# Background

- Born in Los Angeles, California 1951
- University of California, Santa Barbara: B.A. 1969-1973
- London School of Economics: MSc. 1973-1974
- Entered Foreign Service 1976

## Washington, DC

- Assistant Desk Officer for Jordan (NEA/ARN) 1976
- Staff Assistant to the NEA Assistant Secretary of State 1979-1980
- Special Asst.; Special Advisor for Jewish Liaison: White House 1980
- Liaison Officer for Reagan State Department Transition Team 1980
- Office of Congressional Relations 1981

## Islamabad, Pakistan

- Rotational Officer 1977-1979
- Political Officer

## Washington, DC

- Acting Chief of the Consular Section 1981
- Desk Officer for Jordan (NEA/ARN) 1981-1983
- Political Officer at the US Mission to NATO 1983-1984
- Deputy Director; Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO 1984-1986
- Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State 1986-1989

## Ankara, Turkey
Deputy Chief of Mission 1989-1992
Washington, D.C
PDAS, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 1992
Executive Secretary of the State Department 1993-1994
Ankara, Turkey
Ambassador to Turkey 1994-1997
Washington, DC
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 1997-2000
Director General and Director of Human Resources 2000-2001
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 2001-2005
Washington, DC
US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2011-2012

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 30th of January 2006. This is an interview with Marc Grossman done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I’m Charles Stuart Kennedy. You go by Marc?

GROSSMAN: I do.

Q: What happens, why are some Marcs spelled with a C and some with a K? Do you have any idea?

GROSSMAN: My dad always said it was his contribution to culture.

Q: Okay. Well, we’ll start talking about him but first, when and where were you born?

GROSSMAN: I was born in September of 1951 in Los Angeles, California.

Q: Where in Los Angeles?

GROSSMAN: In East Los Angeles. My parents lived in Pico Rivera, or then, just Pico.

Q: Okay. Let’s talk about your, sort of your background. On your family’s side, let’s talk about the father’s family, the Grossmans. Do you have any idea where they came from?

GROSSMAN: We have a vague idea. Both of my father’s parents, my grandmother and grandfather, were immigrants to the United States. They came separately from Chernowitz, which is now Ukraine but my father believes at the time of their immigration
it was Romania. I think they came to the United States in the 1920s. They moved to New
York, met in the US and settled in the Bronx. They then moved, first to Arizona and then
to California in the 1940s, where my grandfather used to sew. There was a style at the
time; women wore sweaters with a mink collar.

Q: Oh yes.

GROSSMAN: My grandfather sewed the mink onto the sweater. My grandmother was a
homemaker. I remember that she wrote English in a wonderful, unique way. They lived
into their 80s; in fact, until after I joined the Foreign Service. They both died when I was
in Pakistan.

Q: Well now, did your grandmother and grandfather, this is, that pair ...

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Did they come from Chernowitz, both of them?

GROSSMAN: They were both adamant that they were not interested in talking about
their histories. We tried as grandchildren on a number of occasions to do oral histories
with them. They were glad they’d left where they left and as soon as they passed the
Statue of Liberty they had no interest in the past. I think that part of that reluctance was
that the rest of the family was destroyed in the Holocaust; I think they felt some residual,
ot guilt exactly, but they felt that they had been saved and everybody else had not.

Q: How about on your mother’s side?

GROSSMAN: They were both born in the United States I am pretty sure. My grandfather
always said that his father had been a defector from the Russian army during the Russo-
Japanese War; he somehow found his way to the United States. I have no way of
knowing whether that’s true or not. But they also ended up in New York and then moved
to California. And so my mother and father met in California as teenagers in the 1940s.

Q: Now what did your father do for work?

GROSSMAN: My father was an elementary school teacher and then a speech therapist.
He was the first person in that family to go to college. He had wanted to become a
librarian, but he became a teacher, then specialized in speech therapy and taught for 40
years for the El Rancho Unified Schools in Pico Rivera.

Q: And on that of your mother?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that, when I was in elementary school she went back to
UCLA and got a degree and teaching certification; it was also her dream to become a
teacher. She very sadly died when I was 13, in 1964.
Q: Do you have brothers or sisters?

GROSSMAN: I have a sister. And I have two stepbrothers and a stepsister from my father’s remarriage.

Q: Younger or older?

GROSSMAN: My sister Aviva is five years younger and lives with her family in Santa Cruz, California.

Q: Well, how Jewish did you find your family? I assume your family was Jewish.

GROSSMAN: They were, they are, yes.

Q: Orthodox or?

GROSSMAN: No, a Conservative Jewish family. I went to Hebrew school and was Bar Mitzvahed; my sister was Bat Mitzvahed. I remember that when I got ready to join the Foreign Service, my grandparents were really worried about it; they were very consistent in telling me that this was not a profession for “people like us.” They had heard all of the stories of the State Department blocking refugees from Hitler and opposing the creation of Israel.

Q: Well then, you grew up where—in Pico?

GROSSMAN: I spent the first five years of my life in Pico Rivera. Then my parents moved across into Orange County, into La Habra, and I mostly grew up there. I went to elementary school and high school there.

Q: What’s La Habra like? Where is La Habra sort of in, let’s use Pasadena, San Marino; is it in that area?

GROSSMAN: No. La Habra is—if you think about Whittier and then you think about Disneyland in Anaheim—La Habra’s in between Whittier and Disneyland.

Q: What was it like as a kid there?

GROSSMAN: My recollections of it are positive. It was a time of the “great coming out” of California during the 1950s and everybody seemed to be able to do essentially what they wanted. My folks didn’t make much money, but I can remember that, because we were in California, they had a house and, if you wanted to go to the beach, you went down to Huntington Beach. And if you wanted to go to the mountains you went up to the mountains. Most of the rest of the extended family was there and the weather was perfect and it was a safe place to be. It also seemed that everyone in the larger neighborhood was more or less equal; we did not see many rich people or people who were poor.
Q: And it is nice and flat so you can bicycle everywhere.

GROSSMAN: We bicycled everywhere and a bunch of us did a lot of bike riding. In fact when I was, I don’t know, 14 or 15, four of us tried to ride from border to border in California. We pushed off from the north. We made it down as far as Big Sur and it was too much traffic and too much craziness and we had to get bailed out by an uncle from San Francisco, but it was quite a trip while it lasted.

Q: What was the environment of the family? Would you sit around the dining room table at night and talk about things or what?

GROSSMAN: Yes, I think so. My recollection is that there was a family dinner and, again, because I was the son of two schoolteachers, there was emphasis on education and in what was going on at school. Whenever I got in trouble at school—which was not often, but sometimes—my parents backed the teachers, no matter what.

Q: Well that was the era, too, when parents did back the teachers.

GROSSMAN: That’s right. My parents followed politics, especially after we moved to La Habra, that’s Orange County, and at the time there was a lot of the John Birch Society and, there was debate about liberals and conservatives and, “who was who,” and so they were part of that conversation.

Q: Where did your family fall in the political spectrum?

GROSSMAN: They were Democrats, admirers of Roosevelt. It was a very union-oriented family—my grandfather was a union member; my dad, I think, to the best of his ability worked to organize teachers. They did not have a union but I can remember him working very hard to make sure they had a dental plan. One year they were all organizing to try to get paid, instead of ten checks a year, twelve checks a year; same amount of money. It was tough on 10 a year; you’d see that last paycheck on the first of July and the next one wouldn’t come until the first of October. My dad worked as a camp counselor and camp director and in my grandfather’s children’s shoe store in Oxnard in summers to make ends meet.

Q: How did you find school? What’d you like, what didn’t you like? What was good, what wasn’t?

GROSSMAN: I liked going to school. It was a time, as you maybe remember as well, of huge expansion in the education system in California and so as an elementary school student I went to four or five elementary schools, as they kept building and consolidating and moving us around. Same kids, but we moved from school to school. I found then as I find now I gravitated to the social sciences and to history much more than the sciences or math. But I liked it and I did okay.

Q: Were you much of a reader?
GROSSMAN: Absolutely.

Q: Can you recall any books, particularly early on, that sort of grabbed you?

GROSSMAN: I remember my dad gave me a series—I can see them now but I can’t remember who published them—one was about Ethan Allen, the Green Mountain Boys. Another was a short history of D-Day. We went to the library constantly. I can remember we had a very astute seventh or eighth grade teacher who, in order to inculcate the joy of reading, encouraged us 12 and 13-year-old boys to read all the James Bond novels.

Q: Well where did the student body come from? What sort of a student body was it at the elementary school would you say?

GROSSMAN: The elementary schools were, I remember it this way anyway, people basically like us. People who considered themselves middle class but were probably financially lower middle class. Our neighbors were plumbers and electricians. I remember the gentleman next door was an estimator for a construction company. At that time, as Orange County expanded, it seemed to me to have expanded equally. So neighborhood after neighborhood looked the same and you met people who I thought were generally from the same economic class. It wasn’t really until high school that I can remember meeting people who had more or less money. A friend’s father owned the Volkswagen dealership, for example.

Q: Was there any Hispanic or African-American representation in the school?

GROSSMAN: La Habra High School was a mixed student body of Anglo and Hispanic and some Japanese-Americans. In La Habra anyway, at the high school there were few, if any African-Americans. The main groups there were Anglos and Hispanics.

Q: Then were you at all keyed into news and newspaper, TV, radio at all?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is being quite interested in the news about Vietnam. Certainly when I was in high school; I remember having a map of Vietnam in my bedroom and trying my best to follow that story. I don’t think I had any views on it one way or the other until I got to college, but certainly in high school I remember following the story, so I must have had some connection to it. We got a newspaper every day and I certainly can recall my folks talking about the news.

Q: Did the Cold War intrude much or was that anything that ... ?

GROSSMAN: I can recall the “getting under the desk drills” at school, especially during the Cuban missile crisis.
Q: Duck and cover.

GROSSMAN: Yes. But like a lot of people my age my first great recollection of an event is Kennedy’s assassination.

Q: How about the movie industry? Did that grab you? Were you a movie buff or not?

GROSSMAN: No. I like to go to the movies and it was certainly part of our life but it never grabbed me in any special way. Hollywood and the stars seemed far away from La Habra, at least to me. The Los Angeles Dodgers were a much bigger story.

Q: Well then, you went to high school, again at La Habra?

GROSSMAN: At La Habra High School, yes.

Q: What was that like?

GROSSMAN: It was a big suburban high school; again, with mixed Anglo and Hispanic population. I did okay there. I was lucky, I was introduced there to speech and debate and I was on the debate team and the speech team. The team had a coach named Ray Benkendorf who took an interest in me. Some days, I wasn’t interested in doing much else except speech and debate, but I was good at it and he recognized that and it is what helped me get through high school.

Q: How about girls in high school in those days? Was this much of a concentration of young boys or not?

GROSSMAN: Oh sure. I think we were lucky in that the speech and debate team was mixed—girls and boys—and so we were able a little bit like kids do today; we moved around in a group. And I liked that. There were a number of women, girls, on that debate team, and boys and we went here and we went there, and so it was more of a group operation for us, which was good.

Q: Yes. Then, while you were going to high school, you would have graduated in what year? This would have been about?

GROSSMAN: 1969.

Q: ’69. This is red-hot Vietnam in those days.

How about in high school? Did Vietnam begin to loom high as far as what you were going to do or not?

GROSSMAN: In terms of what I was going to do?

Q: Yes.
GROSSMAN: In 1968 what loomed large in high school was (Democratic Senator) Eugene McCarthy’s run for President, which was related obviously to Vietnam but was about McCarthy.

Q: That was ’68.

GROSSMAN: ’68. I remember also the day that Robert Kennedy was murdered in Los Angeles. It was an appalling day at our house. My family was sympathetic to what Robert Kennedy was doing. I remember being very struck by the debate over whether people should vote for McCarthy or vote for Humphrey in November and being horrified that people would vote for McCarthy on a principle, which allowed Richard Nixon to win.

Q: Nixon was a California, Southern California boy.

GROSSMAN: Well, I’ll tell you a story. The subdivision that we lived in backed onto a Nixon property.

Q: Yorba Linda was it?

GROSSMAN: No, as I remember it this property was not in Yorba Linda. Nixon’s mother, Hannah Nixon, lived in La Habra. She used to pay a group of us kids to rake leaves. She’d pay us a quarter to rake leaves. The other funny recollection is that, and I don’t know if you had one in San Marino, there was a drive-in burger place called Nixon’s in Whittier, which I can remember going to.

Q: I go back, I was born in 1928.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: And so drive-ins, I think, were just ... and San Marino wasn’t that fancy.

GROSSMAN: In 1968 there was of course Dr. Martin Luther King’s assassination, which had a big impact on me. One because of him and what he stood for and what he was trying to do for America and, secondly, because I think—I’m not sure but I think—that we were supposed to come to Washington for a national speech and debate tournament which was cancelled because of the rioting here after Dr. King was killed.

Q: Well, with your mother and father both college graduates, was it difficult in the time from 13 on without your mother?

GROSSMAN: It was. My dad remarried when I was 16 to a wonderful woman so ...

Q: So that, so you weren’t particularly left in a limbo as far as maternal care or something like that?
GROSSMAN: No. My dad did a heroic job for the three years and then he remarried.

Q: Yes. Well, I take it from this background that you were pointed; you were going to go to college. Was that ... ?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Right from the beginning?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think there was much question about it and, of course, at that time California public education was one of the greatest systems ever and it was free. And so there really was not any reason, if you could get certain grades or have, like I did, an invitation to come and do speech and debate; there was no reason not to.

Q: Yes. Incidentally, in debate, did you find that you liked to basically take the affirmative or the negative? Did you find one was a little more appealing than the other?

GROSSMAN: No, it really depended; each year the topic changed. I don’t remember the topics but I can remember that there were some topics that were better than other topics and I think it changed from year to year.

Q: Yes. Well then, where’d you go?

GROSSMAN: I went to UC (University of California) Santa Barbara. I did not have a sterling transcript when I came out of high school, except in speech and debate, and I applied to a number of the UC campuses but, luckily again, the speech and debate coach at UC Santa Barbara, Kathleen Corey, took pity on me and they did a deal; they looked the other way at my transcript if I would do speech and debate for them for two years. Also, I had an older cousin, Myra, who was at UCSB and was happy there.

Q: How was UC Santa Barbara?

GROSSMAN: It was fantastic. I loved it.

Q: This must have been in ’69.

GROSSMAN: I went there in 1969 and graduated in 1973. There was a lot of ferment there, not just over the war but campus issues as well. There was a huge disruption in 1970, the Bank of America was burned down in Isla Vista. Sadly, a student was killed in 1970 there. And let us not forget those killed at Kent State. 1970 was a very tough year not only to try to get an education but also to try to understand what was going on around us. But I went there and I lived the first two years in the dorms and met a lot of different kinds of people and I thought college was great. My grades skyrocketed and I met my commitment to Kathy Corey and then stopped competitive speech and debate, but it was exactly where I needed to go and what I needed to do.
And again, luck plays its role. I took a class as a sophomore from a professor called Michael Gordon in the political science department and he sparked my interest in international relations and political science. He was good enough to pay attention to me for the year I was a sophomore and the year I was a junior. And the year I was a junior he pushed me to go abroad on a UC education-abroad program. The year I was a senior I went to the University of Birmingham in England.

Q: Well at, I think, maybe I’ve got it wrong but I interviewed another Foreign Service Officer, Joe Wilson, and I think he went to UCSB.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: He went there for the surfing; at least that’s what he said.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Because he was a skier and a surfer but I mean, not a student. He ended up when he graduated; he became a master carpenter, I think.

GROSSMAN: There are there several of us that I know of from that time whom I know about who went to UC Santa Barbara. We always joked that it was a Foreign Service affirmative-action program to get people from UCSB. There’s Joe Wilson, as you said, and Don Hayes, Leslie Gerson and Barbara Bodine. We’re the old-time UC-Santa Barbara contingent.

Q: Did you surf?

GROSSMAN: Only body surfing. I played a lot of Frisbee.

Q: What happened, you mentioned a Bank of America burning down. What was that about?

GROSSMAN: There were two things going on there at the time. The first was over the firing by the Chancellor of an anthropology professor. I remember the chant, there was a huge petition that he should stay and they got 7,776 signatures, and the great chant of the students was, “7776, no more bureaucratic tricks.” I don’t think he ever got rehired, but it was sort of the first ferment there at that campus. Then the invasion of Cambodia was 1970 and, I don’t know for what reason, people believed that the Bank of America was somehow financing the war in Vietnam and, in particular, financing the war in Cambodia. There was a branch of the Bank of America in Isla Vista, which is a community full of students next door to UC Santa Barbara. There were a number of nights of rioting in Isla Vista. The bank was torched and burned to the ground. And …

Q: Well, did you get involved in anti-Vietnam demonstrations at all?
GROSSMAN: I was not involved in any of the violent stuff. I just didn’t think that was right. I was involved in some of the teach-ins. At one point I can remember organizing busloads of students to go and lobby the California state legislature in Sacramento to take a stand against the war. I think Dr. Gordon was an influence who just said, you’ve got to think about this in a broader way and you know, there’s a way to protest this and there’s a way not to. And I was never attracted to the violence. I took from those days a fear of anarchism and nihilism. I did participate in a campus report on police overreaction.

Q: Well did you see sort of the rise of certain student leaders who seemed to be mainly out to exert their charisma or whatever you want to call it? In other words, you know, young people trying on their ability to raise the masses and all that?

GROSSMAN: I think so although my recollection of it is that a lot of the violence—and there was a lot of violence, night after night, tear gassing and police in Isla Vista and on the campus—was mostly nihilism. There was at that time, of course, a whole delusion that there was a revolution going on and it was Europe in 1968 and Berkeley. I read The Port Huron Statement and other documents and some spoke to me and others did not. I can remember going to a campus meeting one day to see (former Students for a Democratic Society/SDS leader) Tom Hayden speak, who was on the semi-sensible end of this. I remember seeing Abbie Hoffman, who was not so sensible. It was a time you had a lot of decisions to make about what you were going to do and how you were going to participate.

Q: Well did you, in a way lose any of your friends to sort of the seduction of this nihilism, drugs, dropout-type thing or something? Was this hitting your group or not?

GROSSMAN: Less so. There were a number of people who experimented with drugs. I did not. I don’t think anybody I knew pursued it to the point of dropping out or destroying himself or herself. In a way, the worst excesses of this passed my group of friends by or passed us over. The lucky people mostly shed that lifestyle and moved on.

Q: How about campus Marxism? I mean, some of those professors, it still hangs on. There’s an illusion about having this, the Marxist approach to things, which has been big in our campuses all over the world for a long time, and how about at your place?

GROSSMAN: There was Herbert Marcuse, at UC …

Q: At San Diego.

GROSSMAN: Yes but he was part of the UC circuit and I think people read a lot of Marxism. I had a class taught by a wonderful professor on anarchism and Marxism. But he was fair, and he let people make up their own minds. But again, I go back to my compliment to Dr. Gordon here, who was always there to say, “Yes but,” or “Yes, have you thought about this?” He was a very realistic person surrounded by some people who weren’t so realistic.
Q: This of course was some of the problems because students are, you know, vulnerable; they’re looking for answers.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: And Marxism often seems to have, you know, has a rather pat answer, you know, and reality is, we all know, it just doesn’t come out very well.

GROSSMAN: Yes, but Dr. Gordon or the others who were also having us read (British academic and professor at the London School of Economic) Leonard Shapiro’s book on the revolution in Russia, the creation of the USSR and the rise of Stalin. We read plenty of other books about what a disaster communism was and would be. And so my recollection is that, although there were Marxist Socialist talkers, there were plenty of people at that time who were saying, “Just hold on a minute and think about this and look at the destruction that this horrible ideology has wrought, through Stalin and through Lenin, and you’ve got to think about this.”

Q: Was Ronald Reagan the governor?

GROSSMAN: He was.

Q: How did he sit with you all?

GROSSMAN: Well, two things I remember about Reagan were, of course, when I went to UC Santa Barbara it was free. There was no tuition and Governor Reagan said, “Well we can’t afford that anymore and people should start paying some tuition.” And it was like the world was going to end; my recollection it was $65.00 a quarter. But he established the principle and it went through and we paid some small tuition from there on. The other thing was that UC Santa Barbara was, as you can imagine, a very environmentally conscious campus and nobody considered that Ronald Reagan was overly environmentally conscious.

Q: He was not a tree hugger.

GROSSMAN: And yet he was also part of life there because his ranch was in the hills up above Santa Barbara on some of the most beautiful property in the world. And Santa Barbara was the Western White House when he was President.

Q: How did the town-gown relationship work in Santa Barbara?

GROSSMAN: It was mixed. The geography led to more separation than there needed to be. UC Santa Barbara is on an 800-acre promontory about 10 miles outside of Santa Barbara. And then Isla Vista, where lots of students lived, is right next door. So if you didn’t have a car you didn’t go to Santa Barbara much. I think that led to more—not exclusion, that’s not the right word. It led to more separation than there needed to be. UC Santa Barbara could be a little universe all by itself.
Q: Did you experience at all, either in high school or at the university, any anti-Semitism? Or was this almost a thing of the past?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that I experienced it in junior high school. Why, I don’t remember. I think I was sent home for fighting either in seventh grade or eighth grade over somebody who’d called me names. So I remember that, but I also remember the opposite, which was at that time Sandy Koufax was pitching for the Dodgers and I can remember him not pitching in a World Series game because it was Yom Kippur.

Q: How about Israel? You know, I’m thinking of your family and sort of from that perspective. Did Israel play much of a role or not?

GROSSMAN: It did. My parents, I believe, met in a Zionist youth organization or had some connection to that. They were both—and all the grandparents of course—were very interested in Israel. I can remember collecting dimes for trees for Israel. The 1967 war was a very intense time at our household.

Q: It was called the Six-Day War.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: Well then, at the university, you were international relations?

GROSSMAN: Political science.

Q: Political science.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: By the way, how was political science at that time? Because my impression, I’m stating my prejudice, political science has gone beyond the bounds or something as far as quantification of everything and all that.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Had that virus hit?

GROSSMAN: There was a big academic debate over normative political science and statistical political science and my recollection is that the UCSB department was split between those people who were at the statistical end of this and those people who were not.

Q: Well the computer was just coming in.

GROSSMAN: Yes.
Q: It really wasn’t a computer but it was a counter. I mean, card machines.

GROSSMAN: There were cards, right. I can remember the library would give out for note-taking tons of used IBM cards and I can remember taking notes for research papers on the back of them. That was as close as I got to a computer at that time.

Q: Were you at all attracted to the quantitative ... ?

GROSSMAN: Never. My quantitative abilities are balancing my checkbook and that’s about it. Our daughter is the math person in our household.

Q: Well then, were you, you were going to graduate in ’73, was that it?

GROSSMAN: Correct.

Q: What were you pointed towards?

GROSSMAN: Well, I go back to 1972, when I was a junior; again full credit to Dr. Gordon. He took me into his office one day and said, “You’ve got some potential there somewhere, you’re at this University of California campus where there’s still a lot of ferment and you need to go someplace more rigorous and learn to write and learn to read critically.” And so the University of California had an education-abroad program that was generally for juniors. Dr. Gordon helped me get an exception and I went abroad as a senior. He encouraged me to go to England, where he had been at university. In August or September of 1972, the beginning of my senior year, I found myself on a charter flight from Los Angeles with all the other UC program students, on my way to London and then to the University of Birmingham. So I spent my senior year as a final-year student at the University of Birmingham in the political science department.

Q: Okay. What was the University of Birmingham like at that time?

GROSSMAN: Birmingham is a redbrick university and an amazing place. Birmingham was then primarily an engineering and science school.

Q: Representing sort of the industry.

GROSSMAN: Absolutely. But there was a wonderful political science department there and I was warmly welcomed and had a great year there. I tried to learn how to read critically and to write and to speak in an organized manner. And I also had a huge opening to the world. I’d never been abroad. I’d never been out of California really. I’d been to Arizona once and I’d been to Oregon but I’d never really been out of the state.

Q: Never been to Tijuana?
GROSSMAN: Not sure about Tijuana, but my dad was reminding me a few days ago that we’d been on a family trip to Ensenada.

Q: I went there once and decided, when I was 10, and made up my mind; I didn’t realize it but I never sought after a Latin American assignment.

GROSSMAN: I was able to see something different in Britain and the UK. Then in December of 1972, we had off from school in December—from the 15th of December to January the 15th—and four of us, or three of us, we flew from London to Rome and we got there, I don’t know, the 15th or 16th of December. We hitchhiked from Rome to Florence to Venice to Trieste to Rijeka to Split. We then went from Split to Dubrovnik where I spent a memorable New Year’s eve. Then we took the bus up to Titograd—it must have another name now! —where it was snowing and then we took the train from Titograd to Athens. About the 15th of January we flew from Athens back to England; it was a real eye-opening trip.

Q: So you were there, this is 1970?

GROSSMAN: This would have been Christmas-New Year’s ’72-’73.

Q: Well, since I don’t recall you, I was Consul General in Athens at the time, so I take it you didn’t get into trouble.

GROSSMAN: We were really lucky; we didn’t get into any trouble the whole way. But it was a real eye-opening experience for me. And when I was done at Birmingham, in the summer of 1973, I said I’m not ready to go home yet. I applied and, amazingly enough, got in and then did a Master’s degree at the London School of Economics, ’73-’74.

Q: Well let’s talk about Birmingham first.

GROSSMAN: Okay.

Q: How’d you find the, sort of the approach to learning for you? I mean ...

GROSSMAN: I loved it.

Q: But can you compare and contrast what you were getting at Santa Barbara?

GROSSMAN: I needed the three years at Santa Barbara in order to have taken advantage of the fourth year at Birmingham and then LSE. Santa Barbara was more, “Here’s what you’re supposed to read and here’s what you’re supposed to know and here’s what the test is going to be about,” and that was okay. But I was ready, it turned out, for a system where it was more, “Well, go read the library and think about what’s interesting to you and write about it and we’ll critically work through what you’ve written.” I can remember at one point getting interested in John Locke and reading books about rights and there was an amazing little institute there at Birmingham on Shakespeare studies. But
they had a bunch of books about John Locke, so I knocked on the door and explained myself and they said, “Well come on in.” And so I spent a week reading about John Locke in the Shakespeare library. I was ready for that and I loved it.

Q: Did the students have any misconceptions about the United States? Did you find yourself sort of the American representative there?

GROSSMAN: Yes. Most of the people who had better grades than me wanted to go to Oxford and Cambridge and London so yes, I was one of the very few Americans there and I spoke and acted as an American, being respectful of their culture.

The other thing that was lucky for me was that at that time, 1972-'73, basketball was just coming to England and so anybody who was an American and could play even marginally, as I did, was immediately recruited for the university team. I played for the University of Birmingham’s basketball team for year, which was great because it allowed me then to have a real connection to the British people who were on that team. We traveled together; we ate together, we practiced together. And that, I think, got me connected to that society in a better way than had I been an outsider.

Q: Well Birmingham, being in the heart of the industrial area, did you get a feel for the class system, labor versus conservative, and all that?

GROSSMAN: Absolutely.

Q: What did you see?

GROSSMAN: First, at that time, people’s clothing told you about their class. People wore different kinds of uniforms to work. Porters had a uniform and cleaners had a uniform and the people at the cafeteria had a uniform. You could tell by peoples’ accents and their shoes and where they’d been to school. I can remember friends who were from the north; I would go to the market and come back with an orange and an apple and they were astonished because they had one orange a year—they got it in their Christmas stocking. Eating lettuce and fruits and vegetables was a foreign thing to them. In the dorm, mashed potatoes were a vegetable. What a difference today.

Q: Traveling in those days was something. I remember going to a salad bar around that time and what they called a salad bar I couldn’t believe it.

GROSSMAN: I was amazed at class. The second year I was there, at LSE in London, there was the miner’s strike and the three-day week and Mrs. Thatcher was, I think, elected. The argument was about class and Labor Party tradition and new ways of thinking about the future. I found in myself a fascination for how people chose to govern themselves, how they made choices about their lives. I should say, just to go back to Birmingham, at that time the car industry was very successful and so Birmingham was a comparatively rich town. While I was there they built a fantastic new library in the city. There was music and a theatre.
Q: Did you have any feel in your classes, both in London and in Birmingham; about that it was sort of an almost transitional thing where the working class is beginning to not think as much as powerless? In other words they were sort of coming into their own and the class distinctions were going down or was there still pretty much ...

GROSSMAN: No I would have to say I didn’t start to really feel that until ten or so years later in England. You’ve got to give Mrs. Thatcher a lot of credit for that in her way. She made it ok to be an entrepreneur. My recollection of ’72-’73, ’73-’74 was of a very stratified class society, at least in my observation.

Q: Well I can remember as a Foreign Service Officer if you called the British Embassy and that would be particularly key to this but it wasn’t hard to tell whether I was talking to somebody from the consular or administrative side or the political or economic side by his or her accent.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: I mean it was ...

GROSSMAN: I fell in with a group of people who were northerners from Middlesbrough, Redcar, Liverpool, and so it was pretty interesting to see all that too.

Q: Did you feel they were having ... sometimes as an American you have this wonderful aura of not belonging to either so nobody ...

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: ... you get a pass, don’t you?

GROSSMAN: Yes, you did.

Q: Well then you went to the London School of Economics?

GROSSMAN: I did.

Q: From when to when?

GROSSMAN: 1973-’74.

Q: And what were you doing there?

GROSSMAN: I did a Master’s degree in international relations.

Q: Again, where stood international relations in the quantitative versus the cognitive or whatever you want to call it?
GROSSMAN: LSE was still a very normative kind of international relations place. There were some people who were working on the quantitative side but, by and large, the people who were there, Professor Northridge and Susan Strange, Michael Banks and Philip Windsor, they were all non-numbers people.

Q: Well, both at Birmingham but particularly at LSE, how was Margaret Thatcher viewed there from the people you dealt with?

GROSSMAN: I don’t remember at Birmingham. I remember at London people were amazed by her. But because I had at that point, I think, really started to focus in on international relations, other than the three-day week, which had a big impact on my life …

Q: This is because of the coal.

GROSSMAN: Coal miners’ strike. I don’t remember too much debate about her in particular. There was a huge debate at that time about their society, because here was this three-day week and it was a crisis; we were cold a lot of the time, and people could not work, and what was going to happen? I can remember people writing letters to the newspaper, especially from Australia, people would write in and say things like, “We hear there’s a three-day week in England. How do you get them to work the extra day?” They didn’t know where they were headed, what their society was supposed to be about.

Q: What was your focus at LSE?

GROSSMAN: The way it worked was we went to lots and lots of classes for the first third of the year. The second third of the year was mostly seminars and the last third of the year was writing a big paper and then getting ready for final exams. And so, I remember the first third I went to every class I could get myself to. I just listened and listened. Then in the second third I had a seminar led by Professor Michael Banks. I started to then be interested in how you could take certain theories of international relations and apply them practically. I think I did my thesis on trying to figure out how normative international relations theory might work in practice. I am sure it was awful. But I was really helped by a part-time professor there who was part-time at Chatham House and part-time at LSE named Susan Strange. Her thing was trying to bring economic theory and connect it to international relations theory. I found her fascinating and I remember her being a big help on my final essay. Then there was a huge, rigorous exam set right at the end; it was the last thing that we did in June.

Q: I assume that there were an awful lot of students from abroad, particularly from Africa. Were there or not?

GROSSMAN: A lot from Africa, a lot from South Asia—Indians and Pakistanis—and then a very large number of Americans; that Master’s program was very attractive to Americans. It was funny to be back among Americans again. But I made friends there
that I still have, especially Jim Jacobs who lives in Denver. Another example: there’s was Pakistani student who lived in the same dorm as Jim named Salman Ali Sheik, whom I’m still in contact with, and here’s the weird thing about it. His birthday is exactly the same as mine, 9/23/51. But even stranger, his father’s birthday is exactly the same as my dad’s.

Q: How was life there?

GROSSMAN: It was great. I applied too late—luckily for me it turned out—to get into a dorm so I sublet a room in a house; an apartment in London near the Warrick Avenue tube station. And luckily the guy I sublet from, Ray Corness, had a circle of friends who we still to this day consider among our closest friends. And so I was incredibly lucky to have fallen in with real Londoners, real people who lived there. They all were five to eight-years older than I was; they had jobs, so they had real lives which were interesting to observe. Life was, pretty attractive. What did I have to do? I went to school. It was very stimulating. But it was a funny time in England where in this apartment we lived in you still had to put coins into the radiator to get heat or light and we had a pay phone in the flat.

Q: A geezer or whatever?

GROSSMAN: Sometimes, at 10:30, if nobody would put money in the meter, it would go off and everybody would be searching around for ten pence coins to put in the damn machine so we could have electricity.

Q: Yes. Did you get any feel for the London School of Economics’ approach to newly emerging countries? I sometimes felt that this is, the LSE brand of socialism and all this, that it probably was more destructive than Marxism.

GROSSMAN: I was there in the first years of change, where they had gone out and hired to be the boss of LSE Ralph Dahrendorf, who was a German Eurocrat. He was a more managerial-type person, and he was the Director. So I think they were consciously making an effort to change both the image of the LSE and the way they thought about the world.

Q: The Gods were no longer the ...

GROSSMAN: Sidney and Beatrice Webb. People paid respect to them and their ideas, but they had become historic figures by that time. And Dahrendorf, not disrespectful to the past, had the job of putting LSE on a different path. By the time I got there wasn’t much socialist, Marxist stuff left.

Q: Did you get any feel for the attitudes of the Professors towards the Soviet Union at the time?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that for some people they lost their naiveté about the Soviet Union with the invasion of Poland and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
My recollection is that many people were rightly shocked by 1968—by the Soviet actions—and I don’t think felt the same way afterwards.

Q: Was there the equivalent, I mean were you aware of at that time something like the French intellectuals, the chattering class, were they at all a factor or something, sort of the intellectuals who would get up and pontificate and all that?

GROSSMAN: Sure. But I always considered that part of the reason to go there was because the system there was that every day or every week they published lists of lectures and you could turn up to anything, you could take any class you wanted. All you had to do was turn up. And so it was a great smorgasbord of being able to wander around and listen to people.

Q: I would think that your time in high school and half time at, two years at Santa Barbara in debating and all would have served you well in the British system, which puts a high ... 

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: ... premium on debate.

GROSSMAN: Yes it did.

Q: Did you have any interest in sort of the Third World, Africa, Asia and all that, at the time?

GROSSMAN: No, I can’t say that I did. My interest, through Salman Ali Sheik and others and through his friends, was interest in India and Pakistan.

Q: Did you have any reading, looking at, contact with either the Foreign Service or American diplomacy? Did you have any feel for this?

GROSSMAN: I did. I was dating at that time a British woman and we wanted her to visit the United States, I guess for the summer, and of course we went one day to the Consular section of the American Embassy in London and we were treated so rudely. I just couldn’t believe the way we were being treated. I finally said, “Wait a minute, I’m an American, you can’t do this to people.” I was asked to leave. The next thing I remember was standing on the steps there, down the side of the Consular section going, “What the hell happened, what happened to me?” It was my first time at an embassy. It was a negative experience and it colored my attitude toward how we treated our clients for the rest of my career. She got the visa in the end.

Q: Well what, going for your Master’s and all, what was going to be the result of all this in your mind?
GROSSMAN: I was sure I was going to go to law school. I took the LSAT in England, in the spring of 1994 at the building of the English Speaking Union.

Q: That’s the ...

GROSSMAN: The law school, LSA ...

Q: Aptitude.

GROSSMAN: I went and took it one Saturday morning. I finished that test and I put my pencil down and I said, “There’s no way, this is not for me.” But I didn’t know what else I was going to do. I passed the LSAT and I applied for law school and I got accepted at the University of San Francisco. But when I went to actually send them the money and say, ” I said, “It’s not for me”. ”

Q: So you were out in ’74?

GROSSMAN: ’74.

Q: ’74 you were out in the cold.

GROSSMAN: Well, not quite. I had two things. One was that in all the summers that I was at college I had worked for a firm called the Jewel Tea Company, the Jewel Home Shopping Service. I was a door-to-door salesman, a door-to-door solicitor. I worked hard at that each summer and made money on commission. When I went back to California in 1974, I first took an opportunity to work for a politician whom I really liked in Santa Barbara named Gary Hart— not the Gary Hart of Colorado but the Gary Hart of California—and he was running for the State Assembly. I did research for him on issues and wrote speeches and did all the kinds of things a low-budget campaign would do and I worked there through the summer of ’74 until Election Day 1974 and he got elected. So then the question was whether I wanted to go to Sacramento with him and I declined. I wanted to stay in Santa Barbara. I got back in touch with the Jewel Tea Company and I was hired as an area manager and I drove a delivery truck in Santa Barbara and then I went back to door-to-door soliciting.

Q: What did you sell door to door?

GROSSMAN: They sold what at the time seemed like everything. The thing that always makes people laugh is that we sold aerosol spray butter.

Q: God, I remember … Did you really?

GROSSMAN: I’m sure the FDA would not allow this today but yes; we sold aerosol spray butter, and a lot of cleaning products, all kinds of stuff. And the deal was that when you solicited door to door you were looking for new customers for the route driver who had that area.
Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: And so you were looking for people who would buy and then continue to buy over a couple of weeks and then, as the route driver, you saw people every two weeks. This was hard work and I always thought that being in the Foreign Service was—compared to selling things door-to-door in Bakersfield in the summer, all on commission—was pretty great.

Q: Well, 1974 was one of those tipping points in our society where all of a sudden households were finding they needed the wife to work, too.

GROSSMAN: Yes, exactly right.

Q: So were you feeling the beginning of the impact?

GROSSMAN: No question about it. In fact we were instructed, when we were doing the door-to-door soliciting, that we could not start knocking on doors until 9:00 in the morning and we had to stop knocking on doors at 4:00 in the afternoon, because so many women who were the customers of the Jewel Tea drivers had gone into the workforce. The drivers now had to see them between 7:00 in the morning and 8:30 and they just couldn’t take any more customers at those hours of the day. So we were searching for those people who had not chosen to work outside the home. It was a very strict rule; the drivers wanted us to fill the middle of their day. We had to knock on hundreds of doors in order to get enough people at home to make enough pitches in order to get enough sales. But it was, for me, a very important experience. One because it taught me a lot of self-discipline, because this was really hard, you were all by yourself every day and it was hot and some days it didn’t go very well.

Q: You were doing this in Bakersfield?

GROSSMAN: Not only Bakersfield. In the summers we solicited what seemed like every door from San Luis Obispo to San Diego. Then one summer I ran routes in Bakersfield—it taught me a lot about human nature. When you knock on doors, you have to first have the discipline to knock on the doors because if you didn’t knock on the doors you didn’t make any money; remember: it was all commission. You started each day with zero. And you met a lot of people and you saw how people lived and I’ve really never forgotten it.

Q: I would think, particularly because obviously you had to knock on a lot of doors, one of the hardest things must be particularly for lonely people and all that. I mean, this would be very hard to say, “Thank you, but I really have to go.”

GROSSMAN: When we were soliciting for new customers the rule was we never stepped inside anybody’s house for precisely that reason, it just took too long. When I was driving a route you had to get into their house and you just had to learn who was going to buy and who wasn’t going to buy and how much time you had and you just had to keep
moving. I worked full time for Jewell for a couple of years, from 1974 and I joined the Foreign Service in 1976.

In 1974, I don’t know when, I went to a lecture. It was at a really fancy hotel in Santa Barbara, and I heard Ambassador Thomas Hughes speak at a conference sponsored by the local World Affairs Council. Hughes was at that time President of Carnegie, but he had just finished being I think the DCM in London. I thought, “Wow, what a great sounding thing.” So I went to the placement office at UC Santa Barbara and I said, “Does anybody know anything about this thing called the Foreign Service?” And they said, “Here’s this card that you could mail in and sign up for the test.” I sent in the card and I took the test in a building at UCSB and lucky me I passed. And here we are. I should say that I have had the occasion to thank Mr. Hughes for his speech.

Q: Well back to the time you were a door-to-door salesman, were you able to make a living?

GROSSMAN: I was. Jewell hired me the year after I was a sophomore at UCSB. So in the summer after I was a sophomore, and a junior and a senior, I solicited door to door and I was lucky enough at it that I never had to work during the school year. I made all the money I needed for the year during those three months in the summer.

Q: What do you attribute your salesman technique? This is, you say, hard work. Did you enjoy it or was this just hard work?

GROSSMAN: The first day after our formal training in a classroom, they had a very good training program; they dropped me off on some streets in La Mirada, California. I started out knocking on doors and I couldn’t do it. I just could not make a sale. I can remember about 10:00 in the morning sitting on a curb there in La Mirada almost weeping in frustration. They were smart, the people who trained us. They picked us all up then for lunch on that first day and they said, “How are you doing?” And I said, “I’m doing terrible, I can’t do this.” They said, “Sure you can do this.” And one of the trainers then went out with me for the afternoon and I saw how somebody else did it. But the first couple of weeks were misery. But I kept at it. And then I started to love the challenge of it. I wanted to know how many doors I could get to and I checked each day to see if it was true that you had to knock on 40 doors to meet 20 people to make three pitches to get one sale. I liked the independence of it. I liked the people I met. I thought it was fascinating to have people open doors and I liked to see who was on the other side of the door. This curiosity about what was on the other side of the door turned out to be a very Foreign Service trait.

Q: Well were there sort of “no go” places? I was thinking African-American neighborhoods and all this. Were there places that one kind of avoided or Hispanic neighborhoods or ... ?

GROSSMAN: I’m embarrassed to say that this may have been true but I can’t remember.
Q: I’m sure it had to be.

GROSSMAN: What happened was on a Friday night they would tell us—there were four of us, usually two guys from Iowa and two guys from California, we lived in a motel. On Friday night they would say, “Monday morning we want you to be in, for example, Atascadero, California. Check in at this motel and at the motel you’ll find an envelope and it will be from the route driver who will have circled for you the streets on which he needs more customers.” I didn’t think about it other than we got there, that’s where the guy needed customers, so we went out and did it.

Q: Well I would think just because of language that Spanish-speaking areas would be ...

GROSSMAN: Yes, that’s probably right. But we were directed by the route driver. He needed customers on Monday in this neighborhood because that’s where he worked on Mondays. So that’s what we did. And on Tuesday we did this and Wednesday, Thursday and Friday and Friday they told us to go someplace else.

Q: Well. To finish this off, did you find that your door knocking paid dividends later as a Foreign Service Officer?

GROSSMAN: Oh yes, I did. I have never had a problem walking into a cocktail party and trying to find someone to talk to. I learned to talk to anybody. Second, it made me very concise in my argument. Because when that door opened you had two sentences to get the person interested in the rest of it. You needed to know your headline. Third, it made me realize what a privilege it was to have a good job. I wouldn’t have wanted to knock on doors for the rest of my life and so I always felt privileged that I got lucky and had a decent paying, mostly indoor, job.

Q: Did you ever have any physical confrontations and all that?

GROSSMAN: No, the only physical confrontation ever was with dogs and we always made friends with the mailmen in the neighborhoods. At that time mailmen carried a pepper spray for dogs, so we would always swap them cakes or something and somebody would give us a pepper spray. We were told, especially when we were younger and went door to door, the rule was don’t go inside, if you don’t go inside the house your chances of being in any kind of trouble are really low.

Q: Well then, you took the written exam. How did you find the written exam?

GROSSMAN: Well, I passed.

Q: This must have been in ’75 or so?

GROSSMAN: I think the written exam was in ’74 because it took a long time as I recall getting all the steps completed. Then I had an oral interview.
Q: Yes, when did you have the oral interview?

GROSSMAN: I don’t remember; it would have been I think in ’75. It was at the Federal Building in Los Angeles and again, a piece of kismet which will follow though our conversation here, the chair of my oral interview panel was Ms. Elaine Smith, who was at that time the desk officer for Turkey at the Department of State. We kept in contact and she attended my swearing-in as Ambassador to Turkey.

Q: Yes, I knew Elaine. As a matter of fact, I think around that time I was giving the oral exam up in San Francisco I think.

GROSSMAN: Yes well, she was the chair of my panel and I can remember after our interview I walked outside and they called me back in and said I’d passed.

Q: Yes. It was at that time when that’s what we were doing.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions?

GROSSMAN: I remember one question really well. They asked if I could describe a main problem in Latin America. I had just read a book about multinational corporations in Peru I blathered on about multinational corporations in Peru.

Q: They were confiscating; they were nationalizing.

GROSSMAN: I can’t remember. But I had read this book, so I talked about it. And then they said, “Well that’s very nice, but how about Cuba?”

Q: Had there been any residue left over from your experience on the steps of the London Embassy or not? From the consular, being expelled?

GROSSMAN: No, that didn’t return to my life until I had a chance to be in charge of a Consular section and I made sure we did not act in that way.

Q: Well were you able to, during your time as a salesman, were you sort of in a limbo, were you able to keep up with the world or anything like that?

GROSSMAN: I did. Luckily Santa Barbara being a university town and a town where a lot of interesting people retired, there were discussion groups and conferences now and then. I can remember going to the library and reading the newspaper, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. The big splurge was The Economist; it came to the house as a subscription.

Q: Did you ever run across a real Foreign Service type at all, retired or anybody of ... ?
GROSSMAN: No. The only person I ever saw who was an FSO (Foreign Service Officer) was Thomas Hughes.

Q: Well you came into the Foreign Service when?

GROSSMAN: In March of 1976.

Q: What was your A-100, your basic officer course, what was the composition of it would you say?

GROSSMAN: Well, there were 34 or 35 of us. There were people of all ages—people who had had jobs, people who were married and seemed like real adults and others of us who were just starting out in a professional setting. The group of people I was with impressed me.

Q: How’d you find the training?

GROSSMAN: I had really nothing to compare it to. Being in contact from California with the people who were supposed to help was hopeless. It turned out all of us had very similar experience. For example, we got a list of hotels we could stay in. When I drove around, most of them are closed or were George Washington University dorms. The list must have been years out of date. The first days were spent filling out forms in a huge dark auditorium in Rosslyn. I thought I’d made a big mistake. I remembered all this when I became Director General and we tried to make the entry process as smooth and welcoming as possible.

Once we got going, I thought that they did a pretty good job. My career development officer was Tom Macklin. He took a real interest in me. We were 34 or 35 in the class and there were about that many jobs. My goal in life at that time was to see the Taj Mahal. I looked on the list of posts that were open and there was one in Islamabad, Pakistan. That was as close as I could get to the Taj Mahal. So when they came around and asked people what post they wanted, I said, “I’d like this job in Islamabad.” I said, “You would?” “Yes, that’s what I’d like to do.” They said, “Fine, you’re it.”

I went from A-100 to a holding assignment because Urdu language training didn’t start until August, and I really lucked out. I was, for four or five months, the Assistant Country Officer for Jordan, which made me the most junior go-fer in NEA/ARN (Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs / Office of Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi Affairs). I did all kinds of things. In that summer, our Ambassador in Lebanon, Frank Meloy, was murdered. It was my first brush with the sometimes terrible price paid by the Foreign Service and the way people rallied to serve. I tried to help out the remarkable group of officers in NEA/ARN. I served on my first Task Force; one night I was put in charge of the Task Force from midnight to 8 am. I met Henry Kissinger in the Task Force area. I got to see amazing FSOs in action: Maury Draper was the Office Director and Tom Carolan was the Jordan Desk Officer. Wat (Tyler) Cluverius IV was there to help.
Roy Atherton was the Assistant Secretary at that time. I really had a chance to see what it was like to be an FSO in Washington for those four months, and then I started Urdu.

Q: Well, did you get to look at any particular issues or anything you were dealing with regarding Jordan at the time?

GROSSMAN: As Assistant Country Officer, I got all the stuff Tom Carolan didn’t want to do, which was all plenty interesting to me—commercial relations and disputes and I got to meet some Jordanians. Tom also taught me how to write for the bosses on the 6th and 7th floors. He was a marvelous writer. I worked on a big case I can remember where we were trying to return 40,000 automobile tires to the US that had ended up in Syria that weren’t supposed to be there. I did all kinds of things for that office. But what I really saw was the great tragedy of that summer, Ambassador Meloy’s murder.

Q: What was the feeling towards Lebanon at the time? Were you getting people throwing up their hands or saying, “What the hell are we going to do here or not?” Lebanon was in the middle of a civil war.

GROSSMAN: An honest answer to your question is because I went back a few years later to NEA/ARN as the Jordan Desk Officer, it all just sort of mixed up. That first year in 1976, I was so junior I just ran around and did what I was asked to do.

Q: Well, did you feel you were in the right place? I mean ...

GROSSMAN: Yes, absolutely.

Q: In ’76, we weren’t too far away from Vietnam. Did you get any feel for Vietnam and ...

GROSSMAN: No.

Q: Tom Macklin and I were in Vietnam together and I was wondering whether, that’s back in ’69-’70, but did you get any feel for the repercussions of Vietnam?

GROSSMAN: Yes, in the sense that it had clearly been for the Department an incredibly trying time. But because I fell into NEA and NEA was a full-time job, I focused on the road ahead. My connection to the repercussions of Vietnam come later, first when we confronted refugee and other questions in Turkey and the Balkans and I had the chance to work with people like (Richard C.) Dick Holbrooke, Les Gelb, Lionel Rosenblatt, Craig Johnstone, Ken Quinn and Mort Abramowitz, and much later when I tried to learn the right lessons about taking action and seeking permission later from Rich Armitage.

Q: Well did you get any feel for, I realize the short time, it is very junior at the bottom of the feeding chain and all that, but did you get any feel for the people you were dealing with and relations with Israel?
GROSSMAN: No, not during that short time. That will come later when … the only time I really ever experienced any anti-Semitism in the State Department was when I became the Desk Officer for Jordan. And a lot of the old NEA types were horrified that somebody Jewish could be on the Jordan desk.

Q: It was a residue of history and the Arabist fantasy.

GROSSMAN: I can remember walking down the hall one day, I think it was during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and having an old NEA hand push me up against the wall and say, “What are your people doing?” For a minute I had no idea what he was talking about. And I thought, “You mean over in NEA/ARN? The staff aides? Are you talking about, the Jordanians?” And it wasn’t until 40 or 50 seconds into this conversation that I realized he means, “my people, the Jews.” And I said, “Stop. You can’t talk to me like that. We’re in a federal government building, I’m an American citizen; you can’t talk to me like that.”

Q: Well it was ...

GROSSMAN: So, the first time around I didn’t bump into it, but the second time around absolutely.

Q: We’ll pick that up when we get there. How’d you find, you took Urdu from what, ’77?

GROSSMAN: Well, it would have been the summer, August of ’76 to spring of ’77. I went to Pakistan in early ’77.

Q: How’d you find it?

GROSSMAN: I discovered I have no aptitude for language.

Q: Welcome to the club.

GROSSMAN: I took the MLAT, and it was pretty low, 59 or something. I was paired in Urdu class with an Army Major named David Lemon. He was a FAO (Foreign Area Officer) on his way to India. I liked him very much. I’d never really met anybody from the military before, so that was also good.

Q: What, how long was the course?

GROSSMAN: Twenty-four weeks.

Q: And then?

GROSSMAN: I went to Pakistan.

Q: Where in Pakistan?
GROSSMAN: To Islamabad. I was the junior rotational officer in Islamabad.

Q: And you were there from?

GROSSMAN: I got there in March or April of 1977 and I stayed there until, June 1979. There had just been a failed election in Pakistan, there was rioting and a lot of unrest. It was a pretty interesting time to be a junior officer. Like in NEA/ARN, I got to see some great FSOs in action. I was there for the last five or six weeks of the tenure of Ambassador (Henry A.) Byroade, a historic character. The DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) was Peter Constable, the Political Consular was Howie Schaffer, the Deputy Political Consular was Arnie (Arnold) Raphel. I went there as a rotational officer. I started my rotation in the economic section, working for Tezi (Teresita C.) Schaffer.

After a few months, the junior officer in the political section got removed by embassy management for violating the DCM’s instructions not to meet with the opposition. They decided I might be able to do the political job, so I was reassigned to the slot. It was a real education to work for Arnie Raphel and Howie Schaffer and Peter Constable and Ambassador Arthur Hummel when he arrived later in the year.

Q: When you arrived there who was the president or prime minister?

GROSSMAN: The prime minister was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I can’t remember what all of the issues were, but it was a very divided country; lots of demonstrations in the streets after what everyone called a failed election, which had taken place just before I got there.

Q: In what manner?

GROSSMAN: There was a lot of cheating and it hadn’t really come to any conclusion and so there was some feeling that Bhutto was not fully legitimate. Bhutto was also pursuing a nuclear program, which put the US and Pakistan at odds.

At some point later that summer, Howie Schaffer got PNG’d (persona non grata) or left Pakistan before he got PNG’d. Howie was talking on the phone to our Consul General in Karachi, Bob Moore, and he said something like, “the elephant never forgets.” They were talking about the election, talking about Bhutto. But the Pakistani security services had tapped the phone and so, the next day or two days later in parliament, Bhutto says, “I have a transcript of a conversation between the Political Counselor at the American Embassy and American Consul General, ‘the elephant never forgets.’ Well, I say to the elephant that we will never forget.” Bhutto made it into a huge thing because he had interpreted it that we would always oppose Bhutto. So Howie, I can’t now remember whether they PNG’d him or whether everybody on the US side thought, “This is probably best if he just sort of moves on.” For months Arnie Raphel was the Acting Political Counselor and there was plenty of work to go around. I became a great admirer of Arnie Raphel and it was a privilege to work for him and with him. I learned how to be an FSO abroad from that group of people. Herb Haggerty then arrived to become the Political
Counselor. He was a true South Asia expert and was great to me. Arnie went back to DC to work for Secretary (Cyrus Roberts) Vance.

Another great story from that time was that when Arthur Hummel arrived to succeed Byroade, let’s say in June, Bhutto was up to his eyeballs in his domestic politics and all this fighting and rioting. Ambassador Hummel wanted our July 4th party to be a *vin d’honneur*. I had to ask, what does that mean? I had never heard of such an event. The plan was to invite everybody to the Ambassador’s residence at noon on July 4. So it gets to be the end of June and Hummel still hasn’t presented his credentials because Bhutto never has time to receive Hummel. Then it gets to be the 1st of July, the 2nd of July, and everyone’s saying to Bhutto, “You can’t go to the American Ambassador’s Fourth of July party until the American Ambassador has presented his credentials.” So July 2nd goes by, July 3rd goes by, and Hummel says to us at CoB (close of business) on the 3rd of July, “I guess you better go home, they’re supposed to call us at some point to go down and present credentials; I’ll let you know.” About 3:00 in the morning he gets a call from the prime minister’s office, “Come right now and present your credentials.” I’m sorry about it, but no one thought the most junior person should come along. Anyway, they went to Rawalpindi at 3:00 in the morning on the 4th of July, Hummel presents his credentials. They have about an hour meeting. Hummel comes home.

I go to work and find out all this has happened. We all then go over to the Ambassador’s residence before noon on the Fourth of July and my job is to greet people at their cars and then walk them up to the Ambassador and try to introduce them. After a while the Ambassador sits in some alcove and it was up to more senior people to bring distinguished guests to him. The house is full of senior Pakistani government, military and opposition people. Arnie at one point goes up to General Zia and says to the then Chief of the Army Staff, “Would you like to meet Ambassador Hummel?” And Zia says, “No, I don’t think so.” Then Arnie says, “Well, okay.” Then he says to Zia, “I know you’re looking to buy a C-12 Beechcraft for the Army, we’ve got one in the country over the next few weeks. Would you like to take a ride?” Zia looks at Arnie and says, “I’m going to be sort of busy over the next few weeks.” So at 2:00, this *vin d’honneur* is over; everybody goes home.

Next morning we wake up, it is now the 5th of July. There’s martial music playing on the radio; there’s been a coup overnight. So I call the political FSNs (Foreign Service National), two wonderful people, Imtiaz and Amman. And I ask, “What the heck is going on?” “Well, there’s been a coup, General Zia’s now in charge of the country, Bhutto’s in jail.” And I said, “Well, when did you know about this?” “Oh, we knew about it in the middle of the night.” I said, “Well, why didn’t you call us?” And they said, “Well, why would we have called you since you all did this?” I said, “What are you talking about?” And they replied, “Well, Hummel went to see Bhutto at 3:00 on the morning of the 4th of July and gave him some demands, all of the conspirators were together from 12:00 to 2:00 on the 4th of July at the Ambassador’s residence, where they clearly made some plan and then there was a coup. So why would we have called you?” None of that was true, of course. It was a great lesson in the power of conspiratorial thinking.
Q: What was the feeling among you all when the coup came? Was this any good thing, a bad thing or what?

GROSSMAN: Fair question. I think in some senses Pakistanis were relieved that there was going to be order. But many Pakistanis and Americans recognized that it was a blow to democracy. And of course Zia took Pakistan in directions no one predicted at the time.

Q: Were you getting, I mean, this was before it happened or maybe discussions afterwards; was Bhutto’s anti-Americanism a sort of handy political ploy to have somebody to be against or was it ingrained or what?

GROSSMAN: I think a little bit of both. If you go back to the LSE problem. He was a British-educated socialist-view person who was very suspicious of the United States. We were also opposed to his nuclear ambitions. But I think he also found the United States was a very easy whipping boy for him and his political party.

Q: Did much change when Zia came in?

GROSSMAN: Yes. Lots and lots of politicians were in jail. I think the parliament was suspended, I can’t remember. The military really ran the country. And so, yes, there was a big change. Then, of course, over time the most important issue of all became Bhutto’s execution. He was tried and then Zia ordered his execution.

Q: That seemed so out of line with the way things happened in there. I mean, the execution. Of course, this happened in Turkey too but those are about the only two examples I can think of coups where they—in sort of major countries.

GROSSMAN: Well it was disastrous and I can remember Ambassador Hummel going, with instructions and without instructions, to Zia saying, “You can’t do this, this is the wrong answer to the question,” and using (Turkish Prime Minister Adnan) Menderes as the example; the execution of Menderes has haunted Turkish society ever since.

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: I can remember him going over there time and time again trying to convince Zia that an execution wasn’t the answer, but they did it. I was sent out that day to try as best I could to judge public reaction. My reporting then was that 50 percent of the people were in tears and 50 of the people were giving each other candy. I was amazed, especially as an American, to see people celebrating the execution of a leader.

Q: Yes. Was Benazir Bhutto at all a factor in those days?

GROSSMAN: No, she was, a student in London and in the US I think, at that time. So we were conscious of her but I don’t remember her being a political factor. Her mother, Bhutto’s wife, was a political factor.
GROSSMAN: It was feudal and tribal.

Q: Feudal.

GROSSMAN: Pakistan was a feudal society. It was also tribal. Baluchistan was certainly a tribal society and the North-West Frontier was as well. There were also great landlords, like the Bhuttos, who were a great landlord family from the Sindh.

Q: Well, one of the things that is so apparent as time has gone on over a period is that Pakistan just doesn’t seem to have been able to really settle things.

India has made the breakthrough apparently.

GROSSMAN: Part of Pakistan’s problem is that Pakistan is still unsure why Pakistan is Pakistan. For a while Pakistan was the homeland for Muslims in South Asia. But then Bangladesh breaks away and so, why Pakistan? What do you believe in? India now has a very large Muslim population, so Pakistan is not the “homeland for Muslims” in South Asia. When I lived there 1977-79, I thought often about how lucky we are to have had more than one Founding Father, in the sense that if you don’t like Jefferson you can like Franklin or Madison or Hamilton. If you don’t like Franklin you can like Washington. Pakistan had one person, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and that was it. He was a great man, but if you didn’t like Jinnah or he didn’t grab you, there wasn’t anything else to believe in. So part of their problem is that they just never were able to unify around some concept of who they were and what they’re all about.

Q: Well Jinnah was rather an austere figure and not very lovable.

GROSSMAN: But he had an idea; he was an intellectual and he helped create the state, and then he died before he could inculcate his vision.

Q: As a junior officer and all, how did you find the corruption factor?

GROSSMAN: In Pakistan?

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: As a junior officer it wasn’t the corruption so much; it was that for the very first time in my life I was confronted with millions and millions of poor people. All of us kept asking ourselves: how are they ever going to get out of this cycle of misery? I know there are poor people in America, but for me the numbers in Pakistan were overwhelming. It was a big splash of reality to wander around there as a junior officer and say, “What’s going to happen here? What do you do? What’s the responsibility of the United States?”
Q: During the time you were there was there a stance—standoffish, hostile or what—towards mainly a Zia government in that early period?

GROSSMAN: It was, no, it wasn’t standoffish except for the fact that the nuclear issue covered over everything. It was Bhutto who said that Pakistanis would “eat grass,” if that’s what it took to invest in the nuclear program. Zia was more cagier. Zia always wanted us to prove there really was a nuclear program. I can remember the first time I ever met Bob Gallucci. Gallucci was flown out as a young INR nuclear specialist accompanied by a photo interpreter, and they went to see Zia. And they said look, here it is.

Q: They showed the pictures.

GROSSMAN: They showed the evidence. They said, “This is what’s happening in your country.” Zia said, “Oh no, can’t possibly be.” And that was the time when the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, was on the cocktail circuit in Islamabad and presumably giving details of the Pakistani nuclear program to countries like North Korea. Zia was much cagier about it and I’m sure wanted the program to continue and was just harder to deal with. But you know at that time we had cut off all assistance to Pakistan; the nuclear issue dominated everything.

Q: Was there, did you get any feel for the Islamic movement in Pakistan at that time?

GROSSMAN: A little bit. As the junior political officer I had a chance to meet people from the Jamaat-e-Islamia party. They were headquartered in Lahore and I can remember going there to call on them and listen to them about how an Islamic State was the answer to Pakistan’s questions. You’ll also recall at that time that Zia himself turned out to be a much more religious figure than anyone had expected and banned alcohol in Pakistan after he became what was called the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Islam and its role in society and government began to be a front-and-center issue there in the year after the coup.

Q: Well as a Political Officer what were you doing when, I take it political movement was pretty well stifled, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: We were able to get out and about. The embassy leadership encouraged it. I can even remember calling on people on house arrest.

Q: Knocking on ...

GROSSMAN: I can remember one time going up to meet a very interesting retired air force officer named Askar Khan, who taught me a big lesson about America. He was under house arrest. I don’t know why, but I got permission to go see him. He was up in the North-West Frontier somewhere; we talked and we talked. He finally said to me, “You know what I love most about America, what I admire most about America?” I said,
“No, what’s that?” He said the peaceful transition of power. He said, “On the 20th of January, someone leaves and someone comes and nobody goes to jail, and here I am in house arrest.” And I never forgot that.

Q: Do you have any feel about the military, where they were coming from?

GROSSMAN: Well, again, I think it was surprising that Zia turned out to be so Islamic. People would have guessed that the military was not so Islamic, or not so religious. They were very restricted in terms of contacts.

Q: Did you get any feel, at least from accounts of other people you talk about, the power of the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) or whatever it is, the intelligence service?

GROSSMAN: No, at that time I did not. I either wasn’t part of it or it wasn’t a focus for me. It is possible that the Ambassador and other people did.

Q: And it may have developed more later, too.

GROSSMAN: That could be. Because don’t forget it was in February, 1979 that (Ambassador Adolph) Spike Dubs was murdered in Afghanistan and that many things in the region started to shift. It was not until Christmas of ’79, after I’d left Pakistan, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The 14th of February of ’79 was the first takeover of the Embassy in Tehran and also when Ambassador Dubs was murdered.

Q: Yes. Well, before we move to that, were the Saudis at that point doing their support of the madrassas and all that sort of stuff or not?

GROSSMAN: I confess I don’t know. Our big external focus was the Iranian revolution. We watched, we were next door and we listened to what was going on in Iran.

Q: Well was there concern for the Khomeini revolution and all that, in Iran that it might spill over and were you thinking that ...

GROSSMAN: In Pakistan, I don’t remember thinking so at the time.

Q: How about Afghanistan?

GROSSMAN: Before the February 1979 events, I’d been to Afghanistan two or three times. We used to swap houses with junior officers in in Afghanistan. I used to drive up there in a little Datsun station wagon. You’d fill the gas tank in Islamabad; drive to Peshawar, and in Peshawar there was a guy who’d sell you aviation fuel. You’d fill half your tank with 110-octane aviation fuel, and get up the hill to Afghanistan through the North-West Frontier and Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. When you got to Afghanistan, all they had was Soviet gas and it was 70 octane. So you’d hope that some of the 110 was still in there and you’d get half or three-quarters of a tank of 70, hoping that the
combination would make 80. But I loved being in Kabul and making that drive. You were surrounded by history and mystery.

Q: You didn’t feel under any particular concerns about the threat of terrorism or that sort of thing?

GROSSMAN: No. It is amazing to think of today. Within the bounds of reason, we were pretty much free to go and do what we wanted. I went with my DEA colleagues to the Swat Valley, for example. And many other places in Pakistan as well.

Q: How about social life? Was there sort of the ruling feudal class; were they still going under military dictatorship?

GROSSMAN: I think so; I would imagine. I don’t know enough; a number of people who opposed Bhutto were probably quite happy with military rule, at least in the beginning. You could see that in the way some Pakistanis celebrated Bhutto’s execution.

Q: I’ve talked to people who served there at that time going out to the country with one of their contacts and they talk about how many villages they own and all that.

GROSSMAN: I can remember being in the Swat District one time; we went for tea with the Wāli of Swat, how could you resist such a thing? While we were there, a man knocked on the gate and they conversed and the Wāli reported that the person had just come by to see if the Wāli wanted anybody killed. I don’t know whether that’s true or not or whether that was done for the visit, for the visiting impressionable American, but that was sort of an amazing comment to hear.

Q: What was your impression of Ambassador Hank Byroade?

GROSSMAN: Unfortunately I was only there sort of five or six weeks with him, but he was an historic character. I’d read Stillwell and the American Experience in China and knew a little bit him. I am sorry I did not have a chance to really work with him

Q: How about Art Hummel?

GROSSMAN: Art Hummel was a marvelous man. When he got to Islamabad he was a great teacher. When I became an Ambassador, I tried to remember how he acted and how he led his team. Ambassador Hummel would come down the hall, stick his head in and say, “Marc, are you doing anything?” I’d say, “No, sir.” He’d say, “I’m going to see the foreign minister, come along and take notes.” We’d get in the car and go over to see the foreign minister and then, on the way back, he’d say, “Why don’t you write the cable up about my meeting with the foreign minister?” I did my best and I’d get it back corrected. He’d call you in and explain, teach. He’d say, “Better this way than that.” He had an ear for the Washington audience that I tried to emulate.
I remember the first week he was there, I didn’t know what he was doing, I didn’t know it was a technique; he came by—we worked Sunday to Thursday so let’s say it was Thursday—and he said, “Marc, on Saturday I’d like you to make an arrangement with the motor pool to get a car and a driver and I want you to take me to three interesting places in Rawalpindi, and then I’ll buy you lunch.” That sounded great. So I made arrangements with the motor pool, I took him to three interesting places in Rawalpindi because a friend of mine and I had often visited Urdu Bazaar, which was where all the books were sold and there were amazing paper things that they made. We went to the Fine Picture Framer, a lovely man who framed pictures, and then we went to the fort. Ambassador Hummel said, “Those are three interesting places, I’ll take you to lunch.” So we went to the Intercontinental Hotel. Hummel told me the story about how (former Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger said that he, Art Hummel, was the “meanest man in the Foreign Service.” He said, “I don’t seem so mean, do I?” I said, “I don’t think so.” Anyway, I dropped him back home and I took the car back and, a couple of weeks later, he said, “Do you know what I did?” I said, “No, I don’t know.” He said, “I wanted to see whether you, as the most junior officer in the place, had enough contacts to get a car and whether you’d ever been to Rawalpindi before and whether you knew anything about this country.” He was a great teacher and a great person.

And Mrs. Hummel, Betty Lou Hummel, was just also a great person and leader. They really led a community.

Q: Well then you left there in?

GROSSMAN: The summer of ’79.

Q: And things, I thought we’d stop at this point.

GROSSMAN: That would be great.

Q: And we’ll pick it up. But just to set things, when you left all hell was going to break loose, including literally at the Embassy.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: Within a relatively short time.

GROSSMAN: November. It happened in November.

Q: But were you feeling under any concern that you were on the lip of a volcano or anything like that?

GROSSMAN: No sir. I can’t say that we did.

Q: Well then, summer of ’79, where did you go?
GROSSMAN: I became one of two staff assistants in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. I became a staff assistant to (Harold H.) Hal Saunders.

Q: Okay, we’ll pick it up then.

GROSSMAN: That would be great.

Q: Before we go, did you get any feel for that time, the sort of New Delhi-Islamabad, the two embassies were not always on the best of terms or, I mean, I think of (John Kenneth) Galbraith.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: How were things then? How were Indian-Pakistani relations viewed?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that while I was in Pakistan there was one of those little tiny warming trends; where there was actually Pakistani diplomatic representation in India and vice-versa. I can remember meeting the Indian representative to Pakistan and I knew the Pakistani representative over there through Arnie. I think Ambassador Hummel and whomever was the Ambassador to India—sorry, I don’t remember—had committed themselves not to get into squabbling between the two embassies. I can remember being sent over to India to meet with the political section there and to spend a few days, and I can remember them coming to Islamabad so that they knew people. The two Ambassadors worked quite hard not to get into these games.

Q: Every once in a while it flares up; it is silly. But it is localitis.

Did you see the Taj Mahal?

GROSSMAN: I got there two or three times and it was like the Grand Canyon, one of those few things that’s even better in person than the most beautiful picture.

Q: One other one, I’ve got this then we’ll stop.

GROSSMAN: Okay.

Q: Arnie Raphel, he’s quite a figure in the Foreign Service. Unfortunately he died in an airplane crash with Zia when he was Ambassador there. But what was your impression; how did he work with you?

GROSSMAN: He worked with me by trusting me; he worked with me by teaching me. He was great to work with and for because he was smart, committed and wanted every day to be fun. He had time for junior people. There is a reason the Department has a leadership and mentoring award named for Arnie. Arnie Raphel was a bottle of champagne. Arnie had a gift for bureaucracy; he had the gift to be able to write quickly
and clearly; he could talk your ear off, and he oozed charm. He was a wonderful human being and I miss him.

Q: Well he also used to lecture at FSI (Foreign Service Institute) on how to deal in a bureaucracy.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Which was something many Foreign Service people don’t have.

GROSSMAN: Right. I took that on after he did it and there’s an old, funny old video of us, of Arnie and me, talking to this course. He was a master at it. When he came back from Pakistan and was Secretary Vance’s Executive Assistant all during the Iran hostage crisis, I don’t know what we would have done without him. This is an institution that has missed him since the day he was killed.

Q: Okay. Well, once again we’ll pick this up in 1979 in the summer when you came back to go into NEA.

GROSSMAN: Great.

* * *

Q: Okay. Today is the 6th of February 2006. Marc, 1979, NEA, was it just a normal assignment; did you lobby for it or what?

GROSSMAN: I did not lobby for it but I know people lobbied on my behalf. Peter Constable, who had been the DCM in Pakistan, came back and was the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs for Hal Saunders, who was the Assistant Secretary. Since I’d served with Peter in Islamabad, I think he arranged for me to come back and be one of the two staff assistants, which I did. I started in the summer of 1979 and I was paired, happily, with Edmund Hull, who was my partner as staff assistant for the year that we did that.

Q: I’m interviewing Edmund when he comes down from Princeton.

GROSSMAN: He and I were partners in that enterprise for a year and we sat in a little tiny office next to Hal Saunders’s office and tried to do our best.

Q: Well tell me, how was Hal Saunders? I mean, this is your first chance to look at somebody who’s up there doing things and what was your impression of how he operated? Then we’ll talk about what was the situation.

GROSSMAN: I was struck by how quiet and determined Hal was. The other thing that really impressed me was that, day after day, he did his best to avoid being driven by everybody else’s agenda. He tried each day to focus on the five or six that he needed to
accomplish that day. He drove in in the morning; he had an old-fashioned green flip pocket notebook. I’d never seen one before but he was a great user of those. On his way to work he would write down the three or four things that he had to get done that day that he wanted to accomplish. He was also a great user of the Dictaphone; he would dictate his priorities. When he got to work he would very carefully set that green notebook out and come back to it all day, trying to make sure that he was doing what he needed to do. Now, obviously that didn’t work out all the time, because there was what the Secretary wanted to do and what was going on in the world, but I was very impressed and tried also to remember how he had set priorities each day. I tried always to emulate that.

As an FSO and certainly as a junior person, I used to run in every once in a while to his office and say, “You’ve got to read this cable” from embassy X or Y. And he’d say, “Marc, I’m the Assistant Secretary of State, I’ve got a lot of people here to read cables for me. In fact, it is one of your jobs, it is one of the jobs of the desk officers and the Country Directors and the DASes (Deputy Assistant Secretary). I can’t deal with cables, except in exceptional circumstances because I’m trying to get other things done.” What he taught me was that cables are important, but that they should not drive your life. They are tools. You’ve got to remember Hal’s connection to Kissinger. In Kissinger’s memoirs, there’s this wonderful section that talks about the difference between Floors One through Six at the State Department and the Seventh Floor. Kissinger observed that Floors One through Six are consumed with cables; cables come in, cables go out and it is kind of a perfect system—that people spend their days working on cables. What’s interesting on Floor Seven are letters, testimony, all the things that are not priorities for everybody else in the building. You could see Hal struggling against that every day. And he gave Edmund and me huge latitude; he relied on his DASes. He had a strong enough ego to delegate. He wanted the Country Directors and the desk officers to do their jobs; he was a great leader in this way. The other thing was that he was a very personable, quiet, moral man who listened intently. He always wanted to know from us when we’d heard that someone’s wife was sick or someone’s child was ill or someone was having a problem, so that he could reach out to him or her. I think part of his great empathy came from the death of his first wife. He was very attuned to the human aspects of the work we all did together.

Q: Could you explain what were the major issues in Near Eastern Affairs that were driving things?

GROSSMAN: Well obviously there was a pre-Iran hostage time, November 4, 1979, and a life post-November 4, 1979. I have only the vaguest recollections of what was going on from July to November. There was a peace process going on and Israel-Palestine and North Africa issues, but obviously November the 4th, 1979, made all the difference. November of 1979 was not just the Iran hostage crisis but our Embassy in Pakistan burned down. In early December, our Embassy in Libya was taken, and so it was, as you say, it was quite a time. And my recollections after the 4th of November obviously are clearer than they were beforehand.
Q: Well, let’s, before we get into sort of the details there, how did you find being a staff assistant? Did you try to throw your body between your principal, Hal Saunders, and all the other people who must have been coming at you, particularly on this? Because this was not just a State Department crisis: this is a national, even a world, crisis.

GROSSMAN: It was a world crisis.

Q: And I would think that, particularly the White House and Congress and all, would be pounding, “You’ve got to do something!” This must have been a very difficult time even at your level.

GROSSMAN: It was difficult mentally and physically and substantively. At that time there was no special assistant in NEA and that meant that the two staff assistants were not just pushing paper, but we really were the two special assistants in that way. Sometimes we spoke for Hal and sometimes we covered for Hal and other people in the front office; we did all kinds of things. Edmund was a huge talent, obviously, and we did our best and we did our best for Hal and everyone in NEA.

I remember mostly the physical aspects of it. When the Iran hostage crisis started, Edmund and I worked ten days on and two days off. The person who came in at 6:00 in the morning worked until about 4:00 in the afternoon; the other person came at 10:00 in the morning and worked until it was over, which was sometimes 8:00 and 9:00 and 10:00 at night. We discovered that it was too much trouble for the night person to leave, notes and readings and a list of what was going on for the person the next morning, so the night person became the morning person. So you’d leave there at 8:30 or 9:00 at night and then come back at 6:00 the next morning and then stay through. Saturdays and Sunday you were on your own because the other person needed a break. By the ninth or tenth day of that in a row—again, all during the Iran hostage crisis Saturday and Sundays were full working days—we were desperate to leave and to go away. Hal and Peter Constable and Henry Precht and so many others never got any time off. And we always remembered the hostages, who were prisoners 24/7. I’ll never forget, we realized obviously there could have been terrible things happening over the weekends and at one point we wrote down for each other, because on your off weekend we wanted to just get away and have nobody call you, the only person—and we kept this for a year—who knew where the other guy was, was the other staff assistant. We made an agreement that I would never call Edmund or Edmund would never call me on our weekend off, unless there was a full scale Arab-Israeli war and conflict between India and Pakistan, which included aerial bombing. So that’s the standard we set because you were desperate for some time off.

The substance of it, the pressures on Hal and the DASs were immense and we tried very hard to deal with it by both protecting Hal’s time but not protecting him from people or from the substance. That wasn’t our job. We weren’t Assistant Secretaries and we weren’t Deputy Assistant Secretaries. We tried to help him get his work done. You can imagine people would say, “Did he get my memo?” This time was especially hard for the NEA people who were not working on Iran. Hal and I and Edmund worked out a deal where there was a part of his desk on the upper right hand corner where we would put
things that he knew he never had to look at, but it was so that we could then honestly say to people “it was on his desk.” And there was a section in his briefcase, which we packed up every night for him to take home, in the back, that he never had to look at so we could honestly tell people in the bureaucracy, “he took it home”. We got quite adept at making his signature and putting his initials on things and I think people would have been pretty astonished at the amount of material that was signed out of the front office of NEA by two FSO-7s, but we had his confidence, because he gave it to us, and it would not have worked otherwise. The human capacity to do all this work just wasn’t there unless it was there by the team.

Q: Well, were you monitoring his calls in those days or had that stopped?

GROSSMAN: No, that stopped; we certainly didn’t monitor his calls. My recollection is that when Secretary Vance came that ceased. That’s not to say that in some of the calls he made, especially during the negotiations with some of the very strange people he negotiated with trying to get the hostages out, there wasn’t somebody on the line from the Ops Center (Operations Center), when we were talking to the French intermediaries or the Argentines or all the other amazing people who came through our lives that year. But I never monitored a Hal Saunders phone call that I can recall.

Q: Yes, I think Kissinger did. Now, it was basically a benign way of doing this but the idea was that you would take the notes of say, okay, “Things to do,” and stuff like that.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: Commitments made, which is not a bad idea.

GROSSMAN: No.

Q: I mean, if somebody, if the person you’re working for doesn’t take pretty good notes...

GROSSMAN: Hal was very good at immediately telling us what needed to be done and we were quite good at then making that known throughout the bureaucracy.

Q: Well, here you were, a very solid subcontinent person, I mean ... Having served two years in the Foreign Service in Pakistan, did you find that Pakistan and that part after that burst of Islamic fury against our Embassy, did that fade off the scene?

GROSSMAN: No, it did not. Because you’ll remember at the time both (National Security Advisor Zbigniew) Brzezinski and (Robert William) Bob Komer, who was at the Defense Department, talked about the Crescent of Crisis, which extended really all the way through into Pakistan. It was a lucky break that the morning, our Embassy was stormed in Islamabad, Peter Constable and I had some mental picture of the place. There was a huge amount of effort then that went on in Pakistan afterwards, because it took months to bring everybody out, deal sensitively with all the families. Ambassador Hummel then made the very important decision that, over the period of the next year, all
of those people who had been trapped in that vault needed a transfer because they would never look on Pakistan and Pakistanis the same way again. So my recollection is that there was quite a lot of effort put into Pakistan after the Embassy was burned down. Of course, it was also because the Russians were then in Afghanistan—the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan that same December—and so that area continued to get a tremendous amount of attention.

Q: I realize you were the fly on the wall, but did you get any feel for Brzezinski and the NSC (National Security Council) at that time? Because Brzezinski had really his own agenda in a way; a different approach say than Vance. Did you get any feel for this?

GROSSMAN: As I think back on it, I am not sure how to answer because I only saw what I saw. You’d sometimes see, for example, the comeback copy of the night notes that the Secretary would send over to the President, obviously only on the Middle East. But the comments that were written on them from Brzezinski were always, I thought, quite remarkable. I think it is important to note the role (Robert E.) Bob Hunter played in this, because Bob Hunter was at that time the Iran guy and the Middle East guy over at the NSC, and he and Hal worked out a very good relationship; they were talking all the time. And so, the real crisis arrived over Desert One and Vance’s resignation. As I look back on it now, it certainly wasn’t any worse than any other State Department-NSC relationships I would have the chance to see.

Q: Did the fact that so many of our Foreign Service colleagues were trapped in Iran, were you getting reflections of this from within, particularly the NEA staff and all that? Were people getting emotionally involved in this thing?

GROSSMAN: Everyone was fully emotionally invested. These were our colleagues and it was very scary, but I think Hal and Secretary Vance and everybody, very much including (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) David Newsom, had decided early on that their objective was to get these people out alive. And that was the object every day; we were going to do everything we could to make the end of the crisis come out so that 52 people walked out of that Embassy or the Iranian Foreign Ministry alive. That became everybody’s calling and everybody’s mission and so everybody did whatever they could to make that a reality. Of course the leader of that on a day-to-day basis was Henry Precht, who was the Office Director, and he would use the overriding objective as a motivating tool. Sometimes I can remember being the afternoon person and packing up at 4:00 and Henry would come in and only half-joking say, “You can’t go home now; we still have 52 hostages in Iran. What will they say when I tell them that you went home at 4:00 in the afternoon?” And his commitment to this, day after day after day after day, was inspiring.

To go back to the question about the NSC, I think the NSC and maybe this was their job, they saw this more as a strategic issue. Secretary Vance and Hal certainly and Henry Precht, they saw this as also a human issue. Not that the strategy wasn’t important and that you had to get this all right by acting in ways that both met the daily crisis and considered our long term interests and our strength in the region and sending the
messages that no one should ever do this to us again, but I think our leadership never forgot the human face of the hostages. I believe President Carter also wanted the hostages out alive.

Q: Again, you were new to this particular scene, but did you see sort of a diminution during this of the Arab-Israeli problem? Because this has always been the center of American NEA, and the rest, particularly Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan and all, were always Number Three or Four on the list, it was Arab-Israeli; I mean, was there a feeling of unease of the people who used to be center stage in NEA?

GROSSMAN: Because Hal was determined that this was a crisis that had a human aspect to it, everyone in the bureau knew what was job #1. As I said before, there was a feeling among the peace process experts that they were being neglected, but they knew in their hearts what had to be done. In fact, the people who were working on the peace process, the DASes—Maury Draper, Mike Sterner, Joe Twinam, took this as an opportunity to get on with their jobs and be their own bosses. I never found Maury, whom I had worked for in my short stint in NEA/ARN, looming over me saying, “When’s my time with Hal and why don’t I get more attention?” He was a professional; every one of them was a professional. They recognized that this was “all Iran all the time,” and, as I say, like any good FSO they took this as an opportunity to do what they were supposed to do.

Q: Did you have time yourself to talk with other people, to kind of ponder what the hell the Soviets are up to getting involved in Afghanistan the way they did? It just sort of struck me as a bit of a conundrum.

GROSSMAN: By that time, we had the 4th of November; you had then the Embassy in Islamabad; you had the Embassy in Libya. I was not doing much contemplating. I can remember Christmas Day being at somebody’s house on Capitol Hill for a celebration and getting the call from the Op Center that the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and I was surely out of the pondering business at that point. I just got in my car and I went to the State Department and we just put it on a list of all the other things that we had to do. I considered the Soviet invasion to be an imperialistic act that had to be reversed. That was enough for me at the time.

Q: You were over it.

GROSSMAN: I was, yes.

Q: Were you there when there was aborted attempt to rescue the hostages?

GROSSMAN: I was.

Q: Well, how did that play from your perspective?

GROSSMAN: Well, two things. One is that I learned an interesting lesson in the days in advance of the action. Edmund Hull and I were privy to what I would have considered 85
or 90 percent of the secrets of the Iran hostage crisis. But we were never privy to the
planning of that mission and rightly so. But I’ll never forget the week or so before the
attempt. Suddenly there would be these FLASH messages that would come unclassified
and they would be weather reports of areas in Tehran and weather reports of the stadium
in Tehran and weather reports of here and there. We went to see Hal and we said we
don’t want to know what’s going on, but this is weird and somebody had better fix this
because if there’s something going on the fact that these weather reports are moving
FLASH—which means everybody pays attention to them and because they are
unclassified—is unbelievably stupid. And it was interesting because he was never able to
solve that problem; somehow the weather people kept reporting the weather over what
we now know were the key sites—FLASH and unclassified. I learned that you need to
watch every detail if you want to succeed; sometimes it’s the small things that trip you up
the most. Second, was the tragic nature of the whole outcome. It was a humiliation as an
act of arms (I became a supporter of a strong military on that day and the need to spend
enough money to make sure we had one) and then of course, for us, it resulted in
Secretary Vance resigning; for the institution it was a real day of shaking. I can remember
Hal going upstairs and coming back down and telling us that the Secretary was going to
resign. I’d never been involved in anything like this. It was like living in a novel.

Q: Did you get any feel for President Carter during this time?

GROSSMAN: Not really. I was very far down the food chain. Hal went to meetings and
came back and gave us guidance.

Q: One last thing on sort of the Iranian thing, you mentioned all these peculiar people
who came up with solutions.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: I mean, as soon as you get into trouble, these people come out of the woodwork.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: And I think we got a lot of them around Iran before things happened. But what was
your, what was sort of the feeling, that these were serious people or everybody was
getting their finger in the pie or something?

GROSSMAN: It was hard to know, because we had a French lawyer and then a French-
Argentine lawyer pop up and say they could help. You should ask Edmund about it.
Edmund at one point traveled, I think to Paris, to join a meeting (he spoke French) with
somebody and I remember he chose an assumed name to travel under: Elijah Halsted.
Hal’s view was you shouldn’t leave any stone unturned. If some mysterious person
turned up, it was worth the conversations to find out if that was a way to free the
hostages. I should note that another hero of this time was Stephanie Van Riegersburg,
who was at that time the Department’s French and Spanish language translator; at all
hours of the day and night she’d sit in the Ops Center and translate conversations
between Hal and various people. And so, who knew who could help us? We never compromised anything by trying all avenues.

Q: Were you also picking up any feel about what was happening in Iran? It was a pretty chaotic time then.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: We didn’t know who was running the show.

GROSSMAN: That’s right. Well, you had Peter Constable go out with Brzezinski I think to Algeria to meet with Iranians before the hostage crisis and we’d get messages back and forth from factions in Iran, but who knew who had responsibility there and what games were being played? Obviously with our eyes and ears cut off, you didn’t know who was up. Everybody else hunkered down and you had the people in the Canadian Embassy and it was all kind of … I remember it as being very, all very opaque and all very scary.

Q: I guess this is all consuming wasn’t it? Or was there anything else we haven’t covered during this year that you were …?

GROSSMAN: All-consuming mentally and physically. As I say, then Pakistan came and I can remember the Ops Center calling early, early in the morning, and saying the Embassy in Pakistan had been overrun and luckily, as I said, I had some mental picture of it. They said, “How can we get more information?” And I said, “Call the Canadian Embassy, they’re across the street, call the British Embassy, they can see our compound.” The collapse of any order in that region was what we tried to manage for the year.

Q: Well then, when, in the summer of ’80, is that when you left?

GROSSMAN: No, oddly enough, Hal arranged an opportunity for me that had me leave the staff assistant job a few months early, in the summer of 1980. I did not know this at the time, but there had been all through the Carter Administration a special advisor for Jewish Affairs. There had been a number of people in that job and in the summer of 1980, President Carter appointed a Covington and Burling lawyer, Alfred Moses.

Q: I’ve interviewed him.

GROSSMAN: Well, then you know then that he was looking for a special assistant from the State Department to work with him at the White House. He got in touch with Hal, and I was assigned to him. I felt I was abandoning Edmund and I felt like I was abandoning everybody, but Hal said this was a really important thing to do and it was the right thing to do for the State Department and he asked me to do it. So I did it. And so I transferred to the White House in the early summer of 1980.
Q: Well was there any concern, just with the title and all, this sort of rested on your ethnicity and religiosity or something. Did you feel, this was kind of pushing you into an area that, you know...

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: ... who wants to be identified, particularly in a service like ours?

GROSSMAN: There was actually quite a lot of that. I was very reticent to do this. Eighty percent, because I felt I was abandoning Edmund and I was abandoning my job; 20 percent because it seemed like tokenism to me. I don’t know if Al told you, but at the end of his time there, which would have been in January of ’81, he wrote a memo to the Office of the President, because Carter obviously was leaving, saying that there should never be such an office at the White House again. Al was not naive. There will always be someone at the White House whose job it is to be in touch with various ethnic groups. But we were in what was called “the ghetto.” We were in the East Wing, and there was a special advisor for Jews, a special advisor for Hispanics, a special advisor for women, a special advisor for African-Americans. I came to conclude that it just wasn’t right. The White House was for all Americans, and it shouldn’t be chopped up like that. So, although I was really interested to do it and it was fun to work at the White House and the relationship I developed with Al Moses has lasted to this day and I consider him a mentor and a friend—it was a very weird experience.

Q: Well, of course, the politicians love to chop people up into workable groups: this issue will get these people an oar, this economic issue will go after the metal workers, or what have you.

Well, let’s talk first about Moses. How did he operate?

GROSSMAN: He was completely different from Hal. My first encounter with him was a disaster. He wanted to travel to the Middle East early in his tenure and so I was making arrangements. I was still working for Hal, trying to do two things at once. And I, of course, did what you would expect me to do. I sent cables out to the various Ambassadors saying, “The President’s new special advisor for Jewish liaison wanted to come and visit.” And I got this phone call from Al Moses who said, “How dare you send these cables; I will travel when I want to, Ambassadors have nothing to do with it”, and on and on. He hollered at me and I said, “Stop.” I said: “One, Ambassadors are the President’s representatives abroad and you’re not traveling to any of these countries without them knowing about it. Two, if you do this without their permission, along with the sort of paperwork I’m trying to do, and some auditor comes along, you’re probably going to get stuck for all this money. And three, don’t ever yell at me again. I can be motivated in a lot of ways, but do not yell at me again.” I was sure that would end my assignment. It turned out that this was exactly the right thing to do because Al Moses is a litigator; he loves to go to court. And I used to love sitting with him in his office and he’d say to people on the phone, “Well, I’ll see you in court.” And he meant it. He loved to go to court. And so that’s just his way. He respected me, thank goodness. As I say, I came to
admire him greatly in so many ways. And of course he later became Ambassador to Romania and I am quite sure guarded his prerogatives as the President’s representative.

His first question about everything is, “What’s the right thing to do?” And that was really interesting to me because he was a dollar-a-year federal employee, so he didn’t work all the time over at the White House, he kept an office at Covington and Burling, which was at that time was right across Lafayette Square. So sometimes I’d go over there to visit him, and I’d take him papers and talk to him on days he didn’t come to the White House. And I got to see a little how these big law firms worked and how the young associates got treated. It reinforced my decision not to go to law school. But he worked hard and he was very well connected. And he taught me a lot of important things. One of the things he taught me, which I’ve kept to this day, was he said, “In Washington, the most important thing is you’ve got to return all your phone calls every day. Do not leave the office until you’ve returned all your calls. You don’t have to talk to everybody, but you have to return all your calls.” He was a maniac at this but it was a terrific lesson and something I’ve done ever since.

He also taught me to embrace the various diasporas and communities that influence US foreign policy. Their ability to influence policy is one of America’s strengths. Most FSOs think the “lobbies” are a pain and have no place. I learned differently from Al. These lessons and experience came in very handy when I was the Jordan desk officer and still had my contacts in the Jewish community and when I was in Turkey, working closely with Turkish, Greek and Armenian Americans.

Al and I worked a lot of different things. One of the things I am most proud of is that we were able to lead the effort to change the State Department’s regulations so that many more Jews and Baha’is came out of Iran. We worked and worked on this problem and we got new regulations written.

Q: How did that work? What did you have to do?

GROSSMAN: Well, luckily, and Hal was right about this, one of the things that helped me was that I had just come from NEA, so we were able to enlist the help of Hal and others. I can remember similarly working with then Congressman Solarz to get more Jews out of Syria and, I think, on to Israel.

About three-quarters of the way into my time with Al Moses, he got pulled off to defend Billy Carter. I can’t remember the details, but Billy Carter got into some trouble and so there were some very big walls set up between Al and me so that I had nothing to do with his work for Billy Carter. It meant he had less time to spend on being the Jewish liaison. And then there was the election, which meant (properly) more walls went up between the political and the career people. I can remember the last few months being pretty desultory. I had a nice office at the Old EOB (Executive Office Building) and it was an amazing experience, and I made a lifelong friend in Al, but it kind of petered out at the end.
Q: Well did you get any feel for the Jewish community?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Because I take it this hadn’t been particularly your bag as a kid or anything else.

GROSSMAN: As I said earlier, many of the people whom I met then and the organizations I became familiar with helped me a lot when I became the desk officer for Jordan and then certainly, interestingly enough, many returned to my life when I was the Ambassador to Turkey. At that time, meeting Abe Foxman at ADL (Anti-Defamation League) and understanding the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish American Organizations, and having some contact with the AJC (American Jewish Committee) and the B’nai B’rith, certainly their Washington reps, all helped me be a better FSO.

Q: Well one of the things about almost any ethnic community in the United States is they tend to break into groups almost immediately just by definition. Did you see this and if you did, how did it seem to play?

GROSSMAN: Well it played out in the sense that there were people who were right and left and center, and American politics was living right in front of you. As I mentioned, it made me not afraid of the role of ethnic politics in our foreign policy. So when I was the DCM and then Ambassador to Turkey, I reached out often to Greek Americans, thinking, “They’ve got a stake in this and I should know them and Armenian Americans as well.” And so I actually like all that; I like the fact that people organize themselves and use the democratic process and have their say. When Turkish diplomats would say, “You should not listen to—what they called—alien factors,” I’d say to them, “No, listen, you’ve got this wrong, these are not alien factors. This is America, these people are Americans and this is what makes us great.” And I had my first insight into that those months I worked for Al.

Q: Was AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) around at the time and was it a major player?

GROSSMAN: Yes. I was doing other things at the time, but I believe that one of the reasons that Al’s predecessor had left was a disagreement over the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. I remember AIPAC being heavily involved in that. I remember meeting them for the very first time at that time as well.

Q: Well where, in the White House, where did this and the other group, where did they fit in?

GROSSMAN: Al said he was a sub-cabinet officer, which at that time meant nothing to me, but as I say, my recollection is that the liaisons were in offices in the East Wing near Mrs. Carter’s office, and we were down a corridor and they were all excellent people. Ann Wexler was the women’s liaison and Esteban Torres was the Hispanic liaison. There was an African American liaison as well.
Q: Well, what were you doing?

GROSSMAN: One of the things I did was try to keep up with NEA news for Al. I remember going to the State Department and getting cables and taking them across the street in those locked bags and he’d read them over in his White House office. Then I’d very carefully take them back to the State Department in the locked bag. He traveled to Israel and to Jordan and to Egypt. I can remember foreign Ambassadors coming by. I went to New York and spoke at synagogue meetings. Al surely did more things than I did and, of course, once the campaign started and he was doing Billygate, things slowed way down for me. Again, once the campaign started, career people were very effectively walled off from anything that had to do with the campaign. I can remember sitting in October and November doing nothing. I felt terrible because the hostage crisis continued.

Q: Well in effect, the office is everything to do with the campaign, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: Yes, and that was true of Al.

Q: But I mean just being in that office. I can see why you wouldn’t be doing anything because that’s in a sense sort of the whole idea of the thing, wasn’t it? I mean, this reaching out to various groups.

GROSSMAN: Right, right.

Q: Every President does this in one way or another.

GROSSMAN: Right. But the fact that I was a career officer and a federal employee meant that once October came, they just said, “You just sit over here and stay out of the way.”

Q: Well then, what happened to you afterwards?

GROSSMAN: Just after the election and Carter’s loss, Ray Seitz, then the Deputy Executive Secretary of the State Department, called me. He said, “I have a job for you, come see me.” So I went to see Ray who said, “I want you to be the liaison officer for the Reagan transition team to the State Department.” And I said, “What’s that mean?” He said, “There’s going to be a transition team and there’s going to be somebody in charge of it and they’re going to sit down on the first floor in the transition space and they’re going to need to interact successfully with the building. A new President has been elected and it is our job to help him succeed. I’m going to assign you to sit across from a liaison officer from the State Department, that person’s going to be Tony Wayne,” who was then an executive secretariat Line Officer. Ray said, “The two of you are going to sit in an office”—and they’d already figured all this out—“you’re going to sit in an office with desks that are looking at each other and the transition team is going to make requests and they’re going to come to you and you’re going to give them to Tony and Tony’s going to farm them out in the building. Then they’re going to come back to Tony and Tony’s
going to give them to you, and you’ll give them to the transition team. Go pack up your
desk at the Old EOB, and come on over because this is going to start pretty soon.”

So I can remember going back and I told Al and Al said, “Fine, there’s nothing more for
you to do here.” And I took a Xerox copy paper box and I put my few things in and I
walked from the White House to the State Department and I went down to the first floor
and I put my things on my new desk. And, just like Ray Seitz had promised, Ambassador
Robert Neumann turned up one day and he was the Reagan Transition Director at the
State Department. He introduced himself and luckily I knew his son who was an FSO.
Robert Neumann was a kind and charming gentleman. Tony Wayne showed up and we
decided we would do our best come what may.

The first few days were quite amazing. Ambassador Neumann came to work and he then
brought in as his deputy, Ambassador Carlton Coon. And so the two of them sat and tried
to figure out what they were supposed to do. And each day more and more people would
come to join the transition team. Tony and spent our days trying to find offices and
telephones and help for all of these people who showed up, people from the Hill and
people from here and people from there. And letters started to pour in. It was the first
time I really saw an underside of the State Department and the Foreign Service because
FSOs, would come down and slip their CVs under the door and say “I was really a
Republican all these years.” And this thing just grew and grew and grew and it was very
chaotic and hard to manage.

Bob Neumann and Carl Coon were doing their best. There were some serious sharks in
that group of people who arrived. It went on like that for some weeks—I can’t remember
how many weeks—and then one day, I think in December in the afternoon, we’re sitting
there trying to do what we’re supposed to be doing. It was freezing in our office. Tony
and I were both sick the entire time. Poor Tony; I remember it was a cold winter and all
the pipes burst in his house. We were sick as dogs; we couldn’t understand what was
really happening. Then one day, as I say, after lunch, it was a Friday, Al Haig shows up.
He instructs Tony and me to gather everybody in the big office. Tony and I went around
to everybody and said, “General Haig would like to see everybody in this big office.”
Everybody piles in there and you can imagine they all thought they were going to get
their assignments—Assistant Secretary this and Undersecretary that—and they pushed
into this room. By the time Tony and I got there we were squeezed up against the back
wall. Haig looked out at this crowd and he looked at his watch and he said, whatever time
it was, he said, “It’s Friday afternoon. I want every single one of you to go home and tell
your wives and your children and your family that you have served America, that you
have served America well. But, as of right now, this transition team is finished and I want
every one of you to clean out your desks and get out of here, except for those two guys in
the back.” And everybody whipped around and there’s Tony and me. He repeated that he
wanted everybody else out of there by COB (close of business).

This was really interesting. Truly, people had come in there expecting to get their
assignments. Three remarkable things then happened. First of all, we were suddenly kind
of big shots because Haig said, “Except for those two guys.” So we went back to our
office and wondered what we were supposed to do now. Second, it turned out that for a number of people in there—(Richard R) Rick Burt, Richard Perle, Richard Haas—they had been tipped off about all this in advance, they knew they were coming back on Monday. So they wandered by and said, “This actually doesn’t apply to us.” And we said, “Well, how the heck do we know that?” And they said, “Just trust us.” But by that time we didn’t trust anybody. Then (Robert Carl) Bud McFarlane arrived. He was terrific and we asked, “Can you help us here, because there are these people who say that they are supposed to come back on Monday.” And he’d say, “Yes, yes, yes, yes to these specific people.” So there was theater that had taken place. And the third thing was all the people who were just shocked to be kicked out had no place else to go. And here we were, FSO-7s or sixes or whatever, and now these big names were pleading with us to let them stay the weekend. And we’d say, “Oh yes, yes, you may, that’s fine.” The human clash in all of this that was really something to see. And on Monday morning Al Haig came and there was a slimmed-down transition team and they got ready and took over on the 20th of January. Tony became Haig’s Foreign Service special assistant.

Q: Well you mentioned in this team, people that came in there were some sharks. This was not a benign change of station ...

GROSSMAN: No it was not.

Q: ... where you’re caught between Carter and Reagan.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: I think of all the Administration changeovers, this is one of the most profound.

GROSSMAN: No question about it.

Q: And there must have been people in that transition team who were, “Take no prisoners.”

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: And sharpening their knives.

GROSSMAN: Some said: “Get me a list of all the Democratic FSOs so we can get rid of them.” It was really an eye-opening thing and it was a very important lesson as a young officer to see it and to learn to resist this kind of politicization of the FSO corps.

Q: I have to say, Marc, that you really got thrown into all this. People like myself were issuing visas and going to prisons; here you were in this thing, you’d really gotten this exposure.

Well how did some of these sharks treat you and Tony?
GROSSMAN: It was mixed. Some people assumed we were so junior that we didn’t have any political views and could help them understand the State Department and the Foreign Service. Others treated us with great suspicion because we were Foreign Service Officers. We’d go by and they’d close the door. One particular team member in the first group wanted to have a huge number of telephone lines in his office. I think he monitored other people’s calls. He didn’t want to have anything to do with us. Other people came and thought we were, I don’t know, dogs’ bodies. I can remember one person, who became an Assistant Secretary of State, dumped all of his laundry on my desk and said, “Take this to the dry cleaners.” I said, “Take it to the dry cleaners yourself.” And he said, “Well, I’m so and so.” I said, “I don’t care who you are. Get your shirts off my desk.” And so it was kind of a very odd collection of people. I admired the way Bob Neumann tried to manage this but he was undercut. It took Bud McFarlane to bring order.

Q: Did you find, was there a significant number of staffers from the Hill?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: From sort of the right wing of the Republican Party?

GROSSMAN: They’d won the election. They’d won and they were coming to take their due.

Q: This is where they ...

GROSSMAN: They were coming down to make sure that the people’s will, as they understood, was going to get followed.

Q: Well now, was anything out of this coming out about what was our policy towards China or Poland?

GROSSMAN: Constantly.

Q: Was this more the issue, or what job am I going to get?

GROSSMAN: Both. That’s one of the things that was most interesting about it. For some of the new people, those were not separate questions. As they promoted their policies they were also promoting themselves. Fair enough. That’s how I got to see how our government really operated; there was an election, Ronald Reagan was President and so I got to see it at the real knocking-heads level. Lots of the people who then came with Haig became the Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries as he joined the State Department.

Q: How did you find the worker bees like yourself, all, and myself but within the Department? Was there a problem of their learning how to work with this new crew, or not?
GROSSMAN: Less than I would have thought. As we speak here today, I’ve come to think that the idea that the Department leans Democratic is wrong. I think that many Foreign Service Officers are moderate Republicans. I think that Ronald Reagan got plenty of votes at the State Department, in the same way that I think that President Bush 41 got plenty of votes at the State Department. Also, I was pretty impressed, especially being at the low end of this, by how seriously people took their oath to serve the President. I can remember Haig called Tony and me in one afternoon and he said, “I want to make a good impression here. What are the three or four things I can do to send a signal out to the State Department that I want the people here to feel that they’re working for somebody who cares about them?” I can remember saying to the general, “You’re going to throw me out of the office for saying this but you know what you can really do to make a huge difference?” This was early in January. He said, “What?” I said, “Could you please turn the hot water back on in this place?” You may have been overseas but at the time because of the energy crisis, President Carter had turned off all of the hot water in the buildings. And Haig said, “We’re not going to wait.” He said, “Just go get somebody to turn the hot water on today please and say we did it.” Some people were scared because that first group of people who came before Haig was so aggressive, but I think mostly once Haig got there and once Bud got there, people recognized in them people interested in serving the nation with backgrounds we could understand.

Q: Well for one thing they’d been dealing with Haig for a long time.

GROSSMAN: He had been part of the government.

Q: Well, did you get any feel immediately after the Administration came in? Because the one place where there was blood in the corridors was in ARA(Bureau of Inter-American Affairs); at least that’s the impression I get. People told get out right away and all this.

GROSSMAN: Well yes, but you know the other place—and it hurt me in particular—was that Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Hal Saunders were in Algiers until the 20th of January and I thought the way they were treated on the 20th of January—they were just called up and told that they were no longer federal employees—was really poor.

Q: Well who was making that call, was this ... ?

GROSSMAN: I don’t know the answer to that question. I think that many of the people who came with Haig felt that these negotiations with Iran had been a terrible sign of weakness; they wanted it to be over with. And you remember that day, the 20th of January; there was a split screen on TV of Reagan being inaugurated and our people coming home. I think both Mr. Christopher and Hal never got the credit they deserved for helping bring our people home.

Q: Well then what happened to you on January 20th?
GROSSMAN: On the 20th of January I actually went home, I took the day off. My job was done. I remember watching all of this on the TV. I had made a commitment to become the desk officer for Jordan in the summer of ’81. It was a commitment I wanted to keep. I felt that I’d done enough staff work, having been the staff assistant at NEA, Al’s staff assistant essentially, and then the transition team, so I wanted to be a desk officer. But there was a question of what I was supposed to do between February and the summertime. And I don’t know how it happened actually, I think through NEA, but for some reason the NEA slot in H opened up.

Q: H being?

GROSSMAN: I’m sorry, the Office of Congressional Relations. So somebody, and I don’t remember who, proposed that maybe it would be useful if I spent my time between February and the summertime filling this position in H, in Congressional Relations, so I did. I went up there and I did the NEA account for some months. That was interesting because I never had anything to do with Congress and I met some people and got to go to the Hill a lot. My big issue at the time was the sale of, I think, tanks to Morocco. I can remember helping with the testimony, arranging briefings. I did a lot of interesting things, met a lot of interesting people. Then Nick Veliotes was named as the Assistant Secretary for NEA at some time in that period and he came home to take over from Hal and he brought with him …

Q: He had been in Jordan?

GROSSMAN: He had been the Ambassador to Jordan. And he brought with him to be his staff assistant Molly Williamson, who’d been the Chief of the Consular section in Jordan. Again I don’t remember who thought this up, but somebody came to me one day and said, “You know it would be a very good thing for you to go take the job as the chief of the Consular section in Jordan for eight weeks while you’re on your way to becoming the desk officer for Jordan, because you’d get to see Jordan, know Jordanians.” I said, “Yes, that’s fantastic.”

Q: That’s a great idea.

GROSSMAN: They said, even better than that, “Since we have no money to put you in a hotel, and since there won’t be an Ambassador there, why don’t you live in the residence?” So in the spring of ’81, I went to Jordan for six or eight weeks. I was the Acting Chief of the Consular section. I was not a very good Consular Officer, but I learned a lot about Jordan; I got to live in the Ambassador’s residence. I had a roommate there, he was a summer intern, Gordon Gray, who then turned into a Foreign Service Officer and was our DCM in Egypt and is now back in NEA as a DAS. I walked back and forth to work. But the great thing was that they knew I was going to be the desk officer for Jordan and (Edward P.) Ed Djerejian was the DCM at that time to Jordan. He was wonderful to me. So I got to meet all kinds of people and I traveled around and I went to Israel and I went to Syria. So by the time I washed up as the desk officer for
Jordan in the summer of ’81, I knew a little something about the country and I had lived in the country, even for a short time, which was terrific.

**Q:** What was the situation in Jordan when you were there? You know, in the spring and so on of ’81? Was much happening?

GROSSMAN: Not that I can remember. Again, I had the kind of a low-end view of this. But I remember it as being safe and fun and there were lots of visitors from Washington. I don’t remember any great crisis at that time, except for me trying to run a Consular section.

**Q:** What was the problem, of visas mainly?

GROSSMAN: Yes. Luckily there was a young FSO, Jo Ellen Powell, who was just spectacular and the FSNs were great.

**Q:** Did you get any impression of how we viewed King Hussein at the time?

GROSSMAN: King Hussein at the time and all through my time as desk officer was considered a true ally of the United States of America, both in his heart and in his head. I think at that time certainly the embassy’s job was to pay attention to King Hussein.

**Q:** Well then you came back and you were the Jordanian desk officer from when to when?

GROSSMAN: That would have been from the summer of 1981 to the summer of 1983. (Richard Noyes) Dick Viets was the Ambassador to Jordan at that time; Ed Djerejian remained there as the DCM. It was a wonderful office, NEA/ARN, which I don’t think exists anymore. The Office Director was (W. Nathaniel) Nat Howell, the Deputy Office Director (James F.) Jim Collins. The Lebanon desk officer was (A. Elizabeth) Beth Jones. The Syria desk officer was (C.) David Welch. The Iraq desk officer was (Francis J.) Frank Ricciardone (Jr.). And I was the Jordan desk officer. It was a great place to work as you can imagine. And Nat taught a great lesson in management.

Nat was a great thinker and a wonderful writer, and what he wanted to do was sit in his office and think about what our policy was supposed to be and guide our policy. He had no interest in the bureaucratic rough and tumble. That’s the lesson. He said, “You always choose people in your office, especially your subordinates, to do the things that you don’t do well or don’t want to do. So what I’ve done is, as you can see, hire a whole load of former staff assistants. You all love the operational aspects and running around and getting the clearances and doing the bureaucratic fighting and going to meetings and I’m going to let you do all that. And if you ever need my help you just have to come and ask me. But I want you to take your guidance from me; to do what I tell you to do, but I’m not interested in running around all day and you are.” It was a wonderful thing and I’ll never forget; he gave us a huge leash. I was really the desk officer for Jordan. The other thing I remember was if you walked into his office he would always be sitting there with
his huge beard, smoking his pipe, and you’d say to him, “Nat, I’m in a little trouble, and I need you to call,” and by the word “call” his hand was reaching for the phone and it was on its way to his ear. He wasn’t going to say, “Well, tell me about it and let’s debate it.” If you went in there and said, “I need help,” he was dialing. And I appreciated it and I never forgot it.

Q: Jim Collins?

GROSSMAN: Jim Collins. I think he went on to Jordan to be the DCM. Beth became the Deputy Office Director. David Welch became the Lebanon desk officer just in time for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and Molly Williamson then came and joined us as the Syria desk officer. So it was still one of the greatest offices I’ve ever had the good fortune to work in.

Q: Well the big thing during the time you were there, was this the Israeli invasion of Lebanon?


Q: It happened that year?

GROSSMAN: It did. That’s when, as I say, David Welch became the Lebanon desk officer, just in time for the Israelis to invade Lebanon.

Q: Well in the first place, how did this affect, or did it, Jordan?

GROSSMAN: My recollection is, other than being a petrified bystander, it didn’t affect Jordan very much at all.

Q: Well I suppose it’s one of these things, stand aside.

GROSSMAN: Right and hope it doesn’t head in their direction.

Q: How did this invasion affect the people in NEA as you saw it? Because this was when essentially Sharon sort of took the bit in his teeth and seemed to be running ahead of his own government.

GROSSMAN: Well, of course it affected people in a lot of ways. One is that the invasion was seen by most people as a terrible mistake. Sabra and Shatila couldn’t have been any more disastrous really. I am sure you have interviewed Ryan Crocker about his experiences. You had also at that time Secretary Haig resign. Phil Habib was trying to get Arafat out of Lebanon and to Tunis. It was a time of high activity. I can remember night after night and day after day on the task forces up there, and so it was a little bit like 1979; for some months you know everybody just did what they were supposed to do.
I got married that year and I can remember being very grateful to everybody that we were able to go on our honeymoon.

Q: How did you meet your wife and how did that happen?

GROSSMAN: Mildred was a Watch Officer in the Ops Center. She had joined the Foreign Service in 1976. Her first post was Copenhagen. From there she went to Ops. It was 1979 and I spent a lot of time in the Ops Center that year. We went out on our first date on the 3rd of November 1979. And who knew? It had taken us a long time to get this date set up because I was working as a staff assistant and my hours were long. She was working in the Ops Center and she worked 8:00 to 4:00, 8:00 to 4:00, 4:00 to 8:00, midnight to 8:00, midnight to 8:00, and then had three days off. So we finally figured it out, went out on our first date on the 3rd of November 1979 and then did not go out again for weeks. The early part of the relationship was defined by the Iran hostage crisis. She remembers (CBS anchorman) Walter Cronkite chronicling for her how many days into our relationship we were as he told the nation each night what day of the hostage crisis it was. So that’s how I met her.

Q: Did you sense at this time—you’d been around NEA—a change in the mood toward Israel, as before it has been “poor little Israel,” protecting itself and all of a sudden it turns into more of a less benign force or something?

GROSSMAN: No. I must admit and this I talked about before—I said we would come back to it on a previous tape—this was the only time I ever really kind of noticed any anti-Semitism in terms of my daily job. Nick Veliotes did quite a courageous thing in ’81. There’d never been, as far as we knew, any Jewish person who had been a desk officer for an Arab country, and so I was the desk officer for Jordan. And Nick had to do a lot of work with the Jordanians, telling them this was going to be okay. He also very astutely took (Theodore H.) Ted Kattouf, who was an Arab-American Foreign Service Officer, and assigned him to the Israeli desk. And so Ted Kattouf and I were the first experiments in this that I know of. When the Israelis invaded Lebanon, I found that that old-fashioned, Arabist, NEA dislike of Israel, dislike of Jews, the mixture of the two things, really welled up. As I said, I was walking down the corridor one day and one of the people in NEA came up to me and with real venom in his voice said, “What are your people doing?” I looked at him and I thought, “What have the Jordanians done today? I don’t think anything.” I looked at him completely dumbfounded and I said, “I don’t think the Jordanians did anything.” And he said, “Not the Jordanians, the Jews. What are your people doing?” I couldn’t believe anyone was speaking to me this way in a corridor of the State Department of the United States of America. I told him, “Don’t ever speak like that again.” And so I thought at the time that this was not just a policy matter. It was also, I am sorry to say, a resurrection—if I could use the word—of all the bad things about NEA, of all the things about NEA that people had warned me about, and the reason Jewish people had stayed away from NEA for all those years. It was a very disturbing thing. Luckily Nick had none of that, Hal certainly had none of that, so it was an outlying attitude but it certainly was there.
Q: Well how, with the Jordanians, with their embassy and also when you were in Jordan, did you find any sort of, because this is the new thing, because now the whole thing is so mixed up, it’s like women giving jobs. It’s no longer an issue.

GROSSMAN: It was then.

Q: But since you were sort of a trailblazer in this part of the world did you feel you were being sort of judged both when you were in Jordan and on the desk?

GROSSMAN: The Jordanians decided—and I think Nick was a huge part of this and so was Dick Viets that they would live up to their rhetoric about, “We don’t like Israel but Jews are okay,” and by a wide margin, they did. I never had any trouble with any senior Jordanians that I knew of. I called on the king in Amman and whenever the king came to Washington he couldn’t have been any more gracious to me. The Jordanian ambassador, who was at that time a retired general, was terrific. I was also greatly helped out by Jack O’Connell, a retired station chief in Amman, who was the Jordanians’ lawyer in town and who at every turn invited me to his house, talked to me, and I think his confidence in me played back into Jordan that I was okay.

And then of course the other side was you had a few people in the Jewish community coming in and saying, “How dare you, how could you do this?” And, “You must be a self-hating Jew to be the desk officer for Jordan.”

Q: You know, it is terrible when you get caught up in these. It is like being an Uncle Tom or something.

GROSSMAN: It did not bother me that much because my leadership always had my back. I’ll tell you a funny story. King Hussein came to visit President Reagan for the first time I think it was in the end of ’81. At that time—I don’t think we do it anymore—the Office of Graphic Services, with the support of the relevant bureau and the Historian’s Office, did these beautiful displays down at C Street, in this case of Jordanian culture and geography, for the important visitor to admire.

Q: Yes and they put it up in the reception area.

GROSSMAN: Under the flags as you walked in. And then the VIP would come in and they’d look at it and say, “How wonderful.” But it also allowed people at the State Department to get a feel for Jordan or other countries. So as you can imagine, weeks in advance this thing starts to take shape and they do a fantastic job. They’ve chosen beautiful pictures and movies and all this great information. A few days before the king arrived they call me down and they say, “We need to talk to you, we’re going to put a map on one of these boards, a map of the area because we’ve got to show where Jordan is, but we know how sensitive lines on maps are in this region.” So we’re looking at this map and it’s a map, like you’ve got up on your walls here. And we’re looking, looking, looking, to make absolutely sure that the dotted line for the West Bank is the right color
and in the right place. We all agree, this is a great map. So they put this map on a backing and they put it up.

The morning King Hussein is supposed to come to the State Department, my job is to go to the end of the red carpet and wait there for Secretary Haig and then introduce the king to Secretary Haig. Then Haig’s is going to show him this wonderful display. I go down there a few minutes early, as you can imagine, and I see that there are dozens of people looking at the map and there are TV cameras taking pictures of the map and I think, “This can’t be good.” So I went to the back and nobody knows who I am, so I shout into this crowd, “Hey, what’s the matter with the map?” And somebody shouts back, “Some idiot has forgotten to put the words Israel on here. There’s no word so Israel is not identified on this map, there’s no word Israel on this map. This must be a message from the State Department.” I thought, “Oh my goodness.” So I quick call Graphic Services and say, “Get somebody up here with a thing that says Israel, put it on the map.” We’d looked at this map for hours, but nobody had stood back and seen that there was not the word “Israel” on the map. So I go out there and I’m now sweating and thinking, “I’m finished, I’m done, because I have approved this map, I did this.” So Haig comes out, “How are you, Marc?” I said, “Well sir, not very good.” He said, “What is it?” I said, “I have a confession to make.” I told him the story. He said, “That’s bad.” I said, “Yes sir, it’s really bad. Therefore, I would recommend to you that you not walk by the map; go the other way to the other elevators to your office. I wouldn’t show King Hussein this map.” He said, “Got it.” He was really mad. So the king gets out of the car, I do my thing, Haig manages beautifully, “Oh Your Majesty, look at this, look at this picture, look at this, come to my elevator.” Whoosh. So I run upstairs, I confess to everybody that I can confess to and everyone says, “Just fix it.” I say, “We’ll fix it.” So Israel gets put in.

So that night on the 7:00 news it is the lead story. “State Department today shows this map, State Department showing that they hate Israel.” It goes on. So the next day, I don’t know who was the spokesman for the State Department at that time, calls me up and he says, “So what should our press guidance be?” I said, “I believe our press guidance should be: we made a mistake and the person who made this mistake regrets this very much.” And he says, “Well, is that true?” I said, “Yes it is true, because you’re talking to the person who made the mistake and I am really sorry.” And so they did. But what was interesting was that then all day I took calls from all the Jewish groups. “Who did this?” I said, “Me.” And they said, “How could you?” And I said, “Because I made a mistake.” And I explained what had happened. By the end of the day it was all over, because in a way I had credibility with them from working with Al Moses. I said, “I don’t hate Israel, I made a mistake.” But it was a horrible day.

Q: Well you mentioned going around with King Hussein from time to time. How did you find him? What was his, well, his persona?

GROSSMAN: He was charming and warm. We went one day, I think it was on that same trip maybe, I can’t remember, but I had the good fortune to go out to California with him. I don’t know why I was there, but he was always very nice to me and he loved Big Macs. And on the way out to the Andrews (Air Force Base) airport …
Q: You’re talking about a McDonald’s, the fast-food hamburgers?

GROSSMAN: Right. We were on our way out to Andrews for a flight to Los Angeles and we had said to the Jordanians, “What kind of food should we put on this plane going to LA?” And they said, “How about some Big Macs?” On the way out there we’ll stop at the McDonald’s, which is just across the street from the front gate at Andrews, and we’ll buy 100 Big Macs. Thanks to the protocol office wizard Gahl Hodges, we had the good sense to call out there in advance and we said, “Look, we’re going to come up, there’s going to be this huge bunch of limousines, they’re going to come screaming up and we want 100 Big Macs and 50 shakes and fries.” Gahl stopped off at this McDonald’s and we got big boxes full of Big Macs and put them on the plane and everyone happily ate Big Macs across the country.

But I can remember, in terms of the king’s human characteristics, my dad lives in Los Angeles, and we were staying at a fancy hotel with the royal party and I thought it would be fun for my dad to see a motorcade take off at one point. I wasn’t going wherever the king was going. My dad and I were standing out in front of this hotel watching the cars line up and the security agents do this and do that—and the king came out and noticed and came over and I introduced my father to him and then off they roared.

Q: How did you find Jordan used its embassy and the king or the king used the embassy? You know, some embassies are pretty effective and some aren’t. How would you evaluate at the time you were dealing with the PR of Jordan?

GROSSMAN: I think it was okay. They, of course, started with a huge advantage, which was that King Hussein was a very well-respected figure in the United States. But they had an ambassador, Abdul Hadi Al-Majali, who was a former high-ranking military officer. He saw his job as to put the best face on Jordan. I remember he bought a nice house out in Potomac or McLean or somewhere and tried to make a lot of contacts with people. Again, Jack O’Connell was a very good face for Jordan around town. We tended on the substance to do our business in Amman between the American Ambassador and the king and I think, given the fact that the king was the king and the king was most of the time in Amman, that was how it was going to be.

Q: Also, the king was extremely receptive to groups, wasn’t he? Many of the big delegations that went to Israel would end up in Jordan.

GROSSMAN: Yes, yes. They were always very good about seeing who needed to be seen.

Q: Did you find any relationship at least overt, maybe covert, between the Israeli Embassy and the Jordanian Embassy?

GROSSMAN: Not that I know of. Especially in the first year of the Reagan Administration you had Ariel Sharon taking the position that the right policy was to
overthrow King Hussein, put Yasser Arafat in Amman, and *presto*, there’d be a Palestinian state. And there were some people at the White House, certainly at the junior levels at the NSC, who agreed with that. One of the hard things for the first few months of the Reagan Administration was getting the White House to understand that, from our perspective anyway, you couldn’t just overthrow King Hussein, put Yasser Arafat there because Sharon said so; that was not the answer to the question. And it took until King Hussein’s state visit to the United States, which I believe was in December of 1981, for the White House to come around to understand that this was a sovereign state headed by an ally of the United States.

*Q:* It was sort of horrifying when you think about it, the idea of putting Arafat and all the problems …

GROSSMAN: Right.

*Q:* Yes.

GROSSMAN: But it was a held view in Israel at the time and it was a held view of some people at the White House at that time.

*Q:* I would have thought the mix of Hussein and Reagan would have been very good.

GROSSMAN: It was very good. President Reagan was fantastic to King Hussein when he came. I’d never been involved in a presidential visit before. Reagan was fantastic; the welcoming speech he gave at the arrival ceremony was spectacular, written I recall by Dana Rohrabacher, who’s now a congressman from California. And I think Reagan and the king did hit it off. After that we didn’t have that problem anymore of, “Let’s overthrown King Hussein.”

*Q:* That must have raised the hackles of you and everybody else in the NEA as far as the Sharon plan or something.

GROSSMAN: We thought the idea of us overthrowing an ally of the United States like that, especially an ally like King Hussein, that wasn’t what a great country did. And it wasn’t going to be the answer to the question anyway even if you did it.

*Q:* No, it would have been terrible.

GROSSMAN: They took a position that there already was a Palestinian state. Their bumper sticker was, “There’s already a Palestinian state, it is called Jordan.” I didn’t understand it then; don’t understand it now.

*Q:* Were there any other issues that you could put together for us during this time?

GROSSMAN: Well, there was the Reagan Plan for Middle East peace which again, like all other plans that Arafat turned down, would have been a good deal for Palestinians. I
can remember going to Jordan on a number of occasions, trying to help sell that policy. Then, as we were talking before, once the Israelis invaded Lebanon that was “all hands on deck,” in terms of the State Department. I spent hours and days and nights being a Task Force director and doing all the other things we’re supposed to do.

Q: Well for the desk officer having the Assistant Secretary having just come from being Ambassador to Jordan made it, you didn’t have to explain or ... 

GROSSMAN: Right. Later on, I hope that the Turkish desk officer felt the same way about me when I was the Assistant Secretary; they didn’t have to go through all the explanations.

Q: Well you left there when?

GROSSMAN: Left the Jordan desk?

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: I left the Jordan desk in the summer of 1983.

Q: And whither?

GROSSMAN: I went to US NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) for a year. I was a one of the many Political Officers at US NATO. I had to decide what to do as I came to the end of my time as the Jordan desk officer. And the decision was about NEA. I understood that the only way to make your way in NEA was to go study Arabic. Sadly, I have no capacity for languages. My MLAT is on the bottom of the scale. The idea of spending two years learning Arabic, I just couldn’t do it. I thought it would be a waste of taxpayers’ money. So I decided that maybe after all those years in NEA—first Pakistan and then the NEA front office and then NEA/ARN, it was time to do something different. At that time in EUR (Bureau of European Affairs), they were looking for people to go to NATO and I put in my bid. Ray Caldwell, who was then the Office Director, said well, you’ve never served in Europe before, why should we have you? And I said let me come talk to you. So I went over and visited with him. Ray was great to me. And (Ambassador Robert Dean) Bob Blackwill, with whom I had worked with on some Jordan issues when he was in PM, was then a DAS in EUR and worked really hard to get us to Belgium. I took a job as the Political Officer there and Mildred was the chief of the Consular section. So we went to Belgium in the summer of ’83.

Q: And you were there until?

GROSSMAN: I was there until ’86. I spent one year at the US Mission. (David M.) Abshire was the Ambassador, Steve Ledogar was DCM and Bob Frowick was the political counselor. My first six or seven months there coincided with the last year in the long tenure of Joseph Luns, who was the Secretary-General (SG) of NATO. The Allies selected a new secretary-general, Lord (Peter) Carrington. It turns out that the NATO
secretary-general has a chief of staff and a deputy chief of staff. The chief of staff had always been of the same nationality of the secretary-general. Luns had a Dutchman and Lord Carrington was bringing a British person with him, Brian Fall, a career U.K. diplomat. The deputy director of the NATO SG’s private office had traditionally been an American. So in the hubbub of the change, Ray Caldwell kindly recommended to Abshire, who in turn recommended to Carrington, that they interview me for this job. So some time in the spring or early summer of ’84, I interviewed with Lord Carrington and with Brian, and, lucky for me, they offered me a job. In the early summer of ’84 I packed up my things in the US Mission and moved down the hall and joined the NATO secretary-general’s office. Which might be a good place to stop.

Q: Okay fine. So I’ll put at the end as usual. We’ll pick this up in ’83 actually and we’ll talk about what you did when you were with NATO, US NATO.

GROSSMAN: Okay.

Q: And then we’ll pick it up following when you worked for Carrington, we haven’t talked anything about NATO or anything else. Great ...

* * *

Okay. Today is the 17th of February 2006. Marc, we’ll pick this up regarding how you got to NATO and I’m going to flip the tape here.

GROSSMAN: How I got to NATO?

Q: Well, was this as a regular assignment or ... ?

GROSSMAN: Oh, yes, well I finished my job as the Jordan desk officer and the time had come really to make a decision about whether I was going to take Arabic-language training. I think we had a little discussion about how low my MLAT scores were. I was offered the chance to go be a Political Officer at NATO, I thought it was a good chance to get another Bureau, so I took it and I went to NATO in ’83, while Mildred became the chief of the Consular section in Brussels. I spent a year at the US mission to NATO; David Abshire was the Ambassador, Steve Ledogar was the DCM, and Bob Frowick was the political consular. I had a very interesting assignment and, it turned out to be for me, a very good portfolio for the future, which is that I was assigned to cover the Aegean, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and also what was then called MBFR, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks. I was introduced to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I went to Turkey for the first time in 1983. I’d never been before, and it turned out to be a theme for the rest of my career. I also had a chance there, thanks to Bob Frowick, to be the US representative to something called the Senior Political Committee on MBFR. As a middle grade officer with no multilateral experience, it was a chance to go and sit behind the plaque that said “United States of America” and have to speak up in Alliance meetings
and carry out instructions and negotiate around the table with allies and I thought it was a very good experience.

_Q: Well speaking on the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction thing, what was the attitude or position of our delegation at the time, both officially and then unofficially, and then of your colleagues there?_

GROSSMAN: MBFR had been a negotiation that had gone on for a long time. There was an attempt in 1983 to see if the US could energize it. Morton Abramowitz was the Ambassador to MBFR in Vienna; strangely enough after his career in Asia, he was appointed the MBFR Ambassador. But because Mort was Mort, he wanted to achieve something and so he spent several months going around talking with allies, trying to figure out a new negotiating position. I can remember him coming to NATO. I had a chance to go and visit him in Vienna and meet MBFR people there.

At some point during 1983, we did launch an initiative on MBFR, which immediately got mired down in various details and inter-Alliance infighting. Years later, MBFR transformed itself into the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks and finally came to an important conclusion.

_Q: In the first place Haig was no longer the Secretary of State was he?_

GROSSMAN: No, George (P.) Shultz was Secretary.

_Q: Shultz. How about on the part of the President, Ronald Reagan and all? Did you get any feel, was there, was this sort of locally generated by Mort Abramowitz? I mean, talks are going or was there a push from the White House or from the top of the Department?_

GROSSMAN: MBFR was not really a seventh floor concern at that time, so my recollection is that it was something that Mort generated and that it took him some considerable time and effort to get the White House and the State Department at senior levels to pay attention, and then to agree to go ahead. Remember, that first year I was at NATO, 1983, the Korean airliner was shot down by the Soviets and we invaded Grenada. So there were lots of other things happening. But Mort had an idea and the US did make an MBFR proposal.

_Q: Well, where did the Brits and the Germans and the French fit into this at that time?_

GROSSMAN: Certainly I can remember the British being interested in moving the negotiation forward. The Germans did as well because they wanted to be in some kind of negotiation with Russia, talking to Russia in some fashion, or to the Warsaw Pact. I think the French were always more skeptical and theoretical about MBFR, but I don’t …

_Q: They were French._
GROSSMAN: I can remember sitting across the table from their representative, sometimes knowing that in terms of the substance of the position they were fine, but having to work my way through the theory of it to get there.

Q: Well, how about the Soviets? How were they at this point?

GROSSMAN: My overriding recollection of that first year at NATO was the shooting down of the Korean airliner, which was of course a terrible thing for the people on the plane, but also for US-Russian relations. We used NATO at that time both for consultations but also to try to raise the profile of the case. It painted the Soviets for what they were, which was at that time, among other things, reckless.

Q: During this ’83 to ’84 time, the Soviets had not yet or had they introduced the SS-20?

GROSSMAN: I believe they had. There was a huge effort led by Rick Burt and Allen Holmes and Richard Pearle and others to keep the Alliance unified. There were a lot of meetings at NATO of senior level groups and they did a huge amount of consultation. It was in many ways a model piece of diplomacy, including, by the way, the extensive public diplomacy. The effort set up the deployment of the Pershing IIs (PII) and then, ultimately, the Zero Option.

Q: I understand at first when they were introduced, at least from our military side, we were saying well, it is nothing new. I mean, wherever the missiles come from, but it was a very big thing particularly in Germany.

GROSSMAN: It was a big thing in Germany; it was a big thing all over Europe to have those Soviet missiles deployed. It’s jumping ahead slightly, but as I look back on that period of ’84 to ’86, I think the fact that the Alliance held together and deployed Pershing II missiles against huge public opposition at that time, that the basing governments held firm. Someday, historians will look back and see it as a really important event, one of those things where the Soviets had to have said, “We’ve got to give this up, we can’t do business this way because here we deployed SS-20s, they’ve deployed Pershing IIs.” I imagine it looked to Moscow like the public was roaring out, saying, “Don’t deploy these missiles,” but NATO did it anyway. I think it was a huge victory for NATO and for the West and I can only imagine what they thought about it in Moscow. They must have taken it as a disheartening defeat.

Q: Yes. At that time how did you find the Alliance? I mean, just your general feeling? It was your first time, you’re the new boy on the block—clearly junior—but did there seem to be cracks in the Alliance or was it working well?

GROSSMAN: I remember it as being a great place to work. At that time NATO was 16 nations, and the diplomats from the other 15 countries were just the best. We all worked in the same building, saw each other at lunch and at committees. Friends and contacts I made there would be with me for the rest of my career. I also had a chance to work closely with our US military colleagues, which was an important education for me.
Q: Well then, you were only there a year. What happened?

GROSSMAN: Well, in the spring of ’84, Lord Carrington was elected to be the new secretary-general at NATO and, thanks to Ray Caldwell, who was then the Office Director for EUR/RPM, the NATO office in the Bureau of European Affairs, who was looking for an American to work in Lord Carrington’s office, my name got put forward and I went and I interviewed in the spring of ’84. I interviewed with Lord Carrington and with his principal assistant Brian Fall. Luckily for me, I got the job. So I left the US Mission to NATO in the summer of ’84 and went down the hall and became the deputy director of the private office for Lord Carrington, which I did from ’84 to ’86.

Q: Tell me about Lord Carrington—what you know of his background and how he operated.

GROSSMAN: Lord Carrington is one of the most amazing and wonderful people I’ve ever had the chance not just to meet, but also to work with. Obviously I knew his background as the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, someone who had negotiated the Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) settlement, someone who had resigned over the Falklands (Malvinas), and I just couldn’t believe my good fortune. I was petrified, wondering, “Am I going to be able to stand up to this?” But he was smart and gracious and purposeful and he worked very hard. One of the things that I really saw about Carrington was his public face was graceful and easy and “all this comes easy to me,” but he worked and he worked at it. For example, he gave among the best press conferences of anybody I’ve ever seen and it looked effortless. But we worked on those press conferences for hours in advance. If he was giving a press conference at 10:00, we would get together at 8:15 or 8:20 and go over the answers and over the questions and he’d try out the answers again and again until he was satisfied with them. We did it in Brussels, we did it in every single country we visited, and we took pride when it was over; we’d sit for a second and make sure we’d gotten all the questions and reviewed the answers to see what they sounded like. He was very well prepared for every meeting he went into, very well prepared for chairing the NATO sessions of ambassadors, and ministers or heads of state and government. I thought he was terrific.

Another thing was he did nothing without a purpose. Also, and I didn’t know at the time, but I was about to learn from him and from (Deputy Secretary of State) John C. Whitehead that these world figures, they don’t sleep. Carrington, and Lady Carrington as well, they would go out seven nights a week if they could. Black-tie dinners every night; it was the way he got his energy and one way he got his information and kept connected to people. And they’d come home at midnight or so and then he’d get up at 4:00, 5:00 in the morning, and he’d spent the period between 5:00 and 7:00 reading all the latest books—novels, non-fiction, everything. I would struggle into the office at 7:00 in the morning and he’d swing by about 7:30 or quarter to 8:00; he’d toss the latest best seller on my desk. “So,” he’d say, “Marc, you read this book yet?” “Well no actually, I’ve not.” He said, “Oh well, I just finished it this morning.” And he’d push off and do his thing. He was terrific.
Q: Did he come in and with a sense of purpose and so okay, Luns was here too long?

GROSSMAN: Yes, but with great respect for Luns as well.

Q: And now is the time to, to pull our socks up and put it together? This must have ...

GROSSMAN: Absolutely. It was very exciting.

Q: That was his purpose.

GROSSMAN: It was and it was a very exciting time. On the substance of it, he wanted to revitalize the sense of consultation at the Alliance; he wanted to give NATO a purpose. He brought with him to be the assistant secretary-general for defense policy an amazing British civil servant, Morrie Stewart, who’d come from London from the MOD (Ministry of Defense) and we put together a Conventional Defense Initiative. Lord Carrington worked so hard to get the Pershing IIIs deployed. I remember dozens of meetings with Dutch parliamentarians and Belgian parliamentarians and German parliamentarians in those NATIO offices and on his many travels, trying to make this thing go forward. He wanted to make the NATO Council of Ambassadors work, he wanted to make the ministerial meetings work, to change the way we did the communiqués so that they actually said something to people. He was all over this all of the time. We visited all of the NATO countries at least once or twice during the time I was with him; he wanted to be the public face of a very successful Alliance.

Q: While you were there being the fly on the wall and all, were there any countries or leaders that were a particular problem in this Alliance at that time?

GROSSMAN: Well, we had never-ending challenges with Greece and Turkey over exercises and demarcations on maps and just about everything else. Luckily for us, both the Greek and the Turkish ambassadors at NATO were good people, serious people, and we could work with them locally; but they sure got some tough instructions sometimes. I think the thing that held us back most at that time—’84, ’85, ’86—was just the constant bickering between Greece and Turkey. It just slowed everything down, made everything harder. You had to walk on eggshells around every possible initiative, every possible idea because, although you didn’t know it, three levels down it had some connection to somebody’s claim in the Aegean. That I remember as just being a constant headache.

Q: At one point there was a real controversy over a hunk of rock there. Was that during your time?

GROSSMAN: Imia/Kardak. That comes later, when I was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Yes.

Q: I talked to Tom Niles about that.
GROSSMAN: My recollection is that deploying the PIIs and getting the CDI right were the hardest of the things that needed to be done. The other thing was trying to get finance ministers out of the purely finance apparatuses in their governments and recognize that defense ministers and foreign ministers just couldn’t come to NATO meetings and promise to make increases in defense spending without being able to actually do so. And that was quite tough. That was a challenge with the Conventional Defense Initiative. At that time Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was really interested in NATO being able to protect its assets, so we, as part of the CDI, focused on getting built a large number of covered and hardened aircraft shelters all around Europe. On the PIIs, remember, at that time you had Greenham Common (the former airfield in Berkshire used for anti-nuclear protest), huge anti-PII demonstrations in Germany, Italy, and Belgium.

Q: Well it turned out, as I recall it, Germany said, “Yes, you can put these in here but we have to have the cover of another country.”

GROSSMAN: There were five other countries. There was Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain.

Q: Is Belgium ... ?

GROSSMAN: And Belgium; I’m sorry. Belgium, yes, so that would be the five.

Q: Well, the Brits were ready to do it, weren’t they?

GROSSMAN: Yes they were but they had the Greenham Common Women, so this was a hard decision for everyone. That’s why it was so important that NATO stay united.

Q: It was called the Ladies of ...?

GROSSMAN: Right, Greenham.

Q: Greenham?

GROSSMAN: Greenham Common, yes.

Q: Greenham Common who were, I won’t say; well they were permanently camped there.

GROSSMAN: They were camped, they, as I recall, were very effective; they made their case. This was an issue of huge public debate—as it should have been. These five governments stood up to the public anxiety and led so that they could meet a strategic requirement to deploy these missiles. I think that the fact that they deployed them, as I say, was a huge victory for NATO, the West, and them. I also want to repeat my admiration for the public diplomacy campaign, which was carried out to make the case for the PIIs. And the fact that they were deployed opened the opportunity for the Zero Option to get rid of them. Had they never been deployed, it wouldn’t have worked out.
Q: As I recall, the big breakthrough was when Italy said, “Okay, you can put them in Sicily and down in the boot of Italy.”

GROSSMAN: Comiso, I think.

Q: How did the Italians play in this? Because often the Italians are, one tends to focus on farther north and all but the Italians ...

GROSSMAN: You know, I found then, and I’ve found since, that the Italians are great NATO allies. They had at that time serious defense ministers, serious foreign ministers. They’ve got their own troubles, like we do and everybody else does, but in a pinch the Italians are serious NATO allies and you can see, I think in the years since, in Afghanistan and all around the world, the Italians step up.

Q: Well what about the French? You know, you have this peculiar thing where the French were in the political side of NATO but not in the military side, yet at the same time our military people and their military people were hand in hand.

GROSSMAN: I’ll give you a wonderful example—I guess from ’83, I don’t mean to go backwards. But in 1983, the French had a military operation in Chad at about the same time or during that same period we invaded Grenada. One of the things that really struck me about the difference between French foreign policy and American policy was when the United States invaded Grenada, Ken Dam, who was then the Deputy Secretary of State, flew to NATO overnight and we had talking points and meetings and tried to convince everybody about what a great thing it was. I remember a couple of weeks later we were sitting in a NATO council meeting and Secretary-General Luns was going through his agenda and at one point he looked over to the French delegation and he said, “Mr. Ambassador, the Americans have really talked a lot about Grenada. Would you like to brief the council on French military activity in Chad?” The ambassador at that time was Jean Marie Merrion and his habit was to hold on to a load of pencils as he spoke and wave them around. And he picked up his pencils, he started to wave them and said, “Mr. Secretary-General, I do not believe that Chad is within the geographical scope of NATO and so I never wish to hear the word Chad spoken at this table again.” And that was that. I confess I thought, “Well good for him.” I know we have different responsibilities to lead and consult but it must have been liberating to take the attitude: “We’re doing what we’re doing in Chad and it is none of your business and I’m not getting gummed up consulting with you!”

Q: I might point out for somebody looking at this, the Chad operation was basically to stop the Libyans and unrest there; this was not an aggressive thing. This was the French just keeping these people, tribes, from murdering each other.

GROSSMAN: They deployed a serious force there and did a good job. But the contrast in the way of dealing with the Alliance was pretty evident.
Q: Yes, we do display all our linen, dirty and clean, far too much. It is a pain in the neck.

Did you, as an American in Lord Carrington’s place, pick up sort of a feeling that a difference in a way Carrington or the Americans approached Carrington as far as, we’re talking about maybe overbearing, we’re overbearing or over explaining or not?

GROSSMAN: No. I thought the United States dealt with Peter Carrington in a perfectly sensible and fair way. David Abshire was the Ambassador; he did a very good job. Whenever we traveled to the United States, Carrington was received by President Reagan and everybody else in town. Carrington was a world figure and people wanted to be near him and they wanted to be liked by him and they wanted to get his advice. So he was a great secretary-general of NATO. Whenever we came to the United States people dealt with him seriously. The other thing is, people admired him for having resigned over the Falklands (Malvinas). You know, not something that we do much of in the United States, but I think he was admired for what he did and they certainly admired the fact that he took this job on to be secretary-general of NATO when he didn’t have to and he wanted to make the Alliance successful. Carrington had come from a military background—he had been a military officer.

Carrington was a stickler for time. If something was supposed to start at 10:00, it started at 10:00. His view was that keeping to your time was a show of respect to the person who you had invited to your office, or you were going to see, or who was meeting you. He found it very disrespectful for people to be late. The first few times we went down to the council, which was supposed to start at 10:00 or 10:15, I can’t remember, he was there at 9:59 and he’s sitting there. Of course all of the other 16 seats are by and large empty because people had come over the years to know it was going to start late. That first time we went down there and he hit the gavel right on 10:00 and he said, “We’re starting,” and there was nobody there. But there were a number of third secretaries sitting in behind and he would say, “You, are you in the French delegation, are you in the British delegation, are you in the American delegation?” And people would say, “Yes sir.” “Well get in the seat, get in the chair, because we’re starting.” So when the ambassadors rolled in about 15 minutes late they found their most junior people sitting at the table carrying on this meeting with Lord Carrington. I’ll tell you, in a meeting or two people showed up on time. And I’ve carried this for myself since. It is a show of respect to the other person, and that’s right.

Q: Were there any particular ... well, did the SS-20 whole thing, did that play out within NATO itself?

GROSSMAN: Absolutely.

Q: I was wondering whether this was sort of one-on-one or ...

GROSSMAN: Oh no, it was all kinds of things. Lord Carrington believed from the start that the PIIs had to be deployed. I think probably if you’d look back to his speeches at the time and his calendar at the time, there were lots of other things to do obviously, but that...
was among the overriding themes. And, as I said, he had a conference room off to the side of his office and there would be days when Dutch parliamentarians, the Dutch foreign affairs committee, would be there, followed by the German defense committee, followed by Italian parliamentarians. He recognized that this was a war for public opinion and his appearances on television, radio, the travel, the schedules—were all designed to support that deployment.

Q: Was there a strong, I want to say leftist, tinge within any of the countries? I’m not saying they were on the side of the Soviets but you know they were, “Let’s not upset things,” and was there sort of a leftist pacifist type? Were there countries like maybe the Danes or somebody like that?

GROSSMAN: There were many countries properly conscious of public opinion—NATO is an alliance of democracies—and there was plenty of public opinion that said, “Don’t do this, it is a provocation.” But in the end, NATO took decision after decision as 16 member nations to proceed and so again, I look back on that time as a time courage shown by a lot of governments that turned out right. We would meet parliamentarians from various countries who thought the whole idea of deployment was crazy, but with meeting after meeting of heads of state of governments of foreign ministers and of ambassadors, the Alliance took that decision collectively. As I say, it showed the Alliance’s great power and must have had a huge impact in Moscow. It was a crucial lesson for me in staying focused, purposeful and calm.

Q: Well, was it right at the beginning seen as, I won’t say it’s a bluff but in a way it is, “Put up or shut up,” as far as the idea was to divide Europe and to make Europe separate itself really from the United States by threatening Europe by saying, “Look, we can hit you and they’re not going to retaliate and all?” Was it seen that if we deployed our Pershings and Cruise missiles this actually could lead to something better, or would it just be more weapons in the countries? In other words, did we see light at the end of the tunnel if we did this and called their bluff we could then move ... it would say, “Okay now let’s do some serious negotiating?”

GROSSMAN: I think there was that hope, but I think mostly the deployment of the cruise missiles and the Pershings was about the first thing you said, which was to make sure that the Soviets did not succeed in de-coupling the United States from Europe and that they did not succeed in having strategic rights over Europe and destroying NATO. Because as you say, what would have happened is Europeans would have concluded that that collective defense was not collective defense.

Q: What about the role of the French? I talked to one person, an American, who was one of the deputies in NATO who said his kids, who were quite young, thought there was a nationality known as “those goddamn French” because he would come home after work and slam his briefcase on the table and say, “You know what those goddamn French did?” I was wondering whether, but at your time, was there that ... the French taking a different tack?
GROSSMAN: The French live their own lives. They define themselves by their difference. But I think Carrington was committed to the fact that, A) they were an Alliance member, and B) at that time, don’t forget, they were on the right side of the PII and GLCM deployments. Although they didn’t deploy themselves, (French President François) Mitterrand made a speech in parliament saying that he hoped that the Germans and the others would. But you know, it was a struggle sometimes. The French come to the Alliance saying, “We’re not going to be dominated by the United States,” and, as I say, that’s how they live their lives. They would also, properly remind us that they had a functioning interagency system and had serious interests and policies.

Q: Sort of like the Canadians in a way. The Canadians, they’re focused on not being Americans.

GROSSMAN: But it is a different thing because the Canadians share a continent with us and Canadian defense is intimately connected to American defense: think of NORAD or what was called the DEW Line. France is a nuclear power. France can deploy forces on its own. They had (like we do, to be fair), a sense that yes, they wanted to be part of the Alliance but they had their own capacities. I never found myself getting that wound up about it personally. I’d go to France and think, “Well, here are people who are really proud people.” But they have something to be proud of. France has a real government and real people and a real inter-agency process. I think sometimes in the United States we think we’re the only people who have that.

One of the things that used to drive me crazy about the way the US worked in the Alliance was that we would spend months bitterly debating Policy X or Policy Y in the interagency. We would come finally to the inter-agency agreement. Then we would arrive at the Alliance, on a Thursday night, before a Friday decision had to be taken and we’d say, “Here’s what we’ve decided. We’ve had our inter-agency debate, and you’ve all seen it because it’s all been in public. It has all been available for you to read about, but we’ve finally decided and so this should be the Alliance’s decision as well.” And I thought that for some of those NATO countries, and especially the French, who would put up their hands and say, “Well, wait a minute. We also have an inter-agency process, we also have a democracy, and we also have the right to decide as a sovereign country.” Although that might be frustrating, it isn’t wrong. And I think that’s just something we had to keep in mind for ourselves.

Really, the number of times that that first year, especially on MBFR, that a decision would have to be taken by 10:00 on Friday, and my instructions would come after inter-agency warfare for months or weeks back in Washington, my instructions would come at 2:00 in the morning. We would spend the night photocopying them and trying to understand them and passing them around, and I would go to a meeting at 10:00 and say, “Well America has decided this and so we expect this to become the Alliance’s policy, too.” What you do is you set yourself up for people like the French to put their hands up and say, “Well, no, we’d like to talk about this.”
Q: No, I agree with you. But I always find it amusing in a way to think of these two sort of proud nations coming head to head, you know.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: It has been a constant battle since Citizen (Edmond-Charles) Genêt, (the French emissary to the United States who severely strained Franco-American relations) coming over during the French Revolution and all the problems (caused by him trying to involve the United States in France’s war against Great Britain).

GROSSMAN: You know, we’re the two countries in the world who think of ourselves as exceptions. And we want to be the exception to everything, and so do they.

Q: How did you see the military side and the political side? NATO is split into two and there’s NATO military of course, which most people think of when they hear NATO but then there is, say you were working the political side. Did these join at any place? Or how did this work?

GROSSMAN: Well they certainly joined in the secretary-general’s office because we all recognized that there was no strength politically unless there was serious militarily strength to back it up. That was absolutely true of the conventional defenses. Conventional defenses are harder, they’re more expensive, and they’re more manpower intensive. Nuclear weapons are cheaper but as you could see for the PII and GLCM debate …

Q: You might explain what GLCM is.

GROSSMAN: Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. You could see that nuclear weapons were not the only answer to the question into the future and that, for future threats and for the health of the Alliance, there had to be conventional forces. So Carrington was very good at bringing together the political line and the military line through the Conventional Defense Initiative. Also there’s the NATO council that met in two organized fashions. One is the North Atlantic Council—which is at 16 including the French—and then NATO also meets as the DPC, the Defense Planning Council, without the French, it met at 15. So there were often times when you’d have an hour’s meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the French would leave and then you’ve have a meeting of the DPC. That’s sort of the way that things were all brought together. The other thing Carrington did was he worked incredibly well with the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) at that time, General Bernie Rogers. Carrington talked to Rogers all the time, traveled with him, worked with him, so that there wasn’t any daylight between him and the commander of his military forces.

Q: How did we see the Soviet military threat at that time? Were we still talking about the Fulda Gap and all that?
GROSSMAN: Yes, absolutely. I mean it was at that time the Pentagon was producing those very good—I thought at the time—annual reports on Soviet military power and so yes, there was a lot of talk about the threat. One of the interesting things that happened at that time was Brian Fall, who was Carrington’s chief of staff, was a real Russia expert—he had served in Russia and spoke Russian—and he conceived the idea of having at NATO a civilian advisor on the Soviet Union. He hired an American expert, Murray Feshbach, who worked at the Commerce Department, oddly enough, and he believed in understanding countries through statistics. He was the first person I ever met who would sit with you and say, “The Soviets are a threat, don’t get me wrong. But how much of a threat are they really?” And then he’d roll out these statistics. For example, “You know there are huge amounts of people with diseases in Russia and so maybe their army’s not really ready to fight.” Or he’d say, “Have you looked at shoe production in Russia? You know, they only produce these many shoes, which extrapolates into these many boots, so I bet you the Russian army actually isn’t very well equipped.” He would take us through these analyses of Russian statistics and he was the first person who I ever heard start to say, “They might not be 10 feet tall.” He wasn’t asking that NATO be dissolved, or that we do something different, but it was the first doubt that anyone put in my mind that maybe the Soviets were in fact very goofed up.

Q: In a way you mentioned the Defense Department’s assessment, which tended to, as a military has to do for both reasons why they’re there—for defense funds and also because any military has to look at it from a worse case position, what are they going to do about it? And to make the Soviets seem more threatening, or did you feel that?

GROSSMAN: No, I didn’t. From my perspective when you sat at NATO and that booklet would come out on Soviet military power each year, which I thought they did a serious job on, and because of the SS-20s, how else could you have interpreted what the Soviets were doing then but as a threat? And it was clear that they were doing everything they possibly could to make sure that the Alliance didn’t deploy the Plls and the GLCMs, so I thought at that time this seemed very real to me. And again, it is easy to look back in hindsight and say, “Well, it was all a big Potemkin village,” but it didn’t seem so at the time.

Q: Well it was a Potemkin village, but the point being that there were real forces there, there was a huge army.

GROSSMAN: Yes. And one of the things ...

Q: And something could set it off. Beyond the ken of practical people, sometimes impractical people get in charge, as we’ve seen everywhere in the world.

GROSSMAN: Well the other thing is, they acted in Hungary; they crushed freedom in Poland. So I think the historical aspects of this ...

Q: Czechoslovakia.
GROSSMAN: Czechoslovakia. The historical aspects of this were, if you were on that European landmass, they weren’t so far away. And one of the things Carrington did was to remind people of the extent of the challenge. He travelled to all the farthest points in NATO. The other thing of course was, I don’t think you could come to many other conclusions about the Soviets if you went to Berlin. To me the Berlin Wall said it all. You’d walk up and down that Wall and you’d look at the Wall and you’d see those guys on top of the Wall and you’d think, “This is a really bad, this is really bad.”

Q: Did Yugoslavia come up while you were there?

GROSSMAN: No, not that I can recall.

Q: You would have.

Q: Yugoslavia had not yet fallen down into the ...

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t really to have anything to do with Yugoslavia until my next assignment. Whitehead and I visited there a number of times, but I do not remember it in the three years I was at NATO.

Q: Was Spain in there at the time?

GROSSMAN: Yes, Spain had voted to integrate with the Alliance and it was during that time that the negotiation about how to integrate took place and, yes, the Spanish ambassador …

Q: (This is tape four, side one with Marc Grossman.) You were saying the Spanish ...

GROSSMAN: I remember the negotiation, they originally had come wanting a military arrangement like France, and it was very right of the rest of the allies to say, “No, we did this once; we’re not doing this again. You’re an ally or you’re not an ally.” And in the end, they mostly integrated into the military structure.

Q: Well, I would think though, to take a military structure such as I assume was in Spain, which must have been a pretty decrepit one by that time, facing no particular threat, and having a government that wasn’t militarily inclined and all. How did NATO look upon having this not very effective military force on their side?

GROSSMAN: Well, two things. One, I think NATO felt that having Spain completed a crucial piece of geography. Second, NATO membership was part of the major effort at that time to integrate Spain into the modern, transatlantic world. We forget now about Spain becoming a democracy, a normal country. They were headed for the European Union over time and headed into NATO and I think people felt that this was a very important step toward consolidating Spanish democracy, protecting Spanish democracy. And we forget now what a close call that all was really and NATO played a crucial role.
Q: Yes. Because there was the left that didn’t want to ...

GROSSMAN: Didn’t want anything to do with NATO.

Q: ... do with this.

GROSSMAN: Third, I think that the allies felt that, if the Spanish military wasn’t so great today, integrating them into the military structure would help it, not hurt it. Then, as I say, there was a great desire to make no more exceptions. It was in or out, and the Spanish made the right decision.

Q: Obviously NATO was instituted as an Alliance against the Soviet Union when it was initiated, but there is an old saying that it was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down. I’ve always felt that, when the Cold War ended it still represented a glue that kept the French from looking at its borders and starting to rearm and worrying about maybe a German threat or the Portuguese worried ... In other words, was there a feeling that there was something bigger than just a military Alliance? This is a way of keeping Europe from getting into its civil war.

GROSSMAN: Yes and, in fact, one of the main pieces of Lord Carrington’s speeches was to remind people that 50 million people had died in World War II, 50 million people. That, although there had been wars and there had been problems in the world after World War II, NATO was the thing, in his view, that had kept Europe from having World War III. He was very explicit about it.

I don’t think it would be fair, though, to look back—’84, ’85, ’86—and say, “Well, we had great ideas about the importance of NATO to Atlantic solidarity post-Soviet Union,” because I don’t think anybody could conceive that there was going to be a post-Soviet Union. So at that time, I remember the Italians would—and maybe they were more forward thinking than the rest of us—from time to time come and say, “Let’s revitalize Article 4,” whatever Article it was, the political article of the treaty, “and let’s have another Harmel Report.” Harmel, or the 1967 “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance,” was a seminal report in that it was the political and economic part of the Alliance. And we’d say, “Yes, yes, thanks a lot but we’re trying to get PIIs deployed and GLCMs deployed.” And so it wouldn’t be right to say that anyone was a great visionary about the other parts of the Alliance. We were very focused on improving conventional defenses and getting those nuclear forces deployed. In the end, of course, it was the other parts of the Alliance, including the political and out of area components, which rose to the top after 1989.

Q: Was anybody looking at, I’m not sure what it was called at that time, but the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)? The Helsinki Accords, which turned out to be pretty critical in what happens in Eastern Europe and with the Soviet Union.
GROSSMAN: That’s a fair question. I don’t remember. I don’t remember OSCE coming into my consciousness until quite a bit later. And I don’t remember when Helsinki, CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), becomes OSCE. I just don’t remember.

Q: Well CSE, but it was basically the Helsinki Accords.

GROSSMAN: Right. But the organization was CSCE and then some very smart people, including Max Kampelman turned CSCE into OSCE at a conference in Madrid and that’s turned out to be a good thing.

Q: Well, it has indeed been important but this is something that is sort of simmering below the threshold of observation.

GROSSMAN: Again, we’ll jump ahead here but when we would go with Whitehead to Eastern Europe (after I left NATO), and meet dissidents in their apartments or hotel rooms and people would say, “Do you know what I carry in my wallet?” And we’d say, “No, what do you carry in your wallet?” And they’d say, “I carry the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and I carry the Helsinki Final Act.” And people would pull it out of their wallets. They’d say, “What gives me hope is the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.”

Q: Well before we leave Brussels, let’s go back, I didn’t quiz you on what you observed ... you had the Mediterranean, the Turkey/Cyprus/Greece portfolio, these friendly brothers in arms and all. What were our concerns; how were things going there?

GROSSMAN: They were going very badly. When I was at the US Mission, there was a wonderful Air Force Lieutenant Colonel upstairs in the defense unit, Mary McLaren. She was also responsible for following Greece/Turkey/Cyprus issues, as I was, and we talked and talked about what initiative we could put together to solve this Aegean problem. We worked hard on it and we never got anywhere. So the best we could do was mitigate the damage that these people wanted to do to each other and to the Alliance. That’s a pretty minimal threshold, I recognize, but that was our goal most of the time, to cauterize that wound and get it surrounded, and then just hope that it didn’t do any larger damage to NATO. There were times when we’d have spent millions of dollars and hundreds of hours on the military side getting ready for an exercise and, at the last minute, the Greeks or the Turks would pop up and say, “You can’t have this exercise, because here on page 782 of the exercise plan there’s some cable that goes from this headquarters we don’t recognize to some other headquarters we don’t recognize and so this has to be cancelled and we’re not doing it.” So it was really, really, really hard. It was similar when I was in Lord Carrington’s office.

Q: Did you get any feel for Turkey? Later you were to go there.

GROSSMAN: I went for the first time to Turkey in November 1983; I remember it really well. I went there to see what the possibilities were for doing an MBFR (Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction) agreement. I went to first Istanbul and I stayed for a couple of days with a Foreign Service classmate of mine, Jim Swigert. He and his wife, Nancy Neuburt, were assigned there. It was rainy and cold and they both went to work and I just spent the day wandering around Istanbul in November of ’83. I was enchanted. Then I went to Ankara and the Ambassador at that time was Robert Strausz-Hupé. I’ll never forget the experience. I went to see him in his office and I laid out this great plan we had on MBFR, and he was quite old at that time …

Q: He was in his 80s, I think.

GROSSMAN: He was a professorial intellectual—all of the things I certainly was not and am not—and he looked at me and he said, “Young man, I wish you a lot of luck with your MBFR initiative, but this isn’t going to work,” and he gave me a five minute seminar on what a fool I was. Then we talked about Turkey and he told me about what he was doing in Turkey and what the USG (United States Government) was trying to accomplish in Turkey. It was snowing I can remember, and he was hosting that night a delegation of Members of Congress who were looking at drug issues. Strausz-Hupé was nice enough to include me in that dinner. So I went to the Ambassador’s residence for the very first time, in the snow in 1983, and little did I know that Turkey would be a big part of the rest of my life. I went back to Turkey with Lord Carrington on NATO visits, in Ankara. On one trip we to Trabzon and then what was the Turkish-Soviet border, now the border with Georgia.

Q: What type of government; was the military in or out?

GROSSMAN: It was a military government, but Turgut Özal had become the technocratic, appointed, prime minister. But the first time Carrington went, and I was lucky enough to be with him, it would have been ’84, ’85, and I can remember really clearly going to see Turgut Özal as the prime minister of Turkey. We were impressed and thought, “The civilians are going to come back here. It might not be today or tomorrow, but this is a person who believes in civilian rule.”

Q: Did the Soviets do any missile threatening with Turkey or was this purely a European-type thing?

GROSSMAN: Good question. I can’t remember. I remember the SS-20s being a central European issue.

Q: I would think so because it would have been almost a waste of missiles to ... the Turks knew, I mean ...

GROSSMAN: Well and I think the Russians would have concluded they weren’t going to carve Turkey away from the Alliance. The Turks were committed to NATO, there weren’t going to be large demonstrations at that time in Turkey saying, “Oh please, let’s be pacifists.”
Q: Well this is it, did you feel there’s a little difference in Greece, where I’ve often felt that, I spent four years in Athens, but that the Greeks were in NATO mainly so that the Turks wouldn’t get an advantage. I didn’t feel that their commitment to sort of the main cause of keeping the Soviets; that wasn’t their focus, it was Turkey.

GROSSMAN: Their focus was on the Aegean. But I think one of the great things about the Alliance and one of the great things about Greece being a member of the European Union and NATO, has been that their strategic thinking has evolved, at least somewhat. At the time, I think you make a fair description; they were much more focused on issues in the Aegean. But one of the good things about this interacting at the Alliance and around the table is that it forces you to lift up your sights. And so, again, this is a long-term project, but I think the interaction between Greece and Turkey today is a lot different. Maybe a small part of it is the fact that they have to sit at the Alliance every day.

Q: Again, NATO has many manifestations. The big thing is, it has kept this pretty rather squabbling area, Europe, from ... or putting their squabbles on the table as opposed to elsewhere.

GROSSMAN: You know, there’s a reason that people are banging on the door to get into this Alliance. When we get to it, I think it matters even more today.

Q: I agree. What about, well not just the Aegean, but also the Mediterranean? Were the Soviets, did they have sort of a forward policy at that time? I’m thinking about a navy and all or not?

GROSSMAN: No.

Q: There had been a time when it looked like they might be trying to really establish themselves in the Mediterranean.

GROSSMAN: Not that I recall.

Q: Their Black Sea Fleet, you know. They would come in, but it was not a particular menace?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think so. I can’t remember whether it was that time or later, there was a discussion of, the (1936) Montreux Convention (Regarding the Regime of the Straits) and what ships can transit the Bosphorus and what the Russians were building. But I don’t recall it as a big thing at the time.

The other big thing at that time, now that I remember it all, was that there was a vicious and murderous Belgian terrorist group called the CCC, the Cellules Communistes Combattantes, and they were blowing up things and killing people. We all had to be really careful, Lord Carrington had to be protected. It was the first time in my career I had to vary my routes and times.
Q: Was this sort of like the Red Brigade in Italy; sort of local, homegrown ...

GROSSMAN: It was.

Q: .. anarchist type thing.

GROSSMAN: It was. But murderous.

Q: Oh yes.

GROSSMAN: Homegrown but very murderous. They engaged in attacking those who were seen as “enemies” of communism, specifically NATO, the United States, international businesses.

Q: We’ve had the Japanese Army, Red Army ...

GROSSMAN: Red Army Faction, or whatever they’re called.

Q: ... and you had these little ones cropping up.

GROSSMAN: That’s right. And this was one of those.

Q: And really nasty.

GROSSMAN: Yes. The Belgians worked at it but it took them some time to bring this group under control.

Q: Yes. Well then, we’re moving to 1980 what? Four? I mean ...


Q: ’86. Where did you go?

GROSSMAN: I left Brussels in ’86 and I was assigned to be the Deputy Director of the office in NEA called NEA/ARN—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. And it was funny because I’d been there as a temporary officer and then I’d been the Jordan desk officer and now I was coming back to be the Deputy Officer Director. The Office Director was April Glaspie, who later became Ambassador to Iraq. I went on home leave from NATO and we bought a house in Arlington and I turned up at work. I was at work just a day or two in NEA/ARN when I got a call from the Executive Secretariat asking if would I be interested in interviewing to be John Whitehead’s Chief of Staff, his Executive Assistant. Charlie Hill was the Executive Secretary at the time, I think, and Arnie Raphel had put my name to Whitehead. So I went up and I interviewed. (Wesley) Wes Egan was Whitehead’s Executive Assistant at that time, and he was moving on, and I interviewed with Mr. Whitehead and he offered me the job. It all seemed pretty straightforward to me
until the personnel system heard about it. I was an 02 officer at the time and this was a senior job. It was a big stretch assignment.

Q: This was 02 under the new system? You know ...

GROSSMAN: Yes, under the new system. So I was a middle-grade officer. This was a job graded for an OC (Counselor) FSO. There was the usual donnybrook. Personnel said, “The sun won’t come up the next morning if he gets this assignment, how could this youngster possibly do this job, etc., etc.” But Whitehead stuck to his guns and I took the job. So I started with him in the summer of 1986, and I stayed with him as his Executive Assistant until January of ’89.

Q: Marc, because your career has been sort of working with the great men, mainly—much more so than many others—did you feel that outside of essentially where you had sort of tenuous roots in NEA with Pakistan and Jordan, here you’re moving up and yet you’re really neither fish nor fowl, but you joined sort of the Special Assistant class.

GROSSMAN: Right. I joined the Special Assistant guild, absolutely.

Q: Looking at this as a good deal or a bad deal or?

GROSSMAN: I looked at it as a great, huge, wonderful deal. In the Foreign Service there are, I don’t know how to put this exactly but, there are a number of internal unions or guilds.

Q: Oh yes, very much so.

GROSSMAN: I guess guilds maybe would be the way to put it: there’s a Staff Assistant guild and there’s a China guild and a German guild.

Q: I belonged to the Consular guild.

GROSSMAN: The Consular guild. My wife was a Consular Officer all of her career. There’s a Japan guild, the Chrysanthemum Club.

Q: An African. Well, you name it.

GROSSMAN: It is human nature.

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: I’m not a trained scholar, but I’m an “operator” in the military sense of that; not in the negative sense, I hope. I like to solve problems and I like to solve lots of problems every day. The other thing I like is, and you have to be happy with this to be in the Special Assistant or Staff Assistant guild, I like operating in the grey zone. I like operating in the area where it isn’t clear what is the best way to proceed. I like to be
where politics meets policy and personalities have a lot to do with it and where the interests of the bureaucracy and the interagency has a lot to do with it, where it is a huge challenge to get anything done. I liked being in that area where you were in the grey zone because, for a young person, for a young officer, in the grey zone, your ideas are as good as anybody else’s. And for the three years I was with Whitehead I had more impact on policy and State Department procedure than many other 02 officers at the time. It’s not because I am so smart, but I was prepared to come every day and help John Whitehead solve his problems and get things done. The negative attitude people have toward people who do staff work aggravated me all through my career; people don’t have a clear view of what it takes to get it done.

Q: Well I think one of the problems that we know is that somebody has spent all their time in NEA, for example, out there in Islamabad or Amman or something like that, “Well damn it, I don’t want to see a Staff Assistant grab an Ambassadorship when he hasn’t sort of paid the dues.”

GROSSMAN: It depends on what you think dues are. I felt that the year I was the Staff Assistant in NEA, the year of the Iran hostage crisis, I paid plenty of dues. Not just did I pay dues, I learned a lot about leadership and I learned a lot about foreign policy. The three-some years I spent with Whitehead, and the years with Carrington too, laid the foundations for my time in Turkey, EUR, the DGs (Director General) office and P (Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs). Paying dues also means you have to learn the meaning of purpose and you have to learn the meaning of leadership and I had the chance to see it in a way that was unique. Arthur Hummel, Peter Constable, Arnie Raphel, Hal Sanders, Al Moses, Lord Carrington, John Whitehead, that’s a master class in leadership. For example, Whitehead was a great leader, but also a huge substantive person. One of the reasons he all got into Eastern European issues was he felt we could do something for the United States there. So the idea of, “there’s only one way to pay dues,” is wrong. There’s sometimes discrimination against people who do the staff aide thing and I think my promotions were probably held up over a number of years because some people look at the performance file and say, “Oh, this guy’s had an easy life, all he does is hang around.” But you know, perhaps for you and for my spouse as well, people who do Consular work for their careers, they don’t end up at the top of this heap in enough numbers and there’s no question consular officers pay dues.

Q: I know, I’m very much aware of that.

GROSSMAN: One of the things the Foreign Service and the State Department has got to get over is the class system that we perpetrate. It’s terrible.

Q: Well, let’s talk about Whitehead.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: He’s not a name that—those in the Foreign Service know Whitehead but I don’t think others outside ... Could you talk about where he came from and then how he operates?
GROSSMAN: Sure.

Q: John Whitehead.

GROSSMAN: John Whitehead. He was an example of the post-WWII greatness of America. He served in the Navy in World War II. He drove landing craft in North Africa and in Europe and served, I am sure, bravely. He went to college on the GI Bill and in the ‘50s decided what he wanted to do was become an investment banker. He was a young man; he went to Goldman Sachs, where he spent 30 years, retiring after the last 10 years having been the chairman or co-chairman of Goldman Sachs. He is, if you’ll read the business literature of the late ‘80s, one of the most admired American business leaders ever. In the books by Tom Peters and others about the best run American corporations, Goldman Sachs and John Whitehead always figured prominently.

He told the story that he retired from Goldman Sachs and was trying to write a book. One day, he said, George Shultz called him and asked him to come down to Washington. Whitehead claimed that he didn’t have any idea what it was about. So he came to Washington to see George Shultz and Shultz said, “John, the President of the United States wants to see you. Let’s go over and see him.” So they get into Shultz’s car and go over to the Oval Office and Reagan says, “I want you to be the Deputy Secretary of State. What do you think?” And Whitehead says, “Well you surely have the wrong person here.” And Shultz says, “No, we want somebody like an investment banker. We want somebody who can walk into a situation, quickly size up the pieces of it and make a decision.” And so Whitehead, good for us at the State Department, took this job.

Q: Who had been the ...

GROSSMAN: Kenneth Dam.

Q: Who?

GROSSMAN: Ken Dam.

Q: And was he just plain leaving or was it felt he wasn’t the man for the job?

GROSSMAN: I have no idea. Shultz hired Whitehead as the Deputy Secretary of State. He was there some months with Wes Egan, who made the transition from Dam to Whitehead, and then I came to serve as his Executive Assistant.

John Whitehead was among the most gracious people I ever met. He had eclectic tastes and interests. He had a wonderful collection of Impressionist paintings and sculptures, many of which he had installed in his office at State. I learned an enormous amount from him. He loved to decide things. He would say, “Marc, the only reason we’re on this earth is to decide things. And you’ve got to have the joy of making decisions.” He said, “I don’t want to do anything unless there’s a decision in it.” When people in the building
could not come to a conclusion about this or that policy, he’d say, “Just bring it to me, let’s decide.” He also taught me that not deciding is a decision. He said it was okay if you didn’t decide something or put it off if you needed more time or information or concluded, “this isn’t ready to decide,” as long as you recognized that that was also a decision. And for the State Department that was a great thing, because people started to realize that if they sent issues up to Whitehead, they would get decided. On some bureaucratic issues you don’t care what the decision is as long as there is one.

And the other good thing was that he encouraged me to decide what I could. We agreed that he did not want me to be in any of his meetings unless they were meetings internal to the State Department. Because, he said, “If you’re sitting in here while I’m meeting the foreign minister of this country or that country, it’s a waste of time. I want you out, then there’s two of us doing my work.” That was a great idea. I’ve tried to follow that for the rest of my career.

And the other thing he said was, “Look Marc, I want you to decide things. I want you to decide anything you think you can decide.” But,” he said, “here’s the thing. You’re going to make some mistakes, because if you make decisions you make mistakes.” And then he said, “But here’s the deal with me. If you make a mistake, I want you to walk into my office and say, “Mr. Whitehead, I’ve got three things to tell you. Number one, tell me how bad it is. Give me the whole story; tell me how bad this really is. Number two, tell me what you’ve done to fix it. And three, tell me what you learned from making this mistake, so at least you don’t make this one again. You’re going to make others, but don’t make this mistake again.” And if you could get those three sentences out he’d absolve you for what you had done wrong because he’d rather have you doing things.

He was often frustrated with the Department. Sometimes late at night, he’d look at me and—we’d have this conversation a dozen times over three years—he’d say, “Marc, how many people work at this building?” And I’d say, “10,000.” And he’d say, “Well, what I want to know is what are the other 9,975 people doing because it seems to me that I see the same 25 people every day on every subject as the only people willing to decide anything around here.”

We had a real interesting occurrence one day; it was at that time when Congress passed the new Inspector General’s law. (William C.) Bill Harrop was the outgoing Inspector General and a person from the Commerce Department, Sherman Funk, came to be the IG.

Q: Oh, I’ve interviewed him.

GROSSMAN: So the question was: Where was he going to sit? So a very senior person (not Bill Harrop) who had the responsibility to decide this question came to see me in my little back office behind Whitehead’s office and he says, “Marc, I can’t decide where Sherman Funk should sit. I have to see Mr. Whitehead.” And I said, “I’m just an 02 officer, you’re a very senior person. If you want to go see Mr. Whitehead to discuss this, I will arrange it immediately. But I don’t think this is a good idea for you and I just want to give you some advice here—decide this yourself—but I reiterate, I’m just a staffer and
if you want to see Whitehead, we’re going in there. But think about this overnight, will you?” So this officer came back the very next day and he said, “I can’t decide, I’ve got to see Whitehead.” So in we go. Whitehead used to have a huge desk and he used to see people seated on either side. I was on one side and the officer was on the other. “What can I do for you,” Whitehead says. And the person starts up, “I’m having this problem deciding.” And Whitehead says, “Stop.” He said, “What’s your job?” He said, “Well my job is XXXXXX”. And Whitehead says, “Well, what’s my job?” He said, “Well, you’re the Deputy Secretary of State.” He looked at him and said, “I will back any decision you make.” This officer started to recite all the pros and the cons and (Whitehead) again said, “No, stop. I will back any decision that you make. Now please go out and make one. I don’t care what it is, I’ll back it.” I thought, wow, that’s fantastic. And so I adopted this line and I’ve used it a lot since; when I was a DCM, an Ambassador, an Assistant Secretary, and an Undersecretary. You have to be careful when you do it and you have to be careful to whom you’re talking and you have to be confident that they’re going to do right one way or the other. But it was incredibly empowering to watch him just say, “I’ll back any decision you make.” In terms of the leadership qualities, you could see why this John Whitehead made millions of dollars, and why people loved working for him. In the end, I had to decide where Sherman Funk would sit. I was extremely unpopular for a awhile.

Q: Well, do you have any thought about, in observing when he made decisions how he, what he used to make decisions? You know, you have to have information in order to make decisions.

G: It was a combination of the information and the time available. Because Whitehead believed, and it seems right to me, that you’ll never have all the information you need. At some point you have to have information plus intuition, plus sometimes you’ve just got to do it; you’ve got to do something. I recall thinking about this at Emergency Action Committee meetings in Turkey. You’d have vague threat information but a community to protect: what were you going to do? He was a big believer that, at some point, those three lines intersected and even if you didn’t have all the information you needed, sometimes you had to decide anyway.

Whitehead was also a believer that, if the next day or a week later you got some new information and your decision looked wrong, you changed it. He was never hung up by, “you’ll look weak because you changed your decision. He’d say, “Marc, listen. If we didn’t make the right decision a week ago and we now know we can make a better decision, let’s just make it.” He was self-confident in that way about deciding. And if it wasn’t right, we’d fix it.

Q: George Shultz came with much the same background.

GROSSMAN: Absolutely.

Q: Being out of business and also as a professor, but basically I take it that they melded well together?
GROSSMAN: Wonderful. They did very well together and it was why Whitehead was able to—we’ll come to this—do his thing in Eastern Europe and that’s why Shultz trusted him to solve a lot of really hard problems in the State Department. Whitehead would ask him for responsibility for things that hadn’t been solved in years. “Let’s solve them.” For example, he got committed to solving the housing problem for our employees at USUN (United States Mission to the United Nations). We worked on this for months.

Q: Could you explain what the problem was?

GROSSMAN: I recall that at the time the USG had gotten involved in some leases in NY that were not optimal and we were trying to work our way out of them. (Vernon) Walters was the UN Ambassador and Walters asked for Whitehead’s help with the Congress and with the Administration to try to find some way to decently house our people there. It was so expensive but couldn’t be declared a foreign posting. We were providing housing yet people were taxed by the IRS for the benefit because it was domestic. I spent hours trying to solve this problem, back and forth to New York and Capitol Hill, and we finally came up with a solution that nobody particularly loved, but we did move that ball forward. The point was, Whitehead was prepared to look for the hard things to do and do them.

Q: Well, we’ve talked mainly about sort of what we’d call administrative matters, which often are the hardest decisions in an organization to make, but what about the problem of Poland or any other country?

GROSSMAN: Well, I’d like to say one other thing on the way to that. Whitehead also took a very serious interest in the D (Deputy Secretary of State) Committee—he actively chaired the Committee—that’s the committee that chooses whom to nominate to the White House for Ambassadorships. He fought for the Department to have the best people to send over to the President and he fought hard against some of the less-qualified political appointees. The way they did it at that time was he went once a month to see Don Regan, who was then the chief-of-staff at the White House, and they would talk about Ambassadorships. Whitehead fought to make sure that the percentage stayed at Foreign Service two-thirds, political one-third. And he really demanded that the political appointments be decent and good ones. So he paid a huge amount of attention to Ambassadorships and felt that was one of his main responsibilities.

On the substantive side, he was very interested in North Africa and we went there, I think, once or twice. But among the reasons that he was so successful as an investment banker was that he was in some ways a visionary. We were talking one day and he said, “I’ve thought about this: Eastern Europe is the place we could really advance America’s interests, because the grip of the Soviet Union is clearly weakening on these countries; the dictatorships in all the countries are going to face a future where they’re just not going to survive. If we could peel some of these countries away from the Soviet Union now and make them a little more democratic, maybe we would do some good for the United States, good for the people in the region and complicate life for the Soviets
simultaneously. This would all be good.” So we developed a concept to propose to Secretary Shultz. Earlier in his life, Whitehead had been involved in trying to rescue refugees from the Hungarian revolution of 1956. (Refugees became a life-long interest for his and he served many years as the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee). We went to see Shultz and he pitched Shultz and said, “I’d like to be in charge of our policy in Eastern Europe, because I have this vision of how we might do this. But I want to make sure a), it’s okay with you and b), that it won’t cross up anything that you are doing with Russia. Shultz considered this proposal and said, “Proceed”. So we did.

Q: By the way, how did the European Bureau ...

GROSSMAN: My next job, after helping square this up with George Shultz, was to go visit Ambassador Roz Ridgeway who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the time. I framed this to her as a “great opportunity coming your way; the Deputy Secretary of State would really like to be interested in Eastern Europe.” She very rightly was skeptical at first. As I learned myself years later as EUR Assistant Secretary, sometimes more “help” from the seventh floor is not what you need, but after she became confident that Whitehead was going to take her advice, work in complete sync with EUR and that Whitehead was not going to cross up what she and George Shultz were doing on the Soviet Union—which was really the most important thing—and that it really was an attempt to enhance the Bureau. She said, “Go for it.”

She was very helpful, and of course had been the Ambassador to East Germany, so she really knew this subject. We were also lucky because the DAS responsible for Eastern Europe at the time was (Thomas W.) Tom Simons, who got on wonderfully with Whitehead and who was a terrific person to work with and travel with.

I think Tom was, in fact, glad to have his neck of the woods highlighted, So as a team, we figured out how to make Whitehead’s vision operational. I can’t remember the exact sequence of events, but we went four times to all of the Eastern European countries over the next three years. We mostly went in the winter so nobody could say we were just gallivanting around. Whitehead worked hard on these trips. We saw some pretty interesting things. The thing we saw again and again was what a complete disaster communism was for every country out there and for all of the people except the dictators. Whitehead went to each one of these dictators; he’d sit with them and he’d say, “Listen. You don’t know too much about the world, really, and I know quite a lot about the world,” but in a more diplomatic way. And he’d say, “You’re doomed. Your way of life is doomed, your country is doomed, your authoritarianism is doomed if you keep on this way. And if you’d like to think about this in a different way and change your relationship with the Soviet Union and change your relationship with us and be more democratic in your country, there could be a real relationship between the United States and countries in Eastern Europe.” We went from place to place saying, “History is going by you here.” And they didn’t believe him. Of course, he was absolutely correct. I think back on that time: here was a person who really had a vision of what the future was going to be like. What a privilege to be part of that.
We went to Yugoslavia; we went to Poland; we went everywhere and some of it was really exciting. He was the first person of that rank ever to meet Lech Walesa (then-Chairperson of Solidarity). John (R.) Davis (Jr.) was our Ambassador to Poland at that time. Whitehead wanted to see Walesa and the Polish government at the last minute said, “No,” and so Whitehead called in the Polish ambassador and said, “Well, fine, then I’m not coming to Poland and we’ll say why.” And they said, “Okay, you’ll see him.” I’ll never forget the night that Lech Walesa and the senior Solidarity leadership appeared at the door of the American Ambassador’s residence to meet John Whitehead. It was incredibly exciting. Then the next time we visited Poland we went to Gdansk and spent the night there, I think.

Q: That was Walesa’s home base; he had been in the shipyard.

GROSSMAN: The shipyard. We went there and I still have—I keep on my desk—a small brass medallion that Walesa gave me at that time. He had signed it. This was 1986. At the NATO Summit in Washington in in 1999, when Poland became a member of NATO, I sat near Walesa at the opening ceremony. What a turn of events. And John Whitehead had seen in coming.

We went once in Bulgaria, I can’t remember which trip, to see the at the time, Todor Zhivkov. We had lunch and we were in this huge room the size of three football fields and there were six or eight of us at lunch at a table in the middle of this room. Zhivkov had a high-pitched voice and he had this maniacal laugh which echoed in this big room. There were cameras all over the place filming the scene. Another reminder of what a disaster communism was for everybody. It must have been the third or fourth time we were in Romania and Whitehead looked at (President Nicolae) Ceausescu and he said to Ceausescu, “I’ve listened to you talk about the progress in Romania but I conclude that you’re either ill-informed or a liar because your country is a disaster. There’s no economic growth here; people are starving. You know, every bulb in Romania is a 40-watt bulb, if you could get one. There is no heat in your homes or offices.” (We would go to meetings at the Foreign Ministry in our overcoats). And Ceausescu said, “Oh no, we’re growing at five percent a year,” and on and on and on. Whitehead, “No, no. You’re either misinformed or you’re lying to me.” It was a really weird thing; a number of us were kicked out of the meeting five or six minutes before it was over. So we were sitting outside and, just as the meeting broke up, and out of another door runs Mrs. Ceausescu, who had, we understood later, been watching the whole meeting through a two-way mirror.

Roger Kirk was our Ambassador to Romania. He would set up meetings with dissidents. These sessions were both heart-rending and yet gave us nerve to proceed because there were people in each country who had the courage to fight the system. I can remember having lunch at Ambassador Kirk’s for the Romanian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) people. He would tell us to never have seconds when the food came around, to leave that for the guests because they did not have enough to eat.
We often flew in small US Air Force planes around Eastern Europe. I can’t adequately describe how much I loved seeing the blue and white plane with United States of America painted on the fuselage at the end of those days in a place like a Romania or Bulgaria. As I say, we were in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia—still at that time, Yugoslavia—I think four times each, and Whitehead’s message to everybody was the same, “You’ve got to get on the right side of history or you’re going to be washed away.”

Q: I would have thought the Poles, because they had such a restive population and one that, it just wasn’t a complacent group, that they would have been more ... who was that ...

GROSSMAN: Wojciech Jaruzelski; it was still Jaruzelski, the general.

Q: Yes, but did he have ... ?

GROSSMAN: They thought they were the king fishes and they were going to stay there forever.

Q: What was happening in the Soviet Union at that time? Was Gorbachev in power yet and if so was he beginning to make his mark or not?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think so. You’d have to consult a timeline. I know we visited Russia at least once. I can remember on one trip to Europe, Whitehead was determined to go to the Berlin Wall and stand up and say the Wall was going to fall down; it wasn’t going to be there in the future. We couldn’t get any press to come and cover the event because everybody thought it was a crazy idea. I rustled up some US Army and embassy people to serve as a crowd. He really worked hard at this Eastern Europe initiative. He met all the relevant local Ambassadors in DC, including from the Vatican because the Pope played such a key role in Poland. He always had time for visiting US Ambassadors from the region.

It was interesting as Whitehead adapted to the diplomatic culture. On our very first trip we went to Hungary. Mark Palmer was the Ambassador. We’d done all the briefing books, as you could imagine. We get to Hungary and he goes to the first meeting with the Hungarians and he didn’t follow any of the briefing books any of the time, nothing. Mark Palmer was furious at me: why was he so unprepared? So after the first meetings I asked if I could see him privately and I said, “Excuse me, but are you going to do any prep for these meetings?” And he says, “Well, of course.” And I said, “Those guys on the other side, they’re serious about this and expect you to be.” He said to me, “Marc, there’s a big cultural difference you and I haven’t overcome.” And I said, “What’s that?” And he said, “Well at Goldman Sachs, the way it worked was, if you had an hour’s meeting there was a 15-minute briefing of the subject for the first 15 minutes of the hour and then there was a discussion for 45 minutes so you didn’t have to prepare that much in advance for meetings.” And I responded, “Well, our world is different from that. You have to read
this material and then we can talk about it.” After that it we melded the two cultures and went on our way.

The other thing I can remember, he delegated like mad. We’d talk about the trips in the weeks before we were going, but mostly he said, “Getting this trip ready is your responsibility.” At that time, he flew first class to Frankfurt and then the Air Force would lend us a jet to go around in Eastern Europe. I can remember two or three times we would get on the plane and he’d sit in that first-class seat and I had one next to him and they’d close the door of the airplane and he’d say, “So Marc, where are we going and what are we doing?” It was at that time I’d take the briefing book out and I’d say, “Well we’re going to go here and we’re going to go here and we’re going to do this, we’re going to do that.” And sometimes he’d say, about halfway across the Atlantic, “Well I don’t want to do it that way. I want to do it the other way.” And I’d make my case for why I decided what I had decided. But once in a while, on some things he would say, “No, I want to do it this way.” So we’d land in Frankfurt and I would spend my next couple of hours making an adjustment or two. But it really taught me about delegating.

Q: How did he use our Ambassadors when he would, say, go to Hungary and all?

GROSSMAN: He wanted our Ambassadors to be in on everything. He was very good with our Ambassadors.

Q: Would he sit down with the Ambassador beforehand?

GROSSMAN: Yes. We never went anywhere where the first thing wasn’t a country team briefing/meeting. It was part of our culture melding.

Q: Yes. So he knew what he was going into?

GROSSMAN: Absolutely. And whenever they were back in Washington he always saw them, as I said. Once he decided to pay attention to this Eastern European initiative, he really paid attention to it. He was serious about it and I think accomplished a lot.

Q: Well was he able to help sow some seeds, with the Helsinki group and in Czechoslovakia?

GROSSMAN: I think so. I can remember dissidents carried in their wallets the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. The Final Act was a living, inspirational document for them. Also, Whitehead planted some really important seeds on our side by further exposing to more people what a disaster these places really were. And so, when some of us who went through this period—Tom Simons, myself, others—when it came time to revitalize NATO and invite these countries in, I had both an emotional and a substantive connection to this. I said these people have fought through terrible dictatorship and authoritarianism and now they want to be free and if they want to be free with us that would be good. So it had a series of long-term consequences.
Q: What about Ronald Reagan? He was obviously a great proponent of freedom; it wasn’t intellectual, it was more or less intuitive, I guess.

GROSSMAN: Right. Well, we went a couple of times over to brief the President. At one I think the President signed MFN for Hungary or Poland, I can’t remember which. I have a picture shaking hands with President Reagan which was pretty exciting.

Q: And that’s Most Favored Nation.

GROSSMAN: Trade status. The President was the person who presided over that ceremony.

Q: In a way this is going against the general concept that when push-came-to-shove the Soviets would move in and do a Poland, a Hungary or a Czechoslovakia, and that, this is the way it was going to be, kind of...

GROSSMAN: John Whitehead wasn’t a traditional diplomat in that regard. He did not think that we should just let these countries be run by the Soviets or their dictators. The US should offer them an alternative: a better relationship with the West in exchange for reforms. And as I say, the meetings with Ceausescu and some of these other guys weren’t very diplomatic. He was a plainspoken businessperson a lot of times. But he was telling them what the truth.

Q: Well, what were the reactions of these leaders?

GROSSMAN: They were mostly astonished. They were astonished the first time around and then they were astonished the second time around. But Whitehead was convinced that one of the problems with our diplomacy is that people went places once and they never went back. He said, “I’m just going to keep going back, like when I was a banker, and I’m going to go back and back until they take me seriously.” And so, as I said, we went three or four times to a number of these countries and he just kept knocking on doors. I think for the dissidents we showed solidarity; for people who wanted more democracy we showed there were people in the West paying attention. It was a morale boost to our embassies that lived in dictatorships and authoritarian societies. And we went to meetings in Romania in our overcoats because it was so cold. It was a disaster—communism was a disaster.

Q: You know, it’s almost like a disease and there were still people who, particularly at universities but much more so in say, European universities and all, who were saying, “Well, maybe there’s some problems but this is the way to go.” And African leaders were doing this and it’s still around but it’s dying out.

GROSSMAN: I had had an intellectual understanding of it, but seeing up close was transforming. A couple of times, when we went to Berlin, we crossed the Wall at Checkpoint Charlie. No more needs to be said. One time Whitehead went to a conference in Potsdam; I don’t even remember what the subject was. But for various reasons there
was only room for him and a security officer there at Potsdam. Lucky for me, because I stayed at the Intercontinental Hotel in Berlin. But my job in the morning and in the afternoon was to go and visit him, and brief him consistent with information security and keep him up to date on world events and see what he needed. I had to do this early in the morning and it was not Checkpoint Charlie that you crossed, it was the Glienicke Bridge. I’ll tell you, there were mornings at 6:30 or quarter to seven when you’d be crossing over from the Western sector to the East. There’s nothing on either side when you are in middle of that span and you get up to these East Germans and you show your passport but you think, I could disappear from here and that’d be it. I can’t tell you how relieved I was each day to cross back over.

I’d like to say one other thing about my time with John Whitehead. We hired an amazing group of young FSOs and Civil Service people to be D Special Assistants. They did a fantastic job. Many went on to distinguished careers at State. The secretaries in that office were also remarkable. Mrs. Eva Henderson kept me going in the right direction. I also met Jim Timbie for the first time. I don’t know why, but he worked his arms control magic as a D staffer. He was a national treasure.

Q: Well tell me about one of the major problems at the time that you were there and that’s Yugoslavia. Or do you want to stop now?

GROSSMAN: Let’s stop.

Q: All right. We’ll stop now and we have just covered Eastern Europe but we have not covered Yugoslavia and what happened. Also, no real talk about Asia, what was going on there and if there’s anything in Africa or Latin America. And we’ll pick it up next time there.

GROSSMAN: Great. I’d also like to talk next time about polygraphing and Shultz’s polygraphing policy. I’d like to talk about that.

Q: Alright. I also would like to get sort of the internal things, talk about the different Bureaus and how they responded, too, from your perspective there.

GROSSMAN: And I’d also like to talk about Iran-Contra.

Q: Oh yes.

* * *

Q: Okay. Today is the 16th of June 2006. Marc, a couple of things: What were you getting on Yugoslavia at this time? Was there anything that particularly came up at this time or not?

GROSSMAN: Actually what came up at this time were. I guess from our perspective anyway, false signals. We were in all of the other Eastern European countries three or
four times during those years, and I think we were in Belgrade three or four times as well. At the time, for us, as outsiders, it appeared that Yugoslavia had a good chance of holding together. I can remember going to meet the collective presidency and people seemed confident about holding things together. I also remember there was a very popular song at that time called *Yugoslavia*. Everywhere we went in Yugoslavia, in restaurants, in the hotel lobbies, there was this song playing. People would sing it and it was, of course, to be perhaps the last anthem for a combined Yugoslavia—but it seemed to us at the time that there was a chance that it could all hold together. The other thing, it was the time of the production of the Yugo and oddly enough when I look back on it ...

*Q: The Yugo being a Fiat.*

GROSSMAN: I don’t know if it was a Fiat but it was a little car. Oddly enough, when I look back on it now there were all of these signs that pointed in the direction of unity. So while I think that Mr. Whitehead certainly, and to the extent the rest of us did as well, could see that there was huge change coming in the rest of Eastern Europe and that they were going to go through a real change, it wasn’t so apparent, actually, in Yugoslavia, at least on the level that we were working. It is another reminder to be modest about predicting the future.

*Q: Well let me ask the question, when you’re talking about Yugoslavia was this pretty much from the Belgrade perspective?*

GROSSMAN: Yes, although I can remember we visited Zagreb, we visited Dubrovnik, we visited a number of places in Yugoslavia and, as I say, either we missed it completely or we were not dealing at the right levels with the right people to get a sense of what was behind the curtain.

*Q: How about Asia? Did Asia cross your radar at all?*

GROSSMAN: It did not, really. I think once Whitehead made a decision to focus on what were then Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, that’s really where we spent quite a lot of time. He certainly received people and tried to pay attention because he was the Deputy Secretary of State, but felt the place he could make the most difference was in Eastern Europe.

*Q: What about Shultz and polygraphing? Could you explain what the issue was and what happened?*

GROSSMAN: My recollection is that there was pressure from CIA and from the FBI for the State Department to adopt a polygraph system where all Foreign Service people would be polygraphed periodically for security clearances, for the updating of their security clearances. Shultz resisted this. He thought that polygraphing was not something that was American. He thought it was false science and certainly should never be used as an investigative tool for surveying large groups of people. There were months and
months of debate about what was the right thing to do. In the end Secretary Shultz decided, I think greatly to his credit, to resist the Agency, to resist the FBI, and to say there wouldn’t be blanket polygraphing of people at the State Department. As I recall he took a lot of grief for it. He did agree that if there was ever an investigation where things got down to one or two people, and if people agreed to be polygraphed then, fine. But just going out and polygraphing everybody—it didn’t work for him. I have stuck to this philosophy and decision for the rest of my career and life.

One of the things that occurred after that policy was instituted, there was a terrible leak of a cable about POW-MIA matters to the newspapers. And so DS (Diplomatic Security) instituted an investigation. This cable was very tightly held and there were only six, eight, 10 people—the drafter and the clearer and a number of us on the Seventh Floor and the Executive Secretariat—who had ever seen that cable. Sure enough, in they came, wanting to polygraph everybody. And Shultz said, “No, we’re not going to do that. This violates the rules.” There was a huge fuss over this. I felt that, in terms of not just the institution but also of people personally, he really protected people when it was hard. The interesting thing was, although we were all investigated and talked to and we all refused to take a polygraph, it turned out that none of the people who were on this list were in fact the leakers. It turned out to be somebody in the communications shop had taken the cable across the way to one of the POW-MIA advocates who were around at the Lincoln Memorial. So we would have all been polygraphed and I don’t know whether anybody would have been found guilty or not guilty by this, but in fact it wasn’t anybody on the list to be investigated.

Q: Well then, then we move to Iran-Contra. Were you aware; how did this dawn on you first?

GROSSMAN: It dawned on us when it was just Iran—the day had yet to come when the issue of Ollie North, Iran, the cake, the travel—burst into the public consciousness. But before the whole story came out, there was a remarkable meeting in Whitehead’s office because someone from the Administration, someone senior, had to go and testify on Iran in front of Lee Hamilton, who was then the chairman of the House International Relations Committee. There was a meeting in Whitehead’s office where everybody who knew anything about this said, “Well, I can’t testify,” and “I can’t testify,” and “I can’t testify.” Finally the conclusion by some of the career people at the State Department was that what they really needed was a political appointee who knew nothing about the whole caper to go testify. So Whitehead, who never shirked from a challenge, said, “Okay, if you want me to go testify.” I can remember saying to him later, “I think there’s something really wrong with this because if there wasn’t something wrong with this, all these senior people who know about this, they should be testifying. You don’t know anything about this. You’ve never followed these issues, you don’t...” And he said, “Marc, I’m the Deputy Secretary of State, I will go and testify.”

We did the best we could to prepare him. I can’t remember the day of the week it was, but he went on an afternoon and testified and famously said that—when asked if he agreed with President Reagan that Iran was not a supporter of terrorism—Whitehead, to
his great credit and wonderfully honestly said, “I hate to disagree with my President but …” He then went on to say that he thought that Iran was a place where they supported terrorism. He got in his car on the way home and he called me up and he said, “So Marc, did I make any headlines?” I said, “Well sir, you ought to know that Jamie McIntyre, who was with WTOP and then with CNN, was reporting, “The last threads of the fabric of any relationship between the State Department and the White House had been ripped apart by John Whitehead.” And so I said, “I think yes, there’s going to be some headlines here.” So he came back and we sat down and he said, “Well, what do you think?” I said, “I think generally when you disagree in public with the President of the United States, people notice.” And he said, “Well I had to.” I replied, “I understand that, but you shouldn’t be now surprised about what happens tomorrow.” So the next morning, huge headlines, “Whitehead disagrees with the President,” “State Department attacks the White House,” huge headlines in The New York Times, Washington Post, every place. Shultz backed him 100 percent. Whitehead said, “I’ll write a note to President Reagan.” So he wrote to President Reagan, a handwritten note saying that he was really sorry to make this trouble but, “I did what I did.” I thought and he thought that he was going to be fired by the end of the day, that this was it, this was our last day, it was his last day in D and it was my last day as the Executive Assistant in D. We just sort of sat around waiting all day for someone to call up and fire us. And we went home that night and nobody fired us and we came in the next morning, and the next morning was the morning that the attorney general announced the Contra part of Iran-Contra. Within 24 hours, nobody remembered anything about what Whitehead did, everybody was then focused on the question of the Contra connection to the Iran issue. And he stayed the Deputy Secretary of State until the end of the Administration. That was good for the State Department, but I thought it probably cost him the chance to be the Treasury Secretary later in the term.

Q: Well tell me though; was it passing by you that something was happening?

GROSSMAN: We had no idea in advance.

Q: It was one of these things; I can sort of imagine somebody would say Ollie North and people at your level would roll their eyes because he was considered a cowboy? Or was he just a non-person?

GROSSMAN: Well for us, we didn’t really have anything to do, Whitehead had nothing to do with this, which is why all of these career people figured out he’d be the perfect person to testify. I was utterly amazed by it all. And I think Whitehead was too. He just couldn’t believe it. Again in a typical Washington way, there’s always somebody who’s in worst shape the next day than you are.

Q: It is interesting that something of this nature could ... You might explain what we’re talking about, as far as we knew North had been doing, for the record.

GROSSMAN: Whoever’s doing the history will have to go back and read all that. I was focused on its impact on Whitehead at the time.
Just one more thing for whoever’s looking at this, there’s a wonderful anecdote in Whitehead’s autobiography where he goes over later to see President Reagan and figures he’s just going to get hollered at for disagreeing with the President. There’s this charming story where Reagan tells Whitehead, “You know John, I was watching the TV the other day and I heard somebody say they disagreed with the President and I wondered how who heck is that? And I turned to the TV, John, and it was you.” And Mr. Whitehead apologized and they moved on from there.

Q: Well did you feel the NSC, National Security Council, was taking action away from the State Department? Was that sort of the impression that you got, or that things were bypassing the State Department?

GROSSMAN: Well, that’s certainly what it was when it all came out. But it was certainly something that Shultz fought against all the way through his time in office.

Q: Well then, after the Iran-Contra thing was disclosed, did that change, at Whitehead and Shultz’s level; what were they doing regarding Iran-Contra? Was Whitehead still remaining sort of off the ...

GROSSMAN: Like every division of labor between Secretary and Deputy Secretary, you can imagine something as important as Iran-Contra went to the Secretary. And my recollection is that we stayed pretty well focused on what we were trying to do.

Q: I can’t remember if I asked before but were you getting anything from State Department or CIA or something, I’m talking about Eastern Europe but also about the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union was not the 10-foot giant or something like that?

GROSSMAN: No, the only time I had ever really heard that argument was when I was at NATO. I told you the story of Murray Feshbach at NATO, Lord Carrington’s Sovietologist-in-Residence.

Q: Well then, is there anything else we should cover during this Whitehead period?

GROSSMAN: Well, I think we’ve talked about Eastern Europe.

Q: Yes. Oh, what was your impression of, from your perspective, of the various Bureaus? I’m sure that people were saying “Oh, this Bureau or that or some were really, really producing, others weren’t or some of the individuals.” Can you give some feel for that? Let’s take the European Bureau.

GROSSMAN: I think generally one of the interesting things about the way the institution operates is that for all of the people who work in the building, from the Seventh Floor you sometimes have the impression—and I know it may not be the right of impression, but you sometimes have the impression—that there are only a small number of people who are trying to get something done each day that’s new. One of the challenges of the Foreign Service and of the Civil Service is that there are so many people who get trapped
in the molasses. Everybody gets trapped in the molasses a little bit, but there are people who just get beaten down by the bureaucracy and the clearances and the turf fighting. It takes immense strength to keep your head above this molasses. I learned to have a certain number of insurance agents around in the Department. When I was with Whitehead, and later when I was Executive Secretary, if I had a memo to the Secretary or to D or to any Principal, and 30 people had cleared it, I was almost certain that nobody had actually read that memo between me and the person who drafted it—because 30 people could not actually have given their full attention to this memo. So what I would do is I would look down the 30 and I’d see if there are any of my insurance agents on there, people I knew were committed to making sure the Secretary got the right thing or that the job got done and, if I saw a couple of names, I was then prepared to read it and move it on. And if there were none of those names, I was sure that 30 people had not added value to this product and we would have to go and test the propositions.

Q: Well did you find that the molasses, was this more turf battles or ... ?

GROSSMAN: No, it is a question of leadership. You asked me about the European Bureau; Roz Ridgeway was the head of the European Bureau at that time, they couldn’t have been any more purposeful, in terms of what they were doing with Russia, certainly in terms of the relationship they had with us on Eastern Europe, what they were doing in NATO. The people in EUR, led by Ambassador Ridgeway, were key figures in the Department. This was because they came to work every day saying, “What can we get done today?” And so I was always very impressed with them.

Q: Did Whitehead take a ... did the administrative side of the Department, how did he work on that?

GROSSMAN: He did. I’ve talked about the D Committee. He also tried hard to organize public support for increased budgets for the Department. He helped organize public education groups to support more funds. He spoke out for increases often. But he also believed that the Department needed to work more effectively if we were going to be able to make the argument that budget should be increased. He created an office attached to D to try to meld money and policy. Skip Boyce and Bob Bauerlien were in charge of that unit. He took a lot of interest in some specific management issues. It was the time of the Moscow Embassy bugging and so how to build a new Moscow Embassy were very much on his mind. He wanted to bring new technologies to our work: he encouraged the consular bureau to accept credit cards for payments for passport and visa fees. As I have already related, it was a time of terrible controversy about housing at the United Nations and we tried really hard to solve that problem. There was also the issue, that was the time when there was the new Inspector General; the Inspector General Act had gotten passed, and so it was no longer possible to have only a career Foreign Service Officer as an Inspector General. So we were very heavily involved in the hiring of Sherman Funk, who was the first non-Foreign Service Officer to be Inspector General of the Department.

In his private capacity, Whitehead was a very generous donor to the then curator of the Department’s Diplomatic Reception Rooms, (Clement Ellis) Clem Conger’s, Eighth
Floor project. In fact, he donated the money for his own office to be refurbished after he left. I can remember Clem coming on a number of occasions after the election in whatever year it would be, after President Bush 41 was elected, and he kept saying, “Okay, Mr. Whitehead, I need to get on refurbishing the D office, when are you going to move out? And Whitehead would say to him, “Clem, I gave you the money and I’m staying here until the 20th of January at noon. At 12:01 you can come here and do whatever you want.” And that’s exactly what happened. They packed up all that beautiful art and at 12:01 I can remember them coming in, these guys in protective suits, who started to tear the place apart because of all the asbestos. So the Deputy Secretary’s office as it exists today was funded by Whitehead while he was Deputy Secretary of State.

Q: Well then, 12:01 on January 20th, ’89 what happened to you?

GROSSMAN: Well, what happened to me was the new Deputy Secretary, (Lawrence S.) Larry Eagleburger, asked if I would help him for a few weeks, which I did, which was great. I helped him for maybe a month or five weeks until he found his own Executive Assistant. My recollection is that at that point I was on my way to be the Political Counselor in Paris. We were getting ready to do that and I had the good fortune to be able to take a couple of weeks of French refresher training, which of course, given the state of my language ability was a struggle. I then went to the wonderful Foreign Affairs Leadership Seminar (FALS), which was great. I learned so much in those few weeks thanks to Carol Wzorek and her team. Somewhere in there, I can’t quite remember when, Ambassador Abramowitz was named to be the Ambassador to Turkey and he was looking for a DCM and asked me if I would shift from being the Political Counselor in Paris to being the DCM in Turkey. So we talked it over, Mildred and I, and we decided we would do that. She was the real loser at the time because she was assigned to be the chief of the Consular section in Paris and had just graduated from the National War College and loved Paris. But I am grateful to her that she was prepared to take a chance on Turkey and we did. Later that year, I guess around Labor Day, I went to Turkey and became a DCM. She stayed for a few more months in DC for some training.

Q: And you were there from ’89...

GROSSMAN: ’89 to ’92.

Q: When you arrived in ’89 how would you describe sort of the internal situation in Turkey at the time?

GROSSMAN: Well, compared to 2005, Turkey was a less democratic place, a more centralized place, and a place where the military still had a very large role in the everyday running of the country. But it was also at a time when there was a change going on because Turgut Özal had moved from being the prime minister to being the president and he was insistent on change in Turkey, freeing Turks, having their entrepreneurial spirit come out, getting them more information. So, for example, when I got to Turkey in 1989 there were two, maybe three, television channels and they were all state TV channels. In the years that I was there it became, 20 channels and now there are 100 channels. Turkey
changed really rapidly. But when I was there in ’89 it was still a place where you couldn’t say the word Kurd in public.

*Q: They were Mountain Turks.*

GROSSMAN: They were Mountain Turks. You couldn’t say the word Kurd in public and it was a much more restrictive and restricted society and yet, as I say, you could see change was coming and Özal was an agent for change.

*Q: Well then, how stood, when you got there in the summer of ’89, the relations with the United States?*

GROSSMAN: I think from the period from September to let’s say November/December of ’89, relations actually were pretty good. Then in late ’89 and early ’90 Senator (Robert) Dole (Republican from Kansas) decided that this was the time to press for a resolution on the Armenian genocide in the United States Senate. Relations with Turkey took a terrible nosedive. All through that period, at the turn of the year and early into the next year, Senator Dole pressed the case that the United States Senate should call it “genocide” and Turks said, “This is unacceptable,” and relations really came to a standstill. It got so bad that, in the summer of ’90, the 4th of July party was boycotted by official Turks. No one would talk to us except to yell at us. Ambassador Abramowitz spent days in Washington trying to head off Senate action, working hard to preserve US-Turkish relations. Senator Byrd of West Virginia took up Turkey’s case and the bill did not pass the Senate. Byrd visited Turkey at some point later and was received as a hero.

And then we got lucky because then Secretary of Defense (Richard) Cheney came to visit.

*Q: (This is tape five, side one with Marc Grossman.) Yes, Secretary Cheney?*

GROSSMAN: Secretary of Defense Cheney came to visit Turkey in the summer of ’90 and I can remember he stayed at the Ambassador’s residence and his wife and daughters came and he really got the full blast of how bad US-Turkish relations were. As Secretary of Defense he understood that Turkey was a very strategic country. This was one of those moments where luck and personality play into policy. Cheney talked to President Bush 41 and said, “This thing with Turkey is just going terrible and you (President Bush 41) can do something about this.” So in late July of 1990, President Bush 41 called President Özal and said something like, “Look, this happened in the Senate. The Administration did everything we could but really, we’ve got to get US-Turkish relations back on track here.” Özal responded along the lines of, “Alright, I got it and our relations with the United States are important, thank you for calling and let’s let the past be the past.” They hang up and of course a week later Saddam invades Kuwait. I think had we still been in a position of not having had Cheney there and had President Bush 41 not picked up the phone and done something about our relations with Turkey, and then had Saddam invaded Kuwait, it would have been a lot harder to work our way out of that hole.
Q: From your perspective in Ankara, what was the instigation of all of a sudden raising this, are we talking about 70 year old issue of the Armenian holocaust or the Armenian disaster (when leaders of the Turkish government set in motion a plan to expel and massacre Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire), whatever you want to call it.

GROSSMAN: To Armenians in the United States and to the global Armenian Diaspora this is a really important issue. I understand that. They want Turkey to take responsibility for what happened to their grandparents. Why Senator Dole decided at this time to make it his cause, I don’t know. Ambassador Abramowitz talked to him and Dole said, “I’m going to do this because I think it’s the right thing to do and you diplomats have to handle the aftermath.” Why that time, that moment, that year, I don’t know.

Q: Did you feel the hand of the Greek American community was in there or not?

GROSSMAN: I think Greek Americans at that time—and I make a clear distinction at that time, because things change over the years—weren’t sorry to see Turkey get knocked around pretty hard in the United States. This all changes later as many Greek Americans become interested in Turkey’s EU aspirations as a bolster to Greek security.

Q: What was your impression of President Özal?

GROSSMAN: He was an unlikely looking person but he was among the most modern people you’d ever have the chance to meet and being around him was to believe that Turkey could change for the better. He was a real Anatolian; he wasn’t from the Istanbul elite. He’d been born in Malatya, in southeastern Turkey and had been educated as an engineer; he’d spent some time in DC at the World Bank. He was in many ways symbolic of what might become a new synthesis in Turkey, which is a modern Anatolian person—globalized and connected to the rest of the world, part of the economy—and yet a religious, socially conservative person. I can remember at the time how some Turks were shocked that Özal went to the mosque on the presidential compound on Fridays. But he was a fundamentally a pluralistic person: live and let live.

Q: I take it that we saw that in Turkey there was sort of a business-oriented elite or something emanating more or less out of Istanbul.

GROSSMAN: Let me be clear: this was and is a remarkable group of people, many strong supporters of Turkish-US ties. But some were, at that time, slow to recognize the power of globalization—in that Özal had it all over them. A lot of people in the Istanbul business elite still felt that they could wall off the Turkish market. You have to remember that in the ’60s and ’70s, some powerful people in Turkish business elite in Turkey opposed EU membership for Turkey when it was discussed at that time. They said, “We don’t want that, we can’t take the competition.” Think how different things might have been has they said yes.
Q: What about a very important element when you got there, let’s say early on, the military. What was their relation towards the United States and their role in Turkey at the time?

GROSSMAN: The military at that time played an outsized, important role in Turkey. That was still a time when American senior visitors, civilian or military, would pay the perfunctory calls on the foreign minister and other civilians, but then the real meeting was with the chief or the deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS). It was at a time when the Turkish military still was mostly pro-American. General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) had just built an F-16 plant outside of Ankara. It was still a time when most of the senior leadership of the Turkish military had been educated in the United States at the (US Army) Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth or had spent some time in America. But they also, through the National Security Council system in Turkey and through their own ways, were the arbiters of many things in Turkey and I think among the things that Özal was intent on changing was to have more civilian control of the military. He used to drive them crazy by not wearing the right clothes to military events. I think he did it on purpose. He did it to show that he was the civilian president of Turkey. Like on the economic side, it was Özal that starts to change the way the military was involved in Turkish society. In fact, we’ll come to this later, but when Özal made the decision to join the United States in the first Gulf War, the then head of the TGS resigned. It was an astonishing thing that a TGS chief would resign because he disagreed with the president. Usually, in Turkey it used to be the president who resigned if they disagreed with the TGS chief. It was Özal who started to say, “You know, actually civilians run this country.”

Q: You arrived within months of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the tremendous changes in, well, it was still the Soviet Union. How did that impact you in Turkey?

GROSSMAN: It was interesting. Turks can be a pessimistic people and you could understand why. I mean, their empire collapsed and they’re surrounded by a lot of difficult neighbors. In 1989, with the fall of the Wall, everybody was saying this is great, but Turks were saying, “Oh this is terrible.” We’d say, “Why do you think this is terrible?” And they’d say, “Because now we Turks are not going to be so important anymore.” I can remember Ambassador Abramowitz talking to Turks and saying, “Well that’s possible, but it seems to me that with the fall of the Wall and the possibility that there’s going to be independent countries to your north and to your east and there’s a whole new world out there, you actually could be more important, not less important.” “Oh no,” they said, “no, no, it is the end of NATO and it is the end of our importance and you won’t care about us anymore.” They were really in the dumps.

Q: Really?

GROSSMAN: Yes. There was nothing we could do to try to convince them that a year from then it was equally, if not more likely, that Turkey would be more important rather than less important and that is just what happened.
Q: So it really is interesting but of course, for some of these countries NATO gave them entrée into something and you needed ... I mean, the wisdom at the time and the creation was the threat of the Soviet Union. With that gone, it means okay, I can understand how they’d ...

GROSSMAN: Yes. But for Turks at the time it seemed all bad; nothing good could come of this. And in turn, as I say, it was just the opposite. Turkey was an even more strategically important country five years after 1989.

Q: Were you at all concerned about Yugoslavia when you were picking this up, I mean as a ...

GROSSMAN: Well once they started to fight, yes. Hundreds of thousands of today’s Turks are either the sons and daughters or the grandchildren of people who immigrated to Turkey at the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Bosnians, Albanians, people from all over the Balkans now are Turks, but they have their roots in the Balkans. You never saw Sarajevo referred to as Sarajevo in the Turkish press or in Turkey; it is Saraybosna. They have names for these places because they were there for so long.

Q: Yes. Well, I think of Sarajevo when I was there in the mid ‘60s when I was in Belgrade and that was a Turkish place. Well, again, we’re still talking about the pre-invasion of Kuwait. How about the neighbors? Was Syria an issue at all?

GROSSMAN: It was an issue because Syria at that time was harboring Abdullah Öcalan, who was the head of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers Party), the terrorist organization that was attacking Turkey. Öcalan was there in Damascus and the Syrians pretended that he wasn’t and relations with Syria were really poor because of that.

Q: Was Turkey at all menacing Syria or Syria menacing Turkey? I’m talking about divisions pulled up and all.

GROSSMAN: Turkey menacing Syria with divisions and artillery tubes doesn’t come until a few years later, when they finally decide Öcalan’s got to go and they put a very large number of troops and artillery tubes down there and told the Syrians, “Get rid of this guy or life’s going to get real hard fast.” I don’t recall at the time, this again is pre-Kuwait war, Iraq war, I don’t remember there being military anxiety between Turkey and Syria.

Q: How about, again going back, was there any, were we monitoring and concerned about Iranian intervention religion-wise into Turkey.

GROSSMAN: Yes, there was some of that. I think, though, we were more concerned with Saudi money being spent in Turkey on schools—madrassas—that promoted radical fundamentalism. Yes, there was concern about Iran, but my recollection is there was
much more concern about Saudi Wahhabism funding the worst kinds of radical and intolerant schools in Turkey.

*Q: Were we looking at the Saudi influence at all or was this not something that we were paying much attention to?*

GROSSMAN: Again, sometimes I forget whether it was during the time I was the Ambassador or earlier as the DCM, but I can remember reporting into Washington, saying, “There’s all this Saudi money coming here and supporting the worst kind of madrassas and could somebody please send a message to Saudi Arabia and tell them to knock it off?” But nothing ever happened that I know of.

*Q: Well then we moved to events in Kuwait. Well in the first place, what was sort of the general impression of Saddam prior to his movement into, he had won the Iran-Iraqi war.*

GROSSMAN: Yes.

*Q: But that wasn’t much of a victory.*

GROSSMAN: Sitting in Ankara, observing from an American perspective, he was a terrible dictator. It’s worth saying that for Turks it was a little more complicated, because the Turks and Saddam had done a deal to keep the Kurds between a hammer and an anvil. Turks were concerned that the PKK was operating in northern Iraq and then moving back and forth across the border and at that time there was a real war going on between Turkey and the PKK. Turks were, in their own way, prepared to manage the Saddam problem if Saddam helped them keep the Kurds under control. And you see that reflected in the run-up to Gulf War I, where a lot of Turkish politicians and others are very concerned about American actions leading to an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; that’s a theme that runs all through the build up to war and its aftermath.

*Q: Sort of where were you and how did the invasion impact and what did we do from the Ankara perspective when that happened?*

GROSSMAN: I actually don’t remember where I was except it was August, I was in Ankara. I can remember thinking, whatever happened to the old “nothing ever happens in August” deal?

*Q: Yes, World War II started in September, you know.*

GROSSMAN: Our most immediate objective after the invasion was, first and foremost, to make sure official and private Americans in Turkey were secure. Clearly as tension rose between the United States and Iraq, Turkey was the place where people thought the Iraqis could strike back at us, and so we spent a lot of time and a lot of effort on security for the American community and American forces in Turkey.
Then the second job was, during that initial period, to get the Turks to agree to meet UN sanctions. The cross-border trade between Turkey and Iraq was huge so when the United Nations put sanctions on, the Turks had a big decision to make. Önal’s decision was that the United Nations was a legitimate international body and that they were members of the United Nations, and so they would impose the sanctions regime. I can remember those first few months being about the UN and getting sanctions in place and then obviously cranking up to actual conflict.

Q: Iran was under sanctions and Iraq now is under sanctions and here you’re sitting on a hell of a lot of oil and right next to Turkey. They must have been hurting.

GROSSMAN: Yes, they did. I don’t think the numbers that Turks use—that they lost 50 billion dollars or whatever it is—is correct, but even if it was a third of that amount of money it was still a lot of money. The living up to sanctions decision by Önal cost Turkey a lot. It devastated the economy in southeastern Turkey that, what do you know, is where the PKK is operating. So all of that effort to try to get people in that area a job so that they wouldn’t have to succumb to the PKK was a corollary disadvantage of having sanctions. That whole route from the Turkish-Iraqi border up to Europe was based on trucks and truck repair, and tires and tire repair, and trading and gasoline and it was just gone overnight.

Q: Did we have any, in this time still up to August of ’90, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: ’90.

Q: Did we have any contact with the Kurdish groups or not?

GROSSMAN: In Iraq or in Turkey?

Q: In Turkey.

GROSSMAN: Yes. We tried hard to make sure that our officers visited with Kurdish leaders, but of course not the PKK; we were very careful obviously not to be involved with anybody from the PKK. But I went on a number of occasions to Diyarbakir and other cities in the east and made sure that when I visited the governor and visited the mayor I also visited with the local human rights association or individual activists. Our consulate in Adana was on the road quite a lot making sure that they were talking to human rights groups and democracy groups all over the southeast.

Q: How did we see the PKK?

GROSSMAN: As a terrorist organization.

Q: Did we see this as basically a terrorist organization, was this a communist organization that we could deal with eventually, how did we ... ?
GROSSMAN: No. I actually never thought we could deal with them. They were terrorists and they did nothing but promote terror. There were three groups at the time; there was the PKK, who connected themselves to Kurdish nationalism and perverted it. Then there was DevSol (Devrimci Sol/Revolutionary Left), which was an indigenous Marxist-Leninist radical group that murdered three Americans while I was DCM. And then there was a very shadowy group called Turkish Hezbollah or the Great Western Raiders or Revengers or Eastern Revengers or I can’t remember what exactly and they attacked a number of targets as well. I must say that I never felt with any of the three groups that someday it would turn out that we would sit down and have a chat with any of them.

Q: How comfortable would you say the relationship was; we had a significant military presence there, both intelligence but also in the air particularly at the time when you got there. How was it working?

GROSSMAN: I thought it generally worked pretty well. There were always stresses and strains at Incirlik (Air Base) because, correctly, Turks considered it was a sovereign base; it was a Turkish base and there were 10,000 Americans living on that base. There were times when Turks didn’t want us to fly and we would want to fly or we’d want to build something they didn’t want. There were times when we were fighting over how much money we should pay to clean up the Konya bombing range. But, by and large, those things—again this is all pre-Operation Provide Comfort or Operation Northern Watch—were in the normal category of relations. Then we also had 900 American service people at the NATO headquarters in Izmir. Then we had, in Ankara, two Major Generals on the country team, one who commanded TUSLOG (Headquarters The United States Logistics Group), which was an Air Force support activity at the base at Balgat, and then the JUSMMAT (Joint US Military Mission for Aid to Turkey), the defense cooperation agreement also headed by a two-star. The US military presence there was a big deal.

Q: Yes. Did we still have monitoring stations along the Black Sea?

GROSSMAN: We had Sinop on the Black Sea coast, which was still there, but it was closed during the time I was there. The Turkish labor unions just raised and raised prices to the point where it was uneconomical to keep it so we closed it.

Q: How did we let the labor unions in that? Normally labor unions don’t try to drive people out.

GROSSMAN: Well, it was one of those things. We couldn’t understand this labor union. I worked with them. We talked to them. The Army at Sinop and the Air Force at Incirlik, they opened their books to their leaders and said, “Look, here’s how this looks. And your labor costs are such that we’re going to go out of business here.” They never believed it. They always believed that Sinop was so vital to American national security that we would never leave there and they were shocked when we said, “Okay, we just can’t afford this anymore,” and left.

Q: Well then we go back to August of ’90. What was the Turkish initial reaction to this?
GROSSMAN: They were like the rest of the world—shocked that Saddam would have invaded a sovereign country. That’s why I think they so quickly signed on to UN sanctions.

Q: Well, how did we bring Turkey in to the alliance against Saddam? Was this a problem or ... ?

GROSSMAN: It took a lot of work and here full credit goes to President Bush and to (Secretary of State) James Baker, who came to Turkey I think four or five times in the period before the war. Credit also to Ambassador Abramowitz, our military colleagues in Ankara and those who visited from Washington and Stuttgart. Everybody worked and worked at this. We needed many things from Turkey; overflight rights for B-52s for example. This was a real lesson in what diplomats do before conflict starts. I give a lot of credit to Baker and I give a lot of credit to President Bush 41, who kept to talking to Ö zal, consulting Ö zal. Ö zal was wary because he was not sure if we were really serious about this. There were two big early questions for us: would he let us use Incirlik for operations and would he approve B-52 overflights of Turkey on their way to Iraq? I can remember as the buildup from Desert Shield was happening, Ambassador Abramowitz would go up to the President’s office and Ö zal would say, “I’m not going to decide, I’m not going to decide yet.” Finally in the week or so before Desert Storm, I can remember Abramowitz going there and Ö zal says something like, “I’m not going to decide about what I’m going to do here until 48 hours into this war.” And Mort says, “Why?” Ö zal, “Because I want to know whether this is going to be war or this is going to be Grenada. Because if it is going to be Grenada and some little intervention, then I don’t want to have anything to do with this because we have to live here. If you’re going to strike Saddam you’ve got to destroy him so you’ve got to go to war. And I’m not sure the United States is ready to go to war. If it is Grenada I’m not doing this because you’ll be off to something else in a few months and I’m still going to be here.” Of course the first night of Desert Shield I can remember Mort going to see Ö zal about 2:00 in the morning on the first night of the air campaign asking “Are you still going to wait 48 hours?” Ö zal said, “No. I got it. You’re going to war. And so yes, the B-52s can come across.”

Q: This is very astute of him, because up to the very end there was the thought of, “Maybe they’ll cut a deal and Saddam will pull back and just take half the oil fields,” which is where they expected it to do it originally anyway.

Why did the chief of staff resign?

GROSSMAN: He resigned because he felt that there was a possibility that a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would be created out of all this chaos and that that was a terrible thing for Turkey. I think he also felt that Americans had dictated the terms of what we needed militarily to Turkey and that Turkey had given up too much, so he resigned. He also knew that every poll showed most Turks opposed the war.
Q: Did you have the feeling that we were asking in a way too much? There’s a tendency in Washington to decide what needs to be done and then our people abroad are supposed to go up and present these demands which are usually at the end of ... often seem overbearing.

GROSSMAN: I don’t think in this case we asked for too much because we were going to war. I don’t think it was too much to ask for overflights of B-52s and bed down for aircraft or search and rescue staging areas.

Q: Where were the B-52s coming from?

GROSSMAN: I think they came from Europe and the US.

Q: What were we thinking about the Kurdish situation there as we went to war? Were we making arrangements with the Turks to make sure that the Kurds didn’t get into difficult straits, or the Kurds didn’t demand too much, or something?

GROSSMAN: We didn’t really know anybody on the Iraqi Kurdish side; we certainly didn’t on the official side because for years there hadn’t been any contact. Again, I just can’t quite place this in terms of time, whether it was just after the Gulf War ended or it was during, it must have been just after it ended, but both Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, leaders of the two main Kurdish factions, reached out to the United States and specifically to the Embassy in Ankara. They said they wanted to meet Ambassador Abramowitz and talk. It seems so amazing now, because Talabani’s the president of Iraq, and Hoshyar Zebari is the Foreign Minister, but this request put the State Department in a panic over whom they should see; what level and where? The decision was taken in DC that while we should agree to meet Talabani and Barzani, the Ambassador couldn’t receive them and that we couldn’t receive them at the Embassy. I was instructed to meet the Kurdish delegation at my home in Ankara. So one day—and again, I just can’t place this except it would have been in the spring-summer of ’91—I received Barzani and Talabani and Hoshyar Zebari at the DCM’s residence in Turkey, and we talked about the situation in Northern Iraq. Our point was, “We’d like to help you and we’d like to talk to you but you’ve got to deal with the PKK as terrorists because that’s what they are.” Over the next few months I met Talabani and Barzani a few times at the house.

Q: I take it the war was on CNN and it was on TV and it was sort of the great evening show of precision bombing and much of it was a little bit not quite as precision as we might have thought but was this playing well in Turkey?

GROSSMAN: It played mixed in Turkey. I’ll give you an anecdote from Özal. Some military briefers from CENTCOM (Central Command) came up at one point to brief on the conduct of the war and they showed 20 minutes of those gee-whiz pictures—bombs down chimneys and bombs in the windows and bombs blow this building up but not that building up; it was really impressive. The lights came up and Özal said, “Colonel, this is really impressive, this is really impressive. But my question is, when are you going to go to war? Because in our part of the world you’ve got to flatten things. Precision only
gets you so far.” Özal again went back to this theme of, “don’t wound this tiger without killing him.” And, “if you’re going to do this, you have to make Saddam disappear.” 

“This is all very nice, bombing down chimneys but what we understand in our part of the world, is total victory.” I think a lot of Turks had in their minds that this was all very interesting technologically but was it going to do the job?

We need also to remember that the majority of Turks hated the idea of that war just as they hated the idea of the 2003 invasion. They don’t like chaos in the neighborhood. As I said before, they had come to a certain arrangement with Saddam about keeping the Kurds under control, and they worried that they’d lose that. At the end of the war, as the US was trying to decide when to stop, and we now know from the histories that General Powell said, “This is enough. The highway of death was enough.” Özal was calling George Bush 41 saying, “Keep going, keep going, let it go for another three or four days. It’s really important that you destroy the Republican Guard.” I don’t think that Özal argued that American forces had to roll to Baghdad, because everybody understood what that would be about, or at the time everyone thought they understood. But Özal begged Bush to go on for three or four more days on the valley or road of death or whatever it was called. For us, it all looked horrible; for Turks, it looked like we were delivering a blow from which Saddam could not recover.

Q: Yes, this is, I’ve talked to people who were in the Near Eastern Bureau at the time and at one meeting somebody raised the thing, “Well suppose Saddam Hussein isn’t overthrown after this war?” And it was met with laughter. You know, it was assumed on our part that he would go. But I take it the Turks ...

GROSSMAN: No, the Turks said the only way he’s going is you’ve got to take him out. Or so weaken the Republican Guard, the Revolutionary Guard, or whatever they were called.

Q: In other words cut off his main source of strength.

Now, we get into the surgical strike thing; if you can do it more neatly. So I take it then, there was sort of basic unhappiness that we stopped it when we did?

GROSSMAN: I think in the Turkish government there was unhappiness that we stopped it when we did. I think the Turkish people were glad to have it over.

Q: Well now, right after the war, Saddam turned on both sort of the marsh Arabs, the Shiite down south, and on the Kurds.

GROSSMAN: Yes. Before we get to that, I’d like to say a word about security. As you can imagine, we were very focused on the security of all Americans—official and private—in Turkey. I chaired the Emergency Action Committee, which met regularly. We put an enormous burden on the people who attended the EAC because we were making decisions that had to do with lives in our community. The EAC team did a great job. I also reached out during that time to Mark Paris, who was then DCM in Tel Aviv,
and to Wes Egan, who was DCM in Cairo. I thought they might be facing similar (or even more complicated) security issues and I was grateful for their advice. The safety of Americans—official and private—was on our minds every hour of every day.

Q: OK. Now back to the end of the war. Particularly the turning on the Kurds, how was this viewed in Turkey? I’d think this would be a mixed reaction.

GROSSMAN: It all turned into a humanitarian disaster so quickly that Turks just couldn’t help but do what the rest of the world did, which was to just feel sorry for the 500,000 people who were pushed by Saddam’s actions into the mountains between Iraq and Turkey. The war ended and it wasn’t a couple of weeks later that Mort was at home and Peter Galbraith, who had been in northern Iraq ...

Q: I’ve interviewed him.

GROSSMAN: Oh good. Well, he was in northern Iraq and he called Mort from somewhere in the east, having, in his story escaped from northern Iraq into Turkey, and said, “You don’t know what’s happening, but hundreds of thousands of people are pouring into the mountains up on the border.” And so Ambassador Abramowitz, went to see Özal and the Turks were also starting to get information that there was this vast influx of people. I think you have it in your mind somehow that these people who fled Saddam were all hardy farmers and people who were used to the mountains. On the contrary, these were urban people who threw everything they had into their Toyotas and drove as fast as they could, as far away as they could, from Saddam’s henchmen and army. Three or four days later what was clear was you had 500,000—and maybe 600,000—people sitting in some of the toughest terrain anywhere, freezing and starving and dying with no capacity to help themselves; these were schoolteachers and lawyers and urbanites who were sitting on the top of mountain peaks. This crisis was the focus of our attention for months to come.

Q: I understand there was a visit by Jim Baker who landed there, took one look and said this can’t ...

GROSSMAN: Right. That was a week or so later, I think. After the initial reports, the first thing we did was try to get information to Washington and the world. Mort decided that it was our responsibility to get information and start to deal with this massive humanitarian problem. Mort approved and I put together Mission teams to head to the border to see what was happening and to see what could be done. I think we sent out five or eight teams, I can’t remember exactly. This was pre-cell phone. Each team was a car, a driver, someone from the State Department or the DAO (Defense Attaché Office) or JUSMAAT (Joint US Military Assistance Team) employee and an FSN. Four people per car. We gave everybody $5,000 in cash and a fax machine. In Turkey you could fax from anywhere; any little hotel, any little place that had a phone line.

We divided up the area into sections and told our teams to “Start driving east and south, get as far as you can toward your area, consistent with being safe, report back and do all
you can to ameliorate the situation.” Those were our instructions. We trusted people to do the right thing. It took people a couple of days to get out there and it became clear this was a disaster and Mort convinced Secretary Baker to stop and see it on his way to Israel. And he and Mort and the Baker team went out quite far into one of the areas where there were just thousands and thousands of people stranded. And as you say, Baker got back on his airplane and on his way to, I think to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, called the President, Cheney and (UN Secretary-General) Kofi Annan and said, “The world has got to do something about this and got to do something about this now.” It was some days before our military started to come in and so for days our Mission teams were it; they were the people who were out with the Turkish authorities doing what could be done. Then we had Special Operations Forces (SOF), led I think by General Richard Potter. They were fantastic. The SOF teams were made for this kind of situation. And then (Major General) Jim Jamerson, who had been the commander at Incirlik during the war, came back to be the commander of the relief operation and then the whole world really started to pile in and bring food and other relief equipment. The US deployed many civilian affairs reservists; they were also fantastic.

I should say that we were lucky because Mort Abramowitz (and his wife Sheppie) had been involved in a massive refugee emergency in Thailand while he was Ambassador there. They really knew what to do and knew the US and international refugee community.

Q: Well, I would think the Turks, in particular the Turkish military, would be very concerned about this. I mean, one, there’s a relief effort; but the other thing is that you almost have a Kurdish state or a Kurdish entity developing.

GROSSMAN: The first priority for the Turkish government was to make sure that the 500,000 Kurds didn’t come in to Turkey. And there were very tense moments when the United Nations, because of the rule of first asylum at UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), demanded that Turkey let all these people in. The United States took the position that while that might be the rule, it wasn’t the smart thing to do in this case, because you could imagine how that would have upset the whole balance of power if 500,000 more Kurds would have come in to Turkey. The Turks would have been mad as hell and it really would have been a mess. So I think the first instinct of the Turkish military was, like ours, to stop people at the border and then have them go home.

The effort was a remarkable one. There were so many personalities involved and so many close policy calls. Mort Abramowitz deserves enormous credit for the success of the effort; he was the galvanizing force. His moral authority compelled attention and he had terrific convening power. Let me give you an example: Mort was able to attract the help of a famous refugee expert, Fred Cuny. Cuny spent some days among the refugees and concluded that most were from the main cities in northern Iraq and that, to get them to go home, the US would have to invade northern Iraq, push Saddam’s forces back and set up a safe zone. I can recall Mort talking to General Powell at one point, explaining that we had to go into northern Iraq if we wanted to end the refugee crisis. Mort won the day and we set up what became Operation Provide Comfort and then Operation Northern Watch.
So many people contributed. General Jamerson as the commander of OPC. Colonel Dick Nabb was in northern Iraq. We sent Embassy liaison officers to Incirlik. French refugee experts designed a “relais” system to coax people out of the mountains by offering gasoline and food in small amounts at “relais” so that people went from one to another and then finally home. General (John M.) Shalikashvili, who was at USAREUR at the time, brought resources and took command of the operation. Other nations contributed people and resources. The airport at Diyarbakir was jammed with relief flights. The US Mission to Turkey continued to be both lead and participate in the effort. I was so proud of our officers and FSNs. And of course the Turks were in it all the way, even though they still worried about the future of northern Iraq.

I can remember touring the area with General Shalikashvili at one point. We landed in Dahuk. It was a crime what Saddam’s forces had done as they withdrew; trashed homes, piles of people's possessions lying in the street.

Once we had established that safe zone in the north, just as Fred Cuny had predicted, 500,000 people went home. It was astonishing because plan B had been to set up nine or 10 massive refugee camps all along a valley in northern Iraq. Many people said that if that were the outcome, these would be the next Palestinians. Instead the Kurds went home and then Operation Provide Comfort really went into operation. At that time it was a U.K., French and American air effort (a no fly zone) to keep Saddam’s army out of the safe zone. Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch went on then for 10 years, 11 years really, until the next Gulf War. The Kurds for the next 11 years showed that Iraqis were capable of having a successful semi-democratic life. Being part of the US and international effort to save those Kurds was a highlight of my career.

Q: How’d you find the NGO community at this time?

GROSSMAN: I was actually quite shocked by most of the NGOs that came to “help” during the refugee crisis. There were some that I thought were great—Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)—who really came to do something. But I must say that many of the others were ambulance chasing. They came with camera crews, they didn’t come with any assistance, and they badgered us and they badgered the Turks for access; they were there for their fundraising.

Q: How’d you find Congress and all; sort of political Washington? Were you deluged with visitors?

GROSSMAN: No, we had all the visitors we wanted. We had some Members of Congress come to watch the relief operation and that was fine. In Turkey, I wanted more visitors, not less visitors. Turkey’s one of those countries where Members of Congress don’t come enough and I’d have taken double the number of Congressional visitors if I could have gotten them.
**Q:** How did you find the aftermath of the war? Did this cause a change in the attitude of the Turkey body politic or not?

GROSSMAN: I think it did, mostly for the negative in the sense that Turks blamed the United States for the economic losses that they had suffered in the sanctions period, and then continuing losses through the sanctions that continued after the war. Then there was always a very profound suspicion that we had a “secret plan” to have a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This is complete nonsense, of course, but I think most Turks worried about it. Some Turks even said that while they didn’t think that of the United States, they did think we were naïve and being manipulated by the British. And so the (August 1920) Treaty of Sèvres was brought out constantly; many Turks thought that the aftermath of the Gulf War was nothing more than an attempt by the British to do what they had failed to do at the Treaty of Sèvres and the Americans were just naïve people who were being hoodwinked by perfidious Albion (the oldest known name of the island of Great Britain). This seeped pretty deeply into the Turkish psyche, that this was all about a Kurdish state, which is why the negotiations during the next 11 years over how Operation Provide Comfort and then Operation Northern Watch should be managed (it had to be renewed by the Turkish parliament every six months) were often so difficult; most Turks didn’t trust us over northern Iraq.

**Q:** What about … was there a change … you were there until when in this DCM period?

GROSSMAN: I was there until June of ’92.

**Q:** Was the Soviet Union still there when you left?

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t think so.

**Q:** Yes, I was wondering when it came apart.

GROSSMAN: I think it came apart in August of ’91, right?

**Q:** Yes.

GROSSMAN: Yes, I can remember watching on TV in Ankara. I should also note that President Bush 41 came to Turkey in July of ’91, to say “thank you” to President Özal and Turkey. It was a fantastic visit. A day in Ankara and a day in Istanbul; it was really exciting. Then I think it was in August of ’91 where Yeltsin’s on the tank. I guess it was that December that the Soviet Union dissolves.

**Q:** Yes. But anyway, in the first place, on the Bush 41 visit, seeing him in operation, what was your impression?

GROSSMAN: Having a Presidential visit is like being in a huge thunderstorm. The advance people came weeks ahead. Every detail was planned. As the DCM, the visit was my responsibility, and Mort, who had decided to retire from the Service just after the
Bush 41 visit, went to Italy for the three weeks before President Bush 41 came. So I was the Chargé and in charge of this visit. It was one of the most exciting things I’d ever been involved in. The President came, we worked really hard, and it was a great success. There were a lot of issues with the Turks over security, as you can imagine. One I recall especially: whose car the President was going to ride in from the airport? Our Secret Service had concluded that President Özal’s car really wasn’t up to standard and they would only allow President Bush to ride in one of our cars. The Turks said, “Hey wait a minute. It is our country, our sovereignty; we’re not having it.” So on the very last day, it was just hours before the President was supposed to arrive, the Secret Service came to see me. They said they had a special car; one of the presidential limousines had extra tall windows and it was lit from the inside so that people who were waving on the street could really see the two presidents inside. Might that help me negotiate? I said, “Are you prepared, to let it have Turkish markings and license plates? They said yes. So I went up to see President Özal late at night; President Bush was arriving at 8:00 in the morning. I said, “Mr. President look, this is the last issue. Here’s the deal. I’ve got this car that is going to make it possible for the people of Turkey to see you and the President together really well. It’s got special windows and special lights and it is just a better car because it is better for you; more people will see you and the President. If you will give me the license plates off your car and the seals of the Turkish government, I’ll put those on our car.” He said okay. So in the middle of the night at the Ambassador’s residence we’re taking the license plates off one car and putting them on this car and gluing the Turkish state emblem on the side of our American limo. At 8:00 in the morning we were all out there at the airport to greet the President and he was in Ankara that day and a night and then we went to Istanbul where he was for a day and a night and it was just terrific. He was great and Mrs. Bush was great and it was a wonderful occasion. 

**Q:** Well while you were there with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire; were the Turks beginning to get a feel of maybe they might spread out a bit? Because you look at Central Asia and it is all Turkey.

**GROSSMAN:** They sure did. They were enthusiastic. You remember also that the Bush Administration did a great thing, opening up our embassies all over there and (Richard L.) Rich Armitage was brought in to get support to those countries. He came to Turkey a number of times; at one point we scoured Turkey for typewriters because he wanted the peoples east of Turkey to use the western writing system. Turks were making the transition to computers and so we at one point shipped hundreds of typewriters to places like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. So Rich was there a lot and the Turks did a lot of training of bankers, for example, but I will say, it was another one of those lessons about what a disaster communism was wherever it was tried. The first Turkish businesspeople who came back from the “Stans”—and they went there with dollar signs going around in their eyes thinking, “These are our cousins and we’re going to get rich”—were shocked by what they found. They found people who didn’t have any idea how to do business. There was no money, terrible poverty, a system that was goofed up beyond all recognition (Rich would call it “FUBAR”). Turkish businesspeople came back saying, “We deeply underestimated the disaster of communism; what a horror for
people.” And so quickly they turned from plans to make money to plans to bring students to Istanbul to teach them how to run a bank or run a business and run a newspaper. Turks really invested heavily in trying to promote education out there. Now in the end, a lot of construction companies especially made a lot of money out there, but the first businesspeople that came back were just horrified.

Q: What about Turkey and the European Union at that time? Not necessarily the entrée into the European Union but I mean just their relationship. Were the Turks making an effort to put roots deeper into it or how did this work?

GROSSMAN: You know, my recollection is that doesn’t really start until, well maybe a little bit in this period, but you don’t really get this as a policy question until ’94, ’95, ’96, when the Turks really decided they wanted to be part of the European Union. So this really doesn’t become a policy effort on the part of the United States and I think mostly on the part of Turks until ’94, ’95.

Q: While you were there were there any of these over flight or passages between islands things, between the Turkish and the Greek islands? Just the other day two planes, a Turkish and a Greek plane crashed against each other maneuvering.

GROSSMAN: Yes, I think so although, again, we’ll come to it later. It was really Imia/Kardak when I was the Ambassador.

Q: Was there any problem from Congress other than you had the Kurdish one, but on the other side there’s always been a very strong Greek American influence in Congress. Did that intrude at all in this period?

GROSSMAN: It is possible that in a couple of military sales to Turkey that Members of Congress and others, Greek Americans, said “Wait a minute, not so fast.” But my recollection of the first time I ever really had anything to do with Greek Americans directly was in the fall of ’91, when the Ecumenical Patriarch died.

Q: He’s based in Istanbul.

GROSSMAN: In Istanbul. He was a wonderful man. I had called on him often when I was in Istanbul. He died and the funeral was set for four or five days later. I was the Chargé and so I flew down to Istanbul to represent the Embassy at this funeral. I was, of course, expecting that there’d be a large official delegation from the United States. I kept waiting for someone to tell me who was going to be the head of this delegation. Apparently there had been a lot of controversy among people back home about who was going to be the head of the delegation. About 2:00 in the morning of the day of the funeral, the White House called me in my hotel room to say that I was going to be the head of the delegation and that they had just announced this from the podium at the White House. I said, “Thank you very much, I can do this. But who is on this delegation and where are they?” And whoever this was calling, I can’t remember, said, “First of all, the President has full confidence in you, you’ll do a great job, you are the head of this
delegation.” I said, “Thank you.” And the second thing they said was that after waiting until a reasonable time, I should call over at the Hilton Hotel, to a Mr. Andrew Athens (co-founder of the Metron Steel Corporation), and explain what’s happened and that Andy Athens would help me. I said okay. I went back to bed.

I woke up about 7:00 in the morning and I waited a few minutes and I called the Hilton Hotel. I said, “Mr. Athens, my name’s Marc Grossman and unbelievably I’ve ended up to be the head of this delegation to the funeral and the White House recommended I call you and ask for your help.” And this charming, amazing man whom I’d never met before said, “Marc, I’m glad you’re the head of the delegation, anything I can do to help, you just let me know.” And I said, “I’d like to meet you and I’d like to meet the rest of the delegates” He said, “Why don’t you come over for breakfast?” So next thing I know I’m at the Hilton Hotel and there’s Andy Athens and a number of the other leaders of Greek-American community and (former Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the Carter Administration) Andy Manatos and a lot of other people and we had a wonderful breakfast. Andy Athens couldn’t have been any nicer to me; he must have been as surprised at this as I was about this turn of events, but we went to the funeral. I made him the co-head of the delegation. We did everything together and this seemed fine with all the other delegates.

I liked him so much. We had dinner that night and we went someplace the next day and he was my first entrée to the Greek-American community and we talked and talked. I saw him often after that and we stayed in close touch. He was a great philanthropist, especially to Hellenic communities around the world. I helped him whenever I could. I was also grateful that the funeral gave me a chance to know Andy Manatos better. He has also remained a wise counselor and good friend.

Although I was the DCM in Turkey and later I was the Ambassador to Turkey, I want to say that Greek Americans and Greeks and especially people who are supporters of the Ecumenical Patriarch, had a legitimate beef with Turkish policy toward the Patriarchate. That is especially true about the way the Turkish government has refused to reopen the Halki Seminary, where Greek Orthodox priests were trained. There are real issues of religious freedom here. I always felt that it was the role of America, and certainly the role of the American Ambassador and the American DCM, to play this straight and to play this fair. I was, and I am, a supporter of the Ecumenical Patriarch. I think the Turks ought to re-open the Halki Seminary, and I think for Greek Americans to raise these issues is right and legitimate. When I was the Ambassador, the Halki Seminary was legitimately a main issue for Senator Sarbanes.

I liked Andy Athens and Andy Manatos and one of the things that occurs—and we’re jumping ahead of the story—is they all become supporters of Turkey’s entry into the European Union because they become convinced that a democratic, modern, tolerant, pluralistic Turkey is best for Greece and the best for the interests of people like the Ecumenical Patriarch. The leadership of the Greek American community was in favor of the efforts that our government made for 10 years to get the Turks a date for the European Union. I think a lot of that came from those early contacts and a lot of it also
came from the fact that we were willing as a government, and I was willing as an
Ambassador, to speak up for their issues when it seemed legitimate to me.

Q: Well it seems to me, too, that there’s probably a generational thing going on here. I
served as Consul General for four years in Athens, from ’70 to ’74, and we were still
dealing with people who had gotten almost literally from their mother’s milk, “The
horrible Turks knocking us out of Smyrna,” and all that sort of thing. The resentment was
still boiling. But we’re talking now about the next generation; that was grandmother’s
problem but they’re moving on and they’re European.

GROSSMAN: Yes, and among the great accomplishments of the European Union is
there’s a way forward in dealing with some of these issues now.

But to go back to the story, I was the head of this delegation; it was really something. It
was an opportunity for me to have a chance to meet all these senior Greek Americans.
Then they came back to Istanbul for the installation of the new patriarch, and there
President Bush 41’s brother was the head of the delegation and luckily I was just a
member of the delegation.

Q: Meeting these Greeks and finding them to be a reasonable people with legitimate
gripes, had you found something that being in Turkey you’d been getting sort of a skewed
view of the Greek-American community and all from people who’d been dealing with
Turkish affairs?

GROSSMAN: That’s a good question. The answer to that question is no. The reason is
that both Mort and I—to the detriment probably of our first few months—we were, of
course, brand new to Turkey and so neither of us had any of that, we didn’t come with
any history with Turkey. I also think that because both of us were Jewish, there’s a
certain sympathy for minorities, and so to see the minority population of Greeks left in
Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarch or the Jewish community there, I had a natural
sympathy toward it, or at least I’m open to the argument. So we didn’t know anybody in
the Greek American community; we didn’t know anybody in the Turkish American
community really. We just came to this cold.

Q: What about your Turkish experts in the various sections and all that? Did you find
that they were badmouthing the Greeks or not?

GROSSMAN: We tried really hard not to get into that, “Embassy Athens says,”
“Embassy Ankara says.” I hate that. I tried not to do it when I was the DCM or Chargé; I
tried not to do it when I was the Ambassador. I don’t know, I just don’t remember either
hearing it or maybe we just were able to give off the signs that we weren’t going to
tolerate it, it is boring. I tried really hard not to fall into the clientelistic view of this. Our
job was to promote American interests, not anyone else’s.

Q: Did you find that being Jewish caused any problem being in an Islamic state at the
time?
GROSSMAN: Well it is interesting. First of all, it is a republic and it is Muslim, but it is not an Islamic state. The other thing, of course, is you go back in history and one of the ironies of history is that when the United States was highly discriminatory against Jews, and especially Jews in the Foreign Service, the only place in the world that would accept a Jewish Ambassador was the Ottoman Empire.

Q: That’s right, that’s right.

GROSSMAN: So it is a really strange thing to look at all of the pictures in the Ambassadorial gallery there in Ankara and there are two interesting sets of people. One is the Confederate General Longstreet, who was sent to be the ambassador or whatever they called it then, Minister, to the Ottoman Empire in the reconciliation period after the Civil War. And then there are pictures of Jewish Americans. In a way, being there as an official of the United States and being Jewish put Mort and me in an historical line. To be clear, there were people who resented Jews and there were extremists who were loud and nasty. That said, most of the people we dealt with didn’t pay much attention. I am not sure if the same would be true today; Ambassador Eric Edelman had a very different experience.

Q: What about relations with Israel during that time?

GROSSMAN: They were just starting to get more formal. One of the things I was most proud of during that period was American official encouragement of the relationship between Turkey and Israel. The Israelis and the Turks had both reached out to each other before Ambassador Abramowitz and I got there, but wherever we could, we encouraged this. There was an Israeli chargé who came during the time I was the DCM, and more and more businesspeople, direct flights, some military exchanges, tourism, and then they upgraded their representation to Ambassadors. I believed this was good for the US, Turkey and Israel.

Q: Well you left there in ’92?

GROSSMAN: Yes but before we move on, I’d like to say something about Mort’s objective to end the official sanctioning of torture in Turkey. When Ambassador Abramowitz arrived in Turkey he heard from many people that a main human rights issue was the then systematic torture of people in police custody, usually in the investigative period of their detention. Mort chose to make one of his prime objectives during his tenure the elimination of this practice. He hated the whole idea of it on moral grounds and understood that Turkey had no chance of getting into the EU if torture persisted. Some people at State and at the embassy advised him against this given our other policy priorities but was committed. He spoke in public and in private. He asked senior civilian and military visitors to raise it, which they seldom did. Mort put this on the agenda in Turkey and forced many Turks to confront it. I had the honor to continue this fight when I was the Ambassador but all credit to Mort for bringing moral clarity on this question.
I left Ankara in ’92. I’d been the Chargé after Mort left, and then (Richard C.) Dick Barkley came and Jim Holmes succeeded me as DCM. I was assigned to Washington and I spent the rest of ’92 as the Principal DAS in PM (Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs). Bob Gallucci was the Assistant Secretary.

Q: And what were the issues that you found yourself in PM?

GROSSMAN: Tech transfers, arms sales, the licensing process and Somalia.

Q: Somalia.

GROSSMAN: When I look back on that, it was one of those lessons about what you learn and how you apply it and, as Neustadt and May highlight in their book *Thinking In Time*, what analogies you use to make decisions. The Army boss of Operation Provide Comfort—now we’re going back to Turkey in ’91—was General John M. Shalikashvili, and the Marine one-star (Brigadier General) who was his deputy was (Anthony C.) Tony Zinni. So fast-forward now to Somalia. General Zinni is at CENTCOM and Shali is at the Pentagon. There are all these people starving in Somalia. Zinni and Grossman and Shalikashvili and many others from the government and the NGO community, who had been successful in northern Iraq said, “We could save Somalis from starvation like we saved the Kurds.”

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: It was also Thanksgiving time and I don’t think anybody could stand to see the starvation.

Q: This played prominently on TV all the time.

GROSSMAN: Everywhere. The pressure to “do something” was enormous. Having been successful in a refugee and humanitarian operation crisis in Iraq, people said, “Why don’t we apply these lessons and do it in Somalia?” As I look back, I’d say it was successful in terms of the humanitarian relief. The humanitarian relief phase of that operation was a credit to the United States and a credit to everybody else that participated.

My recollection is after the election of President Clinton, Bob Gallucci was invited to brief President Clinton in Arkansas about Somalia. I think I also remember that President Bush conveyed to President Clinton that we ought to finish the Somalia operation on January the 20th, 1993. My recollection is he conveyed to President Clinton that he would take responsibility for ending this mission. President Clinton decided to keep on with this and there was mission creep and then there was Mogadishu. I look back and I think to myself it is a mixed bunch of lessons. It is a reminder that you can’t just take an analogy: because we did such a good job in Iraq maybe could do the same thing in Somalia, and yet we did. Then there was a be a big lesson about mission creep, that we succeeded in doing what we wanted to do, which was to feed a lot of hungry people, and then failed in
what we then attempted to do, which was to run the bad guys down.” The fallout of Mogadishu extends to decisions about Rwanda and even into the Balkans.

**Q:** Well what were you personally doing on the Somalia thing?

GROSSMAN: We took the lead at State in the PM bureau. We looked that the chance to contribute to the US effort in Somalia and said, “We’re going to show what a functional Bureau can do.” The PM team worked very hard on this did a great job.

**Q:** Well you left there before the Clinton Administration came in?

GROSSMAN: I did. When the Clinton Transition team came in, Secretary-designate Warren Christopher asked if I would move from being the principal DAS in PM to being the Executive Secretary of the Department. I was honored to accept. That would be a good place to stop.

**Q:** I think this is a good place to stop. And we’ll pick this up the next time in 1993 when you become the Executive Secretary. And we’ll pick it up then.

GROSSMAN: Okay. That’s good.

**Q:** Okay. Today is the 17th of July 2006. Marc, 1993, you had been ...

GROSSMAN: I came back and was for some months the principal DAS in PM for Bob Gallucci. Then there was the election and I got asked to become the Executive Secretary when Warren Christopher became Secretary.

**Q:** How would you describe your job?

GROSSMAN: The first job is that the Executive Secretary supervises the Operations Center, the 24-hour nerve center of the Department. The Op Center is the Department’s connectivity. It is an important face of the State Department and key to the capacity of the State Department to do business. It is also among the first units new political appointee leaders interact with, so we want to put our best foot forward.

Another crucial job is that the Executive Secretary tries to make sure that all of the requirements that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and the Undersecretaries are levying on the building get done in a timely, correct and effective manner. Also vital is to make sure that the political and bureaucratic needs are in balance. There are things the senior people need from the building and there are things the building needs. The Bureaus, the desks, they need guidance and support from senior people, they also need to get paid attention to. On a day-to-day basis, the ExecSec is trying to divide up 100 percent of everybody’s time and that on some days the majority of time was spent making sure that the Seventh Floor got what it wanted and that was right, because they
were leading the Department. But you had some days, and indeed each day to be fair, where it was important also for the bureaucracy and the Bureaus and the people who worked in the State Department to get what they needed as well; a phone call made, a letter signed, a meeting attended. Guidance when it was required. So it was a juggling act and one I loved; trying each day to set priorities.

_Q: Well you came in in ’93; some decisions had already been made regarding I guess the former Soviet Union, hadn’t they? As far as we would have an Embassy in every place?_

GROSSMAN: Yes.

_Q: But we weren’t going to ask for extra money, which is considered to be a terrible mistake, or a real mistake. But anyway, that had been decided. And you had a continuing Yugoslav crisis._

GROSSMAN: Yes, continuing and growing.

_Q: And things had not settled down with China after Tiananmen Square, had they? I mean, there was ..._

GROSSMAN: There was Somalia as well.

_Q: Somalia, yes. So did these things get your time or were you pretty much into the mechanism of just making the machinery work?_

GROSSMAN: The Executive Secretary has to straddle those two things and the machinery has to work. But you have to understand what it is working for. And so at that time we were heavily involved in Somalia and, for example, there was lots of effort to think in a new way about Somalia, especially after Black Hawk Down. So I was involved in a number of those issues, trying to get the structures of government aligned to deal with issues like Somalia or Haiti. With Secretary Christopher’s permission, I brought some people back in from outside of government who’d been retired—Ambassador (James F.) Jim Dobbins for example—to work on Somalia. On Yugoslavia, we were dealing with three issues. One, the substance of it; secondly the international mechanisms of it. But third, as you’ll remember, we had quite a number of Foreign Service Officers resigning, retiring, there were a number of dissent channel messages. So there was also a personnel and morale issue that very much surrounded former Yugoslavia.

_Q: Well speaking of personnel, over the years—I think we’ve talked about this before—the Secretariat had the reputation of being an excellent place to bring up-and-coming young officers to expose them to the workings, one to see how they did under pressure. But the other one was to have them observe the principal activities of the State Department, both helping it go, but also to be the fly on the wall and see how things worked. Was there a conscious effort when you were there to recruit the best and the brightest?_
GROSSMAN: Absolutely. And it started with the Ops Center. Each year we would send out a cable, a personal cable from the ExecSec to all the Ambassadors in the field saying that the Ops Center staff was the cream of the crop, and we asked Ambassadors to personally send in their recommendations for who might be good Watch Officers, senior and junior. Then we went through an extensive process of interviewing people and we tried to choose the best people. Generally then, if people excelled at the Ops Center we then tried to help them either go be Staff Assistants in the Bureaus, or we kept them in the Secretariat to work on the Line, which is the unit that interacted daily and directly with the Bureaus. We also tried to place as many of them as we could as Special Assistants on the Seventh Floor. So our purpose absolutely was to get the best and we always had huge cooperation from the Director General. We went to panel first and we were ready. We worked hard at this because at 3:00 in the morning the people who are sitting in the Ops Center are the State Department. And people whom we sent with Secretary Christopher to travel with him, they are the State Department to him. I recognize that many other people at the State Department do great things every day but service in the Secretariat is a special privilege. So we worked hard and certainly we had wonderful people.

Q: You were there from ’93 to when?

GROSSMAN: Just a year and a bit, I was there just over a year—’93, January of ’93 to the summer of ’94.

Q: How would you describe the relations with say the White House and the CIA and the Pentagon and all of that?

GROSSMAN: You know at that time I thought they were actually pretty reasonable. I think the White House suffered from being on “Clinton time.” Things were late and it was hard for them to decide things in the beginning. I always thought that, and this was a classic case of Democratic Administrations, which generally tend to believe that if they talk about something for long enough that a solution will emerge that everyone will like.

Q: What about did you get any feel for the relations with Congress?

GROSSMAN: Less so from my position. Again, you had a number of Members of Congress forcefully speaking out for US action in Bosnia.

Q: Did you have a feeling that with Bosnia we were essentially punting and hoping for the best or just trying to keep from having to do anything?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think it was that the Administration was trying to keep from having to do anything. It was a question of what could America do that might would work. I also think a lot of people—a little bit like the end of the Bush 41 Administration and into the first part of the Clinton Administration—were hoping that either the Europeans or the United Nations would step up to their responsibilities. And it is not really until too much time goes by and too people have died that you finally have the recognition in the senior
levels of the Administration that the UN isn’t going to do this. The EU is not going to do this. You can’t have two keys on bombing decisions and you can’t have Dutch peacekeepers go out and fear for their lives if they’re going to do anything, and give people guarantees that you can’t keep. So I think that the senior people in our government recognized that the United States was going to have to do something.

Q: When Somalia, because that was played out during the time you were there ...

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: I realize you weren’t in the, sort of the policy seat, but you were juggling the implementing area.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: What was your impression of what happened there?

GROSSMAN: As I said before, this was a question of mission creep. In retrospect, it was too bad that the incoming Administration didn’t take what I recall to be President Bush 41’s invitation to the incoming President, “I’ll take the heat here, let’s get American forces out of there on the 20th of January. They did their job and stopped starvation. That way it won’t be on you. I’ll do it, and then it will be done.”

Q: (This is tape six, side one with Marc Grossman.) Yes.

GROSSMAN: You know, I think people—with good intentions and good hearts wanted to do more in Somalia—started to chase people like Aidid and you end up with Black Hawk Down.

Q: Did you find sort of, oh I don’t know, maybe I’m not using the right term, but dismay or concern or something as how this thing was playing out there? You know, we went in with the best of humanitarian intentions and all of a sudden we find ourselves in to something over our heads.

GROSSMAN: There was a tremendous amount of concern and that’s why in the end we ended our involvement there. But as I say, when I look back I don’t regret advocating the decision to do the humanitarian action. What I think is too bad was that the incoming Administration didn’t accept what I remember as Bush 41’s invitation to pull forces out at the end of his watch.

Q: How about Strobe Talbot? Where did he fit in there?

GROSSMAN: Well he took his job to be essentially the Assistant Secretary for S/NIS, for the former Soviet Union and Newly Independent States, and he worked hard at it. It was his dream to do this, and of course he was a close friend of Bill and Hillary Clinton, and so he was a window into real Clinton life and I think he was a big help to Secretary
Christopher, which is why he becomes the Deputy Secretary of State when Cliff Wharton departed.

Q: Well, you were saying you had to deal with dissent. Was this coming from Somalia or ... ?

GROSSMAN: No, it is coming from Bosnia, from Yugoslavia policy. There were a number of officers, some of whom did resign, but there were a number of officers who were working on the problem. They felt that our policy was bankrupt and wasn’t getting the job done. I admired them; they pressed and pressed and they worked through channels, they wrote their memos and they came to see the Secretary on a number of occasions. We had them come and talk to him and he listened to them. I know we had a number of people use the Dissent Channel. So there was a lot of foment, I guess is the word, inside of the Department over this.

Q: How’d you feel about Bosnia from your perspective? What we should do? Personally, how did you feel at the time?

GROSSMAN: I felt that we should have done more, sooner. I never believed the Europeans were going to organize themselves to do anything and the United Nations had shown themselves incapable of solving this problem. Again, you went back to Srebrenica and these horrible debates about the two keys and who might have military capacity. It was a nightmare. Jumping ahead of the story, you know that’s why—when the debate broke out in 1999 about whether or not we needed a UN resolution to go to Kosovo, when we were writing the Strategic Concept which was adopted at the 1999 NATO summit—some of the Allies demanded that we put into the NATO Strategic Concept the words that the UN would have to approve any future NATO action. We said, “No way. We’re not doing this.” The farthest we would go was to agree that UN approval would be “desirable but not necessary.” I know that how strongly I felt in ’99 was because of what I’d seen in ’93.

Q: How were Christopher and Wharton reacting to all this? You know, both, but just the news about Yugoslavia?

GROSSMAN: I believe that, from the very beginning, Secretary Christopher knew we had to do more. One of his greatest challenges occurred when he went on that trip to listen to the Europeans and we had no plan because the President hadn’t decided on what our plans should be. I think it was horrible for him to have to go on this trip, just sit there without an American plan when he knew that more needed to be done. You could see by some of his appointments—(Charles E.) Chuck Redman was a special envoy for Yugoslavia, (Reginald) Reg Bartholomew as well, these are all people who wanted to do something. I thought by the people he chose to put in charge of this, or to help him, Christopher was trying to say, “We’ve got to do something here,” and I think it was probably a great relief to him when we finally did.
Q: Well did you find, again, were you running across a, say a Yugoslavia mafia within the State Department; people who’d served there before and were they a contributor, one way or the other?

GROSSMAN: A little bit, although the high-level Yugoslavia experts were Larry Eagleburger and (National Security Advisor) Brent Scowcroft. They were gone.

Q: Yes. Well Warren Zimmerman.

GROSSMAN: And Warren Zimmerman, exactly right, and he was still Ambassador. So I don’t think it had to do with length of service or geography of service; I think people on the ground knew and could see what a terrible guy (Slobodan) Milošević was and that the United States of America was the only country that could actually accomplish anything. This was at a time when Secretary Madeleine Albright was talking about the United States being the “indispensable nation,” and I know that some people consider that arrogant, but if you sat where I’ve sat, there’s a lot to it. Very little good in this world can get done unless the United States is doing it or organizing it or supporting it.

Q: You know, I’ve been doing these oral histories now for 20 years, and I come away very strongly with that opinion—for better or for worse—and I stress, for better and also for worse. You had to deal with the various Bureaus. How did you find they responded? Was there almost a ranking system?

GROSSMAN: At that time there was no question that the premiere Bureau at the State Department, was NEA, (Edward P.) Ed Djerejian was the Assistant Secretary and Mark Parris was the Principal DAS and they did the best job of anybody while I was Executive Secretary. They were smart, they were fast, they thought ahead, they supported the Secretary; they were terrific. When I became the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, years later, I kept in my mind, “I want to do it how they did it.” They were spectacular.

Q: How did you find some of the other Bureaus like ...

GROSSMAN: EAP (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs ) was great because Winston Lord was terrific. Winston Lord was a wonderful, smart guy who worked hard and tried to do the right thing. His having worked in Policy Planning for Henry Kissinger really showed. Steve Oxman was in European Affairs and his challenge was that he was charged with leading a bureau radically changed by S/NIS and then also by the uncertainty over the Balkans.

Q: How about ARA? Was this, as so often, almost off the radar?

GROSSMAN: It was a little bit, I’m afraid. And then AF (Bureau of African Affairs), of course, was dealing with Somalia.

Q: Yes.
GROSSMAN: The other thing from that time that will come back in this story is the terrible decision to save money by not hiring new FSOs for two or three years. They even stopped giving the test. Didn’t bring any new Foreign Service Officers in. Not a good choice.

Q: Yes. As soon as you cut off it takes you 20 years to work your way through it. Well, how did you find sort of the making of Warren Christopher and the Foreign Service?

GROSSMAN: Right, yes.

Q: And had done a fine job, particularly dealing with the Iranian hostage crisis. Was he comfortable in the Foreign Service?

GROSSMAN: Yes. He knew the Foreign Service and surrounded himself with good Foreign Service Officers. He was very comfortable with the State Department. And I think in his way he wanted to, would have been very glad to, really just have been the Secretary and given direction and guidance and done the travel which was necessary, and let everybody else get all the credit. That’s how he was. Like Powell, Christopher wanted his Assistant Secretaries to do things and be things and the Undersecretaries to do things and be things.

Q: Well did you pick up any uncomfortableness or sort of behind the learning curve as far as President Clinton and all about foreign affairs? Because they came in strongly on the economy.

GROSSMAN: No, my recollection is that, obviously, they had a hard time in the beginning sorting their relations out with the military. But (Anthony) Tony Lake and Sandy Berger (National Security Advisors) knew plenty about foreign affairs.

Q: Yes. Well of course no matter where a President comes from, they run on a domestic policy and they find themselves invariably sucked into foreign affairs more and more and, one, it is more interesting and, two, it does require them to get out there.

GROSSMAN: People say Americans are not interested in foreign affairs and yet if you’re President, yes, there’s an article in the business section on the economy and maybe one on inflation in the front section. But mostly, if you were to read The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post and The New York Times every day, you’d think we were consumed with foreign affairs, which in a way we are. And I think no President can say, “Well, I’m going to leave that to somebody else,” because that’s what Presidents do.

Q: And did you go on any secretarial trips?

GROSSMAN: I told Secretary Christopher when I took the job that he was not sending me on trips. I sent one of my deputies at all times; they were in charge of those trips. But
when the Secretary of State was away it was imperative that the Executive Secretary of the State Department be at home.

_Q: Why is that?_

GROSSMAN: Because the Executive Secretariat is the backstop for the Secretary when he’s traveling. I only left the country once.

_Q: Well you were there about a year?_

GROSSMAN: A year and a bit, yes.

_Q: And then what?_

GROSSMAN: Dick Barkley, who had been the Ambassador to Turkey, announced he was going to retire, take up another opportunity, and the paperwork was starting to see who’d be the next Ambassador to Turkey. I said to Mildred, “You know this is really weird, but I could do this, and it might be great.” And she said she’d love to go back. So I went to visit the Secretary and I said I know there will be lots of other candidates and lots of people more senior and lots of people deserving—and there could be political appointee candidates—“But I’d like your permission to go down and see the Director General and put my name on the list.” He was very gracious about it and let me out of my commitment to him. So I visited the Director General and I said the same thing, I said, “I know there will be lots of other candidates but I’d like to put my name on this list.” And for whatever reason I got the nod and there were no White House candidates and I went to Turkey. I was sworn in as the Ambassador to Turkey right after Thanksgiving 1994.

_Q: How about Congress? Did you have any problems there?_

GROSSMAN: I did not have any problems that were not of my own making. I learned a huge important lesson during my confirmation. I started to study to be the Ambassador and I called on all the people that I needed to call on, which included all the Members who were pro-Greek and Members who were very anti-Turkey. There weren’t too many people who were pro-good relations with Turkey but I hoped to find them. I went to everybody. I think they appreciated it. So that went well.

But on the day of my hearing, I was on a panel with (Alfred H.) Al Moses, who was going to Romania, and somebody else, I can’t remember who it was. I did a terrible job. I was so embarrassed. The questions were all easy, fair, good questions. Senator Sarbanes went out of his way to help me. But I’d never testified before and I looked up there and there was the Greek press and their TV cameras and there was the Turkish press and their TV cameras and the Senators and the audience and I got confused about who I was talking to and I did an awful job. Now, I guess I did enough to get through because the Committee voted for me and I went on to be the Ambassador for Turkey, but I never forgot it and I said I would never testify like that again. During the years I was in Turkey, I sought people out who testified well, who gave advice about testimony; I tried to watch
people so that when I did it again I would do a better job. I never got as good as Larry Eagleburger or Rich Armitage, but I got better.

Q: Well, there’s these oral histories that I hope will be read by other people, but you learn. Did you get any words of wisdom to pass on?

GROSSMAN: In Turkey, I met an American political consultant—Bob Squier—now sadly passed away, who was working for Tansu Ciller, then prime minister of Turkey. He was at dinner at our residence and I explained to him that I’d done a terrible job at my hearing and wanted to improve.

He said, “Listen, there are certain rules here that you have to remember and the most important is that you’ve got to be yourself.” He said it is imperative when you testify that you be yourself. He said second, “You have to remember that the only audience that matters is the Senators and that you can do press guidance and explain to the press later, but your job is to focus on them.” Third, he said, “Remember to take your time before you answer because you know more about this generally than they do.” What happens to people is that they get nervous and they start talking. And then, as he described it, about five sentences in you finally find your lead and then you start over once you find the answer. Instead, he said, “Just think for a minute and find your lead and then start talking.” And then he said to me a really important thing; “Testifying is a drama in which you play yourself.” In other words, it is part of American democracy; they sit up there and you sit down here and they ask you questions and you answer them. Bob said, “You have to remember that this is a drama in which you play yourself; you play your role.” And he had two or three others rules, which I wrote down on a three by five card. And until the last day I testified, I would put that three-by-five card up under the microphone just to remind myself what I was doing. Another one of those rules was “never get into a fight” because, he said, you can never win a fight in testimony. I got better at it little by little. And I tried to watch people who were good at it. As I said, Larry Eagleburger was spectacular at testimony because he spoke in declarative sentences and tried to answer their questions. Rich Armitage was fantastic in testimony. So my first confirmation was a learning experience.

Q: Well now, talking about the people who you went around to see, particularly you got this I having served my four years in Athens back in time of the colonels, very much aware of the Greek, i.e., anti-Turkish lobbies, not so much of the Armenian but the Armenians out there, too. What were you picking up at that time; this would be ’94, about the American anti-Turkish constituency?

GROSSMAN: I thought that what I heard was that people who said they were anti-Turkish or anti good US-Turkish relations, what they really were saying was that America—because of Turkey’s military and strategic importance—didn’t pay enough attention to Greece and that Greek Americans didn’t get listened to in a serious way. I sensed this in the majority of the calls that I made, people who became quite friendly to me over the years, like Senator Paul Sarbanes; what Paul Sarbanes wanted was a fair hearing. He wanted somebody to pay attention to Greece as an ally of the United States.
When the Turks did something bad, which they did from time-to-time—he wanted somebody in the USG to say something. A lot of them felt—Andy Manatos, Andy Athens, Paul Sarbanes—that the Turks would do things that were wrong and the press guidance that came out of the State Department would say all was right on the Turkish side. So my sense was that people first and foremost wanted somebody to be fair and to pay attention to the issues like religious freedom that really bothered them. So, for example, when I went from place to place everyone said to me, “You’ve got to pay attention to the Ecumenical Patriarch and his challenges.” I had paid a lot of attention to the Ecumenical Patriarch when I was the DCM and I promised them I would continue to pay attention when I was the Ambassador; I’d built up some credibility and they believed me. I saw this as a matter of religious freedom. I think what surprised Senator Sarbanes and some of the others was that I was prepared to say so in public and that I was prepared to say so in public in Turkey.

Now, were there specific things that we fought over from time to time? A weapons sale to Turkey? Yes, absolutely. But fundamentally they wanted somebody to listen to them and they wanted somebody to be fair to them. The other thing that greatly benefited me was that this was also a time when the United States was beginning to have some traction with the European Union about Turkey’s ultimate entry into the EU. It was during the time I was the Ambassador that we drove US policy to help the Turks get into the EU’s Customs Union. Dick Holbrooke, who was the EUR Assistant Secretary, (Stuart E.) Stu Eizenstat, who was the Ambassador to the EU, and Sandy Berger were great allies in this effort, which President Clinton totally supported. The reason I mention that is because Greek strategic thinkers also started to consider the advantages of having Turkey in the European Union and so, while not perfect, you could see the beginning of Greek Americans and Greeks in Greece starting to say it would be better for Greece—and would make Greece even more successful—if Turkey were a member of the European Union, because why should Greece be the eastern edge of the European Union? Why not have it be Turkey?

Q: Who was the Ambassador to Greece while you were there?

GROSSMAN: Most of the time it was Tom Niles. Tom Miller was his DCM.

Q: Well now, while you’re on the subject, what brought the Greeks into thinking that having Turkey with them; did they feel that they were alike and maybe they were part of a bigger hunk of people wanting to come out of the European ...

GROSSMAN: There was a Greek foreign minister who mostly was radically anti-Turkey; his name escapes me at the moment. But one day—this might be a little bit later after I came home from Turkey—he and I were at the State Department. We went downstairs together after a meeting with the Secretary. The Greek Foreign Minister was doing his press conference. He was asked about Turkey and the European Union, and he said, “You know why I’m for Turkey in the European Union? Because those guys up there in Europe say that that it is ‘a Christian club.’ Well we’re Greek Orthodox, and sometimes they don’t think that that’s Christian enough, and so it would be good for us to
have Turkey in there—to remind people that there isn’t just one way of thinking about
the world.” I think he really meant it. The other thing for Greek strategic thinkers, I think
they did come to believe that you could have a choice. You could, if you were Greece,
seek your support from people who are supporting you because Turkey’s a really bad
place. Or you could be in favor of a more democratic, free market, reasonable, self-
confident Turkey, which you’d rather have as your neighbor than somebody who’s out to
violate your sovereignty all the time. I think they looked at the map and they said, “What
do we want over there? Do we want democracy or do we want Iran?”

Q: Yes. When you got to Turkey, what was sort of the issue on the agenda?

GROSSMAN: One of the things I had bumped into when I was getting ready to go to
Turkey was an effort at the White House to bring America into support of what was then
the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline (later the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline) to bring oil
from Baku—the capital of Azerbaijan—to Ceyhan through southeastern Turkey. I
thought, “What a great idea.” All the reasons for supporting it were terrific—
protecting the environment in and around the Bosphorus, no Russian energy monopoly (“multiple
pipelines”) and creating an East-West energy corridor. There was a wonderful NSC
staffer, Sheila Heslin. I met Sheila and she seemed like the only person in the universe at
the time who was in favor of this. But I thought, “What a great idea on the substance and
what a great way for me to start off as the Ambassador of Turkey, if the USG could
support this idea.”

I worked with Sheila Heslin and lots of other people and Deputy NSA Jim Steinberg and
NSA Sandy Berger and all kinds of people and there was a huge debate inside of the
government about our support for the pipeline. Why there was a huge debate I cannot
even remember. But there was a big debate about this, but the President decided that we
were going to support this Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline. I scheduled a press conference in
Ankara just after I presented my credentials, which was in January of ’95. So I sent a
cable back and I said, “I’m going to have this press conference; would it be okay if I
announced our support for Baku-Ceyhan?” Well I get back a cable that says, “Yes, go
ahead, please do and here’s some talking points and here are the reasons and good luck.”
So in January of ’95, at the Ambassador’s residence, I had a press conference and they
asked me what my priorities were and I said, “You know, one of them is right here, right
now: to announce American support for Baku-Ceyhan and then work with the interested
parties to make it a reality.” The huge headlines next day started off my Ambassadorship
in a really good way. Then of course it was a complicated endeavor and many of my
successors and many people at State worked on this for years to come. The irony of our
conversation here today is that Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline opened officially on the 13th
of July, 2006 four days ago. It just proves again that service in government is like running
a relay race. You have the baton and while you have it, you run as fast as you can, and
you give it to the next person. BTC is also proof of the power of an idea and the
especially the power of having an idea in the bureaucracy and being willing to fight for it
over a long period. (This part of the story is well told in The Oil and the Glory by Steve
LeVine.)
Q: What were the problems?

GROSSMAN: Oh, there were a huge number of problems. First, there were a lot of academics and think-tankers in the United States who said, “A terrible idea, it will never happen.” Then there were people who said that it would make Russia mad. And then it turned out to be lots harder to get the financing than everybody thought. One of the conditions that we set, which was a very proper condition, was that BTC had to be commercially viable. The first couple of companies, big oil companies that looked at it, said they didn’t want to have anything to do with it. And then the final reason was that the Turkish government didn’t quite know how to pursue this great opportunity. They had a great point-person, Emre Gonensay, but he had a hard time getting Ankara lined up. The project languished but, back to the indispensability of the United States, during the last few Administrations we’ve had a pipeline coordinator at the State Department—Beth Jones, Steve Mann, John Wolf, Dick Morningstar—wonderful, purposeful people who’ve had that job who just pressed forward and helped make BTC a reality. As I also said, my successors in Ankara worked at this as well. And finally it came in May of this year. It actually started to move oil and they had the official opening on the 13th of July—a really great accomplishment. Now it goes through Tbilisi and sort of hooks in a bit of Georgia, that’s BTC, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, and of course my dream had been and maybe still is, is that one day it would also sort of hook through Armenia and that it would also be a way for Armenia and Turkey to do things together. BTC was a strategic policy issue for the US and I was honored to be a part of it.

Q: How did you find the Turkish government when you went out?

GROSSMAN: Süleyman Demirel was president. It is hard for me to look back and have a great answer because I’d been there just two years before, so for me it was coming back to a world I knew pretty well. Mrs. Ciller was the PM. Turkish diplomats were very good. My counterpart there was the MFA Undersecretary, first Ambassador (Ozdem) Sanberk and then Ambassador Onur Oymen.

Q: How stood matters with Cyprus?

GROSSMAN: Not well at all. Really during the time that I was the Ambassador there I don’t think we really made any progress at all on Cyprus. President Bush 41 made the last, best effort. He used his trip to Greece and Turkey in 1991 to try to make some progress on Cyprus. He made a very fair proposal to the Turks at a breakfast meeting in Istanbul. I thought President Özal was tempted, but the then PM, Mesut Yılmaz, rejected it. Another missed chance.

The big Greek-Turkish crisis at the time I was Ambassador was Imia/Kardak.

Q: Was that that little island?

GROSSMAN: Yes.
Q: Uninhabited.

GROSSMAN: Except for some goats. Mildred was facing serious surgery at that time and my recollection of how this all started is really hazy because I was focused on her. I can remember that the night before she went to the hospital, we were here in Washington, D.C. The night the crisis was the worst was the night before Mildred was going in for surgery, very early the next morning at Sibley (Memorial Hospital) and I can remember sitting there trying to do what I could to make her more comfortable and pay attention to Imia/Kardak. I talked that night to Sandy Berger, to Holbrooke, to everybody who was working so hard to try to solve this problem. Holbrooke in the end did one of his magic pieces of diplomacy. One thing I will never forget is that about 11:00 that night. Sandy Berger finally said, “Marc, I know what you and your wife are facing and we’re going to now stop bothering you; we’ll worry about Imia-Kardak.” I was very grateful. And so, as I say, my recollection of all this is that it was really bad, they were really close to fighting and Holbrooke and Sandy Berger did a wonderful job in having both sides pull back.

Q: I think it was Holbrooke who maybe, I interviewed Tom Niles and I’m not sure who told me but I think it was he quoted Holbrooke as saying, “Here are these two countries that were getting close to war over this stupid thing and Americans were all over the place working late at night and the Europeans, some went home and went to bed.”

GROSSMAN: Well, again to jump ahead, a similar thing happened to Secretary (Colin) Powell at the beginning of his time. The Moroccans and the Spanish started to go at it over Ceuta and Melilla. At one point he spent the whole night on the phone and he came in the next morning and he said, “Could someone explain to me why the American Secretary of State is mediating a problem about Ceuta and Melilla between Morocco and Spain?” But again, the US is the indispensable nation and we have the power to do diplomacy right. If Dick and Sandy hadn’t done that work I think the Turks and Greeks might have gone to war.

Q: Part of it is that I think we poke our nose in but there’s something about Americans they can’t stand to see something coming apart if you can do something; just don’t stand there, do something.

GROSSMAN: We are programed to solve problems. We may not always understand—as Kissinger says the Chinese do—that solving one problem may lead to other problems; we want to solve the problem in front of us. In this case, you had two allies; no outcome of a fight between Turkey and Greece is a good one for them or the United States.

Q: Right. What was the situation with the Kurds at that time?

GROSSMAN: There was a lot of fighting in the southeast, with increasing worry about Americans being targeted. There was information that would come from time to time that the PKK wanted to attack American targets. We were doing all what we could to support Turks in a fight against terrorism, and at the same time we were doing all we could to tell the Turkish government and military that they had to do this in a humanitarian way; that
abuse, the lack of democracy and lack of freedom, restrictions on freedom of expression, were not the answer to this question. We said they were right to fight terror, they had to fight terror and the PKK was certainly a terrorist organization, but the idea that there was a solely military answer to this problem was wrong. I must have said it in public 100 times if I said it once, that there was no solely military solution to this problem. There was no solely political solution either—you had to fight—but the idea that you could just fight was not going to work.

Q: Well had the Turkish PKK, the Kurdish PKK leader, been arrested during that time?

GROSSMAN: No, that came later. Öcalan’s arrest comes while I was the Under Secretary.

Q: What about, were the Turks making any effort at the time to bring the Kurds in to the Turkish body?

GROSSMAN: Compared to now, again, to today, they were doing very little. At that time, you could hardly say the word “Kurd” in public.

Q: It was still Mountain Turks?

GROSSMAN: Yes, but there was starting to be a change, little by little. One of the things that I experimented with when I was there was an offer from David Phillips, now at Colombia University, to help organize some Track Two diplomacy involving Turks and Kurds. There was a confidential, not secret but confidential, group of Kurds and Turks who left Turkey periodically—and who were funded by a grant from the government of Norway, I think—who went and talked in a European country. I read some very interesting transcripts. In the end, they issued a public, joint declaration about the future of Kurds and Turks. It was a courageous thing to do. Also, we were working really hard at that time across the board at ending officially sanctioned torture. Freedom of expression was a huge priority, not just for Kurds for all Turks. There were 100 journalists in jail at that time.

One of the opportunities that came along in 1995 was the possibility that Turkey could join the European Union’s Customs Union. We, the United States, pushed very hard both on Europeans and on Turks to get the Turks into the Customs Union. I made a wonderful friend and alliance with Stu Eizenstat, who was then the Ambassador to the EU, and he worked so hard to make this happen. We got it down to where we understood what the Turks needed to do to get into the Customs Union, including releasing journalists and changing some of their laws. It was a great accomplishment that they became Customs Union members. And what it meant was that huge numbers of journalists got out of jail and the Turks changed a number of sections of the penal codes to allow for more freedom of expression; there were a number of very specific things that got done and it was real diplomatic work, both in Brussels and in Ankara. It was a case of using the opportunity diplomacy presented to accomplish multiple objectives.
Q: Well now, this is the European Union and you’re the American Ambassador, what about the Europeans?

GROSSMAN: There were some Europeans who were really for it. The European Union Ambassador in Ankara, Michael Lake, couldn’t have been more helpful. But this was something that the US took hold of because we were the people who had, I think, enough credibility with Turks to ask them to make the changes that were required to get this job done. It really was the beginning of the vision that Holbrooke and I had that, among the most important things that the United States of America could do, would be to get Turkey into the European Union. I should say that President Clinton approved this policy and was a big source of support.

At that time, our message to the Europeans was to think strategically and not tactically about Turkey and that our view was, better to have Turkey in the European Union than outside the European Union. My recollection is that Turkey was still a pretty big mystery to most Europeans; that a lot of Europeans were in the “Christian Club” category and weren’t interested in Turkey. But, as I say, with a lot of support, we got it done. I confess that there were some people in Washington and Europe who kept betting against us. They kept betting that we’d never get Article 8 of the penal code changed. But we did get these things done for one key reason: Turks wanted the changes for their own future.

The other thing is, you have to keep in mind that especially at that time—this is ’95—that Turkey becoming a European Union member was still a glimmer in a tiny number of peoples’ eyes, including Holbrooke and a number of Turks as well. If you fast-forward now to last October 3rd (2005), they got a date. I am sure there will be many hurdles in the future. And it may never happen. But Europeans and Turks don’t have to make final decisions today. Turkey is not ready today to become an EU member. The EU is not ready to have them. But national aspirations are important.

Q: Yes. Well what about Islamic Fundamentalism while you were there?

GROSSMAN: Well my recollection is while I was Ambassador there was increasing Islamization or Islamism in Turkey; more women in head scarves, more religious talk and, of course, while I was there also Mr. (Necmettin) Erbakan of the Refah (Welfare) Party became Prime Minister. So we could observe that there was increasing, I guess at that time we called it religiosity, in Turkey, and more people wanted to speak out for their religion. So over the years that I was there Ramadan got stricter, for example, more restaurants closed, more people fasted.

Q: Eid being the religious holiday.

GROSSMAN: Yes. Ramadan got stricter, more people were fasting, and more people paid attention. What really bothered me at that time was that we also could see that Saudi money was pouring in to the worst kind of schools in Turkey, teaching Wahhabism and, I don’t know if they were madrassas exactly like in Pakistan, but schools where intolerant
things were being taught. I must have sent cable after cable to Washington asking, “Would somebody please tell the Saudis to knock it off?” But that never happened.

Q: Did Iran have much of a role in Turkey?

GROSSMAN: It did at that time. Thousands of Iranians lived in Istanbul. Thousands of Iranians transited Istanbul to go to the West. Hezbollah operated in Turkey and then, of course, also at that time—and details are sort of fuzzy to me now—we were in a big fuss with Turkey over their interest in building a gas pipeline from Iran into Turkey. The Iran/Libya Sanctions Act (of 1996) was in play. In the end we did a diplomatic deal of delay on the proposed pipeline, I think, so we did not impose sanctions on Turkey. But Iran is always one of those things that is in the back of a Turk’s head; it is big, it is near, it is Persian, it is different.

Q: Well the Iranians, I assume, in Istanbul would be opposed to the government in Iran, wouldn’t it?

GROSSMAN: There were a lot of people there who were proselytizers for the government of Iran. As I say it was a big transit point; we had Farsi speakers in our consulate in Istanbul in order to do visa work.

Q: Iraq at that point?

GROSSMAN: Well Iraq comes heavily back into play. It was Labor Day of 1995 or 1996. Saddam attacked Irbil and attacked the Kurds again, rolled up a lot of the opposition networks, and I was asked and my Embassy was asked to first evacuate people who had close ties to the CIA, which we did. Then we were asked to evacuate about 600 people with close ties to the American government, which we did. And then Julia Taft, God bless her, who was the head of the NGO Interaction at the time, successfully lobbied the White House and we then were instructed to evacuate 6,000 people from northern Iraq who had ties to the US Government. Because we had learned so much in the previous refugee crisis, we were actually pretty good at it. We had the State Department charter aircraft and we chartered a huge number of buses. We brought people across the border and INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) people came from all over the world to help us.

We checked people, moved people, housed people, put people on buses, and we sent them up to Diyarbakir. The charter planes landed there and we put them on the planes and then they went out to Guam where they were processed. The whole US Mission in Turkey pitched in and people did a great job.

Q: Well what was the reaction of the Turkish government to this stirring up within the Kurdish part of Iraq?

GROSSMAN: Well they were always very suspicious of everything we were doing. It is also at this time, and I can’t remember exactly the times that we were adjusting Operation
Provide Comfort to Operation Northern Watch, the French pulled out, and Britain and America were left flying Northern Watch. There was a lot of continuing Turkish anxiety about the future of Iraq.

**Q:** Were you able to get out and around in Turkey quite a bit?

**GROSSMAN:** I got out more as the Ambassador than I did as the DCM. The Ambassador is in Istanbul a lot because Istanbul is New York: all the newspaper publishing and TV and big businesses are there and that’s where CODELs (Congressional Delegation) want to go.

I had heard about what was going on in some of the eastern and southern cities—Denizli, Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep—and I really made an effort to get out there. I thought that what I was seeing there was the beginning of some new synthesis about what Turkish life was going to be like, which were these amazingly entrepreneurial, plugged-in, globalized people but they were more conservative; more Islamic. They sat out in these big towns on the Anatolian Plain doing great and in a way they were saying to the central government, “Leave us alone, we’ll be fine, we can get this job done.” They were saying to the globalized world they were open for business and they were working their way towards some Turkish defined, pluralistic convergence. That’s what I thought, or maybe hoped, at the time. I tried to get to a number of those cities so that I could understand that a little bit better. I got far southeast and I went to Diyarbakir a lot to pay attention to the human rights situation there and once Mildred and I went to Van, which I think was as far east on that trip as we got, we went to Van and saw the lake. So I tried my best.

**Q:** Well were the Turks plugging in to sort of the information revolution, the Internet?

**GROSSMAN:** Absolutely. Well, not into the Internet at that time, but there were cell phones at that time. Cell-phone technology took off in Turkey; everybody had a cell phone. Big businesspeople would have four cell phones; they’d be talking on four cell phones simultaneously.

You know, I went one day to, I think it was Gaziantep or one of those cities out east, and I was on my way to see a textile manufacturer, a young guy, and I’m thinking to myself, “What do I know about textiles? Nothing. What am I going to talk to this guy about?” So I was in the car and I was trying to think up five good questions. I get invited into his office—again he’s a young guy—he’s got one TV tuned to CNN, another TV has Quotron, which at the time was a Reuters service to give people financial information from all around the world. We sit down. He says, “Ambassador welcome, please tell me about the WTO and how you think it will affect my business?” And I thought, well this is globalization right in front of you, right there, right now.

**Q:** Well did you sense that, with the advent of the cell phone and knowing about the personal computer and all that, this is going to have an effect on the body politic of Turkey?
GROSSMAN: Yes, oh yes. Turkey’s one of those countries that I think—unless something terrible goes wrong—will be a more democratic country today than it was 15 years ago or 20 years ago and it is going to be a more democratic country 15 years from now. When I first went to Turkey to serve in 1989, there were three TV stations and they were all government controlled. Well, there now must be 50 TV stations in Turkey and they’re all private. I think there’s still one or two government channels, but when I was there those first couple of years satellite TV came for the first time and people didn’t have to sit around and listen to the government TV proclaim their greatness; every night it was the same—here’s what the president did today, what the prime minister did today, what the deputy prime minister did today. Now you don’t have to watch that in Turkey at all and there are phone-in programs. Turkey’s a much more vibrant place and one of the reasons is that America—the first time I was there and the second time—as best we could we really supported civil society. We encouraged NGOs, we did everything we could to create space where people could come out and participate. I felt that was part of promoting American values.

Q: Well were NGOs, were they taking to the Turkish system?

GROSSMAN: I recall that among the first NGO to form was a group to protect sea turtles in Antalya. It tapped into global environmentalism. And there was a Helsinki Watch group. The turtle people created enough environmental consciousness to encourage the government to set up an EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). I was delighted that when we asked our EPA to send some people to give advice, they responded positively.

Q: How about the universities? Did you go to universities? You know, some places the universities are so radical just because they’re universities. How’d you find the Turkish?

GROSSMAN: I went to many universities. Sometimes you’d be asked hard or provocative questions, but that’s part of the fun, so you answer them. Again, I think what Turkish students wanted was somebody to pay attention to them and listen to their views and answer their questions.

Q: How are relations military to military; I’m thinking our bases there and all? How did they play out while you were there?

GROSSMAN: While I was there we were closing bases and we were doing so for two reasons. One is that strategically there wasn’t a need for so many of these bases and so we closed a lot of the smaller installations around Turkey. Then there were two or three big bases like Sinop, on the most northern edge of the Turkish side of the Black Sea coast and a couple of others, where the unions just priced themselves out of existence. We had a couple of strikes. We opened the books to the unions. I said, “Show them,” but the unions never would believe it and they struck at Sinop and we said, “We’ll just close it, we can’t afford this, and it doesn’t produce anything strategically anymore.”

Q: Well what was the reaction? Were they surprised?
GROSSMAN: Very surprised—because they had deluded themselves into believing that we got priceless information from these facilities.

Q: How about the Turkish military and our military? Were there any problems with them?

GROSSMAN: Well, it operated at two levels. One is the relationship military to military at a high level, which was actually quite good, but there was just constant pushing and shoving between the two militaries at Incirlik over Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch. Life at Incirlik was just really hard; it was made hard by the Turks, it was made hard by us because we had two competing objectives there. We wanted to expand our capacity to protect the Kurds in the north; they wanted to restrict Kurdish autonomy.

Q: These were planes flying over the territory to keep ...

GROSSMAN: Saddam away.

Q: Saddam away.

GROSSMAN: Right. And we kept it up for 11 years.

Q: Was there sympathy for Saddam within the Turkish military or any of those?

GROSSMAN: No. There was some sympathy for Saddam among certain parts of the Turkish diplomatic corps and people who thought the best way to keep the Kurds down was to squeeze them between a strong Saddam and a strong Turkey. I think that was a minority view, but it wasn’t a zero view. I think some days Turks were quite happy with Saddam Hussein because he didn’t like Kurds any better than they did. I don’t think you’d find it today but at the time there were people who were still prepared to talk out loud about it. You know, you’d go into a diplomat’s office and there’d be a picture of Saddam in a silver frame.

Q: How about the Armenians? There was now an Armenia; were there any Armenians left in Turkey and were the events of 1916 still floating around?

GROSSMAN: There was an Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul. I visited him to show our support for religious freedom. Several thousand Armenians still live in Istanbul and worship there with him as their spiritual leader. I had tried as DCM with an American businessman of Armenian origin to promote a cross border electric power-generating and power-sharing scheme and redevelopment of the Trabzon port. It did not work after it leaked in the press. During the time I was the Ambassador, one good thing that happened was that we finally convinced the Turks to open what’s called the H-50 air corridor from Istanbul to Yerevan. But not much really happened, although again not to jump ahead, but it did lay the basis for when I was the Undersecretary. David Phillips, the same person I worked with on the Track Two diplomacy on Turks and Kurds, set one up with
Turks and Armenians, which was very interesting, tricky, amazing, and remarkable. He tells this story in his book *Unsilencing the Past*. But I can’t report any good progress on that issue while I was there. I would say to Turkish leaders, “Open the land border. I read in the press that governors and mayors in the border area are begging for that border to be open because they do a huge business out there.”

*Q: Sure. Was Peter Galbraith at all a factor while you were there, because he got very much involved with the Kurds from time to time?*

**GROSSMAN:** As we discussed before, I recall it was Peter Galbraith who gave us our first warning of the refugee crisis in ’91. He escaped from northern Iraq, got into Turkey and among the very first things he did was call Mort Abramowitz and say, “Terrible things are happening in northern Iraq and a very large number of people are headed toward Turkey, are headed into these mountains and they’re going to die if you don’t do something.”

*Q: What about the spread of Turkey culture in Central Asia? Was that going anywhere?*

**GROSSMAN:** Not really. The reason is that everybody underestimated—I certainly did and Turks did—two things. Number one, people in Central Asia had just thrown off Big Brother and they didn’t want another one right away, even if it was the Turkic Big Brother; they didn’t want to be told what to do by anybody else. And second, nobody had it quite in mind what a complete, utter, and total disaster communism was in Central Asia. As we discussed, the first Turkish businesspeople to come back from there in ’89, ’90, they just couldn’t stop talking about how pathetic it was. And so the Turks had a great vision in ’90, ’91 that they were going to be the leaders of a big orchestra, a big band and they were disappointed in that, and I think gave it up, really. That’s not to say there are not important ties or that Turks did not give important assistance, but it was not what they dreamed it would be like in those early days.

*Q: Did Arab-Israeli issues intrude at all?*

**GROSSMAN:** As I noted previously, we were supporters of good Turkish-Israeli relations. On the peace process, Turks would periodically come to us and say, “You don’t use us enough in the Middle East peace process, we could do more in the Middle East peace process.” Turks generally say to themselves, “We understand the area, we know these Arabs and if you’d only let us help you.” Arabs tend to remember what Ottoman rule was like. I would send back cables saying, the Turks would like to help and the peace process team would always say they were not interested.

*Q: Well I think maybe this is a good place to stop.*

*Q: Did you ever get over to Cyprus?*

**GROSSMAN:** No, I did not.
Q: Over to Greece?

GROSSMAN: Yes. And Tom Miller came to visit us and we set up a program to make sure that the embassies had conferences I think once or twice a year so that everybody got to...

Q: That’s very, very important.

GROSSMAN: It was real important. People got to know each other, yes.

Q: So it is not a localitis thing.

GROSSMAN: We tried hard not to get into those cables of “well they say, and we say.” We really hated that and Tom Miller and I both promised each other we would not fall into that. In fact, we experimented with joint Embassy Ankara/Embassy Athens cables about this and that.

Q: How did you find working out of Ankara with Istanbul being the other center? Was that awkward or did you ...?

GROSSMAN: Bureaucratically? No, I had very good Consuls General there.

Q: Okay then, ’97 where’d you go?

GROSSMAN: ’97 I became the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Q: Okay, we’ll pick it up then.

GROSSMAN: That’d be great.

Q: Okay, today is August 11, 2006. Marc, you were Undersecretary for, or is it Assistant Secretary—all these damn Secretary titles—anyway, for European Affairs. How long were you that?

GROSSMAN: I was the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from summer of 1997 to early 2000.

Q: Could you describe Europe? In the first place, what comprised Europe in the European Bureau? And then could you describe the state of Europe as you saw it in 1997?

GROSSMAN: At the time the European Bureau was divided. That was still a time when there was the Special Advisor for the former Soviet Union and the Newly Independent States (S/NIS) (Stephen) Steve Sestanovich was the boss of that entity. And so my part of it was Western Europe, what we used to call Eastern Europe, now Central Europe, and
then into Balkans and the Mediterranean. At that time the main focus was what was going on in the Balkans.

One of the first decisions I made—and that a lot of people were not so sure about in the beginning and maybe they’re not so sure about it now—was when Strobe Talbot, who was then the Deputy Secretary of State, called me and asked me if I would like to take on this opportunity of being the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, I said that I would, that I was honored with the invitation, but that it was my observation that my two most immediate predecessors, Dick Holbrooke and John Kornblum, had really been Assistant Secretaries for the Balkans. That that was a really important thing, but I told Strobe that it was my observation that with the 1999 NATO summit coming up and with other things to pay attention to, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs had to really be the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; I wanted a senior person to work full time on the Balkans. So a couple of days later, Strobe called me back and proposed that (Robert S.) Bob Gelbard do that. I said that would be great with Bob and he moved in across the hall on the Sixth Floor. He, and then following him Jim Dobbins, took on the bulk of the Balkan work. It allowed me to really be the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, which I appreciated.

Q: Okay. Well first, you mentioned the state of the Balkans. Before we get to that why don’t we talk a bit about European Affairs with NATO and all? The Soviet Union had collapsed. One of your big things was NATO, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: Yes, absolutely.

Q: And at the time you came in, how’d you view NATO? What was this armed alliance against nothing?

GROSSMAN: Well, having grown up in NATO and having served at NATO, I considered NATO to be a really important thing. It goes back to the conversation really at the end of ’98 when the Berlin Wall falls, when people start re-evaluating what the world would mean without the Soviet Union. I can remember sitting in Turkey, having Turk after Turk come say, “Turkey’s going to be less important now, there’s no Soviet Union, what’s it all mean for us?” And I can remember Ambassador Abramowitz responding, “Not so fast, it might be that Turkey becomes a more important country in the future.” Who knew?

I felt the same way about NATO. And as we worked our way through 1998, certainly, and getting ready to be the host of the 50th anniversary of NATO at the NATO summit in Washington in 1999, it just continued to speak to me as an important Alliance and a really important place in which Western powers and like-minded powers could organize themselves to promote and protect—and even project—our values. And that’s one of the reasons that I was so pleased we had the chance to lead that first modern round of NATO expansion.
When I worked for Lord Carrington, he used to say, “You don’t stop paying your fire insurance just because you’ve never had a fire.” That’s how I felt about NATO. NATO is the most successful military alliance in history. People were lined up to join. The future was uncertain. Why give it up? As we worked our way through ’98 and into ’99, two really important lines were coming together in NATO. One was an expanded Alliance with a new thought about what it should do, and the other, of course, was Kosovo.

Q: Well one of the things about NATO that I think most of us who grew up from the ’30s on up, if nothing else, NATO kept Germany and France from starting another one of these European civil wars or whatever you want to call it, which seems pretty remote these days. But if they were all by themselves—each nation by themselves—I mean they’d sort of be looking over their shoulders.

GROSSMAN: One of the things about serving in NATO and then working with NATO so closely years later, is you realize it is the place people can go and talk about most anything. One of NATO’s greatest values is that it is the place for transatlantic consultation. The higher the level of consultation, the better off we all are. The clamor to get into NATO from those former Warsaw Pact countries is a reminder that this is still an organization worth being a part of. And there wasn’t just one round of NATO expansion, there were two, and I had the good fortune to be involved in both of them. There are still countries that want to join NATO.

Although some may say, I think complacently, “What’s it all for?” and, “Maybe without the Soviet Union it has no purpose,” I think NATO has evolved and adapted and is still a key part of our overall strategy. If you’d have told me 15 years ago that NATO would be in charge of the military effort in Afghanistan through ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), and you’d have told me that NATO would be training senior military officers for the Iraqi army and you’d have told me that NATO had acted militarily for the first time in Kosovo or that the first Article 5 declaration in NATO’s history would have been on the 12th of September, 2001, I would have thought it was inconceivable. But it is not inconceivable. I think what happened in ’98 and ’99 laid the foundations for all that.

Q: France has always been, you can’t say odd man out but odd almost out in NATO. Did you see the role of France changing from sort of the de Gaullist, “We’re in politically but not in militarily?”

GROSSMAN: No. That was very much the same at that time. We tried our best to have a full conversation with France and I spent a lot of time there and a lot of time talking to my counterparts in Paris. I think I understand their view, and I confess I often admire it, even if it causes us trouble. France is a serious country and they have real interests and they have real history and a national security bureaucracy and they have a vote. One of the lectures I used to get again and again from French diplomats, and there’s some truth to it, is that in Paris they’re not waiting for the United States to decide what the Alliance should do; they want to participate in making the decisions. As they say, they have a foreign ministry, they have an inter-agency process, and they make decisions and so they have a view. Sometimes I’m sure that that view is defined by, “Let’s do something,
whatever the United States is doing we’ll do something different,” but, you know, there is truth to the position that they take that they’re a real country and they get to have a view. I continue to be sorry to this day that they haven’t returned to the military part of the Alliance. I think the Alliance would be much stronger for it. Maybe they’ll return to the military structure one day. I hope so. They have military capacity.

Q: Well just sort of going around some of the countries in Europe and then we’ll come back to the major things that happened. How did you find the relations with the United Kingdom, particularly the Blair/Clinton friendship? Did this work well or not?

GROSSMAN: Very well. Our relationship with the British all during that time—as we struggled through the Balkans, got ready for the NATO summit—was very close. The British have their own choices to make as a major member of the European Union, but they still were close, close allies of the United States.

Q: Did you see anything changing in Germany? Germany was beginning to grow together, I mean the two had been split for so long and that made things almost simple but, now that Germany was united, were you seeing a change there?

GROSSMAN: Yes. The Germans were starting to feel their own power and, of course, it was an interesting time as well because the decision had been made to move the capital to Berlin. So you could see the sort of physical change in people and going to Berlin wasn’t the same as it used to be. You could go wherever you wanted and the cranes had appeared everywhere and there were huge plans. I think Germans began to really consider themselves as bigger players. You know their hang up always was that, a little bit like the rest of what was Eastern Europe and now Central Europe, communism was such a total disaster that the economy didn’t grow as quickly as Germans hoped it would. Integration didn’t go as quickly as it could because the people in the east were just so far behind, not as human beings but as people who lived in this pathetic and horrible system. So the Germans, I think rightly, spent a huge amount of time and money making sure that that integration took place and took place seriously. But you could feel that they were a growing force and thought about themselves as a bigger part of the system.

Q: Well one of the things that had been raised as a concern at one point was well, Germany gets bigger it means that all of a sudden it is going to be the Number One in what we now call Central Europe, the old Bloc countries. How did we see that?

GROSSMAN: Well, first of all, among the reasons that we were so interested in NATO expansion, and also EU expansion, was to make sure that to Germany’s east there were also successful democratic and free market societies. Also, I think it is important that people to the east of Germany, you know they’d just thrown off one big boss, and I don’t think they were particularly interested in picking up another one—and that would mean us or Germany or France or Britain. People in Poland and the Czech Republic, at that time Czechoslovakia but now the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, all these countries, they wanted to actually have a country, they wanted to have their say, and they wanted to do things their way. As you’ve seen over the years, through the voices and
policies of people in Central and Eastern Europe, they’ve taken their own way. The other thing is that in some of the countries, maybe Poland and Hungary, the economies came back quicker than they did in the eastern part of Germany, so that gave them some strength as well. And then finally, in foreign policy, when it came to doing something in Kosovo, you know a lot of those countries—especially the three new NATO members who joined the Alliance and found themselves in a military conflict—they stepped up to it. That also showed them to be independently minded.

Q: What about Italy? How did Italy fit into the equation?

GROSSMAN: I think the Italians are undersold as allies. Italy is a serious country and yes, there have been a lot of governments and they have a lot of controversy, but I always found them in NATO to be ready to act; they were always good counsel. I thought we excluded them sometimes from inner core groups in a way that was not good for us, because they had a more trans-Atlantic and pro-American point of view than sometimes France or Germany did. When you think of the bases that we had in Italy and the way the Italians stepped up for Kosovo in the Balkans, they did a lot.

Q: Especially the SS-20 challenge.

GROSSMAN: Exactly right, to go back to that. So I always thought that the Italians didn’t get as much credit as they deserved for being strong allies.

Q: I must say that the Italians seemed to sort of grit their teeth even with a large communist party, which was basically a rather responsible communist party compared to some of the other ones, whereas you have the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries that sort of dithered on things.

GROSSMAN: During my time in EUR, I found the Scandinavian countries becoming more robust; the Danes at that time, certainly the Norwegians, and, although not NATO members, the Swedes as well. They were looking at what was happening in the east and they wanted Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to be free and to be successful. They realized that they had to figure out something with the Russians, but they were believers in, “You don’t stop paying your fire insurance just because there’s never been a fire.” One of the things I was involved in was something called the Council of Baltic Sea States. In fact, the very first thing that I did as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, was to go to a meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Bergen, Norway. I’d been on the job about a week or two and I was really impressed with all of those people. Ron Asmus, one of my DASes, later designed and led a Northern Europe Initiative as part of our larger European strategy.

Q: (This is tape seven, side one with Marc Grossman.) Yes.

GROSSMAN: Their view was that they could really have an impact bottom up in western Russia. Then there was formed a group called the Council of Baltic Sea States and I had the good fortune to represent the United States at a couple of those meetings and the
Russians were involved in that. These were interesting sessions because it is a different life up there in the north and they have a lot of interesting interactions. It was those kinds of organizations that I thought were practical, well defined, had objectives, that the Scandinavians were very good at and made a serious contribution to.

Q: Did you feel that coming into sort of the cockpit of diplomacy, i.e., Europe back from your long experience, that it really was a new ballgame, there were serious players from various places, not only governments but non-governmental organizations? It seems like it really is different.

GROSSMAN: It was different. When you think of the issues that we were dealing with at that time, which had to do with the Balkans, with Turkey, its effort to get connected to the European Union, and then the spread of democratic life through Central Europe, I thought it was really exciting. Values and geopolitics were reinforcing. Particularly when you consider how big and how important a contribution the NGOs and private people made to the first expansion of NATO, both in the United States and in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; it was really something.

Q: How about with the European Union? Looking at it as sort of the American dealing with this were we seeing this one, as a good thing but two, as the beginning of a sort of a commercial threat and economic threat or how did we view this?

GROSSMAN: The EU was, at that time, starting to coalesce around the goal of trying to create a common security and foreign policy and common defense policy. Our overarching rhetoric was that we supported a strong European Union, which we do and which we did. The challenges were in the details. So, for example, it was during the time I was in the EUR that the Europeans decided to create the Euro and a lot of people said this is a big threat to the United States. I thought Larry Summers, who was the Treasury Secretary at the time, got it right. He said, “If Europeans think we’re scared of the Euro, we’re not. If they are doing the Euro to poke us in the eye, we don’t care. All we care about is that it be a strong and real currency because this trading relationship between Europe and the United States is too important to get undermined by a bad currency.” I thought that was a good way to say it.

At that time there was a huge amount of conversation about the economic relationship, and I can remember going to meeting after meeting, by myself or with Secretary Albright. We were talking about what seemed to us small economic questions—bananas and other kinds of small things. We said, “We’ve got to raise this up and realize that this is a trillion dollar trading relationship and that we can’t just be talking about the import of bananas from certain Caribbean countries and fighting over this and spending our time over it.” But it was really hard and it was at the time also that the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act passed. So we had a lot of work to do with the European Union and Tony Wayne, who was the PDAS in EUR, and Stu Eizenstat, who was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, really worked hard on that piece of the transatlantic agenda. Really, my hat was off to them. They created dialogues, the CEO dialogue for example, all kinds of links.
The other challenge at that time, which when I look back on it I don’t know if we managed it as well as we might have, was that, as I said before, the European Union was trying to work its way to a common security and defense policy. I confess we were suspicious, especially after a UK-French meeting at St. Malo that took us by surprise. There were some members of the European Union, France in particular, who were pursuing this common security and defense policy as a way to undermine NATO. My team and I worked to try to make sure that NATO and the European Union were working together on common security and defense policy.

One of our main efforts was to make sure that our support for European common security and defense policy wasn’t in any way undermining NATO. One of the huge fights leading up to the 1999 NATO summit was fueled by our insistence that whenever there was a perceived need for military action, NATO had a right of first refusal. In other words, we didn’t mind if the European Union wanted to take military action; in fact, it would be good. There were some things that NATO didn’t want to do. But for us it was important that NATO could choose not to do those things and that, if NATO chose not to do them, we were glad to support a European Union effort. It took us a long time to get this enshrined into the NATO strategic concept. We also tried to avoid any duplication of effort. Defense dollars were scarce enough. One other very hard issue was defense trade across the Atlantic. The defense industry remained very national all through this period. Every nation tried to protect its own industry.

Q: It seems like a country in the European security arrangement a soldier would be wearing two hats; it could be NATO today and European Community tomorrow, because of the forces allocated to NATO. How was this solved?

GROSSMAN: In the end, a series of good agreements that were called Berlin Plus were reached. The formula was to lodge a lot of responsibility in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, who is always a European, and then let that position sort out the specific problems. Because part of the challenge was that there was a lot of European rhetoric about, “We want to have a strong defense, we want European defense forces,” and yet if you looked at European defense spending, it was going down. Part of our challenge was to try to understand how the European Union was going to have real capability when it wasn’t paying for real capability. How was it going to transport troops and, once those troops were there, how were they going to be sustained? And once they were there, how were they going to communicate?

Part of my conversation with Europeans was, “I’m in favor of a strong European defense but a strong European defense won’t come unless, a) European military forces are reformed, and b) people start to spend some more money on defense.” European forces were still, at that time, designed to fight at the Fulda Gap. Their spending on research and development and their spending on mobility and sustainment and communications were really low. So that was part of our challenge as well.

Q: Did Spain and Portugal loom at all in your calculations?
GROSSMAN: Yes, we found Spain to be a very strong ally; I always found President (José María) Aznar to be a serious and strong person. In fact, Spain at that time was trying very hard to assert itself. Whenever you’d go to Spain, all Spanish officials knew that the size of the Spanish economy was growing and asked, in fact, why weren’t they at the main table because they contributed forces, they were a growing economy and a serious people? So we tried to take Spain seriously. I can remember on a number of occasions after we might have been in consultation somewhere in Western Europe, Secretary Albright would visit Madrid on our way home. She would fly to Madrid to do some extra consultations with the Spanish because they were—like the Italians—underappreciated. The Portuguese were always solid and whenever I traveled, I tried to include them in consultation trips.

Q: Of course it had been part of your focus before obviously but looking at it from a different perspective, Greece and Turkey ...

GROSSMAN: We worked in those years to continue to have Turkey move closer to European Union. We tried to raise it every place that we could and our great success came at the Helsinki European Union Summit in—it must have been ’99—where some real big decisions were made about Turkey’s entry into the European Union. Eric Edelman was our Ambassador to Finland and he did a fantastic job bringing this to a positive outcome.

GROSSMAN: It is worth stepping back and remembering two things: one, how much I owe to Ron Asmus, who was the non-career DAS in EUR. He was a scholar and writer on Europe. He was the intellectual father of NATO expansion. He was also a charming and engaging human being who had friends in every European capitol. Ron helped the rest of us in the front office—all FSOs—think about our larger strategy and how it all fit together.

In 1998, we started to consider the spectacular opportunity that 1999 presented us. I said we were not going to sleepwalk through the NATO, US-EU and OSCE Summits set for 1999. I wanted a big idea. I wanted a person who, in December 1999, read all three communiques to think: there was some central idea here, some common themes, and some strategy. Ron Asmus and others in the European Bureau sketched out what I called a “Trifecta” policy. They talked me out of the name because it sounded like betting on a horse racing. We settled on “Triple Crown”, which is also of course connected to horse racing. So we went to work to have a comprehensive, connected strategy to promote US interests at the NATO Summit, the 50th anniversary of NATO, in Washington in April of 1999; the US-EU summit in the summer; and then the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November.

We looked for ways to create a plan to draw all these meetings together to support a strong NATO, a strong US-EU relationship, and then a strong OSCE, which although not a transatlantic organization, would, if successful, be good for the United States and good for US relations with Europe. As I say, our objective was that at the end of 1999 we could
say in a declarative sentence or two that we used the three summits to promote American interests and promote the interests of trans-Atlantic relationships. So we had a big idea and we worked in ’98 and ’99 so that at the end of ’99, we could look back and say we had been to three summits and actually had tied them together in some way. I also wanted to show that the State Department could plan and execute a major strategy, start to finish.

We had fantastic support from the White House for this vision. Don Bandler and then Tony Blinken, the NSC staff directors for Europe in those years, were with us all the way.

Q: What were American interests in Europe as you saw it?

GROSSMAN: To have increasingly successful, pluralistic, democratic free market states with the capacity to contribute to regional and global security in a transatlantic alliance or close relationship with the United States. I always also came back to a phrase of Ron Asmus: that the trans-Atlantic relationship was about solving the remaining challenges in Europe—mainly the Balkans—and then working with Europe and Europeans to solve challenges in the rest of the world. We saw the trans-Atlantic relationship as a platform on which the United States and Europe could work to help solve the world’s problems.

Q: Before we turn to some of the problems and all, could you describe, talk a little about, this is the Clinton Administration and Clinton had been in it, I mean he came out of Arkansas and all, a very knowledgeable person when he first came out. He was not an internationalist by training, he had a somewhat limited background but he was a fast learner. By the time you got there how did Clinton interact with your area would you say?

GROSSMAN: He interacted with my area very positively. Again, 1999 was a year where the President was involved in European affairs, probably more than he wanted to be, because he hosted the NATO summit in April of ’99; we went to war in Kosovo; he had to go to a US-EU summit, and then he was at a OSCE summit in Istanbul. He was in Turkey after the major earthquake they had and in 1999, just before the OSCE summit in Istanbul. The other thing is that in ’98, early ’99, up to the NATO summit, we also were attempting to do something really big, which was to expand NATO. The President was deeply involved in that effort. And here, let me say, I was greatly benefited to lead EUR at a time when the Secretary of State was by birth a European …

Q: Yes, Madeleine Albright.

GROSSMAN: She understood the strategic relationships better than anybody. So this was a great time to have been the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

Q: I must say anybody coming out of Czechoslovakia would certainly understand all the ethnic problems of Europe because they all sort of converge on Czechoslovakia over the years.
GROSSMAN: Right, but she also understood that expanding NATO was a major strategic plus for the United States and for NATO. So to see her in particular, when she testified in favor of NATO expansion, when she gave speeches about it and when she tried to make sure that the votes in the Czech Republic and other places were high enough to show that people were actually interested in being in NATO, it was wonderful. The signing of the documents to get the new members established took place at a ceremony at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. To have Madeleine Albright do that added a lot of special meaning. So one of the great things about being the Assistant Secretary at that time was having a Secretary of State who instinctively understood what it was we were trying to accomplish and a President who also, I think in strategic terms, understood the importance of NATO expansion and making sure that these new relationships worked, especially when it came time to act in Kosovo.

Q: Well did you run across the expansion of NATO; obviously the Russians were opposed to it. You know, it was sort of like they lost and the other side was still game ... it was still there. You had Strobe Talbot, who is Number Two in the State Department, who came out of you might say the Russian mafia, as a correspondent, and so did you find him sort of seeing things, from your perspective, too much from the Russian perspective or not?

GROSSMAN: No, to the contrary. He was a big supporter of everything we were trying to do. He was a big fan of Ron Asmus. So, let’s go backwards a bit. There were people who opposed the NATO expansion. Tom Friedman, for example—and I usually agree with 99% of what he writes—was a leading voice against NATO expansion.


GROSSMAN: Yes. George Kennan was opposed. This wasn’t without controversy. This action deserved debate because we were proposing extending Article 5 guarantees, which are the most solemn guarantees one country can give to another, to come to the defense of another country, to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This needed public debate. It was an important decision that people had to debate. We spent many hours on the Hill making our case. For me, Strobe was like Madeleine—in exactly the right place at exactly the right time. Because he understood so much about Russia, when it came time to negotiate the first NATO-Russia agreement—it is called the Founding Act—he was the perfect person actually to do it. He and Javier Solana, they worked and they worked so hard on this …

Q: Javier Solana is the president?

GROSSMAN: The NATO Secretary-General. The NATO-Russian Founding Act cleared the path for NATO expansion and the fact that the Russians were prepared essentially to live with it was pretty astonishing. Even more if you jump ahead a few more years and recall that the Russians were at that time prepared to accept the second round of NATO expansion, which included Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. I think one of the reasons was that there had been the NATO Founding Act and then we needed an update of it. Strobe again was the right person at the right time.
Q: Well did you find yourself with a little bit walking on eggshells, that you wanted this expansion but at the same time didn’t want to sort of make it look like a challenge to the Russians and be almost triumphal or whatever, “We’re getting bigger than you,” or that sort of thing?

GROSSMAN: No, I didn’t walk on too many eggshells. I don’t know how to put this exactly, but we did prevail and maybe this is not right but we were not dealing with the Soviet Union anymore—we were dealing with Russia. When I think of all the time and the effort that went into defending Europe through NATO, and when I think of the years lost to the people throughout Central and Eastern Europe because they were dominated by this communism and authoritarianism and totalitarianism, and then considered that the people in these states wanted to exercise their right to choose and they chose NATO, the EU, western values. That’s not to say I didn’t want the relationship with Russia to be a good one and be successful, but I thought, to myself, “Here is an opportunity of a lifetime,” which is to say that people who were slaves to communism and totalitarianism are now not just going to be free, but they’re going to join the NATO Alliance. The Helsinki Final Act says people can choose their alliances. I don’t mean to be triumphalist. But when people went to the Truman Library, or in 1999 at the NATO Summit, I was proud that, given a choice, people chose democracy, pluralism and free markets. As I discussed before with you, I had been with John Whitehead to Gdansk, where we had to sneak around to see Lech Walesa. I’d been to all of those Warsaw Pact countries time after time with Whitehead. And anybody who tried to cross Checkpoint Charlie or the Glienicke bridge or who had been to Bulgaria or Romania realized what an amazing thing this was.

I can remember standing—and I don’t mean to jump ahead—but at the NATO Summit in ’99, we were in some big hall waiting for the ceremony to start, and I found myself standing next to Lech Walesa. And I thought, what an amazing turn of events, from seeing him first with Whitehead in Warsaw and then going to Gdansk and now, here we are at the NATO Summit in April of 1999 in Washington, D.C., and Poland’s going to join the Alliance. And I thought, well good for Poland and good for us.

Q: How about during this time, on the subject, how about Congress?

GROSSMAN: The leadership of Congress was terrific on NATO expansion. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden; in the House as well. They very properly debated this and that was their responsibility, because it required a change of the NATO Treaty. The Constitution required that the Senate debate this and vote for it. We testified we tried to answer every question. There was proper skepticism and we made sure we had thought of all the ins and outs. The Senate played its role and we played our role; it was a big vote and we were delighted with the outcome. I pay particular tribute to Senators Lugar and Biden. I can remember going to dinners with the SFRC all during this period. We had a chance in informal settings to explain what we were thinking and hear and then adjust to their concerns. It meant they were invested and it also meant that public testimony was much more meaningful because we were not starting the conversation under the TV lights, we
were continuing it. I thought it was a model of legislative-executive cooperation in the public interest.

_Q: Well this is a time for the Clinton Administration of rather intense partisan politics in Congress when they had a Republican-dominated Congress that led to all sorts of things. Did that intrude, the partisanship particularly, into any of these issues?_

GROSSMAN: Not that I can recall. People who were opposed to the expansion of NATO were opposed because they didn’t believe in it. Or they thought it was dumb, or they thought it was provocative to Russia. I don’t remember anybody saying, “Senator So-and-So or Congressman So-and-So’s going to vote against this because they’re a Democrat or because they are a Republican.” I don’t remember any of that.

_Q: Well that probably proves the point that it wasn’t an issue._

GROSSMAN: I remember this as a debate about substance and senators very rightly saying, “Are we prepared to really defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic if they’re attacked because that’s what Article 5 says?” When I look back, among the things I’m proudest of is to have been part of what was this first, and then we’ll get to the second, round of NATO expansion.

_Q: What about in the really big hunk of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine? Was that an issue at all?_

GROSSMAN: One of the very first things I did as Assistant Secretary is I went to a consultation with my counterparts at the European Union. I can remember stopping off in Germany on the way to wherever it was and sitting with Wolfgang Ischinger, who later became the Ambassador of Germany to the United States. We sat together and Ischinger said to me, “I don’t know what to do, what are we going to do about Ukraine? We pour in money and time and effort into this country and we want it to be successful but just nothing good ever happens in the Ukraine.” Ukraine was sort of mysterious, hard, difficult—nothing seemed to go well except for—and again give credit where credit is due—Secretary Albright and Steve Sestanovich did at one point during my time as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, succeed in getting a de-nuclearization agreement with Ukraine. I don’t remember all the details and I don’t remember what year it was, but it was to me in those four years about the most positive thing I can remember to happen with Ukraine.

_Q: Well it was a major one. It took nuclear arms out of a big country and at least meant that we didn’t have to deal with that particular problem at the time._

GROSSMAN: Right. And as I say, that was a huge success on their part. I had nothing to do with it; for me it was in those three or four years the best thing that happened.

_Q: Although it was on the other side of your particular Iron Curtain, I imagine the Baltic states have been the thorn in the side of the Soviets. We never ceased recognizing them ...
GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: ... all during the whole Cold War and they got rather significant political clout in the United States. They must have been clamoring a lot to get into NATO fast and all that; weren’t they?

GROSSMAN: That round of expansion happens when I was the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. I had a personal connection to the Baltic States because Mildred was, in 1981-1983, the desk officer for Hungary and the Baltic States. That’s sort of an amazing combination, a real reflection of the then cold war. I was the desk officer for Jordan at the time. I can remember learning from her about the illegal incorporation of those States in the Soviet Union, the US’s non-recognition policy, and the Baltic States still had charge’s in Washington, old gentleman who kept hope alive. I remember, she would work with them every year on their budgets; then they would go to Fort Knox and have their gold converted at Fort Knox to dollars, so that these diplomats could run their embassies during the year. I met a lot of Lithuanian and Latvian and Estonian Americans through Mildred. When I look back, I think that 50 years of the non-recognition policy was one of the great moral policies of the United States.

Q: Having come from Turkey, I’ve often thought that Turkey going into the European Union, particularly with acquiring a vote of some countries, especially France but probably Germany holding this out to the Turks when I have a feeling that sort of the right-wing in Germany and France will probably torpedo it, you shouldn’t overplay this? How’d you feel about Turkey in the European Union?

GROSSMAN: US policy was to continue to try to keep Turkey on the path to the European Union. And as I noted before, the EU’s Helsinki Summit in ‘99 was an amazing accomplishment for that policy. Eric (S.) Edelman was the Ambassador in Helsinki at and he just did a fantastic job. I think it was in Helsinki where the EU made a great offer—we thought—to Turkey to start negotiating chapters of the acquis communautaire. The Turks, of course, typically said, “Oh, not good enough, not good enough.”

I can remember getting a call from Javier Solana, who was by then the chief foreign policy person of the European Union and he said, “Marc, we’re getting on an airplane in Helsinki and we’re flying down to Ankara to try to convince the Turks to accept this arrangement. Can you help us convince the Turks it is a good deal?” I said, “Of course I’ll help you, I want this to be true. We’ll do our best with the Turks.”

I called Sandy Berger and said, “Sandy, I need help, could the President please call then Prime Minister (Bülent) Ecevit. Can he please tell Mr. Ecevit that Solana is on his way and the President hopes that that Prime Minister Ecevit will receive Solana, first of all, and then agree to his proposal.”
Sandy and Tony Blinken were great and the President was great. Not long after my request, the President called Ecevit and said, essentially, “Mr. Ecevit, it seems like a good deal to us and I hope you’ll accept it.” Solana saw Ecevit, had a substantive meeting. And then they went out to meet the press. Ecevit says, “Mr. Solana’s been here and I’ve listened carefully to him. President Clinton called me and told me this was a good deal and that I should accept it. So we will.”

To answer your question about the future, of course at that time the questions of French voting, future German voting about Turkey didn’t exist because they hadn’t yet made the decision to offer them negotiations; that comes later. My own view of this is twofold. One is that I think, speaking today in 2006, that the prospect of European Union membership for Turkey has been one of the major catalysts for change in Turkey, which now is a different country than it was 15 or 20 years ago. Turkey is a freer country, a more democratic country, and a more technological country. There is a lot more to do; don’t get me wrong, and no one can predict the future. There is more freedom to be had by many people in Turkey and there are too many journalists in jail and I get all that. But I think any reasonable observer in Turkey will say it is a freer country today than it was 20 years ago. Among the reasons for that is that Turks aspire to be part of the European Union and it is a main reason that the United States helped encourage that aspiration—both on the Turkish side and the European Union side.

The French don’t have to vote on this tomorrow or five years from tomorrow. But if Turkey can continue to change at the same rate that it is changed over the past 20 years, well it is a different Turkey. I also believe that over the next eight or nine years, Europeans are going to have to recognize that they live in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society. Europeans delude themselves that they don’t live in multi-ethnic and multi-religious and multi-cultural societies. Millions of people in France are Muslims, are from North Africa. And so if you look ahead eight years, and you’re a French leader, maybe there is an argument to be made to the French people, “We have a lot of challenges in our own society about multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism and we need to have this come out positively. So wouldn’t it be good if we have as a member of the European Union family a country that shows that you can be secular and democratic and Muslim simultaneously? In other words, this is no mystery; this can be done and wouldn’t it be good if they were part of the family, not just strategically, because it would be good for Europe but also because it would be the right symbol and symbolic effort in our own country.” Maybe that’s not realistic, but it’s a thought.

There’s a third reason. The European population is aging and that population more and more is going to want to retire. But who’s going to do all the work? I think there will be an economic argument saying, “Well, we could ship all these jobs to China or Vietnam or someplace or we could do the manufacturing that needs to be done and the production that needs to be done right inside of the European Union. Turkey’s a young country and a large country and if everybody’s worried about Turkish immigration well, it would be better if Turks worked at home.” So I think ultimately there will be an economic argument for this as well.
Q: Well then, turning to the major challenge, which was Kosovo, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: What was the status of play when you started the job in ’97?

GROSSMAN: When I started the job in ’97 the major focus was still on Dayton Implementation. Kosovo was not at the top of the agenda in ’97, Dayton Implementation was, and with the leadership of Bob Gelbard and then Jim Dobbins and Jim Swigert, the EUR bureau focused hard on Dayton Implementation. They did a great job and they kept at it. By ’98, and of course in ’99, Kosovo rises up higher and higher on the agenda. Through all of ’98, there are Contact Group meetings and we were trying to get allies to support a robust policy on Kosovo. We saw it as a test of whether the Triple Crown was going to be a useful thing, because if you were going to be successful in Kosovo, there was going to be a NATO piece because you might have to fight. There was certainly going to be a US-EU piece because it was in Europe and there was certainly going to be a piece from OSCE, and you’ll remember before NATO got engaged, the OSCE was the leader in Kosovo—the OSCE missions and observers and others. As we turned the corner into 1999, it was clear that when the NATO Summit was convened in April in Washington it was not just going to be about expansion and a major change to the NATO strategic concept summit, it was going to be a Kosovo summit; the new members found themselves quickly to be in an Alliance in combat.

Q: Well did you find, as I recall just watching on TV, there seemed to be innumerable meetings in France sort of ...

GROSSMAN: Rambouillet (a commune in north-central France).

Q: Could you describe sort of your, both role but impression of the players in this?

GROSSMAN: Secretary Albright, I think, sensed early on that there was going to be a conflict in Kosovo. And what we had to do was work our way through every other single conceivable alternative in order to get the allies and to get NATO to come to a similar conclusion. We used to go to Contact Group meetings month after month. They were dreadful. We wanted action in Kosovo and everybody else wanted to keep talking.

Q: Would you explain what the situation was?

GROSSMAN: Well as I remember it, the situation was that Milošević was actively—my perspective anyway—was actively proceeding with ethnic cleansing verging on genocide against Kosovar Albanians.

Q: I’ve interviewed (William G.) Bill Walker, who was the OSCE observer at the time, who called it genocide.
GROSSMAN: Secretary Albright got it right when she said, “We are not going to allow people to be put in railway cars in Europe for a second time in the 20th century.” That crystallized it for me. This was about Milošević and it was about genocide and it was about Kosovars and it was about the future of that part of Europe.

And then we went to Rambouillet. Rambouillet was a castle-like place outside of Paris, a half-hour, 40-minute, drive. There had been a G-7 meeting there once, I believe. We got to Rambouillet and the Serbs were there, and the Kosovars were there, and the Contact Group was there. It was a surreal experience in the sense that we were in this beautiful place and the French had catered it beautifully and we went to session after session where we just couldn’t break through to any settlement. They were the worst two weeks of my diplomatic life until 9/11; there were worse weeks in terms of wars and killings and assassinations, but in terms of pure diplomatic frustration, Rambouillet tops the list.

Q: Was it on both sides; the Kosovars and the Serb side?

GROSSMAN: Both. They were both pursuing the interests as they saw them. The Kosovars were, I thought, more flexible than the Serbs.

The structure of the negotiations worried me. There were too many people, too many groups, and too few clear objectives. I was probably wrong about this because I misjudged the politics, but after a day or so at Rambouillet, I advised Secretary Albright to leave and only return if there was likely to be an agreement. I said it was better if I took the blame for failure rather than her.

But she had a different vision and her vision was that we had to do everything we could and be seen to do everything we could so that if Rambouillet was a failure then there were no further excuses against military activity. And so we worked at trying to bring Serb and Kosovars to some agreement. I remember in the last couple of days at Rambouillet there was a document, but I can’t remember the details and it was just an immensely frustrating two weeks. And it failed. I can remember flying home on the airplane from Paris and we landed at Andrews and Jim Dobbins and I had decided that as we landed at Andrews, he would take over the day-to-day running of Kosovo because I was trying to organize the NATO summit and do a million other things. I can remember landing at Andrews and Jim had been sleeping on the floor of the aircraft we said, “Here we go, this is going to turn into a war so now we have to do our best in the circumstances.” And that’s what we did.

Q: What was your impression of the other representatives at the Rambouillet meeting? Were they in a way willing to keep talking?

GROSSMAN: I think they were willing to keep talking. But after Rambouillet, there were then one or two more meetings of the Contact Group and the one that really sticks in my mind was a session at Heathrow Airport in a VIP lounge and it was where things finally got sorted out. Dick Holbrooke came up from Serbia and Kosovo, where he’d been trying to have one last talk with Milošević, and the agreement reached at Heathrow
was that we had to just go ahead and fight. The Russians were part of this Contact Group. The arrangement was that it would go to the Security Council and the Security Council would say, “Go ahead and act militarily,” but if the Security Council couldn’t agree because the Russians in the end said no, then we would go to NATO and do this job. For me there was both a theoretical and a practical victory here. The theoretical victory was we had worked to make sure that at the NATO summit in ’99 we prevailed against those NATO allies who were arguing for language in the Strategic Concept that NATO could never act unless there was a Security Council resolution authorizing its action. We said, “No way.” In the end, the phrase in the Strategic Concept that was agreed upon was that a UN Security Council resolution authorizing NATO action was “desirable but not necessary.” Everybody at the time thought it was some strange theoretical or theological argument, but here we were now faced with it and we never did get a Security Council resolution on Kosovo and NATO acted anyway. The phrase “desirable but not necessary” turned out to be a very important protection for the United States.

We went to Heathrow, I think it was after Rambouillet, and what I remember most was I was sick as a dog. The other memorable thing was that Secretary Albright was assigned one of those “doomsday planes,” a huge airplane, to take us home.

Q: A 747?

GROSSMAN: I don’t know, but it was fitted out to command survive a nuclear war or something. That’s what brought us home from London that night and I can remember lying in a bunk in the back. I can remember I got called the next morning to go to a Deputies Committee meeting with Tom Pickering, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and I said I’m not going, I can’t talk and I’m sick. I regretted not being able to support Tom, but I had come to the end of my rope.

But then, of course, there were two dozen more Deputies Committee meetings over the next weeks and anyway, we fought the war in Kosovo and I think it turned to have been the right thing to do.

Q: Well tell me, as you moved up to this, as I recall somebody who was at ... going with Holbrooke, I think, going into Belgrade and talking to Milošević, that the Serbs were sort of taunting them with 18, 18; this is, I think, the number of people who were killed in Somalia in the Black Hawk Down incident. The idea being, “Okay, you can talk big but you can’t sustain losses, therefore, you’re not going to do anything,” and so very much the feeling we’re not going to act. I would think the American military, particularly after Somalia, would be very touchy about something like this.

GROSSMAN: Well, they were properly cautious about this. And they should be cautious before sending people into combat situations. But in the end, the President made a decision to do this and this was the decision of the United States and I think the way our military and our allies executed that mission was remarkable.
Q: Well did you, your Bureau get at all involved in the bombing campaign? You know, there was a problem of an accidental bombing of the Soviet Embassy.

GROSSMAN: Chinese Embassy.

Q: Chinese Embassy, but the other part of essentially the bombing consisted of sort of knocking Serbia out of the communications business.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: As opposed to going after its army, which didn’t really suffer that much loss. But was that a military decision or was that one that was sort of achieved ... Were you all looking at this?

GROSSMAN: Yes. My recollection was that we were. Ultimately military operations are properly decisions for the President based on advice from the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership, but I think the idea that we were able over a period to do this job without having to use ground forces turned out to be a good one. I don’t know what would have happened if we’d have faced the issue of ground forces. President Clinton took it off the table. I think that probably extended the time we had to do the bombing, but that’s what he felt was necessary and yes, I can remember daily—certainly twice, three times a week—going up to the Hill and briefing what we were doing, where we were going. I can remember Tom Pickering and the Vice Chairman of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), General (Joseph W.) Ralston, having to go to China to explain the mistaken attack on the embassy.

When I was the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and working again on Kosovo, I visited Belgrade on a number of occasions and it was interesting to still see the bombed out buildings; the precision of the bombing was remarkable. You could go down the street in Belgrade and everything was standing except this fourth building, which was the former defense ministry building or a former secret service building or a former police building. They were gone. I thought it was interesting that the Serbs had kept it like that and that we always were driven by it. On the other hand, compared to the devastation that could have been done through a bombing campaign, this was pretty remarkable.

Q: What was your impression of the Kosovar representation and the idea that would this be an independent state or part of Albania or somehow unwillingly join to Serbia?

GROSSMAN: The people we met clearly had as their long-term goal to be independent. At the time, our objective was to see if we could keep them connected to Serbia in some way, consistent of course with their physical safety and create some political space for them to breath, because that seemed like a good interim step. My view at the time was that, when it came for a vote, because that’s what was envisioned by the failed document at Rambouillet, if democracy had been building up in Serbia and Kosovo, that would help answer the questions about what the future would look like. So, if five years from then, five years from ’99, Milošević was still the boss in Belgrade and Belgrade was still an
authoritarian state and still making trouble all around, then the Kosovars were going to vote for independence and we’d probably support them. If, on the other hand, five years hence or six years hence, I think it was five because in the document, there was a democratic Belgrade and a democratic Serbia and a less authoritarian Serbia and people were free then, that there was a chance then that both people in Belgrade and people in Pristina and around in Kosovo might think differently about their options. I also thought that if Serbia could be a more normal place, the prospect of EU membership might also be an incentive. So far, that’s not turned out to be true, but that was my vision at the time.

Q: How about the Macedonia-Greek equation at the time? Was that a problem?

GROSSMAN: It was a only a problem in that they were fighting over what they should call Macedonia, and we’ll come to that again when I become the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

Q: I got a bellyful of that when I was chief of the Consular section in Belgrade in the ’60s because Macedonia was part of the Consular district, you know. Well anyway, everybody gets involved in the Balkans. At least Madeleine Albright knew the history; her father had served in Belgrade.

GROSSMAN: We were lucky because (Matthew) Matt Nimitz, who was a former Counselor at the State Department and a lawyer in New York, had taken on the thankless task of trying to negotiate a name that both the Greeks and the Macedonians could live with.

Q: Yes. Well, as you viewed it, how about the Bosnian resolution? How did you see that at the time during this time you went?

GROSSMAN: You mean in terms of Dayton implementation?

Q: In how it was coming out?

GROSSMAN: Comparatively, it was coming out pretty well because they weren’t fighting and killing anymore. My predecessors had stopped that war and compared to what was going on in Kosovo, what was going on in Bosnia looked pretty good. A lot of what we tried to accomplish in Kosovo was based on the fact that we had some success, as a country and as an international community, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Remember, at the time there were still a large number of NATO forces there and American forces.

Q: We put the First Division in at one point, yes.

GROSSMAN: So it wasn’t like it is today, but comparatively it seemed then on a plausible path. Again, great credit to Bob Gelbard, Jim Dobbins and Jim Swigert.

Q: How did you view the OSCE? The Russians are in the OSCE; it is a peculiar thing. I remember, I was an observer in Bosnia for the elections there at one point and all of a
sudden, we’re being briefed by a Russian lieutenant colonel and I’ve never seen so many different people come in and talk to us. But there was OSCE, sort of but not, is more inclusive than NATO but NATO is still kind of there. How was the OSCE?

GROSSMAN: I found the OSCE to be a mystery. I really admired the people who worked on it and understood it. We had real experts on this in EUR. We incorporated OSCE into the 1999 Triple Crown strategy. We wanted to make the OSCE a more active organization; the OSCE’s problem, from my perspective, was that it talked too much and did too little.

Our objective was to try to give it things to do and as you’ve talked to Bill Walker and others you know that the OSCE had important things to do in Kosovo. OSCE was also a key part of Dayton implementation, which we just discussed. Our vision for OSCE was that, over time, there would be fewer conflicts in Europe between countries, and more conflicts inside of societies, and that if the OSCE could develop an expertise in that area and work on conflicts inside of societies that would be a real contribution. I want to repeat that I understood OSCE was not a transatlantic institution, but I thought a useful OSCE would be good for US interests.

When we got to the OSCE summit in 1999, among the things that we proposed and got accepted were a roster of experts that could go into countries and work on ethnic conflicts and other issues. The OSCE summit in 1999 was dominated, as I recall, by the controversy over when and whether Russian forces would get out of Georgia as they had agreed to in the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) agreements. It was a very difficult few days in Istanbul. I can remember everyone on our side—Sandy Berger, Secretary Albright—being so tired of it all. 1999 was hard in the EUR universe. I had called on them for something week after week and they’d had enough. Of course here we sit here all these years later the Russians still haven’t met those 1999 OSCE commitments.

Q: Well, was there anything else we should talk about, do you think, during this particular time? How about the summits? Was there anything that particular stick in your mind about the summits?

GROSSMAN: Well again for me, the NATO summit of 1999 was just a great opportunity. It was an honor to work on it. Again, credit to the EUR team, who led this whole-of-government effort. I want to highlight the work also of Ambassador (Robert) Bob Frowick, whom we hired out of retirement to be the day-to-day boss of the summit. He had been my boss at USNATO. He did a great job. In fact, it was Bob who discovered the then unused, dilapidated Mellon Auditorium on Constitution Avenue, which turned out to be the very place the original NATO Treaty had been signed 50 years earlier. Bob convinced the White House to convince the GSA to refurbish it for us. That’s where we held the main sessions with Heads of State and Government. It was a fantastic piece of history come alive. As I said before, the White House was in full support of our effort. We showed we could lead this and they supported us but did not micromanage us.
It was a great event and what came out of it in terms of a new, NATO Strategic Concept protected the right of NATO to act, but also if you look back at the 1999 Strategic Concept, we said in it that future threats are going to be from ethnic conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. I think when you look back, it wasn’t so bad to get that into the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 and, as I say, it was just for me a great moment to watch Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic become members of the Alliance.

I don’t remember too much about the US-EU Summit. Tony Wayne was the boss of that and he and his team did a great job.

We’ve talked about OSCE summit—the third part of the Triple Crown. The whole week was memorable for me. President Clinton had been in Turkey on an official visit in Ankara before attending the OSCE summit in Istanbul.

President Clinton gave one of the best speeches anyone’s ever given on Turkey to the Turkish parliament. Tony Blinken wrote the speech. I was assigned the job of riding with President Clinton from the hotel to the Parliament. I don’t know what possessed me, but I thought I’d offer Bill Clinton a little advice on giving a speech. I said, “Mr. President, there’s one thing you need to know. Turks talk all the time and they have a tendency to talk during speeches, so when you’re in front of the Turkish parliament and people are talking, don’t take any offence, just keep on going, that’s just how they are, they talk during wedding and funerals and they just talk all the time.” He looked at me and said, “Marc, they’re not going to talk while I speak.” And I said, “Okay sir, but my job is to tell you.”

He got onto the floor of the Turkish parliament and you could hear a pin drop the entire time he spoke. He held those people; he was compelling. At the end, we were going back to the hotel, I think, later and he said to me, “You see?” Then the rest of us went to Istanbul to start on the OSCE summit and he took a small airplane and President Clinton went out to see the earthquake damage. There had been a terrible earthquake some days before. The US gave a great deal of assistance. There was a photograph taken of him with some Turkish children. Turks to this day will talk to you about that picture of Bill Clinton and the kids at one of the camps for earthquake survivors.

And then the other thing I remember about the OSCE summit in 1999 was—with great trepidation—having to wake up Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger at three o’clock in the morning on the last night/day of the summit and tell them we could not come to any agreement with the Russians on CFE implementation. Ron Asmus was our negotiator. With even more trepidation, my EUR team, and the terrific interagency team that was there, recommended that the US not sign the OSCE summit document with its current text. This would mean the press would call it a failure, with the President present. But that’s how we all felt and that’s what we recommended to a lot of bosses in bathrobes. We said, “We’d rather have nothing out of this summit than agree to what the Russians wanted to agree to on their remaining troops.” Sandy and Madeleine said “Yes, you guys are right, you were right to wake us up and we’re going to stand firm here and we will see and if we have to leave so be it. We’re better in public and we’re
better testifying and we’re better in our own consciences not having to agree to a bunch of junk.”

I think it was Ron Asmus who went back to the negotiating room and said we were prepared to withhold our signature. The Russians changed their position. Now, we should be honest: all these years later, they still haven’t done what they’re supposed to do, but for the purposes of that moment, it was right to stand our ground and we were prepared to fly out of Istanbul and not accept something bad.

**Q:** Were you still doing European Affairs during the election of 2000?

GROSSMAN: No. No, in early 2000 Secretary Albright decided that she wanted to make some changes in the Department and she asked (Edward W.) Skip Gnehm (Jr.) to be the Ambassador to Australia.

**Q:** He’d been Director General.

GROSSMAN: Yes, he’d been the Director General of the Foreign Service. She asked me to become the Director General, and she asked Jim Dobbins to replace me as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. So early in 2000 I make a job change.

**Q:** Okay, so we’ll stop at that point. Great.

* * *

*Today is the 28th of August 2006. Okay, Marc, so you became the Director General. I don’t think we covered this. I think you’ve talked about it a bit but looking back on it, Madeleine Albright came out of the European context, she was born in Czechoslovakia. How did you find her in European Affairs?*

GROSSMAN: For EUR, it was great. To be the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs while she was the Secretary was terrific because, as you say, she understood the European questions of that time. One was what were we going to do about NATO expansion, and she was a leader in wanting to expand NATO. We believed in that in EUR and for her especially to be involved in the expansion of NATO was just remarkable. Also, when it came time to fight in Kosovo I think she also understood the importance of that as well as the importance of that phrase we’ve used a couple times in this interview, which is to say, Nobody wanted to see people put on railway cars for a second time in the 20th century in Europe, but also the strategic part of it, which was that the United States needed to act because up until then the European Union and the United Nations and others had not been able to. She supported what we were trying to do with Triple Crown, with Turkey, the whole vision. She was wonderful to be the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs for.
Q: Well when you think about Kosovo, I mean we go back a little bit and the initial reaction of somebody who doesn’t have quite that feel was Jim Baker; we don’t have a dog in that fight in the breakup of Yugoslavia and of course we did have a very big dog in there because it is the sort of thing that if it goes sour, you’ve got all of southern Europe and the Middle East could get involved in there.

GROSSMAN: The idea we always had was that the Balkans aren’t called the powder keg of Europe for nothing.

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: They’d been a powder keg before and could be a powder keg again. There had been such success in bringing more democracy and more free markets and more individual rights and liberties to people in then Eastern Europe, now Central Europe, that it seemed a shame that there was this part of Europe that wasn’t participating. I came over the years to believe that there are no people in this world—and I mean people, not the movements like al-Qaida that sometimes hijack them—who by their geography or their color or their religion or their culture who don’t have the desire and the capacity to have some control over their own lives. They might not want to have a society or a system like ours, but I think by and large people want to have some freedom to make choices about what they do and they don’t do and that’s what the fight with Milošević was all about.

Q: Okay. We’ll pick this up in 1990? When did you become ... go to Director General?

GROSSMAN: In 2000.

Q: In 2000.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: What did, talk a bit about the Director General of the Foreign Service is sort of a blanket term and means a number of things. Could you explain in 2000 what it meant?

GROSSMAN: In 2000, the whole title was Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of Personnel.

Q: Which would include ...

GROSSMAN: Include the Foreign Service, the Civil Service and Foreign Service Nationals. Everybody. And so I became the Director General of the Foreign Service and of course it gets shortened to DG, which is understandable but a big mistake because people forget that this person is also responsible for all of the FSNs, all the Civil Service people all across the Department. In the time I’d been in Turkey as Ambassador and then in the time that I had been in EUR, I’d become increasingly interested in how people get motivated and how they worked together and how the organization worked. We
experimented a lot in EUR, a lot of it very successfully and some of it not so successfully, but mostly successfully, with ways forward. So when Secretary Albright asked me then to move from EUR to the DG’s office I thought, “Here’s a chance we can put some of these ideas into play.” It was also the classic case of, “All that complaining that you’ve done all your career about the personnel system, well here, you’re now in charge of it so, be our guest.”

I took the job, I must say, with some hesitation. There were people who thought I would be terrible at it. I wasn’t sure whether I would like it. But it turned out I loved it. It was a privilege to be the DG.

**Q:** You **did it from when to when?**

GROSSMAN: I did it from early in 2000, we have to check the dates, but sometime in 2000 until Secretary Powell came to be Secretary of State and he asked me to be the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, so just over a year. I was sorry to leave that job. It was just a chance to take on a lot of challenges and see if we could do something about them.

**Q:** Okay. Well you say challenges. What were your sort of goals, what did you want to try to do?

GROSSMAN: It is hard to remember now because there were so much to deal with and—this is no disrespect to any of my predecessors, but—the personnel system was a system that everybody had chipped away at before me and yet needed a good push into the 20th if not the 21st century. So we set ourselves both strategic goals and operational, or tactical, goals as well. What I tried to do in the first few months or few weeks was listen carefully to what was really bothering people, inside the bureau and outside. It was very interesting to me that among the people who were in the Bureau—and it is a Bureau of many, many civil service people and a lot of Foreign Service people—in my first walking around people said, “The first thing you’ve got to do is change the name of this Bureau, from the Bureau of Personnel to the Bureau of Human Resources.” People felt that the State Department had fallen behind, first of all in respecting the profession of human resources professionals, and then of actually doing that work. I thought about it a lot and I thought this would be a way to really show people that something different was going to happen. So we did recommend that the Bureau name be changed, and I became Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of Human Resources at the State Department.

**Q:** I come from a much earlier era and Personnel tells me it is people; Human Resources seems to be overly mechanistic, that human people are robots.

GROSSMAN: Fair enough.

**Q:** At the time you did that, what did this change mean to you and to others?
GROSSMAN: It meant a lot to the people in the Bureau for two reasons. One is they wanted the human in there, that it wasn’t just personnel. Personnel to them sounded officious and standoffish and they weren’t working with people—so the opposite of the point that you make. People wanted that word “human” in there and that they were working with people and human beings. They wanted somehow to convey that the greatest resource of the State Department was the humans; we’re not ships and we’re not planes, we have these people. So I think that’s what they wanted. Second, they wanted somebody to pay attention and they wanted somebody to respect them and they looked around and they saw that a lot of big companies were moving to Human Resources. They said, “If these big companies are doing it and the private sector is in many ways a great model for the public sector, we want to be in this. If that’s the modern way to think about this job then we want to think about ourselves in that way.” I took it as an opportunity to change all the symbols of the place.

So we changed the logo and we gave the Bureau a very clear mission statement; we changed a lot of the names of things. I can remember at one point Michael Murphy, who was the Special Assistant, negotiating with some company or another to use the rights for a very aggressive-looking eagle that we put on a mouse pad for everybody that said, “Bureau of Human Resources.” And the tag line we used on every single thing we did and we put it on the letterhead, we put it everywhere, was “The best serving the best.” Some people laughed at that phrase, but our bureau leaders stuck to it and I used it as an aspiration. I wanted people to be proud to work in HR. In changing the name we also then tried to break through the culture there. We printed a lot of posters about, “Diplomacy is the first line of America’s defense,” and used a phrase, “The job of the Bureau of Human Resources is to get the right people in the right place at the right time.”

I felt strongly that these kinds of symbols and actions would let people lift up their game. We were dealing at a time when the personnel system, the human resources system of the Department really was too slow and we couldn’t get people hired in the State Department fast enough, and we weren’t doing right by people in the beginning of their careers, we weren’t doing right by them at the end of their careers. So we tried to take all this on simultaneously and do the strategic stuff, which was to get more resources, to get more money, to get more attention, to start talking about diplomacy in a new way. This is where I start talking about the transformation of diplomacy, and try to find private resources to help us if we could, like the generous Cox Foundation and others. The HR front office was a great team. Gretchen Welch was the PDAS. I relied heavily on Michael Murphy, who was the Special Assistant and took a big career gamble to move with me from EUR.

We created a “skunk works”; I guess it would be called. Lucky for me, a load of people, really smart people, simultaneously ended up without jobs. (William A.) Bill Eaton suddenly ended up without a job; he’s now our Ambassador to Panama, he’d been my Executive Director in EUR; Mike Polt, came back from Germany and for some reason, I can’t remember, he didn’t have a job, and a number of other excellent people were between assignments. I got an office across the hall from mine. I said, “Look, here’s what I want all of you to do. I want you to sit over there and for three or four weeks, think. I
want you to talk to everybody that you can and then make us a list of the 10 or 15 things that we could do tomorrow, without much more money, to really show people that we wanted to change things in the State Department.” They came up with a great list. This was a list of things that we could do to really show people that we meant business. We chose some and I said, “Okay, you all were the idea people, now I want you to get these implemented, just implement them, one after another after another after another. I don’t care in what order, just please get them done.” So they set off to do these things. Meanwhile we tried to raise the Bureau’s level of effort and tempo to get these things done as well, so it was things like we started a fantastic student-loan payback program which is recognized now as the best in government. We tried ...

Q: What does that ... ?

GROSSMAN: As employees came in to the Department with huge college loans, we were able to put together a wonderful program to help them pay them back faster. We even torqued it so that if you served in a hardship post we’d pay more of them back or we’d pay it back quicker. Also, we tried radically to reduce the amount of time it took from the time somebody took the written Foreign Service exam to the time they were given an offer into the Foreign Service. My successors, in fact, Ruth (A.) Davis and (W. Robert) Bob Pearson finished that effort. We just tried to clear away a lot of the underbrush that had built up over the years so things went faster and with more transparency.

We had experimented in EUR with communicating with people by e-mail and being more transparent. We had an email project in EUR called “EUR Right Now,” which was an effort we’d designed with a lot of help from some military colleagues. Everybody in the Bureau, both abroad and at home, could sign on and find out what was going on in the EUR every day and it was a great tool. We tried to do something similar in the Bureau of Human Resources. We just tried to do dozens of things simultaneously.

There were a couple of specific challenges. One was I took over the job at the time when a number of people on the Hill were very rightly concerned about the large number of security violations that people, especially nominees for senior jobs, were getting. We had Ambassadorial candidates held up over this; it was a mess because why did they get all these violations? How could they be leaders if they couldn’t lock their safes? So with AFSA (American Foreign Service Association) and others we tried to work our way through that but nobody could figure out what to do.

One day I was driving in from Dulles and you know there’s those signs on the Dulles Toll Road that said, “This road is for airport users, don’t be an abuser,” and if you did it was some negative points on your license. I thought to myself, “Maybe this is our way to work ourselves out of this.” So we structured a system where security violations had points, they had a time value, they wore off over time, but the people with high-security violation numbers really paid a price for it.
I did a lot of consultations in the Senate, which culminated one night in a remarkable meeting; the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met in closed session in that beautiful room, S-116, which has a round, green table, just like you think of in the movies, and there were many Senators there, led by Senator (Jesse) Helms and me and the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. My job was to try to save the nominations of a large number of career officers who had a shocking number of security violations. I did my best to explain our new system. Senator Helms was very skeptical at the beginning, but I explained what our new program was and how we doing this and make it stick and in the end he said, “All right, I’m going to trust you here,” and everyone got through. I’d never quite done anything like that before. We went back, I remember, to Assistant Secretary Barbara (M.) Larkin’s office, and all the nominees were waiting for us. I can remember looking at each one of them and saying, “I did this for you, but believe me, I’m not doing it again, so clean up your acts on the security violations.”

Q: Well let’s talk about security violations. What was the cause of so many developing a record? You know, I went through, maybe one or two.

GROSSMAN: Me, too. Well, it turns out—and this was the astonishing thing and you would have been as astonished as I was—people had dozens of violations. How was that possible? Day after day I’d see these violations in the files and people who had been Political Counselors and DCMs and Chiefs of Section and chiefs of this and chiefs of that and Ambassadors and they’d had dozens of violations. Not just one, two, five, six, but dozens of security violations. People would come into my office and say, “This shouldn’t be a priority and how can you spend time on this?” I said, “I’m really sorry; this is a matter of self-discipline.” It is a matter of self-discipline and it is also a matter of setting the right example. If you as an Ambassador or a DCM have a dozen or 20 or 30 security violations, first of all, what message does it send to your Marine security guards? Why should they be putting their lives on the line to defend you and these classified documents, if you don’t care? And secondly, what message does it send to your embassy or to your RSO (Regional Security Officer)? And so I thought the Congress in this case was right to point it out. I put the statistics in the State magazine. We kept more statistics, we reported to the Congress, we brought people back for training, we threatened to take people off promotion lists, in fact, we did take people off promotion lists until they had the training, and then we put them back. We wanted people to pay attention to what their duty was. This wasn’t some new obligation that we levied on people.

Q: No, it had been around.

GROSSMAN: Yes. This is your job and you should do something about it.

Q: Let me just stop here.

* * *
Q: (This is tape eight, side one with Marc Grossman.) Marc, you might explain because some people will not understand, what are security violations? What is the procedure how people get these and what is involved?

GROSSMAN: Well the most common of these violations is someone leaving a classified piece of paper out on their desk. Let us say, when they are finished for the day and they have a classified piece of paper, they leave it on their desk and they just walk away. Then in embassies abroad and from time to time in Washington, it is the job, certainly abroad, of the Marine security guards to sweep through the Embassy and find these pieces of paper, because we want them locked up. If you left a piece of paper out, the Marine security guard would confiscate that piece of paper and lock it up and would leave you a pink piece of paper that said, “You left this document out, please come pick it up tomorrow from the Marine security guard” or perhaps from the RSO. And then there was a judgment made about whether there was a possibility of compromise. The chances of being compromised are probably low, but still it was a matter of self-discipline. The right thing to do was to lock up the classified information.

Q: Well we had cleaning people in there.

GROSSMAN: So the deal was that if you got a couple of these violations you would need to be counseled, but what we found was that, as you collected more and more of them, there was no sanction at the upper end.

Q: When you started putting in, saying we really mean this and we are going to police ourselves and all, did you run across the person, there was a certain amount of arrogance, this does not apply to me, I am too senior or something.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: By the time you got there, had the realization gotten to the corps, we are talking about the officer corps, basically, that this was real and they had better clean up their act?

GROSSMAN: No, it was something we had to do through real sanctions, which was through suspending people, taking them off promotion lists, bringing them back to Washington at their expense for training. We instituted a system where at the D Committee meeting—the D Committee was the meeting chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State to choose who should be our next Ambassadors—I asked that there be a report on every single person’s security violation points as part of their package. There were on a number of occasions, names came up to the D Committee to be Ambassador to here, Ambassador to there, but if people had over 30 points, which was the number we chose because it was a lot of violations, if they had over 30 points, then Strobe Talbot, who was the Deputy Secretary of State said, “I am sorry, we are not doing this, people are going to pay a price here.” And so there were on a number of occasions people who missed their chance to be an Ambassador because they had too many security violations.
Now what I did was, because I checked the Virginia DMV (Department of Motor Vehicles) rules, I put them on a time scale so the points reduced over time. I thought it was right to say “Well, if you had 40 points, for example, and you had been shirking your responsibilities for the last 10 years, but you had changed your ways, there ought to be some way to reduce that number. So each year that went by the old points shrank and so if you did right for five or six years you could bring your number down under 30.” But as I said, 30 was already five and six violations.

Q: How did the Foreign Service union, AFSA, what was their attitude?

GROSSMAN: Their attitude was pretty positive. John Naland was the president of AFSA during the time I was the Director General and I think basically John was willing to give us a break on this. How can you make excuses for high numbers of security violations? We worked with him on this system and—I do not want to speak for him—maybe he did not love it but he could see that there were too many violations. I guess he, like me, was astonished that people had this many violations, and so once we ran the numbers, to see what the numbers were like and laid them out to him, he was very helpful.

We also experimented at that time with a 360 review and we put it online, completely voluntarily, a way for you to test how your peers, how the people who worked for you and how the people you worked for, thought about you. There was a 25-question survey and it was easily done and it was all done anonymously and, as I say, voluntarily. John was also hugely helpful in that. We in fact did a joint town meeting one afternoon to introduce this.

Q: Were you there during the lost laptop? A couple of laptops disappeared with a lot of classified information. Was that on your watch or not?

GROSSMAN: No, I think it was before, I think it was when I was in EUR. I am pretty sure. My big problem was ...

Q: It was out of INR?

GROSSMAN: I think that is right. No, my challenge was really to move the HR empire into the 21st century. I will give you an example. I went over one day to visit the people in the Retirement Division. I had taken their briefing and was listening and I noticed two things. One is that it was one of those offices where the conference room had not been painted in ages. I remember I thought to myself, “If people work in these kind of circumstances, the whole tenor suffers.” so I had the place painted. Then another thing in the Retirement Division, I asked whether we had an 800 number, so people, retirees, could call in and get their questions answered. They said, “Oh no, we do not have an 800 number.” I said, “Really, why not? Because if it is money, find out how much it is, let us get you an 800 number, people should be able to call and get their questions answered”. The very good person who was the head of the Retirement Division at the time, said with great honesty, “But if we had an 800 number, then more people would call and the more
people who called, the more bad information my team would give out.” I said, “I am sorry, this cannot be, we have to raise our game to another level.” And she did.

One of things that we also found was that for years people had been struggling to try to get a decent retirement system for our FSNs. It was really complicated and very hard to do across the whole world. Dave Dlouhy worked on this until we got it set so there was a decent retirement system for FSNs in places where there was no retirement system. We had stories of FSNs who had worked for us for years and we had contributed to a retirement system in a country we knew was corrupt. It was corrupt; they were never going to see this money. And I said, “How can we change at least this?” Dave Dlouhy found a way.

My philosophy during this time was: “It does not have to be this way.” For another example, again not my idea, but I was glad to implement it; the FLO people came in one day and said ...

Q: FLO being?

GROSSMAN: I am sorry—the Family Liaison Office. They said that part of retention is families getting jobs. “What if,” they said, “we the State Department could hire a headhunter in a country where there is a bilateral work agreement. We would pay for the headhunter and that headhunter would be available to look for jobs for spouses?” I said, “What a great idea.” And so we pilot programmed it in Mexico City and had, I think, quite a successful run there. I give all the credit for any success to the HR DASs and to my “skunk works” and to Michael Murphy. They hit targets; they said, “Here is something we could do,” and we said, “Let us do it,” and bam they would go out and do it. It was terrific.

Q: Well all of us who have been around for a while who have seen the wheel being reinvented and, I remember, this went back quite a while but there was something called “T Groups” and another called “Encounter Groups” and various personality analyses and all this. During the time you were there, it was basically to let people know how they were doing, was there any particular method that we were subscribing to in the personnel field? You were talking about the “360” thing. What was going on then?

GROSSMAN: Well, nothing worked and the reason was that, although AFSA was very supportive of the 360, they were supportive of it as a voluntary ...

Q: What is the 360?

GROSSMAN: 360 was this program we developed which is a 360 degree view of how you are doing professionally. We contracted with a smart group of Web-based people and we were able to create a 360 on the Web. Let us say that you wanted to find out how you were doing; you would sign up on the Web and you would list some names of people who worked for you and people who were your peers and people who supervised you and they would get by e-mail a request to fill in a survey. It was 25 questions long, you
clicked answers; it took about 15 minutes to do. Then the machine would collect all the answers and spit out a report to you and you would be able to see that on this scale, that scale, some other scale, how you were doing, comparatively. We really wanted to do this and AFSA said, “You can do this but it cannot be used for promotions or for assignments.” I at that point just wanted to get started and see what would happen and, if it proved great, then maybe we would move it into assignments; my interest was not in promotion, my interest was in assignments. I agreed. Also, we agreed that it should be totally voluntary. But what I hoped would happen is that people would use this voluntarily and then as they were applying to jobs they would come to their putative supervisor and say, “Hey, you want to hire me and here is my 360 report.” Or you would go to an Ambassador and say, “I want to be your DCM or your Political Counselor or your Consular Chief because here is my 360 report, I am good at this.” And so that although it was voluntary it would then start being used by the person, him or herself, as a selling point. Well, that never happened and the Foreign Service was very resistant to this, that people would ask, “Well, what if I put down all five of my friends and they will all say I am great?” I can remember getting that question at a town meeting and I said, “Then, you are not taking advantage of what this is all about. I do not care if you put five friends of yours down or not; this is for your conscience and for you to do.” It was not a great success. But I see they are still using some form of it.

Q: And I would imagine the person who has probably got the most problems would be the least likely ...

GROSSMAN: Yes, but what we did was link the survey outcome to the FSI library. FSI was terrific; people there were prepared to serve as mentors and counselors. So let us say that you had a great report on five or six of the lines and one of them you were not doing so great. You could at the end of this program seek some assistance from the FSI librarians, who would propose to you some books, for example, books on leadership or books on management or books on treating people differently that you might, if you were interested in improving yourself, go and read. Or an FSI mentor or tutor might say, “Could I sign you up for a class on this?” So the end of it was not just that you took the test and people said you were great or you were not so great; it said if you want to now improve yourself—and every single person needs improvement; there was nobody who was going to get 100 percent scores on all these lines—it gave you the opportunity to do that. That was our objective; to get everybody involved in this conversation.

Q: One of the things, and again I go back in time, but one of the things that bothers me was that we had these programs of bringing minorities into the Foreign Service for a long time, but for much of that time there was no such thing as sort of mentoring. In other words, it is either sink or swim, and I think the supervisors were a little bit reluctant to get involved because this would seem to be making something special out of a person and this might be misconstrued and all that. How were we dealing with the whole minority thing at your time and did you get involved in that?

GROSSMAN: We got involved in it heavily. The Department had been sued over the years by various groups, women, African Americans and others, so we were operating
under a series of court requirements which were, I think, very proper and the right thing
to do. Mentoring was one of the ways forward and among my predecessors people really
worked hard on getting more mentoring. What we noticed was two things when I was
Director General. One was that while we were doing slightly better in terms of recruiting
African Americans and we were really focused on that and would continue to focus on
that, we were falling down completely on recruiting Hispanic Americans. And people
who were interested in these issues, as we all should have been, but certainly Hispanic
Foreign Service Officers were, would come by and would say, “You have got to do
something about this.” I learned that the CIA at that time was doing a lot better job than
we were recruiting Hispanic officers. I went out to Langley to meet the human resources
people and I asked, “How is it that you are recruiting more Hispanics? Tell me how you
did it.” It was something I should have thought of myself. They said, “We torque where
we send our recruiters and where we send our representatives. And if you send your
representatives to the Northeast of the United States, you are not by definition going to
meet large numbers of Hispanic people.”

So what the CIA found was that if they sent their recruiters and their Diplomats in
Residence or whatever they call them, to Arizona, to Texas, to Southern California, to
New Mexico, just statistically they were going to be better off because they were going to
get to speak to more people of Hispanic origin. That turned out to be true. So one of the
first things we did on the Hispanic side was we moved Diplomats in Residence who were
in the Northeast or other places and—unfortunately I could not expand the program, we
only had a certain number—we moved them to Arizona, to New Mexico, to Texas, so
that the Foreign Service as a career could be put in front of statistically more people of
Hispanic origin, because that is where people live. We also really increased our
participation in career fairs where there were Hispanic American job seekers and
organizations and tried to reach out to them. It is a long-term challenge and I am sure it is
still a challenge.

The other thing that we really focused on and fought hard for the money for—and it has
turned into a just wonderful program—is the Pickering Fellowships, which are not
minority or race-based; they are based on financial need. The Pickering Fellows are as
diverse as America; they are Hispanics and African Americans, Asian Americans,
everybody, Anglos, everybody. That program has turned into a real success. It is very
expensive; it is essentially a State Department ROTC, where we are prepared to pay for
either four years of college or an advanced degree and then the people who are Pickering
Fellows, they work for the Department as interns during the summers and then become
Foreign Service Officers. They take the test, they take the exam and they become Foreign
Service Officers.

Q: How are they, what sort of method of people who apply, what are the criteria?

GROSSMAN: The criteria is somebody who wants to be in the Foreign Service and is
prepared to do the ROTC-like routine, and then it is a needs-based, income and family
income. It is people who might not otherwise have a chance to go to college and study
international relations. The Department makes it possible for them to do so and then requires service, like ROTC, at the other end.

Q: It is a great idea. Is the recruitment of women and all an issue, or has this pretty well been resolved?

GROSSMAN: The promotion of women was still a challenge while I was the Director General. The recruitment of women is now, mostly, a solved problem, in the sense that classes now come that are 50—or over 50—percent women, but I do not think anybody should take anything away from the huge effort it was to get to that point and the struggle it was and the lawsuits and the women who really worked to make that true. The challenge, when I was the DG was still promotion numbers, and also women tended to end up in disproportionate numbers of the Consular cone. In a system which perversely looks for new ways to discriminate against people, one of the last vestiges of it was to have an over-representation of women in the Consular cone.

Q: Yes. How did you find Madeleine Albright was working in her interests in running of the State Department? You know, at the personnel level, human resources?

GROSSMAN: Yes, I found whenever I pitched an idea up to her that was something different and we wanted to change something and I could justify why I wanted to do it, I had her full support.

Q: You mentioned your challenge by Senator Helms and all on the security problem, which was a completely justifiable challenge.

GROSSMAN: Yes it was.

Q: But did you find much interference in other matters from this congress, appointments, within your purview?

GROSSMAN: Not within my purview. The Congress is suspicious of the Foreign Service; the Congress is suspicious of the State Department. So I spent a lot of time talking to people on the Hill about what we were doing and how we were doing it. Like other groups of human beings, I think they appreciated being consulted and wanted to have somebody come pay attention to them and talk to them. So we spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill explaining what it was we were trying to do and how we were trying to change the personnel system. As I say, because I was the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources, my job was to pitch up career candidates for all jobs and it was the White House’s job to pitch up non-career candidates and it was the Hill’s job to call the White House and call the Secretary and say, “We would like so-and-so on this job.” But my job was to get career people in these jobs.

Q: How did you find dealing with disciplinary matters? You know, Ambassadors chasing secretaries around the desk or drinking? Was this pretty much in the matter of the Inspectors taking care of this or did you have to pick up from ...?
GROSSMAN: No, we had a lot of it. I found the ones that really broke my heart were the people who were abusing drugs and alcohol and could not control themselves. I found those cases to be particularly heartbreaking because we were very ready to send people to rehabilitation, but you would still get people who were lost and they were drinking too much and doing drugs and I hated that part of it. I also hated to see visa malfeasance, which we saw some of, unfortunately. I was not sorry to be the disciplinarian, I was just always sorry to see the trouble people got into. It is not surprising that in a system made up of thousands of human beings, human beings get in trouble. You just have to go forward.

I was not afraid of the discipline issues because of my time with John Whitehead. At that time, a lot of discipline cases ended up with the Deputy Secretary and I learned from watching him. Also, Gretchen Welch was great at dispensing fair discipline.

Q: As an old Consular Officer, I could not help noting just this week in the paper an American consul, I guess based in Toronto, was picked up for basically selling visas. One of the problems of course in Consular work is you have got essentially currency to deal with. I mean, the Political Officer, what can they do unless they want to be a traitor, give away the secrets and most of the time nobody is interested. Economic Officer, the same. Admin people can get into trouble because of contracts, but for Consular Officers it is constant pressure.

GROSSMAN: They are under huge strain, but you have to trust people to be honest and then verify.

I was often reminded when I was DG of an opportunity I had at my first post. Peter Constable was DCM in Islamabad. He called me in and said that our Personnel Officer had to go home and have some surgery and was going to be gone six or eight weeks, and he said, “You are going to be the Personnel Officer for six weeks.” I said, “What for, why?” He said, “Because some day it is going to help you; you have to know this to be a good DCM.” And turned out [not] only to be a good DCM, but it was a very helpful thing when I got to be the Director General.

Q: Was there any particular problem, when you were DG, I realize when you are trying to do things with people it can take a long time, but during the year you were doing this, that you wanted to tackle a problem and you found it was just too difficult to get anywhere with?

GROSSMAN: Yes, I am sure that is true. I think it would be better to say, Stu, there were things we started that we could not finish, that maybe if I had been the DG for three years we would have brought to conclusion. But things that we started I was really glad to see that both my successors, Ruth Davis and Bob Pearson, brought to fruition. They had even better ideas of their own, of course, but I was just glad some things I started got completed.
Mostly, because we knew there was going to be a change in Secretary of State but we did not know about being a change in DG, we decided that that year we would hit targets that we could blow up and change things we could change. Let me give you an example.

I had had while I was the Assistant Secretary for EUR a young woman who worked in the Bureau, Civil Service, she was spectacular. She kept taking the Foreign Service exam, the oral, and she kept not passing it. I could not understand why she could not pass it because she was doing the job of a Foreign Service Officer. Well it turns out, I learned as the Assistant Secretary for EUR, that at that time, the Foreign Service oral exam was blind and that the examiners could not ask the person, nor could the person say, that they had any relevant experience to be a Foreign Service Officer. I am sure that this rule got put in for various good reasons over the years. So when I got to be the DG, among the things on my list was I wanted to figure out how to allow someone like this young woman, who is now a Foreign Service Officer, to say, “I work at the State Department, I work here, I do this job and I do it successfully.”

I went to the Cox Foundation and I went to Harvie Branscomb, who is the gentleman who was Chair of the Cox board and I went to Ambassador Clyde Taylor, who was President of the Cox Foundation, and asked, “Can you help me figure this out?” So they paid for a, what was it called? Not an industrial psychologist but a professional who studied the pros and cons of issues like this and then we tried a change. We un-blinded a series of oral exams and what do you know? The sun came up the next morning. We then un-blinded all the exams. So it was then possible, if you worked at the State Department, to tell the oral examiner you work at the State Department or if you were an intern at an Embassy you can say, “I worked here, I have done this.” So we tried to knock off a lot of stuff like that that we could get to.

Q: Well a lot of that developed. I have been in Personnel at one time or another; the whole idea was there were so many challenges that they were trying to make this thing untouched by human hands and you ended up missing out on perfectly good people because you did not know enough about them.

GROSSMAN: Yes. And so, for example, the other thing we did was started an initiative, we called it the “Right Entry Initiative,” which was we took a survey of a couple FSO A-100 classes and we said, “What are the five things you hated the most about your entry into the Foreign Service?” We chose five and we fixed them. Then, we did one at the other end, a “Right Exit Initiative.” We surveyed a lot of retirees and we said, “What are the five things you hated most about retiring?” And we tried to fix them. So we tried to give people a positive experience in their first few weeks and a positive experience as they were leaving. I thought back to the time when I was the DCM in Ankara and if somebody arrived at your post and their housing was not ready and no one met them at the airport, you dug yourself a morale hole that it took months to dig out of. I thought to myself, “If you sent people through A-100 and they do not like it or they think it something is wrong with it, how many years does it take for you to dig your way out of this? And so let us get this right going in.”
And in fact I have the good fortune of reporting that I saw a young man who was an intern last summer, a Pickering Fellow, and he is joining the Foreign Service, and he stopped by to see me last Friday, and he could not stop talking about how wonderful the A-100 class was, how impressed he was with Ruth Davis and Maura Harty and the presentations, how much he loved his new assignment. He is going to Ethiopia and he could not stop talking about what a wonderful thing it was. So I sat down this morning and I sent an e-mail to George (M.) Staples, the new Director General and to Ruth and to Maura and to (Dr.) Ruth (A.) Whiteside and I said, “Here is some positive feedback for you. Here is a kid who thinks he has done the right thing by joining the Foreign Service.”

As DG, I did a lot of speaking. I developed a speech at the time that interested me about how the profession of diplomacy was changing. The other thing I did was, once a week, sometimes twice a week, I did DVCs, digital video conferencing, with groups of junior officers all around the world, and that was real interesting. Sometimes I had to get up at 5:00 in the morning, or would talk at 7:00 at night, 8:00 at night, because the people were in Asia or here and there, but I would sit at the DVC and we would just have a conversation for an hour. I did not travel that much but we were able to touch a lot of people in that way.

Q: Did you have any problem or what was the magnitude of the problem of getting people to accept jobs in either hardship posts or just posts that really most people would avoid? I mean, being the cuckoo-clock man in Geneva or something like that?

GROSSMAN: Maybe there was some difficulty, but when I look now at the challenge that Bob Pearson or Ruth Davis or George Staples have post-9/11, with the hundreds more jobs that are now unaccompanied—no families—whatever problems I had seem pretty insignificant. They are staffing Iraq, staffing Afghanistan. When you think of, for example, Saudi Arabia—which had always been a very good family post—when it goes unaccompanied, that is hard because you are suddenly taking 30, 40, 50 positions out of the system where people say, “No thanks.” I may have had some troubles but, comparatively, it was nothing to what these guys have faced. And let me say that up until now, no one has had to be force placed into Iraq or Afghanistan, which speaks well of the people in the Department.

Q: But just to get a feel for the period, were there places where you had problems, assignments?

GROSSMAN: Yes. But we were able to torque the incentive of the structure for hardships. So we said, for example, “If you will serve at a hardship post, we will double the amount of student loan we will pay back. If you will serve at a hardship post, we will pay business class back and forth for you. Serve at a hardship post …” We had three or four other things. And money talks. Second thing is—although not my idea but I certainly pursued it, and AFSA sometimes did not like it—I was in favor, near the middle of a bidding cycle, of advertising hard to fill positions to the Civil Service. We said to the Civil Service people, “Hey, you want to go on an excursion tour? You want to see what it is like? Here is a load of jobs that your Foreign Service colleagues do not seem to want
but come on, you can do it.” And I thought it was great because I got the jobs filled, and because that Civil Service person came back with a much better understanding of what goes on in the field and had a chance to see the Foreign Service in action abroad.

Q: Was there anything else, any other issue that you dealt with while Director General?

GROSSMAN: Many, but I want to close the section off this way.

In the fall of 2000, (Langhorne A.) Tony Motley, who had been Ambassador to Brazil, ARA Assistant Secretary for Secretary Schulz and was a mentor of mine (he was always asking me if I was thinking about things in the right way), called me up and said, “Marc, are you thinking about the next Secretary of State?” I said, “Yes I am. Whoever it is, Republican or Democrat, yes I am.” And he said, “Well, what are you thinking about?” And I sort of blabbed about some things. He said, “No, no, you need to think about numbers.” He said, “The next Secretary of State is going to sit down with you and he or she is going to say, ‘Where are all of my senior officers?’ You need to know, ‘Who are my senior officers? Where are all my junior officers? Who are my junior officers?’ In other words, that person is going to want all this data sliced and diced in dozens of different ways. Also, he asked me, “What is your plan? What do you want? What do you need?”

I got the “skunk works” folks in and this effort was led by Bill Eaton, and I said, “Okay. We are given a gift here.” This is October, let us say. We have six weeks to figure this out, so go away and think about all the questions you would ask if you were the new Secretary of State and then let us get them answered, statistically and with lists; let us just really do this up. And then let us think up something to ask the new Secretary for.

So Bill and Maureen (E.) Quinn came back after a while and they did a fantastic job on the numbers. I had been reading that in the military, military units have a 15 percent personnel float for training and transit, so that every military unit is only really staffed up if there is 15 percent on top of whatever they have in the unit. I said, “Why not us, why can’t we do that?”

I asked everybody in personnel, and I said, “Think about this. What would 15 percent be? Could we recruit that many new people if we had the money? Over what period of time? Does FSI have room to train them?” We worked on this and we came up with the numbers and then President Bush 43 was elected and Colin Powell was named Secretary of State. And I said, “Lucky us, here is the person who will understand this.” We had a little extra time to get ready for him because of the hanging chads issue at the end of the election. We put together a really good presentation about why we needed a 15 percent float, and 15 percent for us, total State Department, was just under 1,200 people. We made a budget, imagined a timeline. And so, thanks to Tony Motley’s call and some very creative work by the bureau, we were set.
Just before Christmas of 2000, I was in the car with a bunch of kids in the backseat and we were going through the Christmas light show at Bull Run Park. So all these kids are in the backseat and we are driving through the park and the phone rings; it is the Ops Center, it is Colin Powell. I tell the kids to be quiet. He gets on the line and he says, “Are you Marc Grossman?” I said “Yes, I am, congratulations.” “Thank you,” he replied and then he asks, “Marc are you ready?” I said, “Yes, I am ready.” He said, “I am coming to State tomorrow. Give me a few hours to get settled in my office and then I will come call on you because I would like the first person I call on to be the Director of Personnel. Are you ready?” I said, “Yes sir, I am ready. But I have something to say.” He said, “What?” I said, “I will come call on you.” And he said, “Why?” I said, “Because if you come to call on me there will be a riot on the Sixth Floor and it would be disrespectful to Secretary Albright.” And he said, “Okay, come see me.”

So at whatever o’clock the next afternoon, I went down to see then Secretary-Designate Powell in the transition suite and we sat and I introduced myself and he started to ask me questions. He asked me all the questions Tony Motley said he was going to ask me and, thanks to Tony and the HR team, I had the answers. We talked and then, at the end, he said, “So, what could I do for you? What would really show the people here something really great, something fantastic?”

I said, “I actually happen to have an answer.” I pulled out my slides on the float, which I called the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. I pitched him and he said, “First of all I have to tell you I hate the name ‘diplomatic readiness.’” I said, “I do not care what you call it, actually, if you give me 1,200 people.” And he said, “We will have to think about the name. I do not like ‘diplomatic readiness;’ it does not convey to me.” I said, “But think about it from my perspective; you are going to testify to the need for readiness. Who better to testify about the need for to readiness than the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?” He said, “I hate the name but the substance is great. I commit to you, right this afternoon, that we will get these 1,200 people over three years.” I said, “Really?” He said, “You have my word.” And that is what started the DRI, because in the end he could not think of a better name and I could not think of a better name, which has been pursued so successfully by my successors, Bob Pearson and Ruth David, with strong support from Under Secretary for Management Grant Green. We hired just under 1,200 people in three years. Of course, as we sit here today, we still do not have a 15 percent float for training and transit because most all of those people were taken up in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we had the people.

Q: You were saying you were thinking of how we could have survived.

GROSSMAN: How we would have survived without these new people after 9/11, I do not know. This is Ruth and Bob’s story to tell, not mine, but the recruits we got were great. All during the time I was the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, I tried to meet every new FSO class. At one point in their orientation, they take them out to West Virginia for a few days of team exercises and to get everybody to know each other. I used to go up there on a Tuesday night or Wednesday night and I would have dinner with the new class and then I would give them a speech in the evening and answer questions,
spend the night, have breakfast with a number of people the next morning and then drive back. I must say, especially when I was the Undersecretary, it was the most uplifting thing that I did each month. I used to try to swear in as many of these classes as Powell and Armitage would let me; they loved to swear them in even more than I did.

There would be times when I would stand up in front of these groups and there would be 90 of them, or 94 of them. I stood up in front of one group to swear them in and I choked up; I thought, “It is so great to be standing up in front of 90 people to swear in.” We had to move the ceremonies to the Dean Acheson or Loy Henderson Auditorium because peoples’ families and their friends would come. I look back on a 29-year career and there are lots of really wonderful things that I got to participate in, but pitching Powell for DRI and having him say, “Yes,” and then watching these new people come in is something I will always consider to be one of the great highlights of anything I did in the Foreign Service.

Q: Okay. Well we will stop at this point probably.

* * *

Q: Today is the 6th of October 2006. Marc, where are we now? I think you just finished being Director General, had you not?

GROSSMAN: Well, we just finished the story of presenting to Powell the need for 15 percent more Foreign Service and Civil Service people.

Q: As a float kind of...

GROSSMAN: A float for training and transit. I remained the Director General then for another few months and it was during the wintertime of 2000 that Powell asked if I would be the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. I started filling out the papers and making the connections to the Senate, but at the same time I was still holding the DG’s job and one of the really important things that occurred at the end of that year was that we had been working hard with Secretary Albright and her team to see if we could break through even a little bit to make life easier for gay people in the Foreign Service. We worked our way through this and we consulted the group in the Department called Gays and Lesbians In Foreign Affairs Agencies (GLIFFA) along with State lawyers and people on the Hill and came up with, I think, six or seven things that we could do by changing regulations to try to get into the modern world without violating the Defense of Marriage Act.

We decided that the best thing to do was to try to put these new regulations out toward the end of 2000 during the transition. So I got Secretary Albright’s approval to proceed and then thinking back to how Powell had started the Clinton Administration with this controversy over gays in the military, I thought I had better go down there and tell him what we are going to do. So I waited until the end of 2000, and I went in and visited with him and I said, “I want you to know that we are going to put these new regulations out to
ease the burden on our gay officers. These are just common-sense things, like allowing people’s partners to get mail, and they are things that are well past time and they are not any great changes in policy.” So we put it out. It was small but I hope people considered it a start.

Q: Sort of put a historical record, what was the situation about that time with this particular issue?

GROSSMAN: Well the situation was that gay people were both increasingly vocal and increasingly playing a role in our society and in our service. The Department and the Foreign Service had to recognize this reality not just as a matter of justice but also as a matter of good personnel policy, especially as it related to recruitment and retention. We did a lot of consultations with the groups like GLIFFA and AFSA and a lot of other groups that were interested in this and as I said, we had to live inside the Defense of Marriage Act. It was the law at the time and Senator Helms in particular paid great attention to it. So there were certain things that we could not do. But we got to the point where we simply could not understand anymore why people who were partners could not get an Embassy pass or could not have their mail delivered with everybody else or were not on lists for non-combatant evacuations (NEO). Partners were not eligible to pursue jobs that the FLO, the family liaison officer, might put out into the community. As I say, up to the point where our lawyers told us that we were not violating the law, and that was a very important thing, we tried to do as much as possible. As you can imagine, people wanted more but at least something got done.

Q: Did you have any qualms about being Under Secretary for Political Affairs? How did you see it?

GROSSMAN: I had qualms about it for a couple of reasons. One is I loved being the Director General. If I had had a crystal ball, I would have stayed the Director General for the rest of my career. I had qualms about it because I knew how hard it was. I had watched all of those people in P, but I had especially watched Tom Pickering, who is one of the most gifted and energetic Foreign Service Officers ever, and I thought, “If it was hard for him, what is it going to be like for me, who does not have those talents?” So yes, I took it with some trepidation. And then of course, who could have predicted the 11th of September?

Q: Well when you were going to be doing this, did you see any policy ..., sort of not September 11 of course, changed the whole landscape, but prior to that, with the election and the closeness, did you see any profound difference looming on the horizon or was it sort of, I would say a normal change of Administrations, particularly in foreign affairs?

GROSSMAN: Pre-September 11 I would have put it down to the normal range of changes that new Presidents make. Now you can say, “Well Kyoto was a pretty big disaster,” and yes, I thought the way we got out of Kyoto was a mess, but the treaty itself was certainly not supported in Congress. So I thought that the way that we left the Kyoto Treaty, or said we were not going to participate, was a pretty poor piece of public
diplomacy, but the treaty itself, on the substance of it, I do not think anybody supported signing up to that treaty. So I thought generally, for the first few months in terms of policy that this was a normal change of Administration. What I had not predicted, and did not predict, was the antipathy of Secretary Rumsfeld and the people he had brought into the senior levels of the Pentagon to the State Department, and to Secretary Powell in particular.

Q: Looking back, because we are talking about who had been working together, you know, the Gulf War, the first one and all this, had anybody been saying well watch that guy Rumsfeld? Had you picked up anything like that, at any point prior to sort of the personalities began to gel?

GROSSMAN: I think that Dr. Kissinger’s memoirs describe Rumsfeld as a black-belt bureaucratic infighter, which given Kissinger’s capacity at this, was no small compliment. What I had not understood was the deep personal and policy antipathy, which is the only word I can use, that welled up in there between Rumsfeld and Powell and some of the people that Rumsfeld had brought with him. They hated the State Department. They disrespected Powell and what he stood for. I had no idea that this would take over our lives as quickly as it did and as completely as it did.

Q: Well let us talk about what you might call really the honeymoon, well really I mean the takeover. Powell was probably the most welcome Secretary of State that I can imagine. Can you talk about maybe the halcyon days, or whatever you want to call it?

GROSSMAN: Well I think you have to separate all the way through. When people say to me, “How was it to have been there for four years,” I was always able to separate out two very important things. First of all, there is the policy, the substance, the interagency, which was a real struggle. On the other hand, from the first day he was at the State Department to the very last day Powell was at the State Department, for the institution and for our people and for the Foreign Service and the Civil Service and our Foreign Service Nationals, he was great. I think one of the reasons that senior people stayed there, including myself, for those four years, even in the face of Iraq, was because people believed in him and people believed in what he was doing for the Department. So right from the very beginning, he showed up at the Department on the first day with his PT Cruiser and he got out of his car and I think he tried all the way through the transition to show people that the State Department was going to be about him and he was going to be about the Department.

There was a wonderful scene in one of the early briefings. I guess it was after he told me I was going to be the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, so I started to sit in on these briefings to see what I could learn about things I did not know very much about. There was a wonderful exchange with I cannot remember whom. Powell listened to the briefing and asked some questions. The person who was in charge of the briefing said, “Yes, Mr. Secretary-Designate; we will get the answers to your questions back up to your staff.” He looked at this person and he said, “No, no, you have to understand, you are my staff.” He worked very hard at making that true. The core people in terms of Rich Armitage and
Grant Green had to face many early decisions that circled around two basic questions: what about the people and how to do we best execute this or that task?

We were the beneficiaries of six or seven major studies of how to reorganize the Department: one from Rand and one from the Stimson Center, and a lot of good ideas were in the air. And we met as a group, Powell, Armitage, Green and I, with all of the people who had done those studies and we concluded our first job was to try change the way people thought about their jobs and about themselves before we could contemplate changes in the structure of the Department. We wanted to spend the four years that we were there changing peoples’ psychologies and then leave to the next people the moving around of the boxes on the organization chart. Powell at one point said that we could spend our four years moving boxes around on the organizational chart and never have any impact on the way people thought about their profession and their jobs. So we focused in on that.

People at the State Department did not have Internet on their desks. Some people were still using Wang machines. Whenever there was a budget discussion in the early months, Powell said, “Look, here’s what we are going to do; first, money is for people; second, money is for buildings, and third, the money is for information technology. And then we can figure the rest from there.” He kept the word that he gave me as the DG; he made sure that $100 million, actually it was $98 million, was in the budget every year for the three years of that hiring plan and then extended it a year into the fourth year. I thought that the way he handled himself and the way he worked on the building was very inspiring.

There was another moment at one of the senior staff meetings when, I cannot remember again who asked, “I would like to seek your permission to go up on Capitol Hill.” Powell said, “Well, what are you asking me for? If I trust you to be an Assistant Secretary then I trust you to go up on the Hill and pursue our policies and I want you to be on the Hill every day if that is what you think is the right thing and do not ask me permission. Now, if I ever catch you presenting a policy that is not mine or the President’s or not supporting our budget decisions, you are toast. But my assumption is that I have hired you as an Assistant Secretary so I trust you to do what you are supposed to do.”

Q: Well was there almost a conscious effort, one thinks back before with Madeleine Albright and James Baker, both at least from the corridor, I did not serve under them but that there was this coterie around both of them which sort of isolated the secretary. Baker probably had a very extremely talented (cadre) but it still protected the Secretary of State; Madeleine Albright probably had a less talented group around her. I mean, this is what I am getting, whether or not you can object to this. But in both cases, there was a feeling, well, it is a little hard to get to the Secretary. Did Powell, one, sense that, and it just was not going to happen under his watch?

GROSSMAN: You know, I think that part of this is how a person arrives at being the Secretary of State, what they did before. There is a reason that, in my memory, and I leave substance aside here, but for me, the two most natural leaders of the Department
were George Shultz and Colin Powell. Why is that? Well, George Shultz had run one of America’s greatest companies, Bechtel, and had led a number of large institutions, including Cabinet departments. Secretary Baker came from a law firm, and now that I have an office in a building full of lawyers, my observation is that law firms are coalitions of people who all get together for certain purposes and they call themselves partners, but they are really individuals who are all doing a job under one roof. Secretary Albright was a professor. Then you have Powell, who had spent his entire life commanding groups of people. So I think this has less to do with coteries and close associates; it has to do with how people arrived at this job and how they saw their job. And I repeat: that is not a judgement on policy.

Powell came to this responsibility after spending 34 years leading groups of people. When he had five extra minutes or 15 free minutes, he was down in the basement, wandering around shaking hands or he would go up to the Eighth Floor and go into the mechanical rooms and just wander around. He was a curious guy, who understood that his curiosity also sent a big message about who he was. Nobody is perfect, but he had really figured out what it meant to be the leader.

Q: The job of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, I guess changes, depending on the people, but how did you see it and how do you think Powell saw it at that particular time? We are talking about 2001-2005.

GROSSMAN: Well again, you have to divide before September 11 and after September 11. I think before September 11, we were working our way toward a division of labor that would have had Powell focus on Russia and China and the Middle East and would have had Rich Armitage focus in on Asia, which he knows better than anybody else, not China but the rest of Asia, and India, Pakistan. I would have worked on all of those issues when needed, but probably would have focused on Europe and NATO and Colombia, which Tom Pickering had sketched out as the responsibility of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. We were working our way toward a division of labor between Rich and me on who went to Deputy’s Committee meetings at the White House the public appearances and meeting the dozens of foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers and undersecretaries and Ambassadors that need to be seen at the Department: that’s diplomacy. I think we were working our way toward a pretty sensible division of labor and then the 11th of September came and then we just lived in a crisis from then until January of 2005.

Q: Okay, let us just talk about the period prior to the attack in New York. How did you see Congress, particularly Senator Helms but also, this is a Republican Congress which had not been overly friendly to the Clinton Administration on foreign affairs; how did you see it as an area to deal with an also how did you prepare yourself and how were you treated as you moved into this influential position?

GROSSMAN: First of all I need to go back. One of the things that hurt Secretary Albright’s reputation, unfairly, is that people forget, especially in terms of money for the State Department, that she was up against a Republican Congress. I thought she did as
well as she could for a long time with Senator Helms, but the money was hard because it was a different party in control.

Q: She made extraordinary efforts to be nice to Senator Helms and it is not easy.

GROSSMAN: Powell paid attention to Congress from the very beginning, for example by using his confirmation hearings to send messages about what Administration policies would be like and what priorities he would establish. I think it was in those hearings that he introduced the concept of “diplomatic readiness,” which we discussed before. Powell, Armitage and Green worked very hard on the appropriations side of the Hill to show people who did not trust the management of the State Department that we could manage. Rich and Grant Green did a wonderful job. You will remember that when Secretary Albright left there was legislation that we had to have a separate Deputy Secretary of State for Management, so there would be two Ds. Powell said, “We are not doing this.” And they went to see Chairman Rogers, who had put this legislation in, and said, “You have got to give us some time, we will show you that this thing can be managed.” And Grant Green and Rich took that on as their priority, and no second Deputy Secretary of State was appointed.

The Congress, especially the Senate, always treated me very professionally. Sometimes it was a different story in the House. You are treated extremely well by some House members, but for some House members you are just the person they are going to score points off on TV. That’s life. I was also lucky, benefited, that some Members had visited Turkey while I was there and many I had consulted back in DC. There was also some residual trust that had been built up in the preparation of the 1999 NATO Summit.

Q: What was particularly good about that NATO summit do you think?

GROSSMAN: As we have discussed, the best thing about it was that it was NATO expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Second, we were in Kosovo at that time. We had worked hard with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee to testify and consult in advance of the Summit, so that the issues that mattered to them—which had to do mostly with the relationship between NATO and the United Nations—were all taken care of. We worked hard with Congress in 1999 and I think by the time I became the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, while not perfect, I had some decent relationships in Congress.

Q: Well when did you become Undersecretary for Political Affairs?

GROSSMAN: I was confirmed in March of 2001.

Q: Did you feel at that time and maybe even a little before but at that time one got the feeling that the Bush 2 Administration came in and there were a bunch of things that it was not going to deal with right away? One was North Korea and its nuclear ambitions, particularly the Middle East and negotiations there and everything was on hold and of course there was this concern that a lot of momentum was being lost and we need time to
study this but everybody else in the world goes on. Was there a feeling of concern about this?

GROSSMAN: You have to divide those into two. On the Middle East, it is hard to judge that first few months negatively, from my perspective, and here is why. You will remember at the end of the Clinton Administration, first there was Camp David, where Yasser Arafat in my view passed up a huge opportunity. And then Dennis Ross and team tried again at Taba. Dennis Ross was working hard right to the very end of the Clinton Administration. And every night during the transition, Dennis would, either in person or by phone, brief Powell on the state of play. It was, as I recall, an unrelentingly negative set of updates. People were, you can imagine, so disappointed by the outcome of Camp David and it seemed they were going to be disappointed again at Taba. Powell listened to Dennis night after night during the transition and concluded that Arafat was not capable of making a deal. So I think that, when Powell took the oath of office on the 20th of January 2001, and faced with a whole list of things to do, he says, “Why do I want to beat my brains in on this again right away?” So it is hard to underestimate, I think, the impact of Arafat’s actions, or lack of action, at the end of the Clinton Administration. I think the Bush 43 people and Powell in particular came in and said, “For a few months we are just going to stop this because we cannot deal with Arafat; Arafat is just never going to say ‘yes’ to anything that makes sense.”

So you can look back now and say, “Not a good decision, there was momentum, should have kept going,” but there was not any real momentum. What we did not know at the time was—Powell might have known but I did not know at the time—how unalterably opposed to any negotiation people at the Pentagon and over in the Vice President’s office were. It becomes a huge struggle then, and I give Powell credit, because Powell appointed former Marine Corps four star General Tony Zinni to keep things going in the Middle East and he endorsed the Mitchell Report. Then—the chronology escapes me, but—there is either the road map or the President’s statement in June of 2002 calling for two states, which I thought was a very important step that President Bush 43 took, coming out for two states.

So you look back now and if you say to me, “What is the one thing the Administration should be doing now more than anything else?” Well I think it should be pursuing the President’s policy of two states, absolutely. But if you had said to me in April, May, June of 2001, given what had just happened and the way Powell in particular was thinking about the Middle East, would I have sent him out to try shuttle diplomacy in the spring and early summer of 2001? No. You can look back on that and say it was a mistake, but the reporting and everything that I am sure that President Clinton had told President Bush 43, but certainly what Dennis conveyed to Powell, was that nothing was going to happen.

North Korea is different. On North Korea, the White House and the Pentagon said, “Our policy will be anything but the policy Clinton pursued.” If President Clinton and Dennis Ross would have left the Middle East with 5 percent or 10 percent more to do, if they had gotten close but run out of time or if, like the Iran hostages in 1981, the Iranians were determined not to give anything to Carter and waited for the inauguration of Reagan, I
believe that Powell would have tried to finish the last few percent. But North Korea was different. The new administration did not like the Clinton North Korea policy, they did not like what Bob Gallucci had done, they did not like the fact that Secretary Albright had been to North Korea. It was the ABC policy: Anything But Clinton. As Powell adopts what is close to the North Korea policy of the previous Administration he get criticized for it. There is that statement where he says, “I got a little too far forward in my skis.”

Q: Well, you say the Pentagon and the White House were opposed to anything dealing with the Middle East, what would the problem be outside of trying to stop these two squabbling tribes?

GROSSMAN: No, I think they saw it differently. They believed that you could not do business with Arafat. To be clear: I thought that was a very legitimate position. There were times when I was at a Deputy’s Committee meeting and the State Department bureaucracy wanted me to argue that Arafat was just misunderstood, that he would do a deal in the end if we could only find one he liked: I would say: “I am not arguing that. I don’t believe it.” I know it’s more complicated than this, but I think Arafat could have had what he wanted how times over since 1967, but never could say “yes.” So you have to be careful, I think, saying, “Well the State Department is always right, and the State Department position that negotiation is always the answer and so therefore we have got to find a way to accommodate Arafat.” I did not think that was true in this case.

Q: Did you get any feeling as you moved into the Undersecretary’s job, a feeling for the National Security Council, the President and all, how they were looking upon foreign affairs, what their priorities were?

GROSSMAN: Like most White Houses, they would have been happy to deal with foreign affairs less than they had to. They came to office wanting to reassert, or assert, American primacy abroad, to show strength. They believed showing America’s strength and acting unilaterally were synonymous. To be clear: I believe that America must act alone if we must, indeed I might be more of a believer in that proposition than some other people. But I do not think it is appeasement or weakness or being a State Department person to try to build coalitions, to consult traditional allies and try to create new ones and to look for friends around the world to help you. But the instinct of our colleagues at the Pentagon and at the White House was, “We can and will do what we want when we want on our own.” Of course the US is very powerful and we can do many things on our own, but if you can get some support and help, it is better.

Q: Well in the long run you end up by wanting to have some friends and support.

GROSSMAN: For example, I know I am a dinosaur, but I think NATO is a great alliance and they are today operating in Afghanistan. But in 2001, our new White House and Pentagon colleagues came in and they hated the NATO mission in Bosnia, and wanted out of it. They did as little consultation with allies as possible. They felt that all these NATO members were just a brake on what we could do.
Again, I do not say that 100 percent of what they thought or felt was wrong. For example, the Kyoto Treaty was flawed and congressional sentiment was strongly opposed. I was sure that we should have aggressively protected ourselves from the International Criminal Court (ICC). I am in favor of missile defense. And again, as at the NATO Summit in 1999, I believe that there are times that the US must act alone.

But how you do things is important. We did no diplomacy before we left the Kyoto arrangement. We flaunted our rejection of the ICC. I think all of those otherwise defensible decisions got pushed to the excess—“unnecessary roughness” in the football sense—and it was too bad. When it came time to try to build coalitions on other subjects later on in the Administration, it was harder.

Q: Something has always troubled me. I am an old Balkan hand and so I could not help feeling that the whole Bosnian-Kosovo thing was essentially a success. We stopped an ulcer that would have been going on; unless we came in and squelched it, it would still be going on today and probably much worse. I am not quite sure why there were people who just hated our involvement. We were using NATO; it was not costing us troops, it was not costing us a hell of a lot of money.

GROSSMAN: I cannot explain all of that except that these were policies that were Clinton policies, so they did not like that. They were multilateral policies, so they did not like that. They were nation-building policies and, you will recall, a big part of the election campaign was “no more nation building,” so they did not like that. They believed the urban myth that the NATO Ambassadors chose US bombing targets. I think the civilians at the Pentagon felt that it was too much State Department telling the military what to do and where to go and that was their job.

But some of it got completely absurd where, in the beginning they said, “Well, let us just get out of the Bosnia mission.” We argued, successfully, that there was still work to do in Bosnia and work to do in Kosovo. A few months after getting this settled in the USG, the EU said, “We would now like to take over the mission in Bosnia.” I said, representing the State Department at DC meetings, “I think we ought to accept this offer. Let the European Union take this on, one because it frees up American forces and two, this is actually their problem” It was interesting that as soon as I was in favor of that, the Pentagon flipped and was in favor of keeping American forces there because they did not want the Europeans to do it. It was surrealistic. I asked, “Do you just oppose this because I am in favor of it or is there some reason?” I think it was just because if the State Department was in favor of it that they were opposed to it. In the end we did succeed in having our government support the transfer of the Bosnian mission to the European Union.

Q: All of this has turned out to be just sort of an interim, a breathing period before all hell broke loose ...
GROSSMAN: I will give you another example. To me, one of the great successes of Camp David and after has been the peacekeeping mission in the Sinai, the Multinational Force and Observers. This was a useful investment in making sure Camp David and the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt stayed real. Again, our colleagues from the Pentagon came in and they put it right on their target list, “Close it down, get rid of it, get American troops out of there, let somebody else do this.” We spent months talking about this. The Israelis wanted American troops to stay. The Egyptians wanted American troops to stay. But the Pentagon just said, “No, this is not a core mission of our military forces and so we’re not going to do this anymore.” And they, I think, would have been prepared to pick them up one afternoon, take them away. And to me, the issue was, our military forces are stretched and yes, there’s operational tempo. But it seemed to me that one of the great achievements of the United States, leave alone what political party or what President, over the past thirty years has been the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and to keep it bolstered was a good idea. And here again, we were not alone. We led, and we contributed the most, but many other nations were involved in the MFO.

Q: Well, there was this antipathy towards peacekeeping per se. We had a peacekeeping school and maybe we still do, at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania. Outside of getting involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, peacekeeping is a major component of military forces these days. They’re training for it and all that. Did you find that you couldn’t even use the term “peacekeeping” or not?

GROSSMAN: I felt more that no one in the Pentagon civilian leadership believed that anyone at the State Department had the right to even think about where our forces might be used and how they might be used. It wasn’t our business. And so it went through the whole Administration, in Liberia and all kinds of places. Again, I have great respect for our military forces. I have great respect for the challenges that we have on operational tempo. But I thought it was the proper use of diplomacy, and of the tools of national power, that there at least ought to be a conversation about how our forces got used. Our colleagues at the Pentagon believed that no one had the right to have an idea about the use of our armed forces except for them. Now, they were eager to give us advice about every aspect of how to do diplomacy, but it was a one-way street.

Q: Was this the civilian leadership of the Pentagon or maybe you didn’t get anything from the uniformed services?

GROSSMAN: Secretary Rumsfeld tried to cut us off from the uniformed services. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld decided that he didn’t want to have military officers on exchange anymore at the State Department. He recalled a number of the military officers (maybe all of them) who were serving in the PM bureau and elsewhere at State. He did not want to have State Department exchange officers at the Pentagon. In the very beginning, orders went out that my uniformed counterparts at JCS that I would have normally spoken to daily in the course of trying to do my job, were enjoined from talking to me and talking to anybody at the State Department. Luckily for me, many of them ignored this instruction.
Q: Did you feel the influence, or were you getting from Secretary Powell, of the Vice President, Richard Cheney and where he was, in the Administration taking over?

GROSSMAN: It was very clear from the beginning that the Vice President was going to be a powerful figure. The people whom he was hiring were people that we’d worked with before and respected, such as (I. Lewis) Scooter Libby and Eric Edelman, who was a Foreign Service Officer, and one of my successors in Turkey. If the question is between March of 2001 and September 11, 2001, whether I thought there was a lot of power in the Vice President’s office, maybe. Maybe they played a more active role.

Q: Did you get any feel, in your position, about the relationship between Secretary Powell and the President, particularly at that time?

GROSSMAN: It is very difficult to think what life was like before September 11. My recollection is that that relationship was going pretty well, although it seemed Powell was never part of the inner group. He’s not a locker room, towel-snapping, kind of person.

Q: How did you find, when you got there, the relationship with the CIA? It goes back to the Reagan period, where William Casey was sort of a power unto himself, a very strong figure. Was that much of a factor in foreign policy?

GROSSMAN: No, I think that all of those struggles—for Chiefs of Mission, for example and for our government as a whole—that was a ‘70s and ‘80s issue. Much more complicated now, for lots of reasons, is negotiating the relationship with the law enforcement agencies and with deployed Special Forces (SOF). Mr. Rumsfeld made a run or two at COM authority as it related to SOF deployments. We prevailed in the end. I think for Chief of Mission (COM) authority, much more challenging these days is how to deal with law enforcement. One of the great ironies, tragedies and miseries of pre-9/11, was watching all those people out in Yemen fight over who was doing the best job to pursue the USS Cole investigation.

Q: Yeah, I talked to (Michael J.) Mike Metrinko who went out there and said it was screwy, because you had the Navy, the FBI, the State Department, probably CIA, they were running around, this is the attack on the destroyer Cole and they were literally running over sidewalks in high-speed cars with guns. All those different structures which blew their top at each other. He said it was really scary.

GROSSMAN: Yes it was. It was very confusing. We didn’t do a very good job in sorting it out. Barbara (K.) Bodine was the Ambassador and she asked, for example, that I, as P, had to rule on whether or not FBI agents would be able to go outside the compound with long guns. I said, “I don’t care whether they go out with pistols or not, it is okay with me, but I support the Ambassador: I don’t want them wandering around out in Yemen with long weapons.” We tried to make sure everybody could get along and I’m sure there were some things we decided in favor of the FBI that Barbara was mad at us about, but it was a real mess. I am sure if everybody had worked together we might have come quicker to a conclusion about who did this and that might have helped us.
Q: You’ve alluded to this but why at the beginning of the Administration, I can think of a couple of clashes where we seemed to be taking great delight, talking about the United States, the Administration, in going it alone. One was on repudiating the Anti-Missile Treaty and the other one was Kyoto and the third one was ...

GROSSMAN: The ICC, International Criminal Court.

Q: International Criminal Court. It was not a matter of, this type of thing, what you do is you submerge it in diplomatic talk and all this but you don’t do anything about these, or you go ahead but you cover it over. But you don’t turn this into “Look what I just did to those guys.” How did you all see this?

GROSSMAN: As I said earlier, I think part of the challenge here was that, in all three cases, I didn’t have a problem with the substance. But they didn’t do things, early on, with a plan for the long term. The desire to feel good by acting unilaterally overcame the need to do the diplomacy and drowned out the perfectly arguable substance of the decisions.

So, to take each one in turn, I think global warming is a real, serious problem which must be dealt with multilaterally. But the Kyoto Treaty was flawed. The Kyoto Treaty doesn’t have India in it, doesn’t have China in it. I think all these European countries, even though they signed up, they weren’t ever going to be able to meet their targets and timetables.

Q: Canada has just, last week I saw, they’re having problems with gas emissions they can’t ...

GROSSMAN: So many countries signed up knowing, in advance, they were never going to meet these targets and timetables. To me, Kyoto did not seem like a very good deal and, don’t forget, the Congress had voted against it, 98 to nothing. So it is not like the Administration said, “Hey, let’s get rid of this Kyoto Treaty” and didn’t get a lot of applause for it. But there’s a way to get out of it and a way not to get out of it. If somebody would have stood up and given a reasonable speech and said, “Look, global warming’s a problem and the United States is going to be in the forefront of this effort and one of the priorities of the Administration is going to be to work on global warming. But this Kyoto Treaty doesn’t work and it is never going to work because it isn’t going to solve the problem.” And, yes, some people would have said, “terrible,” but I think we would have worked our way through that by using diplomacy and public diplomacy, staking out a position that we were going to be a good steward of the environment.

Same thing with the International Criminal Court. I gave the speech that said we weren’t going to sign up to the International Criminal Court. But the speech started with the idea that the US was a global leader in promoting justice, but that the ICC did not, at that time, meet basic standards to protect US officials abroad and that the ICC was not subject to UNSC review.
Q: Please explain what the issue is.

GROSSMAN: The International Criminal Court is a court that was created by a conference in Rome a couple of years before the administrations changed, in ’98 or ’99, I think. And the International Criminal Court is an attempt to have international justice. Again, a very nice philosophy, but the International Criminal Court, from our perspective at the time, was not answerable to the UN Security Council, is subject to political influence and, if I were a US military member or a diplomat serving abroad, I’d be worried about people bringing political prosecutions against me because I’m an American. The Clinton Administration wasn’t a big fan of it, although they signed it, but they never sent it for ratification and Secretary Powell, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been opposed to the International Criminal Court. Again, I gave the speech saying we weren’t going to do it and it is a rational speech, trying to lay out the arguments for and against.

But then my Under Secretary colleague, John Bolton, went up to the UN to “un-sign” the document. And then we went around for a couple of years and we tried to take aid away from countries that had signed up to the International Criminal Court but wouldn’t give us an exemption for our officials. There’s an article in the International Convention, called Article 98 and Article 98 says, if I recall rightly, that you can exempt people from certain nation and certain prosecutions. We tried to sign up as many countries as we could for Article 98 agreements. But then we started to shoot ourselves in the foot because we wouldn’t give military assistance or IMET (International Military Education and Training), or economic assistance, to people we really needed unless they signed up for an Article 98 agreement. We wrapped ourselves around a an axle over this and I was very interested to see earlier this week that White House exercised Presidential waiver authority on these Article 98 agreements to all of the countries that we need as allies and friends. At some points, we were cutting off assistance to countries that were helping us in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Again, I was not a supporter of the International Criminal Court as it was then structured. I don’t think we should have signed up to it, but at some point you have to avoid gloating and stop pressing certain principles to the outer limit if they conflict with other objectives that you have.

Q: Do you think there was a lot of ego in this; people were puffing themselves up to show that they were tough cowboys or what have you?

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t. I think this was ideological. The Administration came to power saying that internationalism, multilateralism, constrained the ability of the United States of America to do whatever it pleases and that wherever possible we were going to throw off what they saw as constraints. And, to jump ahead, that’s what leads you to Abu Ghraib and that’s what leads you to an attempt to weaken the Geneva Convention on Torture.
I owe you a third answer, which is on the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. Again, the problem’s in the perception. Here I confess I differed from Secretary Powell and Rich Armitage. They were not convinced at the time that missile defense was an effort worth pursuing. I think missile defense is something the United States ought to have and we ought to be spending research money and if we can deploy it we ought to deploy it—and the ABM Treaty was in the way.

We’d go to meetings and the Pentagon was saying, “Let’s just announce tomorrow that we’re renouncing it.” And we’d say, “Well, you can’t do that. The treaty says six months. Plus the fact that it would be better if you talked to your allies about this.”

The President made a decision that we would talk first to our allies. And I made one of those trips to alert our allies. And it is a perfectly rational argument to say that you need missile defense, that there’s a threat out there and you can prove that threat by drawing lines on maps, that those people who are really threatened are our European allies, that missile defense should be part of a defense package that any country ought to be able to have that can get it, and that the ABM Treaty put a cap on some of the things that we can do. That’s all right. You can make that argument. And then you get out of the ABM Treaty if you want to.

But you’ve got to do the consultations. You have to go to NATO. You have to talk to people. And we got out of the ABM Treaty. But we did it I think in a more proper way. And what happened? Russia and China were not happy, but our European allies stayed with us because we had consulted them.

You can see the difference between the Kyoto and ICC examples and the ABM Treaty example. We did diplomacy before we got out of the ABM Treaty. We still got out of the ABM Treaty. It didn’t stop us from doing what we wanted to do. But we did it in a diplomatic way that leaves doors open for the long term.

Q: Another thing that struck me as being an issue in a way, probably a fake issue, but the anti-mining treaty, land mines treaty. The Canadians pushed this very hard. But actually the only place we used them really is in Korea. And it is quite specific, quite well controlled; did you get involved in that at all or not?

GROSSMAN: I was aware of the controversy. But here, again, I think that the fact that our military forces need land mines and that we have technological fixes for the problem was part of the answer. But the other part of the answer is that we spend now, as a country, more money on de-mining than anybody else in the world. So if you’re going to say, “All right, I’ve got to have these land mines in Korea but I will commit myself to huge efforts in de-mining,” then that seems, to me, okay, in the same way as being ready to work on climate change but not signing up to Kyoto. If you take a position internationally that America believes in the good stewardship over natural resources and we’re going to work and spend money on the environment and sustainability, then if you don’t want to sign up to this specific treaty called Kyoto it is all right. But you can’t do one without the other.
Q: Again, these are all prior to 9/11. Did you find here, though, that the Department of Defense, this idea of getting out of peacekeeping, out of the Sinai, out of Bosnia and all this, yet at the same time they’re building up and Rumsfeld was making efforts, which I think were quite legitimate, to make a more flexible military, which I applauded. I thought this was great, shaking things up. But at the same time, behind it all was creating a mobile military that could, in a way, act as a police brigade, go in and take care of problems but we were also committed, in the Administration’s point of view, to not being the world’s policeman. You see a problem with this?

GROSSMAN: No, I did not. I thought that the effort to change our military and to change our military posture was worthy and laudable. I don’t think that they were doing it to be the globe’s policemen and not for purposes of modernization. I don’t think that’s right. I think that they were doing it to deal with contingencies with something less than a whole army. What I didn’t understand at the time was that, and I didn’t understand it until Iraq, is that this was also an attack on what was known as the Powell Doctrine. Yes, our military forces needed to be transformed and needed to be able to do things in an agile and small way, but I did not think that we should simultaneously or correspondingly lose our ability to act with a large force. That’s one of the advantages of being a superpower.

Q: Well, again, looking around the globe, I’m still talking about this one period because it is important to take this as it comes—did you see any major country problems? I can think of North Korea, but how many, China or Colombia or any other countries around?

GROSSMAN: You had in that period the P-3 incident with China. The Chinese forced down our surveillance aircraft and held our people captive for all those weeks. Powell and Armitage took on that problem personally and they were something to watch, the two of them. They worked and they worked on this and Powell would often be typing the messages to the Chinese on his computer and printing them off himself. He and Rich and (Joseph W.) Joe Prueher, who was the Ambassador in Beijing, a retired admiral—they did a wonderful job.

Colombia—when I took over my job, as Under Secretary, I had a talk with my predecessor, Tom Pickering, and Tom said, “I have just three words for you: Colombia, Colombia and Colombia.” I took him seriously. I didn’t know much about Colombia at the time, but I studied hard. I went to Colombia a couple of times during the next year, because he had left me the legacy of Plan Colombia, a great success of American foreign policy and military policy. As far as I know, it was the first real, explicit “whole-of-government” effort. Colombia and Colombians captivated me—they were fighting for their democracy. I wanted to take what Tom had bequeathed me and take it even further. I visited Colombia maybe eight times as P.

Another issue: President Bush 43 came to power wanting to improve our relations with India. People were looking for ways to do that. We laid the foundations for the subsequent nuclear agreement.
We also embarked on another round of NATO expansion.

The President and Powell wanted to improve our relations with Mexico. Pre-9/11 there was a real conversation going on about immigration and border crossings in a way that we could not sustain on the day after the 11th of September. But I think the President wanted to have the right relationship with Mexico, especially with (President) Vicente Fox.

Q: Well, of course as governor of Texas and a real change in Mexican politics when Vicente Fox came in

GROSSMAN: And NAFTA. NAFTA was by then really taking hold and was beginning to have a positive effect in Mexico.

So there were lots of things to do. Up until the 11th of September it was hard with the Pentagon. But I’d lived through Shultz and Weinberger, so I’d seen at least part of this movie before. I just thought it was going to be hard going, ideological, but in the end I thought that Powell was going to win more than his share of battles and therefore so was the Department.

Q: Well during this time, what about Iran? Here is really a major country and we didn’t have relations. In a way it is a little bit like a long period we all experienced with China where we didn’t have relations. This seems to be a problem where we needed to get on with it.

GROSSMAN: No, I’m sorry to say, I don’t have any recollection of people talking very much about Iran in the early days, one way or another. Later, there was an earthquake and we sent aid and there was a slight opening, but it closed right away.

Q: How about Iraq? Was that a sore or was it sort of off to one side?

GROSSMAN: Oh, no, it was front and center because we were fighting with the Pentagon over sanctions. I remember Secretary Powell came in and said the sanctions clearly did not work in Iraq. He developed, along with David Welch, who was then the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, this idea of “smart sanctions” to try to ease some of the sanctions that were, for example, starving Iraqis or making it hard for them to get medicine while allowing room for abuses in the oil for food program. Our friends at the Pentagon tried to block all efforts in that regard. So, Iraq was, from the very first day, part and parcel of the conversation, all the time, every day, every way.

Q: What was the issue? Was it more sanctions and just punishing them or was it the threat?

GROSSMAN: Everybody recognized Saddam was a threat. There wasn’t any question about that. The question was how do you control that threat. Secretary Powell’s view was that basically this guy was in a box and was not a direct threat to the United States and
that he could probably stay in that box for a long time without threatening the United States or any of our allies. But you had a lot of starving Iraqis because of the misery of Saddam’s regime; we were grinding ourselves to a halt on the old sanctions, and there needed to be a new way to think about it and smart sanctions.

Q: As far as food and medicine, I talked to people who went into Iraq shortly thereafter, you were part of this, we sent Foreign Service people there and they said actually there was a pretty good food distribution system under Saddam. People had learned to live with just so much oil and they got so much this and that. So it wasn’t of the nature that you think about in North Korea.

GROSSMAN: I don’t think so, but in fact the distribution system was UN supervised and was good enough so that many of us early on after the overthrow of Saddam by our forces thought that actually the food rolls would make quite good electoral rolls and that you could go quickly to taking the pulse of the Iraqis by using the food distribution system as a voting system. I think, all that said, clearly there were hundreds of thousands or even more Iraqi children who were undernourished and weren’t getting the right medicine, because Saddam was hoarding and keeping it for himself and making his own profit.

Q: Were Islamist fundamentalists menacing us at the time?

A: Well, sure. My life, from June, July, August of that year, was totally taken up with our efforts to deal with what we believed was the surety of an attack on an American Embassy or Consulate or other US facility abroad in that summer. When I look back to the three months before the 11th of September, our mistake, my mistake, everybody’s mistake, was we were, at least at the State Department, based on what we knew and were told, totally focused on preventing an attack abroad. We were sure we were going to be attacked. All the intelligence said a big attack was going to come. We reasoned from what we knew, that it was going to be like Beirut or it was going to be like Nairobi or Dar.

Q: The Dar es Salaam and Nairobi attacks had taken place under Secretary Albright.

GROSSMAN: Correct.

Q: But that was very much in the offing. Where did you think it was going to happen?

GROSSMAN: We didn’t know. But we were sure it was going to be abroad. And if you look back, daily, weekly, we were sending out warnings. Frank Taylor, who was then Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism, and I would have long talks about how do you keep people at a high state of readiness week after week after week. After a while they just say, “Oh, these guys don’t know what they’re talking about.” Having been a Chief of Mission in a high-threat post, I knew that was right. But we were sure we were going to be attacked and we wanted people to pay attention.
Sometime in July, a bureaucratic cable came up to me, late one night, asking (William B.) Bill Milam, who then was our Ambassador to Pakistan, to go and warn the Taliban that if we were attacked by al Qaeda, anywhere in the world, that we would hold them responsible. And there was this long paragraph of words, words. I said, “I am not putting my name on this. We’re going to send a simple declarative sentence: if we are attacked by al Qaeda, we will hold you responsible. No ifs, no ands, no buts.” And I rewrote the cable and we sent it out and Bill delivered it to the Taliban representative the next day.

So that whole summer, I went home every night thinking I’d be called in the middle of the night with a report that one of our missions had been attacked somewhere.

Q: I’ve interviewed Bill and he said talking to the Taliban was like talking to people in the 14th century, except that it was for real.

GROSSMAN: Right, but at that time that’s who there was to talk to and everybody was paying attention to al Qaeda and the failure of imagination was that we focused on an attack on our people abroad.

Q: As Under Secretary for Political Affairs, how did you find your geographic Bureaus, as part of the team? Did some seem to be causing more grief or be attuned or not? Did you find that you were getting the information and the support you wanted from the geographic Bureaus?

GROSSMAN: Yes. Of course Department has an age old problem with getting paper, physical paper, up to senior people on time and in useful formats. It broke my heart when great ideas came up too late to be used in interagency meetings. One thing I admired in my four years was the way the Pentagon never seemed to produce anything that was not action oriented. Our bureaucracy tended to pitch up narratives that showed how smart everyone was or that would highlight the problems of everyone else’s ideas. At one point I asked people, “please, stop writing narratives,” because what happens when you write narratives, it goes on and on and everybody clears it and they write more narrative or they change the narrative. So I said, “Just write declarative sentences or put it in briefing size or something, but just stop with all this narrative because it just takes up too much time and there is no action or new ideas proposed or they are buried somewhere in the words.”

Q: In our business, “he’s a good drafting officer” is considered a compliment. Usually when you’re talking about a good drafting officer, he writes well enough but often it is not pertinent.

GROSSMAN: To be clear: good writing is vital. But you want to say of somebody, “This is a person who can communicate wonderful ideas and has a plan to move them forward.” And so, I was often waiting there at eight o’clock at night for papers to go to a meeting early the next morning. I need to study and to think about how best to approach that meeting. I was brokenhearted for the Department, because here you have ten thousand really smart people who have to spend their day writhing in the molasses. The person who starts with the blank page is probably really good and thoughtful and action oriented.
But by the time this poor person has to clear it and get it here and get it there and get it somehow else, it comes to me at nine o’clock at night, I’m exhausted; I have to use it at eight o’clock the next morning. When does anybody think I’m supposed to read this stuff and understand it? And so often it turned out I’d go to these meetings, especially at the White House, and they would hand you a briefing memo on your way over in the car. Well it turns out I can’t read in the car. It makes me sick. So all of this effort and this energy would go into these papers that would end up with me not making the best use of them.

Everybody’s tried to fix the problem. I failed completely to reform the clearance system when I was the Executive Secretary. Tom Pickering tried really hard to change the way we instructed Ambassadors. When he was P, he called all of us in one day, Assistant Secretaries who’d been Chiefs of Mission, and he said, “Let me ask you a question: when was the last time that you read the talking points you received from the Department out in a meeting just the way they were so meticulously drafted?” Never. You’d read the talking points and fold them up and put them in your pocket and then you’d make a presentation in a way that you knew best to convince your listener, because that’s your job. And he said, “What if we stopped writing talking points at the State Department? And all cables would say, ‘Here’s the problem or the challenge. Here is the context in which you’re problem solving. Now, in the way that you will know best, you’d go see the right people and tell him about it and convince them.’” And even the amazing Tom Pickering couldn’t stop the State Department from writing talking points.

So in this case what you have is people who write talking points, people who clear talking points, and people who clear the clearing of talking points. All to be sent out to Ambassadors who say, “I’m not going to use these!” And so the same thing would happen at interagency meetings. Pages of talking points would arrive. And I would have often a minute or ninety seconds, to make my point in a Deputies’ Committee meeting. That’s it. I was heartbroken at this misuse of people’s time.

**Q:** Again, we’re talking about this early period. You were one of the guys who had to see the foreign ministers and the ambassadors. You were the point man, in many ways, for the Department of State. Were you getting a feeling of disquiet about where America was going? The President became very unpopular, but this may have been later on. What were you getting from friends, allies and others?

**GROSSMAN:** I think we were getting, “We want the facts.” They could understand the policy. They just couldn’t understand why we were doing things the way we were doing it, in what seemed to be a gratuitous manner. These are all adult people, the ambassador of Britain or France or Singapore. You make him an argument about why you’re not signing the Kyoto Treaty; they get that. What people couldn’t understand was why we were doing it gratuitously.

**Q:** There wasn’t, at that time, this sort of anti-American swell or feeling.
GROSSMAN: I know this will sound craven, but in a way it did not matter, because on the 12th of September there was a huge outpouring of pro-Americanism most everywhere in the world. Not everywhere, but in lots of places. The question for the Administration was: could the US take advantage of this to create the coalition we needed to fight extremism.

**Q: Where were you on September 11, 2001, and how did you all respond?**

GROSSMAN: I was thinking it was going to be a day like lots of other days. We had our 8:30 staff meeting, chaired by Rich because the Secretary was in Peru, and then some of us went to Rich’s office, where we were having a meeting of the Ambassadorial selection committee, the D Committee. We were sitting in Rich’s outer office and Rich generally had a TV going all the time in his back office, but we were in his outer office. Just after nine, someone came and gave Rich a note saying that an airplane had hit the World Trade Center. This seemed a terrible thing, obviously, but we continued with our session. And not too many minutes later, another report said that a second aircraft had hit the World Trade Center.

Rich immediately stood up and said, “This is terrorism.” He didn’t have the slightest doubt in his mind. We went for a moment to watch the television in the back of his office and saw these first images of the World Trade Center burning and then they replayed and replayed the images of the airplanes hitting the World Trade Center, especially the second one.

Rich and I, at that point, the best thing we knew how to do was to see what could be done. I went back to my office. Secretary Powell was in Lima, Peru, at a meeting of the Organization of American States. We, obviously, made sure that he had been informed of what was going on.

I went back to my office and started to consider what was happening in New York and if this might preview an attack abroad. I confess that I did not have really any premonition or any idea that anything would be happening to us in Washington. But we had in our office a ledge — out among where the OMSs — with a TV on it and then huge windows that looked out over the Lincoln Memorial and then on to the Pentagon. As you can imagine, it was perfectly natural that a number of people in my office were watching that television. I was not; I was working at my desk. And as they watched the television images from New York, by lifting up their eyes a tiny bit they were able to see the airplane fly into the Pentagon. The plane hit the Pentagon and it is my recollection that our windows shook from the explosion and black smoke started to pour out of the Pentagon. A number of people on my staff who had witnessed this obviously were just terribly shaken. They shouted. I looked up and could see from my desk the smoke pouring out of the Pentagon. I thought we were next and the next thing we’d be looking out the windows and there’d be some airplane headed for us.

I realized at that point that Grant (S.) Green (Jr.), the Under Secretary for Management, who would be responsible for securing the building, was on the other side of the building
and probably had no idea what was going on at the Pentagon. I hit the button on my phone that I had for him and said, “An airplane has hit the Pentagon and we need quickly to deal with our own building.” The Pentagon was burning and Rich, Grant Green and I, together with the Executive Secretary, then made a series of decisions about what we needed to do in our own building and we made three decisions right away.

The first decision was that we activated the alternative Operations Center, which is here at FSI, and that we wanted quickly to move to that Operations Center, get it going, in case something did happen to the State Department building.

Second, we decided that Grant would move to FSI and supervise and be the officer on site. Rich and I would fall back to the Operations Center at the State Department and try to run the Department from there and hope for the best. We also offered the Pentagon the use of the alternate Op Center.

And third, I don’t remember whether it was in the first series of decisions or immediately after, we decided the most prudent thing to do for us was to evacuate our building, because we said, “If this airplane’s hit the Pentagon, there’s another one out there with our name on it.” I don’t remember when news of the fourth aircraft hitting Pennsylvania came into all of this, and whether that maybe influenced our decision about evacuating. But we made a decision to evacuate the building very fast. So we pulled the alarm, which got everybody out. We also then asked DS officers to go office to office to office, floor by floor, to make sure everybody got out, because as you know from drills in the building, people have a tendency to say, “I’m really important and I’m going to stay.” So we forced people out of the building.

I want to say here how much I admired the work of DS that day and how much I admired the fortitude and creativity and grace of the people on duty in the Ops Center.

Q: Was there any connection with the White House, other elements of the government?

GROSSMAN: There was within a few minutes. In the first few minutes, Rich was immediately in touch with the White House and our obvious concern was the Pentagon. We were worried and terribly concerned about the people there. My recollection is that for the first thirty or forty minutes, at the Pentagon, they were dealing with their own massive crisis and loss of life; we were convinced that we were next. Maybe that was egotistical, but it seemed logical to us that we might have been on high on somebody’s list, if you’re going to attack targets in Washington. So I think we took care of our people first.

Rich and I then made a beeline for the Operations Center, where we established ourselves in one of the Task Force Centers. And it was there, quickly, that Richard Clarke organized a government-wide information operation through the …

Q: Richard Clarke, at the time, was the …
GROSSMAN: The Counterterrorism Director at the National Security Council and he very quickly brought together the people by digital videoconference. Simultaneously we were also reaching out to Secretary Rumsfeld to let him know that the alternate Ops Center at FSI was available to him, because we were still alive and still seemed to be doing okay, but if they needed an Operations Center that they could use the one here at FSI.

The FSI one came up pretty quickly. Among the things we learned on that day was, of course, there was a huge traffic jam of people trying to flee Washington. So it took us a little while to get the right people out there and get going but we did.

Q: I happened to be getting off the shuttle bus, FSI to the State Department and all of sudden the guards were pouring out of the building, looking around, looked like a fire drill to me and I walked off and I was listening to a radio and that’s when I heard that, I think it was then, I heard that a bomb had gone off in a car by the State Department.

GROSSMAN: Yes, I’ll come to that, because it was a frightening thing for us.

We also checked immediately to see whether there was any provision for defending ourselves off the roof, whether there were any shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, anything that might be able to protect our roof but there was not, as you can imagine. We were trying to think of all the ways we could defend the people and defend the building.

Rich and I then tried to make a list of what we thought we ought to do. He was engaged essentially full time with the interagency on the VTC and I popped in and out. We decided that the first thing we needed to do was make sure the Secretary was safe. The second thing we needed to do was to communicate with our people overseas. We did not know what was going to happen to us, so we decided to send a message to all of our Ambassadors overseas. It was a simple message saying that a terrible attack had happened in New York and Washington, that the Secretary of State was safe because he was in Lima, Peru, that we did not know what was going to happen to us over the next hours or days and we expected them to do the right thing by and for the US. I drafted such a message; it was four or five sentences long. As I say, I recall the last sentence was that if we disappeared, we expected everyone in leadership positions overseas would do right the right thing. We were confident people would do right no matter what happened to us.

Early on, also, I think it was Dr. (Condoleezza) Rice and the interagency recognized that …

Q: She was the …

GROSSMAN: … she was the National Security Advisor at the time, that as we ramped up our military—we didn’t know what was happening to us—that it was important that we alerted the Russians that our military posture was going to go up. So that job also came to me and I called (Alexander Russell) Sandy Vershbow, who was then our
Ambassador to Moscow; we did it on an open line so the Russians could hear it. I said, “I’m asking you to please go and tell the Russian leadership that they will see that our DEFCON is going up. It has nothing to do with them. It has to do with the fact that we’ve been attacked.”

Q: The Chinese, were they considered somebody else to be informed at that time?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think so, oddly enough. I can’t remember. I was in touch right away with (R. Nicholas) Nick Burns, the Ambassador to NATO at the time, to keep the allies informed. Within days Nick, working with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, had produced NATO’s first Article Five declaration on behalf of the United States.

I don’t know whether it was to make ourselves feel better or give ourselves something to do, but Rich also suggested that we call a lot of ambassadors in town and tell them “we’re still here and that America is a great country and we’re going to be all right.” So with the help of the wonderful people in the Operations Center, I sat in the Ops Center and made calls to many local ambassadors, to make sure they were all right, and also to let them know that we—that the government of the United States and President and the Vice President—were on top of this problem.

Q: The President of course at that time was ...

GROSSMAN: Was away from DC.

Q: Was in Florida.

GROSSMAN: I can’t remember, flying around, trying to get home to Washington. Secretary Powell decided that he would use the opportunity to finish what he was doing in Lima. Not in any way to be disrespectful of what had happened in Washington and Pennsylvania and New York, but to show, because he was attempting to get a statement from the OAS called the Democratic Charter, that on the day we had been attacked by terrorists, to simultaneously speak out for democracy was a very good thing. Once he got the statement, he quickly got on an airplane and headed home to Washington.

We then tried our best to make sure things were established and then, as you said, about a couple hours in, maybe an hour after we had evacuated the building, CNN started a scroll at the bottom, like they do, that there had been a car bomb outside the State Department. We couldn’t see and we couldn’t hear because we were inside and locked in and you can imagine how we felt, that we had evacuated everybody right into a car bomb. We thought, “Oh my God, we’d made this decision thinking that we had done the right thing and here we’d evacuated everybody into this mayhem.” So we asked DS and they quickly went out and searched the perimeter a couple of times and there was no car bomb. Made us feel better but, as you can imagine, like yourself, millions of people thought that there was a car bomb outside the State Department. It took us hours to get CNN to stop running
that scroll. We called and we called said, “It isn’t true. Stop!” But their lives must have been crazy, too. They just kept running it and running it.

Q: Did you ever figure out how that report ...

GROSSMAN: No. No idea.

Q: I heard and I don’t know whether this is true or not, it was somebody in the State Department that tried to figure out how to alert and that was the only operation which they had. In other words, what do you do? You didn’t have a plane crashing into a building but you did have a car bomb going off. So they pushed that button, just in order to mobilize. This is something I heard months later.

GROSSMAN: I have no idea. There was so much chaos and misinformation at the time. There were some very scary moments. For example, there was a Korean airliner flying over Canada that didn’t respond to the order to land, and there were a number of moments where people had to decide whether to shoot it down or not. There was another airplane, I can’t remember which, coming across the Atlantic that didn’t seem to get the word to land in Canada and there was a lot of discussion about whether to shoot it down. I believe people would have shot those airplanes down had they not finally responded. We also suddenly, from the consular affairs perspective, had hundreds of American citizens in Gander, Newfoundland, where planes had been brought quickly. The Canadians—official and private—were wonderful. Our Mission in Canada was great. The consular people in DC did a great job as well.

Anyway, as you can imagine, it was a very hard thing. And Rich, in particular—Rich’s father was a policeman—kept looking at these pictures of the World Trade Center collapsing, thinking of all the people, first of all, but then all the policemen and firemen who had poured in there to save them and had gone in there to their deaths.

Immediately, obviously, people started thinking about who did this. It didn’t take anybody long to figure out this was al Qaeda. It was to me astonishingly fast that people started to come up with names—Mohamed Atta and these other terrorists—started to come up with their visa records and other pieces of data. I thought it was sort of amazing that people knew these names so quickly.

Sometime later in the afternoon, Secretary Powell was then closer to Andrews and Rich said, “I have to stay here. You go to Andrews, meet the Secretary.” The Secretary’s job was then to go directly to the White House, where there was a meeting with the President. I went to Andrews and picked up the Secretary and rode in with him and I explained to him, from our perspective, as best I could, what was going on and what the facts were. We didn’t say much, actually, for most of the ride once I told him what I knew. He asked me a few other questions and then he was obviously thinking about what to do next.

He went to that meeting at the White House and then came back to the State Department sometime in the early evening. By then we’d seen the pictures of the Towers go down so
many times and we were there in the Ops Center—there was Powell and myself and Rich and some of the Assistant Secretaries and the DS folks—and we were just trying to figure out what to do next—whether to open the State Department the next day, how to start to respond to all of this and how to bring together a coalition.

My recollection is we broke up that night about eleven o’clock or so and I walked out of the Ops Center and was headed down to my car when the DS people came and said, “No, we’ll take you home. You’ve got to have a bodyguard. We don’t have any idea what’s happening here. What if the next phase is assassinations?” And I must say, having lived with protection for six years in Turkey and having been quite grateful not to have it anymore, I was amazed to be in the back of a car with a bodyguard and a follow car. No more amazed than my neighbors when we pulled up. I went in the house and they put a car out front of the house.

Some days later I had a chance to talk to my neighbors. There’d been a big debate the next morning about whether this protection was good or bad. Some thought it was good because there was some protection. Others thought it was bad because it was like putting a big bulls-eye on the street.

Q: You say you evacuated the building, but did you have an evacuation because obviously you had people in the Ops Center, security people were there, you were saying consular people; there must have been a real cadre.

GROSSMAN: People were in the Ops Center because you’ll remember that some years before, luckily, when I was ExecSec, thanks to the leadership and planning of Glyn Davies, who was at that time the Director of the Ops Center, we’d moved the DS Ops Center from wherever it was to the Department’s Ops Center. So by and large we had everything we needed right there, including the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) watch. We filled the task force rooms with consular people. Then there was support from the alternate Ops Center at FSI, another farsighted Glyn Davies innovation if I remember correctly.

Q: How did this work out, because I’m told that this was set up but then people had sort of carpeted over outlets and an awful lot of ...

GROSSMAN: It actually worked pretty well. For us, again, out of pure luck, a classic case of better lucky than good, we’d exercised the alternative Ops Center a couple of times and so we knew we could do this. The Ops Center knew what to do and how to do it and how to get the additional shifts of people needed. So my recollection is it actually went pretty well.

What didn’t go very well was for some reason we had a hard time communicating between the building’s communications center and the Department’s facility in Beltsville, Maryland, which is where key work in communications also takes place. The poor communicators, they were working so hard and had not evacuated but nobody could figure out why we couldn’t communicate between Beltsville and us. In the end they
sorted it out and the alternative Ops Center worked and we started to return to some capacity for communication late in the afternoon.

Q: Other than sort of support, “We’re with you fellows,” what were we getting from abroad. Was there concern this may be hitting other places, too, other countries or was the focus on the United States?

GROSSMAN: The focus was on the United States. I think every country, every Western country, probably increased their awareness after this had happened, but I think once the four attacks took place most people believed it was to us and on us. My recollection is that we really didn’t start to hear from the rest of the world until the next morning our time. You can understand, everybody was trying to comprehend what had happened here. So my role for that day was to support Rich and the Secretary. We tried to, as best we could in the circumstances, convey that we were calm and to lead the people that we had there, and also then immediately start to think what we were going to do next. What was tomorrow going to be like, or the next day, or the next day?

And I’m jumping ahead a little bit but the rumors then started to proliferate. There were rumors immediately that Ryder rental vans were filled with explosives and were going to blow up all over the United States. I can remember, I think it was two mornings later, when I was able to drive again by myself, coming across the Roosevelt Bridge behind a Ryder van and thinking, even though I rationally knew better, “This is it. I’m going to be blown up by a Ryder van”! But at that kind of moment, especially with all the 24-hour news cycles, the amount of disinformation and wrong information it really gets to you even if you try to push it away.

Q: In a way, the news revolution, CNN and all that, it was both good and bad.

GROSSMAN: I think the debate about whether it is good or bad is over. It just is.

Q: You have any recollection, at this point, of whether the CIA played much of a role. It would have been analytical, but to get in there and all?

GROSSMAN: I think they were certainly there, doing analysis and trying to predict what would happen next. The amazing thing, as I say, was that suddenly all this information on these murderers started to appear. We knew, on the night of the 11th of September, we were able to tell Powell—I don’t even remember how except it must have come from the Bureau of Consular Affairs that Atta had applied for a visa; that Atta had been given a visa, that the CIA had issued a terrorist warning for him in August but nobody could find him. It was amazing. I guess this all came through the passenger lists. And it was quick; people took the passenger lists and cross-referenced him with lists of visa applicants.

Q: And it was in his name, too.

GROSSMAN: By evening of the 11th of September we already knew basically the name of Atta and some of the others and we knew when he’d come to the United States and we
knew where he’d gotten his visa and we knew the CIA had issued a warning to look for him. Then of course it becomes clear, as in all these things, that the FBI and the CIA had a lot of information on this guy that they never shared with consular officers abroad. When a major terrorist attack succeeds, it means that everything that could have gone wrong for our side went wrong and everything that could have gone right from their side, went right. This was a classic case of that.

Q: The next day what happened?

GROSSMAN: I’m not so sure, actually. I can remember we came to work. I don’t remember what we did with the State Department. I think we told people that we wanted people to come to work, but I think we also told people that if they were too scared to come to work that they should just stay home. I can remember that second day being quite bare of people. We also tried to support our colleagues at the Pentagon in any way we could. We were back in touch with missions abroad. Great credit belongs to NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns.

That’s the day I remember that we started to get support from around the world and NATO met and voted Article Five, for the very first time in NATO’s history for the United States. And there was a huge groundswell around the world of people being outraged at what had happened. I recall mostly still everyone was transfixed with what was happening in New York and of course we could see from our windows the devastation at the Pentagon. So I have a recollection of the second day being about reorganizing ourselves, trying to decide what to do, dealing with the outpouring of sympathy.

Q: Article V being ...

GROSSMAN: The article in the NATO Treaty that says an attack on one is an attack on all and that if such an attack occurs that NATO partners have to come to the defense of the attacked.

Q: At that point, at any point during this time, here is an enemy who doesn’t belong to a country.

GROSSMAN: There is one other thing I recall, which is Rich’s now-famous conversation with the head of Pakistani intelligence. The Pakistani head of intelligence had been in Washington for the two or three days, the 8th, 9th, 10th of September, I can’t remember. I saw him, I believe, on the 10th of September. It was my job to tell him that we simply couldn’t stand it anymore that Pakistan had these close ties with the Taliban; that we couldn’t understand it and we needed some action. I have a recollection, also, that there was an American hostage, a nurse, a female NGO worker, who had been taken hostage in Afghanistan and this gentleman was also trying to get her out and argued to me that the way to get her out was to continue to deal with the Taliban. He was in my office for, oh, the better part of an hour and I told him this story that all during the summer we had worried that the Taliban and al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, who was
clearly the Taliban’s chief guest, was going to strike the United States. We needed some action from Islamabad.

Again, I want to be absolutely clear here. I had no conception that they would strike in the United States. We were sure they were going to strike the United States abroad and that’s what I told this person on the 9th or 10th.

Q: We’d already had a destroyer and two embassies.

GROSSMAN: We were looking abroad. We’d spent the summer ratcheting up our security. And I told him that at one point during the summertime about the cable we talked about earlier that we had sent to Bill Milam, our Ambassador to Pakistan. I said to him, either the 9th or the 10th of September, “We mean this, that if we’re attacked we’re going to respond.” And again, I want to be clear, I was sure this was going to come outside the United States.

The Pakistani head of intelligence was in the United States on the 11th of September. I don’t know what he did that day, but he certainly didn’t leave America, because we thought nobody could leave the United States. And it was then, I think, on the 12th or so, 13th, maybe, that Rich called him in to his office and we sat with him and Rich said, “You all in Pakistan have to decide. You have to decide here and now whether you’re with us or you’re against us. It was al Qaeda who did this to us, the Taliban is al Qaeda’s protector and Pakistan has a choice to make.”

I do not recall, as it is been reported in the press over the past couple of weeks, that Rich threatened him, saying we would bomb Pakistan back into the Stone Age. I don’t recall that at all. I remember Rich very sternly saying Pakistan had a choice to make, whether it was with the United States or whether it was going to be against the United States.

Q: How did we view Pakistan, because there seems to have been almost this duality, where the Pakistani intelligence service was almost running its own foreign policy, which was pro-Islamic or at least it had a different cast than sort of the general Pakistan government?

GROSSMAN: I confess here that I don’t know now what I recall and what I have since read in that fantastic book Ghost Wars, by Steve Coll, about that whole period. But our message on that day was, “Whatever went before, where do you stand after 9/11?”

I think I also remember some time on the 13th or so, or the 14th, because we wanted him to go back to Pakistan and give it to the leadership straight, I think arrangements were made to get him out of the country on a flight home and report directly to President (Pervez) Musharraf that we were not fooling around.

Q: During this day or two, the day of and day or two after, did Iraq cross your radar at all?
GROSSMAN: No, it did not, although I think it is my recollection, and again subject now to all the media reports and everything after, that I know Secretary Powell went, of course, to Camp David on that first weekend after the 11th of September. I know that he came back saying that Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in particular and others were saying, “We’ve been attacked and now let’s go attack Iraq.” Powell I can remember coming back saying he couldn’t understand it. We weren’t prepared to attack Iraq and this had come from al Qaeda and al Qaeda was the Taliban and the Taliban was Afghanistan. And he simply couldn’t understand this, why people were trying to take advantage of this horrific event to pursue this policy of attacking Iraq.

Q: Marc, prior to this, before the attack, had the subject of Iraq come up as being something to be attacked at some point or ...

GROSSMAN: It had certainly come up. Don’t forget that you had in the Administration, including Rich, a number of people who had signed letters and urged the previous President and urged the new Administration to do something about Iraq. So I think Iraq was clearly on people’s minds, because, for various reasons, there were some people who were sorry that we hadn’t finished the job in 1991. There were other people who felt that Saddam Hussein still owed for having tried to assassinate President Bush 41. Now there were other people who believed that, since those two things were true, that if you could make a regime change in Iraq and make it a democracy, that you could change the face of the Middle East. So that conversation was around and people talked about Iraq, but I don’t think we at the State Department ever really thought that this was a serious policy matter or a serious operational matter and certainly didn’t in the days immediately after the 11th of September.

Q: Right after Secretary Powell was going up to Camp David and talking, as you mentioned, of Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and all, did you get the feeling that there was a pretty sharp cleavage between the Pentagon and the State Department?

GROSSMAN: I did, but it was not a result of the 11th of September. We’ve talked about Secretary Rumsfeld coming into office wishing to cut off as many ties as he could with the Department of State. For example, as we discussed, he withdrew a number of the exchange officers, military officers that were working at the State Department, in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, but in other places as well. He tried to cut off similar exchanges of State Department people, Foreign Service or Civil Service, serving at the Pentagon. The sort of whole attitude was that they were off to do whatever they wanted to do and that those diplomatic weaklings over at the State Department had nothing to add to making America great. And so this was really something from the very beginning.

At some point, up to the 11th of September, I considered it just sort of an irritation; it wasn’t the be-all and end-all in my life. It was stupid and silly, but Secretary Powell said, consistently, that we would win in the end. He would take care of this. We should stick with him and ultimately that he and the Department would triumph.
One thing that did get under my skin was Secretary Rumsfeld’s now famous “snowflakes.” He sent them all over the Pentagon to have people do things around the building. That’s fine. His business. But he sent them to Powell. A lot of “snowflakes” telling us how to do our work. He sent them to the President. He sent them to the Vice President. He sent them to Condi. Advice for everyone. My instinct was to answer every single one of them. I remember saying to Powell, “Let’s answer every single one of these, immediately. I’ll take one of the people off my staff and you just should shoot back an answer every day. For two reasons: one reason is that he shouldn’t be able to get away with this and two, you’d have to hope that after about four weeks of this the President would call you both in and say, ‘Knock it off!’ And if the President did that, then we would be the winners, because this wasn’t something that we started.” Powell said that he wasn’t going to do that, that was not how he wanted to manage himself; that he was above that. I can remember, it really made me feel craven for suggesting that we get in and duke it out. But, he said, “I am who I am and I’m going to deal with this my way and I’m the Secretary of State.”

So, from the very beginning there, was just a lot of animosity on the part of civilians at the Pentagon toward the Department. As I said before, as another example, my counterpart on the Joint Staff at that time was (General) John Abizaid, who was the Director of Operations at JCS and he was told by Rumsfeld that he no longer could speak to me, that he could not have any contact with me. For the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to not be able to speak to senior people on the Joint Staff is terrible practice. General Abizaid, who is a very courageous guy, said, “I’ll keep talking to you and if they want to get rid of me they can get rid of me.”

Q: When somebody starts out, this is certainly a deviation from the norm. Even during the Shultz-Weinberger period, these people knew each other very well and you knew that the animosity went way, way back, but was there any feeling about Rumsfeld? He’d been Ambassador to NATO, he’d been around the block at lot, why were he and Wolfowitz and his civilian team acting this way? Were you all feeling it was just power or was this something that happened or what?

GROSSMAN: I think they believed that the Clinton Administration had been a group of weak people; that the Clinton Administration had not defended America’s interests, that the Clinton Administration, for example in the Balkans, had misused American power. Remember, the President ran against nation building and Rumsfeld said, “We’re never doing that again.” I think they had contempt for the way that military force had been used in the previous Administration and certainly had contempt for anything that had been done in the Balkans. They wanted to do everything differently. They also had contempt for diplomacy. They thought speaking to someone else was a concession. And so they set off to make America great, as they defined greatness, and they figured that no one who worked at the State Department could possibly understand what it was they were doing.

Now, to be fair, there had been an election and President Bush 43 got elected. FSOs take an oath to the Constitution, so it was our job to make this as right as we could following the President’s direction. That’s the discipline of being an FSO.
Q: Did you get Colin Powell’s feelings—again, this to prior to 9/11—about how the Balkans came out? Because in my mind, it seemed that things worked out pretty well there. But how did he feel about that?

GROSSMAN: I don’t really know. I can only give you my view. We ended a war. Not one American soldier had been killed in combat. Kosovo had been, in its own way, a military success. I don’t say that anyone thought it could be recreated, but it happened. I would guess that that Powell was proud of what our forces accomplished there.

Powell also understood that the world didn’t change immediately or just because the United States snaps its fingers. Powell understood that things took time and that you had to work with people and talk to people a little bit and you weren’t going to get everything that you wanted.

I think Secretary Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and others, felt they had a limited amount of time, that nothing was going to stand in their way, that they were going to change the way that America used its military forces. I want to say again that I thought a lot of what they were doing on transformation was excellent. But the problem was that it didn’t matter to them what anybody else thought. We had a number of occasions where they would arrive at meetings, say that decisions had been made, for example of the ABM Treaty, on repositioning American forces in Europe, and they were just going to announce it. I can remember saying, “This would actually be a lot better if you’d do a little consultation and talk to people a little and get people behind you. This is what diplomacy and coalition building …” We have already talked about the ICC and Kyoto and why the ABM Treaty was different.

Q: Let’s take the immediate post-9/11, did you have a feeling that Secretary Powell was trying very hard to bottle up his obvious feelings about the Pentagon trying to run with things and not to let it. You and Armitage and all, part of the thing is you don’t show the troops how divided you all are, that’s part of leadership, although I have to say Rumsfeld didn’t play that game.

GROSSMAN: Powell’s great phrase was “never let them see you sweat,” and that was right. My recollection is, the odd thing, after the 11th of September, was that suddenly everyone, including the President, then had to push the Pentagon to do more. Because the President said, “We have to deal with this problem. We’re going to take out Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.” I thought that was exactly the right decision. Then days and days go by and there’s no plan from the Pentagon. And there were moments where, there were meetings at the White House and people were saying to DoD, “Let’s get on with this!” I thought it was an amazing turnaround, where suddenly, pre-September 11th, they were out to do all these things: Good, bad, they were doing it. And then suddenly, the 11th of September, there’s a lot of shock over there, they had people killed, the building had been attacked. You would have thought that this would have redoubled their desire to get out
there and do something. It took them, from my perspective, an astonishing amount of
time to kind of come up with a plan for Afghanistan and get going.

Q: Did you feel that in a way the CIA was beginning to take over the action, started
having guys on horseback, CIA guys, running little guerilla operations and all that?

GROSSMAN: I can’t remember how much of that I know now and how much I know
because I’ve read people’s books about it or seen pictures. But my recollection of those
weeks was mostly a call to CENTCOM, “Let’s get going.”

Q: First place, did you feel that Rumsfeld had gotten so much control the machinery,
talking about his team, that nothing could happen without their full concurrence, or was
this a problem of the planning up and down the line?

GROSSMAN: I thought it was a problem of ideology getting stitched to operations. They
had fixed views about things and when the facts didn’t fit the fixed view, it was hard for
them to adjust. Let me give you two examples:

I think it was just after our military went into Afghanistan; there were reports of
starvation in the northern part of the country. We were begging civilians at the Pentagon
to send forces to get control of Mazar-e-Sharif, because it was the key to a bridge across
the river from which we could get wheat from one or more of the “Stans” to the north.
And day after day we would say, “Please, somebody’s got to take Mazar-e-Sharif, so we
can open the bridge and we can start to feed people. They’re going to starve.” We had to
go back to dumping food out of the back of airplanes like we did in 1991 in northern Iraq.
Many people at DoD could not see this was a whole-of-government challenge. They did
dnot consider it their problem.

We also fought over getting food aid to Afghans through Iran. Again, there were credible
reports that Afghans were starving. USAID Administrator (Andrew S.) Andy Natsios
figured out a way to get large amounts of food into Afghanistan through Iran. The
Pentagon team said, “Oh, no, we’re not going to do that; we’d have to deal with
Iranians.” They’d say, “That’s typical State Department thinking. You have some
Afgans who need food and the next thing we know you want to deal with Iran.” We
said, “We don’t like Iran any more than you do, but if the Afghan population starves
that’s not good for us.” So in the end, after days and days of struggle, President Bush 43
reminded everyone that one of his principles was that the US should not use food as a
weapon and wheat went to Afghans via Iran.

Q: I was just thinking as you mention this, somehow, we found that, when somebody has
a great tragedy, an earthquake or something and, “We don’t get along with you but by
God we’re going to come to your aid and do things” We’ve done this before. I was
advisor to a MASH, a military hospital, going into Yugoslavia, back in ‘62; I guess it
was, ’63. Was anybody talking about, you’ve got Afghanistan? Obviously the Iranians
don’t like this al Qaeda group. This is basically a rogue element. If we want to get the
food in there, this might be an opening.
GROSSMAN: At that time it was really about the food. Period. Where the Iran part comes in is later, when Jim Dobbins and others get ready to try to get the Bonn Agreement on a new Afghan government sorted out. Jim has written a book about this called After The Taliban.

But at some point in this timeline, Iranians make a big mistake. They gave asylum, essentially, to some very senior al Qaeda operatives. We said through various channels, “Listen, all this other contact we have is good but you can’t do this.” There was then an attack somewhere that al Qaeda was responsible for and there was information that these al Qaeda people in Iran had been involved in either planning or the approval of this attack. The Iranians wouldn’t ever give them up, they wouldn’t ever let us ask them questions; they wouldn’t let go of these al Qaeda people. And I still feel it today as we talk, but we particularly felt it so soon after September 11, that this was a bad decision on their part.

Q: Did we get the feeling that Iran was somewhat divided the way Pakistan was divided, in that you had the intelligence service and all essentially out to cause trouble and you had a political side which wanted to stay with us, maybe do something?

GROSSMAN: Maybe, but this is always the question with Iran. If you thought that (President Seyyed Mohammad) Khatami actually ran that country it would probably be better, but he didn’t. And so, especially at that moment, it didn’t matter to us who was responsible for holding onto these al Qaeda people. It was at that time a bad deal.

Q: There’s no doubt about it, it wasn’t one of these nuanced things?

GROSSMAN: No, this was not nuanced at all. We knew they had them, they knew they had them; they knew that we knew that they had them. We sent messages through the Swiss on any number of occasions when we said, “It won’t wash. Give them up or at least let us question them”.

Q: What started to happen, as far as going into Afghanistan? I assume there was considerable diplomatic activity. You talk about Jim Dobbins and also, what we were doing, one, diplomatic activity to get the Pentagon off of our hide but the other one was to turn this Afghan attack, did we give the Taliban one last chance? “Okay, give us Osama bin Laden wrapped up in a Persian carpet,” or something? Or did we just assume right away that the Taliban was seen as the enemy or just the harborer of the enemy? How did we look at it?

GROSSMAN: I don’t remember exactly the answer to the question about last chances. My recollection is that the Taliban was the enemy, as was al Qaeda. By the time we were ready to strike in Afghanistan, they were both bad. I simply can’t remember whether there was one last warning given, or one last chance.
Planning for and executing an attack on al Qaeda in Afghanistan was more difficult than I had thought at the time because there weren’t any plans for Afghanistan on the shelf. Who’d ever thought that we’d be attacking Afghanistan? But there was a period, some weeks, where people just kept saying, “Where is the plan? When do we get started? We need to respond here to the attack of the 11th of September.”

And then, once there was a plan, the Pentagon and our JCS colleagues asked us to work the overflight rights and the bed-down rights so we could get our forces there and sustain them. I remember many days with nonstop action at the State Department, trying to get our allies and our friends and many other countries to provide the overflight rights that we needed, the bed-down rights that we needed, all these kinds of access questions. Our people at home and abroad did a great job. I can also remember the great effort that went into getting our posts abroad to think about their security in case there was backlash by al Qaeda.

There was also a debate at that time about what kind of coalition this could or should be. Remember that NATO voted to invoked Article Five on the 12th of September. So there really was a big debate about whether we should get NATO to come into Afghanistan with us. I think, looking back on it, we made a mistake in not asking NATO to come at that early stage (they joined later, of course). I was part of that argument and I came down on the wrong side. The reason is that I felt that having NATO there early as an organization would really prove the Samuel Huntington “clash of civilizations” argument. What we didn’t need after the 11th of September and what we didn’t need in attacking Afghanistan was to create a furor all over the world about a clash of civilizations. When you look back on it, probably not the right answer, but that’s the answer we came to at the time.

We did, however, have lots of allied help and a number of NATO countries and non-NATO countries did join us in the coalition there. I can’t remember the exact day, if it was a Saturday or a Sunday when the military action started. Rich Armitage and I and Bob Blake, who was my Executive Assistant, were in the office. We sent a series of cables to our Embassies saying that the attack had begun and make sure you’re safe.

Q: This was the attack on Afghanistan?

GROSSMAN: Our cable said: US military forces are engaged in Afghanistan, be careful, look at your security. We had an agreement with the CENTCOM commander, (General) Tommy Franks, that we could send these messages out a little bit in advance, so people were not hearing about this on CNN but had a chance to batten down their Embassies and make notifications to various governments. We were very tight with these messages. Only three or four of us had them and we had agreed on a time when they would go out; they were all moved around in sealed envelopes.

I can’t remember why, but some mechanical problem occurred and it turned out that we had to actually alert some people by telephone and, because it was a Saturday or a Sunday, our expectation was that people weren’t going to be at secure phones. Rich
called somebody at CENTCOM and said, “We have to make these notifications but we’re worried about tipping your operation” I remember General Franks came back and said, “Don’t worry about it. Make any notifications you want, because of the way the first hours of this military activity plays out, it is like the hole of a doughnut. You’re not going to tip our hand.” So we got all the notifications out and people had time to batten down the hatches and button up their Embassies and try to be as safe as they could.

And then began days of doing all you can to support the military forces that are in the field.

Q: Were you called upon early on, were you pretty much staying in Washington or were you going out to spread the gospel?

GROSSMAN: This was a Washington-based activity for me, anyway, and for Secretary Powell and for Rich. There were, just you can imagine, tons of meetings about Afghanistan, Pakistan and what was happening. Our military forces, as everyone expected they would, did a spectacular job and prevailed very quickly. Then the follow-on issues became transparent. Many people in Afghanistan were facing life without food, without shelter, with winter coming on there. I can remember at one point hearing stories, especially from reliable NGOs, that large numbers of people in Afghanistan didn’t have any food and remembering that we had successfully dropped food in northern Iraq in 1991. We were able to convince our colleagues at the Pentagon to do what we did in 1991, which was to load up MRE’s onto C-130’s and drop them out to …

Q: MRE’s, combat rations.

GROSSMAN: And get those out to Afghans who so desperately needed food. That of course wasn’t the long-term solution. We’ve already talked about the debate over getting food from the north and through Iran.

Q: It sounds like at certain points you’re up against an ideological obstacle, essentially, instead of a pragmatic one of how do you deal with a problem. The ideology coming from the civilian side of the Pentagon was really not “Okay, we’ve got a job, let’s do it,” [but] rather, “This doesn’t fit into our ideology.”

GROSSMAN: If you’ve gone into Afghanistan, knocked over a government, and absolutely right that we did, and are now essentially responsible for it, then you’ve got to feed the people. If feeding the people requires that you move food through Iran, then we should. Again. Credit to President Bush who said food is not a weapon.

Q: Did you also feel that it is not only “Iran is bad,” but, “We don’t want to get into this nation building stuff, we sort of knock down the buildings but then we don’t want to get overly involved?”

GROSSMAN: The President of course had run on a platform of never doing any more nation building. But it quickly became clear in Afghanistan that someone was going to
have to support Afghanistan. We tried our best to divide the responsibility for postwar Afghanistan. The British, for example, took responsibility for the antinarcotics question there; the Germans for building up the police force, and the Italians for building up the judiciary. But the truth is only the United States has the capacity to do all these things and to put them forward.

_Q: Still focusing on Afghanistan, did we have a plan for Afghanistan, after the Taliban, were we at least working on a plan of what’s going to come out of this?_

GROSSMAN: Jim Dobbins, who had enormous experience after Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo, agreed to lead that effort. There were a number of conferences with allies, the most famous of which was in Bonn in December 2001, where he and our allies and the Iranians, interestingly enough, tried to put together some ideas on postwar Afghanistan. The Bonn conference and the documents that it developed is still the way forward in Afghanistan. That’s where Karzai emerged and the division of portfolio responsibilities emerged as well, from the Bonn conference. Again, Jim has written a good book on this.

_Q: Did you find that you had a pretty good cadre of people at the State Department to draw on, who both knew Afghanistan, knew how to put things together and all?_

GROSSMAN: Yes, I think we had people who certainly could do the work in Bonn and others, as we showed, and then in Afghanistan we had people who were prepared to do the hard work and go there first. So my recollection is that personnel was not a challenge.

_Q: Sort of a crucial thing, as the Afghanistan situation’s developing, the focus began to move over to Iraq, as though these two were tied together. Initially, how did this thing manifest itself?_

GROSSMAN: It manifested itself in that there was continuing low-intensity planning for Iraq: if we had to do it, what would we do, militarily, politically? And so all the time that there was effort in Afghanistan there was also effort going on, thinking about Iraq. Naively, wrongly, I thought that the planning for Iraq, in which I participated, would transform itself into two tracks. Track one would be that people would recognize that the threat was from terrorist organizations—al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas—and that we would work our way through Afghanistan, and then fight to defeat these terrorist organizations. Or, track two, that we were going to deploy forces around Iraq, continue to pursue the United Nations angle as an internationalized voice for change in Iraq, for inspections and essentially sort of scare the living daylights out of Iraqis, so that somebody might kill Saddam Hussein or Saddam Hussein himself might give up and go into exile. I argued in the interagency, utterly unsuccessfully, that we should make a list of those terrorist organizations which posed the most serious threat to the United States of America at the end of 2001 and then agree on that list, and then let the President decide, “All right, take these people down using all the tools available to us: military, covert, overt, diplomatic, financial, everything” in some priority order. I put that at the time as al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas.
But there was a series of meetings with former General Wayne Downing, who used to be on television as a commentator for one of the networks, who was then a big boss at the White House on terrorism. He looked at me one day and said, “We can’t do it the way you suggest because if you fight Hezbollah, that’s real war. That’s global war. You’re fighting everyone and there’ll be a lot of casualties. That’s global war. So we want to do something different: Iraq.”

Q: Did you feel, in dealing with Iraq, separately from Afghanistan, there was beginning to be considerable pressure—particularly from France, Germany and Russia—to sort of ease up on Iraq, mainly because of economic considerations on the part of those three countries that had considerable investments there? They were maybe spurred more by economic imperatives than we were, but was there a feeling that if we didn’t do something in Iraq that these countries would so water down the sanctions that maybe Saddam would rise again, or not?

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t think so. I think generally people felt, like Powell, that Saddam was in a box, strategically, anyway. Again, I don’t want to gloss over in any way the nightmarish regime he headed and I also don’t want to gloss over the huge amount of corruption that had developed over the Oil-for-Food program. I don’t think consideration of Iraq timing, in terms of our military action in Iraq, had to do with France, Germany and Russia. Indeed, I’m jumping ahead here, it is France’s decision on the 20th of January, 2003 at the United Nations to say that they would never vote for a second resolution, no matter what it said, that I think opened the door for war that spring. The French did not mean it to come out that way, of course, but their action that January created a bizarre coalition of Jacques Chirac and Don Rumsfeld, because the 20th of January decision by the French that they would never vote for a second resolution ended the diplomacy; Paris ended Powell’s effort. And those in the Administration who had said, “Trying to get a resolution at United Nations was a dumb thing to do anyway,” took the French action as proof that they had been right all along.

Q: We’ll come back to that, but let’s talk now about Iraq before we went in. Was there any thought on your part and others in the State Department that there was a major tie between al Qaeda and Iraq? From what we gather, there was a significant effort on the part of the Vice President and Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz and others of that ilk to tie al Qaeda to Iraq. Was this a battle that was being fought in Washington?

GROSSMAN: I know that people believed that, but we didn’t spend too much time on it because there was no way to come to an agreement, or we didn’t spend too much time on it because there just didn’t seem to be real evidence of an operational al Qaeda-Iraq connection. Let me be more precise: there was no evidence that I ever saw that there was Iraqi involvement in September 11th, because there clearly were links between al Qaeda and Iraq. You had al Qaeda people in hospitals there. At that time the issue was more focused on 9/11 and no one could find any evidence that Saddam, al Qaeda and 9/11 were connected and what the true meaning was of the connections between al Qaeda and Saddam. The impulse of those who wished to invade Iraq and finish Saddam Hussein had to do with their world outlook, had to do with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and
we’ll come to that. I thought there were WMDs there, too. It also had to do with unfinished business from 1991.

*Q: These were people who were involved in it.*

GROSSMAN: Sure they were and they felt that, and you could understand, they felt that we didn’t finish the job in 1991; that we had betrayed the Kurds in the north and we had betrayed the Shias in the south and that it was wrong to have stopped in 1991. People had taken that position in the Clinton years and now they were in government. I think it had a huge amount to do with trying, from their perspective, to right what they considered to be a wrong, that the US had left something undone. And don’t forget Saddam tried to assassinate President Bush 41.

*Q: Again, from your perspective, leading up to Iraq, where would you put Colin Powell and Rich Armitage? How were they looking upon this as you were looking around to deal with Iraq?*

GROSSMAN: I think they believed that if the President wanted to deploy large amounts of military force out there to surround Iraq and use that as a way to force the Iraqis to continue inspections, weaken Saddam, to encourage somebody should kill Saddam or pressure Saddam to go into asylum in Saudi Arabia, or somewhere, I think they were prepared to go along with that because they believed Saddam was in a box and could be kept there. President Bush 43 would have this heavy-duty armed deterrent and leave it there for a while and see if he couldn’t shake the Iraqi regime in that way. Diplomacy would have been given enough time to try to recreate the coalition of 1991 if, in the end, we had to fight.

*Q: As we’re going through the political and diplomatic maneuvering leading up to the decision to go into Iraq, talk about weapons of mass destruction. Now there are weapons of mass destruction and some, like poison gas, is not great stuff but it is no threat to the United States. Nuclear-armed long-range missiles of course are a real threat to the United States. How did we feel about using weapons of mass destruction, what were American interests?*

GROSSMAN: American interests certainly were engaged, if Saddam had the capacity to have nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them. A device doesn’t have to be delivered by a missile, it could have been delivered in a cargo container, that that is a threat to the United States of America and so were the other possible weapons of mass destruction—biological weapons, chemical weapons—these were certainly threats to our forces in the region and to our allies in the region, to Jordan and to Israel and even, if you plot the lines on a map, it doesn’t take too much of a missile to land in Turkey or in Italy. So we have real NATO and other allies’ interests involved in this question: Israel and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. It is a combination of things. One is that the weapons themselves would have been a threat to our allies and to our friends. Then second, it was not right that year after year Saddam could just continue to disrespect the will and instructions of the United Nations. At some point, as the President said at the UNGA I
think in September 2012, a UN resolution has to mean something. So I think weapons of mass destruction was a very legitimate argument and as we sit here today in January 2007, the argument was not delegitimized at the time, the argument only becomes, it seems to me now, questionable because nobody found any WMD and that is to me, to this very day, one of the great mysteries of this entire story.

Q: You were being served by INR and by CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency ...

GROSSMAN: At the time I thought we were being served pretty well. Now you find out that an American had never seen Mr. Curve Ball, and there were lots of people down in the ranks of the Agency and INR that didn’t believe a word he said. It is hard to look back without stopping for a minute and remembering that this seemed to be very compelling at the time. I want to be clear. That doesn’t mean that there weren’t individuals that disagreed. Like you, I spent my entire career looking at intelligence, trying to decide whether it was credible enough for me to do anything about it. I spent six years in Turkey, looking at vague evidence that there was going to be a terrorist attack on a US facility in Europe over the next ninety days. And you have to deal with it. What am I going to do about my Embassy with this piece of information?

What I saw day after day in 2001 and 2002, as the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was the most specific information I had ever seen on what I thought were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq—not nuclear, but chemical and biological. Iraqis talking to each other, saying, “The inspectors are coming. Let’s hide this!” Again, I was comparing it to the struggles that I had had in trying to make decisions about vague intelligence for all the previous years. The reports were of remarkable clarity. Maybe we should have thought, “How can they be so exact, so precise?” And it was all false. I can’t understand that. I can’t understand whether this was some cosmic joke that people under Saddam were playing on Saddam. Was it Saddam’s flawed attempt to deter us or someone else? David Kay, who was the weapons inspector, went in after the invasion to see what was going on. He testified at one point to Congress that he felt that it is possible that the looting that went on after the invasion of Iraq was a cover for the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction. He couldn’t prove that but it was one of his hypotheses.

I never expected that we would find swimming pools full of anthrax or huge, two-story-tall stacks of canisters with biological weapons in them. But I would not be telling you the truth if I didn’t say that when we went into Iraq, I expected there to be WMD.

Q: From what Powell said at the United Nations, talking about radio intercepts and all this. It made no sense to manufacture; sometimes you put on radio transcripts to deceive people, but to deceive people to attack you?

GROSSMAN: No, but maybe they were just trying to deceive people to deter. It is possible that one of the great miscalculations was Saddam’s, who may have said, “Gosh, if we pretend we have weapons of mass destruction maybe they’ll think we have weapons of mass destruction and they’ll be too scared to attack us.”
Q: It is possible

GROSSMAN: Maybe when we look back on it. Again, I leave Curve Ball aside.

Q: Curve Ball being the source that was considered not to be a good source.

GROSSMAN: Now considered not to be a good source.

Q: Did you get the feeling, while you were looking at the situation, that there was a cabal or whatever between Rumsfeld and Cheney and Wolfowitz and others in the Pentagon who had their agenda and this was an agenda which had been thought of for some time, that they wanted to go into Iraq and the State Department was saying, “Hey, wait a minute!”

GROSSMAN: I wouldn’t describe it as a cabal, because a cabal implies that their agenda was somehow hidden or secret. It wasn’t. I think they came to power in January 2001 looking for a way in which to right what they saw as the wrong in Iraq from ten years earlier. So I don’t think it is a cabal.

Q: Now Colin Powell, Secretary of State, had been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Kuwait war. Now where would he fit into this, while you were dealing with him as Secretary of State?

GROSSMAN: He felt that Saddam was in a box and that Saddam was a bad person and a miserable human being and terrible for his people and had to be dealt with some day, but that right then, given all the things that the United States had to do, he was in a box, wasn’t a threat to America and he could stay in the box for a while.

Q: Were tensions brought to a rise between the Pentagon, State and maybe CIA and all as this buildup ...

GROSSMAN: Differences often start as substantive and then they become personal. Then what happens is that they spill into everything. So if you’re having a Deputies’ Committee meeting on, you name the subject, all of the fighting over Iraq played itself out over Liberia or over Bosnia or Kosovo. The government became a slave to one big argument that was played out in every single sector. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld, being a bureaucratic genius, had the bureaucracy spinning for months about whether or not we should have four F-15’s in Iceland. There were perfectly legitimate arguments on both sides of this, but everything got fought out over every single little issue. So we had a series of these skirmishes and only the name of the issue changed. The argument was the same. Remember the TV show, The Bickersons? It didn’t matter what they were fighting over, as long as they were fighting. So we went to these meetings and no matter what the topic was, we had the same argument.

Q: From your perspective, leading up to going into Iraq, where did Condoleezza Rice fit in; she was the national security advisor?
GROSSMAN: I think she was trying to represent the President and the question is what had the President decided on January 21st, 2001 about whether he wanted to invade Iraq or not? I don’t know the answer to that question.

Q: She wasn’t, in a way, a player, at least a player whose position was well known?

GROSSMAN: No, but that’s okay. I don’t think that that’s a criticism. That’s not the job of the NSC Advisor. The job of the NSC is to make the machine work fairly so that the President gets timely, creative, strategic advice and options to consider. Her job was also to protect the President and make sure the President’s ideas and policies and decisions were pursued in the government. So the fact that I can’t tell you what her view on Iraq is I think is neither here nor there. The issue is that the Pentagon—because of the force of personalities, because of their size, because of their money, torqued the interagency system.

Q: You were saying that you thought really up close to the end that we weren’t going to go in, it wasn’t really bluff but send enough of a force to say, ‘Here, take it or leave it’ to Saddam Hussein, to leave him no choice but to stand down in some form. But was there a point where people were being tasked in the State Department, “Okay, if we do go in, [then what]?” One of the great [lessons] of the first Gulf War in Kuwait was we didn’t have an after-the-war plan. Was this hanging over, “Let’s get an after-the-war plan?”

GROSSMAN: To be fair here, a couple of things. One is the huge amount of postwar planning that went on; a lot of it run by the National Security Council staff. Where people got hung up and I include myself in this, is we reasoned, from all the terrible things that happened after 1991; so for example there was a fantastic plan in case the Kurds ran up again into the hills, like 1991. There was a good plan were there to be mass starvation in Iraq, like there was in the north in ‘91. There was a plan for getting emergency food and shelter into Iraq if that was necessary. And those plans were extremely well done, and had any of those things gone wrong the government would have comported itself more effectively than it did.

Q: On those plans, all of which require implementation really by the military, was the Pentagon working on those plans? There was cooperation?

GROSSMAN: No question, because it had happened in 1991. We’d been through those exercises in 1991. I was part of the response to that. I figured, “We should learn our lesson. Let’s be ready in case it happens again.”

Simultaneously there was the now famous “Future of Iraq” project going on at the State Department which, run by the Near East Bureau, involved lots Iraqis, lots of Iraqi-Americans, lots of people the State Department thought they had something to contribute. People put their best effort into it.
Given what happened in Iraq, which I believe was a result of not having enough troops to secure the rapid victory, it is not fair to say, “Oh, if only the Pentagon had turned to page one of the Future of Iraq project and started reading, everything would be fine.” Everything would not have been fine. We needed to have secured Iraq’s borders. We needed to have secured the Iraqi Army’s ammunition dumps. Maybe the Future of Iraq Project might have helped (L. Paul) Jerry Bremer and General (Jay M.) Garner think about things in post-war Iraq, but the report went over to the Pentagon, they said, “It is from the State Department. Ignore it.”

Q: Did you get the feeling that the Pentagon planners were in a way talking to the wrong people, the Chalabis and the exiles, because my experience, I’m sure yours, is that we’ve all dealt with exiles or people who have left the country and you know that after six months they no longer have really much to offer, because they’re a special breed and then they have special interests, and yet we treat them very, very carefully.

GROSSMAN: I have a mixed sense of that. I was one of those responsible for trying to keep our relations going with the Iraqi National Congress and Doug Feith and I met with the Iraqi National Congress a lot, all of the people who were on the Iraqi National Congress—Shias, Kurds, Chalabi, others. I thought the Iraqi National Council actually was quite an important group of people, because SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) was on it and Dawa was on it and Chalabi and the Kurds, both factions of Kurds. I thought the Iraqi National Congress was an important thing and I worked hard to a) keep them together, and b) try to have a useful dialogue with them. People at the Pentagon who were only interested in talking to Ahmad Chalabi undermined this effort.

The second thing is, there were many exiles who actually have, since Iraq has been liberated, played roles in their country and its life, Iraqi-Americans who gave up everything to go back and try to make Iraq something decent. So some people relied too much on Chalabi as an individual and maybe not enough on the wider group of exiles, or Iraqi-Americans, or people who could have told us more about Iraq, and people who sacrificed a lot to make Iraq a success. So I think it is too bad that the whole exile movement has become lumped into Ahmed Chalabi.

Q: I’m reflecting this and glad to get the correction. You had very close ties with Turkey and as things were leading up, what were you getting from your Turkish colleagues?

GROSSMAN: I think Turks in their hearts hoped that we were out there to scare the living daylights out of everybody and we were going to sit tight for a few months and let somebody overthrow Saddam or let him go into exile next door to (Ugandan President) Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia. I was heavily involved in trying to get the Turks to agree to let the Fourth Infantry Division go through Turkey. I thought the idea of moving 90,000 Americans through Turkey into Iraq was problematic, but that is what our military commanders wanted, so I worked to try to achieve that outcome. My view was that when you’re going to go to war, the job of the diplomat and the State Department is to do what
the military commanders want for that war to end as quickly and with as few causalities as possible.

So I participated in all the sessions trying to convince Turkey let the 4th Infantry Division go through Turkey and for us to put substantial air forces into Incirlik. I traveled to Turkey on a number of occasions with Paul Wolfowitz and it came down to a view on the Turks’ part that they needed to be compensated. It finally got up into the $18-20 billion dollars that they wanted. We were prepared to give them two billion dollars. One evening, late at night, we were at Colin Powell’s house, sitting in his dining room, with the then Turkish Foreign Minister, trying to come to some agreement. In the end, we came to an agreement on money and Mr. Erdogan promised President Bush 43 that he, Erdogan, would take this issue and the agreement that had been made to the Turkish parliament. That’s their system. It was a brand new government; they hadn’t been in government very long and when they went to Parliament, they did not make the vote a party vote, they made it a free vote, which apparently sent a signal to party members that they must have had the votes and so therefore, “I can vote against it.” So lots of people voted against it. You’ll remember that public opinion was 80 or 90 percent opposed. It actually passed the first time and then those who were opposed invoked a constitutional provision that the vote had to be a majority of not just those who were present but a majority of the total parliament, and on that interpretation the motion failed. This was a Friday or a Saturday and we got word that the motion failed.

Needless to say, we were very disappointed, but luckily we were able to convince senior people that our public response to this should be calm and focus on the fact that while we were disappointed, obviously, in the parliament’s vote, we had always wanted more democracy in Turkey and we respected the decision of the parliament.

After that there was then a negotiation about whether search-and-rescue airplanes and crews could be at Incirlik and I think in the end they were and then some humanitarian stuff then went into Incirlik. Many of our forces parachuted into the north, I recall.

**Q:** Did you go to the Bonn conference?

GROSSMAN: I did not.

**Q:** Did you get involved at all with the Germans? You had, the foreign minister at the time...

GROSSMAN: (Joseph Marin) Joschka Fischer?

**Q:** ... is very famous, went on TV, said, “I don’t believe you.” Did you find, from your contacts, in your position, was there a lot of skepticism about the need to go to war, the Europeans?

GROSSMAN: Europe, don’t forget, was split. There were some Europeans who thought it was the right thing to do. Rumsfeld’s “Old Europe/New Europe” had some truth to it.
But I always rephrase that, which is to say the difference in Europe was between active Europe and passive Europe; in other words, those Europeans who are prepared to do something and those Europeans who are prepared not to do anything. So Denmark is clearly an Old Europe country and Norway is an Old Europe country, but yet they were both with us in Afghanistan and a number of these countries were with us in Iraq. They were active. It wasn’t a transatlantic argument. Spain, before their election in 2004, Britain, Italy, they were prepared to support us and actively so. We did use NATO as a place for consultations, of course, and, in the end, there were NATO efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q: How did you get involved with Congress, or did somebody else do that?

GROSSMAN: Oh, no, I testified plenty to Congress.

Q: How did you find Congress?

GROSSMAN: I think Congress was split, like many other people, about the pros and cons. I tried to do my best in congressional testimony. I did a lot of testimony in public. I did a lot of testimony and briefing behind closed doors. I did a lot of testimony with Pentagon people. We did a huge amount of testimony after the war. Paul Wolfowitz and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I, and I did my best.

Where we did our best work in the Congress was in the months leading up to the establishment of our Embassy in Baghdad. We promised the Congress, and particularly the SFRC (Senate Foreign Relations Committee) that we would have a clear plan, with clear timetables that the Embassy was going to be done on time, and it was. I testified on a number of occasions to both the House and the Senate on our plans for setting up our Embassy. (Francis J.) Frank Ricciardone and General (Claude M. “Mick”) Kicklighter, then at the VA, who led the effort to get this organized, deserve the credit, along with the Grant Greene and his team. Thanks to all of them, we had a plan, we had very clear milestones and we set up an Embassy and John Negroponte took it over and actually we set it up, as you’ll recall, a couple of days in advance of when we thought we were going to, and we were very proud of that.

We were also very proud of the fact that we never had any trouble filling any of those positions at that Embassy from people from the Department. We had 220 State Department positions in that Embassy and we had a thousand bidders on 220 positions. The only constraint for us in all of that time, for State Department people going into Iraq, was bed space. It was never that we didn’t have enough people who were ready to go and wanted to go and wanted to do something important. And so I testified to the best of my ability and the testimony I was proudest of was the testimony in advance of establishment of our Embassy.

Q: What about Saudi Arabia? Were there a lot of problems with Saudi Arabia? We seemed to have moved away, put a lot of our stuff in Qatar and other places like that. Was Saudi Arabia a problem or not for us?
GROSSMAN: I don’t think so. One of the reasons to get rid of Saddam Hussein and have a different Iraq was so that you’d have to have fewer military forces in the Gulf and particularly fewer military forces in Saudi Arabia and therefore take away one of the main arguments of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden—that American forces were running all over the Gulf. The reason we were in the Gulf was Iraq.

Q: Did we see Iran as being almost a passive partner; it would not be shedding any tears or giving any trouble if we knocked off Hussein?

GROSSMAN: I think that’s what we thought and our message to them was to stay still.

Q: One question that really disturbed me about the Gulf War was the fact that we apparently left (General H. Norman) Schwarzkopf (Jr.) with no plan about how to end the war. He met in a tent with a bunch of Iraqi generals and said, “Well, you figure it out.” In the first place, did we, as we went to war was this heavily on our mind, “We got to have a plan?”

GROSSMAN: Yes. It turned out of course that we had plans for all the wrong possibilities. What was on our minds, and I guess it shows part of the failure of imagination, but what was on our minds was to make sure that all these things that happened after the first Gulf War didn’t happen again. For me, sitting in Turkey, what did I see at the end of the first Gulf War? I saw a huge refugee crisis and starvation. And so there was a huge interagency effort made to plan for all of those contingencies: for starvation, for refugees, for mass migration movements, even if they weren’t refugees, and many different kinds of plans, all for events which never took place. And so there were plans. There just weren’t the right plans. As I said before, I think the key issue is that there were not enough troops assigned to consolidate the initial staggering victory.

Q: When the war started, did relations with the Pentagon get better or how would you describe them?

GROSSMAN: I would say they stayed about the same. The war started and I was very surprised, I think everybody was, that the war started the evening that it did. You remember there was a very large effort to kill Saddam Hussein that night, at the beginning of the conflict.

And then, as I’ve said on a number of occasions, I think it is part of the job, and maybe the majority of the job, of the State Department, once conflict begins, to make sure that we’re doing all that we can to make sure the conflict is as safe for our people as possible, American soldiers and military people, and also ends as quickly as possible. That was really the job of the Department in the run-up to the war, to get the kinds of things that our military commanders needed. And once war begins, then the Department is in a supporting role, trying then to get ready for the end of conflict.
Very properly, people at my level were not involved in the operational military details, but clearly this was an astonishing success over a very short period of time. I do think, though, when you think back on it and remember that somewhere in the first week or so it wasn’t going fast enough and there was public criticism of the effort. I thought it was amazing that at one point, Secretary Rumsfeld, in answering questions at a press conference, essentially said, “This wasn’t my plan, it is Tommy Franks’ plan.”

The military part of the war ended astonishingly fast and was an amazing success for America and America’s military men and women. Then came all of the aftermath.

Q: During the war and the early aftermath, was there concern—you obviously had a worldwide role—about Islamic attacks on not only Embassies but also Consulates and our citizens abroad?

GROSSMAN: Yes, absolutely and I believe if you go back and look at the warnings that were given at the time, the effort that was made to keep everybody safe and secure, it was very much a piece of my …

Q: Did anything happen?

GROSSMAN: Not that I can recall.

Q: What about the teams that were assembled to go in and deal with what’s called the “postwar” problems?

GROSSMAN: Back in December 2002, December-January, there was a big debate about how to organize the first military/civilian elements in after the war and it was clear that the Pentagon wanted to do this, that they wanted it to be their responsibility. Secretary Powell, Rich Armitage, Grant Greene and I (and many others, of course) looked around at our own capacity in terms of money, organization, people, and concluded that the State Department was not set up to run the occupation of Iraq in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

So we negotiated and negotiated the document that laid all this out, but we recognized that the Presidential Directive that came in mid-January saying that the Pentagon would have responsibility for this in advance, was, at the time, the only thing that we could do. To skip forward, that’s one of the reasons that Powell was so interested in leaving as a legacy this Office of Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction, so that the President at least would have a choice between the Pentagon and the State Department, depending on what he or she wanted to do. But at the time we negotiated this document it was clear that—in terms of capacity, money, and resources—this had to be a Pentagon function.

Jay Garner, retired General Garner, was chosen to be the head of this organization. I went to any number of meetings as he started to get his responsibility organized. I think he was asking all the right questions and trying to do the right thing. He had previous experience in Iraq.
Q: You dealt with him before, hadn’t you?

GROSSMAN: I had, yes.

Q: On the Turkish border?

GROSSMAN: Exactly. He’d been in northern Iraq before and some of the people whom he hired had been in northern Iraq before. He came to us early on and said he wanted a whole roster of people from the State Department to join him and we sent him over a number of people, I think eleven people at the senior level. On one of the days after he got the list he had to call me up and say that, with very few exceptions, one or two, all of the people had been taken off the list. I said, “By who?” He said, “By people above me.”

I called (Douglas J.) Doug Feith, he was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, my Pentagon counterpart and I said, “What’s the deal here?” He said he didn’t really know and would check. He called me back later and said that people had been taken off by his bosses, particularly by Secretary Rumsfeld. I thought it was amazing that this was happening but it turned out that it was true, Secretary Rumsfeld had decided he didn’t want any of the people we had proposed. People who had experience in the region. People who spoke Arabic. It took Powell himself to try to get a number of our people back on the list. They took back some, but a couple of people didn’t make it at all. So we thought that they really hampered themselves in terms of personnel at the very start.

The people who did go deserve a huge amount of credit for their courage and their dedication. Garner set up some training before they went and then they deployed to Iraq and tried to do their best for Jay Garner.

Q: We talked to some, like (Timothy M) Tim Carney ...

GROSSMAN: Tim Carney, to be fair, was not on our list. Tim Carney was the choice of Paul Wolfowitz. A great choice, but he was not one of the original eleven.

Q: I have talked to some who arrived and the conditions were not like they expected at all.

GROSSMAN: I’m sure not.

Q: Obviously the State Department is full of people who have intelligence experience. Were you able to use your intelligence experience to find out what was going on over at the Pentagon, across the river, why this happened, what was the thinking?

GROSSMAN: There were three things, perhaps. One is there was clearly an ideological check and some people didn’t make the ideological check. Secondly, I think they didn’t want to have people who were Arabic speakers, because they would have an independent base of knowledge and understanding. And thirdly, part of it was a real desire on the part
of Secretary Rumsfeld and his senior colleagues that they could do this, that they didn’t need any help, and they certainly didn’t need the help of the State Department. So not interested; this was for them to do. It was their accomplishment and they didn’t want anybody to get in the way.

Q: One can’t help, not to get into the partisan thing but, correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems to me the ideology, that we would craft this wonderful military, which they had and all sorts of things could be accomplished out of the Pentagon and don’t bother me from other parts of the government. We can do it and we’ll take care of it.

GROSSMAN: They were schizophrenic. On some days they were desperate, after a while especially, for people from other agencies to join in. But in the beginning this was, “This is our accomplishment and we’re going to keep it our accomplishment.” But military people had questions about the numbers and kinds of people Garner was being sent. Eric Shinseki, General Shinseki, was speaking the truth when he talked about the number of soldiers who would be required. No question that the feat of arms to defeat Saddam Hussein was an astonishing accomplishment. The question was, once you’ve done that, do you need large numbers of forces to occupy the country?

Q: Did you get a feel, during wartime and just shortly thereafter, about the role of Vice President Cheney? Was he a figure at all or was it strictly between the State Department and the Pentagon?

GROSSMAN: He was the Vice President. He had a right to participate. He plays a very important role in all of this and I think one of the challenges that Secretary Powell faced is that, in the system as we had grown accustomed to it, fights between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are not unheard of phenomena. There is a National Security Advisor to help sort that out. In this case the Vice President and Secretary Rumsfeld were clearly on the same wavelength. So it distorted the system. There are a couple of ways to look at that. You can say that’s a bad thing. On the other hand, the Vice President of the United States got elected, unlike all the rest of us bureaucrats and appointed people. So I think there’s a challenge there that has a lot to do with the Vice President, yes, but with the system itself, and the power of the National Security Council staff to level the playing field, even when the playing field doesn’t look like it did in the years previous.

Q: Was there a point after our army reached Baghdad and all where your people sort of observing and getting reports and news reports and all, it just wasn’t going the way it was supposed to, where we thinking “Oh, my God, we’d better regroup and really respond,” or something?

GROSSMAN: For me, there were two moments when I thought, “Uh, oh.” One was in the early days after our military victory, when it turned out that the munitions dumps all over Iraq were left unguarded and that people were taking explosives out of these places. I can remember at a number of Deputies Committee meetings asking, “Excuse me, I’m not a military person, but who is guarding the munitions dumps?” Steve Hadley joined
me in asking this question and really tried to take this on. This problem never got solved, as far as I could tell, and I think it really contributed to the insurgency, certainly in the first year.

And the second indicator was, it wasn’t weeks before there started to be reports of people—Syrians, Iranians and others—pouring in over the borders. Again, I can remember going to Deputies Committee meetings and highlighting this to Steve Hadley, and again having Hadley take this up as well …

_Q: Hadley being the Deputy …_

GROSSMAN: … Deputy National Security Advisor. And Steve took this up, too and said, “What is the plan for guarding Iraq’s borders?” There was no plan for guarding Iraq’s borders.

So to me, after a few weeks, the combination of not guarding the ammunition dumps and no plan to secure Iraq’s borders made me really start to worry about what the future was going to be like. I don’t know whether the looting was a spontaneous act of, as Mr. Rumsfeld said, “things happen,” or whether it was part of a plan of the defeated army to sow chaos and throw sand in the invaders’ eyes. I’ve always been struck by, in David Kaye’s testimony—David Kaye was one of those who went out to see where all the weapons of mass destruction were—and in David Kaye’s testimony to Congress he said it is possible, he didn’t come down one way or the other, he said it is possible that the looting and all of that chaos was a cover for the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction. One of the great historical questions is, “Was the looting spontaneous or was the looting a tactic applied by the people who were prepared to fight us forever?”

_Q: Were you getting reports from State Department people who’d been sent reluctantly by the Pentagon over to help recreate ministries, were you getting reports about how bad the situation was?

GROSSMAN: Everything was very hard. Again, I think Jay Garner got a bad rap in all of this. Garner is a good-hearted, patriotic, smart guy who tried to do the best he could. I think he had very confusing instructions; he went out and was trying to help the Iraqis and was trying to organize himself, but he was overwhelmed. Everyone was overwhelmed. He was trapped between not getting the support he needed (some of the people DoD sent out to Iraq [were] young campaign advance people) while simultaneously being micro-managed. Over the weeks the reports came back that that whole structure was basically out of control. And then from somewhere and I don’t know where, but from somewhere comes what I thought was a wonderful idea: Jerry Bremer should take over the job.

_Q: Jerry Bremer, you had sort of replaced each other in …_

GROSSMAN: Yes, I’d known him for much of my career, he was an FSO, and we’d both been in that Staff Assistant, Executive Secretary guild. I thought the jobs he’d done
he’d done well. S/CT for example; he’d made a life for himself after government work that seemed successful. I saw him from time to time. He is a dedicated, very directed, very smart, very organized person. So the first time someone said to me, “Jerry will be the new boss in Iraq,” I thought, “This is fantastic.”

Q: One of the first things when he went out there, this was still during your time, wasn’t it?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: When he went out there, two of the things he did was, correct me if I’m wrong but, one, completely demobilize the Iraqi army and, two, to de-Baathify the Iraqi government system. I wasn’t there right at the end of World War II but very shortly [afterwards] I had to deal with the documents because of visas and all and I remember the de-Nazification process, which was a fairly slow, methodical, but pretty effective system. We got rid of the bad apples and you made allowances for those who just sort of went along. It kept the German machine running. Was anybody looking at these things in the State Department and coming to you [and saying], “Oh, my God, this is a little too precipitous,” or something?

GROSSMAN: Let’s step back. One of the things that happened in the very beginning of Jerry’s term was that there was a sense that Washington had tried to micromanage Garner; telling him what to do or always changing our minds. One of the things that Jerry said, apparently, to everybody and it was communicated interagency, was that he needed to be backed up, he didn’t need constantly to be cross questioned about what he was doing. And sure enough, the first two big decisions are de-Baathification and demobilization of the army. We had many experienced people at the State Department say, “Very important to get new leaders, very important to get rid of the bad apples, but somebody’s got to run this structure.” Our friends at the Pentagon took a different approach: the Baath Party was a terrible thing for Iraq and that people that participated in it ought to pay for that and that people like schoolteachers were actually among the leading edge of the bad guys, they were the ones who were teaching all this nonsense. So we debated and, in the end, Jerry decided that he would de-Baathify and that the de-Baathification would go down quite far into the ranks.

Since it had come just after we had all pledged ourselves to back up the guy in the field, we had all sworn that we were not going to make his life miserable, everybody just said, “Well, I guess if that’s what he wants to do, all right. Jerry’s our new guy. He’s our guy in the field.” Now, I think two things then happened that Jerry didn’t want. One was it went much too far. Two, it turns out, at least I discovered much later, that Ahmad Chalabi’s brother was put in charge of deciding who’s good who’s bad. So immediately this becomes politicized and CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) lost control of this, and so, even if it had been a bad decision, they could have carried it out more sensibly and could have maybe got out of it faster. It turned out to be a bad decision carried out by people who had an agenda.
Q: As somebody who does so many oral histories, the micromanagement of almost anything from Washington can really be both a pain in the ass and destructive, because you have people in conferences that really don’t know the subject, they want to make sure their oars are in the soup. It is a major problem. But in this case, you’re pointing out why ...

GROSSMAN: In this case, as I recall it, said we weren’t going to micromanage and bam, the first thing down the pike is this.

Q: What was your impression of Secretary of State Powell and Rich Armitage as far as dealing with these problems? Did they have much influence over at the Pentagon?

GROSSMAN: Well, first, again, this is a structural issue. You had in Colin Powell somebody who’d been the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but wasn’t the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now, who’d been the National Security Advisor but wasn’t the National Security Advisor now; he was the Secretary of State. He was careful in playing his role in government; he wasn’t the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he wasn’t the National Security Advisor. He had a view on all these things, which he expressed I believe privately to the President, and he expressed at the National Security Council table I’m sure, but he was only in one job. He wasn’t in all those other jobs. So that was a hard thing.

He tried to make the military focus on planning. He tried to focus on future events. But it was hard with a President so committed to be always seen as the ones who were trying to slow things down, to plan more, to be seen as trying to slow things down because we wanted to have allies. We were the people who wanted force to be constrained. The way government works is you cannot win one hundred per cent of your fights. It just doesn’t work that way. So you have to choose them, win all you can, but you can’t win everything.

Powell, Armitage and those of us who tried to support them, we fought for what we tried to fight for, but in this case there were too many thumbs on the scales. Again, it is very important for people to understand that the President of the United States is the elected person here. Everyone else is appointed. If you believe in democracy and you believe in how our system works, then the President gets to decide because he got elected.

Q: I’m not quite sure how it played with you, but were you in many ways the point person for allies, the “Coalition of the Willing?”

GROSSMAN: I tried to help out at the start, but because a lot of this was now operational, (Lincoln P.) Linc Bloomfield (Jr.), who was the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, was meeting sometimes daily, often weekly, with the coalition. Rich and I tried our best to be available to all of our foreign allies and foreign partners. We often spoke at Linc’s meetings. Secretary Powell made a particular effort with the big ones, the ones that were really fighting, like the British, the Australians.
Q: But were you picking up disquiet about, so often allies are happy to sit back and say, “Oh, I don’t think we should do this,” and then after it has happened and it is been successful they’re quite happy to have let us carry the water. But were you picking up feelings of, “We not only disapprove of you doing this, but we don’t like the way it is working out?”

GROSSMAN: Less of that. I would say that in the beginning, the Australians and the British, who were closest and were fighting, everybody reinforced each other’s view that this was really hard. The people who were in Iraq after the major military action ended, for the British, like John Sawyers, who’s now the UK Political Director in London, and Jeremy Greenstock, who did that job and then retired after having been the UK Ambassador to the United Nations, I think they just saw this as we did, as a huge problem to solve.

Q: How was this playing out as time went on? Was the State Department dragged more and more into the situation?

GROSSMAN: We inserted ourselves into the situation, because at one point we recognized that the CPA, the Coalition Provisional Authority, wasn’t going to work either. Secretary Powell said what we needed was an Embassy in Iraq, to try and normalize relations with the Iraqis, give them back their sovereignty. We finally got approval to do so. I supported Grant Greene in the task of trying to bring all of the preparations together. Lucky for us, as I said before, we asked Frank Ricciardone, who was then our Ambassador to the Philippines, he had been my DCM in Turkey, and a retired general Mick Kicklighter, who was then at the VA (Veteran’s Affairs), if they would come help us put together a plan for setting up an Embassy and they did. Working in complete sync with the Grant Green M empire, they did a fantastic job.

We said, “We will do this right. We will show that the State Department can do this”. We had a plan, with timelines, with stoplight charts. I testified to the Congress and what I testified to was that we were going to get this done on time and on budget. And we did open on time and on budget; the Embassy opened early, we opened a few days early and John Negroponte, to his great credit, agreed to be Ambassador. So in all of that mess we were very proud of the fact that we were able to stand up this Embassy. One really big fact is that the Embassy had over 200 Foreign Service positions to start and when we advertised those positions we had a thousand bidders. We were very proud of our people, proud that people wanted to go there to try and make a difference to Iraq, and to the United States.

There was one awful moment in a Deputies Committee meeting as we were trying to negotiate an MOU of what support the military would provide the Embassy and to our people when our DoD friends said that would not provide mortuary services if a State Department person were killed. I was so mad I packed up my things and left the situation room and went AWOL for a few hours. It took Powell himself to get this fixed. That’s how bad this all was.
Q: Why did you feel it was important to have an Embassy?

GROSSMAN: Secretary Powell wanted to try to make it less of an occupation and start to try to give Iraqis some control over their own lives and over their own government; to show that Iraq was sovereign. I did not foresee, maybe other people foresaw but I did not foresee, the vicious communal struggle that’s going on now. And so the idea was that if we had an Embassy that the Ambassador wouldn’t be an occupier, he’d be an Ambassador and the occupation would be over, and that Iraqis would have to start to develop their own institutions and their own responsibilities. We wanted that to happen quickly. And so that was the reason, to civilianize it, to normalize it, to make it not an occupation. That’s why we wanted an Embassy and that’s why we wanted an Ambassador.

Now, clearly, that Ambassador had extraordinary powers and extraordinary capacity and sitting with the military commander, General (George W.) Casey (Jr.), the two of them were in many ways still the occupation. I’m not so naïve. But we were trying to change the facts and the way Iraqis were thinking about their future.

Q: Were we dusting off old organization plans and operations from the Vietnam War? Because so many of us who served in Vietnam go back and say, we have Provincial Reconstruction Teams and all, say, “Hell, this is CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support).”

GROSSMAN: The Provincial Reconstruction Teams came from Afghanistan and because they worked in Afghanistan we tried to encourage them in Iraq. But the Embassy itself, the provision, the building, the organization of the Embassy, was something that came from the minds of Grant Green, Frank Ricciardone and Mick Kicklighter and many others and they all did a spectacular job.

Q: Did you see a change with the arrival of the Embassy?

GROSSMAN: Yes, I think we did. It was short-lived, but I think there was a change; the Iraqis themselves started to feel like they were more in control of their own country. And then this insurgency came and destroyed it all again.

Q: On Iraq, you left in ...

GROSSMAN: My last day of work was the end of February 2005.

Q: Did you feel that the insurgency, by the time you left, was becoming something that we were capable of dealing with but it was really threatening whatever we were trying to do in Iraq?

GROSSMAN: Oh, I certainly think we had come to the conclusion it was threatening everything we were trying to do in Iraq, but two years ago I think there was still a general
view that this was something that the United States and Iraqis, very importantly, could defeat.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Iraqi political leadership? What was sort of the reading you were getting?

GROSSMAN: You could see in the debates in the Iraqi leadership the huge splits there are in Iraq. Think of how long it took to go from the first transition government to the second and the fighting over the constitution. Again, it seems naive to say this, but I think still at that point people were consoling themselves that this is not easy. It wasn’t easy for the United States to get a constitution. It wasn’t easy for other countries to get a constitution. As we stepped back and more Iraqis took responsibility for their own country they would have to deal with these problems and they would deal with them in an Iraqi way. There would be an Iraqi constitution and an Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces.

Q: Were you picking up, from your Turkish network and all, any disquiet at this point about the Kurds and what was happening in Iraq?

GROSSMAN: The Turks are always worried about what’s happening in northern Iraq. As Americans, we understand decentralization. Turks live in a differently structured society. They live in a centralized society. And so this conversation about, “Oh, don’t worry, it is just going to be sort of a federal system,” we get that and we don’t worry about it, because California’s a strong state, New York’s a strong state, etc. But Turks don’t live in that kind of society and this is not a useful conversation to them.

In July of ’03 there was that dustup between American forces and Turkish forces over who did or did not plant a bomb in some northern Iraqi city. Our forces put bags over the heads of Turkish forces and arrested them. So it was confusing.

And, most importantly, the Turks expected, I believe, that when we went into Iraq that we would destroy the PKK terrorist organization elements that were in northern Iraq there.

Q: These are the Marxists

GROSSMAN: Marxist-Leninist terrorists, the people who had been attacking Turkey for many years. There were several thousand of them in northern Iraq and the Turks believed that, just hoped, that this would be high on our list. It turned out not to be so. And so Turks looked and saw chaos, they saw Kurds being increasingly important, they didn’t see a solution on the PKK, they see the PKK operating essentially freely in northern Iraq for a long time. So their anxiety level was up.

Q: During this time were we trying to do anything that might make the American-Iran connection a little more friendly or not, did we see that as a possible positive outcome?
GROSSMAN: Not as a policy, no, but somewhere in this period there was a terrible earthquake in Iran and we sent people and money to help. I think we sent ten million dollars and actually had people on the ground, Americans on the ground in Iran, to help out. And the response we got was positive from Iranian people, from Iranian emergency technicians, and also from the Teheran government. Andre Natsios, the then head of USAID, advocated that when the initial ten million dollars was spent and the initial time we told the Iranians the Americans would be in Iran was over, that we ought to offer another ten million dollars and extend the time for a very small number of Americans to stay in Iran. Unfortunately the Iranians said no to this opportunity. I think that’s too bad. No one knows what might have happened—maybe nothing—but it was a very interesting proposition.

And don’t forget, we had had quite a useful relationship, in a way, in Bonn and then we were deeply disappointed by the Iranians giving shelter to these al Qaeda desperados who left Afghanistan.

Q: What was our analysis of why they would do this?

GROSSMAN: Iran is riven by factions, too. So there were clearly some people who thought it was a good idea to shelter them and once these al Qaeda bad guys were in Iran it was hard to get rid of them. But they wouldn’t let us talk to them, question them, nothing. There were people in our government who felt that these people were still involved in actual organizing of terrorist operations. So from a high point, after cooperation on Afghanistan in Bonn, the next thing we see is this al Qaeda asylum. That’s not a very friendly act.

Q: What about Afghanistan? Was there concern over, to get back to the beginning of this thing, that you were beginning to, that we weren’t giving Afghanistan enough priority as far as, particularly troop and political concentration were moving too quickly over to, were focusing on Iraq and all?

GROSSMAN: Sure, I think one of the big dangers in all this, still today, is that we never finished the job in Afghanistan. Although we celebrate it as a success and as a good thing and I hope it turns out to be a good thing, the reason why DoD finally agreed to have NATO be involved in Afghanistan was so he could be rid of it.

Q: Did the State Department have much of a say in this or was this pretty much a Rumsfeld ...

GROSSMAN: We wanted to internationalize the effort in Afghanistan as well.

Q: Was there any concern about, there was sort of this love affair with Karzai as the future and then the president of Afghanistan. What were you getting from your people who knew Afghanistan?
GROSSMAN: He was by far and away the most likely leader anybody had met. There was no big dissent over this that I recall. He was the person everybody thought could hold this country together.

Q: Did you find yourself, competing Afghan groups coming to see you and all that?

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t think so. There were people who were concerned about Karzai, because of his tribal affiliations, but he was the right choice then.

Q: What about Syria during this time? Is Syria treated as almost on our enemies list or were we thinking that Syria might take a different turn?

GROSSMAN: I don’t think anybody really believed they would take a different turn. The question is whether Assad would stay still. The Syrians did right on the al Qaeda question but then played a very negative role in terms of their border and in terms of controlling the entry and exit from Iraq. So they moved very quickly onto everybody’s list of concerns because of their behavior at the Iraqi border.

Q: What was our analysis and who were these people coming in? Were these Islamic fanatics from all over the Islamic world?

GROSSMAN: Yes and there was a defined route. They’d show up in Damascus and make themselves known and then be taken to this place and taken to that place and taken to some other place and then across the border. There was an organized activity.

Q: Were we doing our best to call the Syrians to account?

GROSSMAN: Yes and it didn’t make a darn bit of difference.

Q: I would have thought the Syrians would have been somewhat nervous early on.

GROSSMAN: I think they were, but in the end I guess they either got over it or got overwhelmed, I’m not sure which.

Q: How did you find the Saudis during this time? They filled a critical role, I think, didn’t they, or not? How much would you say they were on board?

GROSSMAN: I think once we got started they were on board, in the sense that there was no roadblock there. I don’t remember specifically.

Q: It was so easy to get caught up on the Iraq thing; we forget there was [other] business going on all the time. I think it was Dean Rusk [who] said, “If you’re Secretary of State, somebody is doing something to somebody 24 hours a day around the globe.” So let’s talk again about Colombia. What was the situation in Colombia and how did it involve you?
GROSSMAN: I can remember sitting down with Tom Pickering, my predecessor, one afternoon and asking him what the job would be like and what he thought I would do. He said, “I have three words for you: Colombia, Colombia, Colombia.” And I said, “I don’t know much about Colombia.” He said, “You better learn, because Colombia’s going to be a very big part of your job,” and he explained to me that the Clinton Administration, led by Tom and others, had worked out with the Colombians Plan Colombia, which was an integrated effort with then-President (Andrés) Pastrana to try to deal with Colombia’s challenges simultaneously, recognizing that there wasn’t just one problem with Colombia, there were many. There weren’t just military problems, or drug problems or human rights problems, there were lots of different problems and they all needed to be dealt with simultaneously. And they had really made a start on a successful policy. Tom bequeathed this to me and I can remember getting ready for my confirmation hearings, studying about Colombia, and being taken with Colombia, fascinated by Colombia, meeting people who had served in Colombia. I really looked forward to carrying on this work that he had started. I came into the job in March of 2001 and I asked Secretary Powell if I could take the lead pursuing Plan Colombia.

I thought the first time I went to Bogota that it would be like Beirut. But it wasn’t; it was a vibrant, amazing city and I came to believe that Colombians were people who were worth helping because they were fighting for their democracy, for their country. Sometimes in diplomacy you help some people who aren’t, perhaps, so worthy of help, but you help the people who you’re supposed to help and sometimes you get to help people who really merit it. I thought Colombians, they merited it because they were fighting for their democracy and they were fighting for their lives.

I went there the first time and I had a chance to meet with President Pastrana and his senior leaders. At the time there was huge controversy over the safety of the spraying, the counter-narcotics spraying program that the State Department ran.

Q: This was reminiscent of Agent Orange, wasn’t it? It wasn’t the same thing, but in a way ...

GROSSMAN: Well, it was not at all the same thing, but the public reaction was polarizing. Working with Anne Patterson, who was our Ambassador to Colombia at the time, we developed a plan with the OAS, the Organization of American States, to try and deal with this public reaction. I think by and large we did. The way I judged it was that I gave either one or two press conferences each time I was in Colombia, and by the second or third press trip no one was asking me questions any more about the safety of the spraying.

We also tried to keep an important coalition going on the Hill and I pay tribute to those Members of Congress who, even after 9/11, were prepared to pay attention to Colombia. Our goal always was to keep a three-part coalition on Capitol Hill to support Colombia: people who were interested in human rights, people who were interested in counter-narcotics, people who were interested in counterterrorism. If we could keep all three of those strands going we could keep Plan Colombia policy going. Here I want to is pay a
special tribute to Luis Alberto Moreno, the Ambassador of Colombia at that time, who was a constant presence on the Hill and had enormous skill working with Members of Congress and the administration.

Once September 11th came, and everybody was doing Iraq all the time, I really got to work on Colombia, along with Anne Patterson and her Mission and counterparts in DoD, JCS, DEA and SOUTHCOM. President Bush 43 and Secretary Powell were supportive. There was a new President elected, during this time, President Uribe, whom we worked with carefully and closely.

While the Colombians made progress on the military front, supported by the US, and we made progress on the counter-narcotics effort, you could see a lot of the progress in other areas as well: the number of kidnappings went down, the number of murders went down, the number of labor leaders who were attacked went down. So in a lot of ways it was a …

**Q: Why are they going down?**

GROSSMAN: Well, for a couple of reasons. One is that part of Plan Colombia’s focus was on protecting people’s offices and houses, which turned out to be a good thing. For example, labor leaders, we would come in and secure their offices, so that they had the protection against the right-wing paramilitaries or the left-wing militias that were trying to kill them. Second, Colombians started to believe that they had to attack their problems in an integrated way and ignoring human rights questions or allowing people to behave with impunity was not the answer.

I should also note the importance of economic development in all this. The Andean Trade Preferences Act made a big difference in our ability to carry out a broad-based, whole-of-government, simultaneous policy.

**Q: To understand this, as you saw it, who was doing what to whom?**

GROSSMAN: Well, it was complicated. You had the right-wing paramilitaries, the AUC, trying to undermine the government by attacking the left-wing parties and they were ruthless in attacking journalists and labor leaders. One of our early efforts after 9/11 was to have the USG designate the AUC as a terrorist organization. We wanted to show that we opposed them as well as the other illegal armed groups. Then you had the FARC, who controlled a big piece of Colombia. The FARC had leaders who never left this piece of Colombia in forty years. Nobody quite knew what they wanted, except they wanted to be in power, but they were a Marxist-Leninist group and brutal, ruthless; kidnapping people and killing, all the classic things, killing schoolteachers and killing people from the security forces. Then you had a second left-wing group called the ELN, who seemed like mostly narco-terrorists, who were profiting from the narcotics trade. Both the FARC, I believe, and the AUC were into narcotics as well.
When I was ready to give my job over to Nick Burns I said, “Colombia, Colombia, Colombia” and he has taken on this task, has been there a number of times and is transitioning now to Plan Colombia II.

Q: Well now, what were we doing? Were we just handing money over or were we ...

GROSSMAN: We were participating in many different ways. This was in many ways the first explicit, operational, “whole of government” effort. We did give a lot of money to Colombia in the early stages but we also had soldiers from SOUTHCOM in Colombia, not fighting, but advising both counter-narcotics and counterterrorist units. We had USAID people there, a lot of NGO people who worked with us, and that’s also where INL’s Air Wing had at that time its largest presence, because oddly enough the State Department runs all of the aircraft that do all the spraying in Colombia. So the Ambassador there is also an air force boss, has a large number of airplanes and helicopters. We were also heavily involved in, as I said, protecting those people on the human rights side who needed protecting. So we were involved in a lot of areas. To give an example of how the circles run together, the day the pictures of Abu Ghraib first broke out …

Q: You might explain what Abu Ghraib was.

GROSSMAN: Abu Ghraib was the prison that the US military was running in Iraq that was a stain on our reputation for what was being done to Iraqis there. The day that those pictures came, out I was in Colombia, giving a talk to Colombian military people about human rights. Not very convincing.

Q: Who was our Ambassador?

GROSSMAN: Anne Patterson. She was fantastic. Then (William B.) Bill Wood. Bill Wood is now on his way to Afghanistan.

Q: Where’s Anne Patterson?

GROSSMAN: Anne Patterson is now the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and her nomination as Ambassador to Pakistan was just announced. She then will take on another very hard assignment. I admire her.

Q: Did you find that, okay, you’re fighting terrorism, but in Washington terrorism and al Qaeda or if not that, Middle Eastern stuff; were you off the radar or how did this work?

GROSSMAN: On and off the radar—on the radar sometimes in good ways. One of the reasons that we wanted to call what was going on in Colombia narcoterrorism was to remind people that what’s going on in Colombia is part of the struggle against extremism and terrorism. It has been going on there for thirty years. We called it narcoterrorism for a reason, which was to remind people.
Like a lot of other things that we’ve talked about, the Defense Department, especially the civilians at DOD, did not pay much attention to Colombia. Luckily, though, there were two SOUTHCOM commanders during my time who were very interested. (Peter) Pete Pace, who’s now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Marine General. Army Generals Spear, Hill and Craddock, who also couldn’t have been any more committed, followed him. In fact, I think most of the times I went to Colombia the SOUTHCOM commander either went with me or met me there, which I appreciated a lot.

Q: Did you feel any of the disdain that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had for the State Department, or was this under his radar, too?

GROSSMAN: They weren’t interested. That was perfectly fine with me.

There were other times when we got off the radar when it wasn’t so good. One of the great examples of the interrelationship of Plan Colombia was that for a reason I can’t remember, we and the Hill made a mistake and let the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), which was a way for many Colombian goods to come into the United States without tariffs, expire. For some months before ATPA was reauthorized, we tried to pursue a Colombia policy without the ATPA. What we noticed was, the ATPA’s impact was huge. When it expired, thousands of people were thrown out of work in the textile arena, for example, thousands of people were thrown out of work in the cut-flower industry, and it turned out that the cut-flower industry workers were eighty percent rural women. After the ATPA was reauthorized, I went to a textile factory in Bogota and the young man who was the owner of this factory said it wasn’t two hours after the ATPA was reinstated that his phone started to ring, calls from New York, from people who wanted to get back into business. He had five thousand employees and he wanted to expand. He said, “I’m in business, and everyone employed by me doesn’t have to then participate in the drug trade to make a living.” So, to me anyway, it was a very important example of how free trade and American investment and American openness to trade was really important to our counter-narcotics, and all of our other, objectives in Colombia.

Q: You mentioned that you got the three elements within Congress to be on your side, human rights, anti-drug and antiterrorism. Can you name any of the key players in that?

GROSSMAN: Well, on the side of human rights, Senator (Patrick) Leahy was always very interested. I won’t say he was always a big supporter of the every part of the program, but he was always interested in what we were doing and he was always willing to listen. He and his senior staff person, Tim Reiser, always would listen to what we had to say. For me, it was helpful even when he was setting conditions on military or civilian assistance. We tried to meet them, and I think his heart was in the right place about Colombia.

On the counterdrugs side, House Speaker (Dennis) Hastert was the person who was most influential and most helpful to me, and his staff was very helpful to me.
And then on the counterterrorism side, it was interesting that Members who had been Peace Corps volunteers in Colombia or in the region—(Congressman) Mark Kirk, for example—they understood that Colombians were fighting for their democracy. It was actually quite a congenial bipartisan group of people when they were all together. They didn’t all agree about why they were interested in Colombia, but they recognized that they were all part of the coalition.

I testified a lot, especially to the House subcommittee that appropriated the Colombia money. Congressman Jim Kolbe of Arizona was a big supporter and very wise counselor to us. I sent a letter to Members of Congress each year on December 31st, reviewing all the accomplishments and then talking about some of the challenges that we had for the next year. That letter informed Congress each year of what we were doing and where we were against the benchmarks that they had set and that we had set for ourselves. It was interesting how many letters I got back and how many people called me and said, “I’m interested in this. Tell me more about this.” We sent this to the entire Congress and I signed them all and we had people to help us and I wrote in by hand to thank many for what they had done. It was a good way to communicate beyond testimony or office visits.

Q: Latin America wasn’t exactly been your thing, but how did we view Venezuela at the time, because it became a problem.

GROSSMAN: During my time Venezuela was something I think we were all worried about. I was involved, to my regret, in what we thought was a change of government in Venezuela. Turned out not to be and I was one of those misled by what I thought were the facts.

Q: Could you explain?

GROSSMAN: There was an effort one evening by people in Venezuela to push Chavez out and our information was that it had succeeded and what we thought was the new government asked us to recognize it. On the advice of our Embassy and our Bureau we did make a public statement. And it turned out not to be true.

Q: This all got very embarrassing. It had repercussions ...

GROSSMAN: Oh, yes.

Q: And rightly so.

GROSSMAN: There was a Congressional investigation and there was an Inspector General’s investigation. I think while some people felt that we had some complicity, it turned out that those of us who’d made the decision, and I was part of that, we made it on the basis of bad information we’d been given and we jumped too soon. All you can do is look back on it and regret it.
I had the privilege of visiting other Latin American countries. I went to Brazil. One of the things that, again, had been signed in the Clinton Administration was a promise that Under Secretaries from the United States and Brazil would consult every six months. I went to Brazil on a number of occasions and one of the big things we worked with the Brazilians was they wanted to start and then have a functioning aerial interdiction system to try to force down airplanes that were moving and smuggling drugs. At some point, the Peruvians shot down an American plane by mistake and killed the passengers. In response, we suspended all of our support for aerial interdiction programs, until we got one going in Colombia and then we got one going in Brazil, which took the President of the United States to make a series of determinations that we could do this. I also had a chance to go to Buenos Aires to talk to them about debt.

The OAS had a big summit meeting in Mexico where a document on security was signed. I had the good fortune to go and represent the United States. Roger Noriega and I got to negotiate the last few bits of it in the days in advance of the signing. It was a good document because it began to highlight that all problems are related. The United States signed up to language that “social exclusion” is a national security question, and poverty is a national security question, and drugs, obviously, are a national security question. I hope someday this document becomes a more important thing. I recognize that’s a bias because I worked on it. Like the democracy charter; this was the counterpart on the security side. I didn’t leave P being a Latin American expert by any stretch of the imagination, but the trips to Colombia and the other things that I did were certainly an education for me.

Q: Did Mexico, being of course a major neighbor, raise its head while you were there?

GROSSMAN: Mostly to the President, and to talk about immigration. I went to Mexico on a number of occasions. Just as I became Under Secretary, the Mexicans decided they wanted to support Plan Colombia in their own way. I went to a pledging conference for Colombia in Brussels early in my tenure and the Mexicans asked if they could visit with us. They said that they were interested in getting involved in Colombia. So throughout the years that I was working on Colombia I tried very hard to keep the Mexican government closely informed of what we were doing there. I benefited greatly from their advice.

Q: Immigration, of course, is a perennial problem and I imagine the President, particularly having been governor of Texas, this was part of his territory, really. Were we doing anything in that regard?

GROSSMAN: Before 9/11 I think people were doing a lot. Time spent on immigration between the President and Vicente Fox, Powell, others, was huge, and then 9/11 changed everything. The Mexicans really never quite understood that 9/11 was going to make it impossible for the President to pursue his immigration policy. Here we are in 2007 and the debate is finally being engaged again.
Q: Well, before we leave Latin America, how about Cuba? This has always been the third rail for Western Hemispheric policy, particularly for the Foreign Service.

GROSSMAN: And so it remains.

Q: It is sad, in a way.

GROSSMAN: Sure, because what did we learn all over Eastern Europe? What we learned all over Eastern Europe was that engagement in the end was among the key reasons that these regimes come down.

Q: Well then, going back, what about the Middle East? Did you get involved in that?

GROSSMAN: I went to North Africa at the request of Bill Burns, who was the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, who felt we needed to pay more attention there, especially after 9/11. So he and I tried to work the North African account. I represented the United States at a NATO ministerial meeting in Madrid, which for me was fun because I had served at NATO as a young officer; it was fun to be in the chair. And I then went to Morocco, I believe, and Tunisia, after that. I went maybe one or two other times to try to keep that account going and just have the Algerians and Moroccans and Tunisians understand that the United States was still interested.

In the months before the G-8 summit, which was held at Sea Island, Georgia, which would have been in 2004, it was at a time when there was a lot of talk about democracy promotion and we hoped the G-8 would get involved in democracy promotion in the Middle East. I took a trip to Morocco and then I went to Bahrain and to Jordan and to Egypt, and then to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, to consult and make our case for a G8 document on democracy. A lot of the Middle Eastern countries were sure this was all about imposing democracy. I got to go out and talk to people and consult with people about what this was all about, that it wasn’t about imposition, and people would choose their own way forward.

The really remarkable thing about that trip was, we were in Jordan and we were on our way to Turkey. We had left Jordan sometime in the early evening. We were over the Mediterranean, it got dark and we were on our way to Ankara for a day of consultations there, and we were in a six-passenger Air Force Learjet—it was (Daniel) Dan Fried, then at the White House, I think, and Alina Romanowski from NEA and Jonathan Carpenter, who was one of my Special Assistants, and I. We were flying over the Med and I was seated in the right rear of this plane and wham!, a huge noise comes from outside. I said, “This is not right!” Moments later a young USAF pilot comes on the PA system and says, “You probably heard this noise. The right engine’s gone and we shut down the right engine. But don’t worry, there’s still the left engine. It is still working fine and we’re only about eighty miles from the British sovereign base area in Cyprus and we’ve notified them that we’re going to make a little emergency landing there. So it is all going to be fine.”
So we all just tried to concentrate on what we were doing. As we got closer and closer to Cyprus, I thought, “Well, the closer we get, the easier it is to swim.” I can remember, as we were getting prepared to land, the pilot said, “One other thing. When we land, we’re going to taxi. There’s going to be a lot of emergency fire equipment come rushing up to airplane, but don’t be alarmed. We’re going to open the door and I want you to jump out of the airplane and move as quickly as you can away. But don’t be alarmed, it is just a precaution.” So they landed the plane at Akrotiri and there were a lot of lights flashing and we jumped off the plane. We spent the night and they couldn’t fix the plane, so the USAF sent another plane. When we complimented the pilots on their calmness and skill they let us know that when they weren’t ferrying us around, they picked up the film from the reconnaissance missions that flew over Lebanon and ended up in Cyprus. They did this three times a week and they were well known to the tower and well known all around. We left the middle of the next day and went on our way but that landing was very memorable. It was a very interesting trip and some of our work ended up being used at Sea Island.

Q: Okay, well let’s talk about NATO and NATO expansion. What was the situation sort of when you arrived on the job and was there a difference between the Clinton and Bush 43 Administration towards NATO?

GROSSMAN: The Clinton Administration had taken the decision to expand NATO to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I had the good fortune to be Assistant Secretary for European Affairs during that time. It was an honor, and we worked really hard on that thing. Ron Asmus and Secretary Albright and a lot of other people deserve all the credit. It was right that we expanded the Alliance. The three countries came in on the fiftieth anniversary of the Alliance, in April of 1999, at the Washington summit, which the Bureau of European Affairs organized.

When the Administration changed, the question then was would there be further NATO expansion? My argument always was that we ought to be open to further expansion of the Alliance and the question was how many and how fast? The candidates were Romania and Bulgaria, the three Baltic States, and Slovakia and Slovenia. There were a lot of people who said there’s variable geometry here, you could take some of these, and you could take some of those. I went a couple of times to the region, one of these eleven-countries-in-five-days trips, and talked to the people who were candidates about their readiness and willingness and testified to Congress about standards. I also consulted at NATO in Brussels.

There was a lot of debate among us about whether you could split the seven into various candidates. In the end, we decided that you had to do Romania and Bulgaria in order to have some heft; that there was no distinction among the Baltic states and that in terms of emotion, they were the most compelling righting of a wrong because the United States had pursued the principle for fifty years of not recognizing their forcible absorption into the Soviet Union. It was the right policy for fifty years and the fact that they are now NATO members is a pretty amazing thing.
Then we said to ourselves, let’s say you did those five, and then a year later you tried to invite Slovenia and Slovakia. It made no sense. In the end, there was consensus; that we would go for seven and that’s how it worked out. We had closely consulted the Congress as we debated this. Senator (Richard “Dick”) Lugar and Senator (Joseph “Joe”) Biden, just as they were with the first round, were just spectacular supporters. It was a completely public matter because the Senate has to vote on a change to the NATO Treaty. We got all seven through.

Q: Did people who had been dealing with the Soviet Union for so long have any thoughts that this would be provoking the new Russia?

GROSSMAN: Some people felt that about the Baltic States, but two things happened. One is, for whatever reason, Putin, sometime in 2002 or 2003, went to Brussels and, in answering questions, said he didn’t care whether the Balts were members of NATO or not; it didn’t bother him. And so, if it didn’t bother him, why should it bother us? In the end, I think people recognized that if they wanted to be members of the Alliance, they ought to be members of the Alliance, as long as they met the NATO Alliance’s standards.

These are countries that have now participated, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. I remember Senator (John) McCain one day criticizing me in a hearing, “Look at this coalition you’ve got in Iraq. It is all these very tiny countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia!” I said that they might be small but these were countries that were former Soviet slaves and now they’re free and maybe they’re trying to help somebody else get free. Let’s give them some credit here.

Q: Marc, you mentioned a couple of times we’d come up with a change in policy, missile defense or on one thing or another, and you’re often, it is your job to be the point person to go out and do twelve nations in three days or something like that. What do you do? Everybody knows what you’re going to do and the idea that you could get there, charm everybody to agree to something that ...

GROSSMAN: Counties want to be part of the process. They want to have someone come ask their opinion. Other countries are not puppets. Governments are filled with people who want to have somebody pay attention to them and make them feel important. One of the other confrontations with our friends concerned the substantively excellent idea to re-arrange the American force posture in Europe, lessen it in Germany and move the rest forward, do this, do that, bring units home. It was a good plan. And yet, DoD was just going to announce it one day. We said, you can’t do it this way. So again, I went to eleven countries in five days or twelve countries in six days, around all the affected countries and in a number of cases actually they had very good ideas that we then factored into the mix. Diplomacy begins with the thought that all human beings want to be treated with respect. People want to have their views taken into account even if they know that, in the end, the decision is the USG’s to make.

Q: This whole idea of we didn’t consult, we just announced, unilateralism, which I thought was more a posture more than anything ...
GROSSMAN: It is just unnecessary. You see the difference between European reaction to our getting out of the ABM Treaty and our getting out of Kyoto. Although it was last minute, we did actually consult on missile defense and the ABM Treaty before we announced we were getting out, and there was a whole different reaction to it. Everybody said, “Okay, we understand that, got to have missile defense, lot of bad people in the world.” And Kyoto, we didn’t do anything, except announce that we were leaving or not signing, whatever the technicality was.

Again, while Powell and everybody else were working on Iraq, I did a lot on Kosovo and I went to Kosovo four or five times, to Belgrade, Pristina; did a conference in the US on Kosovo. Our effort there was to try to focus the United Nations on its responsibilities in Kosovo, focus the Kosovars on their responsibilities. My thought was that if things could be brought to the point where the European Union could entice Belgrade onto a fast track to the European Union, so that people in Belgrade might be prepared to let Kosovo be independent and consider Kosovo being their past and the European Union their future, it would be good for the region and for the United States. We pursued a policy in Kosovo called “Standards Before Status,” designed by then EUR DAS Kathleen Stevens, trying to get the level of governance in Kosovo up to a standard so that when it came time for them to think about independence it was a possibility. It is interesting now, as we speak in May 2007, that there’s a UN Security Council resolution seeking independence for Kosovo. Unfortunately, I don’t think the European Union is going to do enough for Serbia, and Serbia itself has become more hard line. But I think by the end of the year we’re likely to see an independent Kosovo.

Q: How’d you find the people? I’m an old Balkan hand and they’re not an easy people to deal with.

GROSSMAN: They’re not. I am a big believer in the magnetic power of the European Union. In the Balkans and in Turkey people are willing to do a lot to be members of these institutions, the European Union and NATO, and that’s important. I was in Macedonia, I think consulting on Kosovo or at least paying my respects, the day that the eighty thousand pages of the acquis communautaire arrived from the European Union. I believe that Serbia is the key to all of this in the sense that there’s never going to be a Europe ultimately whole, free and at peace until Serbia is a successful country, given the importance of it and the weight of it and the geography of it. So I think it is too bad that Kosovo’s independence is arriving at the time when there’s this expansion fatigue in the European Union.

Q: During this time, how did we view Putin and Russia?

GROSSMAN: I think basically people viewed it pretty positively until the end of my time. In the beginning the President felt he had some personal relationship with Putin. Putin called early after 9/11. They didn’t block NATO expansion, especially for the Balts. But then, little by little on the human rights side, on the democracy side, it got harder. The independent media started to be closed down. There was a decision to no
longer elect governors. There was the (Mikhail) Khodorkovsky case. So by the time I was leaving, I think there was more and more anxiety about Putin and about Russia in general.

**Q: You retired when?**

GROSSMAN: I stayed a month with Dr. Rice at her request to help that transition. I then went to the FSI retirement course and retired in May 2005.

**Q: Marc, looking back on it, the last part of the time with Powell and all, what was the feeling that Iraq was overwhelming everything and this wasn’t going well? How would you describe it?**

GROSSMAN: I’d describe several feelings here. One was that everybody at State wanted to support Colin Powell. Secretary Powell, following some of the things that Secretary Albright started, invested time and attention in the institution. He hired almost 1,200 new people. He and Rich and Grant got budgets every year, 17 per cent, 14 per cent increases. He conveyed that he cared about people and he built morale and leadership. So there was a great sense inside of the walls of the institution, and by that I include our embassies and consulates, that we had it pretty good.

And yet, all around us, the stature of the United States of America was lower because of the unilateralism, and of course, Iraq. There was general disdain by many in the administration for diplomacy as a national security tool. For many in the administration, diplomacy was synonymous with weakness and diplomacy was only about concessions and diplomacy was only about giving things away.

So I think everybody, including me, was deeply conflicted by all this. What hurt me the most was being called an “enabler” of these policies, especially the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. But I decided to stay. I took my oath to the Constitution seriously. I stayed because Powell and Armitage stayed. I want to be clear here. I was not in love with the ABM Treaty; I thought we were right not to be part of the International Criminal Court. But with few important exceptions (the President’s AIDs policy—PEPFAR—was one, our opening to India another, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and I hope some of the other things I worked on), we had little positive to say, we had no alternatives and the way we did some of these things disadvantaged us for no good reason. We got ourselves into harder spots than we needed to be by not practicing the fundamentals of diplomacy. And we did not take advantage of the post-9/11 outpouring of support for America.

So everybody senior I knew had a conflict. But one of the most interesting things, I believe, to consider is this: if you look at any administration, people come, people go, Assistant Secretaries come and go, Under Secretaries come and go. Look at those four years under Powell; I think there was one change at the Assistant Secretary level. (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) Walter Kansteiner (III), for personal reasons, moved on. Richard Haass, the Director of Policy Planning, left to head the
Council on Foreign Relations. I’m certain he felt he couldn’t turn down such an honor. But everyone else stayed and they stayed because of Colin Powell.

Q: Well, on that note, just one last thing: what have you been doing since?

GROSSMAN: I took the FSI retirement course it was fantastic. My wife, who was also a Foreign Service Officer, said, “You ought to do it, you deserve it, go take it, you might learn something.” I learned a lot. Then I took another couple of months off and rode my bicycle, read a few books that I always thought I should read. I accepted an invitation to become the Vice Chairman of a strategic business consulting business that former Secretary of Defense and Senator (William S.) Bill Cohen started. I co-chaired a commission at CSIS on the Embassy of the Future. I chair the board of the Senior Living Foundation of the Foreign Service. I teach at Georgetown in the MSFS (Master of Science in Foreign Service) program. I have the good fortune to give a talk here at FSI from time-to-time. I loved being a Foreign Service Officer. I’ve tried to convey that to others.

Okay, I want to thank you very much.

Addendum

Q: Today is the 13th of June 2014, with Marc Grossman, and this is Marc Grossman oral history redux, after you’ve retired and so we’re adding on to it.

Let’s talk just a short bit about, after you retired, what did you do immediately after?

GROSSMAN: A few months after I took the FSI retirement course, which was great, I became a Vice Chairman of a business in Washington founded and run by former Secretary of Defense and Senator William Bill Cohen. I had the good fortune to teach at Georgetown for four years in the School of Foreign Service. I am the Chairman of the Board of the Senior Living Foundation of the American Foreign Service and I joined the boards of some other NGOs and charities.

Q: Well let’s talk a little bit about Georgetown.

GROSSMAN: Okay.

Q: What was your impression particularly the attitude of the students of that period; we’re talking about the 2000 …

GROSSMAN: It was 2006 to 2010.

Q: Were they a different breed of cat than what you were used to before? I mean have things changed?
GROSSMAN: The students were very focused on what it is going to take to get a job.

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: They were very focused on opportunities, careers, self-education, internships, finding mentors; making themselves better at what they were doing. That applied to Americans and non-Americans. Four or five people in each of my classes over the years were headed for the Foreign Service, including a number of Pickering and Rangel Fellows; I was very pleased with that. Others went into the Civil Service, NGOs; others went into business.

Q: How did you feel about directing young people towards the Foreign Service? Did you have reservations about this?

GROSSMAN: None whatsoever. And I had a chance from time to time to come here to FSI and talk to A-100 classes and various other classes and groups. I encouraged anybody who was interested to do it.

Q: What about NGOs? Because NGOs have gone through quite a transformation over the time we’ve been in the business and all. How did you find then at by the time you were out of it and all; what were they looking for as far as you’re aware and ...

GROSSMAN: They were looking for a lot of the same skills for their employees that the Foreign Service looks for.

Q: How did you feel about the, sort of the political, the international political situation during this period?

GROSSMAN: The second Bush Administration got a lot more interested in diplomacy. In many ways we had Colin Powell’s foreign policy without Colin Powell. It was different I am sure with Secretary (Robert “Bob”) Gates and Eric Edelman at Defense. And Dr. Rice no doubt got a different perspective sitting in the Secretary of State’s chair.

Q: Yes. Well then, you got called back.

GROSSMAN: I did.

Q: You want to talk about that?

GROSSMAN: In December of 2010, Dick Holbrooke suffered this terrible collapse at the State Department. They took him to the hospital and he had shredded his aorta and had long and ultimately unsuccessful surgery, ending in his death. Secretary Clinton felt that they needed to find somebody to carry on Dick’s work as the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). I know they asked many people who turned her down.
In January 2011, my family and I went to Puerto Rico for a few days. We arrived at the hotel and there was a message on my cell phone saying, would I please call Secretary Clinton. I thought, “This must be a joke or a mistake.” But I called the number and Secretary Clinton really did wish to speak to me. She asked if I would consider helping out in the Administration; in particular whether there was a possibility I’d consider taking the SRAP assignment or becoming the Ambassador in Afghanistan. I said I was honored that she would consider me and that I would like to talk to my family. I called her back a day later to say that I’d be honored to serve if that is what she wanted and that I would take on the SRAP challenge or go to Kabul, whichever she wanted me to do. In the end, she chose me for the SRAP job and, lucky for everyone, Ryan Crocker agreed to become Ambassador to Afghanistan. I became the SRAP in February 2011. I also want to highlight here the understanding of Secretary Cohen, who said there was only one right answer when the call to service arrived.

At one point Secretary Clinton took me to see President Obama, who was also very gracious, well informed and clear with his guidance.

Q: I was just reading a book by Bob Woodward, Obama’s War and talking about Holbrooke and the man saying that everybody knew he had a tremendous ego and this isn’t Marc Grossman. I mean ... What had been your relation with Holbrooke?

GROSSMAN: It had been very good over the years. I had known and worked with Dick for many years. He was Ambassador to Germany while I was the Executive Secretary. He was the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs when I was the Ambassador to Turkey. We had a chance to work closely together on Cyprus, on getting Turkey into the Customs Union of the European Union. As Dick noted in his book To End a War, one of the pre-Dayton negotiations with Mr. (Alija) Izetbegovic took place in my living room in Ankara. In all the years that I’d been the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, I’d had the benefit of his advice on the Balkans and lots of other things. When he left the government, one of the amazing things he organized was a remarkable business coalition against AIDS. He was a very interesting, talented and complicated person. He could see how things related to each other better than almost anyone I ever worked with. People would say to me after I took the SRAP job, “How are you going to replace Dick Holbrooke?” And I said, “I’m not going to replace Dick Holbrooke, nobody can replace Dick Holbrooke.” But the line I finally found that worked was, “But I followed him once before,” because, as I indicated he was Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, “so I think I’ll be okay.”

Q: When you took on the job what did you see as your basic tasks?

GROSSMAN: There were two immediate tasks. One was, of course, I was about to lead a unit of human beings whom Dick had brought together, had organized, had motivated, had led and who were in a state of terrible shock, as you can imagine. Their leader had essentially fallen dead on the floor of the State Department. I thought hard about how to approach these grieving people, how to present myself and how to keep doing the work
that needed to be done. So the first task was to reassure the people who worked there that we were going to continue to be a close-knit unit, that this was going to continue to be a family with a hard job, that, while I wasn’t Dick Holbrooke, I could help them succeed if they would commit to me.

The second piece, Stu, was to move the policy forward. I started in February of 2011 and in mid-February of that year Secretary Clinton took the opportunity to give a speech at the Asia Society—in honor of Holbrooke—in which she wanted to lay out a new policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. The terrific people in SRAP were hard at work on this speech when I arrived and I was able to make a contribution. But the key thing was that the speech gave me the instructions we needed—and very much in public—to carry out US policy for 2011 and 2012.

I think the best way to convey this is to put in here the text of an article I did for The Yale Journal of International Affairs, which appeared in the Summer 2013 edition:

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Pp. 65-75

Seven Cities and Two Years: The Diplomatic Campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Abstract
The 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan could be a model for the conduct of twenty-first century American diplomacy. It was designed as a way to think holistically about the interaction of diplomacy with the other aspects of U.S. national power. It was built on the conviction that diplomacy is a key component of U.S. power, on the belief that a “whole-of-government” approach is the best way to meet twenty-first century challenges, on a commitment to the need to act simultaneously on key matters, and on the force—multiplying strength of fighting and working with allies, friends, and partners. Creating, shaping, and leveraging a web of strategic partnership agreements, international meetings, and economic initiatives, as well as by trying to open the door to an Afghan-led peace process, the 2011-2012 U.S. diplomatic effort sought to engage the countries of South-Central Asia and the international community to support a secure, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan inside of a secure, stable, and prosperous region.

When President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced diplomat Richard Holbrooke’s appointment as the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) on January 22, 2009, they sent a message beyond South Asia. Secretary Clinton wanted the organization she and Holbrooke created to show that the “whole-of-government” philosophy—employing expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation’s most important challenges—was the right model for twenty-first century diplomacy.1) After Holbrooke’s sudden death in December 2010, some asked if the SRAP effort to make and execute policy at
the State Department in a unique way would continue. Secretary Clinton promised that it would, and starting in February 2011 when I was appointed to succeed Richard, I pursued the whole-of-government approach, which I had advocated and practiced in earlier diplomatic assignments.

The purpose of this article is to describe how, building on the foundations laid in 2009 and 2010 and validating the whole-of-government approach, the SRAP team pursued a diplomatic campaign to support U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It draws throughout lessons both for future policy in the region and about modern diplomacy. The two years in the title are 2011 and 2012. While many nations are involved in the effort to bring peace and stability to South Asia, the diplomatic campaign during this time focused on Kabul, Islamabad, Istanbul, Bonn, Chicago, Tokyo, and Washington.

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President Obama laid the foundation for the 2011-2012 diplomatic effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the first two years of his administration. Secretary Clinton launched it in a speech honoring Holbrooke at the Asia Society in New York on February 18, 2011.2) In her remarks, the Secretary made clear that the military surge then underway in Afghanistan was a vital part of American strategy. Without the heroic effort of U.S. forces, joined by many allies, friends, and partners, there was no chance of pursuing a diplomatic end to thirty years of conflict. She also reminded her audience of the “civilian surge” underway in Afghanistan, which had brought thousands of courageous Americans from many U.S. government agencies as well as international and Afghan civilians to promote economic development, good governance, the power of civil society, and the advancement of the role of Afghan women in their society. This civilian surge continues to have an impact on the lives of Afghans, and examples of its work abound. In 2002, an estimated 900,000 Afghan boys were in school and virtually no girls. By 2012, eight million Afghan students were enrolled in school, and nearly 40% of them were girls. Life expectancy has increased in Afghanistan by fifteen years, from forty-five to over sixty for men and women in the last ten years. In 2001, there were twenty-one thousand mobile phone subscribers. In 2012, there were sixteen million. In 2001, there was one state-owned radio/TV station. There are now over seventy-five television stations and 175 radio stations, and all but two are privately owned.3)

Secretary Clinton then called for a “diplomatic surge” to match the military and civilian efforts to try to catalyze and then shape a political end to years of war. This meant drawing together all of our diplomatic resources to engage the countries in the region to support Afghanistan. It also meant, she said, trying to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban to convince them that they would never win militarily and that the United States would support the reconciliation of those insurgents who met the three important end conditions: break with al-Qaeda, end violence, and live inside the constitution of Afghanistan, which guarantees the rights of all individuals, especially women.

To meet Secretary Clinton’s challenge to create the diplomatic surge, I decided first to refer to the diplomatic surge as a “diplomatic campaign” to emphasize that this would not
be a series of ad hoc engagements but instead an effort that followed a comprehensive plan.4) The campaign would require simultaneous, coordinated action by the SRAP team to connect the military effort with the instruments of non-military power in South and Central Asia, including official development assistance, involvement of the private sector, support for civil society, and the use of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

Building on the work that had been done in 2009-2010 and the military and civilian efforts underway, the 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign had three objectives: first, we sought to create a regional structure to support a secure, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan inside of a secure, stable, and prosperous region. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was a particularly keen proponent of the need for a regional approach.5) Second, we set out to try to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban and other insurgents. Third, we wanted to engage the leadership of Pakistan in a useful bilateral conversation to seek their crucial contribution to an Afghan peace process and connect them to regional structures to support Afghanistan that would benefit them as well.

As we reviewed the diplomatic calendar after Secretary Clinton’s speech, we devised a roadmap to produce political and material support for Afghanistan. With our Afghan partners, we pursued this roadmap by shaping, guiding, and leveraging four international meetings already set for 2011-2012: a meeting of Afghanistan’s neighbors in November 2011 in Istanbul designed to define the region’s stake in a secure, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan and what they could do to make that happen; an international meeting to mobilize post-2014 support for Afghanistan in Bonn in December 2011; a NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012; and an international gathering to promote economic development in Afghanistan set for Tokyo on July 8, 2012.

Beginning in March 2011, the SRAP team systematically imagined what could be achieved for the United States, the international community, Afghanistan, and the region when the Tokyo meeting ended seventeen months later. Our plan defined what needed to be accomplished at each meeting and the work that had to be done to produce that result. Every aspect of the diplomatic campaign was integrated to achieve the most comprehensive outcome. Every trip and every conversation with foreign leaders and diplomats at every level was used to press our integrated vision. Each of the four conferences contributed to the larger campaign and explicitly built on the one that had taken place before it. The diplomatic campaign benefitted from work done by the International Contact Group (ICG), an organization created by Holbrooke, to bring together over fifty states (many of them Muslim majority states) to support Afghanistan.

The government of Turkey took the lead in organizing the “Heart of Asia” conference in Istanbul on November 2, 2011. Undertaking extensive travel and making numerous diplomatic contacts, the SRAP team supported the Turkish government’s goal to have the region speak for itself on how it should and would support Afghanistan. At the conclusion of the Istanbul meeting, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and India all signed the Istanbul Declaration, a vision for the region that mandated specific follow-up actions, including cooperation on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and efforts to increase trade and investment.6)
The German government deliberately set the Bonn conference in 2011 on the anniversary of the 2001 Bonn conference that had established the structure of the current government in Afghanistan. Again, the SRAP team supported the outcome sought by the Germans and the Afghans: a 2014-2024 “Transformational Decade” for Afghanistan. (2014 is the date NATO and the government of Afghanistan had chosen in 2010 at the previous NATO summit in Lisbon to end the combat mission in Afghanistan. It was also the year that the Afghan constitution called for the election of a new President.) On December 5, 2011, eighty-five nations, fifteen international organizations, and the UN met in Bonn to review the progress of the previous ten years and, crucially, to agree that the world would not abandon Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan made clear and specific promises in Bonn on governance, women’s rights, and economic development.

At the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit hosted by President Obama, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners took two decisions vital to the diplomatic campaign: first, NATO set a “milestone” date in mid-2013 when, consistent with the Lisbon Decision, one hundred percent of Afghan territory would have Afghan-led security forces in charge. This meant that while international forces would still engage in combat, Afghans would be in the lead everywhere in their country by that time. Second, as a result of the U.S.-led international diplomatic campaign carried out in close coordination with Denmark and the UK, allies and partners pledged $4.1 billion dollars per year for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 to sustain and support the Afghan national security forces (military and police).

In Tokyo, the Japanese government and the Afghan co-chair sought to highlight the crucial role future official development assistance would make to the Transformational Decade. The Japanese government, strongly supported by another unified effort in Washington, secured pledges of $4 billion dollars in development aid for Afghanistan per year for the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Those gathered at Tokyo also emphasized the need for private sector efforts to develop the region and highlighted the adoption of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), in which the government of Afghanistan pledged itself to specific, consistent reform, especially in the area of the protection and promotion of women’s rights, in exchange for continued international economic support. Indeed, the MAF ties a percentage of assistance to the government of Afghanistan’s achievement of these goals.

In addition to the four international meetings, there were two other key outcomes of the diplomatic effort to create a regional structure to support Afghanistan. One was the emerging web of Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPA) between Afghanistan and its neighbors and allies. Afghanistan and India signed an SPA on October 4, 2011. The U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement that was negotiated in Kabul by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General John Allen was signed by President Obama in Kabul on May 1, 2012. The true strength of the document is its commitment to tolerance, pluralism, individual rights, economic growth, and the future consultation between two sovereign states. Others, including the UK, France, Italy Germany, Norway, and China, have now also signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with Afghanistan.
The other key component of the diplomatic campaign’s regional strategy was based on the recognition that no regional structure in support of Afghanistan would succeed without a strong economic component, including a role for the private sector. To that end, Secretary Clinton announced the U.S. vision—a “New Silk Road”—at a speech in Chennai, India on July 20, 2011. The American objective for the New Silk Road was to attempt to connect the vibrant economies in Central Asia with India’s economic success. With Afghanistan and Pakistan in the center, they could both benefit first from transit trade and ultimately from direct investments. As President Karzai has said, Afghanistan could be an “Asian roundabout” through which the region’s economic connections could be made.

Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs Robert Hormats, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake and his team, and leaders from the White House, the Commerce Department, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation were essential whole-of-government partners in promoting economic foundations of the regional structure for Afghanistan. The vision of a New Silk Road, recalling historic trade routes, was based not just on the hope that the private sector, supported by governments, could find a way to connect the region economically, but on ideas and projects already on the table, including the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. Furthermore, a U.S. Geological Survey had concluded that Afghanistan has substantial potential mineral wealth, including rare earth minerals. And the region itself had already recognized the necessity of economic links through its own organizations. Trade between Pakistan and India, with the encouragement of both governments, was also expanding.

The New Silk Road vision highlights a compelling aspect of twenty-first century diplomacy: acting on opportunities and challenges simultaneously. As Philip Bobbitt wrote in his book *Terror and Consent*, “The problem is the picture of warfare to which we cling. The picture unfolds this way: peace-making by diplomats, war-making by the armed forces, peace-building by USAID and reconstruction personnel.

The reality of 21st century warfare is that all of these tasks must be performed simultaneously.” In his book *Monsoon*, Robert Kaplan provides a view of the larger connections: “Stabilizing Afghanistan is about more than just the anti-terror war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban; it is about securing the future prosperity of the whole of southern Eurasia.” A successful New Silk Road would increase the incentives of the insurgents to give up their fight as it could provide, at least for some of their fighters, an alternative way of thinking about the future. It could promote the crucial role of women in development. A New Silk Road would signal to taxpayers in donor countries that their commitment would not last forever. Tying development assistance to the larger vision of connecting Central Asian and South Asian economies with a regional structure for Afghanistan made and continues to make the New Silk Road a quintessential whole-of-government operation.
Alongside setting the conditions for Afghanistan’s transformational decade, the other major objective of the diplomatic campaign was to see if it was possible to sustain the conversation with the Taliban that had started in 2010 to explore the creation of an Afghan-led peace process. In her speech at the Asia Society, Secretary Clinton set three end conditions (not preconditions) for those Taliban who ultimately chose to reconcile and live peacefully in Afghanistan: first, they had to break with al-Qaeda. Second, they had to end violence. Third, they had to be prepared to live in an Afghanistan that protected the rights of all individuals, minority groups, and, especially, women. She also referred to the challenge of talking with enemies. She recognized the difficulty of talking to insurgents, saying that “diplomacy would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends. But that is not how one makes peace.” She concluded that testing the Taliban’s willingness to talk and accept the end conditions was worth the risk. Former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department Mitchell Reiss writes in his book Negotiating With Evil, that in his numerous interviews with people who were involved in this type of negotiation, the moral challenge of talking to the enemy was balanced by the realization that, when negotiations succeed: “There aren’t so many funerals.”

The purpose of the contact between U.S. officials and the Taliban that took place in 2011 and early 2012 was to try to negotiate a series of confidence-building measures that would open the door for the Afghan government to talk to the insurgents about the future of Afghanistan. The details of these meetings necessarily remain confidential. In March 2012, the Taliban chose to suspend talks with the United States. In a speech on April 3, 2012, Secretary Clinton said that the United States remained committed to supporting Afghan reconciliation so that Afghans sit down with other Afghans and work out the future for their country. She noted that “the Taliban have their own choice to make. We will continue to apply military pressure, but we are prepared to work with Afghans who are committed to an inclusive reconciliation process that leads toward peace and security.”

Although direct contact between the United States and the Taliban has not restarted, the idea that there needs to be an Afghan peace process is now squarely on the international agenda. There have been contacts between Afghan officials and insurgents. Afghanistan’s High Peace Council is playing an important role in this process. A meeting hosted by British Prime Minister David Cameron with Afghan President Karzai and Pakistan’s President Zardari on February 4, 2013, yielded what Mr. Cameron called a pledge for “an unprecedented level of cooperation.” As The Economist noted in its report of the session, they “even agreed to work toward a peace settlement with the Taliban within the next six months.”

Key to the effort to attain peace and stability in Afghanistan is the United States’ relationship with Pakistan. 2011 was an awful year in U.S.-Pakistan relations. In February and March, the Raymond Davis case, in which a U.S. contractor shot and killed
two Pakistanis when he thought he was the target of a robbery, mesmerized both
governments. On May 2, 2011, U.S. Special Forces killed Osama bin Laden in
Abbottabad. After an initial positive reaction to the death of the world’s most prominent
terrorist, Pakistanis focused on what they said was a U.S. violation of their sovereignty
and U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated. In September 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
was attacked by fighters from the Haqqani Network, a terrorist gang that operates from
Pakistani territory. On November 26, 2011, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were
accidentally killed on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border by U.S. aircraft.

At this point, we decided that it would be best to step back and let Pakistanis debate the
future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and come to their own conclusions before it
would be possible to re-engage. On April 12, 2012, the Pakistani Parliament unanimously
approved the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security for
U.S.-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{20} In Washington, these recommendations were read as far from
ideal, but they formed the basis of a new dialogue. When Secretary Clinton met President
Zardari in Chicago in May, the two sides agreed to try to draft a work plan for the next
six months, including reopening of the ground lines of communication from Afghanistan
through Pakistan (Deputy Secretary of State Nides and Finance Minister Shaikh
accomplished this task), a focus on supporting the Afghan peace process, joint
counterterrorism efforts, and a recognition that it was time to move the U.S.-Pakistan
economic relationship from one that was centered on U.S. aid to Pakistan to one based on
trade and investment.

Secretary Clinton met Pakistani Foreign Minister Khar in Tokyo in July and in
Washington in September; she met again with President Zardari in New York that same
month. Intense work at lower levels produced a number of actions and agreements,
including restarting a number of Working Groups on key subjects, which followed the
general philosophy that the United States and Pakistan ought to be able to identify their
shared interests and act on them jointly. There was also an increase in people-to-people
diplomacy (the U.S. Fulbright program in Pakistan is the largest in the world) and focus
on women’s issues and entrepreneurship. There is still much work to do on the U.S.-
Pakistan relationship, but relations were better in December 2012 than they were in
December 2011.

Vital to this improvement were Pakistan’s efforts to support the Afghan peace process.
The one bit of good news in 2011 was the establishment of the U.S.-Pakistan-
Afghanistan Core Group, which by the end of 2012, had met eight times, including one
meeting chaired by Secretary Clinton with Foreign Minister Khar and Afghan Foreign
Minister Rassoul. In core groups meetings and, more importantly, in bilateral meetings
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistanis had become more open about their support
for an Afghan peace process and ready to engage in taking specific steps to promote
reconciliation among Afghans such as discussing how to manage the safe passage of
insurgents traveling from Pakistan to a potential negotiating venue. As The Economist
noted in February 2013: “Pakistan’s ultimate objectives in Afghanistan are not that
different from those of NATO, its nominal ally. It has no interest in an endless war to
which its own soldiers and civilians fall victim. Only an extremist fringe and a few
misguided strategic ‘realists’ hanker after a Taliban restoration in Kabul: That would boost the Pakistan Taliban, whose target is the secular government in Islamabad.” 21)

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The 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan was a vehicle not just of policy but also a way to think holistically about diplomacy and the interaction of diplomacy with the other aspects of national power. As former British General Rupert Smith wrote in The Utility of Force, “The general purpose of all interventions is clear: We seek to establish in the minds of the people and their leaders that the ever-present option of conflict is not the preferable course of action when in confrontation over some matter or another. To do this, military force is a valid option, a lever of intervention and influence, as much as economic, political and diplomatic levers, but to be effective, they must be applied as a part of a greater scheme focusing on all measures on the one goal.” 22)

Several lessons can be drawn so far from the 2011–2012 campaign:

There can be no success without recognizing and then harnessing the power of simultaneity. President Obama best described this in his statement in Kabul in May 2012 after signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement in which he outlined America’s five lines of effort in the Afghanistan campaign: transition; train and assist the ANSF; create an enduring partnership with Afghanistan; support the Afghan peace process; and work with the region. 23) All the lines of national effort must work together.

Afghanistan proves again that success is also impossible without allies, friends, and partners. The sacrifice of so many ISAF members and others in the international community in Afghanistan is worthy not only of recognition but also of understanding that the broader the coalition, especially if coalition members are also organizing themselves using whole-of-government principles, the more likely the chances for success. It is also crucial that the financial pledges made by allies, friends, and partners in Chicago ($12 billion for the ANSF) and Tokyo ($16 billion for development) turn into real money. With this support, Afghans will have a fighting chance to protect and even press forward the gains they have made since 2001 at great cost to Afghans, Americans and allies, friends and partners. Meanwhile, the government of Afghanistan must keep the promises it made to the international community in Tokyo in the Mutual Accountability Framework, especially on the role of women in civil society.

Without losing sight of Pakistan’s social and political challenges, the United States can take steps with Pakistan to promote further counterterrorism cooperation and support peace in Afghanistan. Not intimidated by pre-election violence, Pakistanis turned out in large numbers to vote in the May 2013 poll. The election marks an historic transfer of civilian power from one Parliament to another. In working with Pakistan’s new government, the United States can further support a pluralistic, tolerant Pakistan, encourage a shift from providing economic assistance to fostering trade and investment, and bolster a robust civil society.
If, as Rupert Smith argues, modern conflicts are a “war among the people”, what the locally supported government is doing is also crucial, especially in the areas of governance, anti-corruption, and women’s rights. The growth of a strong civil society is a foundation for the possibility of success. In any attempt to restart talks with the Taliban and other insurgents, Americans must be patient because it is for Afghans to decide their future. The Taliban has the more fundamental choice to make: it is for them to accommodate to the changes in Afghan society since 2001, not the other way around. There can be no reconciliation until the Taliban meets the end conditions laid out in Secretary Clinton’s speech and endorsed by the international community in Bonn.

Getting the civil-military coordination right is crucial. There are challenges to achieving this end, including entrenched bureaucratic norms and the difficulty of fighting and talking at the same time, but there is no substitute for unity of effort. While diplomacy must be backed by force, the non-military instruments of power need to be organized into a coherent whole-of-government campaign and supported in the same way as the military effort. With that in mind, I hope that Secretary Kerry will keep the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan intact until December 2014, when he can mandate a return to a more normal structure at the State Department consistent with the completion of the Lisbon transition goals.

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We based the U.S. diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2011–2012 on a conviction that diplomacy is a key component of U.S. power, on the belief that acting as a “whole-of-government” is the way to create a diplomacy that can meet twenty-first century challenges, on a requirement to harness the power of simultaneity, and on the force-multiplying strength of fighting and working with allies, friends and partners. The effort was built on America’s unique capacity to set an example and encourage others to join in pursuing important objectives.24) The campaign also serves as an example of how far U.S. diplomacy has come in meeting today’s global challenges and how much can still be done to create an American diplomacy for the twenty-first century.

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official positions of the U. S. Government. Any errors are solely the responsibility of the author. ■ Y

—Mark J. Redmond served as Lead Editor for this article.

Notes


Q: You talked about the attempt to talk to the Taliban. Can you give us some additional detail of context?

GROSSMAN: Again, it might be useful to refer to the article I did for Prism, a National Defense University publication.

Prism 4, No. 4
Feature
Pp. 21-37

**Talking to the Taliban 2011 - 2012: A Reflection**

When then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked in early 2011 if I would become the United States’ Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)—after the
sudden death of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the first SRAP—she described the foundations Ambassador Holbrooke had laid to manage one of the most challenging tasks facing the nation. Secretary Clinton also said that she wanted to continue the experiment: having the SRAP organization prove that the “whole-of-government” philosophy—the idea that the United States must employ expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation’s most important challenges—was the right model for 21st century diplomacy. The SRAP team brought together experts from across the U.S. Government (and included several diplomats from NATO countries) to develop and implement integrated strategies to address the complex challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.

Among the first things I learned when I arrived at my desk in February 2011, was that an allied government had put the United States in contact with someone who seemed to be an empowered representative of the Taliban, the Afghan insurgent group which the United States had removed from power in 2001, but which had ever since kept up a deadly war against Afghans, Americans and our allies, friends and partners. The contact was preliminary, but many in the White House and on the SRAP team hoped that this connection might open the door for the conversation everyone knew would be required if there were ever to be peace in Afghanistan: Afghans talking to other Afghans about the future of Afghanistan. Such direct talk had so far proven impossible because the Taliban refused to meet representatives of the government of Afghanistan. The intriguing opportunity offered by a direct U.S. conversation with the Taliban was that we might be able to create the context for the Afghan government and the Taliban to talk.

This reflection on the two years (2011-2013) I was the SRAP is my attempt to tell part of the story of the conversation between the United States and the Taliban, an initiative that became central to the SRAP team’s efforts during these years. Others will recall it from their own perspectives, and there has been subsequent activity of which I am unaware. I also draw preliminary lessons and ask questions that might help those who may yet try to return to a conversation with the Taliban and those who will surely be faced with the challenge of talking to other insurgents to try to end future conflicts. Much of the detail of the conversations and the personalities involved properly remains classified, although too many people have already talked too much about our effort in ways that made it harder to achieve our objective.

The effort to sustain a U.S.-Taliban conversation was an integral component of America’s national strategy in Afghanistan and a key part of the 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was ordered, defined and described by President Barack Obama. The President’s speech at West Point on December 1, 2009 was especially important: it was there that he ordered the surge of U.S. forces into Afghanistan and explained to the assembled cadets that, “We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.”

Secretary Clinton made the task explicit in a speech honoring Ambassador Holbrooke at the Asia Society in New York on February 18, 2011. In her address, the Secretary said
that the military surge then underway in Afghanistan was a vital part of American strategy. Without the heroic effort of U.S. forces, joined by many allies, friends and partners, there was no chance of pursuing a diplomatic end to thirty years of conflict. Secretary Clinton also reminded her audience of the “civilian surge” underway in Afghanistan: thousands of courageous Americans from many U.S. Government agencies as well as international and Afghan civilians were promoting civil society, economic development, good governance, and the protection and advancement of the role of Afghan women.

Secretary Clinton then called for a “diplomatic surge” to match the military and civilian efforts to catalyze and then shape a political end to the war. This meant focusing U.S. diplomatic resources in an effort to galvanize countries in both the region and the international community to support Afghanistan, including connecting Afghanistan and its neighbors by promoting regional economic opportunities and by engaging the leadership of Pakistan to make a contribution to an Afghan peace process. We believed that, as Henry Kissinger also argued in 2011, Afghanistan could only become secure, stable and prosperous when the region met its responsibility for a positive outcome.6)

Secretary Clinton was explicit that the diplomatic surge would involve trying to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban even as she recognized the moral ambiguities involved in trying to fight and talk simultaneously with the insurgents. As she said that night in New York, “diplomacy would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends. But that is not how one makes peace.” Crucially, she was clear that the U.S. would support the reconciliation of only those insurgents who met three important end conditions: break with al-Qaeda, end violence, and live inside the constitution of Afghanistan, which guarantees the rights of all individuals, including importantly, women.

\textit{The Diplomatic Surge}

To achieve Secretary Clinton’s objective to create a diplomatic surge, we decided first to refer to it as a “diplomatic campaign” to emphasize that this would not be a series of ad-hoc engagements but instead an effort that followed a comprehensive plan.7) Building on the work done in 2009-2010 and the military and civilian efforts underway, and founded on SRAP’s intense interaction and coordination with our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad, we sought to connect the military effort with all of the instruments of non-military power in South and Central Asia, including official development assistance, involvement of the private sector, support for civil society, and the use of both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. We also sought at every stage to make sure these efforts provided the context to explore the tentative connection to the Taliban.

Throughout my service as SRAP, and especially on questions of talking to the Taliban and other insurgents, I drew on guidance received directly from the President, Secretary Clinton, the National Security Council, and from meetings of the Principals and Deputies Committees and special groups formed to support the conversation with the Taliban. My access to the White House, especially National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, Deputy
National Security Advisor Denis McDonough, and Assistant to the President Douglas Lute, was extensive and productive. When we met Taliban, we did so with an interagency team. There were occasions when some colleagues tried to micromanage the conversation with the Taliban in ways designed to make it impossible to continue, but the need to keep interagency representatives engaged and as supportive as possible overrode my periodic frustrations.

As we reviewed the diplomatic calendar after Secretary Clinton’s speech, we devised a roadmap to create a regional strategy that would produce political and material support for Afghanistan from its neighbors and the international community while trying to set the conditions for talking with the Taliban. We pursued this roadmap by trying to shape, guide, and leverage four international meetings already set for 2011-2012: a meeting of Afghanistan’s neighbors in November 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey, designed to define the region’s stake in a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan, including a potential peace process; an international meeting to mobilize post-2014 support for Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, in December 2011; the NATO Summit in Chicago, United States, in May 2012; and an international gathering to promote economic development in Afghanistan set for Tokyo, Japan, on July 8, 2012.

The government of Turkey organized the “Heart of Asia” conference in Istanbul on November 2, 2011, to have the region speak for itself about how it should and would support Afghanistan. At the conclusion of the Istanbul meeting, Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and India all signed the Istanbul Declaration, a vision that mandates specific regional follow-up actions, including cooperation on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and efforts to increase trade and investment. On December 5, 2011, 85 nations, 15 international organizations and the United Nations met in Bonn to review the progress of the previous ten years and reiterate the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan. The conclave agreed on a 2014-2024 “Transformation Decade” for Afghanistan. (2014 is the date NATO and the government of Afghanistan had chosen at the NATO Summit in Lisbon to end the combat mission in Afghanistan and the year that the Afghan constitution requires the election of a new president.) In Bonn, the government of Afghanistan made clear and specific promises on governance, women’s rights and economic development. The Bonn conference also spelled out the international community’s support for a peace process with end conditions for insurgent participation that mirrored those Secretary Clinton had laid out in February 2011.

In advance of the NATO Summit in Chicago, hosted by President Obama, allies and partners pledged more than $1.1 billion dollars (USD) per year for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 to sustain and support the Afghan National Security Forces, in addition to the substantial support the United States had pledged. The Afghan government also committed $500 million dollars (USD) per year for those three years. The strength and continued development of Afghanistan’s army and police will be essential to back up possible future Afghan negotiations with the Taliban and defend Afghanistan’s progress if talks stall or fail. In Tokyo, the Japanese government and the Afghan co-chair sought to highlight the crucial role future official development assistance would make to the Transformational Decade. The Japanese government got pledges of $16 billion.
dollars (USD) in development aid for Afghanistan for the years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. Those who gathered in Tokyo also emphasized the need for private sector efforts to develop the region and highlighted the adoption of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF), in which the government of Afghanistan pledged itself to specific, consistent reform, especially in the area of the protection and promotion of women’s rights, in exchange for continued international economic support.11)

We wanted the Taliban to receive a series of clear messages from the meetings in Istanbul, Bonn, Chicago, and Tokyo: that the international community supported a regional vision of peace, prosperity and stability which was designed to undermine the Taliban’s narrative of never-ending conflict; that the international community was committed to supporting Afghanistan beyond 2014; that the Afghan government understood the need to improve its governance and fight corruption to answer the Taliban’s charges that they would do a better job for the people of Afghanistan; that it was therefore time for the Taliban to change course and join a peace process with the Afghan government.

The other key component of the diplomatic campaign’s regional strategy was based on the recognition that no regional structure to support Afghanistan’s stability (or encourage an Afghan peace process) would succeed without a strong economic component, including a role for the private sector. To that end, Secretary Clinton introduced in Chennai, India, on July 20, 2011, a U.S. vision for a “New Silk Road” (NSR) to connect the vibrant economies in Central Asia with India’s economic success, with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the center, where they could both benefit first from transit trade and ultimately from direct investments.12)

This NSR, recalling historic trade routes, was based not just on the hope that the private sector, supported by governments, could find a way to connect the region economically, but on ideas and projects already on the table, including the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) and the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement. In addition, a U.S. Geological Survey report had recently concluded that Afghanistan had substantial potential mineral wealth, including rare earth minerals.13)

Trade between Pakistan and India, with the encouragement of both governments, was expanding. The region had begun to recognize the necessity of economic links through its own organizations. In his book Monsoon, Robert Kaplan describes the importance of Afghanistan in the center of these potential regional linkages: “Stabilizing Afghanistan is about more than just the anti-terror war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban; it is about securing the future prosperity of the whole of southern Eurasia.”14)

I also believed that the NSR vision could provide additional context for encouraging talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. A successful NSR would, at least for some fighters, offer economic opportunities that would make it possible for them to conceive of an alternative future.
The effort to create a regional context to support Afghanistan and to sustain the dialogue with the Taliban in order to open the door for a direct conversation among Afghans required that we worked closely with Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider international community. At every meeting of the International Contact Group (ICG)—an organization of over fifty nations (many of them Muslim) previously created by Ambassador Holbrooke to support Afghanistan—that took place in 2011 and 2012, we encouraged the Chairman of the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC), the Afghan government entity given the responsibility to carry out negotiations with the Taliban, to brief the ICG on the status of the Afghan peace process. We used other events, such as meetings of NATO allies and ISAF partners to keep people informed.

We made a major effort to keep Russia and India informed of our thinking. Moscow and Delhi were both skeptical of the capacity of the Taliban to meet the requirements set by the government of Afghanistan and the international community, but both were key to any possible success. SRAP team members traveled often to Central Asia where there was always great interest in the possibilities for peace that could lead to secure borders, economic integration, and more regional cooperation to combat drug trafficking, and to China, where Beijing was arranging its policies toward Afghanistan to support the government in Kabul through various aid programs (three done jointly with the United States) and investments in the extractive industries.

These international and regional consultations always started and ended with discussions with Kabul. We also kept the government of Afghanistan, especially President Hamid Karzai, completely and fully informed of all of our conversations with the Taliban. We worked especially closely with the Foreign Minister and his team and with leaders and members of the HPC. Working with the HPC was especially important. Although more could always be done, especially to include more women in the HPC’s senior ranks, HPC members did try to represent Afghanistan’s geographic, ethnic, and gender diversity. I consulted with HPC Chairman Burhanuddin Rabbani, his deputy Mohammad Stanekzai, and other HPC members on each of my trips to Kabul, at each of the four international conferences and at many other international meetings. Embassy Kabul kept up the dialogue not only in Kabul but also in HPC offices around the country.

During my service as SRAP, we encouraged the HPC to play an increasingly active role in setting Afghan peace policy and in pursuing tentative contacts with the insurgents in Afghanistan and, where possible, in other countries in the region. Indeed, on several occasions the HPC and then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, met potential contacts as a team.

Problems with Pakistan

2011 was an awful year for U.S.-Pakistan relations. In February and March, the Raymond Davis case, in which a U.S. contractor shot and killed two Pakistanis when he thought he was the target of a robbery, pre-occupied both governments. On May 2, 2011, U.S. Special Forces killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. After an initial positive
reaction to the death of the world’s most prominent terrorist, Pakistanis focused on what they said was a U.S. violation of their sovereignty, and U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated. In September 2011, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul was attacked by fighters from the Haqqani Network, a terrorist gang that operates largely from Pakistani territory. On November 26, 2011, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were accidentally killed on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border by U.S. aircraft.

Although we had from the beginning of the diplomatic campaign in February 2011 paid special attention to working with Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership, we felt it best at this point to step back and let Pakistanis debate the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and come to their own conclusions before it would be possible to re-engage.

On April 12, 2012, the Pakistani Parliament unanimously approved the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security for U.S.-Pakistan relations. In Washington, these recommendations were read as far from ideal, but they formed the basis of a new dialogue. When Secretary Clinton met Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari at NATO’s Chicago summit in May, the two sides agreed to try over the following six months to reopen the ground lines of communication from Afghanistan through Pakistan (which had been closed since the November 2011 incident), focus on supporting the Afghan peace process, pursue joint counter-terrorism efforts, and try to move the U.S.-Pakistan economic relationship from one that was centered on U.S. aid to Pakistan to one based on trade and investment. Secretary Clinton met with Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar in Tokyo in July and in Washington in September, and then again with President Zardari in New York that same month to find concrete ways the U.S. and Pakistan could identify shared interests and act on them jointly.

The one bit of good news in 2011 had been the establishment of the U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Core Group, organized to enable the three countries to talk about how to support an Afghan peace process. By end of 2012, the Core Group had met eight times, including one meeting chaired by Secretary Clinton with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khar and Afghan Foreign Minister Dr. Zalmai Rassoul. In Core Group meetings and, more importantly, in bilateral meetings between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistanis seemed more ready to engage in taking specific steps to promote reconciliation among Afghans, such as discussing how to manage the safe passage of insurgents traveling from Pakistan to a potential negotiating venue. This emerging story of joint efforts to promote reconciliation was too often overshadowed during these years by Pakistan’s continued hedging strategy in Afghanistan, and by the Afghan Taliban’s use of safe havens inside Pakistan to support their attacks on Afghan, U.S. and other ISAF forces.

**Talking to the Taliban**

The United States’ attempt to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban and pave the way for an Afghan-Afghan conversation about ending the war started with preliminary sessions with a U.S. “Contact Team” in Europe and the Gulf. I began to participate in these talks in...
mid-2011 and chaired the U.S. interagency team at the several sessions in Qatar until the Taliban ended the talks in March 2012.

One of the first questions I asked when I took on the SRAP responsibility was, “Who was sitting across from us at the negotiating table?” An impostor had already embarrassed NATO in 2010.19 Over a period of months, we became convinced that the Taliban representative, who was professional and focused throughout our interactions, had the authority to negotiate what we were trying to achieve: a series of confidence-building measures designed to open the door for the Taliban to talk directly to the government of Afghanistan.

These confidence-building measures included the opening of a political office for the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, where Afghans could meet to talk about how to end the war. We made clear to everyone that the office could not represent the headquarters of an alternative Afghan government in-exile (and certainly could not be called an office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—the Taliban’s name for the state they were seeking to establish), nor could the office be an insurgent recruiting station or a venue for raising money to support the insurgency.

The confidence-building measures (CBMs) also included the requirement that the Taliban make a public statement (or statements) distancing themselves from international terrorism and accepting the need for an Afghan political process. The CBMs also involved the possible transfer of Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo and the release of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, a captive of the insurgents since 2009.20

As we had more sessions with the Taliban’s representative in Qatar, it became clearer that the Taliban’s main objective was to get their prisoners released from Guantanamo. They were convinced they had leverage on the United States because they controlled Sergeant Bergdahl. Both sides tried unsuccessfully to use their prisoner(s) as a foundation for a larger arrangement.

In the end, we were unable to reach agreement with the Taliban on any part of this CBM sequence. Throughout the U.S. effort to get the Afghan government and the Taliban to talk directly, President Karzai remained very concerned that we would make an arrangement with the Taliban that ignored Afghanistan’s interests. I did my best, supported by the highest levels in Washington and by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his team in Kabul, to convince him that this was not our intent or in our interests.

When the Taliban announced on March 15, 2012, that they were suspending talks with the United States, observers gave several reasons, including the analysis that the Taliban leadership was having a hard time motivating their fighters. “Why should I fight,” some insurgents presumably asked, “when there are peace talks with the enemy?”21) The Taliban claimed that they were suspending talks because we had reneged on our promises about Guantanamo (untrue) and that, to keep faith with President Karzai, we had added some steps to the CBM sequence (true).
The attempt to open the Political Office in Qatar in June 2013, which failed after the Taliban misrepresented the name and purpose of the office, highlights the U.S. Administration’s continued interest in pursuing a political counterpart to the U.S. military strategy and getting Sergeant Bergdahl home, as December 2014 marks the end of ISAF’s combat role. \(^{22}\) Representatives of the Afghan government have met Taliban representatives at conferences and during Track II conversations, including, if press reports are accurate, sometimes talking without the government’s permission. \(^{23}\)

Although there remains a high level of distrust in both Kabul and Islamabad about the others’ strategy, tactics and motivation, Pakistan’s new government has signaled interest in supporting an Afghan peace process, including by hosting President Karzai for meetings in Islamabad in August 2013 and then releasing some Taliban prisoners in early September, “to further facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process.” \(^{24}\) There remain many uncertainties about whether there can ever be direct talks among Afghans about their future and a serious conversation may not be possible until after the April 2014 Presidential elections. President Karzai has recently demanded, as part of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) end-game, American support for opening talks between his government and the Taliban. What is clear is that the need for an Afghan peace process is now squarely on the international agenda in a way it was not when Secretary Clinton spoke in New York in February 2011.

**Conclusions**

As I reflect on our attempt to talk to the Taliban in 2011-2012, here are several conclusions and questions which may be of some use to those who continue the work of the SRAP and, perhaps, others who will again face the question of negotiating with terrorists or insurgents on behalf of the United States.

Diplomacy must be backed by force; the use of force must back the diplomacy. Negotiations must be part of the larger campaign and must be seen to be so by everyone involved. As retired British General Sir Rupert Smith has written, “The general purpose of all interventions is clear: we seek to establish in the minds of the people and their leaders that the ever-present option of conflict is not the preferable course of action when in confrontation over some matter or other […] To do this, military force is a valid option, a level of intervention and influence, as much as economic, political and diplomatic leverage, but to be effective it must be applied as part of the greater scheme, focusing all measure on the one goal.” Smith also writes, “We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measure to create a desired political outcome of stability.” \(^{25}\)

During my tenure, I consulted closely with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Generals James Mattis, David Petraeus, and John Allen, military leaders of U.S. Central Command, and ISAF, in Tampa, Florida, and Kabul—not just about talking to the Taliban, but about how the diplomatic campaign supported the military strategy in Afghanistan and the region.
Working with the intelligence community, we consistently re-examined the possibility that the Taliban had entered a conversation in order to keep us busy or distracted or both while they continued to kill Afghans, Americans, friends, partners and allies, waiting for what they believed would be our ultimate withdrawal. We also recognized that our effort to engage in talks might only produce fissures in the Taliban and not Afghan-Afghan talks, especially as the Taliban were so focused on their Guantanamo prisoners.

The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed by President Obama and President Karzai in Kabul in May 2012, was a key part of our effort to put the talks with the Taliban in the context of a comprehensive vision for a future partnership. The best statement of how important a peace process could be to America’s larger national strategy is President Obama’s statement in Kabul in May 1, 2012. The President said that the United States has five lines of effort in Afghanistan: fighting terrorism; training and assisting Afghan National Security Forces; building an enduring partnership with Afghanistan; supporting an Afghan peace process; and, working to create strong regional structure to support Afghanistan into the future.26)

The SPA sent an important message to the Afghan people: You will not be abandoned after 2014, and the U.S.-Afghan relationship in the years ahead will not be a solely military relationship. The Taliban will also pay close attention to the fate of the BSA, which follows on from the SPA, and which President Karzai has so far refused to sign. Without a BSA, endorsed by Karzai or his successor, President Obama cannot keep even a minimum number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after January 2015 to give the Afghans confidence that we will support them in protecting what has been achieved at such high cost, to pursue the still crucial counterterrorism mission, and to train and ANSF. With no American forces deployed, U.S. allies and partners will have a much harder time supporting Afghanistan militarily.

It is hard to fight and talk at the same time. I underestimated this challenge in our own government and similarly underplayed it in initially analyzing the Taliban perspective. There is always a temptation in the interagency to paper over disputes, but we tried to remain committed to unity of effort because the President had made clear his desire to see what could be done to establish an Afghan-Afghan peace process. One example was the question of how to assess the relative priority between reintegrating individual Taliban fighters back into society and the possibility of a larger reconciliation process with senior insurgent leaders as part of an Afghan peace negotiation.

Some argued that the reintegration program, which had, with Afghan government support, successfully attracted several thousand Taliban out of the insurgency and back into society was all that was needed to end the conflict over time. The SRAP team supported the reintegration program but saw it as one part of a larger whole. I often described reintegration as “retail” (but still very important) and reconciliation that would take place as part of a larger peace process as “wholesale” as a way to bridge these differences in perspective.
Simultaneously fighting and talking was also hard for the Taliban. While we met with a representative of the Taliban Political Commission, who seemed interested in a negotiated end to the conflict, the Taliban Military Commission appeared to want to continue the fight: they could not understand why they should give up what they considered they had achieved at great cost in a political settlement. The Taliban also were unconstrained in how they fought, using the most brutal tactics and efforts, such as suicide bombing, attacks on schools and hospitals and the “green-on-blue” or “insider” killings, which they correctly recognized had a substantial impact on morale in ISAF countries.

When and how to fight and talk simultaneously is also heavily influenced by external events and timelines: a U.S. election for example, or the time it would take for the various parties to comprehend the impact of the outcomes of Istanbul, Bonn, Chicago, and Tokyo. I often told the SRAP team that our effort to sustain a dialogue with the Taliban might have been undertaken a year too soon and that in mid-2013 or early 2014, someone would be back trying to talk to the Taliban or some part of the group. Perhaps the attempt to restart talks in Qatar in June 2013 supports that prediction.

While the objective is to shape events, it is crucial to be able to react to the unexpected. We often found ourselves reacting to Taliban actions, which in their brutality called into question their commitment and capacity to create a peace process. Unexpected events in the United States, such as the accidental burning of Korans and the release of videos showing U.S. soldiers urinating on Taliban bodies gave the insurgents free rhetorical ammunition. But the event that, for me, had the most unforeseen consequences was the murder in September 2011 of the then Chairman of the HPC, Burhanuddin Rabbani. Whoever committed this act had a diabolically accurate sense of how damaging Rabbani’s murder was for the peace effort. What I did not immediately understand was that our challenge would be multiplied because Rabbani’s chief assistant, Mohammad Stanekzai, who was severely wounded in the attack, then spent weeks at a military hospital in India. We realized how much we had missed Stanekzai’s wisdom and courage on his return.

The capacity and the commitment of the allied partner are critical considerations. President Karzai’s objective in the two years I was the SRAP was to expand Afghanistan’s sovereignty. In many important ways, this was exactly what we were also seeking, but President Karzai’s efforts created tension on issues like U.S. support for an Afghan peace process, negotiations on the Strategic Partnership Agreement (and now the BSA) and the question of who should be responsible for holding Afghan prisoners in Afghanistan and for how long. The February 13, 2014 release by Afghanistan of 65 prisoners from the Parwan Detention Facility has refueled this controversy. The Taliban also made much of corruption, which many perceived had infused Afghanistan, especially its financial system, with the Kabul Bank scandal being a prominent example.

The question for the future is whether the government of Afghanistan will meet the obligations it undertook in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, including its emphasis on a legitimate election in April 2014 and, crucially, focus on women’s rights
and protections.27 If they do so, the generous pledges made in Tokyo by donors need to move from pledges to real money. Another key consideration is whether Afghans will fight to protect what they have achieved at such great cost to themselves, Americans and our friends, allies and partners, and whether to carry out this struggle they will support the Afghan National Security Forces. To support this fight, the international community must meet the commitments it made in Chicago to keep these forces funded and trained.

President Obama faces the challenging question of how many U.S. troops to leave in Afghanistan after December 2014 to support the Afghan National Security Force and fight terrorism. A robust number will be an essential signal to Afghans and promote contributions from other allies, friends and partners. The Taliban will be astute judges of whether Afghans have the will to fight and whether we have the will to support them.

It is important to be clear about how much influence to give other countries, organizations, and individuals who are trying to help. The conversation with the Taliban was surrounded by facilitators, enablers, supporters and critics. The German government worked closely with us as we pursued Taliban contacts. The government of Qatar hosted Taliban representatives and encouraged the direct negotiation. The Saudi government worked hard to get the Taliban publicly to break with al-Qaeda. The Turkish government supported the regional effort, and encouraged contacts with the insurgents, including providing medical care and shelter to Taliban “moderate,” Agha Jan Motasim after he was wounded in a shooting in Pakistan.28

The UAE government worked closely with the SRAP team on issues related to both Afghanistan and Pakistan and hosted meetings of the International Contact Group. Prime Minister David Cameron, Foreign Secretary William Hague and other senior British officials kept close tabs on the possibilities and encouraged rapid movement. Other European countries played confidential facilitative roles. The United Nations had its own contacts with the Taliban and others and provided counsel and perspective. The UN Security Council was active both in reforming and managing the sanctions on Taliban travel. The SRAP team was also contacted by numerous groups and individuals who provided insights and the ability to pass messages. There was also an active Track II effort underway in Europe and in the Gulf, where Taliban representatives met informally with private and official contacts, including SRAP team members. I favored multiple contacts with the Taliban as long as everyone told the Taliban that we were in contact with one another so that the Taliban did not believe that they had individual leverage.

The neighbors matter. While easier to prescribe than accomplish, the main task with Pakistan remains to convince them that their real struggle is with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), and that chaos in Afghanistan is bad for Pakistan because it will surely be exploited by the TTP. U.S. leaders need to keep pressing for an end to the safe havens Pakistan either provides or tolerates for the Afghan Taliban. Enforcing that requirement is complicated, however, by the U.S. military’s need for the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) to exit Afghanistan.
The Central Asian states must also continue to be engaged. Their fears: narcotics trafficking, terrorism, lawless borders; are real and need to be addressed through a regional approach founded on the commitments made in Istanbul and after, with the support of the international community. Beijing has taken up the “New Silk Road” mantle. Following trips to the region by his two immediate predecessors, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited four Central Asian countries in September 2013, “eclipsing,” according to the Washington Post, “the American vision of a New Silk Road.”

We need to remain open to the option of talking with Iran about Afghanistan; some, but by no means all, of our interests overlap. When I became the SRAP, the Iranians sent a message through an American non-governmental organization that they would receive me in Tehran to discuss Afghanistan. I was authorized to respond that I would meet an Iranian representative in Afghanistan or in a third country. We passed this message three separate times in mid and late 2011 but never received a definitive response.

It is vital to understand what has been done beforehand. The SRAP team set out to interview people who had been involved in talking to insurgents and those who had set up peace negotiations in the past. We built up a library of information and plans, including models ready in case there was a rapid, broader attempt to negotiate peace. Although there is much academic and practical literature on the question of how wars end and how to speak to insurgents, some scholars and practitioners have looked more deeply than others into these issues.

Create as much public consensus as possible, especially on Capitol Hill. Pay close attention to local opinion. Just as we worked hard to keep allies, friends, and partners fully informed of our activities, we also paid particular attention to briefing the Congress at every opportunity and consulting with members as necessary. While we greatly benefitted from our interactions with members of the House and Senate and took seriously their advice and concerns, we did not succeed in convincing senior leaders of the Senate or the House that transferring Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo to Qatar was the right course of action.

Given the requirements of secrecy involving the negotiation, we also did our best to keep up a public conversation on the need for an Afghan peace process, including having Secretary Clinton reiterate our willingness to engage in a dialogue in a speech in early April 2012, after the Taliban broke off the talks a month earlier.

Talking to the Taliban was not a major issue in the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign; in fact, some columnists and observers generally supported our effort. We regularly engaged the Afghan press, parliament, civil society, and the opposition, both directly and through the U.S. Mission in Kabul, but many Afghans, especially women, remained deeply troubled by the possibilities of anyone talking to the Taliban. Given their history and the Taliban’s tactics, this was understandable and they constantly and properly reminded us not to make decisions for them about the future of Afghanistan. Secretary Clinton met civil society representatives often, including in Bonn and Tokyo.
President Obama and Secretary Clinton were clear about the fundamental premise of the diplomatic campaign: the war in Afghanistan was going to end politically and we would either shape that end or be shaped by it. Shaping the end involved using all of the instruments of U.S. non-military power in South Asia, including the 2011-2012 diplomatic campaign to create a regional structure to support Afghanistan, the NSR economic initiative, and the attempt to negotiate with the Taliban to try to open the door for Afghans to talk to other Afghans about the future of Afghanistan. It was a worthy effort even recognizing that it did not result in a set of CBMs, that the Taliban continue their fight, that Sergeant Bergdahl is still a captive and the concept of a prisoner transfer was poorly received on Capitol Hill.

One more point is worth making: the moral ambiguity involved in talking to insurgents was clarified by our commitment to American values and the way those values define U.S. diplomacy. We believed that any arrangement we managed to make with the Taliban would have to meet not just the standards set in Secretary Clinton’s Asia Society speech but also American commitments to tolerance, pluralism, and the rule of law. In the end, it came down, for me, to the conviction described by Bertie Ahern, the former Irish Prime Minister, who is quoted by Mitchell Reiss: “You ask yourself,” said Ahern, “Can I stop the killing for the next decade? I can’t stop the killing of the last decade… so there’s one acid test: Are these people willing, if circumstances were different, to move into a political process? The reward is there aren’t so many funerals.”

Notes

1. The author wishes to thank The Cohen Group and the Johnson Center for the opportunity to work on this reflection. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Mildred Patterson, Frank Ruggiero, and Mark Steinberg all read drafts and improved the text. Timothy Sullivan also made a key set of contributions. Thanks to Alden Fahy, who expertly and patiently shepherded the text through the U.S. Department of State. Thanks also Jenny McFarland, who helped prepare the text. Any errors are the sole responsibility of the author. The opinions and characterizations in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the U.S. Government.


15. For this section on Pakistan, I have again drawn on my article in The Yale Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2013), 65-75.


19. Rashid, 129


27. Biddle, Foreign Affairs.

28. Pamela Constable brings the so far unsuccessful effort to have Agha Jan Motasim lead an “alternate Taliban” up to date in “Suicide bombing continue surge in lethal Taliban attacks”, The Washington Post, September 1, 2013.


30. Former Iranian Ambassador Seyyed Hossein Mousavian says that that Iran “extended an official invitation” to me to visit Tehran just as I started as SRAP, although I had this only from a U.S. NGO. Mousavian says we “dismissed” the overture. In fact, as I have noted here, we reached out three times to Tehran to open a dialogue. Since I was not likely actually to
go to Tehran, no one will know what might have been accomplished had we found a venue acceptable to both sides. I regret that we were not able to open this channel. Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, “Engage with Iran in Afghanistan”, in *The National Interest*, May 30, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/engag-iran-afghanistan-8528 and conversations with the author.

31. Mitchell B. Reiss, *Negotiating With Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists*, (New York: Open Road Integrated Media, 2010); James Shinn and James Dobbins,


36. Reiss, page 244

Q: I’d like to talk about a couple things. In Afghanistan Karzai, again I’m just ... because of this book I’ve been reading by Bob Woodward, but it represents a train of thought by saying that Karzai was erratic. I mean “delusional” is a word that’s used. He saw conspiracies that we were encouraging the Taliban. These Middle Eastern conspiracies leave me somewhat bewildered sometimes. You know, they seem to be completely counterintuitive. Did you find Karzai’s thought processes a problem, how he approached things; I mean was he in a different world than you, do you think?

GROSSMAN: He was definitely in a different world than we were. But I tried to see it from his perspective and I came to conclude that he was then, what, 10 years, 11 years, now 12 years, President of Afghanistan, which is no small achievement, to still be alive and to still be there. So I tried to think about what his life was like, not to sympathize with it but to empathize with his challenges, so I could understand how I might be able to better do my job. Afghans are very conspiratorial, they see conspiracy around every corner and in front of them all the time. President Karzai himself had two great goals. One was obviously to maintain his position and second, each day he wanted Afghans to
be more in charge of the decisions that they would be making about their own country. Let me give you an example.

Q: Sure.

GROSSMAN: When I got there he was very agitated about something he called “parallel structures.” He’d look out on Afghanistan and Americans or Europeans or foreigners were doing things either that Afghans should be doing or next to Afghans who were doing them. He said, “We’ve got to get rid of these parallel structures,” and I said, “I agree with you and we’re going to get rid of as many of these parallel structures that we can over time.” I think that for him the idea of, “I’m going to stay the President and I’m going to behave in a very nationalistic way so the Afghans make decisions for themselves each day,” meant that he had this larger vision and objectives and they were larger than what I was doing, they were larger than what our military forces were doing. This caused a very substantial disconnect between Kabul and Washington. It made everyone’s life harder. But he wanted Afghans in charge of Afghanistan. My observation was also that he used erratic behavior as a technique; it is how he kept everybody else off balance. He was extremely effective at it, even though there were times when we’d be tearing our hair out over this.

We also did not help ourselves when civilians were mistakenly killed in bombing raids or other military operations. In the fog of war, women out collecting firewood would be killed. There were times when General Allen and I would go see President Karzai and have some key issue to discuss but the whole time and all the energy in the room would be taken up discussing these terrible incidents.

Q: One of the things that comes up again and again, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, let’s talk about Afghanistan right now, and that’s corruption. I mean for Americans we just can’t tolerate large-scale corruption. I mean we’re stuck with it sometimes, but it complicates our relationship. How’d you deal with that?

GROSSMAN: We did our best by keeping it high up on the agenda. During the time that I was the Special Representative there was an egregious case called “the Kabul Bank.” The Kabul Bank had received of millions of dollars of deposits from mostly small Afghan depositors and it was looted. The people who did the looting allegedly, among other things, built or bought apartments in Dubai. It exploded into a major public scandal. We worked closely with Treasury on this. We tried to use the Kabul Bank first as an enforcement moment, to try to get as much of the money as possible back to the people, and to push the Afghans to prosecute some of the alleged perpetrators and enforce some accountability. And then as a teaching attempt to say to people, “It eats the inside of society out when you have this corruption.”

Q: How did you see the Afghani military at the time? Were they able to stand up to the Taliban or ...?
GROSSMAN: Increasingly every day. What we found was, certainly in the two years I had this responsibility, that once our military started to seriously train the Afghan National Security Forces, (ANSF) their confidence went way up. Now, they still needed help in intelligence, they still needed help in organizing themselves, but they fight. And what you’ve seen over the last year or so, long after I left the job, is that ANSF is prepared to make the struggle and we sit here in 2014, especially on a day when the Iraqi army seems to be collapsing, and it is a real contrast. So I think the Afghans are going to fight for what they’ve achieved since 2003. The question is to us. Do we have the patience and the courage to support their fight, not our fight anymore, but their fight? So they take a lot of casualties, they maneuver, and there are a lot of highly publicized attacks in Afghanistan. People die, it is a mess, but what’s the outcome? The outcome is that Taliban doesn’t win these engagements. The ANSF holds its own.

Q: Well how about in the country where you—I’m a product of Vietnam, served there. You know, could you sleep in the village at night? In other words, how about in the countryside?

GROSSMAN: If you set the standard that success will only be achieved when the Afghan government is 100 percent in charge of 100 percent of Afghanistan, that’s too high. For the near-term the question’s going to be, “Can a central government govern this country with tolerable pluralism, tolerance and respect for women and can people who are of various nationalities and ethnicities come to consider themselves as Afghans?” We’re here today on the 13th of June; tomorrow, on the 14th of June, there will be a second round of Afghan elections. The first one was about six weeks ago and seven million Afghans, 60 percent of Afghans, voted; 40 percent of that number were women. The Taliban tried to stop the election; not possible, couldn’t do it, and I don’t think they’ll be able to stop it tomorrow either. So, are these elections perfect? No. Is everybody in every single geography in Afghanistan happy? No. But on Sunday or Monday or Tuesday of next week, when they really count the ballots, will the person who gets elected, one of these two candidates, be seen as legitimate by the majority of Afghans? I hope so.

Q: Was it complicated? I mean you had Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State and you have the role. I mean she’s a strong supporter of the role of women in the world. The Taliban had done terrible things to women. I mean excluded them from schools, practically tried to sweep them off the streets.

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: But at the same time was this Taliban or was this Afghani or a custom or what? What was happening there with the role of women and how did that affect your work?

GROSSMAN: It affected our work enormously because not just Mrs. Clinton, but all of us kept it as a big priority. Ambassador Melanne Verveer was a big part of this effort. In that same speech in February to the Asia Society that we talked about before, one of things Secretary Clinton said to the Taliban was that we were prepared to talk to the Taliban without any pre-conditions, but that there were three end conditions for those
Taliban who wanted to rejoin society to be reconciled, reintegrated. That was to break with al Qaeda, end violence and live inside a society governed by a constitution that recognized the rights of all individuals, and especially the rights of women. And so the rights of women, women entrepreneurs, women involved in peace-making, women policemen, protecting those women who were vulnerable, was a huge part of our policy. Also key to the effort was the US-Afghan Women’s Council, in which Mrs. (Laura) Bush maintained a key interest. We were able to start a US-Pakistan Women’s Council while I was SRAP and my dream is that the two groups will someday work together.

Q: People who are so deep in analysis of the Taliban find that, from what I gather, women really made remarkable progress in Afghanistan prior to the arrival of the Taliban.

GROSSMAN: And after 2003, after the Taliban was gone.

Q: Yes. Was this a game stopper or not? I mean was the subjugation of women sort of a part of the soul of the Taliban or what?

GROSSMAN: I think it was. If you think about Afghanistan today, I said before I thought they’d fight. They don’t want to go back to 2001. Look at the changes from 2003— in 2003 you have 900,000 Afghan children in school, all boys. Today, of 10 million Afghan children in school, 40 percent girls. In ’03 life expectancy, male and female, in Afghanistan was 42; 60 today. There were 120,000 cell phone contracts in Afghanistan in 2003 and there are 16 million today. And nine percent of the people had access to any health care at all and today it is 60 percent. So, maybe I’ve got this wrong, we’ll see. I think if the Taliban were to come back and knock on the door and say, “We’re going back to the way it was in 2003,” a lot of these people would say, “No we’re not, we’re going to fight. We’re going to fight for this. We’re going to fight for what we’ve achieved.”

These numbers are a testament first, of course, to Afghans, but also to the creativity of USG employees: FSOs, AID folks, military members, Department of Agriculture, Treasury, indeed, the whole-of-government effort.

Q: You were somewhat the new boy on the block; you’d been around but all right you had this ... the ... again I would start with Afghanistan, your Afghani experts. How did you find them? The State Department and elsewhere that was part of the team.

GROSSMAN: One of the really good things that Dick had done was bring together in the Special Representative’s office people from inside and outside the government to work on Afghanistan and Pakistan. There were representatives from many government agencies, including JCS. We had a great team of people in government who had studied Afghanistan for a long time. He also brought people from outside of government—Vali Nasser, Rina Amiri, Barney Rubin, who were remarkable people. I was also benefited by the good relationship Doug Lute, the White House Afghanistan “czar”, and I developed,
and the contact Tony Blinken and I maintained, so that we were mostly in sync with the NSC staff and the VP’s office.

Q: Did you find any sort of rifts in your team about how to go about things in Afghanistan or were they pretty much united?

GROSSMAN: No, I think people were united around the objectives laid out in the Secretary’s speech to the Asia Society and to the diplomatic campaign plan we designed.

Q: Well there is this problem that if you take troops out, particularly foreign troops out, which is in itself seems to be a good thing but at the same time you’re opening up to nasty people taking over, right? I mean this is true ...

GROSSMAN: Yes, because that goes back to the question you asked about the Afghan National Security Forces. I was on the VOA (Voice of America) today because of the impact on the election tomorrow and you can imagine, if you’re Afghan today, you’re looking at Iraq and thinking, “Gosh, could this happen to us?” And so we talked a little bit on TV this morning on the Voice of America about the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems to me the difference is that the ANSF has shown itself it can fight. And President Obama has said the US will leave 9,800 troops there, which I think will be a psychological and practical help to the Afghans as they try to continue to build up their own capacities.

Q: What about NATO forces there?

GROSSMAN: People like the British, Italians, Australians, not NATO, but very much an ally, did a lot of the hard work. Look at the casualty figures: British, Italian, Australian, Polish, they took quite a lot of casualties. And let’s pay tribute to the many other NATO members—Germany, Denmark, Turkey, others—who sacrificed.

Q: Did you find difficulty coordinating the military part of the effort? What decisions were made on where to put our efforts? How did this work?

GROSSMAN: For me it worked okay because I had the opportunity to work with two remarkable US military commanders—first (General) David Petraeus and then (General) John Allen. So I was lucky that my interface with that universe was through them. Where troops were deployed and how they were working together was what they spent their day working on. Together we tried to manage the outreach to the Taliban, the regional structure, and then obviously the very hard work that everybody had to be doing was to try to figure out what to do about Pakistan.

Q: Well let’s turn to Pakistan. There’s a peculiar thing where the Pakistanis, I mean it is been called by many a failed government and bad corruption. Whom do you support?

GROSSMAN: Pakistan is a complicated, mysterious place. It was my very first post in the Foreign Service. As we discussed in the first round of this oral history, I served in
Islamabad from 1977-1979, so I had some understanding of it. Pakistanis are educated people, they’re resilient people, goodness knows, entrepreneurial people, but they live in a society that is still controlled by feudal leaders, the military and the intelligence service. A lot of the conversations we had inside the US government during the time I was recalled, the focus was on Afghanistan because that’s where 100,000 young men and women in the military are deployed, so by definition that should be your focus. But everybody thought over the long term what’s the most challenging country between the two of them? Pakistan.

Q: During the time you were there did Pakistan and India come close to nuclear exchanges?

GROSSMAN: No.

Q: Did you all try to solve the Kashmir problem or can you solve the Kashmir problem?

GROSSMAN: We did not. In 2009, when the President appointed Holbrooke, I understand that Dick tried to get India to be part of the SRAP office and the Indians said, “No thank you, we’re not doing that.” And part of the theory was that Kashmir had to be part of the conversation. When I was SRAP, I gave speeches all over the US and often somebody would stand up in the Q&A and say, “Don’t you understand that if you don’t solve the Kashmir problem you can’t solve the problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan.” And I would say to whomever asked the question, “History will judge, but we are not doing it that way. We don’t have the time, the inclination, the effort. The Indians are not interested and so I can’t, spend my time working on Kashmir and still focus on Afghanistan when there [are] 100,000 young Americans there in uniform and thousands of civilians and dates looming for NATO’s leaving in 2014, etc. My instructions are try to do the things in Mrs. Clinton’s speech. You may be right; history will tell. But I’m not doing it that way; I can’t.”

Q: Yes. During this time you were dealing with this problem, how did you find the Indian side of things?

GROSSMAN: The Indians were always very willing to engage at senior levels. They had a Special Representative as well. He was a gentleman with a long history in South Asian politics, Ambassador S.K. Lambah. Ambassador Lambah was wonderful to me, a great resource and teacher. I visited New Delhi often. I consulted with him whenever I could, wherever I could. We did not always agree on everything, but I always took him seriously. We were both members of this group called the International Consultative Group or Contact Group that Dick had set up. So I saw Ambassador Lambah maybe three or four or five times a year; I talked to him on the telephone a lot. I think the Indians were sympathetic to what we were trying to do, but skeptical that we would be successful. And I thought that’s fine; if you’re not skeptical you’re not paying attention.

Q: Yes.
GROSSMAN: India made a lot of economic investments in Afghanistan during the time I was there, very helpful as they tried to employ Afghans. They trained Afghan military people, and especially female policemen, but not in Afghanistan, always in India. So I found them good partners.

Q: Where in the time you were there did the Mumbai attack occur? Was it before?

GROSSMAN: Before.

Q: Before? I mean that’s still a thorn in the side ...

GROSSMAN: The Indians believed that the Pakistanis had never been fully honest about what they knew and when they knew it. The Pakistanis have people in their jails that the Indians want to prosecute. So although it happened before, as you said, the residual overhang of it was part of that relationship every day.

Q: Did you find in a way one takes it that sort of the Pakistani leadership focused on India and Afghanistan is concerned about being surrounded whereas the Indians’ leadership was thinking about the rest of the world?

GROSSMAN: Yes. When you are in Delhi, you are talking about the world. In Islamabad, you’re talking about Pakistan, Afghanistan and India.

One thing that may be worth talking about as we sit here in 2014: I remember that we started to notice in the middle of 2012 that the Pakistanis were beginning to adjust their strategic thinking because they could see that the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) was an existential threat to Pakistan. More and more Pakistanis said, “We have to first of all fight the TTP, secondly, stop hedging; all terrorism is bad.” We also started to sense at the end of 2012 that, because they were concerned about the TTP, they became more interested in a secure, stable, prosperous Afghanistan, because if Afghanistan’s in chaos then the TTP uses it.

Q: Could you explain what is TTP?

GROSSMAN: The TTP, the Pakistanis’ Taliban. A very dangerous group.

Q: What hand did you have in the drone business in Pakistan?

GROSSMAN: Well, for the purposes of this interview, the drones are, for me, still a classified matter. I signed a non-disclosure agreement. I know everybody else talks about it but for me ...

Q: Okay. Well, I’m going to abide by the rules.

Did you find that you could really talk to the leadership in Afghanistan? Not now but I mean ...
GROSSMAN: In Afghanistan or Pakistan?

Q: Pakistan. I mean, when these people could talk and sort of consider things and get a rational judgments and deliver or not? Or were they controlled by events outside the sort of the normal political structures?

GROSSMAN: They were guided by their own worldview. Pakistan’s very hard, I think, for American diplomats because Pakistanis speak wonderful English, they’ve been to our schools, they share our education, but they live in a different psychological world than we do. It is hard to come to a real meeting of the minds because we make assumptions about each other that are not always true. A book came out while I was doing this work by Ambassadors (Howard) Howie and (Teresita) Tezi Schaffer called Negotiating With the Pakistanis. They’re really great because they had a lot of experience in this.

Q: Well is it essentially, I mean it gets very complicated, but the Pakistani view of the world is, “We’re surrounded by enemies, India, Afghanistan; unless we control things there it is going to be part of the problem, and no other country really likes us,” or not or what?

GROSSMAN: Pakistanis believe they have an unshakable friendship with China, so I don’t think they think nobody loves them. They call China their “all-weather friend”. A key problem in Pakistan is that so much is zero sum: in Pakistan, anything that you win, I lose. Pakistan’s a very hard place. There’s a book by a British author whom I was lucky enough to consult a few times, Anatol Lieven, and it is called Pakistan, A Hard Country. And that’s correct.

Q: Yes. And what do we do about training our people who have to deal with this? And you’ve talked at the FSI and other places of ... In a way almost game playing, getting people in to see that it is different, almost mind games.

GROSSMAN: First of all, it takes resources to let people have some time to think and practice these interactions. In the two years I was doing this, I watched people make enormous sacrifices, Americans, State Department people, in Afghanistan, Pakistan. And you know, since the last time we talked, I was thinking about this whole concept of an expeditionary diplomat; somebody who’s got certain skills from working in hard places. And certainly as I watched people in Afghanistan, Pakistan, I became more convinced that some calling or training or specialty ...

Q: Yes, I’ve never heard of that concept before. It makes very good sense. This, you say expeditionary ...

GROSSMAN: In the sense that not everybody’s cut out to do this kind of work. And it is no reflection on whether you are good or bad; it is just a reflection on what kind of person you are.
So for example, in the military, you don’t have to be a Special Forces person to have a great career in the military. But if you are inclined to the Special Forces, then God bless you. If we have people at State—which we do—who are inclined to the really hard things, we ought to encourage that and we ought also to recognize that not everybody is cut out to serve in Afghanistan or Colombia or Libya.

Q: No.

GROSSMAN: Not everybody is built to go to Kandahar for two years. We ought to recognize that. I think what the Department did, which is great, was set up an award to recognize people with this kind of talent. It is called “The Ryan Crocker Award,” and the first recipient was Ann Patterson. The question the Service has to ask is, how do you create the next five, six, eight Ryan Crockers and Ann Pattersons? Where do they come from? Ryan and Ann self-selected in many ways and we’re lucky that they did. But what’s the systematic way to make sure that on your bench, when you need it, you’ve got 10 people who are cut out to be Ryan Crocker and Anne Patterson.

Q: You’ve been around a long time but also the fact that you went out for a while and came back, how did you find, you might say, the atmosphere by decision makers, policy crafters and all in Washington? Has it gotten nastier? I mean certainly the basic political process in the United States has gotten nastier. Did that translate into foreign affairs?

GROSSMAN: Yes, I know it does. But I have to say that for what I was doing in 2011-2012, Afghanistan and Pakistan, we worked hard to make sure that it was as bipartisan a policy as possible. I was lucky, because you remember at that time of the people who supported the basic Afghan policy: Senator McCain and Senator (Lindsay) Graham and Senator (John) Kerry and Senator (Carl) Levin and Senator Lugar. I was able to draw on eight or nine senators from both parties for support, including Senator (Dianne) Feinstein and Senator (Saxby) Chambliss. With the exception of our plan to free Sargent Bergdahl, I was able to draw on a bipartisan group of legislators who were prepared to help me out.

On the House side there was support as well. (Congresswoman) Mrs. (Nancy) Pelosi was always interested in Afghan women. My two main contacts on the House side were (Congresswoman) Kay Granger, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Appropriations who looked after the money, and her ranking member, (Congresswoman) Nita Lowey. I would have been lost without them. They were always welcoming, always ready to help, always willing to see me and always bipartisan. The SRAP team also worked hard at the Hill effort, especially Dan Feldman, who was indefatigable when it came to the Hill.

Can I say one other thing? The SRAP office was on the first floor by the cafeteria. I loved having that office for three reasons. One was that I wasn’t up on the anxiety-ridden Seventh Floor. Second, I really liked to walk my visitors to the front-door entrance and it turns out Pakistanis and Afghans appreciated that. And the third and best thing, was I would go to the cafeteria in 2011 what did I see? More employees, younger people, more diverse people. I loved standing there and thinking: this is alright.
One of the things that was especially great in the SRAP universe was the number of Indian-Americans, Pakistani-Americans, Afghan-Americans, who wanted to work on these subjects. So I had people who not just had the languages because they were the children of immigrants or sometimes the immigrants themselves …

Q: Yes.

GROSSMAN: … but the culture of it, and it was a great thing. It was a great representation of the United States.

Q: I keep coming back to—I can’t help it—but say we’re a remarkable country. And in a way I’m also part of the process because a Consular Officer …

GROSSMAN: Right.

Q: … pushing Vietnamese, Greeks, Koreans, Germans, Yugoslavs, Italians, into the thing and we deal with them. Europe now is having a real problem because they’re unable to deal with the flow of people from other countries. We can take this fairly well because we have machinery for doing that.

What was your impression of Secretary Clinton?

GROSSMAN: I liked working for her very much. And you can imagine, I was always bringing her bad news. But I found her to be, first of all, extremely calm, which is great, given the work I was doing. She was very focused, very supportive of the plan we had laid out after her speech. And although she is one of the most famous women in the world, I found her exceedingly normal. She was fun; she wants to talk about family. The other thing that I was struck by is that she was always the best-prepared person in the room. We’d send her these briefing memos and if you gave her 17 points to make, she’d make them all. She traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan several times. She always had our backs.

Q: This is what I’ve heard about from people when she was the First Lady, going to China or something. She knew her brief and she presented her brief.

GROSSMAN: When I was Ambassador to Turkey, she came to visit as First Lady. She was extremely gracious and very well prepared for every meeting and every event.

Q: Well, I can remember Julie Nixon, the daughter of the President, came to Athens and she made a point of going through the Embassy and shaking every hand. They were delighted because usually the big wheels don’t pay the slightest bit of attention.

GROSSMAN: She was immensely well prepared, very diligent and very, very supportive of what we were trying to do in SRAP. If you needed help she was prepared to give it to you, which for someone in my position, is all you can ask.
Q: Well then, looking at the time, what did you do when you left? You left when?

GROSSMAN: I left in December of 2012. I’d told Mrs. Clinton when she hired me that I would do the job for two years. So around Christmas time 2012, I retired again and, with the blessings of the ethics lawyers, went back to The Cohen Group.

Q: Yes. Did you have much of an impression of President Obama?

GROSSMAN: The interactions I had with him were always fair, friendly, orderly and thoughtful. Like Mrs. Clinton, he was always prepared. He always asked great questions that challenged our assumptions. He and the Vice President were also always personally kind to me, which is no small thing at that level.

Q: There’s something I didn’t ask you about. Again, so many things happened in the world.

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: When Bin Laden was killed was that on your watch?

GROSSMAN: Yes.

Q: Can you talk about that?

GROSSMAN: I can tell you this: by pure coincidence, I was in Afghanistan the night of the raid, scheduled to go on to Islamabad. We were watching TV like everybody else, it must have been 3 or 4 in the morning in Kabul, and President Obama announces Bin Laden is dead. About four o’clock in the morning Bill Burns, who was the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, calls and says, “Don’t go on to Pakistan, it may be too dicey, stay right where you are.” “Okay,” I said. Two or so hours later Bill calls back, says, “We’ve changed our mind. We want you to go to Pakistan and tell our story, give a press conference, be the face of this.” “Fine,” I said, “I’ll be glad to do that.” And so we called up to Manas, which is the airbase where the plane stayed overnight when we were in Kabul …

Q: Manas is in ...

GROSSMAN: Kyrgyzstan. It takes the plane some time to get ready and then fly to Kabul. The Air Force does its usual fantastic job and the airplane’s on its way, but, again, it takes a little time. An hour later, of course, the phone rings. It’s the State Department, “Why aren’t you there yet?”

We got into the airplane and went to Pakistan. Remarkably enough, we had a meeting of the US-Afghanistan-Pakistan Working Group that afternoon. I recall that the first statement the Pakistanis issued about the Bin Laden raid was excellent. It said: this is a defeat for terrorism, we’re really glad it has happened, we will work with the United
States. I looked at the text and I thought, “Wow, this is really fantastic.” By the next day they had completely changed their whole policy and their minds and they wanted to be victims in this instead of leaders.

_Q: But what do you think caused that or what ...?_

GROSSMAN: I don’t know. They concluded they needed to be victims in this.

I gave a press conference the second day I was there. Conspiracy theories were the flavor of the hour. I made my statement. The Pakistani press started in: he’s not really dead; this was done in a Disney Studio like the moon landing; you’ve got him someplace so you can use him again. On and on. I grabbed both sides of the lectern and I leaned over and said, “Listen to me. He’s dead. We did it. That’s good. Next question.” Didn’t make the slightest impression whatsoever, so I just walked away.

_Q: Okay. Well, Marc, is there anything else we should cover?_

GROSSMAN: No, I don’t think so.

_End of interview_