

CLARK: Oh, there were very heavy subsidy programs, protectionist programs, of various kinds. I mentioned the news magazine, but also for television, every event—and here’s the language issue again—every event that’s covered by the CBC has to have two camera crews, one in English and one in French. CBC is very good, and it covers the whole country and you get national news and everything, but as I said, the US doesn’t watch it. So they’re not exporting a lot of Canadian culture to the US, whereas they’re importing a lot of US culture to Canada. They kind of struggle with that as best they can. I think this was beginning to become an issue in cable television. The Canadians wanted to block US ads. Canada cable-ized before the United States did, because there are so many remote communities in Canada where it’s so difficult to broadcast through the air that they were much quicker that we were to run television cables everywhere. And so when they were bringing in US networks the idea was to cut out the US ads somehow and substitute music or Canadian ads or anything, but that created some problems. We had to try to deal with that. But the Canadians still censor US television. I think I read recently, or I heard recently, that The Simpsons is not shown on cable television in Canada because it’s thought to be too violent and vulgar.

Q: It’s a cartoon program which seems to be relatively innocuous to me.

CLARK: Well, it offends some Canadians, I guess.

Q: Did you find yourself in the embassy running across something that we get in spades in France, sort of the intellectual community which carries a lot more weight. I mean, in the United States we can have an intellectual community but nobody pays much attention to them, but in France they do; and I suspect in Canada they do, or not? I mean, is there weight there or not?

CLARK: There is weight and respect given if you’re a university professor, perhaps somewhat more than there is in the US, I think considerably less than there is in France. This symmetry applies to universities too. The Canadians were, maybe still are, very concerned about brain drain, with the best and brightest of their students going to universities in the United States. There’s a lot of concern about that and how can we build up Canadian universities. I think, with my interest in economics, until the 1970s there was only one university in Canada that gave a Ph.D. in economics, maybe two, maybe McGill and Toronto and possibly UBC. But higher education, Ph.D. level education, is relatively recent in Canada. Canadian Studies, as you would imagine, is heavily subsidized, but there were very few Ph.D. programs in history. I had a girlfriend who was an art historian. No program in art history. At the time, no Ph.D. was offered in Canada in art history. You had to go to France, England or the United States. So there was a bit of a reverse during the Vietnam War. A lot of professors and students came to Canada and started teaching, to get out of the draft and so forth, so there was a certain American invasion in that sense.
Q: Well, had you found that the American invasion, I mean, were these people beginning to drift back to the United States? The Carter period had offered an amnesty. I was just wondering whether this folk movement had lasted very long.

CLARK: There were some people who, I think, had just decided to stay. They were comfortable and decided to stay, or maybe thought they would have been uncomfortable going back to the US. But it no longer was an issue; if you want to stay, fine, if you wanted to leave, that’s okay too.

Q: Were there any other issues to deal with?

CLARK: The high Arctic was another source of anxiety on the part of the Canadians because we would send through ice-breakers and submarines and so forth, and we wouldn’t tell the Canadians, sometimes, and the Canadians didn’t have the means of surveillance. I mean, if you’re going to have sovereignty over some place, you should be able to tell if an airplane’s flying over or if a ship is passing by it. And the Arctic is so big, and it’s so far away. It’s as far from the North Pole to the US-Canadian border as it is from the US-Canadian border to the equator.

Q: Good God. And of course most of Canada, the populated parts, are a band of about 100 miles.

CLARK: That’s right. So you’ve got—I don’t know what that comes out to—four, five, six thousand miles of almost nothing. Of course, part of that is ice and snow and so forth. There is a lot of land up there, actually, but it’s almost completely empty.

Q: Well, why don’t we stop at this point?

CLARK: Sure.

Q: And we’ll pick it up in 1981, when you went where?

CLARK: To New York to the US mission to the UN.

Q: All right. We’ll pick up the US mission to the UN.

CLARK: Okay. Thank you.

Q: It’s the 1st of January 1999. We’re moving into a new year. Warren, you were the UN from when to when?

CLARK: From April of ’81 to September of ’85.

Q: At least when you started out, what was your job?
CLARK: The first year I was there, my title was deputy US representative on the Economic and Social Council. The UN has very fancy titles. Functionally, I was head of the Economic Section in the US Mission to the UN, which is functionally an embassy, so basically I was head of the Economic Section at the Mission.

Q: Well, you were there at an interesting time, because Ronald Reagan had just become President, and so could you describe what you were getting before you went to the UN—sort of the corridor talk and all—because I’m sure that there was real concern from our international organization people about what this new president and his administration were going to do, and then how you found things when you got up there.

CLARK: Indeed I was. I think I was really quite innocent and naïve up in Ottawa about all the things that were going on in Washington at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. I was recruited for the job by Marion Creekmore, who at the time was the deputy assistant secretary of the IO Bureau, back in December 1980, at the end of the Carter Administration. And I said, yes, I was interested in the job. Then I got a phone call from the administrative person at US-UN in New York saying, well, Ambassador Kirkpatrick insisted on having personal interviews with people who were coming to work for her in New York. Could I go to Washington to be interviewed by Ambassador Kirkpatrick and, by the way, nobody could pay for my travel? Well, I am from New York. I grew up outside New York city, and my father worked in New York City for a long time. The idea of working in New York was very intriguing to me, although at that point I knew very little specifically about the UN. So I agreed to go to Washington and meet with Ambassador Kirkpatrick, which I did. And we had a perfectly straightforward talk. She asked me about my background. Of course, she was and is a university professor, so she asked me about my academic training, and I told her about my three graduate degrees, and then I mentioned that my undergraduate degree had been in English literature. “Ah,” she said. That seemed to spark her interest. But then she said she would like me to meet with the person who was going to be her deputy for ECOSOC, who was Ambassador José Sorzano, and could I go to New York to meet with Ambassador Sorzano? I said yes, of course, so I got on the shuttle that afternoon and went to New York and met with José Sorzano. He was accompanied by Mark Plattner, who was another political appointee at the Mission, and we had a perfectly straightforward talk for a half an hour or something, and that was the end of it. I went back to Ottawa. And I can’t remember exactly, but anyway the word came through, yes, okay, you’re going to go to New York.

So I transferred out in April of ’81. When I first got to New York—I guess it was in April—I went to see Jeane Kirkpatrick’s immediate deputy. Now New York is a strange and wonderful place. At the US Mission in those days there were five—count them, five—ambassadors, persons with the title, the rank of ambassador. There’s the US representative, who was Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and then the deputy US representative, also with the title of ambassador, who was Marshall Bremen. I went to pay a courtesy call on Ambassador Bremen as a fellow Foreign Service officer because he was a career person. Of course, that’s the usual pattern. You have a political person who’s number one, and very often you have a career person who’s number two. I went to see
Ambassador Brement to pay my respects, and he was very polite, but he looked a little
distracted, and he was a little vague in our conversation. I found out later that he already
had been dismissed. That is, he had gotten to New York as Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s
deputy; they had been there a very short period of time—a matter of weeks at the most;
and there was some difference of views, I guess, and it had already been agreed that he
would leave and be replaced by someone else; and he eventually went off to be
ambassador to Iceland. Well, I never saw Ambassador Brement after that, but that caught
my attention, of course, and everybody else’s attention, that one needed to be alert.

Q: Were you getting anything from the IO Bureau as you checked with them at all?

CLARK: Well, I guess I had my friend Marion Creekmore, who had recruited me for the
job, whom I admired very much. He was at that point on his way out too. I think he was
going to be economic counselor in New Delhi or something, a very good job for ending
up as ambassador. So I had lost that connection with IO, and I guess I hadn’t made any
new connections with IO. Marion was replaced by Gordon Streeb, with whom I rapidly
developed a very good working relationship. So as things developed, four of the five
people with ambassadorial rank ended up being political appointees. That is, there was
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Her immediate deputy became Ken Adelman, later a director of
ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He had been a professor at
Georgetown and was also a political appointee. And then José Sorzano, my immediate
boss, who had also been a colleague of Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s at Georgetown
University. Another fellow, Chuck Lichtenstein, was Jeane’s deputy for the Security
Council and had also a strong academic background as well as qualifications in
journalism. So the fifth ambassador was in charge of what you’d call administration and
management issues. His name will come to me in a minute. But my counterpart at the
mission was the head of the Political Section, and that was Dirk Gleysteen. I may correct
that later on. I think it was Dirk Gleysteen. And he had been there a year already, so I was
the new kid, head of the Economic Section, and so I struck up a relationship with Dirk.
And I think we both, early on, agreed privately between us that there was a danger, which
was that there could be too much of a we-they problem of career people and political
people. Dirk and I, of course, were career FSO’s, although my position actually required
approval by the White House. And we agreed that part of our task would be to promote
good communications and good relationships back and forth between the political level
people and the career FSO’s and other career people.

So that was very early on a task that seemed to be important and evident. And as time
wore on, that first year, I think that proved to be the case. I think if I had a particular
value at the mission in those early days, it was that I didn’t feel any particular inhibition
to talk with anybody, to talk freely and frankly with anybody. And so I think I had pretty
good political communications with my boss, José Sorzano, whom I liked and like very
much, the other political people on the top level, and then my counterparts in the
economic section. At that point I didn’t know the people in the Political Section very
well.

The US Mission to the UN is an extremely busy place. It’s a very intense place. Certainly
that was the job with the most intense time pressure on it that I had had up to that point in my career. The UN has a schedule, it has a rhythm, it has a certain seasonality to it; and certain things happen at the same time every year. And on the Economic and Social Council, where I was working, there are certain meetings that take place right at the beginning, in this time of year, January. There are Human Rights Commission meetings in Geneva. Then there is the social side of ECOSOC, which meets in April in New York. Then there’s the economic side of ECOSOC, which meets every June and first part of July in Geneva. And then to top everything off, there’s the General Assembly, which is the most busy time of year, when you have seven committees going simultaneously, including the meeting of the General Assembly itself and other committees on political, economic, social, human rights, security, administration, budgets issues. These all operate simultaneously, all requiring an enormous amount of expertise, each of which has people in capitals in Washington and other places who have been working on these questions for years, which has the civil servants in the UN Secretariat who’ve been working on these issues for years. And it’s a very busy and professionally demanding sort of time, in which one has to keep a lot of balls in the air simultaneously. So that proved to be enormously interesting—very challenging—but there was, as I mentioned, kind of this theme going through it—internal communications within the US Mission, and how I took it as one of my important jobs to maintain those communications and keep doors open, both, as I say, north-south and east-west—that is, both vertically and horizontally in my part of the Mission.

Q: Often your initial impression is most important, before you get sort of used to “this is the way it is.” What was your impression of the political appointees and the career appointees. Was there as one might expect, not a disconnect, but a problem?

CLARK: Well, as I was trying to suggest, I made it my job to try to make sure there would not be a problem, at least in my little part of the Mission; however, there certainly were enormous differences. Certainly the political people and the career people were coming from very different angles, had very different perspectives on issues. It’s no secret that Ambassador Kirkpatrick and her colleagues—correctly or not correctly—were thought of as being part of a particular political movement at the time, which was called neo-conservatives. This was a group that became prominent in the late 1970’s. There was something called the Committee on the Present Danger around 1977, which thought that the Carter Administration was not doing enough for defense spending, and it was for increasing defense spending. The group was also very critical of President Carter’s human rights policies, saying that human rights was the tail wagging the dog, that human rights were being looked at at the expense of other important political goals and objectives.

And so I was not aware of quite all of this political and intellectual background to the neo-conservative group. I think especially right in the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the election of Ronald Reagan was seen as, in effect, a vindication of the point of view of the neo-conservative groups: that defense spending had to be increased, that human rights should be shifted, and there was a strong desire to promote that kind of
political agenda. At the same time, I think, there was a specific parochial—if that’s the right word—focus on the UN: this was that the new Reagan Administration, I think, had the strong feeling that the US had been abused in the UN—and there’s nothing new about that, that people were beating up on the US for various real or imagined transgressions of one kind or another, and there’s nothing new about that. That had been going on for years, since the agenda for the UN and for the General Assembly had really been taken over by the Third World countries, after the 1960’s—but that the Carter Administration, particular Democrats, had not been sufficiently firm in rebutting arguments criticizing the United States coming from Third World countries through the United Nations. So I think, in addition to defense and human rights issues, there was a strong motive to respond, to rebut criticism of the US, and in my particular area that meant economic and social policies.

*Q:* Could you explain? When they talk about “economic” it’s fairly straightforward, but what is social policy?

CLARK: Social policies in the UN context includes human rights. In the General Assembly the Second Committee is the economic committee. The Third Committee is human rights, and so I think that the fact that the economic and social are lumped together recognizes that many economic problems of development are also social problems of development, that if you’re going to have economic growth, you need maybe to have reforms in more directly social-related areas such as better education, perhaps land reform, perhaps human rights plays a role in that. These days there’s a lot of emphasis, of course, on democracy, and democracy-building, all of which can and do have an impact on economic growth. But the Third Committee was really focusing a lot on human rights. I think the IMF and the World Bank, which are UN organs, reported to the Second Committee of the General Assembly, and the economic part of ECOSOC in Geneva in July. But of course, the World Bank, at any rate, has very broad social programs of social development, in the sense of community development and so forth, which are not, perhaps, strictly economic. So there is a broad overlap. But the social aspect with perhaps the least direct economic impact is the human rights part.

This was a time of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The war in Nicaragua was very hot, involving El Salvador and Guatemala. And it was also a time of martial law in Poland. So it was a cold snap in the Cold War. It was a time when relationships with the Soviet Union were very cold and frosty indeed. There were a number of conflicts around the world which had Cold War ramifications, all of which also involved, or to some people and some aspects involved, intense ideological conflicts, the conflict in Central America being a case in point. There were strong ideological differences in point of view about the nature of the conflict and the degree of involvement of the Soviets with Cuba and so forth.

As a career person, my approach to these issues was primarily pragmatic. Okay, can we solve this problem here or there? In other words, it was not ideological. I did not have strong ideological feelings one way or another. I have to say I probably could not have done as well on my job as I did if I had felt antithetical, if I had felt opposed to the kind
of approach that the new Reagan Administration was taking on a variety of issues. But their approach certainly didn’t bother me a great deal.

Q: Did you have a feeling at all that within this group there was almost a hidden agenda of getting the United States out of the United Nations?

CLARK: I wouldn’t put it that baldly. I think there was very little real desire to completely withdraw from the General Assembly or the Security Council. But certainly there was a high degree of annoyance—let’s put it that way—with the treatment of the US in the UN, a strong belief that we should respond to criticism, that we shouldn’t sit there, that the silence is taken to be consent or indifference. And so that when we were criticized or attacked, our standing instructions were to respond, to defend ourselves or to say, you know, you’re ignoring the beam in your own eye while you talk about the speck in our eye.

But defending the US in the UN was not really part of a desire to withdraw. I think some people may have felt that the UN may be more trouble than it’s worth in some political areas, but certainly the UN is such an enormous bureaucracy that while one may be very strongly opposed to one issue or even one agency or the leadership of an agency there were others in which we had a great deal of support. For example, during this period, the head of the UNDP, the United Nations Development Program, was a former US Congressman, Brad Morse. He was a wonderful, extraverted, enthusiastic Congressman from Massachusetts. He was extremely effective, both in administering the UNDP, and because he was a former Congressman and a natural born politician, he was extremely effective in lobbying the congress for funds. He would go down and talk to his friends, who were head of this or that committee. He also, being a politician, did the same thing with us. He lobbied us. He was very friendly; he was cheerful; he was outgoing; he was very responsive to any questions we had; he was very sensitive to trying to avoid criticism of one kind or another. So I think my boss, José Sorzano, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others thought Brad Morse was doing a grand job and the UNDP in general was doing a very good job, and so we certainly did not oppose the work that the UNDP was doing. The UNDP is an enormous organization. It spends hundreds of millions of dollars every year. And UNICEF is the same thing. Jim Grant was the American head of UNICEF at that time. Jim Grant has probably saved millions of lives, without a lot of exaggeration, by programs to provide food to mothers and children in disastrous parts of the world, and it’s pretty hard to be against that kind of thing. Now I suppose you could have had someone who was ideological or who was doing it in a way that would present political problems, but certainly Jim Grant, as far as I know, did not do this in ways that presented political problems. Au contraire, he, like Brad Morse, was terribly effective at maintaining very good relations with the US Congress and with the US Mission.

I mention the Congress so much because, whereas the budget for parts of the UN—the General Assembly and the Secretariat and so forth and security arrangements—is in response to a formula—the budget this year is going to be X amount of money and the United States pays Y per cent of that X amount, so that the amount sort of falls out in a
semi-automatic way—there is a lot of other spending which is voluntary. And the two I mentioned, UNICEF and UNDP, are voluntary contributions that the United States makes. And because we made the largest contribution, there were Americans in charge, that is, Jim Grant and Brad Morse. And so in many ways, these were agents—you could look upon them as agents—of the United States, extensions of American foreign policy, humanitarian aid. It’s possible that it would be controversial, but generally there was not an awful lot of controversy about humanitarian assistance. And so there was no desire really to pull back or pull out of all of the UN, much as we might want to turn out backs on some parts that seemed pretty nefarious.

Q: What about dealing, particularly in an early part, with the other delegates to the UN? I would have thought that many of the ones would be going “Who is this guy Ronald Reagan and Jeane Kirkpatrick” because unlike most these really came with an awful lot of ideological baggage with them and much of which was focused around the UN, not particularly friendly. And I would have thought that you would have been sought out—you and others of your colleagues—and asked what is this all about, where are we going, and all that? Did that happen?

CLARK: Yes, there’s a time and tide in the affairs of men, and I think, a couple of things, to answer your question. First, when I first arrived in 1981, there were a number of holdovers, people from other missions—the UK Mission I’m thinking of in particular—from the 1970’s. Now this was the period of Carter but also was the period of Labor—I’ve forgotten who was Prime Minister. Anyway, just about the time Ronald Reagan got elected, Maggie Thatcher got elected, so that there was a shift in the UK as well as a shift in the US. Well, some of the more liberal people were left over, and there were a lot of questions, “What about this?” and “What about that?” In my particular area of economic affairs, we had something called global negotiations, which we found ways of chloroforming to sleep. This was a leftover from the late 1970’s, but there were still delegates around who were trying to promote global negotiations, to revise the international monetary system and the trading system.

Q: This was basically a north-south type—

CLARK: This was a north-south dialogue; this was the so-called G-77. So there were a number of those people around. Some of them remained. Some of them never changed and were there the whole time. In the case of the UK delegation there soon came in people who were more compatible with Margaret Thatcher and her point of view. Of course, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were extremely compatible. So yes, there was some sort of disconnect in the beginning, or “Who was this person?” and so forth. But after that there was not an enormous clash of an ideological nature that I recall with other Western non-communist missions. Many of the Third World people, of course, stayed on and didn’t change.

There was another aspect to this, though, which came along perhaps not right smack at the beginning but a little bit later. There would be statements to me of a general nature of, well, you know, you’re a career person and I’m a career person, you and I can talk
frankly, can’t we? Well, I mean, okay, up to a point, but I thought sometimes when those
types of statements were made to me there was an effort to see whether there was going
to be any daylight between myself and the political appointees at the Mission. So I felt I
had to be very careful about that, not making it appear that there was any significant
difference in viewpoints.

Q: Jeane Kirkpatrick and her deputies—what was their management style and how did it
work?

CLARK: Management style... Well, I think that first year, 1981, there was a lot of
learning going on. All of us were new. I was new; they were new. Fortunately, there were
career people who could keep all the wheels turning that had to be turned. You get there
in the morning and you’re immediately hit by fourteen things. About six o’clock in the
afternoon, or 6:30 or 7:00, your workday begins to slow down, and Jeane would have
informal get-togethers in her office. Then you’d have three or four or five or six people
just sitting around shooting the breeze, so that in addition to the formal this, that, and the
other thing that has to be done, there was a certain amount of informal collegiality. Now
that collegial type of rehash of the day’s events was most of the political people among
themselves. It mostly did not include career people, except after period of time I, in fact,
did get included some times in that group. So in time, maybe not even in the first year,
but in time, what I developed with the political leadership of the Mission was access. I
found, somewhat to my astonishment, that probably was the most invaluable thing I had.
I could get to the principal. If there was a really urgent question that needed an answer
right away, I could get to them—not necessarily Jeane, but to a senior person.

During the General Assembly, when the General Assembly is running, it’s a seven-ring
circus. There generally is a meeting every morning at nine o’clock. You would have
maybe 40 people in the room, and along with the political leadership there were public
delegates. I mean, you would have famous or not famous people who were appointed by
the President to be a delegate to the General Assembly. John Davis Lodge was a delegate
one year. Shirley Temple has been in the past. And so you’d have all this. Anything that
big, of course, has to be quite formal. There would be the formal thing like that; then you
would have smaller groups operating. And I’m sure there were relationships that were
extremely [inaudible] that I didn’t know anything about. So there were formal and
informal groups of different sizes and differing membership.

Q: What was the relationship with the Department of State? It always gets tricky,
particularly at this time. Jeane Kirkpatrick was a member of the President’s Cabinet, and
yet at the same time she was getting at least—I won’t say, instructions may be the wrong
word, particularly in her case, but—direction from the Department of State, which means
from IO. Did you find this was a problem?

CLARK: It’s almost built in that there’s going to be tension between the assistant
secretary for IO and the US representative to the UN, and certainly there was tension in
that period. The initial assistant secretary was Elliott Abrams, who was from the same
neo-conservative political background.
**Q:** These were conservative Democrats, as Jeane Kirkpatrick was, who had switched over to Ronald Reagan.

**CLARK:** But despite that, because of their different places where they were sitting and the different institutional factors, there was a good deal of tension. I can’t remember exactly, but I think it was less than a year on, Abrams, in fact, resigned and was replaced by somebody else who, it was clear, was not going to challenge the authority of Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

**Q:** Moving over to the social side, the human rights side, did you find this was a problem? I would think there would be an effort to say, “Let’s not take up that human rights issue,” or something of that nature, “that’s too Carterish,” or something like that. I mean, did you find a diminution of interest in human rights?

**CLARK:** I wouldn’t say a “diminution” so much as a shift in emphasis. The Carter Administration had been quite willing to take on right-wing Latin American dictators, for example. Argentina and Chile come to mind. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who speaks very good Spanish, was not inclined to provoke confrontations with people like Pinochet in Chile. At the same time, she was, and remains, intensely interested in human rights issues *per se*, but I think not in the context of undermining a political régime, a government that was deemed to be friendly to the United States.

**Q:** Using Latin America, both were pretty odious, Argentina and Chile, at that time—lots of disappearances, lots of imprisonments, killings, and all by both the Chilean Pinochet and the Argentinean Junta governments. It’s kind of hard to be for human rights and not try to do something about that.

**CLARK:** Well, a couple of things. I think the worst part of those things happened actually in the ‘70s. I think by the ‘80s those things had been to diminish, the horrors of those things, the disappearances and so forth, had begun to diminish a little bit by the 1980’s. Also I have to say that the Third Committee and the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission in Geneva were handled by other people in the Mission. Carl Birchman did most of the human rights stuff. So I myself did not get personally involved in a lot of the issues, and my own information and my own work was more on the economic side and the economic development side and those kinds of issues. I think I’m not knowledgeable enough to give you a very clear answer to your question. I think it’s a very clear, good question. I just don’t have enough factual background to give you a very clear response.

**Q:** Well, what about some of the issues that were coming up at this time? In your areas, how about dealing with the Soviets and with China? Were there any sort of economic issues that came up, or were they outside of the normal economic sphere of the UN?

**CLARK:** China, during this period, did not really play a very active role in most issues, unless it was something that directly affected them. When it came to things like global
negotiations or positions with the G-77 or this issue or that issue, China’s representatives had standard guidelines to vote with the G-77, vote with the developing country group in the UN, to show their solidarity with developing countries. So they did not take the lead very much in this area. The same was more or less true with the Soviets. The Soviets had a bigger delegation, in many ways, I think, a more involved, sophisticated delegation, with very good language skills. And they played a more active role, especially in these human rights commissions. There was always a big fight every year over Cuba, for example, on the Human Rights Commission, as there was later on about China. So they played a very active role in that. But again, in the G-77 and economic issues, from the Third World people you had jabs at market economics, jabs at the US administration for thinking that markets solve problems, rather than enlightened policies, governments solving problems. So there would be jibes at the US for that, and, of course, we would defend ourselves and jibe back and talk about the “ruble,” the currency of the Soviet Union that nobody wanted to hold and that didn’t have much international value and so forth. And so there was that kind of ideological jousting that went on back and forth, but it was on a fairly low level of intensity.

Q: What about issues such as, from your perspective, Afghanistan, our engagement in Central America? Did these play much of a role in what you were working on?

CLARK: We’re talking about the first year now, because I switched after the first year. But the first year my focus was on Second Committee, economic development, UNDP, UNICEF, and, yes, something like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, something like the war in Nicaragua permeated everything. But it didn’t have a lot of direct impact in my area. Martial law was declared in Poland during this period, and so there were a lot of speeches about that, but for one reason or another, I wasn’t terribly politicized in those areas. My languages are French and Arabic. I don’t have Spanish or any of the Slavic languages, and I hadn’t served in those areas. So I didn’t have much personal background to draw on in terms of being on the barricades.

Q: How about the perennial “Zionism is racism” and all? How did that go?

CLARK: Ooh, that was a hot issue, a very hot issue. Two things, more close to my area. One was Zionism-is-racism in the Middle East. Another was constructive engagement in South Africa. This was when Chester Crocker was the assistant secretary for African affairs in the State Department. There was a lot of criticism of us for cooperating in any way with the white minority government in South Africa. So, yes, there were long debates on the Zionism-equals-racism thing. That, again, came up in a lot of different contexts, and it was something we spoke against forcefully. And we also defended the idea of trying to be pragmatic and encouraging economic development in South Africa, rather than boycotting South Africa. That, of course, changed in 1986, but that was a US policy change over Reagan’s veto. That was after my time.

Q: Well, in a way, I mean, these issues have been around for a long time, and most of the countries have been dealing with these issues for some time now, and I was wondering, how persuasive could you be? If you talked and all, but these are essentially one of their
issues that they had been voting on, various measures, Zionism, racism, South Africa, Afghanistan—you know, I mean, whatever you want to think about—these weren’t new things, and you can buttonhole villages and all but did you find that you really were making much of an impact, or was this something where the lines had been set for some time?

CLARK: You’re absolutely right. Lines had been set for some time. These were issues that had been around for a decade or more in various forms. I think one of the big differences that Jeane Kirkpatrick made

Q: This is Tape 4, Side 1, with Warren Clark.

CLARK: ...was to link the positions that countries took on various resolutions in the General Assembly or elsewhere in the UN with their overall relations with the United States. I think there had been a big tendency by Third World countries to generally go along with whatever the resolution of the moment was, be it on something proposed by the Palestine Liberation Organization or the African National Congress or other exile groups that had various degrees of representation in New York. Everybody would go along in a knee-jerk way. Some of these resolutions had a lot of really quite nasty language about the United States or our motives or that kind of thing. So I think one of the important contributions that Ambassador Kirkpatrick made was to put countries on notice that their votes in the United Nations were going to make a difference, that we were noticing, that we were listening, that we were watching. This started with a very dramatic message that she drafted for transmission, I think it was, by the Secretary of State to every country that had voted in favor of a certain resolution condemning the United States. The message told the US ambassadors in those countries—and there were 40 or 50 or 60 of these countries—to go in, to call the attention of the foreign minister to this resolution that their delegation had supported in the United Nations. They were told to ask the foreign minister what he thought about it, and also at the same time to take note of the degree of American assistance to that particular country. They would ask whether the government or that minister saw any contradiction between the level of US assistance and voting against the US or using this kind of language against the US in the UN. So she linked, quite explicitly, US foreign assistance to votes in the UN, or at least certainly the implicit threat was there, and I think it was quite explicit in many cases.

The second year I was there, I was in the political section. We got together and decided, okay, what were the ten most important resolutions in which it was very important to us how they came out? What was the position of the various countries in the General Assembly, particularly countries with whom we had foreign assistance, on the ten most important votes? And we went down and we counted how the countries voted on those ten votes. And then we sent a cable to every ambassador in those many countries telling them how their government had voted on the most important issues. Of course, this was after the fact. We got better at this as time went on, and we were going in ahead, before the fact, and having confrontations before the General Assembly even started. We said, look now, here are a whole bunch of resolutions that are really important to us, and we’re going to watch very closely how you vote on those issues. A particularly neuralgic
problem was Puerto Rico. There was that issue every year calling for UN supervised free elections about the political status of Puerto Rico. We’ve had many referenda on the status of Puerto Rico. We think the Puerto Rican people are perfectly free to choose whatever form of government they want to, and we were insulted and incensed that someone would think somehow that the Puerto Rican people were not able to choose their form of government. And so we made it very clear to many, many governments that we did not want them voting in favor of this kind of resolution in the General Assembly. Over a period of time that became almost routine. By the end of the four-year period that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was ambassador, people knew that there were going to be tallies about how your government voted on various resolutions of importance to the United States.

Jumping ahead for a moment, when I was ambassador in Libreville, Gabon, one of my coverage states, one of the smallest in the UN, was São Tomé Principe. This was two little islands off the coast of Africa. It used to be a Portuguese colony, had a total population probably less than southern Manhattan, something like perhaps Southwest Washington, about 200,000 people. But São Tomé Principe had a seat in the United Nations and voted along with everybody else. More importantly, São Tomé Principe has a seat on the UN Human Rights Commission, and the Human Rights Commission was the scene of bloody battles every year between people trying to get a resolution condemning Cuba and the Soviet side trying to block a resolution condemning Cuba. And how São Tomé Principe was going to vote on that resolution was very important in our relationship. Without going into detail, whereas in the 1970s they had voted against human rights investigations of Cuba, during the 1980s they switched and all of a sudden abstained on all those resolutions on Cuba, despite the fact that they were getting foreign assistance in that time from Cuba. There were Cuban doctors and Cuban foreign aid people in São Tomé Principe, which did not vote with the Cubans on those resolutions.

Q: Well, during the time you were watching this, did you see that contesting these votes had much influence?

CLARK: On the votes, on the actual outcomes? Yes, I think at the margin they did. I can’t cite a whole number of votes that went one way instead of another way because of our lobbying, but I think it did in fact—the actual number is on the margin—also cause those governments to reflect a little bit on what they were doing. Jeane Kirkpatrick, being an academic intellectual, has got a lot of what are for me interesting insights. She defined power as the ability to cause the other party to reflect before they act. Now this doesn’t mean that the other party is not going to act against you, but they’re going to do it only after they’ve thought about it rather than doing it off-handedly without thinking about it. Now there were years when with enormous effort and organizational lobbying we finally did get some votes in the UN Human Rights Commission. They set up a rapporteur on human rights in Cuba. Dick Schifter, Ambassador Schifter, was the one who did most of the organizing on that. So there were some actual concrete times one could point to where the vote came out in a way we would hope it would after years and years and years of not coming out the way we wanted it to.
Q: As you were working with both the economic and later the political side, was there sort of an ethos within the United Nations or the delegates that really had very little almost regard for what was happening back in their own country. I’m talking about the Third World. You know, there are a lot of votes that the government of Gabon or Mali or Outer Mongolia or something couldn’t care less about but it’s a matter of, sort of, power and personal satisfaction of tweaking the eagle’s tail or whatever it is or something. Did you find that?

CLARK: Yes, I think you’re absolutely right that many, many small governments—first of all they had very poor communications between their foreign ministries and their missions to the UN. Many of the UN ambassadors have independent political power and influence, the way ours do, very often. And also I think, for small nations, they feel in fact they must get together in groups if they’re going to have any influence, and one should remember, I guess, that the UN is much more important to a small or medium-size power than it is to the US. I was in Algeria one time, in Algiers, and—big headlines, about so-and-so said such-and-such at the UN on some topic of interest to Algeria. Well, this would not have made page 29 in the New York Times. It was sort of a non-event. But it was a big deal in Algiers. But it’s for that very kind of reason that I think Ambassador Kirkpatrick put in place a number of these policies, to make governments and presidents and foreign ministers reflect that they should include some notes of caution in their cartes blanches to their ambassadors to the UN not to perhaps unnecessarily take on the United States on some of these questions. Certainly there are going to be disagreements; certainly they’ll oppose us on various things; certainly there will be issues for which solidarity with other members of the G-77 or whatever it is will be important. But certainly not all the time.

Q: What about the reaction of our ambassadors who had to go in with these disquieting, upsetting facts about the voting? Ambassadors generally don’t like to go in and say, hey, you’re voting wrong and this is jeopardizing your aid. You know, it’s just a natural thing. It’s upsetting and it seems like we’re using a heavy hand on a small, unprotected little nation or something. Were there problems with this?

CLARK: No, there really weren’t. There may have been an ambassador here or there who didn’t like getting this kind of instructions, but I’m not aware of getting any negative feedback from a US ambassador on it. I think au contraire, it may be that a lot of ambassadors or embassies get a little annoyed at their host country shooting off their mouth on this or that or the other subject, and it’s nice to give them a dose of reality now and then.

Q: Well, you moved over to the political side for the last two years, is that right?

CLARK: Yes.

Q: Where did you fit in in the scheme of things, and what was your focus there?

CLARK: I mentioned that, although I had a fancy title, I was functionally head of the
Economic Section. That was for the first year. In January of ’82, Dirk Gleysteen, who was the political counselor, did not extend for a third year. He’d been there for two years. I was asked to take over the Political Section, and I did. So the last three years I was in New York, I was head of the Political Section. In that job, my deputy the first year of that period was George Moose, later assistant secretary for African affairs, and in between, ambassador to Senegal and to Togo and a number of other places. I think Gleysteen and Moose had divided up the world, and Gleysteen, who had been in the Middle East, did the Middle East issues, and Moose did the African issues. Moose continued to work very closely on African issues. There was a war going on in Mozambique and Angola, and we were working very hard with a number of countries. We had a very high priority to get the Cubans out of Angola, so the US and the UK and France and Portugal had an informal group called the Contact Group, which got together, and then we collectively met from time to time with the Soviet Union and South Africa and Cuba and Angola, which had its own government, of course, to talk about the possibility of winding down that war. George was very active in the Contact Group on Angola, and Chet Crocker, who was assistant secretary for African affairs in Washington, was orchestrating the whole thing. I told George I wanted to be in charge of everything, including Africa, but he de facto did the day-to-day things on Africa. Functionally, as head of the political section, I was backing up Charles Lichenstein, who was the number three ambassador, and the number one ambassador for the Security Council. The pecking order was Ambassador Kirkpatrick, then her deputy, which first was Ken Adelman and later actually became José Sorzano, and then there was Chuck Lichenstein, who did the Security Council, and I backed up Chuck for Security Council matters. The people in the Political Section were preparing most of the staff work for our work on all questions, including questions on Africa, in the Security Council. In addition to the Security Council there were the political committees of the General Assembly; there was the Committee on Disarmament, a special political committee on disarmament, the other committees I mentioned on human rights, which of course is a very politicized issue. So there were a lot of other political events going on, and disarmament was a big element of that. But my own work focused a lot on the Security Council. I put a lot of emphasis on internal communications, making sure everybody was talking or communicating adequately with everybody else. I think that may have been a problem in the political section before I got there, which was why I was asked to take it over.

Q: Was this a problem particularly with special delegations? I mean, you fling people in because of their political prominence or their glitterati prominence or something like that, and did they get off the range, or was this a problem?

CLARK: Oh, they would get off the range now and then, but generally it was not a problem. Generally the public delegates and the other high-level important famous people who would come to New York were there for a particular meeting, a particular purpose. They would give a speech that somebody else had probably written for them and leave. So, no, the problem mostly was not visiting delegations, either public delegates or people there from the Defense Department or other parts of the government who would come from time to time. If there were problems in communication, it was the initial thing we had identified as the us-them, the career and political appointees.
Q: Were the political people in our staff at the UN tended to be more, you might say, right wing, slightly anti-UN process, and the career people being more sort of making the system work or not, or is that unfair?

CLARK: Well, I’m not sure you’d characterize it too much as left or right. I suppose, yes, most career—I’m not even sure about that—a lot of career Foreign Service officers could be looked on as liberal in the political sense, but by no means all of them. I’ve known some quite conservative FSOs in my day. And I think by the 1980s, the US in general was pretty disillusioned with the UN. I mean way back in the ‘40s and ‘50s a lot of people might have thought it was The Answer to World Peace in some sense, but by the 1980s that was no longer really the case. Most people realized that a strong element of damaged reputation was involved, especially on the political side. So I don’t think it was pro-UN, anti-UN, liberal, conservative—it wasn’t quite that clear a breakdown. But certainly a career person does have different approach, a different mentality, maybe more pragmatic take on what’s going on, and might, especially if you’ve been doing it for a number of years, might resent someone coming and saying, “Well, don’t do it this way; do it that way.” And you might say, well, gee whiz, I know how to do this. I don’t need you to tell me how to do it. There might be that kind of thing. Suppose I’m writing a speech on some particular topic, and a political person’s going to say, well, that’s fine, but add this political element. And the career person says, oh, I don’t want to add a political element in what is otherwise a disinterested, abstract kind of statement. So, yes, there is that kind of personal and professional kind of stuff.

Q: About the only thing I really recall about that time as a not abnormally interested observer was Ambassador Lichenstein telling the UN, “You can pick up your marbles and go, and I’ll stand on the dock and wave you goodbye,” or the equivalent. Could you talk about that?

CLARK: Yes. It got a lot of attention. He said that about the Soviet Union, not about the UN. And I’ve forgotten the immediate issue, but you’re absolutely right. He did make a statement very close to what you’ve just said, “If you don’t like it, you can leave, and we’ll wave goodbye as you go off into the sunset from Lower Manhattan.” His geography may have been wrong, since it would be the sunrise rather than the sunset if they’re going back to Russia. But he got a lot of publicity over that, a lot of mail, and he was given the keys to several cities and things like that. I think it reflected primarily anger at the Soviet Union for things like Afghanistan and martial law in Poland and other cold-war issues. Underlying that anti-Soviet stuff there was an element of disdain for certain things that were going on in the UN that the Soviets had been exploiting.

Q: Speaking about disdain for things that are going on in the United Nations, I’m talking about not quite 40 years of building up a bureaucracy, and I know for many of the smaller countries these jobs are very important. It’s like the bureaucracy of today’s Washington, DC, very ineffective. What was our feeling towards the United Nations administration, the bureaucracy? Was this an issue?
CLARK: Yes, it was a big issue. There was a feeling that the budget was out of control, that the bureaucracy was out of control, that the Secretary General had very little control over either the bureaucracy or the budgets. And the budgets kept getting bigger and bigger; they kept hiring more and more people to do this, that, and the other thing. There was a disconnect between resolutions in the General Assembly on programs and the budget because Third World countries are very happy to vote in favor of a resolution to do this, that, or the other thing to fight locusts, let’s say, in the desert, because they didn’t have to pay for it. Everybody wants to fight locusts in the desert, but it’s probably useful to have some idea of what it’s going to cost to fight locusts in the desert. They never had any idea. It was under Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s watch that there was a change in the procedure so that every time there was a resolution in the General Assembly to do this or that or the other thing, there had to be, before it could be voted on, a statement from the ACADQ, which was the administrative and budget committee, on the budget implications—how much was it going to cost? And if nobody knew how much it was going to cost, you had to either say that or you had to say, well, we’re going to set an arbitrary limit of x number of dollars. So the number of programs had grown out of control. UN civil servants were very well paid, indeed, better paid than American civil servants. There was some chafing about that. In the 1970’s, the US Government salaries did not keep up with inflation. Well, in the UN, they did keep up with inflation and more than kept up with inflation. People were better off in the 1980s than they had been in 1970. That was not true for us and for many people—plus the fact many people decided to retire in Geneva, where they were paid in Swiss francs at the exchange rate on top of everything else, but translated into dollars their pensions were just enormous. So there was a good deal of concern about that.

I think there was also concern about simple bad administration. I mentioned two agencies that I thought were well administered by Americans—UNDP and UNICEF—but there were other organizations that were widely thought to be either hardly managed at all or poorly managed. One that is always mentioned is WHO, the World Health Organization, which is a very large bureaucracy, has wonderful things to its credit, like the elimination of smallpox, but which, by the mid-1980’s, did not have any particular cause—this was before AIDS had become important—it was pushing and was thought to be in many ways very ineffective. There also were some terrible personality conflicts around some other agencies.

**Q:** Were we still in UNESCO at that time, or were we out?

CLARK: UNESCO is a special case. During this period we withdrew from UNESCO, in part because of a disagreement about their budget and in part in disagreement about the substance of their policies and our lack of influence. There was a lot of frustration when, on the one hand, you’re being asked to pay for an organization, or at least a very large percentage of the expense, on the other hand, your views don’t seem to be taken into account very much by that organization. So I think UNESCO to some degree was made an example of, which is not to say the problems were not real—I think they were real—but I think we wanted to show there were limits to how much we were willing to go along.
Q: Who was the leader of that at that time? He was African. Mboya or something like that? [Ed note: Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow (1974-1987.)]

CLARK: Yes, you’re right, but I can’t recall.

Q: But it was considered to be almost his personal fiefdom, and with all the budgetary problems in spades. In this all—we’ve talked about the Soviet Union and those—what about France? We always seem to get cross-wise with France. Was this true when you were there?

CLARK: I think not to a very large degree. Certainly we had differences of views on a number of things. I think France is more prone to vote with the developing countries or the G-77 on a host of issues, but Ambassador Kirkpatrick speaks very good French. She had very good relations internally with the French permanent representative. She spends her summer vacations in France. She has a house in France. And I think the French governments at the time were not particularly anti-American on a variety of issues, so that there seemed to be a general compatibility. I don’t recall any kind of bruising confrontations on ideological or other points.

Q: Did the White House—I’m using the term White House rather than President Reagan because he had a group around him of Deaver and Baker and Meese and all—intrude at all, or Kirkpatrick was pretty well plugged in?

CLARK: She was very plugged in. She came to Washington frequently. Every week, generally, she was in Washington for at least half a day. I think she kept very close to most of those people you mentioned in the White House. I think her priority was to make sure that she was closely in tune with their thinking and that they were in tune with her thinking.

Let me at this point add a couple of anecdotes about Jeane Kirkpatrick. I like Jeane a lot. I did. I think she was a very fine person, and she gave the appearance in public, in interviews on television and in speeches, of having a very clear idea about what she wanted—and she did. As an academic, she had carefully thought through why she thought what she thought about various issues. And I always thought that one of the great values she had to Ronald Reagan and many of the people with him was that they knew what they wanted too, but she could provide the rationale. She could provide a respectable intellectual framework as to why one wanted to pursue this or that particular policy.

I mentioned she came to Washington frequently to attend meetings of the National Security Council. I was told later by an ambassador who was on the NSC at the time that she was greatly feared. When you would have a meeting of the National Security Council, in the group you would have the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State. Now each one of those people had an enormous depth—thousands, maybe tens of thousand, hundreds of thousands of people who were
feeding information into that principal, not always, not all the time, but most of the time. People on these different staffs—Defense, CIA, White House—they talk to each other, so they generally know where they’re coming from. Oh, Joe thinks this or that about this topic. So when the principal, when the Secretary was coming to a meeting that was discussing a topic like Nicaragua, generally people knew what the Secretary of Defense or the CIA director thought about Nicaragua. The staff people had been talking to each other, and generally they knew what the principal was going to say because they had written the briefing paper, they had told the principal what he was going to say. Now the principal might have his own ideas and so forth, but generally the direction was pretty clear.

When Ambassador Kirkpatrick came to meetings, people had no idea what she was going to say because she didn’t have 10,000 people working for her who were talking to the other 10,000 people. So she added an element of uncertainty, which made the bureaucrats very nervous. Of course, it also made it kind of stimulating, I suppose. But à propos of that, she told me a story that she had been at an NSC meeting and there had been a debate—should we do this or should we do that and da-da-da on this side and da-da-da on that side. And finally Jeane said, well, I think we ought to do 1-2-3, A-B-C. And being a very articulate person, she presented a very clear argument as to why we should be doing A, B, and C. Everybody said, oh, okay, and they agreed that they were going to do A, B, and C. And everybody said that’s fine, and the meeting was over and they walked out of the room, and she said to herself, Oh my God, what have I done? People agreed with me! It’s a humbling thing when you’re not simply arguing a point in a sort of academic way but this is going to have real world consequences, and your view prevails, and that’s what’s going to happen. So that gives you just enormous responsibility, and she felt the weight. And anybody would have to feel the weight of that kind of responsibility.

The other thing she said to me one time, because she’s a very honest person, is she said, you know, “Warren, I’ve never, ever been absolutely convinced of anything. I’m never totally sure about my opinion or about anything else.” Well, that is a very good position, a very understandable position for an academic intellectual, a philosopher, to take, but it’s not the kind of statement you expect from a partisan political person.

Q: Very definitely.

CLARK: And that endeared her to me.

Q: I would have thought one of the hardest ones of all the issues she was in was the one that she sort of staked out that actually got her the job, but that was we should be kinder to these right-wing dictators in Latin America. She wrote an article which brought her to the attention of the Reagan—

CLARK: It was called “Dictators and Double Standards.”

Q: I would have thought over time this one would have weighed rather heavily, because, I mean, these were not nice people, and things were beginning to move the other way in
the world.

CLARK: What happened ten years later was, in effect, she said, “I was wrong.”

Q: She what?

CLARK: She said, in effect, “I was wrong.”

Q: Oh.

CLARK: Because part of her thesis was—and indeed I think the foundation of her thesis was—that communist régimes don’t change, that once the communists take over that’s sort of the end of it and they never allow any dissension, they never allow any criticism and you’re sort of stuck with a totalitarian régime indefinitely; whereas if you have a right-wing dictator you have a possibility, after a period of time, that it could soften up or it could become less restrictive, or it could allow more freedom of speech. Or eventually a right-wing dictator might evolve towards greater democracy, whereas a left-wing communist dictatorship does not. Well, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, she had to say, “Well, of course, communist régimes change, too.”

Q: It was, I think, of great frustration and concern to many of us, looking at the Cold War, that there seemed to be a ratchet effect—that if a régime turned communist it never went back. And then you began to have the Brezhnev doctrine and the other things in Poland and Czechoslovakia and in a very muddled way in—

CLARK: “Goulash communism” in Hungary.

Q: How did you find dealing with delegates on the political side? Did the Westerners, the British, German, French, Italian, maybe the Dutch or something, get together in a huddle and come up with plans on various things, or how did this work?

CLARK: We consulted frequently with what’s called WEOG, the Western European Other Group, it’s called in the UN, and that was a formal thing, because there were three semi-formal groups. There was WEOG, there was the Soviet bloc and there were the Third World countries, G-77 for economic stuff and nonaligned for political things. And we would have our caucus and they would have their caucus, and we would often agree jointly on positions on issues, but apart from that we also had bilateral meetings, and this is one of the things that Jeane organized. You know, we’d have six or eight or ten of us and six or eight or ten of the British, and we would have a bilateral meeting with the British. And we did that with other groups and with the Israelis. We had very close relationships with the Israeli delegation.

Q: How did you find the Japanese delegations? Did they have much to contribute?

CLARK: No. The Japanese did not have much to contribute when I was there. I think part of that reflects Japanese politics, which in that period was very reluctant to get out ahead
or have much of a profile on any sort of international issue. They were sticking home and doing their economic development and making their money. I mentioned the other day, though, that there had been an evolution in Japan about language skills. Most of the Japanese delegates by the 1980s did speak very good English and/or French, whereas ten years earlier, when I’d been working on OECD affairs, it was very painful because the Japanese could hardly speak any. Their English was very, very difficult to understand. But by the mid-‘80s they had trained enough of their diplomats that they spoke excellent English.

*Q: You say our relations were very close to the Israelis. I would have thought that this would at times cause problems because, you know, Israel is not our only set of interests in the Middle East, or did you find that was our interest in the Middle East?*

CLARK: Certainly we had many interests in the Middle East, but in this period, I think we were in fact moving closer to Israel on a broad range of issues. This was a period, ‘80-‘84-‘85, when something called the “Strategic Alliance” was announced between the United States and Israel. I think both President Reagan and Jeane Kirkpatrick personally had very cordial and warm feelings towards the State of Israel and its leadership. I think also this was an area in human rights were many would have said that, while there are problems and there have been abuses in Israel, Israel is a functioning democracy, whereas most other countries in the Middle East are not. But apart from that kind of fairly ideological point, I think there was very strong attachment to Israel. This also included, though, some very, very painful moments. One was the invasion of southern Lebanon in 1972.

*Q: By the Israelis.*

CLARK: By the Israelis, and you may recall there was a period when the Israelis essentially had Beirut surrounded. Water and electricity were cut off. I think this period went on for a couple of weeks.

*Q: And they were bombarding.*

CLARK: They were bombarding. And then towards—I’ve forgotten the exact sequence of this—but towards the end of that period, I think, were also the massacres of Muslim Lebanese by Christian Lebanese.

*Q: With the apparent complicity of the Israelis.*

CLARK: Well, there was an issue that involved the UN, because most of these things involved the UN at one time or another. There had been proposals for UN observers in Sabra and Shatila camps, and the United States had opposed putting UN observers in those camps. And I took part in a conversation between Javier Peres-de-Cuellar, who was Secretary General of the UN, and Secretary of State Shultz, and that point came up. So I think it was a point of great sadness and tragedy. Everybody, I think, realized how much the civilians that were noncombatants were suffering also, apart from the massacres at
Sabra and Shatila. There was just an enormous amount of suffering on the part of people in Beirut.

Q: Did you find that the Israelis, the delegates, sort of walled themselves off, or how did they react?

CLARK: I wouldn’t say they walled themselves off, but for most of this period there was a Likud government in power in Israel, the conservative party. Menachem Begin was the Prime Minister, and for the first couple of years when I was there, Yehuda Blum was the Israeli ambassador to the UN, and Blum was very militant, very strong and would get up, you know, when there would be a criticism of Israel, as there inevitably . . .

End of Tape 4, Side A

Q: You were saying, Ambassador Blum—

CLARK: So Ambassador Blum, I was saying, was very militant, was not widely liked by a lot of the UN Third World country people, and Blum was replaced by Benjamin Netanyahu, now Prime Minister of Israel, and another Likud member, of course.

Q: Well, how did you find the Arab representatives within the UN context? Were they effective or not, or what was your impression?

CLARK: The Egyptians always had very skillful representation, and the Algerians had very good representation. Most of the other Arab representatives that I recall were not particularly—how do we say in the diplomatic field?—active, or not very. . . . Well, that’s not true. I take that back. As time went on in the Security Council, I developed my own little rule-of-thumb, which was the worse the government, the better their representative. Idi Amin was in power at the time in Uganda, and Uganda had a super, wonderful representative, a brilliant man who was ambassador of Uganda. He was on the Security Council. His name was Olara Otunnu. But speaking of terrible governments, there was hardly a worse government in the Middle East than Iraq, now or then, and they were represented by a fellow named Ismat Kittani. Well, Ismat Kittani was super; he was wonderful, I mean very effective diplomat—and talk about a difficult brief, talk about a difficult portfolio, to defend Saddam Hussein, but he did, and I think he did it probably better than anybody I could possibly imagine.

This was also the period of the Iran-Iraq war, so it was the time of a lot of tension for Iraq. It was also the time when Saddam Hussein was gassing Kurdish people, I think, in northern Iraq, so Kittani had a difficult brief, but he was very good at it. I’m just sure as a professional representing his sovereign he was very professional and very good at it.

Q: You mentioned how busy things are during the General Assembly. Everybody seems to scurry around, but for somebody from the outside, what the hell goes on at the General Assembly that’s so important, or is it?
CLARK: The General Assembly, of course, represents everybody. When I was there, there were 158 members of the General Assembly. I think it’s now up into the 160’s, maybe more. And most of the votes are by majority vote. If a resolution is passed, and in those days an anti-Israeli resolution might pass by 140 to 2, with only the US and Israel voting against, so something like that, you can say, is not very meaningful. But there are a couple of important qualifications. It’s not very meaningful in the US, to the US, but it’s very meaningful to some other countries some of the time. I mentioned big headlines in Algeria about some G-77 resolution. The General Assembly is where anybody can be heard. If you represent or if you’re the sovereign or the president of the government or head of state of a small country, you can go to the UN, and you can give a speech in the General Assembly, and the other 157 countries in the world will listen to you. Well, that’s pretty good if you’re the sovereign of a small state. This certainly makes you look good back home in Ouagadougou or some other place. It gives a host of small or medium governments political mileage. It also is the place where resolutions that are coming up through these various committees and through other councils all end up, in the General Assembly. So that various programs, of which the UN has many tens if not hundreds of different programs—we’ve mentioned UNICEF and WHO and UNDP and UNESCO and a lot of others, FAO, IFAD—all require budgets and mandates. And for most of these organizations, their mandate must be reviewed and approved every year by the General Assembly. So it’s the begging cup for all those hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats that are manning UN organizations. Those bureaucrats, many of them, have political ties back home. Many of them regard this or that agency as their fiefdom—or might have in the past, anyway—and so it’s a place where a lot of these tensions get played out. So it’s a place for visibility. It’s a place for making a statement on the record. It’s a place for looking good politically back home. It’s a place for approving the ongoing mandate for programs and the ongoing budget for a lot of UN bureaucracies, which, after all, are going to be spending many hundred of millions of dollars every year around the world. So that what the UN does or doesn’t do—especially if you include people like the World Bank and the IMF—has a big impact on a lot of people.

Q: The General Secretary during this time was Perez de Cuellar?

CLARK: When I first arrived there was Kurt Waldheim of Austria. And then he was replaced by Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru.

Q: Within the delegation, listening to the principals and among yourselves, what was the impression of Peres de Cuellar?

CLARK: I think he was very highly regarded. He was, is, a very aristocratic, dignified person, who is also very smart, who I think is or was a candidate to be prime minister or president of Peru, or something like that. And ambassador Kirkpatrick enjoyed very close relations with him, and I think she thought that he was responsive, or at least as responsive as he could be, to our interests, the interests of the largest single contributor to the UN. And he was supportive of most of the efforts for reform of budget and management issues. So I think he was widely appreciated. He did not always agree with the United States. I mentioned the observers in Lebanon.
CLARK: Lebanon was the neuralgic point. There was a UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, which of course got smooshed rather quickly by the Israelis—or, in fact, didn’t put up any resistance because they didn’t have a mandate to put up any resistance—when the Israelis invaded southern Lebanon. There also was a separate UN peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights, which, interestingly, had excellent relations with both the Syrians and the Israelis. Both sides wanted them to be there; both sides were happy they were there. They had a useful role to play of keeping people apart. That’s one of the functions the UN does that doesn’t get headlines, but which is still important. In a lot of places they’re really keeping the peace. Another area where that takes place is in Cyprus, where the UN mans the Green Line between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. And not always, but most of the time, that’s been a pretty quiet situation, and people are happy that the UN is there. So I think, yes, UN peacekeeping has kind of a mixed record, but I think a lot of it is very useful.

Q: Well, we’ve probably covered it. Can you think of anything else we haven’t talked about on the UN side?

CLARK: Yes, let me mention one thing that was important to me. When Ambassador Kirkpatrick was out of town, Ambassador Sorzano was in charge. When he was out of town, Ambassador Lichenstein was in charge of the Security Council. There were some moments when all of them were out of town, and I was in the chair for the United States in the Security Council. This was generally in August. So on several occasions I would speak for the US and, indeed, vote for the US in the Security Council. I think I may be the only non-ambassador to have done that. And there was an important event during one of those periods. There was an Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon, and we’re now talking about the summer of 1984, I think. And the Arabs were very incensed, and they drew up a resolution in the Security Council, condemning Israeli practices in southern Lebanon, especially referring to the areas that they occupied, and calling on the UN to investigate or to __________________________. And we said that was excessive and way beyond anything that was reasonable. So there were negotiations, and at the last minute paragraphs were deleted from the resolution, which called on the UN to do certain things. So basically it was a hortatory kind of resolution condemning Israeli practices in southern Lebanon. My instructions from the State Department, from Mike Armacost, were to veto, to vote against it. The other principals from the Mission were not only not in town but they were not available. I couldn’t get through to them on the telephone. So with the deletion of these paragraphs, the British and French, who had been opposed up until then, agreed to abstain. And so when the vote finally came, the one vote against the resolution was the US vote, which, of course, was a veto, so it didn’t pass. And I met the next day with some Egyptians on another subject, and they were polite on a personal level, but it was clear they were upset at the US veto. About ten days later, a car drove up to the makeshift US Embassy in Beirut, and there was some small explosion and a...
number of people came from the embassy to look at what had happened and there was a larger explosion, and a number of people were killed, including three Americans at the embassy. And after that, it was announced by Hezbollah, that the explosion had been a retaliation for the US veto of the resolution in the Security Council. So that gave me a lot of pause. It brought home to me again what I mentioned to you earlier about how these diplomatic and political actions can have very severe real-world consequences.

**Q:** You left there in 1985.

**CLARK:** That’s right.

**Q:** I thought we’d just put that at the end of this tape and then we’ll stop. Where did you go then?

**CLARK:** To Lagos, Nigeria.

**Q:** All right, we’ll pick it up then when you’re going to Lagos.

**Q:** Today is the 8th of January 1999. Warren, you’re off to Lagos in 1985.

**CLARK:** Yes.

**Q:** You’re going to be doing what there?

**CLARK:** I had been in New York for four years, and before that I had been in Canada for four years, and I had been in Washington before that. So I was identified by the State Department Personnel as time to go to a hardship post. And I said that was fine, I was very happy to go to a hardship post. I’d been in the Middle East before. And they said, yes, and we’re assigning you as economic counselor in Lagos, which is a hard to fill position. And I resisted that. I thought, gee whiz, after all my wonderful experience I should be something more than an economic counselor, so there were a number of interventions. The first was that Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote to the Secretary of State and said that I think that Warren deserves something better than economic counselor in Lagos. Then General Vernon Walters, who was replacing Ambassador Kirkpatrick in New York, asked me to stay on for a fifth year as head of the Political Section backing up the Security Council. Then Alan Keyes, who was about the become the assistant secretary of State for IO, asked me to be his deputy, his DAS, in IO. Well, I thought that sounded like a very good job, although it’s not overseas and not a hardship post, and the State Department took the view, not no, but hell no. You’re going to Lagos. So I said okay. And then I got a request from Reg Bartholomew, who was ambassador in Beirut, to be his DCM in Beirut. Well, by that time we’d gone up and down the mountain three or four times and it was too late, so off I went to Lagos.

I was two years in Lagos.

**Q:** ’85 to ’87.
CLARK: ’85 to ’87. And I found it a very, very interesting place. The first six months I was there—I arrived in September ‘85—I was economic counselor, and the economy is a very interesting situation in Nigeria. I think Nigeria is a wonderful example of how all the money in the world will not produce economic development. They earned hundreds of billions of dollars in the oil boom in the ’70s and ’80s and, alas, had not much to show for it. There also were a lot of pressing problems at the time of repayment of debts. We were trying to get Nigeria to pay some of its debt to the Ex-Im Bank while at the same time we were trying to extend them credits, agricultural credits. So there was a good deal of financial work going on, and I had an excellent junior officer, Bob Burke, who was doing that work. After I’d been in Lagos about six months, what happened was what I half expected to happen, which was I was kicked upstairs to be DCM in Lagos. And in fact, I was chargé, because Ambassador Smith had left prematurely—

Q: Which Smith was this? I mean, there have been a couple of Smiths.

CLARK: I’m sorry, I can’t pull it out right away. We’ll figure that out. He had withdrawn prematurely for medical reasons.

Q: It was Tom Smith.

CLARK: Maybe Tom Smith. He had been in Ghana, I think.

Q: Yes, I think that his wife, Jane, worked for—

CLARK: Jane, that’s it, that’s it. Jane was his wife, yes.

Q: He died of cancer in 1987.

CLARK: Very nice lady, and he was a very nice gentleman. And Don Gelber had been there maybe five years, much of which had been as chargé and then DCM, but Don Gelber was scheduled to leave. So he left, and in the beginning of ’86 I was chargé. And so Princeton Lyman came as ambassador in the fall of ’86. And when Ambassador Lyman came, I, of course, was DCM. Then not very long afterward, I think in December of ’86, I was asked if I would be chief of mission in Libreville, in Gabon. And of course I said yes.

Back up a minute on Nigeria, I traveled around the country a great deal. I think I visited almost all of the states in Nigeria. I found it a very rich country in many ways. It worked well in many ways, despite the fact that the federal government had a great deal of difficulty in organizing itself and organizing its finances and organizing services at a federal level. The country nevertheless worked at a state level and at a local level and, indeed, at a sort of family and clan level. So it was an interesting example to me of a not very effective national government—the damage it can do is considerable but limited, in that a lot of other things work adequately without a terribly efficient national government.
Q: Let’s talk about when you arrived there in ’85. You mentioned taking in billions of dollars with very little to show for it. What, as we perceived it at that time, was the problem of the government? Could you talk a little about the upper level of the federal government?

CLARK: The usual answer to that question is that there was widespread corruption, but I think it’s a little more complicated than that. Part of it, I think, represents Nigeria’s struggle to develop a form of government that works for Nigeria. Back in the early ‘60’s, when they first became independent, they had a parliamentary form of government, like Westminster. Then they had a series of dictators. Then in 1979, the last military ruler turned the government power over to an elected democracy which was based on the American model of a president, and the president was a man named Shagari. There was a House, there was a Senate, and there was a Presidency, and it looked very much like an American model. They hired American consultant to help them run elections and show them what democracy was like. And while the outer trappings were in fact the American model, it simply didn’t work. This coincided with the period when oil prices were very high and revenues were very high indeed, up until 1979 or ’80. But then in the early ’80’s, these very high prices began to decline, and the availability of money was not so easy. And there was rather a general breakdown of services. Telephones didn’t work. The electricity was pirated, so that people who were paying for electricity often didn’t get it, and people who were not paying for it did get it. There was widespread banditry. I was told by Kit Chavez, who was the desk officer for Nigeria in 1979, that that year the house of every American government employee in Lagos was broken into, with the exception of the Ambassador’s Residence. Teams of thieves would drive up in a white truck and put a chain around the bars of the windows, rip the bars off the windows, go into the house, and take away everything they could move.

Don Gelber, whom I’ve mentioned, was the right man in the right place at the right time. He was a very tough fellow, very straightforward, plainspoken fellow from Brooklyn, and the story I heard was that he sent a cable back to Washington, when they could not get the resources they needed to run the Embassy, saying he was going to recommend that they close the Embassy in 1983 unless they got a whole series of security enhancements. Well, that got people’s attention. They did get the security enhancements, and by the time I got there in ’85, the Embassy security was excellent. We had very secure houses; we had guards outside each house; we had roving patrols; we had walkie-talkies; we had all kinds of things. So that Americans were hard targets for the bandits. Once you can get around all of these problems, there was still a great deal to do.

There was still a very active business community, although the business community was declining because the oil revenues were declining. And the Nigerians were again struggling on how to deal with the situation of declining revenues. Now in 1984, as I said, there had been at that point a rather severe breakdown of government activities and government services. The democratically elected government of Mr. Shagari was overthrown by a military coup, much to everybody’s relief. People were relieved that they were going back to a military government that would try to impose law and order. The first military dictator was rather draconian, and he was replaced two years later, in
1985, by Ibrahim Babangida, who was the head of state when I was there. Babangida was, indeed, a dictator, in that he didn’t have a legislature or things like that, but he did it with kid gloves and put on a very pleasant exterior, and he had a very great touch with the other army officers and the public. So Babangida was a rather benign dictator during the period I was there. The very severe problems had been overcome, and the country was beginning to limp along at a somewhat lower level of oil revenues. The government was beginning to consolidate itself and think about what they might do in the future to improve the way the government was run. There was the beginning of the talk of return to democracy, although that hasn’t happened yet; they’re still working on it. They were beginning to start the construction of the new capital in Abuja in the center of the country, rather than Lagos, which is down on the coast in a particular ethnic area. And so they were in fact beginning to deal with some of the nuts-and-bolts problems of nation-building.

Q: What about corruption during this period?

CLARK: Well, I think nowadays they have lists of countries of degrees or corruption, and Nigeria is always, if not at the top, near the top of countries in which bribery and other kinds of corruption are widespread. There are all kinds of stories about invisible bridges that had been billed to the government many times and paid for many times but did not exist. And the tradition of kickbacks and payoffs and so forth was very widespread. This, of course, presents a problem for US corporations because of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It’s against the law for US firms to do that overseas. So US firms have to act and perform things on their merits, which may put them to a disadvantage vis-à-vis some competitors. But there was nevertheless still so much revenue and oil production that a number of US firms were, indeed, still flourishing in Nigeria.

Q: What would you tell an American businessman who had arrived in Nigeria? What about investing in this country, I mean, putting up a firm, doing business? What would you tell them?

CLARK: To be very careful. I think, as in most countries, a great deal depends on a local partner. Almost all these ventures are joint ventures with a local partner, and you simply must know that person, you must know who he is, you must know what his reputation is and whether he’s able to deliver on what he says he can deliver, and not to pay for anything until you’ve seen the merchandise yourself.

Q: In talking just so, what I understand, that the Nigerians in the United States are absolutely notorious for... A friend of mine, a banker, said that if a Nigerian walked into the bank he would almost have to shut the vault and lock the teller’s windows because their ability to come up with schemes, credit schemes, buying things on time, shipping them away, changing names has meant that Nigerians are considered to be very, very clever, much cleverer than any other group of crooks.

CLARK: Yes.
Q: Was this at all reflected in what you all were doing?

CLARK: Yes, it was reflected very much so and in different ways. In the early 1980’s, when the oil prices were still very high, Tom Pickering was the ambassador in those days, and he had a policy of trying to sell as much as fast as possible to the Nigerians to benefit from all these revenues, but also to send Nigerians to the United States to study, because there was scholarship money available to pay for it. But by the mid ‘80’s, what happened was that the oil revenues were down, and many of those students in the United States had run out of money. And so they were finding, as you were suggesting, very imaginative ways of keeping themselves afloat in the United States. A lot of that included fraud of different varieties and swindles of different varieties. And in 1985, when I was on my way out, the police in certain cities were beginning to organize what they called “Nigerian fraud seminars” to educate people about the kind of fraud that was perpetrated by Nigerians. I think the Desk officer at the time was uncomfortable with the description of “Nigerian fraud,” rather than just “fraud,” but it was perfectly true and well known that Nigerians were particularly imaginative in the way they defrauded people in the United States. In Lagos we faced the same kind of thing on visas. By ’85 the situation had reversed because so many Nigerian students in the United States had run out of money. We were very tough on giving visas to Nigerians for the US unless—for students, for example—they could show that they had the money to pay for their tuition and so forth, but also—for business people—to make sure that they had ties that would suggest that they were going to come back to Nigeria. So just as there was a lot of imaginative Nigerian fraud in the US, our consular people had a very, very high refusal rate and ran into all kinds of very imaginative ways in which people would try to convince consular people that they should have a visa to the US. I think more than 50 per cent of all people who applied were not given visas.

Q: What about your structural problems? One used to hear about the port at Lagos, that the loss of oil revenues was such that ships would be stuck in the port waiting to unload for six, seven months, something like that. Was that a problem when you were there?

CLARK: By the time I got there in ’85, it was not a major problem. It had been a problem. I think you may be referring to the famous cement fleet back in 1975, the first big oil boom. Apparently every agency of the Nigerian Government ordered cement for construction projects and so this fleet of ships descended on the Port of Lagos and the Port of Lagos at the time had not been expanded as it later was so that there was an enormous queue to unload. And in fact, there were ships for months at anchor in Lagos harbor, and the way all these contracts were written there were demurrage fees; that is, they had to pay for not unloading. So that was another way of milking Nigeria, another way in which people got enormous sums of money out of Nigeria, through these kinds of problems. Later on, the port was expanded, and people began to be a little more rational in the way they ordered imports, so there was not a long waiting line by the time I got there.

Q: What about the criminality. We’d taken measures, but you had a military dictatorship;
you’d think that they could take care of the problem. Were they or not?

CLARK: I mentioned that Nigeria has been struggling now for nearly 40 years to find a form of government that works for Nigeria, given their culture, given their history, given their geographic and ethnic realities. Different ruling groups, different governments, have approached this problem in different ways, some in harsh ways, some in more benign ways, a democratic way, which failed; and I think any of those systems, though, relies on the skids of politics being greased with funds which are simply never accounted for on the books. And I think up to a point people know that and acknowledge that and it’s not a problem. It’s when it gets beyond that point, when things begin to break down, it’s a problem. There’s the old cliché about the Tammany Hall politician who says, “Well, there’s honest graft, and there’s dishonest graft.” He was against dishonest graft. And I think they were beginning to develop a sense of proportion and what was necessary and what was excessive.

They would go through periods of spasms of reform, when they thought something was out of hand. Just before I got to Nigeria in ‘85—I guess it was in ’83 or ’84—you may remember they expelled Ghanaians. When the oil boom started in the ‘70’s, very many people from Ghana came to Nigeria—they both spoke English as a second language—to find jobs. But by the early 1980s those jobs had diminished, so there were unemployed Ghanaians around, and in a rather draconian measure the Ghanaians were told they had 48 hours to leave the country. I’ll describe the situation where a foreigner, an English person, arrived at Lagos at the airport, and it was wall-to-wall people lying on the ground sleeping because they were waiting for the next airplane out. And he had to step over several acres of bodies to get to where the taxis were. Of course, the taxis wanted an exorbitant sum of money to take him into town. The roads were completely clogged with traffic. There were checkpoints all over the place at which people wanted payoffs to get through the checkpoint. Finally, hours later—this would be in the wee hours of the morning—they got to downtown Lagos. A fire had broken out, which was probably sabotage, in the Nigerian PTT, which is the telephone company. They had a big tower with lots of antennas, and a fire had broken out. The story was there was an accountant who had been defrauding the company and set the fire to destroy the records, so there was this high-rise fire going on. The person arrived at the place where he was staying. The husband and wife who he was staying with were having a marital dispute. I mean, it was one disaster after another, and there were many, many stories like that. There was a story that when the US Embassy used to be in downtown Lagos—when I was there it was in a suburban island—but when it was in downtown Lagos in the late ‘70’s, a fellow left the Embassy at noon to catch a flight that was leaving at 10 in the evening and missed it because it took more than 10 hours to get through the traffic and the roadblocks from downtown Lagos to the airport.

So there were all of these kinds of blockages and disasters and then sudden efforts to solve a problem that would make for a very dramatic up and down situation.

Q: At the time you were there, how long did it take to get to the airport?
CLARK: It was reasonable. You know, you would allow a couple of hours, something like that. It was about 15 or 20 miles, something like that.

Q: I would think that all of this would have, with the lure of money gone, or going, what were our concerns there? I mean our conflict with the Soviet Union—how did all this fit in to it?

CLARK: By the mid ‘80’s, when I was there, there was not a lot of Cold War activity going on. There was Soviet representation and people from the Soviet bloc, but they were mostly looking around for ways to make money, for things they could export to Nigeria. Nigeria was and remains an enormous market in that it’s got a population of nearly a hundred million people, so that even when oil is $10 a barrel instead of $40, it’s a big market. We had oil companies who were producing oil. Mobil Oil Company was producing, and so there were some commercial interests. The Export-Import Bank and others were trying to collect some debt from Nigeria, so that was an ongoing interest.

Q: Why would Nigeria have debts?

CLARK: Well, because, notwithstanding this enormous income, they had spent more money than their income, so that by the mid-‘80s they had many billions of dollars in debts, and they were having difficulty in simply meeting the interest payments.

Q: How about dealing with the government when you were there. It was a military government. And both as economic counselor and as DCM and then Chargé, how did you find the central government?

CLARK: Not difficult, in that the US had great access to high-level officials. I met with Babangida probably more than a dozen times, usually accompanying somebody else, but on my farewell call it was just a one-on-one, the two of us. He called me by my first name. It was a very informal, friendly kind of thing. We had access to ministers. The way Nigeria works—it’s like India—is that a lot of work is done at night, and you know you’ve really reached a certain level when you’re invited over to the person’s home at 10 o’clock in the evening. That’s when important discussions often take place. In fact, our relationship with them was not bad. We still had some agricultural credits. Recovering the debts was in part balanced by extending new agricultural credits. There were US businesses. There was still a lot of interest in scholarships to the United States, things that we could provide. The Peace Corps program had been long gone, but there were a number of active non-governmental organizations. The Ford and Rockefeller foundations had a big agricultural research station near Ibadan, the Center for Tropical Agriculture. And there were a number of other medical missionary people who ran hospitals and that kind of thing. So there are a number of different American groups spread over. There were missionaries, wonderful, idealistic young couples. There were Americans spread throughout the country. And because, perhaps, of the tradition of English colonial rule, people felt comfortable talking English. While the English role was quite diminished, people looked to the United States a lot for medical treatment—they would go there if they could afford it when they were sick—for education for their children, sometimes for
trade, and in the political relations we got a request to send somebody to the White House to study how the White House was organized.

Q: You said that you found that sort of at the state level and below things were working much better in a way. Why was that? Was it just that Lagos was so chaotic?

CLARK: Lagos was chaotic. Lagos was the federal capital at the time. It had a population of—nobody knew for sure—somewhere in the neighborhood of four or five million people. There was a lot of trouble maintaining municipal services like garbage collection, electricity, and telephones. But smaller towns operated the way they had always operated. The British had a policy of indirect rule, and they would leave a local chief—in Nigeria you had obas and people who were sort of kings, who were in charge of a certain region of the country—and the oba or the chief, whoever it was...

Q: This is Tape 5, Side 1, with Warren Clark.

CLARK: Many of these obas and ones and chiefs had become wealthy themselves because they were entrepreneurs. They had money to begin with, and they had invested it. They then made it available in a semi-feudal way in the tradition of the great man would build a hospital for his community and provide medical services at his expense for the community. One chief I visited provided both modern medicine and traditional medicine, and for most ills people would go first to the traditional medicine person, the medicine man, and receive the herbs and the prayers and so forth that he could provide, and only as a secondary resort would they go to the Western scientific medicine. So there was a good deal of this kind of traditional aristocratic way of administering things. In fact, people who had become very wealthy and who didn’t have a title could buy it. And you could get an oba to give you the title of chief, and you would pay the oba, of course, large sums of money. You would then also pay for a large party, because enjoying life was very much part of the tradition in Nigeria, especially in southern Nigeria. Then you would have a chieftaincy ceremony, and there was three days of drinking, eating, and having a good time and dancing, and at some point the oba would hit you on the head with a stick or something. And some of them had courts. They would have boys-in-waiting, and they would have many wives and very colorful flowers and everything. It’s a very lively, colorful place in many ways.

Q: Were we concerned about development there during the time you were there? I was wondering whether any focuses were changing. In other words, it would sound like one would almost throw up one’s hands about Lagos and head out to the countryside and work on wells or something of that nature.

CLARK: Exactly. As I mentioned, the Peace Corps program had been withdrawn long ago, although there were still positive memories of it.

Q: Was that because of political reasons or just they were too wealthy?

CLARK: I think probably both. But I don’t know exactly when. I think the Peace Corps
was most active in the ‘60’s. I think they were pulled out in the early ‘70’s, probably because of political problems. But by that time the oil wealth was beginning to come in also. And of course there had been a big AID program in the ‘60’s. When I was there, there was a very modest AID program. It was not aimed at what you would think of as traditional lines of economic development in the sense of building schools and roads and hospitals. AID was a modest program. They had a program of public health—I guess that was the biggest component—in which AID and other donors would help state government public health officials in population planning. It was a big effort, family planning programs, handing out condoms and educating women on family planning. But I think there was no kind of overall US scheme for, quote, economic development of Nigeria. And as I think you also suggested, one could be much more effective outside of the big cities than inside.

Q: This is the period that the Ronald Reagan Administration and the Kaufman program. Who was the head of AF Bureau?

CLARK: Crocker, Chester Crocker.

Q: Chester Crocker of engagement down in—

CLARK: Constructive engagement.

Q: —constructive engagement in South Africa, which was very controversial in the United States. How was this playing or did it even play in Nigeria?

CLARK: Oh, it played very much. Nigerians are very articulate. They have a very well educated academic class and professional class. The foreign minister had been a professor in Nairobi, so as you would imagine they were very critical of our policy of constructive engagement in South Africa. I was a little amused that about a month or two before the national defense budget was being reviewed by the Revolutionary Command Council, it would be announced that there were military threats to Nigeria from South Africa, that South Africa was planning to invade Nigeria or bomb Nigeria, and therefore you had to increase your defense budget—things like that.

But, South Africa is 2,000 miles away or something. So, yes, they had a principled position opposed to constructive engagement and actually opposed to apartheid. Nigeria is a complex and wonderful country in many ways. The military leader who turned political power back to the civilian leadership was General Obasanjo, and he was at that time considered a wise man of Africa. He took part in something organized by the UN or some peace group with UN backing, sort of a wise man’s exercise. You’d get people from different parts of the country to look at South Africa and make recommendations about what can be done to help South Africa to get past its apartheid period. And they did present a report. It was very well received, and then I think probably ignored. This was the period in 1985 and ’86, when big cracks were beginning to show in apartheid in South Africa. There were riots. There were boycotts of schools. Because of the riots and the boycotts and the bloodshed in South Africa, the US Congress finally put through
boycott legislation, over the veto of President Reagan. So the US Congress was beginning to take a more activist approach. While I was there and in Libreville, because of the increased attention given to Africa by US politics, and especially Democrats, always seeking the votes of African-Americans, Jesse Jackson came to visit. And at the time he was a candidate for President in the Democratic Party. He was very well received by the Nigerians. I ran into him later in Libreville and indeed back here in Washington. So it was beginning to register on the radar screens of American politics too, in a way, not only South Africa but how other parts of Africa related to South Africa. I think Jackson was interested in coming to Nigeria for a variety of reasons, including the fact that there were wealthy, wealthy people there who might provide business opportunities for Americans, might contribute to various causes and so forth. And the press was very critical of constructive engagement.

Q: Was there much interest in Nigeria from the Department of State?

CLARK: I think the experience of most embassies and most ambassadors is that there is not enough attention given to their country or their problems. I heard it expressed by other people in the Embassy that we were not getting as much attention as we might from the Department. In retrospect, I didn’t see any big disconnects between what we were doing and the kind of backup and support and interest we got in Washington. Apart from the purely humanitarian interest and the economic interests and professional interests of the US oil companies, for example, there was not an awful lot at a very high level that was going on between the US and Nigeria, even though it’s such an enormous country. There was one anecdote. The chargé at the time got an invitation to a launching. A launching was a fund-raising operation hosted by the foreign minister or the home government. He thought it was an invitation to lunch. So he sent a cable back to Washington saying, gee, I have this luncheon invitation to have lunch with the foreign minister, is there anything you would like me to bring up? And the cable came back saying, “Bon appétit.”

Q: Was Nigeria and were we involved in any sort of peacekeeping things? Nigerian troops had been used—in fact, today they’re fighting in Sierra Leone—but they have this army that has been used for this type of thing. Was that at all active?

CLARK: They were not active in that period. The Nigerian military in Sierra Leone, and I think also in Liberia, is part of ECOWAS, which is in part a Nigerian construction, Economic Community of Western Africa. But at the time ECOWAS was moribund. The Nigerian army has played a big role in peacekeeping operations. They were in the Congo back in 1960, and I think they’ve been part of other UN peacekeeping groups. And there may still be Nigerian troops—I’m not exactly sure—in the UN forces in the Golan Heights in Syria and southern Lebanon, Cyprus, a number of other places in the world. But it was not a big issue.

Q: What was your impression or were we doing anything with education? A colleague of mine, Henry Mattox, went out to one of the major universities, a retired Foreign Service officer, back in the early ’90s and came back with a very discouraging report. There
CLARK: One of the few things Nigeria did do with its oil money in the late 1970s was to build a series of universities, and I think Nigerians do take education seriously. That’s why wealthy Nigerians are anxious to send their children abroad and will pay for that. But as in, I guess, a lot of countries, unfortunately, especially higher education, education is rather politicized. Students are rather quick to demonstrate against whatever it is they are against that week or that month—and often it’s against the government—and when that happens, bang, the government closes down the universities. So, depending on what year it is, it’s sometimes hard to get a university education. One of the programs we did have was a rather active Fulbright program. We did have US Fulbrighters teaching at Nigerian universities, and we had people doing research in Nigeria. This was at a rather low level; that is, in the whole country of 100 million people, there might have been a dozen Fulbrighters. But still, those kinds of ties, although they’re very small in number, potentially create relationships. I’m not too surprised that your colleague found that the Nigerian university system was disruptive frequently or chaotic. But I think, notwithstanding that, many Nigerians managed to get a reasonably good education.

Q: Well, were there any major issue that you or the Embassy had to deal with while you were there?

CLARK: Not any really overwhelming ones. I mentioned repayment of debts, foreign agricultural credits, consular problems of various kinds. Unfortunately this was at the beginning of the period that drugs were starting to go through Lagos, both from South America and from Pakistan and South Asia, through Lagos by air, of course, to Europe and also to the United States. And we had the beginning of a USDEA (United States Drug Enforcement Administration) drug enforcement program in cooperation with the Nigerians. I think that was a very tricky thing because you were never sure whether the person you were talking with was going to help you or might be part of the problem, and if there was so much corruption, you weren’t sure who was paying off whom. I haven’t followed it that closely, but I have the impression that unfortunately that’s continued and expanded.

Q: When you left there in 198- what?

CLARK: 1987, in the spring of ’87.

Q: How did your appointment to Gabon come about?

CLARK: Well, these things are always mysterious, I guess. I got a phone call from Hank Cohen, who at the time was deputy director general of the Foreign Service, asking me if I would consider having my name presented for chief of mission in Libreville, and of course I said yes. I came back to the US in May or June of ’87, and went through various kinds of training and clearance things. And I finally had my hearing in the Senate in August or September, and I got to Libreville in October of ’87.
Q: So in the fall or ’87 or so you went out, and you were in Gabon from when to when?

CLARK: Well, from October ’87 to July of ’89. I left after the July 4th party.

Q: In the first place, what were American interests in Gabon, and then if you could talk about the situation when you went out—what were issues and how the place worked?

CLARK: The contrasts between Nigeria and Gabon are dramatic. While Nigeria has something like one-fifth of the population of Africa, nearly 100 million people, Gabon has a population that’s estimated anywhere between 600,000 and 1.2 million. In other words, it’s very small. The country’s almost entirely rain forest, with a very low population density. It does have a lot of natural resources, which makes it wealthy on a per capita basis. Originally, this wealth was forest products. The okoumé tree is particularly valuable for making certain kinds of pulp. Then they found manganese, and other kinds of ores, in which US Steel has an interest. In the last 20 years there has been oil, and they have been producing about 20,000 barrels a day of oil. That has made Gabon very wealthy indeed, on a per capita basis. The US interests in Gabon are really quite limited. There is US investment in some of the oil production and other oil concession areas. Gabon does import some goods from the United States, but the overwhelming proportion of imported goods come from France. It’s very closely tied to France. There are some US missionaries in Gabon. There’s a missionary hospital in Gabon, and while I was there there was a good-size and very active Peace Corps program. Some of our interests are commercial; some of them are humanitarian. Gabon also served as a good listening post in that there is a lot of chatter among Francophone heads of State. This was the period of apartheid in South Africa, and not only that, but civil war in Angola, also in Mozambique. There were all kinds of efforts on our part to get Cuban troops out of Angola. So President Bongo or his associates would be going to various meetings or talking to people on the phone about the latest development on negotiations of one kind or another on these subjects, and then they were pretty good at telling me about it. So we were able to pick up a fair amount from Libreville about what Mobutu or other people were doing and saying. Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere and people like that, at various regional meetings. So it was important also as a listening post.

I was also accredited to an even smaller country comprised of two islands off the coast of Africa, near Gabon, that used to be Portuguese, called São Tomé Principe—that’s the name of the country, the name of the two islands. Collectively, they have a population of probably about 100,000 people at most. São Tomé is basically a one crop economy, the crop being cocoa. They don’t know exactly, but the Portuguese probably arrived in São Tomé, as they were working their way down the African coast, about 1469, so the Portuguese have been there a long time. And as you know, Portuguese men usually did not bring Portuguese women with them, so the population of the island is every color of the rainbow, from really quite light up to really quite dark. It has its own culture, which is really quite distinct, quite different from mainland Africa. There was a very strong Portuguese influence—Portuguese-looking buildings—and there is a civility with the people in São Tomé which I always found charming. They were very poor because the
price of cocoa was very low, and people were not investing there much, but not only did they sweep the streets every morning in front of their homes, but they planted flowers in the streets in front of their homes. There is a very nice, charming almost civility about São Tomé.

Q: How often did you go there?

CLARK: Well, I liked the place, and I liked the people, and so I went there as often as I could, which wasn’t that often, but maybe in my two years as chief of mission, I was there 10 times.

Q: Do we have anything going with them, or is it just—

CLARK: Well, the most important thing is kind of tangential perhaps, but São Tomé at the time was on the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, and we wanted their vote very much to promote human rights investigations in Cuba and other places. And the Cubans had a big aid program in São Tomé. So the Cubans were leaning on them in one direction, and I was kind of leaning on them in the other direction. And the São Toméans switched their vote from being in favor of Cuba to being neutral, which we looked upon as a favorable sign.

We had some small humanitarian programs in São Tomé. There was a surplus Civil Defense hospital. At one time there was [inaudible] with an Air Force C-141, which was a pretty dramatic event in the life of São Tomé, and we had a small AID program. And while I was there we also initiated a small Peace Corps program. So gradually we were doing more and more things on a modest level, building up various kinds of American presence in São Tomé.

Q: Well, back to Gabon. What was the government like?

CLARK: I would describe it as a traditional African strong man government. The strong man was President Bongo. He had been in power at that time for 20 years. He’s now been in power for 30 years. I think he’s now the senior Francophone head of state in Africa, with the departure of Mobutu and Houphouët-Boigny, and I would describe him as a benign dictator. He could be tough and brutal when he had to be, but most of the time he didn’t have to be because he had the wherewithal to buy off or to pay for a lot of his problems. And Gabon has always been very close to France. Most investment in Gabon was French. The French, in fact, have a military base in Gabon, outside of the airport in Libreville, Camp De Gaulle, which is manned by French Fusiliers Marins, French marines, the Deuxième Bataillon Infanterie-Canonnerie. The French own most of the forestry operations, they own most of the extraction industries, and most of the oil production. Gabon is part of the CFA franc zone. It was part of French Equatorial Africa, but Gabon became independent in 1960. It was forced to become independent—they didn’t really want to be—and the president at the time, a fellow named Léon M’ba, wanted the Gabonese flag to be the French flag, or at least to have the French flag incorporated into the Gabonese flag. The French said no, not a good idea. But Gabon,
like perhaps most African countries, is divided by different ethnic groups, which are often competing with each other. The largest ethnic group is a group called the Fang, as it is usually spelled, which also exists in southern Cameroon and French Equatorial Guinea. And there’s a story that under Léon M’ba, some missionaries were bringing in some bibles, some New Testament Gospels translated into Fang, and he had them burned because he didn’t want any written language in the country except French, because French was what unified the country. He was very fearful that if you had missionaries translating different ethnic languages and creating a written language, that would reinforce ethnic divisions.

At the time there was a single political party, headed by Bongo. Bongo did have elections every five years or so. There was not an election while I was there.

Q: *He just had one.*

CLARK: He just had one.

Q: *Which, oddly enough, he won.*

CLARK: In the past, he has never had any opposition, or no meaningful opposition. I haven’t heard the details of this latest election, but I doubt there was a very strong opposition candidate either. But I think today he does tolerate more in the way of democratic activity, political groups. I don’t know if there are actual political parties, and I guess they’re kept on a tight rein, but I think he has moved toward recognizing more political diversity than was recognized until recently. But he was effective. I think the French liked him because he ran a tight ship. Every once in a while people should say, “Aren’t we worried about human rights in Gabon?” When I was there, Amnesty International or some similar group came out with an annual report saying that some workers from Equatorial Guinea had been thrown out suddenly or had been beat up. We looked into that. Yes, there were some workers from Equatorial Guinea; yes, their work permits expired or something and they were expelled, and there may have been some roughing up in the process. But that was the extent of human rights concerns. There was not a lot of concern about political opponents languishing in jail or murder or some disappearances or things like that. I think after I left, there was—I think probably “attempted coup” is too strong a word—but there was an uprising of some kind in Port-Gentil, which is the second largest city in Gabon. I think that was put down, and I think there were some people killed in the process there. But, again, that was within the process of a spasm, rather than an ongoing situation.

Q: *Did you find that the French Embassy, the French commissioner, whatever you’d call it, was looking upon you with a certain amount of suspicion? The French have always thought we’ve had probably greater designs on their former empire than I think we in fact actually do.*

CLARK: There’s an interesting history to that, going back 100 years. There were American missionaries in Gabon back in the 19th century, when it was already mostly
under the French orbit. There had been one book written on Gabon by a former American ambassador. He was the ambassador appointed by President Kennedy in 1961. And as a good liberal democrat, he was promoting the idea of democracy in Gabon. And there were, at the time, political opposition groups. I guess he was in touch with some of these political opposition groups, and it was the French who were reportedly very annoyed at this American meddling in this otherwise very calm Francophone pool. And in fact, there was a bomb of some kind—I don’t know what it was or how serious it was—that was thrown over the fence onto the lawn of the American Embassy in Libreville. Nobody was hurt, but there were all kinds of suspicions that, in fact, it was the French that had thrown this device. I think there was some French criticism at the time of the U.S. ambassador. When I was there, we certainly had nothing like that. The French ambassador was a very nice fellow with whom I had very good relations. He was from Corsica. He was a flamboyant person. There were a number of French advisors in the Gabonese government, and there was a well known French advisor to President Bongo. Libreville is on what looks like an estuary. It looks like it’s the mouth or a river; it’s not the mouth of a river. The city is on one side, like this, and you have this estuary, and on the other side of the estuary there is a sandy point of land and sandy beaches all around the edge of it. And on the sandy side facing the town, people had built weekend houses, and people would go out there on a Sunday and have a picnic and go swimming. And we had a boat, an outboard motorboat, a big one, a nice one, and we would go from the little commercial port of Libreville across to the sandy beach to have our picnics. Well, I was the American ambassador, and I stuck the American flag on the back of the boat. Two or three houses down the beach was this French advisor to President Bongo. He grumbled about what was this sign of American sovereignty doing in Gabon, and he complained—not ostentatiously, but he complained about my displaying the American flag. So I called up my main contact with President Bongo, who was a wonderful fellow named Jean Ping (Jean Ping is half Gabonese and half Chinese). I went to see him. I said, “Jean, you know, this guy is giving me a hard time.” “Oh,” he said, “that’s outrageous.” He picked up the phone and talked to the guy, really, and said, “Now this is not to be a problem, and if you think this is a problem you speak to me, but it’s not a problem, is it? No, it’s not a problem, goodbye.” He was a terrific guy. That’s I think in part because I had very good close relations with Ping and with Bongo, and Bongo looked upon me—not me as a person, but me as the US ambassador, I think—as a way of demonstrating a degree of independence from the French. He liked having me around. Every time I would go to see him, on no matter what minor matter, bingo, there were the television cameras and we would be on television that evening because the opening item on the daily news what the president had done that day. So I found when I was traveling around Gabon, that a lot of people recognized me because they had seen me on television. And I figured out after a while what he was doing. He was pushing me in the face of the French, saying, “Look, you’re not my only friend. I have the Americans too.” Well, I wasn’t about to undercut that. At the same time, I would have to say that French interests, French aid, was much more considerable, French responsibilities were much greater in Gabon in that part of what had been French Equatorial Africa than the US ever had or ever contemplated.

I was able to develop a little bit of good-will public relations. And looking back on what I did during my two years there— with rather modest real interests in the country—I
basically worked on good will and cultural and other kinds of ties, commercial ties, whenever I could. A lot of that involved the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps had, when I was there, about 75 volunteers, thinly spread out in little tiny villages in the rain forest, sometimes one, all by himself, building up schools, sometimes two young women teaching in a school. We also had people teaching people how to do fish farming in the rain forest. I would go off into the boonies and call on the local governor. That was usually a big political deal, because for various reasons ambassadors just never got out of Libreville very much to go off to the boondocks. So here it was, the American ambassador was coming to town. The provincial government would bring out the school kids and bring out the local chapters of this, that, and the other thing and have a big dinner or luncheon or whatever it was. And then I would go off sometimes with the governor—and often not—to visit the Peace Corps kids and to say hello and how are you and how’s it going. And they liked that. They loved having visitors too. They don’t get too many visitors out in those little places. So I made points with local politicians; I made the Peace Corps happy, I think; and Bongo—I didn’t realize this at first—Bongo loved it, because he was getting a lot of the political credit for the attention that the Americans are showing to who were after all his political minions out in the provinces. Bongo was very strong on communications—this is the mid-’80’s. He’d already had a dioptr on a geostationary satellite, and the evening news was broadcast from an earth station in Libreville up to this satellite and then back down. Every provincial capital in the country had a dish and then would broadcast it locally. So in fact, he was getting very good coverage to anybody who had a television set.

Bongo had an enormous earth station at one of his palaces outside of town, and at the time there was television being broadcast by AFRS, the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, which was mostly CNN, but then they would cut in things like the Super Bowl game and soap operas. The evening news was the CNN News. This was broadcast all over the world through the US Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. Well, Bongo simply located his dish to pick up CNN, and then he rebroadcast it from this hilltop outside of Libreville down to his palace in the center of town. Nobody else had a dish powerful enough to pull in a satellite, but they could all pull in the rebroadcast that was coming from the hilltop to Bongo’s palace in the suburbs. So in Libreville everybody’s antenna was pointed at Bongo’s antenna, and everybody was watching CNN. You’d go to cocktail parties, and—you know, there wasn’t an awful lot going on in Libreville—so you’d find yourself telling the French ambassador about the NFL—

Q: The National Football League.

CLARK: —the National Football League—or, gee, they’re having snow in Colorado. And this was also the period of the Olympics, so people were watching the Olympics. It was a wonderful thing, very good for morale, but also, I must say, very good for spreading American culture because everybody was watching. And the local news, after you got through what happened to Bongo that morning, was really pretty boring, cultural dances and such. So unfortunately, just before I left, CNN decided that this was piracy because some of this was material they were providing free to the armed forces but not to everybody in the world. So they began to code it, and so that nice little thing ended.
Q: I would have thought that bouncing around out in the boondocks and having CNN coming in would have somehow struck an unresponsive chord with the French.

CLARK: Well, I think they tolerated it because they really didn’t have much of an alternative and they were making most of the money anyway, so they were getting basically what they wanted in terms of trade. The currency was tied to the French franc. The income distribution in Gabon was very skewed, as you would imagine. I think Gabon at one point had the highest per capita consumption of champagne in the world. And no French luxury was lacking. There were a couple of very good—and very expensive—French restaurants. So the French expatriate community in Libreville, in fact, lived very well, notwithstanding that they were not even watching French television perhaps as much as they might want to—but then a lot of French television is pretty boring anyway. The French expatriate community had gone down from what it had been, but still—I’ve forgotten the numbers—there were between 10 and 20 thousand French people in the country.

Q: How about your old stamping ground? Did UN votes come up, or they voted as France voted and that was it?

CLARK: No, they didn’t necessarily vote as France voted. They voted as France voted on issues that were important to France; otherwise, they would vote the G-77 most of the time or the nonaligned movement. Well, having instituted this program of the top 10 most important votes and how your country voted on each one of them in New York, I began to see it out in the field, and indeed, we were instructed to go in and talk to the Gabonese about it. But apart from the Peace Corps, we really didn’t have a meaningful government aid program, and the Gabonese are pleasant people. They’re not looking for confrontation, and if there was anything that was really important, they would try very hard to accommodate us and the French, and it wasn’t that often when US and French interests directly clashed, anyway. So there wasn’t too much of a problem.

Q: How about any intra-African—what is it, the Organization of African States? Or anything else? Did Gabon play much of a role? Did we get involved in that?

CLARK: Not an awful lot, except this role, as I mentioned, of listening post came up now and then. There was an important meeting in Kinshasa when Mobutu was trying to bring about peace and a reconciliation between Jonas Savimbi and Dos Santos, I believe it was, in Angola. They had a meeting between sides which had been antagonistic for a long time. There was a famous moment when Mobutu got the two of them together and they shook hands. And there was enormous controversy afterwards.

I think the meeting, although Mobutu was the host, had been brokered by Kenneth Kaunda. So there were all these reports about Kaunda says this and Mobutu says that and Savimbi says something else. But Bongo was there, because it was one of these regional meeting with all the Francophone states and, I suppose, Anglophone heads of state. So we were getting an independent report from Bongo about what was or what wasn’t going
on. And he frequently consulted with his neighbor, Denis Sassou Nguesso, who was the president of Congo-Brazzaville at the time. In fact he married, while I was there or shortly after I left, the daughter of Sassou Nguesso, a young woman who’s an American citizen. Bongo has many children and has had a number of wives. And so he had close relations... It’s an interesting aspect of African politics that personal relations are often more important than ideological differences. Sassou Nguesso was talking about socialism and militant anti-colonialism and so forth. Bongo was very comfortable with the French and with the United States and with a capitalistic economy. But the two men personally got along very well. Bongo also played a helpful role in the dispute between Libya and Chad. You may recall that, in fact, there was a war.

Q: The Toyota War.

CLARK: Yes, there was a brief war between Libya and Chad. We, of course, were supporting Chad. There was an inter-African commission to try to arbitrate the border problem. Bongo was very active in that and played a very helpful role. So, you know, when the occasion presented itself, he was willing to be very helpful on international questions.

Q: What was the reputation of Mobutu in Gabon at that time?

CLARK: Well, Mobutu is another one of these, as I would describe it, a “big man,” a chief. This time the chief is in Zaire, which is an enormous country as big as the United States east of the Mississippi River. There were widespread stories—as in Nigeria—of corruption and mismanagement to a heroic degree. But among Francophone heads of state he was a brother. He was another Francophone head of state, plus the fact that he had a lot of seniority. So he had, among Francophone African politicians, a lot of respect as a person who was in authority and had longevity and who was a member of that particular club. After I left, in ’89, things got tougher and tougher for Mobutu himself, until, of course, he was finally forced out back in 1993-94, something like that, ’95.

Q: Had the AIDS epidemic made any inroads at that point?

CLARK: It was only beginning to be noticed, and the rate of HIV was very low still in Gabon. There was no systematic testing, but I think when women went to hospitals to have babies, they were tested, at certain hospitals, and for the most part, the infection rates were still low. I think there was a good deal of denial about AIDS. The Gabonese would sometimes say, Oh, well, you know, we’re immune to that kind of problem. There also was an element of denial that took the form of what to a Western mind would seem like magic or worse exploitation. When I was in Libreville the ambassador of Zaire showed a movie or a television program that had been produced in Zaire about how Zairian and Egyptian doctors had found a miraculous cure for AIDS. All you had to do was go to Zaire and pay a lot of money and you would get some injections which would cure AIDS. This kind of unfortunate thing was another reaction, I think, another form of denial of the HIV problem.
Gabon had another and actually a much worse, in some ways, medical problem. I don’t know if you could say it’s worse, as it’s not fatal, but Gabon had a very low birthrate. It’s one reason the population is so low. People have looked into it and they found that many Gabonese women were infertile. And then they looked into why they were infertile, and they found that there was widespread chlamydia. Chlamydia, I guess, is a fungus or a virus. It’s rather insidious because there are no symptoms, but it, in fact, ends up scarring the uterus or the fallopian tubes so that the woman ends up barren. If it’s recognized, chlamydia can be cleared up quite easily with antibiotics—I believe—but because it had not been identified and because many people were in remote rural areas there was a lot of infertility.

Q: I would have thought that would have been a social pressure on children and also been something that we in the West would be responding to with medicine.

CLARK: Well, I think we certainly were prepared to respond, but we, the US, didn’t have medical government people in the country. There were American missionaries who had a hospital out in the rain forest, but they were doing things mostly in their local area. They were not going out doing public health in remote areas. And we knew about this. I’m not sure how aware public opinion in Gabon was about this kind of problem. So we knew about it, and we were concerned about it, but there wasn’t a lot of pressure to provide different forms of assistance.

In the 1970s and early ‘80s, when the price of oil was very high, Bongo had built a railroad from Libreville on the coast to his home town which is a couple of hundred miles inland. It happens to go by the manganese mines, so it was a way of getting the manganese out. But it cost probably a billion dollars to build this railroad, and why did he build the railroad? He wanted a railroad. Other countries had railroads. Cameroon had a railroad, and Congo had a railroad, and he wanted a railroad. So he built it at great cost. Well, this did have the impact of opening up the central part of the country, just like building a road. When you have a road, people come to it and development starts all along the fringes of it. And there was a certain amount of concern about the impact, not on just the environment, but upon the animal population. And there was research going on at the time supported by the World Wildlife Fund and the Bronx Zoo, the New York Zoological Gardens, on doing a census of elephants, chimpanzees, gorillas, and other animals in Gabon. And Gabon, in fact, because it’s rain forest and because the population is so low, was, is home to a lot of wildlife, some of the big wildlife—elephants and gorillas. The difference in Gabon, though, in the rain forest, is that you don’t see them. When you’re in Kenya and you’re on the Serengeti Plain, you can see elephants a mile a way, but if you’re in the rain forest, an elephant can be 200 meters away and you won’t see it. You might hear it, but you won’t see it. So they’re doing a census, and in fact, they found there were lots of elephants and gorillas and chimps. This is a benchmark study, and then they wanted to see what the trends are, whether they’re going up or down. But bush meat was a very popular thing to eat in Gabon. There was beef and pork and chicken imported from France. There were not any beef farms in the country. Many Gabonese preferred to eat bush meat, wild game of various kinds, including monkeys and gorillas and anacondas and other kinds of wild sort of things that were in Gabon. So there
was an increasing attention given to Gabon by the World Wildlife people. There also was attention from the biodiversity people. There were a couple of visits there from the Botanical Gardens in St. Louis. Although I didn’t know this at the time, apparently it’s an enormous botanical garden itself, but they also have a very active worldwide program for collecting botanic specimens. These days there’s keen interest in whatever anti-carcinogenic attributes various kinds of plants might have. So I went off one time into a mangrove swamp with some guys from St. Louis, and they were pointing out to me things that were there which I didn’t see because they’d see it and I don’t, such as epiphytic orchids. I mean, you’d walk into the rain forest, and there would be an orchid growing on the side of a tree in a little, tiny well from the tree trunk or something with enough water and nourishment for a flower to grow. So I got some of those orchids and took them back and put them in my garden or put them in the trees in my garden, and it was very nice.

Q: Well, I thought this might be a good place to stop now, if you want to catch up. You left Gabon in ’89.

CLARK: Yes.

Q: Whither?

CLARK: To AF. I went from Libreville to principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) in the AF Bureau.

Q: All right, well, we’ll pick it up then.

CLARK: Good.

Q: Today is the 12th of January 1999. Warren, you said you wanted to add a little more about Gabon.

CLARK: One thing was my experience in Libreville with Jesse Jackson, a gentleman whom I like and admire very much.

Q: Could you explain who Jesse Jackson is?

CLARK: Jesse Jackson is one of the most prominent African-American political leaders. He was a candidate for President of the United States. He was the founder of PUSH, I think it is, one of the self-help black organizations. He’s one of the best-known African-American political leaders in the US, although he does not hold an elected political position.

I met him first in Lagos, Nigeria, when he was there on a trip briefly. In, I guess it was, November of 1988, President Bongo called me in and said, “Mr. Ambassador, I received a request from my ambassador in Washington, who was called to Chicago to meet with Jesse Jackson. And Jesse Jackson asked my ambassador whether I would loan him my
airplane to fly from the United States to Africa.” And President Bongo said, “What do you think of that, Mr. Ambassador?” I said, “Well, Mr. President, you can do whatever you want. It’s your airplane.” I had no opinion about that one way or the other. He said fine, and I heard no more of it. The two Christmases I was in Libreville I spent with Peace Corps kids out in the countryside, in the jungle. The second Christmas my own kids were there, so we had a big meeting, which was lots of fun. Then we were going up the Ivindo River, deeper into the rain forest, with a woman from the World Wildlife Fund. I got a phone call from my PAO, whom I’d left in charge of the Embassy, saying Jesse Jackson is here. And I said, okay, invite him to lunch tomorrow, and I’ll get back tonight. So I rushed back to Libreville and had a very intense and very interesting day with the Reverend Jackson and President Bongo. I was doing the interpreting back and forth, French to English, English to French, with my kids, and it was a great deal of fun. But what was of particular interest was the style in which Jesse Jackson operated. Bongo, in fact, had sent his Gulf Stream jet airplane to Chicago, stopping in Newfoundland, I think, on the way. It picked up Jackson, and flew him back. And he was in Libreville for two or three days. Then Jackson asked the president to have him flown to Lagos, Nigeria. From Lagos he was going to Harare in Zimbabwe, to meet with Robert Mugabe. From there he was off to Angola to meet with the Angolans and from there to Kinshasa to meet with Mobutu. And Bongo said, “Well, fine, but my airplane’s going to come back from Lagos to Libreville. How are you going to get from Lagos to Harare?” And he said, “Oh, Babangida will give me his airplane”—Babangida being the president of Nigeria. Now he had made no arrangements at all, but he knew that, if he asked, the head of state of Nigeria would loan him his airplane. And we heard later that that’s exactly what happened. He met with Babangida. They had a good talk. Jackson asked him to loan him his airplane to fly to Harare, and they did. And then he asked Mugabe to fly him from Harare to Luanda, Angola, and he did. But then there was a hitch, because he wanted the Angolans to fly him to Kinshasa, but the Angolans only had Soviet airplanes and Soviet pilots, and Jackson thought it was unseemly—and perhaps unsafe—for an American politician to fly in an airplane with a Soviet pilot. The Soviet Union was still existing in those days. And so he asked Bongo to send his airplane to Luanda to fly him to Kinshasa and then back to Libreville. Well, Bongo was a little annoyed about that, but he did, because of good African hospitality. And I saw the Reverend Jackson when he got back to Libreville before Bongo, again, flew him back to Chicago from Libreville. He was exhausted, but I think had a very good trip. I gave him a book on African history because he seemed to be interested in finding out more about African history. That’s just a brief insight into that method of operation.

Q: What was Jackson doing? What were his interests, and what was in it for him?

CLARK: I think he had two interests. One was, frankly, a domestic American political interest, of showing people in the United States, and especially the African-American community, that he had first-hand information and knowledge about what was going on in Africa, that he was building those credentials. The second was he was interested in promoting business between the US and Africa. He was interested in seeing whether there were American business people who could invest in various projects in Africa. And I think also the reverse was true, to a degree. President Bongo was a wealthy person—
Gabon had some money—and was able to fly people around and might be in a position to help business people himself. So there was the business angle, and, in fact, he brought with him members of his family, a couple of his very handsome sons, and some African-American business people, who were looking at various projects.

Q: What was your impression of Jackson? He’d been coming around. How sensitive was he to the situation in Africa and knowledgeable?

CLARK: I think he was very curious and interested in the situation in Africa. I think he was not operating from a lot of background and depth of knowledge of the region, but he was very willing to learn, and that’s why I gave him this book on African history. I first met him when he came to Nigeria. It may have been the first time. This would have been in 1986. He was making public statements about the progress that African-Americans had made in the United States, and how many black mayors there were and black judges and members of Congress and so forth. And the Nigerians were very mystified. They didn’t quite understand. There was a certain disconnect of where each side was coming from. In Nigeria everybody’s black, and the fact that there were blacks here or blacks there in the United States, the Nigerians didn’t quite understand why that was an accomplishment. On the other hand, I think African-Americans may not immediately appreciate how different they are from Africans, that they are truly Americans and they have a different set of values, different set of perceptions, different world-view, different set of information than people do in Africa. And Jackson was making metaphors about the “sentimental journey” of an African-American back to Africa. I think this was very meaningful to him, and maybe some of the people with him, but the people in Africa were, as I say, a little mystified as to what his interests were and what he was trying to say and what he was trying to do.

Q: You came back—

CLARK: Excuse me, can I add one more topic here?

Q: Oh, of course.

CLARK: In Libreville, I had my first experience with USAID. And I later had a lot more experience with USAID. I began to appreciate, in this rather late part of my career, the enormous cultural gap between the State Department and USAID—I mean, talk about the cultural gap between Africans and African-Americans: It’s almost as large between State Department Foreign Service people and USAID Foreign Service people. In Gabon, there was no AID program because Gabon was a wealthy country and didn’t need it. But there was a modest program in São Tomé, and São Tomé is a desperately poor country. I had been to São Tomé many times. I had been told by various ministers that they had acute food shortages, and, in particular, they were trying to build up their livestock, which in this case was hogs, and they were looking around for feed for their hogs, but they couldn’t afford to import much. And I talked to a food aid person here in Washington. Oh yes, we had lots of surplus grain of various kinds that could be used for animal feed, and we had the money to ship it to this little island. Well, that was the food aid person, but
then I spoke to the African person, and he said, no way. I’m trying to figure out why he would not agree, and it simply was not on his list of things to do that year. I mean the fact that there was a need, the fact that the material was available, the funds were available and in somebody else’s budget didn’t seem to matter because they hadn’t gotten on his list of priorities. And I began to appreciate a little bit how much AID was driven by procedure rather than by what we would call substance.

The same thing happened again. I went to an AID conference in Abidjan in which they were planning their budgets, and they agreed to allocate $100,000 for São Tomé. Well, $100,000 is an enormous sum of money in a tiny little place like that, even though it’s a drop in the bucket in somebody else’s budget. I was trying to come up with good ways to spend this money. All the ways that I had thought of, including this food aid program and other things, were turned down because they weren’t on that year’s list of priorities of things to do in that part of Africa. So finally they came up with a program for drip agriculture. This is the sort of thing where you have water going down into an irrigation thing, which runs into a string, which drips down onto a seed, which is growing. It’s enormously expensive. It was developed for the Negev Desert, where water is terribly expensive. Water is very abundant in São Tomé. It’s an island where in parts of the place it rains every day. But it was the only thing they could think of that fit, that they had allocated in their list of priorities to spend the money on. So $100,000 went for drip irrigation. That was shortly before I left, so I’m not sure what the impact was, but I can’t help thinking that the impact of that money was mostly lost on São Tomé. One successful thing I did have was to get a Peace Corps program started in São Tomé.

A similar thing happened with housing in Libreville. Gabon had enough money to have a credit rating, and they could borrow money, and AID had low-cost loans for housing. They expressed great interest, and they sent a whole bunch of people over to inspect the situation. They would go back, and would disappear, and there would never be any kind of report. Finally, an AID person in Washington who seemed to be very influential invited the housing minister to the United States, had a big VIP visit and agreed to consider the whole thing. And then at the last minute he decided not to go ahead with the housing loans. And I came back to Washington, and I asked why he had decided not to do that. And he had really no very clear reason. It was just that he didn’t feel like it that week, or something. So I developed a feeling about the kind of capriciousness about these things, and how decisions were made at long distance for reasons that may or may not make a lot of sense to people who are on the ground. I just wanted to add that little footnote.

Q: Very important. You came back in what, ’89?

CLARK: ’89. I came back in July of ’89.

Q: And you were in AF bureau from ’89 to when?

CLARK: To ’90.
Q: To ’90, and you were doing what?

CLARK: I was a senior deputy assistant secretary in the African Bureau. The assistant secretary was Hank Cohen, Henry Cohen, and there were three deputies: there was myself—I did southern Africa from Zaire south, including Mozambique and Angola and South Africa; then there was another deputy who did West Africa; and another deputy who did economic affairs and East Africa. So there was an assistant secretary and three deputies.

Q: Well, this, of course, is a very interesting time. In the first place—I have interviewed Hank Cohen—could you talk about your impression of him, his method of operation and what he concentrated on and how he seemed to feel about things?

CLARK: I had known Hank Cohen a little bit in several earlier incarnations, which is maybe one reason why he thought of me to be the deputy. I formed a very, very high opinion of him and have a high opinion of him. Hank is a low-key sort of person. He does not come on like a big wind from the Windy City, but he is a very thoughtful person and, I think, a very determined person. He sets goals and objectives for himself, and he works hard to achieve those. And I think he’s a courageous person. He’s willing to take on powerful political persons or groups in order to advance his objectives. For example, he works very hard these days for human rights in Africa, peacekeeping forces, that kind of thing. At the time, the big issues involved moving toward the end of apartheid in South Africa. At the beginning of that period, Mandela was still in jail, but it seemed more and more likely that he was coming out of jail. There were intense negotiations going on between white groups in South Africa and the ANC and others about what a new constitution would look like, a living majority rule. There also were very intense negotiations going on to get the Cuban troops out of Angola. They had been there for a number of years as part of the support of the government in the civil war in Angola. Agreement had been reached in principle—and the South Africans had intervened also—for the South Africans to withdraw, for the Cubans to withdraw. This was being supervised by the United States and the Soviet Union. So during that period we had what were called trilateral meetings among the South Africans, Angolans and Cubans with the US and the Soviet Union as observers, so in fact there were five parties to these talks. And that took place about every three months, periodically, in a formalized way. There were less formalized talks going on in Mozambique to try to bring about an end to its terrible civil war. Those meetings were more ad hoc, but they involved contacts with the rebel forces and contacts with the government. So it was an intense period of peacemaking and conflict resolution in southern Africa.

Q: Here you were, this is your area of responsibility, but in effect, of all of Africa, you had what amounted to a three- or four-ring circus going on at this time: Angola, Mozambique, South Africa—

CLARK: Liberia was coming unglued very rapidly in West Africa. Somalia was beginning to disintegrate in East Africa.
Q: But for you, where did you concentrate, because I would imagine you would have had to do something and Cohen would have had to do something, because there’s just too much there for one person to control?

CLARK: Right. Well, I said my responsibilities were primarily for southern Africa. Hank, of course, was the lead on everything. I would back him up in any place where he couldn’t be that day or that moment, and there was a constant pressure along with these other crises. There was also what I would describe as the care and feeding of Mobutu. Mobutu was our guy in Zaire, but he was constantly provoking one crisis or another. He was trying to broker peace—and not very successfully—between the two elements in Angola. He was having a lot of domestic political trouble himself. He was on the block for gross violations of human rights and a very undemocratic kind of régime. The security situation in Zaire was deteriorating. When Hank Cohen normally would have been taking part in the three-power talks in Angola, at least on one occasion there was a crisis with Mobutu. And he had to go to Kinshasa and talk to Mobutu, and since I was the next in line, I was the one to go to the talks with the others.

While I was in AF we met in Angola, we met in South Africa, and we met in Cuba, at three-month intervals on the Angolan peace process. Usually Hank would have been the head of the delegation, but twice he was tied up with another crisis in the region, most of them having to do with Mobutu, so I led the US delegation to the talks.

Q: Let’s talk about this Angola thing. It’s really very interesting because here we were with substantive talks about peace with the Cubans, probably the only time we’re really talking to the Cubans other than about Cuban-American refugee matters or something of that nature. Can you talk about this?

CLARK: When I arrived on the scene in the summer of 1989, the political process was well advanced on Cuban withdrawal. They had not withdrawn yet, but they were on their way out. We were negotiating what kind of UN observers or other kind of intermediating force would there be to keep the two warring sides apart once the Cubans had left and what kind of stand-down would there be between the two opposing forces. I met the commander-in-chief of the Cuban forces in Angola. I met the foreign minister and the deputy foreign minister and the political guy next to Castro who was following the Angolan situation most closely. I found them all very interesting and surprisingly candid people. The Cubans had been in Angola at that time about 10 years, and I guess it was the advisor to Castro who said to me, “You know, Ambassador Clark, we’ve been working with the Angolans for 10 years. We’ve been there for 10 years we’ve fought with them, we’ve died with them, and we still don’t understand them.” The Cubans were mystified, I think, by the realities of Africa. They had gone there, obviously, for political and ideological reasons, and they seemed to me to be trying to find a graceful and politically acceptable way out.

Q: The war wasn’t going anywhere, was it?

CLARK: No.
CLARK: No, it’s still, more or less, the way it was. So the Cubans I found were more like us than them. The Cubans were more like Americans or Western Hemisphere or Europeans than like the Africans.

Q: What about the Soviets?

CLARK: This was the last days of the Soviet Union, the Soviet empire, and you already had Gorbachev, you already had Glasnost, you already had perestroika, and the Soviets knew that things were changing with them, too. The near collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the driving forces pushing the peace process in Angola. The Soviets had just made it clear that they could no longer continue to send the enormous subsidies they had been sending, not only to Cuba but to Angola. So this was forcing the Cubans out and forcing the government in Luanda to at least talk about brokering a peace with Jonas Savimbi.

So the Russians themselves were a very interesting group. Once we had Hank Cohen’s counterpart, sort of the assistant secretary in the Russian foreign ministry for Africa, who was an extremely brilliant, bright person—I came to admire... The best of the Russians are very, very good. They’re very bright. They have excellent command of languages. They’re funny. They have perspective on themselves. They’re not particularly pompous. And I found them extremely keen and interesting, but playing with an extremely weak hand because their economy was collapsing and, in fact, very shortly thereafter the Soviet Union collapsed.

Q: What was in it for us? I mean, where were we in this can of worms?

CLARK: I think we were driven by a number of factors. I think primarily, it has to be said, frankly, it was South Florida and the Cuban-American votes in South Florida, which are, of course, very influential. I think any American president at that time would have been under strong political pressure to do whatever was possible to get the Cubans out of Africa and particularly out of Angola. So that was one very clear priority. I think there also was a perfectly sincere humanitarian motive to stop the war and stop the suffering, and there was an enormous amount of suffering that was going on in that war in Angola. And I think we also were not indifferent to the geopolitical impact, not only through the Soviet Union but also just in what was happening in South Africa. One always has to keep in mind, in talking about southern Africa, that South Africa is the giant. South Africa has an economy that is many times the size and power of all the other economies of all the other countries in the region. The industrialized part of South Africa produces a GNP per capita, for the advanced sector of the country (I’m not counting the black majority), that’s roughly equivalent to Sweden. I mean, it’s a medium-sized economic industrial power. It could legitimately be a member of the OECD, for example, in most of those definitions, if you look on it as a dual economy and only look at the advanced part of the economy and not the traditional part of the economy. If you looked at the whole
country, of course, the averages are less. But all the other countries of the region—Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and others, all looked, and still do, to South Africa as the economic engine that’ll drive the whole region. They are the taker of other countries’ exports. They are a potential source of investment. Because of apartheid, and because of the boycott, South Africa had been cut off from the rest of Africa, certainly from trade and from the movement of persons back and forth from South Africa.

And I was at a meeting in South Africa—I was heading a delegation again that time—and these meetings can be very pleasant. They have very pleasant moments. We had what’s called a brei, which is a kind of cookout or barbecue in the Transvaal in the Kruger National Park. I was seated next to the wife of the senior advisor to the prime minister of South Africa, the fellow who followed the African politics and getting the South Africans out of Angola. She said to me, “You know, we do earnestly want peace in Angola and the rest of southern Africa. We’re looking forward to having a unified South Africa which will be able to be in contact with the neighboring countries.” And she said, you know, “I’m looking forward so much to visiting Africa.” She clearly saw South Africa as not Africa, but something quite different. I thought there was a certain poignancy to that, coming from a white woman, about the desire for greater reconciliation.

Q: In Angola, you had these two parties fighting each other—they’re still fighting each other, aren’t they? Was it just to get the Cubans out, or did we see there was any opportunity to stop the fighting?

CLARK: Certainly we thought there was an opportunity to stop the fighting, and that was one of Hank Cohen’s primary tasks and accomplishments: that he did get interim agreements on a cease-fire and a stop to the fighting and to get UN observers in between. Unfortunately that good work later came undone, and they’re now back at each other’s throats. But that was a primary motive that we had. Keep in mind that Angola had been a proxy war. This was a manifestation of the Cold War, and South Africa support and US support for Savimbi was seen in terms of Cold War opposition to Russian and Soviet support for the national government. So we were trying to reconcile the two, but also, I think, there was the hope that what would emerge would be a government that would be more democratic, more market-oriented, and more in tune with the rest of the world.

Q: Were we in the process of withdrawing our military support from Savimbi?

CLARK: The answer to some of that question was at the time very sensitive, and I think it’s probably less sensitive now. There were—I think it’s no secret—various kinds of military support for Savimbi coming through Zaire. That has been said in public by Senators and by other people. And it is also no secret that Savimbi was a hero to the right wing in the United States. There were a lot of conservative Republicans and others who saw the war in Angola very much in Cold War terms, saw Savimbi very much as a kind of a hero who was fighting communism. I think anybody who has spent time in Africa knows that there are many layers of understanding of these kinds of issues and that there are other layers of understanding as well. But there was a variety of different kinds of help going to Savimbi at the time.
Q: Was there any disquiet on our side for having won?

This is Tape 6, Side 1, with Warren Clark.

CLARK: I think there was a lot of tension over the degree of our involvement in Angola and what our goals and objectives were. I remember that one of Robert Kennedy’s children visited Angola and visited hospitals where there were many civilians with legs and other parts of their bodies which had been blown away, including by land mines, and there was a big issue about land mines. Ethel Kennedy came in to see Hank, accompanied by one of her sons, to complain, if you will, about US support for Savimbi and the terribly destructive impact that land mines were having on civilians. The response to that was that we didn’t, and we don’t, supply anti-personnel land mines to Savimbi. Translation: there may be land mines for tanks or armored vehicles or something, or it might have been anti-personnel mines coming in from other sources but that the US had not provided anti-personnel land mines. But certainly, Angola is a country that has suffered, was suffering, and did suffer a lot and unfortunately is continuing to suffer a lot with the continuation of the civil war.

Q: At the time you were there, what was the general attitude about our involvement in Angola? Was it, gee, I wish we hadn’t gotten in here in the first place, or let’s get on with it now, or what?

CLARK: Within the State Department?

Q: Yes.

CLARK: I wouldn’t put it that way, no. I think there was some satisfaction that, in fact, the Cubans were on their way out, and indeed, the South Africans were on their way out. I think there was some sincere hope that it would lead to a national reconciliation between the Savimbi forces and the national government, which at the time did not seem like an impossibility. It’s turned out to be very elusive. So I think people thought that the momentum was going in the right direction. Now there were, as I’ve suggested in different ways, domestic political differences that got played out in Angola too. You had liberals and the left wing, such as the Kennedy family, who were very concerned about human rights and how much people were being hurt by this. You had the conservative Republicans. They were very concerned about Cold War issues and who were trying to find ways to support Savimbi and perhaps hoping that Savimbi would take over and kick out the national government. We were in touch with both sides. I went to Luanda several times to talk to the government. I talked to Savimbi’s representatives here in Washington frequently. So the government as a whole was really not completely partisan on the whole issue. There also was, I think, an attempt by members of Congress to see if they could embarrass the Bush government by trying to highlight arms that were going through Zaire to Savimbi, that kind of thing.

Q: What was you estimate that you were getting from your colleagues about Savimbi and
the other man on the other side?

CLARK: Dos Santos?

Q: Yes. What was your estimate of these gentlemen and their entourages? What were they like as we saw it at that time?

CLARK: A lot of African politics are personal and ethnic. So in any of these situations you have personal loyalties and ethnic loyalties. I think Savimbi was drawing on certain ethnic groups within Angola and that Dos Santos and the national government was drawing on other ethnic groups. The national government also had a very strong political tradition. There was a fellow named Neto who had been the president of Angola back in the '70s and who had died and who had been a very strong Marxist and socialist. In 1975, when Portugal had a big revolution itself, and a million Portuguese had left Portuguese Africa and come back to Portugal, the people who took over were very strongly Marxist in their thinking and orientation. So that first generation, many of them had died, including Neto, but the successors felt the need to carry on the ideological banner of the Socialists. So there was a very strong ideological element on top of the personal and the ethnic element. In any situation there’s corruption and there are very nasty things that go on in a war. I expect that was true on both sides.

Q: What about Mozambique? What was the situation there, and what were we doing there? Again, I’m saying in the ‘89-90 period.

CLARK: In Mozambique, there was a long-standing civil war between the government and a political group called RENAMO. RENAMO was an anomaly. It was very hard to figure out exactly what their political objectives were other than to overthrow the government in Maputo. But because the government in Maputo, like the government in Luanda, had been strongly Marxist-socialist in its rhetoric and in its orientation, the war in Mozambique unfortunately took on the same kind of Cold War cast of communist-anticommunist. The Soviets and the Cubans were much less involved in Mozambique than they were in Angola, partly for geographic reasons. But a number of right-wing American politicians felt very strongly that the United States government should be supporting RENAMO in different ways and were trying to find ways of raising money for arms and so forth. The civil war in Mozambique in those days was simply ghastly. It was on a large scale, like what you hear about now in places like Liberia, where “rebels” would come into a town and start hacking people up and chopping off hands and arms and killing people right and left. Just awful, just endless stories of ghastly atrocities, children murdered in front of parents, parents murdered in front of children, villages burned. And it just imposed an enormous price on the civilians, to ends that really were not at all clear, to me anyway. And so we were trying very hard to see what we could do to bring about a reconciliation. And this happened in two ways. One was that the government itself in Maputo—again, this was the second generation of political leadership, the president of Mozambique having been killed in an air crash in an airplane piloted by a Russian, and he was making signals about his desire to be more and more pragmatic. He very much toned down all of the socialist rhetoric. Mind you, Maputo, like
Luanda, had been—you could see when you go there—relatively prosperous colonial cities, with railroad stations and post offices and big public buildings and telephones that worked and railroads that ran and so forth. By the time I saw them in the late ‘80’s, they had all run down, and nothing worked. The telephones didn’t work. Most of the time the electricity didn’t work. The railroad station was a shambles. The post office was a shambles. Most of the hotels were non-functioning. And there had been just a very major disintegration of social infrastructure. The Government of Mozambique found itself completely bankrupt. They had no money at all, and nobody would loan them money or give them money. And in a desperation measure, they freed up the market for food, and Milton Friedman could not have been more happy.

Q: Milton Friedman being—

CLARK: —being a very conservative economist in the United States who stresses the importance of the free market. As soon as they freed up prices on food, miraculously food appeared, and by the time I got there, people were saying, Jeez, it’s amazing, all of a sudden there’s a lot of food around here, because it’s a very rich productive country. And they said, you know, it’s kind of expensive, but it’s there, and if you have the money you can buy it. If you have the money you can get something nice, like a rabbit, and if you don’t have the money for a rabbit, there’s still money for bananas and some staples. So it was a wonderful example of how very rigid extreme Marxist socialism was, by kicking and screaming perhaps, being pushed in a direction more towards the middle of the political and economic spectrum.

Well, that was beginning to take the pressure off the extreme Cold War ideologues. So we were encouraging the government in Maputo to move in a reformist direction, and they were. They were being very responsive. Incidentally, they were also cooperating with South Africa in various ways—because the South Africans had been supporting the rebels in Mozambique. We were promoting talks outside Mozambique, between government representatives and others, in places like Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. There were a bunch of negotiations going on about how they might step down the war or how they might have a cease-fire or how they might open up the corridor between the Indian Ocean and Zimbabwe, that kind of thing. So in the brief period I was in AF, there was a lot of negotiation going on. A lot of it was confidential and not in the public eye.

Q: I dimly recall, had George Bush as Vice-President gone there? For some reason, somebody fairly high up in the Administration had been quite impressed by the Marxist ruler, I mean the man who was killed, but they felt these are people we can talk to. And I’m not sure about who it was. Was there any lingering thing of saying these are actually people that, once you sort of strip them away from their rhetoric, are kind of reasonable?

CLARK: I don’t recall a George Bush visit to Mozambique, but certainly what you just said is accurate. I think there was a feeling that the government in Maputo was increasingly pragmatic, that you could talk to them, indeed, they seemed to be anxious to talk to us. I met with the president of Mozambique a couple of times, and they were very anxious to talk to us, to talk peace, to find ways out, to encourage negotiations with
RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance). The political leadership had limits itself on how far and fast it could go in reform, because it had its own conservatives or reactionaries who wanted to hold onto the old Marxist-socialist way of doing things. But I think the government was becoming increasingly pragmatic in the period.

Q: What about RENAMO? It sounds like a sort of a chaotic, just anti—

CLARK: The local word for them was banditos, bandits, and that was a very politically charged word, because, of course, it’s a “dis” word. It expresses disrespect for them as nothing but bandits, rather than upholders of some noble cause. Our ambassador-designate to Mozambique at the beginning of this period was Melissa Wells, and she referred to RENAMO in her confirmation hearings as “bandits.” Well, Jesse Helms, who was, of course, the conservative Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was very insulted that she would use the word bandits to refer to RENAMO. He held up her nomination for many months while he sent all kinds of long, detailed, and sometimes ridiculous questions to Melissa Wells to answer. One of the questions was—she was born in Lithuania and moved to the United States with her parents when she was six months old—to what degree did your childhood in Lithuania influence your views of Marxism. So it got to that level.

Q: What about South Africa? Did you deal with South Africa?

CLARK: I went to South Africa several times. Everybody who’s been there will tell you it’s a breathtaking country. It’s beautiful, it’s enormous, it’s rich. It has enormous potential. It’s also a land of great sorrow, with enormous social and economic disparities. Not least of all is the ethnic conflict within South Africa. One of the things we were trying to do was promote cooperation among different black groups within South Africa, to have them cooperate in the move towards building a new constitution and ending apartheid. And the very strong tension between the ANC, the African National Congress, and Nelson Mandela and his group, which are not ethnically based, but their base includes a lot of the Xhosa ethnic group, is strongly opposed by Chief Buthelezi, who represents the Zulus. And there are other ethnic groups. So there’s a lot of this tribal tension. So that was part of our agenda, was to see what could be done to promote cooperation between the two sides.

Q: Well, did you, as we were approaching this at this time, feel the problem of, well, Jesse Helms and other in the conservatives who had really been rather strong proponents of the white minority who were there? I mean, was this a problem for you all?

CLARK: No, I think by 1989 the pendulum had swung so far that most people had come to the conclusion that it was only a matter of time when apartheid would be ended, and the only question was would it be ended with or without bloodshed, with or without an ongoing viable régime. The real crunch came in 1985 and ‘86, when there were riots, the last of a whole series of riots in South Africa. There was a school boycott when a whole year went by when black children were not in school. And that bloodshed, and those boycotts, got a lot of publicity in the United States and led to legislation imposing a US

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boycott on South Africa, which had been strongly opposed by conservatives in the US and by President Reagan. President Reagan vetoed that legislation, and then his veto was overridden by Congress.

So the US boycott of South Africa was in place, and I think the writing was on the wall for Apartheid. The focus was on the constitution, on Mandela, or on what it would be like when he was released from prison, on what the relationship was going to be between the Zulus and the other groups and what was going to be the relationship between the internal forces and the external forces. Although Mandela was in jail, on Robben Island, off of Cape Town in South Africa, the ANC leadership was outside of South Africa, leading the struggle, led by Thabo Mbeki, whom I met in Lusaka with Hank Cohen. There were differences between the internal ANC and the external ANC—the people who were still in South Africa carrying on a struggle (and there was something called the United Democratic Front, which tended to be more pragmatic) and the group outside, based in Lusaka, which tended to be more ideological and which had closer relations with people like Qadhafi and the Soviet Union. You can see that still being played out today with Mandela being very respectful to Qadhafi, much to the annoyance, I’m sure, of the United States. That is a gesture not merely to Qadhafi but to those in the ANC leadership who were outside of South Africa during that period and who were supported by Qadhafi and by other radicals.

**Q:** At the time, you were in AF, the new boy on the block when you came in, what was the conventional wisdom of what was going to happen in South Africa? You know, at one point there was going to be a “night of the long knives.” This goes back, I remember when I was in Africa in INR, back in the early ’60’s, but what was the feeling now?

**CLARK:** There always was in the back of people’s minds a nightmare scenario, a worst case scenario, in which there would be lots of bloodshed, racial wars, racial rioting, and it was really an awful thing to contemplate. It was the whites who had most of the weapons, although they were outnumbered more than four to one, so that it was not at all a pretty sight. But I think there was beginning—in some ways going way back, but certainly after 1986—more and more discussions among the whites in South Africa about how to seek an accommodation with the majority. The phrase they used for it was “a new dispensation.” I hadn’t heard that word before. It sounds kind of odd to me, actually, but I find it’s a perfectly good English word. They meant a new régime, a new constitution, a new framework. And so we were certainly thinking very hard about what could be done to bring about a transition. I think, really, what did it was not so much the United States as Nelson Mandela. I think, much to everybody’s delight and astonishment sometimes, he has proved to be just a magnificent statesman, around whom people of all political persuasions and races are able to rally and—you know, knock on wood—I think people are very fortunate that the transition has worked as well as it has.

**Q:** What was the feeling in AF about the commitment interests of both the President and Secretary Baker? What was happening there?

**CLARK:** I think the fact that the President’s veto was overridden in 1986 had a big
impact on Baker. Baker at the time was chief of staff in the White House. He saw that—I’m now interpreting what people said—as a failure on the part of the Administration to be sufficiently sensitive to public opinion, sensitive to Congress, and that there might well have been ways to avoid that kind of confrontation and loss by the Administration vis-à-vis Congress. So Baker’s approach to Congress was to be very careful, and to listen very carefully to the opinions of everybody in Congress, the Democrats and the Republicans. He very early on set up a series of meetings, breakfast meetings, sometimes in the State Department (and I attended one of those), sometimes on Capitol Hill (and I attended one of those), with the Congressional leadership to brief them, tell them how things were going, tell them our perspectives on how things were, and then ask for their views. And I think this approach by Baker was very effective in defusing a certain amount of tension that might normally be expected to arise over something like South Africa. And also, I think the Congress very much appreciated it, because nothing I think—it’s just human nature—makes a Congressman, anybody, more angry than to feel that somebody else is ignoring them or not respecting them. So Baker made a big point of showing respect to the Congress, briefing the Congress, all the time working towards policies that were hopefully going to lead to an end of apartheid and a peaceful transition. In that period the Congressional reaction and the political reaction to South Africa was quite bipartisan, in contrast to what was going on in Zaire and Angola and Mozambique, where there was still a lot of partisanship. And one can sometimes argue that people fight over what’s not important. When it’s really important, it’s so important you’re not going to fight over it, you’re not going to go to the mat over it. And I think Zaire and Mozambique and Angola were sufficiently secondary to the situation in South Africa that the right wing and the left wing felt more free to intervene in various ways at less cost to themselves.  

Q: What about Zaire at that time? You had been sitting in Gabon and obviously been keeping an eye on this giant over there, Mobutu and company. When you came back, was he still our client, or were we getting restive with this?

CLARK: I think there was a lot of discomfort about Mobutu. He was there, he was in charge. For many years he had been our guy, very much in a Cold War context, but this was a period when the Cold War was winding down. Cold War motivations were not as strong as they used to be. It was very clear that he was having a harder and harder time holding onto his power. There were more and more problems of breakdowns of various kinds in Kinshasa and in the country. It got worse after that, but it was already beginning to be clearly a time of troubles for Mobutu and Zaire, and it didn’t take a lot of insight to see that there was an endgame going on here of what kind of an exit Mobutu was going to make.  

Q: Well, those are the areas you were particularly concerned with, is that right, at this time?

CLARK: Yes.

Q: Because the Somalia, Liberia were somebody else’s?
CLARK: Much less. The fellow who was following West Africa was a political appointee, so because I had been in Nigeria, Hank asked me to look over his shoulder a little bit. I did get to Liberia during this period to try to ask Samuel Doe, who was the head of state at that time, to undertake talks with Charles Taylor, who was the leader of the opposition. And Doe wouldn’t see me, so I delivered a letter from Cohen, but my urging of reconciliation fell on deaf ears in Liberia, and only two months later Doe was dead in a coup.

In East Africa, Somalia was beginning to pose a lot of problems, but the biggest issue was Ethiopia. During this period there was a civil war between Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia, and I also stopped in Addis Ababa during this period. There were two concerns in Ethiopia. One concerned the stability of the region. There had been a lot of Cold War play, but there was a lot less now. It was a classic, ethnic-based, geographic-based civil war. But also there was terrible concern about humanitarian impact. There had been terrible famines in southern Sudan and Ethiopia, which had led to urgent international efforts to keep people from starving to death. And there was a lot of concern that the ongoing civil war was going to contribute to a second famine. This was also the period, almost the first week I was on the job, the airplane carrying Congressman Mickey Leland disappeared. His plane was found and everyone on it was dead. I was the escort for the Ethiopian official who came back with the bodies. Our relations with the Government of Ethiopia at the time were very cool because it had been a Marxist régime, it had been supported very much by the Soviets. But the fact that the Ethiopian Government bent over backwards to be helpful—first in the search for Leland, second for bringing back his remains and then sending people to the funeral services—was itself an important political message. I think they were seeking reconciliation with the US, just the way Mozambique was, and many other countries that had gotten wrapped up in Cold War politics out there.

Q: Was there the feeling while you were there that African leaders of various stripes, looking over their shoulder and seeing that the Soviet Union was no longer going to be somebody that they could play against—you know, both get aid but also to use “If you don’t be nice to us, we’ll go to the Soviet Union” and all—were you seeing that?

CLARK: That message was beginning to come home, yes. It was a motivating force behind negotiations in Angola, so—I just mentioned Ethiopia—I think that was the same in many different areas. And I think there was also the beginning—I left AF in 1990 and this feeling grew much stronger after I left—but there was the beginning of the feeling that, oh dear, if the Cold War isn’t around any more, and if we can’t play off East and West, and if the United States is the only game in town, maybe the United States doesn’t care any more about Africa, and maybe they’re just going to ignore us, and maybe the situation will become very much worse. So that concern was beginning also.

Q: Well, you left in 1990. Why then?

CLARK: Well, it’s a sad situation. My tenure in AF simply did not work out, for a variety of reasons. What happens in this situation in the Foreign Service, I think, as in
other organizations perhaps, is that when things go wrong, nobody says anything. People are, on the one hand, polite, and on the other hand, they want to avoid confrontation. So they really don’t tell you all the things. But I think that it has to be said, it simply didn’t work out. I think there was a strong element of—I don’t know what the right word is—innocence or naïveté on my part, having never operated at that level before in Washington, on how things worked or how they don’t work. So I think Secretary Baker felt a little uncomfortable with me.

Q: You know, because we’re trying to get how things work in the government, so could you—I don’t to over- pry, but you know what I mean—in other words, to understand, because there are always these currents going on in any relationship in a bureaucracy, were you on the wrong side of something?

CLARK: I don’t think it was political, in the sense of being too liberal or too conservative or anything like that. I perhaps was not being as productive as some people would have liked, that I hadn’t quite learned how to pull the strings and levers to make things happen. I think I didn’t fully appreciate, especially in the beginning, how important it was to keep people constantly informed about what’s going on. I mean, I come and I give you a briefing, okay, this is the way it is, and you say fine, and then the next day you say, “Well, what’s it like today?” And there really is a need to constantly inform high-level people of what’s going on. I think maybe I didn’t appreciate that.

Q: Normally you would inform Cohen, and Cohen would be responsible, because you did have this group around Baker which was not very typical of the Foreign Service, but I mean, really a closed group. There was Baker, his press secretary, Margaret Tutwiler, Dennis Ross, and three or four others, very bright, Robert Kimmitt—

CLARK: Zoellick, Bob Zoellick.

Q: —Bob Zoellick—very bright people, but it was one that had come over basically from Treasury.

CLARK: Yes, they had been with Baker for several years, some of them in Treasury, but some of them also in the White House. So he had this small group of people that he knew very well and had a lot of confidence in. And one had to deal with them as best one could. I didn’t perceive that I had a particular problem in dealing with them in any kind of we-they kind of situation, as I described it in New York. I think the fact that Hank Cohen—you mentioned that normally I would be reporting to Cohen, and that was true—but Hank was gone a great deal of the time. In fact, I was running the bureau most of the time because he was off talking to one of these other heads of state in one of these other crises. So in fact I was there running the store a good deal of the time and going to the morning staff meetings with Baker and the other people. So they got a feel for me directly, I think.

Q: So what happened? Where did you go?
CLARK: Well, Hank tried to arrange a very nice swap, with me going out to Lusaka, Zambia, to replace Jeff Davidow, who came in to replace me. But I hesitated to do that. I hesitated for about 12 hours, and by that time the situation had changed. Power abhors a vacuum, and the director general of the Foreign Service had already come up with another name, Gordon Strebe, who eventually went out as ambassador. So the DG said to me, “Well, Warren”—it’s now March of 1990, the Berlin Wall had come down, the Soviet Union was in the process of collapsing, Eastern Europe was opening up—he said, “What would you think of working on communications policy in Eastern Europe?” I said, “Well, I’ve never been to Eastern Europe; I don’t know anything about communications policy; but I’ll give it a whirl.” And so I moved from AF to CIP. CIP stands for Communications and Information Policy. And I was told to look around on Eastern Europe and come up with a program and a plan. Some other people had gone out a couple of months before me, and they had come back with a report. So I was asked to look at this report and come up with some recommendations and develop a program. To make a long story short, I did, and eventually I spent more time in that job than I spent in any other job in the Foreign Service. I spent six years in that job.

Q: You were doing this from when to when?

CLARK: From 1990 to 1996, when I retired. And two or three times during that period, the Personnel people said, hey, Clark, it’s time to go overseas again, and I said, you know, look, I’m going to retire in another year or two, why don’t you leave me here where I am? And they very kindly agreed to do that. I asked to stay for two reasons. One was after a year or two, I got to know the region pretty well. I got to know the subject pretty well, and I got to like it, and I enjoyed doing what I was doing. And the other part was that I thought that what I was doing had a good chance of leading to employment after I left the Foreign Service. That, so far, has proven to be the case. So I was not unhappy to stay where I was.

Q: Let’s talk about this. 1990—what was the situation in Communication and Information Policy?

CLARK: CIP in those days was a bureau. It was headed by an assistant secretary. It had been created, I think, for political reasons back in the mid-’80’s. There had been a bureaucratic dispute between the Commerce Department and the State Department over who was going to take over responsibility for what had been in the White House, communications policy, and the upshot of it was, in a typical American manner, that they created two agencies, one in Commerce and one in State. And for bureaucratic and political purposes, they decided to make it a bureau, rather than just an office. So that’s what happened. It later became simply a directorate in EB Bureau, the Economic and Business Bureau, which I think is easier to justify than making it a separate bureau.

It’s a strange place. It does have some sort of main-line duties of people supporting committees and the ITU and the OECD and international organizations of that kind, but then it has a lot of other floating issues or floating programs that seem to have a life of their own. One sometimes wonders what they’re really all about. But I didn’t want to
look too closely at that. In fact, the program I developed was of that nature. I created it out of thin air, and for the time it lasted I thought it was really quite successful. With some money from AID, I put together a program to help governments in Central and Eastern Europe develop, basically, new laws and regulations upon which they could privatize and liberalize their communications, et cetera. And that meant working with lawyers, working with economists, working with communications companies, all of whom were happy to have a little government money to help them carry out seminars or training programs or studies or to make recommendations or, ultimately, to help draft legislation. And so I got to know an interesting new group of people, and I also got to know all of the communications ministries of the governments involved in Eastern Europe. They were very happy to have these American experts coming over and helping them with these kinds of legal and technical problems.

Q: When you say Eastern Europe, under you thing, what did Eastern Europe mean?

CLARK: It was closest to the old Warsaw Pact, that is, it did not include the former Soviet Union, except the three Baltics. My territory included about 10 countries, the three Baltics, what had been the northern part of Yugoslavia, which is now Slovenia, and then the other main countries of the region, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria. We didn’t do much in the former Yugoslavia or Albania or that part of the Balkans.

Q: What were you trying to do? When you say communications, information, are you talking about essentially telephones and computers, or is it—

CLARK: Yes. These days it’s wireless telephones, wire-on telephones, and things that travel through the air or over wires, such as data transmission, access to the Internet, e-mail, all those kinds of information technology.

Q: At that point were things developing that you could, because of technology changes, almost jump over the older ones? In other words, we had to go out and string out telephone lines and all that.

CLARK: We did. One of the recommendations in this report that I had when I first arrived in CIP was, well, maybe we can use old surplus American communications equipment. But no. First of all, governments didn’t want old surplus American equipment. Secondly, that would have been old technology, and the new technology very often was cheaper than the old technology. So a lot of this involved finding ways to apply new technology to an old, creaky system. And a lot of this amounted to lobbying governments, educating...

End of Tape 6, Side A

Traditionally, no authorities in Central Europe had cared much about what consumers thought. Consumers took it or didn’t take it, because there was no market. And even, I think, in Western Europe, enterprises had looked to the government and to banks. That’s
where they got their signals about expanding. And the idea that an enterprise should start
to look to consumers, to customers, and stockholder, in terms of return on equity—it’s a
revolutionary change. And so a lot of what we were doing had to do with training and
education.

*Q: My experience in Europe had been that where we had a telephone system that, since I
was a kid, worked well, you go to Europe and it doesn’t necessarily work well. You have
to know somebody in the PTT in Italy and probably pay a bribe and maybe in a couple of
years you’ll get a tone. That’s Italy. And this is true in France and Germany. I mean, it
really was a sort of an imposed non-responsive place, and I would have thought that the
American scenario would have been almost a breath of fresh air and also we had a much
more practical approach to getting things started.*

CLARK: Well, on the one hand, it’s a breath of fresh air; on the other hand, it’s very
threatening because under the cozy government monopolies that existed in both Western
Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, the managers and the employees didn’t have to
worry too much about what they were doing. The just sort of did what they were assigned
to do. And the idea that one should compete for customers and compete for other
people’s satisfaction is in some ways a very disturbing thought, especially if you’re going
to ask somebody to change their jobs and stop doing one thing and start doing another
thing. Unions become very concerned that you’re going to reduce employment, and there
can be a lot of political and social opposition to these kind of changes. I think what’s
forcing it, really, is less anybody being convinced that economic markets are more
efficient and bring greater consumer benefits and satisfactions than does monopoly, but
that governments are being forced toward a market economy because of global
competition, competition within EU but also competition between regions like the EU
and Eastern Europe and the rest of the world. And they have realized that if they don’t
become more competitive, that somebody else is going to export into their market and
that their going to lose whatever export markets they have. So it’s being forced by
globalism to a degree.

*Q: How responsive did you find our electronic firms? You know, I mean, you had this
office. Were you helping computer outfits, telephone outfits, and all like that find
markets?*

CLARK: Mostly telephone companies. The first thing that happens often is privatization.
That is, they keep the monopoly, the PTT, but they sell part of the equity to a foreign
strategic investor.

*Q: The PTT is the Post, Telephone, and Telegraph.*

CLARK: Right. And sometimes the post office is split off, and then the telephone
company is privatized by selling equity, and that brings in foreign management, modern
management, for things like marketing and finance and technical development. Then,
typically, after a period of time, the market is liberalized by allowing other companies to
come in and compete with the existing dominant telephone company.
Q: Any countries give you particular problems or unique problems?

CLARK: It’s not so much unique problems, but that different countries have approached these issues in different ways or, more particularly, in different time patterns. Hungary was the first off the mark in privatizing very early, in 1993. The Czech Republic was next in 1995, but Poland is only privatizing now, in 1998 and ’99. And other countries are just beginning to think about it. So the progress has been bumpy and slow.

Q: Well, how did you feel when you started, and how did you feel when you ended this? In 1990, you started this, and by the time in 1996, did you feel that in communications there had been a real revolution or the beginning of one?

CLARK: Well, in 1990, I was a very unhappy camper, having involuntarily left a very good position and taken up something that was completely unknown to me. By 1996, I was enjoying doing what I was doing very much. It thought I knew the subject pretty well; I knew the area pretty well; I knew a lot of the people in the area; and indeed, there had begun to be enormous changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw today is a much brighter, more colorful, commercial, lively place than it was nine years ago, when I was first there. So I think it is having a transforming effect on the region. I think it’s a very interesting region, and I’m very happy that I’m able to work there.

Q: What are you doing now?

CLARK: Well, I have had two clients, one in Poland and the other in Romania, supporting activities that are organized by CSIS, the Center for Strategic and International studies. CSIS has what they call “action commissions,” which are basically business and government advisory groups with subgroups on things like agriculture and energy and transportation. I’m co-chairman of the communications and information technology group in Poland and in Romania. We hold meetings and we look at the situation and make recommendations to the government about what the government might be doing to encourage investment and development in the sector. This has focused on getting the government to draft new laws and new regulations that will stimulate competition. In the process, again, you get to know a lot of business people and interface with government people, and that can lead to other kinds of commercial opportunities.

Q: Well, I guess that brings us to the end here.

End of interview