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JOHN HUMMON

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is May 11, 1999, an interview with John Hummon. John, let’s start off with a thumbnail sketch of your career with AID, when you began, and what were your assignments, and when did you retire?
Career Overview

HUMMON: I started with AID [Agency for International Development] in 1960. I came into AID as the third assistant desk officer in the Moroccan Desk under Bob Gordon for a short time. There was some type of reorganization, and I was moved into the East and Southern Africa Desk under Sam Butterfield. In 1964 I was assigned to Tanzania as the program officer, serving also as Acting Director for several months. I came back to Washington as Officer in Charge of East and Southern Africa for a brief period, then moved to the Executive Secretary position for a few years. Following that, I was in Nigeria as Deputy Director and Acting Director - then to the Senior Seminar. In 1993 the Agency assigned me to the Philippines as Deputy Director. Next was a departure from AID for an assignment in Saudi Arabia. I returned in 1980 to PPC [Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination]. In 1986 I went to Botswana as Mission Director; I came back to AID/W [Washington] and worked on reorganization, human resources, and UN [United Nations] Agencies in Geneva. So that’s my summary.

Q: You retired in what year?


Early years and education

Q: Let’s go back to the beginning. Where were you born, where you grew up, what was your education, picking out anything during that time that would suggest why you got into international development as opposed to something else.

HUMMON: I was born in 1930 in northwestern Ohio and grew up near Toledo. My dad was a farmer. Actually, he was working for the Farm Bureau at the time. My grandfather on my dad’s side was also a farmer, but he was involved in many activities, as a State legislator of the Democratic party and a leader in the state Grange. He was active in politics and in speech-making about improved agricultural practices, and I am sure a host of other matters. I actually don’t remember him too well. He died when I was 8 or 9, but I do have a conception of an imposing figure (He was actually rather short) who was stern. My father was the oldest son in his large family and stayed on the farm; grandfather, a self-made man, did not believe a formal education was very important. My dad’s younger brothers, however, rebelled at this and went on to college. My father was very smart, and I believe felt frustrations at times at his lack of schooling beyond the 7th or 8th grade. He was a country poet, song writer, and inventor; most of all, he was a very good man. And my mother was a wonderful person.

We were poor. Dad had gone to Texas early in his marriage to homestead. It never rained and he lost land, and in a sense, never recovered financially, especially coupled with the advent of the Depression in 1929. But, despite the poverty, I remember essentially only a happy childhood with four loving older brothers and sisters. There was always a sense in our family, maybe partly because we were poor, of helping others, and of tolerance. The
idea of helping those less fortunate was embedded into our consciences from an early age, perhaps to an extent through our Democratic political affiliation (FDR [President Franklin D. Roosevelt] was a great family hero), and in part because of a strong religious foundation within the family. My dad and mother were not evangelicals, but they were very religious. I might note that my oldest brother, Serge, went into the Ministry and my other brother Norman, gravitated into career jobs with a focus on helping others - Peace Corps, AID, VISTA [Volunteers in Service to America], etc. My two wonderful sisters, Mary and Janet, were for a time a gospel duet (after trying their luck and talent on Broadway). Religion and its implications were major elements in my upbringing.

A recent letter from my brother Norman gives you an idea of the financial and spiritual condition in my early childhood. He writes, “Once, in the deepest days of the Depression just before Christmas, we prepared for a trip to Toledo to market a few chickens. There we would visit a secondhand shop Mom knew about to get some clothes to replace the garments we had worn out or outgrown. My brother, Serge, and I ran down a dozen chickens, stuffed them in a gunny sack, and Mom took off for Toledo. At the poultry market, a thin, shabby and anxious black fellow stood by closely as we pulled the chickens out of the sack. He noticed that one had been trampled to death in transit. He hoped that it would become his Christmas dinner. I was not very generous, and for some reason prevented him from snatching the dead fowl. My Mother saw this and told me to let him have the stricken chicken and take a live one as well. “He wants his family to have a Merry Christmas, too,” she said. He went away with heartfelt thanks to Mom. It was one of my first lessons in charity. For while we had very little money; we did have quite a few chickens. And sharing with a black family was something that came naturally to Mom.”

So in a sense it was that type of environment that helped to spur my interest in aiding others in a professional sense later.

After high school, I went to Ohio Wesleyan University, partly because both of my brothers had graduated from there (one sister had also attended as well), and also because I was interested in playing football at that level. I knew that I wasn’t good enough to play really big time, but Ohio Wesleyan seemed about right. They actually were trying to upgrade their program. They had scheduled Army and some other major schools, and they showed some interest in me. Actually I left after only one semester, primarily because of a conflict with a religion professor whose interpretation of Jesus was, I felt, too liberal. There were a variety of reasons, but that was the main one. I transferred to Albion College in Michigan where I graduated in 1953, and later went to the University of Michigan where I received an MA and Ph.D. in political science/international relations.

Q: Why did you select international relations?

HUMMON: It came in part from the family background I have mentioned, the idea of helping others. But that was not the sole reason. From a fairly early age I was also interested in other cultures - my brothers Serge and Norman helped to foster that. Later,
the idea of wanting to work in international development was spurred by the fact that my brother Norman had gone to work for ICA [International Cooperation Agency]. You know my brother. He's very much a person who wants to help others and he had quite an impact in terms of his ideas, including relating his experience overseas.

I never went to the University of Michigan with the idea that I’m going to come out and eventually be an ambassador. I wasn’t particularly interested in the regular Foreign Service. However, I took the Foreign Service Examination and passed it, although ironically I failed the physical. I might have joined the Foreign Service had I passed the physical, just because of the allure of it. I might have gone, but in honesty I was primarily interested in working for ICA at that time.

Q: You must have learned a lot from your brother about it.

HUMMON: Oh, yes. He was serving overseas. He was in Libya for several years, then Liberia and later Nigeria. And I actually did my Ph.D. dissertation in the international development area.

Q: What was your subject?

HUMMON: It was entitled: “Protestants and Point Four.” It was not a great contribution to knowledge, but it was basically an assessment of the work, the views and the activities of Protestant churches vis à vis the foreign aid program. But it also included some analysis of what had taken place in foreign aid, where we should be going and so forth.

Q: Any particular theme or findings?

HUMMON: It’s hardly worth mentioning, since it is so dated, but it essentially was a positive assessment of the aid program, and a recognition that the churches had an effective role in early support of the effort.

Q: That's a good foundation...

HUMMON: Sam Butterfield and I have talked a great deal about the history of the AID program (He is working on a book about AID), and some of this early material may have been marginally helpful to him, or so he said.

Q: So, you got your doctorate from...

HUMMON: The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.

Q: Then what happened?

HUMMON: I wanted to work for ICA and I came down and I had an interview with Bill Kontos who was a friend of my brother’s. At that time he said, “Yes, I think we can get you a job as a program officer or probably assistant program officer (but he said
‘program officer’) in Yugoslavia.” At that time, it would have been a very good job. But as it turned out, a hiring freeze was instituted so there wasn’t any opening. I had also taken the Management Intern [MI] exam, the JMA [Junior Management Analyst] exam. There were people who came from various government departments to interview candidates in Ann Arbor. A couple of my professors who were public administration types said that the Navy Department intern program was probably the best in the government. So I signed up with Navy and went to work with them for a year, but stayed in close contact with ICA.

Q: What year was this?

HUMMON: 1958. Right after I finished graduate school. I was 27 years old.

Q: What did you do with the Navy Department?

HUMMON: I was the editor of the of the Navy Management Review; I was also the copy boy. It was in the Navy Management Office, and it was essentially management analysis. It was not terribly interesting in terms of what my longer terms goals were.

Q: You stayed there a year, is that right?

HUMMON: Actually nearly a year and a half.

Q: A year and half and how did you make the transition?

HUMMON: I stayed in contact with ICA. I don’t really recall the specifics of this. Kontos and others had contacts with me and then I got in touch with Bob Gordon, who was the Office Director for North Africa. The freeze broke, so there was an opening.

Q: You joined in 1958?

Joined ICA and worked on East and Southern Africa - 1960

HUMMON: No, ’60. I actually worked for Bob for only about three weeks and there was some reorganization and Sam Butterfield took over as Office Director for Eastern/Southern Africa, and I went to work in that area.

Q: What was your assignment there?

HUMMON: As one of the assistant desk officers. I can’t precisely recall the configuration of that small office. There were two or three of us. Denny Conroy was the main officer. We were handling East Africa and Southern Africa with regular desk officer duties.

Q: Do you recall any impressions you had of ICA at that time, the kind of organization you were working with?
HUMMON: I remember that Doc Fitzgerald, Doctor Fitz, was a key character. He was a powerful force within the agency. He was the Deputy Administrator and the head of the Food and Agriculture Division. The recollections are hazy. This was a time of transition and there was talk about further changes. ICA’s predecessors had been ECA [Economic Cooperation Agency], TCA, MSA [Mutual Security Agency], and FOA [Foreign Operations Administration] and ECA. Moreover, the Development Loan Fund was established in 1957. I think there was a feeling at that time that further change was going to take place and that aid was not a temporary sort of endeavor. I have impressions of strong people such as Marcus Gordon, the Assistant Director for Africa, and Ollie Sause and Bill Wild.

Q: How long were you in this position?

HUMMON: Three years basically. AID, of course, replaced ICA soon after I joined the organization. I went on a TDY to East Africa. Actually, I went for three summers in a row. In 1963 I went to Tanzania for awhile. Allan Loren was the Mission Director and Sam Butterfield was his Deputy, and we hit it off pretty well. Allan asked me if I would be interested in coming out as a program officer or assistant director for program as it eventually became, with the Deputy position being abolished, and I said yes. My family and I went to Tanzania in 1964.

Transferred to Tanzania - 1964

Q: What was your impression of the political and economic situation in Tanzania when you arrived?

HUMMON: When we first arrived it was heartening. Tanzania (then Tanganyika) was considered as the great (pun intended) white hope of Africa in many respects at that time. It was a country that was given special attention. We had, I forget the specifics, but we had a special multi-year commitment that was made...

Q: Long range assistance strategy commitment

HUMMON: Right. It was one of the few countries in Africa where this was done. Nyerere was considered a great leader and hopefully the wave of the future in Africa.

Q: Why was it singled out as being so unusual compared to other countries?

HUMMON: Partly just because it was independent. There were many African countries that still weren’t independent. I think Nkrumah and Ghana had been considered in somewhat similar fashion earlier. His luster had paled by that point. Nyerere also seemed to have a vision of change and helping the poor and bringing about a better life for all people. The commitment to him was made during the Kennedy administration. There was much infatuation on the part of the White House with Nyerere and what he stood for. So it was a combination of factors.
Q: What was the program at that time?

HUMMON: It was small (not small by African standards, but by worldwide standards), and directed primarily in education and training areas and agriculture. It was a technical assistance program with a few supporting capital projects - construction of institutions and roads. It was a solid effort. We had assistance in construction and development of the Changombe Teacher Training College, a technical training college in Zanzibar and the Morogoro Agricultural College. We were involved in participant training.

Tanzania had a large Peace Corps program. This was one of the first Peace Corps programs in the world. They said it was either there or Ghana. We were the predecessor in a sense of the more active AID/Peace Corps cooperation that has taken place in the last several years. My brother Norman happened to be the Deputy Director of the Peace Corps contingent in Tanzania for most of the time that I was there, and we worked together. USAID provided funds for some Peace Corps activities.

Q: That’s interesting because in the early days the Peace Corps didn’t have much use for AID. But you had a cooperative relationship.

HUMMON: We did. Having brothers there, one in each agency, probably helped. As a parenthetical comment, that was a very exceptional mission, the total Country Team. We had Bill Leonhart, as Ambassador, who later was National Security Advisor for a brief period of time, then Ambassador to Yugoslavia. John Burns replaced Leonhart and later became Director General of the Foreign Service. Don Pederson was Consul in Zanzibar. Frank Carlucci was his predecessor as Consul. Tom Pickering was Vice Consul in Zanzibar. I worked very closely with Tom and also with Don. The Peace Corps had a strong staff.

The only time I’ve really been afraid physically was an incident that took place during this period which had to do with the overall political situation. This was it...

Q: What are you referring to when you say, “This was it?”

HUMMON: During the time that I was there, the luster that I talked about concerning Tanzania didn’t vanish, but it was marred considerably by a Zanzibar revolution, a communist revolution in Zanzibar in which killed thousands of Arabs were killed. The minority Arabs had been the ruling elite on the island. After the revolution, Zanzibar and Tanganyika came together into the United Republic of Tanzania. This revolution changed the coloration of Tanzanian politics from a sort of pro-western neutrality which had been the pattern in the initial days after independence. There came to be a suspicion of things American. It was a difficult time. You could see relations change. I can’t think of the name of the man whom I dealt with most of the time, who was the head of foreign assistance coordination for the government of Tanzania. He continued to be helpful and cooperative. But relations cooled in a political sense.

Q: Did you understand why...?
HUMMON: You mean, why there was a revolution?

Q: No, why there was a change...

HUMMON: These were Maoist type communists who engendered the revolution in Zanzibar. This was the social and political orthodoxy that they espoused and so there was a hatred of the United States. There was also hatred of the Arabs who had been in control on the island for so long. The revolutionaries had a tremendous influence upon Nyerere and those who were on the mainland. A sort of a compromise was worked out in a new United Republic of Tanzania with Zanzibar maintaining some internal autonomy, but part of the union. And Nyerere shifted to the left, partly as an act of accommodation with the Zanzibar revolutionaries.

As part of my job I went over to Zanzibar periodically to inspect the progress and the building of the Zanzibar Technical College. I flew in something called the “Bamboo Bomber” which was a 1931 or ’32 De Haviland, that flew from Dar Es Salaam to Zanzibar. I’d go meet with the Minister of Education in the Zanzibar government. The fellow was a dedicated Marxist. He was a Stalinist or Maoist (I’m not sure I know the difference) in his views. He loved to try to tweak me into a political argument - his English was impeccable. I had to negotiate with him on any changes in terms of specifications or whatever. It was sort of a torturous scenario.

Q: But you still supported the project?

HUMMON: Yes, we continued to support the project. And they let us continue to build, although I recall there was some question on whether that would be allowed. I visited Zanzibar many times to check on the project, and carry out negotiations. One day at the airport in Zanzibar as I was planning to leave, (and this is the incident I was referring to), a group of men in uniform, whom today we would call “red guards” or para-military, armed with automatic weapons, surrounded me and pointed their guns at me. I was standing there getting ready to go out to take this little plane back to Dar. They were shouting what I believe was, “American spy, American spy!” It appeared they were either going to drag me away or shoot me right there. I don’t recall all the details; it is rather a blur. The Consul was there to see me off and bravely tried to intervene - that was Don Pederson. But they were not having any of this. Just then, Sheikh Karume, who was the vice president of the new Republic of Tanzania happened to come by. I had met him in another connection, and he, of course, knew Don. Karume (later killed by fellow conspirators, I believe) was a communist and obviously very much a part of that regime, but he knew basically what I was doing on the island. He intervened, and he got them to lay off. But anyway, for a few moments, I thought that was the end of the AID career - or any - career.

I never found out what prompted their action. It may have been only coincidental that the East Germans had published a book about that time listing the names of “U.S. Spies.” My name was among those listed. Anyone in AID or State who was a “Doctor” (although I
never used the title) was automatically on the list, it seemed. It was also just after the time
that the Tanzanians accused Bob Gordon, the Deputy Chief of Mission and Frank
Carlucci, the Consul in Zanzibar, of being spies and declared them persona non grata. I
can recall that the entire American official community at the Dar airport one night
emotionally bidding Bob and Frank farewell.
The charges were completely false, but the Zanzibaris had monitored a mainland to island
conversation between Bob and Frank in which the two were talking about people coming
from Washington for some official Tanzanian celebration. Bob and Frank, not wanting to
be too specific about who was coming until plans had been firmed up, were elliptical in
their comments sousing such a phrase as “we’re going to bring the big guns in.” Or so I
was told at the time. There was no reason for the Tanzanian action, but the firebrands
were ready to jump on anything to make an anti-American statement. The irony is that
Frank later did in fact become a “spy.” When his appointment at CIA [Central
Intelligence Agency] was announced years later, I admit I had some amusing thoughts
about what the Tanzanian reaction might have been. I suspect they had some nervous
moments.

Q: What happened to the project?

HUMMON: It continued. I went back there when I was in the Senior Seminar in the
1970s. I didn’t go to Zanzibar, but I did talk with the man whom I had dealt with in Dar,
the former coordinator of external assistance, and who at that time was the Minister of
Tourism. He was very gracious to me on my return, and said that the project was
operational. But I didn’t go over to the island.

Q: But the project is still going?

HUMMON: You know, I can’t answer that. (Later - in editing this transcript this past
week, January 2000, I checked with the Desk and the Mission. They believe the college is
now the Karume Technical College, but have no information on what training is taking
place there. USAID has no present involvement in Zanzibar. Apparently the political
situation is very touchy on the island, and relations between the mainland and the island
are rocky, e.g., mainland Tanzanians have to have a passport to go to Zanzibar.)

Q: What was the training?

HUMMON: Technical/vocational type of training at or above the trades level, as I recall.
Local skills were extraordinarily limited, as you well know, in such areas. So it was an
important type of project to the Zanzibaris, even as anti-American as these people were.

Q: Who was doing the teaching, a U.S. outfit?

HUMMON: We hadn’t completed it while I was there. So I don’t know who took over,
to be honest with you. It could have been the Chinese who moved in after we left. I just
don’t know.

Q: Did you have any other projects on Zanzibar?
HUMMON: No, not that I remember - not any specific project. They were involved in participant training.

Q: What in Tanzania were some of the projects that stood out in your mind?

HUMMON: The first that comes to mind are the training institutions, in particular the Changombe Teacher Training College and the Morogoro Agricultural College. Incidentally, both of these are flourishing. When we assisted in their development, entrance qualifications were at a relatively low level, say 9th or 10th grade. Today Changombe is on the verge of university status in the field of education, and Morogoro is a full-fledged university. I can still vividly remember sitting on the podium with President Nyerere at the dedication ceremony for Changombe, and participating with other donor representatives in discussions with the Tanzanians on the long term future of Morogoro. One of the rewards of our work is to discover that a project or projects with which we were so actively involved have in fact made a difference in the lives of people. That is a special feeling.

There were many other projects. An important example was road building. A key endeavor in those days was improving the road between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro, which was to be part of a major Tanzanian objective - a solid communication link between the port of Dar es Salaam and Lusaka - important to them for both political and economic reasons.

After the Zanzibar revolution, the Chinese came into Tanzania en masse. I can recall the sinking feelings we in the US official community had when Zhou En-Lai came for an official visit. There was a huge motorcade and thousands of cheering Tanzanians. Around that time or on that day there were rocks thrown at the USIA [United States Information Agency] center. Goldwater was characterized as a dangerous lunatic in the local press leading up to the 1964 election. The political climate changed very rapidly early on when I was there, and the Chinese seemed to be hand in hand with the Tanzanians. It was discouraging to us, but our AID program plowed ahead.

There was great fear in Washington that the Chinese would consolidate their presence in East and Southern Africa by building a railroad between Dar es Salaam and Zambia. We were greatly concerned about the blossoming relations between the Tanzanians and the Chinese.

I have to tell you one brief anecdote. I went over one day to meet with the External Assistance Coordinator (I went with Dave Shear, who was working as the exceptionally capable Assistant Program Officer). I have a difficult time with language. If someone doesn’t speak the king’s English, I have a hard time. It’s something in my hearing. I only understood the Coordinator about 50 percent of the time, but I’d smile and so forth. He was talking on and on, something about the Chinese, and I’d nod. So anyway the conversation ended and we went back. Dave turned to me and said, “Did you hear? Wasn’t that something?” I said, “What do you mean?” He said, “Well the Chinese have
agreed to come in and build the railroad to Lusaka.” And I had not heard this, so I didn’t know it. Anyway, we raced back to the Embassy to see the Ambassador and wrote up a cable on this. Of course, it was major and depressing news for Washington.

We carried out some capital projects as well as technical assistance. It was a combination of both capital infrastructure and technical assistance. Years later, when I was in Botswana, I was at one of the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordinating Committee) conferences. One of the Tanzanian representatives was there and whom, as a younger man, I had known. He commented (of course, who knows all the motivations involved) positively in terms of what we had done in those days as something that was sort of a hallmark of the type of technical assistance that they desired, which they had moved away from when they went into their ultra-African socialism type of motif. In later years, as they moved away from that, he said they had wanted to come back to a similar-type of relationship with the United States.

Q: Well, it was a very upbeat time, during the early days of the Kennedy administration.

HUMMON: It was indeed. Incidentally, I might mention that there were almost 600 Peace Corps volunteers at that time when we were there.

Q: Do you remember what kind of projects we were supporting with the Peace Corps?

HUMMON: We would call them today a small project fund, to individual volunteers for such activities as well building. There was no grand scheme or master plan in terms of revolutionizing the economy. But the idea was to give added resources to the Peace Corps volunteers to carry out their activities.

Q: How did you find it working with the Tanzanian people?

HUMMON: I thought the Tanzanians were by and large terrific. I liked the Coordinator of External Assistance with whom we dealt. He was very helpful and responsive. We also had much contact with a talented individual named Nsekela who later became Minister of Finance. Paul Bomani was the then Finance Minister, and capable. We also had much contact with an Asian minister, Jamal (I don’t remember his portfolio) whom I later met in a different incarnation in Geneva. He was also very bright. Individual Tanzanians at all levels were very kind to me and my family. The political change which took place didn’t really spill over into the type of relations that I had at my level even when I was Acting Director.

Q: How was the bureaucracy to work with?

HUMMON: This is early independence. There were still a lot of Brits around, and there was a need for considerable training of people. There were some highly qualified Tanzanians, but there was a thin number who had really been trained. There were some frustrations, but primarily procedural, not substantive except for the lingering pall cast over U.S.-Tanzanian relations by the overall attitudes about the U.S. after the Zanzibar revolution.
Q: You were there for how many years?

HUMMON: Two and a half years. Allen Loren, who was a great person, left and went back to Washington and I stayed on as Acting Director for several months. Sam Butterfield, a terrific guy, and a good friend to this day, and a very fine officer returned as the Director, and I stayed with him for six months. Then I went back to Washington.

Q: Anything more on the Tanzanian experience that you want to comment on? It was a rather interesting period, I guess.

HUMMON: It was a fascinating period. The most important event that happened to us as a family was that my wife, Jean, gave birth to our daughter, Sarah, at the Aga Khan hospital in Dar es Salaam. Sarah was delivered by a local mid-wife. I must admit that Jean and I had some apprehension, but both my wife and daughter fared well. Given that occurrence, Tanzania will always have a special place in our memory, quite apart from the richness of the experiences we had in our work.

I’ll just mention one other item unrelated to my work, because it gives a sense of what can occur living overseas in different cultures, and in a tragic climate of intolerance.

I’ve always been very much interested in athletics and had played sports in high school and college. We had a USAID basketball team and we would play each new group of Peace Corps volunteers that came into the country. We had a running series. Anyway, this caught the notice of the Ministry of Sports and Culture (or whatever it was called) in the new United Republic of Tanzania. The All-Africa games were coming up in 1965. Tanzania was scheduled to play the Republic of Malagasy, which was the reigning African basketball champion. But Tanzania had no organized team. One of the sports ministry people came to me and said, “Mr. Hummon, would you be the coach of the national basketball team?” I checked with Ambassador Leonhart, and said, “Sure, I’d be glad to.” We had several tryouts. I picked a team in which half were Asian Tanzanians and half were African Tanzanians, all citizens. The best player was an African kid who didn’t have shoes. Despite my buying him tennis shoes, he didn’t want to wear them. We practiced for several days. Well, the Malagasy team came and the night of the game was at the Tanzanian indoor stadium with 2-3000 in attendance. A few minutes before game time a representative of the sports ministry came to me and said, “Mr. Hummon, you cannot play any of the Asians.” And I said, “What? They are Tanzanian citizens.” He said, “No matter. You only play Africans.” I said, “Well, I’m sorry, Mr. Whoever-He-Was, you get yourself another coach. I quit.” Somewhat startled, he went back for a confab with others of his ministry who were there. After a while he came back and he said, “Okay. You can play the Asians but they can’t start the game.” I said, “That’s unacceptable. I’ll start with the best players. They’re all citizens. I was asked to coach the Tanzanian team, a Tanzanian citizen team, and, if the Asian citizens can’t start, you still can get yourself another coach.” He hemmed and hawed and finally went back to this entourage in the stands. They were in serious discussion or debate for some time with the start of the game being delayed. He finally came back and said with little joy, “Okay, do
it anyway you want to.” I wish I could say the game had a Cinderella ending, but we lost 62-16 as I recall, even with the lineup that I insisted upon. The Malagasy team killed us with one fast break after another.

However, the story did not end there. It was two game series, and I changed our strategy but not the lineup. I had our two guards drop back immediately after each of our attempts or success at scoring and stopped their fast breaks. We also played zone instead of man to man we had tried in the first game. Remarkably, the Tanzanian kids, who had been routed in the first encounter, were actually ahead 22 to 19 at the end of the third quarter. The crowd was wild with enthusiasm, including my friends from the sports ministry. Eventually we lost by 3 or 4 points, mainly because our two best players, one African and one Asian, fouled out in the middle of the fourth quarter. The game was a moral victory - to me, in more ways than one. But the overall affair was a depressing example of the evil of intolerance in any form.

Q: Did you notice that attitude in areas other than sports. That the Asians were second class...?

HUMMON: That was the most direct illumination. That was a personal thing, and, in a sense, they could have said to me, “You get out of here period!” Yes, you could see it. But there are shades of gray in so many of these things. Most of the shopkeepers were Asian and they generally employed only member of their own family or other Asians, not Africans to work in the stores. There wasn’t a great deal of understanding and solicitude on the part of the Asians for the development needs of the African masses that had to take place. We have seen similar situations and consequences in other societies. The Zanzibar revolution, with its horrific retaliation, was certainly exacerbated by the insensitivity on the part of the Arabs to the needs of the black Africans.

Q: Did you have any sense of Nyerere’s view?

HUMMON: That’s a tough one.

Q: No evidence of it one way or another?

HUMMON: It’s difficult to answer, I’m sure his sentiments were in favor of tolerance. His basic makeup was to be tolerant and to try to have all Tanzanians feel part of the state - witness the fact that he had Jamal, an Asian, as a minister and a white Tanzanian as Agricultural Minister, as I recall. There was other evidence as well but the pressures were great and the demands for change in the development status on part of the Africans were immense. He was also developing his concepts of African socialism which would have a serious economic impact on the Asian community, and the total economy. I think in fairness to him he was caught in a very difficult situation.

Q: Did you meet with Nyerere?

HUMMON: Yes, several times. We had several signing ceremonies.
Q: What were your impressions?

HUMMON: I should note that my exchanges with him were in the category of pleasantries. But I was impressed with him. I was impressed with him before I went there. I had learned of him when I was at Ann Arbor in graduate school, long before independence. He was one of the heroes of the liberal group of students and professors.

Q: Anything more on Tanzania you want to comment on? When you finished up there in 19...?

HUMMON: 1966. Let me add that the first post, I believe, is usually special for those of us in the Foreign Service. Despite whatever difficulties we might have experienced, Tanzania brings back many happy memories. The Tanzanians are a great people. I recall that when we left, it was with a good deal of sadness.

And, as I have remarked, it is with a satisfaction, and gratitude, to hear that projects with which you were associated are still functioning, and making a difference - after nearly 35 years. Yes, Tanzania was a special place.

Q: And then were did you go?

HUMMON: Returned to Washington as USAID/Executive Secretary - 1966

Q: What position did you go to in Washington?

HUMMON: I went to the position of Officer in Charge of the East Africa and Southern Africa area under Gene Reed, who was the Office Director. Herman Klein was Deputy for Africa and, I guess, Ed Hutchinson was Assistant Administrator. I was in that job for only a brief period.

Q: And you moved on to what position after that?

HUMMON: I became Executive Secretary of the Agency.

Q: I see. What is that position? People may not understand.

HUMMON: The Executive Secretary of the Agency is like a Chief of Staff and special assistant to the Administrator. Generally, everything that goes to the Administrator goes through the Executive Secretary and most items that come out from the Administrator go through the Executive Secretary.

Q: Who was the Administrator at the time?
HUMMON: Bill Gaud was the Administrator. I took over that job with him at the helm.

Q: How did you happen to get that position? That’s quite remarkable.

HUMMON: Well, that’s a good question. I’m not quite sure. The then Executive Secretary was leaving to take over a position as Deputy Assistant Administrator for Administration and so they were looking for a replacement. I didn’t throw my hat in the ring. I didn’t even know I was under consideration but they did some sort of an assessment and they talked with different people. I don’t know. It apparently just sort of happened that my name came up. I guess it was based, in part, upon what had transpired in Tanzania, perhaps being Acting Director for awhile. I was at the right age - generally speaking, as the job over the years has gone to people in their thirties. I’m not sure. Call it luck.

Q: What do you remember of that experience?

HUMMON: Well, I survived. It was a tough job. There were long hours. Weekends. Bill Gaud was there nearly every Saturday, and every minute that he was there, I was there. It was a very demanding job. At that time in AID, there was no separate Chief of Staff position, or Counselor job - there were no special assistants to the Administrator except for a historically focused job handled by the “grand old man” of foreign assistance, C. Tyler Wood. So the Executive Secretary could be involved in a surfeit of assignments, from mundane details of planning senior staff luncheons to helping arbitrate a major substantive dispute between Bureaus. There was considerable contact and negotiation with Assistant Administrators and other senior personnel within the Agency (and also with basically anyone who wanted to see you - and there were many), as well as key people in State, OMB [Office of Management and Budget], the White House, etc. Most important was to ensure that the paperwork and documentation surrounding the actions of the Administrator and Agency were accurate and moved apace. This involved memoranda going to the Administrator for decision, documents sent to the Secretary of State or the President, letters to Congressmen, correspondence to a citizen writing to complain about some aspect of AID’s performance, such as its being a waste of taxpayer’s money, and so on. Every day brought new adventures. It was a real learning experience. It was a job with a tremendous amount of potential for doing good and also for doing some harm.

I have to go back when I was at the Navy Department as editor of the Navy Management Review. In one issue I printed an editorial by the Secretary of the Navy. Unfortunately, in proof-reading I left out the word “not” in one sentence of his about the Soviet Union. I can still remember to this day one of my bosses, a GS-16 Deputy Director of the office, coming into my cubicle and saying, “My God, Hummon. What have you done?” My error had changed the meaning of the Secretary’s sentence so that it appeared he was actually in favor of some reprehensible action of the USSR. Thus, I, at an early stage in my career, became extra sensitive to the importance of accuracy in documentation. And that served me well as Executive Secretary.
I think Bill Gaud was probably one of our most effective Administrators in an extraordinarily difficult time. He was a very bright guy and hardworking and articulate. I know that many people in AID liked him very much and greatly respected his abilities. But I have to be honest. Bill Gaud was not an easy person for me to work with. We just didn’t hit it off at all that well personally. He could be enormously charming and personable to those outside and to the press, but at least to some of the people who worked for him, he could be very demanding and tough, and I didn’t always respond as well to that as I should have. It was more a matter of style; there is no question but that he was an exceptionally gifted manager in the broad sense. He had colorful language more like a tough ship captain than a privileged Ivy League graduate. He was a master of it and was actually very funny at times. I never really was totally comfortable with him until basically the last period of time before his departure after the Democratic loss in the November, 1968 election.

On the other hand, when his replacement, Dr. John Hannah, came in, we hit it off just from day one. We both shared Midwest and Michigan roots and similar views in many areas, including a lively interest in Big Ten football, and a dislike of the University of Michigan football team (this is too complicated to go into, and it obviously has nothing to do with development, but it is an example of the fact that many factors may go into relationships, which in turn have an impact on how we carry out our jobs.)

Q: But during the period with Bill Gaud, were there any particular issues that you recall that you had to deal with? I mean, there must have been a lot of them, but does anything stand out?

HUMMON: There were a variety of things that took place, but the overwhelming item was Vietnam. So much of our attention was focused on what was happening in that country. Many of the decisions on personnel, so much of the funding actions, were related to that. I think that I spent, I don’t know, I won’t give a percentage, but a substantial portion of my time dealing with questions about what was happening in Vietnam.

I remember one thing in particular that typified the schizophrenic view of the Agency on Vietnam in those days. This was right after the Tet Offensive in 1968. The Assistant Administrator for Vietnam came in when I was with Bill Gaud and gave Gaud a glowing report on the AID effort. He said, you know, yes, Tet was tough but it was only for two or three days. Our projects are still moving forward. It was a difficult situation, but it is an example of the fact that many factors may go into relationships, which in turn have an impact on how we carry out our jobs.)

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evening with Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, Bill Colby, and Carol Laise, Bunker’s wife. We sat around and I basically listened. They talked about the war and what AID was doing.

Q: What was their attitude that evening?

HUMMON: Well, Abrams was, I think, very realistic. They all were realistic. This is a tough situation. We’ve got a long ways to go, and this will not be an easy task, but we’re willing to continue. It’s sort of an incremental thing in which we must persevere.

Q: So still upbeat?

HUMMON: Still upbeat. This was in ‘69 now that we’re talking about. This was after Tet. I think Bunker was basically upbeat, Colby certainly was and Dr. Hannah was. He was a supporter of the effort there. As Gaud had been, even though Gaud had his moments of disquietude about what was happening in Vietnam. But when it came down to crunch time, Gaud was willing to continue the support.

I also spent quite a bit of time with a man named John Paul Vann in Vietnam. I don’t know whether you know that name or not.

Q: Yes. It’s a famous name.

HUMMON: He was a supporter, but he also just sort of devastated a lot of the conceptions that I had about what appeared to be the situation. It was almost like a Potemkin Village in a sense, you know. You go into one of these villages and all the smiling children raise American flags and wave enthusiastically. But he was along on one particular visit and he was talking about what was really happening behind the scenes in all the villages and all over the countryside. He talked about the corruption that was endemic in the South Vietnamese military, and the commitment and terror of the Viet Cong...

Q: So he was presenting a...

HUMMON: A very honest appraisal; now, he wasn’t doing that so much to Hannah, because he didn’t have as much access to him, but he was giving it to me. He talked a lot about that and I talked a lot about that with Dr. Hannah, particularly after we left. And I think that Dr. Hannah had reservations but was still hoping that ... well, this was when he first came into office too ... he was hoping that this could be pulled off. God bless them, the AID people who were there, they were surely trying hard, they were trying under very difficult and often dangerous circumstances.

Q: What was your understanding of the program that we were trying to carry out?

HUMMON: It encompassed about everything. You name it, we were involved in it, whether it be a road program, a literacy program or training, or a health program, etc. I
don’t know if we were so much in family planning. We had these Corps organizations in Vietnam and some of our best top flight mission directors were assigned as regional heads in different locations. Within these regions they were trying to improve health, education, sanitation, provincial development across the board. And trying to win the minds of the people as well.

Q: The philosophy was to win the hearts and the minds of the people. Do you think any of it was working?

HUMMON: Yes and no. It is tough to fight fire with marshmallows. Let’s suppose that you come in here and want me to join a theoretically wonderful organization and I have a neighbor who tells me that if I join, he’ll burn my house down. And he has a network of unknown supporters, and the police cannot really protect me because they are corrupt or inefficient or apprehensive themselves. The decision is not going to be difficult. I am not saying that there were not some atrocities on the part of the South Vietnamese and even the Americans in some instances, but we were dealing with an enemy that was determined and brutal. It was very difficult to fight that type of desire and willingness to kill those who collaborated with the Americans. I think, well, obviously you know that there were a lot of factors involved, but we’re talking about whether the effort was successful. The answer is yes to a considerable extent in the development context, but also no.

Q: Why no?

HUMMON: Well, as I say because of the threat. As I’ve indicated, part of the our job was not only development, but also to win the minds and the hearts of the people. We were doing a pretty good job in development, and to a certain extent we were doing a good job in the other, but only to a point - because of the fear in the communities of the sword of Damocles falling on them. If we had driven out all the North Vietnamese and contained the Viet Cong, if in effect we had won the war, the programs would have largely been a total development success. But in terms of winning the peoples’s allegiance, there was just too much danger from the other side lurking in the shadows, and later emerging more openly.

Q: Not a good environment for development.

HUMMON: It was a sad environment. And, of course, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the war. It took resources away from other areas of the world. I forget the figures, but a substantial portion of our personnel force in the Agency was in Vietnam. They were pulling people out of other countries to go to Vietnam. It was THE priority, particularly under Gaud. I was, of course, with him in the waning days of the Johnson Administration. The President, not that I had substantive contact with him, was consumed with Vietnam that last year.

Q: You attended meetings with President Johnson?
HUMMON: I was at ceremonial occasions and I recall reports on substantive sessions.

Q: What was the topic?

HUMMON: Vietnam.

Q: What was the tone of Johnson’s view at that time?

HUMMON: I don’t really know. He was kind of like a person with mood swings - in meetings such as these, or so it was told to me. People said that he would be very upbeat and then kind of get down and then come back in a fighting mood. What I am trying to say is that in my years under Gaud as Ex Sec [Executive Secretary] the White House seemed obsessed with Vietnam. Since AID was such a critical factor in this, it permeated our dialogue. Yes, other events were taking place in other parts of the world, in Africa, or south Asia, wherever, but in my job, working for Administrator Gaud, I primarily remember Vietnam - even though many development initiatives were apace. For example, during his tenure, I had an artist friend, Barbara Shear, paint a scene portraying the Green Revolution as a farewell gift from the senior staff. But other important initiatives were subsumed under Vietnam.

Q: But under Hannah did you find an evolution of his views about what was going on?

HUMMON: I think so, but I left before his term expired and long before the exodus from Vietnam. I’m sure, as in the case of so many, there was a change in views. Vietnam certainly did not consume him. His Administration is remembered for many other initiatives. I think that the visits, especially that first visit, may have tempered his views early on. He was a very complex person, disarmingly simple in approach, but really multi-faceted. I know that you knew him pretty well too. He was a conservative; in fact, he had been Deputy, actually Assistant Secretary of Defense, but the same as Deputy Secretary of Defense, in the Eisenhower Administration. He was conservative in his politics, and he was very pro-military. Maybe that’s not quite the right was to say it, but he was very respectful of the military point of view. He was strongly anti-communist, not in an obsessive way or anything like that, but just in recognizing that this was a danger to the democratic way of life. At the same time, he was a person of compassion and understanding and tolerant of other points of view. And as you know, his mantra was that AID in there to help people. He’d talk about that all the time. It wasn’t just a shibboleth. It was something that he really believed. He was a very smart, cagey guy, and I think that he was wise enough to see that we were in trouble out there and yet he had still the hope that something positive would come of it. I remember Hannah for many things other than Vietnam.

Q: Anything more on your role as Executive Secretary?

HUMMON: Yes, I think that probably I had as good a relationship with John Hannah as I had with any boss. He probably gave me more authority than I ever had, and we had a close personal relationship. I was involved in about everything, including personal meetings he had with such people as Nelson Rockefeller, Duffy Daugherty, the Michigan
State football coach and Jerry Falwell (Actually, Falwell was there to warn against family planning programs and the evil of abortion.), along with much more substantive participation than had been the pattern of Executive Secretaries in the past. He reported to the President, and somewhat laterally to the Secretary of State, and he was my immediate superior. And we were a key agency in the sphere of foreign affairs that enveloped our nation in this period of Vietnam. It was a job that was exceptional. In retrospect, I probably should have stayed with it until he left AID, as he asked me to do, but I was anxious to go back overseas.

**Q: Did he have a particular view of development policy? What was he advocating?**

**HUMMON: Yes. He was a great believer in agriculture stemming in part from his background as President of Michigan State University, a land grant institution with a focus on agriculture. They had been involved in agriculture projects in Nigeria and other countries as well. And he felt that AID should spur agricultural production. That this was a major key to development. He also felt that the university community should be brought more fully into the whole development sphere. And so he emphasized these two views with considerable success and supported the Green Revolution with the miracle seed varieties and the work of IRRI. During that period of time, I helped with the negotiation on some of the grants and the signing with different institutions to foster the changes in agriculture, particularly in South Asia, and to develop the new varieties of grain. Also through Title XII he brought the universities much more into development activities. He believed strongly in training; he believed in education. Perhaps he had less of an interest in the infrastructure side, or in macroeconomic changes within the economy, although he understood those. We also weren’t talking much about the private sector; he believed in private enterprise, but there was not much emphasis on the private sector per se. It was more in the areas that I mentioned. He was one of the two best Administrators ... from my perspective ... that we had in the Agency.**

**Q: How would you characterize how he was better than others? What were his distinctive characteristics?**

**HUMMON: Well, there were two or three characteristics. One was that he was a very caring person and a very good man. I’m not saying that others weren’t. It was just that he was special. If you worked with him on a daily basis you felt this. He was a very fair person. He tried to be eminently fair and he was often in a difficult situation. He wasn’t always able to follow through on personnel decisions that he had made because of the strictures of the Nixon White House. They became very involved at that time in the politics of AID and would not give clearance to certain people for posts, myself included later on. You too. And so Dr. Hannah had to go back on commitments that he made, and I know it was very disappointing for him.**

For example, I remember in a visit to Vietnam we met with the AID regional directors, who had been Latin American or other area Mission Directors. Dr. Hannah said, well, you finish your tour and you’ll get back to being a Mission Director in Latin America or whatever. And he wasn’t able to deliver in those cases in which they were registered
Democrats. They were refused clearance by the White House. But, what I’m trying to say, is that there was one major factor why he was successful - he was a caring person and people recognized that.

Secondly, I think he was right in his emphasis upon PEOPLE, that aid was not an exercise in economic theory, or in debating the variables involved in sustainable growth, or primarily about the U.S. national interest, and the like. It was important to recognize that we were in this to help those less fortunate - that was the real measurement of performance, not GNP or other statistical factors.

I remember visits with him to missions which had a heavy emphasis on sectoral and macro-economic growth. Hannah could be effectively conversant in the mysteries of the macro elements of our assistance effort, but he also in exchanges at such missions, indeed at all missions, continued to stress that our primary focus had to be PEOPLE. I believe that even the most cynical of AID opponents had to recognize that this was a man who truly believed in the human element of our effort. He was able to convey that very effectively.

Next, he was a great Administrator in the sense that he delegated very well to others. He would let the people who were running the bureaus do their jobs, and I think that was good.

Finally, he was very effective with the Congress. And that, perhaps was as important as anything. He had a very good relationship with Congressman Otto Passman, the key player in the House foreign aid appropriation process.

Q: That was a miracle.

HUMMON: Yes, that was a miracle. Passman would rant and rail at him and talk about aid being money going down a rat hole, but then they’d get together and they’d mark up the bill and decide what the figure was. Passman had a bottom line that had already been negotiated with the Administrator. The relationship that he developed with Passman and others helped to maintain a respectable level of funding.

Q: Was he obliged to have quid pro quos with Passman on Passman interests?

HUMMON: Well, you know, I suppose so. Passman was obviously particularly interested in Louisiana politics and projects. I hesitate to comment more than in general terms, since I don’t recall the details, but we would be responsive to this type of tit for tat sort of thing. I have a recollection of our being supportive of at least one project that he was particularly interested in, which otherwise might not have been of the highest priority to AID.

Q: That’s not a unique phenomenon.
HUMMON: No, it’s not unique in life.
Q: What about the Congressional relationship, generally? You were obviously involved to some extent. What were your experiences when you were working with Congress?

HUMMON: My contact with Congress was limited. I had more contact with the White House than I did with the Congress during this period as Executive Secretary. I was, of course, involved in all the weekly Congressional presentation discussions, and probably accompanied Hannah to hearings on a few occasions. Clearly there was a growing unease over Vietnam in Congress as throughout the country and that was reflected in views on the AID program.

As a related matter, disenchantment with Vietnam and a negative perception of AID’s role there on the part of some helped to lead to the earmarking that emerged in the period of the 60s and 70s which became a serious hamstring upon the Agency. The amount of money that should go to certain countries or programs and other restrictive legislation increasingly became the pattern. It handicapped us in terms of our flexibility to most effectively carry out an assistance program. And then, of course, while John Hannah was still Administrator, although this took place after I left Ex Sec, Congress came up with the “New Directions” legislation. Part of this was a reaction to Vietnam, but basically the idea was that our assistance should be focused on helping the poorest of the poor.

Q: Were you there at the time that this idea was being developed?

HUMMON: No, I wasn’t there when the actual legislation came out.

Q: But in the beginnings of that?

HUMMON: Not really. However, Dr. Hannah was supportive of much of the basic concepts in this, in terms of getting our aid to the poorest of the poor and the emphasis on technical assistance as of major importance. As you know, we started off as a technical assistance agency in 1949 and 1950 with Stanley Andrews and Henry Bennett. But we had become a multi-headed instrument in the Cold War. The “New Directions” were, at least in the minds of many, a return to our roots. I should note that Dr. Hannah was developing a New Directions agenda of his own with a new Technical Assistance Bureau as its centerpiece, and the other initiatives I have mentioned. What emerged in Congress as a new mandate was generally consistent with what Dr. Hannah was constructing. But the Congressional initiative went even further in its focus on what later came to be designated as Basic Human Needs.

Q: You said you had a lot of contact with the White House. How would you characterize the difference between the Johnson period and the beginning of the Nixon period?

HUMMON: As far as the discussions that I had with the White House during the Johnson Administration, the focus was mainly about Vietnam. I don’t want to over-emphasize that, because there were many elements - but that was the main subject. When I was Ex Sec under Hannah, the bulk of my discussions with White House staff were almost strictly on personnel appointments, on jobs for Republicans.
Q: This was under Nixon?

HUMMON: Yes, under Nixon. I think that Nixon was basically supportive of the AID program in general, but my personal contact was mainly about getting political appointees assigned to AID jobs. To a degree, that was not totally surprising given that this was a new Administration, Moreover, Hannah had asked me to be the contact at the time, even though it was not particularly appropriate. I was a career employee and as it turned out, I was a Democrat. The experience actually hurt me in ongoing assignments.

Dr. Hannah knew that I was a Democrat, but he judged that I would be fair in looking at the political candidates. He was right. But they should have had one of their own handle this from the beginning, as they eventually did when Lane Dwinell, a former Governor of New Hampshire or some other New England state, took over the duties from me. You know, as I think back, Dr. Hannah believed that, although I was a Democrat, I supported Nixon. I did not have the heart (or courage?) to tell him I would have voted for George had I been registered.

Q: How deep did the Nixon administration go in appointing people into the system? Do you remember?

HUMMON: Well, they went about as deep as they could. And, Dr. Hannah, although he was a Republican appointee, was resisting this. But certainly all of the Mission Directors and Deputy Mission Directors had to be cleared for political acceptability. It was regrettable.

Q: In Washington, the office directors?

HUMMON: No. Yes and no. If some political type wanted a job as Office Director for a specific area, there might be a problem. I cannot recall specific cases of that type. It was more in the nature of: this man helped in the Iowa campaign. What can you do for him? There was much interviewing of prospective appointees, many of them poorly qualified, although clearly not all. We tried to place many of these people. That was fair. What was not fair was to insist upon a certain political registration for all Mission Directors, and generally Deputy Directors - the whole idea of White House involvement, and bringing politics into the selection process for development leadership. It was a crusade for many of these people at the White House at the time (I did not look forward to their calls, just as I was not thrilled when Otto Passman called on other subjects. It was bipartisan timidity or uncertainty on how to handle the requests on my part) and many Directors and Deputy Directors did not get clearance.

Q: And how do you think this affected their performance in the Agency?

HUMMON: Well, in terms of upcoming assignments, for any who were Democrats or Independent, particularly the former, it could have affected them pretty adversely.
Q: Anything else on that period?

HUMMON: It was an exciting period.

Q: Did you feel that there were some specific things that you were trying to do that your position didn’t quite allow for?

HUMMON: No, not really. I was not an originator as such, but, for example, to help in negotiating differences such as on the Green Revolution program was a positive experience. And there was an opportunity to spread the Hannah gospel on helping people. My job was essentially an extension of the Administrator. Of course, as you well know, that in itself gives you a great deal of instant credibility.

Q: Where did you go after that?

Assigned as Deputy Mission Director in USAID/Nigeria - 1970

HUMMON: I went to Nigeria. I remember Dr. Hannah calling me in and saying that he wanted me to go to Nigeria to be Mission Director and, while pleased, I was reluctant.

Q: What year was that?

HUMMON: That would have been 1970. I didn’t particularly want it. I actually had my mind set on going to Indonesia as a Deputy Mission Director. I had been there and felt that would be an appropriate next step in my career. But Hannah had his mind set on having me go to Nigeria. He had a fascination with things Nigerian, and I finally said yes. My name was sent to the White House for clearance. They came back and asked for my political registration, but I didn’t have any. We had moved from Virginia to Maryland and I had not registered. So I went and registered as a Democrat. I know some AID officers (I won’t mention any names) who changed their registration to Republican in that period. Registering as a Democrat was the wrong thing to do if you were trying to get an important assignment at that time. So, the White House refused to clear me. And this went on for an extended period. Finally, they agreed to clear me as Deputy Director. Hannah was still under that impression that he would eventually secure a clearance for me as Mission Director, and the Nigerians thought that I was coming as the Director (I had earlier been introduced to a high-level Nigerian delegation as the new Director-to-be). But it never happened and eventually the White House was holding up other nominations throughout the world, unless Dr. Hannah would agree to select a political type as Director in Nigeria.

Q: But you did go out as Deputy Director?

HUMMON: Yes

Q: What was the situation in Nigeria at that time?
HUMMON: They had emerged from the “Biafran” civil war. There were major animosities among the tribal groups, between the Ibos, on the one hand, and the Yorubas, and Hausa. However, there was much reconstruction that was being undertaken in the East, the former “Biafra.” I spent much of my time on that. In this I worked with Brigadier Obasanjo, who later became President and is President again now. I worked very closely with him.

Q: What kind of projects were you working on?

HUMMON: We were rebuilding roads and bridges - infrastructure in the East. However, the main focus of the program throughout Nigeria had been in technical assistance, and in training, and in the development of agricultural and other educational institutions. We had many university contractors working there. It was a large American presence plus a substantial number of local employees. But the situation was changing. The Nigerians had discovered sizeable quantities of oil. The considerable interest that they had in the past in terms of American assistance suddenly was muted. They began to feel that they really didn’t need our impact as much any more, although they would have welcomed continuing high levels of untied grants or soft loans. There was a diminution in interest in U.S. technical advice. At the same time, Washington started to believe that we didn’t need to be giving much money out there.

So, as it turned out, I went out there in a situation in which very early on it became obvious that there would be a down-sizing. Moreover, I still could not get clearance as Director, and it became apparent quite soon, I believe, to the Nigerians that I was not likely to take over the Director’s position. It was essentially a lame duck situation from the beginning. In all honesty, although there were many, many gratifying experiences and efforts, in many respects it was the least satisfying assignment of my career. There were days when I thought, why did I agree to take this job, given the possibility of various alternatives. But life is like that, isn’t? And the other side of the equation is that there was so much about Nigeria and Nigerians that we loved. We developed excellent relations with many individual Nigerians, and many of the people with whom we worked were exceptionally talented.

Q: What type of work did you have to do in the down-sizing process?

HUMMON: Well, you had to tell people that their jobs were going to be abolished; you had to tell contractors that we were not going to extend their contracts, and you had to tell the Nigerians that we were not going to be providing assistance in many areas in which there had been aid in the past. All the while, you were attempting to maintain Mission morale and hold things together. There were accomplishments. We negotiated a program loan - new in the Nigerian program, and essentially new to Africa. We worked out the parameters of a new block grant approach to assistance which meant a sharp reduction in personnel, and coincidentally, a reduction in levels. Our aid to reconstruction in the East after the “Biafran” Civil War was an important contribution.

Q: What was the extent of the impact that the program was having at that time?
HUMMON: I think that the program before my time, in other words, the program historically had quite a positive impact in terms of developing institutions within the country such as Ahmadu Bello University [agricultural and veterinary colleges] and the Zaria Institute of Public Administration. Also Ife University [agricultural college] and the development of the University of Nigeria in the East were significant contributions. There was considerable training of Nigerians. The AID presence in Nigeria had been basically a very positive experience up to that point. I think that it was at the end of a golden era, if you will, in Nigeria, which unfortunately coincided with my arrival. Things kind of fell apart; we basically phased out of Nigeria; they had discovered oil and they went their own way.

After that period, the Nigerian economy boomed for many years. By the mid-1980s, per capita GDP had actually reached a high of $1,000. But mismanagement of resources, extensive corruption coupled with serious violations of human rights led to a major reversal in the economic situation, let alone a deterioration in political conditions. Many of the economic gains of the past have been reversed. President Obasanjo and the Nigerian people have a major task ahead in getting the country back on track both economically and politically. In recent years the USAID presence was non-existent or pretty limited, as I understand it - essentially NGOs in family planning and maternal and child welfare and attacking the HIV/AIDS epidemic. That is changing - greater participation is planned with the new democratic government.

Q: Well you said that you met several times with General Obasanjo. What kind of person is he?

HUMMON: He was great. Very tough. We traveled together to the East. He was respected within the Nigerian military. While he was from the military, he was very much interested in development as well. He had a wonderful wife. She was a very nice lady. They were really a very special couple.

Q: Did you find that he was a man of integrity, a man of honesty that you could deal with?

HUMMON: Yes, I did. I really liked him. I thought he was one of the most dedicated and competent officials. There were many, of course, who were able. But he impressed me especially as a person of real honesty. You know dash in Nigeria was an insidious item, payments to smooth the way for actions being taken. That’s not limited to Nigeria, that happens in all countries, not excluding our own in certain types of instances. I felt he was much above that. I was not at all surprised when a few years later he became President, and that he relinquished power to civilian authority. I hope that he and Nigeria do well now.

Q: His position then was what?

HUMMON: He was in charge of the Nigerian Corps of Engineers, which was the most
powerful element in the army. He had been a hero of the “Biafran” war. He was in charge of new construction in the East. I just took it upon myself to get very heavily involved in that part because we were kind of at a standstill in some of the other areas for a variety of reasons. One was that we were not getting money from Washington, as much money as we had in the past. I guess that was probably as good a reason as any. But there was also a change in the attitude of Nigerians toward U.S. aid.

Q: What was your recollection or impression of the degree of devastation and the loss of life as a result of the civil war?

HUMMON: Well, I was there after the fighting, of course. But there was a lot of destruction, considerable physical destruction, and, of course, the stories of the dying and starving of the Africans were very much in evidence. I think it was a very tragic situation, and I think it was one of the first times that the international community began to wake up in a humanitarian sense and say, “Something must be done about this.” It was generally more the private community that answered the call and initially inspired the humanitarian response than it was the government. Governments, including our own, were not as responsive initially. But I think AID was very helpful in rebuilding the East, and, as an agency, in eventually helping focus attention upon grave humanitarian concerns world-wide.

Q: Okay. Anything else on your Nigerian experience?

HUMMON: I’d like to think that AID, in that period of time, had some impact that was beneficial to the country. I continue to believe that the future of Nigeria can be a great one.

Q: Well then, you finished up in Nigeria in what year?

HUMMON: I will add something about Nigeria. AID had excellent relationships with the Embassy, and I want to mention Ambassador Bill Trueheart and Ambassador John Reinhardt, and Ed Mulcahy who was the DCM. They were all terrific. They were very supportive in a difficult time. Mike Adler was there as Mission Director when I first went there, and he was a very good person. The Nigerians were particularly difficult with Ambassador Trueheart; his farewell was essentially a lampooning by the Nigerian spokesman, and totally undeserving. The Nigerians were feeling their oats, and the Americans were now considered somewhat irrelevant or worse.

Q: Alright. And you left Nigeria when?

Attended the State Department’s Senior Seminar - 1972

HUMMON: 1972 and went to the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy.

Q: What is the Senior Seminar?
HUMMON: The Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy is a year’s sabbatical for individuals within the Foreign Service agencies and the military to learn more about the United States and a variety of issues and to sharpen your skills and knowledge so that you are a better leader in the future. They’d take, at least in those days, I don’t know what the practice is today, but they’d take a couple of officers from AID, two or three from CIA, one or two from DOD [Department of Defense], five or six from the regular Foreign Service of the State Department, a couple from USIA, and one officer from each of the four military services. We met together daily for nine months in Washington at the Foreign Service Institute and also traveled around the country to learn more about the inner cities, to learn more about what was happening within our own country. We met with political leaders. For example in Chicago, we met with Mayor Daley and in California we spent time with Governor Reagan, Mike Deaver and others of his staff (I am still in contact with Mike Deaver today). We spent time with Jimmy Carter in Atlanta. We went to Puerto Rico. We also did a research project and I actually undertook an assessment of UNDP [United Nations Development Program] performance. In the course of that, I went to Tanzania where I had served before and I also went to Indonesia.

Q: This was your special study?

HUMMON: My special study for six weeks. So it was an eventful year. There was a great deal of comradery among the people that were part of this group.

Q: What were they trying to do?

HUMMON: Well, what they were trying to do was to increase our skills and our understanding of events in our own country. The idea was to enhance our knowledge of what was going on in the United States so that we could more effectively represent our country in our future jobs and throughout the foreign affairs community. But it also sharpened our skills across the board. I mean, we spent time with economists to discuss both domestic and international economic issues and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to learn more about the military. We visited missile silos to understand better the defense apparatus. There was fine tuning in terms of the arts. Visiting critics came in and talked to us. A major part of it was going to urban areas throughout the country to learn more about the problems of the inner cities. That to me was the most valuable part of the program.

Q: Why was it so valuable to you?

HUMMON: I developed a better understanding of the problems that our country was facing in terms of the dramatic changes that were taking place in the cities, especially among minorities, and the continuing cancer of racism. We began to appreciate better that change, in terms of both social action and getting industry involved, had to take place within our own country to help those in the lower sectors of the economy.

Q: What was your understanding of UNDP at that time?
HUMMON: I thought they were a positive force but that their impact was essentially limited to the technical assistance area. I think I really preached the gospel of coordination, in other words, that they should take an even more active role in coordination of all donor efforts in the technical assistance area, and beyond if possible.

Q: Anything else on the Senior Seminar? Anything else that you took away with you that was particularly useful to your future career?

HUMMON: Yes, I would recommend this to others. It is still in existence, although it has gone through changes. I believe at one time funding was so tight that the amount of in-country travel was limited and overseas travel was eliminated. Today, I understand that there is again much in-country travel. There are also funds to carry out the individual research projects, but these are at a set level. If one’s travel overseas, for example, exceeds that level, the participant has to pay it out of his or her own pockets.

Any sabbatical is probably desirable, whatever our occupation may be. A chance for reflection is helpful. Today’s Seminar may not be as necessary in providing insights on what is happening within our urban areas as was the case in 1972-1973 when I attended. We did not have at that time the all-pervasive media and Internet exposure that is available today. As smart as we might have thought we were, we didn’t have a comprehensive understanding of what was taking place in terms of the inner cities - in such areas as race relations, and the need for the private sector to step up its activity to foster development. What we learned helped us to have a better understanding of our society, of both its strengths and weaknesses, and consequently made us more knowledgeable representatives of the U.S. overseas.

Q: What was your view of your colleagues from the State Department and the CIA and others involved in the Seminar?

HUMMON: I think that in a few cases the individuals were in a situation similar to mine. Their agencies didn’t know what to do with them that year. Not that I didn’t consider it a privilege to be there, but it was also partly, what are we going to do with this guy? We can’t get him cleared at the White House and so forth. There were also many officers who were there for the right reasons - important training as a next step in the ladder of professional advancement. By and large, the officers who were in the Seminar were outstanding.

Q: Where did you go next?

A new assignment overseas as Deputy Mission Director in USAID/Philippines - 1973

HUMMON: I went to the Philippines.

Q: In what year?
HUMMON: Fall of ‘73, I guess. I was there about three years.

Q: What was your position?

HUMMON: Dr. Hannah and Dan Parker were able to get clearance for me from the White House as Deputy Mission Director there to Tom Niblock.

Q: What was the situation at that time?

HUMMON: This was during the Vietnam War. Let me backtrack a little bit. The Philippines had generally fallen off the radar screen in AID in the 1960s. At one time AID predecessor agencies had provided a tremendous amount of assistance to the Philippines. For a variety of reasons, and I can't even recollect all of them, our assistance there had become somewhat minimal until Tom Niblock went out there in the late 60s. And coincidentally with his going there, there was a terribly devastating typhoon that hit the Philippines at that period of time. And Congress developed an emergency assistance package to them which was very substantial in those days (Senator Inouye had pushed it through). I think it was $50 million dollars, plus some complementary assistance. Also, at this time the Vietnam War had intensified and the Administration, the Johnson Administration of course and later the Nixon Administration, was looking for allies. The Philippines, in the form of Ferdinand Marcos, became a very strong ally in terms of our position in Vietnam. By the time I got there, this program had expanded and there were large numbers of Americans present. We had a fairly sizeable portfolio and a growing number of initiatives and a very strong and dedicated leader at the Mission, Tom Niblock. He was a very special person and driving sort of Director.

This was an interesting situation too, because Marcos had instituted martial law, and so they had gone from a period in which they had a democratic situation to no elections. There was the promise that there would be elections at some point. And a facade of democracy, his “New Society,” had been promulgated, but basically we thought of it at that time as a benevolent type of dictatorship. Our policy was dualistic in a political sense. We wanted to have a friendship with Marcos, because of the desire to maintain close ties in terms of what was happening in Vietnam, but also we wanted to be hands-off as well. We did not want to get too close; there was much opposition to him because of the lack of real democracy in the Philippines. This opposition was particularly vocal in Congress. It was also believed that there was some serious deprivation of human rights, quite apart from the absence of a democratic political structure. Marcos clamped down on any opposition. However, in all honesty, I have to tell you that at that time, as pro-democracy as we were and should have been, I think that many felt that what was happening was not a totally inappropriate interval from the chaos that had existed before Marcos came into power. There had been virtual anarchy. Many believed that despite the imperfections on the political side, what basically would emerge would be a more democratic Philippines with much greater improvement of conditions for the millions of poverty-stricken Filipinos. We did not envision, especially on the AID side, but also on the Embassy side as well, the eventual corruption and venality which would lead to
Marcos’ downfall.

The Filipinos had a very special relationship with the U.S. I have never been treated any better by any group of people than we were by the Filipinos. We really liked the people we dealt with in the ministries and in the countryside. It was a wonderful experience in so many respects. I dealt mainly with Jerry Sicat, the Minister of Development Planning, an extraordinary individual. As a matter of fact, we played tennis together nearly every week day at lunch time.

Q: What were we trying to do in the program?

HUMMON: I think our goal was very consistent - to help the little people. This was at the time, too, when the Basic Human Needs legislation was going through Congress. As a matter of fact, at one point when I was there I took a group of Philippine governors from the various provinces to Washington to meet with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Elizabeth Keon Marcos, sister of Ferdinand Marcos and the Governor of Ilocus Norte, was co-chair with me of the group. We went to Washington and spent a few days with the Administration and with Congress. We met with Chairman Zablocki of the Foreign Affairs Committee and others.

Zablocki emphasized Basic Human Needs and the Filipinos basically replied that that was essentially what they were trying to do in the development activities. To a certain extent, I think this was very much true, particularly at the governors’ level, at the provincial level. And that is what we were focusing on. We were trying to carry out activities that would reach the poorest of the poor. We had a program called PDAP, the Provincial Development Assistance Program, which was carried out in several of the provinces throughout the country. Some of this was local currency generated by the assistance grant that Senator Inouye and others had pushed through Congress. We were helping in small scale enterprise, in road and bridge building in provinces, in rural electrification, and agriculture

Nutrition was a serious problem in the Philippines. I was very active in the institution of a national nutrition program. We had a period when I was Acting Director. Mrs. Marcos was always looking for new things to do. Partly just for her image, but also I think there was a desire to help in the economic development situation. We had been pushing the idea of better nutrition. We had people come in from Virginia Tech University who were experts in this to take a look at it.

Q: What did you do in the nutrition program?

HUMMON: Well, first of all we had to start it. We had to get something going. We actually were in a very unusual type of situation. Mrs. Marcos called me in to meet with the Cabinet to make a presentation on why it was important to have better nutrition. I had statistics on the state of malnutrition in various provinces. Also that they needed much better research, and they needed to develop a center where they could focus on this. We later helped them to develop this center. The team from Virginia Tech provided
guidelines for schools, for extension programs for mothers and for MCH and population centers.

Q: We’ll come back to that later. Any particular characteristics of the nutrition program that you want to share?

HUMMON: No. I recently (January 2000) checked with the Philippines desk on the present status of the nutrition program. They had no information and USAID is no longer involved in that area, and they were not sure what the GOP is doing.

Q: Was it country-wide?

HUMMON: It was intended to be eventually. We had a pilot province, I think initially in Cebu. A lot of it was just education through the school system and through any other vehicles that were available. It was also a beginning research tool in various areas.

Q: Were we providing any food or supplements of any kind?

HUMMON: We did provide food, but that’s a different story. It seemed as though there was a constant repetition of typhoons and floods. We were providing nutri-buns, a nutritional supplement that was baked by local bakeries which we had helped to devise with them. Yes, there was food provided for this, but that was not the major focus of the long-term program. It was an education and training program. I just don’t recall the details.

Q: That’s okay. Generally was there a wide acceptance of this program?

HUMMON: Yes, and that’s another interesting story. Mrs Marcos, at the Cabinet meeting turned to me and said, “Well, who should head this?” I said that I had met a man in Cebu, a Dr. Solon. She didn’t know him, but they later brought him up for an interview, and they chose him as the head. When I went back a few years later to the Philippines, he was still the director.

Q: Was he a Philippine doctor?

HUMMON: A Philippine doctor, yes. He had a nutrition program that he was working on in Cebu, which I had visited and had been very impressed with what he was doing. The program received major publicity for a period of time. You asked about it being well accepted.

Q: Where was it put in the government, in the structure of the government?

HUMMON: It was in the Ministry of the Health. He reported to the Minister of Health, as I recall. For a period of time, this was a key priority of Mrs. Marcos, but, then, as was her proclivity, she moved onto something else. So then it was on its own. One day it was visible in all the newspapers and the next day it had virtually disappeared. But at the same time there was a basic structure. The basic infrastructure for the project had been
developed and it was expanding. When I left the Philippines it seemed to be in pretty good hands. I heard a few years later (but as I said I’m not familiar today with its status) that it had become quite a successful activity.

Q: You mentioned family planning and that was a major initiative in our program. How did that get underway?

HUMMON: That really ante-dated my going there. It was started in the late 60s, although we provided substantial funding for it when I was there.

Q: How was it being accepted?

HUMMON: Not terribly well in certain quarters. Again, my recollection is somewhat hazy on this but the Philippines, as you know, is a Catholic country so there was a lot of opposition. I think when I first went there it an Archbishop Sin led some of the opposition. Later he became Cardinal Sin during my tenure. I don’t know if there’s any correlation or not. But he and others were very much opposed to this. On the other hand, there was also political support for it. I can’t remember how strongly, but I know that Mrs. Marcos was generally in support of it and that was worth its weight in gold in those days. I recall a widespread public education program.

Q: Was this also in the Ministry of Health or was it separate?

HUMMON: There was a population center or commission. It was separate, but it also had ties to the Ministry of Health. A Dr. Lorenzo was head of the commission and, I believe, reported to the First Lady. (Again my recollection of the organizational details is sketchy.) Actually in the U.S. the program was considered successful at the time. I believe that Ray Ravenholt, who was considered the father of population planning in AID, would point to the Philippines program as one that, in the face of tremendous obstacles, was achieving a great deal.

Q: Were there other initiatives which you were associated with?

HUMMON: We were involved in agricultural activities, e.g., research, such as the development of miracle varieties of rice to the Philippines. I think we were generally quite successful there. Land reform was also a very important initiative, but we had less success in that area. We tried hard and Marcos talked a good game about the necessity of land reform to bring about change for the people, but the GOP follow-through was often problematical. The situation was intolerable, historically. There was a small number of elite Filipinos who owned endless tracts of land and poor peasants who were tenant farmers with virtually nothing. This was a critical issue and had been an issue in Philippine politics for decades. We really tried hard, and we had some success on a small scale, but it just never really got going.

Q: What kind of approach were you taking?
HUMMON: I do not recall the details precisely, but my best recollection is that we would select a certain province, or area, and funds would be available to pay off the land owners a fair amount and to have a distribution to tenants who were already on the land so that they would get an acre or a hectare or two hectares. It was sort of a standard type of approach, but also supplemented by the PDAP program or later on with regional development programs that emerged. We provided farmers with a package of funding for fertilizer, seed, and implements - you know, a package of assistance. In a spotty sense it had successes, but we could never really establish a national commitment to it, despite the fact that there was a good deal of talk about it from the Marcos Administration. Basically, it was not necessarily a failure, but it fell short of hoped-for goals.

Q: If the political opposition was supposed to be strong among the ...

HUMMON: Political opposition. And that’s basic in development. You can’t force things down on political leadership in these countries. Sometimes advocacy can help to move people from one position slightly and so forth. But if they are dead set against it or even ambivalent, which was the case here, there’s little that you can do in a development sense.

Q: Were there any factions or groups that were pressing for land reform that were threatening the leadership?

HUMMON: The Americans were pressing (although of course not threatening.)

Q: But I mean in -country.

HUMMON: Yes, there were certain academics, liberals within the country. Not very many, but a few, and some political types.

Q: Any rural groups or rebel type groups?

HUMMON: Yes, but at this point, they were the fringe. These were the communist guerrillas in the North, the few that had not been rounded up or killed and Muslim rebels in the South in Mindanao, but they were basically under control. The Huk rebellion had been defeated years before, so these were the remnants. These groups had no real power, and were only minimally a terrorist threat at the time.

Q: So there wasn’t much of a threat.

HUMMON: No, no threat. And frankly, much of the populace actually at the time seemed very pro-Marcos, although it is difficult to judge that in the absence of democratic freedoms. I do know that many people talked to us about their desire not to return to the anarchy of the past.

Q: What were some of the other programs that you were associated with?
HUMMON: Those I have mentioned were pretty demanding.

Q: What about the rural electrification program?

HUMMON: Yes, there was a program and I think, quite successful.

Q: Did that start before you were there?

HUMMON: Yes, it started before I arrived.

Q: Why did that go reasonably well?

HUMMON: Why did it go well? It goes well when you start from zero and you develop any sort of electricity. Most of the communities in the rural Philippines had no electricity. We brought in the NRECA [National Rural Electrification Cooperative Association] and they were there for years. And they were there before I got there. It was Tom Niblock’s leadership in this.

Q: Was it well accepted?

HUMMON: Yes. You mean in terms of community involvement? During this period it was received very enthusiastically. I don’t what the situation today, but clearly we considered it a great success. I didn’t have that much involvement. Tom and I kind of divided the projects and that was sort of his creation. There was a lot of traveling around the country as new projects took place with the inauguration and the obligatory switching on of lights for communities.

Q: What were some of the other projects that you were concerned with or have we covered those?

HUMMON: Those were the main ones that we were involved in plus a sizeable training effort. We also had a very strong humanitarian involvement in the Philippines. Since there were typhoons that took place frequently, we spent considerable time helping in disaster relief. Those were the days when there was no strong centralized disaster relief program within the Agency, so we sort of did our own thing. Part of my job as the Deputy Director was to be the disaster coordinator for the Mission or the Country Team. When a typhoon struck and people were isolated in an area, we would go to Clark Air Force Base and work with the Air Force and fly out in these huge helicopters that they had. We’d go out over an area with the bags of nutri-buns and blankets and throw them down to the people below. These were people who were isolated by severe floods and couldn’t be reached by land for days.

Q: Was there a lot of follow-up on reconstruction?

HUMMON: Yes, through the Provincial Development Assistance Program. But now I’m talking about the humanitarian and disaster effort. This also included the refugee
The refugees that we had during this time were after the fall of Vietnam in 1975. We had set up a refugee receiving center at Grande Island near Subic Bay. All Vietnamese refugees and U.S. personnel departing Saigon came through Grande. I’ll never forget the night when I went out with Admiral Donahue, the commander at Subic Naval Base, to the naval vessel, the Blue Star, to greet Ambassador Graham Martin, who had arrived after their exodus from Saigon. As you might expect, it was not an easy situation for him or for any of us. Also, seeing some of my USAID colleagues was difficult. Some of them came to me saying that we’ve got to do something about the locals that were left behind. I have vivid impressions of their distressed countenances and the remarks of AID officers, and of their deeply felt concern for the tragedy likely to affect those left in Saigon.

Q: Was there anything that you could do?


Q: Were there some locals that did come?

HUMMON: There were some. I don’t recall how many, but I don't recall that it was a large number. There were, however, many Vietnamese who arrived at the camp. I remember so many of them coming with their clothes laden with gold and jewelry, items of value that they could carry. My wife, Jean, helped also in this operation which lasted for some time.

Q: Did you set up a camp and all that?

HUMMON: The military set up the camp. They were obviously the key actors in this, but there were many of us from USAID, and probably from the Embassy as well, helping in the processing of the refugees. It was a very sad time, one of the low points of my career in terms of what it symbolized, and the effect on so many people’s lives.

Q: Well, in all of that work on the humanitarian side and disaster relief and so on, did anything stand out that you learned from that in how you operate or not operate?

HUMMON: Not particularly from that unique experience. I just think that in our Agency we do a very good job in these areas. I think that AID has strong humanitarian roots along with its emphasis on overall development. Part of that is just because we want to help people. I think that many of us who came into this Agency came into it because of that motivation. I found over the years that the people I have worked with, by and large, in AID Missions have shared that sentiment. I think we were particularly good at it in the Philippines. There was an additional reason there. We had a huge military presence in the Philippines with Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base that you could draw upon and work very closely with them. This made it much easier.

Q: They were helpful?
Q: What was your sense of what the Philippine government had to say about the whole operation?

HUMMON: That’s a good question. Initially, I think, certainly during the period that I was there, there generally was a total acceptance of the role of AID and the U.S. military in disasters. When a disaster struck, we’d immediately call on the U.S. Air Force to bring in choppers to help dispense the basic necessities, the food and supplies to people and help to rescue people those who were marooned. The Filipinos cooperated fully with us.

Shortly after I left the Philippines and had gone to Saudi Arabia, the man who had come in to replace Tom Niblock as Mission Director, Garnett Zimmerly and some of his colleagues, the Economic Counselor, a Deputy at the Asian Development Bank and the British Economic Counselor - 7 or 8 of them - were coming back to Manila from the Bicol region, about 150 miles from Manilla, I would guess. Their plane went astray in a typhoon-type situation and disappeared. Immediately the U.S. military was going to start looking for them with its high-tech infrared capability that could detect metal in the mountains, hoping that they could quickly find the plane.

The Philippine government refused to let the U.S. military undertake this search. There had apparently been momentum building that the Americans were too much involved in handling every disaster situation. And there had been several of them when I was there. It was just a particularly difficult time with the weather situation at the time of my service and then the refugees who came in from Vietnam. Within the government, opposition emerged; and it came to a head in this search and rescue mission. My recollection is that they finally relented and let the Americans search after about twelve days. The Air Force immediately found the wreckage with no survivors.

Q: Did the government have any disaster units that you could work with or were you fairly independent?

HUMMON: They had someone. We dealt with someone, but whoever it was did not make a terribly indelible impression I guess.

Q: In effect, it was the U.S. that was operating alone in these disaster situations?

HUMMON: It seemed to me that we were coordinating more with Colonel Vigilar who was the head of PDAP, the Provincial Development Assistance Program. He was a very able person. I don’t recall, I just hazily recall an office for disasters and that type of situation.

Q: The PDAP was a national program wasn’t it?

HUMMON: A national program. They reported to the President.
Q: And they had a separate office?

HUMMON: A separate office and a separate operation. Many solid projects were undertaken. It was a very interesting period.

Q: How did you find working with the Filipinos?

HUMMON: They were extraordinarily nice people to deal with and you could have a very open relationship in a lot of areas. I really enjoyed it. There was sometimes not as much follow through as was promised - you can, of course, say that about all people, including Americans in some cases. But the Filipinos will always be special to my family and me.

Q: Did you meet with Ferdinand Marcos?

HUMMON: You know, I saw him many times, but it was generally only in signing ceremonies. We signed everything. He was extremely interested in showing that the United States was closely aligned with his regime, and so it was no problem in getting publicity for the AID program. We had ceremonies that would announce we were going to undertake a program. We would have a ceremony or signing when we funded the first grant. We had another ceremony when the first contract was let, or something like that. We had a signing on use of local currency generated. So we were over at Malacanang Palace often, and I met him in that connection. I really had no official contact with him apart from the fact that he knew who I was from these signing ceremonies and from some negotiations.

Q: What about Imelda Marcos?

HUMMON: With the nutrition initiative, I had considerable contact with her, and in family planning to some extent. I traveled with her in her private jet at least once around the country to visit projects.

Q: What was her personality?

HUMMON: She was effervescent and very likeable. Just charming, a handsome lady. She was a rather good singer. She loved to sing “Dahil Saiyo,” a favorite Filipino pop song, and I played it for her a few times on the piano at social occasions. She would ask me if I would play it for her.

Q: What about your AID association with the Embassy? Did the Embassy have a dominant role in what you were doing or should be doing?

HUMMON: They were not terribly involved. They were, as I said earlier, very sensitive about getting too close with Marcos. They also wanted to maintain Marcos as a friend, so I know they had some split feelings about him. As we did to a certain extent too, but I think that we were more up-beat about the possibilities for development change.
Q: Any other issues that stand out in your mind?

HUMMON: Not really. I left the Philippines and went to Saudi Arabia.

**Headed up the U.S. Mission to the**
**U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Commission - 1976**

Q: What year was this?


Q: This is a special and unique type of program. What’s the background on this type of program? This was not with AID, I gather?

HUMMON: No, this was with the Treasury Department. I had to meet with Bill Simon who was Treasury Secretary and I met with Larry Eagleburger, whom I had known when I was Executive Secretary. I think he was an assistant to Katzenbach at an earlier time, but he had become Under Secretary for Political Affairs in 1976. So there were some political dimensions to this job. The genesis of it was the energy crisis in 1973 when the oil supply was cut off by OPEC, and the price of oil quadrupled overnight, and the Saudis and the other Mideast nations just took a really tough stand. The United States suddenly realized that we had talked about a special relationship with the Saudis, and we in fact did have one out of necessity; we needed to improve that relationship to ensure the continued flow of oil. The Saudis also had an interest in close relationships with the United States in terms of support for their regime and their overall policies. They were very fundamentalist, but there’s another element of fundamentalism that goes even further to the right, as witness to what happened in Iran. Saudi Arabia wanted to develop closer relationships with the United States.

Q: This was a time when they were accruing vast sums from the increase in oil price, is that right?

HUMMON: Yes. To repeat, there was a coalescence of interest. The United States wanted to develop a better relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis wanted to get a better relationship to help protect their regime. And they also suddenly had these tremendous oil revenues. Their production shot up to 9 million barrels a day from whatever it was ... a very low figure. And they stabilized at this time at about 8.5 million. So they were receiving millions and millions of dollars in revenues. In 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger and Crown Prince Fahd signed an agreement for a Joint Commission, which would be to share certain ideas on financial matters and the like. But it also was to be basically an assistance program by the Americans in areas of industry, agriculture, science and technology and manpower.

Q: What was the name of the program?
HUMMON: JECOR. The Treasury was wild about acronyms, but this was the Joint Economic Commission ... the U.S. Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. It was an interesting setup in a procedural sense.

Q: How did it work?

HUMMON: Pretty well.

Q: But functionally, how was it? It was their money.

HUMMON: We had two co-chairs of the Joint Commission. The Secretary of Treasury, Simon and Blumenthal when I was there and, on the Saudi side, was the Minister of Finance and National Economy. The Joint Commission met once a year with the Secretary and Minister co-chairing either in Riyadh or in Washington, alternating capitals. Then there were two Coordinators, and the Coordinator for Saudi Arabia was the Deputy Minister of Finance, at that time, Dr. Mansour al-Turki, and on the American side it was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Gerry Parskey and later Fred Bergstrom. But as a practical, de facto matter, the day to day coordination by the U.S. was by the Director of the U.S. Representation to the Commission in Riyadh and that was the job I had. I worked with the Saudi Coordinator, and I met with him or his Deputy often to carry out the Commission mandate. There was an office in Treasury that back-stopped us.

We had in staffing a Director, a Deputy Director, a Controller, an Administrative Officer, a GSO and Program Monitors in the four areas of involvement: industry, manpower, science and technology, and agriculture. All of these salaries were paid by the Treasury Department out of a special fund under Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Thus, we were not being paid by the Saudis. However, the people that we brought in as technicians in the various development areas were paid on a reimbursable basis.

Here’s how it worked. A Saudi Ministry would say we want assistance in the development of financial information services within their Ministry. And they would come to us and ask if we could recruit some Americans to work on that. They might come to us directly or they might come to the Saudi Coordinator, and he would then come over to me, and we would write up a project agreement or perhaps initially carry out a study. Then we’d get an estimate of what the funding would be and, instead of going to Congress for our funding, we would go to the Saudis and sit down and explain to them what the funding would be. If they agreed they would come back and say, “All right, we’re going to give you x amount,” which we would put into the Joint Commission account at Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City, later to a Treasury Trust account, and we would proceed from there. We developed project agreements, of course, with specific financial plans.

When I left after a couple of years we had project funding of, I don’t recall precisely, but something on the order of $300 million that we had accrued in that period of time. We
had about two hundred Americans working plus numerous third country employees. The number grew to over 300 Americans in later years. We were involved in a host of activities.

Q: What do you regard as the most significant role in terms of development?

HUMMON: I think probably at that particular time a significant accomplishment was getting the overall program operational and assisting in the start up of several projects. These included such activities as agricultural research, electrification, development of national parks, vocational and technical training, upgrading of the Saudi Arabian national statistical system, initiation of a program for new energy resources, transportation planning, customs administration, and so on. Included in nearly all of this was a strong training component.

Q: Were we not including institutions within the country? Were we mostly training in the U.S.?

HUMMON: It was a combination. Much of the training was in-country, e.g., the development of vocational training programs and centers within the Kingdom. Later, many participants were sent to the U.S. under various projects. When I was there much of the funding was for the costs of U.S. technicians - salaries and related housing and administrative costs. We also financed electrical equipment, and of course, there were training costs.

Q: Any particular institutions stand out in your mind as continuing today that you helped establish?

HUMMON: I think that, by and large, the fact that the Joint Commission was successful and that it continued in existence is a credit to the Saudis and to all those on the American side who were involved. There were a number of other Joint Commissions that never got off the ground, at least when I was there. As for the projects, I believe there was success in meeting the objectives we had outlined in the various activities I mentioned earlier.

A mark of what transpired is the fact that the Joint Commission is in its 25th year with Saudi Arabian funding over these years totaling around $1.7 billion, according to my contacts at Treasury. Perhaps the most signal accomplishment has been the substantial training in the various areas of involvement, and the development of systems for carrying on institutionalized activities in various sectors - key elements of modern state administration in such areas as census capability, consumer protection, gathering of statistical data, transportation and power grid planning, auditing, customs, survey and research in agriculture and natural resources, and so on. I understand that since the Gulf War, there has been a phasing down of the program, partly because of a tighter financial situation in the Kingdom. Other factors may have been considered as well. The Commission is scheduled to terminate its operations in June, 2000. But it is clear that the magnitude of the effort was significant and made an impact on development.
Q: Was AID associated with this in any way at all?

HUMMON: No. Not at all.

Q: Did they help with the recruitment of people?

HUMMON: Well, they helped in my recruitment.

Q: But I mean in terms of bringing out the technicians?

HUMMON: No. The Saudis didn’t want AID involved and they made that very clear. I recall one meeting that they had with Ambassador Porter and me. They said that they did not, I don’t exactly know the context in which it came out, but they did not want to be seen as putting their hands out as a recipient country. (They didn’t say it precisely that way, but that was the intent of their comments.) They associated AID with that. They were very proud.

Q: The name of the agency would have determined that.

HUMMON: The name of the agency... yes. So they made that very clear and AID had no involvement whatsoever.

Q: How did you go about locating and identifying American technical people?

HUMMON: We advertised via the Commerce Bulletin just as AID does. I mean we went out to tender and so forth.

Q: You used a competitive process?

HUMMON: Yes, where private firms were involved. As I recall, we basically used AID procedures, although there may have been some variation on the themes.

It is important to keep in mind that much of the technical assistance was by teams from U.S. Government departments and agencies. When I was there we had teams or individuals from Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, Interior, Labor, Transportation, GSA, and the National Science Foundation. The bulk of the assistance was of this nature. As I remember, the private contractor element was largely in the electric power sector, although I know that expanded into other areas in the future.

Q: Was there any responsibility for accountability or auditing or anything like that? Or was this just the Saudi Arabian money that...?

HUMMON: No, no. We brought in auditors, too. We wanted to make sure that these funds were spent wisely.

Q: Were there any different criteria for what you would select or reject?
HUMMON: Basically, we responded to what the Saudi Arabian Government was interested in having the Joint Commission become involved in. Certainly, we discussed possible areas for assistance, but there was no master or strategic plan such as we try to have in USAID. We were more a reactive organization. It was after all funded entirely by the Saudis except for joint funding of an energy project, and the salaries of the U.S. Representation administrative staff.

Q: Were there any of AID’s interest in family planning and health services or anything?

HUMMON: Nothing in the family planning area at all. Nothing. I mean, there was no interest on the part of the Saudis for that. I mean, they were interested in increasing their population, so we didn’t. It was not a development situation comparable to what we were familiar with in AID. In more recent years, certain health projects did develop.

Q: Were they interested in working with the poor Saudis?

HUMMON: Well, yes, I mean, in a sense that all of this was designed to help in bringing about change that would affect all the people. But that was not the sole motivation of the program. A key element of the program was to bring the modern elements of state administration and performance standards to Saudi society. In one sense, it was kind of novel in a way. It was a different type of atmosphere to operate in, I suppose. To a purist in development, this is what are you doing? You’re bankrolling a variety of projects. Yet the projects did have a development impact; it was just very different.

Q: Within the Treasury were there differences of view on what should or should not be done? How things were operated? Any issues that you had to deal with?

HUMMON: Yes, a lot of them, but they not particularly relevant. There were differences on the administration of the program, the role of the Embassy, on the degree of involvement by the Saudis in our communications, on the supervisory role of JECOR over project teams, etc.

Q: How did you find them to work with?

HUMMON: Well, I found that the people I dealt with by and large were first rate. They were really interested in making change within their society, at least in the economics field, not politically, but in terms of development. They were hard working and very interested in change. But there were frustrations as well. You might plan to have a meeting with a Deputy Minister scheduled for next Tuesday at 9:00 am, and you’d go to his office and the male secretary would say, “Oh, Hussein? No, he’s in Paris.” I don’t know exactly how to describe it, but it was a very different experience is the best way to put it. Commitments were not always kept; it sometimes seemed as though the frequently used word “inshallah” (if God wills it) could provide a built-in legitimate justification for inaction, or for doing something different than anticipated. Yet I found the experience incredibly fascinating. The culture. The whole orthodox, Islam society.
Q: How did you find living in that culture?

HUMMON: Well, it’s very different.

Q: Why?

HUMMON: Particularly for the women, I think it’s hard for women. Although my wife, for some reason, found it mesmerizing. I don’t know, maybe it was just the total immersion in religion, the different faith. She really liked it. But many women in the international community found it very difficult. Women can’t drive. There’s no theater. The cultural life, in that sense, provides little to do. There are no other faiths in Saudi Arabia than Islam. The government quietly did permit us to have a Christian service. We brought in a Baptist minister under the guise of his being a social welfare worker, and we met in the office of the Saudi Arabian National Guard for religious ceremonies every Sunday. We felt somewhat like the early Christians meeting surreptitiously, you know. There was no high school education available for teenagers. We had to send our son, Marc, away to school in Rome. So there were many elements of that kind. Much time, frankly, was spent with trying to get a recreation center built for the American employees, and many other hand-holding type of actions. I think much of the work was that of a Peace Corps Director, in dealing with personnel-type situations.

Q: Was there any socializing with the Saudi Arabian people?

HUMMON: Quite a bit by me, although not so much across the board by JECOR people.

Q: Men only or were there family get-to-gathers?

HUMMON: Almost all men, although we were invited a few times to Saudi homes where we met the wives. And Jean, my wife, became friends with the wife of the man whom I worked with most closely. But mostly the parties we had were men visiting our home.

Q: Anything about the culture that you were dealing with... This program must have had a profound effect on the culture?

HUMMON: I don’t think that it had an effect in terms of the culture. I think it had an effect in terms of the administration of certain areas, but not on the culture. As an ancillary point, there was little general interaction by Westerners with Saudis. The Americans lived in compounds, for example.

Q: Pretty isolated then.

HUMMON: Pretty isolated. While I had quite a bit of social contact with counterparts and entertained often, it was not in terms of total family get-togethers. Women wore the veil (and continue to wear the veil today) and were separate in many areas. And also one thing to keep in mind. We were not involved at all in the basic education system. There was no request for us, and I think that still remains true today. There was no request for
us to be involved in anything to do with the basic education system. So I don’t think that the program, when I was there, had any impact in terms of culture.

*Q: I would have thought that over time the training of large numbers of people in the technical fields would begin to develop a mass of a modernized, technologically advanced people.*

HUMMON: True. But we were in at the beginnings. Change with greater training and education will come. But I’m not particularly familiar with the present-day situation. I know the regime has been attacked by both the left and the right. Some advisory political structure has been established to give the people more of a voice.

*Q: There were no programs involving women at all?*

HUMMON: Not directly.

*Q: Alright. Anything else on that?*

HUMMON: No, I think not.

*Q: Okay, very good.*

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**Returned to USAID/Washington with PPC leading to assignment to head the budget office - 1980**

HUMMON: So then I came back to AID.

*Q: What year was this?*


*Q: And what position did you come back to?*

HUMMON: I came back as ESF [economic support funds] and Asia Coordinator for awhile, for a brief period of time.

*Q: This was in PPC?*

HUMMON: Yes, PPC. I came back and after a brief period of time had one of the pleasant experiences of one’s life when you are promoted over your boss. Peter McPherson and John Bolton asked me to be the head of the budget office in PPC, which is the central budget office in AID.

*Q: What’s that job?*

HUMMON: Well, it was a busy job. That job had the primary responsibility for
coordinating the development of AID’s world-wide budget covering Development Assistance, ESF and PL 480. It meant that you were the key advisor to the Administrator and the AA/PPC on various decisions affecting program levels, budget allocations among the bureaus, regions and countries, on functional account totals, and on related policy issues. In the job you also were the chief negotiator and spokesman for AID with the State, OMB and other agencies in the interagency budget process. There also was heavy involvement in the planning process, especially in developing guidance for Country Strategy submissions and action plans, and in evaluating the various submissions.

Q: Well, then in the position you had a tremendous amount of influence on how money was allocated, who got what and what it was for?

HUMMON: Absolutely. That’s right.

Q: What kind of guidance and criteria did you have in mind in doing that sort of thing?

HUMMON: Let me put this in some perspective. This was during the Reagan Administration in which there was a strong emphasis to increase the amount of military assistance and security assistance. Peter McPherson came in as the Administrator at this time and I worked very closely with him. Not in the same type of personal relationship that I had with John Hannah when he was Administrator, but still, I mean almost daily contact with Peter. I think that he and Hannah, of course this is personal, were the best Administrators that we had by far. John Bolton, the AA/PPC, was a very cagey, smart as a whip individual, and I worked very closely with him also. And Fred Schieck, also a very able guy, was Deputy, although Fred actually didn’t get much involved in the budget. I worked primarily with Bolton and McPherson. When they first asked me to take over the job they said, we want you to maintain DA [developmental assistance] levels and also ESF with strong development connotations. We want you to fight hard to maintain those development levels in the face of pressures to increase military assistance and security-oriented ESF resources at the expense of AID priorities. My role really, partly, was to be a tough guy in negotiations with State and OMB. They wanted me to maintain strong DA levels and also ESF levels which particularly had a development impact.

Q: Any particular type of argument that you were making on the DA levels?

HUMMON: Oh, a whole host of arguments, the importance of development and that this was more important than this or this ... the peaceful world that we want and so on. I can recall the first sessions of negotiations with State and refusing to accept any reduction in our proposed DA levels. We went down one country after the other, and I refused to accept any reductions. In fact, a State Rep went to the Administrator and said, “We can’t deal with this guy.” The Administrator called me in and said, “Good for you. That’s exactly what we want.” I don’t know, there perhaps had been too much acquiescence and caving-in in the past and so that was the line. I was in this job for a few years, and we were able to work out a modus operandi with State and OMB. Basically, we were very successful in maintaining substantial levels of Development Assistance and related ESF
in the face of this strong emphasis on the security side. That was one hallmark.

A second element was coordinating the planning process for annual budget submissions. I instituted a monthly luncheon with all the heads of DP [development program] of the various Bureaus to share ideas. We’d bring each other up to date; I think that was useful.

We also set up a monthly meeting to check on the progress of obligations with the co-chair being the Counselor, a position established as the number three job in the Agency. I also established with the Deputy Administrator a management review with each of the Bureaus to go over a whole host of management issues that they might have in terms of assignments of personnel and numbers and so forth. These reviews were on a frequent continuing basis. The job broadened out into a variety of activities.

Q: Were there any particular development themes that you were giving priority to in terms of saying that this is where the money should go rather than there?
HUMMON: This was, I think, one of the real changes in AID policy. I also think this is one of the high points of AID history. This period of McPherson in which there were the so called four pillars.

Q: What were the four pillars?
HUMMON: The four pillars were originally to be the four “cornerstones,” and I think that I coined the word “pillar.” They were policy reform, private enterprise, science and technology and institutional development. I think that the emphasis on the private sector was very important. We had emphasized the private sector in the past, in different types of configurations; here there was much greater intensity. Part of this is that historical forces were such that there was more receptivity by countries to look to the private sector. We were emphasizing not only across the board changes to be made within a total economy but also within individual projects.

I think also, that the concept of policy reform too was important. And McPherson also strengthened again the role of the technician, and the importance of science and technology.

And another thing that we did, not that I was directly responsible, but was to get more delegation to the field in this period. I don’t recall all the details, but on projects up to a certain amount, actions could be taken in the field instead of having to go to Washington. There were a number of changes in that regard. I think this was one of the high points of the Agency, that period of AID during the Reagan Administration, under McPherson. I feel very much a part of that.

Q: Were there other initiatives at that time?
HUMMON: Well as I said the whole question of policy reform was a major one. And that covered a variety of areas. We also established a Private Enterprise Bureau. In fact, I worked on that establishment and was assigned there for a while to work with Elise
Dupont, the Assistant Administrator for the bureau. One other thing, this is not in direct response to your question, but one other thing I am grateful to have had the opportunity to participate in. I mentioned that back in Tanzania that we had a coordinating involvement between AID and the Peace Corps. In this PPC job, I had the lead in establishing a AID-Peace Corps coordinating committee which came into effect in the 1980s with McPherson and Loret Ruppe, the Peace Corps Director, as co-chairs. And we had several meetings.

Q: What was the objective in having those meetings? In the past the Peace Corps wanted to keep AID at arms length.

HUMMON: Yes, that’s true but the objective was to bring an exponential impact to their resources by bringing in some AID funding and billed in such a way that it didn’t infringe on the pristine nature of the Peace Corps. I believe that the coordinating committee continues today as quite an effective mechanism and I think it has strengthened the operations of the Peace Corps.

Q: Were we transferring funds to the Peace Corps directly?

HUMMON: That’s right.

Q: Do you remember the scale of resources?

HUMMON: No, I can’t remember the amounts. I mean we’re not talking large amounts but ... it would be in individual countries, too. We discussed not only funding but also areas of emphasis as to what we were interested in and what they were interested in. In certain countries, if AID were say, involved in nutrition, to talk to the Peace Corps about the possibility of Peace Corps volunteers coming in that area as well.

Q: Interesting. Any other initiatives that you were taking at that time?

HUMMON: No. Much of this job was a day to day, crisis to crisis scenario staying on top of the paperwork and much hand-holding.

Q: The Bureaus are always clashing about who gets what and how much and so on. How did you sort out some of these clashes?

HUMMON: Probably not always terribly well.

Q: Was there some sort of procedure that you followed when trying to resolve these with the Assistant Administrators?

HUMMON: I talked with the DAAs [Deputy assistant administrator], heads of DP, or the Assistant Administrator. I had calls all the time on questions of levels. Often Mission Directors would call or when they came into Washington come into the office and make a plea for maintaining their levels. A lot of it was working out compromises. We were just
trying to work out acceptable scenarios without trying to offend too many people. You had to work closely with the Administrator as to what he wanted and what he saw was possible and he might say, “Okay. This is what we are going to do. See if you can sell this to the Bureaus.” It was more of an art than a science. And yet, I don’t mean to imply that actions were capricious. We were dealing with solid development proposals by and large, submitted by the Bureaus. We weren’t dreaming up these things by ourselves. It was more like, you would make an assessment of: is it more important that we have a new family planning initiative in Kenya as opposed to something additional in El Salvador? We had to make those types of broader decisions.

**Q:** Were there areas that the Administrator kept pressing on you? Saying, I want to do more on this or on that?

**HUMMON:** Yes, projects and programs involving the four pillars. But he was a very pragmatic person. He had a lot of ideas, probably too many ideas in one sense.

**Q:** What were the concerns in the many initiatives?

**HUMMON:** Let me restate that. He was an exceptional administrator and manager. What I meant was he was involved in everything, and yet he also delegated, but he was involved. He would call at home and (I’m sure you experienced this too). He was interested in anything and everything. But, still he had strong feelings in terms of the four pillars and in maintaining a strong development presence in the face of security and military assistance.

**Q:** What about your working with State? Of course, they had very strong views on levels?

**HUMMON:** Yes, but eventually we worked out a pretty good relationship. Basically, they got increases in security and military aid, but we maintained development levels.

**Q:** Did you have to deal with Congress at all at that time?

**HUMMON:** Yes, but not... Well, I guess I testified. Basically I would go up with the Administrator often, but just carrying his briefing books and he might turn to me to get a piece of paper, although he didn’t do that much. Also there was considerable briefing of the Congressional staff. In summary, there was quite a bit of contact with Congress, but not up front as the prime witness.

I do recall the first time I went up with Peter McPherson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, just after I had taken this job. We had been having a lot of problems with Senator Helms at the time on the AID program. We were standing around I guess, just getting ready to sit down before the Committee went into session. Meanwhile, Senator Helms walks over towards us; I’m standing a distance from Peter, and Helms walks over to me and Peter is looking and Helms just reaches out to me and warmly shakes my hand and says, “How are ya [you] ... good to see ya [you]...” and so forth, but I didn’t know him from Adam, except from TV. He obviously thought I was
somebody else, but McPherson looked at me like, “I just hired a spy in the ranks. Who is this guy?” But in a way I think Peter was sort of pleased because he had me sit right behind him and maybe thought that would help him. I don’t think it did; the Senator gave Peter a very, very tough time that day.

**Q:** You dealt a lot with OMB at the Stockman level?

HUMMON: Well, I dealt a lot with OMB, but not at the Stockman level, but at office or division levels or whatever they were called. I dealt with them a lot. I did accompany the Administrator to one meeting, maybe more, with Stockman, one critical meeting where we were talking about the 150 Foreign Affairs Account. I think that McPherson was very successful in those meetings with the OMB Director in maintaining the AID levels successfully. I don’t recall the particulars, but I know we departed from that particular session with a glow and congratulated ourselves on a job well done. That was about the extent of the details that I remember at this time.

**Q:** Was OMB always negative about cutting the program or did they have any part of it that they were interested in promoting?

HUMMON: My impression of OMB staffers during the 80s was that they were not terribly development friendly. They were more interested in military assistance, military sales, and security assistance. There were, of course, exceptions. And in our Agency, even though John Bolton was very conservative politically, he was very supportive of the development activities of this Agency. And, of course, McPherson came from a position of we want support for development, and that helped to prevail in large measure at OMB.

**Q:** Of course that’s what AID was all about.

HUMMON: True. But still you could go into the Agency and basically emasculate it. Now that’s not in his character or personality, but still he’s got to fend off others. I think he was extraordinarily successful.

**Q:** Any particular initiative that he used to sell the development side of foreign assistance? You know, child survival or ORT [oral rehydration therapy]? 

HUMMON: Oh, yes, ORT and child survival, and an emphasis on the role of technicians. But the prime focus was to get the private sector involved and to stress policy reforms. And the Agency has had much success implementing those approaches.

**Q:** And you finished up there in what year?

HUMMON: Assigned to USAID/Botswana as USAID /Director - 1986

HUMMON: In 1986. I went to Botswana and was there until 1990 and was Director there. I also shared responsibilities to a certain extent for the regional projects in SADCC. Also, for about a year, we were trying to get a program started in Namibia, so I had that portfolio, too.
**Q: What led you to Botswana?**

HUMMON: I don’t know. I was asked to go there as Mission Director.

**Q: How did you find the situation there when you arrived?**

HUMMON: Well, Botswana is a very special place. It was particularly special at that time because it was one of the few truly functioning democracies in Africa. Botswana was a small country and there had never been (they had been under the British as Bechuanaland) a substantial white presence in the country to speak of. So they didn’t have a lot of the hang-ups, as I found in some of the countries in Africa where they had experienced a very strong colonial presence. I had been in no other country where the people were so self-confident in dealing with outsiders in a pleasant way. I found that Nigerians were very self-confident in dealing with others, but part of that came from a somewhat different motivation. Botswana had sort of a national characteristic that everybody was an equal, and it didn’t matter who you are, or whatever. I liked that setting better than any post that I had ever been. Dealing with the Botswana was a genuine pleasure. It’s hard to explain it but it’s just that the feeling of equality and openness and candor. If they said that they couldn’t do something they wouldn’t do it, and if they said they were going to do something, they did it. It was just a unique experience in many regards.

**Q: They were less subject to being pushed around by donors compared with some other countries or dominated by donors. They were more independent minded about what they wanted and did not want. Is that accurate?**

HUMMON: I think that it’s true that they had a mind of their own and were self-assured. You’re right in that you didn’t tell them what to do, because I haven’t found any country where you are basically going to tell them what to do, nor should we try to be in that position. But it was just an atmosphere of willing to sit down and discuss equally and thoughtfully what needed to be done. And as a consequence we had, I thought, and a lot of people that were familiar with what took place concurred, we had an important impact in a variety of areas, particularly in opening up the economy. One of the things that I did when I first got there was to bring in a team of world-class experts, who were there for six weeks. And I worked with them and the Ministry of Finance to develop a pattern of what we should be doing with the funds that were available to us to strengthen the private sector within the country. It was designed to help encourage new industries, to liberalize the foreign exchange constraints and various impediments to doing business there such as residents permits, and generating local entrepreneurial know-how. It was across the board strategy and almost all of the main emphases went into the next year’s national budget speech of the Vice President. Our effort helped to give much greater importance to the role of the private sector, and USAID continued its support after I had left there. The Botswana, of course, were the leaders in all this, and they had their own time-table, as should be the case. Our participation was more to help identify some of the key constraints to private sector development, to help diversify the economy.
Q: Who was this group that you had in?

HUMMON: I can’t remember the names. A well-known economist was the head of it, and we had two other high-level specialists in private sector development and training.

Q: What was the context in terms of how Botswana saw itself in relation to the Southern African complex? What were their fears or hopes in that context?

HUMMON: During the time when I went out there, South Africa was still under apartheid. Given the situation in South Africa at the time, none of us anticipated the peaceful transfer of power that would take place. I think all of us out there thought there was going to be a blood bath.

We were trying to strengthen Botswana and other countries in that area such as Zambia and Zimbabwe away from their reliance in the past upon the South African economy. In this context, there was much attention, particularly in the regional program, given to developing routes for goods to move in and out of Botswana and Zambia and Zimbabwe and Malawi and other countries without having to go through Durban, the main port in South Africa.

I liked to think, quite frankly, when I was in Botswana that the Botswana program, and our involvement in SADCC regional activities, and the development of the outlines of a program in Namibia were an attack upon the evil of apartheid.

We had only been in Botswana a short time when South African gun ships came in and bombed Gaborone, the capital. The bombing was a mile or so from our house, or maybe more; we were never in any danger. They killed about 12 or 13 people - supposedly at an ANC base of freedom fighters, or “guerrillas” in South African terminology. It was a rather tense situation during the years that we were there. One priority of Botswana was to develop themselves so that they would have greater independence from South Africa. And we were trying to help in several areas.

We wanted, for example, to strengthen tourism, and to help poor people living near game areas to profit from the benefits of tourism and to get involved in game cropping if possible. This was an area of promise, it seemed to us, which we discussed with the Botswana, and after I had left, the Mission jointly developed with them a natural resources management project. There are tremendous game resources in Botswana in Chobe and the Okavango Delta.

Q: In terms of the wild life?

HUMMON: Yes. In terms of the wild life. At least at the time that I was there these areas were unspoiled, natural. There were no tarmac roads going through them as in the Nairobi game park and so on. So we were involved in that. We were also involved in curriculum changes in education and this was very important. We had some great contract people out there from Ohio University. Dr. Max Evans was the head of that - a
terrific person. To make education more practical, because the educational pattern was very much the Cambridge school system.

Q: What scale of resources did you have roughly?

HUMMON: Not a great deal. $20 million a year was tops and that includes food assistance that we provided until we phased out of that area. DA was $8 - $10 million; much of it went for people whom we brought in as experts in different areas.

Q: Did they have an OPEX program at that time? Operating Executives...

HUMMON: Yes.

Q: How did that work?

HUMMON: Well.

Q: We were filling positions in the government, is that it?

HUMMON: Well, yes and no. I mean some of them were positions that were both advisory and operational. We used that in a sense to have more people in a technical assistance type of mode. So we had many Americans. Although our program was small in dollars, it was a program that had a large number of personnel. I feel very good about that. I can’t think of much that AID did as an institution that I wished we had done differently.

Q: Any particular program stand out in your mind as having the most impact?

HUMMON: There were several. Certainly the focus on the private sector was important. We also had an important impact in education - especially in primary education. That project - and I was heavily involved in that using the “lemon aid stand syndrome,” as an illustrative example, to emphasize the importance of a practical education, self-reliance, and the dignity of work - was very successful. We really worked closely with the Botswana to make quality changes in primary education and develop a Department of Primary Education at the University. Both Ministry of Education and University leadership were deeply involved in this project in providing guidance and support, and the Ohio University team was outstanding.

We also had some success with a junior secondary project, although I had to make changes in this project during my stay in Botswana to make it more in keeping with GOB [Government of Botswana] priorities. We were able to provide food assistance to Botswana during a severe drought situation - in the face of opposition from certain quarters in Washington who thought Botswana could buy its own food. We also were able to negotiate a phase down and phase out of food assistance.

The USAID was involved in agricultural extension and research, and we were able to
work with the GOB to make this project more results oriented and extension friendly. We began involvement in anti-AIDS actions and health activities, and developed a population planning project. I had actually been asked to be a keynote speaker at the country’s national population conference, and we worked with the GOB to develop a population project. In a sense, the population project was both too broad and too specific. It has been drafted mainly in Washington, and needed change. I made liberal judgements on satisfaction of conditions precedent when I was there (and rightly in my mind given the overall situation) in interpreting actions by the GOB to enable our continuation of funding tranches. After I left, the project was restructured. In summary on this, we were successful in helping to focus attention on the importance of population policy, but we were less successful in drawing up a project that met both Washington’s perceptions of the speedy action required, and more importantly, the reality of the Botswana situation.

We worked very closely with the Peace Corps in Botswana, which had a large program. I believe we provided some funds, and they were involved in areas or sectors of considerable interest to us. It was a very good relationship, and Lloyd Pierson, the Peace Corps Director during my tenure, deserves much of the credit. I also worked on strengthening cooperation with UNDP, to encourage their leadership in donor cooperation. Finally, I served as Chargé for a few months at this post. May I note that USAID had superb Embassy support from Ambassador Bellocchi and Ambassador Kordek, and DCM Johnnie Carson. My wife, Jean, also served as CLO [community liaison officer] at the Embassy during the four years that we were there.

Q: What kind of projects were we supporting in the private sector?

HUMMON: Well, across the board in terms of liberalizing the climate. First, we had this study to pinpoint some of the constraints to development of the private sector. Then we cooperated with UNDP in jointly sponsoring a national private sector conference to identify actions needed. We initiated a donor group on the private sector, and negotiated with local banks a loan guarantee scheme to get resources into the hands of small-scale entrepreneurs. We worked closely with the Botswana in developing an employer’s organization. Training and technical assistance and business conferences were all part of it. Recommendations on residence permits policy and on establishing a commercial attaché office in the embassy in Washington, tax policy, etc.

I must mention that none of these projects or initiatives would have had any measure of success without superb cooperation from the Government of Botswana. There were many, many Botswana who cooperated with us, and were so helpful, but one in particular I must mention - Baledzi Gaolathe, who at that time was Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and National Development. He was the key person on the development side and an outstanding talent. We had lunch frequently, and I would go over the agenda with him and solicit his advice. It was a very collegial situation. He was extremely impressive, and enormously helpful to me during my tenure in Botswana. Obviously much credit for Botswana’s record must go to President Masire, and to his successor, President Mogae.
Q: So you were there for...

HUMMON: Four years.

Q: You had a long stint there and made a rather important contribution.

HUMMON: I think this was probably, in terms of my field of experience, the most important involvement that I had in any country situation. Then I came back and basically worked in AID Washington.

Returned to USAID/Washington in various assignments - 1991

Q: This was in what year?

HUMMON: 1991. I was involved in a host of activities, mainly on the Human Resources side until I retired.

Q: What kind of activities were you engaged in within the Agency?

HUMMON: I worked out of the Administrator’s Office actually for a while under John Blackton who was a special aide to the Administrator Roskins. Blackton was the second most powerful official in the Agency at that time. I worked on a reorganization for a long period of time.

Q: What were you creating?

HUMMON: Well, we were creating a more centralized structure, really. After McPherson left there was somewhat of a hiatus in leadership within the Agency. We had one Administrator who came in and probably would have been very successful but died tragically. And then we had an acting type of situation for a long time, which, I know from my own experience, can be very difficult. Then we brought in Ron Roskins from the University of Nebraska. He had many fine qualities, but for whatever reasons his tenure was troubled. I think that relationships with Congress deteriorated. There was a feeling that there was mismanagement of AID resources. AID came under a lot of criticism and AID Administrator Roskins was not able to turn that around. As good as he was, he was not as familiar with the details of programs as McPherson had been. There was criticism that he didn’t really understand the program and its details. I believe Roskins initiated the reorganization idea in part to deflect growing criticism of the Agency. I guess I was sort of a chief of staff person in the reorganization of the human resources area. I can’t remember all the elements that were under this.

Q: But it was a centralized operation?

HUMMON: Yes, a centralized operation to theoretically permit better control and also, in a word, to distance the Administrator from day to day administration. You had two new directorates, one in operations and one in financial administration and a policy staff. The
Assistant Administrators would report to the Operations Director. The two Directors would then be the key people in dealing with the Congress. I had some misgivings about this, but part of it was being a good soldier and all of that. You’d go along and you might make recommendations, but it was basically a decision of the Administrator in the final analysis as to how it was going to be set up. And so, it was put into effect right before the election in 1992. Bush loses, Roskins leaves, the new Administration comes in and the whole thing is thrown out.

Q: So it didn’t have much longevity.

A brief assignment as U.S. Representative to UN Agencies in Geneva and various assignments before retiring - 1993-1995

HUMMON: No, I had spent a lot of time on something that had very little impact. I then basically finished up my career before I retired... Well, I had about a year in Geneva at the UN Agencies as the Acting U.S. Representative for AID before we basically decided to phase out that job in the cutting back process.

Q: What was that position? This was in what year?

HUMMON: ‘93.

Q: What was the position? Your function?

HUMMON: Acting USAID Representative to the UN Agencies. Much of my time there was spent on strengthening the humanitarian response capability of the UN, and specifically the Department of Humanitarian Affairs which is headquartered in Geneva. This was work on pushing a US position on responses to natural and man-made disasters. It also involved work with ECOSOC [The United Nations Economic and Social Council] on a variety of subjects, and with WHO [World Health Organization] and the Red Cross, and of course, with a host of other donors. I might have stayed in that position until I retired, but there were questions at the US Mission about where the position should be located, what grade level was needed, etc. And eventually AID, as part of its reduction of Missions, cut out the American position. The Government should have reduced some other position, because the AID person there, particularly at a senior level, could have an important impact.

However, I returned to Washington. And then, over last period before my retirement, I was head of Work Force Planning within the Agency, which was trying to get a new system established for a more effective input and output system, you might say on personnel, to meet the needs more effectively within the limited numbers that we had. And also I was Chairman ... Chairperson, I should say, given the title ... of the Agency’s Equal Opportunity Task Force, which was to try and get the Agency to be much more responsive to minority needs and to focus on problem areas there. That was basically it.

Q: Well, then you retired in 19 ...
HUMMON: ‘95.

Q: 1995. Were there interesting assignments after you retired that you want to make note of?

HUMMON: No. I have basically been involved in church mission and volunteer work, and travel and time with family.

Concluding observations

Q: Well, then let’s move to some broader observations. I guess first given your rich experience all over the world, what stands out in your mind as some of the lessons that you learned from this process? What would you convey to others as important things to keep in mind in development work?

HUMMON: I think it’s important to be able to work with people of another culture in an open and mutually caring way. Where I had the most success, or the programs where we had the most success were when there was a real feeling of shared involvement. Non-paternalistic. A genuine feeling of tolerance and understanding for those who were different. And I think that if you don’t have that, you shouldn’t be working for AID.

Q: From your observation was there a lot of pressure on moving things, getting money obligated, moving projects around?

HUMMON: Yes. That could complicate matters. But in the long run, with a tolerant type of attitude you’d have more success in getting things done and meeting obligations targets and so on. I’ve seen cases where people had great abilities, but they just for some reason had a very difficult time dealing with those of a different culture and, thus, were not very successful.

I also believe that technical assistance continues to be extremely important - the hands-on type of activities. It can have a tremendous impact. I’ve witnessed that personally in many situations such as nutrition in the Philippines, the private sector development in Botswana, where individuals had an influence. I would not wish to see the Agency become just an Agency of Program Managers. Incidentally, when I was working in Workforce Planning, we had many discussions about whether we should maintain technicians with the Agency of the future. My vote was always that technical competency is needed along with program management.

Q: What is your impression? Some people say that the Agency has lost its technical capacity.

HUMMON: I think that it has to a certain extent. My impressions of the Agency today are that the golden age has passed away. (However, I suspect that some of those people who were around many years ago, probably felt that golden age ended with ECA or MSA
or FOA). I guess that part of what I am saying is that we do not have as much technical competency, and that is unfortunate. The importance of AID in foreign policy has also diminished. At the same time, the success of keeping AID from being totally integrated into the State Department was a signal achievement of Administrator Atwood.

Many of the changes of the present Administration were probably necessary given the attacks that the Agency faced in the early 90s, especially from the Congress. It was undoubtedly desirable, or necessary to cut back on the number of countries (although I am sure that a case could be made for continuation of assistance in nearly all of the countries deleted.) That was necessary to save operating expenses, and because it was felt we were spreading our resources too thinly. Moreover, it was believed that some of the countries did not need and/or deserve our assistance. In any event, the political pressure from the Hill made the reductions essential. And later (after I left) a RIF [reduction in force] was necessary because of the funding situation. (It is hard to understand why we cannot come up with sufficient funds in our remarkable economy to provide the numbers of personnel needed in development - but of course I do understand why we don’t). More sophisticated computerization was needed, but it was going too far when I was leaving, or so it seemed to me. You cannot put the development mix into a computer and expect to come up with a ready answer to what is needed in meeting program objectives. People who have been in the development business for a long time, or people with just plain old common sense, know that it doesn’t work like that, particularly in the field where we deal with different cultures, ideologies, different economic structures, and the like. I am not saying that reengineering and greater use of computers doesn’t have value. But we must continue to recognize that development is an art as much as a science, and the variables are sometimes mysterious and unexpected. The presence of solid technical expertise helps us to respond to the uncertainties that are inherent in development.

Q: Are there other program approaches that you want to comment on?

HUMMON: I think that AID, with the funds that we have available, has been a catalyst for change. One striking example is in the private sector. We were a leader in the push for opening up the economies of countries and in the basic concept of policy reform. The World Bank and IMF [International Monetary Fund], of course, have played a significant role, and will even more in the future, since AID will not have the funds to affect the total structure of an economy. But we were a leader in this. I recall in Africa that other donors were often quite willing to accept, or even tended to advocate, an economic approach emphasizing government intervention at all levels. USAID took a more balanced approach, and in the ‘80s, went even further in stressing the need to open up the economy. I give the Reagan Administration and Peter McPherson the main credit for that. But, of course, there were a host of factors involved - primarily the disintegration of communism in the East, and the documented failure of non-private sector oriented economies. You need to do this - open up the economy. That’s the secret to development.

Q: Let’s go into a little bit more about what you mean by “open up the economy.” What were you referring to?
HUMMON: Well, letting the private sector play a much more active role. And I don’t mean just the local private sector, but foreign investment as well.

Q: And this is the business sector?

HUMMON: Yes, but I’m talking about everything. I’m talking primarily about the business sector, but I’m also talking about private organizations across the board. Greater private participation is needed in all areas of development. Balance is needed. In some areas, more in developing countries than in industrialized societies, government leadership is required to implement programs such as in health, family planning and agriculture. But we need to have more private participation in all these and other sectors to have development success.

Q: Well that leads me to another question. Over the years do you think that Foreign Assistance has made a difference in the world? Some people are skeptical about it and say, well, where did all that money go and what happened with the things we set up out there.

HUMMON: You’re asking the wrong person, because I am a great defender of the program. It would be surprising if I said something different given my career. I don’t think that in some cases we had as much impact as we claimed, but in other cases we probably had more than we were credited for.

Q: What’s different today than if we hadn’t been involved?

HUMMON: How can anyone answer that definitively? I like Sam Butterfield’s answer to five questions in an article he wrote for the Foreign Service Journal. “Overall, has the U.S. Government’s development aid policy been successful? Are the poor people of the world better off now than they used to be? Have America’s money and Americans’ toil been effective? Could we have done our work better? Could we usefully have done more? The answer to all five questions is ‘Yes’!”

Much development has taken place throughout the world. We can cite success stories: the Marshall Plan and recovery of Western Europe, the growth of AID graduates such as Korea, Taiwan, Costa Rica, Botswana, etc., the improving rates in GDP, literacy, agriculture production and availability of health services, greater longevity, lower infant mortality, stronger educational opportunities, and a host of other factors. AID has played a strong role in these changes.

But, and this is critical, no change is possible unless the people of a country or region want it. And thus, those primarily responsible for the success of development in the country situations or functional examples we have witnessed, are the people themselves living in the developing world.

Even if AID and its predecessors hadn’t existed, much of the change would have taken place at some point. But I believe that the change would have been significantly slower,
and with different consequences. What if we had not helped Western Europe with the European Recovery Plan? Suppose we had not developed and carried out initiatives in a host of developing countries? The list of questions could go on and on, and the answers will always be somewhat in the hypothetical category. But we can point to several areas where it is an undeniable fact that the Agency was a leader in getting things started, and in follow through. I can cite several of these:

* The Green Revolution. AID played a major role in promoting the development and use of miracle seeds through our support to the international research centers. I know. I was there. And we were a leader overall in agricultural assistance.

* Family planning. The situation would have been much worse than it is today in terms of population growth rates, if we had not taken a stand early on in this often controversial area.

* Opening up the economy. AID’s leadership in this is undeniable. (I’ve touched on what this means earlier).

* Health areas. Again, USAID has been a primary actor. I remember in the African Bureau many years ago when Doc Curtis was in charge of health programs - you probably remember him. We decided at the Agency, I forget what year this was, probably the early 60s that we were no longer going to emphasize health in the Agency. I don’t recall all the reasons, but it apparently was felt that it was a better use of funds to focus on so-called growth sectors. I remember Doc Curtis saying to me once,”John, you know, I’m out of fashion, but I’ll be back.” And he was right. Think of it, ORT, maternal child care, smallpox and measles eradication, anti-AIDS programs and a host of related efforts have either been inspired largely by USAID or USAID has been a major contributor to these.

* Environment. Here once more, the Agency has demonstrated its leadership in natural resources management, reforestation and the like.

* Education. I remember in the early days of my career we were sending teacher trainers to East Africa from Teacher’s College at Columbia University. Programs in education, first focusing on secondary and later primary, as well as higher-levels, have been a significant element of U.S. assistance as long as I have been involved with the Agency. And we often emphasized a more practical type of education geared to the local economy and culture. The Peace Corps has also been a major element in providing assistance in education - primarily by providing badly needed teachers to local communities.

I could add other areas, but any objective observer gets the point. And the amounts of money, while not at the levels the average American may think them to be as a percent of our budget, have been substantial. It reflects great credit, I believe, on the American people, that this country has continued a major program of aid for some 50 years. I would like to see us do more, and I know we could in economic terms. But notwithstanding that,
I think we professionals do not often enough recognize that without a significant level of support from the American people, what we have been able to accomplish, would never have happened. And much credit should also go to the Congress. Despite the barnacles, and the frequent criticisms of opponents, in the final analysis, Congress has come through with substantial funding.

I believe that we can make a very strong case that USAID has had a definite impact on the betterment of the human condition.

Part of the real reason that we have been able to carry on our programs is because, I believe, of the strong latent humanitarianism that is part of our nation’s character. That has helped fuel the total program, and specifically has sparked support for the notable efforts our Agency had made in disaster and refugee situations over the years.

That doesn’t mean that we didn’t make mistakes in the overall aid program - too much involvement in Vietnam, and support to regimes such as Mobutu in the Congo...

Q: What about Marcos?

HUMMON: Yes, Marcos. I was there, however, when the full extent of his true colors had not been revealed. And I still would say that what we carried out had a positive impact in terms of the Philippines economy and was directed towards the common man. I am proud of the projects we undertook in the Philippines given the time and circumstances. And I am sure that a case can be made in many other situations where aid went to countries with repressive regimes that the aid, by and large, had a beneficial economic impact. The downside of this is that our aid often helped to prop up a non-democratic regime.

In the Philippines the case was not so simple. We had seen what had preceded Marcos, the programs we supported were directly helpful to the poorer elements of society, and we believed that he would be a transition to democracy. And remember, too, that all of this was essentially played out against the backdrop of Vietnam and the Cold War.

Ironically, I think that in some respects the Cold War had a beneficial impact on USAID programs. I do not think that we would have become as involved in Africa if the U.S. had not perceived strategic interests in danger from the Soviet Union and China.

Q: Well, that’s interesting. Some people argue that the U.S. political security interests undercut the development interests; on the other hand, other people say these interests support the program and help justify the funding. How do you come out on that?

HUMMON: This is again somewhat hypothetical, but I think that a strong case can be made that in the absence of the Cold War, we would have done much less in development. Certainly the European recovery would not have occurred in the same fashion without the perceived threat of communism. We would not have provided the support to Korea and Taiwan in the absence of a Communist China. I do not believe that
we would have moved into Tanzania and Kenya and other African countries as quickly as we did without the fear of communist intrusions on the continent. The same holds true for other areas of the world.

It is true that some aid was skewed toward the security side, but AID predominantly was involved in activities that had, or were designed to have, a development impact. Even ESF, with a few notable exceptions, had development ramifications. I am fundamentally quite certain that without the threat of communism, development aid levels would have been much lower. That was the rationale for tying security and development assistance together in the Congressional Presentations - it made it easier for some Congressmen to support the total package.

I also believe that in time, even without the threat of communism, the huge disparity between the industrialized world and the poorer nations would have woken us up to the necessity of sharing. That factor was a prime motive for many of us all along. But without the threat of communism, the type of development effort would have been much slower in coming. You could say that about many things. I do not think that the nations of Africa would have achieved independence as rapidly in the absence of what happened in the Second World War and its aftermath. History is what it is. It is history as it occurred. The Soviet and Chinese menaces were perceived as real, and a serious danger in the battle for the minds of people throughout the world, and these menaces found a fertile breeding ground in situations of poverty and hopelessness. In part, the growth of U.S. aid was a response to that.

Q: On a more operating level, do you have any experience where our short term political security interests advised you to do things that were not effective or appropriate development-wise or undercut what we were trying to do?

HUMMON: Not when I was in the field, no. I was not involved in that. No, I wasn’t.

Q: Well, any other general observations that you might like to make about the role of foreign assistance?

HUMMON: I think not.

Q: Well, let’s conclude here. Any comments about how you assess your career in foreign assistance. How would you characterize your experience?

HUMMON: I had some of the best jobs in the world.

Q: Why were they the best?

HUMMON: Helping people and also doing things that were exciting, working in fascinating areas with fascinating people. It was, I think, a very special type of career. And it was special for my wife and family. Our children, Jan, Marc, Sarah, and Gretchen, had experiences in learning about other cultures that were priceless. They all benefitted
immensely from this. This positiveness doesn’t mean that I wouldn’t have done some things differently and I have some regrets about some things, but overall I feel very fortunate to have had a chance to work for this Agency, in this field.

**Q:** What if a young man or young women came to you and said, well it sounds kind of interesting, but should I get into this business these days?

**HUMMON:** I think so. It’s different. I think that the Agency has changed. The world has changed, but still there are going to be development requirements extending far into the future. I would say, well, you couldn’t choose any activity that is more interesting from my perspective or more helpful to others. And that’s a pretty tough combination to beat.

**Q:** Okay, a good place to stop and thank you very much.

**HUMMON:** Thank you.

*End of interview*